CHRISTIAN-THEISTIC EVIDENCES

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

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

1953

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CHRISTIAN - THEISTIC EVIDENCES

PREFACE

We may preface our discussion in this course by a few general remarks about the nature and purpose of Christian evidences. Evidences is a sub-division of apologetics in the broader sense of the term. If we take apologetics in its broad sense we mean by it the vindication of Christian theism against any form of non-theistic and non-Christian thought. This vindication of Christian theism has two aspects. In the first place, Christian theism must be defended against non-theistic philosophy. We have sought to do this in the course in apologetics. In the second place, Christian theism must be defended against non-theistic science. It is this that we must seek to do in the course in Christian evidences. Evidences, then, is a subdivision of apologetics in the broader sense of the word, and is coordinate with apologetics in the more limited sense of the word.

Christian-theistic evidences is, then, the defense of Christian theism against any attack that may be made upon it by "science." Yet it is Christian theism as a unit that we seek to defend. We do not seek to defend theism in apologetics and Christianity in evidences, but we seek to defend Christian theism in both courses. Then, too, in the method of defense we do not limit ourselves to argument about facts in the course in evidences nor to philosophical argument in the course in apologetics. It is really quite impossible to make a sharp distinction between theism and Christianity and between the method of defense for each of them.

Nevertheless, in evidences it is primarily the factual question with which we deal. Christianity is an historical religion. It is based upon such facts as the death and resurrection of Christ. The question of miracle is at the heart of it. Kill miracle and you kill Christianity. But one cannot even define miracle except in relation to natural law. Thus, we face the question of God's providence. And providence, in turn, presupposes creation. We may say, then, that we seek to defend the fact of miracle, the fact of providence, the fact of creation, and therefore, the fact of God.

But if the matter is put this way we may as well say that we are seeking to defend Christian theism as a fact. And this is really the same thing as to say that we believe the facts of the universe are unaccounted for except upon the Christian-theistic basis. In other words, facts and interpretation of facts cannot be separated. It is impossible even to discuss any particular fact except in relation to some principle of interpretation. The real question about facts is, therefore, what kind of universal can give the best account of the facts. Or rather, the real question is which universal can state or give meaning to any fact.

Are there, then, several universals that may possibly give meaning or statement to facts? We believe there are not. We hold that there is only one such universal, namely, the God of Christianity. Consequently, we hold that without the presupposition of the God of Christianity we cannot even interpret one fact correctly. Facts without God would be brute facts. They would have no intelligible relation to one another. As such they could not be known by man.

Suppose, then, that we take the system of Christian theism and think of the attacks that are made upon it by science. We may for convenience take the six divisions of Systematic Theology and note in turn the attacks that are made upon our doctrines of God, of man, of Christ of salvation, of the church, and of the last things. Every attack upon one of these is an attack upon the whole system of truth as we hold it. For that reason the answer to each attack must be fundamentally the same. We shall, in each case, have to point out that the explanations offered by non-Christian views are no explanations at all inasmuch as they cannot relate the facts discussed to all other facts that must be taken into account. Yet, in order to work according to orderly procedure, we shall first notice the attacks made upon the doctrine of God, then those upon the doctrine of man, and so on till we come to the doctrine of the last things. Thus we have before us a broad outline picture of the road.

It remains only to remark on the meaning of the scientific attack we have mentioned above. When we speak of evidences as the vindication or defense of Christian theism against science we take the word science in its current meaning. We think first of the results of science, real or imaginary. These results are before us in various fields. Physical science seems to have come to some definite conclusions about matter and motion. Biological science seems to have come to some definite conclusions about organic life. Psychological science seems to have come to some definite conclusions about spiritual life. Social science seems to have come to some definite conclusions about the origin and nature of human society, and historical science seems to have come to some definite conclusions about the course of events. Even though there be much disagreement among scientists working within a given field, and among scientists working in different fields, it is at least quite true that there is a common negative attitude toward Christianity.

Together with thinking of the results of science as they are offered to us in various fields, we must think of the methodology of science. Perhaps there is greater agreement among scientists on the question of methodology than on the question of results. At any rate, it is quite commonly held that we cannot accept anything that is not the result of a sound scientific methodology. With this we can as Christians heartily agree. It is our contention, however, that it is only upon Christian presuppositions that we can have a sound scientific methodology. And when we recall that our main argument for Christianity will be that it is only upon Christian-theistic presuppositions that a true notion of facts can be formed, we see at once that it is in the field of methodology that our major battle with science will have to be fought. Our contention will be that a true scientific procedure is impossible unless we hold to the presupposi-

tion of God. Moreover, since this question of methodology is basic to all the results of science, we shall have to discuss it first. That is, we shall have to discuss it first so far as our systematic treatment of evidences is concerned. We shall, however, preface our systematic discussion with a brief survey of the history of evidences. From such a brief survey we may learn about much valuable material that we can use in our own defense of Christianity. We can also study the method of defense employed by apologists of the past.

It is needless to say that the task we have set before ourselves in this preface is too great for us to accomplish with thoroughness. It is too great particularly as to the extent of the field we seek to cover. No scientist pretends to know the whole field of science with thoroughness. How much less can a layman pretend to do so? The discussion will, therefore, have to be largely general. Our hope is that a general discussion may not be false to the facts as experts know them. The chief major battle between Christianity and science is not about a large number of individual facts, but about the principles that control science in its work. The battle today is largely that of the philosophy of science.

Chapter I

THE HISTORY OF EVIDENCES

Butler's Analogy

It will not be our purpose in this brief historical survey of evidences to touch on all those who have written on the subject. We shall merely select for consideration some of the chief writers and more particularly Bishop Butler. The reason for this selection is obvious. Butler has virtually controlled the method of Evidences in orthodox circles for two hundred years. His Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Courses of Nature was published in 1736. It was meant to be a defense of Christianity against the thought of the day, especially against deism. A short summary of the argument of the Analogy is accordingly our first task.

In his Introduction Butler tells us what he proposes to do. He begins by making the distinction between probable and demonstrative evidence. The former admits of degrees from mere presumption to moral certainty, while the latter brings immediate and absolute conviction.

The degree of probability that a certain event will take place may increase in proportion to the number of times that we have seen a similar event take place in the past. "Thus a man's having observed the ebb and flow of the tide today, affords some presumption, though the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again tomorrow: but the observation of this event for so many days and months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives a full assurance that it will" (The Works of Bishop Butler, edited by Rt. Hon. W.E. Gladstone, Vol. I, Analogy, p. 3).

It is this sort of probability that we must act upon in daily life:

> "From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen; if the result of examination be, that there appears upon the whole, any the lowest presumption on one side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree greater; this determines the question, even in matters of speculation; and in matters of practice, will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption of low probability, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely, a man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole appears, according to the best of his judgment, to be for his happiness, as what he certainly knows to be so" (p. 6).

But this is not enough. Butler goes on to point out that we must often act upon a chance of being right:

"For numberless instances might be mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and with great application too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less, and where the probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding" (p. 7).

In these quotations we have the heart of the probability concept upon which the Analogy is based. We are to argue that Christianity has at least a practical presumption in its favor. We are to be very modest in our claims. Even if there were only a mere chance that Christianity is true we ought to act upon its precepts. And if we act upon a mere chance of the truth of Christianity we are acting upon the same principle that we frequently act upon in daily life with respect to ordinary matters of experience.

But Butler does not mean that there is no more than a chance of Christianity being true. He thinks there is a considerable degree of probability that it is true. We shall see this in what follows. For the moment we must note on what basis such a probability rests. Probability in daily life rests upon analogy.

"That which chiefly constitutes probability is expressed in the word likely, i.e., like some truth, or true event; like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer of its circumstances. For when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some other event which we have observed has come to pass. And this observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event has or will come to pass; according as the observation is, that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always so far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions" (p. 4).

This passage indicates something of what Butler means by "analogical reasoning." It is reasoning about unknown possibilities from the known "constitution and course of nature." This "constitution and course of nature" is our starting point as far as the facts from which we reason are concerned. We take for granted that God has made and controls the "constitution and course of nature" (p. 10).

The application of analogical reasoning to the question of the truth of Christianity as made by Butler can perhaps be best illustrated by quoting what he himself remarks about Origen:

"Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen has with singular sagacity observed, that he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the constitution of nature. And in a like way of reflection it may be added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been from God upon account of these difficulties,

may, for the very same reason, deny the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation of Providence, which experience together with reason informs us of, i.e., the known course of nature; this is a presumption, that they have both the same author and cause . . ." (pp. 9-10).

Reason

These words of Butler really state the whole case. It will clarify matters more fully, however, if we quote still further with respect to the place of human reason in the argument. Butler explains what use he makes of human reason by contrasting the position of Descartes to his own:

> "Forming our notions of the constitution and government of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles which we assume, whether from the attributes of God, or anything else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Descartes. Forming our notions upon reasoning from principles which are certain, but applied to cases to which we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain the structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines from mere mathematics without sufficient data,) is an error much akin to the former: since what is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to others that are like them; from that part of the Divine government over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and more general government over them which is beyond it; and from what is present, to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter" (pp. 10-11).

It is not always easy to ascertain in detail just what place Butler assigns to reason, but in general it is plain. Broadly speaking, Butler is an adherent of the empiricist school of John Locke. Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding had appeared in 1690, two years before Butler's birth. In his early life Butler had taken careful notice of Samuel Clarke's attempt to give a demonstrative proof of the existence of God by the way of Descartes' a priori reasoning. Butler found Clarke unconvincing. "Ever afterwards he was chary of Clarke's mathematical methods in philosophy, veering sharply toward the doctrines of empiricism and probabilism which he found in the study of Locke" (Ernest Campbell Mossner, Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason, N.Y.C., Macmillan, 1936, p. 1).

It is naturally of basic importance for us to understand the function of reason as Butler conceives it. We may learn more about the matter by turning to chapter five of his book. In this chapter he argues that even if by abstract reasoning we should be driven to the position of fatalism, we should not be justified in rejecting the commands of religion. The reason for this is that we have a practical experience of freedom. The notion of necessity is "not applicable to practical subjects" (p. 146). But if this be then interpreted as a reflection upon the powers of reason, Butler hastens to add:

"Nor does this contain any reflection upon reason: but only upon what is unreasonable. For to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to practical principles, which the Author of our nature gave us to act upon; and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with regard to which, our own short views, and even our experience, will show us, it cannot be depended upon and such, at best, the subject of necessity must be; this is vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness" (p. 147).

With the empiricists in general Butler wishes to make a certain reasonable use of reason. Butler is severe on the Cartesian a priorism, it seems, inasmuch as it ventures far beyond known fact, and inasmuch as it ventures conclusions which he thinks are contrary to fact. When Clarke seeks to give a demonstrative proof of God he reasons, according to Butler, far beyond fact. When the fatalists argue against free will they reason, according to Butler, contrary to fact. But in putting the matter in this way we have not put it quite correctly. Butler does not really object to Clarke's reasoning beyond facts to the existence of God, but to Clarke's contention that such reasoning is demonstrative. And Clarke's reasoning was supposed to be demonstrative because it was a priori. Thus it was likely to be contrary to fact because it was reasoning that disregarded facts or possible facts.

The point with respect to the freedom of the will is basic to the whole matter. Freedom is said to be a fact of experience. All reasoning must adjust itself to this and other facts. And this constant necessity of returning to the facts clips the wings of reason. No reasoning can be absolutely conclusive except when it deals with the purely abstract. On the other hand, it "must be considered just to join abstract reasoning with the observation of facts." That is, we are justified because of the observed constitution and course of nature and because of the assumption of the "Author of nature," to reason from the known to the unknown.

When Butler applies these principles of reasoning to the question of Christianity he makes a twofold use of them. He makes, first, a positive use of them. It is based upon the idea that we can legitimately make conclusions about the unknown, assuming that it will be like the known. In the second place, he makes negative use of them. The unknown, though we may expect it will be like the known, may also be unlike the known. When such a phenomenon as Christianity presents itself, we are, according to Butler, in a position to believe it primarily because it is like the constitution and course of nature. There is a real continuity between nature and Christianity. But when men make objection to Christianity on the ground that it is so unlike what we know in nature, we can fall back upon the argument from ignorance. We should expect, Butler would say, that the unknown will be to a considerable extent unlike the known, even when it is also like the known.

In order to make plain the meaning of these principles, and especially the function of reason according to Butler, we quote what he holds the place of reason to be with respect to the Scriptures and their content. In reply to certain objections made against Christianity, Butler says:

"And now, what is the just consequence from all these things? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of Divine revelation. For this would be to infer, that we are unable to judge of any thing, because we are unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence, of revelation. First, it is the province of reason to judge of the morality of the Scripture; i.e. not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; for objections from hence have been now obviated: but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness – to what the light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed upon suppositions, which would equally conclude, that the constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not" (pp. 238-239) . . . "Secondly, reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence of revelation and of the objections urged against that evidence: which shall be the subject of a following chapter" (p. 240).

A little later, when speaking of the credibility of a Mediator coming into the world he adds:

"Let reason be kept to: and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption of the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up: but let not such poor creatures as we go on objecting against an infinite scheme, that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call this reasoning; and, which still further heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we are not actively concerned in" (p. 275).

These are the main principles of reasoning as employed by Butler. By the use of these principles he proceeds to prove the reasonableness of both natural and revealed religion. We cannot follow him into the subdivisions of the argument. A selection from the section dealing with natural religion and a selection from the section dealing with revealed religion may suffice.

A Future Life

In the section dealing with natural religion Butler devotes a good deal of space to the question of a future life. The argument hinges largely on the significance of the fact of death. Is death likely to be the end of all? To find out, we must turn to experience and reason from analogy. Although we have in our lifetime undergone much change, we have still survived. Therefore, it is likely that we shall also survive death. Says Butler:

"But the states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different from our present in mature age, as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees of life can be. Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different

(suppose) from our present, as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy of nature: – according to a natural order or appointment of the very same kind, with what we have already experienced. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness and misery: for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying pleasure and suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and capacities before death, is a presumption that we shall retain them through and after death; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the destruction of those living powers: because there is in every case a probability, that all things will continue as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to think they will be altered. This is that kind of presumption or probability from analogy, expressed in the very word continuance, which seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the world will continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only reason for believing, that any one substance now existing will continue to exist a moment longer; the self-existent substance only excepted" (pp. 22-23).

This passage affords an excellent illustration of the principle of likeness or continuity on which Butler rests his reasoning from the known to the unknown. His positive argument for a future life depends upon the observed principle of continuity. In the immediately following section he deals with the main objections against the idea of a future life. In meeting these objections he uses his celebrated argument from unlikeness or discontinuity. The objections against the idea of a future life must spring, he says, either "from the reason of the thing or from the analogy of nature." As to the former he adds:

"But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that death is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is in itself; but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones" (p. 25).

And as for the analogy of nature, Butler asserts:

"Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole analogy of nature, to afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals ever lose their living powers, much less, if it were possible, that they lose them by death: for we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or through it, so as to see that becomes of them. This event removes them from our view. It destroys the sensible proof, which we had before their death of their being possessed of living powers, but does not appear to afford the least reason to believe that they are, then, or by that event, deprived of them" (p. 26).

We might stop at this point to ask whether Butler, in view of his empiricism, is entitled to make the distinction he does make between the "reason of the thing" and the "analogy of nature," but we are just now engaged in

the nature of his argument from ignorance or discontinuity. Butler says that there is a strong probability for the general notion of continuance of the course of nature. We must find specific reasons for thinking it will not continue in the future as it has in the past. But we cannot find such specific reasons because we are in the dark about that future. This mode of reasoning is typical of Butler. For our positive contentions we rest on general probability which is based upon observed facts, and in reply to the objection raised against our positive contentions, we fall back on what he thinks of as legitimate ignorance.

In this connection it should be noted that Butler makes his ignorance or discontinuity apply not only to future events, but to present events as well. He extends the principle in these words:

> "And besides, as we are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise of our living powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers themselves depend upon – the powers themselves as distinguished, not only from their actual exercise, but also from the present capacity of exercising them; and as opposed to their destruction: for sleep, or however a swoon, shows us, not only that these powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion does in inanimate matter; but shows also that they exist, when there is no present capacity of exercising them: or that the capacities of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain undestroyed. Since, then, we know not at all upon what the existence of our living powers depends, this shows further, there can be no probability collected from the reason of the thing, that death will be their destruction: because their existence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affected by death: upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. So that there is nothing more certain, than that the reason of the thing shows us no connection between death, and the destruction of living agents" (pp. 25,26).

It becomes apparent rom such an argument as this that it is the bruteness or dumbness of the facts that is of basic importance for Butler. With it he meets the argument for fatalism; with it he also meets all objections to general morality and Christianity. His principle of unlikeness or discontinuity is based upon the idea of pure contingency as pervasive of all reality.

We have the main trend of the argument before us. There is one detail that we would instance in passing. It has to do with the relation of man to the animal. Butler himself voices an objection to his argument from ignorance by saying that according to it animals as well as man might be immortal. To this objection he replies by saying that natural immortality in animals would not imply rationality. But suppose it did, even that would be no argument against our own future life. In this connection he makes a statement that sounds very modern:

> "There was once, prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as there is against the brute creatures, arriv-

ing at that degree of understanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace up our own existence to the same original with theirs. And we find it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are altogether without the use of them, for a considerable length of their duration; as in infancy and childhood. And a great part of the human species go out of the present world, before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree at all" (pp. 37-38).

At this point we should recall that Butler presupposes an "Author of nature." We may find this presupposition inconsistent with his statement that there was prior to experience as great presumption against man attaining to mature rationality as against the animal, but we should not forget that Butler himself does believe in God. He does not pretend to argue for the existence of God in this volume. He takes this existence for granted. Still he gives us at one or two places a fairly clear idea as to what he thinks an argument for the existence of God should be like. We quote:

". . . taking for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor of the world. For, as there is no presumption against this, prior to the proof of it, so it has been often proved with accumulated evidence; from this argument of analogy and final causes, from abstract reasonings, from the most ancient tradition and testimony, and from the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of religion" (p. 12).

To this passage another similar in nature may be added:

"Indeed we ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent. For we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, i.e. immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be, somewhat, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype of it. And from hence (for this abstract, as much as any other, implies a concrete,) we conclude, that there is and cannot but be, an infinite and immense eternal Being existing prior to all design contributing to his existence, and exclusive of it. And, from the scantiness of language, a manner of speaking has been introduced, that necessity is the foundation, the reason, the account of the existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be at all intended, that everything exists as it does, by this kind of necessity; a necessity antecedent in nature to design: it cannot, I say, be meant, that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of necessity, upon several accounts; and particularly because it is admitted, that design, in the actions of men, contributes to many alterations in nature" (p. 141).

For the moment it is not necessary to analyze these passages that speak of the argument for the existence of God. We merely call attention

to the fact that they present us with a problem. The question cannot be avoided whether the argument for God as thus briefly outlined by Butler rests upon the same foundation as, for instance, does the argument for a future life. We know that Butler says he "supposes," i.e., presupposes, the "Author of Nature." We now see that he "supposes" it because he thinks God's existence can be established by a reasonable argument. On what then exactly does this reasonable argument rest? Is there another foundation besides experience and observation from which we can reason from the known to the unknown? If there is, why may we not use that other foundation as a starting-point for our reasoning with respect to a future life? If there is not, is not our argument for the existence of God of just as great or just as little value as our argument for a future life? What meaning then is there in the idea that we "suppose" an "Author of nature"? Are we not then for all practical purposes ignoring Him? In other words, God is presupposed; if God is presupposed should not that presupposition control our reasoning? And in that case can we be empiricists in our method of argument?

Christianity

Coming now to Butler's discussion of Christianity, it is profitable to note at the outset something of his general approach to the question of the evidence for Christianity.

The first question to be asked in this connection is why there should be any Christianity at all. On this point Butler says:

> "And indeed it is certain, no revelation would have been given, had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense as to render one not wanting and useless" (p. 185).

According to Butler we are to consider of Christianity as:

> ". . . first, as a republication, and external institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to the present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote natural piety and virtue: and secondly, as containing an account of a dispensation of things, not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us" (p. 188). . . "By reason is revealed the relation which God, the Father, stands in to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In Scripture are revealed the relations which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty, which we are under to them" (p. 197). . . "The essence of natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to God the Father Almighty: and the essence of revealed religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in religious regards to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost." (p. 198).

Speaking further of our relations to Christ and the Holy Spirit he adds:

> "And these relations being real, (though before revelation we could be under no obligations from them, yet upon their being revealed,) there is no reason to think, but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended with the same kind of consequences under God's government, as neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations made known to us by reason" (p. 200).

These quotations give us considerable information as to what Butler means by Christianity and as to why he thinks revelation is necessary. But we must go back of what he says at this point to an earlier section of his book. In chapter five Butler discusses the question, "Of a state of Probation, as Intended for Moral Discipline and Improvement." In this chapter he gives expression to his views about man's original estate. We should know what he says on this subject in order to understand correctly his conception of the necessity of revelation.

Having previously proved the moral government of God, Butler tells us at the outset of this chapter that we are placed in this world "that we might qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for another state which is to follow it." . . . "The known end, then, why we are placed in a state of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state of security and happiness." (p. 106).

Naturally the point that interests us here is whether we are really placed, as Butler says, in this estate of affliction and hazard. Were we created perfect and then fell into sin? If we were created perfect and then fell into sin afterwards, was there anything in the nature of things that made it difficult for us not to fall into sin? On these points Butler does not leave us in the dark. He says:

> "Mankind, and perhaps all finite creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right: and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits, for a security against this danger" (p. 120).

This general statement really affords us sufficient information about Butler's position on man's original estate. Yet, since it is a matter of extreme importance, we quote him more fully on this point. He tells us that originally man had certain propensions that were not subject to virtue.

> "For, together with the general principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame various affections towards particular external objects. These affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the government of the moral principle, as to the occasions upon which they may be gratified; as to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the objects of them may be pursued: but then the principle of virtue can

neither excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all consideration, whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it is found they cannot. For the natural objects of affection continue so; the necessaries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable; though they cannot be obtained innocently, nay, though they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects of any affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful means; but may be obtained by them: such affection, though its being excited, and its continuing some time in the mind, be as innocent as it is natural and necessary; yet cannot but be conceived to have a tendency to incline persons to venture upon such unlawful means: and therefore must be conceived as putting them in some danger of it" (pp. 120-121).

Against this danger that we as finite creatures are in because of these propensions to external objects, we have a remedy in the cultivation of the habit of virtue.

"Thus the principle of virtue, improved into a habit, of which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the strength of it, a security against the danger which finite creatures are in, from the very nature of propension, or particular affections."

In reading this argument, one might still be in doubt as to whether Butler is offering the fact of our "natural propensions" as an explanation for the original fall of man, though it is difficult to see how he could avoid doing it. But he tells us in so many words that he does explain the fall of man by the above considerations.

"From these things we may observe, and it will further show this our natural and original need of being improved by discipline, how it comes to pass, that creatures made upright fall; and that those who preserve their uprightness, by so doing, raise themselves to a more secure state of virtue."

It appears, then, that Butler takes essentially the Arminian position with respect to the fall of man. Arguments similar in nature to that given by Butler may be found, e.g., in Watson's Theological Institutes and in Miley's Systematic Theology, sub voce.

For Butler the very idea of finite perfection includes the idea of "propensions" to particular objects, which, if gratified, mean sin. He tells us that we cannot explain the fall of man simply by stating that man was made free.

"To say that the former (Butler means the fall of man) is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than that an event's actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of its happening" (p. 123).

Continuing from that point he adds:

> "But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature of particular affections or propensions. For, suppose creatures intended for such a particular state of life, for which such propensions were necessary: suppose them endued with such propensions, together with moral understanding, as well including a practical sense of virtue, as a speculative perception of it; and that all these several principles, both natural and moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were in the most exact proportion possible; i.e., in a proportion the most exactly adapted to their intended state of life: such creatures would be made upright, or finitely perfect. Now particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present; though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle. But if they can be gratified without its allowance, or by contradicting it; then they must be conceived to have some tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some tendency, to induce persons to such forbidden gratification. This tendency, in some one particular propension, may be increased, by the greater frequency of occasions naturally exciting it, than of occasions exciting others. The least voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumstance, though but in thought, will increase this wrong tendency; and may increase it further, till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it becomes effect; and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual deviation from it: a danger necessarily arising from the very nature of propension; and which therefore could not have been prevented, though it might have been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would be, as if we were to suppose a strait path marked out for a person, in which such a degree of attention would keep him steady: but if he would not attend in this degree, any one of a thousand objects, catching his eye, might lead him out of it" (pp. 123-124).

We see from this that finite perfection is to be thought of, according to Butler, as a matter of proportion between natural and moral principles. It remains only to notice that according to this manner of thinking the fall is something that comes by degrees.

> "Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt act of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution; unsettle the adjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed it, and in which the uprightness of its make consisted: but repetition of irregularities would produce habits. And thus the constitution would be spoiled; and creatures made upright, become corrupt and depraved in their settled character, proportionably to their repeated irregularities in occasional acts" (p. 124).

This position of Butler with respect to man's original estate corresponds to his empiricism in general. The "Author of nature" finds certain facts with characteristics of their own when he creates the world. He cannot fashion a perfect man except in so far as he can manipulate these facts. These facts have from the outset an independent influence upon the course of history. In their own nature they constitute a source of danger to the moral principle in

man. On this point, too, the position here taken by Butler is similar to that taken by the Arminian theologians and to that of Rome.

Man's Ability

Corresponding to what from the Reformed point of view must be called a low view of the original estate of man, is Butler's teaching on man's ability to do what God wishes him to do. After telling us that as men we do not seem to be situated as fortunately as we might be, he adds that we have no reason for complaint.

> "For," says he, "as men may manage their temporal affairs with prudence, and so pass their days here on earth in tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care: so likewise with regard to religion, there is no more required than what they are well able to do, and what they must be greatly wanting to themselves, if they neglect" (p. 102).

This statement of Butler may be compared with that of the Westminster Larger Catechism, Question 25: "The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consisteth in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of what righteousness wherein he was created, and the corruption of his nature, whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite unto all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually; which is commonly called original sin, and from which do proceed all actual transgressions." The contrast between Butler's view and that of the Westminster divines is basic.

Butler knows of no "corruption of man's nature." According to him man's reason is now virtually what it was when it was created, and man's will, though weakened by the habit of sin, is yet inherently as much inclined to the good as it ever was. Accordingly, Christianity need be no more than "a republication" of what was originally God's requirement, plus such requirements as the second and third Persons of the Trinity have seen fit to add to those of the first. From what we can learn of Butler, the first Person of the Trinity seems to have changed His relation to men very little, if any, on account of sin. At any rate, Butler definitely says that revelation speaks only of the Son and of the Spirit. Reason, even after the entrance of sin, continues to be able to know what needs to be known about the Father. Still further, there is no mention of the need of regeneration anywhere in Butler's Analogy. Butler limits the content of Christianity to the objective facts of the redemptive works of Christ. Man can accept this or he can refuse to accept this of his own power. Here, too, Butler's point of view must be contrasted with that of the Reformed Faith. The latter holds that Christianity includes the subjective factors of regeneration and faith as well as the objective factors of the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ.

The Remedy for Sin

To understand clearly what Butler thinks Christianity is we must now consider briefly his discussion of the work of the Mediator. He finds that the idea of a Mediator is in analogy with what we may expect from the constitution

and course of nature. All the bad natural consequences of man's actions do not always follow such actions. The "Author of nature" has afforded reliefs for many of the ills of natural evil. Thus there are several instances not only of severity, but also of "indulgence" in nature. We might conceivably think of a constitution and course of nature in which there would be no redress from evil at all. But, as a matter of fact, nature has a certain compassion. We quote:

> "But that, on the contrary, provision is made by nature, that we may and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad natural effects of our follies; this may be called mercy or compassion in the original constitution of the world: compassion, as distinguished from goodness in general. And, the whole known constitution and course of things affording us instances of such compassion, it would be according to the analogy of nature, to hope that, however ruinous the natural consequences of vice might be from the general laws of God's government over the universe; yet provision might be made, possibly might have been originally made for preventing those ruinous consequences from inevitably following: at least from following universally, and in all cases" (p. 256).

In this passage there lies before us what may be called the Arminian equivalent to the Reformed doctrine of common grace. On it Butler is soon to build a more specific argument for the necessity of a Saviour. Before doing that, he investigates the question as to whether we could possibly save ourselves. He concludes that it is unlikely that we could. People often ruin their fortunes by extravagance. Yet sorrow for such extravagance and good behavior ever after will not suffice to erase the evil consequence of their deeds. Then, too, their natural abilities by which they might help themselves are often impaired. All this being the case, Butler asks:

> ". . . why is it not supposable that this may be our case also, in our more important capacity, as under his perfect moral government, and having a more general and future interest depending? If we have misbehaved in this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment, which God has annexed to vice: it is plainly credible that behaving well for the time to come may be - not useless, God forbid - but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment; or to put us in the condition, which we should have been in, had we preserved our innocence" (pp. 259-260).

Upon this foundation Butler now proceeds to bring in the revelation about a Saviour:

> "Revelation teaches us," he says, "that the unknown laws of God's more general government, no less than the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at present, are compassionate, as well as good in the more general notion of goodness: and that he hath mercifully provided, that there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind; whatever that destruction unprevented would have been. God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth, not to be sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, that

whosoever believeth in him should not perish: gave his Son in the same way of goodness to the world, as he affords particular persons the friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures; when, without it, their temporal ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies: in the same way of goodness, I say: though in a transcendent and infinitely higher degree" (pp. 261-262).

Still further, Butler finds an analogy in nature for the vicarious suffering of Christ.

"And when, in the daily course of natural Providence, it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection, as the instance we are now considering. The infinitely greater importance of that appointment of Christianity, which is objected against, does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same kind, with what the world affords us daily examples of" (p. 272).

Finally, if the objector should still continue to bring in further points that seem to him to be strange in the economy of Christianity, Butler falls back on the argument from ignorance.

"Lastly, that not only the reason of the thing, but the whole analogy of nature, should teach us not to expect to have the like information concerning the divine conduct, as concerning our own duty" (p. 275).

From the passages cited the nature of the argument for Christianity employed by Butler appears clearly. Little needs to be added on the question of miracles, which was, after the attack on them by Hume, to occupy such an important place in Christian evidence. The real defense of miracle rests upon the defense of Christianity as a whole. After having defended the concept of Christianity as a whole, Butler goes on to give the historical evidence for miracle, and meets the objection brought against them. He seeks to prove that the witnesses who gave testimony to the happening of miracles were trustworthy, that they had no cause for deceit, etc. All this is familiar.

Yet there is one point to which we wish to call special attention. After having discussed several arguments for Christianity from prophecy fulfilled and miracle performed, Butler seeks in the second place to bring all of these arguments together into one whole. He says:

"I shall now, secondly, endeavour to give some account of the general argument for the truth of Christianity. . . For it is the kind of evidence, upon which most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined: evidence arising from various coincidences, which support and confirm each other, and in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the point under consideration. And I choose to do it also: first, because it seems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by every one, that the proof of revelation is, not some direct and express things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also; and

that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be joined together; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the result of those several things, considered in their respects to each other, and united into one view: and in the next place, because it seems to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be acknowledged by them also to contain together a degree of evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several things before themselves distinctly, and then with attention consider them together; instead of that cursory thought of them, to which we are familiarized" (pp. 328-329).

Butler then proceeds to bring all the evidence for Christianity and natural religion together into one argument. He supposes a person who is wholly ignorant of the matter. Such a person is to be shown how largely natural religion is corroborated by Scripture, and how the two blend together. If this is done there will be no danger that such a person will see conflict between reason and revelation, "any more than the proof of Euclid's Elements is destroyed by a man's knowing or thinking, that he should never have seen the truth of the several propositions contained in it, nor had these propositions come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician" (p. 339).

After reviewing this argument as a whole Butler remarks as follows:

"This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered as making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious persons, to set down every thing which they think may be of any real weight at all in proof of it, and particularly the many seeming completions of prophecy: and they will find that, judging by the natural rules, by which we judge of probable evidence in common matters, they amount to a much higher degree of proof, upon such a joint review, than could be supposed upon considering them separately, at different times; how strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence, but multiply it" (pp. 350-351).

The nature of Butler's argument is clear. Butler thinks that he has done more than he need have done to make the practice of Christianity reasonable. "And that the practice of religion is reasonable, may be shown, though no more could be proved, than that the system of it may be so, for ought we know to the contrary: and even without entering into the distinct consideration of this" (p. 362). If therefore there were no more than a presumption in favor of the truth of Christianity, men should act upon it. But Butler has shown, he thinks, that there is more than a presumption. He has shown that there is a great positive probability for the truth of Christianity. And that is all that reasonable men should require. If they require more they forget that satisfaction "in this sense, does not belong to such a creature as man" (p. 364). "But the practical question in all cases is, Whether the evidence for a course of action be such, as, taking in all circumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and judge of

conduct, determine that course of action to be prudent. Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness, abundantly determines an action to be prudent: but evidence almost infinitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too; even in the conduct of every day" (p. 365).

Toward the end of the book Butler makes a point of telling us again exactly what his mode of procedure has been. He has sometimes, as in the case of fatalism, argued upon the principles of his opponents. Then, too, he has omitted the consideration of the "moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever," and the principle of liberty itself.

"Now these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view, than merely as a question of fact: and in this view it is here considered" (pp. 367-368).

What Butler says here is simply a restatement of his disregard of a priori reasoning. At an earlier point he absolutely rejected the validity of a priori reasoning. At the conclusion he seems to say that he, though admitting its validity, has simply omitted the use of it. He explains the difference between the two types of reasoning at this point in the following words:

"To explain this: that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth: but that they appear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact" (p. 368).

At any rate, it is plain that the argument for Christianity as set forth by Butler is an argument that wishes to make its appeal to fact, first of all. After it has been shown that miracle and fulfilled prophecy are facts, that is, that such things as have been recorded have actually taken place, these facts must be shown to be in analogy with the facts as we observe them in the "constitution and course of nature." The tool with which we do the work of comparing one "fact" with another "fact" of a different nature is the "faculty of reason, which is the candle of the Lord within us" (p. 375).

With this we may conclude our summary of Butler's Analogy in order to see something of what later generations have done about its argument.

Chapter II

HUME'S SCEPTICISM

The argument of Butler's Analogy was directed against the deists. The "Deist Bible," i.e., Matthew Tindal's book Christianity as Old as Creation: Or, The Gospel, a Republication of the Religion of Nature, appeared in 1730. The deists believed, generally speaking, in the following points: (1) that there is one supreme God, (2) that He ought to be worshiped, (3) that virtue and piety are the chief parts of divine worship, (4) that we ought to be sorry for our sins and repent of them, (5) that divine goodness dispenses rewards and punishments both in this life and after it.

It will be observed that Butler did not need to oppose the deists on what they believed, but only on what they did not believe. He argued that if they could believe what they believed, they ought also be willing to believe Christianity.

Before long, however, the reasoning and the conclusion of both Butler and the deists were subjected to radical criticism. The question is sometimes asked: Who won the deistic controversy, Butler or the deists? The answer is often given that the sceptics won it.

David Hume published his Treatise of Human Nature anonymously in 1739-40. He is said to have had a high regard for Butler. He tried to get Butler to read the manuscript before publication, as appears from a letter he wrote to Lord Kames:

> "Your thoughts and mine agree with respect to Dr. Butler, and I would be glad to be introduced to him. I am at present castrating my work, that is, butting off its nobler parts, that is, endeavoring it shall give as little offense as possible, before which, I could not pretend to put it into the doctor's hands" (E.C. Mossner, Biship Butler and the Age of Reason, N.Y., 1936, p. 156).

Hume did not meet Butler, but we may look at what later fell into Butler's hands when the Treatise appeared.

The high regard of Hume for Butler was due in part to the "judicious" character of Butler's writings. Hume hated all "enthusiasm." But more than that, it was the common opposition they shared against all a priori reasoning that drew Hume toward Butler. Both had learned from Locke. Both hated "innate ideas." The only difference between Hume and Butler was that Hume was not willing to accept any positive construction of knowledge even to the extent of reasonable probability. The carefully prepared argument of the Analogy seemed to Hume to be invalid.

Knowledge Based on Sensation

Basic to all Hume's opposition to Christianity and to theism is his conception of knowledge as derived from the senses. His objections to miracles as well as his objections to natural religion are based upon his theory of knowledge. He marched right up to the very citadel of his opponents in order to attack them there.

> "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such, as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion" (A Treatise on Human Nature, being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, by David Hume, edited by T.H. Green and T.H. Grose, London, 1874, Vol. I, p. 311).

In this opening sentence of the Treatise we have the gist of the matter. All knowledge comes from sensation; that is basic to Hume's theory of knowledge. We have no ideas which are not faint copies of previous impressions. Ideas, as copies of sensations, Hume argues, are discrete. He is in entire agreement with Berkely that "all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term." He holds that Berkely's "discovery" of this point is "one of the most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters" (Op. cit. 325.)

The far-reaching significance of Hume's point of view appears at a glance. Since all knowledge is of sensation there is no a priori reasoning. To be sure, in the field of algebra, when we are merely concerned with the manipulations of figures, we may speak of a priori knowledge, but when we pretend to deal with factual knowledge, a priori reasoning is taboo.

But what of the a posteriori reasoning such as Butler has employed in his Analogy? Granted we are willing to forego the certainty and universality that a priori reasoning was supposed to bring, can we not at least depend upon probability? May we not reasonably expect that the "constitution and course of nature" will continue in the future as it has in the past? Such questions, though not asked by Hume with direct reference to Butler, are yet asked by him with respect to the type of argument used by Butler.

The answer to such questions, says Hume, depends upon the nature of the connection between our various ideas. One particular idea simply recalls

another particular idea. It is thus that we obtain our general ideas. There is no necessary connection between our various particular ideas. There is no systematic relation between them. There is no systematic relation between them because there is no systematic relation between our sensations.

It will be observed that in this way there is no basis for the notion of cause and effect. There is no "impression, which produces an idea of such prodigious consequence" (377). Yet all ideas must come from impressions. My impressions are simply of contiguity and succession. Hence my ideas too are merely of contiguity and succession.

> "Tho' the mind in its reasonings from causes or effects carries its view beyond those objects, which it sees or remembers, it must never lose sight of them entirely, nor reason merely upon its own ideas, without some mixture of impressions, or at least of ideas of the memory, which are equivalent to impressions. When we infer effects from causes, we must establish the existence of these causes; which we have only two ways of doing, either by an immediate perception of our memory or sense, or by an inference from other causes; which causes again we must ascertain in the same manner, either by a present impression, or by an inference from their causes, and so on, till we arrive at some object, which we see or remember. 'Tis impossible for us to carry on our inferences in infinitum; and the only thing that can stop them, is an impression of the memory or senses, beyond which there is no room for doubt or enquiry" (p. 384).

Absolutely all our reasoning about cause and effect goes back to sensation, and sensations are discrete. To this basic point Hume returns again and again.

> " 'Tis therefore by EXPERIENCE only, that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another. The nature of experience is this. We remember to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of another species of objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession with regard to them. Thus we remember, to have seen that species of object we call flame, and to have felt that species of sensation we call heat. We likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without any farther ceremony, we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer the existence of the one from that of the other" (p. 388). "From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never will arise any new original idea, such as that of a necessary connexion; and the number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confin'd ourselves to one only" (p. 389).

It is easy to sense the implication of all this for the argument of Butler. Butler holds that we may reasonably expect the course and constitution of nature to remain the same in the future as it has been in the past. Hume says that if we expect this it is because of custom only. There is simply no logical relation between the past and the future.

To see this point clearly we may follow Hume still further when he enters upon a discussion of probability.

Probability

Continuing from the passage we have just quoted, Hume says:

"Since it appears, that the transition from an impression present to the memory of senses to the idea of an object, which we call cause or effect, is founded on past experience, and on our remembrance of their constant conjunction, the next question is, Whether experience produces the idea by means of the understanding or imagination; whether we are determin'd by reason to make the transition, or by a certain association and relation of perceptions. If reason determin'd us, it would proceed upon that principle, that instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same. In order therefore to clear up this matter, let us consider all the arguments, upon which such a proposition may be suppos'd to be founded; and as these must be deriv'd either from knowledge or probability, let us cast our eye on each of these degrees of evidence, and see whether they afford any just conclusion of this nature.

"Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince us, that there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience. We can at least conceive a change in the course of nature; which sufficiently proves, that such a change is not absolutely impossible. To form a clear idea of anything, is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it.

"Probability, as it discovers not the relations of ideas, consider'd as such, but only those of objects, must in some respects be founded on the impressions of our memory and sense, and in some respects on our ideas. Were there no mixture of any impression in our probable reasonings, the conclusion would be entirely chimerical: And were there no mixture of ideas, the action of the mind, in observing the relation, wou'd, properly speaking, be sensation, not reasoning. 'Tis therefore necessary that in all probable reasonings there be something present to the mind, either seen or remember'd; and that from this we infer something connected with it, which is not seen nor remember'd.

"The only connexion or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause and effect; and that because 'tis the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another. The idea of cause and effect is deriv'd from experience, which informs us, that such particular objects, in all past instances, have been constantly conjoin'd with each other; And as an object similar to one of these is suppos'd to be immediately present in its impression, we thence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant. According to this account of things, which is, I think, in every point unquestionable, probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and

those, of which we have had none; and therefore 'tis impossible this presumption can arise from probability. The same principle cannot be both the cause and effect of another; and this is, perhaps, the only proposition concerning that relation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain" (pp. 389-391).

Butler's Inconsistencies

This passage deals with the central concept of Butler's Analogy, namely, that of the presumption that the constitution and course of nature will be the same in the future as we have seen it to be in the past. Hume finds no justification for this presumption except in custom. It is important to note that his argument here is, if sound, as destructive of Butler's reasoning as it is of a priori reasoning. To be sure, his argument appears to be primarily against the idea of a necessary connection of an a priori sort. Yet his argument is equally opposed to the idea of a presumptive rational connection of a probable sort. The whole point of Hume's argument is that there is no rational presumption of any sort about future events happening in one way rather than in another. We may expect that they will, but if we do, we do so on non-rational grounds. Our reasoning is based upon past experience. Past experience is nothing but an accumulation of brute facts which have been observed as happening in a certain order. Why should not the events of the future be entirely different in nature from the events of the past?

Could Butler have escaped the argument of Hume? It does not seem so. Butler appealed to brute fact. To brute fact Hume forced him to go. Butler sought to defend Christianity and theism upon an "empirical" basis. Hume tested his system by a consistent empiricism. Butler's empiricism was not consistent. It was inconsistent at two points. It had in it a mixture of a priori reasoning as well as a posteriori reasoning. We have seen in the previous chapter that Butler sometimes appeals to "the reason of the thing" and to "intuition." His main assumption, that the constitution and course of nature may be expected to remain in the future what it has been in the past, rests upon an uncritical remnant of a priorism. The "reasonable use of reason" that Butler held to, his "joining of abstract reasoning with facts," which he said must be allowed to be just, was entirely un-critical. Butler gives evidence of halting between two opinions. Butler should have justified his procedure. If one expects to defend the Christian religion by the use of clear-cut a priori reasoning, it is well. If one expects to defend the Christian religion by a clear-cut use of a posteriori reasoning, it is well. Butler sought to combine a priori with a posteriori reasoning. This, too, is well if one will tell us the exact nature of the combination between the a priori and the a posteriori that he has in mind. Butler did none of these things.

The second point on which Butler's empiricism was inconsistent was in its relation to his conception of the "Author of nature." We have hinted at this point in the previous chapter. The matter may be put as follows: If an "Author of nature" is really presupposed it will control the nature of reasoning that one employs. If we may presuppose an "Author of nature," the facts are cre-

ated by Him. That means we cannot be empiricists, in the sense in which Butler takes empiricism and in the sense in which Hume takes empiricism. If an "Author of nature" is presupposed, all the facts of the "course and constitution of nature" are bound together by the mind of God. Then human minds are made by God. This means that we can never be a priorists in the Cartesian sense of the term. Our minds can never legislate future possibility and probability because this future possibility and probability lies in the control of God. Yet it means that human minds may speak of universal connection between ideas and between ideas and things. There is an entirely reasonable expectation that the constitution and course of nature will be the same in the future as it has been in the past because of the rationality of God that is back of it. Even so it should be remembered that God may at any time send His Son to change the constitution and course of nature. The point is that only that will happen in the future which will be in accord with the rational program of God. We can contrast this position with that of Hume by saying that for Hume the basic concept of thought is bare possibility, while for one who holds to an "Author of nature" the basic concept of thought should be God's complete rationality. Butler failed to see this basic alternative. We may agree with him when he rejects a priorism of the Cartesian sort, but we cannot agree with him with he substitutes for it an empiricism of an un-critical sort.

Hume's empiricism was far more critical and consistent than that of Butler. We proceed to see what happens to the conception of probability on the basis of Hume's empiricism. If all knowledge is based upon experience, and experience is interpreted without the presupposition of the "Author of nature" as Hume claims it is, we cannot expect that one thing rather than another will happen in the future. From the point of view of logic, one thing as well as another might take place in the future. But why is it then that we expect the course and constitution of nature to remain the same? "Wherein consists the difference betwixt incredulity and belief?" asks Hume. (395). The answer is once more that it is in nothing but custom and feeling.

> "Now as we call every thing CUSTOM, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion, we may establish it is a certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present impression, is deriv'd solely from that origin" (p. 403).

Custom gives vividness to an idea, and the vividness of the idea is the source of our belief in the existence of the object of the idea. "Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. 'Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy." (p. 403).

Future Life

In this connection Hume applies these principles to the question of a future life:

> "As belief is an act of the mind arising from custom, 'tis not strange the want of resemblance shou'd overthrow what custom has established, and diminish the force of the idea, as much as that latter prin-

ciple encreases it. A future state is so far remov'd from our comprehension, and we have so obscure an idea of the manner, in which we shall exist after the dissolution of the body, that all the reasons we can invent, however strong in themselves, and however much assisted by education, are never able with slow imaginations to surmount this difficulty, or bestow a sufficient authority and force on the idea. I rather choose to ascribe this incredulity to the faint idea we form of our future condition, deriv'd from its want of resemblance to the present life, than to that deriv'd from its remoteness. For I observe, that men everywhere concern'd about what may happen after their death, provided it regard this world; and that there are few to whom their name, their family, their friends, and their country are in any period of time entirely indifferent.

"And indeed the want of resemblance in this case so entirely destroys belief, that except those few, who upon cool reflection on the importance of the subject, have taken care by repeated meditation to imprint in their minds the arguments for a future state, there scarce are any, who believe the immortality of the soul with a true and establish'd judgment; such as is deriv'd from the testimony of travellers and historians. This appears very conspicuously wherever men have occasion to compare the pleasures and pains, the rewards and punishments of this life with those of a future; even tho' the case does not concern themselves, and there is no violent passion to disturb their judgment. The Roman Catholicks are certainly the most zealous of any sect in the Christian world; and yet you'll find few among the more sensible people of that communion who do not blame the Gunpowder-treason, and the massacre of St. Bartholomew, as cruel and barbarous, tho' projected or executed against those very people, whom without any scruple they condemn to eternal and infinite punishments. All we can say in excuse for this inconsistency is, that they really do not believe what they affirm concerning a future state; nor is there any better proof of it than the very inconsistency" (pp. 413-414).

In these passages we have the answer from a pure empiricist to the argument for a future life as set forth in Butler's Analogy. There is no doubt but that the criticism of Hume is sound. A pure empiricism can give no presumption for anything to happen in the future. A pure empiricism would require us to be entirely neutral as to the future. Hume develops the point in this immediate connection. It is well that we look at it carefully inasmuch as it brings before us the whole problem of the law of chances, which has played so large a part in later works on evidences.

In order to bring this question before us as clearly as possible, Hume distinguishes between three kinds of reason, viz., "that from knowledge, from proofs, and from probabilities" (p. 423). Explaining these three kinds of reason he says:

"By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, these arguments, which are derived from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncer-

tainty. By probability, that evidence, which is still attended with uncertainty. 'Tis this last species of reasoning, I proceed to examine" (pp. 423-424).

Thereupon he divides reasoning from "conjecture" into two parts, namely, reasoning from chance and reasoning from causes. The first one is now before us. We quote from Hume at length on this subject:

The Law of Chances

"The idea of cause and effect is deriv'd from experience, which presenting us with certain objects constantly conjoin'd with each other, produces such a habit of surveying them in that relation, that we cannot without a sensible violence survey them in any other. On the other hand, as chance is nothing real in itself, and, properly speaking, is merely the negation of a cause, its influence on the mind is contrary to that of causation; and 'tis essential to it, to leave the imagination perfectly indifferent, either to consider the existence or non-existence of that object, which is regarded as contingent. A cause traces the way to our thought, and in a manner forces us to survey such certain object, in such certain relations. Chance can only destroy this determination of the thought, and leave the mind in its native situation of indifference; in which, upon the absence of a cause, 'tis instantly re-instated.

"Since therefore an entire indifference is essential to chance, no one chance can possibly be superior to another, otherwise than as it is compos'd of a superior number of equal chances. For if we affirm that one chance can, after any other manner, be superior to another, we must at the same time affirm that there is something, which gives it the superiority, and determines the event rather to that side than the other: That is, in other words, we must allow of a cause, and destroy the supposition of chance; which we had before establish'd. A perfect and total indifference is essential to chance, and one total indifference can never in itself be either superior or inferior to another. This truth is not peculiar to my system, but is acknowledg'd by every one, that forms calculations concerning chances.

"And here 'tis remarkable, that tho' chance and causation be directly contrary, yet 'tis impossible for us to conceive this combination of chances, which is requisite to render one hazard superior to another, without supposing a mixture of causes among the chances, and a conjunction of necessity in some particulars, with a total indifference in others. Where nothing limits the chances, every notion, that the most extravagant fancy can form, is upon a footing of equality; nor can there be any circumstance to give one the advantage above another. Thus unless we allow, that there are some causes to make the dice fall, and preserve their form in their fall, and lie upon some one of their sides, we can form no calculation concerning the laws of hazard. But supposing these causes to operate, and supposing likewise all the rest to be indifferent and to be determin'd by chance, 'tis easy to arrive at a notion of a superior combination of chances. A dye that has four sides mark'd with a certain number of spots

and only two with another, affords us an obvious and easy instance of this superiority. The mind is here limited by the causes to such a precise number and quality of the events; and at the same time is undetermin'd in its choice of any particular event.

"Proceeding then in that reasoning, wherein we have advanc'd three steps; that chance is merely the negation of a cause, and produces a total indifference in the mind; that one negation of a cause and one total indifference can never be superior or inferior to another; and that there must always be a mixture of causes among the chances, in order to be the foundation of any reasoning: We are next to consider what effect a superior combination of chances can have upon the mind, and after what manner it influences our judgment and opinion. Here we may repeat all the same arguments we employ'd in examining that belief, which arises from causes; and may prove, after the same manner, that a superior number of chances produces our assent neither by demonstration nor probability. 'Tis indeed evident, that we can never by the comparison of mere ideas make any discovery, which can be of consequence in this affair, and that 'tis impossible to prove with certainty, that any event must fall on that side where there is a superior number of chances. To suppose in this case any certainty, were to overthrow what we have establish'd concerning the opposition of chances, and their perfect equality and indifference.

"Shou'd it be said, that tho' in an opposition of chances 'tis impossible to determine with certainty, on which side the event will fall, yet we can pronounce with certainty, that 'tis more likely and probable, 'twill be on that side where there is a superior number of chances, than where there is an inferior: Shou'd this be said, I shou'd ask, what is here meant by likelihood and probability? This likelihood and probability of chances is a superior number of equal chances; and consequently when we say 'tis likely the event will fall on the side, which is superior, rather than on the inferior, we do no more than affirm, that where there is a superior number of chances there is actually a superior, and where there is an inferior there is an inferior: which are identical propositions and of no consequence. The question is, by what means a superior number of equal chances operates upon the mind, and produces belief or assent; since it appears, that 'tis neither by arguments deriv'd from demonstration, nor from probability" (pp. 424-426).

Grant an infinite number of possibilities, to begin with, as an absolutely pure empiricism must presuppose, then there is an infinite number of improbabilities in cancel every infinite number of probabilities. That is, there is no probability at all. Such is Hume's argument. Hume is right when he says again and again that "an entire indifference is essential to chance." The idea of a law of chances is, strictly speaking, a contradiction in terms. It is to this position of total indifference with respect to the future that anyone embracing a pure empiricism is driven. By Hume's argument Butler would be driven to accept a pure empiricism with the consequences now before us, or to accept the "Author of nature" as a real and effective principle of interpretation.

A Priorism Faces The Same Difficulty

At this point some one may argue that Butler would not necessarily be driven to this alternative, because he is not a consistent empiricist. He may, therefore, fall back upon the a priorism in his thought in order to escape the sceptical conclusions of Hume. But apart from the fact that Butler himself rests the whole of his argument upon the empirical fact, we may point out that any sort of non-Christian a priorism would eventually also be placed before Hume's alternative. Those who seek to prove the existence of God by an a priori argument of the non-Christian sort, prove too much. If they prove the necessary existence of God, they also prove the necessary existence of everything else that exists. The necessary existence of God is said to be implied in the finite existence of man. That is taken to mean, in effect, that necessary existence is a correlative to relative existence. But this in turn implies that relative existence is a correlative to necessary existence. Thus God comes into existence by the hypostatization of man. Temporal things together with the evil in them are then taken as correlative to God. This is destructive of God's unchangeability. God as well as man is in this way made subject to change. Thus we are back at chance as the most fundamental concept in philosophy. A priori reasoning on non-Christian assumptions, no less than a posteriori reasoning upon non-Christian assumptions, leads to the apotheosis of chance and thus to the destruction of predication.

Hume's main criticism is now before us. It is destructive of both aspects of Butler's reasoning. On an empirical basis there can be no positive presumption that the future will be like the past and the unknown like the known. Neither, on the other hand, can we use the argument from ignorance with respect to the future and unknown in general. To say that we are justified in expecting that the future will in a measure be unlike the past or that God will, in his dealings with the universe, act in a measure differently from ourselves, presupposes our ability first to show that the future and God will be in a large measure like the present and like ourselves. The validity of the negative aspect of Butler's argument presupposes the validity of the positive aspect of his argument. And in both cases the "unknown causes" working in the field of chances are taken for granted.

Objection to Miracles

The real character of Hume's objection against miracles now appears. His objection against miracles is built upon the section about belief in general. The whole point of the objection to miracle is that a "weaker evidence numerically considered can never overthrow a stronger" (See Hume's Dialogues on Natural Religion, N.K. Smith, p. 59, Oxford, 1935). We have so many times in the past experienced that certain phenomena follow certain other phenomena that we cannot accept the evidence from testimony for events that are out of accord with what we have experienced in the past.

It is well to observe what Hume signifies by the term miracle. He sometimes speaks of it simply as that which happens out of the ordinary

course of nature. Yet he realizes that he needs to give a more exact definition of miracle. A more careful definition of miracle, according to Hume, is that it is something that happens by a particular volition of the deity. The real point of Hume's opposition to miracle is, accordingly, that there is no reason to think that a God who could work miracle can be proved to exist. As to particular miracles that are said to have happened, Hume seeks to discount the testimony with respect to them by urging that: (a) it is among barbarous people that such claims for the miraculous abound, (b) the passions of surprise and wonder to which the idea of miracle appeals are agreeable emotions, (c) the miracles of one religion cancel the miracles of another religion (N.K. Smith, Op. cit., p. 62). After all is said and done, however, the real point by which Hume seeks to destroy the conception of miracle is by the destruction of a valid argument for the existence of God. For suppose, on an empiricist basis, that all the evidence with respect to the miracles that are said to have taken place in connection with the establishment of Christianity were proved to have taken place, it would simply be that much more experience of the strangeness of natural events. Hume needed not to have worried too greatly to destroy the validity of the evidence for miracles. Granted the evidence for the validity to miracles was incontestible. Granted that it could be proved by undeniable historical evidence that Christ has been raised from the grave; this would, on the basis of his empiricism, prove no more than that our custom with respect to what we expect from the womb of chance would have to change.

Christianity in General

What holds for miracles in particular holds with respect to the truth of Christianity in general. If one seeks to make an empirical defense of Christianity as Butler seeks to make, the real and most fundamental question at issue is not the historicity of the events that have taken place in connection with the introduction of Christianity. If these were all assumed to have taken place, it would still be possible for Hume to undermine the foundation of the whole structure built on empirical foundations.

With this we might conclude the matter of Hume's criticism on the type of argument as set forth by Butler. Because of the prevalence of Butler's type of argument down to the present day, however, we may trace in somewhat greater detail the argument that Hume urges against the foundations of Christianity. This argument appears most fully in his "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Three persons are introduced in this dialogue: Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo. There has been much debate concerning whom or what these three persons represent. Mossner thinks he is justified in saying that Demea represents Samuel Clarke and his a priorism, that Cleanthes represents Butler and his a posteriori argument for Christianity, while Philo represents Hume and his scepticism (Op. cit. p. 164). Others hold that Hume's own position is best set forth by Cleanthes. Still others maintain that Hume's position appears from the general outcome of the argument as a whole (see N.K. Smith, op. cit., p. 75). We need not enter upon this discussion. It matters not to us what Hume's personal beliefs were. We are concerned merely

with the objections he raises in one form or another to Christianity. These objections are certainly most fully set forth, as far as the present dialogue is concerned, by Philo.

The Argument from Design

The main point in dispute in these dialogues is the argument from design. Cleanthes sets forth this argument at various stages. We quote from his first statement of the case:

> "Not to lose time in circumlocutions, said Cleanthes, addressing himself to Demea, much less in replying to the pious declamations of Philo I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look 'round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy, which ravishes into admiration all men, who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence" (Section II, Green and Grosse, Vol. II, p. 392).

In section IV he says much the same thing in these words: "The whole chorus of nature raises one hymn to the praises of its creator" (p. 410).

The main question here is, What is the nature of the criticism that Philo brings against this sort of argument?

The first point Philo raises in opposition to Cleanthes is that by the a posteriori method Cleanthes can never hope to prove the existence of an absolute deity. He can at best prove the existence of a finite God.

> "It is not easy, I own, to see, what is gained by this supposition, whether we judge of the matter by Reason or by Experience. We are still obliged to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive" (p. 407).

Or a little later he adds: "How therefore shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being, whom you suppose the Author of Nature or, according to your system of Anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material? Have we not the same reason to trace that

ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on in infinitum? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us remember the story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more applicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so on, without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the present material world" (p. 408).

In this argument Hume questions the power of analogy to carry us to a region in any way different from that of our experience. We can at most discover a God who is, like ourselves, subject to limitations. He carries this type of criticism still farther when he says that the God whose existence could be proved by the method of Cleanthes should have evil in him as well as good. Such a God must in every major aspect of his being resemble us. There is no good reason to hold that God resembles us in the good that is in us and differs from us with respect to the evil that is in us. There had been many attempts on the part of Christian apologists to show that the good of the world outweighs the evil. To this sort of attempt Philo makes reply as follows:

"But allowing you, what never will be believed; at least, what you never possibly can prove, that animal, or at least, human happiness, in this life, exceeds its misery; you have yet done nothing: for this is not, by any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance, surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic, which I have all along insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning rejected with scorn and indignation" (pp. 442-443).

We recognize this argument. Xenophanes in ancient times said that cows would make gods in their own image. Hume in a similar vein speaks of a world of spiders that would make a spider god. Speaking of the spider who weaves a web from its own substance, Philo adds: "Why an orderly system may be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, it will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason" (Sect. VII).

The Argument from Analogy Fails

All the objections of Philo, we note, are alike in nature and spring from the same source. Analogy cannot carry us into the unknown; that is the burden of them. Analogy is based upon experience. Experience cannot predict the future nor look into the unknown above us. But granted it could, then that which is above us or in the future must in every respect resemble

us. We cannot positively prove the existence of God, but if we could, he would have to resemble us in being finite and evil as well as good. Plato would say that there are somehow ideas of "mud and hair and filth" in the ideal world.

We are anxious to know what Cleanthes has to say for himself after this attack of Philo. Will he accept the offer of Demea to fall back on the a priori proof for God's existence? Demea feels that Philo's strictures have been to the point only if one should seek to establish the existence of God by a posteriori proof. But he is equally confident that one can demonstrate God's existence by the a priori method.

> "But if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori, said Demea; had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument a priori, which, by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all doubt and difficulty? By this argument, too, we may prove the infinity of the divine attributes, which, I am afraid, can never be ascertained with certainty from any other topic" (pp. 430,431).

Demea, we note, agrees that the a posteriori argument can do nothing but prove at best a finite deity. Will Cleanthes accept his offer to fall back on the a priori proof? Not for all the world. In reply to the a priori proof offered by Demea he says: "I shall begin by observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no Being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no Being whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.

> "It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent Being; and this necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, that, if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident, that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent.
>
> "But farther; why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the material world is not the necessarily existent Being; and this argument is

derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the world. 'Any particle of matter,' it is said, 'may be conceived to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible.' But it seems a great partiality not to perceive that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable; And no reason can be assigned why these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with it" (N.K. Smith, pp. 232-234).

When Cleanthes has thus delivered himself of his ultimatum against all a priori reasoning for the existence of God, Philo cannot refrain from adding many similar words. He too argues that the idea of necessary existence would have to rest upon something in such an existence that is entirely unknown to us. But if that is the case, who knows but that the material universe may harbor such unknown powers as to be necessarily existent? Philo asks us to look at the fact of the numerical relationship. A superficial glance might make us think that this relationship rests upon nothing but chance. A skillful algebraist will, however, conclude that this relationship rests on necessity. Thereupon he asks:

"Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible, they could ever admit of any other disposition? So dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present question! And so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite to the religious hypothesis!" (Part IX, p. 434).

Thus, there appears upon the horizon a very strange phenomenon. Demea, the devotee of the a priori, agrees with Philo the sceptic that a posteriori reasoning leads to pure irrationality or diversity. On the other hand, Cleanthes, the devotee of the a posteriori, agrees with Philo the sceptic that a priori reasoning leads into blank identity. In this manner do the shades of Heraclitus and of Parmenides control us from their urns. It only remains for us to say that all three of the participants in the debate were right in what they affirmed by way of objection to their opponents. But this will occupy us in the sequel. We limit ourselves just now to pointing out that Cleanthes, whose argument resembles that of Butler in its main outline, virtually admits that he cannot prove the existence of God. He not only admits that there is uncertainty in the proof, for uncertainty he was gladly willing to admit because it was involved in the very nature of his argument, but what is more, he virtually admits that the only God he can prove to exist would be a finite God, a God whose being is essentially penetrable by the mind of man. In reply to the contention of Demea that God can be proved to

exist by an a priori argument, Cleanthes affirms that such a God would be a pure blank. Thereupon, he adds:

> "For though it be allowed, that the Deity possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension; yet ought we never to ascribe to him any attributes, which are absolutely incompatible with that intelligent nature, essential to him. A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly simple, and totally immutable; is a mind, which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or in a word, is no mind at all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without composition" (Sect. IV, p. 407).

Then, at the conclusion of the whole discussion, when Philo has urged his alternative with respect to evil, namely, that either we must hold to an infinite God and hold him responsible for evil, or else we must drop to a lower level and be content with a finite God, Cleanthes once more refuses the services of Demea and says:

> "Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all human analogy, as seems your intention, Demea, I am afraid we abandon all religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. If we preserve human analogy we must forever find it impossible to reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; much less can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind; a satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and every untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then be chosen, in order to reach a desirable end: And in a word, benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world asthe present" (Sect. XI, p. 444).

The upshot of the whole dialogue is, therefore, that the representative of Butler's type of thought virtually admits defeat. He will not give up his mode of appeal to fact. Yet he realizes that with this mode of appeal to fact he cannot prove anything more than a finite god. In fact, though he does not admit it, he really cannot prove anything. On the basis of brute fact no predication is possible.

Chapter III

REHABILITATION

Butler's Analogy continued to have great influence after his death. It is no great marvel that this should have been the case. Butler expressed the temper of the age. The endency in theology was in the direction of Arminianism. Wesley and Butler differed in their characters, but in their theology there was a large measure of agreement. Says Mossner: "Yet theologically the two leaders were not disparate, both being Arminian in principle" (op.cit. p. 167). If there is to be any philosophical apologetics for Arminianism, it must be of the sort that Butler furnishes. Arminianism will not allow that "whatsoever comes to pass" comes to pass in accord with the counsel of God. Philosophically expressed, this means that Arminianism begins with "brute facts" and with the human mind as the final interpreter of those facts. The universal of God is excluded from the outset. This being the case, Arminianism can turn only to some form of non-theistic reasoning. Of these forms of non-theistic reasoning, it is the a posteriori reasoning that fits in with the genus of Arminianism rather than the a priori form of reasoning. When Arminianism flourishes in the field of theology we may be certain that Butler's method will flourish in apologetics and evidences.

Butler's method has two points that seem to commend it to us. If we use it we have common ground with our opponents on the question of "fact." We do not have to raise the knotty problem of the philosophy of fact. Non-believers and believers alike are ready to appeal to facts in order to settle their differences. In the second place, believers and non-believers can in Butler's method use the same method of procedure in going to the facts. The knotty question of scientific methodology does not have to be raised.

To this a third point must be added. In addition to similarity on the question of starting-point and method, there is not too great a difference in the conclusions to which the believers and non-believers come. Arminianism does not ask unbelievers to accept the doctrine of a sovereign or absolute God. A finite God is really all that it asks men to accept. And with a finite God goes a conception of man as having original powers next to God, and a conception of the sinner as able to judge of good and evil without the necessity of regeneration.

It is no wonder, then, that Butler's Analogy continues to be popular. The really amazing thing is that it was popular in some Reformed circles as well as in Arminian circles. But of this we shall speak later.

It is impossible and unnecessary to trace the influence of Butler in detail. Those interested in the details of the matter can find fuller discussion in Mossner's book. We only observe that, though there was some recognition on the part of Butler's followers that his argument needed to be

corrected in some respects, the main concepts of the Analogy were not altered by them. William Paley's "Natural Theology" presents an argument for theism similar to that of Butler for Christianity. Paley's argument, like Butler's, contains a negative and a positive aspect. In the negative aspect of his argument Paley reasons against the rationalists and in the positive aspect of his argument, he reasons against the sceptics. The attributes men ascribe to God, Paley argues, are negative ideas. "'Eternity' is a negative idea, clothed with a positive name. . . Self-existence is another negative idea, namely, the negation of a preceding cause, as of a progenitor, a maker, an author, a creator" (American Tract Society Edition, p. 289). This negative argument would lead Paley straight into scepticism. It implies that man knows nothing at all of a transcendent God. It is the idea of pure equivocation in reasoning. To prevent this sceptical conclusion Paley argues that we can assert something about the attributes of God if only we "do not affect more precision in our ideas than the subject allows of" and confine our explanation to "what concerns ourselves" (op. cit. p. 289). Here a bit of univocal reasoning is supposed to cure the pure equivocation to which his negative argument led him. Pure equivocation which leads straight to scepticism and pure univocation which leads straight to the identification of man with God are combined to form what is called analogical reasoning. Both Paley's and Butler's methods are similar to that of Thomas Aquinas. And what is true of Paley is generally true of other, though less known, writers on evidences and natural theology.

Fideism

All this does not mean that there were no believers in Christianity who observed the sceptical tendency of Butler's and Paley's arguments. On the contrary, there were many of these. We may perhaps place them into two categories. There were, in the first place, those who deemed Hume's criticism of Butler's argument as conclusive not only against Butler, but as conclusive against any intellectual argument for Christianity. Thinking that Butler's type of argument is the only type of argument conceivable, they gave up all hope when they saw their hero defeated by Hume. They saw no way of harmonizing the facts of the Christian religion with the "constitution and course of nature." They gave up the idea of a philosophical apologetics entirely. This fideistic attitude comes to expression frequently in the statement of the experiential proof of the truth of Christianity. People will say that they know that they are saved and that Christianity is true no matter what the philosophical or scientific evidence for or against it may be. And this is done not only by those who have had no opportunity to investigate the evidence for Christianity, but also by those who have.

But, in thus seeking to withdraw from all intellectual argument, such fideists have virtually admitted the validity of the argument against Christianity. They will have to believe in their hearts what they have virtually allowed to be intellectually indefensible.

A second and less consistent class of fideists, though denying the validity of any philosophical argument for Christianity, turns to arguments

taken from archaeology, biological science, etc., hoping in this way to show that the spade corroborates the Bible. This class of fideists approaches very closely to those who profess to follow the method of Butler. They seek a scientific or factual defense for Christianity. In fact, we may say that there is only a difference of degree between the three groups spoken of: (a) the direct followers of Butler, (b) the more consistent fideists, and (c) the less consistent fideists. There is in all of them an emphasis upon the appeal to "brute facts," whether those facts be external or internal. They differ only in respect to the relative faith they have in their ability to unite the "facts" in which they believe into a rational whole that shall be able to withstand attack on the part of modern science and philosophy. The followers of Butler think that there is a defense of the Christian experience before the bar of philosophy as well as before the bar of science. The consistent fideists hold that no defense of any sort is possible. The inconsistent fideists contend that Christianity may be scientifically, but cannot be philosophically, defended.

Reconstruction

In distinction from the three classes enumerated there are those who see that Hume's criticism has destroyed the validity of Butler's argument, but who think that Hume might be answered and a better argument for Christianity constructed. The reconstruction attempted has usually been built with the help of the thought patterns of Kant. When we say this, we do not think of that large host of modern theologians who have sought to combine Christianity and modern thought by reducing Christianity to something hazy and subjective. We are thinking only of the orthodox theologians who really wish to preserve the central concepts of historic Christianity. Of these there are two classes who have depended on Kant.

There are first, those who have sought help from Kant by dividing, as he did, the field between science and religion. Kant claims to have made room for faith by giving to it the whole of the noumenal realm, reserving for science only the phenomenal realm. It appears, however, that such a division is based upon the idea of an appeal to brute fact. We are free in the noumenal realm, though determined in the phenomenal realm. According to science, there is no rational cosmology, but we feel and are morally certain that the world was created by God. According to science, there is no argument for the existence of God, but we feel that there is a God. That is, we feel the truth of the existence of freedom, immortality, and God because these are regulative concepts. They are not altogether irrational, but seem in some way to be implied in our rational understanding of the universe. There is once again a vague probability which ought to make us act as if. The presumption seems to be in favor of the existence of God. This position resembles that of Butler. The only difference is that this position has granted the validity of Hume's and Kant's criticism on the positive analogy argument of Butler. We can at best come to the idea of a finite God only, by the process of analogy, say Hume and Kant, and strictly speaking we must end with a neutral attitude on the question of God's existence. On Kant's basis we

may believe in Christianity as "practically true" even though intellectually it cannot even be shown to be probably true.

Kant's phenomenalism is but the typically modern expression of the philosophy of the would-be autonomous man. This man virtually makes man the measure of reality. He boldly claims that only that is significantly real which he can categorize.

Kant's phenomenalism is but the natural out-growth of ancient philosophy. Once man assumes the virtual identity of his intellect with that of God he is driven to maintain with even greater clarity that all rationality is purely formal and that, correspondingly, all differentiation is purely non-rational. Aristotle had virtually maintained this, and Thomas Aquinas had followed him. It remained for Kant and his followers to assert the exhaustive correlativity of pure logic and pure fact, thus banishing the God of Christianity from any intellectually ascertainable contact with the universe.

The Idealistic Reconstruction

There are others, however, who use Kant in order to refute Hume, and then seek to refute Kant with the help of Kant. These men think, and we believe think correctly, that every appeal made to bare fact is unintelligible. Every fact must stand in relation to other facts or it means nothing to anyone. We may argue at length whether there is a noise in the woods when a tree falls even if no one is there to hear it, but there can be no reasonable argument about the fact that even if there be such a noise, it means nothing to any one. There is, therefore, a necessary connection between the facts and the observer or interpreter of facts.

It was in this way that Kant met the criticism of the causality concept by Hume. And it is by the use of Kant's arguments that Professor James Orr, e.g., seeks to reply to the criticism of Hume in general. His book David Hume tells us how he hopes to accomplish his purpose. Afterhaving spoken of minor criticisms that Kant makes of Hume, Orr goes on to say:

> "But Kant goes deeper. It is essential to Hume's theory of the derivation of the causal judgment, that, prior to the possession of the idea of causality, we should observe successions of phenomena in a fixed order. It is from observation of their regular conjunctions that the idea is supposed to be obtained. It is here that Kant strikes in with his penetrating criticism. In assuming the existence of an objective world, and of orderly succession in that world, you have, he argues, already implicitly supposed the operation of that causal principle which you imagine yourself to obtain from your experience of it. For what is meant by speaking of objects, and of a succession of objects, in the natural world? To speak of a thing as object at all, is, as shown in the last chapter, to give that thing a place in an order or system which has subsistence, coherence, and connection of parts, irrespective of the course of our ideas of it. It implies an order in which the parts are definitely related to each other, in which each has its place fixed by relation to the other parts. But such an

order already involves – is constituted for our thought and experience through – this very principle of causation which we are proposing to derive from it."

In reflecting on this passage, we may distinguish two points. There is first, the method of the argument, and there is second, the conclusion drawn from it. With Orr we hold that the method of the argument is in its form essentially sound. By that we mean that it is impossible to reason on the basis of brute facts. Every one who reasons about facts comes to those facts with a schematism into which he fits the facts. The real question is, therefore, into whose schematism the facts will fit. As between Christianity and its opponents the question is whether our claim that Christianity is the only schematism into which the facts will fit, is true or not. Christianity claims that unless we presuppose the existence of God, in whom, as the self-sufficient One, schematism and fact, fact and reason apart from and prior to the existence of the world, are coterminous, we face the utterly unintelligible "brute fact." We do not intend to develop this point here. We mention it merely to indicate that we can be in a large measure of agreement with Orr when he uses this aspect of Kantian methodology in order to meet the brute facts of Hume and Butler.

The second question we must ask, however, is whether the particular schematism of Kant itself avoided landing us once more into the realm of chance or brute fact. And here, too, we are happy to be in agreement with Orr when he seeks to go beyond Kant. It is apparent that the whole realm of the noumenal as Kant conceives it is a realm of brute facts. And since that noumenal realm surrounds the phenomenal realm and has a possible influence on it, the result is that the phenomenal realm is really also a realm of chance and brute fact. Kant's phenomenal realm is but an island, and that a floating island on a bottomless and shoreless sea. After all, the human mind can furnish at most a finite schematism or a priori. We do not admit that the human mind can furnish any a priori at all unless it is related to God. But suppose for a moment that it could, such a schematism could never be comprehensive. Even Kant himself, besides setting his noumenal realm over against the phenomenal, admits that those facts for which the human mind furnishes the a priori are at the outset brute facts. Without the percepts, the concepts of the mind are blind, says Kant. This, he should have argued, points to the need of God, in whom there is no correlative relation between percepts and concepts, because His concept includes all possible percepts of His creatures.

Orr has sensed something of this. This appears in the book of which we are speaking and in the one on The Christian View of God and the World. He has made use of the later Hegelian or idealist argument in order to overcome the limitation of the position of Kant. In the book on Hume he quotes frequently with approval from the famous idealist criticism made on Hume by Thomas Hill Green. Green has criticised Hume from the Hegelian point of view. Going beyond Kant he says it is not enough to bring the schematism of the human mind to bear upon the brute facts of Hume and empiricism. We need in back of the human mind an absolute mind. Without such an absolute

mind the human mind and the facts it seems to coordinate would still be nothing but brute facts. In line with this sort of argument Orr says:

> "When all is said, it must be granted that an ultimate inexplicability attaches to this act in which, under sense conditions, a world which is not ourselves enters as a real factor into our knowledge. How is this possible? Only, it may be replied, on the hypothesis that the distinction between ourselves who know and the world we know is not after all final – that there is a deeper ground and ultimate unity, that the universe, including ourselves, is a single system the parts of which stand in reciprocal relation through the spiritual principle on which in the last resort the whole depends. Here, however, we enter a transcendental region which leaves Hume far behind, and into which, in this connection, we need not travel further" (op. cit. p. 164).

It will be necessary for us, however to travel much further along the road on which Orr has taken us. Orr represents a tendency in orthodox apologetics to utilize the idealist argument for the defense of Christianity. We shall have to see whether it is legitimate to do this.

We may agree at the outset that idealism is right as over against empiricism in claiming that bare facts are in themselves unintelligible. We may also rejoice in the fact that Hegelian idealism has outgrown the eighteenth century rationalism in that it has recognized the fact that an a priori that stands in no relation to the facts is unintelligible. All this Kant taught idealism. He sought "die Bedingungen die die Eufahrung moglich machen," i.e., "The presuppositions that make learning by experience possible" (See Experience and Reflection, by Edgar A. Singer, Chapter II, p. 15, mimeographed). He held that we could not recognize or individuate objects without an a priori equipment furnished by the mind. That was the death-blow to empiricism. On the other hand, he recognized as over against Leibniz that individuation is not by minute description, but by space-time coordinates. On this point Kant agreed with Hume. Brute fact occupies as fundamental a place in the philosophy of Kant as in that of Hume. And Kant's philosophy is, in consequence, fully as sceptical as that of Hume. Retaining the idea of brute fact, or pure chance differentiation, he was driven to reduce the idea of absolute rationality to that of a merely contingent rationality for us. He "saved" universality by subjectivising it. He "saved" causality within the world by denying God as the causal creator of the world. That is to say, from the Christian point of view he destroyed rather than saved universality.

But we must briefly note the idealistic development that went beyond Kant. Hegelian idealism is usually called objective idealism inasmuch as it is by inclusion rather than by exclusion of the "facts" that it seeks to interpret experience. It looks for a "concrete" rather than an "abstract" universal. It wishes to bring the phenomenal and the noumenal world of Kant into one world explained by one principle of interpretation. That is the principle of dialecticism.

Kant's view, valuable as it was, would, if tested by its own standard, defeat itself. We quote the admirable statement of Singer on this point:

"But no sense of the cogency of the reasons driving Kant to the doctrine of a priori science should blind one to the difficulties facing this philosophy. . . The following objections are as obvious as they are serious: The sciences to which a priori knowledge is confined are (1) such science as enables us to order our experience in space-time coordinate – the science of geometry, and (2) such as furnish us with the concepts by means of which we recognize an object as an object – the science of logic. Since we bring these abilities to experience, we must in some sense bring to experience the sciences not to possess which is to lack such abilities. But we all know – and Kant was willing to concede, even to insist on the point – we all know that these sciences are the possession of none but the mature, which is to say, the highly experienced mind. We might even go farther and maintain that no human mind has yet won a complete insight into the ways of either geometry or logic. The technical journals are filled with patient efforts to put science in more masterful possession of these disciplines: one would not be risking much in predicting that if this cooling planet ever comes to its last day, and if in that day there still appear technical journals, their tables of contents will continue to include such titles as 'On the axioms of Geometry,' 'On the Postulates of Logic.' How then and in what sense can that science which is beyond the grasp of a Euclid or of an Aristotle be the possession of a new-born babe? Or to render the matter still more preposterous, does it not seem that a Euclid or an Aristotle must have spent his life in a none too successful struggle to possess himself of a science the possession of which was the condition of his beginning the struggle?" (Chap. IV, p. 5).

The point of difficulty to which Singer calls attention is our old friend hard or brute fact. Kant was not willing to go with the rationalists in identifying the particular facts with the infima species, i.e., in individuating by minute description. His principle of individuation was non-rational The space-time coordinates by which facts are brought into contact with the rational principles of the mind are themselves non-rational; they are intuitions. Thus, the rational principle of the mind, i.e., the a priori, is still set abstractly over against the non-rational facts. The result is that the hard facts are still with us. The Ding an sich selbst escapes us. Hume has not really been answered; his criticism on Butler still stands.

In order to overcome the weakness of Kant's position the idealist school boldly advanced the idea that the real is the rational and the rational is the real. Hegel and his successors felt that Kant's thought had to be supplemented by an appeal to an absolute mind. The rationalists were basically right in asserting that unless reason can comprehend all facts it does not really understand one fact. For one fact to be known truly, it must be known in all of its relations to all other facts. But since man cannot have such comprehensive knowledge, we must introduce the notion of the Absolute or God. Only an a priori principle that is wide enough to sweep the whole universe would vanquish the spectre of brute fact.

On the other hand, the idealists also felt that Kant was right as over against the rationalists in holding that the a priori must not stand abstractly over against brute facts. In that case, too, brute facts would still be independent of the rational principle. Idealism was not willing to give up the space-time coordinates as the principle of individuation. Idealism sought to bring Kant's intuitions of sense into closer contact with the categories of undestanding than Kant himself had done.

Idealism sought to bridge the gap between Plato's world of sense and of Ideas, and between Kant's phenomena and noumena. For Plato the world of sense had somehow participated in or imitated the world of Ideas. Plato sought but could not find a rational connection between the two worlds. Aristotle wanted to correlativize form and matter in order to bring them together. Kant went much further in the same direction. Even so, pure form or rationality still stood abstractly over against pure matter. What Plato, Aristotle and Kant looked for but could not find, Hegel found. Or so he thought.

He found the rational connection between fact and principle, the one and the many, the Ideal and the Real, with the help of the concept of the dialectic. The meaning of this concept will become apparent to an extent if we contrast it with Plato's concept of absolute affirmation. For Plato the ideal world, the world of Reality, was the fully known world. That ideal world was fully known without any reference to the sense world. The ideal world would affirm itself without setting over against itself the world of non-being as a correlative. Affirmation was there, independent of negation. In that world there was individuation by pure description, if there was individuation at all.

At opposite ends of this ideal world was the world of pure non-being, and pure ignorance. And the sense world lay somewhere between these two. In his earlier dialogues Plato tended simply to identify reality with the world of ideas. At a later stage Plato sought a solution to his problem by toning down something of the independence of the ideal world. It was no longer to stand over against the world of non-being in a self-sufficient spirit. The world of non-being was to contribute the element of diversity, and the ideal world was to contribute the element of identity in the knowledge situation (see The Sophist.) The ideal world was to admit that its pure affirmation was in itself as meaningless as the pure negation of the world of non-being. They simply were unintelligible without each other. The idea of a husband disappears without the idea of a wife, and the idea of a wife disappears without the idea of a husband. So the ideal world and the world of non-being were to recognize the need of each other.

But we have really put too much of Hegel into Plato. We can really say no more than that Plato felt that it was somehow in this direction that the solution was to be found. Hegel now made this idea of the correlativity of the principle of identity and diversity the foundation of his system. The ideas of pure being and pure non-being, he said, were interchangeable because empty. It is only if brought into contact with one another that they have meaning. And this contact must be established by the principle of dialectic. Both pure being and pure non-being, or pure affirmation and pure negation

are to give up their isolation and seek to interpenetrate one another. By interpenetration only can they live. Sein and Nicht-Sein found their common reality and meaning in Werden (Hegel's Logic).

In this way Hegel sought to establish a rational connection between fact and principle. By rational connection he did not mean the same thing that the Rationalists meant. He did not hold to his a priori at the expense of the facts, but he held to his a priori with the help of the facts. Without the diversity offered by the factual, there would be no meaning in the rational.

Bradley and Bosanquet

Since the matter is of utmost importance, it is well that a short survey of the idealist conception of judgment be introduced at this point. Hegel held that it was of the essence of human judgment or predication that there be an equal ultimacy of the principles of identity and diversity. F. H. Bradley and B. Bosanquet have worked this idea out in their great works on logic.

Both Bradley and Bosanquet have made much of the point that we need to have a comprehensive a priori if we are to have knowledge at all. The idea of a brute fact, they say, is unintelligible. We simply can do nothing with brute facts in and by themselves. We cannot even count them. If we are to count them we must think of a number scheme as a whole. Says Bradley: "The main point is this, that all counting presupposes and depends upon a qualitative whole, and that the collective judgment asserts a generic connection within the group. Hence no mere particulars can be counted" (Principles of Logic, Vol. I, Bk. II, note on page 369). Similarly Bosanquet tells us: "The hope of complete enumeration is the justification of counting, (Logic, Vol. I, p. 176). Or again, when speaking of demonstrative judgments, he says: "Except in view of a finite goal number does not help us, does not tell us anything, grounds no ratio of parts to whole (op. cit., p. 176).

The point with respect to this matter of counting is that unless there were a numerical system as a whole we could not tell one number from another. If we are to add information to our store of knowledge, we need the system of knowledge in order to relate a new fact to the system of facts already known. We cannot think of an infinite series without thinking of a system. "The idea of numerical infinity arises from neglecting the continuous nature of the unity, and therefore omitting the element which alone arrests computation at one number rather than another" (op. cit., p. 137).

In this way Bosanquet seeks to meet the challenge of empiricism. The charge against all forms of rationalism by the empiricists has always been that on a rationalistic basis one can know only abstractions; one cannot know the particular in its unique character. To this Bosanquet makes reply by saying that "the more marked an individuality is, the more it depends on internal proportion" (op. cit., p. 262). Naturally, if individuality is dependent upon internal proportions, then individuality cannot be observed

except in relation to other facts, and that to all other facts. True, as human beings we cannot in any instance observe all the relations of one fact to all other facts, but it is enough if we know that they are so related. Then we can at least see something of the nature of individuality; without that knowledge we could see nothing of it. So runs the argument.

The question we must ask at this point is whether Hume hasnow been answered. Has the idealist insistence that we must presuppose an absolute system if we are to have knowledge of any fact, met the challenge of Hume? It would at first glance seem that it has. Kant had shown that for universals, such as cause and effect, to have any significance, we must presuppose them, and Hegelian idealism has shown that this presupposition must be all-inclusive. And it would seem that thus we are at the same time very close to the Christian position. Have we not presupposed the idea of God and shown that without this presupposition we could not know so much as a single fact?

It would seem, too, that in this way we have outgrown the weaknesses of Butler's Analogy. The basic weakness of the Analogy was its appeal to bare fact. The positive argument for the probable truth of Christianity, no less than the negative argument from ignorance was based upon the appeal to brute fact. But now brute fact seems to have been vanquished. Accordingly, we can now show that the positive probability presupposes the actual existence of that which is supposed to be proved. Without the existence of God as a system there would be no probable relation between any set of facts, none even between two facts. But with the presupposition of God's existence you have more than probability, you have absolute necessity. The indispensable character of the presupposition of God's existence is the best possible proof of God's actual existence. If God does not exist, we know nothing. For Descartes' formula "I think, therefore I am," we now substitute, "God thinks, therefore I am." The actuality of God's existence is the presupposition of the intelligibility of the concepts of possibility and probability.

Idealism Bows to Brute Fact

But now we come to the other side of the story. Above we noted that Plato attributed to the sense world an original, non-created existence. When he sought to bring the ideal world and the world of non-being into one whole he took for granted that each was to make an original contribution to the union. Each was to recognize its insufficiency without the other. In a similar fashion the Hegelian logicians hold that the principle of diversity is the original contribution of pure time as the principle of identity is the original contribution of the world of pure reason. The history of idealistic logic shows that the originality and ultimacy of the contribution made by the world of diversity has been increasingly stressed as time went on. We cannot trace this history in detail; a few observations must suffice.

In his book Hegelianism and Personality, A.S. Pringle Pattison contended that Bradley and Bosanquet had been unfair to the world of diversity. He

was afraid that in their philosophy God had swallowed up man. He contended for the imperviousness of the human individual. In a similar way James Ward contended that the ideal world should not presume to supply to us both principles, diversity as well as identity. In that case the world of sense would be reduced to a slave of the ideal world. "In whatever sense you say absolute, you cannot say many" (Realm of Ends, p. 37). For that reason he urges that we cannot begin with God in our reasoning. "We cannot begin with God and construct the universe" (Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. II, p. 120). He insists on complete correlativity between God and the world. "If we attempt to conceive of God apart from the world there is nothing to lead us on to the idea of creation" (Realm of Ends, p. 309).

Yet it is not from strict correlativity that idealists wish to start. It is, says Ward, "from the reality of the world that we start" (Realm of Ends, p. 245). If we conclude to the existence of God, such a God must live in accordance with the conditions of the universe. "As immanent in this world, God must, it would seem, so far be conceived as subject to its fundamental conditions" (op. cit., p. 194). He says that much of the talk about the transcendence of God is based upon a violation of the categories of experience. "If the categories of substance and cause are only valid within experience, they cannot be applied to experience as a whole. Whatever implications experience may involve, it surely cannot involve that of transcending itself. Such misled transcendence, if it have any validity, must really be immanence at bottom" (Naturalism and Agnosticism, p. 129).

This criticism of the absolute idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet made by Pringle Pattison and Ward is typical of that made by others. The contention of these critics is that according to the logic of idealism itself, we are not entitled to a really transcendent God. When Bosanquet spoke much of God as the "Beyond," he was entitled by his own logic to mean no more than the "higher aspect" of the universe. In fact, man must begin with his own experience and count that as the ultimate starting-point of his philosophy.

But this places idealism before a dilemma. The very purpose of introducing the concept of God was that in terms of God our experience might be explained. It was found that Kant's a priori which was the a priori contributed by the mind of mankind, was not comprehensive of all facts. For that reason idealists had turned to a divine mind which should be comprehensive of all facts. But if the universe is a non-created, ultimate reality, the plurality and the evil that characterize it are ultimate too. This means that there will be once more ideas of "mud and hair and filth" in the ideal world. The ideal world cannot be offered as the explanation of the sense world, since it is from the outset, by definition, conceived of as no more than a correlative of the sense world.

G. Watts Cunningham, in his book The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, sets this dilemma before us in the course of his argument. The gist of his argument against idealism is, in effect, that it has not lived up to its own view of experience. To quote:

"The whole matter may perhaps be put briefly. If the Absolute is to grow logically out of what is 'within our own experience,' then it must be conceived so as to leave room for finite centers of experience standing in their integrity. If it is not so conceived it is, so far, arbitrarily conceived, and must remain for us unintelligible, not alone in the sense that it leaves much unexplained in detail, as any general view must, but in the further and objectionable sense that one (apparently basal) character of experience is left standing outside as a negative instance. On this point, then, the case of the personalist against the absolutist is essentially sound" (New York, 1933, p. 536).

The Absolute was "to grow logically out of what is within our own experience." This was very definitely, says Cunningham, the claim of Bradley and Bosanquet themselves. If the Absolute is to stand, "it must serve as a principle of explanation of experience – that is, it must grow out of experience as a necessary implication of it. So much the absolutist admits, at least verbally. But his procedure seems to belie his profession; for he is apparently willing to truncate experience in order to fit it in with the conception of the Absolute. Herein lies the basis of justification for the accusation frequently advanced against him to the effect that he does not, as he professes, derive the conception of the Absolute from an analysis and interpretation of experience, but rather, forcibly bends experience at those points where it does not readily accommodate itself to the nuances of the conception of the Absolute as more or less arbitrarily defined" (op. cit., p. 534).

Now we can readily understand, says Cunningham, how it was that the Absolutists fell into the temptation of believing in an Absolute into whom we as human beings are "somehow" to be transmuted. This Absolute must "somehow" explain what we cannot explain. Any "general view" of reality must allow for the "negative instance." There is a novelty to life that refuses to be fitted into our logical schematism. This fact we must all admit. But this fact presents us with a clear-cut alternative. We can be consistent with our own basic starting-point, or we can be inconsistent. If we are consistent the God or Absolute in whom we believe must be a "necessary implication" of our experience. He must be intelligible to us as we must be intelligible to Him. There must be a clear-cut logical or rational relation between Him and us. On the other hand, if we are inconsistent, we define our Absolute independently of our experience. In that case, He will have a non-rational relation to us; He will be "somehow" related to us and we "somehow" related to Him. God is not then intelligible to us and we are not intelligible to Him.

The whole point may be stated differently by saying that we must either make God surround that which is irrational to us, or we must make that which is irrational to us surround God as well as ourselves. God either includes the "negative instance" or the "negative instance" includes God. God either controls the devil, or the devil, in some measure at least, controls God. Reality is either such that there is novelty for us, but no novelty for God, or such that there is novelty for God as well as for us.

Now, the Absolute idealists, says Cunningham, have chosen the inconsistent position. If they had been consistent with their own theory of judgment they should have thought of an Absolute who is intelligible to us. And an Absolute who is not intelligible to us must, since he is by definition absolute and we are by definition something less than absolute, "sublate" or "transmute" us. Such an Absolute explains us by explaining us away.

That the criticism thus offered against absolutism is to the point, may be seen from the fact that the absolutist is himself quite willing to have his Absolute tested by the ordinary tests of logical procedure. The Absolute is offered very definitely as a help to the logical understanding of experience. This point needs to be emphasized "since some of the critics of absolutism have at sometimes written as if they supposed the absolutist to assume that his conception of the Absolute was somehow logically privileged and not subject to the ordinary rules of logical procedure. It is clear that the absolutist assumes nothing of the sort, at least it should be clear to anyone who has taken the trouble to become acquainted with his argument. He is perfectly willing to subject the conception to the ordinary tests of intelligibility; and, in the main, he is in agreement with the preceding statement of what those tests concretely are. What he contends is that his conception is required by an adequate analysis of experience, and he is willing to have his conception tried by any such analysis" (op. cit. p. 523). But now the difficulty is that Bradley and Bosanquet will either have to give up their thinking of the Absolute as not intelligible to us.

As for Bosanquet, we may say that in his best moments he forgot his acosmic longings. Frequently he defines the Absolute as the "Whole." Paraphrasing his thought we may say that the Absolute "is all that is." Accordingly, "a basal characteristic of the Absolute is 'negativity'" (op. cit., p. 141). When first we look at experience, contradiction seems to characterize it. But this contradiction is emended until it becomes frictionless in the form of negativity. Quoting from Bosanquet, we observe that friction "is that same characteristic which has been described as the fact that experience is always beyond itself – the character, indeed, which we have described from the beginning as that of which the universal, or, in other words, the tendency of every datum to transcend itself as a fragment and complete itself in the whole" (op. cit., p. 417, quoted from Bosanquet The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 228). This contradiction turns into negativity and negativity "is really affirmation – affirmation of differences, with contradiction removed. ." "When we say, then, that negativity is a characteristic of the Absolute, what is to be understood is that, in the Absolute, contradiction has entirely disappeared, while the spirit of difference survives in its highest form. The Absolute negates conflict and confusion, it affirms system and significant opposition; and to put the matter paradoxically, its negation and its affirmation are one and the same" (op. cit., p. 142).

All this indicates that we as human beings are, according to Bosanquet, not to be entirely "transmuted" beyond recognition after all. The contradiction of our finitude will at least abide as a permanent "difference"

within the Absolute. This much we know, since it follows from our theory of judgment. To this extent the Absolute is not unintelligible to us; we have trimmed him down to some extent to the needs of our intelligibility. And to this extent we are also pushing the remnants of the irrational beyond God as well as beyond ourselves.

There is encouragement for us in all of this, to think that we as human beings make a real contribution to the life of the Absolute. We have spoken of the Absolute as "Beyond." But by this thinking of the Absolute as beyond we have never meant what the Christian theology means when it thinks of God as self-sufficient. On the contrary, "The perfection of the Absolute, however, must not be conceived as excluding the process through which these finite systems are completed. For its own self-completion the Absolute presupposes the temporal order, the hazards and hardships of finite self-hood; apart from this order and the content it furnishes, the Absolute would be nothing at all. Its very perfection is dependent upon the temporal instruments through which that perfection is achieved; its negativity belongs as much to them as to itself" (op. cit., p. 143). Thus Bosanquet speaks of the Absolute as "simply the high-watermark of fluctuations in experience, of which, in general, we are daily and normally aware" (op. cit., p. 140).

It appears that the Absolute of Bosanquet is, when his argument is most consistent with itself, first demoted from a "Beyond" to the "Whole," and then from the "Whole" to the "Universal" within human experience. Reality for Bosanquet seems to be like a string of beads. God is the string, the universal, while temporal plurality furnishes the beads. Without either you do not have a string of beads.

In his book The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy Bosanquet divides philosophies into two classes. On the one hand, there is the class of the "progressists." They demand that there shall be "absolute and ultimate progression in the real." On the other hand there is the class which we may call the "perfectionists." For them the temporal series is "only an adumbration" of a "deeper totalitywhich in its perfection knows no change" (op. cit., p. 417). The former wish to put "the Absolute in time," while the latter wish to put "time in the Absolute." Now the question is, whether these "extremes" are really as far apart as Bosanquet would have them appear.

Cunningham thinks they are not. If the Absolute must really depend for its content on the time-series, as Bosanquet says that it must, it follows that wholly new content may appear for the Absolute. Thus the "negative instance" is really beyond God, as well as beyond man. Reality answers to the demand of our logical theory that the analytic and the synthetic aspects of judgment must be equally basic (Bosanquet, Phil. Rev. V, 32, 1923, p. 596). We are consistent with our basic theory of judgment and give up the notion that God is not Himself surrounded by the irrational.

As a compromise between the alternative "time in the Absolute" or "the Absolute in time," Cunningham suggests a third possibility, namely, "the Absolute through time," and adds: "If the conciliatory position here suggested is accepted, of course the non-temporal character of the Absolute is forthwith surrendered, and a qualification of its character of all-inclusiveness is called for" (Cunningham, op. cit., p. 422). This, Cunningham holds, would really be in accord with the idealistic theory of judgment and with the scientific method. On the one hand, we must posit a unity in experience or we could ask no question about it. On the other hand, there must be the wholly new, or our questions would be answered in advance of the asking. Bradley was right in speaking of this twofold nature of reality as being ultimately mysterious. "This twofold nature of reality by which it slides away from itself in our distinction, so as there to become a predicate while all the time it retains in itself, as an ultimate subject, every duality we loosen from and relate to it, is, if you please, inexplicable" (F.H. Bradley, Logic, Vol. II, p. 620). But Bradley and Bosanquet did not always bring out clearly that God and man together form reality, which reality has a novelty as well as a permanent aspect. They sometimes made it appear that the Absolute was wholly beyond time, and therefore beyond the difficulties that meet those who are in some sense subject to the limitations of time. But now we see clearly that God or the Absolute Himself is faced with novelty; He has now no advantages over us.

The upshot of this brief examination of the idealist position is, that it has not accomplished what it set out to do. Bare fact still stares us in the face. Hume has not been answered. Bare possibility and probability are still thought of as the most ultimate concepts of philosophy. The future must be to us the womb of chance out of which anything may come; rationality itself is nothing but a correlative to the irrational. And no Christian apologetic can be based upon the destruction of rationality itself.

James Orr's Apologetics

It is this last point, we most humbly believe, that Orr and others who have based their hopes for a Christian apologetic upon the idealist argument have not fully recognized. There is throughout Orr's book, The Christian View of God and the World, the usual appeal to brute fact. We shall not take the time to show this in detail. A few remarks may suffice.

In the second chapter of his book Orr reasons, e.g., from the course of history. He traces a downward movement away from Christ which finally leads into pessimism and an upward movement toward theism. He speaks of the "logic of history" asserting itself. But can there be any logic in history unless there be logic back of history? In other words, we cannot by the logic of history, as an entity conceived of as intelligible in itself to both Christians and non-Christians before they begin their argument, prove the existence of logic back of history. The logic of history conceived by itself, and as intelligible to the believer and non-believer alike, is nothing but a universal that is based upon brute facts. It, therefore, has no greater valid-

ity than the principle of analogy employed by Butler, which principle could not stand the criticism of Hume.

The third chapter of Orr's book is perhaps the most important for our present interest. The notes on the appendix to the chapter are in ormative. They show that Orr has given a valuable criticism of T.H. Green's argument for the existence of God. That is, he is not unaware of the dangerous tendency in idealism. He tells us that idealism tends either to make all things equal with God or to reduce God to a mere intellectual principle. This, in effect, is the criticism of idealism that we have made in our foregoing discussion. Then Orr goes on to agree with the criticism of absolute idealism made by Pringle Pattison as spoken of above. We should therefore expect that Orr would go on from there to a careful distinction between Christianity and idealism in their modes of reasoning. Orr is not unmindful of the shortcomings of many arguments for the existence of God. He says we should not forget that the saying of Jacobi that a God capable of proof would be no God at all. Such a God would have something higher than himself. His own existence would have to be proved. Thus we land in an infinite regression. Orr seems to see, therefore, that the common or popular use of the theistic proofs, which starts from an already known universe to God, is invalid. But he says Jacobi's statement does not apply to a higher mode of reasoning: "It does not apply to that higher kind of proof which may be said to consist in the mind being guided by the clear recognition of its own ultimate presuppositions. Proof in Theism certainly does not consist in deducing God's existence as a lower from a higher; but rather in showing that God's existence is itself the last postulate of reason - the ultimate basis on which all other knowledge, all other belief, rests" (p. 114).

But does Orr live up to this high standard? We believe that he does not. At various points he after all reasons from brute fact. This appears in this chapter as well as throughout the book most strikingly in his constant effort to find a basis of common agreement between those who confessedly reason on the basis of brute fact and those who hold to Christianity.

As an illustration of this seeking similarities between the Christian and the non-Christian view we may mention the fact that Orr thinks we as Christians can be in agreement with Herbert Spencer on the question of mystery. He identifies the church's doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God with Spencer's doctrine of the unknowable, in the respect that both admit mystery (p. 103). But how can this be allowed from a Christian point of view? For the Christian, God is back of all mystery; for Spencer mystery surrounds God as well as man. No greater contrast is conceivable. For Spencer the knowledge that we human beings have is based ultimately upon observation of brute facts. God is not brought into the picture as the presupposition of the possibility of man's knowledge of facts. On the other hand, Orr argues, and argues rightly, that the very possibility of human knowledge presupposes God. But neutralizes the force of this argument when he allows that a man who forgets all about such a presupposition has none the less the same knowledge about facts as a man who maintains it. He thus virtually allows that facts can after all be known truly without the presupposition of God.

Accordingly, Orr often speaks as though reason and the facts of nature as interpreted by reason present to us a known phenomenal realm independent of God. Before proceeding to a discussion of the theistic proofs Orr says: "The doctrine of God's existence must be shown to be in accord with reason, and to be in harmony with and corroborated by the facts of science and of the religious history of mankind" (p. 105).

Finally, at the conclusion of the chapter, Orr expresses a similar sentiment when he says: "It is not one line of evidence only which establishes the theistic position, but the concurrent force of many, starting from different and independent, standpoints. And the voice of reason is confirmed by the soul's direct experiences in religion. At the very least these considerations show--even if the force of demonstration is denied them--that the Christian view of God is not unreasonable; that it is in accordance with the highest suggestions of reason applied to the facts of existence; that there is no bar in national thought or in science to its full acceptance. And this is all that at present we need ask" (p. 133).

All this indicates that Orr is halting between two opinions. He has done good service in showing that brute fact is unintelligible, that we need to have God as the presupposition of our knowledge of the facts. On the other hand he seeks to prove the existence of God from the facts as brute facts without the existence of God. Orr has not distinguished clearly between idealistic thought and Christian thought on this matter. It is only if we take seriously the argument as Orr himself has suggested it, only if we take the "Author of Nature" or the presupposition of God seriously, that we can get away from brute facts. Then only can we talk about "facts" at all.

Chapter IV

CHRISTIANITY AND ITS FACTUAL DEFENSE

From the discussion in the preceding chapters we may conclude that if we seek to defend the Christian religion by an "appeal to the facts of experience" in accord with the current scientific method, we shall have to adulterate Christianity beyond recognition. The Christianity defended by Bishop Butler was not a full-fledged Christianity. It was a Christianity neatly trimmed down to the needs of a method that was based upon non-Christian assumptions. And what was true of Butler is largely true of English-American evidences and apologetics in general.

This situation places us before a dilemma. It seems that if we wish to be "scientific" in our methodology we cannot defend a full Christianity, while if we wish to defend a full-fledged Christianity we cannot be "scientific." If this dilemma be a true dilemma we cannot but make the choice for a full-fledged Christianity.

If at this point our opponents smile and intimate that Christianity is, therefore, according to our own notion of it, simply a matter of irrational choice, we need not worry too greatly. For if the dilemma mentioned above be a true dilemma, it follows that our opponents as well as ourselves have chosen a position. We have chosen to follow full-fledged Christianity at all costs, while they have chosen to follow the "scientific method" at all costs.

Yet there is even so a difference between the two choices that are made. The choice we have made, we claim, is based upon the fact that we have first been chosen of God, while the choice our opponents have made, they claim, is made entirely by themselves.

Still further we have become aware of the fact that we are chosen of God only after accepting the truth of Christianity from the Bible. Thus the Bible appears at the outset to us as the absolute authority by which we seek to interpret life.

From the point of view of our opponents the thing is by this time hopeless. How can there be any rational arguments with those who have substituted the position of authority for that of reason? So, for instance, Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, in their book, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, divide the various methods of interpreting life as follows: First there is the method of tenacity. That means that we simply hold on to our beliefs that we have been taught in our childhood, because we do not have the mental energy to look into new hypotheses. Then there is the method of authority. Of course, he says, there is a legitimate appeal to authority. When we wish to know what diet or exercise will relieve certain distressing physical symptoms we ask the doctor. But this authority is only relatively final. We always reserve the right to modify the findings of the expert. But

there is, he says, a second and objectionable kind of authority. Such an authority "invests some sources with infallibility and finality and invokes some external force to give sanction to their decisions" (p. 194). He adds: "The aim of this method, unanimity and stability of belief, cannot be achieved so long as authorities differ. Buddhists do not accept the authority of the Christians, just as the latter reject the authority of Mohamet and the Koran" (p. 194). Thirdly, there is the method of intuition. But what people once believed on intuition, as they thought, has since been proved to be mistaken in many cases. There remains then the method of science or reflective inquiry. It alone is free from caprice and willfulness. The other methods, so far from leading us to certainty, lead us into an irrational interpretation of life. On the other hand, the method of reflective inquiry, "which takes advantage of the objective connections in the world around us, should be found reasonable not because of its appeal to the idiosyncracies of a selected few individuals, but because it can be tested repeatedly and by all men" (p. 195).

This modern statement of the requirements of scientific methodology, so far from turning us back, can only establish us in our determination not to hide anything of our belief that Christianity is, for better or for worse, a religion of authority. In fact, it alone is a religion of authority. The other "religions of authority" teach a relative authority, and authority that is, after all, subject to the final judgment of man. We cannot develop this point here. Suffice it to intimate that we do not wish to hide the fact that in the last analysis we make every thought captive to the obedience of the revelation of God as it has come to us in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.

It should be interjected at this point that when we say that we do not hide the fact that we submit to absolute authority, this does not imply that we must always and in every instance bring in the discussion of authority at the outset of every argument with those we seek to win for Christianity. This may frequently be omitted, if only we ourselves do not fall into the temptation of thinking that we can stand on neutral ground with those who hold to a non-Christian position.

What it implies to say that Christianity is the religion of authority may be learned if we now turn to a consideration of the teaching of Scripture on some of the points at issue between Christians and non-Christians.

Theism

Fundamental to all the differences between Christians and non-Christians is the conception of God that both parties entertain. If we search the Scripture to see what sort of God it holds before us, it does not take long to see that as the Bible itself comes to us with authority, so the God that speaks from it is a sovereign God. The God of the Bible existed as the self-sufficient Being before the world was. We are told that he exists as the Triune God. That is, there are three persons in the ontological trinity, which are equally ultimate in the Godhead. God needed nothing beside himself in order to be conscious of himself. His affirmation of himself was internally complete.

Accordingly, when God did freely create something beside himself, this something, the universe, could never become a correlative to himself. Least of all could man, who was one of the creatures of God, develop principles of interpretation or a method of reflective inquiry that could interpret life correctly without the presupposition of God. Every fact and every law in the created universe is brought into existence by God's creation. Every fact and every law in the created universe continues to exist by virtue of the providence of God. Every fact and every law in the created universe accomplishes what it does accomplish by virtue of the plan or purpose of God. God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass.

The full implication of these matters will appear when we contrast this position with the current conception of the scientific method. For the moment we wish to state the Christian principles of interpretation broadly. If we take the Scripture doctrines of God, of creation, of providence, and of the plan of God, we observe that we have a Christian philosophy of fact and a Christian methodology that is squarely opposed to the current philosophy of fact and the current scientific methodology. Scripture teaches that every fact in the universe exists and operates by virtue of the plan of God. There are no brute facts for God. As to his own being, fact and interpretation are co-extensive. There are no hidden unexplored possibilities in God. And as to the universe, God's interpretation logically precedes the denotation and the connotation of all facts of which it consists.

In contrast with this, the current philosophy of fact and of method takes for granted the ultimacy of brute facts. This point was involved even in the idealist conception of logic as we have traced it in the previous chapter. If any God is discovered by the current scientific method, it is invariably a God who, as a rational being, is set over against a universe in which there are irrational facts, and the two are then made correlative to one another. It is taken for granted by the current scientific method that there is a realm that is truly known to man, even though God be not taken into the picture. Or even if it be admitted that we perhaps need God for the interpretation of life, we need him only as a help to ourselves. We might compare this point of view to the attitude taken by science when a new planet appears upon the horizon. When a new planet is discovered, scientists can explain the movement of the heavenly bodies somewhat better than they could before. This new planet is only one force among many that influence the behavior of the heavenly bodies. And the new planet not only influences other planets, but is itself influenced in turn by the other planets which are on a par with itself.

Christianity

Before developing these matters further, we may observe that the second aspect of biblical teaching concerns the question of sin and redemption. Here again it is the sovereign God who meets us. When man had fallen into sin God, the triune God, graciously provided redemption for his people. He was sovereign in that he needed not to have given redemption to any, and he is sovereign in that he does not give it to all. This work of redemption on the

part of God reveals itself in this world in supernatural form. Miracle is at the heart of Christianity. The incarnation of the second person of the trinity, the death and the resurrection of Jesus, are but the central cycle of the larger circle of redemptive works that have proceeded from it.

As to the purpose of redemption, it was both restorative and supplementive. The miracle of redemption graciously dropped into the center of history by God, the creator of history, spreads its influence till it reaches the very circumference of the universe. There is no fact not affected for good or for evil by the redemptive work of Christ. And this includes the acceptance or non-acceptance of redemption. "He that is not for me is against me."

The consequence of this position is that here too we meet with the same basic alternative between Christian and non-Christian methodology. As Christians we hold it to be impossible to interpret any fact without a basic falsification unless it be regarded in its relation to God the Creator and to Christ the Redeemer. On the other hand, the current methodology takes for granted that at best redemption is one among several independent facts that must be taken into consideration when we interpret facts. For us there can be no true interpretation of facts without miracle; for our opponents miracle is at most a somewhat unruly fact.

Thus Christian theism stands before us as a unit. It offers to men the conception of God the Creator and Redeemer as the ultimate category of interpretation. It claims that no fact is intelligible unless seen in relation to this category.

That this implies a reversal of the method employed by Butler and the others we have discussed in the previous chapters, is apparent. We do not offer Christianity to men apologetically, admitting that their interpretation of life is right as far as it goes. In particular, we do not accept the "appeal to facts" as a common meeting place between believers and unbelievers. Christianity does not thus need to take shelter under the roof of "known facts." It rather offers itself as a roof to facts if they would be known. Christianity does not need to take shelter under the roof of a scientific method independent of itself. It rather offers itself as a roof to methods that would be scientific.

The Scientific Ideal

It is well now that we turn to a discussion of the general difference between a truly Christian and the current scientific method by contrasting them on certain definite points. The first point to note is that of the scientific ideal. By the sceintific ideal we mean the goal which science has set for itself. This goal of science is that of complete comprehension. Science, as we are told, must work with this ideal before it. We quote the words of Cohen on this point: "A completed rational system having nothing outside of it nor any possible alternative to it, is both presupposed and beyond the actual attainment of any one moment. It coincides in part with the Bradleyan Absolute, but it is an ideal

limit rather than an actual experience. Unrealized possibilities as are within it precisely to the extent that it contains endless time" (Reason and Nature, p. 158).

This statement of Cohen presents fairly the common notion of the scientific ideal. If we seek to evaluate this ideal from the Christian point of view, we note that it wipes out the basic distinction between the Creator and the creature. In this it is based upon the suppositions of all non-Christian philosophy. Speaking more particularly, there are two objections to this scientific ideal. As it does not make a difference between God and man, it does not allow that God has already reached that scientific ideal. Or rather, it does not allow that all facts exist by virtue of their previous interpretation by God. In the second place, the scientific ideal does not realize that it is illegitimate for a creature to set before itself the notion of comprehending all existence. To do so is to set before itself the being of God as penetrable to the mind of man, inasmuch as he is part of "existence." This would be to deny the incomprehensibility of God. For man to set before himself the ideal of absolute knowledge is to set God aside as the one who has created the universe and its laws. It would be to absolutize the law of non-contradiction and set it above God.

It may be profitable to develop this criticism of the absolute ideal of science more fully by indicating what is meant by the fact that it is called a limiting concept. The absolute ideal is said to be a limit toward which man must strive. This notion of a limiting concept has had its first modern expression in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant used this idea of a limiting, or regulative concept, in contrast to the notion of a constitutive concept. He said that we cannot actually by the employment of the categories of the understanding prove the existence of God. Yet we cannot do without the notion of God entirely. We need the notion of God as a correlative to the phenomenal universe. Human thought is itself constitutive. For that reason God's thought cannot be constitutive. Yet human thought is not comprehensive. For that reason it needs the notion of God as an ideal, as a limit toward which man must strive.

It is difficult to think of a greater contrast than that between this Kantian limiting concept and the notion of God as the constitutive creator and interpreter of the facts of the universe. The latter thinks of God as self-determinative, and man-determinative. The former thinks of man as self-determinative and God-determinative. The latter interprets reality in terms of God. The former interprets reality in terms of man.

The idea of the limiting concept, accordingly, involves the notion of pure contingency. The conception of brute fact underlies this ideal. There may always be new facts that may show our interpretations of previously "known" facts to have been mistaken. This fact that science does not look for objective certainty is the counterpart of the fact that it strives for complete comprehension. In the quotation given above, Cohen spoke of "unrealized possibilities" within the very Absolute that he says we need as an ideal.

It is on account of these "unrealized possibilities" that the scientific ideal is said to be a limiting concept. The similarity between this position and that of the idealist logicians appears clearly if we recall that idealists are insistent on the need of an absolute but are equally insistent on the need of novelty for the absolute.

Cohen himself expresses the idea that science presupposes contingency. And by contingency he does not mean merely contingency for us as human beings. He means contingency for God as well as for man. "To hold seriously to the popular dictum that everything is connected with everything else would make the scientific search for determinate connection meaningless" (p. 151). Again he adds: "This uneliminable character of contingency is but the logical expression of the metaphysical fact of individuality. There is no universe without a plurality of elements, of atoms, of moments of time, etc. It is a blind hostility to pluralism, a preference for a lazy monism wherein all distinctions and differences are swallowed up, that leads to blatant panlogism from which all contingency is banished. But the latter attempt defeats itself. In the end the universe of existence has the particular character which it has and not some other; and contingency is not removed by being funded in the conception of the whole universe or made into the essential character of reason itself" (p. 152).

It will be apparent from this passage that the Christian notion of God as the ultimate interpretative category of experience is in this manner set aside. As Christians we hold that there would be no explanation of any fact unless all facts were already interpreted by God. Cohen would call this a blind panlogism, that has denied one aspect of reality, namely its contingency, and has therefore made interpretation of fact impossible.

Indeterminateness

The same point may be expressed again by saying that for us as Christians God is the completely determinate experience on which we depend for the determinate character of our experience. On the other hand, for Cohen God is indeterminate in order that our experience may be determinate. As Christians we think of God as having a complete plan for the universe. All things happen in relation to that plan. There is indeterminacy for us, but there is no indeterminacy for God. In contrast with this, Cohen expresses himself in these words:

> "The total universe is by definition never actually complete in any moment of time, and the principle of causality means that something occupying a given position in time and space can be determined only by something else also occupying a definite position in space and enduring over a definite time-interval. This is not to deny the determinateness of the physical universe in its distributive sense, i.e., in the sense that each thing in it is determinate. But the absolute collective whole is - at least from the point of view of the scientific method - undetermined by anything outside of it, nor can the absolutely total universe be said to have any definite character such that from it we can infer that some particular entity

has one rather than another determinate trait. Attempts to characterize the universe as a whole, as one (not many), continuous (not discontinuous) conscious or purposive, and the like, all involve a stretching of the ordinary use of words to include their opposites, and from this only confusion rather than determination can result.

"We may put this in a different form by saying that scientific determinism is concerned with the definite character of things rather than with their brute existence. Rational scientific investigation is not concerned with the mystery of creation whereby existence may have come into being out of the void" (p. 153). A little later Cohen adds" "A metaphysic of scientific method is, then, concerned with the nature of a world in which the result of scientific investigation is always subject to contingency and error, but also to the possibility of self-correction according to an invariable ideal" (p. 155).

From this interpretation of the metaphysics of the scientific method by Cohen, it appears again what is meant by saying that the scientific ideal is a limiting concept, and also what is meant by saying that all knowledge is only probable knowledge. For Christianity, God's thought is constitutive. By God's thoughts do the facts of the universe come into existence. We are, in contrast to Cohen, most deeply concerned about the origin of facts. There is no contingency for God and therefore no probability for God. There is contingency for us and therefore probability for us. But the probable character of our knowledge presupposes the certainty and comprehensiveness of God's knowledge. We may be uncertain as to whether a particular statement of physical law be correct. Perhaps some other statement is correct, or at least more correct. But this simply indicates that the knowledge of human beings can never be comprehensive. It never implies a basic scepticism. Then too there are certain facts of which we have absolutely certain, even though not comprehensive, interpretations. We are certain of God's existence. We are certain that the universe was created by God. We are certain that man fell into sin by eating of the fruit of the forbidden tree. We are certain that Christ died and rose again and sitteth at the right hand of the Father, and that he will come again to judge the quick and the dead. Our uncertainty then about many matters is not based on an ultimate irrationalism. In this exactly is it distinguished from the uncertainty of modern scientific methodology. Scientific methodology as we know it in the literature of the day and as it has been developed out of the history of philosophy and science, presupposes an ultimate Chance back of the universe. It could not do otherwise, inasmuch as it thinks that it deals with brute or uninterpreted facts. "Science" thinks it deals with a stream of time out of which the absolutely novel proceeds constantly. "Eternity may thus be viewed," says Cohen, "as a limit or ordering principle of a series of expanding vistas" (p. 155). For that reason God can never be thought of as the final or ultimate cause of anything. Cohen says that since reality is in the last analysis indeterminate at the edges, it has no meaning to say that reality as a whole or anything beyond reality as a whole is the cause of any particular thing in this universe. He holds that there may be rational connections between various phenomena in

the universe, but that it is unintelligible to speak of God as creating or being the cause of anything in this world.

Bare Possibility

We see then that the current scientific method presupposes the notion of bare possibility. Christianity on the other hand presupposes the absolute actuality of God. This difference implies a life and death struggle. The question is simply upon what presupposition does life have significance, or, otherwise stated, upon which presupposition is intelligent predication possible. On which presupposition can there be any knowledge of facts? Only by thus challenging the modern "scientific method" can Christianity be defended. This ought to be plain from the fact just mentioned, that according to the scientific method God can in no sense be said to be the cause of the world or of any specific thing in the world. It is fatal to try to prove the existence of God by the "scientific method" and by the "appeal to facts" if, as Cohen asserts, the scientific method itself is based upon a presupposition which excludes God. That the "scientific method" is not neutral ought to be apparent from what Cohen says about it. Scientific method does, to be sure, begin with the facts, but it begins with brute facts. It insists that facts are and must remain brute facts for God and man alike.

But if there should remain any doubt that the scientific method as commonly understood is exclusive of Christianity, we may continue our discussion of it a bit further.

The Non-existence of Any Fact

What we have said thus far about the scientific method by the help of Cohen, would seem to indicate at first blush that, according to it, any sort of fact might be thought of as existing. This is frequently expressed by saying that we can intelligently think of the non-existence of any fact. In the Dialogues on Natural Religion by Hume, even Cleanthes, the defender of Christianity, took this to be the foundation of all sound reasoning. If this be applied to God as well as to man it signifies that God is not a necessary being. Now it is perfectly true that the existence of a necessary being cannot be proved if one, with Cleanthes, begins with brute fact. But this exactly shows the fatal character of beginning with brute facts. God as the absolutely necessary being must be presupposed as the possibility of intelligent predication of "contingent facts." The "scientific method" begins by assuming that all facts, God as well as other facts, are contingent facts.

The Theoretical Relevancy of Any Hypothesis

Thus it would seem that for the consistent application of the scientific method it is necessary to hold that any sort of fact can exist. Corresponding to this claim that any sort of fact may be held to exist, is the notion that theoretically any sort of hypothesis is, to begin with, legitimate and relevant. It is not supposed that practically any hypotheses may legitimately be offered. It is not claimed that in practice any theory is as good as any other. It is

taken for granted that we may discover a certain tendency in nature. In practice we must limit ourselves in the offering of such hypotheses as are consistent with that tendency. Nevertheless it remains true that, to begin with, any hypothesis is virtually asserted to be as relevant as any other.

Over against this contention that theoretically any hypothesis is as relevant as any other, we place the Christian position, which says that no hypotheses which exclude the necessary self-existence of God can be relevant to any group of facts. There is only one absolutely true explanation of every fact and of every group of facts in the universe. God has this absolutely true explanation of every fact. Accordingly, the various hypotheses that are to be relevant to the explanation of phenomena must be consistent with this fundamental presupposition. God is the presupposition of the relevancy of any hypothesis. If one should seek to explain the claim of the disciples of Jesus that their Master's body was raised from the tomb by offering the hypothesis of hallucination, we reply that the hypothesis is irrelevant. Our further study of the factual evidence in the matter is no more than a corroboration of our assertion of the irrelevancy of the hypothesis. If one offers the hypothesis of biological evolution as the explanation of man's appearance on the earth, we reply that the hypothesis is irrelevant. Our further study of the factual material is no more than a corroboration of our assertion of the irrelevancy of the hypothesis.

The Test of Relevancy

To allow the theoretical relevancy of any sort of hypothesis is to imply that the relevancy of hypotheses must be tested by an appeal to brute facts. That Cohen thinks of the appeal to brute facts as the way in which the relevancy of hypotheses must be determined, may be learned from the following words:

> "In thus emphasizing the role of reason in scientific method we do not minimize the appeal to experiment and observation, but make the latter more significant. The appeal to experience is thus involved throughout: first as the matrix in which inquiry arises (as that which suggest question), and then as that on which all theories must be tested. We start always with general assumptions and with contingent or empirical data. By no amount of reasoning can we altogether eliminate all contingency from our world. Moreover, pure speculation alone will not enable us to get a determinate picture of the existing world. We must eliminate some of the conflicting possibilities, and this can be brought about only by experiment and observation. The fact that two or more hypotheses are logically possible means that none of them involves self-contradiction. They cannot be eliminated by logic or pure mathematics alone. Experiment or observation of crucial cases is needed for such elimination. When an hypothesis is first suggested we try to see whether it will explain the known facts. But we generally need new situations to determine whether its explanatory power is superior to that of other hypotheses" (p. 82).

It is important that we see the exact point at issue here. The Christian position is certainly not opposed to experimentation and observation. As Chris-

tians we may make various hypotheses in explanation of certain phenomena. But these various hypotheses will always be, as far as we can tell, in accord with the presupposition of God as the ultimate explanation of all things. Our hypotheses will always be subordinate to the notion of God as the complete interpreter of all facts and if we make our hypotheses about facts subordinate to this God, it follows that there are no brute facts to which we can appeal in corroboration of our hypotheses. We appeal to facts but never to brute facts. We appeal to God-interpreted facts. And this is simply another way of saying that we try to discover whether our hypothesis is really in accord with God's interpretation of facts. The ultimate test for the relevancy of our hypotheses is therefore their correspondence with God's interpretation of facts. True human interpretation is implication into God's interpretation.

In contrast to this, the ordinary scientific method seeks to determine the relevancy of hypotheses by an appeal to brute facts. An ultimate chance is assumed as the matrix of facts. Then the chance collocation of facts is taken as the rational tendency among these brute facts. And the relevancy of an hypothesis is determined by its correspondence to this "rational tendency" in things. Thus the circle is complete. We start with brute fact and we end with brute fact. We presuppose chance as God, and therefore conclude that the God of Christianity cannot exist.

Challenging the "Scientific Method"

It is impossible to overemphasize the importance for Christians of seeing the difference between their position and the current scientific method on the three points that we have now considered. A Christian cannot allow the legitimacy of the ideal of complete comprehension. That this ideal is made a limiting rather than a constitutive concept does not improve matters, but, if possible, makes them worse. It clearly implies that God as creative and constitutive of reality and of true human interpretation is, from the outset, excluded. It implies the elevation of chance to the place of God. Secondly, Christians cannot consistently allow the theoretical relevancy of every sort of hypothesis. This too implies an elevation of chance to the place of God. In the third place, Christians cannot allow the appeal to brute facts as a test of the relevancy of hypotheses. Once more this implies the elevation of chance to the position of God.

There is accordingly but one thing that Christians can consistently do. They must challenge the legitimacy of the scientific methodology as based upon an assumed metaphysic of chance. The traditional method of the defense of Christianity has not done this. It has toyed with the idea of neutrality. Accordingly it was and is willing to allow the legitimacy of the current scientific ideal, the legitimacy of the notion that theoretically any hypothesis is relevant, and the notion that an appeal to brute facts is the test of the relevancy of any hypothesis. This attitude has been fatal. It has made possible the proof of nothing but a finite God, and of a Christianity that is cut after a naturalistic or semi-naturalistic pattern.

Sometimes men seem to have sensed something of this issue. So, for instance, the argument for miracles and their possibility has sometimes been taken out of the domain of physical experiment and placed exclusively in the domain of history. It is assumed that modern physical theory is correct in its method. But it is argued that by physical experiment no known law can be discovered which should make for the a priori impossibility of miracle. The reason for this is that scientific experiment in physics must always end in a margin of error. With the most refined instruments we cannot escape this margin of error. Accordingly, an experimenter, after he has taken a large number of experiments, must take what he thinks is the average result of his experiments. This involves a choice on his part. The scientist can never be wholly passive in scientific experiment. It is unavoidable that he should exercise his choice at some point of the process. Thus an element of uncertainty comes into the picture. The average any scientist has hit upon may not be representative of any particular fact. It follows that one cannot be certain that the resurrection of Christ or the raising of Lazarus has not taken place. We may therefore safely turn to history to see if the testimony for such miracles is reasonably sufficient. And if we find that it is we may believe in the occurrence of miracles.

Is this sort of reasoning in defense of the miraculous valid and useful? We cannot think so. Suppose that we did go to history and discovered from history that the evidence for the truth of the story that an axe-head floated upon the water is sufficient. It is difficult to see how modern physical theory, which accepts experiment as the test of relevancy of an hypothesis, could allow for the possibility of such a fact. If a million experiments were taken with axes thrown into the water such axe-heads would sink each time. There would be no margin of error allowing for the entrance of subjective interpretation. All "known facts" would flatly contradict the notion of the floating axe. Accordingly the "hypothesis" that God made the axe-head of the Old Testament story to float would have to be discarded.

But even if we could for a moment forget the consideration just advanced; suppose we did somehow find room to allow for the floating axe-head as something that has happened. In that case the floating axe-head would still be nothing but a brute fact for which we have so far found no explanation. It would simply be a strange event. It would not be true that by a miraculous power of God the axe-head was made to float. Thus it has profited us nothing to seek escape from the field of physics into that of history. If we allow the legitimacy of the current scientific method anywhere, we are at the mercy of our opponents.

The Practical Exclusion of the Christian "Hypothesis"

That the wolf of scientific method intends to feed on the lamb of Christianity can be learned from a consistent application of that method to the concept of miracle. We have already indicated that for the follower of the "scientific method" miracles can be thought of as nothing but strange events. To this we should now add that the Christian concept of miracle is sometimes

definitey and clearly rejected simply by the application of the scientific method. We quote from William Adams Brown to prove this point. Speaking of the intellectual difficulties involved in the acceptance of miracle, he says:

"Let us take the intellectual difficulty first. To establish the occurrence of a miracle, whether in the thirteenth century, or in the sixteenth century, or in the seventeenth, it was necessary to show that the event in question was incapable of being explained by natural law. This, though difficult, would not be impossible provided one knew just what was meant by 'nature' and what events were explicable by natural law. But today we are no longer sure that we know where to place the exact boundaries of natural law. Natural law is only our name for certain recurrent sequences in the order of the occurrence of phenomena. Nature is not an independent power over against God which acts as a cause among causes. Nature is that part of the totality of things which admits of classification according to principles which embody the results of an analysis of past experience. To prove that an event is a miracle in the sense in which Aquinas or Calvin believed in miracle, it would be necessary not merely to show that it had not yet been possible to assign it its place in the observed sequence, but that it never would be possible to do so in the future, which manifestly cannot be done.

"Many modern opponents of miracle are content to rest their case at this point. They do not deny the possibility of miracles, but only the possibility of proving that any particular event is a miracle. Take any of the miracles of the past, the virgin birth, the raising of Lazarus, the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Suppose that you can prove that these events happened just as they are claimed to have happened. What have you accomplished? You have shown that our previous view of the limits of the possible needs to be enlarged, that our former generalizations were too narrow and need revision; that problems cluster about the origin of life and its renewal of which we had hitherto been unaware. But the one thing which you have not shown, which indeed you cannot show, is that a miracle has happened; for that is to confess that these problems are inherently insoluble, which cannot be determined until all possible tests have been made.

"What, moreover, shall we say of these events, formerly deemed miracles in the technical sense, which today many scientists believe can be brought under law? For example, the miracles of healing or of demonic possession? We find analogous phenomena at the present day which seem to belong in the same category, such as the healings of Christian Science, or the exorcism of Christian missionaries in China. Must we therefore admit that the religious significance of the Biblical stories has been impaired and the evidential value of the events they record has been disproved? Such a conclusion would inevitably follow if the older methods of proof were correct. But modern defenders of miracle are not willing to admit that this is the case. The religious significance of the Biblical miracles, they tell us, is not impaired by any progress which we may have

made towards a scientific understanding of their antecedents, for the very simple reason that the quality which gives them their significance for religion lies in a region to which the methods of science cannot penetrate" (God at Work, p. 169-171).

Neutrality - Negation

When reading such a passage we may well ask what has become of the boasted neutrality of the scientific method. But we knew it was not neutral. We are not surprised to find the negation of everything specifically Christian grow naturally out of a consistent application of the "scientific method." If we adopt the "scientific method" we must allow that it is quite possible that at some future date all the miracles recorded in the Bible, not excluding the resurrection of Christ, may be explained by natural laws. We should admit the ideal of complete comprehension of all facts under one principle of explanation that is open to the mind of man. There can then be no God whose mind is essentially higher than human minds. Such a God would have a plan of his own that he would carry out. This plan of God would not be open for inspection to human visitors. For that reason it cannot be tolerated by the "scientific method."

Now if we should ask what sort of explanation it would be that science would give of miracles, we may listen to the words of Bernhard Bavink, in his book, Science and God. Bavink discusses the question of miracles in the following words: "It is a complete error to attempt now to uphold belief in miracle, in the ordinary sense of the word, by basing it upon the purely statistical character of natural laws" (p. 131).

What does Bavink mean when he says we cannot defend miracle by appealing to the purely statistical character of laws? He means that all facts are brute facts, and that therefore we cannot predict anything with certainty about any fact. We must therefore use the method of sampling. We must take samples out of the mass of facts about us. These samples are to be representative of the nature of the mass of facts we are seeking to interpret. But we must assume these samples to be representative. We have taken for granted that other uninvestigated facts will be like the sample we have been able to study. We can never be sure that this will be the case in any individual instance. There may be some very strange instances. So there may conceivably be some physical phenomena that do not fit into what we think of as the law of nature. On this point Bavink says:

> "Let us take the example we have cited from Perrin and the tile When this falls off a roof, there is a possibility every 101,010 years that chance unevenness in the distribution of molecular pressure may give it a considerable impulse sideways, and thus, for example, divert it from the head of a passer-by which it would otherwise have struck, if its fall had taken place according to the normal (that is to say average) law of falling bodies. But if the argument is put forward in theological quarters that the possibility of a miracle is thus proved, the result would be only to damage

theology's own case. For in the first place as we have seen, the probability is so small that it may be regarded as practically identical with impossibility. If one such tile had fallen every second since the beginning of the history of man, no noticeable fraction of the time would have passed which, according to Perrin, that would be necessary for the case to occur. And secondly, even if such an immeasureable small possibility should actually once be realized, there would again be a second, almost equally great, improbability that it should happen just at the very moment when the passerby, who was to be 'providentially' protected, was under that particular roof.

"Similar considerations apply, for example, to the walking of Peter on the water, which is naturally also imaginable as the result of unequal molecular pressure, but even less probable, and other miracles. Hence the theological world cannot be too strongly warned against attempting to make capital in this way out of the new discoveries" (p. 131-132).

A little further Bavink adds, "The new physics now hands this whole cosmos over to pure chance, with its statistical laws. This might seem to be fundamentally less in keeping with our belief in an omnipotent, and above all an eternally wise God, than the old point of view" (p. 134). This warning of Bavink should surely be taken to heart by orthodox defenders of Christianity. If we appeal to the margin of error and to the statistical character of natural laws in order to point out that science itself can allow for miracle, we jump for safety from the burning ship of determinism into the sea of indeterminism. Death will pursue us in either case. A scientific method that is based upon a metaphysic of chance must seek to destroy the Christian position which is based upon the metaphysic of God as a self-conscious being with a comprehensive plan for all reality.

The Christian "Hypothesis" Said to be Irrelevant

We have now seen that the "scientific ideal" is a forest fire that stops for nothing. Neutrality is, to be sure, spoken of and even lauded. But it is not put into practice. The same holds true for the question of the relevancy of hypothesis. We have noted above that Cohen claims that theoretically any hypothesis is relevant. But of course in practice we must exclude some hypotheses. Which kind of hypotheses does Cohen think we ought to exclude? The answer is plain. Such hypotheses must be excluded as would involve the truth of Christianity. Speaking of Rationalism, Naturalism, and Supernaturalism, Cohen says:

"It is frequently asserted that the principle of scientific method cannot rule out in advance the possibility of any fact, no matter how strange or miraculous. This is true to the extent that science as a method of extending our knowledge must not let accepted views prevent us from discovering new facts that may seem to contradict our previous views. Actually, however, certain types of explanation cannot be admitted within

the body of scientific knowledge. Any attempt, for instance, to explain physical phenomena as directly due to providence or disembodied spirits is incompatible with the principle of rational determinism. For the nature of these entities is not sufficiently determinate to enable us to deduce definite experimental consequences from them. The Will of Providence, for example, will explain everything whether it happens one way or another. Hence, no experiment can possibly overthrow it. An hypothesis, however, which we cannot possibly refute cannot possibly be experimentally verified.

"In thus ruling out ghostly, magical, or other supernatural influence, it would seem that scientific method impoverishes our view of the world. It is well, however, to remember that a world where no possibility is excluded is a world of chaos, about which no definite assertion can be made. Any world containing some order necessarily involves the elimination of certain abstract or ungrounded possibilities such as fill the minds of the insane" (p. 159).

It appears that the philosophy of chance on which Cohen himself builds the whole idea of scientific method cannot allow the concept of God as an absolutely rational being. We do not wonder that it cannot. To allow the concept of God would be to destroy the scientific method. It was claimed that theoretically any hypothesis is permissible. The "hypothesis" of God is, however, excluded at the outset. And what are the bases for excluding the idea of God? It is expressed very pointedly when Cohen says that the idea of providence for instance "will explain everything whether it happens one way or another." Is this true? As Christians we hold that the doctrine of God's plan or providence does indeed explain everything. But we also hold that it is because of this very providence that things happen just as they do and not otherwise. In other words, we hold that the charge here made against Christianity must be returned to those who make it. It is only if we start with a philosophy of chance that things may happen any way at all. There is then no rationality at all.

APPEAL TO BRUTE FACTS

As the Test of the Relevance of Hypotheses

Nevertheless it is a cause for rejoicing that matters are put thus plainly by Cohen. Christians ought to be able to see from his statements, as well as from those of Brown and Bavink given above, that they cannot defend the teachings of Christianity by the use of the "scientific method." The final test applied by Cohen when he is sorting his hypotheses as to their relevancy is the appeal to brute facts as they are supposed to be known by man apart from God. By this method of appeal to brute facts it is found that the hypothesis of God as it appears in the doctrine of providence cannot even be considered relevant. Speaking of this matter of appeal to fact in order to test the relevancy of hypotheses Cohen and Nagel say: "The hypothesis that the universe is shrinking in such a fashion that all lengths contract in the same ratio is empirically

meaningless if it can have no consequences that are verifiable. In the same way the hypotheses that belief in a Providence is a stronger force making for righteous living than concern for one's fellow man can have no verifiable consequences unless we can assign an experimental process for measuring the relative strength of the 'forces' involved" (Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, p. 207).

We shall not pursue this question further. There will be occasion to point out more fully when e.g. we discuss the method of the psychology of religion schools how this principle is applied. If one realizes that such experiences as regeneration and faith as well as external miracles such as the resurrection of Christ are, as far as science is concerned, simply awaiting the day of their explanation by natural law, be it statistical law, one ought to give up, once for all, the hope of establishing the truth of Christianity by the "scientific method." The procedure of the current scientific method is well illustrated by the sample Edwin G. Conklin gives of it in his article in the book Has Science Discovered God? edited by Edward H. Cotton. First Conklin tells us there can be no real conflict between science and religion. They ought to be good friends, for they operate in different spheres. "What is back of evolution no one knows" (p. 86). That is the idea of neutrality. It sounds very good. It would seem then that theoretically any hypothesis might be deemed relevant. Yet it soon appears that the Christian hypothesis is not considered to be relevant. Conklin says: "No longer is it possible to think that man was created perfect in body, mind, or morals, or that in physical form he is the image of God. No longer is it possible to think of God as 'the Good Man' or the Devil as 'the Bad Man'" (p. 80). Thus the Christian "hypothesis" is excluded as irrelevant. It is not long before Conklin positively asserts that the non-Christian concept of Chance must be accepted. "Undoubtedly chance has played a large part in the evolution of worlds and of organisms, but I cannot believe that it has played the only part" (p. 88). To begin with Conklin tells us that no one knows. Secondly he, in effect, tells us as Christians, "But you are wrong." And thirdly he adds, in effect, "I as an evolutionist and believer in chance am right." No one knows, but you are wrong and I am right; this is typical of the current scientific method, as we have seen by looking at a few fair samples.

We do not wish to suggest that there is intentional fraud in this matter. It only points to the actual exigency of scientific methodology. It cannot do differently. Nor does our criticism imply that we are not very appreciative of the great accomplishments of scientists who are not Christians. We readily allow that non-Christian science has done a great work and brought to light much truth. But this margin of truth which science has discovered is in spite of and not because of its fundamental assumption of a chance universe. Non-Christian science has worked with the borrowed capital of Christian theism, and for that reason alone has been able to bring to light much truth.

To illustrate our attitude to modern science and its methodology we call to mind the story of Solomon and the Phoenicians. Solomon wished to build a temple unto the Covenant God. Did he ask those who were not of the covenant

and did not know the God of the covenant to make a blueprint for him? No, he got his blueprint from God. The timbers were to be laid in accordance with this blueprint. The timbers had to be fitted into the place made for them by the blueprint. Perhaps it took some of the builders a good while before they found the proper place for each timber. Perhaps they had various hypotheses as to just where this or that particular timber would fit. But they never doubted the ultimacy of the blueprint itself. They offered no hypotheses that they did not think to be in accord with the blueprint. They did not appeal to brute timbers in order to test the relevancy of the blueprint. They knew the facts would somehow have to fit in with the blueprint.

But did this attitude of the builders of Solomon's temple imply that there was nothing useful to do for those who were not of the covenant? Not at all. The Phoenicians were employed as laborers to cut the timber. These Phoenicians were even recognized as being far more skillful than the covenant people in fashioning and trimming the timbers. They might even build temples of their own with the timber they cut. Such temples might resemble the appearance of Solomon's temple. Yet they would be nothing but temples reared to idols. Therefore these temples would sooner or later fall to the ground. Solomon knew this very well. He used the Phoenicians as his servants, not as his architects.

Something similar to this should be our attitude to science. We gladly recognize the detail work of many scientists as being highly valuable. We gladly recognize the fact that "science" has brought to light many details. But we cannot use modern scientists and their method as the architects of our structure of Christian interpretation. We deny the legitimacy of the ideal of science, we deny its principle with respect to the relevancy of hypotheses, and we deny the legitimacy of its appeal to brute facts. We challenge its whole procedure. Instead we offer the God and the Christ of the Bible as the concrete universal in relation to which all facts have meaning. We maintain that there can be no facts but Christian-theistic facts. We then go to the "facts," the phenomena of experience, and find again and again that if we seek to interpret any "fact" on a non-Christian hypothesis it turns out to be a brute fact, and brute facts are unintelligible.

PART II

Chapter V

THEOLOGICAL EVIDENCES — GOD

We turn now to a brief consideration of some of the doctrines of Christianity in order to see what modern science does with them. Basic to all Christian teaching is its doctrine of God. What is the attitude of modern science with respect to God?

To this question we can give a fairly definite answer. Not as though all scientist agree on the matter in the form of their statements. Some disavow any belief in God. Others profess agnosticism. Still others, and they are perhaps in the majority today, claim to have discovered God by the pathway of science. But these three types of answers given by modern scientists agree on one point. Practically without exception modern scientists agree in denying the biblical notion of God. If they do believe in a god, they believe in a god who is but an extension of the universe or a principle within the universe.

Pre-Kantian Science

There can be no doubt but that the growth of science accounts for a great difference between ancient and modern man. Ancient man thought of himself as at one with the universe. For him the macrocosmos and the misrocosmos were scarcely distinguishable. Modern man, on the other hand, stands sharply over against nature. This has made the question of epistemology all important for him. It brought the question of brute fact sharply to the foreground. Are some facts entirely beyond the reach of the mind of man? The earliest form of modern science asked this question and gave a definite answer in the negative. Mathematics was the first of modern sciences to reach far out into the realm of space. There was, as someone has said, "faith in the harmony of the infinite universe and trust in mathematics as the key to its mysteries." Descartes proposed to begin his study of the universe with a few clear and distinct ideas. He wished simply to deduce all the consequences that these ideas contained. "Inspired by a vision, wherein the Angel of Truth appeared and spoke encouragingly to him, he created a new combination of algebra and geometry which is now called analytic geometry but which he called 'universal mathematic': and armed with this formidable weapon, he worked out a complete system of Nature in which everything from stars and stones to living animals and living human bodies is reduced to a combination of material particles moving according to mathematical laws in a universal homogeneous medium or ether." (Walter Marshall Horton, Theism and the Scientific Spirit, New York, 1933, p. 9).

It was by this scientific method of Descartes that Spinoza constructed his theology. He dealt with God more geometrico. Spinoza was certain that he could prove the existence of God. He has been called the God-intoxicated man. For Spinoza the mind of man is but an aspect of the mind of God. There is really only one universal mind of which man's mind is a part. This universal mind rules all reality. Brute facts do not exist. The universal mind causes all facts to be just what they are.

We need spend no time to indicate that this Spinozistic conception of God is radically opposed to the Christian conception of God. Spinoza virtually identifies human and divine thought. Christianity begins with the notion of the sufficiency of God's thought and the createdness of man's thought. Spinoza's philosophy gives us the first modern illustration of the sort of god modern science will accept. It is an exclusively immanentistic god.

But Spinoza had done away with brute fact too summarily. If one does not begin with the biblical creation idea then there is such a thing as brute fact, and brute fact will not down. The empiricists were not slow to point out the fact that Spinoza had done violence to brute fact. Leibniz hoped to be able to meet this criticism of the empiricists and carry through the ideal of the mathematical explanation of all reality. By means of higher mathematics he hoped to bridge the gap between phenomena that observation seems to show us utterly discrete. The qualitative differences between individual phenomena were reduced to functional differences in a mathematical series. Thus Leibniz hoped to make all phenomena penetrable to the mind of man. The qualitative differences of the various monads consisted merely in the degree of clarity with which they reflected the whole cosmos. The "petites perceptions" of the material monads, said Leibniz, lead by imperceptible but logically traceable degrees up to the clear "apperceptions" of the spiritual monads. There is a strict logical continuity between them.

Thus it seemed that a perfect method of science had been reached. It was on the basis of the mathematical method that LaPlace claimed to be able to predict all future events. Man, he thought, could penetrate to the very circumference of reality with the searchlight of mathematical method. What would become of Christianity in this scheme? The answer is at hand. Just as Spinoza denies the transcendence of God, Leibniz denies the uniqueness of Christianity. He discusses the relation between nature and grace. The "realm of nature" means for him nothing but the realm of that which is below reason but still governed by reason. God fits into the picture as the one who orders all things by Reason. God is but an aspect of universal Reason. The sovereign God of the Bible is reduced to the notion of universal Reason. The doctrines of redemption are woven into a naturalistic pattern.

A Posteriori Science

But this first manifestation of modern science was strictly a priori in its method. We must accordingly turn to the a posteriori form of pre-Kantian science. Is not a true scientific method always inductive in nature?

Perhaps the method of Leibniz and the early mathematicians was not truly scientific after all. Perhaps its sweeping denial of Christian theism was due to its false a priori character.

"In the eighteenth century, when the center of scientific activity and leadership passed from continental Europe to the British Isles, and applied mechanics replaced pure mathematics as the prevailing interest, the scientific spirit became more inductive and empirical" (Horton, op. cit., p. 45). Isaac Newton's great ambition was to deal with facts as they are. He worked upon the basis of the experiments of Galileo with the swinging lamp in the Cathedral of Pisa. His laws of motion he formulated on the basis of observation.

Locke's philosophy was largely an application of the scientific principles of Newton. And Butler's Analogy was in turn largely an application to theology of the philosophical principles of Locke. In our first section we have noted the sad results of Butler's method. Nothing but a finite God could be proved by the "inductive method" of Butler. The uniqueness of Christianity had to be toned down to the requirements of a naturalist pattern. In short, the results of the a posteriori method no less than the results of the a priori method of pre-Kantian science were subversive of Christianity. In the latter it appears very clearly that the ideal of modern science is complete comprehension of all knowledge. In the former this does not appear so clearly, but is none the less true. Empiricism began with what it thought of as a "known realm" of facts. The "unknown" was thought of as simply in analogy with the "known." The known realm was thought of as known by man as such. For man to know the world it was not thought necessary that God should first know it. The facts were assumed to be brute facts instead of God-interpreted facts. Thus man as autonomous was thought of as fully equipped to interpret at least one area of brute facts. And knowing one area of brute fact, he simply needed to extend the borders of his knowledge into the "unknown," by the same method by which he had learned about what he already knew. Even if God should seek to reveal himself to man, he would have to reveal only such matters as would be in continuity with what man already knew. God could never come to man as a sovereign God. Christianity could never come to man with unconditional grace.

Post - Kantian Science

But we must hasten on to a consideration of post-Kantian science. In what does it differ from pre-Kantian science? There is no basic difference. We might say that post-Kantian science has shown an even greater respect for brute fact than pre-Kantian science did. This appears primarily in the fact that the scientific ideal was reduced by Kant from an absolute ideal to that of a limiting concept. For Kant the space-time coordinates formed the principle of individuation. In this he opposed Leibnizian rationalism. Leibniz thought of complete description as the principle of individuation. Every individual could be set into its logical niche. For Kant logic had no such com-

prehensive sweep. It was balked by a buzzing-blooming confusion of temporal facts. This factual realm could never be wholly reduced to logical relations. The categories of the understanding can, according to Kant, at most show us aspects of truth. What a fact in itself is we can never fully know. We can do no more than make approximations to the knowledge of facts.

The far-reaching significance of this position of Kant requires careful attention. It still means that facts are just there somehow. The mind of man can never by its utmost efforts get back of this just-there-ness of facts. If the mind of man attempts to get back of the brute facts, argues Kant, it winds itself into a knot of hopeless antinomies. Here we hit upon the source of Kant's criticism of the "theistic proofs." Kant's criticism of these proofs cannot be met unless we lay bare the spectre of brute fact. This spectre can be banished if we take the Christian conception of God as the Creator of the space-time world as the presupposition of all knowledge. A true science will have to build itself upon this Christian foundation. Unless one builds upon this foundation complete scepticism stares us in the face.

Post-Kantian science has not faced this fact. It has simply reduced the ideal of complete comprehension for human knowledge from an absolute to a limiting concept. It has taken for granted with Kant that it is up to the human mind as such, as itself a brute fact, to arrange these brute facts into universals or laws as best it can. It has taken for granted that in this procedure it is on the way to truth, forgetting that the whole structure is built upon brute facts. Thus modern science has virtually assumed that the addition of zeros will produce something more than zero.

The apparent success of modern science should not blind us to the fact that the whole structure is built upon sand. The success of modern science, we believe, is due to the fact that it really works with borrowed capital. If there really were brute facts there would be no science. There can be no brute facts. All facts are, as a matter of fact, created by God. So too the mind of man is created by God. There are real universals in the world because of the creation of God. Even the mind of sinful man can see something of this in spite of his sin. Hence, though built upon a metaphysic which is basically false, the science of the non-Christian may reveal much of truth. When the prodigal son left home he was generous with his "substance." But it was really his father's substance that he expended.

With this background we can now turn to nineteenth century science. Naturally, one thinks at once of Lamarck, Darwin and DeVries. But we shall not enter upon the evolution question here with any fulness. We merely wish to point out one important matter. It was once more the assumption of the just-there-ness of facts that underlay the efforts of Lamarck, Darwin, and DeVries. Darwin thought that species derived from one another by small gradual variations. DeVries thought that there were great jumps in nature. There was a difference between Lamarck and Darwin on the question whether or not the change from one species to another is effected primarily by en-

vironment or from within. But for our purposes these differences fade into insignificance when we think of the non-Christian assumption that all three took for granted.

Neutrality

That nineteenth century science took for granted the just-there-ness of facts appears most clearly from the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Spencer's Agnosticism is really no more than Kant's philosophy restated with the help of biological terminology.

It is this Agnosticism that underlies the notion of scientific neutrality. Scientists speak a great deal of approaching the facts with an open mind. The story has been told over and over again how up to Darwin's time men had simply believed on authority that there is a God and that he has created man in his own image. Then Darwin looked at the facts dispassionately and found that man has come from the lower animals.

In reality this story is based upon a myth. Darwin took for granted the just-there-ness of facts. He took for granted that the mind of man can deal with brute facts. Thus at the outset he excluded the Christian conception of God. And what holds for Darwin holds for other scientists. It is commonly taken for granted that the scientist who begins simply with the "facts" is neutral. Yet he cannot but take the facts either as created or as non-created. If he takes them as non-created he has already at the outset excluded the notion of God's interpretation of the facts. Thus he has assumed his own mind to be the ultimate interpreter of the facts. In short, he has come to his task of interpreting facts with a non-Christian philosophy of facts.

At this point we should distinguish between what has been called impure and what has been called pure Agnosticism. Romanes makes this distinction in his book, Thoughts on Religion. He says that the agnosticism of Spencer was an impure agnosticism. He himself once held to this impure agnosticism. When a young man, he says, he was enamoured of the ideal of science as then understood. It was the ideal that man must know reality comprehensively. And he thought that this ideal could actually be realized. Accordingly he felt that there was no need for the concept of God. He even thought that the idea of God was scientifically illegitimate. But when he grew older he realized that science deals with the abstract aspects of reality only. Since that time he professed a pure instead of an impure agnosticism. This pure agnosticism he speaks of as an "attitude of reasoned ignorance touching everything that lies beyond the sphere of sense-perception – a professed inability to found valid belief on any other basis" (p. 113). Romanes holds that pure agnosticism may be distinguished from impure in that the latter welcomes evidence of all sorts while the former does not. He says: "Pure agnostics ought to investigate the religious consciousness of Christians as a phenomenon which may possibly be what Christians themselves believe it to be, i.e., of Divine origin" (Idem, p. 108). Thus, according to Romanes,

pure agnosticism is really trying to be neutral. This appears still further, according to Romanes, from the fact that pure agnosticism is not intellectualistic. Impure agnosticism, he says, would not listen to anything but the abstract arguments of the intellect. The pure agnosticism, however, concludes that: "Reason is not the only attribute of man, nor is it the only faculty which he habitually employs for the ascertainment of truth. Moral and spiritual faculties are of no less importance in their respective spheres even for everyday life; faith, trust, taste, etc. are as needful in ascertaining truth as to character, beauty, etc. as is reason. Indeed, we may take it that reason is concerned in ascertaining truth only where causation is concerned; the appropriate organs of its ascertainment where anything else is concerned belongs to the moral and spiritual region" (Idem, p. 118).

What shall we say of this "pure agnosticism" of Romanes? Does it really furnish a basis for a neutral attitude? Can Christianity get a fair hearing at the bar of the pure agnostic? Our answer is that there can be no such thing as pure agnosticism. The pure agnosticism of Romanes, no less than the impure agnosticism of Spencer, maintains that man can have knowledge of an area of brute fact. From this area God is excluded. Moreover, Romanes himself adds that whatever we may believe about the realm that is beyond scientific control, it must be in analogy with that which is known by science. He expresses his conviction on this matter in the following words: "The more remote from experience the sphere contemplated, the less value attaches to antecedent presumptions. Maximum remoteness from possible experience is reached in the sphere of the final mystery of the thing with which religion has to do, so that here all presumption has faded away into a vanishing point, and pure agnosticism is our only rational attitue" (Idem p. 116). In this manner the principle of continuity between the known and the unknown is maintained. If we are to believe in God at all, such belief must be the result of our ignorance. When we see that we cannot reach our ideal of comprehensive knowledge we allow that God may exist. He may then take care of such facts as we cannot ourselves control. Such a God is no more than a finite God. Thus pure agnosticism no less than impure agnosticism has chosen at the outset against the Christian doctrine of God.

Agnosticism in Recent Science

What difference then is there between a scientist who denies God outright and the one who says he does not know whether God exists? The difference, such as it is, can be only emotional; logically the two positions amount to the same thing.

Is the claim to neutrality and pure agnosticism still made today? Indeed it is very frequently made. We call attention to a few instances of it. In the book, Has Science Discovered God?, edited by Edward H. Cotton, a number of scientists give their views of God. Nearly all of them inform us that, of course, they are altogether neutral on the question of God's existence when they begin their investigations. So Kirtley F. Mather, a geolo-

gist, says, "Knowledge and mystery have always had a habit of appearing hand in hand, and today we are beginning to suspect that the mind of man is incapable of grappling with the ultimate reality in any truly scientific way. There may be in the cosmos that which can actually be termed the Absolute; but all we know is the relative" (p. 4). Here, as in the case of Kant, Spencer, Romanes, etc., God is brought in to take care of the remnants of the brute facts that we cannot altogether catch in the net of our understanding. Surely, to call such a God absolute is to use words without meaning.

Certain remarks of Robert A. Millikan, the great American physicist, amount to the same thing. He says: "The assumption that our feeble finite minds understand completely the basis of the physical universe is the sort of blunder that has been made over and over again throughout all periods of the world's history, and in all domains of thought. It is the essence of dogmatism – assertiveness without knowledge. This is supposed to have been the especial prerogative of religion; and there have been many religious dogmatists; but not a few of them, alas, among scientists. Every one will recognize Mr. Bryan, for example, as a pure dogmatist, but not every scientist will recognize that Ernst Haeckel was an even purer one" (p. 34). The only point Millikan is willing to concede is that science does not know everything. He does maintain that science can know much without God.

Heber D. Curtis, an astronomer, speaks of his agnosticism in the following words: "As we look back over the discarded scientific theories of the past, once regarded as inspired and now only of historical interest, we are more and more forced to the conclusion that in the final analysis any scientific theory is simply a belief" (Idem, p. 59). Accordingly he says that many scientists, especially among the elder of them, "have learned to smile a little" (p. 61). Einstein says, "Strange is the situation here upon earth. Each of us comes for a short visit, not knowing why, yet sometimes seeming to divine a purpose" (p. 93). Julian S. Huxley adds, "The first and in a way most important ingredient of any religion congruous with science must be a reverent agnosticism concerning ultimates, and, indeed, concerning many things that are not ultimates" (p. 106).

It is clearly apparent what scientific agnosticism implies. It implies not only a recognition of the fact that science has not yet covered the whole of reality with its interpretation. It implies definitely the rejection of the idea of an interpretation given by God to man. At least it implies full liberty to subject any statement of the Bible about man or the universe to the independent judgment of man. Thus the so-called attitude of neutrality is seen to involve the negation of the Christian conception of the Bible. Sir James Jeans expresses this idea repeatedly in his book The Mysterious Universe. He tells us that some millions of years ago certain stars wandered blindly through space. The sun threw certain fragments into space. Then he adds, "In course of time, we know not how, when, or why, one of these cooling fragments gave birth to life" (p. 3). Thus in the same breath we have an assertion of agnosticism, a denial of Christianity, and the assur-

ance that Chance rules the universe And this is but typical. We shall look at a few denials of the existence of the God of the Scriptures.

Outright Denials of God

In the volume spoken of above we find several of the men who have avowed their agnosticism tell us that, of course, they cannot believe in the traditional notion of God For it they substitute an idea of God that they think to be in accord with modern science.

If Kirtley F. Mather is asked whether he has discovered God he tells us that he has. "The emergence of personality in the evolutionary process is an event of transcendent importance, the full meaning of which is still unappreciated. It must have occurred, however, in response to personality-producing forces in the universe. It is to these particular portions of cosmic energy that I would apply the term God" (Has Science Discovered God? p. 9). Elsewhere he says, "To explain humanity at its best, the evolutionists must ascribe to the universe those qualities which we do well to call divine" (Science in Search of God, p. 69). Or again, "Thus in a scientific age the search for God leads to a new answer to the ancient question. The answer is theism. God is a power immanent in the universe. He is involved in the hazard of his creation. He is striving mightily to produce a perfect display in the world of sense-perception, of his own true nature" (Idem, p. 69) And if we should complain that this is a theism without transcendence, Mather would answer, "Not all the resources of the universe today are in use, even as many now used were not in use a geological period ago. In other words, the theistic God is not only immanent; he is also transcendent" (Idem, p. 72). Mather has reached this conception of God by the application of the scientific method. "In this New World the scientific method stands approved, vindicated by experience; unless it is applied to the problems of religion, the theologian cannot expect to make any permanent gains in the midst of modern civilization" (Idem, p. 28). This scientific principle has done away with all dualism, says Mather. It has taught us to apply the principle of continuity everywhere. "The dualistic philosophy which implied a conflict between rival administrators, God and Satan, or between spiritual ambitions and natural desires, was a product of a pre-scientific age" (Idem, p. 19). "With monotonous regularity the world discovers that science is right, that theology is wrong" (Idem, p. 33). Science cannot admit any authority above man. It cannot allow of a God who is transcendent in the sense that he has interpreted the facts and can reveal his interpretation of the facts to us "Science has as its goal the complete description of the universe in which we live; religion seeks to find the most abundant life which man may possess in such a universe" (Idem, p. 43). "The theologian must use the scientist's description of physical phenomena as an aid in discovering the higher values of life" (Idem, p. 45).

Thus Mather finds that by the help of the scientific method he is bound to reject the biblical notion of God and substitute for it one that is but a principle within the cosmos

As for Millikan, whose agnosticism we noted, we observe that he identifies God with nature outright. "The idea that God, or Nature, or the universe, whatever name you prefer, is not a being of caprice and whim as had been the case in all the main body of thinking of the ancient world; but . . ." (Has Science Discovered God?, p. 28). For Millikan the old idea of God is something that we gradually outgrow if we listen to the voice of science. "If, as we pass from the seven-year-old to the thirty-year-old stage of our racial development, our conceptions of God become less childishly simple, more vague and indefinite, it is because we begin to realize that our finite minds have only just begun to touch the borders of the ocean of knowledge and understanding" (Idem, p. 39).

Heber D. Curtis opposes the notion of a God concept that is fixed in the following words: "If you say that your belief in God is final and fixed, that your religious creed is inspired of him, and that no other belief is true, then I shall be offended and refuse to follow you because you are unscientific" (Idem, p. 71).

As for Einstein, we have noted that he too says we do not know why we are here in this world. Yet he is certain that the Christian idea of God is mistaken. He says: "I cannot imagine a God who rewards and punishes the objects of his creation, whose purposes are modeled after our own – a God, in short, who is but a reflection of human frailty" (Idem, p. 97). His own God is identified with the abstract ideals of goodness, beauty, and truth (p. 94).

Julian Huxley, another "agnostic," is certain that the Christian notion of God is wrong. Speaking of the relation between religion and science, he says, "Where, then, does the solution lie? It would seem to lie in dismantling the theological edifice, which will no longer bear the weight of the universe as enlarged by recent science, and attempting to find new outlets for the religious spirit. God, in any but a purely philosophical, and one is almost tempted to say, a Pickwickian, sense, turns out to be a product of the human mind. As an independent or unitary being, active in the affairs of the universe, he does not exist" (Idem, p. 105).

Sir J. Arthur Thomson speaks of the process of the unification of science. But he does not wish to have men stress the "Lowest Common Denominator" in the Universe. He would distinguish between the realm of things, the realm of organisms, and the realm of man. Then he adds, "Now along this line of thought we come upon the suggestion that God is to be thought of as the summation of all the powers of the Universe." Yet he does not wish to say that God is the "sum of all the energies" in the Universe. "Energy is a physical concept and measurable; God is a transcendental concept, of the Supreme Reality, and infinite" (Idem, p. 174). Elsewhere Thomson speaks of God as "the constitutive principle of the Universe" (Science and Religion, p. 224). But he is careful to observe that even that can be no more than a suggestion since "no man by science can find out God" (Idem, p. 100).

These examples may suffice. We can learn from them what science today means by God. Science begins with brute facts. It assumes the mind of man as the ultimate interpreter of these brute facts. The mind of man finds that it cannot actually give a comprehensive interpretation of the facts. There remains a realm of mystery. It is within this left-over area of science that God must be sought Even so he is always essentially penetrable to the human mind The realm of the mysterious as thought of by modern science is no more than the not-yet-explored The ideal of complete comprehension is maintained as a legitimate ideal.

Broadly speaking, then, we may say that post-Kantian science is neither deductive nor inductive in the pre-Kantian sense. It does not claim to be able actually to see through the infinite. It does not expect to be able to see through all reality in any given length of time. It is not rationalistic in the Leibnizian sense. Nor is it intellectualistic. For the deductive and inductive ideal it has substituted the limiting concept. This seems to be more modest. It seems to allow for the recognition of another than the intellectualistic approach to reality. It seems to make room for a spiritual realm that is somehow beyond the physical and phenomenal realm. It seems, in short, to allow for some sort of transcendence. Kant thought he had made room for faith; modern science thinks the same. Neither of them did anything of the sort. That is, neither of them allowed room, let alone make room, for the orthodox Christian faith.

Recent Science in Accord with Recent Philosophy

We may point out briefly in this connection that the God of recent science is in accord with the God of recent philosophy. In order to do this we take note of what A. Seth Pringle Pattison says in his book The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy.

In the first place recent philosophy agrees with recent science in that it holds to the idea of God as at most a limiting concept. This appears very pointedly from the emphasis placed upon the notion that all human knowledge requires an experience foundation Kant argued that there can be no rational cosmology, or psychology or theology. All possible experience, he said, must be based upon the intuitions of sense.

Pringle Pattison argues in a similar vein when he says: "Certainly, apart from our actual experience, God or the Absolute is a subject wanting for predicates, an empty form waiting to be filled" (p. 158). But Pattison does not wish to stop short with a Kantian position. He thinks we may hold that the phenomenal is an actual manifestation of the noumenal. Says he: "But we need not be at a loss for predicates: in the words of the apostle, 'The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead'" (Idem, p. 158). A little later he adds, "The nature of ultimate Reality is to be read, therefore in its manifestation, and may be read there

truly. We may be sure the revelation is not exhaustive, for all revelation must be ad modum recipientis; it must be proportionate to the capacity of the receiving mind" (Idem, p. 175).

All this sounds very orthodox. It seems to accord with the idea of Paul in Romans that the universe is the handiwork of God. Even the incomprehensibility of God seems to be taught. The finite character of our minds is urged as the sufficient reason for our limited knowledge. In reality we have here a complete denial of the orthodox doctrine of God. That this is indeed the case may be garnered from the fact that God as well as man is virtually said to be dependent upon the intuitions of sense for his knowledge of facts. For Pringle Pattison, as for Kant, all possible experience, divine as well as human, is subject to limitations. All possible experience, both divine and human, must deal with brute facts. We quote, "The most exalted intelligence must read, as we do, in the volume of God's works, to learn His nature; his knowledge like ours, is through manifestation. Though it may be truer in the sense of ampler and more adequate, and so correcting errors and solving difficulties incident to our more limited range of vision, this is but a difference of degree, not of qualitative distinction between absolute and relative, as if the one knowledge were true and the other vitiated by some inherent defect. Our knowledge is as true for us as the ampler knowledge for the higher being. Each is true as being an interpretation of the facts accessible at that particular stage. With new data comes new insight; but the new insight carries forward and incorporates the old – it does not abolish it" (Idem, p. 176). Speaking of the Absolute he says, "Of the Absolute it has been finely said, 'its predicates are the worlds.' We learn its nature through the facts of the universe, especially so far as any system or scale of values is discernible in them. This is the immanent God on our knowledge of whom it has been the purpose of this first course of lectures to insist" (Idem, p. 175). At an earlier point in the argument Pringle Pattison says, "The qualities are the modes in which the substance exists and reveals itself; to know a thing through its qualities or phenomena – its modes of action – is to know the real thing in the only way in which God or man can know anything" (Idem, p. 162). Criticising the position of T.H. Green, he adds, "To think of the world as a permanent presentation, self-presented to an eternal percipient, does not meet the case, unless we confer upon the presentation just that degree of distinct and independent existence which makes it a real object contemplated by the eternal percipient, and therefore capable of being similarly contemplated by other minds" (Idem, p. 197).

All of this shows how deeply the idea of brute fact has become imbedded in modern philosophy as well as in science. The only God modern philosophy or science will accept is one who is a fellow philosopher or fellow scientist seeking to interpret brute fact as well as he may. Such a God is not qualitatively distinct from man. He is but an hypostatization of man. Even God's universals or laws cannot envelop the whole area of brute fact. He himself is surrounded by bare possibility and mystery. Together with us he may seek to penetrate into that mystery. Together with us he may set for himself the

ideal of absolute comprehension in knowledge. But together with us that ideal will always have to be for him a limiting concept. Brute fact will always be just ahead of him as well as ahead of us

Recent Science in Accord with Recent Religion

As modern philosophy is in accord with modern science, so modern religion is in accord with both. Charles Hartshorne has recently written a book entitled Beyond Humanism, in which this agreement between modern religion on the one hand, and modern science and philosophy on the other hand, appears. Hartshorne is very critical of the Humanists. They have not given heed to the higher things of life. But like Pringle Pattison, Hartshorne rejects with scorn the idea of a God who is not essentially penetrable to the human mind. "The notion that God must be even higher than the maximal case of known variables is simply a set of words without meaning. For 'higher' is defined by these variables, or it is merely a veil for intellectual sabotage" (p. 122) Accordingly Hartshorne does not differ from J. Dewey as far as the latter's opposition to orthodox theism is concerned. "The idea of God so perfect that he eternally realizes all possible values is fatal to religion, for it makes human choice of no significance whatever. Infinite value will exist no matter what we do. 'Serving' such a God really means only serving oneself by securing his favor. But even this self-service cannot make any difference to the totality of values, since this totality is always an absolute maximum.

> "In my opinion Dewey gives here an unanswerable objection to the theism of Augustine and Aquinas. However, I cannot regard this theism as having much to do with that of the Bible" (Idem, p. 42). For the God of Augustine and Aquinas Hartshorne substitutes one who will help us strive for the ideal as a limiting concept. "The sum of the matter is that human life is in fact not merely finite, and yet, if humanists are right, is not genuinely super-finite. It is not merely finite, for each particular limit is provisional only, and progress a perpetual human obligation; yet without God the thought of the infinite ideal, by which alone this perpetual progress can be inspired, is intolerable, since its actualization is both desirable and impossible" (Idem, p. 49).

For Hartshorne, as for Pringle Pattison, God himself depends upon brute facts and gradually gathers his knowledge with respect to them. We seek the truth about the actual world; and the ideal here is the whole truth about it. But how can such a truth-whole be conceived except in terms of a perfect mind and its omniscience? However, this omniscience is of the actual world, not of all possible worlds as though they were actualized" (p. 50).

Similarly God's omnipotence is limited by brute facts. Hartshorne again agrees with Dewey in rejecting the notion of omnipotence as "complete responsibility for all that happens." "'All-powerful is taken to mean possessing

all the power there is, so that there can be no power not the power of God. If this is true, if power is not divided between God and other beings, then responsibility cannot be divided either. But the division of power, and hence of responsibility, is an analytic truth since, evil or no evil, power must be employed upon something, and that upon which it is employed must also possess some power, for the completely powerless or passive is nothing. Hence 'all-powerful' can only mean possessing all possible power over all other things, that is, all the power there is except that which is inherent in those other things by their very existence.

> "To maintain this conception of the omnipotence consistently, we have to renounce the standard theological doctrine of the 'purely active' character of God; but naturalistic theism is in any case prevented by all its major principles from accepting that doctrine. Thus it is free from any motive for asserting the responsibility of God for evil merely on the ground that evil exists. Since God must be partly passive to the actions of the creatures, of whom men are an almost infinitesimal proportion, we cannot hold that he could coerce complete harmony or goodness in these actions" (Idem, p. 54).

In these passages and throughout his book Hartshorne emphasizes his view that any true philosophy must begin and end with brute fact. It is by emphasizing this that he hopes to accomplish a complete reconciliation between science, philosophy, and religion. All three are to take brute fact for granted at the outset; all three ought to join with one another and with God in striving toward the complete understanding of the brute facts. All three, together with God, ought to realize that this ideal can, because of the bruteness of the facts, never be more than a limiting concept.

Current Definitions of God and Religion

That Hartshorne is not alone in working on this program is evidenced from the notion of religion maintained by several modern philosophers. Religion is, generally speaking, thought of as the attempt to realize ideals that mankind has set for itself. Fulton J. Sheen in his book Religion Without God has collected a number of definitions of God and of religion from recent philosophers. We give a few of them, as found in his book (p. 44 ff.).

> "Indeed the existence of a supreme being as a person external to ourselves and to the world, like a magnified human creature, is not affirmed by the religious consciousness, and if it were known to be a fact, would have no bearing on religion" (B. Bosanquet, Value and Destiny of the Individual, p. 254). "Religion is an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large" (McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, p. 3). "Religion is the force of faculty prompting to action in accordance with the highest ideals having reference to the future of the individual and race" (G.M. Irvine, Churches and Progress, pp. 13, 18). "The religious experience is best described as the experience of the

ideal, the realization of value which comes in an exalted emotional moment that makes us one with our kind, at least with the best of our kind, who might include the whole of them" (Ellsworth Faris, Journal of Religion, Vol. VI, N.3, May 1926, p. 241). "Religion is the projection in the roaring loom of time of a concentration or unified complex of psychical values" (Jos. Leighton, Man and Cosmos, p. 545). "Whether God exists or not, is not important to the nature of religion" (R. Eucken, Truths of Religion, p. 129). "Religion is the projection and pursuit of ideal personal relations with the universe and man – Because it is a projection and pursuit, religion is an ever moving process in the direction of complete personal adjustment and control in man's total environment" (Edwin E. Aubrey, The Nature of Religion, Journal of Religion, 1925, pp. 189-191). "God is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always a relation of entity to ideal: Reality regarded from the standpoint of its favorableness or unfavorableness, to human life, and prescribing for the latter the propriety of a certain attitude" (Ralph B. Perry, The Approach to Philosophy, p. 66). "Faith in God is synonymous with the brave hope that the universe is friendly to the ideals of man" (A.E. Haydon, Journal of Religion, March 1927, p. 128).

This may suffice. It would not be difficult to garner similar utterances from other thinkers. There will be occasion to speak further of the matter when we discuss the psychology of religious literature. We merely observe here that recent science, recent philosophy, and recent theology agree with one another. They are basically opposed to the Christian position. The immanentistic finite God, the God penetrable to the human mind, the God who is an aspect of the cosmos, the God who is the unexplored realm of the mysterious, is the fruit and ripe result of the application of the modern scientific method. If the "scientific method" of today is a true scientific method, this conclusion is inevitable But we have seen that the scientific method is based upon the philosophy of chance. This philosophy of chance, or of brute fact, destroys human predication. Upon its basis there is no connection between one fact and another fact. We shall have to bring the matter back to this fundamental point again and again. Christian theism alone can vanquish the spectre of brute fact.

Chapter VI

CREATION AND PROVIDENCE

In the preceding chapter we dealt with modern science and what it says about God. We turn now to the questions of creation and providence. In the following chapter we take up the question of teleology. In this way we cover the field of theism as it is usually divided. The first chapter dealt with the question of being. That is the problem of the ontological argument. The present chapter deals with the question of causation. That is the problem of cosmology. The following chapter deals with the question of purpose. That is the question of teleology.

It is a well-known fact that Kant had essentially the same type of criticism to make on all three of the theistic proofs. In fact he led them all back to the ontological proof. His criticism was that the "proofs" imply an illegitimate jump from man's knowledge of the phenomenal world to reality beyond possible experience. Thought as such is an abstraction, says Kant. It is only in connection with the intuitions of sense-experience that it has meaning. Therefore it is impossible to extend thought to a realm beyond experience.

Applying this criticism to the concept of causality Kant finds that it is a category that is immanent in experience. The concept of causation is subordinate to that of explanation and explanation must be immanent within the universe. Explanation must be something that is within reach of the human mind.

Kant holds that if we seek to conclude from a series of causes that we observe in the phenomenal world to a cause of the world itself we contradict our own principle of explanation. It would mean that thereis a God who is not penetrable to the human mind. He would be beyond our possible experience. In this manner we should involve ourselves in contradiction. We should then have a God who was supposed to have caused or determined all things. That would destroy our freedom. That would destroy the contingency of temporal events. We would then be back to a position similar to that of Leibniz. We would also be doing violence to brute fact.

Just now we said that Kant thinks of the creation idea as bringing us back to a position similar to that of Leibniz. In reality Leibniz and Kant agree in holding to an exclusively immanentistic principle of interpretation. Both would substitute reason for causation when the universe as a whole is up for discussion. Both would follow a principle of continuity that avoids any real transcendence. But Kant does not think reason can envelop the whole area of brute fact. More than that he does not think reason can comprehensively interpret even one brute fact. Reason deals with universals. It must deal with universals. It seeks to bring individual brute facts into relation with one another. To do this it must subtract from the uniqueness of

individuals. When an individual is treated as a member of a class and we make general statements about the class we have subtracted from the uniqueness of that individual. I may put an individual into ever so many classes. Then I may add what I have said about each one of those classes. Still I will not have exhausted the meaning of the individual.

Accordingly I must give up the notion of absolute truth. With all my categories I can but express aspects of the truth. Brute fact will never allow itself to be completely caught in the net of my categories. There will always be more of brute fact for me to catch. When I apply the category of causality to the brute facts that meet me I do throw light on an aspect of the behavior of brute fact. But I can never apply the category of causality to the existence of brute fact itself. That would mean that I had explained the whole of brute fact. But when I claim to have explained the whole of brute fact I involve myself into contradiction and thus deny my own principle of explanation. If I am to continue to claim that I can explain anything at all I shall have to give up claiming to be able to explain everything, and even that everything is essentially explicable by the human mind.

Thus modern irrationalism as it is based upon Kant is in no sense a return to Christian theism. It is rather a desperate effort to save the principle of exclusively immanentistic interpretation from bankruptcy. In the hands of the rationalists the principle had involved itself in complete self-contradiction. To avoid this contradiction and yet save the immanentistic character of interpretation, Kant emphasized more than ever the bruteness of brute facts. That seemed to release the strain between categories. Instead of each claiming to be supreme over the whole area of reality they could divide the territory. Or rather they could be thought of as each contributing a number to the program of intellectual interpretation. And even the whole program does not claim to represent the exclusive interest of the brute facts.

All this does not mean that Kant and modern philosophy after him have no patience with any sort of creation idea. On the contrary Kant held the creation idea to be useful as a limiting concept. Human thought must seek to interpret brute facts as far as it can with the help of its own categories. Using the category of substance as a functional aspect of reality it must see how far it can explain reality with the help of it. Using the category of causality as functional it must think back as far as it can and see how far it can explain reality with the help of it. Using the category of purpose it must look forward as far as it can and see how far it can explain reality with the help of this category. If thus used as limiting concepts, the application of the categories does no injustice to brute fact. And if thus used as a limiting concept the application of the categories to brute facts does no violence to the exclusively immanentistic character of the principle of explanation. The creation idea does not then lead to a really transcendent God.

It will now be apparent that modern thought and Christianity stand squarely opposed to one another on the creation concept. If anywhere the

contrast ought to be clear at this point. Brute fact is the issue. Modern thought assumes it. Assuming brute fact God is thereby reduced to the level of man. He is at most a co-interpreter of brute fact. His thought is therefore not on a higher level than the thought of man. Man does not need to await the interpretation of fact by God before he gives his own final interpretation.

Over against this Christianity holds that God is the creator of every fact. There are therefore no brute facts. Thus God's thought is placed back of every fact. Thereby man's thought is made subject to God's thought in the interpretation of every fact. There is not a single fact that man can interpret rightly without reference to God as the creator of that fact. Man cannot truly apply the category of causality to facts without the presupposition of God. It is God who has caused all facts to stand in a certain relation to one another. Man must seek to discover that relation.

As Christians we join the battle with modern thought at this point in a life and death struggle. We maintain that unless God has caused the existence of the universe, there would be no possibility of scientific thought. Facts would then be utterly unrelated. No two of them could be brought into any sort of relation with one another. We could not even think of the categories of human thought as revealing aspects of reality without the presupposition of God.

But this also implies that God must really be taken as the presupposition of the possibility of human interpretation. If with Butler we first allow the non-theistic principle of exclusively immanentistic interpretation for an area of human life, we have no further argument against modern thought. For us to allow that we can interpret any one fact without God is to maintain the bruteness of that fact. It is also to reduce God's thought to the level of man's thought. It is to make of God a finite God. We can then at best prove the existence of a finite God. We can in that case never prove the existence of the Creator of heaven and of earth. He has been excluded from the outset.

Recent Philosophy and the Creation Idea

Before turning to a consideration of recent science and its attitude to the creation idea, we note what post-Kantian philosophy has to say on the subject. Has there been any change from the attitude of Kant? The answer is that, if possible, there is a still more vehement rejection of the biblical creation idea than in the case of Kant. The pragmatic types of philosophy naturally have no use for the creation idea. To them reality has simply sprung from bare possibility. It is only in the idealist types of philosophy that any place is found for a creation concept. But the idealist types no less than the pragmatist types reject the biblical notion of creation. In this they but follow ancient idealism. Like ancient idealism modern idealism has no place for a real creation idea because it holds to the notion of an exclusively immanentistic principle of interpretation.

The more extreme of absolute idealists, such as Bradley and Bosanquet, are very outspoken in their opposition to the traditional creation idea. It is only among those who reacted against absolute idealism that we seem to find some appreciation of creation. But even they are careful to distinguish their creation concept from the traditional one. So for instance A. Seth Pringle Pattison, who led the personalist revolt against the absolutist idealists says: "The first feature in the ordinary idea of creation to which I wish to draw attention is that creation is regarded as an event which took place at a definite date in the past, to which we can remount by a temporal and causal regress" (The Idea of God, p. 299). He is amazed to find that "so able a theologian" as the late Professor Flint "should think of creation as an event." He then discusses Flint's argument for temporal creation. Flint, he says, examines the universe to see whether it gives evidence of being an event. "And," he says, "because such an examination reveals mutability stamped upon every particular fact in the universe, even its apparently most stable formations – so that each may be treated as an event dependent on a previous event, a phase in a universal process of transformation – we have the extraordinary conclusion drawn that the universe as a whole is an event or effect in the same sense. But surely such an argument is an example in excelsis of the fallacy of Composition." Then he adds: "It is difficult to understand the importance attached by many theologians to a temporal origin of the physical universe, if we have abandoned the geocentric hypothesis and its corollaries" (Idem, p. 300).

On this we may remark as follows. The criticism of Pattison with respect to Flint is to the point. No defense of the creation idea can be made if we assume that the category of causality is already intelligible to some extent without it. The creation idea offers itself as the presupposition of the applicability of the causality concept. If the causality-concept is thought to be applicable within reality without the presupposition of the creation idea we cannot reason on to the creation idea. But though the criticism of Flint is to the point this does not prove that the creation idea is just a hobby of theologians. Without the creation idea as applied to the whole universe there would be no fruitful application of the causality concept within the universe

Pattison continues to speak of the creation of the world by a "self involved Deity," and says: "But such a conception of creation belongs to the same circle of ideas as the waving of a magician's wand. It has no place either in serious thinking or in genuine religion. It was an old gibe of the Epicureans, familiar in Cicero's day, to ask what God did before He created the heavens and the earth, and how He came to choose just then to create them, after forbearing to do so for so many ages – a flippancy, no doubt, but a flippancy provoked in some measure by the shallow anthropomorphism of the doctrine assailed" (p 303). He says that Augustine did not really answer this question when he stated that time itself was created by God. "The world on his theory, still had an absolute origin and, even if it had never existed at all, the self-existent being of God would have been in no way affected. And this external and almost accidental relation between the two is inevitably

implied in phrases which speak of divine existence 'before the world was.' But this solitary, ante-mundane Figure is the residuum of a primitive and pictorial fashion of thinking, a magnified man, but rarified to bare mind, after the analogy of Aristotle's pure thought, and left standing apart from the world he is invoked to explain" (p. 304).

This passage affords an interesting illustration of the real reason why the creation notion is rejected. The creation notion involves the notion of the self-sufficient God. The existence of such a God would destroy the self-sufficiency of human explanation and life. It would destroy the assumed sufficiency of the exclusively immanentistic principle of explanation. "A God so conceived," says Pattison, "is an Absolute in the old bad sense of a being existing by itself with no essential relations to anything else." "But if God is the principle through which the world becomes intelligible, His relation to the world cannot be of the merely incidental character indicated. If the universe is to be understood through God, the nature of God must no less be expressed in the universe and understood through it" (Idem, p. 304).

In his book The Idea of God, C.A. Beckwith expresses the same sentiment: "And even if the atoms themselves may be conceived of as having had a beginning of their present form the energy out of which they arose must be affirmed to be eternal. . . What we term cause has no other signification than uniform and concomitant variation among phenomena" (N.Y. 1922, p. 119). So also J.E. McTaggart in his book, Some Dogmas of Religion, says that the notion of a changeless cause outrages reason, (p. 196 ff.). C.F. D'Arcy argues in a similar fashion when he says, "It is quite possible to conceive a Deity who is not quite good, as we think of goodness, but to imagine such a being as the Sovereign Power of the Universe is to our minds absolutely intolerable" (Theory of a Limited Deity, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1917-1918, p. 164). Again we note the words of M.C. Carroll to the effect that: "Ultimate questions as to the value of this universe are obviously meaningless, since this universe as a whole is the final value and the standard of values" (Philosophical Review 1921, p. 183 , article on The Nature of the Absolute in the Metaphysics of Bernard Bosanquet).

James Ward tells us that there is not one point on which philosophers are so well agreed as on the fact that God has not created the world. (Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. II, p. 120). He adds: "We cannot begin from God and construct the universe" (p. 120). Or again: "If the categories of substance and causality are only valid within experience they cannot be applied to experience as a whole. Whatever implications experience may involve, it surely cannot involve that of transcending itself. Such miscalled transcendence, if it have any validity, must really be immanence at bottom" (Idem, p. 129). In his book The Realm of Ends, Ward reasons in a similar manner. He says: ". . . the solution of our problem . . .ultimately turns on the reality of the individual existence" (p. 282). Here is the heart of the matter. The creation idea would destroy not only the ultimacy of brute fact, but also the ultimacy of the human mind. A created mind cannot consistently act in an autonomous fashion. A non-created mind can.

Modern thought assumes that determinate experience itself springs from the void. It takes for granted that brute facts have somehow of themselves formed themselves in such order that the categories of cause and substance can be applied to them. Against this we maintain that there would be no determinate experience unless God exists as absolutely self-determined Experience.

With the rejection of the creation idea goes the rejection of the transcendence of God. Says Ward: "In calling God transcendent we seek only to express that duality of subject and object which we take as fundamental total spiritual being, not to suggest that his relation to the world must be thought under the category of external causation, like the interaction of object with object" (Idem, p. 447).

This may suffice to intimate the hostility of recent philosophy to the creation idea of Scripture. It is with this background that we now ask whether recent science is in accord with recent philosophy on this point.

Recent Science and the Creation Doctrine

The first point we should be careful to note again is that the mere assumption of brute fact is in itself a denial of the creation doctrine. Moreover, it is a denial of the creation doctrine on a priori grounds. We have found that post-Kantian science claims not to be a priori in its method. Even mathematicians like Sir James Jeans and Professor Eddington claim to test their mathematical speculations by experience. But when it comes to the very first step of scientific procedure all non-Christian scientists are equally a priori in their methods.

Taking brute facts for granted scientists must also take for granted the ultimacy of the human mind. If there are brute facts God is not all-comprehensive in his interpretation. He is then finite. Therefore man is on a par with him. Man's thought is then not subordinate to God's thought.

We do not wonder that scientists who build upon these non-theistic assumptions will find no evidence for the creation doctrine in the universe. They may say they are perfectly open-minded on the question. They may profess agnosticism about origins. They may even affirm belief in creation. It all amounts to the same things.

It is now quite generally admitted that the first generation of evolutionists were really philosophers as much as scientists. They taught cosmic evolution back of biological evolution. Herbert Spencer and John Fiske did much to popularize the notion of cosmic evolution. Recently scientists are said to be more careful. They are specialists who do not readily go beyond their province. But let us listen to some of them.

James Jeans tells us about some of the new discoveries in astronomy and physical science. In the foreword to his book The Mysterious Universe, he says: "The question at issue is ultimately one for philosophic discussion.

but before the philosophers have a right to speak, science ought first to be asked to tell all she can as to ascertained facts and provisional hypotheses." As a scientist he then tells us what he thinks in the first four chapters. Of the fifth chapter he says: "The last chapter stands on a different level. Every one may claim the right to draw his own conclusions from the facts presented by modern science." We should therefore expect that in the first four chapters Jeans would carefully limit himself to scientifically controllable material. Nevertheless we have given to us a complete cosmogony at the outset. He says that "some two thousand million years ago" a certain star wandered about near the sun. The result was that the sun threw off planets into space. The earth is one of those planets. It gradually cooled. Then he speaks of the origin of life as follows: "In course of time, we know not how, when, or why, one of these cooling fragments gave birth to life. It started in simple organisms whose vital capacities consisted of little beyond reproduction and death. But from these humble beginnings emerged a stream of life which, advancing through ever greater and greater complexity, has culminated in beings whose lives are largely centered in their emotions and ambitions, their aesthetic appreciations, and the religions in which their highest hopes and noblest aspirations lie enshrined" (p. 3). A little later he adds: "Into such a universe we have tumbled, if not exactly by mistake, at least as the result of what may properly be described as an accident. The use of such a word need not imply any surprise that our earth exists, for accidents will happen, and if the universe goes on for long enough, every conceivable accident is likely to happen in time. It was, I think, Huxley who said that six monkeys, set to strum unintelligently on typewriters for millions of millions of years would be found in time to write all the books in the British Museum" (p. 4). The concluding sentence of the book of Jeans reads as follows: "So that our main contention can hardly be that science of today has a pronouncement to make, perhaps it ought rather to be that science should leave off making pronouncements: the river of knowledge has too often turned back on itself." But it would seem that Jeans made a fairly comprehensive pronouncement at the outset. It is the announcement that the universe came by Chance. It is the announcement that the creation idea must at the outset be assumed to be wrong.

Yet we may observe that the last sentence of Jeans' book is in reality a pronouncement no less than the one given from the beginning. It is a pronouncement of agnosticism. Jeans argues that science in the nature of the case deals with universals only. It can merely give us "pointer readings" of the facts. We should observe that such agnosticism is natural if one begins with brute facts. In fact the agnosticism ought to be more thorough than it is. Science cannot even give "pointer-readings" without the creation idea. If it does it is in spite and not because of its method.

The second man we look at briefly is H. Levy. In his book The Universe of Science he tells us: "There is no ultimate philosophy for an eminently practical venture like science" (London 1932, p. 79). That would seem to allow room for the possibility of creation. But Levy leaves no room for creation. He says that science proceeds by the process of isola-

tion. It takes the brute facts and studies isolated aspects of them. "Science, like common sense, sets out in the first instance to search for systems that can be imagined as isolated from their setting in the universe without appreciably disturbing their structure and the process they present. Here is a child. Almost as soon as the term child has been applied to it we have effected the isolation, for, in thought at any rate, we have dismissed its history, its family relationships, its home and its country. We have isolated it by classifying it in this case, by merging it tentatively with other objects under the general heading CHILD" (p. 43). But if we should fear that in this method the individuality of the object investigated may be lost Levy says: "This method of isolation by detailed classification does not destroy individuality or uniqueness. It merely examines it by disclosing the unique combination of isolated systems that the object possesses (p. 46). We need not follow Levy any further in his analysis of the scientific method. Our main concern is to point out that back of his method lies the assumption of fact as brute fact. Back of his whole procedure also lies the assumption that revelation can have nothing to do with scientific investigation. Speaking of scientists and their hypotheses he says: "If, in the development of their theories, they make demands on the Universe so exorbitant that the experimenter cannot meet these claims, then repudiation must be his only alternative. For in the last resort he is the arbiter" (p. 65). It is not so much then a direct denial of creation that we find in the book of Levy. He simply does not need the creation doctrine in the whole of his scientific procedure. And this is from the Christian point of view no better than a flat denial of creation.

This assumption that in the whole of scientific procedure we need not take the creation doctrine into consideration is common among scientists. So, for instance, C.D. Broad has a very thorough work on science and its procedure entitled Scientific Thought. Among other things he brings science into relation with philosophy. Philosophy itself, he says, consists of two parts. There is critical and there is speculative philosophy. In the past men have indulged in working out speculative schemes without due respect for the facts of science. But "One's Speculative Philosophy tends to be influenced to an altogether undue extent by the state of one's liver and the amount of one's bank balance" (London, 1927, p. 21). We must therefore listen first to what science has to say. Then we can turn to critical philosophy. It takes the notions of science and evaluates them. After that we can form such speculative theories as we can. Broad himself does not enter upon the field of speculative philosophy in this book. He limits himself, he says, to critical philosophy. In fact, however, there is back of his critical philosophy and his scientific method the speculative assumption that facts are just there. He has assumed that creation is not back of the facts.

What is true about Broad is also true about Sir Arthur Eddington in his recent book, New Pathways in Science. He is willing to admit that science cannot give us a full interpretation of life. "Science is an attempt to read the cryptogram of experience; it sets in order the facts of sensory experience of human beings Every one will agree that this attempt has met with considerable success but it does not start quite at the beginning of the Problem of

Experience. The first question asked about scientific facts and theories, such as we have been discussing in this book is, 'Are they true?' I would emphasize that even more significant than the scientific conclusions themselves is the fact that this question so urgently arises about them" (New York, 1935, p. 310). This sounds very encouraging. It would seem that here a scientist is really going to ask about the origin of facts. At last we seem to have found a modern scientist who realizes that the nature of facts is one thing if they have been created and another if they have not been created. But we are disillusioned in the very next sentence after the one given. "The question 'Is it true?' changes the complexion of the world of experience – not because it is asked about the world, but because it is asked in the world. When we go right back to the beginning, the first thing we must recognize in the world of experience is something intent on truth – something to which it matters intensely that beliefs should be true" (p. 211). Thus even when Eddington wants to ask about ultimate issues he definitely declines to ask the question about the origin of the universe. Even when he asks the question, "What is the ultimate truth about ourselves" (p. 311), Eddington leaves the creation idea out of the picture. When he does give us his own speculative philosophy it is similar to that of Jeans, as the following quotation shows: "It seems that normally matter collects in big masses with excessively high temperature, and the formation of small cool globes fit for habitation is a rare occurrence. Nature seems to have been intent on a vast evolution of fiery worlds, an epic or milliards of years. As for Man – it seems unfair to be raking against Nature her one little inadvertance. By a trifling hitch of machinery – not of any serious consequence in the development of the universe – some lumps of matter of the wrong size have occasionally been formed. These lack the purifying protection of intense heat or the equally efficacious absolute cold of space. Man is one of the gruesome results of this occasional failure of antiseptic precautions" (p.310). We are not surprised that Eddington should come to such conclusions about man. He began with the assumption of a philosophy of chance; he would naturally end with a philosophy of chance.

We cannot continue our discussion of this point. Modern science has at best proceeded along the lines just now indicated in the case of Eddington. William Cecil Dampier-Whetham in his book A History of Science (New York 1931) shows this very thoroughly. We give merely an instance of what he brings out throughout his book. Speaking of geology in the nineteenth century he says: "Nevertheless, attempts made to explain how the Earth reached its present state were still forced into conformity with biblical cosmogonies involving cataclysmic origins by water or by fire.

"The first to content systematically against these views was James Hutton (1726-1797), who published his Theory of the Earth in 1785. Once more a practical acquaintance with natural processes paved the way for scientific advance" (p. 289). The idea of Dampier-Whetham is that the creation notion was based upon speculation, while the evolution theory was based upon sober scientific investigation.

From what has been said so far some may infer that most scientists today deny that the universe had an origin at all. We are not greatly concerned about this point. Some scientists think the earth has had a beginning: others think it has had no beginning. Sir James Jeans is quoted by Dampier-Whetham as follows: "Everything points with overwhelming force to a definite event, or series of events, of creation some time or times, not infinitely remote. The universe cannot have originated by chance out of its present ingredients, and neither can it have been always the same as now. For in either of these events no atoms would be left save such as are incapable of dissolving into radiation; there would be neither sunlight nor starlight but only a cool glow of radiation uniformly diffused through space. This is, indeed so far as present-day science can see, the final end towards which all creation moves, and at which it must at long last arrive" (From James Jeans, Eos, or the Wider Aspects of Cosmogony, London, 1928, p. 55; Whetham p. 483). We have already quoted from Jeans' book The Mysterious Universe to show that for Jeans there is nothing but chance back of the universe. It does not help us then if modern scientists do hold to "creation" if they think of this creation as springing into being by chance out of the void.

The total picture we obtain from both modern science and modern philosophy is a complete rejection of the biblical notion of creation. It matters not whether this rejection comes in the form of an outright negation in the form of agnosticism or in the form of substituting another meaning for the word creation. As orthodox Christians we have to face the fact that we are at this point, as along the whole line of thought, out of accord with modern thought. And it is at this point that the weakness of the method of defense of Christianity as advocated by Butler appears most clearly. It was based upon the assumption of brute facts and man's ability, apart from God, to explain at least some of them. If one grants this much one cannot present any argument against modern science on the question of creation. The assumption of brute fact is itself the most basic denial of the creation doctrine. And the assumption that man can of himself interpret brute facts is itself the denial of God as Creator. We need therefore to challenge the very idea of brute fact. We need to challenge man's ability to interpret any fact unless that fact be created by God and unless man himself is created by God.

Providence

What we have said in the first part of this chapter with respect to Kant and modern philosophy applies to the concept of providence as much as to the concept of creation. We can, for that reason, now be brief in our discussion of providence. Then, too, those who do not accept creation are not likely to accept providence. Accordingly we do not really expect to find any acceptance of the providence doctrine in modern science.

As Christians we believe that God has made the facts of this world and the laws of this world. He has made the facts and the laws for one another. Moreover, he continues to support both facts and laws. This support and guidance of both facts and laws we call providence. To this we must add a

word about "special Providence." The Christian position holds that God has a sovereign control over the history of this universe. He may at any time add new factors to the course of its development. The notion of the catastrophic is inherent in the Christian philosophy of history. When we say this we are not thinking of redemption and its miracles. The idea of the catastrophic precedes the idea of redemption. The idea of the catastrophic comes to a specific form of expression in redemptive miracle. But we must not anticipate our discussion of teleology. We merely wish to intimate that in the discussion of providence we are really discussing one aspect of the whole question of the philosophy of history. The other aspect is discussed in the question of teleology.

For the moment then we wish to limit ourselves chiefly to a consideration of what is generally called natural law. Or, to be still more specific, we wish to speak of physical law. What does modern science think of physical law?

In general this question may be answered by saying that science takes for granted the ultimacy of law as it takes for granted the ultimacy of facts. This is involved in its rejection of the creation doctrine. And this makes a biblical notion of providence impossible. The basic difference between a Christian and a non-Christian concept of providence is found at this point. It is not merely a question of whether a person believes that God can suddenly intervene with a special supernatural act in nature. It is that, as noted above. But even before that we hit upon the question of the foundation of law itself. It is not only on the question of special occurrences in nature that we differ with modern science; it is on the question of the basis of natural law itself that the rift appears. The Butler type of apologetic has failed to observe this basic point. As it has not questioned the legitimacy of the assumption of brute facts so it has not at every point challenged the legitimacy of the assumption of self-contained, ultimate laws. It has granted that science can make a true explanation of brute facts with the help of impersonal laws. It is only when this process goes so far as to explain away the specific doctrines of Christianity that the Butler type of apologetics has demurred. Instead of this we should challenge the notion of brute law as we should challenge the notion of brute fact.

The question of an exclusively immanentistic explanation meets us very pointedly here. It is by the laws of physics that the physical phenomena are supposed to be explained. No physical fact is said to be explained unless it fits into the scheme of physical law. We have already spoken of this in our discussion of the method of evidences. The point we wish to emphasize here is that even if science were willing to admit the occurrence of the "special providence" in some sense, it would still give a completely anti-Christian explanation of physical phenomena. It would still assume that laws are self-sufficient in the sense that they are not created and sustained by God. God would be left out of the picture.

To make plain what we mean on this matter we may refer to some scientists to see what they say about providence. J. Arthur Thomson speaks of

the matter in his book Science and Religion, as follows: "The religious concept refers to a Spiritual Order, which can only be spiritually discerned. It is the glimmering of an idea that behind all is the will of God. It is the idea of a Creation which was not an event over and done with unthinkable millions of years ago, but remains as an enduring Divine thought. But God's relation to His world must remain entirely beyond man's comprehension. The Divine Imagining is beyond man's imagination.

"One way of thinking of it we may safely exclude. We must not think of something Divine that underpins the material universe and its physical correlate It seems inconceivable that the world should need any underpinning, else were there great imperfection in the creative institution of the Order of Nature. It is more conceivable that the 'irreducibles,' such as electrons and mind, which were the work of His hands, were quite able for that work that He gave them to do" (New York, 1925, p. 56). Later he adds: "In objecting to the idea of underpinning, or the secondary subsidising of natural processes with grants from a spiritual treasury, we are not departing from our belief in God, as 'the constitutive principle of the Universe,' the source and home of all the order" (p. 124).

It may appear difficult to understand why Thomson should be so sure that the idea of "underpinning" the universe may be safely excluded. Is it easy to conceive that the "irreducibles" of which he speaks are self-sufficient? He does, to be sure, say that these "irreducibles" have been created by God. But the God who has "created" them is himself, by definition, but an aspect of the universe. Thus the "irreducibles" are really taken as self-sufficient. We do not think it is conceivable that the"irreducibles" of the universe should be self-sufficient. At any rate Thomson himself must admit that he is in the realm of speculative philosophy here. He should have given a philosophical justification of his position.

The real reason why Thomson feels he must exclude the idea of providence is that it would be inimical to the notion of an exclusively immanentistic principle of interpretation. It would mean that God might at any moment bring in the catastrophic And even back of that it would mean that God's interpretation would have to be recognized in the investigation of every fact. And this is intolerable to modern science.

Indeterminacy in Physics

At this juncture it may be questioned whether science is insistent upon a principle of continuity in its interpretation. Has not the conception of natural law changed in recent times? Has not a good deal been made of the fact that law is no longer thought of as absolute? Pre-Kantian science, we are told, whether of the rationalistic or of the inductivist variety, thought of physical law as absolute. Then Kant came. He showed that law is a subjective contribution to the knowledge situation. Its meaning was limited to possible experience There is an area about which the mind cannot legislate. The reign of law is not universal. We can never subsume the whole of reality un-

der the domain of law. Science deals with abstractions - Thomson speaks of this when he says of the scientific method: "It is not the only kind of knowledge; it is partial and abstract, for it deliberately restricts itself to verifiable factors that can be measured or registered, observed again and again, and even experimented with" (op. cit., p. 165). Jeans and Eddington make a good deal of the abstract character of science. C.E.M. Joad in two recent books speaks of it again and again, (Guide to Modern Thought and Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science). The point of this fact that science deals with abstractions is that it can, accordingly, never determine the individual completely. It can never explain the individual object without residue. It is therefore impossible to predict the future of any individual with absolute precision. When we deal with prediction about the behavior of individuals we can merely speak of likelihoods and probabilities. To the extent that our universals such as causation enlighten us about an aspect of individual things they can only tell us what the likely behavior of individual behavior will be.

To this argument from the abstract character of science we must add another. We are told by many scientists today that there is "free-will" in the atom. In describing scientific theory Joad says: "The atom is not in a constant condition; it may absorb energy from without or radiate energy outwards. When it does the former, an electron jumps from an inner to an outer orbit; when the latter, from an outer to an inner. A peculiar property of these electronic jumps is that the jumping does not appear to pass over the intervening space between the orbit of departure and the orbit of arrival. It is simply observed to turn up in a new orbit, having last been observed in a different orbit: so far as the evidence takes us, one might be justified in saying that it goes out of existence in one place and comes into existence again at another. Another peculiar property of the jumps is that we do not know when they will occur or why. They seem, in fact, so far as our knowledge goes at present, to be uncaused" (Guide to Modern Thought, New York, 1933, p. 80).

These two arguments, the one from the abstractness of science and the one from the "free will" in the atom amount virtually to the same things as far as the question of law is concerned. Both arguments tell us that science cannot predict completely. Prediction itself is limited to aspects or aggregates of reality. The individual object cannot be completely explained. It is once more brute fact that appears more brute than ever. Accordingly laws have to be thought of as being no more than statistical averages. As statistical averages physical laws tell us what is likely to be true of a certain individual. The individual reveals an aspect of itself as a member of the class about which the law speaks. The individual may reveal several aspects of itself as it is a member of several classes. "Laws of behavior are generalized statements of what has occurred in the past. They can be nothing more. They are based on past evidence and have no guaranteed validity for the future. In this sense there is no determinism in science or anywhere" (H. Levy, The Universe of Science, p. 140).

This conception of physical law as merely statistical average has in recent times been used in order to show that science is favorable to the no-

tion of providence. But if we look at the matter carefully it appears that statistical law is no more favorable to the doctrine of providence than is absolute law. In the first place statistical law, as thought of by scientists, is no less deterministic than absolute law. The admissions that science deals with abstractions only, that there is "free will" in the atom, or that the laws of behavior are merely generalized statements about past experience do not imply that law, as far as it goes, is any the less deterministic than it was before. They only imply that law cannot go as far as men formerly thought it could go. It only implies that the behavior of a certain individual cannot be completely predicted.

But it will be said at this point that recent science is basically indeterminist in its philosophy. Must not recent science be contrasted with the science of Leibniz and the other rationalists, on the point of determinism? Is there not a basic metaphysical irrationalism at the root of recent science? Granted this be true, and there is much truth in it, even so the principle of continuity is not given up by science. The ideal of complete comprehension is before the mind of the recent scientist no less than it was before the mind of Leibniz. Even if he grants that he can never in any given finite time expect to predict completely, he will not allow that his prediction, as far as it can, in the nature of the case, reach the individual, is not self-sufficient. For him the unique individual is a "not yet explored" something. His prediction may be based upon a philosophy of chance or indeterminism. In that case the scientist will assume that the laws are chance collocations of facts. But all this will for him have nothing to do with God's creation of or providence over facts.

Having clearly seen the basic difference between the modern concept of physical law and the doctrine of providence we can more readily understand that modern science cannot allow for the idea of the supernatural. To allow for the idea of the supernatural is to allow for the idea of the sovereign transcendent God. On an indeterminist basis science can and does indeed allow for the strange and weird. The strange or the weird are for science nothing more than the individual that cannot be wholly explained, or the individual that is an exception to statistical law. We shall not here deal with the concept of the miraculous. That will come under the question of redemption. The supernatural is inherent in the very bedrock of theism. Without recognizing it we have not recognized providence. A sovereign God cannot be subjected to experiment. He may do something that will not fit into our schemes. But science cannot accept that which is not open to experiment.

Before concluding this chapter we may call particular attention to the fact that involved in the notions of creation and providence is the notion of revelation. If the universe is created by God and if it is maintained by God it is itself a revelation of God on a finite scale. But if God's providence is over this world he may at any moment introduce, as we have observed, new factors into the development. Similarly God may speak to man when he pleases in a supernatural fashion. We believe that he has done this in the

Scripture. In fact our doctrine of creation and our doctrine of providence come from the Scripture. As sinners we could get it nowhere else. Calvin brings this out in his Institutes when he says that the sinner needs must be told by God not only that he is a sinner but also that he is a creature. It is the characteristic of the sinner that he will not consider himself to be a creature of God. He feels this to be too humiliating for him. If he is a creature of God he must submit to God. But sin is the declaration of man's independence from God. Sinful man seeks to be autonomous. Thus the rejection of the Bible itself implies the rejection of creation and providence. On the other hand, those who accept creation or providence cannot logically reject the Bible. Sinful man is as much opposed to the one as to the other; saved man accepts the one as well as the other.

This does not mean that we hold creation or providence to be merely a matter of revelation in the sense that it is not rationally defensible. On the contrary we hold that though we must, as sinners, get these doctrines from the Bible, they are indeed defensible. With them it is as with the rest of the Bible teaching; unless they be true there can be no interpretation of anything without them. The world of facts would be utterly discrete. There would be no laws at all. There would be none to interpret the facts and the laws. We need them because we need the self-sufficient God as the presupposition of our experience.

Chapter VII

TELEOLOGY

The question of teleology must now engage our attention. In it we deal more specifically with the Christian philosophy of history. Christianity presupposes the self-sufficient God. It is within the ontological trinity that we find a self-sufficient purpose. When God created the universe he created it for and unto himself. By his providence God sustains the universe in order to realize his ultimate purpose with it.

It follows from this that there is purpose within the universe because God has a purpose for the universe. Every purpose within the universe must, in the last analysis, be referred to God. Without this reference to God no purpose within the universe has meaning.

It follows also that every fact within the universe has a purpose, or function to fulfill. Even that which we think of as mechanical has a purpose. Mechanical laws are, from the ultimate point of view, completely teleological.

It follows still further that the universe is organically teleological. This is true in a twofold sense. In the first place the "mechanical" is subordinate to that which is self-consciously teleological. Man was created prophet, priest, and king over the universe. This places a connection between the vicissitudes of man and the universe. In the second place the events of earlier history are preparatory to the events of later history. There is an increasing purpose through history. God is gradually reaching a climax with history. Every event leads up to that climax and contributes to it. That is the Christian notion of progress. The universe is successful; the Christian is an optimist: he alone can be an optimist.

If we think more particularly of man in this teleological scheme we have the following. Man's thoughts and acts have meaning and fulfill a purpose, just because of God's purpose with all things. Man thinks analogically and acts analogically He does whatever he does "to the glory of God." When he manipulates his immediate impersonal environment he is conscious of the ultimate environment which is personal. In all this he thinks God's thoughts after him and does God's works for him. And thus he is genuinely free. He is free because he is determinate. He is finitely determinate because God is absolutely determinate.

Special mention should be made here of the fact that the question of evil or sin does not change the conception of teleology advanced. Evil did not come into the universe as a surprise to God. It is subject to his counsel. God accomplishes his ultimate purpose with the universe in spite of and even by means of sin and evil. Sin is a wilful transgression of the revealed will of God, but not a breaking of the counsel of God.

In complete contrast with this Christian view of teleology is the non-Christian view. The non-Christian view denies the doctrines of creation and providence. It denies any reference to a transcendent, self-sufficient God. It is based upon a philosophy of chance. Bare possibility is taken as the most basic metaphysical category. Frequently all teleology is denied. But even if some sort of teleology is affirmed it is a teleology that is a chance collocation of brute facts. It is always an exclusively immanentistic teleology.

The modern form of this non-Christian immanentistic teleology is strikingly expressed by Kant. As noted above, he virtually reduced all the theistic proofs to the ontological one. According to Kant, speculative theology made an unjustifiable leap beyond the realm of possible experience. He said it took abstract thought and concluded to a Being that is beyond experimental proof. As against this he held to what he called the transcendental nature of thought. Thought, says Kant, is an abstraction, unless brought into connection with space-time facts. Accordingly the categories of thought can never go beyond the phenomenal world. So then the category of purpose, like the categories of substance and causality, apply within our experience of the phenomenal world. Purpose cannot be spoken of in connection with the universe as a whole.

But again, says Kant in effect, as in the case of substance and causality, we may use the notion of purpose as a limiting concept. We may strive as best we can to bring life into unity with the notion of a supreme purpose. To be sure we shall never succeed in doing so completely. The mechanical cannot be completely subordinated to our purposes. And what is true of the mechanical is still more true of evil. Yet we must place before ourselves the goal of absolute perfection, both of ourselves and of the universe.

Idealist philosophy has followed Kant in his notion that teleology must be thought of immanentistically. It may seem sometimes as though idealist philosophy has returned to the notion of a transcendent purpose. It speaks much of God as the Absolute. It even speaks of God as the Beyond. It wants to interpret "the lower in terms of the higher." Yet, on the whole, idealism identifies the Absolute with the Whole. God then becomes the higher aspect of Reality as a whole. Thus purpose is reduced to an exclusively immanentistic category after all.

That idealism really teaches nothing but an immanent teleology may be seen from its notion of individuality. Bosanquet speaks of this at length in his book: The Value and Destiny of the Individual, (London, 1912, p. 153 ff.). He feels that if he is to believe in God as the Beyond he must reduce man to an adjective of God. He has no eye for the theistic conception of analogical thought and action. He thinks univocally. If God does something or thinks something man can ultimately have nothing to do with it. If man does something or thinks something God can ultimately have nothing to do

with it. It is an either-or conception of thought. Christianity holds that God thinks and acts in an absolute sense and man thinks and acts after God on a created plane.

The personal idealism of such men as A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, though reacting against absolute idealism, still holds to an exclusively immanentistic teleology. Pattison connects his discussion of the subject with that of Bosanquet (see Bosanquet, Individuality and Value, Lecture IV; The Teleology of Finite Consciousness and Pattison, in The Idea of God, p. 323 ff.). Pattison dislikes having the finite individual reduced to an adjective of the Absolute. He wants to maintain the "imperviousness" of the finite individual. He had developed this criticism of Bosanquet and absolute idealism in his book, Hegelianism and Personality. He returns to a similar line of thought in his later book, The Idea of God. But this approach to the question is immanentistic no less than is the approach of Bosanquet. If man is, strictly speaking, impervious to God it means that he thinks his thought independently of God. We have noted before that for Pattison God no less than man is dependent upon brute facts. In the present connection Pattison says: "The modern scientific view thus tends to coincide with the ideal outlined by Kant at the close of the Critique of Pure Reason, – 'the systematic unity of nature,' conceived as 'complete teleological unity.' This ideal, 'essentially and indisolubly connected with the nature of our reason and prescribing the very law of its operation,' impels us to regard all order in the world as if it originated from the intention of a supreme reason.' But, as he wisely adds, the agency of a Supreme Being is not to be invoked by a species of ignava ratio to explain particular phenomena, instead of investigating their causes in the general mechanism of matter. This is to consider the labor of reason ended when we have merely dispensed with its employment, which is guided surely and safely only by the order of nature and the series of changes in the world – which are arranged according to immanent and general laws" (Idea of God, p. 329).

To this Pattison adds the following words. "The whole idea thus sketched constitutes an emphatic repudiation, on Kant's part, of what he had himself signalised as characteristic of the old argument – the view of purpose as external and contingent, superinduced upon the facts and manifested only in particular contrivances of nature" (p. 329). Or again: "And when we analyze our real meaning in the light of Kant's suggestion, we see clearly that, in attributing purpose to the universe or any lesser whole, what we are concerned about is the character of the reality in question and not the pre-existence of a plan of it in anybody's mind A teleological view of the universe means the belief that reality is a significant whole" (p. 330).

This view of Pattison, based as it is upon Kant, sets forth clearly the modern view of teleology. The contrast between modern philosophy and Christianity is on this point, as elsewhere, complete and irremediable. There is one aspect of the problem, however, that calls for special consideration. What does modern philosophy do with sin and evil? Does it hold to a teleological universe even in the face of evil?

The answer of Idealist philosophy on this point is plain. There have been several major works dealing with this problem. Among them are the works of Josiah Royce and Hastings Rashdall. Following the example of Hegel these men have sought to knit evil into the pattern of a universe in such a way that there should be a balance in favor of the good. Evil is thought of as merely a stepping stone toward the good. Yet even here the absolute good is again nothing but a limiting concept. As all facts are taken to be ultimate so the fact of evil is also taken to be ultimate. Evil is another brute fact. It has nothing to do with the plan of God. It is just there somehow. God faces ultimate evil just as we face it. He cannot overcome it entirely any more than we can overcome it entirely. Good and evil are really equally ultimate aspects of the universe as a whole.

Idealism is opposed to Christianity in that it holds to an exclusively immanentistic conception of teleology. Other types of philosophy are certainly no less so. Some of these other philosophies are materialistic or mechanistic. As such they reject every sort of teleology. But even non-mechanist philosophies other than idealism hold to an exclusively immanentistic teleology. Pragmatism believes in teleology. It thinks that man must make nature subordinate to his wishes. But the universe which must be made subordinate to man is itself a product of chance. Thus there is not a particle of theistic teleology in pragmatism.

Non-theistic Teleology in Science

With this background we are prepared to inquire about modern science and its attitude to teleology. It has frequently been pointed out that the eighteenth century was unfavorable to teleology. There seemed to be teleology in the system of Spinoza but it was a rationalistic teleology. Such teleologies were largely deterministic and therefore really no teleologies at all. Even those who, in opposition to Rationalism, held to the inductive method did not believe in a theistic teleology. The Newtonian universe was usually thought of as a machine. Newton himself, we are told, thought of it thus. As an orthodox Christian he believed in the God of the Bible, but as a scientist he thought of the world as a machine. God did now and then work in the world miraculously but for the rest the universe seemed able to run its own course (see Horton, Theism and the Scientific Spirit, p. 47 ff.). Thomas Paine thought of God as the "Almighty Lecturer." "The belief in God," he says, "far from having anything of mystery in it, is of all beliefs the most easy." God is simply the maker of the world machine. Paine holds that this position is far superior to that of the materialists (see Horton, p. 56. Quotation from Paine, Theological Works, p. 49).

In short pre-Kantian science, whether rationalist or inductivist, thought of the laws of nature as absolute and self-existing. The deists before Locke were, generally speaking, rationalistic and those after Locke were, generally speaking, inductivist, but both were equally insistent upon the self-sufficiency of the laws of the universe. If God had any purpose with the universe it was all expressed in the original act of creation.

In post-Kantian science, all this was gradually changed. Science caught up gradually with the Kantian notion of the limiting concept. Not as though the change was sudden. In fact the change was only gradual. There is a good deal of materialism and mechanism in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless the concept of organism appears upon the scene. A. Seth Pringle Pattison has, in the book already referred to, a chapter on "The Liberating Influence of Biology" (Idea of God, p. 66). To be sure, Darwin himself held to chance variation as the origin of new species. But even so there was at least the fact of the emergence of life as of something new to be taken into consideration. Says Pattison: "The great biological advance belongs to the century between us and Kant, and we should expect accordingly to find in the science and philosophy of today a more adequate interpretation of the characteristic attributes of life than is offered in the Kantian theory. On the whole, this expectation is not disappointed. The mechanistic tradition is still strong among 'the old guard' of physiologists, but among the more thoughtful biologists of a younger generation, a steadily increasing number of voices is heard pleading for 'the autonomy of life.' The last series of Gifford lectures delivered in this University by Professor Driesch, on the 'Science and the Philosophy of Organism,' sufficiently attests the prominence of this question at the present time" (Idem, p. 69).

Two points should be noted here. In the first place the very study of biology was in itself conducive to the thought of teleology. In the second place among biologists there was a difference of opinion. The theory of DeVries that evolution came about by jumps, and particularly the theory of Driesch and others that evolution is not mechanical but organic, pointed to a possible teleological interpretation of life as a whole. It is noteworthy that M. Bergson's philosophy was very prominent toward the close of the nineteenth century. Speaking of Bergson, Pattison says: "But undoubtedly the most striking feature of his thought is the extent to which it is determined by the biological way of looking at things. The intimate appreciation of living experience forms the basis of the whole Weltanschaung which he offers us. His philosophy connects itself, therefore, directly with the biological revolt against the reduction of reality to the interplay of physical constants" (Idem, p. 69).

Heinemann in his book Neue Wege der Philosophie traces the development of nineteenth century thought in a similar fashion. He speaks of three stages of development. First there is the Geistphilosophie. It is represented by the monistic school of Hegel. It was still largely rationalistic, says Heinemann. We should not forget, however, that Hegel came after Kant and had learned of Kant to take the space-time coordinates as the principle if individuation. After the Geistphilosophie, says Heinemann, came the Lebensphilosophie. In psychology Freud sought to get away from intellectualistic theories. Bergson's stress on intuition rather than on intellect as the source of knowledge is characteristic of this period. In history the school of Rickert gained ascendency. History was henceforth to study the individual. The individual was no longer to be thought of as a mere illustration of an absolute law. He was to be studied in and for himself. In the third place Heinemann

says we come upon the Existenszphilosophie, It is but an extension Lebensphilosophie in its reaction to the Geistphilosophie.

With respect to this nineteenth century development we would remark that it indicates an ever increasing emphasis upon the self-sufficiency of exclusively immanentistic categories. Granted there is some sort of recognition of teleology it is at most an immanentistic teleology. There is in the first place a great emphasis upon starting from experience as from something ultimate. The individual of Dilthey is an ultimate individual. It is Das Eimalige, in the absolute sense of the term. It is brute fact from which he wishes to start. These individuals are no longer to be brought into the relational system of fixed qualities, but must be brought into a dynamical or functional "Wirkungszusammenhang," "der als solcher zugleich wertgebend, swecksetzend, kurz schaffend ist. Das ist der springende Punkt" (Heinemann, p. 201). Thus the universal of interpretation is to be sought without any reference to God. Dilthey's position implies the complete rejection of the ideal of absolute interpretation as an absolute ideal and the substitution for it of the absolute ideal as a limiting concept. Says Heinemann in setting forth Dilthey's thought and the thought of the Lebensphilosophie in general: "Es gibt im Grunde keine letzten Antworten aug die Fragen des Lebens, sondern nur den Prozess des Fragens und Antwortens selbst" (Idem, p. 207). We shall speak of these matters more fully in a following chapter.

Summing up the development in the nineteenth century science we see no evidence of an approach to Christianity. The reaction of the Lebensphilosophie represented by such men as Driesch, Bergson, Dilthey and Freud indicates a tendency away from idealism but does not indicate an appraoch to Christianity. This reaction merely indicates a deeper descent into the self-sufficiency of brute fact and man's interpretation of brute fact.

Changes in Twentieth Century Science

But now we turn to the twentieth century. Many apologists have become very enthusiastic about the changes in recent science. They seem to see a real approach to Christianity in it. Nineteenth century science was still largely materialistic and mechanistic but the twentieth century, we are told, has reintroduced the concept of teleology in a real way. We shall briefly analyze the foundation of this contention.

In the first place it is said that scientists now tend to think of the universe as spiritual while formerly they tended to think of it as material. And as we associate the spiritual with the personal and the higher aspects of life this change in viewpoint on the part of science is said to be favorable to Christianity.

Appeal is made particularly to such men as Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur S. Eddington. Both of these men have given us extensive popular interpretations of their scientific findings. They have sought to estimate

the religious significance of the present day conclusions of science. We shall look at Eddington's view first.

In 1929 Eddington published his book The Nature of the Physical World. In this book Eddington contends that we cannot really know the physical universe, as common sense thinks it can. He gives an illustration as follows: "The word elephant calls up a certain association of mental impressions, but it is clear that mental impressions as such cannot be the subject handled in the physical problem. We have, for example, an impression of bulkiness. To this there is presumably some direct counterpart in the external world, but that counterpart must be of a nature beyond our apprehension. And science can make nothing of it. Bulkiness enters into exact science by yet another substitution; we replace it by a series of readings of a pair of calipers. Similarly the greyish black appearance in our mental impression is replaced in exact science by the readings of a photometer for various wave-lengths of light. And so on until all the characteristics of the elephant are exhausted and it has become reduced to a schedule of measures. There is always the triple correspondence:

(a) a mental image, which is in our minds and not in the external world:

(b) some kind of counterpart in the external world, which is of inscrutable nature,

(c) a set of pointer-readings, which exact science can study and connect with other pointer readings.

"And so we have our schedule of pointer readings ready to make the descent. And if you still think that this substitution has taken away all reality from the problem, I am not sorry that you should have a foretaste of the difficulty in store for those who hold that exact science is all sufficient for the description of the universe and that there is nothing which cannot be brought within its scope" (New York, 1929, p. 254).

It is upon the indirect nature of knowledge that Eddington lays a great deal of stress. He draws from it two main conclusions. One of these pertains to the unpredictability of events and the other to the right of mystical interpretation.

Speaking of "The New Epistemological Outlook" Eddington says:

"Scientific investigation does not lead to knowledge of the intrinsic nature of things. 'Whenever we state the properties of a body in terms of physical quantities we are imparting knowledge of the response of various metrical indicators to its presence and nothing more.' But if a body is not acting according to strict causality, if there is an element of uncertainty as to the response of the indicators we seem to have cut away the ground for this kind of knowledge. It is not predetermined what will be the reading of the weighing machine if the body is placed on it, therefore the body has no determinate mass; nor where it will be found an instance hence, therefore it has no definite velocity; nor where the rays now being reflected from it will converge in the miscroscope, therefore it has no

definite position; and so on. It is no use answering that the body really has a definite mass, velocity, position, etc., which we are unaware of; that statement, if it means anything, refers to an intrinsic nature of things outside the scope of scientific knolwedge. We cannot infer these properties with precision from anything that we can be aware of, because the breach of causality has broken the chain of inference. Thus our knowledge of the response of indicators to the presence of the body is non-existent and therefore we cannot assert knowledge of it at all. So what is the use of talking about it? The body which was to be the attraction of all these (as yet unsettled) pointer readings has become superfluous in the physical world. That is the dilemma into which the old epistemology leads us as soon as we begin to doubt strict causality.

"In phenomena on a gross scale this difficulty can be got around. A body may have no definite position but yet have within close limits an extremely probable position. When the probabilities are large the substitution of probability for certainty makes little difference; it adds only a negligible haziness to the world. But though the practical change is unimportant there are fundamental theoretical consequences. All probabilities rest on a basis of a priori probability, and we cannot say whether probabilities are large or small without having assumed such a basis. In agreeing to accept those of our calculated probabilities which are very high as virtually equivalent to certainties on the old scheme, we are as it were making our adopted basis of a priori probability a constituent of world-structure – adding to the world a kind of symbolic texture that cannot be expressed on the old scheme.

"On the atomic scale of phenomena the probabilities are in general well balanced, and there are no 'naps' for the scientific punter to put his shirt on. If a body is still defined as a bundle of pointer readings (or highly probable pointer readings) there are no 'bodies' on the atomic scale. All that we can extract is a bundle of probabilities. That is in fact just how Schrodinger tries to picture the atom – as a wave centre of his probability entity" (Idem, p. 304-305).

Here we have both items spoken of above. There is the substitution of statistical law for absolute law; i.e., the idea of real probability instead of probability merely based upon ignorance. Secondly there is the "symbolic texture that cannot be expressed on the old scheme."

What he means by this "symbolic texture" can perhaps best be learned from his little book, Science and the Unseen World, published in 1930. The title of this book, the contents of which was given as the Swarthmore Lecture for the Society of Friends, indicates that Eddington thinks he is able to justify the "Mystical outlook" on life. Inasmuch as science can give us no direct knowledge of the universe we may trust the intuitions of our own consciousness, he thinks. In this little book Eddington again emphasizes the indirectness of abstractness of scientific knowledge "And if today you ask a physicist what he has finally made out aether or the electron to be, the answer will not be a

description in terms of billiard balls or fly-wheels or anything concrete; he will point instead to a number of symbols and a set of mathematical equations which they satisfy. What do the symbols stand for? The mysterious reply is given that in the phenomena of the physical world it is necessary to know the equations which the symbols obey but not the nature of that which is being symbolised." Now all this contains a challenge to materialism, says Eddington. Science no longer pretends to say that ultimate reality is material. How could it since it claims to know nothing about ultimate reality? "Penetrating as deeply as we can by the methods of physical investigation into the nature of a human being we reach only symbolic description. Far from attempting to dogmatize as to the nature of the reality thus symbolized physics most strongly insists that its methods do not penetrate behind the symbolism" (Idem, p. 36). This sounds very encouraging at first blush. Yet we have become somewhat wary of recent expressions of agnosticism on the part of science. They have sometimes had a sting in them. Do we find this to be the case with Eddington? Let us see.

Following the sentence just quoted, Eddington continues: "Surely then that mental and spiritual nature of ourselves, known in our minds by an intimate contact transcending the methods of physics, supplies just that interpretation of the symbols which science is admittedly unable to give. It is just because we have a real and not merely a symbolic knowledge of our own nature that our nature seems so mysterious; we reject as inadequate that merely symbolic description which is good enough for dealing with tables and chairs and physical agencies that affect us only by remote communication" (Idem, p. 36).

And what do we seem thus directly to know about ourselves? Negatively we know that we are free. Natural law cannot hem us in. "Natural law is not applicable to the unseen world behind the symbolism, because it is adapted to anything except symbols, and its perfection is a perfection of symbolic linkage. You cannot apply such a scheme to the parts of our personality which are not measurable by symbols any more than you can extract a square root of a sonnet" (p. 56).

Eddington goes on to describe the nature of the unseen world, without limiting his remarks to the self with respect to whom he says we have immediate knowledge. He says "When we assert that God is real, we are not restricted to a comparison with the reality of atoms and electrons. If God is as real as the shadow of the Great War on Armistice Day, need we seek further reason for making a place for God in our thoughts and lives? We shall not be concerned if the scientific explorer reports that he is perfectly satisfied he has got to the bottom of things without having come across either" (Idem, p. 67). Thus Eddington somehow feels that God may exist. With respect to matters of the Unseen World reasoning fails us altogether, he holds. It is in our consciousness as such that we touch the Unseen. "Obviously we cannot trust every whim and fancy of the mind as though it were indisputable revelation; we can and must believe that we have an inner sense of values which guides us as to what is to be needed, otherwise we cannot start on our survey even of the physi-

cal world. Consciousness alone can determine the validity of its convictions" (Idem, p. 75).

Of this position of Eddington, C.E.M. Joad made a criticism in his recent book Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science. He feels that Eddington has really done very little but set forth the position of subjective idealism. He says that Eddington needs the brute facts, which he says science cannot reach, as a criterion by which to measure the truth of his scientific pointer readings. "Thus the world of common experience is the datum from which the physicist starts and the criterion by which he determines the validity of the structure he raises. It is, therefore, presupposed as real and objective throughout" (London, Second Impression, 1934, p. 46). To this criticism of Joad, Eddington replies in his book New Pathways in Science in the following words: "The argument seems to be that unless a datum is presupposed to be objective no inference can be based on it. This is so astonishing a suggestion that I wonder whether it can possibly be Mr. Joad's real opinion. The data furnished by individual experience are clearly subjective, and it is ultimately from these data that the scientific conception of the universe is derived – for what we term 'collective experience' is a synthesis of individual experience" (New York, 1935, p. 234). Speaking of a similar criticism of Joad, Eddington continues as follows: "His difficulty rather suggests that a cyclic scheme of knowledge with which science has familiarized us is not yet appreciated in philosophy. I have formerly (the reference is to The Nature of the Physical World, p. 262) illustrated the nature of a cyclic scheme by a revised version of the 'House that Jack Built' which instead of coming to an end repeats itself indefinitely – that worried the cat, that killed the rat, that ate the malt that lay in the house, that was built by the priest all shaven and shorn, that married' – Wherever we start in the cycle we presuppose something that we reach again by following round the cycle. The scheme of physics constitutes such a cycle; and equally we may contemplate a wider cycle embracing that which is beyond physics. Starting at the point of the cycle which corresponds to our individual perceptions, we reach other entities which are constructs from our perceptions" (Idem, p. 295).

The argument with respect to idealism and realism faces us here in modern garb. From the Christian point of view both the realist and the idealist are mistaken. Both begin with the assumption of brute fact. Both begin with the assumption of the self-sufficiency of the human mind. It is for this reason that the argument takes the form it does. Upon the presupposition of God there could be no argument about idealism and realism. It is evidence of a false intellectualistic ideal for science to wish to have a comprehensive understanding of the facts of the universe. It is because man wants to be as God that he tries to understand facts comprehensively. Then when he finds that his universals are not comprehensive he concludes to agnosticism. He takes for granted that if he cannot catch the facts in his net completely that God is confronted with the same limitation. The result is that he thinks the facts of the phenomenal world are surrounded by an ultimate void. The Unseen World of Eddington is the void that surrounds both God and man. We have already noted that in spite of his agnos-

ticism he does accept a philosophy of chance. And as to man he is for Eddington simply a late-comer in the evolutionary history of the universe. Accordingly there can be no revelation of God to man. "Religious creeds are a great obstacle to any full sympathy between the outlook of the scientist and the outlook which religion is so often supposed to require." Or again: "The scientific objection is not merely to particular creeds which assert in outworn phraseology beliefs which are no longer held or no longer convey inspiration to life. The spirit of seeking which animates us refuses to regard any kind of creed as its goal" (Science and the Unseen World, p. 89).

That there is in the general scientific view of Eddington no real approach to Christianity appears most clearly when we look more narrowly at his notion of teleology. It is nothing but the negative counterpart of a causality concept in the non-theistic sense of the word. Eddington simply denies the comprehensiveness of the concept of causality. And what is not comprehended by an immanentistic causality is assigned to teleology. But a Christian conception of teleology must first show that there is teleology back of causality. It must show that all human concepts of causality and teleology, as far as they pertain to phenomena, presuppose God's comprehensive purpose with the whole universe. If this is done there is no need of dividing the field between causality and teleology. We can then admit causality and at the same time teleology with respect to the same facts.

And when this is done we have met the position both of the realist and of the idealist. When Joad discusses the relation between causality and teleology he comes to conclusions that are remarkably similar to those of Eddington. Herod and Pilate have become friends when it comes to facing the Christian conception of things. We may briefly note what Joad says about teleology in relation to causation. He thinks they cannot parcel out the area of life between them. Yet they have each of them certain limitations. "So far we have been content to apply and to illustrate the principles of Mechanism and Teleology, and to show how they ramify through every sphere of natural happening and human activity. There are, however, certain outstanding difficulties to which each of the principles whose ramifications we have been discussing are exposed" (Guide to Philosophy, London, 1937, p. 198). "Mechanical causation, if treated as ultimate and universal, is exposed to the criticism that it obviously fails to account for some mental phenomena, notably those involved in moral, aesthetic and religious experience" (Idem, p. 200). "To the doctrine of teleological causation it may be objected that it is prima facie inapplicable to the behavior of physical phenomena. It seems absurd to say of an egg which is placed in a saucepan of hot water that it is striving to achieve the condition of being hard-boiled, or of the assemblage of the scattered parts of a car in a Ford factory that each, as it is fitted into its appointed place, is seeking to fulfil the end of the complete or perfected car. Even when applied to living organizms, the notion of teleological causation seems to entail the pre-existence of the end which is aimed at, in order that it may be in a position to exert the influence which,

it is said, inclines, if it does not compel, the developing process in the organism which seeks to realise the end" (Idem, p. 201).

To this we need only reply that the end of all created things does exist previous to the things. God is not the Vis a Terge and the Terminus ad Quem to which the finite facts are vaguely drawn. In that case the egg would have to jump into the frying pan of its own accord if it were to be teleological. But if self-consciously created man takes the phenomena of the created world and manipulates them to the glory of God it is quite possible to say that the category of teleology applies to the frying of the egg. The man fries the egg so that he may be well nourished and thus enabled to live his life teleologically, that is, to the glory of God. If things are thought of as organically teleological all the debates about the relative areas of causation and teleology fall away. Nor need there then be any difficulty about their overlapping. God created all things. His providence is over all things. He leads all things to their intended goal. God's universal therefore precedes the facts and laws of the created universe. Before this background man can labor and do all things teleologically.

A few words must now be said about the position of James Jeans. It is in many respects similar to that of Eddington. Both draw idealist conclusions from the fact that scientific knowledge is "indirect" or abstract. Both claim that indeterminism has replaced determinism in physical theory. But there is a noteworthy difference between the two. The method of Jeans is as follows: He reasons that the counters of science have become gradually more and more general. And all of them are directly dependent upon the activity of the mind. The human mind must do its interpreting of the universe with the help of mathematical symbols. In fact the matter of interpretation is chiefly if not exclusively a matter of mathematical symbols. And this seems to set a barrier between the mind and the facts which the mind is supposed to know. Accordingly we find in Jeans the customary assertion of agnosticism: "To speak in terms of Plato's well-inown simile, we are still imprisoned in our case, with our backs to the light, and can only watch the shadows on the wall" (The Mysterious Universe, New York 1930, p. 135). "The shadows which reality throws on the walls of our cave might a priori have been of many kinds. They might conceivably have been perfectly meaningless to us, as meaningless as a cinematograph film showing the growth of microscopic tissues would be to a dog who has strayed into a lecture room by mistake" (Idem, p. 136). We see here how Jeans takes for granted the existence of the brute facts of the universe. But what interests us now particularly is something else. "It is true, in a sense somewhat different from that intended by Galileo, that 'Nature's great book is written in mathematical language.' So true is it that no one except a mathematician need ever hope fully to understand those branches of science which try to unravel the fundamental nature of the universe, the theory of relativity, the theory of quanta and the wave-mechanics" (Idem, p. 136).

This is an example in excelsis of the pride of sinful man. All honor is due to the accomplishments of the mathematician. But to seek by an absolu-

tized mathematics to lay down what God can or cannot do is indeed a gigantic insult to God. We have here the clearest possible antithesis between Christian and non-Christian thought. For Christian thought it is God's thought that determines the possibilities of the created universe. In that case man will not seek to construct a mathematics that will envelop God. In that case man will look at mathematical relationships within the created universe as one aspect of the way God has created things.

The fruitlessness of the approach of modern mathematics as illustrated by the contention of Jeans appears from the accidental way in which the mathematical construction of human thought is brought into contact with the facts. Jeans develops the analogy of the cave to which reference has been made. He wonders how the shadows that we see on the wall fit on to actual facts. They seem somehow to fit the facts but how it is that they do must remain an ultimate mystery. Then he adds: "To drop our metaphor, nature seems very conversant with the rules of our mathematics, as our mathematicians have formulated them in their studies, out of their own inner consciousness and without drawing to any appreciable extent on their experience of the outer world" (Idem, p. 138). It is no wonder that this accidental relationship is said to obtain between subject and object upon the basis of an assumed metaphysics of chance.

We are not greatly impressed therefore when Jeans tells us that he believes in God. For him God is nothing but a magnified mathematician, who is on the level with his colleagues on earth in that both face brute facts which may or may not fit into his mathematical scheme. "The Great Architect of the Universe" who "now begins to appear as a pure mathematician" has nothing to do with the Christian conception of God. And this enables us also to estimate the conception of teleology entertained by Jeans. Speaking of teleology he says: "Today there is a widespread measure of agreement, which on the physical side of science approaches almost to unanimity, that the stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality; the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine. Mind no longer appears as an accidental intruder into the realm of matter; we are beginning to suspect that we ought rather to hail it as the creator and governor of this realm of matter, not of course our individual minds, but the mind in which the atoms out of which our individual minds have grown exist as thoughts" (Idem, p. 158). By the sound of words we have here the Christian doctrines of God, of creation, and of purpose. In reality we have none of these. At every point Jeans is diametrically opposed to the Christian view. His is again an exclusively immanentistic teleology. We need not discuss Jeans' views of indeterminacy as he sets them forth more fully in his book The New Background of Science. Nor need we instance the realistic criticism given by Joad on the indeterminacy concept. It is invariably built upon the negation of the causality concept as all inclusive. Invariably, too, the causality concept whose comprehensiveness is denied is the non-Christian causality concept. But to deny the comprehensiveness of the non-Christian causality

presupposes the recognition of its validity to a certain extent. In fact those who hold to indeterminacy in recent physics do not deny the legitimacy of the non-Christian causality concept. Most of them, if not all of them, agree with the sentiment expressed in the words of Levy when he said with respect to prediction: "The subject matter of such studies has consisted mainly in things that can be circumscribed, roughly speaking, in space and time of moderate dimensions, the world that man experiences, and as a feature of that world we cannot deny the type of predictable and deterministic activity science has exposed. The range of space and time over which this is valid is, of course, a matter for experiment, but in the attempt to extend the range there are a number of points that have to be carefully watched if we are not to fall into the fallacy that has spoiled much of the discussion on this matter. Whatever may develop, the form of determinism already separated out by science, stands, that rests on inescapable evidence" (The Universe of Science, p. 145).

We have limited our discussion of scientific teleology chiefly to the question of indeterminism in recent physical and mathematical theory. We might have instanced other fields. There is, for instance, a good deal of discussion in the field of psychology about teleology. McDougal's teleological psychology is frequently mentioned by apologists who seek to find a similarity between Christianity and recent scientific thought. But it was chiefly on physics and mathematics that science relied for its notion of determinism. Says Dampier-Whetham: "Philosophy has been wont to draw its strongest evidence for scientific determinism from physics, where it was thought that there was a closed circuit of mathematical necessity." Accordingly now that in physics indeterminism seems to have made its entry the bulwark of determinism appears to be broken. But in all this there is little cause for rejoicing from the Christian point of view. The new indeterminism is nothing but a bit of chance sprinkled between the crevices of determinism. Or, we may say, the determinism of a previous generation is now thought of as ice-blocks afloat on an ocean of chance.

Probability

The whole point of view is well summed up by Hans Reichenbach in his book Atom and Cosmos. He first speaks of the nature of causality as follows: "Causality is a blind concatenation through causes; its symbol is the machine, which moves its piston only because of a certain pressure of gas, etc., on it, not for the sake of any meaningful function" (New York 1933, p. 268). This shows clearly that the causality concept is thought of as working independently of God. Reichenbach then continues to point out that since Galileo's time science built its structure upon the notion of causality. "The whole development of natural science in the following centuries is a single triumph of this great idea" (p. 269). Then he adds: "The French mathematician LaPlace gave this determinism its classical formulation; if there were a perfect intelligence, its supreme spirit could comprise all the happenings of the world in

one formula, from which, by the insertion of definite numerical values for the invariable, time, the state of the world at any desired future, or, for that matter, past time could be calculated" (p. 270). Then he shows that in recent times vitalistic ideas have triumphed over mechanistic ideas in the realm of biology. "Nevertheless," he says, "such objections availed nothing against the causal concept, so long as the idea of causation triumphed in physics, the most exact of all natural sciences, for the consideration could not be neglected that physiological processes must ultimately be reducible to mechanical motions of atoms and molecules, and that, accordingly, all the imperfection of causal explanations which we observe can be only provisional, and non-existent for the spirit imagined by LaPlace, which can compute the motions of the billiards of atoms in advance, just as well as we do those of the planets" (p. 270).

It is only now, therefore, that we have to speak of a real crisis for the causal concept, when doubts as to the perfect determination of all natural happenings gains ground even in physics, and when, as we have shown, these doubts, precisely in the mechanics of the interior of the atom, have led to conscious renunciation of causal conceptions" (Idem, p. 271).

Reichenbach then enters upon a discussion of the problem thus raised by the rejection of the comprehensiveness of the causality concept in the following fashion: "It was investigations of a philosophical direction which next looked into this question; and specifically, they proceed from an analysis of the probability concept. The central significance of this concept had never been recognized in earlier epistemological discussions. It had been regarded as more or less parallel to human imperfection; that is, the merely probable correctness of prophecies as to nature was regarded as a result of human ignorance, which one endowed with perfect powers of learning could avoid" (Idem, p. 272). Then he adds: "The symbolical idea of LaPlace, which we have already mentioned, grew precisely out of such conceptions. It is found in a work of his on the philosophy of the theory of probability; and LaPlace wished thereby to express the opinion that a superhuman intelligence would not need the laws of probability, but would foretell the result of a game of chance, just as astronomers foretell the courses of the planets. This conception is named the subjective theory of probability; it leads to determinism, the doctrine that all which happens in nature follows flawless principles, and that all uncertainty of prophecy is occasioned by human weakness only.

> "The philosophical critics of the probability concept, on the other hand, held that a subjective theory can never prove the objective validity for reality of assumptions concerning probability, as that reality is expressed in the frequency laws of statistics. It is, in fact, not at all clear why, for instance, each face of a die should be uppermost about a hundred times out of six hundred throws, if the equal probability of the faces corresponds only to human ignorance; we cannot imagine that nature should

pay such close attention to man's incapacity. This argument against the subjective theory of probability is conclusive, and an objective theory was therefore set up, which attempts to present the validity of laws of probability as an objective fact in the occurrences of nature, just as the validity of causal law signified such a fact. According to the objective theory, the regularity of statistical processes, such as those of aggregates of molecules, means a fundamental trend in natural events, the understanding of whose laws is quite as much the task of natural science as is the understanding of causal law. From this point of view it seems senseless to see anything merely provisional in the use of statistical laws; even the Laplacian superman – as the French mathematician Cournot remarked in the 'forties of the last century – would not renounce the use of statistical laws, but on summing up the computations concerning the separate casts of the die, would still discover that, on the average, all sides appear with equal frequency.

"Starting from such a view of the probability concept, it was possible to take the next step, uniting the concept of probability to that of cause; for both concepts, as we have pointed out, present objective realities. In fact, the two are firmly chained together, and it can even be shown that the causal principle would be an empty, useless assumption, if the principle of probability was not also there. It is not at all true that we ever find strict laws in nature. For all that we observe, each time, is that a law has been approximately fulfilled; a hurled stone, a flowing electrical current, a deflected ray of light, when exactly measured, will never show the course prescribed by the mathematical formula, but there will always be little deviations, so-called errors of observation, which may be decreased by better experimental devices, but can never be fully eliminated" (274-275).

In this passage Reichenbach sums up the matter of indeterminacy fairly. It is difficult to see how one could expect any approach to Christianity from recent science. As already pointed out, the only God such a view can allow for is one who, together with man, faces a universe of brute fact. When formerly we thought of the universe as run by absolute causal law, we could think of God as predicting all things. That was not because he had made or caused all things, but because he happened to be a more profound mathematician than we. Jeans thinks of God in that fashion. In him there is something of the rationalist. Yet he too holds to indeterminism. Hence he too must picture God as wondering how his thoughts fit on to reality. Together with Reichenbach he must think of God as using the probability method. But a God who as a clever mathematician watches a universe of chance to see what he can do in order to predict its behavior is hardly the God of Christianity.

This leads us to remark in conclusion that the Butler type of Evidences has no valid argument against this position. Butler's view is, as we have

seen, based upon the notion of brute fact. It is also based upon the non-theistic notion of probability. But by a probability argument based upon brute fact one can get nothing but a god similar to the one of Reichenbach and Jeans. Hume once upon a time reduced such an argument for God to an absurdity. If used today it would be reduced to absurdity again.

The only way we can meet the position of modern science is by pointing out that non-theistic probability notion, whether of the subjective or of the objective kind, reduces experience to nonsense. Such a notion is based upon a philosophy of chance. And a philosophy of chance is the opposite of a philosophy of rationality. There can be no causality and there can be no computation of statistical averages except upon the presupposition of God as creator and preserver of the universe. The God of Christianity has a purpose with the universe, for that reason there is purpose within the universe. A true immanentistic teleology requires a transcendent teleology.

Chapter VIII

ANTHROPOLOGICAL EVIDENCES — GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

In the preceding chapter we remarked that the world is organically teleological. Man therefore stands at the center and head of the whole creation of God. He represents the universe with God and represents God with the universe.

As to his own being he was created as a covenant-personality. He was to interpret himself and the universe intellectually, as a prophet. He was to dedicate himself and the universe to God as a priest. He was to rule over the universe, under God, as a king. God had made him in his own image. Man was a self-conscious and morally perfect being. His body and soul are but two aspects of his being. The one would not be complete without the other.

This man, thus created by God, rebelled against God. He became a sinner. "Sin is any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God." As a sinner man is subject to the wrath of God and is morally polluted. Only those who are in Christ are saved from sin. But even they are saved in principle only while in this world. They still sin against their wills. They are still subject to disease and death. After death their souls and bodies will be reunited so that the whole man may forever be with God. And when man is fully redeemed the whole creation will be fully redeemed. The lost are lost forever in self-conscious suffering, but as such do not disturb the renewed creation of God.

It is not necessary to set forth a detailed biblical anthropology. We presuppose it in order to note its reception by modern science. In the present and in the following chapter we deal chiefly with that aspect of man's personality which we usually speak of as the soul. In the chapter after that we deal with that aspect of man's personality which we usually speak of as the body. In this chapter we shall naturally come into conflict with modern psychology, while in the next chapter we shall come into conflict with modern psychology of religion. In the chapter after the next we shall naturally come into conflict with modern biology. We wish first to see something of the trend of modern psychology as such. Then we turn more particularly to the psychology of religion and after that to the question of biology.

In his article "Die moderne Religonspsychologie" (Theol. Rundschau, 1032, p. 310), Karl Beth begins by saying that he who would understand the psychology of religion must first look at psychology in general and study its recent development. The reason for this is not far to seek. Those who work in the field of the psychology of religion have come to the study of religion with the stated intention of applying to it the methods and insights of modern

psychology. They hoped in this way to obtain a new and more valuable interpretation of religion. And it is but natural that these men will seek to apply the latest and best methods and results of psychology in general to the subject matter of the psychology of religion. So, for instance, Ames is a functional psychologist and it is this functional psychology by which he interprets religion. Says he: "The point of view employed is that of functional psychology, which is necessarily genetic and social" (The Psychology of Religious Experience). Accordingly we shall give a short survey of the trend of things as it appears in the several schools of psychology today.

In order to understand the recent trend in pscyhology we must note that the psychology of the earlier nineteenth century was, generally speaking, that of associationism. This psychology had its origin, as far as modern thought is concerned, in the philosophy of Descartes. Descartes separated the mind from the body in dualistic fashion. In the second place we should note that Descartes defined the mind primarily in intellectual terms. "L'ame pense toujours" was the main principle of his psychology. "The essential nature of mind (for Descartes) is thinking substance, as which it can be completely identified." The emotional and volitional were largely discounted or only inconsistently recognized.

Upon this basic conception of Descartes the association psychologists built when they formulated the laws by which the mind was supposed to work. Those laws themselves they conceived of after the analogy of physical laws, as physics was conceived of by Descartes, that is, in mechanical fashion. There was thought to be a direct proportion between the stimulus and the response in the mind in a way similar to the proportion observed in physical momentum. The gradual refinements in psychology were all in the direction of finding more definite and more intricate relationships of proportion between stimulus and response. Psychometrics was developed. Fechner brought in logarithms in order to show the relation between stimulus and response. In order to carry through this program of psychometrics it was necessary to reduce the mental phenomena to their most elemental constituents. By this "Elementaranalyse" the soul was reduced to something that could be handled much as a blockhouse can be built up from individual blocks. The same blocks can be placed in different relation to one another in order to obatin different kinds of houses.

The chief characteristics then, of this psychology as they are noted in the histories of psychology, are (a) its intellectualism, and (b) its atomism.

We should observe that the nineteenth century psychology, based as it was upon a Cartesian foundation, was not at all Christian. The mind of man was virtually thought of as being independent of God. The laws by which one mind was brought into fruitful relationship with other minds were abstract laws that were somehow found in the universe. Thus both the particular and the universal and their relationship to one another were thought of as independ-

ent of God. But there was at least this much resemblance between a truly Christian psychology and the Cartesian psychology that both placed man far above the beast. To this it is sometimes added that both placed the intellect above the other aspects of the mind. This is not correct. Christian psychology does not place the intellect ahead of any other aspect of man's personality in the sense that one should be more truly human than another. Man is equally prophet, priest, and king. All that Reformed theology has meant by emphasizing the priority of the intellect is that it is only through intellectual interpretation that we can communicate with one another about the meaning of reality.

With the advent of the twentieth century, psychology has made a new advance, and that an advance farther than ever away from Christian theism. When we say that this began with the turn of the century we do not mean that the tendency was not already operative, and to a certain extent prepared for, somewhat earlier. This further advance away from Christian theism occurred when men wiped out the borderlines that separated man from the beast, and the beast from the inorganic world, thus reducing man to a focus of action and interaction in the sea of an ultimate irrationalism. Let us note some of the stages by which this result was accomplished.

In the first place we must observe that as there was a general reaction to the Geistphilosophie on the part of the Lebensphilosophie in the latter part of the nineteenth century, so the new psychology reacted against the intellectualism of associational psychology. The sharp distinction that even Kant had made between sense, intelligence and reason gave way to a view in which the intellect lost its high place of authority (History of Psychology, M. Baldwin, Vol. II, p. 27.). This might have been done in the interest of a Christian type of thought. Christianity has always sought to equalize all the aspects of man's personality. However, the dethroning of the intellect was not done in the interest of theism but in the interest of irrationalism. Psychology was but following the lead of Schopenhauer and VonHartmann in their ultimate metaphysical voluntarism when it searched in the non-rational for a deeper insight into the nature of the human soul.

In the second place the new psychology reacted against the separation of the soul from the body. This too might have been in the interest of Christian theism. Heinemann has quite misinterpreted the Christian conception of the relation of the soul to the body when he says: "Das christliche Mittelalter kennt die Seele als Hauch, von Gott dem leblosen Korper eingehaucht, so als geschaffenes Wesen hoheren Ursprungs, aus einer unkorperlichen Region stammend und als unsterblich in sie zuruckkehrend" (Heinneman, Neue Wege der Philosophie, p. 274). The Christian position is not that the soul existed in an immaterial world before its union with the body. The Christian position is rather that both soul and body came into existence together. Moreover, as they came into existence together they will also be immortal together. True, there is a time when they are separate, that is from the time of death

to the time of the resurrection, but this period of separation is to be followed by a permanent reunion. So then the Christian position has never been guilty of abstract separation of the soul and the body. Accordingly, in so far as the new psychology seeks to bring soul and body into close harmony with one another, we can only rejoice.

However, we should again observe that union of soul and body by modern psychology is in the interest of wiping out the distinction between them. Heinemann significantly says that the soul of modern psychology resembles the Vitalseele, the simple life principle of the ancients.

It should be noted that the first step led directly to the second. The descent into the volitional and emotional was in the direction of a further descent into the corporeal. Says Heinemann: "Erscheint so der Mensch als tief verflochten in das historische Geschehen, so bedeutet die Betonung der Triebschicht nichts anderes als eine Einbettung des Seelischen ins Korperliche, eine Biologisierung der Seele, die zugleich eine Dynamisierung ist. Das seelische Leben ist ein Kraftespiel, das hier freilich recht naturwissenschaftlich als Energieumsatz verstanden wird. Damit ist die Seele wieder das geworden, was sie in der Antike war: Vitalseele. . ." (Idem, p. 285).

We see then that the first step, that is the emphasis upon the emotional and the volitional has not worked in the direction of finding a better balance between the intellectual and the other aspects of personality but in the direction of doing away with the distinction of soul and body which is basic to the theistic conception of man.

In the third place the new psychology reacted against the old in that it laid more emphasis upon child psychology. The older psychology was almost exclusively an adult psychology. Children were treated as miniature adults. The new psychology tries to do fuller justice to the individuality of childhood than the old psychology could do. Says Jastrow: "What we may accept is the principle that the child is an authentic embodiment of the earliest, racially oldest, most persistent, truest to nature, depository of natural behavioristic psychology" (The Reconstruction of Psychology in "The Psychological Review" #34, 1927, p. 169, Joseph Jastrow).

Again it should be noted that this third step follows naturally upon the second. The intellectualism of the older psychology could do scant justice to the individual. All men were cut after the same abstract pattern of rationality that was somehow taken for granted on the basis of observation of a large number of "normal" adults. But the emphasis of the new psychology upon the emotional and the volitional naturally also meant an emphasis upon the individuality of each person. The emotional and the volitional life of man is notoriously unwilling to be cut according to one pattern. And this emphasis led to the idea that children too should be regarded as individuals at each stage of their existence. In other words the concept of the variabil-

ity of personality was introduced into psychology. A child is thought of as quite an independent type of being instead of as a little adult. A child is, to the extent that it is a personality at all, thought of as a unique personality. In accordance with this enlargement of the field into relation with which the grown-up personality is set, it is as true to say that the adult must be interpreted in terms of the child as to say that the child must be interpreted in terms of the adult.

With respect to this third step we wish to observe again that it too might have been taken in the interest of theism. Individuality is a concept that is embedded in the very foundations of theism. As Christianity has done justice to the emotional and the volitional so it has done justice to the individuality of each person. Orthodox theology has constantly maintained that the image of God in mankind cannot be fully expressed until every individual man has contributed his unique personality. Associationism had inherited the abstract universalism of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, but had ignored Augustine and Calvin. So too Christianity has constantly done justice to childhood. The Old and the New Testament have in their educational principles made provision for the child as an emotional and volitional being by insisting not only upon abstract intellectual presentation of truth but also upon surrounding the child with an atmosphere that will influence him at his emotional center.

But we must add that the third step of modern psychology has not actually been in the direction of theism. The variability concept by virtue of which psychology seeks to do justice to childhood is based upon an ultimate activism. Modern psychology thinks of personality as being exclusively a self accomplishment on the part of man. At this point it is directly opposed to Christianity which holds that personality is created by God. According to the Christian view, then, variability can mean only that human personality is not fully developed when created, but grows into the pattern set for it by God. The activity by which personality realizes itself is, to be sure, very genuine and significant but it is genuine and significant only because it acts against the background of the plan of God. The integration of personality, that is, the constant readjustment of the particular and the universal within itself, and the constant readjustment of the whole personality as an individual to the universal found in the universe beyond itself, takes place by a more ultimate and constant readjustment of the individual together with his surroundings to God who is the absolute particular and the absolute universal combined in one ultimate personality. The integration of personality according to the Christian view is an integration toward and by virtue of an ultimate self-sufficient personality.

In contrast with this the modern concept of the integration of personality is an integration into the void. We can best appreciate this if we note that the concept purpose itself has been completely internalized. In the same connection in which he brings out that according to Freudianism the soul has

become a Vitalseele, Heinemann says that Freud has, willy nilly, to recognize the "sinnhaftigkeit des psychovitalen Geschelens" (Heinemann, p. 285). By that he means that the idea of purpose itself is something non-rational.

This leads us to note the fourth step of the descent into the irrational on the part of modern psychology, namely, its emphasis upon the unconscious, whether of the adult or of the child. The adult is not only to be interpreted in terms of the child, but the child and the adult are both to be interpreted in terms of subconscious drives. It was not enough to coordinate feeling and will with the intellect or even to insist upon the primacy of the feeling or of the will; modern psychology has made the whole of conscious life to a large extent subordinate to man's unconscious life. That is, modern psychology has, to a large extent, sought the explanation of the conscious life in the fields of the unconscious.

It is well known that the psychoanalytical schools of Freud, Adler and Jung have done much to seek to interpret our waking life by our dream life. We consciously purpose to do something, but the reason for our conscious purpose, they say, is an unconscious drive. We are not concerned with the fact that Freud sought to explain the whole of self-conscious life by the sex drive while Adler sought to explain it largely by the selfishness instinct. The differences within the psychoanalytical school do not concern us. It is enough to note that their explanation is an explanation of the rational or self-conscious by the irrational and sub-consciousness.

We should also note in this connection that the psychology of McDougal in this respect resembles that of Freud and his followers. It is often quite mistakenly supposed that McDougal affords much comfort to those who believe the Christian position, since he at least holds to the concept of purpose while such schools as Behaviorism cling to a mechanistic interpretation of all mental phenomena. Behaviorism, to be sure, is anti-teleological. But it is scarcely better to say that you do allow for the concept purpose, and even insist upon its originality in the field of psychology, if you bury this concept of purpose in the lowest depths of irrationalism and therewith place it at the farthest possible remove from Christian theism. McDougal says that his concept of teleology has nothing in common with the concept of teleology as held to by the theologians, since the latter is externalistic while his own is exclusively immanentistic. He even goes so far as to say that purpose is not primarily to be related to any intellectual activity of man at all.

Even this fourth step of modern psychology has good elements in it. As Christians we believe that man was originally created with the love of God in his heart. That is, we believe that man was priest as well as prophet. More than that, we also believe that man was in part conscious and in part unconscious in his activity. We hold that man was created a character. That is, we maintain that in his unconscious as well as in his conscious activity man was directed toward God. Scripture is full of the idea of the sub-con-

scious. David prays that he may be forgiven for sin of which he is unaware. We say that we are conceived and born in sin, which does not merely refer to the agency of the parents, but means that we are sinners when we come into the world even though we are not self-conscious. We are worthy of eternal punishment because of our relation to Adam. The church has never limited personal responsibility to the self-conscious activity of man. The activism involved in the Arminian conception is not truly representative of the Christian position.

But this only brings out the antithesis between the truly Christian position and the non-Christian psychology of the day more sharply. It is sometimes asserted that modern psychology has corroborated the Calvinistic position rather than the Arminian inasmuch as both modern psychology and Calvinism emphasize the significance of the relationship of the individual to the sub-conscious and the historical while Arminianism does not. There is truth in this contention. In so far as modern psychology has shown that the individual's conscious life is dominated by drives that come up from his unconscious life it has stood with Calvinism against Arminianism. On the other hand, it may be said that modern psychology is closer to Arminianism than to Calvinism because of the activism that characterizes it. Arminianism has departed one step from the position of Christian theism inasmuch as it will not allow that man was created a character. Modern psychology has gone all the way in that diredtion and has said that man's character is exclusively his own accomplishement. Arminianism, inconsistently but happily, turns back to God after the first step inasmuch as it believes the creation doctrine; modern psychology has no such limitations and places man in a void.

It ought now to be clear that there are only two positions that are consistent on this point. If one begins upon the path of complete activism one cannot stop until one has come to the place where modern psychology has come. If God has not created man then man has somehow come upon the scene from the realms of chance and one's character has nothing to do with God. Of course it may still be said that one's character is not wholly one's own since each individual is surrounded by cosmic influences of all sorts. But, in any case, God has been put out of the picture altogether. Hence it is necessary, if the Christian conception is to be defended at all, that it be defended by rejecting modern activism in its entirety. God has created man with intellect, feeling and will. God created man soul and body. God created the first man as a full-grown person but has caused later generations to spring up by growth from childhood to maturity. God has related man's self-conscious to his sub-conscious life; his childhood to his maturity. Every activity of every aspect of the human personality, at any stage of its development, acts as a derivative personality before the background of the absolute personality of God. Man is an analogical personality. It is this consistently biblical and Christian-theistic concept alone that can be defended against the activism of modern psychology. Arminianism, here as elsewhere, offers no sound defense.

If put in this way the issue is taken out of the surface areas in which it is usually discussed. Many Christian apologists use all their ammunition by contending against modern psychology on the ground that it immerses man in the meshes of drives, etc., over which he has no control. It is said that Christianity insists on the responsibility of man and that it is this that we must seek to defend against modern psychology. Now it is true that Christianity holds man responsible. But to argue in the blue for freedom does not help to establish man's responsibility. It is true that in general modern psychology allows for no responsibility but the most basic reason for this is not that it has immersed man's will in the midst of instincts and drives. The real reason why modern psychology has left no room for responsibility is found in the fact that it has taken the whole of the human personality in all its aspects, self-conscious and subconscious, and immersed it in an ultimate metaphysical void. Man cannot be responsible to the void. Hence the only way in which we can establish human responsibility is by showing the ultimate irrationalism of all non-theistic thought of which modern psychology is but a particular manifestation. In that way we place man self-consciously and subconsciously in every aspect of his person before the personality of God. Man is responsible in the whole of his personality, but only if he is the creature of God. Man before God is the only alternative to man in the void.

The fifth step of modern psychology in the direction of ultimate irrationalism is its study of abnormal psychology. Says Jastrow; "Prominent in the reconstruction of psychology is the recognition of the abnormal and its significance as a clue to the understanding of behavior" (P. 185).

The study of abnormal pscyhology is a good thing. It has undoubtedly thrown light not only on the behavior of the abnormal but also on the behavior of the normal. This is not in dispute. It is not the fact that men turned to the study of abnormal psychology that is important but the reason why they did it. The reason was the assumption that the normal and the abnormal are both of them normal in the sense that they are both naturally to be expected in human life. Hence it is said that one can really get as much light on the normal behavior of man by studying his abnormal behavior as one can get on the abnormal behavior of man by studying his normal behavior. On this point we again quote Jastrow: "The abnormal, like the genetic, is the normal magnified and distorted, the normal is the abnormal in miniature and under control" (p. 185). To this he adds: "The accusation or the pleasantry as suggested by the reaction from this trend that psychology first lost its soul and then its mind, carries the truth of historical vicissitude; but he who loses his soul shall find it" (p. 185).

One need only to read a book like McDougal's Outline of Abnormal Psychology to see the extent to which the assumption expressed by Jastrow in the quotations given has influenced men. One ought to remember that McDougal's psychology is typical in its anti-intellectualism. McDougal seeks the real place of purpose in the drives of man. Still further his psychology is typical in that it emphasizes the social. This emphasis upon the social is extended so

far as to include the abnormal. Throughout McDougal's book on abnormal psychology it is taken for granted that new light can be shed upon the normal by the study of the abnormal because the abnormal is natural as well as the normal.

It is at this point that modern psychology appears once more in its anti-theistic character. As Christians we rejoice that psychology has finally come to the study of the abnormal. The Christian position has preceded non-Christian scientists by centuries in the study of the abnormal. Non-Christian science has for ages taken for granted that somehow the abnormal is an inexplicable mystery quite out of harmony with the effort at a complete intellectual interpretation of life. Just as Plato's ideas of mud and hair and filth were there and remained there to disturb his attempted subordination of all experience under the category of the good or the one, so non-Christian thought assumes that evil is as ultimate as the good. It always has assumed this. Now the logical consequence of this position is that men should give up seeking any rational interpretation of life at all. But till recent times men have not been willing to accept the consequences of an ultimate irrationalism, neither yet now are they fully willing. Yet it is undeniable that the descent into the irrational has been rapid in modern thought. It could not be otherwise. If there is irrationalism somewhere in the universe, and if it is taken for granted that this irrationalism is as ultimate as rationality itself, it follows that irrationalism must be thought of as never to be overcome. One rotting apple in a bushel will spoil the whole bushel in time. One spot of ultimate irrationality will not only spoil rationality in the future but even now makes all talk about complete rationality meaningless.

With its conception of God as self-contained absolute rationality Christianity teaches that man was created wholly rational. That is, though man was not created with the ability to grasp the whole of rationality comprehensively yet his rationality was sound. Hence irrationality in the mind of man, that is insantiy, must be the result of a deflection of man from the source of absolute rationality. Accordingly the Christian will have to bring in his doctrine of sin when he discusses abnormal psychology. Not as though every insane person is a particularly great sinner. There are, to be sure, particular forms of sin that readily lead to insanity. Yet there are many insane persons who are not nearly so great sinners as others who are normal. We explain this on the ground that responsibility is corporate. Jesus said that the tower of Siloam fell upon those upon whom it fell not because they were greater sinners than others, but because of the sinfulness of the race. All men have merited God's punishment. So all men have merited insanity, because of their departure from the only rational God. Eternal punishment is the abyss of irrationalism into which they will fall who do not return to the God of rationality.

It will appear from this that the assumption underlying the study of the psychology of the abnormal, as it is usually undertaken today, is indicative of a farther departure from theism than was the case with earlier psychology.

The sixth step of modern psychology in the direction of the irrational is its study of the soul of "primitive man." To quote again from Jastrow: "Worthy of separate enumeration is the recognition of the place of the primitive psyche in the interpretation of behavior-trends from the simplest to the most complex (p. 181). Freud and his school look upon the study of primitive phenomena as a "reservoir of psychic trends." And of the anthropologists like Tylor, Frazer, Levy, Bruhl and others, Jastrow says that "they have supplied a geneology to an important chapter of modern psychology, portraying as an amazing reconstruction the procession of intellectual shifts and increments in rationality" (p. 181).

In the first five steps enumerated we dealt with an extension of the field in the direction of space only, but in this step we meet for the first time with an extension of the field in point of time. Hence it is really at this point for the first time that the full significance of the doctrine of evolution comes to view.

At this point too Christian thought has an explanation of its own to offer. It says that man was created perfect. That is, man was created as an adult with full rationality. This sets off the Christian position clearly and distinctly from all evolutionary views. There can have been no "increment of rationality" in the sense that the rational has slowly developed from the non-rational. On the other hand Christianity does not claim that man did not develop in the sense that by the exercise of his increated rationality he increased his rational powers and his rational accomplishments. It is quite in accord with Scripture that man should at first live close to nature and should use implements taken immediately from nature such as those that are found by archaeology. God gave to man a program in accordance with which he should bring to light the forces of nature gradually. Man did not do this as well as he might have done it if he had not sinned. Through sin his growth was not only retarded but also made abnormal. Hence we see that man's progress in civilization has been very slow. If as Christians we use the term "primitive man" at all we should be clearly conscious of the fact that we do not mean by it the same sort of being that the modern psychologist means by it. It is not as though every one knows just what primitive man is and that all that remains to be done is to draw certain conclusions from his works. On the contrary the whole debate between Christianity and non-Christianity is involved in the question as to what the "primitive man" is. If Christianity is true the real primitive man was Adam who came upon the scene of history as a full-grown man. On the other hand if the teaching of current evolution is true primitive man is an independent growth, that is, a growth out of bare vacuity.

Now modern psychology has adopted the evolutionary philosophy. With respect to this we may quote the words of Jastrow: "Modern psychology had a fortunate childhood because it came upon the scene when the struggle of existence for evolution had already been successfully waged by its historical sponsors" (p. 171). Modern psychology is deeply imbedded in a non-theistic

metaphysics which it has taken for granted uncritically. Yet the claim is made that it was at the time of the emergence of the modern outlook that doctrinaire methods were first done away. To quote from Jastrow: "If we return to the era of the emergence of the modern outlook we readily recognize that the speculative and doctrinaire type of introspection was doomed" (p. 177).

Suffice it in this connection to have called attention to the fact that modern psychology has raised primitive man to a position next to that of modern man in so far as principles of explanation are concerned. Modern psychology has assumed the non-Christian position with respect to the concept of this primitive man.

The final or seventh step of modern psychology in the direction of the irrational is the elevation of the animal as a principle of explanation for man. Without this last step the others would have no significance. If mankind has come from the God in whom Christianity believes, the adult man is the standard of interpretation of all rationality in mankind. We may take this adult in the various stages of his growth and note that each stage has its own peculiarities, but we cannot alow that the child, the abnormal person, primitive man, and finally the animal, can be put on the level with the adult as a source of explanation of life as a whole. On the other hand, if man is what non-Christian thought says he is, the normal adult stands on no higher level as a principle of interpretation of life as a whole than the child, the abnormal person, and the animal. In that case the animal even has a certain priority over the primitive man, the latter over the child, and the child over the man on account of the fact that man was originated from and through them.

The recent schools of psychology have been more consistent than the association psychology in the application of the non-Christian concept of man. In former generations man sometimes sought to find interesting parallels of rationality among the animals. Some thought they had discovered religion in the animal world. Yet somehow they began from the normal adult man as a sort of standard. Recently, however, there has been a great emphasis upon animal psychology. The assumption is that the behavior of animals sheds direct light on the behavior of man. Just as non-Christian logic likes to speak of thought without asking whether it should perhaps make a distinction between human thought and divine thought, so modern psychology speaks about behavior without asking whether it should perhaps speak of human and of animal behavior in distinction from one another. Of course psychologists do speak of human behavior and of animal behavior, but it is taken for granted that if any laws can be discovered in the one field they can without any further criticism be transferred to the other field. The interesting debate between the behaviorists, the Gestalt-psychologists and the hormic psychologists brings this out. Watson the Behaviorist, Koffka the Gestalt-psychologist, and McDougal the hormic pscyhologist are all of them interested in animal psychology. This in itself shows that the interest in animal psychology is characteristic of recent psychology as a whole. But more important than that they

are all interested in the subject is the fact that they all take for granted that the animal behavior is directly illuminative for the understanding of human behavior.

Thus we have reached the end of the road beyond which no man can go. Let us sum up what we have found. We have not enumerated all the recent schools of psychology in order to enter into the debates that they have between themselves. We have rather sought to trace one general tendency that pervades them all. One can find a good survey of the recent schools of psychology in the two books "Psychologies of 1925" – "Psychologies of 1930." But in reading these books one is likely to be lost because one is tempted to listen carefully to the debate in which these schools are engaged. Woodworth's Contemporary Schools of Psychology will help us to get something of the trends that appear in those schools. Even so, however, Woodworth and others like Brett and Baldwin, who give histories and surveys of the schools of psychology, themselves take the modern theory for granted. They do not bring out what is important from the Christian point of view. They think of the main question as being something in which we are not directly interested. Accordingly we have to survey the tendency of the modern schools of psychology with the distinct purpose in mind of ascertaining what their attitude to Christian theism is.

This attitude, we found in our survey, has been in the direction of irrationalism. The net result is that man now stands before us, if we allow modern psychology to draw the picture, as a Feldwesen. That is, man is thought of as a focus of action and interaction of cosmic forces which have somehow sprung into existence. The field to which man is related and in terms of which he is to be explained is not only the whole world as it now is, but the whole world as it has somehow become in the milleniums of the past. Ultimately then we must say that the field is the void. It is this concept that is substituted for the concept of Christianity.

Thus we have a complete contrast of the consistently Christian and the consistently non-Christian view of man as the two types of psychology involved in each of these two views picture them. We have found new corroboration of the interpretation of the problem of evidences as given in a previous chapter. Modern psychology as well as modern philosophy in general is seeking the absolute particular, or brute fact. From the adult as a standard to the child, from the child to the abnormal and from the abnormal to primitive man, and from primitive man to the animal, each of them thought of as independently contributing new light on the behavior of man, this is the story of recent psychology.

We may well ask the question how modern psychology is going to get back to any sort of universal and more particularly how the psychology of religion is going to get to the universal that it is seeking by applying the method and the materials of modern psychology in general.

Chapter IX

ANTHROPOLOGICAL EVIDENCES - THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

In the psychology of religion we meet with a particular form of modern general psychology. Yet we have a special interest in the psychology of religion. It deals directly with matters pertaining to Christianity.

The Religious Consciousness

The object of study in the psychology of religion literature is "the religious consciousness." Men hope to find in the study of the religions consciousness something that has never been found before. They hope to find out what religion really is. In the past men have spoken of religion as the science of God. Men have taken for granted that religion had an objective reference. Now religion may have an objective reference, but if it has we must discover this from a study of the religious consciousness itself (John Baillie: The Interpretation of Religion, Edinburgh, 1929, p. 134 ff.). John Baillie assures us that in thus studying the religious consciousness the psychology of religion is but following the best methods of philosophy and science. "We are then doing no more than following the very oldest tradition in this matter if we define the business of theological science as the interrogation of the religious consciousness with a view to discovering what religion is" (Idem, p. 15). Baillie is right in his claim. From the Greeks to the moderns philosophy and psychology have assumed that the consciousness of man does not need the interpretation of God before it can begin its own interpretation.

Thus we meet at the outset with a complete rejection of the Christian position. Or rather we meet at the outset with the assumption of the truth of the non-Christian position.

Naturally this rejection of the traditional position is done under cover of neutrality. So James Bissett Pratt says that at the outset one is permitted to adopt any definition of religion that he pleases. It is merely a question as to whose definition will stand the test of scientific method. Discussing a definition of religion he says: "Again let me admit, or rather insist, that this, like all other definitions of religion, is more or less arbitrary. Whoever wishes to do so has certainly a perfect logical right to give a much narrower or a much broader definition of the term, provided he is willing to take the consequences. He may, if he chooses, even confine religion to belief in Jehovah, on condition that he will stick to his definition and consistently call irreligious all men who do not so believe. A narrow definition based upon a particular theological belief, however, has two patent disadvantages. In the first place it leaves out a great number of people and a great number of phe-

nomena which are by general consent recognized as religious. Thus if we hold that belief in a personal God is the criterion of religion we not only run counter to the general view which classes Buddhism in its original form (that great stumbling block to most definitions) among the religions, but we are forced to call irreligious many deeply spiritual souls nearer home, who certainly have something more within them than can be included under philosophy or morality" (The Religious Consciousness, p. 3).

The Method of the Psychology of Religion

In the passage quoted from Pratt it is taken for granted that we need not introduce the distinction between false and true when studying the religious consciousness. This at once excludes the claim of Christianity to being the only true religion. Yet it soon appears that the psychology of religion needs some sort of criterion by which to judge the various phenomena that offer themselves as being religious. If any general statements are to be made about religion, a criterion of judgment is indispensable. The psychology of religion, like modern science in general, is face to face with the problem of brute fact. What is to be done with all the various religious phenomena? Shall we simply enumerate them? But if we do we have not really gained much. How do we know that when people speak of their religion they have really given expression to what is deepest in them? How do we know that religion can really find expression at all? Perhaps it is true that in all we say about religion we still have not caught the real thing. This is expressed in the saying: "Spricht die Seele, so spricht, ach, schon die Seele nicht mehr."

The struggle has been to find the most immediate and therefore the most genuine expression of religion. In the psychology of religion men wish to find the "native witness of religion." They wish to see religion as it acts when not encrusted in a theological system. On the other hand men seek to find universally valid conclusions about the phenomena of religion. But the nearer they seem to come to direct expression of the religious sentiment the narrower is the realm of its validity. If the soul does not really express itself when it expresses itself in words, the psychologist can turn to no other method than that of introspection. But if he turns to introspection alone his words will not be received by others. Thus there will be no science of the psychology of religion.

We note the similarity of this difficulty to that of science in general. The universals cannot fully express the particulars. The universals give but aspects of the particulars. Brute fact cannot be categorized. It must remain ultimately mysterious. Very little of this difficulty appears in the manuals on the psychology of religion. They speak of the various methods of study used in the psychology of religions. They speak of introspection, of autobiography, and of the questionnaire. They express preferences for the one method or the other. They seek somehow to combine the three methods. But there is evidently in their procedure no well thought out con-

ception of the relation of the universal to the particular.

One would think then that, at the outset at least, the Christian religion might be allowed to stand on a par with other religions. Yet such is not the case. Speaking of the danger of defining religion too narrowly Thouless says: "Such writers remind us of Mr. Thwackum who when he meant religion meant the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion but the Church of England" (Robert Thouless; An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p. 2). It is in a similar vein that Farmer speaks when he says: "It is curious how folk insist on approaching religion from the theological end, which is almost as foolish as trying to approach a rose from the angle of the theory of relativity" (Herbert H. Farmer: Experience of God, p.31). Thus Christianity is really excluded at the outset by the method followed.

Yet most of the writers on the psychology of religion hold that Christianity is somehow the best of the religions. Baillie speaks of this when discussing the psychology of religion: "The science was at the beginning provided with its motto and device by Max Muller when he gave utterance to the now famous words: 'Wer nur eine Religion kennt, kennt keine.' The intention of this saying is clearly to claim that a proper theoretical interpretation of religion has for the first time been rendered possible by our modern historical knowledge of the religion of other peoples and epochs" (Op. Cit., p. 120). In criticism of this view Baillie says he cannot do better than use the words of Harnack which seem to have been spoken in sly reference to Muller's dictum just quoted. Harnack said: "Wer diese Religion kennt, kennt alle." But Harnack certainly did not mean that the Christian religion was to be taken as true and others to be taken as false. Baillie says of him: "And he was no doubt alive to the truth of the view which would find the typical structure of the religious consciousness present in any authentic example of it, and would at the same time find the whole truth of it nowhere but in its best or Christian form" (Baillie, Idem, p. 121).

We see in this position of Baillie how he is struggling with the difficulty already mentioned. He wants to get at the absolutely particular. Still he must also find some standard by which to judge these particulars.

Summing up what we have found thus far we may say: (a) the religious consciousness is assumed to be an ultimate entity, (b) this religious consciousness gives forth a witness and part of this witness may have to do with God, (c) there are authentic manifestations of the religious consciousness found everywhere, (d) the religious consciousness must interpret itself by principles derived entirely from itself.

In this way the psychology of religion hopes to get at the real essence of religion. It is evident that this approach to religion excludes Christianity at the outset. It is taken for granted that man, even sinful man, has the true principles of explanation within himself.

It is not a matter of surprise then if we find that when the psychologists of religion deal with specifically Christian doctrines that these doctrines are rejected. The whole of the supernatural must be rejected inasmuch as it must be the ideal of science to explain all phenomena by one principle. Says Pratt; "Leaving aside hypotheses that involve the supernatural, he must seek – very likely in a plodding and prosaic fashion – to find out what can be done with the natural" (Religious Consciousness, p. 63). Here we meet again with the ideal of absolute comprehension as a limiting concept. As to the measure of success that has attended the efforts of the scientist to explain religion by the exclusion of the supernatural Pratt says: "And in our particular problem his methods have not as yet proved inadequate. The prophet and mystics have, indeed, been greatly influenced by the subconscious, but it is far from clear that there is anything mysterious about the ultimate source of this sub-conscious influence" (Idem, p. 28). The only God that can be tolerated is therefore a God who is penetrable to the human mind.

Similarly the only assertion of prophets or apostles that can be accepted as true is that which can be verified by experience. On this point Pratt says: "Inasmuch as nothing can be communicated to other men or verified by them but that which is presented to common human experience, science is limited to describing the experience data of human beings and the relations between them" (Idem, p. 26). It is plain that with such a standard the Christian conception of regeneration could never get a hearing. Nor can there come to us any objective revelation. Speaking of the prophet Pratt says: "The prophet ponders long over the condition of his people, the will of God and the problem of his own duty. Then some day suddenly the sought for solution rushes into his mind – he finds a message ready made upon his tongue, and it is almost inevitable that he should preface it with the words: 'Thus hath Jehovah showed!'" (Idem, p. 29).

The whole situation may be well summed up in a story given by Bouguet in his book Religious Experience, Its Nature, Type and Validity. He compares various metaphysical views to see which are favorable and which are unfavorable to religion. He thinks naturalism is unfavorable to religion. He feels that we need something in the nature of transcendence to justify religion. Then in comparing these various views discussed he says: "The case has been well compared by an American psychologist to an account which might be given by a man who had seen the sun for the first time after having lived under abnormal conditions, and given to a company of blind men who had never seen it. The seer would describe quite frankly the bright round object of his vision: but the blind psychologist would say that he could account for phenomenon by certain conditions prevailing within the eye, raised eyelids, stimulated retina, afferent impulse in the optic nerves, the stimulation of the visual centres in the occipital lobes. Both would be right. The explanation of the psychologist would be correct within its own limits and it could not prove the objective existence of the sun merely by movements going on within the eye, for it might easily say that those movements produced the appearance of a luminous ball

which was therefore a projection from inside the eye. And yet it would be generally admitted that the seer in question really did see the sun" (p. 10).

From the Christian point of view we should say that practically all the psychologists of religion are like these blind men. They insist on explaining religion exclusively from the "inside." Christian believers, on the other hand, may be compared with the man who had been blind but who later saw the sun. He knew what it was to be blind and what it was to see. He could therefore understand his blind friends while they could not understand him. Christians having been born again, can understand those who have no experience of the new birth. But those who have not been born again cannot do justice to the unique experience of those who have. They must continue to explain that experience in the only categories that are open to them.

We do not agree with Bouguet, however, when he says that both the blind men and the seer were right from their different points of view. The blind men were entirely wrong. They had no understanding of what it means to see the sun at all. In contradiction to the words of the seer they sought to explain the phenomenon of seeing from the inside. They did, to be sure, observe the movement of the eyeballs, etc. But they gave an entirely mistaken interpretation of these phenomena. The blind men as well as the seer moved their eyeballs. The only point in question was whether the blind men or the seer was right about seeing the sun. Of course, we answer that the seer was wholly right and the blind men were wholly wrong.

The Origin of Religion

So far we have spoken of the religious consciousness as the self-sufficient source of explanation and of the non-theistic method of study employed by the psychology of religion literature. To this we may add some remarks on the nature of religion as thus discovered. Something of this has already become apparent. In fact it is easy to predict what religion must be on the assumptions made. Yet it is useful to see in some detail what men have said about the matter.

In the first place we wish to examine more fully the manner in which the orthodox Christian view is rejected. It is rejected by the assumption of religion as a brute fact. We are told over and over again that we must make no metaphysical assumptions when we study the phenomena of the religions. We are told that the traditional position constantly makes such assumptions. It has, we are told, a whole scheme of metaphysics in the light of which it interprets the religious experience. In contrast to this we are to go to the facts and study them with unbiased mind. In the first place we must go to history to find out about the origin of religion. We find that man gradually evolved from the beast. Religion and morality have somehow sprung from the non-moral and the non-religious. Men evolved the religious attitude in response to their physical needs. They made gods for themselves in order

to get rain and sunshine. They made gods for themselves because they lived in dread of the powers of nature.

We need not enlarge upon this matter. It is too well known to need further elucidation. What does need elucidation is the fact that men can seriously offer such a presentation and still think they are not taking for granted a complete scheme of metaphysics and epistemology. What does need elucidation too is the fact that men will accuse Christianity of intellectualism in its conception of religion and then assume an intellectual interpretation of reality themselves.

To say that we can find the origin of religion by simple historical study is to assume the non-Christian position. It takes for granted that history is self-explanatory. It therefore at the outset excludes God as the creator of history. In this the psychology of religion is but following the lead of Kant. Kant, as noted above, held that every reference to a transcendent God is illegitimate. It would mean that God could think apart from brute facts.

It would be fatal to oppose this Kantian epistemology as it underlies the recent psychology of religion literature with the method of Butler and his school. We should then have to grant the legitimacy of starting with brute facts. We should then have to admit the competence of the mind of sinful man to judge of these brute facts. With these assumptions the picture given by the psychology of religion can be made to appear plausible. Is there not a great deal of evidence that early man did just the sort of thing that we are told he did? Does not the evidence indicate that man has made gods in his own image? Yet there is evidence for an original monotheism. But even so we cannot reach to the high position of the Bible account. That account speaks of an originally perfect man. Where is the factual historical evidence that such a man ever existed?

We cannot resort to possibilities and probabilities. The Bible requires absolute faith in its truthfulness. We cannot resort to a dualism between our faith and our rational interpretation of life. The Bible says that we are created as unified personalities. The only method of dealing with this whole problem is that spoken of repeatedly. We should allow men to work out a complete interpretation of life upon the basis of the principles they have assumed. They will then run into a blind alley. So in the present instance. Starting with brute fact the psychology of religion must end with brute fact. Starting with self-sufficiency it cannot find in history any criterion with which to judge between better or worse. Starting with the normalcy of the mind of sinful man the abnormal is made an aspect of the normal. Truth cannot be distinguished from error. Light cannot be distinguished from darkness.

When the bankruptcy of the non-Christian interpretation of the origin of religion thus appears we point out that the "facts" are in accord with the Christian position. We presuppose God. That gives meaning to history as a

whole. God is the maker of all things. He created man in his own image. Man's consciousness could therefore function fruitfully when it sought to interpret life in accordance with God's interpretation of it. But man became a sinner. He sought within his own consciousness the principle by which to interpret life. Eve equated the words of God with the words of the devil. She put on a par the interpretation of history given by the maker of history and the interpretation of history given by one who was himself immersed within history. This was, in effect, the reduction of God to the level of an historical being. Eve thought that both God and the devil were like scientists who placed before themselves the ideal of complete comprehension of the meaning of brute facts, as a limiting concept. Accordingly she thought that the interpretation of neither of them could be comprehensive and certainly true. She would have to make up her own mind at a venture. She took for granted that man must interpret the whole of history in exclusively immanentistic categories.

It is but natural that after his evil beginning mankind made gods in its own image. God was after that pictured as being no more than a magnified man. Then too there would naturally be many gods. We expect evidence for early polytheism. To be sure man could not quickly forget his original home. So we also expect evidence for early monotheism. All this has meaning only on the basis of the Christian philosophy of history.

The Nature of Religion

Yet it is upon the assumption of the self-sufficiency of history that the psychology of religion proceeds. Upon such a basis we expect that men will be able to find no common definition of religion. Leuba has collected some forty-eight definitions of religion in his book. They are similar to some of those we have given from the book of Sheen. Pratt remarks about these definitions as follows: "Professor Leuba enumerates forty-eight definitions of religion from so many great men (and elsewhere, adds two of his own, apparently to fill out the even half-hundred). But the striking thing about these definitions is that, persuasive as many of them are, each learned doctor seems quite unpersuaded by any but his own. And when the doctros disagree what are the rest of us going to do? Can we be justified in talking about religion at all?

> "The truth is, I suppose, that 'religion' is one of those general and popular terms which have been used for centuries to cover so vague and indefinite a collection of phenomena that no definition can be formed, which will include all its uses and coincide with every one's meaning of it. Hence all definitions of religion are more or less arbitrary and should be taken as postulates rather than as axioms. In this sense I shall myself propose a definition of religion, not as a final or complete statement, nor because I think it of any great importance, but because I intend to write a book about religion and it therefore seems only fair that I should tell the

reader in advance not what the word means, but what I am going to mean by the word" (Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 4).

From this passage of Pratt it appears what will happen to the notion of religion if the traditional position be given up. All human experience is then a matter of brute fact. One interpretation of it is practically as good as another. All definitions are allowed an equal standing. There is only one definition that must be excluded. That is the orthodox Christian one. The reason for this is plain. If the Christian conception of religion were allowed it would disallow all the others. We preach the unknown religion as Paul preached the unknown God. We beg not for a place in the parthenon; we demand the destruction of the parthenon.

If we look at some of the definitions actually proposed we find that they offer amid a great variety a basic similarity. They all "lose themselves in their round globe." Leuba has classified the definitions of religion as follows:

In the first place: "Religion is the feeling (or emotion or attitude or behavior) called forth by the mysterious or the sacred.

In the second place: "Religion is the quest after the meaning of life; or, from a somewhat different point of view, it is the determination of what is most worth while.

In the third place: "Religion is the belief in something superhuman which has the power of making life what it should be.

In the fourth place: "Religion is devotion to the welfare of humanity.

In the fifth place: "Religion is an experience implying the existence of a spiritual world" (God or Man, p. 114).

Every one of these classes of definitions are based upon an assumed intra-cosmical principle of interpretation. What is the mysterious spoken of in the first class of definitions? From the Christian point of view it would be the incomprehensibility of God who has revealed himself according to the measure of man's ability to receive such revelation. In Leuba's statement it is taken to be something beyond what man can understand by himself. In reality all things are mysterious on this basis. There can be no distinction between sacred and secular on an assumed historical relativity. What is the meaning of life spoken of in the second class? It is taken for granted that the answer to this question must be found in history itself. And what can make life what it should be? Man must discover this for himself in the course of history. Yet he can never discover it because all the brute facts of history are on a par with one another. What is for the welfare of humanity? One says one thing and another says the opposite. There is nothing but confusion on the subject. No final answer can be given. And what is the nature of that spirit-

ual world of which the last class speaks? No one knows or ever can know. Brute facts can never be fully interpreted by the universals of science.

Yet it is frequently said that no man of intelligence can really hold to the orthodox view of religion today. Leuba tells us in no uncertain terms that we are obscurantists if we hold to the orthodox view. He traces the history of the idea of God. Some gods were invented and moralized, he says. Other gods were invented and depersonalized. The former was in the interest of the heart. The others were in the interest of the head. What did the Christian Church do with these gods? We give Leuba's words: "The God of the Christian creeds unites these two incompatible features; he possesses the essential mental traits of a human person, and can, therefore, sympathize with man and minister to his happiness. He is also an infinite impersonal absolute, and as such, cannot be affected by man's behavior. The social, personal traits of God are due to man's desire for some one able and willing to protect, comfort, do justice, and otherwise gratify the needs of the heart; his impersonality is the outcome of a desire to understand rationally, logically, to see things as they are and not as we would like them to be. No god, who is not both personal and impersonal, can altogether satisfy human nature, compounded as it is of heart and head. The presence of these two contradictory features in the conception of God accounts for the confusions and compromises, some tragic and some ridiculous, which affect civilized humanity" (God or Man, p. 53). To this he adds a little further: "The intellectual gymnastics to which the Church Fathers were prompted by this perplexing situation are a monument to man's resourcefulness, and in particular, to his ability to believe the unbelievable in order to live content. The achievements of these men equal probably any other self-deception achieved by humanity" (p. 57).

It may be said that the position of Leuba is extreme. Are there not other psychologists of religion who are favorable to the Christian Faith? We reply that Leuba's position is extreme only in its manner of statement. Some other psychologists of religion are more polite in their rejection of Christianity than is Leuba. That is really the only difference. We may as well face this situation. The psychology of religion literature says in effect that Christianity reduces experience to absurdity. The only way in which to meet this charge is to show that the opposite is true. When Leuba speaks of believing the unbelievable we point out that he, together with others, has denied the very law of non-contradiction. He and his confreres have virtually given up every effort to give an intellectual interpretation to the phenomena of experience. They simply think of religion as a function with which man helps to adjust himself to the environment. Let us look briefly at the religion of the psychologist of religion.

Religion as the Joyful Submission to the Inevitable

Some years ago a series of Outline Bible Study Courses proceeded from the University of Chicago. Professor Kingsbury, a psychologist, tells us in

it what the good life is. He says that the good life is the "well-integrated life" (Forrest Kingsbury, What Religion Does for Personality, p. 70). Personality itself appears upon the universe somehow. It must integrate itself somehow. It must seek the unification of its motives. "Unification of motives is not something we start with and then lose, as did grandfather Adam in the Garden of Eden. Oneness is an achievement, worked out, if at all, only in the struggle and effort of living in a difficult world" (Idem, p. 77). Thus the task of personality begins to take shape. Personality is here somehow in a universe which is here somehow. The personality and the universe are somehow evil as well as good. In this chance conglomeration human personality is somehow going to achieve integration.

If we fear that this integration is not likely to be effected we turn to the philosopher Wieman. He assures us that there will somehow be something stable in the accidental universe. At least he tells us that if the universe were only accident and chance, integration would not take place. "Change without something that retains its identity throughout the change is meaningless. All purpose, all meaning, all progress, all hope, requires that something changeless persist throughout the sequences of transition" (Henry N. Wieman: What Religion Does for Personality, p. 37).

To this we can but reply that it spells the condemnation of the whole effort put forth by the psychology of religion. That whole effort is confessedly based upon an ultimate philosophy of flux. But we must believe the unbelievable and see what happens. If we become disheartened and think that on such a basis the whole of life and religion is a delusion, Wieman assures us that it is not. "Let us call to mind that the aspect of the universe called God is a pervasive aspect constantly and intimately operative in our lives and in the world about us. In so far as we yield ourselves to it indescribable possibilities for good hover over us and open before us. At regular seasons of worship let us cultivate this sense of divine presence, with the attendant possibilities for good and evil.

"But we must not stop with this sense of divine presence and apprehension of attendant possibilities. Each of us must recognize, and through regular seasons of meditation clarify, the definite part which he is fitted to play in bringing the divine aspect of the universe into dominance with all the consequent good, and in reducing the evil aspects with their consequent disasters" (Experience in Personal Religion, p. 79).

Finally in order to enlist our energies in making the divine aspect of the universe dominant Wieman identifies it with popular notions of the kingdom of God: "This genuine possibility for maximum good inherent in the universe may be called the cause of Christ, the will of God, the kingdom of Heaven, the utmost welfare of mankind, etc., but its specific nature and the best way to promote it is something about which only the fanatic is sure, and he is probably the most mistaken of all" (Idem, p. 95).

Thus religion becomes something entirely subjective. It is an attitude to brute facts for which we have no metaphysical or epistemological justification. If the universe is nothing but a mass of brute facts then we have no right to assume that we can integrate our personalities. Religion on this basis becomes nothing but acceptance of the inevitable. Wieman himself virtually admits this when he says: "One is free of demoralizing fear just as soon as he is ready to accept the facts precisely as they are. There is a record of a man who found he was going blind. As long as he clung to his failing eyesight he was fearful and depressed. But when at last he saw there was no hope, he resigned himself to inevitable fact, and set to work to cultivate his sense of touch in order to become an expert flour tester, his fear departed —

"Now this state of complete self-committal, this total self-surrender to reality, with consequent command over all the resources of personality, is possible when one fills his mind with the thought that underneath all other facts is the basic fact upon which all else depends. This basic fact can be called the structure of the universe or it can be called God. Whenever we commit ourselves in love to God, accepting him with affection and all things else for his sake, we are free from fear. This state of mind requires cultivation" (Idem, p. 138).

Thus religion becomes the joyful submission to the inevitable. But perhaps it will be said that the inevitable is not as inevitable as it used to be. Has not recent scientific research shown us that determinism must be replaced with indeterminism? And does not this give human personality an opportunity that it did not formerly have, to integrate itself? We do not think so. As pointed out before, human personality is no better off with a chance universe than with a determined universe. The psychology of religion literature, together with modern science in general, assumes a philosophy of chance. Upon such a basis no predication is possible and religion itself becomes unintelligible. Christianity alone does not destroy reason and therefore it alone does not destroy religion.