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PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

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Professor of Apologetics


at

Westminster Theological Seminary  
Philadelphia 18, Pennsylvania

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN



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Michael T. Ruiter

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PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

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Westminster Theological Seminary  
Philadelphia 18, Pennsylvania

*Michael J. Rutz*

1935

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*Michael T. Roston*  
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INTRODUCTION: "THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS"

It is not the purpose of this course to take up the material that is usually taken up under the subject of the psychology of religion in order to treat it as it is usually treated. We have a definite apologetical objective in mind. We wish to discuss the literature of the recent science of the psychology of religion in order to see what its relation is to Christian truth. We are here to defend the Christian view of God and the world. We believe that the modern school of psychology of religion is a new form of attack upon Christian truth. We would therefore study the nature of this attack and the way in which we should meet it.

In saying that our main purpose is to see how we can meet this new enemy we do not mean to suggest that we cannot learn many things from the recent advocates of the psychology of religion. For the construction of a Christian psychology we can no doubt gather many helpful suggestions from our enemies. Just as in the world war the Allies could learn much from the Germans and the Germans could learn much from the Allies so we are quite ready to sit as learners when we read the pages that our opponents have written. But just as the Germans in the war used that which they had learned from the Allies for the purpose of destroying their enemy and the Allies used that which they learned from the Germans for the destruction of the Germans, so we will also have to use what we learn from the enemy for the destruction of the enemy.

It has sometimes happened that men have taken a course in the psychology of religion with the hope that they would learn from it something that will be of benefit for them when they get out into the ministry and have to deal with the souls of men. They hope to learn from the psychology of religion how to approach men and how to deal with them in a truly psychological fashion. It is quite customary in our day to hear men speak much of dealing with people psychologically. Salesmen are given a course in sales psychology in order to "sell people what they do not want." So it is thought that those who are to deal with the souls of men from the point of view of their eternal welfare ought to have the best possible training in the field of psychology.

There is no doubt an element of truth in this contention. Ministers of the gospel should have a knowledge of a sound psychological approach to men. But it should be noted at once that if Christianity is true the best psychological approach is in itself worthless unless it is made effective by the power of the Holy Spirit. This does not mean that therefore it is of no importance to know psychology. It does mean, however, that we must know Christian psychology and must be able to distinguish it from non-Christian psychology. What would be considered the best psychological approach to a person from the non-Christian point of view may be the worst from a Christian point of view. From the non-Christian point of view it will usually be considered a wrong

policy to seek to inculcate a sense of sin in people. This is strikingly illustrated in the field of pedagogy. In this field non-Christians and Christians stand opposite one another. The former is definitely trying to overcome what it considers bad psychology, namely the inculcation of a sense of sin in the minds of children. They think that this works a spirit of defeatism in children which is very bad for their healthy development. On the other hand Christian parents are definitely trying to carry through the time-honored program of teaching the child what the man should know, namely, that he is a sinner and needs to be saved by Christ.

We see then that as Christian ministers we can no doubt learn something from the technique of the modern school of psychology of religion. We should always be thankful for any improvement in the technique of handling men that any one offers us. But we cannot afford to forget that we must employ that technique for the propagation of the Christian religion and not for the non-entity which goes by the name of religion today. Accordingly we do not hesitate to say that the main thing we should expect to learn from a study of the modern literature of the new science of psychology of religion is not a more refined technique in psychology. In so far as we seek for this, and seek for it in the territory of our opponents, we might better go straight to the great works on general psychology that modern times have produced. The psychology of religion school has not added to the store of general information in the field of psychology unless it be in small details. The writers of this school only seek to apply the principles of modern psychology to the phenomenon of religion. Now this would be very enlightening if only the differences between the Christian and the non-Christian religions were recognized as they ought to be recognized. But since the writers of the new school take for granted that there is at most a gradational difference between the Christian and non-Christian religions, they misinterpret the mind and heart of man.

It is much nearer the truth then to say that we can learn from the modern school of the psychology of religion what not to do, than to say that we can learn from them what to do.

We believe, according to Scripture, that sin has not destroyed the psychological make-up of man. The laws of his mind and heart work now as they have ever worked. Consequently there is a great similarity in the way false religions on the one hand, and the true religion on the other hand, manifest themselves. Christians pray and non-Christians pray; Christians sacrifice and non-Christians sacrifice. Christians respond with their intellects, their wills and their feelings to the revelation of God to them; non-Christians also respond with their intellects, their wills and their emotions to what they have set up for themselves as divine. Hence there is a similarity between the forms and manifestations of all religious exercises, and in this sense we may speak of religion in general. But this similarity is only formal. It must always be seen against the background of the basic ethical distinction between Christianity as true and the other religions as false.

It appears then that a minister of the gospel of Christ, if he would truly benefit by a study of psychology, should study psychology from a Christian point of view. He should study a psychology that freely recognizes its relation with, and in a sense its dependence upon, Christian ethics and Christian theology in general. There are two main points on which he will radically disagree with the modern psychology of religion school. We shall discuss these points in greater detail at a later stage of our inquiry but may as well mention them now. In the first place we cannot as Christians allow the assumption of the metaphysical independence of the self-consciousness of man in general and of the religious consciousness in particular that underlies the whole of the modern psychology of religion. If we are Christians at all we believe the creation doctrine and this makes man dependent upon God metaphysically. In the second place, we cannot as Christians allow the assumption of the ethical independence of the self-consciousness of man in general and of his religious consciousness in particular. If we are Christians at all we believe in the doctrine of sin, and this makes man ethically alienated from God and yet dependent upon God.

If then it should seem to some that we cannot learn much from a study of the psychology of religion, we would hasten to say that we can learn much from it in every way. We can learn from it something very striking as to the devious paths in which human thought has gone in order to escape the necessity of facing the living God. Satan is using this means in addition to all the other means he has used throughout the ages in order to reach out to that which is most sacred, that is man's direct relation of his inmost being to his Creator God, in order to drag it down into the dead horizontal place of exclusively intra-cosmic relationships. If it is well for a minister of the gospel to be on the alert for the wiles of the devil for himself and for his flock, it is worth his while therefore, to study the recent psychology of religion movement.

## THE MATERIAL

A word must first be said about the material that is to be taken up. We have already referred to the modern school of the psychology of religion. This modern school has sprung up, roughly speaking, at the turn of the present century. Says J. Baillie, "The devotees of this science claim that it dates from about 1890, having first come into being with the investigations in America of William James, Stanley Hall, and Professors Leuba, Starbuck, and Coe" (1). It should be understood at once that no one claims that there was no psychology of religion in any sense till this time. It is admitted by all that men like Augustine and other saints have given us many and beautiful discussions of their own and other men's religion. To quote from Coe: "To dissect out the quasi-psychological elements in theology would require a survey of very nearly the whole history of Christian doctrine. The natural man, creationism and traducianism, dichotomy and trichotomy, inspiration, regeneration, free will, the person of Christ -- these are some of the angles from which theologians have made the mind of man, as they have believed, an object of study" (2). What is given as the distinguishing mark of the modern school is that it has for the first time begun to apply the scientific method to the study of



religion. Says Coe: "The closing years of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth mark the beginning of a definite determination to use the resources of scientific psychology in the investigation of religion" (3). Or again James Bissett Pratt tells us: "Writers on the Philosophy of Religion, from the time of Augustine and even of St. Paul, have dealt with certain psychological factors of religion, but the application of modern critical and empirical methods to the study of religion hardly antedates the last decade of the nineteenth century" (4).

In giving these quotations we are not greatly concerned as to the exact date, whether it be 1890 or 1900, that our science began. We are rather concerned to know at once whether it is not true that the origin of the science lies farther back. We hear a great deal about the application of the truly scientific or empirical method to the study of religion. It is quite customary to associate this rise of a truly scientific method with the coming of the evolutionary hypothesis or even further back with the philosophy of Kant. We believe therefore that it is very enlightening when John Baillie tells us that we should really trace the origin of the psychology of religion movement as far back as Kant and Schleiermacher. This shows us that there is a greater issue at stake than seems to be the case when no mention is made of anything but the application of the scientific method to the phenomenon of religion.

Baillie first gives a passage from James and then proceeds to criticize it. We shall give both the passage from James and the criticism of Baillie. James writes:

"In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless.

"It would be unfair to philosophy, however, to leave her under this negative sentence. Let me close, then, by briefly enumerating what she can do for religion. If she will abandon metaphysics and deduction for criticism and induction, and frankly transform herself from theology into science of religions, she can make herself enormously useful" (5).

In criticism of this passage of James, Baillie says:

"With the change which it is here proposed to introduce into the traditional theological procedure we have already expressed ourselves as being in the most eager sympathy. We have shown how it is precisely owing to this defect in the older theology that the 'Psychology of Religion' came into being; and in common with almost all serious students of the subject we believe that the new study is every day doing more to remedy this defect. We do, however, feel obliged to add the qualifying reminder that this much needed change in method was first effectively introduced into theology not in 1890 by James and his contemporaries, but a hundred years earlier by Kant and Schleiermacher and the Ritschlians, though indeed they were endeavoring to bring

out the native witness of faith to its own truth rather than to discover an outside proof for it, were yet looking at religion through the eye of their own traditionally supplied Christian conviction, and were not, as the Psychology of Religion recommends, endeavoring to draw impartial conclusions from all the available data in the spirit of inductive science" (6).

It is interesting to note what the debate between James and Baillie seems to signify. Baillie and James agree that religion must be studied from the inside and not from the outside. Both agree also that the traditional theology has studied religion from the outside. But Baillie claims that the study of religion from the inside has really begun with Kant and Schleiermacher. He even contends that many writers of the present school of the Psychology of Religion do not really study religion from the inside as well as Schleiermacher did. To quote: "What has above all characterized the Psychology of Religion has been its desire to look at its facts from the outside after the manner of the natural sciences" (7). He quotes from James' work on psychology to prove his point. James says: "Psychology is a natural science" and again "To the psychologist the minds he studies are objects in a world of other objects" (7). Baillie goes further than that. He thinks that a better psychology of religion may be gleaned from the writers mentioned, Kant, Schleiermacher, etc., than from the more recent school. He says: "Moreover it has seemed to us that the kind of descriptive analysis of the religious consciousness which may be found within the Kantian and Schleiermachian tradition, though doubtless still far from perfect, is in reality much more profound and penetrating than any that has come from the newer school; and that accordingly a better psychology of religion is to be gleaned from the writings of theologians like Schleiermacher and Ritschl, Herrmann and Karl Heim, Sabatier and Gaston Frommel, George Tyrell and the Baron von Hugel than from any of the recent text-books which explicitly claim to provide us with this material" (8).

All of this is very illuminating. It gives us light on the question of dates. The date of the rise of the psychology of religion clearly depends upon one's point of view. All we need to do as Christians is to go one step further than Baillie and say that we hold that religion has really begun to be studied from the outside rather than from the inside since the time of Kant and Schleiermacher. It was then that men self-consciously began to separate the self-consciousness of man, and therewith the religious consciousness, from God entirely, and so cut themselves loose from the only way in which religion can be studied from the inside. We hold then that if we wish to trace the origin of the modern psychology of religion as far back as it can be traced, we have to trace it back to Paradise when Eve first listened to the temptation of Satan who said that she could study her religious consciousness more fairly and open-mindedly if she would cut herself loose from God. Accordingly, we think that much more real knowledge about religion may be found in the writings of those who have truly been restored to God and stand in relationship with Him through Christ, than from all the writers of modern times who for the first time claim to have given us the "native witness" of religion. As Christians, we claim that only we can allow the native witness of religion to speak out.

This point is mentioned at this time in order to bring out at once that every angle of the literature of the Psychology of Religion school involves an argument between Christians and non-Christians.

### THE OBJECT OF STUDY.

It appears then that the material for study as far as the literature is concerned, lies first of all in the books of the recent writers directly dealing with the question of the psychology of religion. In the second place, if we wish to know what religion is according to the standpoint of non-Christian thought, we are greatly helped if we read such writers as are mentioned by Baillie. All of these men approach the problem in a thoroughly non-Christian way. The only real difference between the more recent and the earlier writers is that the more recent ones have more thoroughly liberated themselves from all Christian influences than the earlier ones so that they approach more nearly their ideal of putting all religions on an equality at the outset of their investigation. In the third place, we are convinced as Christians that the whole approach of both types of writers mentioned is false. We can learn much from them in details but we cannot learn from them what the essence of true religion is.

But now we must look more carefully at the material to be studied, that is, we must see what it is that is taken up in the writings of the psychology of religion men. Speaking generally we may say that they deal with the religious consciousness. This phrase is in itself significant. Men hope to find in a study of the religious consciousness something that has never been found before. They hope to find out what religion really is. The claim is made that now for the first time religion is really being studied from the inside. In the past, we are told, men have confused religion and theology. They have spoken of religion as the science of God. They have taken for granted that religion has a reference to something outside the consciousness of man. It is that assumption that we must now challenge; or to put the point as Baillie puts it, it really makes no difference whether we speak of theology or of religion as long as we do not take for granted that an outside reference must be included in our conception. We shall again quote his position fully, in order then to criticize it. He says:

"Should we then perhaps have defined theological science from the start, not as the science of religion but as the science of God? This is a definition which has often been defended and which indeed can claim in its favor several centuries of unbroken tradition; and it is also and very obviously the definition which is etymologically responsible for the formation of the word. Nevertheless there is more than one serious objection of scientific principles which can be urged against it. (1) To begin with, if we employed such a definition, we should be begging the very important question whether God and religion, though admitted by all to stand in the closest interrelationship, are yet wholly and in every respect conterminous. A number of distinguished modern thinkers, such as Sir J. R. Seeley and the late F. H. Bradley,

have even taken the view that religion need not have anything at all to do with God, but may entirely center round some other and lesser object of adoration; and while we shall in the sequel find it necessary to dissent with this view, we shall at the same time have to admit, with the large majority of modern students of primitive cultures, that religion is, historically regarded, a considerable older phenomenon than the definite conception of deity" (9).

In addition to the objection mentioned in the quotation given, Baillie says that at any rate God is not the only object of religious faith and religious feeling. "Human immortality, for instance, is a very common object of both" (9). In the third place, he objects to calling theology the science of God because God cannot be made the object of scientific study. "We feel that it is not by science that we know God, but by religion, by faith; and that faith's way is the only way of knowing Him that is open to us" (9). Finally Baillie objects that: "There is a great deal of conceivable knowledge about the Supreme Being in which theology, even if it could attain to it, would not have the remotest interest; and the reason why it would not be interested is simply that such knowledge does not concern religion" (10).

Before criticizing these objections to the traditional view we shall add the testimony of others who share his general approach. This will bring out more fully that the general approach of most writers on psychology of religion is definitely antitheistic and anti-Christian at the outset. Edward Scribner Ames is fully conscious of his opposition to the traditional position. He says: "In the later Hebrew as in nearly the whole Christian period, the conviction of the truth of the one religion, and the falseness of all other religions was taken in a complacent way, which could not arouse interest in the intrinsic nature of religious experience" (11).

A similar sentiment is expressed by Professor Leuba as follows:

"The outcome of the application of current psychological teaching to religious life is, then, to lead us to regard Religion as a particular kind of activity, as a mode or type of behaviour, and to make it as impossible for us to identify it with a particular emotion or with a particular belief, as it would be to identify, let us say, family life with affection, or to define trade as 'belief in the productivity of exchange'; or commerce as 'greed touched with a feeling of dependence upon society'. And yet this last definition is no less informing and adequate than the far-famed formula of Matthew Arnold, which I forbear to repeat" (12).

A still further element is added by Irving King. He not only holds that theology has in the past been a hindrance to a really fruitful study of religion but he also holds that unless the religious consciousness be thought of as independent of God, no scientific study can be made of it. As Baillie tells us that no scientific study can be made of God, so King tells us that no scientific study can be made of the religious consciousness unless we leave

God out. King first argues that the religious activity of man is nothing that is essentially different from any other activity. Then he begins to discuss the question whether the religious experience may not possibly, in distinction from other experience, be the result of the relationship of God to man. He reasons as follows:

"Of course we have not as yet fully considered the possibility of an actual difference of content due to the operation of preternatural forces. These, as was stated above, if they are to be taken into account at all, must be regarded as causes of mental states which, as far as observation can extend, appear not unlike the content of the rest of experience. It might also be held that these external forces determined in some subtle way the form and organization of the religious experience.

"The only possible way to deal with this problem is from the logical side, and from this point of view we may ask: Are the various reactions which fall within the religious category to be regarded as complete, or are they on the human side incomplete, requiring that various superhuman elements be joined in some way with the disjecta membra of the human experience that the statement on the existential side may be complete? If the latter alternative is the true one, we may say at once that we do not believe there can be a psychology of religion in any proper sense of the word. If the content of the religious consciousness is subject to a different organization from that of other psychic states, and if, above all, it is not susceptible of a complete statement within itself, but requires the interpolation of 'spiritual' elements to fill it out, it would clearly be vain to seek for any more than disconnected and variously isolated or partially related elements; elements which could be completely stated only through the speculations of theologian and philosopher. From a scientific point of view, nothing definite could ever be established about these reactions, since it would be as impossible for psychology to determine its own limitations in dealing with them, as it would be for it to try to subject the so-called 'spiritual' elements of the experience in question to a scientific examination" (13).

The sum of what we have given in these quotations may be said to be that the study of the religious consciousness is undertaken by many in definite reaction to the traditional view that it is only in the Christian religion, which regards man as the creature of God and therefore in all the operations of his consciousness in relation to God, that religion, that is true religion, is found.

It should be added at this point, however, that many writers are not so outspoken as the ones we have quoted in their opposition to the traditional point of view. Many speak as though the traditional point of view was good enough as far as it went. The only difficulty was that the traditional view did not go far enough. Many others assume that naturally in this enlightened age religion has interest for us only as a phenomenon of the general consciousness of man as it has developed in its evolutionary journey.

But whether the opposition to the traditional view be open and avowed or covered and assumed, there can be no reasonable doubt that the opposition is there. We shall have occasion to point this out again and again. At this point we wish to answer those who are frank enough to state their objection.

To these we would say first of all that we greatly appreciate the fact that they state their objections frankly and openly. It will do no one any good to try to keep up the illusion of neutrality. Those who have voiced their objections freely and openly have done us a great service since it is our basic contention that in the psychology of religion school, as in modern thought in general, we meet with the very opposite of Christianity.

In the second place we are thankful to a man like Baillie who has sought to show his confreres that the real issue is not between the recent school and Christianity only, but that the issue has gone back as far as Kant and Schleiermacher, and even as far back as Socrates. To quote:

"Socrates himself, however, would probably not have allowed himself to speak of a science of God. He insisted on approaching every such investigation from the nearer or human end of it. He would have said with Pope, and indeed, if we are to trust the report of his disciple Xenophon, did say before Pope:

'Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;  
The proper study of mankind is man.'

'He was the first', says Cicero, 'who called philosophy down from the heavens, to the earth.' In a famous passage in the Phaedo Plato makes him relate how he had once, in his youth, essayed an independent inquiry into the ultimate nature of things after the manner of the Ionian physicists, but had long ago given it up, and preferred now to examine the truth of existence through men's existing conceptions of it. In this, he says, he is like a wise man who, in viewing an eclipse, does not blind himself by examining the sun directly, but looks at it only as reflected in water or some other medium, but he adds: 'Perhaps my illustration is not entirely accurate, for I am not prepared to admit that he who examines existence through conceptions is dealing with mere reflections of it'" (14).

A little later Baillie draws his conclusion with respect to the relation of Socrates to the present object of theology in the following word: "We are then doing no more than following the very oldest tradition in this matter if we define the business of theological science as the interrogation of the religious consciousness with a view to discovering what religion is" (15).

Here we have the heart of the matter. It matters not whether the undertaking be called theology or psychology of religion, it is plain that it does back to non-Christian roots. Nor is there anything forced in this tracing back of the purpose of the psychology



In this paragraph Baillie halts between two opinions. He does not seem to have the courage of his convictions. It would seem to be fair enough to say that in studying religion the theologian must deal with whatever as a matter of fact he finds that religion brings him. This would seem to make it possible to think that God is the object without which the religious relationship does not exist. So also it seems fair enough to say that we are concerned with the boundaries of man's religious interest and that we are not concerned with anything beyond those boundaries. This too would seem to leave it an open question whether perhaps God falls within these boundaries. Still further it would seem quite innocent when Baillie says that we are concerned with whatever lies at the further end of the religious relationship only in so far as that is known through the religious relationship. Such a contention is quite permissible from the Christian point of view. In orthodox theology we make many divisions between the various theological disciplines. When we deal with anthropology we deal with man and not with God. That is, the object of immediate study in anthropology is man and not God. Yet we know all the while that our concept of God has a controlling significance for our study of man. Now it might seem that Baillie in his statements here means nothing more than we mean by making man, or the soul of man, the immediate object of study. Yet in the former quotations given, Baillie plainly means much more than that. There he makes it plain that he wants to study the religious consciousness in total independence of God. His halting statement in the paragraph just quoted shows that he himself sees that if God is really at the further end of the religious relationship, that fact has a bearing upon the meaning of religion itself.

Still further, the halting position noted here seems to turn about entirely the recognition of the truth of the theistic position in another part of his book. In a remarkably fine section Baillie argues those who say that the psychological study of religion should be undertaken without any desire to discover whether the objective references of which religion speaks are true or not. He says it is highly doubtful whether the religious interest, which itself deals with values, can be treated effectively from a merely existential point of view. To quote his words:

"For why should psychology, even provisionally, invite us (in the words quoted above from the same writer -- Professor Price) 'to regard mental phenomenon as finding their complete explanation within the mental series,' if their real explanation lies elsewhere? If the religious experience is really of a trans-subjective kind, then it is difficult to see how any account or explanation of it which contains no trans-subjective reference can possibly be true, or can do anything else than mislead. And if a satisfactory intra-subjective explanation can be given, then what need is there to go on, in the name either of theology or of anything else, to any other?" (17)

A little further on he adds: "We can only conclude, then, that if religious experience is as a matter of fact objectively determined in any degree, then any intra-subjective explanation is not only beside the point but is also definitely false" (18).



These last words express our criticism on the whole of the school of the psychology of religion in so far as their assumption of the independence of the human consciousness is concerned. That independence should have been critically established. We do not mean by this that every one who writes a book on the psychology of religion should first write a treatise on epistemology. What we do mean is that every one who writes a book on the psychology of religion should be well aware of his own epistemology and should be able to tell us how and where we may find a justification of his position.

It is in this way that we would answer the first criticism of Baillie when he says that if we define theology as the science of God, we have begged the question "whether God and religion though admitted by all to stand in the closest interrelationship, are yet wholly and in every respect coterminous." In the first place orthodox theology has never said that God and religion are coterminous. That would be nonsense. Orthodox theology has not even said that one who does not worship God is not religious. What orthodox theology has said is that if man is to have true religion then the God of Christianity must be the object to which his religion is directed. To use the argument of Baillie, suppose that this is as a matter of fact the case; then any other explanation is not only beside the point, but definitely false. So then we would say to Baillie, "It is not I that have troubled Israel; but thou and thy father's house in so much as you have taken for granted that true religion may exist whether or not God exists." We say true religion. This does not mean that neither Baillie or anyone else of the moderns speaks about true and false religion. But it means that if they use the distinction at all it is to disparage it. The fact that they usually speak merely of religion in general shows that they do not care to make a distinction between true and false religions. To them all religions are equally true. To be sure, they may say that not every religion is equally adequate. The one may appear upon investigation to be somewhat more satisfactory than others, but not one religion is ever thought of as being the only true religion.

As Christians, we are quite willing to justify our position on this matter. We do not beg the question and simply begin as though the problem did not exist. That is what our opponents do. We are ready to challenge the starting-point of the psychology of religion school and debate with them on their epistemology and metaphysics. We maintain that their starting-point makes it incumbent upon them to show us that it is reasonable to suppose that human experience, the human consciousness, has sprung out of the void.

It is necessary to dwell on this point still further, since it may appear as though the writers on the psychology of religion are not as uncritical as we have presented them as being. So, for instance, James Bissett Pratt seems to be very magnanimous when he tells us that we are entitled to our definition of religion as much as he is entitled to his. He says:

"Again let me admit, or rather insist, that this, like all other definitions of religion, is more or less arbitrary. Whoever wishes to do so has certainly a perfectly logical right to give a much narrower or a much broader definition of

the term, provided he is willing to take the consequences. He may, if he chooses, even confine religion to belief in Jehovah, on condition that he will stick to his definition and consistently call irreligious all men who do not so believe. A narrow definition based upon a particular theological belief, however, has two patent disadvantages. In the first place it leaves out a great number of people and a great number of phenomena which are by general consent recognized as religious. Thus, if we hold that belief in a personal God is the criterion of religion, we not only run counter to the general view which classes Buddhism in its original form (that great stumbling-block to most definitions) among the religions, but we are forced to call irreligious many deeply spiritual souls nearer home, who certainly have something more within them than can be included under philosophy or morality" (19).

This is typical of the attitude taken by many writers. We shall add to it at once the justification of taking the religious consciousness in general as the object of study given by Leuba. In answering those who say that a naturalistic conception of religion is unsatisfactory he says:

"The fact is that even though the gods should have a merely subjective existence, and that there should be, therefore, in religion, low and high, no interference of divine beings, nevertheless its origin, its continuance, and the high value attached to it would be easily explicable. Let us pass in review the benefits which would accrue to mankind from a belief in non-existent gods. They may be divided into the effects expected by the worshipper and those not expected" (20).

Then among the results expected he lists the following. Men hope to get rain and sunshine by worshipping the gods. They hope to be cured from diseases. Among the benefits not directly sought for but nonetheless genuine he lists the following: "The gratification of the lust for power and of the desire for social recognition. Less obvious, perhaps, but not less influential is the general mental stimulus provided by the ideas of ghosts, hero-ancestors, spirits, and gods, living unseen in one's vicinity; intelligence as well as the feelings is quickened." In the third place he adds: "From the very first, gods have exercised a regulative, moralizing influence, for they have been made the embodiment of the ideals of the community" (21).

It will readily be noted that both Pratt and Leuba beg the question which they claim to be discussing. Pratt begins by saying that his definition "like all other definitions of religions" is arbitrary. But the very point in question is whether all definitions of religion are arbitrary. It is only on the assumption of an ultimate philosophical skepticism that one can say that all definitions of religion are equally arbitrary. The very question is whether or not we should begin with an ultimate skepticism.

It is no wonder then that Pratt can so easily dispose of his opponents by referring to the "general view" of people with

respect to religion. If the universe is nothing but an evolutionary product, and the race of mankind is nothing but a chance appearance on the ocean of bare possibility, it is but natural that we should take the opinions of the majority for true. But suppose that the universe is actually created by God in the way that Scripture says it is and man was created perfect, in the image of God, then only those who are regenerated can see the kingdom of God and the majority of men are wrong in their view of religion. On this basis we do not close our eyes to a great number of facts, as Pratt says we do, nor do we say of a great number of men that they are without religion. We say that all men are inherently religious but that since the fall of man they have a false religion rather than the true religion which they should have. In this way we can include Buddhism and also those "deeply spiritual souls nearer home" that Pratt speaks of. What Pratt should have done was to justify his basic contention on which his whole argument rests, namely, that all definitions are arbitrary. Since he has failed to do that his own procedure has been arbitrary in the sense of unscientific.

The same criticism must be made with respect to Leuba. He too takes the whole of evolutionary philosophy for granted and then enumerates the benefits that he thinks man has had from his belief in gods. Suppose Christianity is true; then there was a time when man was in touch with the true God in Paradise. If he had remained true to God there would have been no diseases from which he would need to be cured. In that case he would never have thought of worshipping ghosts. His whole life, intellectual, emotional and volitional, would have been quickened much more effectively by his contact with the living God, than through his worship of false gods after he forsook the true God. What Leuba should have done therefore is to justify the evolutionary philosophy which he has taken for granted. The last sentence of the quotation we have given is the most striking of all. He tries to prove to us that the gods have always had a good moralizing influence upon the human race because they have, from the beginning, been made the embodiment of the ideals of the community. But the very question is with respect to the subjectivity or objectivity of the existence of God. Leuba assumes the merely subjective existence of the gods. Of course, if the gods have been made by man, it is very easy to show that it was a good thing that they should have been made. But the question was whether they were made by man or whether they made man.

Our general conclusion, then, can be no other than that the writers of the school of the psychology of religion have taken a non-Christian point of view for granted when they began their investigation of the religious consciousness. They have simply assumed the philosophy of Chance that underlies modern evolutionary thought and have therefore taken for granted that the human consciousness was somehow operative independently of God. They have taken for granted that the religious consciousness is complete in itself. Here lies the fons et origo of all further disagreement on our part with the conclusions to which the writers of this school have come.

### References: Chapter I

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18. Baillie, Idem, p. 143.
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METHOD

In the foregoing chapter we have tried to ascertain what it is that the psychology of religion school studies when it seeks to learn about religion. We have found that the object of study is usually defined as the religious consciousness. In the present and following chapters we must seek to learn how, that is by what method, this religious consciousness is studied.

The question of methodology is of the greatest possible importance for any science. Methodology has in modern times even become a special branch of study. But important as the question of methodology is from any point of view, it is particularly important for us in the discussion in hand since we plan to consider the psychology of religion literature with an apologetical purpose in mind. We believe that the position a person takes and the method he employs go hand in hand. The two are interdependent. We are not now debating this question. We only point out that if Christianity is true then there is only one method of research that a Christian can use. The method that a Christian uses must always presuppose the existence of God. Every non-Christian position is characterized by the fact that it leaves God out of consideration. Thus it often happens that the struggle between the Christian and the non-Christian position is fought with greater heat at the point of method than anywhere else. We say that it often happens. Alas it does not happen often enough. It all too often happens that Christian apologists are not aware of the struggle at the point of method. They expect to do their fighting elsewhere and while they go elsewhere they allow the enemy to gain the upper hand at the most strategical place of all.

Still further we contend that this general truth has a particularly pointed application in the subject now under discussion. The whole modern problem of method seems to appear here to be exceedingly difficult of formulation. The enemy is always very subtle in presenting his position as being very innocent. This is especially true in the field of method and most especially true in the method of the psychology of religion. We need therefore to search very carefully for the adder underneath the grass when we discuss this question.

In order to do so it is well to throw the searchlight of the epistemological and metaphysical antithesis between theism and antitheism upon the method used by the psychology of religion school. It is only when the method of this school is clearly observed to be nothing more than a particularly subtle form of the antitheistic method that is used by all non-theistic science in general, that we can evaluate it aright. Then too it is in this way alone that we can hope to escape being ensnared by it.

When we consult any ordinary manual on the subject of the psychology of religion one of the first things with which we become acquainted is that there are three sources from which the

psychologists of religion draw their material. In the first place they study their own experience. In the second place they ask other living people about their religious experience, either by direct conversation or by means of a questionnaire sent through the mails. In the third place they study autobiographies or other writings of a religious character.

It may be said that this part of the method of psychology of religion deals merely with the gathering of evidence and does not mean that there is any peculiar way in which this evidence is utilized once it has been found. This is partially true, but we shall soon see that even the place where a person looks primarily for his evidence is significant if we wish to know about his method.

Yet it is no doubt true that the way he handles this material once he has obtained it is the most important aspect of the method of the psychologist of religion. It might seem at first glance that there is nothing to do but tabulate this evidence. But this is not true. It is, as Freierenfels says: "Es ist oft übersehen worden, das Keinerlei Gegebenheit, auch nicht die unmittelbaren Selbsterzeugnisse ohne weiteres als Erkenntnisquelle anzusehen sind. Es gibt in jedem Fall die kritische Herausarbeitung der seelischen Motivation. Hierin besteht die Hauptarbeit der Religionspsychologen" (1).

This critical evaluation of the material that is at hand requires one to employ a standard of value. One has to determine whether a certain personal revelation given in a questionnaire is really that which the author ought to have given if he were honest. People are often consciously or unconsciously deceitful when it comes to the expression of their deepest feelings. "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it" (Jer. 17:9).

Still further, a difficulty that men feel they must figure with is that even if some one who expresses his religious emotions does not intend to deceive, even if he seeks to be as truthful as he can, he is still handicapped by the fact that words will not carry the load he tries to make them bear. This is expressed in the saying, "Spricht die Seele, so spricht, ach, schon die Seele nicht mehr." The full truth cannot be expressed in words.

Now in view of the recognized difficulties involved in the critical evaluation of the material which may come from any source, there have been some who have favored introspection as a source of information. Others have favored the questionnaire and still others have deemed autobiographies the most valuable source of information.

The struggle has been on the one hand to find the most individual and therefore most immediate expression of the religious sentiment, and on the other hand to find the most universal validity for conclusions drawn from this religious sentiment. The difficulty that men face is this, that the nearer they seem to come to a really and genuinely direct expression of the religious sentiment, the narrower is the validity of this expression. If the

soul does not really express itself when it expresses itself in words, it is plain that the psychologist can turn to no other method than that of introspection. But if he turns to introspection alone it is certain that his words will not be received by others because they too will turn to introspection alone and so there would be no science of the psychology of religion.

Very little of this internal difficulty appears in the manuals on the psychology of religion. They generally state the three sources of information, then say a word or two about the fact that some set greater value by introspection while others prize more highly the study of biography and conclude by saying that most men seek to effect a combination of all three. In this way, they say, we get the benefit of having the greatest possible directness and at the same time the greatest possible validity. In this way too, they say, they are only applying the general scientific method of modern times.

As to the last claim, that the psychologist of religion is simply seeking to apply the modern scientific method, there can be no doubt but that this is true. Only, we remark, this is no guarantee that its method is sound. We believe that the modern scientific method itself is suffering from the same disease that we have said the psychologists are suffering from particularly, namely, they have no well thought out conception as to the relation of the universal and the particular.

In examining the psychology of religion method and the scientific method in general, let us note first that it is quite customary to begin the discussion on method by discarding the traditional method without any argument, or at least with a mere flourish of the hand. Pratt says that any one is permitted to make as narrow a definition of religion as he pleases, if only he will take the consequences and call every one irreligious who does not conform to this pattern, and then adds that every definition of religion is arbitrary anyway. Mr. Thouless, speaking of the danger of defining religion too narrowly, says: "Such writers remind us of Mr. Thwackum who when he mentioned religion meant the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion but the Church of England" (2).

It is in a similar vein that Farmer speaks when he says: "It is curious how folk insist on approaching religion from the theological end, which is almost as foolish as trying to approach a rose from the angle of the theory of relativity" (3).

It is certainly curious to see anyone make a statement of this sort and then tell us a few pages further on that he finds God to be necessary for religion after all. Farmer says himself: "We believe in God, in part at any rate, because we cannot help it, because something 'hits' us immediately out of our world, something which, in its essential impact upon our spirit, comes as the call of God to us" (4).

Less flippant but no less definite is the expression of the sentiment that in the study of the psychology of religion one must

do away with all bias and be neutral in one's approach. This appears particularly strong when men discuss the notion that there is one true religion while other religions are false. In discussing the history of the aim of the psychology of religion school Baillie says: "The science was at the beginning provided with its motto and device by Max Müller when he gave utterance to the now famous words: 'Wer nur eine Religion kennt, kennt keine' -- 'He who knows but one religion knows none at all.' The intention of this saying is clearly to claim that a proper theoretical interpretation of religion has for the first time been rendered possible by our modern historical knowledge of the religion of other peoples and epochs" (5).

In criticizing this view Baillie says he cannot do better than begin with the words of Harnack which seem to have been spoken with a sly reference, to Müller's dictum just quoted. Harnack said, "Wer diese Religion kennt, kennt alle" that is, "He who knows this religion, knows all religions." But if we should think that therefore Harnack believed with the traditional position that Christianity is the only true religion we should be mistaken. Baillie makes this plain to us when he explains Harnack's statement and adds: "And he was no doubt alive to the truth of the view which would find the typical structure of the religious consciousness present in any authentic example of it, and would at the same time find the whole truth of it nowhere else but in its best or Christian form" (6).

As for Baillie himself, he tells us on the one hand that the trouble with the science of religion has been that it has tried to be "a natural science of religion and has essayed to treat the faiths of mankind as so much dead matter, to be understood not by introspective insight but by external inspection and comparison" (7), while on the other hand he says that the task of the science of religion precedes that of general philosophy, in which statement he implies that: "It is wrong in principle for theology to start out with any philosophical preconceptions, or to make any use whatever in its own research of results previously arrived at by any system of speculative philosophy; for to do so would be to make the cart draw the horse and the arch support the pillars" (8). From this it is clear that what both Harnack and Baillie want is, as far as our viewpoint is concerned, the common position of neutrality. They criticize extreme naturalism but are much more hostile to the idea of setting the religion consciousness, from the outset, in relation to a system of thought. This they think would do violence to the native witness of the religious consciousness. We see in this position of Baillie how he is struggling with the difficulty which we have called the great difficulty of the whole modern conception of method, that is, that he feels somehow that it wants the absolutely particular and yet feels also the need of some sort of standard by which all the mass of particulars should be judged. This standard Baillie seems to want to find in one's own consciousness. Baillie ought, however, to realize that one's own religious consciousness, if it has been nurtured in a Christian land, has itself been nurtured in contact with the constant contention that there is only one true religion while all others are false. It is quite impossible to get a completely native witness of one's religious consciousness if one means by that a simple pure manifestation of the religious sentiment without any bias whatever for the very good reason that no single man's religious consciousness has ever been nurtured on a Robinson Crusoe's island.



Baillie's point of view is very common today. For this reason we must state it a little more fully and criticize it as definitely as possible. One common argument for the contention that in the method of the psychology of religion we must steer clear of any metaphysics is that in the course of history the native witness of the religious consciousness is, as a matter of fact, the source of all metaphysics. To quote Baillie's words: "We are accordingly safe in concluding that religious faith cannot be substantiated by appeal to any idealistic philosophy, because it is itself the source of all such philosophies; just as it cannot be discredited by appeal to any naturalistic philosophy, because no philosophy could be naturalistic which had not begun by discrediting it" (9).

A little later Baillie defends his position on this point by pointing to the analogy of moral life. He says: "Metaphysics is the last thing in the world to be able to provide the moralist with the assurance of the validity of the moral point of view. Only his own moral consciousness can do that" (10).

From these two quotations we can learn that the presupposition of Baillie's point of view is that the moral consciousness, as was also pointed out in the first chapter, is a totally independent entity, something that has somehow appeared on the scene of history, no one knows how or what for, and now the only method consistent with this supposition is that we must first seek to hear the native witness of that moral and religious consciousness before we begin to speculate upon the nature of reality as a whole. Apparently Baillie is unaware of the fact that this presupposition of an absolutely independent moral and religious consciousness is itself a metaphysical assumption of no mean significance. It is simply the assumption of the non-theistic position that the mind of man is independent of God. It is a certain and foregone conclusion that one who begins with this position will find that his native witness will always be against the idea of an absolute God. It is quite possible to predict what the native witness of such a consciousness will be and therewith it has ceased to be a native witness in the sense in which Baillie and others use that phrase.

We have noted first the ease with which the traditional method of study has been rejected by psychologists of religion. Then we noted that more serious students who, as we saw in the first chapter, assumed the metaphysical independence of the religious consciousness, in the nature of the case also assumed the validity of the only possible method that could be used consistently with such a basic assumption, that is the method of neutrality. Let us now proceed to observe that men expect to obtain great things by this change of method.

Ames speaks throughout his books as though it is in modern times that religion has really begun to be studied for the first time in any thorough way. Speaking of his method he says: "Something more is required here than the naive assumption of the ancients that it is natural and necessary that all peoples have their own religions, or the equally unreasoned attitude of certain developed, aggressive religions, that all people have their own religions, but that all are utterly false or merely poor imitations except the one aggressive religion itself" (11).

Then further, the serious consequences that follow if we allow the truth and validity of Ames's method become apparent when we note that he hopes to make psychology the conditioning science of theology. To quote: "The psychology of religious experience, becomes the conditioning science for the various branches of theology, or rather, it is the science, which in its developed forms becomes theology or the philosophy of religion" (12).

A little later he adds: "The idea of God, for example, which is the central conception of theology, is subject to the same laws of mental life as are all other ideas, and there is but one science of psychology applicable to it" (13).

It might appear again as though these are extreme views since they are held by an open advocate of functional psychology who does not hesitate to say that he takes the whole evolutionary point of view for granted. For this reason we again quote from Baillie who represents the more conservative attitude to the psychology of religion. He, as we have seen, criticizes the psychology of religion school for treating their subject according to the laws of natural science. But just as we saw that his own position does not really differ from that of others who study religion according to the modern method, when we discussed the question of neutrality, so we may now note that his position does not really differ from that of Ames when he speaks of the place of theology. He in fact speaks of theology rather than of the psychology of religion in his book. Yet he makes the object of the study of theology nothing but the religious consciousness so that theology becomes practically identical with the psychology of religion.

"The real object of theological study," he says, "is not ultimate reality in all its aspects, but only those aspects of ultimate reality which are approached by us through the religious consciousness; and the religious consciousness is a special side of our mental life and one which is constantly and notoriously entering into conflict with other sides of it" (14).

This identification of theology with the psychology of religion is all the more serious because Baillie adds: "It is of course clear, to begin with, that each departmental investigation must be given the last word in the interpretation of its own set of facts" (15).

We can now sum up what the general attitude of men is on the question of the importance attached to the method commonly employed. We must keep in mind that (a) the religious consciousness is assumed to be a quite independent entity. Then (b) this religious consciousness is thought of as giving forth a witness and part of this witness is the idea of God. Still further (c) there are authentic manifestations of this religious consciousness found everywhere. Finally (d) this religious consciousness must interpret itself by principles deduced entirely from itself. The net result of all this is then to be called theology. And this would not be so serious if nothing more would be claimed than a right to use the word theology for anything one pleases, though this in itself would be confusing enough. The implication is, however, that

to speak of theology as the science of God or the science of the revelation of God, as the traditional viewpoint has spoken of it, is quite wrong and meaningless. An open war is declared on the orthodox view when it is said that as a matter of fact the god-idea is a late comer in the course of history so that those who make a definite God-concept basic to all their theology are dealing with fancies rather than with facts. Thus the older method is ruled out of court as being utterly unscientific.

We must, however, go still further and see that the change in method proposed and the importance attached to this change rests upon a definite claim on the part of the school of the psychology of religion that they by this method are for the first time really getting in touch with reality. We have already mentioned the fact that according to the new school it has, for the first time, tried to study religion from the inside while the traditional view of religion studied it only from the outside. So Pratt tells us, "In short, religion is not a theory about reality: it is reality" (16). Here again we must be careful to ascertain just what is meant. If one went to an outspoken evolutionist like Ames he would simply tell us that the psychology of religion, to be fruitful, must be based on a theory of reality which says that the religious consciousness is quite sufficient to itself and is an aspect of the general consciousness of man which alone gives expression to the meaning of Reality. In short, when we deal with men like Ames we know where we are at. We know that we deal with open and avowed enemies of the traditional position.

Strange to say, however, Pratt, though he can sometimes be sufficiently outspoken in his condemnation of the traditional view since it, as he thinks, gets at the problem of religion from the outside only, on the other hand hesitates between holding to a complete intrasubjective self-sufficiency of the religious consciousness and holding to the notion that religion must have an outside reference point. Pratt rightly criticizes the passage from Ames that we have quoted to the effect that since the idea of God, which is the central idea of theology, is subject to the same laws of psychology to which all other ideas are subject, by saying that this statement would prove the exclusive subjectivity of everything. He says that what may be said for the idea of God may also be said for the idea of the solar system.

"But," he adds, "neither astronomy nor theology means to limit its study to our ideas. They both mean to be objective -- and it is hard to see why one should be denied this privilege if it be granted to the other. And if objectivity be denied to theology, the dangers that inevitably result are evident. Theology becomes purely subjective -- a description of the way we feel; the idea of God is substituted for God and hence becomes the idea of an idea, of a confessed illusion, and the psychology of religion, having absorbed all that was objective in religion, finds it has nothing left to study, or at best becomes a branch of abnormal psychology" (17). To this he adds the criticism of Boutroux from his work on "Science and Religion," pp. 196-197, to the effect that a view such as that of Ames would destroy its own object of investigation.

We are now in a position to understand what Pratt means when he says that in studying religion we are studying reality. At any rate, if we are to be allowed to interpret him as consistent with himself, we must understand him as meaning that in studying religion in the manner in which he has told us to study it, that is, by a description of the religious consciousness wherever found, we are getting directly in touch with objective reality. We cannot therefore, in fairness, interpret Pratt's words as being in any sense consistent with theism. It is true that Pratt himself speaks sometimes as though he leaves the question of theism open for a metaphysical rather than a psychological discussion. He proposes to limit himself, when studying religion, to psychology and shun all metaphysics. He says that there are to be sure "gaps" in our experience which we must fill out by hypothetical "gap-fillers" (18). He also says that as far as metaphysics is concerned the one may be true or another may be true and adds: "If so then the ultimate explanation of the phenomenal world -- the explanation of our experience as a whole -- would be found in this ultimate reality. But this ultimate kind of explanation is a matter for philosophy, not for science. Her task is more modest than this. Her only sphere is human experience and her only aim description" (19).

From all this we would begin to doubt whether Pratt is really consistent with himself. He tells us on the one hand that in the psychology of religion we deal not merely with ideas. We deal with objectivity; we deal with God and not only with the idea of God. On the other hand he tells us that he is not dealing with an ultimate explanation of reality but only with the description of a small portion of reality. It would seem to be logical to conclude then that the God with whom we are actually in contact according to Pratt's own words is a God who has nothing to do with ultimate reality. It is at best a very small God, one who can comfortably reside within the bounds of the religious consciousness of man. And it is difficult to see how this position differs essentially from that of Ames. Both positions would seem to imply, according to the words of Boutroux, the destruction of the object of religion.

In the first chapter a similar inconsistency has been noted on the part of Baillie when he discussed the question whether religion needs an outside reference-point. We shall therefore briefly observe that on the question of method Baillie too, just as well as Pratt, wavers between two opinions. This appears if we look at his statement about the difference between description and explanation. "To say of a science that it is normative," he says, "is not to imply that it is not descriptive, nor even (at least not in the first place) that it is more than descriptive, but rather that the region of experience of which it is descriptive is itself concerned with norms" (20).

Here too we seem to have the same contradiction that we appear to have in Pratt. Baillie seems on the one hand, as we have shown in various quotations, to wish to have a definite objective reference for religion. At least he wishes to leave the question of an outside reference open for difference of opinion. On the other hand if there is such an outside reference it does not come to the religious consciousness in the form of a norm that may have some

descriptive influence upon it. On the contrary the description of the religious consciousness is quite sufficient to itself. Its own description is normative, IN THE ONLY SENSE IN WHICH THE WORD NORMATIVE HAS ANY SIGNIFICANCE. The word normative itself, he says, means nothing but that the field we deal with deals with norms. This, if taken at its face value, means nothing but that norms have somehow appeared upon the scene of history just as the religious consciousness has somehow appeared. And such a view is, of course, definitely exclusive of the theistic tradition.

From all this confusion it appears not that these men are not thorough and consistent thinkers, but only that they have tried to do the impossible and that even the best of men cannot do the impossible. They have tried to harmonize the contradictory. They have tried to tell us on the one hand that they are quite willing to leave the theistic question in abeyance and to limit themselves to a mere descriptive analysis of the religious consciousness. On the other hand they have maintained that that description is normative and objective, that is, that we are really in touch with reality when we are simply describing the religious consciousness.

What is perfectly clear from all this is that at any rate the Christian theistic view is excluded from even the remotest bit of consideration. The very least that is claimed is that by the method of the description of the religious consciousness, men have explained that little spot of reality without any extraneous help. There is at the very least one little island that is quite independent of foreign invasion. There is at least this one spot where the creature and also the sinner may flee from the wrath of God, that wrath which claims that there is no escape in hell from it. And it is of very little logical significance whether one maintains the independence from God for this one little island or whether one maintains the independence from God for the whole universe outright since each human being can at any rate make a little island for himself and in this way altogether outwit God who has threatened to cast in the bottomless pit all those who have sought for independence from Him. The psychologists of religion seem to have emptied out the bottomless pit even though they have not yet succeeded in filling it up.

That this conclusion is warranted we can make still more definitely clear by noting particularly that when the normative is reduced to or identified with the descriptive the theistic distinction between good and evil has disappeared. This is already implied in the contention that it must be taken for granted as a matter of course that there are authentic cases of religious experience which are by common consent taken to be genuinely typical of true religion. But this procedure, though usually followed quite uncritically, is sometimes justified by philosophical argument. We may use as an illustration the statement made by Farmer when he discusses the objection to belief in God that springs from the presence of moral evil in the world. He says there should be no objection to belief in God on the ground of the presence of evil for the simple reason that evil is the natural consequence of freedom and freedom is the presupposition of moral life in general. "Thus it is," he concludes, "that in every form of religion, even the most primitive, room has to be made for the phenomenon of the wicked or impious man" (21).

This metaphysical assumption that evil is necessarily as ultimate as the good is sometimes justified in turn by what seems to be an exclusively psychological consideration that a person must certainly be the sole originator of his deeds if he is to be held responsible for them. That is, if man were a creature as Christianity says he is, then he could not be responsible for his deeds for in that case he derived all his strength for the performance of his deeds not from himself but from God. But whether this exclusively activist and anti-theistic metaphysics of chance be justified by the anti-theistic psychology, it is certainly true that both of them are equally anti-theistic and that they imply one another.

Thus we sum up our argument in this section and say that at any rate the psychology of religion school takes for granted the non-theistic assumption of the total self-sufficiency of the religious consciousness metaphysically and in the second place that it takes for granted the non-theistic ethics of the ultimacy of evil. Every one of God's creatures is therefore promised a little island of his own and in addition is given the privilege of an eternal moral holiday; he may take his pet sins with him and practice them forever.

But after all, the psychology of religion school does more than claim that it has a little island all to itself. We have already noted that it has great expectations from the results of its methods. We must now note that it is not really satisfied with the description of the religious consciousness but that it really claims to offer us a definite insight into the nature of Reality such as we have not had before. In seeking to lead us deeply into the individual consciousness in order thus to bring us in close touch with reality the psychologist of religion wants to help us help ourselves and help us help others. That is, they hope to give us something that is of benefit for the whole of our life. In short, they deal with universals as well as with particulars; they hope to get at the true universal through the particular.

In this connection it is once more enlightening to begin with an open pragmatist such as Ames. He tells us on the one hand that there is no such thing as a definite norm. To quote: "The texts often make much of the fact that psychology is a natural science, while others are normative sciences. But it is interesting to see that the author is usually careful to insist that by normative he means not primarily the application of the norm, but merely its discovery and the recognition of its function" (22).

However this is only one side of the study. In the immediate context Ames continues as follows: "In attempting to understand the nature and function of consciousness, we are inevitably plunged into the consideration of the nature of reality, not indeed as something over against consciousness, but as involved in the knowledge process itself" (23).

A little later still he adds: "It is by taking wide surveys of these phenomena as they appear in different races that one may be able to dissociate the permanent principles of religion from its accidental content, and gain a perspective in which the developed, historical religions may be interpreted" (24).

From these quotations of Ames we learn that though he says he deals only with the description of the religious consciousness, this description is nevertheless so important as to enlighten us on the question of the true and the false. Not as though he would tell us by his method which religion is true and which is false but he discovers by his method that there is no distinction between true and false. He discovers that religion is a fluctuating something. He discovers not only that this has been the case in the past but he also discovers that this will be the case in the future. This conclusion may be drawn directly from the fluid nature that experience must have according to Ames. But we may also quote his own words in which he tells us what the religion of the future must be. He says: "Viewed in this way, as an expression of the profoundest social consciousness, religion must continue to advance in the future, as in the past, in close relation with the concrete life of mankind" (25).

Still further we should observe that not only Ames but many other psychologists do as a matter of fact bring the whole of special revelation, as given both in the Old and in the New Testaments, under their rule of descriptive analysis without residue. This certainly shows that if the method of the psychology of religion is a genuinely scientific method, that we as orthodox believers are in a bad way with our faith. From our point of view we may say that if Ames has done nothing more than describe the fact of prophecy he has by his description destroyed it completely. We do not care whether a person describes us out of existence or explains us out of existence; the only possible difference can be that the former is little more polite way of destroying us than the latter. So then the question of method is certainly a matter of life and death.

And what has been said with respect to Ames applies equally with respect to Pratt. Here we are far more politely chloroformed to death than in the office of Ames. Pratt throughout his book makes a bow now and then to the traditions of the past. He tells us again and again that there may be truth in whatever metaphysics we may care to hold. He tells us that that is not his concern. But then he tells us, nevertheless, that his description of the religious consciousness may advise us in our lives.

In the first place his view implies that we can certainly not hold anything to be true that cannot be verified by everybody. He tells us that the method of science must be applied to the religious consciousness but the method of science is necessarily universal. He speaks as follows: "Inasmuch as nothing can be communicated to other men or verified by them but that which is presented to common human experience, science is limited to describing the experience date of human beings and the relations between them" (26).

With these words in mind we may well fear whether we shall ever get scientific standing for the specifically Christian experiences such as that of regeneration. The very meaning of regeneration, according to our view, is that one who has not experienced it cannot understand it and therefore cannot verify it. So then it is a foregone conclusion that if we should be lured by the signs on Pratt's office that we may take our metaphysics with us and still be scientifically examined without harm to our inwards, the X-ray examination

will prove accidentally fatal. We shall surely be listed with the sacrifices that must necessarily be made in order that science may advance.

That there can be no doubt of this appears more fully still if we note that Pratt definitely tells us that science must do its best to seek to explain the religious consciousness with reference to anything supernatural. Speaking of the scientist he says: "Leaving aside hypotheses that involve the supernatural, he must seek -- very likely in a plodding and prosaic fashion -- to find out what can be done with the natural" (27). And with respect to the measure of success that has attended this definite effort to exclude the supernatural he says: "And in our particular problem his methods have not as yet proved inadequate. The prophets and mystics have, indeed, been greatly influenced by the subconscious, but it is far from clear that there is anything mysterious about the ultimate source of this subconscious influence" (28).

In this way we can see that Pratt means to do his best to describe the prophets down to our level and, as well, describe the devils up to our level. To give but one illustration of what will happen if we submit the testimony of the prophets to Pratt's examination we give the principle by which he works: "The prophet ponders long over the condition of his people, the will of God, and the problem of his own duty. Then some day suddenly the sought for solution rushes into his mind -- he finds a message ready made upon his tongue, and it is almost inevitable that he should preface it with the words: 'Thus hath Jehovah showed me'" (29).

Think of Isaiah being examined this way. When we see a patient suffering from such a bad case of supernaturalism so easily and completely cured we need not hesitate to prophesy that the method of Pratt will never fail.



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## Chapter III

### METHOD -- CONTINUED

In the previous chapter we have seen something of the difficulty involved in the question of method as it faces the modern psychologist of religion. The method employed is, generally speaking, definitely anti-intellectualistic. It seeks to get at religious experience prior to its intellectual interpretation. Yet it is only through intellectual interpretation that the religious experience can be spoken of to others. Then too it wants to avoid metaphysics while on the other hand it seeks to tell us just what the essence of religion is. In this way it cannot avoid metaphysics. On the contrary it involves us in a very definitely non-theistic type of metaphysics.

In the present chapter we must continue the argument of the preceding one and carry it further.

We have already seen that there are some psychologists of religion who admit that one will eventually have to come to a metaphysical theory if the phenomena of the religious consciousness are to be fully interpreted. Let us now note that there are others who even appeal to a definite metaphysical theory for the defense of their method.

One of those who appeal to a definite metaphysics is Bouquet in his book Religious Experience Its Nature, Types and Validity. In the first part of his book Bouquet makes the usual claim that we must begin our study of the religious consciousness by a simple description of that which we find in it. Soon he is faced, however, with the difficulty involved in the idea of exclusive description. Exclusive description would give equal standing to the devil and the saint. Accordingly he tells us that some standard will have to be used in order to exclude that which does not really contribute to an understanding of the nature of religion. He says:

"There is a certain type of decadent who is only too ready to open his neurotic mind to the public, and it does not follow that the individual who is most willing to answer the psychologist's questionnaire or write an autobiographical sketch is just the person who has had the richest and deepest experience" (1). This would seem to indicate that there is a level that is too low to give us genuine insight into religious experience. On the other hand there is also a level that seems to be too high. We may gather that from the following words:

"Moreover, the intuitional experiences of the prophet, the seer, and the mystic need to be co-ordinated by comparison with the other types of evidence, and are accordingly guaranteed or invalidated by their discordance or harmony with the remainder of the data available. They must in fact pass the test of coherence" (2).

Thus we have a level that is too low and a level that is too high to give us normal religious experience. At least so it seems.

It appears, however, that this is not the case. Those whom we thought of as prophets, may appear to be erotics if we apply our test of coherence to them. Says Bouquet:

"The sanity and practicality of some intuitionists must not blind us to the existence of others who can only be described as pathological specimens" (3).

So then if we find that the prophet's experience does not pass the test of coherence successfully his experience is proved to be of too low a nature to be valid.

In all this we may note that (a) Bouquet is so far unaware of the fact that he is already dealing with metaphysics when he attempts to be neutral and to begin merely by describing the religious consciousness. He is unaware (b) of the fact that he is already in the midst of a definite kind of metaphysic, namely, a definitely anti-theistic metaphysic, when he says that all prophets must be tested by a coherence test that we have devised without them.

Yet Bouquet is definitely aware of the fact, of which some other psychologists of religion seem not to be aware, that validity is after all the great question in the psychology of religion as well as everywhere else. This appears not only from the quotations given but is also definitely stated elsewhere in the book. He tells us when speaking of religious intuition that "The one all-important question to be decided is the validity of this intuitive knowledge" (4).

Still further Bouquet is aware of the fact that certain theories of metaphysics are definitely hostile to religious experience. He argues at some length against "naturalism" in order to show that that which he speaks of as religious experience is not a mere delusion. He says:

"It must be admitted that until recently naturalism seemed in a very strong position, firmly entrenched in a world from which the fortuitous element was steadily being banished. Recently, however, there has been a marked tendency to admit that observation has detected and recorded a certain free, fortuitous, and spontaneous element in the minutest forms of matter, and also that the picture of the universe as a closed and monotonously mechanical system is only of the nature of a map, and is arrived at by omitting those features which do not harmonize with such a conception. Hence the tendency towards the qualification of the wholly immanent view of the relation of God to the world, which has been noted elsewhere" (5).

Here we see that Bouquet definitely seeks to exclude one system of metaphysics and defend another in order to hold to his conception of religion. Of course he would say that all that he is doing is to seek to prevent any one system of metaphysics from making a free description of experience impossible. Yet he ought to allow that the mechanists as well as he thought that they were doing nothing more than describing experience. When the mechanists were in control of the scientific field they thought they had done nothing but exclude false metaphysics when they excluded such a metaphysics of fortuitous elements as Bouquet is now defending. In other words Bouquet ought to see that every interpretation of ex-

perience is a theory than that of the mechanists. He does, to be sure, say that he holds to the metaphysics of the Bergsonian type but he makes the mistake of saying that the mechanists have not tried while he has tried to draw his metaphysical theory from experience.

What we would note particularly is that after all Bouquet is very outspoken as to the nature of the metaphysics that he thinks the religious experience, as scientific research discovers it, requires. He is definitely committed to the theory of reality to which many scientists such as Jeans, Eddington and others are committed. He holds that reality has in it a large element of the fortuitous. In a passage in which he speaks of his theory of metaphysics rather fully he says that there are three theories of the nature of intuitional experience. In the first place there is the supernatural view. According to it, he says: "There is, as it were, a miraculous downrush of Deity into the soul which is of the nature of revelation" (6). This view he naturally discards, as he says elsewhere, on the ground that it does not fit in with our coherent experience. To quote:

"Now apart from our single method of organizing and reflecting upon experience we can have no means of judging the validity of an alleged revelation" (7).

With the help of Galton's theory of mental images, which has aided him in getting his test of coherence into operation, Bouquet can easily bring prophesy into harmony with our own experience.

"To say, 'Thus hath the Lord showed me' need not involve the speaker in self-deception or fraud any more than to say 'I have had an intuition'" (8).

Now when the supernatural view has been thus disposed of Bouquet turns to the naturalism which we have already spoken of and then adds:

"The third view may be called the mediating one. It avoids dualism by saying that all is natural and all supernatural, and that the one is only an intensification of the other. Religious experience is thus not miraculous in the sense of being an intervention from a totally distinct order. It is simply a penetration of the finite and partially spontaneous by That Which brought it into being and from Which it derives not only its origin but also whatever degree of spontaneity it possesses, and it is thus the reinforcement and heightening of a life already there by a fresh current of life from the Original Source; this influx of life being rendered possible by a certain purity and receptive disposition on the part of the spontaneous agent" (9).

From all this it appears clearly that Bouquet thinks he is defending theism while in reality he is defending a peculiar type of antitheism. Theism does not think of the relation of the supernatural as nothing but an intensification of the natural. But we are not now debating the issue between theism and anti-theism. We only wish to bring out the fact that Bouquet has throughout his book

been living under the delusion of being perfectly scientific in his method, that is, he has all the while thought to be doing nothing but describing experience. Yet he has found it necessary to defend the antitheistic conception of reality. Now we do not criticize him for connecting his metaphysics and his psychology. On the contrary, we hold that every one who faces the facts squarely will have to relate these two. What we do criticize, however, is that Bouquet seems to think that others are not also trying to be true to experience though they have a different view of metaphysics from his. As Christians we claim to be doing justice to experience. In fact we claim that we only are doing justice to experience because we only are interpreting experience truly. But we claim that experience can be justly treated and rightly interpreted only if no artificial separation is made between psychology and metaphysics. We claim, moreover, that we only are interpreting experience aright because we only have a true view of reality as a whole. Still further we are quite willing and even anxious to debate the question with our opponents whether we have the best interpretation of reality. We cannot allow ourselves to be disposed of, however, in the manner in which the psychologists of religion are seeking to dispose of us. They are simply saying that every one who does not come to the same conclusion with them is not even trying to be true to experience. In other words they have first limited the meaning of the word experience so that it by definition excludes what we think ought to be included in it. That is, they exclude everything that cannot be made to cohere with the interpretation of that which we speak of as the natural man. They have made the natural man the standard of what is to be admitted as being genuine religious experience.

Here exactly lies the point of dispute. We hold that the natural man is not a good judge of what is true and what is false religious experience. We hold that the natural man must himself be judged. Still further we believe that there is a very good justification for our view in this matter in the fact that if the natural man is set up as the judge matters are soon led into a blind alley. If the natural man must be deemed fit to judge there is no good reason for excluding from the testimony that is to be given the most extreme and the most bizarre. There is then no longer any sense in speaking of what is the essence of religion. One worships God, another worships the devil, a third worships the host of heaven and a fourth worships something else, likely himself. Thus the act of worship itself becomes a perfectly colorless thing at best that is not worth any one's investigation.

The whole situation may be well described by the story which Bouquet himself quotes in order to prove that mechanists are blind to experience and facts. The story we give in his own words:

"The case has been well compared by an American psychologist to an account which might be given by a man who had seen the sun for the first time after having lived under abnormal conditions, and given to a company of blind men who had never seen it. The seer would describe quite frankly the bright round object of his vision; but the blind psychologist would say that he could account for the phenomenon by certain conditions prevailing within the eye, 'Raised eyelids, stimulated

retina, afferent impulse in the optic nerves, the stimulation of the visual centres in the occipital lobes. Both would be right. The explanation of the psychologist would be correct within its own limits and it could not prove the objective existence of the sun merely by the movements going on within the eye, for it might easily say that these movements produced the appearance of a luminous ball which was therefore a projection from inside the eye. And yet it would be generally admitted that the seer in question really did see the sun"(10).

Now from our point of view we would say that practically all the psychologists of religion are blind psychologists because they themselves have never had the experience of regeneration. They are therefore determined to explain everything from the "inside." We believe further that we may be compared to the seer who had himself been abnormal and who was therefore in a position to judge of both conditions while the blind psychologists are not. Only we would not add, as Bouquet adds, that both the seer and the blind psychologist were right. It is true that we must receive the revelation of the Sun of righteousness and in receiving we are active, that is our mental powers are operative. Yet as Bouquet leaves out of consideration the power that changed the seer from a blind psychologist to a seer and only speaks of the movements of the eyes of the seer after he becomes a seer, so we when we say that we are active and mentally operative while the revelation of God comes to us, we leave out of consideration for the moment that we had first to be given the power of sight before the movements of our eyelids received any revelation at all. The blind psychologist as well as the seer moved their eyelids. That is therefore not the point in question. The only point in question was whether the blind psychologist or the seer was right when it came to the question whether or not there was something objective that corresponded to the movement of the eyes. On this point the seer was wholly right and the blind psychologist was wholly wrong. So too if Christianity is true we may all admit certain mental and emotional activities, that is, certain modes and manifestations of the religious sentiments. But we are clearly before the choice of saying that it is in these motions themselves, apart from their truth-bringing character that we are interested, that is, that we are interested in the movements of the eyelids as such and not in the question whether or not the sun shines, or we shall have to say frankly to one another that we believe we see the truth while our opponents do not see the truth. The futility of every attempt which tries to escape this dilemma by an appeal to "experience" and the scientific interpretation of experience only establishes anew the actual existence of the alternative.

That our insistence upon a relationship between the method employed by the psychology of religion and a certain theory of reality is justified may further be demonstrated by an appeal to those who have in modern times discussed the question of method in its widest significance. We may mention George Burman Foster in his book, The Finality of the Christian Religion. Foster brings out the fact that the problem of method is definitely related to modern historic relativism in general. We shall bring out his argument by a few quotations from his section on The Essence of Christianity: The Problem of Method.

Foster brings out that the question of the finality of Christianity cannot be separated from the question of its essence. Harnack has written a book that has been very much discussed in recent times entitled The Essence of Christianity. But if we must know what the essence of Christianity is in order to know whether we can own its claim to finality we must know how to determine the essence. With respect to this Foster says:

"Time was when the problem did not exist. There was no debate concerning methodic procedure, because the concept 'essence of Christianity' had not arisen. And it had not arisen because there was no need for it. Catholic theology, if there had never been any other, would never have used it. It would have spoken familiarly and uncritically of 'the faith of the church'" (11).

Then, he says, came Protestantism, and though it, strictly speaking, still did not bring up the problem of essence but only the difference between Protestantism and Catholicism, it nevertheless led the way into the problem. Foster says:

"It may be said that the question of essence is continuous with that old controversy; still its present form is not due to that controversy so much as to the rise of modern evolutionism and of the historico-critical science of history of which the former is methodic presupposition" (12).

To this line of argument Foster adds that the subjective principle that had been introduced by Protestantism made the question of method for the first time come to the foreground. He says that the Protestant in distinction from the Catholic applies a subjective norm to the Scriptures when he uses a concept such as the justification by faith as a standard by which to judge of the value of Scripture. From this favoritism shown to Paul it was but another step in the same direction to say that the Scriptures contain only "saving truths" (13). Thus the old inspiration idea suffered irretrievable collapse. Still men sought to maintain something of the objectivity that that old doctrine was intended to give by the thesis "that the religious teachings of Jesus Christ constitutes the historical beginning of Christianity; that the so-called sources contain this teaching, and that the historical beginning of Christianity is the decisive norm for the determination of the essence of Christianity" (14). So we see that "Systematic deduction yields here to the empirical and inductive method." But, says Foster, it is doubtful whether we are on terra firma even here. We cannot always say that the teaching of the founder of a religion must be regulative for the fixation of the essence of that religion. Moses cannot be cited as the standard by which all the religion of Israel must be judged. Moreover, it is not usual that the exact religious ideas of any one can be exactly determined and liberated from all the influences that have been brought to bear upon him. Still further, while the procedure seems to exalt Jesus it does not really do so since "such a procedure amounts to a reduction of the pleroma of his mighty spirit to a didactic function" (15).

Then he adds:

"Finally, the fixity of the criterion under review, and the implied stability of the object to be tested, are foreign to the modern conception of reality -- belong indeed, together with the previous norms, to the old view of the world in general. Norms arise, grow, and change, like everything else. So does religion" (16).

Foster holds that the old notion of reality and the old method of which he speaks may be compared to the seeking of the essence of a flower "by pulling off the petals and stamen one by one."

From these few quotations it appears that according to Foster the modern method has its origin in historic relativism and its consequent anti-intellectualism. We have reached the point where we see that just as we considered the method of the psychologist of religion as absolutely fruitless and in error, dealing as it does with a non-entity, by a method of abstraction, so Foster holds that the traditional method is unfruitful because it deals with abstractions. Each accuses the other of pulling the flower to pieces while seeking for its essence.

So then it would seem that the traditional method has at least as good a standing as the modern method, as far as the logic of the matter is concerned. Foster seems to see something of the dilemma that we have pointed out as lying hidden in the modern conception of method. He points out that if the idea of historic relativity is to be taken seriously you cannot really bring up the problem of essence at all. Loisy said: "The essence is the actual history itself." Loisy has criticized Harnack in that he has not really applied the historic method or he would not have held the essence of Christianity to be Protestantism. He would have had to find the essence at least in the totality of the living Church and its activities. That is the point that we have spoken of before. If there is no absolute standard there is no justification in taking one manifestation of the historic spirit as a standard for other manifestations.

"In view of these diverse judgments," says Foster, "the methodic question must be raised again and pursued in every direction." He even adds "How far is it really a historical problem? Is the historical-inductive standpoint the only one, or are there other means at our disposal? If so what are they?" (17)

Certainly we may say that Foster seems to see something of the fact that since Christianity claims to be based upon the conception of God who is supra-historical and the Christ who is supra-historical that a method which assumes historical relativism cannot be successful in dealing with these entities unless it has first proved that Christianity's claim to be a supra-historical religion is false. Certainly if the Christian religion cannot exist unless the supra-historical God and the supra-historical Christ, upon the belief in which it is founded, and in the belief in which it has its origin, exists it is a foregone conclusion that it cannot be truly investigated by a method which at the outset resolves to apply the test of coherence that presupposes historical relativism.



Now it would seem that those who have taken historical relativism as their starting-point ought to be consistent and say that there is no such thing as the essence of Christianity or for that matter of anything, Foster sees something of this too when he speaks as follows:

"To be sure, there is one hypothesis upon which the task would be unnecessary, upon which the problem would not even arise. If essential Christianity and empirical Christianity were incidental tensively and intensively; if, as Loisy says, the essence is the actual history itself, such would be the case. But there are two considerations which weigh against this hypothesis: first, the self-contradictory elements in Christian history, as has already become apparent; and, secondly, the pervasion of the historical with moral evil" (18).

Here Foster sees something of the criticisms we have brought against the method of the psychology of religion and against the modern scientific method in general. In the first place no merely historical series can in and by itself raise any problems because there is in a mere historical series no relation of elements to one another. This is the primary metaphysical difficulty in which all non-theistic thought is involved. In the second place granted that one were able to think of an historical series as having meaning in and for itself all the facts of this historical series should be considered as of equal value. There is never any excuse for any one historical being in and of himself to lord it over other historical beings and say to them that their religion is not valuable. No standard of judgment could be evolved of from a mere historical series.

We see then that the quest for the absolutely individual, for the native witness of the religious consciousness, is but one manifestation of the general tendency in our day to look in the historical series alone not only for the facts to be explained but also for the universal principle by which these facts are to be explained.

In order to fully understand this historicism we must note that it is opposed first of all against the type of theism which holds that in God as an eternal and self-conscious being lies the ultimate ground of the explanation of all things. Yet it is also opposed to the various forms of impersonal eternalism that have appeared in the course of the ages. With respect to this Foster says:

"Thus both a supernatural and natural dogmatism are excluded from the presuppositions of our task. These, whether unchangeable orthodox criteria or unchangeable rational truths, are dead entities, and we may not seek the living among the dead. The essence must be a magnitude which possesses inner vitality and mobility, productive powers of propagation. It must be a self-developing spiritual principle" (19).

With all these things in mind Foster then turns to ask the question we have before propounded whether method is to limit itself to description only or is also to consider itself explanatory. He points out that recent German theology has struggled with the same problem. To quote:

"The Windelband-Rickert school of history designates the method ideographic. The Dilthey-Wundt school designates the method nomothetic -- the ideographic being virtually the descriptive, the nomothetic virtually the explanatory" (20).

At this point Foster marshalls forth the arguments pro and con with respect to both these methods. The ideographic holds that by the nomothetic method we do not get at that which is really individual and essential. "In all that is historically and individually experienced there is a remainder that is incomprehensible -- something inexpressible, indefinable, ineffable. Thus, the ultimate and innermost essence of personality resists analysis by means of categories, and this that is incomprehensible appears to our consciousness as the feeling of the causelessness of our being; that is, of individual freedom.

Underivable self-dependence, universal conformity to law -- these coexist in history" (21).

Against this criticism on the part of the ideographic school the nomothetic school replies that even the historical individuals must have a relation to the whole of history and it is only to the extent that we have a relation to the whole that we can really communicate to one another with respect to matters of common experience.

Now what does Foster say about the whole controversy? He says that they should have laid aside their differences and helped one another. We quote:

"Philosophically, the nomothetic, taken by itself alone, rests on a monistic view of the world; the ideographic, taken by itself alone, on a pluralistic view of the world. But since the unity and the multiplicity of reality are alike real, and equally real, an exclusive monism and an exclusive pluralism are alike partial and inadequate. The truth of the former is its recognition of the interaction and system of reality; of the latter, the relative independence, originality, and value of the individual. Each conception, indeed, has its difficulties and a complete solution of the problem of the unity and the multiplicity of existence seems to be impossible" (22).

Summing up this whole discussion with respect to Foster we may say that (a) he clearly shows how inextricably the whole question of scientific method is interwoven with the larger question of the nature of reality or metaphysics. Then, (b) the type of metaphysics with which modern historico-scientific method is related is definitely antitheistic. This appears most clearly from Foster's statement that both aspects of reality, multiplicity and unity, are equally real. What has appeared in the case of the logic of the great idealistic school of Bradley and Bosanquet appears here in the question of scientific method. Bosanquet has emphasized the idea of the equal ultimacy of the apriori and the aposteriori, of eternity and time. Here in Foster the same idea is expressed by saying that both aspects of reality are equally real. Both empha-

size the fact that there is one level of reality only. Both are equally hostile to the Christian idea of God who alone is eternal and who has in His eternity the equal ultimacy of the one and the many, that is required for the solution of man's logical and methodical problems. Still further (c) we would note that Foster and others with him, though they refuse to seek for a solution of their problem in theism, will nevertheless admit that the problem seems to be hopeless. One may be inclined to stress the ideographic method because he is strongly impressed with the individualistic nature of reality. Another may be inclined to stress the nomothetic method because he is strongly impressed by the necessity for unity in experience. Others may say that we must do justice to both. But even if it is said that we must do justice to both this does not help matters greatly. One may say that all reality is water. Another may say that all reality is fire. A third may say that both are right and that we must therefore have a mixture of equal parts of each but this does not solve the problem. No more than fire and water will mix will an abstract universal and an abstract particular mix.

Foster, we may say, ends up at the point where some of the psychologists of religion have seen that their method ends. We quote only from Ames:

"The search for a definition of a profoundly complex process always ends in such a tentative flexible statement. It involves recognition of the living reality of experience, and results in a modest effort to describe it, to analyze it, and to gain certain explanations concerning particular features and stages of it" (23).

The whole of the method of the modern psychology of religion school rests therefore upon the one granted assumption of the equal ultimacy of the eternal and the temporal. We will, with this in mind, not take too seriously such statements as that of Pratt that so far as they have gone the method of the psychologists of religion has been successful even when they confront claims that seem to come from an exclusively eternal world. When men talk freely and glibly about the wonderful accomplishments made through the application of the scientific method in other spheres and bring out a plausible argument in favor of the idea that all religion will also have to submit to the same examination we think of a patient who thinks that he feels quite well for the moment and is ready to climb mountains while in reality he is suffering from an internal disease that will never allow him to reach the top so he may see the vision of the whole.

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## Chapter IV

### METHOD -- CONTINUED

Our discussion of method would not be complete if we did not seek to set the question more definitely in the picture of modern thought as it has developed especially in Germany, though not only in Germany. It will, however, be impossible to do more than give a rough sketch. For this reason we may conveniently follow the lead given us by Heinemann in his book "Neue Wege der Philosophie." We may add, however, that the path followed by Heinemann has been followed by others, that is, his interpretation of the trend of modern thought is accepted by many.

Now Heinemann gives in the sub-title of his book a very suggestive survey of the trend of modern thought. The sub-title is "Geist Leben Existenz." We must briefly seek to ascertain what he means by this.

What is meant by Geistphilosophie is relatively clear. Heinemann means by it the philosophy of the idealistic schools. These schools build largely upon the basis given them by Descartes. The human reason is made sufficient to itself and is considered the ultimate source and principle of the interpretation of experience. The cogito was considered to be a good foundation for the sum. Kant and Hegel no doubt greatly changed the philosophy of Descartes but it remains true that for them too the human Ratio was enthroned. Both the Neo-Kantian schools and the Neo-Hegelian schools have carried forth this tradition.

Now this Geistphilosophie tried to solve the question of the One and the Many. Its tendency was to emphasize the One. It was definitely seeking for a law of interpretation of experience which would include all phenomena without residue. The philosophers of this school were trying hard to bring the eternal and the temporal, the conditioned and the unconditioned into one whole and give each element its due.

Slowly, however, it began to appear more and more clearly that there was an irrational element in experience that would not thus be classified. We may interject that one need only to read the works on logic by Bradley and Bosanquet to see how hard men have tried to bring the irrational into subordination to the rational. Bosanquet has constantly emphasized the fact that the a priori must precede the a posteriori and the eternal must precede the temporal if there is to be any interpretation of experience. Yet he would also maintain that the a posteriori is as ultimate as the a priori. Just as we have noted that Foster says that the two aspects of reality, the changeable and the unchangeable are equally real, so Bosanquet holds that we must seek for an interpretation that will hold both these aspects to be ultimate. It is taken for granted that the eternal and the temporal are aspects of one another.

Now when it is thus taken for granted that the eternal and the temporal are not more than aspects of one another it was bound to

appear eventually, when modern thought became increasingly self-conscious, that there would have to be a remnant of experience that refuses to be rationalized. The temporal aspect of reality always produces something new and unexpected, something wholly unrelated. And this may be applied to the individual man. He is a temporal being. Hence his individuality is something unique. The problem of ancient philosophy, how to get the universal and the particular together, has only been more definitely treated in modern times. Even in ancient times Plato and Aristotle saw that their systems of thought had left an abstract particular at one end and an abstract universal at the other end of their speculations while the infima species problem showed that Aristotle was held in the iron chains of this question in the middle of his thought as well as at both ends. In modern times this problem has only been intensified because of the fact that the temporalism of modern thought has greatly emphasized the "irrational" element in experience.

Now it was in opposition to the attempts of an essentially rationalistic effort of modern thought, as it appeared in the Geistphilosophie, that the second stage was introduced called Lebensphilosophie. Ancient thought, though it had taken its stand upon the consciousness of man as the last court of appeal, had nevertheless sought in some vague manner to connect man's consciousness with the ideal world so that man was thought of as participating in the nature of the eternal. In modern times, with the greater self-consciousness of philosophical thought, man was to see ever more clearly that he must seek for his principle of interpretation in the temporal universe only. Hence the great emphasis upon the irrational in modern times. Men became increasingly less hopeful of obtaining an interpretation of experience as a whole. It is striking indeed that men are just simply taking for granted that since man has shown that he cannot himself give a comprehensive interpretation of life that therefore it is no longer justifiable to believe that God has given us such an interpretation. Every descent into the irrational is a step further away from Christian-theism.

A great deal of literature has appeared in recent times against the idealistic school of thought (1). In the field of philosophy proper the Bergsonian type of thought came forward. Bergson's thought is definitely anti-intellectualistic. He says that the intellect cannot catch experience till it is already petrified, till it is no longer living and moving. The intellect is cinematographic in its work. It is only by instinct that we can get into touch with reality.

It should be noted particularly that this opposition to the intellectualism of the early nineteenth century, though it implied the giving up of comprehensive interpretations of life, did not mean that men were giving up the idea of getting at reality. The Lebensphilosophie was a definite effort to get at the meaning of life by catching it at a more elementary stage of its manifestation. By seeking to get at man's intuitions, instincts, drives, etc. men said they were getting what might appear to be a more basic level of life, but which is nevertheless more truly life itself.

We would pay special attention to this point. From the Christian point of view it is highly important. It is not a matter of psychology only. The modern dive into the irrational is an attempt to get further away from the God of Christianity. For Christianity God, as absolute self-consciousness, as absolute rationality, is man's ultimate category of interpretation. Hence from the Christian point of view the intellectual interpretation is always at a premium. One can never think that he is getting into a deeper level of interpretation when he gets at the instincts of man than when he deals with the intellect of man. There are from the Christian point of view no higher and lower levels of existence. Man is equally a prophet, a priest and a king. The ineffable, the inexpressible, the "groanings that cannot be uttered" are not any more valuable in the sight of God than the self-consciously expressed praise of God. We often wish that we could give utterance to that which we feel. The fact that we cannot is to a large measure due to the fact that we have not developed the God-given powers of utterance. To the extent that we have failed in our opportunities in this matter it should be a sin in our eyes for which we seek forgiveness. In so far as it is natural that we should not be able to express all that we feel since we are created priests as well as prophets, we should rejoice that God accepts of us just as he has made us, as priests and as prophets, as prophets and as priests.

But now we must continue to see that the tendency displayed in the Lebensphilosophie is a desire to seek for the interpretation of life by trying to find the absolute particular. This appears in the attempt to turn to history rather than to nature for the solution of man's life. The recent Lebensphilosophie is a reaction against mechanistic naturalism as well as against the monistic systems of Hegel and his school. All "eitle systemsucht" is to be done away with. We are told that we must look for the absolutely individual. And the absolutely individual can be found in history only. Men no longer seek to build ambitious schemes of interpretation of experience with which boldly to face the future; they rather seek to live in resonance with the past (2). And history men do not seek to understand by means of abstract concepts but by analysis of concrete relationships. Studied in this way we shall see that from the past there springs an endless, incomplete, and never to be completed process in which we find ourselves. "It is the tragedy of man, who has lost his God and seeks for this God first of all in the universe and finds Him in his pantheistic carousals. Then when an ever advancing science empties out nature both of God and the soul he flees into history" (3).

But then comes the question what history is. Man as an exclusively historical being becomes a problem to himself. "About this one problem, the historicity of man, all other problems revolve" (4). Dilthey, who was one of the leaders in the discussion of this historical problem, tells us very frankly that "explanation of the universe in terms of itself with the exclusion of all transcendental factors" is his aim (5). In this way Dilthey hopes to get at man in his "unverstümmelten Realität."

Now we may note in passing that Heinemann looks upon this change in the direction of historicism as something quite new. He overlooks,

what from the Christian point of view is very important, namely that the Lebensphilosophie with its ever increasing emphasis upon temporalism was naturally to be expected and was latent even in the most eternalistic type of non-Christian idealism or Geistphilosophie. Even in the Geistphilosophie, and for that matter even in ancient thought, man as an historical individual was made the last court of appeal in epistemology and the temporal world, the world of the Many, was thought of as being as ultimate as the world of the One. But it remains important to note how even those who do not accept the Christian interpretation of history nevertheless clearly see the increase in temporalism in modern thought. Heinemann sees clearly that Christianity must according to its very essence be opposed to this immanentism and secularism of modern times (6).

A point of importance that brings the thought so far developed into immediate contact with the question of the psychology of religion is that according to Dilthey, his search for reality in the field of history rather than nature is only another way of saying that we are seeking for reality in the soul rather than in the spirit. By this he means that we are seeking for reality in the individual human being and more particularly in his feelings rather than in his intellectual processes. In this way history becomes "Seel-suche."

Thus, says Heinemann, the thought of Dilthey fits in with the general tendency of the age to set the soul above the spirit as it appears in another manner in the stormy methods of the new psychologies, in Nietzsche, in the psychoanalytical schools, in Gestaltpsychology, in Behaviorism, in the force with which the idea of psychotherapeutic healing makes its headway, in Bergson's absolutising of the idea of duration and in the struggle of Klages for the supremacy of the soul over the spirit (7).

We see how definitely Heinemann finds a place for the modern psychological movements in the midst of the general tendency to look for the irrational. He says that in Dilthey's philosophy the soul is looked upon as having replaced the Idea. In this way too the word experience itself is given a meaning that is contrasted with the ideational. Just as in English the word experience has come to mean that which is opposed to intellectual construction so in German the word constantly used is Erlebnis. The whole movement is but an expression of the same spirit manifested in Schleiermacher when he tried to rescue religious experience from the petrification that it had suffered through the dogmas of the church (p. 191). It is all an ever clearer expression of the "Diesseitigkeit des Modernen Menschen." Religious pantheism forms the foundation for the modern scientific consciousness (p. 191).

Now since Dilthey saw that there was a wholly different emphasis given to everything one touched once one began to apply the descriptive method to the personalities of history, he also saw that the abstractions of the psychology of the earlier part of the century would have to be modified. "Im Erlebnis sind die seelischen Zustände unmittelbar gegeben, das ist die Grundanschauung Dilthey's" (p. 193). Accordingly the old types of association psychology, which was intellectual in character inasmuch as it built up



the concept of the human soul from mutually independent elements of an ideational nature, had to be replaced by a psychology in which the whole precedes the parts and in which the relationship between the aspects of the soul is not one that is logically thought out but one that is experienced (p. 193). Thus we see that that which was thought of in Greek philosophy as being of a lower order, namely the "Einmalige, Zufällige und Momentane" is now raised to a position of highest metaphysical value. The infinite value of the individual soul so much preached about by modernist ministers can be understood in this light. The movement of phenomenology in Husserl's logic and descriptive psychology alike are manifestations of the search for the infinite value of the soul in and for itself.

Now we may ask what sort of universal it may be by which these individuals of history are to be bound together. The answer is that this universal cannot be found in the old relational system of fixed qualities but must rather be found in a living dynamical "Wirkungszusammenhang" "der als solcher zugleich wertgebend, zwecksetzend, kurz schaffend ist. Das ist der springende Punkt" (201).

Thus we see that in the philosophy of Dilthey we can discern the following elements.

In the first place he naturally carries on the antitheistic conception of the independence of the consciousness of man from God. He has this in common with the Geistphilosophie against which his theory is directed.

In the second place he makes a forward step in the direction of the general irrationalism of modern thought. He is no longer interested in intellectual categories except in so far as they are regarded merely as secondary and symbolical of a reality that lies deeper than they. The universal of interpretation must definitely be sought for in this world without any reference to the ideal world.

In the third place he seeks to bring the idea of reality and value, of existence and meaning into close relationship with one another and fixes them both in the individuals of whom history is composed. We have not only a "Wirkungszusammenhang" in the individual but also a "Bedeutungszusammenhang," which consists in a mysterious and irrational relationship between the various individuals of history.

Now with respect to all this Heinemann asks a very significant question. He says that the work of Dilthey has been very valuable. However, he adds "The deeper question how a temporal process manages to produce values out of itself and to realize ends is a question that is not answered though it is asked" (201). How it is possible for me to think that my individual experience can be taken as interpretative of all experience cannot be answered on the basis of historical relativism. The attempted answer is that there is a movement of life to life, and that the harmony in my own experience can be taken as indicative of the harmony of my experience with all human experience. The whole matter rests on the gratuitous assumption that it is impossible for something to arise in another man's experience that has not arisen in mine. Says Dilthey "Die selben Funktionen und Bestandteile sind in allen Individualitäten, und nur

durch die Grade der Stärke unterscheiden sich die Anlagen der verschiedenen Menschen" (204). It is interesting to note that Heinemann in this immediate connection makes an application of this arbitrary principle of Dilthey to the conception of interpretation of other men's experiences. The whole scheme of Dilthey is sometimes designated as a method of hermeneutics (203). Now with respect to Dilthey's method of interpretation Heinemann says:

"In other words: there is just as in the case of Schleiermacher really no qualitative difference between Author and interpreter. They are distinguished from one another only by the degree of the priority of soul on the ground of general human nature": (204).

Now it does not require much imagination to see that there could not well be a more fundamental opposition than between this modern psychological concept of interpretation and the concept of interpretation that is implied in the Christian position.

The Christian concept of hermeneutics is based first of all upon the creation idea, that is, upon the conviction that there are not merely one but two levels of existence, and that man must be interpreted in terms of God. In the second place the Christian concept of interpretation is based upon the epistemology involved in the notion of two levels of existence, that is, that man's interpretation must always be reinterpretation. Man cannot get at reality at all except via the interpretation of God. Thus even if there were no sin in the world and we were not even dealing directly with God but only indirectly by dealing with man, God's creature, so that we could, on the ground of a common creation, assume a similarity of nature between man and man, our interpretation would nevertheless be reinterpretation of God's interpretation. The fact that it is reinterpretation makes our interpretation valid. But in the third place sin did as a matter of fact come in. Accordingly the qualitative difference that would meet us only indirectly in the case of our interpretation of the experience of our fellow man apart from sin, now meets us directly in the fact that all our interpretation must now be done in the light of the direct interpretation that is given us of ourselves and of our fellow man in the Scriptures of God. We can see this throughout Scripture itself but especially in the climax to the redemptive revelation as it is given in the Apocalypse of John. John submissively receives God's interpretation of the things that must shortly come to pass. That is, John may add nothing that originates with himself. He is told what to write and what not to write in a book. John and those that read after John are to be submissive interpreters of God's interpretation of all things that pertain to the life of man, from the smallest matter of daily bread to the greatest matters of the coming of the Christ. Two types of hermeneutics are arranged in deadly combat against one another.

In this connection we would emphasize two matters. In the first place it should be observed how clearly Heinemann sees that psychology has simply replaced epistemology and is really only another name for the same search of man for the validity of his experience. He says:

"Die Hermeneutik als Theorie des Verstehens nimmt jetzt die Stelle ein, die früher die Erkenntnistheorie einnahm" (208).

Psychology, he says, has become the means of understanding the historical-spiritual world and therewith of the world as such.

In the second place we would observe that the whole attempt to escape an intellectual interpretation of reality as it appears in modern philosophy is but an admission that it is impossible to find an answer to the riddle of life. Says Heinemann:

"Es gibt im Grunde keine letzten Antworten auf die Fragen des Lebens, sondern nur den Prozess des Fragens und Antworten selbst" (207).

All this only corroborates our contention that once one turns his back upon the concept of an absolutely self-conscious God it becomes impossible to interpret experience. Experience cannot be interpreted as afloat on an irrational abyss. If that is done, all that remains of philosophical speculation is to determine what sort of characteristic has the upper hand in one's mind, the intellectual the emotional or the volitional. Some philosophers were intellectualists by temperament, others emotional and still others volitional, and that accounts fully for their various interpretations (207).

The truth of Heinemann's interpretation of modern thought can be seen from the fact that in the psychology of religion literature the prophets of the Scriptures are simply explained psychologically. We have already referred to one or two specimens of this sort of interpretation. Besides, one may constantly meet with efforts on the part of liberal theologians to explain the whole of the traditional position away by psychology. As an example we mention Cole's "History of Fundamentalism." In the entire book there is nothing but one effort to show that the conservatives believe what they believe because their fathers taught them. Now the real question behind all this psychological interpretation, of which we have so much to-day, is whether the psychological explanation itself means anything unless it be upon the presupposition of the truth of the Christian position. Mere psychological explanation is, we believe faced with the difficulty that we have discussed above, namely, that it has no standard of judgment. If one is to be consistent with the method of psychological explanation one must say that all beliefs of men are but manifestations of a certain temperament. In that case one needs to describe all the various forms of temperamental reaction in the world and give them equal weight. One thus ends up in bare description. Mere psychological explanation is not something in which men may turn with hope for success, after they have been persuaded that intellectual interpretations of reality are impossible, but is itself a manifestation of the confessed hopelessness of finding the meaning of life as such. If all intellectual interpretation is false there is not one bit of reason to think that we can get at reality by way of some other avenue of the soul. It would mean a reversion to an old and outmoded faculty psychology to turn from the intellect to the feelings in order in the feelings to find a passage-way to the meaning of life.

And now we must briefly seek to bring out the close relation that exists between this historicism that we have seen in the thought of Dilthey, and in Germany in general, with the psychology of religion schools in America. After discussing Dilthey, Heinemann goes on to Troeltsch. In Troeltsch's writings we have a definite effort to interpret the Christian religion and more particularly the Protestant religion in terms of history alone. He begins with historico-psychological reality. If one wishes to say that Christianity is a relative something one is quite right because the historical and the relative are identical (214). --Troeltsch is quite convinced that our starting-point must be not only the historical individual but, in the historical individual, the non-intellectual religious experience itself. Hence we must deny all the old universals such as revelation and inspiration with which this religious experience was formerly related and through which it was explained. But though we must do away with the old universals Troeltsch sees that we must have a universal and therefore begins to seek for one. He does this in what he calls the philosophy of religion. This philosophy of religion includes first the psychology of religion, then the epistemology of religion and finally the metaphysics of religion (215). The first task is that of psychological analysis. Now in this psychological analysis, Heinemann says, Troeltsch attaches himself definitely to the American school of the psychology of religion as represented in James, Leuba and Starbuck. The problem of this psychological analysis is to study the religious phenomenon "in seiner tatsächlich-irational-einmaligen Eigentümlichkeit" (215). "Das Religiöse ist eine besondere Form der Irrationalen Handlung" (215). Here we see that Troeltsch is in search of the absolutely individual. He seeks for this in a level of existence that is prior to the intellectual. If he should continue in this path he would soon end in the bottomless abyss of an ultimate mysticism and as a matter of fact Troeltsch does hold that religion is primarily mystical.

Now, however, comes the other side of the story. After psychological analysis has led us some distance into the abyss we begin to realize that we have somehow to get out of this abyss if our religion is to mean anything to our fellow man. With respect to this we quote Heinemann in full:

"Hat die psychologische Analyse die Variabilität des religiösen Urphänomens in seiner konkreten unverstümmelten Lebendigkeit mit dem Wirrwarr ihrer Verworranheiten, Verschmelzungen und Einzeitigkeiten aufzuzeigen, liefert sie das empirische Material, so erscheint es Troeltsch als das grosse Problem aller Erkenntnism, ja geradezu als das Geheimnis der Wirklichkeit, die Verbindung dieses Irrational-Individuellen mit dem Apriorisch-Rational-Allgemeinen herzustellen" (216).

Now with respect to this we would observe that Troeltsch has clearly seen that psychological analysis is quite meaningless unless it leads to something further than itself. It must bring us to the question of the validity of the experience that we have. But now we should note further that the way in which Troeltsch seeks for this universal by which he wishes to validate the religious experience is not by the process of intellectual justification. The religious apriori is interpreted as being something

quite unique and independent of intellectual speculation. In this he has followed the general Neo-Kantian philosophy of religion such as that of Otto, Bousset, Stange and others. Says Heinemann:

"Das Apriori bedeutet auf dem Gebiete der Wissenschaft eine autonome oder selbständige, aus eigener innerer Nöwendigkeit sich bildende Vernunfttätigkeit, auf dem der Religion dagegen eine antiintellektualistische, sich mit innerer Nöwendigkeit sich entwickelnde Gültigkeit."

Thus we see that in the first place Troeltsch's effort to seek for the native witness of the religious consciousness fits in with the irrationalism of the day and is but typical of practically all of the psychology of religion that we have. But more important than that, the apriori that is found to be necessary is itself sought in anti-intellektualistic lines. This sinks as still more deeply into the hopeless abyss of the irrationalism of modern thought. It cuts religion once and for all loose from all scientific speculation. It is a great step in the direction of an ultimate subjectivism.

This ultimate subjectivism stands out still more clearly if we note what Heinemann says in this connection about the manner in which this religious apriori manifests itself. The main thing, he says, in the religious apriori of Troeltsch is that it realizes itself in an act of determination and choice and more particularly so when the individual is placed before a choice of a number of various religions. The subjective choice that is made has the feeling of validity. In this way, says Heinemann, the religious apriori has given up not only its intellectual character, but also its claim to eternal validity and universality. The whole matter is reduced to a vague feeling that someone has placed himself in the main stream of the spirituality of things, and that this has been accomplished by intuition (216). It is in this way that Troeltsch sees that he is driven to a position in which he has to give up seeking to give a universally valid interpretation of life. Troeltsch has demonstrated that when one begins on the pathway of historicism one cannot stop till one is at the very last station, namely, that of complete solipsism and irrationalism.

It is particularly important to note that in Troeltsch we have an attempt to weave the method of the psychology of religion schools, as represented by its main exponents, into a larger scheme of the epistemology and the metaphysics of religion. What many of the writers on psychology of religion refuse to do, that is, to set their thought in the larger context of a complete life view, Troeltsch has not hesitated to do. Thus he has shown us something of the logic of the method of the psychology of religion. Well does Heinemann say of the whole matter:

"Wie flutet und wogt es in dieser Religionswissenschaft gegeneinander! Wie erreicht hier die Relativierung und Subjektivierung des Religiösen grossmöglichen Grad, und wie drängt es auf der anderen Seite wieder zurück zum Absoluten! Zunächst wird die Absolutheit des Christentums, dann die der Religion auf gehoben, aber ein neues Absolutes tritt auf, und die Grundtendenz nach einer Fortentwicklung des religiösen Lebens erscheint als das Streben nach einer neuen Metaphysik" (217).

The whole matter reveals itself as an indication of the tragical situation of modern religion (218). History is to be conquered by history (221). Men seek to eternalize the moment (223). The Absolute goes to the devil (226), and what is given us under the name of apriori is something quite different from what has hitherto been understood by that word (226). After we have gone through the whole matter the entire weight of the problem of life falls upon our shoulders anew. We have found no relief (226).

And now it remains for us to discuss briefly the Christiantheistic method by which we expect to study the psychology of religion literature.

We should recall first of all that we are not trying to develop a Christian psychology or psychology of religion. Our main purpose is to discuss the literature on the psychology of religion written mostly by those who are opposed to the Christian religion in order to evaluate it from the Christian point of view.

Now what we have seen thus far with respect to the question of method is that the method employed by the psychology of religion school has led to an impasse. By their search for the absolute particular men have cut themselves loose from all relationship with their fellowmen and from God. And all this has been the result of an attempt to be absolutely neutral as to the theory of metaphysics and epistemology.

What we need accordingly to do is see clearly that in Christiantheism we have the solution of the one and many problem. When we make plain to ourselves that this is the case we shall be saved from the temptation of following the method of "neutrality."

Naturally we cannot here seek to discuss the metaphysics of Christiantheism in detail. We shall only enumerate the presuppositions that underlie our method of dealing with the psychology of religion material as they are involved in our acceptance of Christian theism.

In the first place we are conscious of having as our foundation the metaphysical presupposition of Christianity as it is expressed in the creation doctrine. This means that in God as an absolutely self-conscious being, in God as an absolute personality, who exists as the triune God, we have the solution of the one and many problem. The persons of the trinity are mutually exhaustive. This means that there is no remnant of unconsciousness of potentiality in the being of God. Thus there cannot be anything unknown to God that springs from His own nature. Then too there was nothing existing beyond this God before the creation of the universe. Hence the time-space world cannot be a source of independent particularity. The space-time universe cannot even be a universe of exclusive particularity. It is brought forth by the creative act of God, and this means in accordance with the plan or the universal of God. Hence there must be in this world universals as well as particulars. Moreover they can never exist in independence of one another. They must be equally ultimate which means in this case that they are both derivative. Now if this is the case God cannot be confronted by an

absolute particularity that springs from the space-time universe any more than He can be confronted by an absolute particularity that should spring from a potential aspect of His own being. Hence in God the One and the Many are equally ultimate which in this case means absolutely ultimate.

We cannot now justify this conception of God. It might be argued that we have manufactured such a God-concept as we see the demands of logic force us to make. It will be granted that if we could believe in such a God all our problems with respect to method and for that matter all our problems with respect to anything else are solved in principle. Our answer is that unless this God exists, unless He is more than a concept in the mind of man, human experience would be meaningless. And that He exists in reality cannot be denied because it is affirmed by every denial. That is, we would reduce all the historical theistic arguments to the one argument from human predication. We do not say every effect must have a cause and therefore this world must have a cause and must have been created by God. We rather say that if the word cause is to mean anything to any one, whether it pertains to things within the phenomenal or to things of the noumenal realm, there must be an absolutely unified experience in relation to Whom as a final reference point we may bring our predication of the cause and effect concepts. So too we do not say that God must exist since the existence of perfection is higher than the mere concept of perfection but we rather say that if our concept of perfection, of existence and non-existence is to have any meaning we must presuppose an absolute existence by virtue of which we could make concepts about anything, whether about things in the phenomenal or in the noumenal realm. And if it be said that by this type of argument we might also establish that if we are to have a concept of evil there must be an existence that is absolutely evil, this does not follow. That would be the platonic argument that every concept in this world must have its independent prototype in the ideal world. But the argument for Christian-theism is the very reverse of this. It says that if even the concept of negation is to have meaning whether it be applied to anything in the phenomenal world or to God Himself, we must presuppose the existence of that God as an absolutely unified experience by virtue of which, and by Whom as a reference point, the negation can be made to mean anything at all. Finally we note that we do not say that there is purpose in this world and that therefore there must be a God who has placed purpose in this world, but we rather say that if the word purpose or any other word that we use, whether it be with respect to things within the world or with respect to the existence of the world as a whole, then we must presuppose God as the absolute One who has His purpose in Himself.

To sum up we may say that unless we presuppose God our predication has no field of operation. "Panta Rei" is the only alternative to the Christian God concept. On a non-Christian basis all things change into their opposites as Parmenides said with respect to Heraclitus' position. There is no subject to which a predicate can be attached and there is no predicate to attach to a subject.

Our second presupposition that we accept and make the recognized basis of our method in dealing with the psychology of religion literature, as well as with anything else, is the epistemological

presupposition of revelation. This is but the corollary of the first. By virtue of creation we have seen the universals and particulars that we meet with in the universe cannot exist in independence of one another. Hence there can be no warfare between the priority of the subject or the object of knowledge. They are made for one another. They do not merely happen to fit together somehow but find their fruitful contact because they have been created in fruitful contact with one another by God. Still further, because of the fact of creation, man should never study and can never really study any space-temporal fact or law or combination of fact and law unless they be placed in their position of subordination to God. The words being, existence, cause, purpose, and any other word may be applied to the things of this world by a proximate reference but behind this proximate reference lies the ultimate reference in God. "Whether ye eat or drink or do anything else do all to the glory of God." Now when the human mind recognizes these facts, it recognizes that all things in this universe and especially his own mind are a revelation of God. There could be no true knowledge except it be by the recognition of the revelation of God. To know truly, man's thought must be receptively reconstructive of the revelation of God.

But now some one may make the same objection that was made with respect to our first presupposition, namely, that by this sort of argument one would have to conclude that evil too is a revelation of God. But as we pointed out in that connection that the God-concept required is one by virtue of Whom as an absolutely self-consistent and unified affirmation, negation or evil can exist only as something that is subordinate to Him, so also in this instance we would not that there must be within the reach of man a norm by which he can exclude the evil from his predication. If there were not, man would have to interpret his experience of evil as being as ultimate as the good and end up in meaningless description as we see that the school of the psychology of religion does.

Moreover, this norm must, now that evil is actually in the world, be externally given to man and must come to him as an absolute authority. Originally, when man was created perfect, he did not need an externally promulgated norm since he spontaneously perceived the absolute norm within himself in the activity of his own consciousness. Since the entrance of sin, however, man would spontaneously regard the evil as being as ultimate as the good. We have already noted that the writers on the psychology of religion do this. Yet, as they have felt that somehow a norm is necessary if all their description is to mean anything, we say to them that we preach the God that they are ignorantly groping for. In other words we make no apology for the conception of an authoritative Scripture. Without it human experience cannot be interpreted. It is but the absolute God speaking to us. Hence it is as necessary for our interpretation as is the concept of the absolute God.

Incidentally we remark that our acceptance of the Scriptures does not depend upon our argument for the absolute God, and our argument for the absolute God does not depend upon our acceptance of the Scriptures. We say that the one does not depend upon the other because they are mutually involved in one another and quite inseparable. Our concept of an absolute God is as a matter of fact



nowhere taught but in Scripture. That is as we should expect, since Scripture itself is necessary because of man's departure from the knowledge of God. Scripture is nothing but God's self-testimony to the sinner as once God's self-testimony came to man through man's own consciousness. Hence too it is only His own internal testimony in our hearts, that is, through the regeneration wrought by the Holy Spirit that we believe His own external testimony as it lies before us in Scripture.

But it should be noted that this does not mean that therefore intellectual argument is useless. We have especially sought to bring out the fact that the Holy Spirit needs to convince us of the truth of Christianity, but that He does this by showing us the truth.

From these two presuppositions, the metaphysical one of creation and the epistemological one of revelation, we can now draw a standard of judgment which we may apply to the psychology of religion literature.

In the first place we note what we will not do: We will not seek for the origin or nature of religion in historicism. We will not follow the psychology of religion school in its search for the absolute particular. We want, to be sure, the native witness of religion, but we will not seek for this native witness in the particular historical person about whose relation to God and to mankind we claim to know nothing as yet.

Secondly we will not seek for knowledge with respect to the origin and the nature of religion in an impersonal eternalism. We will not follow those who turn away from the blind alley of the absolute particular to the blind alley of the absolute universal of abstract impersonal and eternal ideas.

Thirdly we will not follow the many writers on the psychology of religion who seek for light on the origin and nature of religion in a mixture of temporalism or historicism and eternalism. We will not begin with the position which takes reality as it is for granted as being ultimate and say that reality has a permanent and a changeable aspect and that we somehow have to take them both. We are certain that this sort of method is no better than either that of pure historicism or that of pure eternalism.

Whoever follows one of these three paths must in the nature of the case run into a blind alley.

We may state these same negations by getting at the matter from the other way.

In the first place we will not follow the method of abstract description. That method is nothing but the application of the concept of historicism. If all reality is on an equal level, if all reality is such a stream can one apply the method of exclusive description. We may say that we reject the method of pure description and the metaphysics of temporalism that is involved in it or we may say that we reject the metaphysics of temporalism and the method of pure description that is involved in it.

In the second place we shall not follow the method of explanation that seeks for a norm in abstract universals which are thought of as eternal. Plato has taught us once for all that the ideal world does us no good as a source of explanation of the sense world as long as that ideal world is impersonal. In such a case we need after all to develop our own norm and choose for ourselves which of the equally eternal ideas, some of which are evil and some of which are good, we will set as our standard. Hence this sort of abstract impersonal eternalism turns out to be after all once more nothing but historicism and the method is after all nothing but that of description. No non-theistic method can be anything but bare description.

In the third place we can say that we will not follow those who seek for a combination of description and explanation by seeking to find the universal as well as the particular in the temporal stream. We have seen how Troeltsch tried to generate an apriori for religion from the course of history and how he ends up in nothing but the abstract particular after all. When men in the field of logic say that the synthetic and the analytic must be thought of as equally ultimate we reject their logic and maintain that they can never develop a law of contradiction on such a basis. Similarly we now hold that if men seek to apply a combination of what is called the ideographic and what is called the nomothetic methods by saying that we must somehow use both and use them simultaneously we hold that this is nothing but a confession that explanation has been given up altogether.

Turning now from these negations, which we believe are comprehensive of the various ramifications of the method of the psychology of religion schools, we may say what we will do:

We will in the first place fearlessly take our concept of God as absolute personality as the standard of human thought. We hold that human thought is analogical of God's thought. Hence we keep the universal and the particular together always. Mankind was created as a unity. The individual experience of one human being could never bring an independent and so called native witness to the nature of religion. No one man ever existed or was meant to exist in total independence of all others. Each human being was meant, to be sure, to show forth something individual and in this way add something to the witness of the whole of humanity as to what God means to man, but this individual should always be thought of in conjunction with the whole race.

Even more important than this, if possible, is the fact that this witness of humanity as a whole must have God as its objective reference and could not exist without this objective reference. God is the presupposition of the very existence of those who give the witness to Him; hence their witness is reflective. The human consciousness as a whole cannot be thought of as functioning except upon the presupposition of God and so too the religious consciousness cannot be thought of as functioning apart from God.

It follows from this too that we will not set the feeling in opposition to the intellect. God has created man as a harmony.

One aspect of man's personality cannot lead us deeper into reality than another aspect can.

Still further it follows that we will seek for the solution of our problems as far as possible in the direction of rationality rather than irrationality. Individual human beings are not drops afloat upon the sea of the Irrational, but live before the background and in relation to an absolutely self-conscious God.

Finally it follows from our acceptance of God as the standard that there can be only one true religion. Only that religion is true which uses God as its standard of judgment. We have seen that evil must be subordinate to God to exist at all. Hence if there are other religions besides the one which recognizes God as the standard, it is only by virtue of the true religion and more ultimately by virtue of God through Whom true religion exists that these religions can exist. More than that, since evil must exist in subordination to God if it exists at all, all religions but the one that recognizes God must be spoken of as false.

In the second place we not only maintain that God is the source and standard of our judgment with respect to the truth and the falsity of religions, but we also hold that since God has spoken in the Scriptures we must use the Scriptures to determine which religion is true and which is false. We saw that God had to make Himself known externally in order that the sinner might know Him at all.

In passing we remark that Modernism cannot escape making a choice between the position we have here outlined and the position of the non-Christian by appealing to Christ in distinction from the Scriptures as a standard. Christ is but the fact revelation of which the Scripture is the word revelation. The two stand or fall together. Christ Himself said that He came in order that the Scriptures might be fulfilled.

Finally we note that if it be objected that since we are ourselves the interpreters of Scripture we have after all our effort to escape subjectivism landed headlong in it once more, we reply that since the Scripture does not function without the operation of the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit makes us submit ourselves to Scripture, so He also guides us into the truth of Scripture. This is to be sure mysticism from the point of view of those who do not hold to it. But this fact that it appears as mysticism to our opponents is but a corroboration of the truth of our position since it fits in with the idea that in a sinful world only the absolute God Himself can convince men of the error of their way.

Thus we stand face to face with the psychology of religion literature. We throw its method overboard completely. We definitely claim that we can explain that which in the nature of the case they can merely describe, and cannot really describe. We deny that they can even describe religion truthfully because they do not describe it for what it really is. They deal only with bare facts which need explanation. We are not ashamed of our method and the charge of obscurantism does not trouble us. We say with Paul: "Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world, for after that

the world by wisdom knew not God it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save those that believe." Our method is the only method that will not lead us into a blind alley. Our method is not a wild fantastic "Quest for Certainty," which has no practical bearing on life, but the only method by which life can be thought of as having any meaning at all.

References: Chapter IV

1. Enumeration of literature may be found in:  
D. Emanuel Hirsch, Die Idealistische Philosophie und das Christentum, 1926.  
Eduard B. Spranger, Der Kampf gegen den Idealismus, 1931.
2. Heinemann, Neue Wege der Philosophie, p. 180.
3. Idem, p. 180.
4. Idem, p. 181.
5. Idem, quotation from Dilthey, p. 183.
6. Idem, p. 185.
7. Idem, p. 187.

Note: The references to the other pages in Heinemann are inserted in the text.

GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

In an article on "Die moderne Religionspsychologie" (1) Karl Beth begins by saying that he that would understand the psychology of religion must first look at psychology in general and study its recent development. The reason for this is not far to seek. Those who work in the field of the psychology of religion have come to the study of religion with the stated intention of applying to it the methods and insights of modern psychology. They hoped in this way to obtain a new and more valuable interpretation of religion. And it is but natural that these men will seek to apply the latest and best methods and results of psychology in general to the subject matter of the psychology of religion. So, for instance, Ames is a functional psychologist because he thinks functional psychology to be the best type of psychology, and it is this functional psychology by which he interprets religion. Says he: "The point of view employed is that of functional psychology, which is necessarily genetic and social" (2). Accordingly we shall give a short survey of the general trend of things as it appears in the several schools of psychology today.

In order to understand the recent trend in psychology we must note that the psychology of the earlier nineteenth century was, generally speaking, that of associationism. This psychology had its origin, as far as modern thought is concerned, in the philosophy of Descartes. Descartes separated the mind from the body entirely. He studied the mind as an entity that had nothing to do with the body. Moreover Descartes thought of the mind in exclusively intellectual terms. "L'ame pense toujours" was the principle of his psychology. The emotional and the volitional were disregarded.

Upon this basic conception of Descartes the association psychologists built when they formulated the laws by which the mind was supposed to work. These laws themselves they conceived of after the analogy of physical laws, as physics was conceived of by Descartes, that is, in mechanical fashion. There was thought to be a direct proportion between the stimulus and the response in the mind in a way similar to the proportion observed in physical momentum. The gradual refinements in psychology were all in the direction of finding more definite and more intricate relationships of proportion between stimulus and response. Psychometrics was developed. Fechner brought in logarithms in order to show the relation between stimulus and response. In order to carry through this program of psychometrics it was necessary to reduce the mental phenomena to their most elemental constituents. By an "Elementar-analyse" the soul was reduced to something that could be handled much as a block-house can be built up from individual blocks. Blocks can be placed in different relations to one another in order to obtain different kinds of houses.

The chief characteristics, then, of this psychology, as they are noted in the histories of psychology, are (a) its intellectualism, and (b) its atomism.

The nineteenth century psychology, based as it was upon a Cartesian foundation, was not at all Christian. The mind of man was thought of as being independent of God. The laws by which one mind was supposed to be brought into fruitful relationship with other minds were abstract laws that were somehow found in the universe. Both the particular and the universal and their relationship to one another were thought of as independent of God. But there was at least this much resemblance between a truly Christian and the Cartesian psychology, that both placed man far above the beast. To this it is sometimes added that both placed the intellect above the other aspects of the mind. This is not correct. Christian psychology does not place the intellect ahead of any other aspect of man's personality in the sense that one should be more truly human than another. Man is equally prophet, priest and king. All that Reformed theology has meant by emphasizing the priority of the intellect is that it is only through intellectual interpretation that we can communicate with one another about the meaning of reality.

With the advent of the twentieth century a new advance, and that an advance farther than ever away from Christian-theism, has been taken by psychology. When we say that this began with the turn of the century we do not mean that the tendency was not already operative and to a certain extent prepared for somewhat earlier. This further advance away from Christian-theism occurred when man wiped out the borderlines that separated man from the beast, and the beast from the inorganic world, thus reducing man to a focus of action and interaction in the sea of an ultimate Irrationalism. Let us note some of the stages by which this result was accomplished.

In the first place we must observe that as there was a general reaction to the Geistphilosophie on the part of the Lebensphilosophie in the latter part of the nineteenth century, so the new psychology reacted against the intellectualism of associationism. The sharp distinction that even Kant had made between sense intelligence and reason (3) gave way to a view in which the intellect lost its place of high authority. This might have been done in the interest of a Christian type of thought. Christianity has always sought to equalize all the aspects of man's personality. However, the dethroning of the intellect was not done in the interest of theism but in the interest of Irrationalism. Psychology was but following the lead of Schopenhauer and Von Hartman in their ultimate metaphysical voluntarism when it searched in the non-rational for a deeper insight into the nature of the human soul.

In the second place the new psychology reacted against the separation of the soul from the body. This too might have been in the interest of Christian-theism. Heinemann has quite misinterpreted the Christian conception of the relation of the soul to the body when he says:

"Das christliche Mittelalter kennt die Seele als Hauch, von Gott dem leblosen Körper eingehaucht, so als geschaffenes Wesen höheren Ursprungs, aus einer unkörperlichen Region stammend und als unsterblich in sie zurückkehrend" (4).

The Christian position is not that the soul existed in an immaterial world before its union with the body. The Christian position is rather that both soul and body came into existence together. Moreover, as they came into existence together, they will also be immortal together. True, there is a time when they are separate, that is from the time of death to the time of the resurrection, but this period of separation is to be followed by a permanent reunion. So then the Christian position has never been guilty of abstract separation of the soul and the body. Accordingly, in so far as the new psychology seeks to bring soul and body into close harmony with one another, we can only rejoice.

However, we should again observe that this bringing of soul and body together by modern psychology is in the interest of wiping out the distinction between them. Heinemann significantly says that the soul of modern psychology resembles the Vitalseele, the simple life-principle of the ancients.

The first step led directly to the second. The descent into the non-rational was in the direction of a further descent into the corporeal. Says Heinemann:

"Erscheint so der Mensch als tief verflochten in das historische Geschehen, so bedeutet die Betonung der Triebacht nicht anders als eine Einbettung des Seelischen ins Körperliche, eine Biologisierung der Seele, die zugleich eine Dynamisierung ist. Das seelische Leben ist ein Kräftespiel, das hier freilich recht naturwissenschaftlich als Energieumsatz verstanden wird. Damit ist die Seele wieder das geworden, was sie in der Antike war: Vitalseele ---" (5).

We see then that the first step, that is the emphasis upon the emotional and the volitional, has not worked in the direction of finding a better balance between the intellectual and the other aspects of personality, but has led in the direction of doing away with the distinction of soul and body which is basic to the theistic conception of man.

In the third place the new psychology reacted against the old in that it laid more emphasis upon child psychology. The older psychology was almost exclusively an adult psychology. Children were treated as miniature adults. The new psychology tries to do fuller justice to the individuality of childhood than the old psychology could do. Says Jastrow:

"What we may accept is the principle that the child is an authentic embodiment of the earliest, racially oldest, most persistent, truest to nature, depository of natural behavioristic psychology" (6).

Again it should be noted that this third step follows naturally upon the second. The intellectualism of the older psychology could do scant justice to the individual. All men were cut after the same abstract pattern of rationality that was somehow taken for granted on the basis of observation of a large number of "normal" adults. But the emphasis of the new psychology upon the emotional and the

volitional in man naturally also meant an emphasis upon the individuality of each person. The emotional and the volitional life of man is notoriously unwilling to be cut according to one pattern. And this emphasis led to the idea that children too should be regarded as individuals at each stage of their existence. In other words the concept of the variability of personality was introduced into psychology. A child is thought of as quite an independent type of being instead of as a little adult. A child is, to the extent that it is a personality at all, thought of as a unique personality. In accordance with this enlargement of the field into relation with which the grownup personality is set, it is as true to say that the adult must be interpreted in terms of the child as to say that the child must be interpreted in terms of the adult.

With respect to this third step we wish to observe again that it too might have been taken in the interest of theism. Individuality is a concept that is embedded in the very foundations of theism. As Christianity has tried to do justice to the emotional and the volitional, so it has also tried to do justice to the individuality of each person. Orthodox theology has constantly maintained that the image of God in mankind cannot be fully expressed until every individual man has contributed his unique personality. Associationism had inherited the abstract universalism of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy but had ignored Augustine and Calvin. So too Christianity has constantly tried to do justice to childhood. The Old and the New Testament have in their educational principles made provision for the child as an emotional and volitional being by insisting not only upon abstract intellectual presentation of truth but also upon surrounding the child with an atmosphere that will influence him at his emotional center.

But now we must add that the third step of modern psychology has not actually been in the direction of theism. Its variability concept by virtue of which it seeks to do justice to childhood is based upon an ultimate activism. Modern psychology thinks of personality as being exclusively a self-accomplishment on the part of man. At this point it is directly opposed to Christianity which holds that personality is created by God. According to the Christian view, then, variability can mean only that man's personality is not fully developed when created but grows into the pattern set for it by God. The activity by which personality realizes itself is to be sure, very genuine and significant but it is genuine and significant only because it acts before the background of the plan of God. The integration of personality, that is, the constant readjustment of the particular and the universal within itself, and the constant readjustment of the whole personality as an individual to the universal found in the universe beyond itself, takes place by a more ultimate and constant readjustment of the individual together with his surroundings to God who is the absolute particular and the absolute universal combined in one ultimate personality. The integration of personality, according to the Christian view, is an integration toward and by virtue of an ultimate self-sufficient personality.

In contrast with this the modern concept of the integration of personality is an integration into the void. We can best appreciate this if we note that the concept purpose itself has been completely



internalized. Heinemann says, in the same connection in which he brings out that according to Freudianism the soul has become a Vitalseele, that Freud has willy-nilly to recognize the "Sinnhaftigkeit des psychovitalen Geschehens" (7). By that he means that the idea of purpose itself is something non-rational.

This leads us to note the fourth step of the descent into the irrational on the part of modern psychology, that is, its emphasis upon the unconscious whether of the adult or of the child. The adult is not only to be interpreted in terms of the child but the child and the adult both are to be interpreted in terms of the sub-conscious drives. It was not enough to coordinate feeling and will with the intellect or even to insist upon the primacy of the feeling or the will. Modern psychology has made the whole of conscious life to a large extent subordinate to man's unconscious life. That is, modern psychology has sought for the explanation of the conscious life in the fields of the unconscious.

It is well known that the psychoanalytical schools of Freud, Adler and Jung have done much to seek to interpret our waking life by our dream life. He argues that man consciously purposes to do something but the reason for their conscious purpose is an unconscious drive. We are not concerned with the fact the Freud sought to explain the whole of self-conscious life by the sex-drive while Adler sought to explain it largely by the selfishness instinct. The differences within the psychologico-analytical school do not concern us. It is enough to note that their explanation is an explanation of the rational or the self-conscious by the irrational and the sub-consciousness.

We should also note in this connection that the psychology of McDougal in this respect resembles that of Freud and his followers. It is often quite mistakenly supposed that McDougal affords much comfort to those who believe the Christian position since he at least holds to the concept of purpose while such schools as Behaviorism cling to a mechanistic interpretation of all mental phenomena. Behaviorism, to be sure, does not allow for the concept of purpose at all. But it is scarcely better to say that you do allow for the concept purpose, and even insist upon its originality in the field of psychology, if you bury this concept of purpose in the lowest depths of irrationalism and therewith place it at the farthest possible removed position from Christian theism. McDougal says that his concept of teleology has nothing in common with the concept of teleology as held by the theologians, since the latter is externalistic while his own is exclusively immanentistic. He even goes so far as to say that purpose is not primarily to be related to any intellectual activity of man at all.

But even this fourth step of modern psychology has good elements in it. As Christians we believe that man was originally created with the love of God in his heart. That is, we believe that man was priest as well as prophet. More than that we also believe that man was in part conscious and in part unconscious in his activity. We hold that man was created as a character. That is we maintain that in his unconscious as well as in his conscious activity man was directed toward God. Scripture is full of the idea of the

subconscious. David prays that he may be forgiven for sins of which he is unaware. We say that we are born and conceived in sin which does not merely refer to the activity of the parents but means that we are sinners when we come into the world even though we are not self-conscious. We are even worthy of eternal punishment because of our relation to Adam. And though we would conceive of our relation to Adam as a federal and not a realistic one, it at any rate clearly shows that the church has never limited personal responsibility to the self-conscious activity of man. The activism involved in the Arminian conception is not truly representative of the Christian position.

But this only brings out the antithesis between the truly Christian position and the non-Christian psychology of the day more sharply. It is sometimes asserted that modern psychology has corroborated the Calvinistic position rather than the Arminian inasmuch as both modern psychology and Calvinism emphasize the significance of the relationship of the individual to the subconscious and the historical while Arminianism does not. There is truth in this contention. In so far as modern psychology has shown that the individual's conscious life is dominated by drives that come up from his unconscious life it has stood with Calvinism against Arminianism. On the other hand it may be said that modern psychology is closer to Arminianism than to Calvinism because of the activism that characterizes it. Arminianism has departed one step from the position of Christian-theism inasmuch as it will not allow that man was created a character. Modern psychology has gone all the way in that direction and has said that man's character is exclusively his own accomplishment. Arminianism, inconsistently but happily, turns back to God after the first step inasmuch as it believes the creation doctrine; modern psychology has no such limitations and places man in a void.

It ought to be clear that there are only two positions that are internally consistent on this point. If one begins upon the path of complete activism one cannot stop until one has come to the place where modern psychology has come. If God has not created man then man has somehow come upon the scene from the realms of chance and one's character has nothing to do with God. Of course it may still be said that one's character is not wholly one's own since each individual is surrounded by cosmic influences of all sorts. But, in any case, God has then been put out of the picture altogether. Hence it is necessary, if the Christian conception is to be defended at all, that it be defended by rejecting modern activism in its entirety. God has created man with intellect, feeling and will. God created man, soul and body. God created the first man as a full-grown person, but has caused later generations to spring up by growth from childhood to maturity. God has related man's self-conscious to his subconscious life; his childhood to his maturity. Every activity of every aspect of the human personality, at any stage of its development, acts as a derivative personality before the background of the absolute personality of God. Man is an analogical personality. It is this consistently Biblical and Christian-theistic concept alone that can be defended against the activism of modern psychology. Arminianism, here as elsewhere, offers no defense.

If put in this way the issue is taken out of the surface areas in which it is usually discussed. Many Christian apologists use all their ammunition in the fight by contending against modern psychology on the ground that it immerses man in the meshes of drives etc. over which he has no control. It is said that Christianity insists on the responsibility of man and that it is this that we must seek to defend against modern psychology. Now it is true that Christianity holds man to be responsible. But to argue in the blue for freedom does not help to establish man's responsibility. It is true that modern psychology allows for no responsibility but the most basic reason for this is not that it has immersed man's will in the midst of instincts and drives. The real reason why modern psychology has left no room for responsibility is found in the fact that it has taken the whole of the human personality in all its aspects, self-conscious and sub-conscious, and immersed it in an ultimate metaphysical void. Man cannot be responsible to the void. Hence the only way in which we can establish human responsibility is by showing the ultimate irrationalism of all non-theistic thought of which modern psychology is but a particular manifestation. In that way we place man self-consciously and subconsciously in every aspect of his person before the personality of God. Man is responsible in the whole of his personality but only if he is the creature of God. Man before God is the only alternative to man in the void.

The fifth step of modern psychology in the direction of ultimate irrationalism is the study of abnormal psychology. Says Jastrow:

"Prominent in the reconstruction of psychology is the recognition of the abnormal and its significance as a clue to the understanding of behavior" (8).

The study of abnormal psychology is a good thing. It has undoubtedly thrown light not only on the behavior of the abnormal but also on the behavior of the normal. But this is not in dispute. It is not the fact that men turned to the study of abnormal psychology that is important but the reason why they did it. This reason was the assumption that the normal and the abnormal are both of them normal in the sense that they are both of them naturally to be expected in human life. Hence it is said that one can really get as much light on the normal behavior of man by studying his abnormal behavior as one can get on the abnormal behavior of man by studying his normal behavior. On this point we again quote Jastrow:

"The abnormal, like the genetic, is a nature-made product, and thus authentic and directive; the abnormal is the normal magnified and distorted, the normal is the abnormal in miniature and under control" (9).

To this he adds:

"The accusation or the pleasantry as suggested by the reaction from this trend that psychology first lost its soul and then its mind, carries the truth of historical vicissitude; but he who loses his soul shall find it" (10).

One need only to read a book like McDougal's "Outline of Abnormal Psychology" to see the extent to which the assumption expressed by Jastrow, in the quotations given has influenced men. One ought to remember that McDougal's psychology is typical in its anti-intellectualism. McDougal seeks for the real place of purpose in the drives of man. Still further, his psychology is typical in that it emphasizes the social. This emphasis upon the social is so far extended as to include the abnormal. Throughout McDougal's book on abnormal psychology it is taken for granted that new light can be shed upon the normal by the study of the abnormal because the abnormal is natural as well as the normal.

It is at this point that modern psychology appears once more on its antitheistic character. As Christians we rejoice that psychology has finally come to the study of the abnormal. The Christian position has preceded non-Christian science by centuries in the study of the abnormal. Non-Christian science has for ages taken for granted, that somehow the abnormal is an inexplicable mystery quite out of harmony with the effort at a complete intellectual interpretation of life. Just as Plato's ideas of mud and hair and filth were there and remained there to disturb his attempted subordination of all experience under the category of the good or the one, so non-Christian psychology has never been able to find any explanation for the phenomenon of mental abnormality. Non-Christian thought assumes that evil is as ultimate as the good. It has always assumed this. Now the logical consequence of this position is that men should give up seeking for any rational interpretation of life at all. But till recent times men have not been willing to accept the consequences of an ultimate irrationalism, neither yet now are they fully willing. Yet it is undeniable that the descent into the irrational has been rapid in modern thought. It could not be otherwise. If there is irrationalism somewhere in the universe, and if it is taken for granted that this irrationalism is as ultimate as rationality itself, it follows that irrationalism must be thought of as never to be overcome. One rotting apple in a bushel will spoil the whole lot in time. One spot of ultimate irrationality will not only spoil rationality in the future but even now makes all talk about complete rationality meaningless.

Christianity with its conception of God as the absolute rationality has taught that man was created wholly rational. That is, though man was not created with the ability to grasp comprehensively the whole of rationality, yet his rationality was sound. Hence, irrationality in the mind of man, that is insanity, must be the result of a deflection of man from the source of absolute rationality. Accordingly, the Christian will have to bring in his doctrine of sin when he discusses abnormal psychology. Not as though every insane person is a particularly great sinner. There are to be sure particular forms of sin that readily lead to insanity. Yet there are many persons who are insane who are not nearly so great sinners as others who are normal. We explain this on the ground that responsibility is corporate. Jesus said that the tower of Siloam fell upon those upon whom it fell not because they were great sinners than others but because of the sinfulness of the race. All men have merited God's punishment. So all men have merited insanity because of their departure from God. Eternal punishment is the abyss of

irrationalism into which will fall those who do not return to the God of rationality. Even in this life, what we call rational or normal experience is a gift of God's common grace. No man is worthy of it.

It will appear from this that the assumption underlying the study of the psychology of the abnormal, as it usually is undertaken today, is indicative of a farther departure from theism than was the case with earlier psychology.

The sixth step of modern psychology in the direction of the irrational is its study of the soul of "primitive man." To quote again from Jastrow:

"Worthy of separate enumeration is the recognition of the place of the primitive psyche in the interpretation of behavior-trends from the simplest to the most complex" (11).

Freud and his school look upon the study of primitive phenomena as a "reservoir of psychic trends." And of the anthropologists like Tylor, Frazer, Levy, Bruhl and others, Jastrow says that "they have supplied a genealogy to an important chapter of modern psychology, portraying as an amazing reconstruction the procession of intellectual shifts and increments in rationality" (12).

In this step we see again that it is in the direction away from theism. In the first five steps that we have enumerated, we dealt with an extension of the field in the direction of space only, but in this step we meet for the first time with an extension of the field in point of time. Hence it is really at this point for the first time that the full significance of the doctrine of evolution comes to view. Up to this point it was to be sure possible to speak of an increment of rationality so far as the individual is concerned in the process of growth from childhood to maturity, but now we meet with the contention that the mind of man has gradually evolved through the ages. We begin to see the outlines of the abyss of irrationality more clearly now than ever before.

At this point too Christian thought has an explanation of its own to offer. It says that man was created perfect. That is man was created as an adult with full rationality. This sets off the Christian position clearly and distinctly from all evolutionary views. There has been on "increment of rationality" in the sense that the rational has slowly developed from the non-rational. On the other hand Christianity does not claim that man did not develop in the sense that by the exercise of his increased rationality he increased his rational powers and his rational accomplishments. It is quite in accord with Scripture that man should at first live close to nature and should use implements taken immediately from nature such as those that are found by archeology. God gave to man a program in accordance with which he should bring out the forces of nature gradually. Man did not do this as well as he might have done it if he had not sinned. Through sin his growth was not only retarded but also made abnormal. Hence we see that man's progress in civilization has been very slow. We may even say that there would have been no progress at all if it were not for God's common

grace. If as Christians we use the term "primitive man" at all we should be clearly conscious of the fact that we do not mean by it the same sort of being that the modern psychologist means by it. It is not as though every one knows just what primitive man is and that all that remains is to draw certain conclusions from his works. On the contrary the whole debate between Christianity and non-Christianity is involved in the question as to what the "primitive man" is. If Christianity is true the real primitive man was Adam, who came upon the scene of history as a full-grown man. On the other hand if the teaching of current evolution is true, primitive man is an independent growth out of bare vacuity.

Modern psychology has adopted the evolutionary philosophy. With respect to this we may quote the words of Jastrow:

"Modern psychology had a fortunate childhood because it came upon the scene when the struggle of existence for evolution had already been successfully waged by its historical sponsors" (14).

Modern psychology is deeply imbedded in a non-theistic metaphysics which it has taken for granted uncritically. Yet the claim is made that it was at the time of the emergence of the modern outlook that doctrinaire methods were first done away. To quote from Jastrow:

"If we return to the era of the emergence of the modern outlook, we readily recognize that the speculative and doctrinaire type of introspection was doomed" (15).

Suffice it in this connection to have called attention to the fact that modern psychology has raised primitive man to a position next to that of modern man in so far as principles of explanation are concerned. Modern psychology has assumed the non-Christian position with respect to the concept of this primitive man.

The final or seventh step of modern psychology is the elevation of the animal as a principle of explanation for man. This is already involved in the previous steps. It is simply the last step in the direction of complete irrationalism. Without this last step the others would have no significance. If man has come from the God in Whom Christianity believes, the adult man is the standard of interpretation of all rationality in mankind. We may take this adult in the various stages of his growth, to be sure, and note that each stage has its own peculiarities, but we cannot allow that the child, the abnormal person, the primitive man and finally the animal can be put on the level with the adult as a source of explanation of life as a whole. On the other hand if man is what non-Christian thought says he is, the normal adult stands on no higher level as a principle of interpretation of life as a whole than the child, the abnormal person and the animal. In that case the animal even has a certain priority over the primitive man, the latter over the child and the child over the man on account of the fact that they appeared upon the scene of shistory first and man was originated from and through them.

The recent schools of psychology have been more consistent than the association psychology in the application of the non-Christian concept of man. In former generations men sometimes sought to find interesting parallels of rationality among the animals. Some thought they had discovered religion in the animal world. Yet somehow they began from the normal adult man as a sort of standard. Recently, however, there has been a great emphasis upon animal psychology. And the assumption is that the behavior of animals sheds direct light on the behavior of man. Just as non-Christian logic likes to speak of thought without asking whether it should perhaps make a distinction between human thought and divine thought, so modern psychology speaks about behavior without asking whether it should perhaps speak of human and of animal behavior in distinction from one another. Of course psychologists do speak of human behavior and of animal behavior, but it is taken for granted that if any laws can be discovered in the one field they can without further criticism be transferred to the other field. The interesting debate among the Behaviorists and the Gestalt psychologists and the hormic psychologists brings this out. Watson the Behaviorist, Koffka the Gestalt psychologist, and McDougal the hormic psychologist are all of them interested in animal psychology. This in itself shows that the interest in animal psychology is characteristic of recent psychology as a whole. But more important than that they are all interested in the subject is the fact that they all take for granted that the animal behavior is directly illuminative for the understanding of human behavior.

Thus we have reached the end of the road beyond which no man can go. Let us sum up what we have found. We have not enumerated all the recent schools of psychology in order to enter into the debates that they have among themselves. We have rather sought to trace one general tendency that pervades them all. One can find a good survey of the recent schools of psychology in the two books "Psychologies of 1925" and "Psychologies of 1930." But in reading these books one is likely to be lost because one is tempted to listen carefully to the debate in which these schools are engaged. Woodworth's book on "Contemporary Schools of Psychology" will help us to get something of the trends that appear in these schools. Even so, however, Woodworth and others like Brett and Baldwin, who give histories and surveys of the schools of psychology, themselves take the modern theory for granted. They do not bring out what is important from the Christian point of view. They think of the main question as being something in which we are not directly interested. Accordingly we have to survey the tendency of the modern schools of psychology which the distinct purpose in mind of ascertaining what their attitude is to Christian-theism.

This attitude, we found in our survey, has been in the direction of irrationalism: The net result is that man now stands before us, if we allow modern psychology to draw the picture, as a Feldwesen. That is, man is thought of as a focus of action and interaction of cosmic forces which have somehow sprung into existence. The field to which man is related and in terms of which he is to be explained is not only the whole world as it now is, but the whole world as it has somehow become in the milleniums of the past. Ultimately then we must say that the field is the void. It is this con-

cept that is substituted for the concept of Christianity. Heinemann seeks to make plain to us this concept of Feldwesen by contrasting it with the substance concept of the older psychology. He says:

"An Stelle dieser Substanzauffassung tritt vielmehr die Feldauffassung, d. h. der Mensch ist ein Aktions- und Reaktionszentrum in einem mit ihm wesentlich verknüpfter Felde" (16).

Thus we have a complete contrast of the consistently Christian and the consistently non-Christian view of man as the two types of psychology involved in each of these two views picture them.

Thus we have found new corroboration of the interpretation of the problem of evidences as given in a previous chapter. Modern psychology as well as modern philosophy in general is seeking for the absolute particular or brute fact. From the adult as a standard to the child, from the child to the abnormal, from the abnormal to the primitive and from the primitive man to the animal, each of them thought of as independently contributing new light on the behavior of man, this is the story of recent psychology.

We may well ask the question how modern psychology is going to get back to any sort of universal and more particularly how the psychology of religion is going to get to the universal that it is seeking for by applying the method and the materials of modern psychology in general.

#### References: Chapter V

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THE NATURE OF RELIGION --  
OBJECTIONS TO THE TRADITIONAL VIEW

Our discussion so far has been preparatory to what follows. We have yet to see exactly what it is that the psychology of religion school means by religion. We have already seen something of this, and we are already in a position to know what, in the nature of the case, it must be. We have observed that men have taken for granted that it is in the religious consciousness, taken as an ultimate something and as a normal something, that we must look in order to find what religion really is. We have also seen that when men look to this religious consciousness, they claim to be quite neutral in so doing. They claim to be merely describing what they find as a matter of fact. Now, we have pointed out that, in the nature of the case, it is a certain type of religion what must result from these assumptions. Yet we must see somewhat more explicitly what the nature of religion is thought to be.

All that is said about the nature of religion by the writers on that subject in recent times can be summed up in three heads. In the first place, all agree that religion is not what traditional Christianity says it is. In the second place, there is an element of uncertainty about every definition of religion. It is said that nobody really knows what religion is. In the third place, it turns out that religion is definitely as some sort of resignation to the universe as it is. We shall look at these three points, in the order given.

In the first place, the writers on the psychology of religion thoroughly agreed on one thing, and that is that religion is not what the traditional point of view says it is. Whatever differences there may be among these writers about other things, there is a hearty agreement on the negative attitude with respect to traditional Christianity. We note some of the reasons that are usually given in justification of this opposition to the traditional point of view.

It is said that the traditional view is arbitrary because it leaves out of consideration many people that are truly religious. This point is emphasized by Pratt, as was pointed out in the first chapter. We also recall the statement of Müller that he who knows only one religion really knows none at all. Thus men seem to be wider in their sympathies than they formerly were.

Then, too, it is said that the traditional view is based upon a false intellectualism, and that in a two-fold sense. The traditional view is said to be intellectualistic psychologically. It does not do justice to the feeling and the will. In the second place, the traditional view is said to be intellectualistic epistemologically. It is based upon the assumption that it is possible for man to have absolute truth on the ground of which he may condemn those who have it not. Thus men seem to be more modest than they formerly were.

Under these two heads, we believe, we can conveniently classify the common objections to the traditional view.

With respect to these objections, we must note first that the objections are not made on the ground that the traditional view is not true. That is, the objectors do not and will not engage in an intellectual debate about the nature of reality. Their objections is rather that the traditional view is not true to life. That is, that it falsifies experience.

The main reason for holding that the traditional view is not true to life is found in the fact that men think they can find the origin of religion in history. It is said that during the beginnings of the race there was no religion. Man gradually became a moral and religious being. And what is true of religion in particular is true of all the intellectual categories of man in general. The idea that there is an absolute truth has itself appeared only gradually. Or, even if it has appeared rather suddenly, it is said that what we now regard as axioms were once upon a time no more than practical postulates.

It is for such reasons as this that Pratt says that from the intellectual point of view there is no difference between one religion and another. "One purely intellectual position does not differ psychologically from another" (1). To this he adds: "Hence the very admission that there is such a thing as the psychology of religion presupposes that we mean by religion something else than a theological affirmation" (2).

Now, with respect to this criticism of Pratt, and with respect to the whole idea that the traditional point of view can be set aside in this way, we would remark the following. In the first place, the traditional position cannot fairly be described as a purely intellectual point of view. It is, to be sure, often scornfully referred to as mere belief in certain intellectual propositions. Yet this has never been the case with orthodox Christianity. There have, to be sure, always been those who have been adherents of the Christian religion; but who have abused Christianity by reducing it to something merely intellectual. However, this is an abuse and it is not fair to measure the value of a position by the abuse that certain of its adherents have made of it. More important than that, Pratt ought to know right well that at the center of the Christian position stands the conception of the personality of God. This personality of God is thought of by the Christian Church as having the utmost practical significance. God is thought of as either taking people into eternal communion with Himself or else as rejecting them forever from His presence. Now, whether one like or dislike this sort of conception of things, one can scarcely say that it is a mere intellectual dogma that has no practical significance or that it does not differ from other positions psychologically. It is no doubt true that one "purely intellectual" position would be the same as any other "purely intellectual" position. Such a statement is, however, quite without meaning because there never has been any purely intellectual position. It is quite remarkable that modern psychologists, of all men, should talk of purely intellectual positions. Is it not they, more than other

men, who have told us that all intellectual interpretations of reality are made by men in the interests of practical life? Is it not they who have told us that the races of men have made intellectual constructs as they needed them on their upward passage from the irrational to the rational? Is it not they who have reconstructed for us the sacred history of the Scriptures and told us that when Israel wanted to enter Canaan they made for themselves a fearful war god who authorized and even commanded the massacre of the Canaanites, and that when they were reduced to the position of the underdog, they invented a god who stood for justice and mercy? Surely, then, the psychologists of religion ought to be the last to charge the traditional position with mere intellectualism.

When, accordingly, Pratt says that: "If religion is merely this purely intellectual and rather superficial thing, it is hardly worth very much discussion" (2), we cannot regard his refutation of the traditional position as being worthy of a serious psychologist. There must be other and deeper reasons for the rejection of the orthodox position.

These other and deeper reasons must, in the nature of the case, be of a metaphysical nature. He who asserts that history has proved or can prove that the intellectual constructions of all the religions of the world evince their exclusively subjective origin, asserts something that he cannot prove by a mere appeal to "facts." It is necessary to think precisely at this point. Let us note first what the orthodox position has maintained with respect to the early history of mankind. It holds that Adam and Eve were created in fellowship with God. Man is therefore created with a character and with intellectual endowment. He is a rational and moral creature at the outset. His God-concept and his self-concept were simultaneous. Hence, the distinction between subjective and objective, as it is usually employed, would be false in such a case. Man's idea about God would be a correct replica of God's idea about God, and man's idea about himself would be a correct replica of God's idea about man. In short, man's interpretation of all the "facts," though subjective, in the sense that it was truly his own interpretation, would nevertheless be objective in the nature of the case, because the possibility of his own interpretation presupposed the interpretation of God.

But then sin enters. By virtue of it, man seeks to interpret experience independently of God, not only, but he is left to himself so that he must seek to interpret all things without God. Hence, all his interpretation will be wrong. He will set up a new and false standard of objectivity. Man will think that though he interprets alone, he nevertheless interprets correctly. He thinks that his idea of God is still correct, though there is no longer any foundation for his ideas about anything.

What we therefore expect to find in the greater part of the earliest literature of mankind is that men have made God in their own image. The orthodox view does not maintain that man, when he was still in the state of innocence, gave a written interpretation of his views. On the contrary, it pictures Adam and Eve as living in simple child-like faith and without literary output. Moreover,

it pictures the period of perfection as being very short. When, therefore, the writers on the psychology of religion produce all manner of evidence from the earliest extant literature, to prove that men have everywhere used religion for selfish ends, this does not disprove the orthodox position. On the contrary, it establishes it.

But now we must go one step further. If writers of the psychology of religion school seek further to prove that the Old Testament partakes of the same character of exclusive selfishness, their argument is not sound. When they do so, they have assumed that a thing must be so everywhere because it is actually so at many places. Why was it impossible that God should once more reveal Himself to man after the entrance of sin? Clearly, it was not impossible if man was, as the orthodox position says, a creature of God. In that case, man remained accessible to God.

What the critics of the Old Testament have forgotten is that this revelation of God to man after the entrance of sin would naturally have certain characteristics. In the first place, it would naturally be given through man; that is, in ordinary human language. We have seen that when Adam was in paradise, his consciousness spoke the truth. All that God needed to do was to speak the truth through the consciousness of man once more. The most basic argument, the one to which all others finally reduce, against the concept of a special revelation is, that, after all, it shows itself to be human, and that at any rate the human interpretative factor must come in somewhere. Now, this basic argument rests upon an anti-theistic assumption. If Christian theism is true, man was originally God's creature, and his consciousness, though interpretative, was re-interpretative of God's interpretation. Hence, the fact that revelation comes in the form of ordinary human language is not an argument against it. On the contrary, it is just what we should expect. And if the Holy Spirit can speak through the consciousness of man and deposit this revelation in Scripture, this same Holy Spirit can also work in the consciousness of man to make it see the truth of this revelation and make it accept this revelation. The testimony of the Spirit in the heart corresponds to the inspiration of the Scriptures.

What men should therefore do is to prove the impossibility of the human consciousness being the bearer of the truth of God at the outset of the life of the race. And here we have come to the point where we can no longer deal with any literature. All the literature in the world can, in the nature of the case, shed no light on this question, because it is a question as to the meaning of history itself. Men will have to leave their supposed actual basis to enter upon a discussion of metaphysics in order to do this. Now we do not object to their entering upon metaphysics. We only object to their entering upon metaphysical conclusions while they still maintain that they are strictly within the realm of facts.

In the second place, another characteristic that would mark the special revelation of God to man is that it would assume a form that man could understand at the stage of the development in which he was at the time of the arrival of the revelation. By the "stage

of development" we do not mean the evolutionary concept of development. It is that which we are combating. But this can best be combated by setting over against it the theistic notion of development. And when we speak of the theistic notion of development, we once more do not mean that which is usually meant by theistic evolution. We mean simply that which was already suggested above when we said that man naturally at the beginning lived a very simple life without literary interpretation. Man was, to be sure, created as a full-grown being, but he had yet to bring out to their full display the powers of nature and of his own heart and mind. That was his task as prophet, priest, and king. And this task was to be accomplished not by a few individuals, but by the race as a whole. Hence it could not be accomplished except as the race came gradually into existence through following generations.

With this idea in mind, we can understand that if man fell into sin in the first generation of human existence and if the special revelation of God in the nature of the case had to come in that soon also, since by it alone man and the universe could continue to exist, as they do exist, then the form of this revelation would at the outset have to be very plain and simple. This principle explains why the Old Testament rewards and punishments take almost exclusively a temporal form. This explains why the promise of the Savior of the world first came in the form of the "seed of the woman" and gradually assumed different forms as time went on. This also explains why God revealed the nature of His being gradually to Israel, so that often in the earlier stages of revelation He will appear more as a God of judgment while later as a God of mercy. It was the same God who revealed Himself only gradually in all the fulness of His being.

It was necessary to bring out these points in order to see that the objection, which is most common in the writings of the psychology of religion school, that men have their ideas about God and about everything else, and that these ideas have constantly changed, does not hold as an objection to the truth of the Christian position. If it is to hold as an objection to the Christian-theistic position, it must once more be argued out on metaphysical grounds. That is, it must be shown that the only way this so-called development can be accounted for is on the basis of the non-theistic concept of evolution. The "facts" are perfectly consistent with a Christian-theistic point of view. When it is said that Amos had a certain idea about God and that he preached this idea, we say that this is true, no doubt, but that the question is whether Amos' idea about God was, as far as it had been revealed, the true idea about God. If it is said that Amos thought that Jerusalem was the center of the worship, we say that he no doubt did, but that it was not really so by the command of Jehovah. If men reason that when Israel wished to enter the land of Canaan they made for themselves a God who ordered the destruction of the Canaanites, we say that this interpretation of the "facts" is but the manifestation of an evolutionary bias which has assumed that because the Israelites thought the Canaanites had to be destroyed it could not really be the command of Jehovah that they should. If man is a creature of God to begin with, and if sin is therefore a deflection from the living God on the part of man and a breaking of the law of God, then all men have merited nothing but destruction at the hand of God, and it was only the condescending

grace of God itself by which any nation could continue to exist upon the face of the earth at all. Now, if these nations, Israel included, in themselves merit nothing but destruction and all live by the common grace of God while Israel lives in addition to that by the special grace of God, there was a "natural law in the spiritual world" by which the power of the special redemptive principle of God should begin to manifest itself by making room for itself in the world. The whole of history is, if Christian-theism is true, a struggle between the re-inserted power of God and the usurping power of Satan. It is only because men will not have this interpretation; it is only because men have assumed that all men are by nature not sinners, but "infinitely valuable;" it is only because men oppose this special principle, that they seek to interpret the "facts" as they do. These "facts" are perfectly consistent with the Christian-theistic interpretation of them. In fact, if it were to be reasoned out on the metaphysical basis here, we would seek to prove that the "facts" must be interpreted in the Christian-theistic way. The only alternative to interpreting history as a struggle in which God is actually victorious over the devil and his dominion is to interpret it by saying that the forces of evil are as powerful as the forces of good. And this, when put in logical terms, means that negation is as basic as affirmation so that no coherent experience were possible. But we are concerned here to point out that men are in vain trying to say that they are merely interpreting the "facts" of history and that a mere unbiased interpretation of the "facts" of history compels one to throw aside the orthodox position is a non-theistic bias with which one approaches the "facts."

We have introduced the discussion of the last pages in order to meet the argument that men can justly ignore the claim to absolute truth on the part of the Christian theistic interpretation of religion because they think they can show how "the idea of God" and other ideas connected with religion, and for that matter, all intellectual interpretation, have originated. We have shown that the only way men can refute an intellectual claim is to enter upon the defense of another intellectual claim. One has to go back of the "facts" of history to a discussion of the meaning of history. That is, one has to give an intellectual interpretation to the whole of history for the meaning of history as a whole cannot be discussed except in intellectual terms.

Our conclusion, then, is that the rejection of the orthodox position on the part of the psychology of religion school is done on no other ground but that of prejudice against it. Men often openly express this prejudice, as we have seen, by saying that the traditional position leaves out of consideration many people who are truly religious and because it seems to indicate pride in one's own position. But back of this expression of prejudice is the attempt of the justification of it which we have just now reviewed. This attempt at justification by the claim that the origin of all historical ideas connected with the religions can be shown, is no justification at all. This justification is itself based upon the assumption of the truth of the non-theistic position, which says that history is self-explanatory. Instead of being a humble recognition of the force of "facts" it is, moreover, really the most

extreme form of dogmatism. On the basis of an assumed historical relativism, it makes a negative statement about all possibilities, past and future. It says that back of man's interpretation there can be no other interpretation. To say this is not only to assume that man and history are ultimate and self-explanatory, but is to make a universal negative proposition about what lies back of history and the "facts."

This brings to our minds again what has been said in an earlier chapter about the psychological explanations that men give of the orthodox position. These psychological explanations all partake of these evils: (a) The assumption of the truth of the non-theistic interpretation of reality, in spite of the fact that the claim is made that they deal with "facts" only; and (b) A universal negative intellectual proposition about all prehistoric reality in spite of the fact that intellectualism is ridiculed and all intellectual interpretations are said to be derivative and to have no universal validity.

We see then that the orthodox conception of the nature of religion is rejected on the ground that nobody really knows what the nature of religion is. That is, nobody knows what the essence of religion is because nobody knows about the essence of anything. No one knows what the essence of reality is. No one knows what the essence of Christianity is. We have noted that Foster in his book on "The Finality of the Christian Religion," points out that the question of "the essence of Christianity" as it was discussed by Harnack got men into all manner of trouble. If all reality is static, there can be no question about the essence of anything. On the other hand, if all reality is a flux, there can be no question about the essence of anything. Hence he said that we have to assume that stability and change are somehow equally ultimate aspects of reality. At that time we pointed out that this is the conception that is prevalent in modern times and that it really amounts to saying that all reality is a flux. And it is this assumption that all reality is a flux that underlies the opposition to the orthodox conception of the essence of religion. The basic point in the debate between the orthodox and the newer view is therefore on the question of whether human predication is possible at all. Christianity says that human predication is possible because God is unchangeable and because this unchangeable God created this world of change. In this way stability and change are not equally ultimate aspects of one reality, but God is a unified experience in terms of which the question with respect to the essence of anything is possible. Now, the psychology of religion school has joined the other schools of modern thought in rejecting this Christian theistic position not on the ground that the "facts" compel them to, but because of the assumption of the ultimacy of change.

Unfortunately, however, the issue is never put this way in the psychology of religion literature. If it were, and men saw the significance of it, the result would not only be the rejection of the traditional position, but the rejection of every other position. It would mean the rejection of all intellectual interpretation of human experience. It would certainly mean the giving up of every effort to define the essence of religion. Now, the numberless

definitions of the essence of religion that have appeared in the writings of those who have rejected the traditional view of things, is itself the best evidence of the fact that men have not understood the implication of their own position. They have tried to do over and over again what they have just said cannot be done. Leuba has collected some forty-eight in one of his books (3). Pratt remarks with respect to this as follows:

"Professor Leuba enumerates forty-eight definitions of religion from as many great men (and, elsewhere, adds two of his own, apparently to fill out the even half hundred). But the striking thing about these definitions is that, persuasive as many of them are, each learned doctor seems quite unpersuaded by any but his own. And when the doctors disagree, what are the rest of us going to do? Can we be justified in talking about religion at all?

"The truth is, I suppose, that 'religion' is one of those general and popular terms which have been used for centuries to cover so vague and indefinite a collection of phenomena that no definition can be framed which will include all its uses and coincide with everyone's meaning of it. Hence all definitions of religion are more or less arbitrary and should be taken rather as postulates than as axioms. In this sense I shall myself propose a tentative definition of religion, not at all as a final or complete statement, nor because I think it of any great importance, but because I intend to write a book about religion and it therefore seems only fair that I should tell the reader in advance not what the word means, but what I am going to mean by the word" (4).

From this quotation it appears that Pratt sees something of what will happen to the concept of religion, and for that matter, to all concepts, if the traditional position be given up. What happens, he says, in effect, is that all human experience is arbitrary. Our retort to his statement with respect to the orthodox position, that if religion is such a purely intellectual thing it is scarcely worth talking about, is that if experience is this purely arbitrary thing that Pratt thinks it is, not only religion is not worth talking of, but nothing is worth talking of. Moreover, it is difficult to see how religion can then be distinguished from anything else.

We are, however, thankful to Pratt that he has pointed out that all the many definitions that have been given in all seriousness by writers on the psychology and philosophy of religion should be taken cum grano salis -- since if men give definitions of religion at all they have entered upon the metaphysical arena and have donned intellectual weapons.

Some of the more recent writers on the psychology of religion have felt something of this inconsistency and have therefore tried to be more consistent. They have definitely fought against all the remnants of intellectualism that they discovered in the writings of their confreres. We have noted in our review of the schools of general psychology that the more recent tendency is away from all



intellectualism. In accordance with this, the writers on the psychology of religion also deprecate all definitions of religion that have any intellectual interpretation in them: Religion is to be interpreted in terms of certain instincts and drives that are inherent in man. This is at least more consistent than the earlier positions were. It is more in harmony with the idea that all reality is a mere flux and that the intellect itself is a part of this flux. But the main point to notice now is that even though men reject, as they think, all intellectualism, the mere fact that they give definitions of religion over and over again shows that they, after all, are intellectualists. They cannot get away from intellectual terminology even if they try to describe reality in terms of irrationality.

Accordingly, we shall not pay a great deal of attention to the debate that has been carried on between the various writers in the field of the psychology of religion on the point of whether or not religion contains an intellectual element. We only stop to note the five classes of definitions of religion as given by Leuba in his latest book entitled, "God or Man."

In the first place: "Religion is the feeling (or emotion) or the attitude (or behavior) called forth by the mysterious or the sacred."

Secondly: "Religion is the quest after the meaning of life; or, from a somewhat different point of view, it is the determination of what is most worth-while."

In the third place: "Religion is a belief in something human which has the power of making life what it should be."

In the fourth place: "Religion is devotion to the welfare of humanity."

In the fifth place: "Religion is an experience implying the existence of a spiritual world" (5).

In these five classes Leuba thinks all the definitions of religion can be subsumed. Now, with respect to all of them, it is clear that a theory of reality has not been avoided. With respect to the first class we may well ask, "What is the mysterious or the sacred?" We have already noted that on the assumption that all reality is a flux no predication is possible. It is plain that there cannot well be a distinction made between the sacred and the secular if nothing is stable. What is sacred one day may be secular the next. Certainly if history is not expressive of a system of truth back of it, it can as a matter of fact be shown that the sacred and the secular intermingle. It is a matter of historical record that what people once thought was sacred they now think of as secular. So then, if no more is given than a description of what the peoples of the world have throughout history thought to be sacred or mysterious, and this description itself is spoken of as a definition of religion, it is plain that the assumed theory of reality at the basis of it is the non-theistic one of panta rei.

With respect to the second definition, that religion is the determination of the meaning of life, the real criticism is not that that is really what philosophy is. The real criticism is once more that men must choose between making a description of what men have thought to be the meaning of life the basis of their definition, with the metaphysics of chance that this position implies, or men must realize that there could be no significance in what men have thought about the meaning of life unless there is back of them and back of the whole of history the absolute God by virtue of whom all their thoughts have meaning.

The third definition speaks of making life what it should be. We ask again by what standard one is to judge what life should be. If we are to do no more than ask what men have thought that life should be, we still have on our hands the question of whether men have thought correctly. It will not do for us to assume that they have and that no standard has been given them from above history. That is to engage in a metaphysical assumption, without giving a justification for such an assumption.

The same thing holds true for what is spoken of as the welfare of humanity in the fourth class of definitions. What is the welfare of humanity? Is it that which men have thought of as being such? We cannot assume that the flatly contradictory conceptions that have been held with respect to this question will all "come out in the wash" after a while like the family quarrels do. To assume that they will is to assume that all intellectual interpretation is worthless and to say that all intellectual interpretation is worthless is to say that the rational and the irrational are identical and there is an end of all talk about religion and about everything else.

Finally, to say that religion is an experience that implies the existence of a spiritual world is subject to the same difficulties. What is the nature of this spiritual world? The that of that spiritual world, without the what, can have no psychological significance. A bare that is an empty concept. The existence of a blank has no meaning for us. Is this spiritual world personal or impersonal? Is it temporal or eternal? Our psychological attitude with respect to it would depend entirely upon the answers given to these questions. If the spiritual world is used as a synonym for the conception of an eternal self-conscious God, then that spiritual world makes all the world of difference to us. Then we are created by it. Then the presence of evil in the world must be accounted for by the personal transgression of man of the law of God. But in that case we can be sure that what men have thought about the spiritual world is wrong unless they have built their thought upon a new interpretation of God given them after the entrance of sin into the world. On the other hand, if by the term "spiritual world" nothing more is meant than some vague impersonal principle that has come into manifestation in the course of history, it will have an altogether different psychological significance. In that case, such a spiritual world is nothing but the shadow of the real world in which we live, and to have an experience which involves the existence of the spiritual world is to have an experience that involves the existence of the shadow of yourself.

It were much better than if men were more outspoken in their views and simply say that religion is an experience of the shadow of yourself. And it is this which Leuba has done more fully than others. We would accordingly turn to what Leuba says in order to see what a very outspoken exponent of the psychology of religion school says. His last book illustrates the fact that if one is at all consistent, one has to do away with the distinction between the religious and the secular altogether. On the other hand, Leuba's book also illustrates the fact that men cannot be wholly consistent, or they would have nothing left to talk about. We will not take up the whole of Leuba's book in this connection, but only that part which deals with his method of the rejection of the traditional position.

In the first place, Leuba is more consistent than some others are in the very fact that he says more frankly than they that he is only describing what the people of the world have meant by their religions. After reviewing the five classes of definition spoken of above, he says: "When, instead of giving to 'religion' any one of the meanings defined above, we mean by it the distinctive method of life embodied in all the organizations bearing the name, a number of ever-recurring vexatious questions find a ready answer, among them the following: .....

These questions to which Leuba thinks he finds a ready answer are: "Is There a Religious Instinct?" Leuba says not. Religion, like other activities of man, is learned. Secondly: "Is There at least a Specific Religious Purpose?" Again he says not. Religion is at first wholly non-ethical and non-moral. When men became moral, they also ethicized their gods. Thirdly: "Is there a Religious Emotion?" Again he says not. "The emotion aroused at any particular time is determined by the situation in which the worshiper finds himself at that moment and by the nature he ascribes to his god. In the earliest religions, fear and awe dominate; yet not unmixed at times with confidence and friendliness. Whereas, in up-to-date Christian religion, the tender emotions have replaced the sterner ones. In the most prosperous Christian communities, the dreadful Calvinistic Jehovah is obsolete; God has been won over to the prevalent educational temper: all love and no punishment" (7).

It is clear that the only reason Leuba has for the rejection of the orthodox position is a prejudice based upon the assumption of metaphysical relativism. This is strikingly brought out in the fact that for him the really important thing to ask is, what the temper of people has been. If the people of the suburbs have developed a temper hostile to Calvinism, then religion must be defined in such a way that it includes both. Now, it would be hard to imagine what content could be given to the term "religion" if it has to include both Calvinism and the educational temper that comes to expression in Modernism. Yet that is just what the position of the psychology of religion demands.

With this in mind, we may see what Leuba himself means when he uses the word "religion." He says: "We have not the pretension to predict what will happen ultimately to the term "religion," but we are intent upon making clear that in this book it is used in a

sense which includes the religions. It does not mean, therefore, merely a particular emotion; or the search for the meaning of life; or a set of ethical principles; or devotion to the good, the beautiful and the true; or to any of the human instruments of happiness. It does not even mean only a comforting belief in a super-human power making for righteousness. Whatever else they may include in the way of desires, emotions and beliefs, the religions involve social relations with one or many divine beings; that relation is the very essence of the religious life as it is generally understood by those who profess belief in any of the organized religions" (8).

The utter emptiness of all this appears if we only think for a moment what the term social relations may possibly mean in such a case. It is a commonplace in the literature of religion that one person's god is the next person's devil. What one person fears, the other loves. Now, the result of this is that either the whole of the religious attitude is meaningless because the "divine things" do not actually exist so that it makes no difference whether they are feared or loved; or, if they do exist, it will make a great difference. Now, if the "divine beings" do exist and it does make a difference whether we love the devil or not, then it is no longer possible to study the psychology of religion in a neutral manner and say that it has nothing to do with theories of reality.

We may note still further that Leuba deals in his rejection of the orthodox position with fancies and not with facts. He tells us that we may learn a great deal about the nature of religions by studying their origin. To quote: "A long history preceded the appearance of belief in somewhat definite spirits and gods, and of definite ways of influencing them. About that pre-religious history, nothing can be said here; we begin at the point where religious behavior had come into existence" (9).

We would, of course, be glad to excuse Leuba or any one else from saying anything about that prehistoric period in any particular book or at any particular time if only he would, or someone else using the same method as he would, tell us at some time and somewhere whence they have the information that there was a long time that the human race existed in a non-religious way. It seems strange that men can jump over this question lightly, dispose of it in a sentence or two, and begin to write volumes upon volumes that are based upon one grand metaphysical assumption that cannot be proved to be true. It is clear that if the evolutionary hypothesis is not true, all the superstructure about the rise of the religious from the non-religious is a fiction. It is impossible for any one to get under way with a description of any phenomenon of the human spirit such as religion without first facing the question of the origin of the human race; and this, in the nature of the case, is a metaphysical question.

Leuba says that he begins where religious behavior is already present. Now, as explained above, we do not wonder that practically all religion about which literature gives us any information has some of the perverted characteristics of which Leuba speaks. This could not be otherwise after the entrance of sin into the world.

But the real question is as to what lies back of this literature, paradise or the beast. Leuba has assumed that it is the beast.

It is this assumption of an originally existing non-religious human race that accounts for the fact that Leuba goes on to give a perfectly arbitrary limitation of what is religious in order to prove that the traditional position is false. He speaks of religion as being one of the many factors that have been used by man in order to advance himself in the struggle for existence. He takes for granted that there are many physical forces and many psychical forces at the service of man by which he may help himself forward so that he need not appeal to anything religious. Moreover, he takes for granted that man does not need God in any way in order to know about these forces. We must look at the last point first, reserving the others for a later chapter.

In his chapter on "Making the Gods Useful," he assumes a non-Christian epistemology and takes for granted that no argument is necessary to prove that knowledge in no sense involves God. He says that after the race existed a long time and invented some gods, it moralized and de-personalized these gods. The first was in the interest of the heart of man, and the second in the interest of his head. His characterization of the creeds of the Christian Church brings out the point we have before us, forcibly. Says Leuba:

"The God of the Christian creeds unites these two incompatible features: he possesses the essential mental traits of a human person, and can, therefore, sympathize with man and minister to his happiness. He is also an infinite impersonal Absolute and, as such, cannot be affected by man's behavior. The social, personal traits of God are due to man's desire for someone able and willing to protect, comfort, do justice, and otherwise gratify the needs of the heart; his impersonality is the outcome of a desire to understand rationally, logically, to see things as they are and not as we would like them to be. No god who is not both personal and impersonal can altogether satisfy human nature, compounded as it is of heart and head. The presence of these contradictory features in the conception of God accounts for the confusions and compromises, some tragic and some ridiculous; which afflict civilized humanity" (10).

A little further, he adds: "The intellectual gymnastics to which the Church Fathers were prompted by this perplexing situation are a monument to man's resourcefulness, and in particular, to his ability to believe the unbelievable in order to live content. The achievements of these men equal probably any other self-deception achieved by humanity" (11):

Still a little further we find the following: "The alleged existence of a superhuman source of knowledge is mainly responsible for the amazing doctrine of Faith invented by the Christian Church" (12).

Finally, he winds up the discussion by saying: "If such persons ever feel the need to excuse the incongruity of their behavior, they may say with the German chancellor reproached for breaking international agreement, 'Necessity knows no law'" (13).

From these questions we may observe that just as Leuba started with the assumption of a metaphysical relativism and on the ground of that mere assumption felt justified in rejecting and ridiculing the traditional position, so he also assumes a non-theistic epistemology, and on the ground of that assumption, involved as it is in the first assumption, he once more enters upon a tirade against the traditional position, totally unaware that it all hangs upon the thin thread of an assumption. If theism is true, there is no human nature that exists independently of God, and there is no knowledge transaction that is independent of God. Not asking now for evidence as to where in the creeds of the Christian Church there is any such notion as an impersonal God, we only remark that for Christian theism, the concept of God as an absolute personality is the presupposition of all knowledge and intelligible experience. If Leuba can say this is unbelievable, he will only need to turn to the concept of universal flux in order to see that some men are able even to believe in that. Surely the Faith invented by the psychologists of religion is far greater, -- if capacity for carrying unconsciously a great number of inconsistencies be greatness -- than the Faith "invented" by the Church. And if we are to speak of achievements in self-deception, we must admit that, with the present educational temper of the suburbs, the trophy will have to be taken from Calvin and given to Leuba. A braver man is Leuba than ever German chancellor was.

#### References: Chapter VI

1. Pratt, p. 4.
2. Pratt, p. 4.
3. Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion, Appendix.
4. Pratt, p. 2.
5. Leuba, God or Man, pp. 14-16.
6. Idem, p. 17.
7. Idem, p. 19.
8. Idem, p. 20.
9. Idem, p. 31.
10. Idem, p. 53.
11. Idem, p. 57.
12. Idem, p. 58.
13. Idem, p. 59.

RELIGION AS THE JOYFUL SUBMISSION TO THE INEVITABLE

In the preceding chapter we have seen that the psychology of religion school has rejected the traditional conception of religion on the ground that it deals with metaphysics. Yet, in order to reject the traditional view, it was necessary for the new view to enter the field of metaphysics too. Hence the new view has the disadvantage of doing stealthily what the traditional view does openly. Moreover, the new view is at a disadvantage in that the metaphysics to which it holds requires it to make a universal negative statement about that which it has just professed to know nothing.

We must now see that in addition to making a universal negative statement about the traditional position, the new view also makes a very definitely positive statement about the nature of religion. After ridiculing the old view on the ground that it conceitedly and complacently held that there was one religion that was true, while all others were false, we would expect that men would engage in nothing but a description of what the religions actually are. Consistency would seem to require such. And we can see in numerous books that deal with the psychology of religion definite avowals that description is the only purpose that they have. We mention only one here as typical of many others. Says Horace M. Kallen: "I have tried to treat religion as what it is, a confused event in history and a complex institution in civilization; to analyze without judging, to understand without embracing. My study purposes no vindication and projects no assault" (1).

Yet nothing is further from the truth than that the psychologists of religion limit themselves to mere description of all or some existing religions. Though men say they deal merely with what is and not with what ought to be, they almost invariably do tell us what they think religion ought to be. We shall notice this in the case of a couple outstanding examples.

It is perhaps a profitable procedure if we see what according to some psychologists of religion, the religion of an educated man today should be. For it is when men discuss that future that they tell us what religion ought to be. When they are dealing with primitive peoples and with fundamentalists, men seem to limit themselves to description and ridicule. But this ridicule itself implies that either religion ought to be overthrown if it is this ridiculous thing, or else it ought to be modified so that it becomes more respectable. So we would ask what the respectable citizen of the suburbs may in the future be supposed to have by way of religion.

We shall indeed take a very respectable citizen, one who is well educated and has even read modern science in general and psychology of religion in particular. Such a man would certainly read the book of Leuba on "God or Man." From it he would learn that the traditional view is worthy of nothing but ridicule or pity. He would see that it is a serious task that psychologists of religion

have today, namely, that of instilling some sensible notions with respect to religion in the minds of the generality of men. He learns that the Church is really misguided in her efforts, at best. To quote from Leuba:

"While an army of physiologists, neurologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, and educators are laboring with encouraging success to find and to remove causes of social maladjustment, of delinquency, of crime, and of sin-breeding ignorance, what are the ministers of the Christian churches doing? -- denouncing, remonstrating, encouraging, announcing punishments and rewards (mainly in a distant Heaven) and offering to the sinner divine assistance and the comfort of such doctrines as the stoning death of Christ and such practices as the sacraments. As to the theologians, the fruitfulness of their labors with regard to 'sin' and 'sinfulness' had better not be inquired into. there are few chapters of history better calculated to make humanity look ridiculous" (2).

It is, to be sure, true that ministers in churches may sometimes be of service to their fellow-men, but then it is not because of but in spite of their religious administrations as the story of the drunken Scotchman may illustrate. While Dr. McElveen was pastor of the Shawmut Church in Boston, a man more than half drunk came to him and asked him if he could tell him anything that would keep him from drinking if he did not want to. Dr. McElveen proposed that he should sign the pledge, trust in Christ, etc. These suggestions were cast aside as having all been tried without success. The man refused to join the minister in prayer. In order to gain a moment's time, the minister asked the man's name. "MacDonald," was the reply. "Are you Scotch?" asked the minister. "Yes, sir, that's what I am," with a noticeable pride. "You Scotch too?" "Yes." The drunken visitor fell upon the minister like an onslaught of soldiery. He almost wrung the minister's right hand off him.

The pastor perceived his advantage. He said to the drunkard that he was not Scotch, at least that he was not pure Scotch. "I could do something for a real Scotchman." The drunkard swore prodigiously that he was a Scotchman, but all to no avail. He begged the minister to believe that he was Scotch. Still the minister refused. "Well, MacDonald, you know yourself that one thing the Scotch are famous for all the world over is that they're so stubborn. Once they make up their minds, nothing can change them. But you, MacDonald, why, you have promised repeatedly that you won't drink, but something always leads you off. You can't keep your promise. Oh, it's plain enough, MacDonald; you're not Scotch." Finally, the fellow burst out and said that he would let the minister pray with him if only he would believe that he was Scotch. The minister refused even this. At last, the minister agreed to pray if the man would pray with him. The man promised he would. Both got on their knees. The minister prayed, but the man would not utter a word. Dr. McElveen leaped to his feet. "Now I know you're no Scotchman. You've gone back on me." The man asked the minister to get down again and then he prayed: "O God above, make this minister man know I'm a Scotchman, for Jesus' sake. Amen" (3).



This story illustrates that what the minister was really doing was to appeal to the most primitive powers in man that had nothing to do with religion. It is natural that every human being will greatly prize the characteristics of the group with which he has been associated in childhood, and these are often the greatest assets for the reformation of character. The minister, not as a minister but as a practical psychologist, did this man great good. He never drank again. And it is in this way that the Church as a whole, with its educational activities of various sorts, may yet do some good, if it will only learn from psychology.

Another thing that our respectable citizen learns in this connection is that the greater the intelligence on the part of the people, the less likely are they to believe in the objective existence of God or gods. He reads about Leuba's questionnaire from Leuba himself and from Julian Huxley. With respect to his questionnaire in which Leuba asked whether men believed in God and in immortality, he says: "A comparison of the several classes with each other and, in each class, of the less with the more distinguished group, yields particularly interesting results. In every class, without exception, the number of believers is considerably smaller among the distinguished men. It is among the psychologists, who may be supposed to have more knowledge bearing upon God and immortality than other scientific men, that one finds the smallest number of believers. Whereas, among the greater men of the other classes the number of believers in God varies from 35% to 17%, it is only 13% among the greater psychologists" (4).

Our respectable citizen will certainly be duly impressed by the fact that the more distinguished a person is, the less likely he is to believe in God. Especially will this be the case if he discovers that others besides Leuba attach great value to such questionnaires. He may read Julian Huxley and find that he thinks the results of Leuba quite important and adds something of his own. Huxley says that the result of a questionnaire in England showed that the readers of the London Nation, generally speaking, did not believe in the existence of God, while the majority of the readers of the Daily News did (5). Surely, then, our respectable citizen cannot be a fundamentalist. If he were, he would not be considered intelligent by the most distinguished psychologists, mindful of Shakespeare's dictum that he should regard the judgment of the intelligent few as of far greater value than the opinion of the people that is accursed; he gives up his belief in God. Besides the number of those who do no longer believe is growing. Fundamentalists are "unmindful of the mere fact that there exists tens of thousands of devout Christians to whom the fabulousness of Noah's ark or Jonah's whale is a matter of the utmost unconcern" (6). This will certainly add to the comfortable feeling of our respectable citizen, since he can now, on the authority of an eminent scientist, be a good Christian and remain intelligent.

But if we should then suspect our respectable citizen of duplicity, and say that he should not consider himself a good member of a Christian church at all if he does not hold to the teachings of traditional Christianity, he will readily clear himself because he certainly agrees that the methods and policies of the Modernists

and scientists who have given up the central teachings of Christianity should no longer pose as Christians, in the sense of remaining in the churches. So Huxley says in the same connection in which he speaks of the Fundamentalists that certainly the position of the Modernists is in one respect, at least, worse than that of the Fundamentalist. Says he: "The thought of religion, even of the single religion, Christianity, has become self-contradictory. The liberal wing of various churches and sects has long moved into that half-and-half position of which I have already spoken; the outsider may be pardoned if he compare their attitude to that uneasy but proverbial one of trying to ride two horses at once" (7).

To this may be added a few remarks of Leuba about Modernism and Modernists. Speaking of the English Modernists, he says: "The Christ of the English Modernists is as different from the Christ of the rank and file of the worshipers as the infinite, impassive God is different from the compassionate Father. For these Modernists, Jesus differs from other men not in kind, but in degree only. -- We are all born of God and divine in the same sense as Christ, -- Between this Christ and the Only Son of God, who bore our sins on the Cross and redeems those who believe on him, there is a chasm which not even the subtleties of Modernism can bridge" (8).

Then, as to American Modernism, he quotes from Fosdick as follows: "To be sure, God cannot be an individual to whom we cry. -- What we are manifestly dealing with is a vital universe surcharged with Creative Power. -- That power has issued in spiritual life and in terms of spiritual life must be interpreted."

With respect to this concept of Fosdick, which he has quoted more fully than we have done here, Leuba says: "Let this be noted: In the opinion of the New York clergyman, the Creative Power may not be interpreted as an individual to whom we may cry for help. He is, therefore, not the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, or of the writers of the New Testament, -- he is not the God of the religions."

"In the theology of the Reverend Mr. Fosdick, as in that of the English Modernists, the role of Jesus has ceased to be essential, for the Fall and the Atonement by the Son of God are myths, and man has direct access to God" (9).

A little later, Leuba adds: "Logically taken, Modernist theology would make impossible the traditional worship; nevertheless, these disbelieving Modernists address God in terms fitting a great Being in social relation with them; they supplicate him, praise him, return thanks to him, -- all according to the ancient formulae. Many of these practicing disbelievers lead their congregations from pulpit or altar in this sham (they prefer the word 'symbolic') worship. This situation demands a word of comment."

This word of comment runs somewhat as follows: "The Modernists assume that the Church is a living changing organism, and on that ground they think they are justified in translating the language of an "obsolete metaphysic" into terms of modern thought."

"Strong in this assumed right, Modernist clergy stand up before their congregations and, in the language of the creeds, confess, with hands joined and eyes upturned, that they believe in the resurrection of the 'flesh,' but, as Bishop Westcott explains, they do not mean by 'flesh' that material substance which we can see and handle. -- The Historic Faith. They say that they believe in Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary by the operation of the Holy Spirit, but they know that the sperm of Joseph operated. They affirm the Fall and the Atonement for Original Sin, but the 'Fall' means then Darwinian ascent from brute to man.

"They speak thus, and yet they are aware that their sophisticated behavior 'does press on certain sensitive consciences;' especially on young men preparing for ordination who, believing like their Modernist masters, are nevertheless required to solemnly subscribe to the Articles of Faith."

Then Leuba quotes from Principal Major to the effect that the Modernist "symbolic transformation sticks in the throat, not simply of rigid traditionalists, but of plain men who are, it may be agnostics, atheists, Unitarians, or Quakers. It revolted the soul of 'honest John Morley' and of Professor Henry Sedgwick, the English ethical philosopher."

At the conclusion, Leuba asks: "Why, then, recognizing this, do they continue their morally offensive and corrupting practice?"

His answer is in short: "As the Modernists are, after all, no more than mere good men, it may be surmised that a probing of their souls would bring out two desires as dominant factors in their objectionable behavior; the desire to retain a wealth of pleasant associations accumulated from infancy about a hallowed church and its worship; and the desire to keep a social position; of honor and influence, when one is hardly prepared to fill any other."

Surely, then, after reading this analysis of the Modernist theologians by an eminent psychologist, our respectable citizen will have nothing to do with the duplicity of Modernism.

But our respectable citizen goes even further on this point of duplicity. He is intelligent enough to detect duplicity even in some scientists who are not psychologists. He agrees when he reads Leuba to the effect that even some scientists are really largely to blame for the action of the Modernist theologians. You cannot really blame the theologians if even scientists try to harmonize their scientific convictions and an outworn religious attitude. To quote from Leuba again: "Many Protestant scientists have recently come forward as Modernist champions of 'religion.' As their prestige is great and has been won in the field of science, the arch enemy of the religions, their support has been joyfully and noisily acclaimed by orthodox Christian people. Had these scientists taken more pains to make clear what 'religion' they defend, their reception by the churches would have been much cooler; they might have been received as wolves in sheep's clothing" (11).

Then, speaking of Millikan as representative of many, he says with respect to this scientist's conception of God: "Millikan's idea of God is what one would expect of a modern scientist, but is his God the god of the religions? He tells us that 'God is that which is behind the mystery of existence and that which gives meaning to it.' Science shows us 'a universe that knows no caprice, a universe that can be counted upon; in a word, a God who works through law.' 'The God of science is the Spirit of rational order and of orderly development.' Thus, this Christian Modernist agrees with Spinoza, the atheist -- so at least he was called -- who said, 'By the help of God I mean the fixed and unchangeable order of nature.' But Spinoza, unlike the American physicist, never allowed himself to be mistaken for a champion of any organized religion" (11).

A little further, Leuba adds: "The attitude assumed by these scientists towards the churches would delight an old-style diplomat" (12).

If we add to all this sound argument by the highest authority about the duplicity of the Modernist theologians and the Modernist scientists, the probability that our respectable citizen has likely read such books as that edited by Cotton, "Has Science Discovered God," and that edited by the secretary of the Christian Evidence Society in England, C. L. Drawbridge, on "The Religion of Scientists," in which it is made to appear that there is no difference between the viewpoint of science today and Christianity, we can understand that he will reject all such false attempts at unification. He will openly side with what an intelligent man can accept by way of religion, come what may, whether he be persecuted for heresy or not.

After our respectable citizen has thus found his proper temper, and knows whom to choose as his authority, we may note what he learns about the nature of religion from the most eminent psychologists of religion.

He learns first that all educated and eminent psychologists of religion assume a relativist metaphysics without being aware of it themselves. So the thing for him to do is to read the books of these psychologists and also assume a relativist metaphysics without being aware of it himself. If it be thought that this will be difficult for him to accomplish, we may note that he is greatly aided by these psychologists who constantly reiterate that they are not dealing with metaphysics, but only with facts, and that they deal with facts in a perfectly neutral way. Since we have already discussed both of these points in a previous chapter, it may suffice here to enumerate this as one of the steps that our respectable citizen must not forget to make.

In the second place, we have also seen in a previous chapter that a man like Leuba takes a non-theistic epistemology for granted. Again our respectable citizen will learn to do this readily because this is done by modern scientists in general and not only by psychologists. Modern scientists as a whole take for granted that it is possible for man to know this universe, or at

least large aspect of this universe in which we live, whether or not God exists.

When he has, unnoticed by himself, but altogether properly because practiced commonly by the highest psychological authorities, got past these first two stations, he has already gained much for his concept of religion. In fact, we might point out that after this all other things will come very easy. But we will note some of the things that men actually say about what the nature of religion is as well as what may be inferred about the nature of religion from the assumption of a non-theistic metaphysic and a non-theistic epistemology. We will note the latter first.

If men assume a relativist metaphysics, it means that there can be no objective reference to God in relation to which the religious sentiment has its meaning. Metaphysical relativism is the opposite of the creation doctrine. It implies that man is not the product of a self-conscious God. It means that impersonal principles are man's most ultimate environment. It follows that personality is exclusively man's accomplishment. Man was first a non-moral being and a non-religious being. Or, granted that he was at the outset a religious being, the nature of the religion that characterized him was from the outset not something that was determined by the existence and character of God, for there was no God to determine either him or his religion.

With this relativist metaphysics, men will naturally interpret the history of religion, in so far as it has almost always involved the attribution of personality to God or gods, to some mysterious tendency in man to personalize all things about him. All the laws of logic drive one, once one has assumed metaphysical relativism, to interpret the "facts" in this way. Of course, since the psychologist of religion is not aware of the fact that he has assumed a metaphysical relativism, he is also not aware of the fact that it is the force of apriori reasoning and not the force of facts that propels him.

Still further, with the assumption of this relativist metaphysics, men must hold that evil is something that is inherent in the very ingredients of the universe and is quite ineradicable. If man is God's creature, and has therefore been made perfect, since by definition God cannot harbor in his being an equally ultimate affirmation and negation, then evil has come into the world by the willful disobedience of man. Then, too, it may be removed. But since it is taken for granted that this position is wrong, it follows that evil is ultimate.

We may take Julian Huxley's argument as an illustration of our argument here. He definitely says that it is one of the tasks of those that are interested in an intelligent religion to depersonalize God. Speaking of this question in general, he says: "In this view, the next great step which religious thought must take, and, if the voice of history is not a cheating voice, one day will take, is the liberation of the idea of God from the shackles of personality which have been riveted on it by man's fear, ignorance, servility, and self-conceit" (13).

Now, we quite agree with Huxley that this is the logical step for religious thought to take if it is to continue on the path of assumed metaphysical relativity. Evil must be thought of as quite impersonal. If we may say with Huxley that: "All reality then consists as Whitehead puts it, of events. The events are all events in the history of a single substance. The events looked at from outside are matter; experienced from inside they are mind" (14), there is no other conclusion but that we can no longer intelligently speak of a God who is above and beyond history and for whom history exists. The religion of the future for our respectable citizen therefore can have no truck with the idea of a personal God.

This necessity of a priori logic has made Huxley and the generality of psychologists to read history as they have read it. This is the psychological explanation of their contention that men merely imagined a personal god or gods at the objective end of the religious relation. They had to read the facts this way. The question itself of the existence or non-existence of a personal God is, in the nature of the case, a metaphysical question. Christian theists openly acknowledge this. They are perfectly willing to debate this question with any one who denies or doubts it. But the psychologist, who is the authority for our respectable citizen, has assumed God's non-existence and must therefore deny that religion has an objective reference in relation to a God who does actually exist.

The religion of the psychologist and the religion of our respectable citizen will have to involve what it considers to be the recognition of the fact that the universe is nothing but a chance conglomeration of impersonal principles. Whatever the nature of religion will be thought of as being from this point of view as to details, it must certainly be some sort of self-generated something that somehow helps the finite personalities that have somehow come into this world to adjust themselves to what is inevitable. Or, from another point of view, we may say that religion will have to make finite personality make its jumps from one block of chance to the next as they follow one another in the series of accidents that is usually called "history." But we shall develop this point at the close of the chapter and therefore pass on now.

Religion, we may say further, will have to deny all the doctrines of historical Christianity. Some means will have to be found by which all these facts are reinterpreted till they fit in with the predestined scheme. On the basis of assumed metaphysical relativism, there can be no guilt. Man is not guilty as Christianity has thought of him as being, since man was not created by God but is himself a chance occurrence among other chance occurrences of the universe. There can therefore be no Fall and no Atonement.

Accordingly, it will appear that psychologists of religion will have to find ways and means by which they can interpret what men have meant by guilt, fall, atonement, etc., in purely subjective terms. It is of course not difficult to interpret the "facts" of history till they seem to fit in with this scheme. If the entire God-concept can be interpreted as being due to men's natural fears in an unfoward universe, it is easy to see that they added to

this God-idea such ideas as those of guilt, fall, atonement, etc. But it is also easy to see that the whole interpretation rests upon one grand assumption; namely, that of the relativity underneath it all. The facts are perfectly consistent with the Christian point of view. If man was the creature of God originally and fell into sin, it is natural that he should feel guilty, and it is also natural that he should feel something of the fact that if relief is to come, it must come from without. And then too, it is natural that actually, relief has come from without. It is then natural that Christ is the veritable Son of God, that He wrought miracles, that He sent prophets before him and apostles after him; in short, the whole structure of Christian thought is involved in the concept of the objective existence of an absolute God. Now since the existence of this God is a question of metaphysics, the assumed nonexistence of God must of necessity lead men to the rejection of all the essential doctrines of Christianity.

Thus it comes to pass that those who said that they were not going to exclude any religion and are simply going to describe all religions and make a definition of religion, if they engage in making any definitions at all, by including all the elements of importance of all the religions, must invariably conclude that the existence of God and all that follows from it is not important for true religion. In this way, men who have said that they are planning no attack or no defense, but only description, end up with the exaltation of one religion to the exclusion of the other. Thus it happens that those who speak of the "insufferable arrogance of those who claim to be in sole possession of religious truth," referring to the traditional position, have branded as superstition all those who do not agree with their particular form of paganism. (15).

But all this is made plausible to our respectable citizen by repeating in his ears that it is in this way that religion can be made to conform to the requirements of science. Says Huxley: "If we were prepared to admit that the ascription of personality or external spiritual nature to gods were an illusion or error, our comparison of religion with science or with art would then be complete. Each then would be a fusion of external fact with inner capacity into vital experience (or, looked at from a slightly different angle, each is an expression of that vital experience)" (16).

We may now turn to what men have actually said with respect to the nature of the religion of the future for our respectable citizen. What they have actually said is wholly in accordance with what we have predicted they will have to say. It is quite in order for us to give psychological explanations of what psychologists say. They are constantly explaining people psychologically, and should not object to having their own medicine turned on themselves. It is that which we have done up to this point by showing what they, in the nature of the case, had to say. Let us now see what they actually say.

The first thing to note is that men say that religion is a wholly derivative something. That is, religion is not taken into account at the outset when men make their definitions of personality. Personality is thought of as already existing apart from

religion, and then religion is thought of as in some way making itself useful to this personality by helping it to become what it ought to become.

So, for instance, the matter is conceived of generally by the numerous writers who contribute to the series of "Outline Bible Study Courses" "composed and printed by the University of Chicago." We may note a few of their statements and begin with what Professor Kingsbury says in the series on "What Religion Does for Personality." He begins by defining personality and the goal to which personality ought to strive in wholly nonreligious terms. To quote: "It is not the business of psychology to define 'goodness' or to specify the particular acts necessary to make a person 'good.' Psychology as a science is concerned with discovering, describing, and relating facts, and not with debating about values."

This is the usual asseveration of neutrality that every psychologist finds it his business to make in the preface or on the first page of his book in order to proceed to break his promise either on the same page or shortly thereafter. In this case, the author goes on to do on the same page what he has just said is not his business to do, namely, to define what the good life is. To quote: "There is no one set pattern to which all good lives must conform. In fact, we usually prize the very fact of distinctiveness, individuality, as itself being of worth. Nevertheless, when we examine those lives which competent judges call 'good,' we find they possess at least one characteristic in common, and that we may therefore adopt as our starting-point. The good life is a well-integrated life" (17).

This statement is either purely formal, in which case it means nothing, or it definitely defines the good life in non-Christian terms. The basic contention of the traditional position is that personality itself cannot be defined except in relationship to God and goodness or the well-integrated life is the life that orders itself according to the pattern set for it by God. Now, to define personality and to define goodness and thereafter to define religion as having nothing to do with the question of the existence or nonexistence of God is not to be neutral nor merely to describe "facts," but it is to give expression to one's philosophical conviction.

So, then, we find that personality is supposed to make its appearance somehow and to integrate itself somehow. It must work out a unification of motives for itself. To quote again: Unification of motives is not something we start with and then lose, as did grandfather Adam in the Garden of Eden. Oneness is an achievement, worked out, if at all, only in the struggle and effort of living in a difficult world" (18).

Thus the picture and the task of personality begins to take shape before our eyes. It comes into existence somehow. The universe into which it comes, comes somehow. And this universe is somehow evil and will remain evil. Yet the personality is somehow to achieve something that is integration of personality in this accidental conglomeration. Of course, we are strictly not supposed



to use that term, "accident." That would seem to undo the matter of achievement. Says Kingsbury: "No, we must realize that integration is an achievement, not an endowment, not a lucky accident" (19).

And if we should have our misgivings, or if our respectable citizen should have his misgivings, whether achievement were an impossibility since the whole of reality, no matter which way one looks at it, seems to be nothing but a series of accidents, then we and he can rest assured that there are great possibilities to be realized by personality. Especially are we assured on the point that, though by definition the whole of reality changes and there is no unchangeable God back of history, we need not fear that there will be no meaning to this whole beautiful scheme of the integration of personality. We have it from Wieman that there will somehow be something stable in the midst of all the instability. To quote: "Change without something that retains its identity throughout the change, is meaningless. All purpose, all meaning, all progress, all hope, requires that something changeless persist throughout the sequence of transition" (20).

Naturally, we think that this admission ruins the whole structure of the integration so carefully wrought out for the readers of the extension course. The argument would seem to be simple enough and so compelling that even Wieman himself must admit the force of it, that where there is nothing but change, there is no meaning to life. By definition, all reality changes according to the modern theory of reality as we have shown by the quotation that Huxley gives from Whitehead. This is the theory of the various schools of modern philosophy without exception. But fortunately, our respectable citizen is not troubled with these difficulties, since he has first learned that the most eminent psychologists and philosophers do not believe in a changeless God, and he trusts that, somehow, provision will be made for him in his time of need. And we see that he has been taken care of now by Wieman, with the assurance that all is well.

We may look a little more fully at the nature of this assurance that Wieman gives our respectable citizen on this question. Our respectable citizen wants to be sure that he can be genuinely religious, and truly worship if he joins the group that we have been discussing. On this point, Wieman assures him by showing him what worship really is. We quote: "It is a state of awareness. Awareness of what? Of that total encompassing presence which sustains you and shapes you and in adaptation to which all your life is lived in so far as it is lived well, and in so far as the greatest goods of life are attained by you. This presence is God; but if you have doubts about God, call it a certain behavior of the universe, or ozone, or electricity, or other; or innumerable atoms, or any other misconception of God you may prefer. (We are trying to explain how one can worship and at the same time cast out every belief concerning which he has doubts.) Better let belief in God force itself into your mind against your will than try to hold it when it seems to be slipping away. Whatever you do, be honest. This first step in the act of worship, then, is relaxed and empty-minded awareness of the all-encompassing presence.

"The second step is to think of how this total process of atoms or electricity or ether (of course, it is God) is working upon you and in you and through you to shape the cells of your body and the impulses of your mind into the likeness of Jesus Christ when you make right adjustment to it. If this thought about Jesus gives rise to any doubts, then think of that noblest kind of personality, that highest degree of health, that clearness of mind and greatness of purpose which may be yours when you make right adjustments to this total process of God. No matter how you may doubt your own possibilities, at least there is a maximum of nobility, a maximum of health and mentality and purpose of which you are capable, however small that maximum may be" (21).

At a later point, speaking of the same subject, Wieman says:

"Let us call to mind that the aspect of the universe called God is a pervasive aspect constantly and intimately operative in our lives and in the world about us. In so far as we yield ourselves to it, indescribable possibilities for good hover over us and open before us. At regular seasons of worship, let us cultivate this sense of divine presence, with the attendant possibilities for good and evil.

"But we must not stop with this sense of divine presence and vivid apprehension of attendant possibilities. Each of us must recognize, and through regular seasons of meditation clarify, the definite part which he is fitted to play in bringing the divine aspect of the universe into dominance, with all the consequent good, and in reducing the evil aspects with their consequent disasters" (22).

And if this should seem to be nothing but resolution to make the most of the universe as it is, Wieman assures us that: "It is not resolution: it is re-making of personality through exposure to the stimulation of supremely significant facts" (23).

Finally, in order to enlist our energies for the task of making the divine aspect of the universe dominant, Wieman identifies it with what we have been accustomed to think of as the kingdom of God. He speaks as follows: "This genuine possibility for maximum good inherent in the universe may be called the cause of Christ, the will of God, the Kingdom of Heaven, the utmost welfare of mankind, etc.; but its specific nature and the best way to promote it is something about which only the fanatic is sure; and he is probably most mistaken of all" (24).

We would seem to have before us here a pretty complete picture of the meaning of God, of Christ, of worship, of the kingdom of God; in short, of all the concepts that are used in the Christian conception of things. We can see quite plainly that the whole thing is something subjective within the universe and that the universe is somehow here. God is identified with the "facts" or with an aspect of the universe. Nor are we kept in the dark as to what, in the last analysis, the whole of the religious activity amounts to. It is nothing but acceptance of the universe as it is. It is acceptance of the inevitable. We quote again from Wieman:

"One is free of demoralizing fear just as soon as he is ready to accept the facts precisely as they are."

There is a record of a man who found he was going blind. As long as he clung to his failing eyesight, he was fearful and depressed. But when at last he saw there was no hope, resigned himself to inevitable fact, and set to work to cultivate his sense of touch in order to become an expert flour-tester, his fear departed.

"Now this state of complete self-committal, this total self-surrender to reality, with consequent command over all the resources of personality, is possible when one fills his mind with the thought that underneath all other facts is the basic fact upon which all else depends. This basic fact can be called the structure of the universe or it can be called God. Whenever we commit ourselves in love to God, accepting him with affection and all things else for his sake, we are free from fear. This state of mind requires cultivation" (25).

We have no doubt that such a state of mind requires a great deal of cultivation.

And now, if it be objected that our respectable citizen has after all gone back to the Modernist theologians whom he has found to be inconsistent, we reply that these Chicago theologians have been very careful to make their definitions of religion in harmony with what psychology teaches. That is even one of their main concerns. They hold very clearly that it is the psychologist better than anyone else that can tell us what human personality is. So they are very careful constantly to refer to what modern psychology says when they trace the development of personality. Of the chapter on, "The Growth of Personality through Conflict" it is said in a note that: "A well-known psychologist has cooperated with the officers of the Institute in the preparation of this study, especially in the material of Part I" (26). Further, the chapter on "How Religion Integrates Personality" is written in part by Professor Forrest A. Kingsbury, who is "Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Chicago" (27). We mention these facts in order to allay the fears of our respectable citizen that he has after all been led into the same sort of position which he has just before learned as an honest man to cast away. For all that any ordinary citizen can see, the position that we have described on the basis of the writings of the University of Chicago publications, in which such men as are listed at the end of this chapter have collaborated, and the position that has been criticised as dishonorable by Leuba, are identical (28). Both continue to use the terms God, Christ, etc., but mean something quite different by these terms than has historically been meant by them. But our respectable citizen will, we trust, have no more difficulty about accepting this new religion and thinking that he can call it the Christian religion if he so desires. He has now the authority of leading psychologists as well as leading theologians. He is happily oblivious of the fact that both the psychologists and the theologians have assumed what they should prove in that they began all their discussion of the "facts" on the assumption that the facts exist

and can be known without God, which is the whole point in question. He is also happily unaware of the fact that these psychologists and theologians have boasted of their neutrality, their broadmindedness and their humility because they were not as the self-righteous Pharisees who claimed to have all knowledge and who condemned all religions that were not identical with their own and then have turned around to reject as superstition all those who still believe in Christian theism.

Our respectable citizen can now get real satisfaction out of reading other books that discuss the question and define religion; for instance, as Leighton defines it when he says: "Religion is a projection in the roaring loom of time of a concentration or unified complex of psychical values" (29). Or again, when Aubrey says: "Religion is projection and pursuit of ideal personal relations with the universe and man" (30). Or, one more, when Perry says: "Religion is, then, man's sense of the disposition of the universe to himself" (31).

Our respectable citizen can enjoy all these things because he has been told on good authority that religion is exclusively subjective, that it is and can be nothing but a projection and that anyone who thinks otherwise is superstitious and has no intelligence. Then, too, our respectable citizen has by this time been assured that it is quite possible and respectable to talk of having personal relations with an impersonal universe. He has learned that these irrevocable laws of the universe, whether called electricity or God, somehow have little loopholes of vacuity in them in which human personality has marvelous possibilities of development. He has learned that, though the universe is on the one hand irrevocable and disposes of us according to impersonal laws, and though the loopholes of vacuity would naturally kill personality instantaneously, it is nevertheless possible for human personality somehow to integrate itself. It does this by being joyfully ground to powder in the realms of the inevitable and by being joyfully exploded in the realms of vacuity. And since personality will inevitably explode in the vacuum as well as be ground to powder in the inevitable, our respectable citizen sums up his whole religion by saying that it is the joyful submission to the inevitable. That is the religion of the future, the religion of all intelligent man.

References: Chapter VII

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6. Idem, p. 92.
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8. Leuba, God or Man, p. 266.
9. Idem, p. 268.
10. Idem, pp. 270-271.
11. Idem, p. 262.
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13. J. S. Huxley, Religion Without Revelation, p. 12.
14. Idem, p. 76.
15. Idem, p. 54.
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## Chapter VIII

### RELIGION AND OBJECTIVE REDEMPTION -- MIRACLE

In the last two chapters, we have seen something of the nature of the objections that the psychologist school has to the traditional position and also something of the nature of the religion that it wishes to substitute for the traditional view. The general principles on which the psychology school works are now before us. It remains for us to see something of the results of the application of these principles to the specifically Christian doctrines. We wish to see what happens to such doctrines as Revelation and Inspiration, theophany, prophecy and miracle, in the objective aspect of redemption and what happens to such doctrines as regeneration, conversion, sanctification, prayer, etc., in the subjective sphere of redemption. In short, we wish to see, be it only briefly and by way of general discussion, what happens to the special principle, that which God does for us to bring sinners back to Himself and to lead creation to its intended goal. We begin in this chapter with the results of the psychology of religion principles when they are applied to the objective aspect of our redemption.

We naturally expect that men will have to reject all the objective factors of our redemption if, as we have seen, they have assumed a metaphysical relativism at the basis of their thought. They even have to reject the specifically theistic doctrines, such as creation and the existence of God. We say they even have to reject the theistic doctrines. By that we do not mean that it were really conceivable that they should only reject the specifically Christian doctrines and not reject the theistic doctrines. Christian-theism is a unit in its conception. If one rejects the one, one will also of necessity have to reject the other. Yet it ought to be particularly clear that if one rejects the specifically theistic doctrines, one will certainly have to reject the specifically Christian doctrines. And it is that which we wish to note now that the metaphysical relativism and the epistemological relativism that underlies the whole school of the psychology of religion assures us in advance of the negative results. We are not wondering whether men will reject this or reject that particular one of the doctrines of Christianity. We are certain in advance that they will reject every one of them. We only wish to see how they do it.

In the first place, we expect that the usual ridicule will be poured out upon the orthodox doctrines in particular as well as upon Christianity in general. We have already noted that according to Leuba the Church fathers manifested humanity's ability to believe the unbelievable when they formulated the Church's creeds. Now, with respect to the common opposition to the creeds we may remark that here the psychologist of religion voices the common objection that comes from the philosophical irrationalism of the day. It is that no intellectual interpretation can in the nature of the case be expressive of absolute truth, because there is no such thing as absolute truth. At best, all intellectual affirmations are only one side of the story. There can be no either -- or argument between opposing systems of interpretation, but only a both -- and

argument. So Huxley, when he discusses the religion of the future, says that: "The test of formal membership of a particular religious organization would still reside in the acceptance of particular beliefs and ideas; but these different schemes of thought would be all particular aspects of a more general scheme, and matters would be so arranged that intellectual barriers, in the form of creeds and dogma, should no more prevent a religiously-minded man from worship in a church not of his own set than that a lover of art should be compelled to make a profession of belief in impressionism or cubism of pre-Raphaelitism before being allowed to enjoy an exhibition of pictures" (1).

In passing, we remark that it is a pity that much theology today that wishes to be classed as orthodox does not seem to see the danger of playing with this fire of ultimate irrationalism. It seems to think that in it we have something similar to what the Church has taught by the incomprehensibility of God to man. It therefore toys with the idea of paradox and speaks much in the same way that Huxley speaks. We give only one quotation in order to illustrate this point. In the book of Donald Mackenzie on "Christianity the Paradox of God," we read among similar things: "The Christian believer takes his stand on this paradox of the Divine Human Christ as on a sure foundation, and the glory of our paradoxical faith is that it never reaches its climax until it becomes a doxology, in which seeming contradictions vanish in a stream of praise" (2).

It were devoutly to be desired that, instead of thus playing with the whole irrational approach of modern philosophy, orthodox men would always and everywhere be ready to combat it. It is very necessary to maintain that back of the whole concept of Christianity lies the notion of an absolutely self-conscious and rational God, who, though not fully comprehensible to his creatures, yet by virtue of His existence makes the intellectual knowledge that they have to be genuinely true. It is only the metaphysical relativism that lies at the basis of the psychology of religion school that leads them to this attack on the claim to absolute truth on the part of Christianity. In the nature of the case, this could never be established by an appeal to the "facts," it is a matter of philosophy about the "facts."

It will readily be seen that, if we granted that all intellectual interpretations are no more than mere approximations to the truth in the current sense of the term, the whole of the Christian system falls to the ground at once. Grant the truth of the ultimate irrationalism of modern thought, and religion is, in the nature of the case, something that cannot have anything to do with God as God is understood by Christians. For Christians, the what, that is, the character of God is the all-important thing to consider in any definition of religion. Their whole religion consists in man's relation to God. Hence reject this concept of God, and you at the same time say that religion may be something and must be something that does not need God as its object at all. Hence, on this basis, men will have to reject all the doctrines of the orthodox Church with respect to the revelation of this God for the salvation of sinners.

What we would particularly note at this juncture is that this alternative is in no sense done away with even if men speak of the possibility or even of the necessity of an objective reference for the religious transaction. So we have seen that Baillie, in his discussion of religion, thinks he differs quite materially from many of the psychologists of religion when he insists that religion must have an objective reference point. Speaking of religion as dealing with man's consciousness of value, he says: "Yet religion is more than the consciousness of value and more than the love of goodness. It has to do, rather, with the relation of value to reality, with what Socrates and Plato long ago called 'the identity of goodness and being'" (3).

It is not sufficient, then, for us to say that as Christians we believe that religion has an objective reference, while for the modern viewpoint, religion is merely subjective, unless we define our terms more closely. It is even customary for the most extreme pragmatists to say that religion is not merely something internal. So Wieman says of his conception of worship: "It is not resolution; it is re-making of the personality through exposure to the stimulation of supremely significant facts" (4).

The real question, therefore, is as to what sort of objective reference men think that religion needs. And on this issue there are only two answers. The Christian says that religion needs the God of the Scriptures, the absolutely self-conscious God, while all other theories say that all the objective reference religion needs is some sort of impersonal universe. Even when men love to speak of God in personal terms, they really believe that the most ultimate environment of man is impersonal. They only speak of God as somehow to be at the heart of the universe as an impersonal principle. The term "personality" is no more than a symbolism. Yet, for convenience' sake, we may speak of the Christian-theistic conception as the objective and of the other views as subjective. It brings out the difference fully and finally, if only we keep in mind what has just been said about some non-theist who also seems to desire some sort of objective reference. It brings out the difference quite basically, because if one does not believe in God, one cannot believe that there is anything objective in all that has to do with our objective redemption. If men do not believe in God, they will have to find a subjective explanation for revelation, for the atonement, etc.

It is this acceptance of the non-Christian philosophy of the nature of reality that makes men so easily ridicule the Christian position. Leuba, for instance, thinks that Christian Science is accomplishing a great deal of good for humanity without all the "abracadabra" of Christian teaching. He says: "Christian Science has boldly swept aside the dogmatic scaffolding of orthodox Christianity. The triune God, the Fall of man, the Incarnation of the Son born of the Virgin Mary, and his atonement for the sins of man -- all that abracadabra is disregarded, and fear and worry are directly and vigorously attacked as constituting the major cause of physical and moral evils" (5).

Or again we note how certain the psychologists are that their interpretation of the "facts" is correct when we find that Leuba



thinks it has been fully proved that the story of paradise is a myth. He says, of the behavior of dogs when they shrink away before their masters, that it is similar to the behavior of Adam and Eve when they hid from the face of God. To quote: "There are striking similarities in the behavior of Adam and Eve and of Darwin's dog. Instead of gamboling joyfully towards his entering master, the dog hid under the sofa. Likewise our first ancestors, guilty of disobedience, concealed themselves from their Maker; -- thus, it seems, does conscience make cowards of us all" (6)!

But now that we have once more looked at the assumption of the non-Christian position and the joyful certainty of infallibility that this gives to such writers as Leuba, we must note some of the reasons that they and others offer for the rejection of the orthodox view. Some of these reasons given are, deceit on the part of priests, etc., happy coincidences, political astuteness on the part of religious leaders, actual use of natural powers in the name of religion, etc. Let us look at them more fully. We may classify these objections according as they attack the concept of fact-revelation or as they attack the concept of word-revelation. In this chapter we deal with the former, and in the next chapter, with the latter.

In the first place, the old notion that religion is due to priestcraft, though discarded by many inasmuch as it is now seen that whatever religion is, it is at any rate deeply imbedded in human nature, has not wholly died out. But this objection may be dismissed at once. No one denies that crimes have been perpetrated in the name of religion. Certainly we admit that the religions as a whole have been falsified by sin. We even expect that all manner of crimes will be committed in the name of religion. The corruption of the best is always the worst. We even gladly admit that in connection with the insertion of the special principle, crimes have been committed. The story of the Pharisees is notorious. They perverted the Old Testament and committed crimes in its name. But this is no argument against the Old Testament itself or against the general idea of the insertion of a true revelation in the midst of the perversion that sin had brought in the world.

In the second place, there is the objection that the priests and prophets have often been successful in their predictions, etc., because there were happy coincidences in nature that made it appear as though their prophecies came true. This brings up the whole subject of magic in religion.

Again we would note with gratitude that men are less extreme today in their discussions on the subject of magic than they used to be. It used to be argued that all religion is due to magic, and therefore a farce. Today magic itself is no longer said to be a farce, but something that naturally comes up in the course of history. Moreover, some writers would distinguish sharply between magic and religion. But, basically, all this makes no difference. The present discussion on the subject of magic in religion or magic and religion is just as hostile to the Christian position as the earlier discussions were. That this is true can be appreciated at once if we only note that magic is at any rate said to be the same

thing as what Scripture speaks of as miracle. It makes no difference whether men discuss the subject under the heading of magic or under the heading of miracle, the assumption is that they are the same. This denies the redemptive principle, and, with it, Christianity. Secondly, men take for granted that whatever takes place in nature when magic or miracle is spoken of, if anything takes place, it takes place in and by virtue of a system of natural laws that exist independently of God. Thus theism as well as Christianity is denied, and all that is done in the name of the "facts" and is said to involve no metaphysics.

In his chapter on "The Works Attributed to God, Illustrated and Explained," Leuba proceeds to show that what has often been thought of as happening as the result of prophecies, incantations, etc., is really nothing but the happy coincidences of nature. To quote: "The mystery of the long vogue of magic is not sufficiently explained by Puck's saying, 'What fools these mortals be!' If the results due to the wiles of the performer are left out, magic owes its reputation to coincidences, immediate or delayed (if one may speak of delayed coincidences), and to its subjective effects. As an example of the first, rain is bound to follow more or less closely upon rainmaking ceremonies -- quite closely indeed if the magician persists until it comes! Many patients cannot fail to improve, and even to recover, soon after the usually absurd practices of the medicine man; for many diseases are normally of short duration, and others have sharp turns; fever abates at times very rapidly, and fits of asthma are known to come and go with disconcerting suddenness" (7).

We should note that when Leuba brings forth this explanation that he offers it at least as a partial explanation of all the miracles that are recorded in Scripture as well as of all the miracles that are recorded outside of Scripture. Moreover, we should add that he brings out very fully that many Christians are even today so superstitious as to think that God has something to do with the weather and other natural events, and that thus they have not outgrown the stage of magic in religion. To be sure, the liberal theologians are no longer guilty of actual belief in magic, but they should be reminded again of their inconsistency of singing hymns, etc., that still have magic in them. Says Leuba: "Liberal Protestantism has little faith in prayer for rain or for the lifting of a contagious plague. It is proper, however, to remind those adherents that the official books of worship retain prayers for the weather and against physical accidents, and that these prayers are still read in all seriousness in the churches they attend; . . ." (8). Now, Leuba rejects the whole matter of magic and miracle completely. We may quote a sentence to show his attitude. He says: "Love, peace, confidence -- these removers of wasteful fear-inhibitions and of the sense of inferiority -- work in the Christian religion, whether God, Christ, the Virgin, and the saints are living personalities or mere creations of the human mind" (9).

We bring out this point so fully in order to point out that the struggle is a very comprehensive one indeed. It is of the utmost importance that it be seen that the struggle is completely comprehensive. This fact is often obscured when men quibble about

some of the Old Testament miracles in distinction from the incarnation and the resurrection of Christ, etc., as though it is really only against the former that they are fighting. On the other hand, the issue is often obscured by Christian theologians when they talk as though they, to be sure, accept the central miracles of Christianity, but are willing to make all manner of concessions on the question of Old Testament miracles. The fact is, that all the miracles of Scripture form one body. The Old Testament miracles and all miracles of Scripture cluster round the central miracle of the Person of the Christ. They form one organic whole. It is the Christ as the central miracle that comes into this world to redeem that which has been ruined by sin. It is He that makes the "natural" truly natural once more. He sent his activity of power before Him in the Old Testament times in order thus gradually but actually to accomplish the redemption of the universe. These early miracles will, in the nature of the case, have a different appearance than the miracles of the later times. They will deal more with matters of seemingly little significance, and it will be more difficult to show the connection between them and the central miracle of Christ than it will be in the case of the New Testament miracles. Hence, it will also be more difficult to distinguish them from the counterfeit miracles done outside of the pale of redemptive revelation. Two miracles, a true miracle and a false miracle, may even as to appearance be identical in form without being identical in actuality.

This is not to say what is sometimes said by orthodox theologians today, that it all depends upon the question of how one looks at an event, whether it is to be called a miracle or not. So, for instance, Mackenzie says: "A miracle or paradox, in the Biblical sense, therefore, may be as ordinary a thing as a harvest, if only we see God at work in it, and if it calls forth His praise, or it may be as startling as the raising of the dead" (10).

Or again: "Miracle in Scripture is a religious, not a scientific or non-scientific conception" (11). And once more: "Miracles in the Old Testament are not to be explained physically or historically at all; they are to be explained theologically and redemptively" (12).

To put the matter as Mackenzie does is to say that it makes no difference whether the facts recorded actually took place in the physical and historical sense of the term. Now, we consider it of the utmost importance to say that they actually took place. But we hold, in addition to that, that they must be explained "theologically and redemptively." That is, their actual occurrence itself depends upon their theological and redemptive explanation. It was for the sake of the redemption of the world that the incarnation, the death, and the resurrection of Christ actually took place physically and historically, and therefore it is also for the actual redemption of the race that the Old Testament miracles took place physically and historically. But this does not exclude the possibility that counterfeit miracles may have had externally the same appearance as true miracles. Christianity holds to the position of the actual existence of the devil and that the devil has had, certainly in the time of the actual realization of the special revelation of God, influences on the physical world.

And then if the question be asked concerning how then people were to know what were true and what were false miracles, we add that it was not always possible to distinguish clearly if one individual miracle was taken by itself; but that if they were taken in connection with other miracles and with the whole body of truth of which they were illustrative and complementary, the distinction was usually quite clear. The distinction naturally became clearer as time went on, and the new miracles could be compared with the body of truth and the recorded miracles of the past.

If the whole matter be regarded in this way, it appears that the psychology of religion discussion of magic and miracle is a direct attack upon the whole conception of redemptive revelation. And it also appears that the whole attack rests upon one grand assumption. It rests upon the grand assumption that the "natural" works independently of God, and that the "natural" is truly natural, that is, that it has no evil in it or that the evil that is in it is natural. Now, if Christian theism is true, nature does not work apart from God. The doctrine of Providence is basic to the whole of Christianity. So, then, if something happens by natural means, it may still happen as a miracle in the interest of redemption. As illustrations, we may take the crossing of the Red Sea and the falling of the walls of Jericho. If an east wind drove the waters of the Red Sea away so that Israel could go through dry-shod and then stopped so that the Egyptians were drowned, Leuba would naturally conclude that this was a happy coincidence. He would say that chance was on their side that day. So, also, if an earthquake shook down the walls of Jericho, he would conclude that the Israelites walked long enough until the walls had to come down. But the real question is whether the God of creation is also the God of redemption so that he makes the powers of nature to be subservient to the work that He is accomplishing for the people of God. To Abraham, He said that He was El Shaddai, that is, the One who could even use the natural means for the realization of his special promises. So, then, it will not do to argue against the actuality of miracles on the ground that they happen through the forces of nature unless it be further shown that these forces of nature are not themselves the servants of God.

And in this connection, we may take up the whole question of miraculous influence brought to bear on the religion of man. Great confusion reigns in the discussion of this matter in the books of the psychologists of religion. They have not taken the trouble to acquaint themselves with what the orthodox position really holds. The orthodox position distinguishes clearly between the miraculous as it took place in the period of the insertion of the special principle and whatever has taken place since that time. It does not deny that there has been anything miraculous in any sense since the completion of the objective aspect of redemption. It even allows that immediately after the close of the objective principle, there were certain miracles still. Yet it maintains that only the miracles that occurred in connection with the insertion of the objective aspect of the special principle have universal significance. But the psychologists reason as though the orthodox position is equally interested in maintaining the miraculous character of all manner of so-called church miracles as it is in maintaining the miracles of

Scripture. They should certainly distinguish between the Roman Catholic position and the Protestant position, and it may be seriously questioned whether they are at all doing justice to the Roman Catholic position. Leuba, for instance, tells us about some individuals who are said to have been healers, in order, as he thinks, to expose them, and then thinks that he has said something significant against the orthodox position with respect to Biblical miracles. To quote: "In modern times, one of the most remarkable healers by the grace of God was Prince Alexander Leopold Hohenlohe. Ordained as priest in 1815, he acquired in later years a widespread reputation. G. B. Curren in "Three Thousand Years of Mental Healing," quotes a letter of Louis, ex-king of Bavaria, referring to the Prince's activity: 'There are still miracles. The last ten days of the last month, the people of Würzburg might have believed themselves in the time of the Apostles. The deaf heard, the blind saw, the lame freely walked, not by aid of art, but by a few short prayers and by the invocation in the name of Jesus.'"

With respect to all such matters, he says that it is of course very difficult for anyone to say what has actually happened, but it seems quite clear that the healings have been of such diseases as could naturally be healed by suggestion, etc. The thing we would note now is not the argument itself, but the fact that it is in this way that Leuba thinks he is also undermining the notion of Biblical miracles. But the whole position, at any rate of the Reformed churches, has been that miracle is an exceptional something that occurred in the nature of the case in connection with the entrance of the redemptive principle into the universe. The very fact then that men merely take for granted that when they have discussed such things as Leuba has discussed they have also discussed the Bible miracle, shows that they have not understood the orthodox position and have not even discussed it. Moreover, they have merely assumed that all miracles are on the same level, and that is just the thing in dispute.

We cannot here fully discuss the question of miracles in general. It is necessary that we hasten on to see that the psychologists seem to offer a good reason for the rejection of the orthodox position in addition to the fact that the whole thing seems to them to be absurd. That reason may be said to be that they say that miracles are quite unnecessary. All that man has always been after is the removal of certain fears and the help and comfort in trying situations. Now, all those things may be attained equally well without as well as with miracles. It is this type of argument that Leuba tries to bring out very fully in his last book. We only summarize it briefly. Says Leuba: "Few people, even among the well informed, know how much progress has been made in the application of recent knowledge to the moral education of the child without reference to heaven and the God of the religions" (13). Or again: "A powerful movement carried on by educators, psychologists, social workers, and even psychiatrists is on foot, sweeping past the religions" (14). Then in this connection he enumerates several of those agencies. Later, he brings up the subject anew when he writes on the replacement of the religions. He visualizes a future in which the knowledge of which he speaks will be diffused in a religious way by the educators of the land. To quote: "The taking over of the moral education of the public lay schools constitutes the most important phase of the last surrender required of the traditional religions" (15). A little further, he adds: "The change required in the orientation of the schools and in the matter and

manner of teaching implies, of course, a corresponding change in the selection and preparation of the teachers. They are to constitute a priesthood consecrated to the service of man" (16).

All that Leuba would allow by way of concession to anything objective in the religion of humanity is some vague sense that all is well with the world, much as Wieman holds that man must speak of a divine aspect of the universe. Leuba says: "Provided it be left sufficiently vague and undefined, a faith in a power making for goodness and beauty need not be in disagreement with science" (17).

This once more brings the importance of the issue before us. The rejection of miracle implies the worship of man instead of the worship of God. Let us now see what these forces are that Leuba thinks of as standing at man's disposal if he will only open his eyes and use them. In the first place he speaks of physical forces at the service of man. Here he enumerates the many diseases that science has already mastered. Says he: "Is it necessary to draw up a list of other scourges mastered by medical science: smallpox, yellow fever, hydrophobia, tetanus, sleeping sickness, syphilis, leprosy? These and other diseases, responsible in the past for a very large part of the losses and suffering of humanity, are now under complete or partial control" (18).

But then comes the still more important point that we may expect that in the future we will be able to use indirect instead of direct methods of eliminating undesirable characteristics of various individual human beings by approaching the matter physically rather than morally. To quote again: "No less wonderful than the success of science in checking or eliminating microbic diseases are the discoveries in connection with the function of the endocrine glands. These glands, the thyroid in the neck, the pituitary at the base of the skull, the adrenal above the kidneys, and many others secrete substances (hormones) which modify the structure or function of certain organs" (18). How much Leuba expects humanity to benefit from all this is clear from the following statement: "These brief notes will suffice to open up a vista on a new world dawning upon medical science. It seems to hold the promise of a control of human nature far more complete than had ever been dreamt of -- a control not only of the physiological organism but of the intellectual and moral being" (19).

It is true, thinks Leuba, that in the moral sphere we have not seen so clearly that we can make use of more indirect and therefore better means than that of religion in order to improve humanity, but this too will come in time. Says he: "If the triumphs of the physical and of the medical sciences have been so great and so obvious that in these fields the competing use of the religious method has become little more than perfunctory, the situation is different with regard to the moral life. Somehow, despite the evidence, the majority of Christian believers continue to think that the moral life can be affected only by direct action of moral forces, and usually of moral forces under divine control" (20). Then speaking more fully of the way in which morality may be improved by the truly scientific and indirect method, he says: "The most potent of the indirect methods for the production of the elimination of traits -- physical,

intellectual and moral -- is selective breeding. The introduction of systematic fundamental, eugenic practices would undoubtedly prove to be a turning point in the history of humanity" (21).

To all this Leuba then adds a chapter on "The Psychological Forces at the Service of Man." In this chapter he gives instances of people who have come out of a morass of immorality by what he speaks of as non-religious means. So he tells the story of Dora Hadley, who, from a life of immorality, was taken to a psychopathic hospital. Of her stay there, he says: "The affection of the social workers about her and her admiration and love for them, kindled in her a firm intention to become 'just the kind of a girl' they wanted her to be. With the help of man, and without any reference to the God of the religions, Dora Hadley made good" (22).

This argument of Leuba covers pretty well the whole ground and is quite typical. It may be objected that it is very extreme. This may be true, but it is nevertheless quite typical. The discussions by other psychologists of religion on these questions come down to the same thing as far as the place of God and Christianity in the whole scheme is concerned. We only add a statement from Wieman on the matter of death, since Leuba has not mentioned this subject. According to Wieman, man can face even death without the God of Christianity. To be sure, Wieman talks as though he favors religions, and Leuba is outspokenly against Christianity. But this makes no difference as to the point in discussion, for Wieman's God is no more than an aspect of the universe as we have already observed. Hence, he as truly as Leuba wants to do without the God of Christianity. Says Wieman, speaking of his religious man: "He can even master death in the sense of facing it fearlessly and making it yield up whatsoever profit it can be made to yield to himself and to his fellow-men" (23).

What shall we say about all this? Fortunately, we do not need to say much about it. The whole argument has been beside the point, if it meant to dethrone the traditional position. The orthodox position does not deny that God works through natural means. The question is not whether the endocrine glands or God help someone, but the question is whether God is back of the endocrine glands. Leuba has assumed that He is not. The question is not whether God or the social workers helped Dora Hadley, but whether God was back of the social workers. Leuba has assumed that He was not. And even so, that is not stating the case centrally as far as the bearing of all this on miracle is concerned. So far, we have only said that the question is whether there is a providence of God or not. But providence and miracle are not the same. Even to say that God is back of the endocrine glands is not to say that God is working miracle. God is working miracles only if directly through His providence, that is, through secondary causes, or indirectly through intervention He inserts the redemptive principle into the sinful world. Now, if the nature and purpose of this redemptive principle be understood, then it will also be understood that all the ammunition shot by Leuba and others is shot "in the blue." We may see this if we study for a moment what the Church maintains that the significance of the special principle is for any individual today.

In the first place, we note what the special or redemptive principle means for one who accepts it. It means above all That it is well with him for eternity. Suppose that Dora Hadley's endocrine glands had been properly taken care of, and suppose that she became "just the kind of girl the nurses want her to be," and thus "made good," how does Leuba know that she has really "made good" as far as eternity is concerned? How does he know that what Scriptures say is not true when they speak of our righteousness as filthy rags in God's sight? He speaks of the foolishness of comforting people with the promises of a distant heaven. Is this heaven so far distant? Or is eternal punishment so far distant if it is actually on the way? If they are actually on their way, they are as close to us as the day of our death, which is not very far from any of us, and may be very near at any time. At death, we close our eyes and will be with Christ or away from Christ, if the Christian position be true. The only reason that Leuba or anyone else can have for not believing in this is that they do not like to believe in this. And what one does not like to believe in, one does not like to speak of. Hence it is taken for granted that this life is the whole of man's span of existence, or at least the whole with which he should be concerned. This could be true only if there is no God who is our creator and to whom we are actually responsible. Hence the existence of God should first be disproved before men say that someone has made good, though he has paid no attention to the redemptive work of God.

Now, if the chief benefit that a Christian gets from his acceptance of redemption is his eternal welfare, it follows too that he is not substituting medicine for God or using the doctor instead of God when he accepts the benefits of the knowledge of medical science. These are to him gifts of God's common grace to man. Again, it is not glands or God, but we thank God for the advances of science. And when Wieman tells us that fear may be eliminated to the extent that those who do not accept the God of orthodox Christianity can nevertheless die in peace, we only say again that this is, at most, evidence of the subtle perversion of sin. We believe it to be a fact that it is set unto every man to die, and after that, the judgment. Hence, if any one will so blind himself as not to see that and even to be insensitive to that on his deathbed, it only proves that sin is what Scripture says it is, namely, something which has completely blinded the creature's eyes. That is, the Christian interpretation of the matter, and it will not do to set it aside by not mentioning it and treating it as though it did not exist. The peace of the dying man may be the prelude of everlasting peace or it may be the delusion that precedes the most awful awakening, as in the case of the rich man of the parable, according as Christianity is or is not true.

Thus we see that the Old Testament miracle, the death of Christ, the resurrection, the ascension, the return to judgment, are all parts of the one concept that God is actually, though gradually, bringing in redemption into the universe. All this would be meaningless if sin were not what Scripture says it is, the breaking of the law of God on the part of man. So all the doctrines of Christianity hang together, a theistic conception of reality, then the theistic conception of sin, and thereafter the Christian conception of the removal of sin. Either all of this is true or



none of it is. And whether all of it is true or none of it is true is not a matter that can be settled by a mere appeal to the "facts," because it involves the very question of the origins of the facts themselves and of the origin of the evil in the facts. If the facts are just there without God, then the evil in them is also just there, and has nothing to do with God. Only in that case can the whole redemptive scheme of Christianity be said to be an illusion. But these basic questions the psychologists of religion say they are not interested in. We answer that they are then wilfully making air-castles and no more. When therefore J. S. Huxley tries to dispose of the whole question of the miraculous by telling us what Rebecca West is reported to have said about those who spend much time on the virgin birth question to the effect that: "Ecclesiastics who talk about the Virgin Birth are as absurd as persons would be who, having been visited by the wisest man in the world, stopped repeating his wisdom to an audience longing to hear it, and wrangled whether he had traveled to their house by a bus or a tramcar" (24).

We reply that if Rebecca was sick with appendicitis we feel confident that she would like to know whether she had a qualified surgeon or a quack at her side. We are certain that there could not be one man who would be the wisest of all and worth listening to if, as Huxley says, all reality is change. In that case, no one would be worth listening to, least of all ourselves. It goes without saying that if religion is the joyful acceptance of the inevitable or the peering by the blind into an abyss of darkness, as it is if Christianity is not true, that in that case miracles have never occurred and are quite unnecessary. But if reality has meaning because of the existence back of it of the God who alone could give it meaning, then miracles have occurred and are necessary. They then have occurred because they are necessary. That is, they are then necessary for the purpose of the redemption of the world and the world without redemption could not exist for the fraction of a second since the wages of sin is death.

References: Chapter VIII

1. J. S. Huxley, Religion Without Revelation, p. 57.
2. Donald Mackenzie, Christianity the Paradox of God, p. 94.
3. John Baillie, The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul, p. 120.
4. Wieman, Experiments in Personal Religion, p. 79.
5. Leuba, God or Man, p. 174.
6. Idem, p. 285.
7. Idem, p. 151.
8. Idem, pp. 154-155.
9. Idem, p. 154.
10. Mackenzie, Op. Cit., p. 196.
11. Idem, p. 194.
12. Idem, p. 194.
13. Leuba, God or Man, p. 145.
14. Idem, p. 146.
15. Idem, p. 300.
16. Idem, p. 304.
17. Idem, p. 319.
18. Idem, p. 89.
19. Idem, p. 90.
20. Idem, p. 90.
21. Idem, p. 93.
22. Idem, p. 107.
23. Wieman, Experiments in Personal Religion, p. 138.
24. J. S. Huxley, Op. Cit., p. 89.

## Chapter IX

### RELIGION AND REDEMPTION -- REVELATION

In the preceding chapter, we have concentrated our attention chiefly on fact revelation, or miracles. In this chapter we must concentrate our attention on interpretation or word revelation. The two together can be said to sum up that which God has done for man in order to accomplish his redemption after he fell into sin.

And as in the previous chapter it was chiefly the result of a false metaphysics that we observed, in this chapter we shall more definitely see the results of a false epistemology. If one assumes a metaphysical relativity, it is certain that nothing can happen in the course of history that is the result, directly or indirectly, of the redemptive work of God. If, on the other hand, one assumes a non-Christian epistemology, e. g., the Kantian creativity of thought, it is certain that one cannot allow for any interpretation of the facts of history by anything that comes from beyond the mind of man.

In this chapter, too, we must note, as we did in the preceding chapter, that it makes no difference whether men say outright that all prophecy or divine interpretation is subjective or whether they are willing to allow that there is something objective in it. As long as they do not allow that it is God as an absolute self-conscious personality that is back of all human interpretation, and in particular that actually has come into the world to reinterpret the whole of reality by way of interpreting, for us, the meaning of the redemptive facts that He has Himself brought into the world, they are from our point of view still subjective.

And this leads us to remark further about the nature of the objections that are brought against special revelation or interpretation in general. The assumption of the Kantian creativity of thought makes it impossible for men to see what the difference between analogical and univocal reasoning is. That is, they do not see that as theists we have a wholly different conception of the nature of reason as such from those who are not theists. We cannot discuss this point fully here (1). We only call attention to the fact that all the objections that are raised against the idea of prophecy, inspiration, etc., are based upon the presupposition that all interpretation that comes to us in the form of human words and the thought-medium of human beings must, in the nature of the case, be false or mistaken to some extent. The common argument is that since there is necessarily at some point an activity of the human mind, if man is to receive the revelation of God, there must be also of necessity a certain amount of error.

But this is itself a basic error. If Christian-theism is true, man was originally in contact with God, and the interpretation of his mind was, in the nature of the case, correct, because the mind's activity itself was revelational. Man's interpretation was, to be sure, not comprehensive, but nevertheless true. It is only on the non-theistic assumption, that all reality is ultimately

impersonal and that evil is inherent in all reality from the outset, that it can be taken for granted that all that passes through the human mind must, in the nature of the case, be to some extent mistaken.

A further point that we may discuss here is that the attacks upon the Christian position usually forget to look into the meaning of it sufficiently to distinguish between special revelation and illumination. They reason as though it were true that when they have made a valid objection to the idea that men today receive special revelations from God, they have also proved that God did not at any time speak to man. It is quite the style to ridicule people of the orthodox persuasion by speaking of their "insufferable arrogance" in thinking that they know it all, as Stanley Jones spoke on December 14, 1933, of the amazing ease with which some people cast others into hell when these others do not agree fully with their intellectual interpretations of reality.

We should admit that the majority of Christian people are much to blame in this matter, since they themselves have not carefully distinguished between revelation and illumination. What is often spoken of as guidance, as, for instance, in the Buchmanist movement, usually appears to cover both illumination and revelation. But the standards of the churches of Protestantism do make a clear distinction. Their argument that the canon is closed is definite proof of this. The orthodox church is much more strongly opposed to the idea of people getting new revelation today than the school of the psychology of religion could well be. The whole meaning of Christianity is at stake if we should allow that special revelation still continues. The once-for-all-ness, which is the great claim of the special revelation, would drop to the ground at once. Hence when Leuba and others are at great pains to show that many of the so-called mystical revelations of the period after the closing of the canon can be explained naturally, they are only beating the air as far as a real attack on the Christian position is concerned.

With these preliminary remarks, we may now turn to a discussion of the objections to the orthodox position. The main objection is once more that there is another and more natural explanation for the phenomena that have, in the sacred books of the world, been classed under the term "revelation."

We may note in the first place in what way the psychology of religion school is able to explain how men come to believe that God exists. This is of basic importance, because if it can be explained how men come to think of God's existence, it can also be explained how they come to think that God reveals Himself to them. We have already touched on this point in the preceding chapter. We only note one or two typical instances here.

The tendency to personalize reality as a whole is naturally said to be at the base of it all. And this personalization is done in order that men may be able to change their condition for the better. Men want relief from disease or surcease of a famine and feel they must have a personal God to whom they can pray. Thus there is often an unconscious conflict that makes them postulate a God and a God who speaks to them. We quote from a chapter on the "Growth of

Personality Through Conflict," written by a "well-known psychologist," in collaboration with the officers of the Institute of Sacred Literature, published at Chicago.

"There are many varieties of unconscious conflict. The person who has an unrecognized dread of diseases may be a constant pill-taster. The child who has been fed regularly may, when his meal is late, start a fight with someone without knowing that the inhibited eating response is energizing by conflict his fighting inclination. A clergyman who is publicly trying overmuch and overoften to prove the existence of God may be suffering from a conflicting fear that there is no God" (2).

This attitude is but expressive of the general irrationalism of modern thought that we have discussed above. The whole of rational argumentation is replaced by a vague sense of moral values. We cannot review the whole of the recent literature on the theology and philosophy of value, but only point out that since the time of Kant, and as a natural consequence of the Kantian creativity of thought, this argument has been current. It is perhaps as well expressed in Professor Sorley's book on "Moral Values and the Idea of God" as anywhere. On the basis of a review of this literature on the philosophy of value, John Baillie says: "Perhaps it is true that we are coming more and more to doubt the value of formal argumentation of any kind, and to wonder how many people have ever really been led to embrace a new view of things as the result of debate. It is the experience of life that changes a man's outlook, and not the discovery of a well-turned syllogism. Argument is at its strongest in pure mathematics, and in mathematical physics, and in statistics, and in religions where experimental methods of induction can be applied; but in the region of art and morals and religion, and in all regions where we are concerned with sensitiveness to fine gradations of value, its effectiveness is much more open to question" (3).

At a little earlier stage of his argument, Baillie says: "It is never possible for a man to have a firmer hold upon God than he has upon duty. It is never possible for a man to be any surer of the reality of God than he is of the loveliness of love and the ugliness of falsehood and selfishness. The only assurance of God which religion ever promises is an assurance which is of the same kind, of the same texture, as the assurance of our ultimate values" (4).

How completely Baillie has separated our sense of values from our certainty with respect to the existence of God may still further be seen from the following quotation: "The Doctrine of the Attributes of God, the Doctrine of Providence, the Doctrine of the Forgiveness of Sins and the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul are all based, in the last resort, on our practical acquaintance with the workings of love in the heart of man" (5).

We may note at once that all this reasoning is based upon the assumption of the truth of Platonism rather than Christianity. If Christian theism is true, value is not something that exists independently of God, but in the last resort, has its basis in the

nature of God. If that is true, then one cannot reason independently for the existence of value and for the existence of God. And we may also observe that it is assumed in Baillie's argument that we can know the love of man without having any reference to God. This is no doubt good Kantianism, but the very reverse of Christianity. It is only because men have assumed that Kant rather than Augustine is right, that they are able to reason in this way.

But the importance of this question of the independent existence of value appears more fully still if it is realized that it is essentially the same argument that is used when men discuss the earlier religions. It is said that man naturally appears upon the scene of history as a being with certain desires and drives. Man is said to be a non-rational being at the outset. It is said that his intellectual interpretation is no more than an effort on his part to rationalize the experience that he already had. It is thus that he objectifies the evil and the good values that are known to him, and it is thus that he imagines that the good values personified as God speaks to him and promises or threatens with rewards and punishments for this life and the next. To quote from Thouless in this connection: "When a man feels the conflict strongly, he tends to objectify the two sides of it, and he objectifies the forces on the side of moral goodness as God" (6).

The most important point in this connection from the point of view of the psychologist is that he is able, as he thinks to show that the God idea itself on which the whole question of revelation depends, is subject to the same laws of development as other ideas. To quote from Ames: "The idea of God, for example, which is the central conception of theology, is subject to the same laws of the mental life as are all other ideas, and there is but one science of psychology applicable to it" (7).

To this we may add here, though the full significance of it will not appear till we discuss the subjective aspect of redemption, that as is the case with the race, so also is the case with the individual, according to Ames. In both cases, the God idea is a late arrival. In both cases, religion is something that is learned. To quote from what he says on this subject: "All that psychology permits is the conclusion that the infant is non-religious, non-moral, and non-personal; that in early childhood impulsive sensuous reaction together with absorption in immediate details and fragmentary interests make it impossible for the child under nine years to pass beyond the non-religious and non-moral attitude to any considerable degree; but that in later childhood up to about thirteen years of age, he responds to more interests of a social and ideal character, and thus manifests tendencies and attitudes which are religious in character" (8).

All of this merely illustrates what we have said in our preliminary remarks, namely, that the psychologist of religion simply takes the non-Christian conception of reality and knowledge for granted, and on that basis argues beside the point. Ames, as well as many others, takes for granted that when they deal with the God idea, they must naturally deal with completely self-conscious ideas. Now, we do, to be sure, maintain that when Adam was in paradise he

had a self-conscious idea of God as well as of himself. But when Ames deals with this question, that is, with the question of what has happened in the past in the infancy of the race, he cannot prove that intellectual interpretation is a later arrival than the desires of men. At best, he can hope so and think so because his evolutionary philosophy may demand it, but he cannot prove it.

If it be said that the God idea and all other intellectual interpretations of man are closely connected with the desires of man, we answer that that is just what orthodox theology has consistently maintained. It was only at certain stages of the history of non-Christian thought that the intellect has been set up as the master in the human soul. Christianity has constantly maintained that man was prophet, priest and king from the very beginning of his existence on earth.

Further, if it be said that the God idea is subject to the same laws of psychological development as other ideas, that, too, is no matter of worry to us. It is even part of our most basic contention that the God idea must come in at the level of sensation if it is to come in at all. It is only after sin has come in that perversion takes place on this point. It is only after sin comes in that men serve and worship the creature rather than the creator. It is only after sin comes in that men make false distinctions between their idea of themselves and their idea of God. It is then and not till then that they assume that their idea of themselves is more fundamental than their idea of God. Hence, if in the great mass of the religious literature of the world, Ames and the other psychologists do find that men have really not made the God idea count in their lives inasmuch as they have used the God idea for selfish purposes and have made it secondary in their thought so that they have thought and spoken of God only after they have thought and spoken of many other things at length, this fact is quite consistent with the Christian position. Since mankind fell into sin in the early infancy of the race, and since the very nature of sin was that it substituted the service of man for the service of God, it is but to be expected that the religious literature of the world, generally speaking, will reveal what seems to be a late arrival of the God idea.

Finally, as to the point that there are non-religious persons today and that childhood is not religious, we would remark as follows. We definitely hold that every person living is inherently religious. But we also hold that many have a false religion. False religion is, in general, the love of man instead of the love of God. Now, many may have become so expert in this religion of man that they are not even aware of the fact that they have a religion at all. There is an unconscious conflict at the bottom of it all we would say, if we may use the psychologists' methods, and turn them upon themselves. Man is kicking against the pricks. He will not serve the only living God. Satan helps him to devise all manner of ways and means by which he will seek to escape the obligation to serve God. The most effective way of doing this would be to try to erase from the minds of men the memory of God. That would be more effective than to fight against God. Hence he has cultivated the spirit of neutrality and said that gods are no more than symbolical expressions for the laws of nature. Satan has

employed the psychologists of religion in particular to devise such plausible arguments as the one devised with respect to the origin of the God idea. He will see to it that men, for no good reason at all, think that psychologists ought to know more about God than other people do. If Freud can get a hearing for his father-complex, we certainly ought to get a hearing when we offer as a psychological explanation of false religion the idea of an Anti-God complex. We would go so far as to explain the whole of the argument advanced by the psychology of religion school by this Anti-God complex. When men in their hearts hate the living God, they begin to make psychology the conditioning science for systematic theology and claim that the study of the origin of religion will solve many theological puzzles.

To all this, Ames can at best advance no other than a metaphysical or epistemological argument.

Similarly, with respect to the contention that the child has no religion. Does the fact that the child is interested only in immediate things prove this? No, it does not, unless the assumption be granted that religion can be present only if men have well-developed self-conscious ideas. But if Christianity is true, religion deals with the most common-place things of life. It includes the toys of the child as well as everything else. We would explain the early manifestations of anger, etc., by the Anti-God complex. What but a metaphysical argument can be advanced against this? It is a metaphysical position that we hold with respect to it, we grant and gladly grant. Why will not our opponents also grant that it is a metaphysical position they are defending with respect to this same point? We feel confident that that fact too must be explained because of the Anti-God complex.

And now we must turn to a further examination of the Anti-God complex as it operates when it is definitely confronted with the phenomena of special revelation. It goes without saying that we cannot discuss every objection that is raised against every part of the revelation that is contained in Scripture and against the idea of Scripture itself. Nor is this necessary. Since the Christian position is a system so that the revelation given through the prophets of old depends for its significance upon the revelation of the one great prophet Jesus Christ, and since the same is true of the Apostles, an attack upon any one of them is an attack upon the whole system; the defense of any one of them is the defense of the whole system. In this way we have dealt with the question of miracle, and in this way we shall now have to deal with the question of revelation.

It may perhaps be well that we take Moses of the Old Testament first in order to show what the Anti-God complex has done to him. Moses is called the Mediator of the Old Testament. He typifies the idea of revelation perhaps better than anyone else in the Old Testament. Now, in the writings of Moses, we have an interpretation of the past, of the present, and of the future. Moreover, this interpretation presents itself as authoritative and as a substitute for what may be thought of these matters without the help of this revelation. This is especially clear if we note that Christ and the



Apostles themselves interpreted Moses' words as being identical with God's interpretation. Everything that is obnoxious to the natural man is present in the idea of revelation as it comes to us in Moses.

If we turn first to Moses' revelation with respect to the past, we observe that naturally the psychology of religion school will agree with the negative critics of Scripture, and the negative critics of Scripture will agree with the psychologists that by all means Moses did not write some of the things attributed to him at so early a date as it is said that he did. But the reason given for this rests not upon established facts about the date of Moses' life, but upon certain "moral impossibilities." It is said that in the nature of the case the idea of an ethical monotheism could not arise till at a certain time in history.

But of more immediate concern to us now is the other claim that what Moses wrote about creation was in the nature of the case no more than a myth. Are the psychologists of religion here dealing with facts? They are not. In the first place, if Christian theism is true, if God did actually create the world, as we have pointed out so often, then sin must also be what Scripture says it is, a wilfull disobedience to God, with the result that man's mind was darkened and forever after anxious to disprove the existence of God and the truth of creation. The truth of creation would be a constant reminder to man that he was guilty, and the sinner does not wish to be reminded that he is guilty. Hence, if the truth was to come once more to man, it would have to come by way of a revelation that set itself in contrast to the wisdom of man and demanded the subjection of the wisdom of man to itself. It is this that Paul later brings out fully when he says that the world by wisdom knew not God, but that it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save those that believe. So then special revelation, if it was to come at all, had to come as a re-interpretation, coming to man with its own demand of authority. And if it be said that at any rate man would have the power to accept this revelation or reject it as he pleased, the answer is that this exactly is not the case. Just because sin is the complete rejection of God and the hatred of God, revelation would have to come in by way of the almighty power of God's redemptive grace. It would have to give to man the power of accepting, as well as the objective revelation itself.

Then at this stage it may be said that certainly Moses received the traditions of the race, and one of those traditions was the story of creation. Does not this make the idea of a special revelation quite unnecessary? We answer that it does not. Granted that Moses received the actual information about the creation of man from tradition, it would still be necessary for God to corroborate this tradition as the truth. It was even necessary, we believe, that God should through His revelation purify the tradition. After the Anti-God complex had been corroding it for some generations, it was not as pure as it originally was. But granted that somewhere in the human race there remained the tradition, as an intellectual statement of the fact of creation as it had actually occurred, even then corroboration would have been necessary. The fact of creation

was to be made the foundation fact, as far as history is concerned, of the story of redemption. Hence the story itself had to become a part of the redemptive revelation. Looked upon apart from redemption and apart from the sin of man that is involved in it, as all the stories of creation in all the literature of the world with exception of the story of creation in the Old Testament are, it became no more than a bare fact, a fact without meaning. And the history of philosophy proves that all the stories of creation found elsewhere but in the Old Testament were soon overgrown with the anti-theistic conception of an evil that is inherent in matter per se.

Because of the importance of this point, we would take the matter a step further back than we have so far done. We would even maintain that, though the tradition of creation was as a matter of fact originally thought out by man himself and not revealed in the sense that the information about it was verbally communicated to him, it should still be called revelational when preserved in its purity among the people of God. Originally, man's thought was in the nature of the case true. If man thought upon his origin, he would naturally come to the correct conclusion that he was created by God, and this thought of himself would be revelational since God laid His truth in the mind of man. But when sin came into the world, man no longer thought truly. Suppose we think of Cain and Abel, both of them equally familiar with the truth of creation as it had been thought out by Adam, the real meaning of this fact was understood by Abel only. He it was that recognized by his attitude of humility at the occasion of the sacrifice that he was guilty because as a creature he had broken the law of God. On the other hand, if Cain knew intellectually that he was a creature, the meaning of this fact did not come home to him because he seemed still to think it proper that a creature should break the law of God. By that attitude he showed that he did not know what it meant to be a creature of a holy God.

Now if we keep these points in mind, it will be clear that it is only the Anti-God complex or the Cain-complex that could point to the fact of the prevalence in other than Old Testament literature of creation stories that are similar to the Old Testament story as proof that the Old Testament revelation is not a revelation of God. The "fact" and its meaning can never be separated. Nowhere else does the "fact" of creation appear as the foundation of the story of redemption than in the Old Testament. As such no sinner could think of it. As such, it would have to be a part of the gracious revelation of God. Hence, those to whom God has graciously given the Abel-complex instead of the Cain-complex will rejoice that God has told them that Adam was right when he first thought about creation but wrong when he thought that it was proper for a creature to set up his own standard of goodness and truth. They are glad to be told that they are sinners, and they cannot be told that they are sinners unless the meaning of the term "creation" be brought home to them.

What the whole matter amounts to is this, that to prove that the Mosaic account of creation is no more than a myth, it would have to be established that creation is not a fact. If it is a

fact, and the real significance of this fact were yet to be known to sinners, it would have to be revealed. Sinners would be bound to twist the significance of the fact in order to make it fit in with their declared autonomy. It involves the making of a universal negative conclusion on the ground of an assumed relativity if the psychology of religion interpretation of the phenomenon of Mosaic revelation is to be credited. Nor is the fact that a universal negative statement is required in order to make the interpretation of the psychology of religion school acceptable in the least modified when men say they are only dealing with facts, and that such interpretation can only lead to uncertainty. So Ames says: "The search for a definition of a profoundly complex process always ends in such a tentative, flexible statement. It involves recognition of a living reality of experience, and results in a modest effort to describe it, to analyze it, and to gain certain explanations, concerning particular phases and stages of it" (9).

If it is really true that it is in the nature of the case impossible for man to be certain as to the true nature of reality, then our psychologist friends ought to be a little more tolerable of our youthful mistakes. Our mistakes are then as innocent as the child's who thought he could easily take one of the stars in his mouth. But we are not begging for mercy on that ground. We are perfectly willing to have ridicule poured out upon us if we deserve it, because even in this day and age of enlightenment, even after the psychologists have been kind enough to offer us the solution of our theological puzzles, we still cling to the traditional creation story that is to be interpreted physically and historically as well as theologically and redemptively.

And this leads us in this connection to remark about this whole matter of certainty with respect to revelation and truth. As Christians, we maintain that certainty is of the very essence of knowledge itself. As in the soteriological sense we hold that faith is not faith to the extent that it wavers so with respect to the whole of revelation, we hold that unless revelation had come into the world after sin entered, man would have no knowledge at all. Hence when revelation did enter, it had to bring its own testimony, and the testimony of truth cannot be that it may be or may not be truth. Revelation therefore has to come with authority. When Sabatier in his famous book on "Religions of Authority and Religion of the Spirit" sought to make a contrast between religions of authority and the religion of the Spirit, he failed to penetrate to the really theistic concept of revelation. As the true nature of human thought was the interpretation of God's interpretation since that is the only thing that a creature can do, so human thought is once more restored in principle to its original power if it submits to the authority of God in Christ. When he says that the true education of the human race is the passage "from faith in authority to personal conviction" (10), we reply that men will never have conviction till they once more submit to authority.

This is also our reply when so many of the psychology of religion writers speak again and again of the cocksureness of those that hold to the orthodox view.

Says Ames on this point: "In the later Hebrew as in nearly the whole Christian period, the conviction of the truth of the one religion, and the falseness of all others was taken in a complacent way, which could not arouse interest in the intrinsic nature of religious experience" (11).

We have seen that the conviction of the truth of one religion and the falsity of all others is not something that is complacently taken by the serious adherents of the true religion. It is to them a conviction that the nature of religion itself demands that there be only one true religion, and that all others be therefore false. If theism is true, only that thought and interpretation on the part of man is true which recognizes God as the source of man and man's interpretation. Hence we hold that in the nature of the case there is not only one true religion, but only one true interpretation of all science as well. We hold that all science that does not recognize God as the maker of the facts with which it deals and the mind with which it thinks as created by God and as properly thinking God's thoughts after Him, is false science. For the same reason we hold that there is in the nature of the case only one true religion.

And that in the early stages even the true adherents of revelation were not fully aware of this demand of exclusiveness is no argument against it. Or if people are too well aware of it as the charge often is, as when Stanley Jones, for instance, refers to the case with which some people cast others into hell when they do not agree with them, this too is no argument against it. When people take revelation exactly for what it is, the absolute truth, they cannot but be deeply convinced of all that it implies and those that are of the contrary part will have to interpret this certainty as being due to conceit.

And now that we have discussed the absolute otherness of revelation and the certainty that it involves, we must also say a word in this connection about the unity and diversity of all religions.

On this point, too, Christianity and the psychology of religion school have opposing conceptions, and on this point, too, the psychology of religion school thinks it can easily settle the matter by an appeal to the facts, while in reality it does nothing more than interpret the facts in the light of a non-Christian metaphysic.

What the present attitude is with respect to this question may be seen in a few words from Ames, as follows: "Something more is required here than the naive assumption of the ancients that it is natural and necessary that all peoples have their own religions, or the equally unreasoned attitude of certain developed, aggressive religions, that all peoples have their own religions, but that all are utterly false or merely poor imitations except the one aggressive religion itself" (12).

If we ask what this something more is that must be added, the reply is to be found in the evolutionary concept that man appeared upon the scene of history originally as a non-moral and non-religious being, and that his morality and religion originated as circumstances required. Hence different circumstances will naturally produce different ideas of God and of religion. As to how the mind of

man works in its early stages, Ames says that it is all a matter of adjustment to environment. He speaks as follows: ". . . this adjustment to the physical or social environment occurs through the psycho-physical organism and is therefore expressed or registered in definite neural activity and in various objective effects" (13).

Moreover, it is quite common in our day to add that there was no intellectual interpretation found in early man. In order to see the argument of Ames as a whole, we cannot omit what he says on this subject. He first criticizes those of the older writers on religion, that they had not sufficiently banished the intellect from the interpretation of early man. Says he: "This characteristic expression of the view of most writers upon the subject of animism or spiritism betrays plainly the effect of the old rational psychology" (14). A little further on, he adds: "The fact seems to be that both self and object are fused in one activity, and are not contrasted in the actor's mind. It is not so much a projection of the self to other things as it is the participation of all in one total undifferentiated process, warm with vital interest" (15).

Then as to the object that results, Ames adds: "First, the object emerges at the point where the attention is arrested. Secondly, the objects thus attended to are not abstracted beyond the active process in which they appear" (16). The significance of all this for the problem of religion, Ames expresses as follows: "The principles" (of which he has spoken) "simplify many of the problems which have arisen in the interpretation of primitive religion. They account for the great multiplicity of spirits and for their transient, shifting character. They explain why different peoples have different kinds of spirits and also why the spirits of a given tribe are determined so characteristically by their environment and occupation" (17).

It is in this way that Ames hopes to explain both the underlying unity and the real diversity of the various religions. The unity is due to the fact that the various tribes of men all have certain basic needs such as food and sex, while the diversity is explained by the diversity in the opportunity of satisfying these basic needs. Of the result thus obtained, Ames says further: "A conception of religion is thus gained which is free enough to include the lower forms and also the various stages of its development, without the confusion and vagueness which have heretofore arisen from attempting to identify it with such an intellectual element as belief in spirits, or with an emotional factor like the feeling of awe" (18).

To all this we should add one more quotation, as follows: "When the tribe attains some social history, preserved in oral traditions and various monuments, then the god is credited with long life in the past" (19).

With respect to this whole line of reasoning, typical as it is, even though Ames be more extreme than some others, we again remark that it is only another evidence of the operation of the Cain-complex. The traditional position is not an unreasoned position, as Ames says it is. It admits frankly that it believes

in a theistic view of reality. Hence its conception of sin is what it is. Since sin is what it is, revelation must be what it is, the insertion of a new interpretation opposed to the interpretation which the sinner has given to reality. Hence those who have received this new revelation must feel certain of the truth of that revelation. They must regard other religions as false. These other religions will be in a sense very similar to the true religion. It could not be otherwise. All men are actually creatures of God. All men fell into the same sin. All men therefore hate God and are possessed of the Cain-complex. Hence they will all be alike negatively in the sense that they try to subordinate the God-idea to other things. They have all worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator. Even in the midst of those who have been given the true knowledge of God, we shall expect that the remnants of the cain-complex will not be immediately and completely removed. They will not even be fully removed in any one till after this life. Therefore, we find the tendency to idolatry and other sins among Israel. Hence their desire to be in many things like the other nations. They still dislike the idea of distinctiveness. And positively there will be a great similarity, too. All men are the creatures of God and made in the image of God. The form in which they express their hatred of God will still be similar to the form in which the redeemed express their love to God. Cain and Abel both go to sacrifice. According to appearance, they are doing the same thing. In reality, one was serving God, while the other was serving himself. There will be, to be sure, a tendency of separation in the course of time and there will usually be a difference in externals, to some extent, but yet it remains true that basically it is a matter of the heart.

It follows then that all the arguments advanced about the external similarities between the religions as they appear in the mode of worship, the manner of prayer, the rituals, etc., etc., are not to the point. We not only grant that similarity, but maintain that we only can give a rational explanation of it. On the basis of Ames and the other psychologists of religion, there is no explanation of the similarity between religions for the simple reason that they conceive of all reality as consisting of an ultimate flux which means an ultimate chance. The principles enunciated by Ames do not simplify, as he thinks, the question of the origin of religion, but make it forever impossible to see any light on the subject at all. Christianity's interpretation of the origin of religion is absolutely other than all other explanations, it is absolutely certain of its truth, and it is the only explanation that is an explanation at all.

In this connection we may add a word about Jesus' relation to the Old Testament and to what it says of the past. If Christians say that Jesus believed the Old Testament to be true, it is answered by the Old Testament critics that he naturally would, since he was a child of his time, but that this does not in the least diminish his greatness as a teacher. Then if it be added that Jesus knew himself to be the Son of God so that His approval of the Old Testament is the best proof of its truth, the critics and with them the psychologists can, as they think, explain in a perfectly natural way how it came about that Jesus thought He was the Messiah or the

Son of God (20). In a chapter on "Religion as the Source of Poise and Power," Shailer Mathews gives a picture of what he calls the influence of religion on the personality of Jesus (21). The assumption is that Jesus was a man only. The assumption is that the kingdom of God is that vague Platonic notion of good principle as somehow existing in the universe.

Jesus had joined "the new messianic movement." Naturally, a man of his ability would feel that he was perhaps to be the leader of the movement. But he kept himself in check. Thus he was victorious over the temptation. That was "Poise in the Presence of Alluring Suggestion." To quote: "Such a poise was not due simply to self-control, but to a deep religious dependence upon God. As the Evangelist picturesquely says, after the storm and stress of his great decision had passed, 'angels came and ministered to him,' Mark 1:13, which being interpreted in the language of our own thinking means that he gained that serenity and calm and self-direction through his recourse to God" (22).

Jesus is also said to have had poise "in arguing about the Supernatural." This became apparent when he reasoned with the Pharisees about the question as to the power by which he cast out demons. Even here, Jesus did not give way to anger, but simply refuted the Pharisees on the ground of inconsistency. But as to Jesus' own relation to the evil spirits, Mathews says: "Jesus' own estimate of this phase of his activity is, of course, not acceptable to today's way of thinking about religion, but it became an issue between himself and the religious authorities" (23).

Finally we would note that according to Mathews, Jesus kept his poise even "in the midst of defeat." Speaking of the last days of his life, Mathews says: "It was with the same controlled spirit that he ate the Passover with his disciples, from which he retired to spend the night under the olive trees in Gethsemane. There his personal problem became acute. He saw the hopelessness of his endeavors, the hostility of the authorities, and the imminence of his own arrest and execution. His mission was a failure. His enemies were powerful: his friends disillusioned. There was no recourse for him but to God. The Father was presenting the cup, and he waited upon circumstances to disclose what the Father's will might be" (24).

This may suffice to give us a typical explanation of the personality of Jesus by psychology of religion today. And what happened to Jesus has happened to the Apostles and to the prophets as well. They have all been reinterpreted in this way in order to make their claims fit in with a naturalistic philosophy. Can the "facts" prove that there are no evil spirits with which Jesus came into contact? On what basis does Mathews make a universal negative statement about their existence or non-existence? Can the "facts" prove that there was no angelic host that came and ministered unto him? On what basis does Mathews make a universal negative statement about the existence of angels? Can the "facts" prove that Jesus was wholly dependent for his course of action upon circumstances whose actions have nothing to do with God, the creator of them? On what ground does Mathews say that Jesus'

conception of himself as the Son of God is to be subjectively interpreted in the sense that it was not actually true?

The case is similar to that of Moses. The editor of "What Religion Does for Personality" says of Moses: "Arrived at Sinai, the Holy Mountain, Moses sought to cement the bonds between himself, God, and the people. (Exodus 33:35-40 comes from a later period than the story narrative.) Moses must create a basis for the ideals of his people. He prepared a code, probably of supreme simplicity of form, but representing those ideals of living at peace with God and with each other which had been proved by his own experience, and the best group-experiences of which he knew, to be fundamental, and presented it to the people as the law of God. The people said that Moses had spoken 'face to face with God,' Exodus 19:20" (25).

With these quotations, we may draw this chapter to a close. They suffice to show that the whole contention of the psychology of religion school, as well as that of the Bible-critics in general, is based upon metaphysical assumptions. No man can prove by the "facts" that God did not actually speak to and through Moses on the Mount. No man can prove from the "facts" that when the prophets said, "Thus saith the Lord" that the Lord did not really speak to them. No man can prove from the facts that Jesus was not actually the Son of God.

Now, if Jesus was the Son of God, then he did actually send his prophets before him, and gave his apostles power of interpretation after him. If he was the Son of God, then he came into the world to save sinners as he said he did, and as his authorized Apostles after him said he did. And if he did come to save sinners, the creation story is true because only creatures could be sinners. And if the creation story is true, and it was to be made known in its true significance to those who were sinners, it had to be revealed to them. The fact and the true interpretation thereof was certainly wholly unknown to sinners. At most, they knew something of the bare fact. Hence if Jesus was the Son of God, this put anew the stamp of absolute truth on Moses and on what Moses said. The full meaning of creation could not appear till the full meaning of redemption appeared, and the full meaning of redemption could not appear till the full meaning of creation would appear.

Now this also enables us to judge fairly about the question as to what Moses and Christ or any of the other prophets said about the present in which they lived. What holds with respect to their interpretation of the past holds also with respect to their interpretation of the present. It was given as the redemptive reinterpretation of God. This whole redemptive reinterpretation forms an organism. It is a whole that cannot be taken apart. Moses gave the law that men might obtain the knowledge of sin from it. Only if men saw that they were the creatures of God and that God naturally expected perfection from his creatures, would they begin to understand that sinners must flee to God for his grace, if they are to be saved. No sinner can be perfect. Yet every sinner must be perfect. Jesus set the same standard that Moses set and he set no higher standard. True, certain things were allowed for the hardness of men's hearts by Moses, but the real standard that he set was the standard of absolute perfection. Such a standard could not be set by anyone who did not believe that man was a creature of God and a sinner against



God. Or if it be said that Moses set such a standard for pedagogical reasons, we reply that then you have to explain Jesus in the same way, and the only way you can do that is by assuming that both of them were no more than men.

But the law had also to be given as a regulator of the life of those who were redeemed. It was to the people to whom God had given the promises. It was to the children of Abraham and to no one else in ancient times that the law came. They only had been graciously redeemed. The law is a part of the covenant of grace. Can the "facts" prove that the law was not a part of the saving plan of God for man?

As part of the saving plan of God the law was absolutely other than the code of Hammurabi or any other law that expressed "tribal experience" up to that time. We will not seek to debate about the similarities and dissimilarities between the law that Moses gave and the laws of other nations. We expect a great deal of similarity. We could hold again that even if there had been existing somewhere a code identical in form to the code of Moses, the two would still have been entirely different as to their meaning and interpretation. As a matter of fact, there is no law formulated among the nations outside the pale of Israel that demands absolute obedience of man, just as there is nowhere a story that tells man simply that he is the creature of God and wholly responsible to God. Thus the absolute otherness of Moses and Christ's interpretation of the past and of the present can only be cast aside by those who are bound to do so by virtue of their adherence to a metaphysical relativism.

This is also the case, with respect to what they said about the future and for the same reasons. What Moses said could not be understood till Christ should come. His whole interpretation of the past and of the present, the significance of the creation story and the significance of the law depended upon the Son of God and his coming into the world to give the redemptive reinterpretation of God in full. And this in turn could not be done till the redemptive facts were completed. Hence Christ empowered his Apostles to finish the interpretation which He had been carrying on through his prophets and Himself. He promised them the guidance of the Holy Spirit so that they might interpret truly and set all the facts of this universe in the light of His great redemptive work. Hence the idea of a finished canon is implied in the work of Christ. The fact revelation had to be fully interpreted by the word revelation. Thus the whole of special revelation, the miracles spoken of in the foregoing chapter and the word revelation discussed in this chapter, stand before us as a unit. It is absolutely other than any other interpretation found anywhere else in the world. It claims absolute authority, and in the nature of the case it should, if it is absolutely other. It is, also, the only interpretation of life that is really an interpretation at all. All other interpretations are, at most, descriptions and they cannot even be true description because true description is really interpretation, too.

Driven by the Cain-complex, men have tried their best to weave the special principle into the natural in order to escape its condemnation. The facts are perfectly consistent with the Christian-theistic metaphysic and only with the Christian-theistic metaphysic. The Cain-complex has twisted the facts to suit its fancy.

## References: Chapter IX

1. See Notes on Epistemology.
2. What Religion Does for Personality, p. 23.
3. John Baillie, The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul, p. 229.
4. Idem, p. 215.
5. Idem, p. 239.
6. Thouless, An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p. 46.
7. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 26.
8. Idem, p. 209.
9. Idem, p. 13.
10. Auguste Sabatier, Religions of Authority, Vol. I, p. xxi.
11. Ames, Op. Cit., p. 11.
12. Idem, p. 7.
13. Idem, p. 16.
14. Idem, p. 95.
15. Idem, p. 97.
16. Idem, p. 100.
17. Idem, p. 100.
18. Idem, p. 110.
19. Idem, p. 113.
20. See G. Vos, The Self-Disclosure of Jesus.
21. Shailer Mathews, What Religion Does for Personality, p. 124.
22. Idem, p. 129.
23. Idem, p. 130.
24. Idem, p. 133.
25. Editor of What Religion Does for Personality, p. 101.

RELIGION AND SUBJECTIVE REDEMPTION --  
REGENERATION AND CONVERSION

In the last two chapters, we have discussed the manner in which the psychology of religion school attacks the objective aspect of the redemptive principle. We must now add to this a brief discussion as to how it attacks the subjective aspect of redemption.

In order to do this, we should first emphasize the fact that according to the orthodox position the subjective aspect is involved in the objective. To speak about regeneration, conversion, etc., without the work of Christ's suffering is quite meaningless. It was only because Christ finished His work for us that the Holy Spirit did His work within us. If one remembers that the Holy Spirit is the moving power in the whole of the subjective process of redemption and that the Holy Spirit Himself as far as His soteriological activity is concerned is merited for us by Christ's objective work, we see clearly that we can never separate the subjective from the objective aspect of redemption.

But the psychology of religion writers have paid no attention to this all-important fact. James, in his "Varieties of Religious Experience," and those that have followed his example, has reasoned as though the two could be taken apart from one another. They have done this particularly by simply ignoring the objective factor of redemption. On the ground that they were dealing only with the psychology of religious experience, they simply passed the objective factor by. Now, this could not have been done unless it were assumed at the outset that the objective existence of God, of Christ as the Son of God and of the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Trinity is a matter of indifference. Now, we have repeatedly seen how psychologists assume that religion as a psychological phenomenon need not take into account the question of the existence or non-existence of God, since these are metaphysical questions.

It will readily be seen that if there is no God, and if there has been no objective process of redemption, there can be no such thing as regeneration in the sense that Christians conceive of regeneration. There might, we may say for argument's sake, be some sort of experience which resembles in form what Christians call regeneration, but there could be no regeneration. Regeneration, by definition, is the implanting of the new spiritual life by the Holy Spirit into the souls of those who are in themselves dead in trespasses and sins. Now, if there is no Holy Spirit, He cannot implant new life, and if there are no sinners, they cannot have life implanted into them.

We may develop this point, that psychologists are talking about something different from what Christians talk about when they discuss the process of subjective redemption a little further. Besides taking for granted that the objective existence of God and the work of Christ have nothing to do with subjective redemption, it is usually taken for granted that there is no such thing as sin.

Of course, the term "sin" is constantly used as the term "regeneration" is constantly used. But quite naturally, if God has not created man, he cannot be a sinner. In that case, evil is inherent in the universe. It is therefore taken for granted that what are spoken of as the disintegrative forces of personality are quite natural (1). The assumption of Greek philosophy that evil is as original as the good is basic to the whole of the approach of the psychology of religion school to the problems of subjective redemption. When Hocking writes his book on "Human Nature and Its Remaking" we may say that he could as well have called it the "Making of Human Personality." There has been no Fall of man which has unmade or ruined personality. There has instead been a gradual ascent from the lower to the higher forms of moral life. If one takes for granted the evolutionary theory of the origin of the moral life instead of the creation and fall conception, it goes without saying that when one speaks of regeneration he means something different by the word than has been meant by it in the Christian Church. It also goes without saying that in such a case one will have to interpret all the recorded experiences of regeneration on the part of Christians as being so much delusion as far as the objective aspect of the matter is concerned. It will have to be maintained that though men no doubt had very real experiences, these experiences had, as a matter of fact, nothing to do with God, with Christ and with the Holy Spirit, no matter how much the experiencer thought they did. We may see how this is done by quoting Leuba as follows: "The reality of any given datum -- of an immediate experience in the sense in which the term is used here -- may not be impugned: When I feel cold or warm, sad or gay, discouraged or confident, I am cold, sad, discouraged, etc. Any and every argument which might be advanced to prove to me that I am not cold is, in the nature of the case, preposterous; an immediate experience may not be controverted, it cannot be wrong." "But if the raw data of experience are not subject to criticism, the causes ascribed to them are. If I say that my feeling of cold is due to an open window, or my state of exaltation to a drug, or my renewed courage to God, my affirmation goes beyond my immediate experience: I have ascribed a cause to it, and that cause may be the right or the wrong one" (2). A little later, he adds: "The mistake made by the mystics is that the validity belonging incontrovertibly to sensations, emotions, thoughts, as such, -- to the raw datum of experience -- is transferred to an explanation of the datum, or to an external object to which the thought is said to refer. That is why he feels secure in saying: 'Argue to your heart's content, nothing can alter the fact; I have had an experience of God's presence. Awhile ago I was weak, now I am strong; I was hopeless, now I am confident; I was ignorant, now I know.' As a matter of fact, his only immediate and incontestible experiences have been various feelings, emotions, connotations, and ideas of a divine Being; the objective existence of a Being corresponding to those ideas may be an illusion" (3).

This statement of Leuba is typical and covers the whole range of subjective redemption. We may reply to it in the words of Hocking that a God that does not come into our experience at the level of sensation will never come in afterwards. Leuba thinks he has avoided all metaphysics and epistemology. He thinks he is very scientific since he emphasizes the facts of immediate experience.

Yet he has taken for granted the non-theistic conception of epistemology that experiences can have meaning without God's existence. But this is not the case if Christian-theism is true. The analogy of my having a cold and the open window as the cause of it, presupposes the truth of anti-theism. I may have a cold and have gotten it from various sources. Hence my speculation about the open window may be true or may be false. But the place of God in the experience of the Christian is that there is no other source from which experience could come. It will not do then to say that all manner of experiences can really be present and that perhaps they may have come from God and perhaps from some other source unless I have first established that God is such an one that there are other possible sources of human experience besides Him.

The whole argument of Leuba is similar to that of Wieman studied in another connection to the effect that we can have worship no matter what we believe or disbelieve about God. As though worship were the same thing psychologically if God does not exist as when He exists! If we regard the matter carefully at this point, we shall see that the whole of the psychology of religion literature on the question of the subjective aspect of redemption has been beside the point as far as the truth or non-truth of Christianity is concerned. The writers have taken for granted that there is such a thing as a raw datum of religion which will yield its native witness if only we do not obstruct it by our intellectual abracadabra. Now, it may be true that the psychologists have not added any intellectual abracadabra to their investigation of the religious experiences as far as argument is concerned. The reason for this is not that there is not an intellectual abracadabra involved in their position, but the reason is that they have preferred to assume rather than to reason out their intellectual abracadabra. James assumes that the Christian experience is one variety of religious experience. This would be true only if, as a matter of fact, there were no absolute God, if there were no Christ who died for sinners, and if there were no Holy Spirit who changes the hearts of men.

The main thing for us to do therefore in discussing the psychology of religion literature is not to try to point out that the Christian's conception of regeneration is different from other experiences that seem to be similar to it, in that it has a greater degree of certainty, etc., but to show that the psychologists are not talking about the same thing that we are talking about, and that they cannot talk about the same thing at all for the reason that they have assumed back of the whole of their psychological interpretations the non-theistic conception of reality.

Then, further, we should add to this our own psychological explanation of this attitude of the psychologists of religion. And here the story of the blind psychologists who were trying to judge the simple seer is in point. Men will not see that regeneration is anything different from other experiences because of their assumption that there is no God. And they assume that there is no God because of the Cainitic wish. It is that which we must substitute for the Freudian wish. If God does exist, then man is a creature of Him. Then, too, man is a sinner. Then, too, man could only be saved by objective acts of redemption underlying subjective acts of

redemption. Then, too, the initiation of the whole process would, in the nature of the case, have to lie with God. Then, too, God must have come in somewhere by way of redemption, because if He did not, the universe in sin could no longer exist. Then, too, we could not have known this fact, that the universe without the redemptive work of God could not exist unless we had been made to see it by the work of God. Hence, when the objective factor testifies of itself that it is of God, and the subjective power of the Spirit testifies to the truth of the testimony of the objective factor, the two make connection in us and through us and we believe. But back of this self-conscious act of ours, back of faith, must have been an operation of the Spirit. This Spirit's operation may indeed terminate immediately upon the processes of our consciousness so that we cannot tell the day of our regeneration. Yet the whole of the fact that we see all things in a different light than that in which the non-Christian psychologist of religion sees them, is itself the best evidence that we have this new insight not of ourselves. Hence we would deny that you can distinguish between the raw datum of religious experience as something which we experience and the arguments about the source of this datum. The arguments that we use are but the intellectual manifestation of the experience, and are therefore themselves an aspect of the experience. In this way, the argument that Leuba and others use to the effect that experience can be separated as a raw datum from the arguments about their source in connection with it is nothing but the intellectual expression of the experience of hatred of the living God.

Another assumption that makes it impossible for the psychologists of religion even to see and therefore to talk about regeneration is their conception of personality as being exclusively an accomplishment. This is, of course, a part of the evolution theory. Now, Christianity says that personality is created. It is naturally only personality that is created that can be regenerated. Regeneration presupposes passivity. Just as in natural birth we do not contribute anything, so in spiritual birth we are passive. But if one begins the whole of his research with the assumption that personality has somehow of itself crawled out of the abyss of the void and is wholly a self-accomplishment, it can never be passive for a moment. Of course, in such a case, man's personality would not need regeneration, but neither could it be regenerated. That which has generated itself can also regenerate itself if we take regeneration in the non-theistic sense of overcoming the disintegrative forces inherent in reality. On the other hand, that which has generated itself can never be regenerated if we take regeneration in the theistic sense. Hence if we wish to discuss the question of regeneration with the non-theistic interpreters of it, we should first recognize on both sides that we have differing conceptions of regeneration. Then we, as Christian theists, should try to point out that the non-theist conception of regeneration is impossible. Regeneration would be generation only. And even generation is impossible, because it is activity in the void. How can personality step out of the void unless it is at some point passive? How did an exclusively active personality come into the world originally in an active way? Any personality wholly active could never originate. That which has origin is passive. Only that which is wholly unoriginated is wholly active. Now, there is back of that which is originated either pure

accident or absolute activity. Non-theism assumes that back of originated personality there is the blank. So it has chance and passivity back of its conception of personal activity. This involves the whole position into utter self-contradiction. Non-theism has to hold to an ultimate fatalism and an ultimate activism. It therefore, as we have seen, defines religion as the joyful submission to the inevitable and at the same time speaks of the infinite "unrealized possibilities" before man.

For these reasons, the Christian holds that his conception of God as absolutely and eternally active with its corollary that man is a created character, and then, when he becomes a sinner, a re-created character if the grace of God touches him, is the only interpretation of experience that does not reduce everything to a meaningless something.

Nothing could more pointedly reveal the whole difference of point of view between Christians and non-Christians on the concept of regeneration than to bring up the question of whether children can or may be regenerated. To say that they can is the height of absurdity in the eyes of psychology of religion. Ames makes a great deal of the fact that children cannot even be said, properly speaking, to be religious. To quote: "The results of the varied and minute psychological study of child nature lead to the conclusion that religion is not an instinct in the child, nor a special endowment of any kind. Religion is rather an experience of groups of individuals resulting from their collective and cooperative efforts to secure and preserve the ideals which appeal to them as possessing the greatest value" (4).

It will readily be seen that Ames here presupposes the activist theory of the origin of human consciousness that we have been discussing above. He takes for granted that there can be no religion present in the consciousness of the child till it is self-consciously expressed and with some considerable understanding of the meaning of the transaction. Set over against this conception of Ames the position of the Scriptures, that we are born and conceived in sin and therefore subject to the wrath of God from our birth unless we be regenerated by the Spirit of God, and it will be seen that nothing but a war to the death can be fought between these two positions. No compromise can ever be made. That Ames plans no compromise may be seen from the following words: "This functional view of mental development and of the growth of the religious consciousness in connection with mental maturity and the social experience solves some theological puzzles and furnishes psychological explanation for many customs with reference to the treatment of children" (5).

The first matter that may be explained by Ames' view, he thinks, is the way in which parents regarded their children. Speaking of the child, he says: "On this account he has been regarded by many theologians as sinful and perverse by nature, and without the capacity for any good thought or deed, until miraculously regenerated by supernatural power" (5). A little later, he adds: "The diary of Cotton Mather tells how he took his four year old daughter into his study and set before her the sinful condition

of her Nature, and charged her to pray in Secret Places every day that God for the Sake of Jesus Christ give her a new Heart" (7). Still further: "But to suppose that the religious nature is miraculously implanted at birth or before birth betrays inconsistent and unscientific ideas, both of religion and of human nature" (8). He concludes by saying: "All that psychology permits is the conclusion that the infant is non-religious, non-moral, and non-personal; that in early childhood impulsive, sensuous reactions together with absorption in immediate details and fragmentary interests make it impossible for the child under nine years to pass beyond the non-religious and non-moral attitude to any considerable degree; but that in later childhood up to about thirteen years of age he responds to more interests of a social and ideal character, and thus manifests tendencies and attitudes which are religious in character" (9).

With respect to all this, we may only make a few remarks. In the first place, when Ames says that his view explains why Christian parents have regarded their children as depraved, this is true. Christian parents have in the past not been so sophisticated as to think that it makes no difference to the idea of religion whether or not God exists. They have been nourished upon the great creeds of the Church. These creeds of the Church express the essence of Christiantheism. But when Ames further thinks that he has solved the theological puzzles that are involved in these creeds themselves, we beg to say that he has solved these puzzles only by assuming that no intellectual interpretation of any sort means anything, and that therefore his own solution of the puzzles do not mean anything. If you are going to limit yourself to the absolutely individual experience or the raw datum, as Leuba speaks of it, you have absolute and final mysticism, and the result is a night in which all cows are black.

Hence our reason for not giving up the old notion of the actuality and the genuineness of the regeneration concept, as it has historically been understood, is, that we feel it is an inherent part of Christian theism as a whole, and that Christian theism is the only view of life which does not destroy experience itself.

For this reason we do not think that Cotton Mather was as foolish as Ames thinks he was. It may indeed be true that Christian parents have not always wisely applied the psychology that is implied in their system of thought. We are happy to learn from the psychology that is implied in their system of thought. We are happy to learn from the psychologists of religion or from any other modern psychologists with respect to details in educational psychology. Yet we are convinced that our Christian psychology is sound and fits the facts of life, while the current psychology is unsound and does not fit the facts of life. Hence, we will try to develop our own psychology and re-interpret everything that we learn from our opponents in the light of our own principles. It is a pity that Christian people, ministers as well as others, do not as a rule see the seriousness of the situation with respect to educational psychology. The courses that the teachers get in the normal schools are based upon the theories of Ames, Leuba, Dewey, etc. The child is looked upon as not being religious at the outset. Religion itself is interpreted in exclusively activistic terms. The religion that men



think of as at all worthy of the attention of an intelligent people presupposes that man is inherently good. It ridicules the idea of the fall of man.

We should particularly note again that it is in the nature of the case impossible for the psychologist of religion to say that his theory of religion in childhood and his theory of religion in general is right because the facts prove it. How can the facts prove that that which I speak of as regeneration is not actually the work of the Holy Spirit of God? Instead of saying with Leuba that what we experience is one thing, and the reasons on account of which we hold that our experience is from God is quite another thing, so that we can never be sure that our experience is from God, we would say that the only way our opponents can deny that our experience is from God is by an intellectual argument that Christian-theism is not true. That is, it would require a universal negative proposition about the non-existence of God to prove that regeneration is not true. This is the negative side of the story and the positive side is that if Christian-theism as a whole is true, regeneration must also be true. The world could not exist without redemption, and the subjective application of redemption is part of the whole of the redemptive program.

A word remains to be said in this connection about the subconscious. There is a debate in process between psychologists as to the significance of the subconscious. Some say that William James made too much of the subconscious as an explanation of several phenomena of human life. But whatever he said about this by psychologists, we are chiefly concerned to point out that as Christians we have a theory of the subconscious which is basically opposed to every variety of theory that exists today. Naturally this is so because we hold that the whole of personality is created by God. Originally the whole of man's personality, the subconscious as well as the conscious aspect of it, was good. There were no inherent tendencies to evil in it. The deepest and most hidden layers of human personality were directed to God ethically as well as metaphysically. But we also believe that the whole of the personality was influenced by sin. Hence David prays that God may cleanse him from sins that are hidden to himself. The subconscious has become an ever-bubbling fountain of evil tendency.

When orthodox Apologists tell us that Calvinism and Freudianism resemble one another because both maintain that human nature is inherently bad, they forget some of the most basic distinctions of thought. According to Freudianism and modern psychology in general there is no God by virtue of whom the whole of the human personality exists. According to modern psychology, man was not created perfect and man did not fall and man is not guilty before God. Thus the only resemblance that remains is a very superficial one, the fact that both say that human nature is at present actually evil.

If one remembers the whole of the theistic conception of human personality, it will be seen that the whole of this personality remains accessible to God. By regeneration, God's Spirit enters the subconscious aspect of human personality primarily in order to turn its activity toward God instead of away from God.

In contrast with this, the subconscious according to modern psychology is not something that is accessible to God inasmuch as God has not created it. It somehow came into being without God and is exclusively activistic. It need not be regenerated and cannot be regenerated.

Turning now from the question of regeneration to that of conversion, we also turn from the realm of the subconscious to that of consciousness. According to the traditional position, that which has taken place in the subconscious, through the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit, comes to expression in consciousness at the time of conversion. While at the point of conversion, man is, in the nature of the case, wholly passive, in conversion man begins to be active.

We should again notice that the psychology of religion literature has not really touched the question of conversion, inasmuch as it has once more assumed that when man is active, he only is active. In other words, modern psychology, like modern philosophy, believes in the univocal theory of action as it holds to the univocal theory of thought. That is, even where man acts, as in the case of conversion, and in the case of all the activity that follows conversion, such as true faith, prayer, worship, etc., there is an ultimate activity of God back of whatever man does. "It is God that worketh in you both to will and to do."

This assumption on the part of psychologists that man only is active if he is active at all accords with the idea above discussed that there are physical and psychological forces at man's disposal that are quite independent of God.

So it is easy for us to make a picture of which the psychologists mean when they talk of conversion. Back of their concept of conversion is the idea of an ultimately impersonal environment for man. Hence man's personality is exclusively an accomplishment. We have then univocal action or ultimate activism. The evils that meet this personality on its way of self-integration are quite natural. They are no more than natural obstacles that come in the way. These obstacles are even necessary for the development of personality. Man did not have, as "Father Adam," any given unification of motives, but had to attain to it through his efforts. All that man needs to do is to make the divine aspect of the universe dominant in himself and in the world. Says Wieman: "Let us call to mind that the aspect of the universe called God is a pervasive aspect constantly and intimately operative in our lives and in the world round about us" (11). The way we can make this divine aspect of the universe dominant is by making the adjustments that we find we have to make in order that we may joyfully accept the inevitable. Says Wieman: "One is free from demoralizing fear just as soon as he is ready to accept the facts precisely as they are" (12).

So we see that from this point of view there is no need for conversion if conversion be understood in the traditional sense of

the term. On the other hand, we may add that the psychologists will hold that there is need for conversion in many instances. Yet if they do hold that there is need for conversion, it means conversion from some particularly and outstandingly noticeable forms of gross sins, such as drunkenness and vice. To be sure, it may be said that the psychologists of religion also hold that man must learn to love where he has formerly hated, so that conversion according to them includes the internal attitude as well as the external deed. This is true, but they do hold nevertheless that man is in himself quite able to love God and his neighbor if only he will set himself to do so. He does not need to be converted in order to be able to do so. It is only when his hatred for his fellow-man has expressed itself in violent form that conversion can really be spoken of. Says Thouless: "Religion wants to prevent its followers from becoming Cellinis, without making them into Bunyans" (13).

Thouless' description of Bunyan is typical; he thinks that Bunyan was really converted when he had learned not to be violently explosive in his sins. Bunyan himself thought that, even so, his heart was not right with God. But this further aspect was detrimental to true morality, thinks Thouless, inasmuch as it made him too introspective. Man is, then, according to the prevailing view, quite able to make the adjustments that have to be made in order that he may accept the universe as it is with its necessary evil and its necessary good. At the same time he has, somehow, infinite possibilities for good in him. In other words, the modern concept of conversion partakes of the modern concept of religion in general. On the one hand, it seems to be nothing but a matter of accepting the inevitable. This would seem to indicate that reality is deterministic. And this aspect we have emphasized in our definition of religion ascribed to the psychology of religion school. We have emphasized this aspect because it puts the whole concept of religion as thus formulated in sharp contrast with the Christian conception which has God as an absolutely self-conscious personality back of man. On the other hand, it is true that from another point of view we may say that man is surrounded by an open ocean of possibilities. Hence religion from the modern point of view may just as well be called adjustment to the void. How these two are to be harmonized is the nice task of the philosophers whose principles the psychologists have uncritically accepted. It is the basic contradiction at the heart of all non-theistic thought. We cannot harmonize these two aspects by saying that religion is the successful turning away from the inevitable in the direction of the void, because on closer examination it appears that the inevitable itself has come out of the void and has come by chance. Hence the inevitable may lie before us as well as behind us. We shall have to leave this as one of the mysteries of reality to be solved by psychology in the future.

Now, it is on the basis of this assumed non-theistic conception of reality and the nature of religion that the old idea of conversion is ridiculed. And this ridicule has often been expressed by showing how our parents taught children, as we have seen in the case of Cotton Mather. Then, too, the traditional position is often ridiculed when the methods of revivals are "showed up." We mention only a few remarks made with respect to them by psychologists of religion. So Huxley, though not speaking of revivals in

this connection, says that religious workers make an unworthy appeal to certain aspects of personality in order to exploit it. He speaks of "a religiosity of sentiment especially among emotional women, which takes the undisciplined overflow of adolescence and sexual feeling, directs it on to religious objects, and in so doing not only encourages morbidity, but degrades the objects of worship themselves" (14).

Leuba, when he speaks of the power and value of such work as was performed by Coue, says: "One is reminded of the revivalist's admonition to the sinner: 'All efforts on your part to save yourself are vain; you must surrender to the saving grace of God'" (15).

But not only is the revivalist method ridiculed; it is also said to be definitely harmful. So Thouless remarks: "How many weak souls were driven by the threats of hell-fire and thunders against the filthiness of human righteousness to despair and madness or vice, we do not know" (16).

The objection made to revivals is that they lead men to a morbid pre-occupation with themselves and to a cultivation of an unnatural other-worldly attitude. Moreover, the work that needs to be done for those who are in gross immorality, etc., can be better done by medical aid and psychiatry than by religion. We have already spoken of this in another connection. We only add a remark of Leuba that brings out this point very definitely. Says Leuba, when speaking of the work of two doctors who by the help of hypnotic suggestion had been working for the recovery of drunkards: "The success of these two physicians surpasses the achievements of the best mission workers or revivalists" (17).

In this connection, we should note further that the psychologists of religion also have an explanation of their own to account for the sudden conversions that take place at revivalist meetings or elsewhere. In the first place they usually account for the suddenness of these conversions by saying that this suddenness is only the coming to the surface of that which has been going on in the subconsciousness perhaps for a long time. Leuba speaks of two classes of people. The one class is hyper-emotional or abnormal. Naturally we would expect, he says that in such people a change would come suddenly if it came at all. But even in the case of people who are quite normal and calm, we may sometimes expect to find sudden transformations. He says: "One should guard, however, against the supposition that remarkable and apparently sudden transformations can take place only in persons of an abnormal instability. Noteworthy and sudden conversions happen, for instance, in persons whose life has been normally constant. In this class of cases, investigation shows that the instantaneousness of the transformation is only an appearance. The work of transformation had been going on for a long time, often for years; there had been protracted consideration and hesitation; the conversion-crisis marked simply the moment when the trays of the balance changed position" (18).

So we see that the psychologist thinks himself to be fully able to account for all the phenomena that take place at the time of conversion. He can explain Paul's conversion on the way to Damascus by the principle that neurotics do make sudden changes and if this

should not suffice, he could add that even very calm people have been known to make sudden changes.

With respect to all this we may remark, first, that the issue is not as the psychologist presents it as being primarily one between the method of revivalism and the method of the psychologist. Sorry to say we cannot greatly blame the psychologists for thinking that it is if many Christians themselves constantly speak as though it were. Many churches have departed so far from what ought to be their program of Christian nurture that they expect conversions to take place only when revival programs are put on. But this is itself a sign of spiritual decay. It is as though a person stopped eating regularly and then suddenly gorged himself. The real issue is therefore between a church that is fully conscious of its task, which not only seeks to bring Christian influence to bear upon the child from its earliest infancy, but constantly surrounds the child with Christian influences at all times, and the method of the psychology of religion. And particularly we would note that only if religion is not separated from the rest of life, as it often is in the revivalist periods of the church, but is brought into connection with every aspect of life, and, most of all, with the interpretation of nature and history in the schools, it may be expected that many conversions will take place in the quietude of daily life. The most common and typical conversion has nothing to do with the saw-dust trail. Woe betide that church that depends for its conversions on the saw-dust trail alone or chiefly. Such a church will have few conversions indeed.

But this also leads us to see more clearly what the issue really is. The psychologists limit themselves to the revivalists because at bottom they recognize no other conversions but those that involve an open break with a life of drunkenness or shame. In opposition to this, the Christian Church has maintained, consistently with its conception of the total depravity of the human race since the fall of man, that everyone, no matter how much he may be moral man, still needs conversion. The Pharisees needed conversion as well as or worse than the publicans. The real issue, so far from appearing clearly when we have a drunkard turning from his evil ways to a life of soberness, appears rather in the heart of that person who, though perhaps not at all visibly changing his mode of life, nevertheless has undergone a complete change as far as the inward attitude of his life is concerned. It is quite possible that a man may be turned from a life of drunkenness with the help of the suggestion, but that he has not been converted at all. He may have been turned from a publican into a Pharisee and be more difficult of conversion for that very reason.

Here, then, we have the real issue. The psychologists of religion will not allow that all men need to be converted. They certainly would not allow that a man turned from drunkenness to soberness may yet have been converted. Thus the question deals primarily, though not exclusively, with an internal attitude of the heart. And this puts the whole matter once more in the field of discussion that one cannot approach with the laboratory methods of the psychologist. Is man a sinner? Does he need conversion even if he is outwardly a moral person? He does if this outward morality is at

best a manifestation of the common grace of God. In that case, we as Christians certainly value it for this life, and do not at all despise it. Yet we say that it has no value for eternity. Hence the man with the greatest gifts of common grace will still be lost for eternity unless he is led to see his righteousness to be but filthy rags. Now, this whole interpretation is right if Christian theism is wrong. Hence when the psychologists of religion point to the work of certain doctors and say that they have been more effective than the best revivalists, we are glad to believe that these doctors have helped men as far as this life is concerned. Yet we maintain that it is only if one assumes the truth of the non-Christian position that one can really in any comprehensive way say that these doctors have been more successful than the pastors were. They were not trying to do the same thing at all. The former were only trying to make man's lives a little more bearable in this world; the latter were seeking to save souls for eternity. Now, souls either do need to be saved for eternity or they do not. If they do not, then it can be said that the doctors were more successful than the pastors, because in that case the main part of the pastor's work is an illusion. On the other hand, if souls do need to be saved for eternity, then the pastors were certainly more successful than the doctors, for in that case the main burden of the latter's work is based upon an illusion. Not as though their work has no value for this life. It certainly has. But the idea that they should, by helping men to turn from publicans to Pharisees, actually think that they are doing all that needs to be done for the integration of human personality, is certainly an illusion.

Our conclusion is, then, that the whole question in debate on the matter of conversion is once more an aspect of the large debate about the truth of Christian theism. The psychologists of religion have, here as elsewhere, assumed the truth of the non-theistic position. It is on the ground of this assumption that all their arguments and their ridicule rest. We are willing to accept the ridicule. We know it comes from the Cain-complex. We were ourselves converted from the ways of darkness to the way of light. When the unconverted and the converted speak together about conversion, they usually do not speak of the same thing. If they do speak of the same thing at all, the unconverted must hold that the converted think themselves conceited or that they are deluded. Argument about the whole matter is to be sure unavoidable, necessary and profitable if only the argument be seen to be a part of the debate as a whole and if only it be conducted by the converted in consistency with their own belief that no one will see the kingdom of God, unless it be given him by the grace of God.

In the chapters that should follow if our discussion were to be complete, we would have to take up such matters as faith, prayer, worship, etc. A great deal of literature has been written on these subjects. We may even say that much more literature has been written about these subjects than about the matters we have discussed in this course, with the exception of regeneration and conversion. Yet we believe that it was more necessary to discuss the matters we have discussed than to enter upon many matters of detail as they appear in the literature on prayer, etc. We have dealt with the main problems that control men in the treatment of these problems.

With a knowledge of the method employed and the assumptions taken for granted, we will not likely lose ourselves when we read the literature on the psychology of religion that appears in ever increasing volume. We can be of greater service to those whom we are called upon to help if we can show them the principles underneath a discussion than if we can only point to some errors of fact or misinterpretation on questions of detail.

#### References: Chapter X

1. Cf. what such books as What Religion Does for Personality and Experiments in Personal Religion say on the subject.
2. Leuba, God or Man, p. 242.
3. Idem, p. 243.
4. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 206.
5. Idem, p. 207.
6. Idem, p. 208.
7. Idem, p. 208.
8. Idem, p. 209.
9. Idem, p. 209.
10. What Religion Does for Personality, p. 77.
11. Experiments in Personal Religion, p. 79.
12. Idem, p. 138.
13. Thouless, An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p. 56.
14. J. S. Huxley, Religion Without Revelation, p. 164.
15. Leuba, God or Man, p. 124.
16. Thouless, Op. Cit., p. 55.
17. Leuba, Op. Cit., p. 135.
18. Idem, p. 123.



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