

BT
1107
.V32

B 390610 DUPL

A CHRISTIAN THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

A2a6

BY


CORNELIUS VAN TIL, Th.M., Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF APOLOGETICS

WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

CHESTNUT HILL, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
GENERAL LIBRARY



THE GIFT OF
Michael T. Rinter

A CHRISTIAN THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Cornelius Van Til.

Professor of Apologetics at
Westminster Theological Seminary

1954

Michael J. Rantz

This syllabus is used for class purposes
and is not to be used for public discussion
without permission.

BT
1107
.V32

3115
Mint...
4-27-54

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Preface	i
I	Preliminary Survey	1
II	The Holy Scriptures	12
III	The Autonomous Man	25
IV	The Church Fathers	50
V	Autonomy and Authority	108
VI	Evangelicalism and Scripture	125
VII	Natural Theology and Scripture	148
VIII	Common Grace and Scripture	176
IX	Old Princeton and Amsterdam Apologetics	197

4-30-54 MFP

PREFACE

The present syllabus deals with the Christian theory of knowledge. If plans mature there will be two others, one dealing with the Christian theory of being and one dealing with the Christian theory of behavior. The three will be mutually supplementary. Yet each is intended to be a whole in itself.

The three syllabi are to be used for outlines of class discussion. Discussions in class are calculated to elucidate what is set forth summarily and generally in the syllabi.

The course for which these syllabi serve as outlines is concerned with Christian apologetics. But it is impossible in such a course to avoid discussing the differences between the Romanist and Protestant interpretation of the Christian faith. Again, it is impossible to avoid discussing the differences between the Reformed and the non-Reformed view of Protestant Christianity. The method of reasoning for the truth of Christianity will be affected by the view one has of the nature of Christianity.

The present writer holds with the late B. B. Warfield that the Reformed Faith is the most consistent expression of Christianity. Christian apologetics is therefore considered identical with Reformed apologetics. No depreciation of non-Reformed views of Protestantism is implied. On the contrary, it is the writer's conviction that the cause of Evangelical, that is, non-Reformed Protestantism, is bound to profit from a defense of the Reformed Faith. For a defense of the Reformed Faith is not primarily a defense of the "five points of Calvinism." A defense of the Reformed Faith is a Reformed method of the defense of Christianity. And this should be to the profit even of Roman Catholic Christianity.

Reformed apologetics wants first of all and above all to be Biblical apologetics. Its aim is to interpret all of life in terms of basic truths derived from the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as the infallible rule of faith and practice. The writer is therefore greatly indebted to the Reformed exegetes of Scripture. In modern times many excellent commentaries written by Reformed scholars have appeared. The writer is also greatly indebted to the great Reformed dogmaticians of modern times, such as Charles Hodge, Thornwell, Dabney, Shedd, Kuyper and especially Herman Bavinck. Back of all of them stands that master theologian and exegete of Scripture, John Calvin, whose writings have been constantly consulted.

The present work seeks specifically to show the relevance of Christianity to modern thought. Its main contention is that Christianity has the answer that

modern thought seeks in vain. Now modern thought in general is largely controlled by the basic principles of modern philosophy. To evaluate these basic principles from the point of view of Christianity is therefore of paramount importance. Much help has been received on this matter from the writings of D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, and Herman Dooyerveerd of the Free University of Amsterdam, and from G.H. Stoker of Potchefstrom, South Africa. It is the writer's hope that something in the way of a beginning may herewith be made in the utilization of all the wealth of Reformed Scriptural exegesis, theological research, and philosophy that has appeared in recent times for purposes of a Reformed or consistently Christian apologetics.

Chapter I

PRELIMINARY SURVEY

The present chapter offers to the reader a preliminary survey of the contents of this work. It wants especially to indicate in a broad way the method of reasoning that is to be pursued.

In this syllabus, as in those to follow, the Christian position will be set forth first. Then the non-Christian view will be presented. After that the argument for the truth of the Christian position will be put forward.

As already indicated in the preface, it is impossible to set forth the Christian position without considering the different interpretations that have been given of it. In particular the difference between Protestantism and Romanism must be noted. And this implies that a difference in method of reasoning between a Protestant and a Romanist defense of Christianity must be explained.

Even so another difference comes into view at this point. All Protestants will agree with one another that the doctrines of Protestantism must be defended as over against Romanism. But not all agree that there is a distinctly Protestant method of defending Christianity as a whole. Some hold that Protestants should first join the Romanists in order with them to defend the doctrines that they have in common. All Christians, we are told, believe in God. All believe that God has created the world. All Christians hold that God controls the world by his providence. All believe in the deity of Christ. These and other doctrines may therefore be defended in the same way by all Christians. There is no specifically Protestant way of defending the Christian doctrine of God. How could there be since this is the common property of all Christians?

Other Protestants contend that there must be a specifically Protestant defense of all Christian doctrines. Their argument is that all Christian doctrines are interdependent. Each major doctrine implies all of the others and colors all of the others. A Protestant's doctrine of the atonement will to some extent color his doctrine of God. In fact the difference with respect to all other doctrines rests ultimately on a difference with respect to the notion one has of God.

But what, it will then be asked, is the difference between a Protestant and a Romanist doctrine of God? The answer given is that the Protestant doctrine of God stresses his self-sufficiency and therefore his ultimate control over all that comes to pass in the course of the history of the world. The Romanist doctrine of God, while also speaking of God's self-sufficiency, none-the-less compromises it to some extent. It does this by virtually ascribing to man a measure of self-sufficiency. And by ascribing a measure of self-sufficiency or ultimacy to man, God is in some measure made dependent upon man.

It is natural, then, to ask how this difference between the Romanist and the Protestant concept of God should necessitate a specifically Protestant defense of Christianity as a whole. The reply would be as follows. The Protestant doctrine of God requires that it be made foundational to everything else as a principle of explanation. If God is self-sufficient then he alone is self-explanatory. And if he alone is self-explanatory then he must be the final reference point in all human predication. He is then like the sun from which all lights on earth derive their power of illumination. You do not use a candle in order to search for the sun. The very idea of a candle or of any other created light is that it is derivative. So the very idea of any fact in the universe is that it is a derivative. It cannot have come into existence by itself, or by chance. God himself is the source of all possibility.

On the other hand if God is not self-sufficient and self-explanatory then he is no longer the final reference point in human predication. Then God and man become partners in an effort to explain a common environment. Facts then are not what they are in the last analysis by virtue of the plan of God; they are partly that, and they partly exist in their own power. And most basically of all, then, the human mind need not subject itself to the revelation of God as absolutely authoritative for him. He may defer to God as to an expert who has had greater experience than himself; but he need not make all thoughts captive to the obedience of Christ.

How would it be possible to challenge the unbeliever to accept Christianity on this Romanist view? The difference between the two positions is then not basic. The Christian cannot, on this view, indicate to the non-Christian that his position is destructive of experience. Nor can he make plain to the non-Christian that Christianity will give him, and certainly give him, what he needs. The essence of the non-Christian position is that man is assumed to be ultimate or autonomous. Man is thought of as the final reference point in predication. The facts of his environment are "just there"; they are assumed to have come into being by chance. Possibility is placed above God and man alike. The laws of logic are assumed as somehow operative in the universe about man or at least as legislative for what man can accept or cannot accept as possible or probable. If a god exists he must at least be subject to conditions that are similar to if not the same as, those to which humanity itself is subject. How then is the Christian to challenge this non-Christian approach to the interpretation of human experience? It is only if he shows that man must presuppose God as the final reference point in predication. Otherwise he would destroy experience itself. It is only if the non-Christian is shown that even in his virtual negation of God he is still really presupposing God. It is only if the non-Christian is shown that he cannot deny God unless he first affirm him; unless he is shown that his own approach throughout its history has been shown to be destructive of human experience itself.

But the Romanist method of defending God does no such thing. It does not, to be sure, agree with the non-Christian position in assuming that man must de-

liberately be made the final reference point of human predication. On the other hand, it does not clearly insist that God be made the final reference point. In other words, the Romanist position is a compromise between the Christian and the non-Christian view on the matter of the final reference point of human experience. Hence it cannot distinguish clearly between the two positions. It can not consistently show that the non-Christian view is ruinous to man. It cannot consistently show that the Christian position means salvation for human experience.

* * * * *

Up to this point in our discussion it has been assumed that all Protestants agree in thinking of God as all-sufficient and as self-explanatory. But this assumption must now be examined. What accounts for the difference between Protestants on the matter so far discussed? Why does one group advocate the idea that there is a distinctly Protestant method of defending Christianity in all of its doctrines? Why does the other group maintain that Protestants should first join Roman Catholics in defending doctrines they have in common with them in order to go on to the defense of the specific Protestant teachings? The only reason that can be found is that the second group is basically sympathetic to the Romanist view of man as being in part autonomous.

We refer now to those Protestants who are usually spoken of as evangelicals as distinct from those who embrace the Reformed Faith. Under the term evangelicals we include all those who hold to the Remonstrant or Arminian view of man in his relation to God. We include also the Lutherans. To be sure Lutherans are not by any means to be identified as Arminian in every respect. But on the point at issue their view is basically the same as that of the Arminians. The point is that both Arminians and Lutherans maintain that man has a measure of ultimacy or autonomy. In this respect they resemble the Roman Catholics. The measure of autonomy ascribed to man is much smaller in the case of many Arminians and Lutherans than it is in the case of the Roman Catholics. Even so any measure of autonomy ascribed to man implies a detraction from the self-sufficiency of God. For it implies that God can no longer be taken as the final reference point in human predication. It is expected then that evangelicals, holding as they do in their theology to the idea of man as having some measure of ultimacy, will also maintain that Protestants may and even must join with Roman Catholics in defending certain doctrines that they have in common. They will hold that only after certain doctrines that Roman Catholics and Protestants hold in common have been defended against the non-Christian by both groups standing side by side will there be occasion for Protestants to go on to the defense of their own teachings. And then this defense of their own teachings will have to be against Roman Catholics as much as against unbelievers.

Over against these convictions of the evangelicals with respect to the method of defense of the Christian faith stands the position of Reformed theology. Reformed theology holds to the self-sufficiency of God without compromise. It

therefore rejects every form of human autonomy. Only on the assumptions of divine self-sufficiency and man's complete dependence can the difference between the Christian and the non-Christian points of view be clearly made out. Only thus can the issue be clearly drawn. The non-Christian assumes that man is ultimate, that is, that he is not created. Christianity assumes that man is created. The non-Christian assumes that the facts of man's environment are not created; the Christian assumes that these facts are created. The Christian has derived his convictions on these matters from Scripture as the infallible Word of God. As self-explanatory God naturally speaks with absolute authority. Therefore the Bible does not appeal to human reason as ultimate in order to justify what it says. It comes to the human being with absolute authority. Its claim is that human reason must itself be taken in the sense in which Scripture takes it, namely as created by God and as therefore properly subject to the authority of God.

It is therefore required of man that he regard himself and his world as wholly revelatory of the presence and requirements of God. It is man's task to search out the truths about God, about the world and himself in relation to one another. He must seek a systematic arrangement of the facts of the universe. But the system that he thus tries to form is not the sort of system that the non-Christian is seeking to make for himself.

The two types of system, that of the non-Christian and that of the Christian, differ because of the fact that their basic assumptions or pre-suppositions differ. On the non-Christian basis man is assumed to be the final reference point in predication. Man will therefore have to seek to make a system for himself that will relate all the facts of his environment to one another in such a way as will enable him to see all the relations that obtain between them. In other words the system that the non-Christian has to seek on his assumption is one in which he himself virtually occupies the place that God occupies in Christian theology. Man must, in short, virtually be omniscient. He must virtually reduce the facts that confront him to logical relations; the "thingness" of each thing must give up its individuality in order that it may be known; to be known, a thing or fact must be wholly known by man.

It is true that in modern thought there seems to be no such striving after exhaustive knowledge. But the reason for this seeming "irrationalism" of modern thought lies in the fact that it puts great stress upon another non-Christian assumption; this assumption is to the effect that all reality is temporal throughout. Hence all facts are assumed to be what they are simply as products of Chance. This assumption was implied in ancient non-Christian thought as well as in modern non-Christian thought. But it was not until modern times, especially since the time of Kant, that this assumption has come clearly to the foreground. In consequence modern thought speaks of its systems as being limiting concepts or ideals. But the ideal is still that of complete comprehension for man.

The system that Christians seek to obtain may, by contrast, be said to be analogical. By that is meant that God is the original and that man is the derivative. God has absolute self-contained system within himself. What comes to pass in history happens in accord with that system or plan by which he orders the universe. But man as God's creature cannot have a replica of that system of God. He cannot have a reproduction of that system. He must, to be sure, think God's thoughts after him; but this means that he must, in seeking to form his own system, constantly be subject to the authority of God's system to the extent that this is revealed to him.

For this reason all of man's interpretations in any field are subject to the Scriptures given him. Scripture itself informs us that at the beginning of history before man had sinned he was subject to the direct revelation of God in all the interpretations of his environment that he would make.

It is of basic importance to understand what is meant by saying that the human system should be self-consciously analogical. For there are many non-Christians who also speak of their systems as analogical. But when they do they simply mean that man cannot exhaustively explain reality to himself, and that therefore he projects the idea of a god who does. Then he adds that man is dependent upon this god; but in reality this is not true. For the god that the non-Christian speaks of is in fact a projection, or limit. He is not self-contained. It is man who is assumed as being original and God is assumed as being derivative. So non-Christian systems should not be called analogical.

Then there is the Romanist use of the idea of analogy. Romanism thinks that it has the true idea of analogy. It holds that Protestantism, and especially the Reformed faith, does not have a true notion of analogy since it does not do justice to man as in some measure autonomous. Roman Catholic theology will not make man fully and exclusively dependent upon God, and therefore cannot do justice to the idea of analogy. It will not make a clear-cut choice between the Christian and the non-Christian position on the question of the final point of reference in predication. If man is made or assumed to be ultimate then he is not analogous of God. Only if God is taken to be ultimate is man really analogous of God. And it is only in the Reformed Faith that God is really taken to be ultimate. Hence the Reformed idea of system is different not only from the non-Christian and from the Romanist, but even from the evangelical idea. We mean that so far as the evangelical holds with the Romanist that man has some measure of autonomy, he cannot do justice to the idea that the human system should aim to be analogical and no more.

The difference between Christian system that seeks to be consistently analogical and one, like that of Romanism and evangelicalism that does not, is that only in the former is the false ideal of knowledge of the unbeliever rejected. If one does not make human knowledge wholly dependent upon the original self-knowledge and consequent revelation of God to man, then man will have to seek knowledge within himself as the final reference point. Then he will have to seek

an exhaustive understanding of reality. And then he will have to hold that if he cannot attain to such an exhaustive understanding of reality he has no true knowledge at all of anything. Either man must then know everything or he knows nothing. This is the dilemma that confronts every form of non-Christian epistemology. And the Romanist or evangelical type of argument for Christianity is not able to indicate this fact with clarity. The only way by which this dilemma can be indicated clearly is by making plain that the final reference point in predication is God as the self-sufficient One.

* * * * *

So far in this chapter the general difference between a consistently Protestant or Reformed and a more generally evangelical method of reasoning has been pointed out. The Romanist or evangelical method would start reasoning with the non-Christian on a neutral basis. It would not challenge the presuppositions of the non-Christian at the outset of the argument. The reason for this is obvious. The Romanist and the evangelical are in some measure in agreement with the non-Christian on his presuppositions. They too attribute a measure of autonomy to man. They therefore hold that the non-Christian quite legitimately demands that Christianity shall be shown to meet the demands of the autonomous man.

These demands are that Christianity shall be shown to be in "accord with reason." By "reason" is meant the reason of man as the determiner of the possible and the impossible by means of "logic." Only that is said to be possible which is in accord with, or at least is not against, the law of contradiction. Secondly, Christianity must be shown to be in accord with the "facts." These facts are the facts as reason, the determiner of the possible and impossible, has "discovered" or observed.

The Romanist-evangelical method of defending Christianity therefore has to compromise Christianity while defending it. If the demands of "reason" as the non-Christian thinks of it are assumed to be legitimate, then Christianity will be able to prove itself true only by destroying itself. As it cannot clearly show the difference between the Christian and the non-Christian view of things, so it cannot present any clear-cut reason why the non-Christian should forsake his position.

The Reformed method of apologetics seeks to escape this nemesis. It begins frankly "from above." It would "presuppose" God. But in presupposing God it cannot place itself at any point on a neutral basis with the non-Christian. Before seeking to prove that Christianity is in accord with reason and in accord with fact, it would ask what is meant by "reason" and what is meant by "fact." It would argue that unless reason and fact are themselves interpreted in terms of God they are unintelligible. Then reason is a pure abstraction that has no contact with fact, and fact is a pure abstraction that has no contact with reason.

Reason and fact cannot be brought into fruitful union with one another except upon the presupposition of the existence of God and his control over the universe.

Since on the Reformed basis there is no area of neutrality between the believer and the unbeliever, the argument between them must be indirect. Christians cannot allow the legitimacy of the assumptions that underlie the non-Christian methodology. But they can place themselves upon the position of those whom they are seeking to win to a belief in Christianity for the sake of the argument. And the non-Christian, though not granting the presuppositions from which the Christian works, can nevertheless place himself upon the position of the Christian for the sake of the argument.

The Christian knows the truth about the non-Christian. He knows this because he is himself what he is by grace alone. He has been saved from the blindness of mind and the hardness of heart that marks the "natural man." The Christian has the "doctor's book." The Scriptures tell him of the origin and of the nature of sin. Man is dead in trespasses and sins (Eph. 2:1). He hates God. His inability to see the facts as they are and reason about them as he ought to reason about them is at bottom a matter of sin. He has the God-created ability of reasoning within him. He is made in the image of God. God's revelation is before him and within him. He is in his own constitution a manifestation of the revelation and therefore of the requirement of God. God made a covenant with him through Adam (Romans 5:12). He is therefore now in Adam a covenant-breaker. He is also against God and therefore against the revelation of God. For this revelation of God constantly and inescapably reminds him of his creaturely responsibility. And as a sinner he has in Adam declared himself autonomous.

So then intellectual argument will not, as such, convince and convert the non-Christian. It takes the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit to do that. But as in the case of preaching, so in the case of apologetical reasoning, the Holy Spirit may use a mediate approach to the minds and hearts of men. The natural man is quite able intellectually to follow the argument that the Christian offers for the truth of his position. He can therefore see that the wisdom of this world has been made foolishness by God. Christianity can be shown to be not "just as good as" the non-Christian position, but the only position that does make non-sense of human experience.

Up to this point no notice has been taken of the fact that not all Reformed theologians follow the method briefly suggested so far. What has been called the Reformed method in the preceding discussion is implied in the basic contention of Reformed theology, namely the self-sufficiency and self-explanatory character of the triune God. But that such is the case has not always been recognized. The Reformed theologians of the Reformation period did not work out a Reformed apologetical methodology. This is not to be marveled at. They laid the ground work for it. Some later Reformed theologians continued to use the Romanist-evangelical method of defending Christianity. At least they did so up to the point

where the specifically Reformed teachings on the sovereignty of God in soteriology came up for discussion. Thus the apologetics of the Reformed theologians at Princeton Theological Seminary (prior to its reorganization in 1929 when the Reformed Faith was rejected in principle) used a method of argument similar to that employed in Bishop Butler's Analogy. Now Butler's work is perhaps the most outstanding historical example of the evangelical methodology. It starts with assuming that man, though he has not taken God into account has by his own principles been able to interpret the course and constitution of nature aright. Butler's argument is to the effect that if men would only follow the same method they have employed for the interpretation of nature when they are confronted with the claims of Christianity they will be driven to accept the latter as true. Men have seen evidence of substitution in nature and they have recognized it as such. So then why should they not also accept the idea of the substitutionary atonement by Christ, the Son of God, as presented in Scripture? Men have admitted that the exceptional, the inexplicable, takes place in nature. There is a principle of discontinuity as well as a principle of continuity that men recognize in the world. Why then should they object to the possibility of the supernatural and of miracle? They can allow for these without in the least giving up their own basic principle of interpretation. (Cf. William Brenton Greene - The Metaphysics of Apologetics; B. B. Warfield's article in Schaff Herzog's Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge on Apologetics.)

It was against a position similar to this that Dr. Abraham Kuyper protested in his famous work The Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology. His argument is to the effect that apologetics of this nature gives over one bulwark after another to the enemy. Kuyper's contention is that the Christian must take his place directly upon the presupposition of the truth of the Christian religion as it is presented in Scripture.

In similar fashion Dr. Herman Bavinck argued that there is only one principle of interpretation for the Christian, namely as it is objectively expressed in the Scripture and as this is testified to by the Holy Spirit in the mind and heart of the believer.

Even so both Kuyper and Bavinck did not work out their own principles fully; their primary interest was theological rather than apologetical. And when they did engage in apologetical argument they sometimes employed the method which they themselves had criticized in others.

What has been called the Reformed method in the preceding discussion is however employed by both the men of Princeton and of Amsterdam to which reference has been made. At one point or another all the Reformed theologians of modern times argue that unless the "reason of man" and the facts of the universe be taken as they are taken in terms of the infallible revelation of God given to man in the Bible, human experience runs into the ground.

It is to this basic approach of Kuyper and Bavinck, of Charles Hodge and B. B. Warfield and Geerhardus Vos (ignoring or setting aside the remnants of the traditional method that is found in their works), that appeal is made in this work.

It is of critical importance in the current scene that a consistently Reformed apologetic be set forth. The non-Christian point of view is much more self-consciously hostile to Christianity than it has ever been. And the fact that it is the assumption of human autonomy that is the root and fountain of all forms of non-Christian thought is more apparent than it has ever been in the past. Any argument for the truth of Christianity that is inconsistent with itself should not expect to have a hearing. Only a position which boldly and humbly challenges the wisdom of the world and, with the Apostle Paul, brings out that it has been made foolishness with God will serve the purpose. Only such a method which asks man to serve and worship the Creator rather than the creature honors God and assigns to him the place that he truly occupies. Only such a method is consistent with the idea that the Holy Spirit must convict and convince the sinner. The Holy Spirit cannot be asked to honor a method that does not honor God as God.

Recently however there has been an objection raised to what has been called the Reformed method of apologetics earlier in this chapter. In a book entitled, General Revelation, and Common Grace, Dr. William Masselink of the Reformed Bible Institute at Grand Rapids, Michigan has taken exception to the position taken by the present writer. It will be necessary therefore to take up this matter later. The question hinges largely on the question of the value of the knowledge of the non-Christian. Masselink's contention is that on the basis of the position taken by this writer no value can be assigned to the knowledge of the unbeliever at all. And this, he argues, is against the Reformed Confessions. For these confessions speak of the natural light of reason by which men, though they are sinners against God, yet have natural knowledge of God and morality. And in particular God has by his "common grace" not only restrained the sin of man but maintained the image of God in him and thus enables him to make contributions to science and to practice "moral virtue."

In dealing with this contention it will be shown that the doctrine of general revelation and of common grace must not be taken as justifying a neutral area between the non-Christian and the Christian. There is no escape from taking it as such unless with Calvin appeal is made to the knowledge of God which the natural man inescapably has (Rom. 1:19, 1:20, and 2:14), but which he seeks to, but cannot wholly suppress (Rom. 1:18).

As far as the principle of interpretation is concerned, the natural man makes himself the final point of reference. So far then as he carries through his principle he interprets all things without God. In principle he is hostile to God. But he cannot carry through his principle completely. He is restrained by God from doing so. And being restrained by God from doing so he is enabled to make contributions to the edifice of human knowledge. The forces of creative

power implanted in him are to some extent released by God's common grace. He therefore makes positive contributions to science in spite of his principles, and because of the fact that both he and the universe are the exact opposite of what he, by his principles, thinks they are.

As against this method of approaching the question of the knowledge of the non-Christian, Masselink argues with the late Dr. Valentine Hepp of Amsterdam, that there are central truths about God, man, and the world on which Christians do not greatly differ. That is to say Masselink, following Hepp, does not signalize first the difference between the two principles of interpretation, the one based on the assumption that man is ultimate and the other based on the assumption that man is the creature of God. Common grace is in effect used to blur the differences between these two mutually exclusive principles. There is supposed then to be some area where the difference between these two mutually exclusive principles does not very greatly count. There is a twilight zone where those who are enemies fraternize and build together on the common enterprise of science; there is an area of commonness without difference, or at least without basic difference. It will be our contention that in this manner the doctrine of common grace becomes a means by which a specifically Reformed conception of apologetics and therefore a consistently Christian method of apologetics is suppressed. In other words it will be shown that what was done at Princeton when Butler was used as a sample of true methodology is now being done more self-consciously by means of "common grace." True progress in apologetics will need to relate the doctrine of common grace to the sovereignty of God in such a way as to express instead of blur it.

It will be plain from the foregoing that the question of a truly Christian method of defending Christianity is very much a matter of dispute. Naturally a method such as is set forth in this syllabus will appear to many to be very "dogmatic and absolutistic." The non-Christian is to be told that his basic assumption is mistaken, that on his assumption experience is reduced to that which has no meaning. The Roman Catholic is to be told that his theology involves a compromise with the "natural man" and that therefore his method of apologetics is internally inconsistent and cannot challenge the natural man. The evangelical even is to be told that he too has to some extent made compromise with "the enemy," allowing him such rights as no creature should claim for himself. And the time-honored method of apologetics followed by great Reformed theologians of "old Princeton" is said to be inconsistent with the theology that these very men have taught us to embrace.

Here the following remarks are in order. In the first place every Christian must tell the non-Christian that he must be saved from his false views of God and himself. The greatest love can be shown for the lost only by those who have themselves sensed most deeply the lost condition from which they have been saved. The best physician is he who tells the patient who needs surgery that he must be rushed to the hospital, not he who tells him to take a strong sedative. It is this that the present writer has learned from those from whom he

has been bold enough to differ at points. And it is only in a subordinate way that he differs from the great theologians of the preceding generation. The greater part of what is presented here is due to the fact that the writer stands on the shoulders of the great Reformed thinkers mentioned above. He is merely gathering together the thoughts found over a widely diversified body of writings in order to present briefly that which basically they have taught. The present syllabus is no more than an effort to stimulate thinking along the lines of consistent Christian approach to modern thought. The message of Christianity must ring out clearly in the modern tumult. If it is to be heard above the din and noise of modern irrationalism and existentialism it must think in terms of its own basic categories. If it has to import from the enemy it cannot expect effectively to conquer the enemy. It is the Christian faith that alone has the truth; this should be its claim. It should be made with all modesty; those that have accepted it once were blind. They have been saved by grace. Little would it behoove them to regard themselves as the source of wisdom. But disclaiming themselves as the source of wisdom they cannot make apology for God. If men would be saved, if they would save their culture as well as themselves, they must meet the requirements of God. Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that the world by its wisdom knew not God it pleased God through the foolishness of preaching to save those that believe.

Chapter II

THE HOLY SCRIPTURES

In presenting an argument for the truth of Christianity it is essential to know what is meant by Christianity. So the question at once comes up as to how this is to be discovered. And this leads directly to the Scriptures. For the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the source book of knowledge for Christians. True, not all Christians have the same view of Scripture. Not all regard it as the exclusive source book of knowledge with respect to the nature of Christianity. Roman Catholic theology places tradition alongside of Scripture as a source of information. Their position will therefore need separate discussion. We first set forth the Protestant doctrine of Scripture.

But is there, it will at once be asked, such a thing as a doctrine of Scripture on which all Protestants agree? Bavinck's words to the effect that there is no dogma on which there is more unity than the dogma with respect to Scripture comes to mind at once when we seek a reply to this question (Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, Vol. I, p. 422). But in saying this Bavinck does not mean to deny the basic difference between Protestants and Roman Catholics on the doctrine of Scripture. And he himself works out a doctrine of Scripture with which only Reformed Christians can fully agree. And this is only to be expected. For only those who hold to the doctrine of God as self-sufficient will naturally also hold to the doctrine of Scripture as wholly self-interpretative. But there is no need to discuss this matter here. The difference between a specifically Reformed and an evangelical doctrine of Scripture will appear more clearly at a later point. For the moment we proceed to set forth the idea of Scripture as the Reformed confessions and the Reformed theologians have set it forth.

The Self-Sufficiency of Scripture

The first point about a truly Protestant or Reformed doctrine of Scripture is that it must be taken exclusively from Scripture. It is, says Bavinck, exclusively from the Scriptures that we learn about the Christ and his work of redemption for man. From the Scriptures alone do we learn about God's work of redemption for man. On its authority as the Word of God do we know the whole system of Christian truth. Therefore also on its own authority do we believe what the Scripture says about itself. The Scripture testifies to itself.

"If true religion is to beam upon us, our principle must be, that it is necessary to begin with heavenly teaching, and that it is impossible for any man to obtain even the minutest portion of right and sound doctrine without being a disciple of Scripture. Hence the first step in true knowledge is taken, when we reverently embrace the testimony which God has been pleased there-

in to give of himself. For not only does faith, full and perfect faith, but all correct knowledge of God, originate in obedience" (Calvin, Institutes, Beveridge Tr., Book I, Chp. VI, section 2).

Reformed theologians have pointed out that the idea of Scripture as self-attesting is involved in the fact that in it we have the message of redemption for man. And this message of redemption is not a piecemeal affair. It centers around the person and work of Jesus Christ. Moreover Jesus Christ was an historical person. His incarnation, his death and resurrection, Bavinck points out, cannot be repeated. They are historically unique (Dogmatiek I, p. 399). The Son of God became like unto men in all things, sin excepted. So the question of identification becomes at once important. Who is the Christ? Is it this man Jesus of Nazareth? But does not he seem to differ greatly from other men? How can he be identified as being the Son of God as well as the Son of Man?

Can there be identification unless there be complete or exhaustive description? How is that which is wholly unique, completely different, to be indicated for what he is to those who are wholly different from him? Or, if he is not wholly different, if he is like them and yet also unlike them, where is the boundary line between likeness and difference? We can recognize him only at the point where he is like us or identical in nature with us. But when we thus recognize him we have not seen him where he is different from us.

The upshot of such considerations is that identification of Jesus Christ must be by authority. Without authoritative identification the Christ is lost in the ocean of relativity.

A distinction must be made at this point. Authority is needed for purposes of identification in history. But the authority of Scripture, as has already been mentioned, has to do with the question of redemption through Jesus Christ as the Son of God. Christ came to redeem sinners. And sinners are covenant-breakers. They are descendants of Adam in whom, as their representative, they turned against God. The natural man, the sinner, the covenant-breaker in Adam, is blind. He is wilfully blind. He cannot see the truth because he will not see it. He seeks to suppress the truth in unrighteousness (Romans 1:18). Sinners hate the idea of a clearly identifiable authority over them. They do not want to meet God. They would gladly make themselves believe that there is no clearly discernible, identifiable revelation of their Creator and Judge anywhere to be found in the universe. God's work of redemption through Christ, therefore, comes into enemy territory. It comes to save from themselves those who do not want to be saved, because they think that they do not need to be saved.

It is this situation, as has been indicated by Reformed theologians, that accounts for the inscripturation of the authoritative and redemptive Word of God.

But this view of sin itself comes from Scripture as authoritative. Experience apart from Scripture does not teach such a doctrine. Only he who accepts

the Scripture as the authoritative revelation of God will accept what it says about himself as a sinner. So we are of necessity moving about in circles. Those who accept the fully Biblical conception of sin will accept the Bible as authoritative. And those who accept the fully Biblical view of sin do so because they accept the Bible as the authoritative Word of God.

The inscripturation of the Word of God with respect to God's plan of redemption through Christ, therefore, is the Bible. The Word of God thus acquires the greatest possible permanence of form. It is less liable to perversion than mere tradition would be.

That the Bible is the Word of God pertains therefore, only to the original autographs. The versions and translations may fairly be said to be faithful reproductions of the autographa. But they cannot be said to be exact replicas of them.

It may at this point be said that in that case we have no identifiable revelation of God after all. The autographa are not available and none of the manuscripts from which our Bible is taken are perfect. Why then speak of an absolutely identifiable Word of God? Why then claim that you have direct revelation of God in the Bible? Do we not in any case have to rely on that which we think is generally reliable without its being absolutely infallible?

In reply to this objection the following remarks are in order. There would be no reasonably reliable method of identifying the Word of God in human history unless human history itself is controlled by God. The doctrine of Scripture as self-attesting presupposes that whatsoever comes to pass in history does so by virtue of the plan and counsel of the living God. If everything happens by virtue of the plan of God then all created reality, every aspect of it, is inherently revelational of God and of his plan. All facts of history are what they are ultimately because of what God intends and makes them to be. Even that which is accomplished in human history through the instrumentality of men still happens by virtue of the plan of God. God tells the stars by their names. He identifies by complete description. He knows exhaustively. He knows exhaustively because he controls completely.

Of such a God it is that the Bible speaks. So it is once again a matter of going about in circles. It is impossible to attain to the idea of such a God by speculation independently of Scripture. It has never been done and is inherently impossible. Such a God must identify himself. Such a God it is, and only such a God, who identifies all the facts of the universe. And in identifying all the facts of the universe he sets these facts in relation to one another.

It is such a view of God and of human history that is both presupposed by, and in turn presupposes, the idea of the infallible Bible; and if such a God is presupposed then it is no great worry if the transmissions are not altogether accurate reproductions of the originals. Then the very idea of "substantial

accuracy" or "essential reliability" has its foundation in the complete control of history by God. Then it is proper and meaningful to say that God in his providence has provided for the essentially accurate transmission of the words of the original.

Without such a view of history as wholly controlled by the plan of God the idea of essential dependability would be without foundation. If history is not wholly controlled by God then the idea of an infallible Word of God is without meaning.

It thus appears afresh that a specifically Biblical or Reformed philosophy of history both presupposes and is presupposed by the idea of the Bible as testifying to itself and as being the source of its own identification.

To what has been said one further point needs to be added. It has been stressed that the Reformed concept of Scripture and the Reformed view of history imply one another. And it has been stressed that the inscripturation of the Word of God is necessary because of the sin of man. Thus we have the idea of an authoritative revelation of God as self-attesting in a world of sin. But the world was not always a world of sin. Before the fall of Adam man walked and talked with God in intimate fellowship. Then no Bible was required. Man was not alienated from God. No Christ was needed for man's redemption. But shall we add that therefore no supernatural authoritative revelation was necessary for him? Shall we say that man could originally identify himself and the facts of the universe without supernatural thought communication on the part of his Creator? The answer must be in the negative.

Authoritative self-revelation of God in supernatural fashion is inherent in the human situation. It is "natural" that there should be supernatural revelation. Apart from and prior to the entrance of sin God actually spoke to man. God identifies one tree among many in order to indicate to man his task on earth. Man's task is to cultivate the earth and subdue it. He can do so only if he thinks and acts in obedience to his Maker. So his obedience must be tested. He must become even more self-consciously desirous of keeping covenant with his God. Hence supernatural thought communication is from the outset of history added to revelation through the facts of the universe in order thus to intimate to man his cultural task. Self-conscious covenantal reaction on the part of man presupposes identification of the facts of history and of particular facts of history and nature as clearly and directly carrying the will of God.

Man was to deal covenantally with every fact of history. He must therefore have available to him in history the direct confrontation of God and his requirements. Man must be able to identify every fact about him as the bearers of God's requirements; hence he needs a special supernatural test at the outset. He needs to learn by way of one example what he is to do with all the facts of history.

Thus the idea of supernatural thought communication on the part of God to man is inherent in the human situation. It is important to emphasize this point. Without clearly seeing that such is the case there is no good argument for the necessity of Scripture. The idea of the Bible as the infallible Word requires, as has been noted, the idea of God's complete control over history. In similar fashion the idea of the Bible as supernatural revelation and as self-attesting presupposes the idea that God's supernatural identification of his will in history took place before the fall of man. It was against such a specific self-identification that man sinned. The idea of sin is precisely that of wilful setting aside of that which has been clearly identified to him as the will of God by God himself. So pre-redemptive supernatural revelation is the presupposition of redemptive supernatural revelation.

A further point remains to be made. It has been pointed out that the Bible tells the story of God's redemptive work for man. And this work is accomplished through Christ, the Son of God, who is also the Son of Man. The Word tells about the fact of the person and work of Christ. But Christ himself tells about the Word as being authoritative because the Word of God. Christ testified to the Old Testament as being the Word of God that cannot be broken. He performed his work on earth in accordance with the program outlined for him in that Word. Thus the Christ as testifying to the Word and the Word as testifying to the Christ are involved in one another.

But the work of Christ was not finished while he was on earth. He accomplished much of his work through his apostles after him. So he promised them his Spirit that they might write the New Testament as a supplement to the Old Testament. But who should identify the New Testament as being the Word of God after it was written? Should the church do this? Protestant theologians have replied that the church cannot and did not authenticate the New Testament Scriptures as being the Word of God. The New Testament as well as the Old is self-attesting. The church merely recognized the Word in its self-attestation.

It is only if in this manner both the Old and New Testaments are regarded as a unit, and as a self-attesting unit, that justice is done to the idea of the Scriptures as the Word of God.

It is only thus too that the unity of the work of Christ can be maintained. The work of Christ is the work of establishing and perfecting the covenant of grace in a world of sin. He came to redeem a people for the Father. That people is a unit by virtue of their common redemption through Christ. But they are taken out of a broader unit, namely the human race. And this work has the greatest possible significance for the human race as a whole. Christ's work is of cosmic significance. He came to save the world. So there is through him and through his Word an authoritative interpretation given to mankind of the whole of the cosmic scene. Every fact in the universe must be Christologically interpreted. Through Christ the new heavens and the new earth are to come into being as sprung from the old through the redemptive power of the risen Christ. In

greater or in less degree all the facts of the universe are what they are because of the work of Christ. For it is through the work of Christ that God accomplishes his plan with the world.

Accordingly the Bible must be identified in its entirety in all that it says on any subject as the Word of God. And it is again only if history is considered to be what it is because of the ultimate controlling plan of God that such a relationship between God's Word and all the facts of the universe can be obtained.

In several of the preceding sections we have seemingly gone beyond the matter of Scripture's self-attestation. It has been impossible to avoid dealing with the question of what Scripture teaches even in the discussion of where the Scripture may be found. In other words the question of the identity of Scripture could not be discussed without asking about the truth of which it speaks. The that and the what were seen to overlap.

This is but to be expected. And it is of the utmost apologetical importance. It is precisely because God is the sort of God he is and his revelation is in the nature of the case self-attesting. In particular it should be noted that such a God as the Scripture speaks of is everywhere, and everywhere self-attesting. It is not now our purpose to deal fully with the problem of general or natural revelation. But so much must be said of it as to bring out the full significance of the Scriptures as self-attesting. To see the import of this doctrine it must be noted that man cannot look anywhere but he confronts God, and God as self-attesting. Natural or general revelation speaks with as much authority and as directly, albeit in a different manner and not on redemption, as does the Bible.

It is this supplementary character of supernatural and natural revelation that must be born in mind when approach is made to the question of the indications of the divinity of Scripture. The Westminster Confession of Faith speaks eloquently of the heavenly character, the consent of all the parts, etc., of Scripture.

Says Calvin on this subject:

"For it is wonderful how much we are confirmed in our belief, when we more attentively consider how admirably the system of divine wisdom contained in it is arranged; how perfectly free the doctrine is from anything that savors of earth – how beautifully it harmonizes in all its parts – and how rich it is in all the other qualities which give an air of majesty to composition" (Institutes, Bk I, Chp. VIII, part i).

Then after considerable discussion on the various matters he adds:

"There are other reasons, neither few nor feeble, by which the dignity and majesty of the Scriptures may not only be proved to the pious, but also completely vindicated against the cavils of the slanderers. These, however, can-

not of themselves produce a firm faith in Scripture until our heavenly Father manifest His presence in it, and thereby secure implicit reverence for it. Then only, therefore, does Scripture suffice to give a saving knowledge of God when its certainty is founded on the inward persuasion of the Holy Spirit" (VIII, 13).

In this passage Calvin brings into contact the fact that objectively the Scriptures have on their face the appearance of divinity while yet none will accept its self-attestation unless the Holy Spirit, himself divine, witness to the Word which he has inspired the prophets and apostles to write.

First then, argues Calvin, we are not to separate the fact of Scripture from the nature of Scripture. The identification of the fact of Scripture is identification by setting before us the content of Scripture, the system of truth in Scripture. This system of truth centers in the idea of God as self-contained and of his plan for the universe which controls whatsoever comes to pass. The identity is not that of an unknown quantity. Faith is not blind faith.

"The nature of faith is acceptance on the basis of testimony, and the ground of faith is therefore testimony or evidence. In this matter, it is the evidence God has provided, and God provides the evidence in his Word, the Bible. This means simply that the basis of faith in the Bible is the witness the Bible itself bears to the fact that it is God's Word, and our faith that it is infallible must rest upon no other basis than the witness the Bible bears to this fact. If the Bible does not witness to its own infallibility, then we have no right to believe that it is infallible. If it does bear witness to its infallibility then our faith in it must rest upon that witness, however much difficulty may be entertained with this belief. If this position with respect to the ground of faith in Scripture is abandoned, then appeal to the Bible for the ground of faith in any other doctrine must also be abandoned" (John Murray, *The Attestation of Scripture*, in *The Infallible Word*, Philadelphia 1956, p. 7).

It is this interdependence of the idea of the fact and the content of Scripture that is all important. The that and the what are correlative or supplementative the one of the other. It is this interdependence that enables Calvin to exult in the absolute assurance that he has before him in the Bible not the word of man, not the word of man as it speaks in a church that claims to authenticate the Word, but the very Word of God himself.

"As to this question, How shall we be persuaded that it came from God without recurring to a decree of the Church? It is just the same as if it were asked, How shall we distinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter" (*Institutes*, I:VII, 2).

It is through the heavenly content of the Word that God speaks of himself. Faith is not blind faith; it is faith in the truth, the system of truth displayed in the Scriptures.

At the same time the interdependence of the that and the what of Scripture fits in with the idea of the witness of the Holy Spirit to the divinity of Scripture as alone able to convince men of its divinity.

It is this whole system of truth that is set forth in the Bible. The writers of Scripture were inspired by the Holy Spirit to set forth this system of truth. Thus the system is self-attesting. And the testimony or influence of the Spirit in the heart of man cannot be in the nature of new information. The whole system of truth is already contained in Scripture and is being identified as such. It would not be identified by the Spirit as such if the Spirit gave other additional revelation. And the Scripture would no longer be self-attesting if the Spirit gave additional information. On the other hand it is on the sovereign act of the Holy Spirit that the Scripture can be seen to be the self-attesting Word of God. For sin is that by which men seek to interpret facts apart from the revelation of God. The sinner seeks a criterion of truth and knowledge independent of the revelation of God. The sinner wants to test that which presents itself as the revelation of God by a standard not itself taken from this revelation. He complains of the circular reasoning that would be involved in accepting the word of Scripture about the nature of Scripture. So then to overcome this hostile attitude of the sinner it is necessary that the Holy Spirit convict him of his sin in not accepting the Bible as the Word of God. The miracles, the prophecies fulfilled, the symmetry of its parts etc., will all be misinterpreted because interpreted by the wrong standard unless the Spirit convicts and convinces the sinner that he is dealing with the Word of God.

"For as God alone can properly witness to his own words, so these words will not obtain full credit in the hearts of men, until they are sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit" (Institutes, I, VII, 7).

It should be noted that his view of Scripture thinks of God as here and now speaking to men through his Word.

"Scripture is not a dry tale or an old chronicle, but it is the ever living ever youthful word which God at the present time and always sends out to his people. It is the ever continuing speech of God to us – It is the viva vox Dei epistola omnipotentis ad suam creturam" (Bavinck, Geref. Dogm. I, p. 405).

* * * * *

The foregoing brief statement of the doctrine of Scripture is quite out of accord with the modern view of Scripture. We shall deal with the modern view of Scripture in the next chapter. For the moment reference is made to it only in so far as to make plain the historic Christian view. It is our purpose here to view and discuss two classes of objections that are raised against the orthodox view. The first is that it is based on pure a priori assumptions without regard to the facts as they are ascertainable by scientific research. The second is that

the system of truth supposedly contained in Scripture is no system at all; Scripture is said to contain doctrines logically incompatible with one another. In other words the orthodox Christian is said to disregard both facts and logic when he accepts on mere authority a doctrine of Scripture such as has been outlined.

Facts

The question of facts in relation to Scripture may be divided into two parts. One part deals with the facts or phenomena of Scripture itself and the other part deals with the facts of nature and history with which science and philosophy deal apart from Scripture. There are many works dealing with these questions; a word about each point must suffice here.

(a) The phenomena of Scripture

It has already been pointed out that the claim to infallibility for the Scripture does not pertain to anything but the originals and that the originals are not available for inspection. It is therefore to be expected that there will be "discrepancies" in the Bible. Orthodox scholars have labored to show that these are of no great moment for the "system of doctrine" contained in the Bible. But the point is that in an infallible Bible there should not be any discrepancies. There should be no statement of historical fact that is contradictory to a statement of historical fact given elsewhere. And higher criticism has in modern times found what it thinks are facts that cannot possibly be harmonized with the idea of an infallible Bible.

What shall be the attitude of the orthodox believer with respect to this? Shall he be an obscurantist and hold to the doctrine of authority of the Scripture though he knows that it can empirically be shown to be contrary to the facts of Scripture themselves?

It goes without saying that such should not be his attitude. He should rather freely admit that orthodox scholarship has not solved all of the difficulties deriving from the phenomena of Scripture. It is not even likely that these difficulties will ever be fully resolved.

"But some difficulties, perhaps many, remain unsolved. The earnest student has no adequate answer and he may frankly confess that he is not able to explain an apparent discrepancy in the teaching of Scripture" (John Murray in The Infallible Word, p. 6).

It must be said therefore that there is a sense in which the orthodox believer holds to his doctrine of Scripture "in spite of appearances" (Bavinck, I, p. 461). He believes in the Bible as the Word of God because God has said that it is his Word.

"With respect to the inspiration of Scripture as is the case with every other doctrine the question is not in the first place how much can and may I believe without coming into conflict with science, but what is the witness of Scripture and what is accordingly the expression of Christian faith" (Bavinck, I, 462).

In these words of Bavinck, expressing the same sentiment as is expressed in the article of Professor Murray, we would take our starting point. To do so is consistent with what has been said above about the Scripture as self-testifying. To say that Scripture testifies to itself and therefore identifies itself is to imply that it also identifies every fact in the world. That is to say that God of which the Scriptures speak is the God who makes the facts to be what they are. There can therefore be no fact which is ultimately out of accord with the system of truth set forth in Scripture. Every fact in the universe is what it is just because of the place that it has in this system.

Moreover, to say that every fact in the world is what it is because of its place in the system of truth set forth in Scripture is to establish the legitimacy of the Christian principle of discontinuity. The system of truth set forth in Scripture cannot be fully understood by the creature. The point here is not that creatures who are sinners are unwilling to believe the truth. The point is that man as finite cannot understand God his Maker in an exhaustive manner. And as he cannot understand God exhaustively, so he cannot understand anything related to God in an exhaustive way. And all things are related to God.

The objections against the phenomena of Scripture would therefore be legitimate if those who make them could show the positive foundation on which they stand in making them. And this foundation should enable them to explain the facts in terms of a system of truth other than that which is offered in the Bible. This point will concern us more fully later. For the moment the difference between the final point of reference of the Christian and the final point of reference of the non-Christian is indicated so as to make plain that no discussion of "fact" can be said to settle final issues unless it takes this difference into consideration. The Christian's belief in the Bible as the Word of God is involved in and is an expression of his belief in God as the only final point of reference in all human predication. The Christian holds to the authority and finality of the Bible not because he can clearly, that is exhaustively, show the coherence of every fact with every other fact of Scripture. He rather holds to this doctrine of Scripture because, unless he does, there is no resting point for the search of facts anywhere.

(b) Facts outside of Scripture

Having dealt with the question of the facts of Scripture as they are related to the divinity of Scripture, little needs to be added on the second point mentioned above. The facts of the universe in general may either be regarded in the light of the system of truth presented in Scripture or they may be seen in the light of some other system of truth that men think they possess. The Christian is con-

vinced that there is no other system of truth in the light of which facts of the world may properly be regarded; this point will reappear later. The question is not whether the teachings of Scripture are in accord with the facts of science as science is often understood. As often understood science may properly interpret the facts of the universe without reference to the system of truth set forth in the Bible. It is then assumed that science has performed this task and has been successful in doing so. It has therefore a field of its own, a territory in which it is autonomous. And so the Christian must see to it that what he regards as truth revealed in Scripture is in accord with these "assured results of science."

Now it is of course true that many of the sciences do not, like theology proper, concern themselves directly with the question of religion. Granting this it remains a matter of great significance that ultimately all the facts of the universe are either what they are because of their relation to the system of truth set forth in Scripture or they are not. In every discussion about every fact, therefore, it is the two principles, that of the believer in Scripture and that of the non-Christian, that stand over against one another. Both principles are totalitarian. Both claim all the facts. And it is in the light of this point that the relation of the Bible as the infallible word of God and the "facts" of science and history must finally be understood.

Logic

The second objection mentioned, namely that the system of truth is out of accord with logic, must be answered in the same manner. In fact in dealing with the question of facts it has been impossible to disregard the question of logic. We have repeatedly asserted that the facts of the universe are what they are because they express together the system of truth revealed in the Bible. But the point to note now is that what is meant by the idea of truth as found in Scripture does not mean a logically penetrable system. God alone knows himself and all the things of the created universe exhaustively. He has revealed himself to man. But he did not reveal himself exhaustively to man. Neither the created universe nor the Bible exhaustively reveal God to man. Man has not the capacity for such an exhaustive revelation. And God reveals himself to man according to man's ability to receive his revelation. All revelation is anthropomorphic. Moreover, when we say that man understands the revelation of God what is meant is not that he sees through this revelation exhaustively. Neither by logical reasoning nor by intuition can man do more than take to himself the revelation of God on the authority of God. Bavinck has well said that dogma begins and ends in mystery. All the revelation of God points to the self-contained God. This God as self-contained makes every fact to be what it is. And therefore man's study of every fact, his understanding of any fact, is an understanding of something of the ways of God. Man's system of truth, even when formulated in direct and self-conscious subordination to the revelation of the system of truth contained in Scripture, is therefore not a deductive system. God has in himself absolute truth.

We need not call it a system of truth because there is in his case no gathering of facts into coherent relationships with one another. Secondly, God reveals to man in Scripture a system of truth. But this system is not an exhaustive replica of the truth as it is in God himself. It is a system that is adapted to human understanding. Third, the church's restatement of this revealed system of truth is a reworking of the system of truth in Scripture. It cannot therefore claim to be of the same authority as the system of the Bible. But the church must of necessity set forth a system of truth in the form of Confessions. It must do so in order the better to understand the truth of Scripture and in order to oppose error.

But the main point to be emphasized here is that the system of truth as the Christian thinks of it as found in Scripture is an analogical system. To be faithful to the system of truth as found in Scripture one must not take one doctrine and deduce from it by means of syllogistic procedure what he thinks follows from it. One must rather gather together all the facts and all the teachings of Scripture and organize them as best as one can, always mindful of the fact that such ordering is the ordering of the revelation of God, who is never fully comprehensible to man.

In the Westminster Confession of Faith the statement is made that that is true which by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture. This should not be used as a justification for deductive exegesis. One must not start with the sovereign control of God over all things and deduce from it the idea that there is no human responsibility. Nor must one begin with the doctrine of human responsibility and deduce from it the idea that there is no absolute control by God over the wills of men. But to say that one must not engage in this sort of deduction is not to say that the Bible can teach that which is contradictory. It is not to say that the Bible can teach both that God elects men to salvation and at the same time that they have the power to reject the grace of God. To say such things is to say that the Bible does not identify itself as the Word of the God of truth. It would be to violate the whole doctrine of Scripture as set forth above. For that doctrine involves that God identifies his Word as the Word of truth, as the Word of himself as the God of truth. Thus the fact and the meaning of the fact, the that and the what of God's revelation are seen to be involved in one another. There is therefore an ascertainable system of truth in the Bible. And that which in its very statement involves the denial of the idea of the Word of God as containing absolute truth content is in effect to deny the Bible itself. It is to deny the fact that God in the Bible identifies himself as God.

In conclusion it should be pointed out that the doctrine of Scripture set forth above sets before men the face of God. And God requires of men that they love and obey him. He made them perfect in his image. They rebelled against him. Now he is in grace calling them to repentance through his Son. He tells them about this call to repentance and love in the Bible. So the Bible comes as a living witness of God to men.

It follows that those who take the Bible to be what it says it is, must also present this Bible as conveying a challenge to men. They must use it always as a means with which to send forth a clarion call of surrender to those who are rebels against God. To be sure, it is the grace of God that is offered to men. Just as Jesus wept over Jerusalem and her children desiring that they might repent, so those who are believers must be filled with deep concern and love for the lost. But in their love for the lost they must, none the less, not lower the claims of God upon men.

And this call to repentance has application for the whole of human life and for all the activities of men.

"The authority of Scripture extends itself over the whole man and over the whole of humanity. It stands above mind and will, above heart and conscience; it cannot be compared to any other authority" (Bavinck, Geref. Dogm., I, 492).

Men must therefore be asked to repent for the way they have carried on their scientific enterprises no less than for the way they have worshiped idols. Scripture is the Word, the living Word of God who is the Creator and Redeemer of men and of mankind. It presupposes that he to whom it comes is

"corrupted in his religious attitude and therefore in need of redemption. It would therefore be to deny itself if it recognized the natural man as its competent judge. If Christianity is in the full sense of the term a religion of redemption and therefore wants to redeem man from the error of his intellect as well as from the impurity of his heart, if it wants to save man from the death of his soul as well as from that of his body, then it can in the nature of the case not subject itself to the criticism of man, but must subject man to the criticism of itself" (Bavinck, I, p. 533).

"The revelation of God in Christ does not seek support or justification from men. It posits and maintains itself in high majesty. Its authority is not only normative but also causative. It fights for its own triumph. It conquers for itself the hearts of men. It makes itself irresistible" (Ibid).

Chapter III

THE AUTONOMOUS MAN

In the previous chapter the Biblical notion of Scripture has been set forth. This has been done only in so far as it has direct apologetical significance. Stress has been laid on the fact that the Bible speaks as the Word of God as self-contained. That is, the Bible is the Word of him who alone can identify himself. He identifies himself in terms of himself because he exists exclusively in terms of himself. There is no non-being over against him that influences him. There are no laws of logic above him according to which he must measure his own internal consistency. It follows that this God should be the final reference point for predication to his rational creatures. They, and with them all things in the universe, must be explained in terms of him. And he is never wholly comprehensible to them. Therefore no fact in the universe is ever wholly comprehensible to them. They shall therefore need to live by authority. They shall have to be told who they are and what the things of the universe mean in relation to themselves and finally in relation to God. God's supernatural revelation is therefore presupposed in all successful rational inquiry on the part of man. And all revelation of God to man is anthropomorphic. It is an adaptation to the limitations of the human creature. Man's systematic interpretation of the revelation of God is therefore never more than an approximation to the system of truth revealed in Scripture. And this system of truth as revealed in Scripture is itself anthropomorphic. But being anthropomorphic does not make it untrue. In fact only such a human system which pretends to be nothing more than a frankly approximated statement of the inherently anthropomorphic revelation of God can be true. For it is such a system that is directly involved in the idea of the self-contained God.

As over against this Christian view of God as the final reference point in predication, there stands that of fallen man. For fallen man the final point of reference is himself. It is of the utmost significance for Christian apologetics that this point be carefully noted.

The picture of fallen man as given in Scripture is that he knows God but does not want to recognize him as God. That he knows God is due to the fact that all things in the universe about him and within him speak clearly of God. Moreover, at the beginning of history Adam, representing mankind, received from God direct supernatural communication about himself and his task in the world. And all men are responsible for this revelation. Speaking of the Gentiles Paul says that "when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened" (Romans 1:21). And further, that they "changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshiped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed forever" (Romans 1:25). In consequence of their rejection of God as

their Creator and Lord they are now subject to the wrath of God. "Wherefore as by one man sin entered the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Romans 5:12). And having sinned in Adam they are now by nature born dead in trespasses and sins (Ephesians 2:1). They are "children of disobedience" (Ephesians 2:2); "...by nature the children of wrath" (Ephesians 2:3). They walk "in the vanity of their mind," "having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart" (Ephesians 4:18). Paul speaks of fallen man as having a "carnal mind," and, "...to be carnally minded is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace. Because the carnal mind is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be" (Romans 8:6).

Here then is the heart of the matter: in Adam man has set aside the law of his Creator and therewith has become a law to himself. He will be subject to none but himself. He seeks to be autonomous. He knows that he is a creature and ought to be subject to the law of his Creator. He knows that his Creator has made him in his image; he ought therefore to love his Maker and bountiful Benefactor. He knows that the light of knowledge depends for him upon his walking self-consciously in the revelation of God. Yet he now tries to be the source of his own light. He makes himself the final reference point in all predication.

Note 1. What is said above has been, of course, taken from Scripture. It is not what fallen man says about himself. This at once raises an important question of procedure. Is it fair for us to take the picture of Scripture alone and to ignore what the fallen man says about himself? Is it not of the first importance to live into the problematics of men sympathetically and to see it from their own point of view? Are we not condemning without hearing what the accused has to say for himself?

In reply it must be said that those who are by nature "as others children of wrath" but who have been saved from the "wrath to come" ought to be utterly sympathetic with those who have not yet become the objects of God's saving grace. They themselves have not chosen the Christian position because they were wiser than others. What they have they have by grace alone. But this fact does not mean that they must accept the problematics of fallen man as right or even as probably right. For the essence of the idea of Scripture is that it alone is the criterion of truth. The standards by which the fallen man judges himself are false standards. That is the most important point in his case. Fallen man has no means by which he can make a true analysis of his own condition. The remedies that he employs for his own salvation are the wrong remedies just because the diagnosis that he has made of his own disease was made by the wrong criterion. A medical doctor is frequently able to prescribe the right medicine for a patient just because he, rather than the patient himself, has given the correct diagnosis of the patient's disease.

So then the Christian apologist should, to be sure, live sympathetically into the efforts of men in general when they seek to analyze themselves and their problems. There will be no doubt "elements of truth" in such an analysis; even so ultimately the idea of a standard of truth is involved in the system of truth. The Bible is the only ultimate standard of truth. And therefore the analysis of sin and evil, in particular, must primarily be made by means of it as the light by which men are to be judged.

Note 2. Just now we spoke of "elements of truth" that may be found in the non-Christian diagnosis of sin and evil. This points to the necessity of making qualification on the analysis of fallen man given above. What is there said of him is true in principle. Fallen man does in principle seek to be a law unto himself. But he cannot carry out his own principle to its full degree. He is restrained from doing so. God himself restrains him; God is long-suffering with him. He would call him to repentance. So he keeps fallen man from working out the full consequence of his sin. Reformed theologians speak of this restraint of God upon mankind in general as common grace. The restraint of God upon fallen mankind enables man to help build the culture of the race. Mankind was given the task of subduing the earth. He was to subdue it "under God" and thus to the glory of God. But as a sinner man seeks to make himself, instead of God, the ultimate aim as well as the ultimate standard in life. Yet he cannot ultimately change the practical situation. He is still the creature. The universe is what God has made it. And it will be what God intends it to be. So fallen man cannot destroy the program of God. He cannot even destroy himself as a builder of culture for God. In spite of what he does against God, he yet can and must work for God; thus he is able to make a positive contribution to human culture..

Thus it comes to pass that they of whom Scripture says that their minds are darkened can yet discover much truth. But this discovery of truth on their part is effected in spite of the fact that in principle they are wholly evil. They are not partly evil, they are not just sick; they are wholly evil, they are dead. But in spite of being dead in sins, they can, because of God's common grace, discover truth. The universe is what the Scripture says it is. And man is what the Scripture says he is. On both of these points it says the opposite of what fallen man says about himself. And fallen man knows truth and does "morally good" things in spite of the fact that in principle he is set against God.

Note 3. In view of the facts mentioned in the two preceding notes we shall have to concern ourselves first and primarily with the two principles of interpretation. The Christian principle of interpretation is based upon the assumption of God as the final and self-contained reference point. The non-Christian principle of interpretation is that man as self-contained is the final reference point. It is this basic difference that has to be kept in mind all the time. It will be difficult at times to see that such is actually the case. The very fact that by God's common grace fallen man is "not as bad as he could be" and is able to do that which is "morally good" will make the distinction between two mutually exclusive principles to be an extreme over-simplification.

In fact, it is in spite of appearances that the distinction between the two principles must be maintained. The point is that the "facts of experience" must actually be interpreted in terms of Scripture if they are to be intelligible at all. In the last analysis the "facts of experience" must be interpreted in terms of man taken as autonomous, or they must be taken in terms of God.

It is our task now to indicate how fallen man, the man who in principle assumes himself to be a law unto himself, will estimate the idea of Scripture as outlined in the preceding chapter. The Scriptures speak of the self-identifying God and therefore of his self-attesting revelation to man. Scripture requires that man renounce himself as autonomous and submit himself to the law of God. The Scripture requires repentance. It says to the natural man that he is blinded in mind and rebellious in heart. It tells him therefore that he cannot of himself see the truth which he yet ought to see, and that he cannot do that which he yet ought to do. True, as noted above, Paul says that man knows God and that he recognizes in a sense the difference between right and wrong. But when Paul speaks of the natural or fallen man as knowing God and as knowing and even in a sense doing good, he is not speaking of that knowledge which is according to truth which man needs in order to be what God at the first made him. There are therefore two senses to the word "knowledge" used in Scripture. There is the sense in which Paul uses it when he says that men by virtue of their creation by God in his image have knowledge of God. They cannot at any point of their interest succeed in escaping from the face of God. Their sin is therefore always sin against better knowledge.

This point is of the utmost importance for Christian apologetics. For the moment it may suffice to stress the fact that the Bible itself would come to man in a vacuum and its whole claim would be without meaning except for the assumption that all the facts of the universe, including man himself, are revelational of God. The revelation of grace comes to those who have sinned against the revelation that came to man previous to his need for grace. Men could not have sinned in a vacuum. The very idea of sin is sin against the revelation of God.

Though it is of the greatest possible importance to keep in mind that man knows God in this original sense it is of equally great importance to remember that he is now as a sinner without true knowledge of God. He is blind. That is, he is spiritually blind. He will not see things as he in another sense knows that they are. He hates to see them that way because if he admits that they are what they really are, then he therewith condemns himself as a covenant-breaker. He therefore cannot see the truth till he at the same time repents.

This is but to emphasize the fact that it is with the human person as a unit that we deal. We are not concerned with the intellect of man and its supposedly legitimate demands. We are not dealing with some abstract "rational man" who is seriously and open-mindedly seeking the truth. There is a sense in which fallen man, in natural things, may be said to be looking for the truth. But we are now concerned with ultimate principles of interpretation. We are looking

for a final point of reference. And that final point of reference must be said to lie in God instead of in man. Fallen man will use his intellect. It will be like the saw of a carpenter with which he fits the boards that he wants to use for the construction of his building. The set of the saw is all-important. The saw may be very shiny and ever so sharp; if the set is wrong it will do all the more damage. So the intellect of fallen man may be ever so brilliant, if the set of his person, as a covenant-breaker is wrong it will, in the ultimate sense, do all the more damage. It may also at the same time, because of God's common grace do all the more good for the progress of culture.

Note 4. Again it must be borne in mind that when we say that fallen man knows God and suppresses that knowledge so that he, as it were, sins self-consciously, this too needs qualification. Taken as a generality and in view of the fact that all men were represented in Adam at the beginning of history, we must say that men sin against better knowledge and also self-consciously. But this is not to deny that when men are said to be without God in the world they are ignorant. Paul speaks of the ignorance of men to whom the gospel has not been preached. There is therefore a gradation between those who sin more and those who sin less self-consciously, as some are closer and others are further removed from God's gospel call to repentance. There is even a matter of gradation between those who were closer and those who were further removed in history from the original direct supernatural revelation of God to man. Even so when we speak of the human race as a whole, as fallen in Adam, we must think of it as in principle being opposed to the truth of God. In Adam mankind has set aside the truth of God.

Now since it was in Adam as their representative that men have sinned it is well that the implications of this fall for the Christian theory of knowledge be ascertained as far as possible.

The story of Adam in paradise is familiar. It is part of the orthodox view of things to regard this story as historical. It is so presented in Scripture. And it is in accord with the idea of Scripture as identifying to man in this story a clear-cut expression of the will of God. Those who would make a myth or a saga out of this narrative do so in the interest of a philosophy that holds that no clear and direct revelation of God to man can be given in and through the facts of history.

The tree of the knowledge of good and evil then indicated to Adam a test by which God would bring man to a fully self-conscious reaction to his will. Man was created good. He was not created with a will that could as well turn in the direction of evil as in the direction of the good; even so God would have man become fully and wholly spontaneous and self-conscious in every sense of the word in his attitude towards God. God wanted man to accept God's judgment or criterion as that to which man would gladly and lovingly submit.

But man decided at the instigation of Satan to set himself up as the ultimate standard of right and wrong, of the true and false. He made himself, instead of God, the final reference point in predication.

For the question of knowledge this implied the rejection of God as able to identify himself in terms of himself and with it the rejection of God as the source of truth for man. Instead of seeking an anlogical system of knowledge, man after this sought an original system of knowledge. And this meant that God was reduced with him to the necessity of seeking truth in an ultimately mysterious environment. In other words, it implied that in setting up himself as independent man was declaring that there was no one above him on whom he was dependent. But man even then knew that he was not ultimate. He knew that he had no control of reality and its possibilities. So what his declaration of independence amounted to was an attempt to bring God down with himself into an ocean of the irrational.

This effect on knowledge, it may be indicated in passing, is equivalent to the effect of bringing God down into the realm of abstract possibility in the field of being. Abstract possibility in metaphysics and ultimate mystery in epistemology are involved in one another. To this must be added that in ethics this involved the denial of God's right to issue any commandment for man.

At the fall then, man virtually told God that he did not and could not know what would happen if he (man) should eat of the "forbidden tree." Why was this called a forbidden tree? Was it not perhaps because God arbitrarily thus called it, being the first upon the scene of history? No one had as yet had any experience with eating of this tree; there were no inductively gathered records to indicate even as much as a tendency to evil being involved in the use of the fruit of this tree. It was this "inductive method" with its assumption of ultimate mystery involved in pure possibility that Adam introduced. This was utter irrationalism. It was therefore by implication a flat denial of God's being able to identify himself. It was in effect a claim that no one, neither God nor man can really know what he is or who he is. How could there be any ultimate or final distinction of preference made in an ocean of Chance? Anyhow why should one "rational being" who had become rational by Chance, seek to lord it over another "rational being" who also had become rational by Chance? In a world of Chance there can be no manner of self-identification and there can be no system of truth. There can therefore certainly be no authoritative identification of truth and law by one "rational being" for another "rational being." There can be no such thing as authority in the Biblical sense of the term.

But there is another side to the story of the fall of man. How could man be sure that he could safely ignore the command of God? How did he presume to know that God did not know what would come to pass should he eat of the forbidden tree? If there was to be any seeming sense to such an action it would have to be on the assumption that man himself knew that the evil threatened would not take place. Satan told man that the issue would be quite otherwise

than God said it would be. He said that God knew that it would be otherwise. Satan suggested that God too knew that man would be as God, knowing good and evil, if man should eat of the tree. Reality, said Satan in effect, is wholly lit up, lit up for the creature as well as for the Creator. Man therefore does not need to live by the authoritative assertions of the Creator. He can discover by his own independent inspection what will take place in the course of time. Man as well as God can ascertain the laws of being by means of the laws of rationality in his mind. Is not the law of rationality in the minds of men and of gods ultimately one with the law of being in reality as a whole?

It was thus that man in rejection of the covenantal requirement of God became at one and the same time both irrationalist and rationalist. These two are not, except formally, contradictory of one another. They rather imply one another. Man had to be both to be either. To be able to identify himself apart from God man had to distinguish himself as an individual from all the relationships of the system of which he is a part. And if he were not part of a system of relationships he would be an entity in a vacuum; he would not be distinguishable to himself from any one or anything else. In fact he would not be self-conscious at all. He or it would be part of "the great buzzing blooming confusion" that would constitute Chaos. On the other hand, being part of a system of relations man would have to know this system exhaustively in order to know it at all. Reality then must be "wholly lit up" to himself without any appeal to authority. Only then can he rightly say that he does not need to be identified and set in a system of relationships by God his Creator.

It is with this background, frankly taken from Scripture as authoritative, in mind that we can interpret with some measure of intelligence the history of human thought. There are many schools of philosophy with which the college student has to make his acquaintance. The textbooks speak of some of them as objective and of others as subjective. Some are spoken of as monistic and others as pluralistic. Some are said to be pantheistic and others deistic, some rationalistic and others indeterministic, etc. But all these differentiations, important in their way, must be seen in the light of the analysis made of them in Scripture. The main question that can be asked about any system of thought is whether it is man-centered or God-centered. Does it make the Creator or does it make the creature the final point of reference in predication? If an answer to this question is found then the problematics presented by the various schools of philosophy become intelligent to us.

When man seeks to identify himself as the final reference point he will deny that it is possible to know anything about such a God as Christianity presents. He will say that mystery is ultimate, that any god of which man speaks must be merely a limit and an ideal, of which when anything positive is said, it is admittedly said by way of allegory. God is "beyond" anything that any man can say of him. He is not the self-conscious self-identifying being who identifies and gives orders to man.

Again when man seeks to identify himself in terms of himself he will also demand that any God he is asked to believe in must be "rationally connected with his own experience," that is, he must be wholly known to man. God must with man be wholly mysterious and unknown and at the same time wholly rational to both God and man and therefore systematically or speculatively controllable by man.

Of these two demands, first one and then the other may come to the fore. But each is involved in the other. In ancient philosophy the rationalistic motif seemed to dominate the scene; in modern times the irrationalistic motif seems to be largely in control. But the one never lives altogether independent of the other.

Note 5. Professors D.H. Th. Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd of the Free University of Amsterdam have worked out a Christian system of philosophy. They stress the fact that man should by virtue of his creation by God stand self-consciously under the law of God. And then they point out that since the fall man seeks his reference point in the created universe rather than in the Creator of the universe. They speak of non-Christian systems of philosophy as being immanentistic in character, refusing as they do to recognize the dependence of human thought upon divine thought. They indicate that on the basis of immanentistic philosophies there has been a false problematics. Immanentistic systems have absolutised one or another aspect of the created universe and have therewith been forced to do injustice to other equally important or more important aspects of the created universe. So for instance the Pythagoreans contended that all things are numbers. By thus taking the idea of the numerability of created things, which is the lowest and therefore the least informative aspect of reality as the whole of it, as the final principle of interpretation, they have done grave injustice to other and higher aspects of reality. But in thus arguing for the significance of higher dimensions of created reality they do so by insisting that no dimension of created reality has justice done to it unless it is seen in the perspective of its being subject with all other dimensions to the law of God for all created reality. In other words, there is a non-Christian as well as a Christian dimensionalism. The former too wants to maintain the reality and significance of higher dimensions than numerability and spatiality etc. But only the latter are able to keep from reducing all dimensions to one stark identity, for only the latter keeps the intellect of man within its place. It requires the intellect of man to find the dimensions of created reality, without legislating for reality. On the other hand even the highest form of non-Christian dimensionalism still is rationalistic in that it would reduce all reality, in all of its dimensions, to a penetrable system.

* * * * *

It is to be regretted that no full use of this well-worked out system of Christian philosophy can be made. It would carry us too far afield. But it will

be greatly helpful to us especially in the analysis of the history of non-Christian philosophy.

What then, it must be asked, is the attitude of the non-Christian to the notion of the Bible? In answering this question do we ask the individual men who have been confronted with the Bible? To be sure we do. But it will be noted at once that by no means have all men been confronted with the Bible and its claims about itself. We should therefore in any case have to judge the race as a whole by the example of the few. We shall have to ask what would have been their attitude had they been placed before the Bible. From this point of view then our reply cannot be the result of exhaustive empirical examination.

We shall need, however, to go further than this. We cannot even approach the examples of those who are confronted with the Bible and who have given their answers in a neutral attitude. We must needs approach them in the light of what the Bible says about them. This is the only thing that can be done consistent with the idea of the Bible as the Word of God. This is not to impugn the honesty of men. If they profess to believe the Bible as the Word of God we accept their profession at face value. We then take for granted that by the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit they have been enabled to see the Scriptures for what they really are. But we are now speaking of fallen man and the question of his ability or inability to see the need for the authority, the sufficiency, and perspicuity of Scripture in the way that Scripture itself regards them. And then the answer must be that fallen man cannot, because he will not, accept the Bible. For in accepting the Bible he must at the same time accept what it teaches about God in relation to man. And that, fallen man will not do.

The Necessity of Scripture

For convenience we may look at what are often spoken of as the attributes of Scripture to see how the fallen man reacts to them. As already indicated, these attributes are the necessity, the authority, the sufficiency, and the perspicuity of Scripture.

The necessity of Scripture, as seen in the previous chapter, lies in the fact of the sin of man. Man does not need the Scriptures because he is finite; he needs them because he is a sinner. They tell him of God's work of redemption in Christ; they alone tell him of this work. So every sinner needs the Scriptures as he needs the Christ. And these Scriptures telling of the Christ must identify themselves as they must identify the Christ to sinners. Moreover, this identification is not made effective except through the testimony of the Holy Spirit which convicts and convinces sinners of their sin and of their need of salvation.

But the sinner will not of himself, from his experience, own the fact that he is a sinner. He may own that he is far from being what he ought to be. He

may own that he is very wicked. But he will not own that he has sinned against the revelation of God, that he has set God aside and made himself a law unto himself. He does not believe in any revelation of God. The very essence of his sin, as noted, is that it has lifted man, the creature, up to the level of God his Creator, or brought down God the Creator to the level of man, his creature. The sinner is therefore "monistic" in his thinking. When Isaiah says that God's thoughts are higher than man's thoughts, fallen man will shake his head and deny it. He may allow that there may possibly be a god whose thoughts are higher than man's thoughts, but then he simply means that the thoughts of this god are more extensive than are the thoughts of man. The thought of God is for fallen man always essentially of the same quality as the thought of man.

Accordingly fallen man cannot admit that he has sinned against the revelation of the thought or will of God. There could, he argues in effect, be no expression of such a thought by such a God.

To this contention the following objection has frequently been raised. If only you look at the facts of the history of the human race, it is said, you can see that men have believed in God, in the revelation of God and in the idea that they have sinned against this revelation of God.

But precisely here it is of importance to apply the principle that it is Scripture that must interpret the facts of history for us. And according to Scripture none but those to whom the Scripture has come have of themselves been able to analyze their need of redemption. To be sure, there are the "redemption religions"; there is the fact of numberless altars made by all manner of religious men all over the world. But these facts only indicate the fact noted above, namely, that all men are actually created by God and in a sense know this to be the case. Paul says that all men know God and that they have broken his law. They have inherited an evil nature and with it an evil conscience. So they seek to appease the "gods." But the gods against whom men think they have sinned are always intra-cosmical entities; at least they are, like men, themselves surrounded by an environment more ultimate than themselves. It is true of all the "mystery religions" that they serve and worship the creature more than the Creator. And it is from this worship of the creature as being the essence of sin, that the Bible calls men away. And it is only by grace that men can see the need of turning away from idols to the living and true God. Men do not see the need of grace till by grace they see it. They do not see the need of Christ unless through the Bible they are told of the Christ in the Scripture. And men do not accept the Scripture as the Word of God telling about salvation through Christ unless by the Holy Spirit witnessing to its truth they believe in it and with it in what it says about the Christ who came to save, and God the Creator against whom they have sinned. Knowledge of sin, as well as knowledge of salvation comes, not from experience as interpreted by experience; the one is involved in the other and the two together come as a unit by the grace of God. The Heidelberg Catechism makes this matter plain when it asks, Whence knowest thou thy sin? And the answer is, "From the law of God." Not from experience, but

from the law of God or from the revelation of God comes the knowledge of sin and therewith the recognition of the need of Scripture.

The question of the point of contact may be briefly touched upon in this connection. This matter will be more fully considered later. At the moment it is brought into the picture because it is frequently used as an objection to the point of view just expressed. Does not Scripture itself appeal to those who are "weary and heavy laden," to those who have a realization of their own distress and need of salvation? Granted that men do not clearly know just what it is that ails them and what the remedy may be for their need, is not their vague sense of need the point of contact for the gospel of redemption? Are not men ready to listen to the gospel of redemption because they know themselves to be in distress?

Full justice should be done to this question. No doubt their own sense of need makes men, in the providence of God, "ready to listen to the gospel." And the greater the sense of need the greater the readiness to listen to the gospel. Those who lie in hospital beds awaiting serious operations will be more "amenable to the gospel" than they are when "riding high" in full prosperity and health. Men know that they are creatures of God; they know that they have broken the law of God. They know that they need "salvation." Even so in the worst of their condition men still rebel against the analysis of their case as given in Scripture. They may speak with Kant of the "radical evil" in man; they may speak with Freud of the utter corruption of the race. They yet hold that this is something that is inherent in reality as such. Man, they hold, cannot really be held responsible for his sin; he is not exclusively responsible. He has not sinned in Adam against a known will of God. His own personal sin is not to him a matter for which he himself fully deserves eternal separation from God.

Thus the patient and the doctor still have radically different analyses of the nature of the disease and radically different conceptions of the kind of remedy that will rescue him from death. God in his mysterious providence may use the sense of distress as a means by which the Holy Spirit convicts the sinner of what is really wrong with him. Thus God no doubt uses the fact that men are actually creatures of God and deep down in their hearts know themselves to be such as a fact on which he builds his work of salvation. But it is by grace that men must learn to know what it means that they are creatures of God in even another sense than they already know that this is true.

It is only if we set the two principles of interpretation spoken of above clearly over against one another that the matter comes to stand in the right perspective. So far as the natural man thinks self-consciously according to his principle as a sinner he cannot accept the analysis that God gives in his Word. But since man is unable to carry through his principle of interpretation, since the folly of carrying it through stands clearly before him at all times, and since in many instances the love of God to sinners is preached to him and lived before him in the lives of the people of God, God can use this situation in order by means of it to enforce upon men that they are what he tells them they are.

The point of contact with the sense of need found in the sinner is therefore not simply a matter of telling him that you have what he knows he needs. Here is a man who says that he needs some groceries. He goes to the store and the storekeeper does not have quite the brands that he wants. But he assures his customer that what he has, though the customer has never used it before, is just what he wants, in fact just what he needs.

In contrast with this the sinner says that he has not lived up to his own ideals of a good life. He fears that this may bring him evil consequence. Somehow reality visits "sin" with punishment. And if sin is inherent in the race, if it is endemic in man, if sin is original sin, then he will welcome any alleviation any one may offer. How may he get rid of his "guilt complex"? By the doctrine of original sin, that is, by distributing his guilt over the whole human race? By making it therefore a natural something?

To all this the message of the gospel comes with a quite different analysis of sin. It presents the sinner with a different meaning for every word he uses. It does so because it sets man in a wholly different complex of relations. It offers him no way of escape except that of repentance before his Maker and Redeemer. "More of this sort of food" the Christian grocer says, is only poison to you. It is the bloodstream that itself must be cured. And that is beyond the power of any human doctor. Your sin is of such a nature as to need the Son of God and his death upon the cross for its removal. Its nature may be best seen in the light of what it takes for its removal. Do you own that you are rightly a child of eternal damnation? It is that from which Christ came to redeem you. That is what the Bible therefore says of sin. It is that which you must confess your sin to be. Till now you have done nothing of the sort.

With this basic contrast in mind it is then possible to speak in Biblical fashion of the point of contact for the gospel in the sense of need found in men. For then this sense of need is simply the unavoidable confrontation of men with God the Creator and Christ the Redeemer. It is this original and ineradicable revelation of God and of his will within men's minds that is the background and foundation for the work of the Holy Spirit. Without this background the gospel would speak into a vacuum.

Authority

The question of what the natural man will do when confronted with the Scripture's claim to its authority needs to be answered next. The question is whether the natural man, so far as he self-consciously works from his principle, can be in any sense favorably disposed to the Biblical notion of its own authority. The answer must be in the negative for essentially the same reason that the natural man cannot recognize the necessity of Scripture. For it is the necessity of the Bible as speaking with authority that we dealt with in the previous section. It has been intimated that fallen man is both irrationalist and rationalist, and

both at the same time. His irrationalism rests upon his metaphysical assumption that reality is controlled by or is an expression of pure Chance. His rationalism is based upon the metaphysical assumption that reality is wholly determined by laws with which his thought is ultimately identical. It is to be expected that on such assumptions fallen man cannot allow for Biblical authority. For this idea, as noted above, rests upon the idea of the self-contained God. And the idea of the self-contained God involves the idea that God himself is wholly known to himself and that the created universe is also wholly known to him. This is the Christian principle of continuity. The natural man would call this rationalism and determinism. He would say that the idea of freedom and significance for human knowledge has disappeared. At the same time the Christian idea of authority involves that God's thoughts are not open to the inspection of man. God must reveal himself. This is the Christian principle of discontinuity. The natural man would call this irrationalism and indeterminism. He would say of it that it cuts off all reasonable continuity between God and man. It requires man to be subject to the purely arbitrary pronouncements that God may make upon him.

Thus it is that a combination of the non-Christian principle of continuity correlative to the non-Christian principle of discontinuity stands over against the Christian principle of continuity correlative to the Christian principle of discontinuity. Frequently Christians are deceived in this matter. They tend to forget that the meaning of discontinuity is determined by its correlative. Thus one who defends a non-Christian principle of discontinuity will on the surface appear to be defending Christianity and its supernatural elements. Yet one who argues against determinism and naturalism, one defending "higher dimensions" of reality, may be doing no more than defending his own supposed freedom or autonomy from the encroachments of its own principle of continuity.

Note 1. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd have pointed out how, particularly in modern times, apostate man has come to sense something of the destructive character of his own problematics. In the beginning of the modern era he seemed to have won for himself absolute freedom. At the same time he was using modern mathematics in order by means of it to control the whole of reality, including man himself. The ideal of his science was to know and control all things, including the internal movements of the human mind. But if this ideal should succeed, man would have lost his freedom. And this he wishes at all costs to maintain. So in the philosophy of Kant there is a sort of compromise between the ideal of science and the ideal of free personality. To the former is assigned the realm of the phenomena, to the latter is reserved the realm of the noumena. But this is merely a modus vivendi; it is no solution of the problem. No solution is possible on a non-Christian foundation.

From the non-Christian point of view then, the idea of Biblical authority is impossible. This idea is impossible if human experience is to be interpreted by the adopted principle of apostate man. It is then impossible that there should be the sort of God who should have to speak with authority. To be sure the non-

Christian principle of discontinuity demands that one hold to abstract possibility. "Anything" is possible on this principle. And thus it would seem that the existence of such a God as the Bible speaks of may also be possible. But when the natural man says that for him anything is possible and that therefore he has an open mind for the evidence of anything that may be presented to him, this assertion has a basic limitation. When he says that anything is possible, this is for him an abstraction or a limiting concept. He knows that cows cannot jump over the moon except in fairy tales. So the idea of a God whose experience is not subject to the same conditions as those that control man is not practically possible. Such an idea, he says, is meaningless. It is without intelligible content. It is the mere assertion of a that without an intelligible what. It is therefore pure irrationalism.

On the other hand the Christian notion of Biblical authority is said to be pure rationalism. It would require a view of rationality as controlling whatsoever comes to pass. It would give man no measure of independence, his own reason would be of a piece with that which is predetermined from all eternity by God. Thus there would be no authority at all because authority implies the freedom of one person over against another.

The non-Christian is quite consistent with his own principles when he thus rejects the Christian claim to authority as well as the Christian claim to the necessity of Scripture. How could there be any necessity for that which is inherently meaningless and outside the realm of practical possibility? How can we say that man has sinned against a God who exists in isolation from man and yet places irrationality upon him by making demands out of accord with the nature of human personality?

It may be objected, as it was objected on the question of the necessity of Scripture, that we have ignored the facts of history. As men recognize their evil and sin do they not also, many of them, recognize the need for authority? As they appeal for help to the gods, do they not also therewith appeal to the authority of these gods? Did not the Hellenistic schools of philosophy themselves appeal to authority?

We answer as we did in the preceding section. The kind of sin that men own and the kind of redemption that they want is one thing. But the kind of thing sin is according to Scripture and the kind of redemption that men actually need is quite another thing. So also the kind of authority men will appeal to is one thing, but the kind of authority they ought to appeal to is quite another thing. A brief indication may be given of the kind of authority that the man who does not begin with Scripture will accept. The kind of authority that he will accept must, in short, be consonant with his own ultimacy and with his own right to be the final arbiter of his fate. In other words the kind of authority he will allow for is such as is consistent with his principle of self-reference.

1. Man will allow that the matter of finding the meaning of his experience

is a joint enterprise. No one man can know all things. Thus there are authorities in this field and in that field. The doctor is expert in the field of medicine. The physicist is expert in his own field, and so on. Such expert authority men will of course readily own. It is quite consistent with their principle to admit that they are finite.

2. When it comes to religion men will own that there are those who are experts in this field. So the Jews seem to have been a pre-eminently religious people. And among them Jesus of Nazareth was perhaps the greatest religious expert that the race has seen. He is the kind of man that we should like to be. So we may take him as our guide or authority. He seems to have had a sort of intuition of the nature of God or ultimate reality. And since it is in any case impossible to find exhaustive knowledge, since man cannot by the laws of his thought reach further than the world of experience, it is well to appeal to one who has a feeling for the numinous. Perhaps there is more to life than appears to the eye. Perhaps the great mystics were not altogether wrong. No one knows. But perhaps some have real hunches.

In such views of authority, it is clear, the final point of reference is still the would-be autonomous man. The experts may differ; then it is up to every man finally to decide for himself. And this is proper; the sanctity of the human person must not be violated. Ask any man to accept anything on pure authority, the sort of authority that the Bible claims for itself, and you are virtually asking him to deny his manhood. You are then asking him to be irrational and therewith to deny him the use of the powers that constitute his personality. With Plato I may look for some great expert, and listen to mythology as a second best, but rational inquiry, for better or for worse, must be my final guide. For better or for worse I must hold that I have the final criterion of true or false within myself.

Note 1. The point of authority is so all-important that a note on some of the modern theologians and their views may here be appended.

Schleiermacher

Schleiermacher is usually called the father of modern theology. Following Kant he held that it is impossible for man to know a transcendent God, such as historic Christianity has always taught about. He rejected the orthodox view that all things in the world are clearly revelational of God. Yet he asserts the idea of man's absolute dependence on "God." But then this god is not the God of historic Christianity. The God of Schleiermacher is reality.

Now man is religious when he feels his absolute dependence on this his god. But to feel our absolute dependence we must know ourselves to be absolutely free. Absolute dependence and absolute autonomy are, according to Schleiermacher's argument, correlative to one another. Human personality, he assumes with Kant, has the final criterion of truth or falsity within itself.

When the religious man says that he is wholly dependent upon God and upon Christ he virtually says that he admires them greatly for their noble attitude toward reality.

Thus there is no place in Schleiermacher's system of theology for authority in the Biblical sense. It is only the authority of the expert, the sort of authority that the non-Christian scientist will also allow for in his field that Schleiermacher will admit as having any right in the Christian scheme of things.

Recent theologians

We omit discussing Ritschl and the mediating theologians since their views are very similar to those of Schleiermacher. We turn to some of the representatives of recent British or Anglican theology.

Taking first A.E. Taylor, we find in him the combination of an outstanding philosopher and an ardent churchman. Apparently Taylor has been able to harmonize reason and authority in his life and in his thought. In his great work The Faith of a Moralist he deals specifically and fully with the subject. But the viewpoint is again familiar. Taylor pleads for the recognition of authority in philosophy, but argues that the kind of authority to be invoked must not, in the nature of the case, be external or infallible. Agreeing with Ferrier that it is more important for a philosophy to be reasoned than true, he says:

"But if we once allow an assent which is more than consciously tentative and provisional to be given to that which has not been thought out by personal effort, but taken on trust without question or criticism, and this is the kind of assent a positive religion necessarily demands when its God has spoken – the central conviction which lies at the heart of all rational philosophy – the conviction that reality has a structure which is intelligible – has been surrendered" (Vol. II, p. 200).

With this agree the words of another member of the Anglican Communion, Alfred Edward John Rawlinson when he says:

"The final appeal is to the spiritual, intellectual, and historical content of divine revelation, as verifiable at the threefold bar of history, reason, and spiritual experience" (Essays Catholic and Critical, New York, 1926, 1. 95).

And even Archbishop William Temple makes no higher claim for the authority of Scripture than that of expert advice. For the individual, he says, authority must precede experience, but for the race experience must precede authority (Nature, Man and God, London 1925, p. 329). The spiritual authority of revelation, he contends, "depends wholly upon the spiritual quality of what is revealed" (Idem, p. 347). And whether the quality be spiritual, of that, Temple argues in effect, the autonomous man must ever remain the judge. Accordingly revelation is said to take place not by communication of propositional truth, but

by means of personal impression (Revelation, edited by John Baillie and Hugh Martin, London 1937, p. 120). Doctrines can never be the "vehicle or the content of that revelation; they are the exposition of it, as the textbook of astronomy is the exposition of the starry heavens. The revelation is the fact - Jesus Christ Himself" (Idem, p. 120). And Jesus has the sort of attitude toward the universe or reality that we, as independent judges, approve.

Here then modern Protestantism, including the Church of England through its leading voices, agrees with modern philosophy in submitting all authority to the final adjudication of autonomous reason.

Dialectical theology

But has there been a great and sudden reaction to all this "consciousness" theology? What of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner with their followers? Have they not bravely contended for an "absolutely other" God, for a God whose Word should admit of no appeal beyond itself? Look at the lashing Barth gives the "consciousness" theologians in his Dogmatik (1927). Note with what increasing consistency through the periods of his development he has sought to set his theology over against that of Schleiermacher and "modern Protestantism"! And behold how desperately he has striven to find a theology that shall be able to out-reach the vile clutches of Deuerbach's ghost and "laugh him in the face." A true theology, Barth argues, has its chief canon in the first and great commandment, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." A true theology must break through all human systems and thus reach man in the depth of his being. It wants man to obey the voice of authority implicitly. Here then, our student may think, is at least one among the "types of modern theology" that will not agree to submit its pronouncements to human reason as a final arbiter. Here, it seems, is one theologian who dares to stand up against both modern philosophy and theology, defending the idea of absolute or unqualified rather than expert authority.

Yet Barth too, as much as the consciousness theologians he so vigorously opposes, accepts Kant's idea of the autonomous man as the presupposition of all he says. The "absolutely other" God, whom Barth's man of faith obeys, is once again of the sky-rocket variety: he has first been cast up by the would-be self-sufficient man before he comes to speak to him. He has been cast so far into the dark sky of non-existence by the power of pure negation on the part of autonomous man that he seems indeed to be wholly other. But he is wholly other and has authority just so long as he does not speak, but remains, in company with Aristotle's noesis noeseos, hidden in the contemplation of his own blankness. It is again the autonomous consciousness itself that must supply the content of the revelation that is to come to man with such authority.

By the authority of the Bible Barth does not mean that what it says is, as such, and as an ascertainable system of truth, normative for what man should think and do. As an historical entity the Bible is written by fallible and erring

men. It is through their words as a witness to revelation that we must seek to hear the revelation of God's will for man. And we do not hear that revelation of God unless, through Christ, we are eternally contemporaneous with God. This contemporaneity, in turn, is an Event in which men participate from all eternity. Thus for Barth the idea of participation of man in God through Christ replaces the orthodox doctrines of creation, incarnation and of revelation. Naturally the Bible can no longer be taken as authoritative in the historic sense of the term. With the Creator-creature distinction removed, there can be no authoritative Bible.

After this we need not spend much time on the Americanized forms of Barthianism, such as is to be found in the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, Richard Niebuhr, Nels F. Ferré, John A. Mackay or Elmer George Homrighausen. In their theology, as in that of Barth, it is in the last analysis the religious consciousness that divides itself into two sections after the style of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. The higher aspect will then address the lower aspect and insist upon obedience to its voice. And thus man will tell himself that he has been listening to God or to Jesus.

So far then we have found a wonderful harmony between the representatives of authority and those of reason. The two have found each other in the notion of the expert. The clergyman sends out his questionnaire to the scientists and philosophers asking whether they still believe in God; the answer is reassuring. The philosopher sends out his feelers to the representatives of religion asking whether they will honor the autonomous man; he need no longer expect any opposition from them. Does not the Bible itself appeal to reason? "Come now, let us reason together.." said Isaiah the prophet. Was it not then mere priestcraft that spoke otherwise?

So much is clear that though many men, including leaders of the modern church, will allow for the idea of authority it is not Biblical authority that they accept. They will accept only such an authority as is consistent with man as ultimate and as the final point of reference in all human assertion.

The question of the point of contact may therefore again be noted briefly. Is there no value then in the fact that men recognize their need of authority? Does their recognition of absolute dependence mean nothing at all? Is man's recognition of the need of gods above him as well as his recognition of wrong he has done of no value for the question of point of contact? Is it only a head-on collision that you seek with the natural man in seeking to win him to the faith?

We answer as we did above on the question of the necessity of Scripture. In their recognition of their sin and in their expressed need of authority men do recognize, but in spite of themselves, that they are really not so self-sufficient as their principle requires them to be. They are like the prodigal son whose principle requires him to deny that he is a son of his father whom he has left, but who cannot forget his father's voice. God's authoritative Word does not

speaking in a vacuum. It speaks to such as are unable ever to escape the call of his voice. They have to maintain their own principle artificially by building dams anew each day against the overwhelming evidence of the presence of their Creator and Judge. Men therefore try to naturalize the idea of authority as well as the idea of sin; they say it is to be expected that finite men do not know all and do not do fully that which is right and true. Even so they cannot fully naturalize these concepts. They will not be naturalized. And so in their refusal to be naturalized these concepts testify to man to the effect that he ought to accept that which his adopted principle requires him to reject. And so the futility of his struggle with the problem of authority as well as with the problem of evil is itself a means by which God brings his pressure to bear upon men. Their having a consciousness of their creaturehood and with it a consciousness of "good and evil," and their need of authority is the sounding board against which the gospel comes to man. But the gospel's idea of authority is not a mere continuation of the idea of authority as the natural man admits that he needs.

Sufficiency

By the sufficiency of Scripture is meant its finished character. In Scripture there is given a once for all and completed revelation of God's redemptive work for man. This attribute of Scripture again involves the question of the "that" and the "what," of identification and of content or system. Here is a body of writing identifying itself in distinction from all other writings as the Word of God. Granted that human agency was used in the collection of the several books of the Bible into the canon of Scripture; it remains true that Scripture identifies itself. The human agents did the subordinate work of collecting that which witnessed to itself as divine in each part as well as in the whole. And then this self-identified body of writings pretends to give men a finished system of interpretation of human life and history. What does the "modern mind" think of this?

Naturally it rejects this idea, as it does that of the necessity and authority of Scripture, and with vigor. Not only does it do this in the work of higher criticism, but back of this work of higher criticism lies the assumption that there cannot be such a thing as a finished revelation of God in history. And how can there be if man is himself the final reference point in predication?

Modern man argues that on the basis of a finished Bible, a closed canon, there could be nothing new for man to discover. The idea of a finished, directly given revelation in Scripture, is opposed to the notion of the "open universe" or to the open aspect of the universe. It does not accept the modern view that human knowledge must therefore be synthetic as well as analytic. It does not realize that no fact in the phenomenal world is an entity by itself. It does not realize the fact that all human knowledge is correlative to the human mind and to that extent must be considered subjective. In fact the orthodox doctrine of a finished

revelation seeks to identify as absolute something that is, as involved in the "human situation," relative.

And as the idea of a closed canon seeks to identify something as absolute in a sea of relativism, so it separates this identified object from all relations of significance with human experience. It sets the Bible off as a mechanical something, over against human experience. And yet it wants this Bible, though thus separated out of contact with the stream of human experience, to have an all-controlling influence on this experience. It wants the Bible to be the standard of human life. But it lifts this standard of life out of contact with life and then expects it to have an all-important bearing on life. It wants all of human life to be regulated rationally, by a hard and fast pattern that is not adjustable as human experience accumulates.

Thus the idea of the sufficiency of Scripture as well as that of its necessity is charged with being both irrationalistic and rationalistic. And this charge is based upon the assumption of the ultimacy of man. Thus man's ultimate irrationalism requires that he charge with rationalism the Christian position because it holds to a God who controls all things. And this man's ultimate rationalism requires that he charge the Christian position with irrationalism because it holds that God controls all things by his counsel that is itself above and prior to and therefore not involved in the "relativity" of history.

Note 1. It may be well at this juncture to deal briefly with the dialectical view on the Scriptures as a finished revelation of God. For it is particularly Karl Barth who has insisted that the Bible is God's Word. He has insisted on this as over against the views of such modern theologians as Schleiermacher and Ritschl. At the same time Barth insists that higher criticism must have free course and that we must be done with the orthodox doctrine of the givenness of revelation. Barth is vigorously opposed to the notion that there should be in history an identifiable Word of God, as he is also vigorously opposed to the idea that we should claim to find in history a man that can as such be said to be the Son of God.

In his Church Dogmatics Barth speaks of the Word of God in its threefold form, the Word as proclaimed, the Word as written and the Word as revealed.

To understand what is meant by the Word of God, says Barth, we must start with the fact of its present proclamation. This Word as proclaimed must be based on definite content. Yet it is not "at hand." It takes place moment by moment (je und je) rather than in accord with any plan (Kirchliche Dogmatik I; 1, 94). The Word of God is an Event. It is an act of God. The Word as proclaimed must be tested by the Word as written. Scripture is our canon (Idem, p. 103). As such it has constitutive significance for church proclamation (Idem, p. 105).

But the idea of the Bible as having constitutive significance for the proclamation must not be taken in the orthodox sense. The Bible is not a finished prod-

uct. For the Word of proclamation is a continuation of the same Event as the Word of inscripturation (dort die Schrift als Anfang, hier die heute zu haltende Predigt als Fortsetzung eines und desselben gechehens) (Idem, p. 104). The written Word is therefore the antecessor to the proclaimed Word as its successor (Idem p. 107).

Thus there is for Barth no identifiable body of writings that stands out from other writings or from words spoken by men as being alone the Word of God and as constituting a final norm for church proclamation. We should be doing poor honor to Scripture, says Barth, if we should identify it with revelation (Idem, p. 115).

The reason why the Bible must not be identified with the Word of God according to Barth lies in the fact that revelation lies back of ordinary history. The Bible is therefore no more than the record of the event of revelation (Idem, p. 116). The event itself is a matter of super-history. In super-history there is no distinction between past and future. It is the realm of exclusively personal relations. And personal relations defy all calendar distinctions; they are always in the "present." And this "present" is not the border between past and future. It is beyond the distinctions of the calendar altogether.

To be sure this revelation took place in the "fulness of time." As such it is a "fixed event" (abgeschlossene geschehen). Of it we must assert that "it is finished" (Idem, p. 131).

But to say that it "is finished" is not to say that it took place in the past. It is unique in that it is finished as a presently continuing event. "Thus we must think of every state of revelation as a process of revelation, that is, as conditioned by the very act of revelation" (Idem, 1. 122). To identify the Bible with the idea of God's revelation would, therefore, according to Barth, be destructive of the very idea of revelation. It would be to deny, in effect, the free and sovereign character of that revelation. For revelation is God, and God is revelation. Now the free and sovereign God must not be identified by something that is past. Then God would be dead.

Moreover the idea of the Bible as a finished revelation would preclude man's profiting from the work of Christ. God is his revelation and this revelation is Jesus Christ. It is Jesus Christ as the Event of God in revelation. And man must profit from this Event of revelation by participating in it. Revelation is redemption and is reconciliation. Our time, our history, must therefore be taken up into this one Event which is Christ. Otherwise our time is lost, is past, is dead.

But we are, as reconciled to God through Christ, contemporaneous with him. Even from all eternity we have participated in this contemporaneity. Our true past therefore lies in this contemporaneity with the eternal God in Christ as the Event of revelation (Idem, pp. 6 ff.).

Everything therefore depends, says Barth, upon our taking the idea of revelation as that which takes place now in the one eternally present act of incarnation, reconciliation and redemption. Nothing is past, nothing is merely future. All is present. So then in our time, in history measured by the calendar, there can be no more than a witness to this contemporaneity of man with God. The witness points to but is not identical with revelation. "Dass sie von Gottes Offenbarung zeugt, das bedeutet ja nicht, dass Gottes Offenbarung nun in irgend einer göttlichen Offenbarkeit vor uns läge. Die Bibel ist kein Orakelbuch; sie ist kein Organ direkter Mittülung. . . Die Menschen, die wir hier hören, reden als fehlbahre, als irrende Menschen wie wir selber. Was sie sagen und was wir als ihr Wort lesen, könnte an sich und durch sich selbst den Anspruch, Gottes Wort zu sein, wöhl erheben, aber nimmermehr siegreich durchsetzen" (Idem, p. 562).

He who says that he deals with the Word of God should deal with something that is wholly beyond the control of man (Idem, p. 585). Of the book as such we can only say that in that book we have heard the Word of God, that the Word of God has been heard in it, and so we expect to hear the Word of God again in this book (Idem, p. 509).

It is this activistic character of Barth's conception of God and his revelation that must, therefore, be kept in mind, if we are to understand what Barth means when he asserts that the Bible is the Word of God and when he avers his belief in verbal inspiration. The Bible is never directly identical with the Word of God says Barth. If we took it as such we should only have something relative. And how could one relative entity take precedence over other relative entities? And how could it have relevance to human experience? The Bible must therefore be taken as indirectly identical with the Word of God. It is that which we should mean when we say that it is the Word of God (Idem, p. 597). And as for verbal inspiration, it therefore means that this fallible and erring human word is now as such taken into his service by God, and in spite of its human fallibility is to be taken and heard as God's Word (Idem, p. 592).

Perspicuity

Finally a word must be said about the perspicuity of Scripture in relation to those who hold to the doctrine of the autonomous man.

The system of truth set forth in the Scriptures clearly and simply tells man who he is, what the nature of his sin is and what is the nature of the remedy that God has provided for the removal of that sin. But this idea of perspicuity or clarity is not opposed to the "incomprehensibility" of God. The system of Scripture is an analogical system. The relation between God and man is in the nature of the case not exhaustively expressible in human language.

Yet the sort of system the natural man requires is one in which every part is penetrable by human logic. In other words the natural man, as we saw

in the analysis given of the fall of Adam, will not submit himself to a God whose thoughts are essentially higher than his own. He will gladly admit the existence of "larger" or "greater" minds than his own. But he will not admit the possible existence of a mind to which his own must be in subjection, on the voluntary action of which his own mind depends. This is what we have called the rationalism of the natural man.

In terms of this rationalism he must therefore deny that any system can be called perspicuous or clear that is not open to complete inspection by man. To be sure, the natural man does not mind if it takes many thousands or millions of years before reality should be exhaustively stated. What he objects to is the idea of the mind of God as inherently incomprehensible to man, because self-sufficient and therefore independent.

On the other hand the natural man, as indicated repeatedly, insists that reality is ultimately "open." It constantly produces the wholly new. It cannot then be controlled by a plan of a God who exists apart from the world. God himself must, together with the world and as an aspect of the world, be involved in a process or he cannot be honored as God. So the idea of a system of truth such as orthodox Christianity pretends to have, a system which clearly, in readily identifiable and in directly available fashion, tells man what is true and what he ought to do, cannot exist. We must think of mystery as something ultimate, as something that envelops God as well as man. This idea of mystery as inclusive of God as well as man is taken as correlative to the notion that all reality, again inclusive of both God and man, is exhaustively lit up and wholly penetrable to man. The two notions must be taken as supplementative of one another. Only then, says modern man, do we do justice to both aspects of reality, its wholly hidden and its wholly revealed character.

Note 1. A brief word may again be added on the dialectical view of the perspicuity of the Scriptures. From what has been said about Barth's view on the authority and sufficiency of Scripture it will be expected that Barth does not hold to the historic doctrine of the perspicuity of Scripture.

In the world of historical relativity there can be no such thing as a directly distinguishable entity that can as such properly be called the Word of God. As an eternal novelty, an ever-contemporaneous event, revelation therefore cannot be clear or perspicuous in the orthodox sense of the term. To be clear in the orthodox sense of the term, Barth argues, God would have to be exhaustively revealed without at the same time being completely hidden. And the very essence of a true theology is that it thinks of the Deus Revelatus as being at the same time the Deus Absconditus. In the incarnation God is fully revealed and yet is wholly hidden.

The Bible merely witnesses to this Event of revelation, as wholly hidden when wholly revealed.

Summing up now what has been said on the attitude of "modern man" to the Scripture, we have the following:

(a) Basic to all the various views present is the common assumption of man as autonomous.

(b) This basic assumption is in principle the exact opposite of the view that the Bible, God's Word, is autonomous.

(c) By and large modern man therefore cannot allow for:

1. The idea of a Bible that testifies to itself by identifying itself as alone the Word of God.

2. The idea that there is in this Bible a system of truth that requires men to interpret the world and themselves in terms of it.

(d) The ideas of the Bible as identifying itself and of containing the divine system of truth are correlative to one another. They are together involved in the idea of God as self-contained.

(e) These ideas will therefore be charged with being both irrationalistic and rationalistic by those who make man the final reference point in predication.

1. They will be said to be irrationalistic in terms of what is actually the rationalistic notion of fallen man. Fallen man putting himself virtually in the place of God also virtually demands essential continuity between himself and God. He speaks of thought in general and of the laws of being in general. He therewith subjects the thought and being of God to the same limitations to which man is subject. In consequence the Christian's view of Scripture appears to it as breaking the continuity between God and man, as being irrationalistic.

2. On the other hand, the Biblical idea of self-identification and as containing the ultimate system of truth will be charged with being rationalistic by the natural man. This is the case because such an idea of Scripture involves the notion that God knows all things because he controls all things. Thus, it is argued, the sacredness of human personality and human freedom would be violated. In the name of the ideal of science the ideal of complete comprehension and continuity, the idea of Scripture is said to be irrationalistic. In the name of the idea of personality – the idea of freedom – the idea of Scripture is said to be rationalistic.

(f) Modern science, modern philosophy and modern theology are, broadly speaking, in agreement with one another in their assumption of the autonomy of man. We have limited our discussion largely to modern theology. Its two main

schools, that of the old or traditional modernism (Schleiermacher and Ritschl) and that of the new modernism or dialecticism are in agreement on this. That this is true of dialecticism seems, on the surface, to be denied by the assertions of Barth and Brunner to the effect that they want to return to a "theology of the Word."

Yet when the views of dialectical theology are examined they are seen to hold to the same activist theory of knowledge and being that controls the views of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. These views are, like those of modern philosophy, largely in accord with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

Chapter IV

THE CHURCH FATHERS

In the two preceding chapters the Christian and the non-Christian positions with respect to Scripture have been outlined. To make the issue clear we have taken the most consistent (some would say the most extreme) forms of the two positions. Between these two "extreme" positions lies that of Roman Catholicism. Romanism seeks to "do justice" to both "reason" and "authority." In order to do so it divides the field of human experience between them. Of course when it is asked what it means by reason it says that it is the reason of man as created in the image of God. And this reason, Romanism adds, is wounded through sin. To an extent then, Rome seeks the interpretation of human reason in terms of the Christian religion. But in practice Rome teaches that those who take reason as autonomous and who therefore make man the final point of reference in predication are essentially right in their methodology. In particular is this the case with Aristotle who is constantly called "the philosopher" by St. Thomas and frequently said to be right in his basic conclusions.

It may therefore fairly be said that the Roman Catholic system is a system that is made up of two mutually exclusive principles, the Christian and the non-Christian. Naturally it is instructive to see something of the nature of such a system; but before doing so it is well that for background we deal with some of the church Fathers. In them we see a struggle to do justice to the Christian view of Scripture together with frequent adjustments to systems produced by the natural man.

Philo Judaeus

A few remarks may first be made with respect to the Jew Philo-Judaeus. He was an orthodox Jew. As such he held to the authority of Scripture, that is the Old Testament. But he did not think of the authority of Scripture as implying the necessity of getting basic concepts of philosophy from Scripture. In other words he seemed to think it quite possible that a system of interpretation based on human experience should be found to be consistent with the content of Scripture. In fact he did his best to show that what Greek philosophy had taught about God and man was virtually the same thing that the Old Testament taught about them.

Philo makes the Old Testament teach that which Greek philosophy based on autonomous human experience had taught. Wherever the Old Testament obviously conflicts with the teaching based on self-interpreted experience Philo resorts to allegory. So the Mosaic account of the origin of the world and of the days of creation must not be taken as historical but as allegorical. Matter and change are eternal. Therefore creation is not the bringing into existence out of

nothing but it is the molding of pre-existent material. On the one hand there is in the universe an eternal undifferentiated matter, and on the other hand an eternal form. In other words Philo interprets the origin and course of the world in terms of the form-matter scheme of much of Greek philosophy. Original matter has no qualities. And God has no qualities that man can know. These are virtually taken as limiting concepts of one another. They are correlatives. (James Drummond, Philo-Judaeus, Vol. I.) On the other hand Philo asserts belief in the idea of creation out of nothing. Yet it is his chief effort to know how Greek philosophy and Scripture accord with one another. And to do this he uses allegory as a means of removing the Biblical doctrine of creation in general and of the creation of man in particular.

What is true with respect to the idea of creation is also true with respect to the fall of man. The lower parts of the soul are said naturally to turn to the things of sense and evil. It is the mind, the intellect, that must act as governor. And it naturally does not always succeed. Thus it is virtually denied that originally man was perfect in all aspects of his personality, and that because of the fall man became sinful in all the aspects of his personality. Here again it is the Greek rather than the Biblical idea that dominates the scene.

Basically the idea seems to be that it is not possible that Scripture should identify one point in history at which man is clearly confronted with the expressed will of God. History is composed in part of the wholly irrational. The temporal world is made up of "matter" that has no quality; and this matter makes it impossible for any fact of history to be the medium of the revelation of God to man. Certainly then it is impossible that there could be one particular point in history which is of all-determinative significance.

Similarly history is determined in part by the idea of an all-inclusive Form, a universal that includes all forms of consciousness, the consciousness of God no less than the consciousness of man. It is impossible then that there should be conveyed to man as a finite consciousness a system of truth by another form of consciousness standing above it. The two forms of consciousness are continuous the one with the other.

Thus the Greek principle of discontinuity and the Greek principle of continuity involved in one another kept Philo from accepting the notion of Scripture as testifying to itself and as authoritatively conveying to man its system of truth.

Coming now to the church Fathers we use a few illustrative examples. They show that these Fathers were no doubt seeking to be true to the Scriptures as the Word of God. But they also show that they did not as yet clearly see the implication of this position. They, like Philo Judaeus, some in smaller and some in greater degree, failed to realize that the Scripture must identify itself, and that its system of truth is therefore the opposite of such systems as are built upon human experience assumed to be ultimate.

In particular the early church Fathers have not clearly observed that the Christian principle of continuity and the Christian principle of discontinuity are involved in one another. That such is the case may be learned from one constantly recurring fact. In their apologetical presentation of Christianity to unbelievers they were, of course, confronted with both the non-Christian principle of continuity and with the non-Christian principle of discontinuity. The former is found in particular in the idea of Form as the all-embracing universal idea. The latter is found in particular in the idea of indeterminate matter as an original constitutive factor of reality. Now the church Fathers tended by and large to identify the non-Christian principle of continuity with the Christian principle of continuity, the non-Christian idea of system with the Christian or Biblical idea of system. But the non-Christian idea of system was rationalistic and deterministic. It involved the disappearance of the personality and with it of the individual reason of men. And some non-Christians charge the Christians with holding to rationalism and determinism. Then, and this is the point of importance, the Christians would reply that they believed in free will. They were not determinists or rationalists. The Biblical system permitted them and required them to do full justice to the freedom or autonomy of man.

Thus because they had mistakenly identified the principle of system or continuity with the non-Christian idea of system they appealed to the non-Christian idea of discontinuity in order therewith to remedy the situation.

On the other hand the Christian position was frequently charged with being irrationalistic and arbitrary. Did not the will of God through this authoritarian Scripture fix on one point in history, namely the death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, as being all important for human attitude? How could there be identification of God's presence in history without his succumbing entirely to the irrationalism and indeterminism of history? Then, and this is again the important point, the Christians would appeal to analogies of such things as they were required to believe in on pure authority, in the history of Greek philosophy or mythology. Was there not in Greek philosophy a place for a mediator or at least for mediation?

Here then we have these two facts, together constituting two aspects of one fact (a) the charge of rationalism and determinism lodged against them was answered by means of the non-Christian idea of indeterminism, and (b) the charge of indeterminism lodged against them was answered by means of the non-Christian idea of determinism. The reason for this was that they identified the non-Christian idea of determinism and rationalism or system with the Christian idea of God's control of all things, which is the Christian system. Again they identified the non-Christian idea of indeterminism, namely that of free will or human autonomy with the Christian idea of man's being a responsible creature of God. And the reason for both these identifications lay in the fact that they did not observe that the Christian idea of God's control of all things – the Christian principle of continuity – requires a Christian idea of human freedom or responsibility – the Christian principle of indeterminism. These two are cor-

relative of one another. And the relationship between them cannot be penetrated by the mind of man. This relationship is not contradictory since in God there is full internal coherence. But for the human mind they must in the nature of the case have the appearance of being contradictory. The idea of their unity must therefore be given on authority. Hence the need of supernatural revelation, and, after the fall, of the inscripturation of this supernatural revelation. It involves the self-identification of God and of his finished revelation to men in history. And it involves the idea of God's giving in this self-identified revelation a system of truth, which is anthropomorphic in its expression and yet all-determinative in its content. And these two ideas, that of self-identification and of an authoritative system, are involved in one another.

It was not till the contrast between the Christian principle involving its own continuity and discontinuity was seen to be the radical opposite in principle of the non-Christian principle with its own continuity and discontinuity that the idea of Scripture came to its own. Therefore it was not till the Augustinian and later the Réformed system of the content of Scripture was set forth that the Bible's idea of itself could have full justice done to it. But it must be added at once that this does not imply the idea that the substance of the matter was not present. It only means that there was no fully self-conscious Biblical doctrine of Scripture till there was a fully self-conscious understanding of the content of Scripture.

Tatian

With these general remarks for our background it is not necessary to dwell at length on individual men. Even so some of them are of more importance than are others for our purposes. Tatian needs only to be mentioned in passing.

He seeks to show the Greeks that there is a great similarity between their system and that of Christianity. On the other hand he argues that as a creature man is, in the nature of the case, in contact with non-being. Thus there is by nature in man a lack of power to resist evil. And the nature of sin is a tendency to cling to the material, rather than the wilful transgression of the known will of God. Accordingly the idea of salvation too is not conceived of along fully Christian lines. The ethical relationship between God and man is confused with the metaphysical and this involves at the same time an inadequately Christian notion of the metaphysical relation itself. It is this failure to distinguish clearly the Christian from the non-Christian system of truth that keeps Tatian from doing full justice to the idea of Scripture as self-attesting.

Theophilus

Theophilus seeks to justify the idea of authority by stressing the fact that God is in himself incomprehensible. He must therefore reveal himself if we are to know him at all. But Theophilus does not distinguish between the Christian and the Greek notion of the incomprehensibility of God. In Greek philosophy,

as in all non-Christian thought, there is the monistic assumption that "god" and man are aspects of one universe. That is involved in the non-Christian principle of continuity or system. On this basis God is ideally comprehensible to man. That is to say, reality is open to the inspection of the human mind. On the other hand this same reality is actually not comprehensible in its entirety. That is to say, mind and reality do never wholly correspond; there is in reality an ultimately irrational element. This is the Greek idea of mystery in reality; the idea has been carried through into modern times. Modern philosophy has, more than ancient philosophy, stressed this irrationalistic element in reality. For that reason it is often spoken of as being irrationalistic as over against Greek philosophy which is then said to be rationalistic.

Now the point of significance is that the Christian doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God is the exact opposite of this non-Christian notion of the irrational. The latter involves in it the expression of the idea of Chance. The former excludes the idea of Chance. The latter excludes the idea that God is the creator of man and that by his counsel he controls whatsoever comes to pass. The Christian view therefore is based upon the idea of the self-contained character of God. And it is this self-contained character of God which is, as already observed, the basis of the idea of Biblical authority. On the non-Christian idea there could be no revelation on the part of God at all, let alone authoritative revelation, for the reason that on this basis there is no God.

Another point of special interest in Theophilus is his handling of the resurrection. The idea of the resurrection of Christ is wholly out of accord with the Greek view of things. It would break upon the unity of experience. The only way the resurrection can therefore be presented for what it really is is to show it to be a part of the whole system of truth as presented in the Bible. The resurrection of Christ can be identified for what it is only if the whole of reality is what the Bible says it is. And men can be told that reality as a whole is such as the Bible says it is by authority. And such authoritative assertions can come to sinners only if the authority be given once for all by God himself.

That Theophilus has no adequate appreciation of Scripture as self-attesting because attesting to the truth of the system of truth it contains, appears from the fact that he compares the resurrection of Christ to the annual resurrection of foliage in the Spring. "Don't you see a resurrection every day? And don't you see a resurrection of a bigger sort every year? Why then can't you believe in the grand miracle, in a great resurrection? It is a similar resurrection to that which you see every day and that you see every season." Theophilus herewith shows that he does not fully appreciate the fact that the resurrection of Christ is the climax of his work of redemption. And redemption is necessary because of sin. Its facts cannot then be directly compared with the facts of nature. If they are so compared it is evidence of confusion of the ethical and metaphysical relation between God and man. It is only if sin is inherent in finitude, as it is for non-Christian thought, that the resurrection of Christ can be taken to be something that appears in the natural course of things. For then the natural course

of things is the course of the cosmos running in terms of itself rather than in terms of the plan of God. On such a basis there can be no authoritative preaching of the resurrection in terms of Biblical identification and signification.

Finally it is well that we call attention to what Theophilus says in regard to the nature of the faith by which men are asked to believe in the Bible and its teaching. Faith in Scripture, as has been indicated in the second chapter, is itself a gift of the Holy Spirit. It is as such the fruit of the work of redemption wrought by Christ and applied to men by the Spirit of God. Faith is a gift of God involved in the covenant of grace of God with men through Christ. It is therefore the proper response to the revelation of God. In particular its object in sinful men is the Christ and his work of bringing them back to God.

Was there room for such faith in Greek philosophy? Of course there was not. The whole idea of redemption, based on creation and the fall, is absent from Greek thought. But there was place for "faith" of a different sort in Greek philosophy. Reality is taken by the Greeks, as it is by all non-Christian thought, as being not actually though theoretically penetrable to the mind of man. To be sure Plato, following Parmenides to a large extent, tried very hard to show the exhaustively penetrable nature of all reality. But then the result of this effort was that the world of daily experience, the world of sensation of time and change, was said to be only partly real. Its reality was in part denied because man found it impossible to penetrate it wholly by means of his laws of logic. Parmenides boldly asserted that only that can be real which the mind of man by means of logic can show to be possible. In modern times Spinoza carried this idea through once more when he asserted that the order and connection of things is identical with the order and connection of ideas. And the assumption in the case of both Parmenides and Spinoza was that no distinction need be made or can be made between human thought and divine thought. What the one can do by logic the other can in principle also do. Thought, human or divine, is thus assumed to be legislative for reality.

But this rationalism showed itself to be quite impractical. A theory that had no application to human experience as such is "too extreme" to maintain.

In opposition to Plato, therefore, in so far as Plato carried through the idea of the coterminity of abstract reality and abstract being, Aristotle insisted that being is individual as well as universal. Accordingly the laws of logic must not themselves be regarded as exhaustively correspondent to reality. And in particular these laws cannot be demonstrated as being identical with being. It is by intuition or faith that we must hold to the applicability of logic to reality.

It might seem as though there is here a direct evidence of the bankruptcy of the non-Christian principle of continuity. On the non-Christian basis man must know everything to know anything. For a thing must be known in relation to the system of which it is a part. Thus when the natural man rejects the idea

of God's having a system of which he and his works constitute a part, then he must himself produce a system or indicate a system of which particularity and change are a part. But the attempt to do so led, in the case of Parmenides, to the denial of any particularity and change. The result of the non-Christian principle of continuity is the idea of the block universe in which all predication ceases.

To "save appearance" therefore, even Plato himself had to allow that his system, demonstrative as it tried to be, none the less was not able to include all the facts of experience. In particular how could prophecy be made scientific? How could the future be seen in advance? Yet the future must be seen in advance and prophecy must be made "scientifically" demonstrative, if the non-Christian system of reality is to be maintained.

To escape the obvious impasse involved in the rationalism of the non-Christian principle of continuity Aristotle self-consciously introduces the idea of pure contingency or discontinuity as in a sense having equal right with the idea of pure rationality. Plato had grudgingly allowed a measure of reality to the idea of irrationality. Aristotle began to modify the very idea of system in order to make room for it. He took irrationality into correlativity with rationality. He made a virtue of necessity by insisting that if we did not do so it would be necessary to go about in circles. How can we demonstrate first principles of logic by means of these first principles? First principles must be taken on intuition. It is thus that irrationalism is given legitimate standing in the non-Christian principle. It is natural that such should take place. The idea has been carried much further in modern times. Aristotle was still largely a rationalist. He did what he did more or less grudgingly. But in modern times, since the days of Kant, the idea of pure irrational factuality is assumed as one of the two originally constitutive elements of human experience.

The difference between the Christian and the non-Christian idea of faith appears to be basic.

Theophilus did not clearly make this distinction. Nor did any others of the church Fathers. He argues as though non-Christians already live by a principle of faith that is adequate for the acceptance of the resurrection of Christ, if only they are made acquainted with it. But faith in the irrational is the act of an autonomous man, and springs precisely from the very heart of the idea of autonomy. In modern times this idea of faith has come into prominence. It fits in with the distinction made by Kant between the phenomenal and the noumenal. The phenomenal is said to be the area of science, of knowledge or system, and the noumenal is said to be that of faith. And God is in the noumenal realm; he is therefore said to be the object of faith. He is the object of faith because he cannot be the object of knowledge. No revelation of him can come into the phenomenal world. Certainly no particular fact in the history of the phenomenal world, such as the resurrection from the dead of Jesus of Nazareth, can give men knowledge of God. Human knowledge is always in the nature of the

case relative to the human subject. It can never be a direct communication of God to man. Yet since possibility is greater than the realities of the phenomenal world it behooves men to act as if God exists. God is then a "faith-construct." He is a projection of the autonomous man in a realm that lies out of his reach when he works with the categories of knowledge.

And there is an idea of "authority" that goes with this idea of faith. The projected deity is said to be "wholly other" than man. He is said to speak to man and since he cannot speak by way of giving men knowledge directly, he speaks with authority. Even though he has to speak through the words of ordinary human knowledge, yet he does not identify his revelation with these words. He speaks through these words in spite of the fact that they distort his revelation to men. So authority stands over against reason. And yet it is the correlative to reason. The total picture of reality, according to this approach, must be found in a reasonable combination of authority and reason. Man's attitude to reality is partly that of knowledge and partly that of venture.

It is therefore of the utmost importance, as there will be occasion again to show, to keep the Christian and the non-Christian ideas of faith distinct from one another. The non-Christian idea of faith is faith in reality which is partly incomprehensible to him. The Christian idea of faith is the acceptance by the creature, (and now, since the fall, the sinner) of God's plan set forth in Scripture. Theophilus did not make adequate distinction either between the object or the subject of faith as Christians and non-Christians respectively believe in them.

The Recognitions of Clement of Rome

Clement of Rome offers us an imaginary dialogue between the Apostle Peter and Simon Magus. Peter the Apostle surely represents the idea of Biblical authority. Simon Magus asks the question whether God is both good and omnipotent. If God is both good and omnipotent then why does he tolerate evil and suffering in the world?

Working on the basis of the autonomy Plato had given in answer to this question, God, he concluded, is good. He must therefore be the source of the good. He cannot then be the source of evil. Hence there must be another ultimate principle that is the source of evil. God, in other words, is finite. To be sure Plato also has the idea of the Good as enveloping all and being identical with unity and rationality. But then of this Good nothing can be said. It is "beyond good and evil" in the way men know these concepts. Even if what men call good and evil is good and evil by reason of participation in the ideal unity of the Good, it remains true that the nature of this participation is wholly unintelligible.

This procedure of Plato is typical of the non-Christian approach. It illustrates the concept of system as the autonomous man conceives of system. Adam refused to take God's word as the authoritative criterion for good and evil. So

also Plato would rather accept ultimate dualism as characteristic of reality than forego the principle of autonomy. Thus it is that the sinner, taking his own mind to be the normal standard of right and wrong, refuses to obey God at his word. Since he cannot logically penetrate the various aspects of that revelation of God to man he holds such a revelation to be irrational.

Does Clement succeed in giving the truly Biblical answer to this question? The Biblical answer requires the idea that the system of truth as given in Scripture is of necessity apparently contradictory to man. God is certainly both good and almighty. God certainly determines all things and yet man is free. These are not really contradictory. In God they have their unity. But the human mind cannot fathom how this is true. If man the creature attempts to see how this can be true then he is setting up the idea of a principle of unity that is above both God and man. It is that which Adam did, and Plato after him. And so far from this effort succeeding, it has resulted in the necessity of positing an ultimate irrationalism as the correlative of this ideal of unity.

But Clement of Rome did not thus set the Christian idea of God as speaking with authority over against the non-Christian idea of rationality. He did not truly represent the Apostle Peter. He sought somehow to make the Christian position reasonable in terms of the system of the natural man. He therefore did not challenge the wisdom of the world with the wisdom of the Word. So Clement failed to set off the Christian view of reason over against the non-Christian view of reason as Theophilus failed to set off the Christian view of faith over against the non-Christian view of faith. And the failure of both is due to the fact that they did not trace back the non-Christian concepts dealt with to their root in the autonomy of man. Thus the authority of God is compromised and the natural man is not challenged in clear-cut fashion.

Justin Martyr

The works of Justin Martyr again indicate the effort to make the Biblical system given by authority acceptable to those who interpret life in terms of man himself. Of course Justin, like Clement, and like Theophilus, holds basically to the idea of Scripture. But he does not do justice to his own conviction in the matter.

In his first Apology Justin seeks all manner of analogies of Christian doctrines in Greek philosophy. He finds analogy for the virgin birth of Christ, for the incarnation, and for the suffering of Christ. He fails to note that facts pertaining to the life and death of the son of God are a part of the system of reality that is presented in the Bible and in the Bible alone. The facts are what they are because of the system, as the system is what it is because of the facts. The facts can therefore not be presented for what they are except in terms of the system. And the system is of necessity mediated through Scripture.

The Dialogue with Trypho the Jew is most interesting in this respect

(Tr. by Lukan Williams in the Christian Literature Translation Series). Justin is anxious to show Trypho that the prophecies of the Old Testament, which Trypho professes to believe, are fulfilled in Jesus Christ.

At the outset Trypho and Justin agree that Greek philosophy, in particular Plato, does not have the answer to the question of human life. If we seek with the Greek philosophers to understand man's relationship to God systematically or speculatively, we discover to our dismay that human identity disappears. For if unity is really to be effected it must be unity in which all diversity disappears. If then on the other hand we turn with Plato to a second best and appeal to "the will of God" we run into the ultimately irrational and arbitrary.

So from Greek philosophy transition is made to the prophets. But how do the prophets differ from the ancients to whom Plato himself appeals? Plato would admit that the ancients had authority. He was willing to appeal to it when rational enquiry had come to the end of its tether. But his ideal remained, and that was to make prophecy itself scientific. For him to appeal to authority was admittedly irrational, as one who has found that medical science cannot help him goes to the medicine man.

Platonic philosophy has no answer for the problem of separate human identity, of man's immortality and for his sense of guilt. May we then expect that Justin will find in the framework of creation, the fall, and redemption through the promised Messiah answers to these of life's problems? Only if he can show how their prophecies are fulfilled in Jesus of Nazareth. For in him all the Law and the Prophets center. If they are not seen to center in him, they are not seen for what they really are.

It is therefore again a matter of identification. More particularly it is again a matter of self-identification on the part of God's Son by means of God's Word and of God's Word by means of God's Son. And identification of both through the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. In other words the identification of Jesus of Nazareth as the fulfillment of prophecy cannot be made by any means short of that of the self-authentication of God to man in grace.

But Justin does not approach the matter in this way. Trypho keeps pressing him with the question of identification. Justin keeps putting it off. It will come in time, says he. First he must deal with other preliminary problems. Trypho is willing to wait till all proper preliminaries are over. But finally it appears that Justin can give Trypho no adequate answer. For he seeks to give him an answer in terms of a system that is other than the system of which Christ is a part.

If Trypho had been a true Jew, if he had really believed the Old Testament as the infallible Word of God, then he would also have accepted the testimony of Jesus and his apostles with respect to him. The accord between them is really there. How could men fail to see the original that stood before them if

they had really studied the portrait of him given in the Old Testament? Only if men have first distorted the portrait can they fail to recognize the original when it stands before them.

Trypho finally challenges Justin by saying that he cannot show that Jesus of Nazareth is the promised Messiah. He cannot do this, Trypho argues, because it is impossible to show that the ever changeless God is at the same time a truly changing man. In other words the attributes attributed to God and the attributes attributed to man cannot be found in any identifiable fashion in the phenomenal world. And here is the heart of the matter. Only if one holds to the reality of the God of Scripture as the source of possibility is it possible to have divine self-attestation. When Paul preached Christ at Athens he identified him in terms of authority alone. He "declared" the Christ. For Justin the resurrection of Christ was quite possible even according to the philosophical principles of Plato.

At other times however Justin seems to set the Christian view of things and the Christian view of authority quite clearly over against Greek speculation. But all in all, with no fully clear conception of the difference between the Christian and the nonChristian approach to the problems of life, Justin was not able to set the self-attesting Bible and its God in challenging fashion over against unbelief.

Athenagoras: A Plea for the Christians

Only a word need be said about Athenagoras. His general position is similar to that of Justin Martyr. Together they hold to the Logos theology. It is to be expected, therefore, that Athenagoras, like Justin, will think favorably of the efforts of Greek philosophy so far as it has spoken of God. Athenagoras thinks that Plato holds to one God and that Christians do not differ from Plato in this respect. Yet he also realizes that the philosophers have been unable to discover the truth that men need and that Christians therefore turn to "those guided by the Spirit of God."

On the Resurrection

In his brief treatise On the Resurrection he argues that since God has created all things it should not be impossible for him to raise men from the dead. This is in itself true. But Athenagoras did not realize that, according to the views of Plato and others, God did not create all things. He apparently did not appreciate the fact that when he argued for the possibility of the resurrection in terms of the philosophy of his opponents he himself was no longer true to his own position. According to his own position the possibility of the resurrection is based on the God who has created the world. Athenagoras also argues for the possibility of the resurrection by appealing to what his opponents should be willing to recognize on their own principles. He says that human life changes greatly from its inception till its end. The changes from the beginning of a human

being till he reaches his end are so great and so much beyond our power of comprehension that those who see them ought to be willing to allow for the possibility of a resurrection of the dead.

But to argue thus for the possibility of resurrection is no longer to argue for its possibility on the grounds of the doctrine of creation. Yet he was not aware of the fact that in the two types of argument that he employed, the one based upon and the other not based upon the idea of creation, he was making use of two mutually exclusive notions of possibility. The Christian doctrine of resurrection fits in with and presupposes the Christian doctrine of creation and providence. The Christian doctrine of resurrection does not fit in with and would indeed not be "possible" without these doctrines as its presupposition. For on any other presupposition than that of creation the idea of possibility is that of Chance and the resurrection as a Chance fact is not the resurrection as spoken of in Scripture.

Irenaeus: Against Heresies

In the work of Irenaeus, Against Heresies, we have a comprehensive discussion of the gnostics. He attacks the idea of matter as eternal and as the source of evil. In particular he challenges the gnostic conception of salvation. He warns the gnostics that in using terms borrowed from the philosophers they are in danger of accepting their content too. He asks whether the men from whom they get their speculations, the philosophers, know or do not know the truth. If they know the truth then there was no need of the coming Savior at all and they might as well have spared themselves their elaborate discussion of intermediaries between God and man.

"Did all those who have been mentioned, with whom you have been proved to coincide in expression, know, or know not, the truth? If they knew it, then the descent of the Savior into this world was superfluous. For why (in that case) did He descend? Was it that he might bring that truth which was (already) known to the knowledge of those who knew it? If on the other hand, these men did not know it, then how is it that, while you express yourselves in the same terms as those who knew not the truth, ye boast that ye yourselves alone possess that knowledge which is above all things, although they who are ignorant of God (like-wise) possess it?" (B II, 14:7).

In contrast, Irenaeus asks, "How much safer and more accurate a course is it, then, to confess at once that which is true: that this God, the Creator who formed the world, is the only God, and that there is no other God besides Him - He himself receiving from Himself the model and figure of those things which have been made - than that, after wearying ourselves with such an impious and circuitous description, we should be compelled at some point or another, to fix the mind on some One, and to confess that from Him proceeded the configuration of things created" (II XVI, 3).

The basic point of Irenaeus is that we must not seek the explanation of the course of the cosmos in that cosmos itself. That is what Valentinus and the gnostics have done. And that, he says, is characteristic of the heresies of Marcion, of Simon, of Menander or whatever others there may be who, like them, cut off that creation with which we are connected from the Father" (II XXI:1).

In rejecting the doctrine of creation these heretics also take away the possibility of the performance of miracles which they themselves affect (II xxxi:2).

In particular does Irenaeus attack the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. He finds no difficulty in pointing out that if Plato himself was in the state of oblivion which came upon all men due to their having connection with the body, he cannot speak of a state of knowledge preceding that oblivion, "for if the cup of oblivion, after it has been drunk, can obliterate the memory of all the deeds that have been done, how, O Plato, dost thou obtain knowledge of this fact (since thy soul is now in the body), that before it entered into the body, it was made to drink by the demon a drug which causes oblivion?" (II; xxxii:2). Irenaeus therefore contends that the souls of men had a beginning in creation.

In all this it appears that Irenaeus is not afraid of seeking to meet the philosophers in philosophical debate; his position is that of the apologists in general. He too wants to show that the Christian faith is rational and he wants to show that it is more rational than opposing views. At the same time Irenaeus was apparently of the opinion that the Logos as the Christ was at work in the whole race of men from the beginning of their existence.

In rejecting the idea of the peleroma he says: "The disciple of the Lord, therefore, desiring to put an end to all such doctrines, and to establish the rule of faith in the church, that there is one almighty God, who made all things by His Word, both visible and invisible; showing at the same time, that by that Word, through whom God made the creation, He also bestowed salvation on the men included in the creation, thus commenced His teaching in the gospel: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made. What was made was life in Him, and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not" (III, xii).

It is in harmony with this universalism that he speaks of the conversion of Cornelius, to whom Peter the Apostle brought the message of the Son of God, in the following words: "He thus clearly indicates that He whom Cornelius had previously feared as God, of whom he had heard through the law and the prophets, for whose sake also he used to give alms is, in truth, God. The knowledge of the Son, was, however wanting to him"(III, 12:7).

"The apostles, therefore, did preach the Son of God, of whom men were ignorant; and His advent, to those who had been already instructed as to God; but they did not bring in another God" (Idem). He also speaks of God as having "purified the Gentiles through the blood of His Son."

In accordance with this, Irenaeus speaks of those among the heathen who were more moral than others as being acquainted with the governor of the world and therefore as speaking of him as the Maker of the Universe (III, xxv:1).

With genuine penetration he remarks in this connection that those who seek two ultimate principles back of the world, the one as the source of goodness, the other as the source of justice, lose both goodness and justice." But he thinks that Plato has not made the mistake of thus dividing God into two principles. "Plato is proved to be more religious than these men, for he allowed that the same God was both just and good. . ." (III:xxv:5).

In all this Irenaeus shows that though on the one hand he was committed to the Rule of Faith and ready to maintain the truth against every form of heresy, he yet seemed to think of a general theism maintained by many men who are not Christians and of Christianity as something that is added to this general theism.

Perhaps the most enlightening statement of the views of Irenaeus is found in the last book where he sets forth the positive position of Christians as over against the gnostics.

"There is therefore one God, who by the Word and Wisdom created and arranged all things" (XX:iv).

In this section the Logos theology of Irenaeus expresses itself. In it there is (a) the idea of God as unknown (b) then the idea that this unknown God is made known through the Logos first in creation and then in the incarnation, through whom man, that is mankind, is brought back to God, that is, passes into the glory of God.

All in all it may be said that Irenaeus has been unable to work out a fully Christian doctrine (a) of the Trinity (b) of creation (c) of providence (d) of incarnation and (e) of redemption. He was too much under the influence of the philosophy of the Greeks to whom he sought to bring the gospel to really challenge them with the gospel.

Tertullian

In dealing with Tertullian we deal with a most important figure for the history of theology and for the history of apologetics. He is called the founder of Latin Christianity. B. B. Warfield speaks of him as "the real founder of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity" (Studies in Tertullian and Augustine, p. 107). If this estimate of Warfield is at all correct, it will at once be apparent that

Tertullian is of the utmost importance in the history of theology and apologetics. For it is the doctrine of the ontological trinity that constitutes the very foundation of both sound theology and a sound apologetic. His treatise on the trinity is found in Against Praxeas.

A second point on which Tertullian is found to make a striking contribution is connected with such phrases as Credo Quia absurdum. It is the question of authority. Liberal theologians and their faithful followers tend to quote such a phrase as evidence of the fact that there was a man who was willing to believe anything however absurd or irrational it was, as long as the Bible asserted it to be true. And it is still customary to hail Tertullian in court as the representative of an unenlightened fundamentalism.

But in looking into Tertullian's view of authority as he sets it forth in his work On Prescription Against Heretics it is of importance at the same time to see what he says in his discussion of the soul (A Treatise of the Soul). For in this treatise he seems to make his appeal to the soul of man in general for corroboration of the truth of God's Word in Scripture. This seems to be a different approach from that of a mere authoritarianism.

It is mainly with the three points mentioned, his doctrine of the trinity, his doctrine of authority, and his doctrine of the soul, that we shall be concerned. In seeking light on these matters grateful use may be made of B.B. Warfield's article Tertullian's Doctrine of the Trinity. Warfield's article, to be sure, limits itself to a discussion of the problem of the trinity, but this discussion is so thorough and its outreach into the field of general apologetics is so great that it is highly valuable for our purpose.

To begin with it will help us if we listen to Warfield as he sets forth the general characteristics of Tertullian's theology. Warfield sums this up by saying that on the one hand Tertullian lived and moved and had his being under the spell of the Logos speculation, while on the other hand, "there was one thing— which was more fundamental in Tertullian's thinking than even the Logos speculation. That was the 'Rule' of Faith — the immemorial belief of Christians, grounded in the teachings of the Word of God(26). This rule of faith had come down to him from the beginning of the gospel as he phrased it; and he recognized as his first duty to reserve it whole and entire" (27).

Let us assume for the moment the correctness of this analysis of Warfield's. And with this analysis let us imagine the struggle through which the fiery penetrating Christ-loving mind of Tertullian had to go in order to meet the theological needs of the hour. Here was the philosophical inheritance of his predecessors, the Apologists. Here was this Logos speculation on which he had been nurtured. "Its point of origin," says Warfield, "lay in a conception of the transcendence of God which rendered it necessary to mediate his activity ad extra by the assumption of the interposition of intermediary beings. In their highest form, the speculations thus indeed gave birth to the idea of the Logos. Un-

der the influence of passages like the eighth chapter of Proverbs, and the first chapter of John, the historical Jesus was identified with the Logos, and thus the Logos theology was, in principle, completed. It will be observed that the speculation was in its very essence cosmological in its intention: its reason for existence was to render it possible to conceive the divine works of creation and government consistently with the divine transcendence: it was therefore bound up necessarily with the course of temporal development and involved a process in God. The Logos was in principle God conceived in relation to things of time and space: God, therefore, not as absolute, but as relative. In its very essence, therefore, the Logos theology likewise involved the strongest subordinationism. Its very reason for existence was to provide a divine being who does the will of God in the regions of time and space, into which it were inconceivable that the invisible God should be able to intrude in his own person. The Logos was therefore necessarily conceived as reduced divinity - divinity so to speak at the periphery rather than at the center of its conception. This means further that the Logos was inevitably conceived as a protrusion of God, or to speak more explicitly, under the category of emanation. The affinity of the Logos speculation with the emanation theories of the gnostics is therefore close (20).

It is readily seen that in the formulation of this Logos theology the apologists were largely influenced by Greek modes of thought. The question for them was how they could protect the deposit of faith against those who were real heretics while they were themselves so largely controlled in their thinking by false modes of thought. Here were the gnostics; they thought of God as the featureless beyond. They brought this featureless beyond into contact with the world of space and time by means of a series of impersonal emanations. Now the acceptance of the Christian deposit of faith required of the apologists that they reject this doctrine of a featureless God. They did not really believe in such a God. They believed that God was personal. Again the gnostics thought of the emanations of God into the world of space and time as necessarily involved in the nature of God's being. The apologists, on the other hand, according to the deposit of faith, thought of the creation or emanation of the Logos as a voluntary act on the part of God. But how would they be able to defend either their doctrine of God or their doctrine of the voluntary procession of the Logos from the personal God against the equivalent teachings of the gnostics so long as they themselves admitted that God needed an intermediary to make contact with man? If they really held to the God of the Bible there was no room for such an intermediary and if they really held to the personality of God and to the exhaustively personal character of his work with respect either to himself or to the universe, they would have to renounce their rationalistic efforts of explaining the relation of God to the movements of history. The God of the deposit of faith must be presupposed and the rational understanding of the relation of God to the world must be to the effect that unless one presupposes this God there is no possibility of reason understanding anything.

The problem of harmonizing the teaching of the Rule of Faith with the speculations of Greek philosophy would therefore, in the nature of the case, tend to

become the problem of defending the deposit of Faith against the encroachments of this speculation. This was especially true for Tertullian when he was confronted not only with the general gnostics heresy but with the monarchians. The monarchians, says Warfield, "did not come forth as innovators in doctrine, but as protestants in the interest of the fundamental Christian doctrines of the divine unity and of the Godhead of the Redeemer against destructive speculation which was endangering the purity of the Christian confession. They embodied the protest of the simple believer against philosophic evaporation of the faith. Above all, they were giving at last, so they said, his just due to Christ" (23). Was not Christ full God? If fully God then he was not identical with God. And there is only one God. Were not then the monarchians more orthodox than the followers of the Logos theology? The answer is that they were not: The monarchians were formally right in demanding that Christ must be all that God is. But while they demanded the equality of Christ with God they demanded the equality of the historical Christ in his human as well as in his divine nature, with God. In other words, they did not separate God, the triune God, from the cosmic process. They had no self-contained deity. For them the final subject of predication was reality; and the principle of unity found in this reality they called God. Their speculation was cosmological. If the Logos speculation tended to bring God down into the process of the temporal universe, the monarchians tended to lift the process of time and history into deity.

So then when Tertullian was dealing with Praxeas, the monarchian, he found himself confronted with a dilemma. He clearly saw that the monarchian principle would destroy the Rule of Faith; if all the process of this universe is in God then there is nothing unique about the Christ and there is no need for the work of redemption. But how could the heretical monarchians be met? Was not their basic fault their rationalistic effort to bring God and the universe into subjection to the one principle that is open to full inspection by man? What was required was the positing of the unity of God and of distinctness of personality within this unity in the Godhead as prior to any relationship to the course of history and as the one who is the creator and controller of history. But then what of the Logos speculation? If he was to answer the monarchians effectively Tertullian would first have to clean house with respect to his own Logos speculation. He would have to move on to ground higher than that on which he was when speaking for and seeking harmony between the Christian and Greek views of life. From seeking harmony, he was driven to notice the basic difference between the two positions and then to the defense of the Christian position against the inevitable encroachment of the Greek spirit. And this necessity of defense led him to the necessity of an internal development of "the immanent movement of Christian thought," toward the development of an ontological trinity.

If he was to make an effective reply to monarchianism he would have to cleanse his own thinking from the last remnants of Logos speculation. If he was to oppose the intermingling of the universe with God he would have to remove from his thinking the intermingling of God with the universe.

In some such way as this Warfield conceives of the struggle going on in Tertullian's mind when he is dealing with the trinity. We may use this approach of Warfield's as an heuristic principle by means of which to seek to understand the tenor of Tertullian's thought as a whole and in particular his view of the relation of the Rule of Faith to reason. Perhaps we shall be able to generalize the conclusion to which Warfield comes when he says that Tertullian, being basically true to the deposit of faith, made great progress toward the doctrine of a truly Christian doctrine of the trinity while yet he remained to some extent bound to the principle of Logos theology. Opposing the cosmological heresy of monarchianism he cleared himself largely but not wholly of the cosmological speculation of the Logos theology.

In dealing with the main writings of Tertullian a beginning may appropriately be made with his Apology.

Like other apologies of early Christian theologians Tertullian first defends the rites and morals of the early Christians. Then he begins to set forth the Christian doctrine of God. "The object of our worship is the one God..." (XV:ii). This God, he says, is invisible and incomprehensible. Yet he is also revealed to us. He is presented to our minds in his transcendent greatness, as at once known and unknown. "And this is the crowning guilt of men, that they will not recognize the One, of whom they cannot possibly be ignorant." Then Tertullian argues eloquently that round about and within men there is evidence of God's existence. He appeals here, as well as in his separate treatises on the soul, to the inherent nature of man's knowledge of God. To this natural revelation must be added the revelation through the prophets now given us in the Scriptures (XVIII, XV:ix). In particular this discussion pertains to the coming of Christ. And we must make a remark about his divinity (xxi). The Son of God is "made a second in manner of existence...in position, not in nature." "Even when the ray is shot from the sun, it is still part of the parent mass; the sun will still be in the ray, because it is a ray of the sun - there is no division of substance, merely an extension. Thus Christ is Spirit of Spirit, and God of God, as light of light is kindled." In this connection Tertullian appeals to Zeno and to Cleanthes as also believing in the creation of the world by the Logos. He seems to assume that on this matter of the Logos there is therefor no basic difference between the views of the philosophers and the teaching of Scripture. Then as to why men should believe in this Christ as God Tertullian says that even if Christ is a man and imposed a religion on his followers he did nothing that some of the heathen, such as Orpheus, and others also have done. He adds: "Surely Christ, then, had a right to reveal Deity, which was in fact His own essential possession." And if men find that belief in Christ changes them for their improvement they ought to believe in him.

In all this Tertullian is aware of the fact that there is a real difference between the religion of the heathen and his own. He employs great eloquence in exposing the folly of demon worship. Yet we find no very valuable argument for the basic doctrines of the Christian faith. The apologetic is largely prac-

tical; do not the Christians serve the emperor loyally; do they not pray for him as they should according to their books?

The nearest that Tertullian comes to a theoretical foundation for Christian ethics is when he says that Christians are "taught of God what goodness is" while the idea of goodness derived from the heathen poets and philosophers is based on human authority (XLV). "Man's wisdom to point out what is good, is no greater than his authority to exact the keeping of it; the one is as easily deceived as the other is despised." But here too he allows that even as the heathen had knowledge of God similar to that of Christians, they also had knowledge of the laws of ethics. Only the laws that the heathen possessed were derived "from the law of God as the ancient model" (XLV). "What poet or sophist has not drunk at the fountain of the prophets? Thence, accordingly, the philosophers watered their arid minds, so that it is the things they have from us which bring us into comparison with them" (XLVII).

The basic difficulty with the apologetic of Tertullian at this point is that he does not realize that the truths recognized by the heathen are truths which they seek to suppress by means of their systems of philosophy and interpretation. Tertullian seeks largely to connect Christian thought with heathen thought; there is to him a great difference, but the difference is one of gradation rather than of contrast.

AdNationes

In Ad Nationes Tertullian again defends the Christian against persecution and treats of the differences between the practices of Christians and non-Christians.

An Answer to the Jews

Omitting the details of this discussions with the Jews, there is one point of interest in his answer to the Jews. It is the question already discussed in the case of Justin Martyr. It is the question of how Tertullian seeks to prove to the Jews the identity of Jesus as the Messiah.

He argues, as did Justin with Trypho, that the Messiah is prophesied as having such traits as Jesus of Nazareth actually had. He also argues that the prophecy that all nations should believe in the Messiah has been fulfilled in Christ (VII). He goes on to show that the times and seasons as foretold by the prophets have been fulfilled in Christ. The destruction of the city of Jerusalem was foretold by the prophets. Thus he traces the "course of the ordained path of Christ, by which he is proved to be such as He used to be announced"(XI).

In all this there is a good answer to the Jew who really believes the Old Testament Scriptures. But there is no attempt to settle the matter of identity as far as those who do not believe the Old Testament is concerned. And there

is no attempt made here, any more than there was in the case of Justin, to intimate that the real reason for the error of the Jews is their rationalistic unwillingness to accept their own Scripture at face value.

The Soul's Testimony

We come to two exceedingly important writings of Tertullian. The first is The Soul's Testimony, and the second is A Treatise on the Soul. The question to be asked is again whether Tertullian is here working largely under the influence of a sort of Logos speculation or whether he has outgrown such a speculation and has done justice to the deposit of Faith as found in the oracles of the Christian religion.

In an earlier reference it was found that he appealed to the soul for evidences of the fact of God's existence.

To begin with it is apparent that the approach in these treatises is not exclusively to the authority of Scripture but also to experience. He wants in The Soul's Testimony to prove the existence of God from the testimony that any man's soul, whether Christian or not Christian, will give. "Thou art not, as I well know, Christian; for a man becomes a Christian, he is not born one. . . . Yet Christians earnestly press thee for a testimony; they press thee though an alien, to bear witness against thy friends, that they may be put to shame before thee, for hating and mocking us on account of things which convict thee as an accessory" (L).

The soul is asked to testify to the fact that there is one God, man's creator. Tertullian finds such testimony in the expressions of the people when they say instinctively "If God so will" which may God grant, or when recovered from illness they give praise naturally to God. "In thine own forum thou appealest to a God who is elsewhere; thou permittest honor to be rendered in thy temples to a foreign god. Oh, striking testimony to truth, which in the very midst of demons obtains a witness for us Christians"(II end).

Secondly the soul is asked to witness with respect to its own noble immortality. The Christian view of the soul, says Tertullian, is more noble than that of the Pythagoreans because it does not teach that man turns after this life into some beast. It is "more complete than the Platonic" view of the soul because it teaches the resurrection of the body as well as the survival of the soul. And it is more worthy of honor than the Epicurean view because it saves the soul from destruction (IV). "But we are not ashamed of ourselves if our presumption is found to have thy support."

Tertullian does not seem to realize that the Christian idea of the soul and of man's position fits into the picture of Christian truth in general and cannot find and should not seek support from the testimony of the soul that seeks to interpret itself in terms of itself. How could the soul of Plato support the Chris-

tian doctrine of God and of its own immortality unless given primarily in spite of the system of Plato? If Tertullian had been fully aware of the difference between the general Christian and the general non-Christian view of things he could hardly have said what he says in the following words at the conclusion of this treatise. "There is not a soul that does not, from the light that is in itself proclaim the very things that we are not permitted to speak above our breath" (VI). What he says is, of course, true in the sense in which Calvin later was to speak of the sensus deitatis. Every man knows that he is a creature of God. But the difference between Calvin and Tertullian is basic. They hold to the same doctrine of creation. But Calvin realizes that man seeks to suppress this truth and that therefore the soul's testimony for the truth must be wrung from him as from an unwilling witness. The sinner seeks as sinner to suppress and falsify the truth about himself as created. But Tertullian appeals to the system of the philosophers themselves. True, he does say that he appeals to the soul of the common man rather than to the soul of the sophisticated. He appeals to a common consciousness, so to speak. Nevertheless even this common consciousness to which he makes his appeal is still the consciousness of the unrepentant sinner who is supposed, in accordance with his own principles, to speak the truth about himself against the persecutors of the Christians. And this testimony is not forthcoming; in fact the reverse is true. The soul of the common man may speak of being created, but it does not take this as involving the necessity of repentance from sin any more than do the theories of the philosophers unless this soul of the common man is reborn by the Spirit of God. And it is not of this reborn soul that Tertullian speaks. In this treatise Tertullian does not ascribe any work to the Holy Spirit in the way of regenerating the soul before that soul will give forth the truth about itself; his appeal is to experience as such. And experience as such will not speak forth the truth about the origin or the nature of the soul; it will do the opposite since it is the experience of the sinner.

A Treatise on the Soul

In A Treatise on the Soul, Tertullian deals more fully with the philosophical theories about the soul. Again we are confronted with a measure of confusion in the midst of brilliant and penetrating study. In The Soul's Testimony Tertullian seems to think that the experience of the non-sophisticated person directly corroborates the truth about the soul as taught in Scripture. He was appealing there to the common consciousness of man not in order to have it build up the whole doctrine of the soul, but in order to have it, at least in part, establish and corroborate the teaching of Scripture about the soul.

In similar fashion Tertullian argues in A Treatise on the Soul that the best of the philosophers have in their systems said that which, as far as it goes, is true about the origin and nature of the soul; they can therefore again serve, in part, for the establishment and corroboration of the Christian statement. He assumes that Christians must get their own full information about anything, and therefore about the soul, from the Scripture. His appeal is therefore not so

largely to experience as it was in The Soul's Testimony. This point will be more fully discussed when we come to the consideration of his treatise The Prescription against Heretics. Our concern now is primarily to discern to what extent Tertullian has built up his doctrine of the soul from the Scripture and to what extent his desire for corroboration from the philosophers has forced him to defective notions of the soul.

A. There is no doubt that Tertullian's main desire is to be true to Scripture. Again there is no doubt that he realizes that this often implies taking choice against the philosophers, even against Plato, whom he seems to think of as the best of them all. Let us first note some of the main points on which Tertullian sets off his doctrine from that of Greek philosophy, and seeks to build it up on the foundation of Scripture.

1. Mention may be made first of the frequent appeal to Scripture as the Christian's final and sole source of information about basic truths.

Contrasting his own position with that of the philosophers Tertullian says: "To the Christian, however, but few words are necessary for the clear understanding of the subject. But in the few words there always arise certainty to him; nor is he permitted to give his inquiries wider range than is compatible with their solutions; for endless questions the apostle forbids. It must, however, be added that no solution may be found by any man, but such as is learned from God; and that which is learned of God is the sum and substance of the whole thing" (II end).

This basic assertion about the Scriptures ought to set the Christian's procedure off clearly from that of the philosophers, "those patriarchs of heretics, as they may be fairly called" (III). And when we are forced "to try our strength in contests about the soul with philosophers" we should not allow the stage to be set and the problems to be stated by them in terms of their basic assumptions. Tertullian is to a large extent aware of the necessity of setting the Christian position over against that of the philosophers.

As may be expected, the point about Scripture as the final authority of the Christian is strikingly brought out in his work on Prescription against Heretics. Says Tertullian: "Let our seeking, therefore, be in that which is our own, and from those who are our own, and concerning that which is our own. . . , and only that, which can become an object of inquiry without impairing the rule of faith" (XII).

2. It is therefore to be expected that the great and brilliant defender of the Faith against various heresies, but in particular against the gnostic heresies, will single out the cosmological speculations of Plato as the source of them all. There, he says of Plato's views, is "the mystical origin of the ideas of these heretics. For in this philosophy lie both their Aeons and their geneologies" (On the Soul, XVIII).

3. More specifically Tertullian sets off the Christian conception of the origin of the soul over against the Platonic theory. "For when we acknowledge that the soul originates in the breath of God, it follows that we attribute a beginning to it. This Plato, indeed, refuses to assign to it, for he will have the soul to be unborn and unmade"... And again, in the same connection: "So far, therefore, as concerns our beliefs in the soul's being made or born, the opinion of the philosopher is overthrown by the authority of prophecy even" (On the Soul, IV).

4. In addition to the fact of the creation of the soul Tertullian brings into consideration also the fact of its fall into sin. This is done as over against Plato's idea that the irrational element of the soul is inherent in it and natural to it. "That position of Plato's is also quite in keeping with the faith, in which he divides the soul into two parts – the rational and irrational. To this definition we take no exception, except that we would not ascribe this twofold distinction to the nature (of the soul). It is the rational element which we must believe to be its natural condition, impressed upon it from its very first creation of its author, who is Himself essentially rational. For how should that be other than rational, which God produced on His own prompting: nay more, which He expressly sent forth by His own afflatus or breath?" (On the Soul, XVI).

Moreover, Tertullian is perfectly aware of the implication of Plato's theory. "But, inasmuch as the same Plato speaks of the rational element only as existing in the soul of God Himself, if we were to ascribe the irrational element likewise to the nature which our soul has received from God, then the irrational element will be equally derived from God, as being a natural production, because God is the author of nature" (XVI).

In this connection Tertullian appeals to the perfect man Jesus. The Platonic psychology, he argues, would not fit the case of our Lord. Plato divides the soul into three parts. There is the rational element which we have in common with God; then there is the irascible element (ΘΥΜΙΚόν) which we have in common with the lions, and the concupiscible element (ἘΠΙΘΥΜΗΤΙΚόν) which we have in common with the flies. But our Lord had all these three elements and none of the elements were in his case evidence of animality or imperfection. "There was the rational element, by which He taught, by which He discoursed, by which He prepared the way of salvation; there was moreover indignation in Him, by which He inveighed against the scribes and the Pharisees; and there was the principle of desire, by which he so earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples

"In our own case accordingly, the irascible and the concupiscible element of our soul must not invariably be put to the account of the irrational (nature) since we are sure that in our Lord's case these elements operated in entire accordance with reason" (XVI).

5. The fact that Tertullian valiantly defends the validity of the knowledge obtained by sensation ought also to be mentioned. The validity of the senses, though impugned by Plato, is defended by Christ. "There are the faculties of seeing, and hearing, and smelling, and tasting, and touching. The fidelity of these senses is impugned with too much severity by the Platonists, and according to some by Heraclitus also, and Diocles, and Empedocles; at any rate, Plato, the Timaeus, declares the operations of the senses to be irrational, and vitiated by our opinions or beliefs" (XVII).

To the argument that the senses deceive us, as when oars appear bent when immersed in water, or when we think a noise is in the sky and it is actually somewhere else, Tertullian answers in most penetrating fashion that "there cannot occur illusions in our senses without an adequate cause" (XVII, p. 195 column 2). And "whatever ought to occur in a certain manner is not a deception." It is no deception when oars appear bent when immersed in water because we can know that it is the nature of water to have such an influence on the oar. But most important of all is the fact that Tertullian signalizes the charge that the veracity and clarity of the revelation of God to man as it comes to him in the things about him. "Hence we are bound most certainly to claim for the senses truth, and fidelity, and integrity, seeing that they never render any other account of their impressions than is enjoined on them by the specific causes or conditions which in all cases produces that discrepancy which appears between the report of the sense and the reality of the objects. What mean you, then, O most insolent Academy? You overthrow the entire condition of human life; you disturb the whole order of nature; you obscure the good providence of God Himself: for the senses of man which God has appointed over all His works, that we might understand, inhabit, dispense, and enjoy them (you reproach) as fallacious and treacherous tyrants!" (XVII).

6. Still further Tertullian points out that the Platonic theory of knowledge leads to the destruction of knowledge.

He shows this by indicating that no theory of judgment can stand if it separates intellect and sense in the way that Plato did. "For is it not true, that to employ the senses is to use the intellect? And to employ the intellect amounts to a use of the senses. What indeed can sensation be but the understanding of that which is the object of sensation? And what can the intellect or understanding be, but the seeing of that which is the object understood?" (XVIII).

He shows the same thing most basically by indicating that on Plato's theory the soul of man, when encased in the body, is out of touch with all principles of rationality and could attain to no knowledge at all (XXIV). In this connection Tertullian points out that Plato virtually identifies the soul with God, and that if the soul virtually has the character of divinity it is inexplicable why it should in any wise be without memory or knowledge in this world.

From the consideration of these several points one might conclude that

Tertullian would surely set no value on the testimony of the soul to the existence of God and its own immortality if that testimony derives from a soul that is interpreted along the lines of Greek philosophy. And we might be led to think that he would clearly discern that the testimony of the soul to its own creation by God is suppressed by the systems of the philosophers. But we find the contrary to be the case. He does not seem to sense that the systems of philosophy formed by non-Christian thinkers are the products of men who are sinners and who therefore do not love the truth about themselves. He seems rather to think of the mind of the sinner as though it were quite willing and able to see and speak forth the truth about itself and about the world. Right after asserting in the strongest terms that the Christian must get his information about God from God he says: "Of course we shall not deny that philosophers have sometimes thought the same things as ourselves. The testimony of truth is the issue thereof. - - Man may hit upon the truth accidentally." "In nature, however, most conclusions are suggested, as it were, by that common intelligence wherewith God has been pleased to endow the soul of man" (On the Soul, II). The philosophers have to an extent failed to be true to nature. But the failure of philosophers in this respect is not connected by Tertullian with sin. It is simply something human. There is always an uncorrupted intelligence that can and does give forth the truth according to nature. Experience, as interpreted by non-Christian or Christian alike, is therefore for Tertullian one of the two sources of information about the soul.

Yet experience when thus interpreted gives forth a testimony about the origin and nature of the soul totally different from the testimony of Scripture. But Tertullian is not aware of the discrepancy. He seeks, on the contrary, to force the two testimonies into harmony with one another. The result is that no coherent conception of the soul can be found in his writings, however penetrating and valuable they are with respect to many details. There is the truth of Scripture to which Tertullian wants to be true; according to it the soul is part of the man created by God and subject to the providence of God. But there is the rationalist-irrationalist theory of being that is characteristic of all forms of non-Christian thought. And it is as a matter of fact largely in accordance with such a non-Christian philosophy of being that Tertullian draws up his picture of the constitution of the human soul.

1. In the first place though Tertullian holds that the origin of the soul is from the inbreathing of the breath of life by the Spirit of God, yet he also holds, and that first of all on purely philosophical grounds against the Platonists, that the soul is corporeal. He appeals to various philosophers and their arguments in support of his view. He turns to the great medical authority of Soranus who has proved, he thinks, that the soul "is nourished by corporeal aliments" (VI). And then he also appeals to Scripture, and especially to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus as given by our Lord. The rich man, lifting up his eye in torment, seeks relief from thirst. This proves that he has a corporeal existence. "But what is that which is removed to Hades after the separation of the body; which is there detained; which is reserved until the day of judgment; to which

Christ also, on dying descended? I imagine it is the souls of the patriarchs. But wherefore (all this), if the soul is nothing in its subterranean abode? For nothing it certainly is, if it is not a bodily substance. For whatever is incorporeal is incapable of being kept and guarded in any way; it is also exempt from either punishment or refreshment" (VII).

2. On the question of the corporeality of the soul Tertullian holds with those who oppose Plato but on the question of simplicity he again agrees with Plato. He would speak of the soul as "an indivisible simple substance" (XI). More specifically it is identical with breath. Because it breathes, that is, because of its activity of breathing, the soul must be called spirit. "So we are driven to describe, by (the term which indicates this respiration— that is to say) spirit — the soul which we hold to be, by the propriety of its action, breath" (XI). As identical with breath, the soul may therefore be called spirit (not because of its condition, but of its action; not in respect of its nature, but of its operation" (XI).

There is here a very subtle distinction. Tertullian does not want to identify the soul with spirit as a substance for fear that this will place him in the camp of those who identify the spirit of man with the spirit of God. Hermogenes, he says, holds that man's soul came from matter, because if it were said to come from the Spirit of God, by the inbreathing of the Spirit of God, then the sin of this soul would virtually be the sin of the Spirit of God(XI).

The important point here is that in his reply to Hermogenes and other heretics Tertullian finds it necessary to insist that the soul is at the outset of its creation nothing but the breath of the living organism of the body. That is to say, he too, together with Hermogenes and the heretics, is afraid that if he says the soul of man directly bears the imprint of the character of the spirit of God he cannot escape the charge of thinking of man as virtually identical with God. He therefore defines the soul as something that is as near as possible to non-being. It has as little of character as it can have consistent with any sort of self-conscious existence.

It is this point that is basic to the psychology of Tertullian. And this point that is basic to the psychology of Tertullian is of fundamental importance for his epistemology and therefore for his apologetic. We must look at it more carefully. First let us quote Tertullian fully: He starts with a quotation of Isaiah 57:16: "He giveth breath unto the people that are on the earth, and Spirit to them that walk therein." In exegesis of this passage he then remarks as follows: "First of all there comes the (natural) soul, that is to say, the breath, to the people that are on the earth, — in other words, to those who act carnally in the flesh; then afterwards comes the Spirit to those who walk thereon, — that is, who subdue the works of the flesh; because the apostle also says, that 'that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, (or in possession of the natural soul), and afterward that which is spiritual' " (XI). Adam first received the natural soul. Then when he "straightway predicted that 'great mystery of

Christ and the Church,' when he said, 'This now is bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh - he experienced the influence of the Spirit. For there fell upon him that ecstasy, which is the Holy Ghost's operative virtue of prophecy.'

In contrast to the Holy Spirit who may come upon a man after he exists as a soul in the natural sense, there is the evil spirit. Thus we have the picture of the natural soul of man, though brought into existence as the breath of life and as such, because of its action, called spirit. Yet this soul is placed before the choice of accepting either the Spirit of God or the spirit of evil as its dominating power. "Consequently, as the spirit neither of God nor of the devil is naturally planted with a man's soul at birth, this soul must evidently exist apart and alone, previous to the accession to it of either spirit: if thus apart and alone, it must also be simple and uncompounded as regards its substance; and therefore it cannot respire from any other cause than from the actual condition of its own substance" (XI).

In all this we have the assertion of the freedom of the will in the sense of autonomy over against the spirit of God and the spirit of evil. In other words Tertullian, though wishing to be faithful to Scripture in its teaching of man in the image of God, finds it still more necessary to be faithful to the supposed demands of "reason" according to which the idea of man as analogous of God would not be acceptable. Therefore he virtually substitutes for the Biblical concept of freedom of the will of man as within the counsel of God and as in relationship to an environment constituted by the providence of God, the idea that man stands between God and the devil, both conceived as having some sort of ultimate power. That is to say, instead of thinking of man and Satan first of all as creatures of God and thus putting Satan and the power of temptation subject to the plan of God he puts Satan as a power next to God. And then he also puts man as still another power next to God.

3. It is to be expected that with such a view of the will of man there is a similar view of his rationality. Tertullian says that the nous of man is identical with the soul. It is therefore a function of this wholly autonomous man who needs must choose as ultimate between ultimate good and ultimate evil.

The burden of what Tertullian has to say about the origin and nature of the soul lies in his teaching of man's creation by God as a being with free will and rational power. But there is great ambiguity in it all. As already noted he is afraid of ascribing any moral character to the soul as first created lest he be charged with attributing the origin of evil to God. Yet God who is rational and good must be said to be the origin of the soul (XVI). But the basic concept remains that of the soul as so independent of God and so nearly without character at the outset of its career as is consistent with distinguishing it from non-being. "Now, if neither the spiritual element, nor what the heretics call the material element, was properly inherent in him (Tertullian is speaking of Adam) (since, if he had been created out of matter, the germ of evil must have been an integral part of his constitution), it remains that the only original element of his nature

was what is called the animal (the principle of vitality, the soul), which we maintain to be simple and uniform in its condition" (XXI).

In a section in which he recapitulates what has preceded he says: "The soul, then, we define to be sprung from the breath of God, immortal, possessing body, having form, simple in its substance, intelligent in its own nature, developing its powers in various ways, free in its determinations, subject to the changes of accident, in its faculties mutable, rational, supreme endued with an instinct of presentiment, evolved out of one (archtypal soul) (XXII).

4. There remains now, says Tertullian the question how all the souls are derived from the one archtypal soul. Plato is certainly mistaken in deriving them from one the way he did. The loss and the origination of knowledge could not be explained on the Platonic basis of *μεθυσίς ἀναμνήσεως* "learning is reminiscence" (XXII). After reviewing many philosophers he seeks the Christian answer on the derivation of all souls from Scripture: "Brother (in Christ), on your own foundation build up your faith" (XXVI). His answer is given on the basis of such births as those of Esau and Jacob, of John the Baptist and others that "Since God forms us in the womb, He also breathes upon us, as He also did at the first creation, when, 'the Lord God formed man, and breathed into him the breath of life'" (XXVI). The soul and body are "conceived, and formed, and perfectly simultaneously, as well as born together; and that not a moment's interval occurs in their conception, so that a prior place can be assigned to either" (XXVII). Tracing this process back to Adam he says: "Accordingly from the one (primeval) man comes the entire outflow and redundancy of men's souls - nature proving herself true to the commandment of God, "Be fruitful and multiply." We are not to conclude from this close interrelationship of the soul and body as to origin that they are identical and that the soul dies with the body. The body is as it were the house of the soul. The soul as well as the body does need food and drink, as we have seen before in the case of the rich man and Lazarus. But the soul needs nourishment because of "special necessity" while the "fish" needs nourishment "from the nature of its properties." Accordingly the soul can depart safe and sound"and in possession, too, of its own supports, and the aliments which belong to its own proper condition, - namely immortality, rationality, sensibility, intelligence, and freedom of the will" (XXXVIII).

5. The derivation of individual souls from the one archtypal soul has a bearing upon the question of original sin. It is difficult to see how Tertullian with his view of the free will of man could hold to any such thing as original, or transmitted sin. It would seem that he could not hold to any form or representation of all men through Adam. But how could he even hold to any form of transmission at all? Should not on his view each soul be placed in the same position as was the soul of Adam? If later souls were in any way tainted with sin from the fact of their derivation from Adam would not God, on Tertullian's logic with respect to Adam's free will, have to be charged with the origin of this sin?

And indeed Tertullian seems to account for the universal presence of sin primarily on an empirical basis. "For to what individual of the human race will not the evil spirit cleave, ready to entrap their souls from the very portals of their birth, at which he is invited to be present in all those superstitious processes which accompany childbearing?" (XXXIX). Yet he also appeals to a common nature that all have in Adam as the reason for the need of regeneration. "Every soul, then, by reason of its birth, has its nature in Adam until it is born again in Christ; moreover, it is unclean all the while that it remains without this regeneration; and because unclean, it is actively sinful, and suffuses even the flesh (by reason of their conjunction) with its own shame" (XL). Or again, "There is, then, besides the evil which supervenes on the soul from the intervention of the evil spirit, and antecedent, and in a certain sense nature, evil which arises from its corrupt origin. For, as we have said before, the corruption of our nature is another nature having a god and father of its own, namely the author of (that) corruption. Still, there is a portion of good in the soul, of that original, divine, and genuine good, which is its proper nature. For that which is derived from God is rather obscured than extinguished. It can be obscured, indeed, because it is not God; extinguished, however, it cannot be, because it comes from God. Thus some men are very bad, and some very good; but yet the souls of all form but one genus: even in the worst there is something good, and in the best there is something bad. For God alone is without sin; and the only man without sin is Christ, since Christ is also God. Thus the divinity of the soul bursts forth in prophetic forecasts in consequence of its primeval good; and being conscious of its origins, it bears testimony to God (its author) in exclamations such as: Good God! God know! and Good bye!" (XLI).

- - - - -

The main elements of Tertullian's teaching with respect to the soul, its origin in paradise, its nature psychologically speaking, its ethical disposition at the first and after the fall, and its inheritance of evil and of good from the time of Adam to the present, are now before us.

In evaluating the matter as a whole the approach that Warfield has suggested may be of help. There is first the evident desire to be true to the Rule of Faith. Tertullian realizes that as a Christian his basic source of information about the soul is the Scripture. Yet there is also his allegiance to a sort of broad idealistic philosophy that is in general patterned after Plato. Even when he departs from Plato on important points he is yet of the opinion that there are basic points on which he can agree with the great master of Greek philosophy.

The result is that there is a basic confusion in all that is said about the soul. Some points are perfectly clear, to be sure. The soul is created; to hold with Plato that the soul is uncreated is to make it one with God. But at once the very Platonism just rejected, or at least some form of philosophy derived from the soul as interpreted without the doctrine of creation, tones down the far-reaching significance of the fact of creation. Appeal is virtually made to

Being in general and to possibilities within this Being, rather than to God the Creator, in explanation of the nature of the soul. The soul's basic nature is interpreted in terms of the idea of slenderness of being, as existing near the abyss of non-being. The nature of man's freedom is sought in this fact that man's is at a great remove from the fulness of the being of God. Here also is the source of explanation of the possibility of sin, even the likelihood of sin. Because of the slenderness of his being, man has very little power of resistance against the prince of evil. At the same time God is said not to be responsible for the entrance of sin because God made man free, which is to say that God himself is not at all or is only remotely present with man as he yields to temptation. Throughout all this, appeal is made to metaphysical discontinuity between God and man within a common unity of being.

It is this common unity of being that forms the basic presupposition of the discontinuity between God and man that is supposed to explain both the freedom of man and his fall into sin. Tertullian seeks hard to defend the Christian doctrine of the soul against the charge of determinism. The heretics had argued that if God has made man perfect, and if therefore man's freedom lies within the plan of God, then evil too is traceable to God and God must be held responsible for its entrance. Tertullian seeks to escape this charge by the notion of man's slenderness of being as already explained. But here he makes his basic mistake. The idea of slenderness of being involves the idea of commonness of being between man and God. The non-Christian principle of discontinuity employed by Tertullian in order with it to defend the purity and holiness of God brings him into entanglement with the non-Christian principle of continuity which leads inevitably toward the identification of man with God. The non-Christian principle of discontinuity can never be employed without also employing the non-Christian principle of continuity; the two are dialectically involved in each other. Irrationalism cannot find expression except in terms of rationalism, and indeterminism cannot find expression except in terms of determinism; the result is that in all his efforts to absolve God from the responsibility for evil Tertullian succeeds only in immersing God with man in a common situation in which evil is as ultimate as the good.

The most crucial points at which Tertullian's enslavement to a non-Christian principle of continuity appear are therefore the same as those at which his adoption of a non-Christian principle of discontinuity have been shown to manifest themselves. Man's freedom is sought in the slenderness of his being. This is the non-Christian principle of discontinuity; if Tertullian had simply taken the creation doctrine and applied it in explanation of the freedom of man, he would not have referred to slenderness of being at all. He could speak of slenderness of being only because he assumed commonness of being; man's being is assumed to be a slender bit of the same sort of being that characterizes God. The Creator-creature distinction is not made basic in his thought and is not applied to the explanation of the soul at this crucial point. Now it is in this notion of the commonness of being that there lies the rationalist and determinist tie-up of the human soul with God. Man has after all a bit of divinity in him.

His being is itself divine. Thus Plato cannot have been so wholly wrong as he was said to be. Man gets his being from God and whatever he gets from God is and remains good. Therefore there always remains an element of good in all men. He cannot hold to total depravity. Consistently Tertullian would not be able to hold that Satan is wholly evil; has he not some measure of being and did he not get this being from God?

Then as to the matter of the inheritance of evil, here too the non-Christian principle of discontinuity comes into the picture. By the principle of discontinuity employed, Tertullian would be driven to the position that there is no such thing as inheritance at all. For his principle of discontinuity was introduced by him in order to escape the charge of determinism. That is, if he would employ the fully Christian principle to which he stands committed he would be called a determinist by the heretics. So in order to escape this charge of determinism Tertullian falls for the trap of using the non-Christian principle of indeterminism. But in using this he must at the same time use the non-Christian principle of determinism and rationalism. He therefore must hold that even that slender bit of being in man is really divine or participant in divinity. The doctrine of creation is virtually reduced to that of participation in divinity. At least it is the same being that is in God that is also in man, in however attenuated a form.

And it is this bit of being, participant in divinity, that is said to be in all men even after Adam has fallen into sin and even after individually men fall again into sin. Tertullian uses the notion of a common human nature. His principle of discontinuity would not entitle him to this. According to it he should attribute to each man afresh a total independence of his fellows. But he must maintain some slender connection between all men. This slender connection by way of a common human nature presupposes back of it a common nature as between man and God. And it is this assumption of a common nature or being which, since it is participant in divinity, is said in some measure to be always good even in the midst of evil.

The result of all this for Tertullian's view of the nature of sin is that its Biblical character of ethical alienation from God is not fully appreciated. Tertullian's notion of sin is still largely controlled by the idea that sin is the metaphysical opposite of the good. It is as it were lower in the scale of being than is the good. It is however inevitably, or almost inevitably, there on account of the slenderness of being that is man's character.

With this we must conclude our discussion of Tertullian's doctrine of the soul. In spite of his allegiance to a non-Christian philosophy, Tertullian, as noted, was able to make a great advance in setting forth a Christian conception of the nature of man. In the way that he made his great contribution to the doctrine of the trinity, so also he made a great contribution to the true doctrine of man. A consistently Biblical doctrine of the trinity would have implied the complete rejection of all subordinationism. A completely Biblical doctrine of man

would have implied the complete rejection of all Platonism. In opposing heresies while yet controlled to some extent by the same principle as those which controlled his opponents he could not reach such heights as those who later made use of his constructions were able to reach. He was a true giant groping above himself for light, seeing it yet not seeing it.

Authority

Our discussion of Tertullian's doctrine of authority need not be long after what has already been said. It has already appeared that he means to hold to the authority of Scripture as the source of Christian doctrine. But it has been shown that he also appeals to experience as a final source from which both establishment and corroboration of doctrine may be derived. Yet it is in The Prescription Against Heretics that we have the most express statement with respect to the authority of Scripture. And it is to this treatise that appeal is frequently made by those who think that Tertullian stands for the idea of the acceptance of religious truth even when wholly above and even contrary to truth discovered by reason.

As an illustration of such a view the words of Windelband may be quoted. Windelband speaks of a growing "opposition between revelation and knowledge by reason" as developing during the early Christian era (History of Philosophy, p. 224). "The more the gnostics, in developing their theological metaphysics, separated themselves from the simple content of the Christian faith, the more Irenaeus warned against the speculations of worldly wisdom, and the more violently Tatian, with oriental contempt of the Greeks, rejected every delusion of the Hellenic philosophy which was always at variance with itself, and of whose teachers each would exalt only his own opinions to the rank of law, while the Christians uniformly subjected themselves to the divine revelation."

"This opposition became still sharper with Tertullian and Arnobius. The former, as Tatian had already done in part, adopted the Stoic materialism in its metaphysical aspect, but drew from it only the logical consequence of a purely sensualistic theory of knowledge." This sensualistic theory of knowledge, says Windelband, allowed for no knowledge of the deity. "Just for this reason it (he speaks of the soul) needs revelation, and finds its salvation only in faith in this. So sensualism here shows itself for the first time as basis for orthodoxy. The lower the natural faculty of man, and the more it is limited to the senses, the more necessary does revelation appear."

"Accordingly, with Tertullian, the content of revelation is not only above reason but also in a certain sense contrary to reason, in so far as by reason man's natural knowing activity is understood. The gospel is not only incomprehensible, but is also in necessary contradiction with worldly discernment: credibile est quia ineptum est; certum est, quia impossibile est - credo quia absurdum. Hence Christianity, according to this view, has nothing to do with philosophy, Jerusalem nothing to do with Athens. Philosophy as natural knowl-

edge is unbelief; there is therefore no Christian philosophy."

Only a passing remark need be made about the charge that Tertullian held to a narrow sensualistic theory of knowledge. This was not the case. As already noted, he defended the validity of knowledge derived from the senses, but he did this in the interest of showing that God's revelation, wherever given, is trustworthy. Moreover he argued that sense knowledge and knowledge obtained through intellectual error are directly involved in one another. Still further Tertullian held that God could and did directly reveal himself to man by means of the prophets. Finally he even held that the soul had inherently the ability of direct contact with God. All in all scepticism is about as far from his thought as anything could be.

But more basic is the charge that Tertullian believed what he believed because he thought it to be absurd and impossible. The quotation given from Tertullian's work On the Flesh of Christ does not bear this out. In the sections preceding the one from which the quotation is given he argues for the possibility of the incarnation. He argues for this against Marcion and others who held to a docetic view of the human nature of Christ on the ground that a real incarnation was impossible. He puts the following words into the mouth of the heretic. "But, you say, I deny that God was truly changed to man in such a wise as to be born and endued with a body of flesh. On this ground, that a being changed into something else puts an end to the former state. Change, therefore, is not possible to a Being who cannot come to an end" (III). To refute this argument against the possibility of the incarnation Tertullian argues that we must not apply our concepts of possibility to God since he is not subject to our conditions: "But nothing is equal with God; His nature is different from the condition of all things. If, then, the things which differ from God, and from which God differs, lose what existence they had whilst they are undergoing change, wherein will consist the difference of the Divine Being from all other things except in His possessing the contrary faculty of theirs -- in other words, that God can be changed into all conditions, and yet continue just as He is? On any other supposition, He would be on the same level with those things which, when changed, lose their existence they had before; whose equal He is not in any other respect, as He certainly is not in the changeful issues of their nature" (III).

It is thus by an appeal to the fact that God is "wholly other" than man that Tertullian seeks to establish the possibility of his incarnation. To this he adds that all this will seem to be foolish and absurd to Marcion but then will he not realize that God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise? God has chosen such things as are foolish in the eyes of those who measure God by their own conceptions. According to the world's wisdom it "is more easy to believe that Jupiter became a bull or a swan, if we listen to Marcion, than that Christ really became man" (IV). If Marcion thinks it foolish to believe in the incarnation why does he not also think it is foolish to believe in the death of Christ? But then "after all, you will not become 'wise' unless you become a

'fool' to the world by believing 'the foolish things of God.' So he cries out: "O thou most infamous of men, who acquittest of all guilt the murders of God! For nothing did Christ suffer of them if He suffered nothing at all. Spare the whole world's one and only hope, thou who art destroying the indispensable dishonour of our faith. "Whatsoever is unworthy of God, is of gain to me. --- The Son of God was crucified; I am not ashamed because men must needs be ashamed of it. And the Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed because it is absurd (ineptum). And He was buried, and rose again: the fact is certain, because it is impossible."

Whatever may have been in Tertullian's mind in the last couple sentences, the context shows that he certainly did not believe the death and resurrection of Christ because he himself thought these facts to be impossible or absurd. He has just argued for their possibility on the ground that God is not subject to the limitations of the creature. And he has included the birth and death of Christ among those things which appear foolish only to those who are so foolish as to measure the divine being with human concepts.

There remains to be sure, something obscure in the manner of Tertullian's statement. He has often argued that the belief in the existence of God is very rational, even on the basis of the soul's testimony. And he appeals frequently for corroboration of his views to certain of the philosophical systems. On this ground he might well be charged with retaining elements of "rationalism" in his thought. And this would itself be evidence of how untrue to the evidence Windelband's statement about Tertullian holding to an irrational faith is. But then there is the other side of the story. He who retains elements of rationalism is bound also to retain elements of irrationalism. And this seems to find expression in the quotation given just before to the effect that God's nature is virtually wholly other than human nature. It would seem then that we may believe about God such things as are wholly contrary to what appears to be possible according to rational principles. In other words Tertullian does not presuppose the ontological trinity at this point, and therefore does not think of human thought and experience as analogical of God's. Therefore he is unable to set off the Christian philosophy of life with any full consistency over against the non-Christian philosophy of life. When he seeks to defend the "rationality" of the Christian religion he falls into a measure of univocism, or identity; he then argues that the God of the Christian and the God of the Stoic are virtually the same God. On the other hand when he must defend the transcendence of God above man against Marcion he apparently falls into equivocism; he then argues that the God of the Christian is wholly other in nature than man. He has not clearly set the Christian principle of continuity and the Christian principle of discontinuity, together forming the Christian principle of analogy, over against the non-Christian principle of continuity and the non-Christian principle of discontinuity. So he is driven back and forth between two extremes. When he is attacked by a non-Christian principle of continuity he opposes to it what is in part at least a non-Christian principle of discontinuity. On the other hand when he is confronted by a heretic who stresses the non-Christian principle of dis-

continuity then Tertullian responds, in part at least, with setting over against it a non-Christian principle of continuity.

For all that Tertullian holds basically to the Christian principle of interpretation. And it is this fact that comes out magnificently in the expression frequently quoted from the Prescription Against Heretics. In it he argues that as Christians we must live in our interpretations by the Scripture alone. That must be our criterion of judgment. Our investigations must now allow for hypotheses that would undermine this criterion. And it is in this connection that he uses the famous words: "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? what between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from 'the porch of Solomon,' who had himself taught that 'the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart.' Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition. We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel. With our faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our palmary faith, that there is nothing which we ought to believe besides?" (VII).

Is this vigorous attachment to Scripture as the only source and criterion of truth a mere irrational adherence to something about which nothing can be said in terms of rational proposition? What has been already adduced from Tertullian in the way of his refutation of the basic tenets of Platonism is in itself sufficient to prove the contrary. Tertullian knew and pointed out that if one assumes that man is not the creature of God, if man on the contrary assumes that he is of a piece with God, then there is no possibility of intelligent predication. He is therefore setting the Bible as the criterion for the believer, not as something irrational but as that which brings the God who, in the nature of the case, since he is man's creator, cannot speak otherwise than in terms of authority. And Tertullian is simply asserting what all Christians should assert, namely that in the Scripture they have the truth and that the truth has its own criterion of its truth within itself. It is the self-sufficiency of the truth of Christianity that Tertullian is bravely and more boldly than his predecessors asserting. Would that he had himself always been fully true to it. Then he would not have sought in the testimony of the "soul" as such for corroboration of the truth of Scripture statements about God or man. Then too he would not have aligned himself in any way or to any extent with the "wholly other" god of the Greeks. Then he would not have been controlled by any irrationalist-rationalist principles in his many and brilliant discussions with the heretics. It is because he was not fully true to his own principles of Scripture that Tertullian did not offer a good defense of Scripture and good defense of the truth of Christianity.

Summing up the matter discussed with respect to Tertullian we have the following: (1) In his doctrine of the soul he seeks to be faithful to Scripture but he is not fully so. (2) In his doctrine of Scripture as the supreme rule of faith and practice he again sets forth the Christian principle marvelously but again is in some measure unfaithful to his own principle. And so (3) with respect to

the doctrine of the trinity he approaches the doctrine of the equality of their persons and their internal unity better than his predecessors but again he is not fully true to his own principles. Tertullian appears as a Samson doing mighty deeds of valor for the people of the Lord but then falling in love with the beauty that the Philistine offers.

Alexandrianism (Clement and Origen)

From Tertullian we turn to an altogether different sort of world, the world of Alexandria. And our concern will, of course, be primarily with Clement of Alexandria and with Origen.

In these two men, and especially in Origen, we meet with the first major attempt at a comprehensive statement of a world and life view in terms of principles that are true both to Greek thought and to Christian doctrine.

It is not our purpose to trace the thought of these two men as they historically developed it; nor do we intend to speak of the many subjects of which they spoke. Our intention is rather to confine ourselves to such matters as are of immediate and basic importance for Christian apologetics. In particular we now limit ourselves to what they have to say on the question of authority.

We have seen that though men held to the absolute authority of Scripture, they were not able to give themselves a good account of their reasons for doing so. Their defense of Scripture was frequently in terms of "reason" or in terms of irrational faith, or in terms of a combination of these two. In practise, therefore, they were unable to escape a vacillating procedure; they sought to build up their epistemology, their metaphysic and their ethics both by an appeal to authority and by an appeal to reason.

The Alexandrians do not differ from these men in these respects. The difference between them and such a man as Tertullian, for instance, lies not in that the latter appealed exclusively to authority while they appealed exclusively or primarily to reason. Both Clement and Origen appealed to the authority of Scripture. Origen did much work in determining the text of the Septuagint and spent a good part of his literary effort in exposition of the Scriptures. The difference would seem to lie rather in the greater degree with which the Alexandrians in practice allowed themselves to be controlled by principles of experience rather than by Scripture in working out their views. The Alexandrians, and particularly Origen, were far more speculative than was Tertullian. They were far more controlled by the idea of "thought in general," "being in general," and "good in general" that is, by the Greek approach to the problems of philosophy. Accordingly they made much more extended use of the method of allegory in their interpretation of Scripture. By this method they were able, as they thought, to find harmony between teachings drawn from experience and teachings drawn from Scriptures.

In practice their recognition of Scriptural authority was therefore largely the same as the recognition given to the authority of an expert. And recognition of the authority of experts in religions was common in their day in Alexandria. Recognition of authority, says Windelband, was "the felt need of the time" (History of Philosophy, p. 210). "For the farther the contrast between the systems (of philosophy, he means) extended, the more it became evident how little able philosophy was to fulfill its task which it had set itself: namely, that of educating many by a sure insight into a state of virtue and happiness, to inner independence of the world" (210). It was "felt in every direction that man in his own strength can become neither knowing, nor virtuous nor happy" (p. 211). "Man's essential interest became thereby transferred for long centuries from the earthly to the heavenly sphere; he began to seek his salvation beyond the world of sense" (211). There was a readiness to accept "religions of authority" and this for the solution of the problems of life and of thought alike. "The thought of antiquity described a peculiar curve, separating itself farther and farther from religion from which it proceeded, reaching its extreme separation in Epicureanism, and then again drawing steadily near to religion, to return at last entirely within it." It was natural that under such circumstances it was Plato's system of thought, with its stress on the reality of the supersensuous world, that should find much interest. "It was, therefore, this latter system which formed the controlling centre for the religious closing development of ancient thought. A religious development of Platonism is the fundamental character of this period" (212). "The philosophising individual no longer had confidence that he could attain to right insight or to his soul's salvation by his own strength, and sought his help, accordingly, partly amid the great monuments of the past, partly in a divine revelation. Both tendencies, however, are ultimately upon the same basis, for the confidence which was placed in the men and writings of a previous time rested only upon the fact that they were regarded as especially favored vessels of higher revelation. Authority, therefore, acquired its value as the mediate, historically accredited revelation, while the divine illumination of the individual as immediate revelation, came to its assistance. Differently as the relation between these two forms was conceived of, it is yet the common mark of all Alexandrian philosophy that it regards divine revelation as the highest source of knowledge. Already in this innovation in the theory of knowledge, we find expressed the heightened value which this period put upon personality, and on personality as evincing itself in the feelings. The longing of this time desired that the truth might be found by experience, as an inner communication of man with the supreme being" (219).

What is to be particularly observed in all this is that the view of "authority" as Windelband thus outlines it, is a view which fully accords with the idea of human autonomy, and is wholly out of accord with the idea of absolute Biblical authority. "The appeal to authority often makes its appearance in Greek and Hellenistic philosophy in the sense of confirmation and strengthening of an author's own views, but not as a decisive and conclusive argument" (219). It was the sort of authority that naturally developed out of the history of Greek speculation. It was when this speculation had become sceptical and irrationalistic that

it developed its idea of authority. The natural man was being impressed with his own failures to interpret reality exhaustively in terms of his immanentistic categories. It was as part of this general recognition of irrationalism that the Hellenistic idea of personality was developed. This idea was to the effect that man must be sufficient to himself in spite of what may happen in the universe. That is to say, it was assumed that the universe was not controlled by the providence of God as this providence is understood in the Christian sense of the term. Even the Stoic notion of providence was nothing but an intra-cosmic principle of supposed rationality. And this intra-cosmic principle found, as it were, over against itself an area of the irrational. Therefore, man was still surrounded by forces over which there was no rational control and of which there was no rational knowledge. So man had to cultivate his own sufficiency within himself.

Thus there is a concomitant development of an irrationalist-rationalist notion of authority and of an irrationalist-rationalist notion of personality. In this development there may be said to be an intimation of the modern post-Kantian situation. In modern thought the autonomous man is quite willing to recognize authority. He has in modern times so clearly developed the idea of personality as autonomous and is so certain that there is no knowledge of God, in the historic Christian sense of the term, that he is perfectly safe in asking for authoritative information about that of which he himself virtually asserts that there cannot be any knowledge.

Similarly at the time of the early church Hellenism had developed the idea of self-sufficient personality. It was based on two seemingly exclusive reasons. The first is the idea that man knows that he is surrounded by an infinite ocean of possibility that may influence him for good or for evil and that he himself has no knowledge of this ocean. The second is that man "knows" that out of this ocean of possibility nothing can come in the way of a revelation from God in the Christian sense of the term. The first reason is irrationalist and the second is rationalist. And the two reasons are involved in one another.

The idea of personality and the concomitant appeal to authority, as these were developed in Hellenistic thought and as they operated in Alexandria, therefore led directly to the mysticism of Plotinus. As such they were wholly exclusive of the Christian idea of personality as created in the image of God and of the Christian idea of authority. That is to say, the Hellenistic idea of personality and of appeal to authority implied the idea of pure mysticism and therefore the complete rejection of revelation in the orthodox sense of the term. According to neo-Platonism man must seek absorption in deity. This is his ethical ideal. The idea of revelation that corresponds to this is the idea of immediate illumination of the individual by the deity. And this illumination is not by way of information transmitted in thought communication but comes by way of ecstasy. All thought, Plotinus teaches, is inferior to this state of ecstasy; for thought is motion - a desire to know. Ecstasy, however, is certainty of God, blessed rest in him; man has share in the divine Theoric, or contemplation

(Aristotle) only when he has raised himself entirely to the deity.

Ecstasy is then a state which transcends the self-consciousness of the individual, as its object transcends all particular determinateness - "It is a sinking into the divine essence with an entire loss of self-consciousness: it is a possession of the deity, a unity of life with him, which mocks at all description, all perception, and all that abstract thought can frame" (Windelband, 228).

It is thus that the epistemology of Greek philosophy starts with the idea of the bold assertion of the autonomous man that he can determine the nature of all possibility by means of his logical power, and ends by this self-same autonomous man cravenously seeking non-rational absorption into some impersonal non-determinate absolute. Modern philosophy was to tell this same story in aggravated form. And it was the question whether the Alexandrian theologians were able to distinguish between the true and false notion of personality and therefore also between the true and the false notion of authority. Or did they yield to the temptation of seeking to combine the Christian and the pagan notion of personality and therefore the Christian and the pagan notion of authority? As is well known, the latter was the case.

Both Clement and Origen appeal to the authority of Scripture. They even speak of this authority in very orthodox terms. But in the construction of their philosophical system they do not feel bound by this authority as basic to all else. The chief writings of Clement are his Exhortation to the Greeks, his Instructor, and his Stromata or Miscellanies. In all of them we find appeal to the authority of Scripture. So for instance in the Stromata we find the following words: "But we, who have heard by the Scriptures that self-determining choice and refusal have been given by the Lord to man, rest in the infallible criterion of faith, manifesting a willing spirit, since we have chosen life and believe God through His voice. And he who has believed the Word knows the matter to be true; for the Word is truth. But he who has disbelieved Him that speaks, has disbelieved God" (Bk II, Chap. IV).

One might expect from the sound of these words that Clement would make faith in this word as it speaks of the saving grace through Christ all-determinative in his thought. We soon discover, however, that Clement has interwoven the idea of faith in Scripture with the philosophical faith in first principles as the basis of the possibility of intellectual apprehension. "Well, Sensation is the ladder to Knowledge, while Faith, advancing over the pathway of the objects or sense, leaves Opinion behind, and speeds on to things free of deception, and reposes in the truth" (Stromata II:IV). Clement argues that faith is an ingredient in all Knowledge, especially of all knowledge with respect to ultimate things. "Should one say that Knowledge is founded on demonstration by a process of reasoning, let him hear that first principles are incapable of demonstration; for they are known neither by art nor sagacity" (Ibid). Or again "For knowledge is a state of mind that results from demonstration; but faith is a grace which from what is indemonstrable conducts to what is universal and simple, what is neither

with matter, nor matter, nor under matter. But those who believe not, as to be expected, drag all down from heaven, and the region of the invisible, to earth's absolutely gasping with their hands rocks and oaks, according to Plato. For, clinging to all such things, they asseverate that that alone exists which can be touched and handled, defining body and essence to be identical" (*Ibid*). "Now Aristotle says that the judgment which follows knowledge is in truth. Accordingly, faith is something superior to knowledge, and is its criterion" (*Ibid*).

When therefore Clement speaks of the "infallible criterion of Faith" this does not in his case imply the absolute authority of Scripture. He is speaking of a general faith which is required of man since, as the philosophers have shown, man cannot intellectually demonstrate first principles.

In this, then, Clement's thinking is controlled largely by Greek thought rather than by Scripture. For him faith points to something supernatural. But he does not distinguish between faith and its place in a system of philosophy that deals with "thought in general" and "being in general," and faith as it fits into the Christian system. He does not distinguish between faith in the irrational and faith in the thought communication of Scripture. Standing at the fork in the road he is apparently trying to go in two directions, the one leading to the mysticism of Plotinus and the other to the gospel of Paul.

There is therefore a basic confusion running throughout the writings of Clement on the relation between the gospel and the wisdom of the world. The wisdom of the world as expressed in his day in Greek philosophy led straight to the irrational mysticism of Plotinus. Yet this wisdom of the world was for Clement a positive preparation for the coming of the Logos incarnate (*Stromata* VI:XVII). The prevailing view of Clement is that the Greeks knew the true God but knew him less perfectly than do Christians who have a fuller revelation than had the Greeks.

Much more might be said to indicate that for Clement faith in Scripture is the same faith that the best of the philosophers had and is faith in the same God that the philosophers had, but is fuller faith in a fuller revelation of this same God through the Christ who is the Logos. Clement has failed to warn men away from the road that leads to Plotinus. In particular he failed to warn men clearly that only by grace can they be saved. He did not present the Son as saying: "No one cometh to the father but by me." Men already knew the Father; they had always known the Father; they had not offended the Father; they were not covenant breakers; they did not clearly need redemption. So even the work of the Son as the Savior could not be presented truly. His revelation among men when incarnate is taken to be nothing but the climactic expression of this self-same Christ, revelation found among all men from the beginning. Clement virtually identifies the Christ incarnate with the general idea of the Logos. And since all men everywhere have been enlightened by the Logos it follows that all men everywhere, in some measure, have been enlightened by the Christ. Clement speaks of the Word as the "Song of salvation" but he assures

the Greeks that this song is not new;"it was from the beginning and even before the beginning. But we were before the foundation of the world, we who, because we were destined to be in Him, were begotten beforehand by God. We are the rational images formed by God's Word, or Reason, and we date from the beginning an account of our connection with Him, because 'the Word was in the beginning.' Well, because the Word was from the first, He was and is the divine beginning of all things; but because He lately took a name, - the name consecrated of old and worthy of power, the Christ, - I have called Him a New Song" (Exhortation to the Greeks, Butterworth, p. 17).

In all this the notion of "thought in general" and of "being in general" is more prominent than the notion of the gospel of Christ.

Basic to his inability to distinguish mysticism from the Christian doctrine of revelation was his conception of personality. On it too he was instructed by the Greeks rather than by Paul. Clement does not teach that Adam was in paradise in full possession of the knowledge of God by virtue of his creation by God and by virtue of his communication with God. And so he has no concept of personality that would even allow for the possibility, let alone the actuality, of authoritative revelation on the part of God to man. His conception of personality is taken from the idea of being in general rather than from the Scripture. He assumes that Adam and his followers are in essentially the same sort of position with respect to their knowledge of God and with respect to virtue. Neither Adam nor his posterity knew God by nature; they are made so that they can learn to know God. "Above all, this ought to be known, that by nature we are adapted for virtue; not so as to be possessed of it from our birth, but so as to be adapted for acquiring it" (Stromata VI: XII). Immediately following this general statement about men as a race he speaks the following words about Adam: "By which consideration is solved the question propounded to us by the heretics, Whether Adam was created perfect or imperfect? Well, if imperfect, how could the work of a perfect God - above all, that work being man - be imperfect? And if perfect, how did he transgress the commandments? For they shall hear from us that he was not perfect in his creation, but adapted to the reception of virtue. For it is of great importance in regard to virtue to be made fit for its attainment. And it is intended that we should be saved by ourselves. This, then, is the nature of the soul, to move itself. Then as we are rational, and philosophy being rational, we have some affinity with it. Now an aptitude is a movement toward virtue, not virtue itself. All, then, as I said, are naturally constituted for the acquisition of virtue" (Idem XX).

It may be noted that the position of Clement is similar to that of Tertullian. Both seek to escape the charge of rationalism and determinism made against the Christian faith by the heretics. Both do this by using the idea that man was really not in possession of the true knowledge of God and of virtue at the beginning. Man began at the bottom of the scale of being. He therefore had free will. But this notion of free will is the expression of an irrationalist philosophy of being. Or it is expressive of the non-Christian philosophy of being so far as such

a philosophy is of necessity irrationalist. But to thus answer the charge of determinism and rationalism by means of irrationalism and indeterminism is but to prepare the way for a pendulum swing back to still greater rationalism. And it is this rationalism that finds expression in Clement when he speaks of all men, whether Christians or not, as participating in the knowledge of God through the Logos. In other words the correlative to his principle of indeterminism found in his teaching on the free will is found in the principle of continuity by which all men, whether they have knowledge of the historical Christ or not, are yet virtually said to be in him.

Origen on Epistemology

We need not now add much by way of discussion on Origen's conception of epistemology. It is generally speaking the same as that of Clement. He too asserts belief in Scriptural authority. This is the starting point of his famous work on First Principles. Yet by his allegorical method he can make these Scriptures produce that which is largely in accord with the principles of Greek philosophy. When Scripture teaches plainly the idea of temporal creation out of nothing, Origen, controlled by the idea that the logic of man can determine what can be and what cannot be, says we cannot think of a moment when God was not creating. He must therefore have created all things from eternity. Thus he pays lip service to the Scriptures as the source of his information and quickly turns to Plato and asks him what can or cannot have been the case in all the ages past. It is the idea of thought in general that largely controls him in his speculation. Accordingly he does virtually the same thing that Clement does when he wants to explain the nature and origin of evil in the world. He refers to the Biblical idea of the fall of Satan and of man but he interprets this in terms of the idea of the chain of being. He interprets the Genesis narrative with respect to the fall figuratively, as intimating a pre-historic ultimate differentiation in reality. In this too he resembles Plato.

To escape the charge of determinism and therefore of making God the author of sin, Origen introduces the purely speculative notion of the souls of men as having sinned in a pre-existent state "for if this were not so, and souls had no pre-existence, why do we find some new-born babes to be blind, when they have committed no sin, while others are born with no defect at all" (First Principles, VIII).

This may suffice to indicate the nature of Origen's respect for Scripture. That Scripture is not really absolutely authoritative for him is clear from the fact that its whole message of grace is turned into the opposite so as to mean universal salvation. In other words, just as he seeks a non-Christian principle of discontinuity in order to explain the origin of evil so he uses a non-Christian principle of continuity in order to have all men saved. The nature of being in general is such that all men will eventually participate in the being of God.

St. Augustine

With a more Biblical system of theology than that of any of his predecessors Augustine also had a more Biblical idea of the Bible itself than they. True, he only gradually realized the implications of his own basic principles. In fact he was never able to reach full consistency in his teaching. But it is safe to say that his basic principles are derived from Scripture as the self-testifying word of God.

The opposite is maintained by such men as Harnack, the historian of doctrine, and by Windelband, the historian of philosophy. For Windelband the essence of Augustine's system lies in the idea of self-sufficient internality. Augustine is thus taken to be the forerunner of Descartes and of modern philosophy with its starting point in man as sufficient to himself. But B. B. Warfield has, we hold, shown that this interpretation of Augustine cannot be sustained by the chief body of his writings. (See: Warfield, Studies in Tertullian and Augustine.)

Though in some measure subject to the principles of Platonism and particularly neo-Platonism, Augustine yet produced from Scripture, more clearly than any one before him, such concepts as have enabled his followers to set off the Christian idea of Scripture and of its system of truth clearly against all kinds of non-Christian speculation.

Earliest writings

Naturally it will be impossible to do more than take some samples of Augustine's writings. In the samples chosen it will be our purpose to ascertain, as best we can, whether and to what extent Augustine was using his own adopted Biblical principles.

In the first works of Augustine the question is largely, though not exclusively, that of epistemology. He had accepted the position of the Manichees because they claimed to be able to explain life in terms of reason. But he had been disappointed with them. He had therefore wondered whether it was possible to know ultimate reality at all. The academics had fascinated him at least for a brief time. So the question of knowledge, and as a part of this, the question of the relation of authority and of reason, concerned him deeply. He knew from his experience that he was saved by grace; how then could he justify this position before the world?

Augustine did not want to tone down the Christian position in order to make it acceptable to the natural man. Harnack gives witness to this fact both with respect to the Scripture as the source of the system of truth which he now believed, and with respect to the nature of this system itself. In both cases Augustine, says Harnack, is to be contrasted with the Alexandrians, at least in the early period of his literary life.

"On the one hand, Augustine was convinced that everything in Scripture was valuable for faith, and that any thought was at once justified, ecclesiastically and theologically, by being reproved to be Biblical – see his doctrine of predestination and other tenets, of which he was certain simply because they were found in the Bible. By this principle and unity of doctrine were nullified. But, on the other hand, Augustine knew very well that religion was a practical matter, that in it faith, hope, and love, or love alone, were all-important, and that only what promoted the latter had any value. Indeed he advanced a considerable step further, and approximated the Alexandrian theologians: he ultimately regarded Scripture merely as a means, which was dispensed with when love had reached its highest point, and he even approached the conception that the very facts of Christ's earthly revelation were stages beyond which the believer passed, whose heart was possessed wholly by love" (Op. Cit., p. 99). Harnack thus thinks that from his own point of view Augustine developed an increasingly more liberal view of Scripture. But this contention shows at any rate that, according to Harnack, Augustine held to a very high view of Scripture in his earliest period.

Corresponding to what Harnack says about Augustine's view of Scripture is what he says about his view of the content of Scripture. "From our exposition up to this point – and only the most important facts have been mentioned – it follows that we cannot speak of Augustine as having a system, nor did he compose any work which can be compared to Origen's. Since he did not, like the latter, boldly claim the right to an esoteric Christianity, but rather as Christian and churchman constantly delayed taking this liberating step, everything stands with him on one level, and therefore is involved in conflict" (Op. Cit., p. 102).

In general it may be said that Augustine therefore wanted to hold to sound Christian doctrine but that he sought ways and means by which to prove to himself and to others the truth of his doctrine. The question for him was one of apologetical rather than of systematic theology.

And on the question of apologetics the teachings of Augustine in his earliest writings are instructive because he sought to develop theism and Christianity by separate and different methods. He thought theism could be established by a priori means and then Christianity must be established by empirical means.

In other words, Augustine was largely rationalistic in his defense of theism and largely irrationalistic in his defense of Christianity. He held to a rationalist principle of unity and to an irrationalist principle of diversity in his apologetic defense of Christianity. That is to say, he tended in this direction. Throughout his argument both for theism and for Christianity there appears a tendency to reason in a better way, a way that is more in accord with his own final theology. But then he had not yet worked out his final theology and it could hardly be expected that he should therefore at once be able to work out a true method of apologetic.

His Rationalism

In his Confessions he speaks of the time when he was converted to Christianity and how he sought to relate his acceptance of Christ as his Savior with his philosophical speculations. He says that he found theism but not Christianity in the writings of the philosophers. In speaking of the books of the Platonists, he says, "And therein I read, not indeed in the same words, but to the self-same effect, enforced by many and varied reasons, that, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made. That which was made by Him is life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness and the darkness comprehendeth it not. And that the soul of man, though it bears witness of the light, yet itself is not that light; but the Word of God, being God, is that true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. And that He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. But that He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. But as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His name. This I did not read there.

"In like manner, I read there that God the Word, was born not of flesh, nor of blood, nor of the will of man, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God. But that the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, I read not there" (VII Ch. IX, p. 100). Augustine continues to tell us what he found and what he did not find in the books of Platonists. The substance of his remarks is to the effect that he heard about God and about the Son and about men's participation in the Son but not about the humiliation and exaltation of Jesus the Savior.

In other words Augustine seems to think that a true theism is found among the Greeks and that therefore he can use the arguments given for the defense of theism as these have been worked out by the philosophers.

So when after his conversion he seeks to give himself an account of his faith he begins with defending theism. And he defends theism with a method that is essentially Platonic. At least he does not recognize the fact that there is a difference, and that a basic difference, between the Christian and non-Christian defense of the doctrine of God. Augustine does not realize that in defending a bare theism, a theism alike acceptable to Christians and to non-Christians, he is precluding the possibility of going on to a defense of Christianity. A bare theism is a theism which thinks it needs not Christianity; the God of a bare theism is such a God as does not need the work of Christ in order that men might be saved.

Soliloquies

In the Soliloquies Augustine personifies Reason and discourses with it. Reason asks what he would know. "God and the soul, that is what I desire to

know. R. Nothing more? A. Nothing whatever" (Bk. 1. 262). (Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihil ne plus? Nihil omnino). A little later Reason asks whether then if Augustine cares to know nothing more he is not interested in learning truth. "What, do you not wish to comprehend Truth? A. As if I could know these things except through her. R. Therefore she first is to be known, through whom these things can be known" (Bk. 1. 27, 274). But how shall we know the truth and how be sure that we know Truth? The answer given is essentially the Platonic one that Truth is the form in terms of which anything and in relation to which anything that is true must be called true. And the form cannot perish. Nothing that perishes must be said to be the truth. It must at most be said to participate in truth. Then "so also, if anything is true, it is assuredly from Truth that it is true" (*Ibid*). And as nothing that perishes can be as such said to be true, so nothing that perishes can as such be said to be at all. "Nothing is therefore rightly said to be, except things immortal. Do you diligently consider this little argument (says Reason), lest there should be in it any point which you think impossible to concede. For if it is sound, we have almost accomplished our whole business, which in the other book will perchance appear more clearly" (Bk. I:29, p. 275).

The second book then deals with the possibility of error. How is error to be distinguished from truth? This question must be answered if we are to know the truth. We must teach concerning falsity not falsely if we are to know the truth. The question of criterion is therefore all-important.

Well, we must hold that this criterion is in the mind because the mind is in the truth. Truth always abides and the subject always abides in the Truth. To be sure, when the matter is put this way the problem arises how an untrained mind, or the mind of an infant, may be said to contain or to be in the truth. "Or shall we rather inquire this, how a science can be in an untrained mind, which yet we cannot deny to be a mind" (Bk. II.27, p. 291). But even this question will finally get its answer if only we think of Truth in sufficiently formal fashion. And here is the heart of the argument of Augustine. "R. From this truth, as I remember, that Truth cannot perish, we have concluded, that only if the whole world would perish, but even if Truth itself should, it will be true that both the world and Truth have perished. Now there is nothing true without truth: in no wise therefore does Truth perish. A. I acknowledge all this, and shall be greatly surprised if it turns out false" (Bk. II, 28, p. 291). Having thus established the idea of Truth as that which must always exist even when itself perishes, it follows, argues Reason, that God and the soul exist and are known. The existence of God is immediately involved in the existence of Truth (32). And as for the soul we need not worry, for it, too, exists and is immortal. "Do you not at least know what a line is, asks Reason." (Bk. I.9, p. 264). "And in answering that you do, do you fear the Academicians? Not at all, is the answer. For that much the wise men themselves grant as being independent of the reliability of the senses. For whether the figures of Geometry are in the Truth, or the Truth is in them, that they are contained in our soul, that is, in our intelligence, no one calls in question, and through this fact Truth is also compelled to be in

our mind. But if every science whatever is so in the mind, as in the subject inseparably, and if Truth is not able to perish; why, I ask, do we doubt concerning the perpetual life of the mind through I know not what familiarity with death? (Bk. II. 32).

In his book on the Immortality of the Soul Augustine carries on the argument of the Soliloquies. To know the soul it must be, and to be it must be immortal. But to be immortal it must be within the Reason. "Reason is the aspect of the mind which perceives the true per se and not through the body... Nobody doubts that the first of these is in the mind" (ch. VI, p. 306). But now comes the difficulty with respect to the "stupidity" which enters the mind. This difficulty is similar to the one mentioned above when the question was asked how a mind that is untrained can yet be said to be in possession of the truth. "But that very turning away from reason by which stupidity enters the mind cannot occur without a defect in the mind." But how can there be a defect in the mind? How can that which is in the truth and in which the truth is, turn to stupidity? In other words, how can that, the very existence of which is truth and being, turn away to falsity and to non-being? The answer that Augustine gives is virtually to the effect that error and non-being are within Truth and within being. In other words the answer that he gives is the typical idealist answer that has found expression in the Aristotelian idea of the analogy of the being. And therefore the mind of man naturally, that is as the result of its inherent nature, turns to falsity and to non-being. But for all that it must still be said to be within truth and within being. Irrationality and non-being must be dialectically related to truth and to being. And therefore in another way Truth and being must be both formal, that is they must be above all concrete differentiations. "For if the mind has more being when turned towards reason and inhering in it, thus adhering to the unchangeable thing which is truth, both greatest and first: so when turned away from reason it has less being, which constitutes a defection. Moreover, every defect tends toward nothing (non-being), nor do we ever speak, more properly of destruction than when that which was something becomes nothing. Therefore, to tend towards nothing (non-being) is to tend towards destruction. It is hard to say why this thing does not occur to the soul in which defect occurs" (VII, p. 307).

But can the process of stupidity or destruction go on so far as to have the soul perish altogether? The answer is again similar to the one given about the truth when it was said that even when truth perishes it is true that Truth perishes. In other words the mind can be deprived of "some of its form" but it cannot ever be wholly deprived of form. Even the body cannot be wholly deprived of that by which it is the body. Much less can the mind be wholly deprived of that by which it is mind." And so, if anything should be feared, it is that the mind may perish by defection, that is, may be deprived of the very form of its existence. "Although I think enough has been said about this, and it has been shown by clear reasoning that this cannot be done, yet it should be also observed that there is no other reason for this fear, except that we have admitted that the stupid mind exists defectively, while the wise mind exists in more certain and

fuller sense." But if, as nobody doubts, the mind is most wise when it looks upon truth which is always in the same mode, and clings immoveable to it, joined by divine love; and if all things which exist in any mode whatever exist by that essence which exists in the highest and greatest degree; then either the mind exists by virtue of that essence, inasmuch as it does exist, or it exists per se. But if it exist per se, it is itself the cause of its existing and never deserts itself, it never perishes, as we also argued above. But if we exist from that essence there is need to inquire carefully what thing can be contrary to it, which may rob the mind of being the mind which the essence causes. So, then, what is it? Falsity, perhaps? because the essence is truth? But it is manifest and clearly established to what extent falsity can harm the mind. For can it do more than deceive? And except he live is any deceived? Therefore, falsity cannot destroy the mind. But if what is contrary to truth cannot rob the mind of that being mind which truth gave it (for truth is thus unconquerable) what else may be found which may take from the mind that which is mind? Nothing surely; for nothing is more able than a contrary to take away that which is made by its contrary" (Ch. XI).

"But suppose we seek the contrary of truth, not inasmuch as it is truth as the contrary of falsity, but inasmuch as it exists in the greatest and highest degree (although truth exists thus to the extent that it is truth, if we call that truth by which all things are true, in whatever degree they may exist, they exist inasmuch as they are true); yet by no means shall I seek to avoid that which this suggests to me so clearly. For if there is no contrary to any essence inasmuch as it is an essence, then much less is there a contrary to that first essence inasmuch as it is essence. Moreover, the antecedent is true. For no essence exists for any other reason than that it exists. Being, moreover, has no contrary except non-being; hence nothing is the contrary of essence. Therefore, in no way can anything exist as a contrary to that substance which exists first and in the highest degree. If the mind has its very essence from that essence (for since it does not have it from itself [ex se] it cannot have it otherwise than from that thing which is superior to the mind itself); then there is no thing by which it may lose its existence (being), because there is nothing contrary to that thing from which it has it. Hence the mind cannot cease to exist. But since the mind has wisdom because of turning to that by virtue of which it exists, so also when it turns away it can lose this wisdom. For turning away is the contrary of turning toward. But what it has from that to which there is no contrary is not a thing which it can lose. Therefore, it cannot perish" (ch. XII).

If truth perishes, it is still true that Truth perishes and so Truth still exists. If I am deceived it is still I that am deceived and so I am immortal. It is thus that Augustine thinks he establishes the existence of God, of himself and of truth. Augustine is utterly unaware of the fact that by this mode of argument, if it were valid, the distinctions between God and man, truth and falsity, subject and object would be wiped out. For the validity of both sentences, the one about the perishing of truth and the one about the deceptions of man, depends upon the reduction of all concrete differences in existence to the formal identity of pure

logic. A truth that is true even when it perishes is pure formal truth. And a mind that exists and lives as deceived but does not know that it is deceived, exists as a blank. And a mind (or subject) that thus exists as a blank is in no wise different from the Truth (or object) which it knows as a blank. Moreover a mind that is a blank is in no way distinguishable from the truth that is a blank.

On the other hand if anything is to be retained of the distinctions mentioned, if everything is not to be reduced to abstraction this can only be done by a principle of irrationalism. In other words concrete differences can be maintained only at the expense of the validity of the argument. The tendency toward non-being, or destruction, the stupidity of the mind, of which Augustine speaks, is assumed to be ultimate. Falsity, even as non-being; evil as a defect of being, is assumed to be ultimate. It is in spite of this error, this evil, this defect of being as ultimate, that the argument is said to be valid. But then such validity as the argument may have depends precisely upon the ultimacy of all existential distinctions as being irrational. A formal theory of truth requires for its correlative the notion of brute fact. Modern philosophy since Kant has demonstrated this fact over and over. One can say that the formality of the theory of truth is the result of a desire to maintain the idea of truth in the face of an assumed brute factuality. Formal truth is therefore the result of a dialectical relationship between abstract universality and abstract particularity. The argument of Augustine therefore depends for its validity upon its formality and its formality is the correlative of irrationality. Thus truth is true as long as it has no content; as soon as it has any content it is no longer true.

It follows that Augustine did not really have, as he thought he had, an adequate answer to the dualism of the Manichaeans or, for the matter of that, to the Scepticism of the Academicians.

Augustine and Irrationalism

It has already been intimated that if one employs an abstract non-Christian principle of unity one is bound (if consistent) also to use an abstract principle of diversity. Accordingly we find that as Augustine uses a largely rationalistic principle by which to prove the rationality of belief in theism so he uses a largely irrationalist principle by which to prove the truth of Christianity. In fact he uses both a rationalist and an irrationalist principle in order to establish both theism and Christianity. This could not well be otherwise. The one principle cannot be used at any point to the exclusion of the other. But in Augustine's case his rationalism is more prominent when he deals with theism and his irrationalism is more prominent when he deals with Christianity.

Let us therefore turn for evidence of irrationalism in Augustine to his discussion of the profit of believing. But before turning to his treatise on this subject a word must be said about another work, composed soon after his conversion called Concerning the Teacher. In introducing this treatise Whitney J. Oates says that it contains perhaps "the most concise statement of St. August-

ine's theory of Divine Illumination" (p. 360). Augustine's theory of divine illumination is, no doubt, as Warfield argues, theologically based upon the Christian doctrine of man's creation in the image of God. But in the earliest writings, its expression at least is largely controlled by Neo-Platonic forms of thought. In other words Augustine was at this stage of his development unable to distinguish clearly between a Christian and a pagan form of the a priori element in human thought. As already shown it is upon a Neo-Platonic form of a priori knowledge that he is definitely dependent in his effort to defeat Manichaeism.

It is in the interest of showing his son Adeodatus that without a priori knowledge man could not know anything that he writes this treatise. His argument is to the effect that there can be no intelligent communication as between man and man if, generically speaking, man is not already in possession of the truth. He speaks of words and signs by which men seek to communicate with one another. And he asks what can be communicated by these means from one man to another. The answer is nothing less than startling. It is to the effect that nothing can be thus communicated. "For when a sign is given men, if it finds me not knowing of what thing it is a sign, it can teach me nothing, but if it finds me knowing the thing of which it is the sign, what do I learn from the sign?" (Ch. X, p. 387). The use of words and signs is therefore to remind us of what is already known to us rather than to give us knowledge additional to what is already in our possession. "For it is the truest reasoning and most correctly said that when words are uttered we either know already what they signify or we do not know; if we know, then we remember rather than learn, but if we do not know, then we do not even remember, though perhaps we are prompted to ask" (XI, p. 389). "To give them as much credit as possible, words possess only sufficient efficacy to remind us in order that we may seek things, but not to exhibit the things so that we may know them. He teaches me something, moreover, who presents to my eyes or to any other bodily sense or even to my mind those things which I wish to know" (XI, p. 389).

What this view does to history and the reporting of history may be gathered from Augustine's own treatment of the Scriptural story of the three young men who were thrown into the fiery furnace. "But do we accept the story of the boys, that they triumphed over the king and over the fires by faith and religion, that they sang praises to God, and that they won honor even from their very enemies? I answer that everything signified by these words was already in our knowledge. For I already grasp what three boys are, what a furnace is, and fire, and a king, what unhurt by fire is, and everything else signified by those words. But Ananias and Azarias and Misael are as unknown to me as saraballae [head coverings]; these names do not help me at all to know these men, nor can they help me" (XI, p. 389). There can be therefore no communication of truth about individual historical happenings. The whole point is startlingly expressed as follows: "Whenever we say anything, either the hearer does not know what is said is false or true, or he knows that it is false, or he knows that it is true. In the first mode he will either believe (or accept in good confidence), or he will form an opinion, or he will hesitate; in the second mode he will resist the statement and reject it;

in the third he merely confirms. In none of these three cases does the hearer learn anything from what is heard" (XII, p. 392).

These passages have been quoted as evidence of irrationalism in Augustine. But it should be stressed that they might equally well be cited as evidence of rationalism in Augustine. For, as already observed, Augustine himself argues for the inability of signs and words to communicate truth in the interest of the idea that truth is within the mind itself. The negative argument against the possibility of truth communication by means of words and signs is meant to corroborate the a priori argument employed to establish the abstract idea of truth as expressed in the idea that if truth perishes it is true that Truth perishes and so Truth does not perish.

Augustine does not, in this connection, contend that knowledge obtained from the senses is of no value. He seems, on the contrary, to hold that knowledge obtained by pointing the finger at physical objects is true knowledge. Yet there is evidence enough to show that for him knowledge obtained from the senses is a lower type of knowledge than knowledge obtained from the mind itself. And the logic of his position would lead him to hold to a distinction between a genuine knowledge of intellectual things by means of the intellect and a lower type of knowledge, hardly worthy of the name knowledge, obtained by means of the senses. For it is from Truth that anything is true. But sense objects cannot be shown to be "from truth." They are wholly individual. They do not participate in Truth. For Truth is defined as being Truth precisely because it is so abstract as to have no contact with concrete content of any sort. Or if it be said that Truth is true because the content which it contains is wholly flexible, then the content has at any rate no rational significance. The content must then be irrational in order to be content or purely formal Truth.

At any rate in his earliest writings Augustine is concerned to establish intellectual Truth as wholly or largely independent of the senses. "For even if you believe not your senses, and are capable of answering that you are wholly ignorant whether it is a true^{tree}, yet this, I believe, you will not deny, that it is a true tree if it is a tree; for this judgment is not of the senses, but of the intelligence" (Soliloquies, Bk. 1.27, p. 275).

And it is this intellectualism, involved in a Platonic type of a priori, that requires for its correlative the idea of brute factuality. Of course Augustine's belief in the creation of the world by God did not allow for depreciation of sense knowledge. And his Christian theology did not allow for either a non-Christian a priori nor for a non-Christian type of a posteriori reasoning. Innate knowledge and acquired knowledge are involved in one another. They are interdependent. They are limiting concepts one of another. They are dialectically related to one another. But they must be placed upon the Christian presuppositions of the triune God as self-contained and the doctrines of creation and providence. And Augustine did so place them, especially in his later writings. But in his earliest writings, and especially when defending the Christian faith apologetically, he

employed a non-Christian notion of abstract Truth and therefore also a non-Christian notion of brute fact.

Accordingly his concepts of reason and faith and their relations to one another are at this stage defined, the one in rationalist and the other in irrationalist terms. The notion of Aquinas that an object of knowledge cannot be at the same time an object of faith and that an object of faith cannot at the same time be an object of knowledge can find a good deal of support in Augustine's earliest writings.

If therefore we were to interpret the famous statement of Augustine to the effect that faith precedes knowledge (Credo ut intelligam) in accordance with the principles of his earliest writings it would mean that faith is something practical by which we are brought into contact with objects which we already know from within. In other words the Platonic or Neo-Platonic theory of truth requires a definition of knowledge which assumes that man inherently knows all things. He is potentially omniscient. Does he not exist as participant in Truth? And truth is eternal. For the soul of man to exist it must exist as eternal and therefore as being omniscient?

And to be thus omniscient all things of which we are omniscient or virtually omniscient must have been from all eternity. To be at all is to be eternal. The soul is eternal. It has always been. Then the soul of Christ is also eternal and has always been. Everything that can be said to be soul in history has always been. In other words with the type of reasoning developed in Augustine's early writings we are back to a Platonic type of epistemology and ontology which would make historic Christianity wholly without meaning. Jesus of Nazareth, would be reduced to the Word which is eternal. And all men, all souls, would be eternal in him as God. And thus we would be back with all the heresies of Origen.

It goes without saying that these consequences were not drawn by Augustine and that he would have rejected them as utterly abhorrent to him. But that only shows how inconsistent his apologetic method was with the principles of his theology.

On the other hand if the objects of faith should be thought of as historical rather than as eternal they would then have to be thought of as wholly irrational. Or, we may turn this about and say that if the facts of the life and death of Jesus should be taken as individual historical facts rather than as mere illustrations of eternal principles of reason, they would then have to be taken as objects of an irrational faith. Of such objects nothing could then be known. That is to say they would be objects of faith and therefore not objects of knowledge. The moment they would become objects of knowledge they would have to be eternally existent objects and therefore not temporal at all.

The whole method of apologetics followed in these first writings is therefore largely Platonic. The same dilemma that faces Platonic thought therefore

also faces Augustine. When Plato took his line and divided it sharply between eternal being of which there was genuine or scientific knowledge and non-being of which there was no knowledge at all he was faced with the question of how learning by experience was possible. Either a man already knew all reality and he needed not to ask questions or he knew nothing and knew not how to ask questions. Similarly with Augustine. For him either Christianity is true or it is not true. If it is true then it is known by man, by all men. But then if it is eternally existent and is not historical at all, then it is no remedy for sin committed in history because the sin for which it would be taken as a remedy would itself not be an historical fact. On the other hand Christianity may be taken as not true. Then it would be also non-existent. And the man for whom and in relationship with whom it would then have come into existence would also be non-existent. For then all would be historical and therefore not eternal and therefore not existent and therefore unknown. In the first case Christianity would be an object of knowledge but it would itself be an abstraction without content. In the second place it would be an object of faith, but again an abstraction; it would have no intelligible content.

The only way that the dilemma was to be kept from plaguing Plato or Augustine too directly was through the fact that the rationalism which led to knowledge without content and the faith that led to an object without knowledge were kept in balance with one another. The abstract character of Truth involved in the idea that if truth perishes it is still true that Truth perishes and therefore Truth does not perish, is hidden from view to some extent by the fact that there is a flavor of the concrete in it by means of the idea that truth might perish. An abstraction cannot perish. It has no content which can perish. On the other hand if there were any content in truth and it really perished how then could one know that it was truth that had perished? In other words things perishable are without any intelligible content. For to have intelligible content a thing must exist and exist eternally. That is Augustine's definition of that which really exists and is really knowable. Therefore if anything could perish it could not exist and could not be known to perish. And therefore too it could not be applied to truth. If the idea of perishing could in any wise be applied to truth it would not be truth to which it was applied for truth is something that does not perish. But the abstract character of the perishable was kept from view by the fact that the perishable was said to be in contact with truth.

In other words it was the measure of correlativism and dialecticism that was unavoidably involved in the very statement of an abstract theory of truth and an equally irrational and abstract theory of existence, kept Augustine himself from observing how un-Christian and how utterly invalid his argument was.

But now we must still note in some detail the irrationalistic nature of Augustine's concept of faith in his earliest writings. Augustine's theory of knowledge should have compelled him to say that there was no use at all in believing. How could one, first believing through means of the word spoken by other men, ever come to any knowledge of that which was spoken of? Even if

we could ourselves go to see the things that were spoken of by words, we should then have only sense knowledge. And sense knowledge is not real or true knowledge at all. Even so Augustine, in the very context in which he says that by means of words spoken by others we cannot learn anything, says that there is a certain utility in believing.

"From what has been said it follows, therefore, that in the case of those things which are grasped by the mind, anyone who is unable to grasp them hears to no purpose the words of him who does discern them; though we may make an exception in regard to the fact that where such things are unknown there is a certain utility in believing them until they are known" (Concerning the Teacher, XIII, p. 392).

It is difficult to see the force of this contention. Suppose that we believe in the story of the historic Christ and his work. To be consistent Augustine would have to treat that story the way he treated the story of the three "boys" in the fiery furnace. As shown above he argues that by our hearing that story we have learned nothing. On the other hand Augustine's theory of knowledge would require him to say that we do not need to be told the story for we know it already. "But, referring now to all things which we understand, we consult, not the speaker who utters words, but the guardian of truth within the mind itself, because we have perhaps been reminded by words to do so. Moreover, he who is consulted teaches; for He who is said to reside in the interior man is Christ, that is the unchangeable excellence of God and His everlasting wisdom, which every rational soul does indeed consult" (Concerning the Teacher, XI, 390).

Augustine on the Profit of Believing

This treatise too was written with the Manichaeans in mind. As he has sought to meet the dualism of the Manichees (or its irrationalism) by means of a monism which itself destroyed the uniqueness of Christianity and even of theism, so now he seeks to meet the rationalism of the Manichees by means of an irrationalism which destroys the possibility of putting intelligible content into the doctrines of Christianity.

The Manichaeans, he says, promise that "apart from all terror of authority" they would set men free from error's claims (p. 399). They made a "certain great presumption and promise of reasons." But they have failed to give good reasons. Particularly they have failed to show that man can do without authority in his handling of the problems of life. Is it so strange that we should have to receive information about many things from those who are experts in their fields? Are any of us omniscient? Surely if we err in seeking truth from such few as may have the truth we err "with the human race itself" (p. 410). "I am not, am I, sending you to fables? I am not, am I, forcing you to believe rashly? I say that our soul entangled and sunk in error and folly seeks the way of truth, if there be any such. If this be not your case, pardon me, I pray, and share with me your wisdom; but if you recognize in yourself what I say, let us,

I entreat, together seek the truth:" (ch. 14, p. 410). Here speaks the "humble inductivist" and not the "flaming rationalist." Are we not all human beings? Are we not all finite? Do we not all err? Is it then anything exceptional if we seek authority? Must not all men do the same?

In fact that inductivist Augustine now holds to something like a tabula rosa theory of the human mind. He calls on his hearers to imagine a sort of Robinson Crusoe type of person, who had not heard of the truth. "But the case, that we have not as yet heard a teacher of any religion. Lo, we have undertaken a new matter and business. We must seek, I suppose, them who profess this matter, if it have any existence. Suppose that we have found different persons holding different opinions, and through their difference of opinions seeking to draw persons each one to himself: but that, in the meanwhile, there are certain pre-eminent from being much spoken of, and from having possession of nearly all peoples. Whether these hold the truth, is a great question: but ought we not to make full trial of them first, in order that, so long as we err, being as we are men, we may seem to err with the human race itself" (15, p. 410).

A moment's thought will tell that this approach is as irrationalist as was the approach before discussed in relation to the Truth as being true even when it perishes is rationalist. Certainly it is a flat denial of the Christian doctrine of man's creation in the image of God to think that any man can be without a teacher of any religion. All men have been from the beginning in Adam taught the true religion. All men are therefore in contact with the truth. To say this is not to fall back on the rationalism which we have so sharply criticized. It is rather to assert that there is such a thing as innate knowledge by virtue of man's creation by God. And it is also to say that man's innate knowledge is correlative to his acquired knowledge, the knowledge that he obtains by a process of study of nature and self. Augustine therefore had to forsake his theology both when he first spoke as a rationalist and when he then also spoke as an irrationalist.

It should be observed too that Augustine, who before said that the human mind has eternal truth within itself because even to be it has to be eternally and be eternally in possession of the Truth, now thinks of man as being in no sort of contact with truth. To be sure the case he puts about the man who has not heard about any religion is hypothetical. But his theology did not entitle him to make such an hypothetical case. The presuppositions of his faith required him to offer only such hypothesis about the origin and nature of religion as are not destructive of these presuppositions themselves. But the case of a man who has never heard of any religion is an hypothesis which would destroy the doctrine of creation and of providence alike. Man was not created a blank. Man was created in possession of the truth.

To suppose such a man as Augustine here supposes is therefore also to deny the fact of the fall of man as taking place by way of disobedience to the revealed will of God. If sin is disobedience to the revealed will of God then there

is such a thing as a revealed will of God. But instead of taking his notion of sin and error from Scripture Augustine at this point takes his conception of error from Plato. Error is for him here nothing more than the tendency toward non-being and therefore to metaphysical destruction of himself. (We cannot discuss fully the question of the will of man as Augustine held to it in these first writings. A word may be said about it in passing. His doctrine of the will was at this time not clearly defined in Scriptural terms. It was rather defined in terms of the idea of the analogy of being. It was slenderness of being, so to speak, that accounted for man's free will. And it is this will as consisting of slender being that has in it a measure of stupidity. This stupidity is therefore inherent in the will because of the slenderness of the being that comes to expression in the will. It is thus by a measure of irrationalism that Augustine thinks he is answering the Manichaeans when they charge God with being the origin of sin. Augustine says it is rather the will of man that originates sin. But then since he must at the same time answer the dualism or irrationalism of these self-same Manichees and since this can be done only by a principle of monism, Augustine maintains this monism even while he maintains the will of man. Man is man and has real being because he participates in eternal or changeless being. He has being, and so he is responsible. He has only slender being and so he, not God, is responsible. Thus he has again forsaken Christianity and at the same time and for that very reason failed to answer the critics of Christianity).

But how then can Augustine show that there is any profit in believing? He tries to show that in the nature of the case all human beings, since they have but slender being and are therefore full of stupidity, must of necessity believe at certain points. He places himself on neutral ground with his opponents. This implies taking for granted the truth of the epistemology and the metaphysics of these opponents, their virtual denial of creation and of the fall of man. With the unbeliever who with him will of course allow that he is finite and that he is in some sort of error, Augustine would now seek the true religion. Together therefore they can agree that they need the help of authority. Of course when he has granted the epistemological and metaphysical assumptions about the nature of man and of sin they can agree with him in his claim that they need authority, for the authority that they then need and all the authority that he can then claim they need is that of experts in the field of religion. The place of experts is then the place of those who have had deep and long experience of sensing somehow what reality is like. For it can then not be the authority of those who come with thought communication given themselves by God. In other words when Augustine seeks on neutral ground with his opponents to establish a place for authority he has chosen for the non-Christian rather than for the Christian notion of authority. But what then of the problem of criterion? How shall "we" -that is, all men together, unbelievers and believers alike - know where to find the right authority?

The answer is again nothing less than amazing. Augustine says: "The case standing thus, suppose, as I said, that we are now for the first time seeking unto what religion we shall deliver our souls, for it to cleanse and renew them; without doubt we must begin with the Catholic Church. For by this time

there are more Christians than if the Jews and idolators be added together" (10, p. 412).

But are we then to go by numbers only? That would be too absurd on the face of it. So to the ideas of number is added that of the expert again. "But of these same Christians, whereas there are several heresies, and all wish to appear Catholics, and call all others besides themselves heretics, there is one church, as all allow: if you consider the whole world, more filled in number; but, as they who know affirm, more pure in truth also than all the rest" (19.). Here it is "those who know" who are supposed to be among those of the greatest number that must guide us, that is all men, in the choice of religion.

This tells us the whole story. Augustine now tells how he himself when he had been among the Manichees, had acted on these principles. "However, I continued to unsew myself more and more from those who now I had proposed to leave" and he says to his hearers: "If you see that you too have been long affected in this way, therefore, and with like care for your souls, and if now you seem to yourself to have been tossed to and fro enough, and wish to put an end to labors of this kind, follow the pathway of Catholic teaching, which has flowed down from Christ himself through the Apostles even unto us, and will hereafter flow down to posterity" (XX, p. 413).

It is to the Roman Catholic church indeed rather than to the Protestant church that the sort of Christ that would comport with such an approach would be bound to follow. For it is the idea of expert authority on the part of the pope to which this reasoning would lead. Involved in the argument for authority as thus constructed is the assumption that there is no such authority as the Bible presents, for on the idea of Biblical authority, which was part and parcel of Augustine's soul, the idea of analogy of being is to be rejected. Therefore his rationalism which led to the identification of man with God would have to be rejected. And so also his irrationalism which presupposes that man is not in any wise connected with the truth of God and is therefore not responsible for any rejection of the truth is also to be rejected.

At the same time while Augustine was thus untrue to his own theology when he reasoned by combining rationalism and irrationalism, he was at the same time also unable to answer the Manichaeans. This could only be expected. It is one of the great blunders of Christian apologetics that it has sought to answer lower forms of non-Christian thought by higher forms of non-Christian thought. Particularly mistaken is the idea involved in the traditional method of apologetics such as is used by Butler and his school, that non-Christian irrationalism can be cured by the application of non-Christian rationalism and that non-Christian rationalism can be cured by the application of non-Christian irrationalism, and that the truth of Christianity is therefore expressed in the nice combination of the two non-Christian principles. This is the Romanist idea of the analogy of being which is still so largely used in the traditional form of apologetics used among Protestants.

But Augustine was the one who has more than all his predecessors worked out a theology which has put the church in possession of the means with which to meet the world of unbelievers. In working up the doctrine of the ontological trinity still more consistently than Tertullian had done and in stressing the fact of the grace of God in Christ given by the sovereign disposition of God to his people (predestination), he has given us the foundation on which to build a principle of interpretation which shall be neither rationalistic nor irrationalistic nor a combination of these two, but which shall make sense of human experience. By presupposing the ontological trinity man is, to begin with, in contact with the truth. He does not know all the truth, but does not need to know all the truth in order to know truth. Then error is explained not by slenderness of being but by willful transgression of the revealed will of God within and around man. Consequently there is the possibility of the communication of truth by God to man and through man to other men with absolute authority, and on the basis of absolute authority the reason of man may know and know truly.

It is impossible here to discuss the later works of Augustine. In them the Bible as self-attesting and as setting forth the system of truth based on the ontological trinity comes out much more adequately than it does in the earlier writings. It is the earlier writings that show, better than the later ones, how the Roman Catholic position on authority could with some measure of justice appeal to Augustine. The later writings of Augustine pre-figure and prepare for the Protestant doctrine of the Rule of Faith.

Chapter V

AUTONOMY AND AUTHORITY

We must now turn to the Roman Catholic doctrine of Scripture. The question to be asked is to what extent this doctrine is true to Scripture itself. A truly Scriptural doctrine of Scripture must ask Scripture to bear witness to itself. Moreover, a truly Scriptural doctrine of Scripture must think of Scripture as that revelation of God to sinful men to which all other lights are subject. For it is only by doing so that the natural man is really challenged to forsake the autonomous principle by which he seeks to interpret all of life.

Official Writings

First it is well that we look at the official statements of the Roman Catholic church. These official documents do not say a great deal about Scripture. For further elucidation some of the discussions of the Roman dogmaticians may be of help. In particular the general principles of epistemology as they appear in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas will shed light on the position found in the official confessions of the church.

1. Of the various Symbola Romana the Canons and Dogmatic Decrees of the Council of Trent comes first. The Council of Trent met soon after the Reformation was in progress. Its deliverances are, accordingly, taken in relation to the Reformation principles. This holds both for what it specifically says about Scripture and for the system of doctrine that it contains.

In the decree concerning the canonical Scriptures it says that the gospel of God in Christ, "...are contained in the written books, and the unwritten traditions (sine scripto traditionibus) which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ himself, or from the Apostles themselves, the Holy Ghost dictating, have come down even unto us, transmitted as it were from hand to hand [the Synod] following the example of the orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with an equal affection of piety and reverence, all the books of the Old and of the New Testament - seeing that one God is author of both - as also the said traditions, as well those appertaining to faith as to morals, as having been dictated either by Christ's own word of mouth, or by the Holy Ghost, and preserved in the Catholic church by continuous succession" (1).

Then follows a list of the sacred books to be thus venerated. This list includes the books of the Apocrypha as well as those of the Old and New Testaments. It is added that if any one receive not this list "...as they are contained in the old Latin vulgate edition; and knowingly and deliberately contemns the traditions aforesaid; let him be anathema."

(1) Phillip Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, New York: 1919, Vol. 2, p. 80

In addition it is asserted that in seeking to know what the sacred books teach in matters of faith and life men must not "presume to interpret the said sacred Scripture contrary to that sense which holy mother Church - whose it is to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the holy Scriptures - hath held and doth hold, or even contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers; even though such interpretations were never intended to be at any time published."

2. The Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council.

In the decrees of the Vatican Council (1870) Pope Pius IX begins with the idea that the church is the Spouse of Christ, and the teacher of truth and morals. The second chapter of the Decrees deals with Revelation. Some things may be known by reason; others must be made known by revelation. "The same holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, may be certainly known by the natural light of reason, by means of created things; . . . but that it pleased his wisdom and bounty to reveal himself, and the eternal decrees of his will, to mankind by another and supernatural way: as the Apostle says, 'God, having spoken. . .'."

It is to be ascribed to this divine revelation, that such truths among things divine as of themselves are not beyond human reason, can, even in the present condition of mankind, be known by every one with facility, with firm assurance, and with no admixture of error.

This, however, is not the reason why revelation is to be called absolutely necessary, but because God of his infinite goodness has ordained man to a supernatural end, viz. to be a sharer of divine blessings which utterly exceed the intelligence of the human mind (Schaff, Vol. II, p. 240, 241). Then appeal is made to what has been quoted above from the Council of Trent on the matter of the sacred books, the traditions, and the Vulgate edition. The sacred books and traditions ". . . having been written by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author, and have been delivered to the Church herself" (Idem, p. 242). Appeal is also made to what was said by the Council of Trent on the fact that the church alone has the right to declare the sense and meaning of the sacred writings and traditions.

Chapter IV deals with Faith and Reason. It speaks of a "twofold order of knowledge distinct both in principle and also in object; in principle because our knowledge in the one is by natural reason, and in the other by divine faith; in object, because, besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to us mysteries hidden in God, which unless divinely revealed, cannot be known" (Idem, p. 247).

The relation between faith and reason is further explained in the following words:

"...and not only can faith and reason never be opposed to one another, but they are of mutual aid one to the other; for right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith, and, enlightened by its own light cultivates the science of things divine; while faith frees and guards reason from errors, and furnishes it with manifold knowledge" (Idem 249).

Still further, stress is once more laid on the authority of the church as the final determiner of the meaning of sacred doctrine.

"...for the doctrine of faith which God hath revealed has not been proposed, like a philosophical invention, to be perfected by human ingenuity, but has been delivered as a divine deposit to the Spouse of Christ, to be faithfully kept and infallibly declared" (Idem p. 250).

The infallible declaration of meaning by the church is "never" to be departed from, under the pretense or pretext of a deeper comprehension of meaning of them (Idem p. 251).

In order that the infallible declaration spoken of may be accomplished most effectively, the "perpetuity of the Primacy of blessed Peter in the Roman Pontiffs" is then discussed. And the end of this argument is that the Roman Pontiff is declared to be "the supreme judge of the faithful" (p. 265). He has "supreme jurisdiction over the universal church" (Idem 265). He also has "the supreme power of teaching" (Idem 266). The supreme Pontiff is not to make known new doctrine, but to teach conformably to the sacred Scriptures and the Apostolic traditions (Idem 269). Speaking ex cathedra that is "when in charge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority" he gives such definitions of faith and morals as are "irreformable (irreformabilis) of themselves, and not from the consent of the church" (Idem, p. 271).

In what has been quoted, two points may be distinguished. First there is that which deals directly with the sacred Scriptures. Second there is that which deals more broadly with the relation of faith and reason.

On the question of the place of Scripture the following elements stand out:

- i. The place of the church is above the Scriptures instead of below it as in the case of Protestantism. Directly guided by the Holy Spirit it in turn guides, infallibly guides, the faithful (1).
- ii. In performing the function of teaching the faithful the church uses the Bible as one of two main sources of revelation. The other source is that of Apostolic tradition. This tradition is supplementative to the sacred writings.

(1) Cf. the work of Prof. G.C. Berkouwer, De Strijd om het Roomsche - Katholieke Dogma, Kampen (no date)

It stands on a par with Scripture. Scripture is not the only source of revelation.

iii. The church declares the sense or meaning of Scripture and of the Apostolic traditions. Thus in practice what the church teaches, and not on the basis of Scripture alone but on the basis of Scripture and the Apostolic traditions as sources of revelation, is that which must control the faithful.

Professor G. C. Berkouwer points out that Romanist theology thinks of the church as "identical" with Christ. That is to say, the incarnation is a process. The incarnation is not a once-for-all and finished fact. He who speaks of the incarnation speaks therefore of a universal phenomenon (1). To be sure, Roman theology does distinguish between the historic Christ and the church. Its doctrine is not pure naturalism. Nor is it idealism. "But from the fact that Christ still is man and remains such eternally, it follows that the incarnation is as actual as it is historical" (Idem p. 273). Berkouwer quotes the Roman Catholic dogmatician, Brom, that the church is so filled with the idea of the actual living Christ that she may herself be called a continuous incarnation (Idem p. 273).

This view of the church as in a sense a continued incarnation fits in with the notion of the analogy of being which so largely controls Romanist metaphysics. It is not the place here to discuss this doctrine. It is mentioned in passing only. This idea of the analogy of being compromises the Biblical doctrine of creation. It tends to reduce the distinction of God as the Creator and man the creature to that of the Greek notion of man's participation in the being as such. According to the Greek view of reality, especially as set forth in the philosophy of Aristotle, called "the philosopher" by Thomas Aquinas, all being is ultimately one. All individual beings are beings to the extent that they participate in this one ultimate being. According to Aristotle god has the fulness of being. As such he is pure Act. At the lower end of being, not found in any actually existing thing that man can know, is pure potentiality of being. Man exists between pure actuality and pure potentiality of being. There is therefore a continuity between him and God. For man may increase in his participation of pure act. On the other hand there is discontinuity between man and God. Man is near the realm of pure non-being. He participates, as it were, in non-being as well as in being.

It is thus that for Aristotle the principle of potentiality and actuality control the relationship between God and man. And this relationship is therefore one of process. It is activistic. It is the natural working out of the principles of continuity and of discontinuity involved in the fall of man.

Only if the doctrine of the self-contained God and of creation is maintained as the presupposition of all that is said on any doctrine is it possible to maintain the fully Christian position. And Romanism is unwilling to make this doctrine of God basic to all its thinking.

(1) Conflict met Rome - Kampen, 1948, p. 273.

The reason for this lies in its own conception of the autonomy of man. Man is said to be free. And this does not merely mean that man is not ethically as corrupt as Protestant theology says that he is. It means that he is metaphysically ultimate. That is to say, he partakes in ultimate being. His will is therefore of the same sort as the divine will. It can initiate the wholly new. God does not control whatsoever comes to pass. Man determines in part what the ultimate issues of history will be like. God approaches man by way of the in-fima species, the lowest class. But he never controls in the final sense the act of the individual man. For the individual as individual exists in part at least by virtue of his ultimate independence of will.

It was necessary to introduce this much of Romanist metaphysics in order to indicate the fact that its activistic conception of revelation is inherent in its basically activistic conception of the relation of God to man. With God and man together, to some extent involved in a process of being, it is natural that the matter of knowledge should also be one of process.

How then shall the matter of identification be settled? How could there be on Romanist basis a finished revelation of God in history? There is not even a finished incarnation in history. There cannot be. Reality as a whole is a process. There is no once-for-all act of justification of the sinner by God in history; justification too is a process, an infusion of and participation of the sinner through grace in the supernatural righteousness of God in Christ.

On the other hand the matter of identification must be settled. So it is settled arbitrarily. According to its theory of reality Romanism cannot even attribute infallible knowledge to God. For God cannot know what will come to pass. He is dependent upon millions of human wills, each in some measure able to initiate that which is wholly new. God can send his son into the world. He may intend to save all men. But men can resist this grace; they have autonomy; who can decide their ultimate fate but themselves? So there can be no infallible Bible in the Protestant sense of the term as there can be no finished acts of redemption in history in the Protestant sense of the term. What is to be done about it?

An idea of finality that is correlative to the idea of process must be discovered. A principle of identification that shall furnish continuity as well as discontinuity must be found. It is this combination of continuity and discontinuity that finds expression in the idea of the church, as, on the one hand continuing the incarnation and on the other as possessing irreformable truth and as infallibly teaching this irreformable truth by means of the supreme Pontiff as the supreme teacher of the faithful.

Thus Romanism seeks to serve both God as supreme and the autonomous man as supreme in his field.

The Attributes of Scripture

It will not be difficult now to see why the Protestant Reformation developed its so-called attributes of Scripture in opposition to the Romanist position. With a different system of theology went a different view of Scripture. In Protestantism it is by one act of faith that the believer embraces the Christ and the Scriptures which tell of the Christ. It is therefore a matter of interdependence. The believer comes to Christ through the Bible and through the Bible to Christ (Bavinck, Gerf. Dogm., Vol. I, p. 610). And this one act comes about through the testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the believer to the truth of the Bible and with it to the divinity of Christ.

The Christ of God came once for all to finish his work of redemption for his church. He finished his work. Through his apostles and prophets he gave a finished interpretation of this his work. And all the elements of that work are finished in Christ. The faithful are justified; justification is an act of the judgment of God. Men are certainly saved, and on the basis of the promises of God may know that they are certainly saved. They will certainly be glorified. God's program for history will be accomplished; he controls whatsoever comes to pass.

The church therefore stands under the Scripture. It first recognizes the Scriptures by way of identification. It determines the canon simply because it sees what books carry the message of God. No supplementative tradition can stand next to the self-attesting word of God. The Holy Spirit does not directly and independently guide the church; he guides the church in understanding the Scriptures as self-attested. Nothing but the autographa can be said to be infallibly inspired. The Scripture must be interpreted by Scripture. The church must subject itself in its explanation of the system of truth of Scripture as well as in its identification of Scripture to the self-attested Word as found in Scripture. No interpretation as such may be said to be infallible. There is an ever deeper insight into the truth of Scripture promised to the church if it submits its efforts at interpretation to the Scripture itself.

In presenting the Scripture as self-attesting and as containing the finished work of redemption through Jesus Christ the motives of credibility must themselves be interpreted in terms of the self-attesting Word of God. Only that is credible which is in accord with the system of truth set forth in this Bible. The more clearly this system be set forth in its contrast with the systems of men, based as they are on a theory of being and of knowledge that involves both God and man in a common process or that places man with God into a common changeless substance, the more clearly will the natural man be driven to turn away from himself to the living God.

The Necessity of Scripture

The Protestants therefore argued for the necessity of Scripture because man, the creature, has sinned against God. He has broken the covenant. Sal-

vation is an ethical matter. Man was created perfect. He needed no grace as a creature. To be sure he needed and received God's favor. And sometimes Reformed theologians have called this grace. But then the word is used in a broader sense. So Bavinck speaks of it. And too, man as a creature, though perfect, needed supernatural revelation. God's revelation to him in nature was supplemented by God with his supernatural word communication. This was to tell man of his destiny and to make him self-conscious as a covenant being. But all this betokens no defect in the creature as such. The ideas of creation and covenant are supplemental of one another.

Over against this the Romanist conception of the need of supernatural revelation is quite different. According to Romanism grace is necessary for man before he has sinned. This is because man, as finite, is inherently defective to some degree. Therefore supernatural revelation is, for Romanist theology, a matter of grace from the beginning.

"According to Rome grace is thus a donum supernaturale per se and not per accidens, not only because of sin. Sin has not changed the nature of grace. Perhaps it has increased because of sin. But both before and after the fall it was the same, namely, an elevation supra naturam. That is its character and essence; Christianity may then also be an Erlosungsreligion; it is not in the first place reparatio, but elevatio naturae, it serves the purpose of lifting nature above itself, to make man divine. It was that purpose that was served in Adam's case by the gratia gratum faciens; it is that purpose that is now served by Christianity. Grace was then and now the same; i. e. the real, the essential thing in Christianity has not been made necessary through sin; it was necessary before the fall" (Bavinck, Idem p. 587, Vol. I).

The incarnation was therefore necessary for man as finite, not for man as a sinner. In order that man should become like God, God had to become like man. "...this law held as well before as after the fall... Now (after the fall) the incarnation brings redemption to man as something subordinate. The emphasis for Rome lies not in reconciliation and forgiveness of sins, but in God becoming man and in man becoming divine" (Ibid).

It was against this view of Christianity that the Reformation set itself. It opposed in particular the proposition that supernaturale amissa, naturalia adhuc esse integra (Ibid). For corresponding to the idea that man is by virtue of finitude inherently defective is the idea that even so he is normal. To reach his supernatural goal he needs, even apart from sin, supernatural grace. But even without supernatural grace he is normal. In Roman thinking man can be without justitia supernaturalis and yet be a good, true, completely sinless man, having a justitia naturalis, which in its kind is without fault (Idem p. 591). At most it can be said that without supernatural grace man is wounded. But to be wounded is mainly to be incomplete, that is, incomplete as far as man's ultimate end is concerned. Supernatural grace is therefore basically a matter of supplementation.

Bavinck lays great stress on the ethical character of Reformation theology. The work of Christ, his incarnation, his death and his resurrection, together with the infallible setting forth of the meaning of this work in Scripture and the testimony of the Holy Spirit by which the Scripture and the Christ are accepted – it is all because of sin.

It is readily understood that there is therefore in Roman theology no place for Scripture in the true sense of the term. There is no strict need for redemption from sin. And since men are not as sinners hostile to God they would not, if left to themselves, hate God and their neighbor. They would not oppose the coming of supernatural revelation. They would not seek to suppress it. It would not need to be once-for-all inscripturated against the ravages of sinful men.

Authority of Scripture

With the Romanist doctrine of the church as standing above Scripture, there is no necessity for Scripture in the Protestant sense of the term. Similarly for Romanism there is no place for the authority of Scripture. To be sure, Rome does not deny the authority of Scripture in so many words. On the contrary, she affirms it along with its inspiration. But in practice the Scriptures are made to be dependent upon the church.

"The authenticity, the integrity, the inspiration and authority of Scripture is determined by the church" (Bavinck, Ger. Dogm. Vol. I, p. 481). Quoad se the Scripture is said to be independent but Quoad nos it is dependent upon the church. The church does not claim to have inspired the Scriptures, to have made it canonical etc. But she alone can recognize these characteristics of Scripture infallibly.

The idea of papal infallibility is but the logical climax of the Roman concept of the church and of Christianity in general. If, as Bavinck points out, Christianity is primarily supplemental to nature, then the idea of the absolute authority of God over man is out of place. The idea of expert authority is then appropriate.

This idea of expert authority is perfectly in "accord with reason." The autonomous man can very well admit that he needs supplemental information. The ideal of Christianity as possibly leading him to a super-human destiny is not out of accord with his basic desires. He may even admit that through sin, his reason is wounded, that is, even more than otherwise in need of supplemental information and help.

But how can we harmonize this view of Romanism with the following words?

"Man being wholly dependent upon God, as upon his Creator and Lord, and created reason being absolutely subject to uncreated truth, we are bound to

yield to God, by faith in his revelation, the full obedience of our intelligence and will" (Vatican Council, Chpt. III; Schaff II p. 243).

The answer lies in the fact that this is to be taken as correlative to what follows:

"Nevertheless, in order that the obedience of our faith might be in harmony with reason, God willed that to the interior help of the Holy Spirit there should be joined exterior proofs of his revelation. . ."

Thus on the one hand men must be "wholly dependent upon God," live by supernatural grace, and receive the interior light of the Holy Spirit, and on the other hand man can yield "voluntary obedience to God himself, by assenting to and cooperating with his grace, which he is able to resist" (Idem p. 244). Thus the authority of God as it comes to man is never absolute. It is correlative to the idea of human autonomy.

As noted earlier the idea of papal authority is therefore purely arbitrary. The promises of God in Christ as given in Scripture for man's salvation may not be believed as certainly true, and that such is the case is asserted on the basis of the infallible authority of the supreme teacher of the church.

The Perspicuity of Scripture

From the official documents of the Roman Catholic church we learn not only that there are apostolic traditions supplementing the sacred writings as the church's source of revelation. We learn also that the church alone authoritatively and irreformably interprets both of these sources. Without this infallible interpretation on the part of the church the faithful would be sure to misunderstand its meaning. For the Scriptures are not inherently clear in their presentation of the Christ and his work of redemption. How could there be in the phenomenal world any fully clear interpretation of the course of history? Is not Reality in part controlled by millions of men whose wills are not ultimately under the control of God?

But this is not the reason given by the church for the necessity of its exclusive explanatory and declarative function. If it gave this reason it would, to be consistent, have to maintain that there can be no full clarity of interpretation anywhere. For on the assumption of the philosophy involved in the idea of human autonomy, as noted before, clarity would have to be by complete or exhaustive logical description. Only if the relations of anything to everything are exhaustively set forth can there be full clarity. But when the relations of anything would be thus exhaustively set forth, the individuality of the thing would have disappeared. There would then be no change, no history, nothing new, no increment of being. Accordingly, to provide for individuality, for change and for history, there is need of another idea, the idea of pure contingency or chance. This idea must be made correlative to the idea of exhaustive rationality.

The result is that there can be no actually ascertainably clear revelation of God to man in history. And, of course, there can then be no Scripture that is clear in the presentation of its system of truth. For the idea of the system of truth as found in Scripture presupposes the notion of the self-contained God. This God is, naturally, "incomprehensible." That is, he is not fully comprehensible. The idea of the perspicuity of Scripture, therefore, does not mean that its system of truth is logically penetrable to man. On the contrary, as noted above, its system presupposes mystery between God and man. But the mystery between God and man itself presupposes the the internal perspicuity of God to himself and therefore a true apprehension of the meaning of the revelation of God by creatures made in his image.

Accordingly man must make every thought captive to the obedience of Christ. Obedience is the mark of the true covenant submission. Scripture must be the supremus iudex controversarium.

The Reformation therefore rejected the idea of the correlativity between reason subjecting itself "wholly" to revelation and revelation being quite in accord with reason. For the false ideal of a rationalistic system made correlative to the false ideal of independent, irrational individuality, it substituted the Biblical notion of God attesting himself clearly to men who are as creatures analogous to him in thought and being and who, as sinners, need to be unmistakably challenged by a revelation that cannot be confused with the speculations of the autonomous man. The declarative function of the church must therefore be ministerialis rather than magisterialis.

The Sufficiency of Scripture

Coming now to the question of the sufficiency of Scripture we are again confronted with the idea of tradition; this time the idea of supplementative tradition. Supernatural revelation comes to the church, says Rome, both through the sacred oracles and through tradition (in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, qual ipsius Christiore ab Apostolis acceptae, aut ab ipsis apostolis Spiritus Sancto dictante quasi per manus traditae ad nos usque pervenerant) (Vatican Council, Sess. 3 cap 2). The Scriptures without this apostolic tradition are therefore, on this view, not a complete or finished revelation of God. And the Holy Spirit does not testify to the Old and New Testament Scriptures as being alone the Word of God.

The Holy Spirit guides the church, but not exclusively by means of the system of truth contained in Scripture. The revelation of God need not be and is not the written word alone. And even the apostolic traditions do not constitute a finished unit. Tradition is said to be infallible, but what is contained in this tradition is ultimately determined by the church. And now that the Pope, with consent of the church, has declared the infallibility of the supreme teacher of the universal church, it is this teacher that practically determines the content of the traditions.

"When the pope pronounces a dogma it ipso facto becomes apostolic tradition. The criterion of tradition has been successively found in apostolicity, in episcopal succession and in papal declaration. Therewith the end has been reached. The infallible Pope is the principium formale of Romanism. Roma locuta, res finita. Pope and church, Pope and Christianity are one; Ubi Papa, ibi ecclesia, ibi religio Christiana, ibi Spiritus. From the Pope there is no appeal not even to God. Through the Pope God himself speaks to humanity" (Bavinck, Op. Cit. Vol. I, p. 516).

It is thus that with the rejection of the necessity, the perspicuity, and the authority of Scripture goes the rejection of its sufficiency. And the rejection of the Scriptures in each instance is due to the desire to make Christianity acceptable to the autonomous man. The idea of the autonomous man is that gods and men are alike expressive of and subject to the conditions of one universe. Accordingly when man seeks a system of truth this system must be identical with the divine system. The human system cannot be an analogical reproduction of the system revealed by God. The two systems must be one system. There must be identity.

But this identity cannot be attained. Even God has no absolute system. There is no such system. Reality is open. Time is ultimate. Chance is one of the ingredients of ultimate reality. The universe or Reality is open as well as closed. So God is wholly hidden as well as wholly revealed.

It is because of this correlativity between reality as wholly hidden and wholly revealed that non-Christian thought speaks of the analogy of being and the analogy of thought. The idea of God is then projected as the ideal of complete comprehension of reality. Accordingly the god of the autonomous man is frequently spoken of as if he had attributes similar to those of the God of Christianity. But the attributes of the god of the autonomous man are projections of his own ideals. He speaks as if such a god exists. He speaks as if such a god were revealing himself and giving commandments to man. In reality no such god exists.

Since Romanism seeks on the one hand to be true to historic Christianity and on the other hand to please the autonomous man its "system" is a combination of two mutually opposed systems and even of two mutually opposed ideas of system. When the Roman Catholic speaks of his idea of analogy it is this confusion of two mutually exclusive ideas of system that he is really presenting. On the other hand the Protestant idea of analogy does not seek to please the autonomous man. It would call the natural man to repentance. It would have him accept the Christian instead of the non-Christian idea of system; the Christian instead of the non-Christian idea of being and knowledge. It would have him submit himself and his thoughts to the obedience of God in Christ.

With a "system" that is itself a confusion of two ideas of system it is quite impossible for Romanism to present the challenge of the gospel to the natural

man effectively. Granted that Romanism has in it a large element of true Christianity, this element is counterbalanced and modified by so much that is taken from non-Christian philosophy that it is impossible for the light of the gospel to shine through its message with clarity and challenge to the man who thinks of himself as properly the final point in predication.

Thomas Aquinas

A few words must now be added about the theology of Thomas Aquinas so far as it relates to the relation of supernatural revelation to natural theology. This will help to understand the official position of the Roman Catholic church as intimated in the quotations given from its confessions.

In the encyclical letter of Pope Leo XIII the study of St. Thomas is recommended to the teachers of the church in the interest of the spreading of the faith in the following words:

"We, therefore, while we declare that everything wisely said should be received with willing and glad mind, as well as everything profitably discovered or thought out, exhort all of you, Venerable Brothers, with the greatest earnestness to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it as far as you can, for the safety and the glory of the Catholic Faith, for the good of society, and for the increase of all the sciences" (Summa Theologica, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Vol. I p. xxx):

The first thing to note about the approach of Thomas is that he begins his identification of God, in both the Summa Contra Gentiles and in the Summa Theologica by means of the natural reason. In other words, at the outset of his theology, and controlling everything that he says, he not only assumes but assures us that reason can prove the existence of God. He argues that it cannot say much about the nature of God but he insists that it can prove the existence of God. At first he seems, in the Contra Gentiles, to assert that reason can only know of the fact that God exists, but cannot know anything about what God is.

"Now in treating of the divine essence the principal method to be followed is that of remotion. For the divine essence by its immensity surpasses every form to which our intellect reaches; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is" (Contra Gentiles, Vol. I, p. 33).

But this very way of remotion, he adds, tells us something at least of what God is by telling us what he is not. We shall approach all the nearer to a knowledge of the nature of God even by the way of remotion "as we shall be able to remove by our intellect a great number of things therefrom." "For the more completely we see how a thing differs from others, the more perfectly we know it; since each thing has in itself its own being distinct from all other things."

"Wherefore when we know the definition of a thing, first we place it in a genus,

whereby we know in general what it is, and afterwards we add differences, so as to mark its distinction from other things: and thus we arrive at the complete knowledge of a thing's essence" (Ibid).

It is in this way that Thomas combines one principle which, if carried through, would lead to the idea that man can know nothing of God and another principle which, if carried through, would lead to the idea that man can know everything of God. On a Protestant basis the way of remotion or negation cannot be applied at all unless there be first a positive identification of God by himself. And now that men are sinners this positive way of identification must be by the way of the self-attesting Scriptures. To apply the way of remotion in the manner of Thomas is evidence that one has accepted a way of affirmation that is not based on the Creator-creature distinction, but on the assumption of a unity that is above this distinction. In other words, the irrationalism that is involved in Thomas' way of remotion presupposes and is correlative to the rationalism involved in the idea that man can directly participate in a process of definition by which all reality can be exhaustively known.

It is thus that Thomas must reach the natural man with the teachings of Christianity. He would show to those who do not stand with him on the position of authority that many truths about Christianity are attainable by reason, and that those which are not attainable by reason are at least not contrary to reason.

"For certain things that are true about God wholly surpass the capability of human reason, for instance that God is three in one: while there are certain things to which even natural reason can attain, for instance that God is, that God is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers proved demonstratively of God, being guided by the light of natural reason" (Op. Cit. p. 5).

Thus the natural reason, as employed by the philosophers, can attain to the knowledge of the existence of God and of the nature of God to the extent at least that it knows of his unity. And this must be done primarily by the way of remotion.

Thomas analyses this method further when he speaks of univocism, equivocism, and analogy. He says that nothing is predicated univocally of God and of other things (Idem, p. 76). On the other hand, "...not all terms applied to God and creatures are purely equivocal" (Idem, p. 78). We must therefore say that "...terms applied to God and creatures are employed analogically" (Idem, p. 79).

He gives several reasons for saying that we cannot predicate univocally of God and creatures. But all the reasons given rest upon the idea that pure univocism implies virtual identity. Parmenides argued that only that can exist which is fully subject to the laws of human logic. In other words Parmenides assumes that the reach of human logic is the limit of possible existence. There is on this basis the clearest possible ideal identification of the human with the divine mind.

Or we may say there is the plain assumption that there is no divine mind that stands above the human mind at all. In other words this position is purely rationalistic and deterministic. If it were held, the whole of Christianity would at once disappear. This same rationalistic and deterministic motif controls Plato in much of his thinking. His ideal is, as it were, to have man disappear into God. Man's separate self-existence is evil. To the extent that he is individual he has no true being. To be sure, even Plato did not carry this rationalistic motif through completely. Particularly in his later dialogues did he see that such an ideal is destructive of human experience. So he thought to "save appearance" by making concessions.

But Aristotle from the start of his major work contends that rationalism and determinism must not be taken as the only and all-controlling principle. We must not be definition-mongers. We must not hold that even our first principles of thought are demonstrable; they must rather be taken as intuitive lest we go about in circles. Thus what seemed to be a defect to Plato, namely the idea of substance not wholly reducible by definition, is from the point of view of Aristotle a great virtue.

Thomas follows Aristotle rather than Plato in this idea of primary substance as being individual as well as specific. It is this that he begins from in both of his Summae. When arguing for the existence of God we must not, he says, hold that this existence is self-evident. To be sure, the existence of God is self-evident in itself. But it is not self-evident to us. The reason is that we do not know the essence of God.

"Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature - namely, by effects" (Summa Theologica, Vol.I, p. 21).

Accordingly Thomas also contends constantly that all human knowledge begins from sensation. Our knowledge must to this extent be empirical.

With this rejection of Parmenidean rationalism in its various forms considered in itself we can have no quarrel. But what is the foundation that underlies the notion of equivocism in the name of which Platonic univocism is rejected? Is it the positive idea of God's creation of the world? Is it the idea that in each fact of the universe surrounding man he is confronted with the plan of God, and therefore with an element of mystery? Certainly this is not the case with Aristotle. His principle of individuation is wholly irrational. So when he argues for the existence of God he argues by way of remotion till he reaches the idea of deity as a specific or generic unity rather than that of numerical individual existence.

As for Thomas, he does defend the idea of creation. One would therefore expect that he would set his principle of individuation clearly over against that

of Aristotle. One would think that he would say that we must start from the senses because in the world about us we are surrounded with the created reality of God. But Thomas does not do this. To be sure he does say that "the knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled into us by God" (Summa Theologica, Vol. I, p. 14). And he constantly falls back on the idea of creation of man by God. Yet, so far as he does this, he has already taken the Christian point of view for granted. And it is his purpose to prove the truth of the Christian position to "reason." And he assumes that even those who do not think of man as created by God have used their reason correctly in essentials.

So when he constantly refers to the fact that human knowledge is derived from the senses he must, to be true to his method, assume with Aristotle and others, that there is a non-rational principle of individuation. The only principle of equivocism that those who hold to a non-Christian principle of univocism can understand and accept is an irrationalist one. And that is the kind of principle of equivocism that Aquinas constantly employs. For him the fact that our knowledge as human beings is derived from the senses is evidence of its lack of universality and therefore of uncertainty. Accordingly knowledge is defective to the extent that the senses are involved. But such a view is not consistent with the idea of creation and providence. If God has made all things and if he controls all things by his plan, then knowledge from sensation is no less certain and true than is knowledge obtained more directly by intellection proper.

But one further point must be mentioned in connection with Thomas' idea of analogy. And it indirectly establishes the point made just now about the non-Christian character of his principle of individuation. The point is that just as Thomas opposes the non-Christian idea of univocism by means of a non-Christian idea of equivocism so in turn he opposes the non-Christian idea of equivocism by a non-Christian idea of univocism. In other words what Thomas does is to seek to avoid the extremes of univocism and equivocism by keeping the two in balance with one another.

If he used the idea of equivocism without first placing it upon the Christian doctrine of creation and carried it through relentlessly he would come to complete scepticism. He could not then rightfully claim that we can argue from effect to cause. There is no justification for thinking that the cause and effect relation obtains between the things with which human knowledge deals unless it be based upon the presupposition of the doctrine of the comprehensive plan of God.

But the whole approach of Thomas is to the effect that man does know the relations and even the essences of created things without at all referring them to their Creator and controller. And it is quite in accord with his basic principle of theology as well as in accord with his basic principle of apologetics that he should assume this. If one holds to the idea of human autonomy in theology to such an extent that he thinks man can resist the plan of God he has therewith set aside the all-comprehensiveness of that plan; he has to some extent introduced the non-Christian notion of individuality as being what it is by chance. And he has

also introduced the non-Christian notion of universality as being above God and man. So then Thomas thinks he has the right to argue from effect to cause without first inquiring into the differences in meaning between the idea of cause when used by Christians and the idea of cause when used by those who do not take the Christian position.

And it is this uncritical assumption that vitiates the entire argument for the existence of God that he offers, and in fact vitiates his approach to every other problem in philosophy and in theology. For Aristotle the idea of cause is not that of production. It is rather that of a principle of explanation. Particularly when he speaks of God as the first cause or the prime Mover, this does not mean for him that God has created the world. For him God does not even exist as a numerical being. He does not know himself. He is not self-conscious. He is an "it." And this sort of god is the logical outcome of Aristotle's method. With his assumption of human ultimacy and therefore with his further assumption of the idea of rationality as inherent in a reality that envelops gods as well as men, and still further with his assumption that Chance is ultimately the source of individuality, there was no other god that he could find. His god is the logical result of following the way of remotion in the way that Thomas too employs it.

It follows too that when Thomas argues that God is his own essence, that in God essence and existence are the same, and other such things, many of them, so far as the validity of his argument is concerned, are untenable. On his principle he cannot relate the existence and the essence of God at all. One cannot relate these two except by presupposing their mutual implication and then starting from this God as the presupposition of all predication. The way of remotion can tell us nothing of the nature of God unless we have first determined the significance of the way of remotion itself by the way of positive creation and revelation. We could know nothing about a thing by knowing how that thing differs from other things unless we presuppose that all things that we know have intelligible relations to one another. And this is the critical point. Thomas assumes the non-Christian principle of abstract Parmenidean rationalism even while he rejects it. How should man know what God is by knowing what he is not, unless we have first enveloped God with ourselves in a common universe of abstract rationality? It is only if first with the early Greeks we assume that all reality has one character, that we can also with Anaximander assert that God is indeterminate. So also the method of Thomas should lead him to say that God is wholly indeterminate. But as a Christian theologian he does not believe this. The result is that he confuses that which he believes as a Christian and that which his method requires him to hold as a would-be neutral reasoner.

It remains now to indicate the significance of what has been said about the general principles of Thomas' theory of knowledge for the idea of Scriptural revelation.

The idea of Scripture as the word of the self-contained God of Christianity cannot be accepted if Thomas' principles are true. If these principles are true

there is no necessity for Scripture in the Protestant sense of the term. For man is then not a sinner in the sense that he is spiritually blind to the truth. The principles of the natural man, even when they are inherently destructive of the Christian position are, nonetheless, assumed to be such that man can by means of them truly know the truth about the universe.

Man can even by means of them know much about the nature of God. There are many things about God, the fact that he is eternal, that he knows all things, that he knows singulars, etc., which Thomas proves about God. But the god about which all this is proved is at most a god who is correlative to the universe. So the god thus proved as existing does not stand above man. He cannot give a finished revelation of his will to man. He cannot even clearly speak to man. He is not a person; he is an "it."

All this is not to say that as a Christian theologian Thomas does not hold in some sense to Christian teaching. It is to say that the natural theology as worked out by him fits in with the natural theology of the official documents of the Roman Catholic church, as inherently inimical to the Protestant idea of Scripture.

EVANGELICALISM AND SCRIPTURE

In the preceding chapter, frequent mention has been made of the Protestant as over against the Roman Catholic view of Scripture. And in conjunction with that, frequent mention has been made of the Protestant as over against the Romanist system of truth that goes with and is involved in the Protestant view of Scripture. But Protestants are not fully agreed among themselves about the system of doctrine contained in Scripture. And the difference between them on the system of doctrine contained in Scripture can largely be traced to the difference in their estimate of the autonomy of man. At any rate it is from that point of view that we shall look at them in this chapter. For it is not the whole Protestant doctrine of Scripture that we wish to discuss. It is only the apologetical significance of this doctrine that comes before us. And for that purpose the all-important question is, What estimate is put upon the natural man and his ability to accept the gospel when it is presented to him? Does his decision with respect to the gospel ultimately rest with himself or with God? Is his decision autonomous or is it analogical? Is it possible to say in answer to these questions that the decision is partly with God, even largely with God but that it is also partly, even if in a very small degree, with man?

On these questions there are two answers given among Protestants. The first answer is that of Evangelicalism. By this term we would indicate those who hold to either the Lutheran or the Arminian view of the human will. The evangelical view of the human will is that it does have some measure of ultimate power of its own over against the overtures of the gospel as presented in Scripture. There may be, especially as over against Romanism, a very great stress on the sovereignty of the grace of God. Yet there is, in the last analysis also a power of ultimate resistance against God.

The Reformed view of the human will is, on the contrary, that man has no ultimate power either to accept or to resist the overtures of the gospel. It is, to be sure, man who accepts, and it is man who rejects the gospel. And this acceptance or rejection of the gospel on the part of man is of the highest importance. But if it is not to be action in the void it must take place in relation to and in dependence upon the all-embracing counsel of God.

It is this difference between the evangelical and the Reformed view of man which, in practice at least, involves at the same time a somewhat different view of Scripture. At least it involves a different attitude toward Scripture. Each party will, of course, charge the other with not being true or at least with not being fully true to Scripture. But the difference goes beyond that. Each will charge the other with not having an adequately Protestant view of Scripture. That is, each will charge the other with imposing upon Scripture a system of interpretation derived from human experience as such instead of from Scripture.

The nature of these charges may at once be intimated. The evangelical will charge the Reformed person of being both irrationalist and rationalist with respect to Scripture. The Reformed position is said to be irrationalist in that it presents the Bible as the word of a wholly arbitrary God, and as therefore teaching things contrary to reason, which itself is given by God to man. The Reformed position is said to be rationalist in that it presents the Bible as teaching one major doctrine, the sovereignty of God, with all other doctrines logically deducible from it.

On the other hand the Reformed person will charge evangelicalism with both irrationalism and rationalism. There would be no issue from these charges and counter-charges except for the fact that the charges in each case spring from a clearly distinguishable source. And this difference in source, as already intimated, springs from the difference with respect to human autonomy. The evangelical holds to some measure of human autonomy. It is this that colors the nature of the charges of irrationalism and rationalism that he brings against the Calvinist. The Calvinist, on the other hand, does not hold to any human autonomy. It is this that colors his charges of irrationalism and rationalism that he brings against the evangelical.

It is to be expected that this difference between the evangelical and the Reformed view of human autonomy has a direct bearing upon the attitude toward Romanism manifested in each of the two cases. Again this is often only a practical difference. As both parties avow their utter loyalty to the Scriptures as the infallible word of God, so both parties are equally set against Papal authority. But, as noted in the previous chapter, it is a compromising view with respect to human autonomy that lies back of the idea of papal authority. It is because Romanism seeks to interpret human life in terms of a method derived from Aristotle in order then to supplement it with supernatural revelation, that it really has no truly Christian concept of Scripture at all. Similarly evangelicalism, still retaining some measure of the idea of human autonomy, is unable to do full justice to the idea of Scripture. And thus it is unable at the same time to set off the Protestant position with full consistency over against Romanism.

It follows then that not being able to distinguish clearly in practice between a Romanist and a truly Protestant notion of authority in relation to human autonomy evangelicalism is weak in its presentation of the gospel to the natural man. It cannot clearly distinguish the position of Christianity based as it is upon the idea of the internal self-contained character of God from the position in which man is his own ultimate interpreter.

With B. B. Warfield we may say then that the Romanist position can be called Christian, but with a large admixture of naturalism. Evangelicalism is Protestant but with some, though a much smaller, admixture of naturalism. It is only in the Reformed system that the idea of the Bible as well as of the system of truth contained in it comes to its own. This is not to contend that every one

professing the Reformed faith therefore has a more truly Biblical attitude toward Scripture than any one professing some form of evangelicalism. The question is only what the system of doctrine calls for. Those holding the best of systems often live at a far distance from their own confessions.

With these introductory remarks as background we turn to a discussion of the evangelical position on Scripture.

In the Confessions of the evangelical churches the Romanist conception of the church and of traditions is vigorously rejected. So for instance in the Formula of Concord the following words appear: "We believe, confess, and teach that the only rule and norm, according to which all dogmas and all doctors ought to be esteemed and judged, is no other whatever than the prophetic and apostolic writings of the Old and of the New Testament, as it is written (Psalm cxix) 'Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path.' And St. Paul saith (Gal. 1:8) 'Though an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you let him be accursed' " (Schaff, *Op. Cit.* Vol. III p. 93). The five Arminian Articles (Schaff, *Idem* p. 545) contain no separate statement on Scripture; these articles were written by those who were officially committed to belief in the Belgic Confession. And this Belgic Confession was the Confession of the Reformed Churches of the Netherlands.

The difference then between the evangelical and the Reformed view of Scripture must be garnered from the way in which those adhering to these positions have dealt with Scripture. Do they really make it the Word of God attesting to itself? Do they really interpret all things in terms of its principles? In particular do they, like Romanism, allow that the natural man in terms of his adopted principles can truly identify and order large areas of life? That is to say, what is their attitude toward the Romanist conception of natural theology as related to revealed theology? No attempt will be made to give anything like a comprehensive survey of the history of evangelical thought dealing with the doctrine of Scripture in relation to natural theology. What will be said will be by way of giving illustration of the main point, namely that evangelicalism cannot, because of its system of doctrine, provide for a fully self-attesting Scripture. On this point we shall deal first with Lutheranism and then with Arminianism.

Lutheranism

For an excellent work on evangelical Lutheranism, for one dealing directly with the question at hand we can do no better than to take the Christian Dogmatics of Francis Pieper. Dr. Pieper was, according to John Theodore Mueller "for over half a century the outstanding teacher of dogmatics at Concordia Seminary" in St. Louis, Missouri. The work has been translated from the German. More recent teachers of Lutheran theology, like Engelder and Dr. Mueller himself, make grateful acknowledgement of indebtedness to Pieper.

Pieper makes a searching analysis of the "theology of self-consciousness," that is, the modern theology of Schleiermacher and his followers.

"Invented for the purpose of insuring the scientific character of theology, this theology makes its advocates play the role of the man who, in order to brace his toppling Ego, takes a tight hold on his Ego. Furthermore, the Ego theology is a form, the worst form, of idolatry" (Vol. I, p. 127).

But what of Reformed theology? Does Pieper share the frequently stated position that all orthodox Protestants have essentially the same view of Scripture? Does he think that all "fundamentalists" should unite in common opposition to all "modernists," calling them back from their confidence in "experience" to belief in the Word of God? Far from it! Pieper is convinced that orthodox Reformed theology is deeply tinged with the principles of "Ego-theology." Says Pieper:

"The desire to go beyond Word and faith, and to walk by sight already in this life, has given rise to Calvinism, to synergism, and lies at the bottom of the entire modern 'construction theology' (Konstruktionstheologie)" (Vol. II, 389).

The main objection raised against Calvinism is that of rationalism as based upon and proceeding from an ego-theology.

"What we object to in the Reformed theology is this, that in all doctrines in which it differs from the Lutheran Church and on which it has constituted itself as the Reformed Church alongside the Lutheran Church, it denies the Scriptural principle and lets rationalistic axioms rule" (Vol. I, p. 186).

As for Calvin himself, says Pieper, he virtually forsook the revealed will of God.

"The depths of the Godhead are not hidden to Calvin; they are so clear to him that by them he cancels the revelation in the Word (the gratia universalis)" (Vol. II, p. 47).

Calvin's "particularism" is said to have its roots in his rationalistic appeal to the hidden will of God.

"Luther lets the Word of God, Scripture itself, tell him what the gracious will of God is, how far it extends, and what it effects. Calvin lets the result (effectus) or the historical experience (experientia) determine what God's gracious will is" (Vol. II, p. 48).

"True, also Calvin says that we should not seek to explore the hidden will of God, but rely on Christ and the Gospel. But how can Calvin direct men to rely on Christ and the Gospel since he teaches that only some of the hearers

of the Word have a claim on Christ? As a matter of fact, he does not direct men to Christ and the Gospel, but to their inward renewal and sanctification, or to the gratia infusa" (Vol. II, p. 46).

"Calvin's theology, therefore, is not basically Biblical, but rationalistically motivated" (Idem, p. 276).

In following Calvin, Reformed theology "through the use of rationalistic axioms, fixes an unbridgeable gulf between itself and genuine Christian theology" (Vol. II, p. 271). So, for instance, we are told, Calvinism holds to the purely speculative maxim that the finite cannot contain the infinite (finitus non est capax infinite). In virtue of this "rationalistic axiom" Calvinism virtually denies the incarnation.

"In so far as Reformed theology, in its effort to disprove Lutheran Christology, applies the principle that the finite is not capable of grasping of the infinite, it inevitably denies the incarnation of the Son of God, and Christ's vicarious atonement, and so destroys the foundation of the Christian faith" (Vol. II, p. 271).

In this way, Reformed men commit "theological suicide" (Vol. II, p. 167).

Again Calvinism is said to deny the "Scripture doctrine of gratia universalis" because of another "philosophical axiom," namely, "Whatever God earnestly purposes must in every case actually occur; and since not all men are actually saved, we must conclude that the Father never did love the world, that Christ never did reconcile the world, and that the Holy Ghost never does purpose to create faith in all hearers of the Word. This is the chief argument of Calvin in the four chapters of his Institutes (iii, 21-24) on Predestination. He disposes of the Scripture declarations which attest universal grace with the statement, repeated again and again, that the result must determine the extent of the divine will of grace" (Vol. II, p. 26).

John Theodore Mueller, professor of Systematic theology, takes essentially the same position as that of Pieper. Speaking of the confessional Lutheran church, he says,

"Its theology is that of the Holy Bible, and of the Bible alone; its doctrine is the divine truth of God's Word. The Lutheran Church is therefore the orthodox visible Church of Christ on earth" (Christian Dogmatics, St. Louis, 1934).

Pieper's charge is not that individual Reformed theologians have been rationalistic in their approach to Scripture. His charge is that it is of the genius of Reformed theology as such to be rationalistic. The system of Reformed theology, he argues in effect, is rationalistically constructed. This we deny.

Pieper has not sought to refute the painstaking exegesis of Calvin and his followers as they deal with the doctrines of predestination, the two natures of Christ, and particularism. If Calvin and his followers had been moved by rationalistic considerations in the formulation of these and other doctrines they would have tried to show how such doctrines are "in accord with reason," in accord with "the experience of freedom." On the contrary, Calvin and his followers have interpreted "the laws of reason" and "the experience of freedom" in terms of Scripture as the only final authority for man. At the very beginning of Calvin's Institutes we are told that man does not see himself for what he really is except he recognize himself as a creature of God. And to recognize himself as a creature of God he must own himself to be a sinner before God. Moreover, Calvin argues further on, to recognize one's sinfulness, he must have learned to know himself in the light of Scripture, of Scripture as understood by the regenerating and illuminating operation of the Holy Spirit.

According to Calvin, man as interpreter of Scripture must first be interpreted by Scripture. And Scripture is the Word of God. The idea of Scripture as the Word of God and the idea of God as speaking through Scripture are involved in one another. Scripture tells us that God is infinite, eternal and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth. Scripture tells us that this God cannot deny himself. It is this self-contained, wholly self-dependent God who speaks in Scripture. It is not rationalism to assert that Scripture cannot also reveal a God who does deny himself, a god who creates man with powers equal to himself. For Scripture speaking is God speaking. Is God indeterminate? Has he no character?

At this point, Calvinism and Lutheranism, as set forth in Pieper's work, part company. With unquestioned desire to follow Scripture wherever it may lead him, Pieper virtually holds that it may lead anywhere. It may teach "that God intends what is never accomplished." God "intends to save the world through Christ." Nevertheless "God's purpose is not accomplished in a part of mankind" (Vol. II, p. 27).

This approach is irrationalist in character. If God's will of decree can be resisted, he is as Luther would say "a ridiculous God." The nature of his power would be indistinguishable from the nature of man's cause. The distinction between God as original or ultimate and man as derivative and dependent cause would be done away. Then Luther's words are applicable: "But if I know not the distinction between our working and the power of God, I know not God Himself" (The Bondage of the Will, Eng. Trans., Grand Rapids, 1931).

Moreover, the irrationalist doctrine of the human will leads away from the Protestant doctrine of Scripture. Romanism required men to have implicit faith in the church. From this slavery of men to other men Luther appealed to Scripture.

"What say you, Erasmus? Is it not enough that you submit your opinion to the Scriptures? Do you submit it to the decrees of the church also? What can the church decree, that is not decreed in the Scriptures? If it can, where then remains the liberty and power of judging those who make the decrees?" (*Idem*, p. 22).

The very idea of the Bible as a final standard of judgment becomes meaningless on the assumption that there is no God who controls whatsoever comes to pass. Faith would be blind trust in the guesses of men themselves surrounded by Chance.

We must now inquire about the nature of Lutheran apologetics as Pieper and others think of it. Do we not expect him to call upon men simply to believe in the Scriptures as the Word of God? If his doctrine of Scripture is irrationalistic in nature, how then can he appeal to reason at all? Yet, to "reason" he does appeal.

"When we compare the Holy Scriptures according to content and style with other 'Bibles' in the world, e. g., with the Koran, - then a reasonable reason cannot do otherwise than conclude that the Scriptures must be divine and confess that it is more reasonable to grant the divinity of Scripture than to deny it. This is the domain of apologetics" (Vol. I, p. 310). Again, "Christ is appealing not only to the Scriptures, but also to something which is known even to natural reason - to the omnipotence of God" (*Idem*, 311).

This conception of apologetics as held by Pieper and other Lutherans is essentially the same as that of other "evangelicals" or "conservatives." Together with other "conservatives" Pieper appeals to the "natural man" as having within him, a standard by which he can judge the truth or falsity of the Scriptural claim to its own authority.

The final question now presses itself upon those who hold to the Reformed Faith. The Calvinist certainly believes in the Scriptures as self-authenticating. For believing this, he is virtually labeled as irrationalist. Again, the Calvinist certainly believes that it is God, the self-contained and self-determinate God, who speaks in Scripture. For believing this he is called a rationalist by the "conservatives" as represented by Pieper.

From Pieper's argument it appears that he is willing to begin from the Bible as the word of the self-attesting God without some qualification. To say that God testifies to himself in his word is to say that he makes himself unmistakably known in the facts of the phenomenal world. In particular it means that he makes himself unmistakably known in the work of redemption as this is accomplished in the phenomenal world. But according to Pieper the Bible might teach anything about God. It might say such things as can in no wise be identified by man. In other words, God's revelation may be of a God whose character is indeterminate and whose actions in the world cannot in consequence be iden-

tified. Thus Pieper is not willing to maintain that the idea of possibility is wholly subject to the self-contained God of Scripture. He constructs his system, in part at least, upon the idea that possibility is above God. And it is this that makes identification in history impossible.

It is not that we wish to claim for man the right and ability of identification in history first, in order that then he may identify Scripture as the word of God. On the contrary, it is because we would maintain that identification of any fact or truth in the phenomenal realm is possible to man in history only because all things in history are controlled by God back of history that we object to Pieper's position. Identification of fact or truth in history by human reason must be frankly based upon identification by God. Only if the authority of God's self-identification and of his self-authenticated revelation to man in history is assumed can there be any intelligible predication by man. But such self-identification of God cannot be obtained if it be allowed that God may reveal anything. God can reveal only that which is consistent with his nature as a self-identified being. The law of identity in human logic must be seen to be resting upon the character of God and therefore upon the authoritative revelation of God. But to say that God is both omnipotent and not omnipotent, because conditioned by the ultimate determinations of his creatures, is to remove the very foundation of the law of identity. This is irrationalism of the non-Christian sort. It allows the legitimacy of the non-Christian principle of individuation, namely chance. It is quite impossible, once this is allowed, to challenge the non-Christian position effectively.

Corresponding to this concession to the non-Christian principle of individuation, is a concession to the non-Christian principle of unification. Pieper holds that Scripture cannot teach that the ultimate differences between men come from the plan of God. He argues that God's overtures to men are ultimately in terms of classes. The individual finally decides to which class, the elect or the non-elect, he will belong. Man can finally resist the grace of God.

This position involves an appeal to a principle that is higher than the counsel of God. It is in effect an appeal to a unity in which God orders only the relations of parts. It is to reduce the Christian conception of causation as actual determination to the non-Christian idea of a formal principle of unity in an infinitely extended universe of pure factuality. And doing this involves again the inability to challenge non-Christian procedure. For the essence of non-Christian methodology is to appeal to rationality that is above God and man as well as to possibility that surrounds them both.

It is true, of course, that Lutheranism thinks that its doctrine of Scripture is taken from Scripture itself. In particular is it true that its doctrine of the freedom of the will is thought to come from Scripture by exegesis. In a book dealing specifically with this problem Karl Francke gives a detailed exegesis of Scripture in defense of the Lutheran position. His book gives a thorough analysis of the noetic effects of sin as set forth in Scripture. The title is Metanoetik. He calls it "the science of thought that has been redeemed"

(Leipzig, 1913). It is impossible to do more than intimate something of the nature of the argument as a whole, and to point out the notion of the human will that results from it.

Francke's startingpoint is II Cor. 5:17, "Therefore if any man be in Christ Jesus, he is a new creature, old things are passed away; behold all things are become new." He speaks accordingly of regenerated thought as thought that is radically changed. This change is designated in the New Testament with the term metanoein.

Francke's interest is not in seeking to determine the ethical consequences of regeneration so much as it is in seeking to determine the nature of the "purely noetical" consequences of regeneration.

The three main divisions of the book deal with the necessity, the possibility, and the actuality of regenerated thought.

In the first section, the author collects the Biblical material that has bearing on the blinding effects of sin. The author brings out very well the fact that non-regenerated thought seeks at one time to know all reality and at another time maintains that nothing can be known. "Einerseits soll es Wahrheit überhaupt nicht erkennen, anderseits umspannen, was hoher als der Himmel, tiefer als die Unterwelt" (Job. 11:7 ff.). This is the point to which we have called attention by saying that anti-theistic thought wants to use language univocally or give up the possibility of knowledge altogether. Anti-theistic thought will not be receptive. "Es will sich nicht mehr passiv und rezeptiv verhalten" (1. 14). Accordingly it loses itself in the artificial fabrication of insoluble antinomies. It refuses any help. It will accept nothing but what has come out of the depth of its own wisdom.

The stages throughout which this process of sinful thought comes to its completion are three. The first stage is that of deceit, apaty. This deceitfulness of sin may be subdivided into the deceitfulness of philosophy, Col. 2:8, the deceitfulness of riches, Mt. 13:22, and the deceitfulness of false morality, II Thess. 2:10. It is this first stage that places the seeds of separation from God in the heart of man. The second stage is that of erring in thought, plany. Psalm 95:10 speaks of a people that do always err in their hearts. The same thought is expressed by Isaiah when he says, "All we like sheep have gone astray." It was this "spirit of error" (I John 4:6) that moved the false prophets of old to oppose the realization of the kingdom of God. Error gives a more external expression to that which lives in the heart through deceit. The third stage is that of stupor, katanuxis. This marks the climax of the process of antitheistic thought. To it the wisdom of God is foolishness. It hardens the heart (Rom. 11:25). Truth is obnoxious to the victim of the spirit of stupor. It closes the ears to the witnesses of the Truth, (Isa. 9:10). This third stage is often given to men as a punishment for falling into the earlier stages (Rom. 1:26, 27). In this third stage the first and second stages reach their natural

climax. It may therefore be said that the first stage is the determining point. It is not only when matters have come to such a pass as is portrayed in the first chapter of Romans that God is displeased. Since the third stage is often the result of a punishment of the first and second stages it follows that in the eyes of the Lord it is the first stage that is already decisive. At first this natural thought will not see and hear, and at last it can not see and hear (Op. cit., p. 4).

The picture of the noetic effect of sin as painted by Francke is black enough. Yet the Lutheran conception of man's independence underlies the whole discussion. Man, as it were, starts this whole course of error without any relation to God's plan. Francke will, of course, grant the doctrine of creation, but he fails to see the full significance of it. He says that God had to respect the freedom he himself had given to his creatures. "Er muss die ihm schopfungsmässig garantierte Freiheit respektieren" (Op. cit., p. 48). And this freedom is interpreted as meaning that man can do some things without any reference to God. The whole process of deflection is pictured as beyond God's operation till He sees fit to intervene when things have gone too far.

This independence of man is still more apparent in the second section of the book which deals with the possibility of regenerated thought. After the dark picture given of the position of sinful man it would certainly seem that only God could take the initiative in the process of restoration if there is to be any. The "natural man" would seem to be so dead that it would require the Holy Spirit to blow into his nostrils the breath of life. We thought we saw the natural man as dead in trespasses and sins, i. e., as a corpse. But we were mistaken. The "corpse" is not a corpse. It breathes and moves. Not only did God have to respect the freedom given at creation, but even the sinner is given strength to search for and desires the truth, apart from the operation of the Holy Spirit. Of his own accord he "comes to himself" and reflects upon his lost condition without any help from the Holy Spirit. Not as though the natural man could get out of his predicament without the help of the Spirit. "Die dämonischen Geister des Isreals können nur durch Mittel und Kräfte eines überdämonischen d. i. göttlichen Geistes verbannt werden" (Op. cit., p. 51). But the sinner seeing his predicament can at least cry for help. There is a longing to get out of the misery and into the truth. Francke is unbiblical and pelagianising in his thought.

Francke establishes his point, he thinks, by referring to Christ's promise to the apostles that he would give them the spirit of truth. He also pictures Paul's crying for release from his awful conflict with sin as an instance of the natural man seeking light. But these examples only prove the poverty of an argument of this sort. The apostles, with the exception of Judas, were true disciples of Christ, according to his own word. We would naturally expect that they would ask for the Spirit of Truth. And Paul tells us in the immediate context of Romans 7:24, that the new life within him is seeking to throw off the bondage to the remnants of the old man that he finds within himself against his

will. Thus Paul thought of himself very definitely as a regenerated man when he uttered that famous cry for relief. So then, the very examples adduced in proof are the best of testimony that the position of Francke is unbiblical. Moreover, if man is really unable to seek God by nature, as Francke himself says that he is, where does this new ability to seek God suddenly come from? Either we must accept the exegesis of Francke in his first section in which he portrays the result of sin seriously, and reject his second section as in opposition to it, or we must maintain his second section and hold that in his first section he was all the while clinging to a false independence idea. And it would seem fair to choose the second alternative since Francke is most anxious to reserve for man a freedom as a creature by which he is able to do all manner of things that seem to be beyond God's control.

Francke's argument might be called the very opposite of that of Luther in "The Bondage of the Will." Luther proves in great detail that man is by nature unable to do any good. And we have seen that in many ways the argument of Francke in the first section of his book resembles that argument of Luther. But the swerving from the first to the second position on the part of Francke resembles that which happened when the semi-mechanism of Luther turned into the synergism of Melancthon. In both cases it was really a development rather than a reversal. And it could not be a development if there were not already some germ of the second position found in the first position.

We may say, then, that in the second section of his book Francke is unfaithful to the redemptive principle as a whole. If one maintains a soteriological theory in which the "natural man" is conceived of as able of his own accord to seek the truth because he has a true insight into his own sorrowful condition, one cannot but become anti-theistic epistemologically in the sense that he must then think of certain facts as existing in such a way that man can have knowledge of them without having knowledge of the true God. If no one can come to the Father but by Christ, and no one can say Christ is Lord except through the Spirit, it is equally possible or equally impossible for man to come into contact with the Father or the Son or the Spirit. If one maintains that he can approach Christ of his own accord even though he is a sinner, he may as well say that he can approach the Father too. And if one can say that he knows what the fact of sin means without the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit, he may as well say that he can know other facts without reference to God. In fact he may as well say that he can know any and every fact without reference to God. If one fact can be known without reference to God there is no good reason to hold that not all facts can be known without reference to God.

Francke is unable to do justice to the identification of Scripture as a unit. He identifies the desire for the Spirit of truth as he thinks it exists in the "natural man" with the desire on the part of Old Testament saints for the fulness of the promise of the Shiloh, as given in Genesis 49:10. But such an identification presupposes that these Old Testament saints rather were unbelievers while actually we are told that Abraham is the father of the faithful. Hence, his appeal

to the Old Testament saints weakens rather than strengthens his position. And his further argument that as this longing for the Shiloh became ever stronger and stronger in the course of the history of the Old Testament, so the longing for the truth on the part of the "natural man" may become constantly stronger, also falls to the ground. "The natural man can learn to wait for the Spirit of Truth." (Da naturliche Denken kann die Kunst lernen, auf den Geist der Wahrheit zu warten. Und wo dieses Warten brunstig, aufrichtig und zielbewusst geubt wird, gestaltet es sich unwillkurlich zum bitten um denselben" (Op. cit., p. 56). This picture of the natural man as conscious of the end he has in view, that is, of seeking the Truth and then praying for it, is about as far remote from the picture Scripture gives of the "natural man" as it could be. Once start on the decline and there is no stopping.

That Francke has no very deep conception of sin is further evidenced by the fact that he minimizes original sin. To him the conception of inherited sin is a logical contradiction (Op. cit., p. 73). This is an important point. Why should original sin be considered a logical contradiction? It can be so considered only if it is taken for granted that personal representation is an impossible conception. We are not now concerned to prove that the principle of personal representation is Biblical. That cannot easily be denied by any one who reads Romans 5:12, "Therefore as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all have sinned." We are only concerned to know why this representational principle can be denied only on the supposition that a personal act must necessarily be a unipersonal act. In other words, on this basis an act can be truly personal only if the surroundings of the person be impersonal. To be truly personal on this view, there really should be no more than one person. If there were more than one person, the surroundings would not be entirely impersonal, and to that extent the act would not be fully personal. And this reduces the position to an absurdity, because if there were only one person there could be no personal relationship at all. It were quite legitimate and true to say that the foundation of all personal activity among men must be based upon the personality of one ultimate person; namely, the person of God if only it be understood that this ultimate personality of God is a triune personality. In the Trinity there is completely personal relationship without residue. And for that reason it may be said that man's actions are all personal too. Man's surroundings are shot through with personality because all things are related to the infinitely personal God. But when we have said that the surroundings of man are really completely personalized, we have also established the representational principle. We have not only established the possibility of the representational principle, but its necessity and actuality as well. All of man's acts must be representational of the acts of God. Even the persons of the Trinity are mutually representational of one another. They are exhaustively representational of one another. Because man is a creature he must in his thinking, his feeling and his willing be analogically representative of God. There is no other way open for him. He could, in the nature of the case, think nothing at all unless he thought God's thoughts after him, and this is analogical representational thinking. Thus man's thought is representa-

tive of God's thought, but not exhaustively representative.

The Biblical doctrine of original sin is based upon this purely theistic and therefore purely Biblical concept of representation. Since the whole being of God, if we may in all reverence say so, is built upon the representational plan, it was impossible for God to create except upon the representational plan. This pertains to every individual human being, but it pertains just as well with respect to the race as a whole. If there was to be a personal relationship between finite persons – and none other is conceivable – there would have to be representational relationship. Every act of every finite person affects every act of every finite person that comes after him by virtue of the one general plan of God with respect to the whole of creation. Hence, it could not be otherwise than that the acts of Adam should affect, representationally, every human being that should come after him.

To reject the doctrine of original sin may therefore be characterized as a concession to the anti-theistic idea that the acts of human personalities are surrounded by a universe over which God has no complete control, i. e., an impersonal universe. Thus it comes to pass that the rejection of the doctrine of original sin on the part of Francke is merely another indication and proof that our interpretation of his idea of the "natural man" is correct. If there is an element of anti-theistic thinking at one point, it is sure to reappear elsewhere. A suit of clothes usually shows signs of wear at several places simultaneously.

Summing up the whole teaching of Francke on the question of the possibility of renewed thought, we may say that according to him, the possibility of renewal does not lie so much in the fact that the Holy Spirit is all-powerful – though this is a sine qua non – as in the fact that the "natural man" is after all quite powerful for good because he always remains a rational creature, and no rational creature is ever quite helpless. Francke has given to man a vicious independence to begin with.

And summing up the whole of Lutheran epistemology as far as we have discussed it, our conclusion can be none other than that Lutheran epistemology has not lived up to its early promise. There is in Lutheranism a great advance upon the scholastic position. And that advance is found in every direction. Yet that advance might have been much greater if Lutheranism had had the courage to carry the Reformation a little farther than it did. Lutheranism is too much anthropological instead of theological. Its theology at some stages of the process speaks as though there were matters that pertain to the welfare of man without affecting the position of God. Lutheranism has not been quite theistic enough in the sense of making God the completely original and exclusively original personality which serves as the foundation for the meaning of all human predication.

Arminianism

Turning now to the general Arminian conception of Scripture, it is well to look briefly at the works of Arminius himself. It is his theology that underlies, in large measure, the five articles of the Remonstrants against which the Reformed Synod of Dort set forth the Reformed view in five counter articles. We are not now concerned with the Arminian system as a whole except in so far as it has a bearing on its view of Scripture. (We take our information from the Works of James Arminius, translated from the Latin, the first two volumes by James Nichols, and the third by W. R. Bagnall, Auburn and Buffalo, 1853.)

"Let Scripture itself come forward, and perform the chief part in asserting its own divinity. Let us inspect its substance and its matter." It is thus that Arminius begins his discussion of the divinity of Scripture (Vol. I p. 123). Corresponding to this assertion of the objective divinity of Scripture is his position with respect to the necessity of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit in witnessing to the Scriptures as the Word of God. He says that the "Holy Spirit is the author of that light by the aid of which we obtain a perception and an understanding of the divine meanings of the word, and is the Effector of the certainty by which we believe those meanings to be truly divine; and that He is the necessary author, the all-sufficient Effector" (Idem p. 140). In stating his position on Scripture he opposes the Roman view of tradition and papal authority.

But it soon appears that Arminius holds to a view of human autonomy that is out of accord with the idea of Scripture as self-attesting. This fact appears again and again in his several disquisitions on predestination. Predestination is not, for Arminius, a part of the actual control of whatsoever comes to pass.

"I could wish also that the word 'ordaining' were used in its proper sense, from which they seem to me to depart, who interpret it...to decree that something shall be done. For its true meaning is to establish the order of things done, not to appoint things to be done that they may be done; though it is used sometimes by the fathers in the latter sense" (Vol. II, p. 284).

That man has autonomy is involved in this notion of ordering rather than controlling. God cannot determine in advance what man will do. He can order reality in accordance with what he foresees man will do. Thus election is not an actual determination on the part of God with respect to man. It is rather a determination to order the relations of the events in history in such a way that those whom God foresees will believe shall then be saved. Again and again Arminius makes the point that God's foresight of their faith precedes God's election of men.

"This decree has its foundation in the foreknowledge of God, by which he knew from all eternity those individuals who would, through his preventing grace, believe, and through his subsequent grace would persevere, according to the before described administration of those means which are suitable and proper

for conversion and faith; and, by which foreknowledge, he likewise foreknew those who would not believe and persevere" (Vol. I, p. 248).

It is in this manner that Arminius repeatedly tones down the doctrine of election, from that of ultimate causation to that of ordering of aspects of reality that exist in part at least beyond the control of God. And since the doctrine of election is based upon the doctrine of providence, Arminius quite consistently also tones down this doctrine till it resembles the idea of an abstract formal unity more than that of the control of God. To be sure Arminius speaks of providence as preserving, regulating, governing, and directing all things. In addition to asserting this he says,

"Besides this, I place in subjection to Divine Providence both the free will and even the actions of a rational creature, so that nothing can be done without the will of God, not even any of those things which are done in opposition to it; only we must observe a distinction between good actions and evil ones, by saying, that 'God both wills and performs good acts,' but that 'He only freely permits those which are evil' " (Vol. I, p. 251).

Of the natural man Arminius says:

"...it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will and perform whatever is truly good" (Vol. I, p. 252).

So the only question remaining between him and his opponents, says Arminius, is whether the influence of God is irresistible.

"...that is, the controversy does not relate to those actions or operations which may be ascribed to grace, (for I acknowledge and inculcate as many of these actions or operations as any man ever did), but it relates solely to the mode of operation, whether it be irresistible or not. With respect to which, I believe, according to the scriptures, that many persons resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace that is offered" (Vol. I, p. 254).

Arminius' doctrine of the relationship between the idea of necessity and contingency are in accord with this formal notion of God's providence.

"My opinion concerning Necessity and Contingency is 'that they can never be applicable at once to one and the same event'" (Vol. I, p. 289).

Again,

"For every being is either necessary or contingent. But those things which divide the whole of being, cannot coincide or meet together in any single being. Otherwise they would not divide the whole range of being. What is

contingent, and what is necessary, likewise, differs in their entire essences and in their whole definition. For that is necessary which cannot possibly not be or not be done. And that is contingent which is possible not to be or not to be done. Thus contradictorily are they opposed to each other; and this opposition is infinite, and, therefore always dividing truth from falsehood: as, 'this thing is either a man or it is not a man;' it is not possible for anything to be both of these at once...that is, for anything of one essence" (Vol. I, p. 290).

On the basis of this fundamental difference between necessity and contingency Arminius says it is impossible that an event would be necessary "with respect to the first cause which is God, and contingent with respect to second cause."

"It is not only a rash saying, but a false and ignorant one 'that a thing which, in regard to second causes, is done contingently is said to be done necessarily in regard to the divine decree'" (Idem, p. 291).

The relation between the will of God and the will of man is to be resolved rather by saying that God's power is adjusted "to the mode of a thing." In the case of the events accomplished through the will of man, God's power is persuasive only. Thus the event that occurs will be said to be done contingently. Its eventuation will be "certainly foreknown by God according to the infinity of his understanding" (Idem, p. 291).

This mode of reasoning, it will be noted, is in terms of ideas of necessity and contingency borrowed from non-Christian philosophy. It is basically subversive of the idea that human thought and human action is analogical of divine thought and divine action. It assumes, as was the case with Pieper and Francke above, that all human thought and action must, at some point, be autonomous. Human thought and action, it is argued on the basis of abstract possibility, and abstract logic, cannot be derivative and receptively reconstructive; it must, at least in some measure, be ultimate. Human thought and human action must be unipersonal.

With a system of thought thus taken in part from non-Christian principles of interpretation Arminius cannot consistently allow that Scripture is self-attesting. For he has found that man can identify facts and laws in nature and history, in reality as man sees it, without reference to the self-attesting deed of God in his revelation. The thinking of Arminius is carried on in part in terms of a system of reality apart from God, and in part in terms of Scripture. The result is that though his position is far better than that of Romanism, it is none the less infected with something of the same naturalism that marked the latter view.

Watson

The tendency to think in principles other than those derived from Scripture is more prominent in later Arminian theologians than it is in Arminius

himself. We shall look at some of them now.

Watson's Theological Institutes begins by asking why it is that revelation is necessary for man. His reply is that the nations had confused ideas about God and morality previous to the coming of revelation; he does not make a clear distinction between general and special revelation. But it soon appears that he thinks of man as originally having some defect because of his finitude.

“No creature can be absolutely perfect because it is finite; and it would appear from the example of our first parents that an innocent and in its way perfect being, is kept from falling only by taking hold on God, and as this is an act, there must be a determination of the will in it, and so when the least carelessness, the least tempering with the desire of forbidden gratification is induced, there is always an enemy at hand to darken the judgment and to accelerate the progress of evil” (Vol. I, p. 33).

This view of the nature of man as first created is frequently found in Arminian theologians. It naturally goes with the idea of autonomy. For this idea involves the notion that man must accomplish his own character. He was not created perfect; he could not be created perfect. Creation is finite and therefore itself imperfect. It needs from the outset some sort of supernatural gift in order to attain its end.

This position is very similar to the idea of the donum superadditum of Roman Catholic theology. In both cases grace is something supplementative to nature that would be defective without it. Like Thomas Aquinas, Arminius uses the idea of man as a creature tending toward non-being from which he was taken at the first. Having so little of being in it this creature easily sways between the forces of evil and good. He has to make a habit of choosing for the good. Then his character will gradually be formed. At last he will be inclined toward the good all the time.

But this view of man is out of accord with the narrative of Scripture. Man was created perfect. His character or nature was given him by God. To be sure man was subjected to a test. And this test would elicit from man greater self-conscious reaction to the gifts of God. But the idea of this test does not imply that man was not already perfect. As Jesus was perfect and yet was subjected to the test of obedience so original man was also perfect. Original man could fall while Jesus could not fall. But in both cases the test came to a perfect man.

From Watson's views of the will of man as the ultimate source of man's character it follows that the necessity of Scripture and its redemptive revelation is not exclusively due to sin. If evil and finitude are involved in one another it is no longer possible to distinguish clearly between an argument for general and an argument for special or redemptive revelation. For in that case redemption is necessary just because man is finite. The incarnation would have been nec-

essary even apart from sin. Man was subject to forces not under God's control. The facts about him did not speak to man exclusively of God but also of other, equally ultimate forces. Man's own consciousness was then not inherently revelational. Man's actions had to be unipersonal to be personal at all. He would find himself in a sea of abstract possibility. Reality would be basically of one sort; God and man would be together in a universe surrounding both. Watson does not hesitate to subject God to the same condition of temporality as man.

"Duration then, as applied to God, is no more than an extension of the idea as applied to ourselves; and to exhort us to conceive of it as something essentially different, is to require us to conceive what is inconceivable"
(Vol. II, p. 357).

What man can conceive is the limit of possibility, and since man cannot conceive eternity as other than an extension of time, therefore it must be an extension of time.

This line of reasoning is quite out of accord with Watson's general orthodox position. He seeks to satisfy the demand for univocism or continuity as the autonomous man thinks of it. So to satisfy the autonomous man's demands he is willing to subject his God to the conditions of finitude. For it is only so that, according to the autonomous man, God can have any definite characteristics. On the other hand he seeks to satisfy the autonomous man's demands for equivocalism or discontinuity. So he says that man, according to Scripture, has not been given a character by God; he must accomplish his own character by actions that are exclusively his own.

Watson's soteriology agrees with his views about original man. The natural man has, according to Watson, the power to resist the overtures of the gospel. Salvation is made possible for him by God. God approaches him only as a member of a class. The individual man must make the ultimate decision; Christ's active obedience is not attributed to his people; Christ has done no more than remove the obstacles in the way of man's salvation. The work of the Holy Spirit too is limited to a removal of obstacles. By regeneration the power of sin over man is broken so that with free choice man can serve God.

Of peculiar interest is the fact that Watson not only claims to hold to the Biblical doctrine of total depravity but claims to be able to do so more consistently than the Reformed Faith can. For on the Arminian position he says the good deeds done by the natural man are seen to be the effect of an influence on them by the Holy Spirit, while in the Reformed faith these good deeds must be explained by the artificial doctrine of common grace (Vol. I, p. 48). This mode of reasoning resembles that of Schleiermacher when he argues that it takes full independence in man for him to feel "absolute dependence." For without such full dependence man cannot with full self-consciousness submit himself to God. On any basis but that of full independence the relation between God and man would not be exclusively personal. However, as noted above the exact reverse

is the case. There can be only one final reference point in predication. If man is taken to be this final reference point his environment becomes dependent upon him, and any other personality that may exist is not more ultimate than he. Therefore there is no God on whom he can feel himself dependent. He is his own god.

It is of interest to note that though Watson claims to do full justice to the Biblical teaching on total depravity, in reality his conception of grace, like that of Rome, reduces the differences between the virtues of the believer and those of the unbeliever to a matter of gradation. Grace supplements and perfects nature. Nature is inherently in need of such supplementation. It is thus the gradation motif inherent in the idea of reality as a chain of being that is given a determining influence in Christian theology.

Thus the Scriptures are not actually taken as the exclusive source of ultimate identification. Watson's basic principles are taken in part from Scripture and in part from the autonomous man.

Bishop Butler

Similar to the position of Watson is that of Bishop Butler. His work, Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature, is a classic on the method of apologetics current in evangelical circles.

The essence of this method is that the course and constitution of nature is perfectly intelligible to man in terms of principles not taken from the Christian religion. And Christianity is said to be in analogy with what man has already found in the course of his own independent investigations of nature and history. Christianity is therefore first a republication of natural religion adapted to the present circumstances of mankind. Secondly Christianity tells of a dispensation not discoverable by reason,

"...in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. By reason is revealed the relation which God, the Father stands to us. Hence arise the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In Scripture are revealed the relations which the Son and the Holy Spirit stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty, which we are under to them" (The Works of Bishop Butler, edited by Rt. Hon. W.E. Gladstone, Vol. I, Analog. p. 3).

It is apparent that here again the idea of gradation and supplementation largely controls Butler's thinking. It is not that man has sinned against the triune God that accounts for his need of redemption and therefore for his need of an infallible interpretation of the work of redemption. It is merely that by reason man has met only the Father, and that it would enrich him if he also met the Son and the Holy Spirit, that Christianity is given.

As with Romanism, so with Butler, original man hovered near the realm

of non-being. As such man was naturally inclined to "external objects." He had to exercise his will and thus establish a habit in order to overcome his natural propensity to these external objects. Not that this propensity in itself was an evil. But if not resisted it would keep him from turning to higher things.

"Thus the principle of virtue improved into a habit, of which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the strength of it, a security against the danger which finite creatures are in, from the very nature of propension, or particular affections."

When original man did yield to his natural propensities for external objects and thus failed by discipline of will to establish habits of virtue, then God through the Son and the Spirit came to his assistance. Not that the Father's laws were too rigid. Even in nature, where the will of the Father is revealed, we find not only severity but also indulgence (Op. Cit., p. 256). Even so the Son and the Spirit in a special sense reveal the mercy of God.

"Revelation teaches us, that the unknown laws of God's more general government, no less than the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at present, are compassionate, as well as good in the more general notion of goodness; and that he hath mercifully provided, that there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind; whatever that destruction unprevented would have been" (Idem, p. 261).

God "gave his Son in the same way of goodness to the world, as he affords particular persons the friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures; when without it, their temporal ruin would be a certain consequence of their follies; in the same way of goodness, I say: though in a transcendent and infinitely higher degree" (pp. 261, 262).

On such a theology as this, it is evident the Protestant doctrine of Scripture cannot well be maintained. There is no longer any strict necessity for Scripture on account of the sin of man. This sin is, in part, due to man's finitude. So man is scarcely, at least not exclusively, responsible for his sin. And his sin is not self-conscious disobedience against the known will of God. Man was not at the first clearly surrounded by the will of God. God's revelation was not clear because it was not all-inclusive. So redemptive revelation cannot be clear. It too comes in a universe that contains forces over which God has no control. And the authority ascribed to such a revelation can be no higher than that of expert advice to the largely autonomous man. The relation between god and man is not that of the covenant as pictured in Scripture, but is a matter of claims and counter-claims of one person who is greater than the other to whom he gives good advice about the arrangements of the universe. There could be no finality to the revelation or advice given by this greater, more experienced person to this lesser, less experienced person. For the greater person would find himself in a process of development too.

Of course this view of Christianity and of its function in the world is not typical of the average Arminian Christian. The average Arminian evangelical has a much more Scriptural view of Christianity. Even Butler had a better view of Christianity than is expressed in his mode of reasoning for its defense. But the point of importance to note is that when the idea of autonomy in man is accepted in any measure the Protestant view of Scripture is to that degree compromised. We are then back with the chain of being idea, the gradation motif of Romanism. Christian men have undertaken to satisfy the supposed needs of the natural man as this natural man himself defines those needs. Christian theologians undertake to prove the truth of Christianity by reducing it to such an extent that it is scarcely distinguishable from the higher types of non-Christian thought. Scripture is then no longer what it intends to be, the self-testifying Word of God, basic and controlling in the principles of those who give their thoughts over to the subjection and obedience of Christ Jesus.

Miley

The theology of Miley is also Arminian. A few words may be in order about him. He also interprets Scripture in terms of a philosophy in which the idea of the autonomous man plays a prominent part. According to Miley, Adam lived in a sort of pre-moral state. Adam's nature, he argues,

"...certainly could contain no proper ethical element, such as can arise only from free personal action" (Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 409).

Adam had a non-ethical and therefore non-meritorious holiness. Human action to be moral action, according to Miley, must not be done in relation to the all-encompassing plan of God; it must rather be done in a vacuum. Only a series of acts resulting exclusively from the determination of man himself could result in a good character. The idea of created ethical character is rejected by Miley and by Arminian theologians in general.

It is clear that by this insistence on human autonomy Arminianism has involved itself in the hopeless problematics of non-Christian thought. How could moral action initiate from a moral amoeba? How could it operate in a vacuum, granted it could originate? How could a moral action be distinguished from a non-moral or an immoral action? In other words, how could the ought ever be set off over against the is? How, that is, could there then be any authoritative revelation of God over man? The very idea of revelation in the Christian sense of the term is compromised in this manner of speaking. The Christian theologians are again seeking to satisfy the natural man's demands.

The fact that Miley cannot consistently carry through the idea of an absolute beginning of moral action through man in a moral vacuum appears from the fact that he finds it necessary to insert some distinction between good and evil actions in man from the beginning.

"While Adam and Eve were constituted holy in their moral nature, the spontaneous tendencies of which were toward the good, yet in their complete constitution there were susceptibilities toward temptation which might be followed into sinful action" (Op. Cit. p. 434).

But there is not any justification for instituting any difference between good and evil unless it be upon the presupposition of God who identifies himself as good, who makes man good and unavoidably aware of the good. It is this identification of good by God himself and by God to man in his nature and in the direct commandment given him that is presented in Scripture. For that reason Scripture is self-authenticating. In being self-authenticating it authenticates clearly and unimstakably in man and to man the distinction between good and evil.

It follows from this view of Scripture as self-authenticating and as authenticating to man what is true and false, what is good and evil, that man lives by the absolute authority of God. All identification in history is therefore ultimately by way of God's authoritative statement. And therefore man cannot expect to understand exhaustively the reason for any particular commandment of God. The commandment as given to man in paradise with respect to the forbidden fruit was not based upon some easily discernable difference between the fruit of that tree and the fruit of other trees. It was, as far as man could discern, a matter of indifference. But God's setting aside the tree as forbidden indicated to man that the good for him is that which God says is good and because God says it. To be sure God would say only what is in accord with his holy nature. But there is for man no direct knowledge of this nature of God except through the expressed will of God. The will of God as expressed supernaturally in conjunction with the revelation of that already manifest in created reality is the source of man's knowledge.

It is this idea of Scripture as thus making God known to sinners through his will, requiring obedience to that will, which the autonomous man will not allow. He insists that he has the right of self-determination, the right of distinguishing for himself the true from the false and the right from the wrong. And it is this claim that Miley and other Arminians are owning as fit and proper for the sinner. And they own it to be right and proper for the sinner because they in the first place have reduced the idea of man's creation in the image of God into something resembling the non-Christian notion of man as participating in the being of God.

That the Arminian conception of man leads readily to the modern position in which man is frankly made the standard of right and wrong can readily be seen from O.A. Curtis' book, The Christian Faith. In his case Arminianism has practically lost its Scriptural moorings and placed itself upon a non-Christian philosophy of experience. Curtis acknowledges the influence of the personalist philosophy of experience of Bordon P. Bowne upon him. And this personalist philosophy is based upon the assumption of Immanuel Kant that man is his own interpreter. Albert C. Knudsen, also a personalist philosopher, claims

that Methodist theology was peculiarly fortunate in adapting itself to modern thinking inasmuch as it is empirical in its method from the beginning (The Christian Advocate, March 5 and 12, 1931).

He interprets the emphasis of early Methodism upon the "primacy of religious experience" as something that was bound to eventuate in a change of attitude toward the traditional objective view of Scripture, and Christian doctrine in general. And then he goes on to say,

"The important thing here, however, is to note that the primacy of religious experience, which may be said to be the basic principle of our church, makes theological finality impossible, and that if we are to be true to this principle our theology must continually adapt itself to the changing thought of the world. . . must, in a word, be progressive" (Idem, p. 292).

Whatever our reaction may be to this claim of Knudsen's, it remains true that the Arminian point of view makes compromise with the natural man. In this it resembles the position of Rome and cannot be said to represent Protestantism at its best. And Arminianism therefore cannot place the Christian system of truth squarely over against the non-Christian system. It has granted that the non-Christian thought, which is based upon the idea of the autonomy of man, upon the idea of a principle of continuity that stands above both God and man, and upon a principle of discontinuity that surrounds both God and man with chance, can, for all that, make intelligible distinctions between right and wrong, between one fact and another fact, and between truth and falsehood. To make such an admission involves a failure to present Christianity as expressed in the self-authenticating Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as requiring man to turn away from his sin to the living God through the Christ whom he has sent to be the Savior of men.

Chapter VII

NATURAL THEOLOGY AND SCRIPTURE

We have now reached the point in our discussion where we may ask how Christians who believe the Bible for what it is, the self-attesting word of God, should present this Bible to those who live by the principle of the autonomy of man. From time to time that question has already been answered, at least by implication. In general the answer implied or suggested is that the Bible must be presented to men as the principle in terms of which the whole of human life is to be explained. It cannot come to men other than as the word of God. It must come in terms of authority. It must therefore require the obedience of men. It comes to men as the rightful sovereign comes to rebels who have usurped authority in his realm. It must come the way King Shaddai and Prince Immanuel did to the diabolonians in Bunyan's Holy War. At the same time it must come the way Jesus himself the Son of God came to Jerusalem weeping over its children, softly and tenderly offering them rest from the toil and burden of sin. God seeks spontaneous and loving acceptance of his Word; as he wanted this in paradise, so he wants it now. Christians must be, like the Apostle Paul, all things to all men in order to save some. Firm and insistent in their ultimate objective they must approach their goal suaviter in modo.

It is to be expected that Roman Catholics will not wish to present Scripture as authoritative in the sense described. They do not believe in the absolute authority of Scripture in any practical way. Their philosophy of reality allows for the notion of expert but not for that of absolute authority. According to Romanism God does not control all things and therefore he is not in a position to give an authoritative interpretation of all things nor really, of any one thing.

Evangelicals too, though of course they actually do constantly speak of the authority of Scripture, have a philosophy of being that cannot do justice to this idea. So they too, though to a much smaller extent than the Romanists, make compromise with the idea of human autonomy.

The way this compromise appears in connection with the presentation of Scripture is a matter of great interest for us. How do sincere Christian men who truly want to accept the Scriptures as the self-attesting word of God but who also want, in some measure, to own the claims of human autonomy, present the Scriptures to men?

The answer is that they seek to do this in piecemeal fashion. They would interpret Paul's words to the effect that they must be all things to all men in order to win some in such fashion as to present the natural man with what are to him the least objectionable features of Christianity first. Surely, they say, we must not antagonize men from the outset. We must not tell him at once that as ambassadors of the King of kings we demand unconditional surrender and will

be satisfied with nothing less. We must rather begin from what as Christians we have in common with men. Perhaps men have not stopped to think that even in their own view of the world there is room for the idea of the Beyond. It is no disgrace surely for anyone to admit that one is not omniscient. Do not all things end in mystery? In particular do not modern scientists, such as James Jeans and Eddington and others, stand reverently at the borders of the universe bowing before a god that is wholly beyond anything that man has discovered? And do not the best of philosophers interpret the lower things of the universe in terms of that which is higher, the material in terms of the spiritual? So why should not men accept the idea of the supernatural? It is but an extension of the principle of discontinuity which they themselves, in terms of their own philosophy, admit. The possibility of the existence of God, of his revelation to men, of his miraculous work in history ought to be granted by all but extreme determinists and rationalists.

From this point on, the evangelical will say to his friend, we can look together at the facts of nature and history in neutral fashion to see whether there is evidence there of God's presence and of Christ's redeeming work of mercy. Does it not look as though in all probability the facts can be better explained in terms of the theistic and Christian hypothesis than in terms of any other? Let reason by all means be adhered to; you are yourself the final judge, but will you not be compelled to admit that there is at least a probability, even a high probability that theism and Christianity are true? And should not probability be our guide in life? Does not one act upon it when in the nature of the case no demonstrative certainty can be obtained? In the case of ultimate things we should not expect demonstrative but only moral certainty. About the question of existence, that is all that can be expected. So then it is wholly reasonable that you should submit yourself to the authority of the Christ of the Scriptures. We are not asking you forthwith to accept the Scriptures as the infallible Word of God. We are asking you first to regard them merely as historical documents. As such they speak of Jesus of Nazareth. They portray him to us and let him speak for himself. If you look at that portrait you will see that it has all the signs of verisimilitude upon it. You be the judge. Is he not divine? If you cannot trust him and his words, what else is there that you can trust? Then human nature in its deepest needs and in its highest aspirations cannot be satisfied.

It is in some such way that the evangelical argues for the idea of the Scriptures as the Word of God. They seek to show that it is quite in accord with "reason" to believe in the Bible as the Word of God. It is in accord with reason because reason itself points beyond itself, and what is presented in Scripture is not so far beyond anything that reason teaches but that it can be shown to be in accord with it. That is, principles of discontinuity and of continuity, of equivocity and of univocity as they are involved in the notion of human autonomy, are not challenged by this method of the evangelical.

Historically, it is in Bishop Butler's famous Analogy that this method of argument has been first worked out fully. Butler argues that both he and his

opponents agree on a known area of interpretation, the course and constitution of nature. From that known area he seeks to have his opponents go with him by the principle of analogy onto an acceptance of Christianity. Butler's principle of analogy is to all intents and purposes the same principle as was employed by Aquinas. We have already shown how this principle is inherently destructive of the Protestant idea of Scripture. For this principle starts with the principle of man as ultimate. How then is it possible to reach the idea of man as derivative from the idea that man is ultimate? It is a foregone conclusion that on the principle employed by Aquinas and Butler the god that is discovered is not absolute. He will be an abstract universal obtained by the way of negation based on the idea of autonomy or he will have only metaphorical characteristics when obtained by way of eminence from the same idea of autonomy. And the authority of the Scriptures that is involved in this method is therefore nothing higher than that of the expert.

In practice, of course, the position of the evangelical is far, very far, better than this. But it is his adherence to the idea of autonomy in some measure at least, that keeps him from doing justice to that which lives in his heart.

* * * *

It might be expected then that Reformed theology would have nothing to do with such an essentially Roman Catholic method of presenting the doctrine of Scripture. Its basic philosophy of reality, itself taken from Scripture, is that God controls whatsoever comes to pass. And this is true because God is what he is, the necessary self-existent One. God cannot possibly not exist. This too is taken from Scripture. On a non-Christian basis it must be maintained on the one hand that existence and being are coterminous and on the other hand that they have no necessary connection at all. Those who work on the idea of human autonomy have to be both utter rationalists and utter irrationalists. They have to hold that God knows all things as man also knows all things and that God does not know all things as man does not know all things. There is on this basis one law of rationality and one law of being to which God and man are alike subject. By its principle of continuity a god is obtained who is wholly rational and quite necessary for man as man is wholly rational and quite necessary for this god. By its principle of discontinuity a god is obtained who is wholly other than man, or rather, who is wholly unknown to man.

Over against this sort of God who springs from the principle of the autonomous man is the God of Scripture. He presents himself in Scripture as the One in terms of whom man himself is to forsake his autonomy and permit himself to be interpreted by God. In other words the Scripture presents God as ultimate. Accordingly Scripture presents itself as the final principle by which all things must be measured. The gods produced by the thinking of man apart from Scripture are idols. To hold to any such god is to break the first commandment of the God of the Scriptures.

Involved in this doctrine of God who controls whatsoever comes to pass is the notion that all things in the world are revelational and that man as created by God knows himself in relation to this revelation of God. He knows himself to be analogical to God in his being, his thought and his action. Even the sinner after the fall knows that his idea of autonomy is a false idea. He knows that he is a creature of God; yet his idea of autonomy would make him think as though he were not. So sin is always sin against better knowledge. But the sinner's depravity is such that he cannot but sin against better knowledge. His evil nature has become second nature to him. He is now controlled in his thinking by the idea of his own ultimacy. That is his adopted principle. It is that principle with which he confronts the challenge that comes to him in the idea of the Bible as the Word of God.

Not as though he is in every sense self-conscious of his own adopted principle. In practice the natural man is much better than his principle. He does not live up to his principle. He is not a finished product. He is restrained by the non-saving grace of God from "being as bad as he can be" and as bad as he will be when his principle has full control of him.

In practice therefore the man of the street is a complex individual. He is first the creature made in the image of God. He was represented in Adam at the beginning of history. In Adam he broke the covenant of God. He is now in principle opposed to God. He is dead in trespasses and sins. He is wholly polluted in all the aspects of his being. So far as he lives from this principle he will not because he cannot, and he cannot because he will not, accept the overtures of the grace of God unless by the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit he is made alive from the dead. But he does not live fully from his principle. Therefore he does not react in the exclusively negative way that we would expect him to, if we look at the principle that ultimately controls him. Like the prodigal of the Scriptural parable he cannot forget the father's voice and the father's house. He knows that the father has been good and is good in urging him to return. Yet his principle drives him on to the swine trough. On the one hand he will do the good, in the sense of that which externally at least is in accord with the will of God. He will live a good moral life. He will be anxious to promote the welfare of his fellow men. And in all this he is not a hypocrite. He is not sufficiently self-conscious to be a hypocrite.

It is therefore of the utmost importance to distinguish between what the natural man is by virtue of his adopted principle and what he still is because of the sense of deity that he has within him and because of the non-saving grace by which he is kept from working out his principle to the full and by which he is therefore also able to do the "morally good."

When presenting the Scriptures as the word of God to men it is therefore necessary to do so with due consideration of all of these facts. Men have the sense of deity within them. At bottom they therefore know that not to glorify God is to be disobedient to God, is to break the covenant of God. When chal-

lenged with the idea of the Bible as the word of God this challenge finds an immediate and unavoidable response in the deepest of men's beings. Men know at once that they ought to accept this challenge; they know that they are rebels and ought to resubmit themselves to their rightful sovereign.

It is therefore a fatal mistake not to demand absolute surrender of the natural man. He can understand the language of absolute surrender; he can understand no other language. This is not to say that he will forthwith surrender when the challenge is made. He will not surrender till the Spirit of God, who himself inspired the Bible as the Word of God, will give him life from the dead. But the challenge will be entirely intelligible to him. It requires him to accept his original sovereign, from whom he has turned in a false effort at autonomy, as his rightful Lord. He understands that in the nature of the case his Lord cannot accept a compromise peace. The diabolonians of Bunyan's parable sought such a peace; they were not offered anything but the promise of life on the basis of surrender, and death on the basis of anything less.

Does this idea of challenging the natural man with the demand for absolute surrender violate the principle of human personality? It would do so only if it were first granted that human personality would be thought of as inherently autonomous. But if human personality is inherently analogous of God's personality then it is natural and proper and good for this personality to own its Lord. Then too its rightful claims will be met. In paradise God did not force his requirements upon Adam. He presented him with a choice. He asked him to do that which is right from a deep desire to love and serve his Maker. It is that which must again be done when the sinner is confronted with the gospel as presented in Scripture. But the idea of choice, such choice as is incumbent upon and proper for human personality, cannot be of any significance if it is to take place in a void. And only upon the presupposition that is in relation to the commandment of God does human choice not take place in a void.

What needs to be done then in presenting the Scriptures to the natural man is to appeal to his sense of deity, to the fact that in the very penetralia of his consciousness he does always confront the same God who now asks him to yield obedience to him. The gospel of God's grace to sinners comes to creatures who know God but who have rebelled against God. It comes to those who now have needs such as they at the first did not have. They are now subject to the wrath of God due to their disobedience. If they are to be reinstated to favor with God, there must be atonement made for them. The Son of God has made that atonement for men. He now everywhere calls men to accept this atonement. Whosoever believes will be saved. That is, whosoever turns from his evil ways of unbelief, whosoever now accepts the finished work of Christ in his death and resurrection as paying in his stead for the penalty that was due to him for his sin, the penalty that is of eternal death, he will be saved. And he can learn about this salvation from no other source than from the Bible.

Nor can he learn of this salvation from the Bible as being merely an his-

torical record. The idea of the Scriptures as telling about the work of the Christ merely as historical records is inherently unintelligible. The idea is that these documents are supposed to be historically trustworthy even though they are not to be taken as the Word of God. That is to say the idea why Christian apologists approach the unbeliever with this idea of the trustworthiness of the gospels as historical documents rather than as the infallible word of God is to make the acceptance of what they teach easier for the natural man. But how could the natural man consistently allow that what the Scriptures say about the Christ could be historically true? From the point of view of the principle of autonomy with its principle of continuity and of discontinuity, what is said about Christ and his work is simply and utterly impossible. On the other hand what the gospels say about Christ is quite possible, as possible and therefore of as little special significance as anything else. From the point of view of his principle of continuity, the autonomous man must deny the uniqueness of Christ and his work, and from the point of view of his principle of discontinuity this same autonomous man must hold that Christianity as a fact is unique as everything else is unique.

Put in other words, on the principle of autonomy there is no intelligible principle of identification of anything in history. In the words of Goethe it may be said on this basis that if the individual speaks it is no longer the individual that speaks. If a fact is identifiable in history it is identifiable only in terms of a rationalist system that at the same time sublates its identity into relations.

The implication of what has been said is this: If Christians ask non-Christians merely to accept the gospels or some other part of Scripture as historically trustworthy documents they are allowing the legitimacy and efficacy of the principle of autonomy. They are allowing that it is possible intelligently to identify and set in order the elements of human experience in history by means of the principle of autonomy. But if this is true, if by the principle of autonomy such identification and ordering can take place as to intelligible predication, then there is no need for the idea of God speaking to men. It is just because man cannot speak intelligently to himself without God and because the sinner has sent God out of his life that God in condescending grace comes back to him. But he asks men to accept him at his word for what he is, the indispensable presupposition of all intelligent human predication.

It is in consonance with this approach that the Reformed Confessions assert that our final acceptance of the Scriptures as the Word of God rests upon the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. All the indications of the divinity of Scripture would lose their effectiveness and would indeed accomplish the very opposite of what they are meant to accomplish if they are taken out of their relation of dependence upon the testimony of the Holy Spirit. These indications do of course objectively show the Scriptures to be the Word of God. The whole Bible in all respects shows itself objectively to be the Word of God. The majesty of its style, the harmony of its parts and other such things, all indicate the Scriptures to be the Word of God. Prophecies fulfilled and miracles per-

formed, the works as well as the words of Christ, all that Scripture contains shows its divinity. And the record of these works and words of the Christ is ipso facto as a record identified by God as the Word of God. But the acceptance of both the Christ and his word, both the personal word and the spoken word, comes by virtue of one and the same act of submission and surrender. And this act of surrender and faith comes in consequence of the testimony of the Holy Spirit.

This testimony is therefore not a new revelation of God that would in turn need a new testimony for its corroboration. Nor does it work apart from the objective evidence of the divinity of Scripture. It appeals to man as made in the image of God with full ability to see and understand the significance of his deeds. It speaks to this same man as the sinner with utter inability to understand spiritually and to respond obediently to the demands of the gospel. It speaks to him through the content of the Bible and only through the content of the Bible. It actually convinces the sinner and practically convicts him of sin and of judgment. It compels him to believe that which he knows he ought to believe but which because of the perverseness of his will and the darkness of his mind he otherwise cannot believe, namely, that the Bible is the Word of God and what it contains is the system of truth as given to man by God.

What has been said so far in this chapter has not been universally agreed upon by Reformed theologians. There are among them at least two generally distinct points of view with respect to the matter discussed. It is well that these two distinct points of view be considered.

The difference between these two points of view hinges largely on the question of the method of apologetics to be followed in presenting the Christian faith to men. And this general difference of method of apologetics involves and is even centered in a difference of evaluation of the place and value of natural theology in relation to Scripture. At least in connection with our general purpose of dealing with Christian epistemology it is this question that interests us.

It will not be possible to do more than deal with some of the outstanding representatives of each of the two points of view. In fact it is around two names in particular that we wish to center the discussion of this subject. There is first the name of Dr. Abraham Kuyper Sr., founder of the Free University of Amsterdam. Then there is the name of Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, outstanding theologian of Princeton Seminary. Frequently the difference between the two points of view on apologetics is spoken of as the difference between the Princeton and the Amsterdam point of view. (It should be noted that since the reorganization of Princeton Seminary in 1929, neither the theology nor the view of Scripture entertained by Warfield are now taught at that institution. The representatives of the new Princeton should be classified with the modern rather than with the orthodox theologians.)

In looking into the difference between the Amsterdam and the Princeton schools of apologetics it should be noted first that there is little difference between them on the theology of Scripture. Barring relatively minor matters, the schools of Princeton as represented by Warfield and that of Kuyper are remarkably similar in the presentation of what Scripture teaches. More than that, there is equally close similarity between the views of Scripture as there is between the views of the content of Scripture. Both hold to the idea of God as controlling whatsoever comes to pass. Both hold with Calvin to man's having a sense of deity that is ineradicable because he is made in the image of God. Both are therefore equally opposed to the evangelical view of man, to the extent that it attributes autonomy to him in relation. Both hold with Calvin to the idea of the necessity of the testimony of the Holy Spirit if the natural man is to accept the Bible as the Word of God.

It is because of this large measure of agreement on the doctrine of Scripture as well as of the content of Scripture that the difference between them on the matter of natural theology is so remarkable.

Generally speaking, Warfield's method of apologetics implies a much higher view of natural theology than does that of Kuyper. But in saying this a word of explanation is in order. It is on the question of what each of these two men mean by natural theology. Kuyper frequently uses it as synonymous with the idea of general, non-soteriological revelation. Again he speaks of it as being that natural knowledge that man has by virtue of the fact that he is made in the image of God and has within him the sense of deity. So when he deals with the Belgic Confession and particularly with its statement to the effect that there are two ways of knowing God, one through nature and one through Scripture, he says that this must not be taken to mean what rationalists have made of it but must be taken to mean simply that "without the substratum of natural theology there would be no redemptive theology" (Encyclopaedie der Heilig Godgeleerdheid, Kampen, 1909 Vol. II, p. 328). It is not therefore the idea of the autonomous man that Kuyper thinks of when he speaks of natural theology. When he discusses the sinner and the fact that this sinner has usurped the authority of judging the work of redemption that God has wrought for man, he speaks of the natural principle, principium naturale (Idem, p. 335). He then contrasts with it the special principle, the principle by which God has in Christ and through the Spirit come to save sinners. These two principles, he argues, stand utterly opposed to one another.

"Since the revelatio specialis presupposes the fact that the operation of the natural principle has been disturbed in its healthful function through sin, it follows as a matter of course that this natural principle has lost the power of judgment. Whoever attributes this power of judgment to it recognizes it ipso facto as sound, and has therewith done away with the ration sufficiens of special revelation" (Idem, p. 335).

Warfield also uses the idea of natural theology sometimes as referring to natural revelation within and about man. Usually, however, he refers to the conclusions which men in general, whether Christian or not, have drawn from natural revelation. And the issue with respect to natural theology is with respect to this latter matter. It does not refer to natural revelation, either round about or within men. Nor does it even refer to what men ought to infer from this natural revelation whether external or internal. Nor does it refer to what those who have become redeemed have learned to infer from natural revelation inasmuch as they regard it in the light of Scripture. The question is, What evaluation is to be placed upon the interpretation of natural revelation, internal and external, that the natural man, who operates with the principle of autonomy, has given? Can the difference between the principle of autonomy and that of Christian theism be ignored so that men can together seek to interpret natural revelation in terms of one procedure?

It is on this point that Kuyper and Warfield differ materially. At first sight at least it seems as though the difference between them is irreconcilable. It is this difference that must first be delineated.

Kuyper's position has already been indicated in the telling sentence quoted. The idea of two ultimate principles is, he insists, a contradiction in terms. Either allow that the natural principle has within itself the legitimate powers of self-interpretation and then expect the special principle to be destroyed by it, or else maintain that the natural principle is in any case finite and more particularly sinful and then present the special principle to it with the demand of submission. Of course Kuyper chooses the second of these alternatives.

"Of course," says Kuyper, "the natural man has power to observe the facts of the physical universe, to weigh them and arrange them. It can reason logically; sin has not made man insane. But the direction of the human person has changed. The power of thought may be compared to a sharp blade. If this blade is put into a mower but it is put too high so that it cannot reach the grass there is no good result" (Idem, p. 241).

The result is, says Kuyper, even worse than that. For the action of sinful human thought is not merely fruitless; it is destructive of the truth. Sinful man is out to destroy the special principle when it comes to him with its challenge. The natural principle takes an antithetical position over against the special principle and seeks to destroy it by means of logical manipulation (Idem, p. 242). The natural principle lives from apistia; its faith is fixed upon the creature instead of upon the Creator (Idem, p. 254). It will therefore use its principles of discontinuity and of continuity in order by means of them to destroy the witness of Scripture to itself. The natural man is perfectly consistent with himself and intellectually honest in doing so. He is simply true to his principle. A principle, a first premise, cannot be proved. It is the basis of proof. If proof were given of a principle it would cease to be a principle (Idem, p. 338). The Christian realizes that the non-Christian does not know the truth about himself and of his

power of reason. He should therefore expect that the non-Christian will, from his principle, seek to destroy the special principle. He will do so by saying that the "irrational" element, that is the supernatural, is like the irrational element found everywhere. Or it will by means of its principle of continuity absorb all the claims of Scripture into a system of logical gradation (Idem, 339). (Zelf toch erkent ge van uw eigen standpunt, dat wie buiten stat, het werkelyk bestand van zyn eigen wezen, endus ook van zyn rede, nietinziet en niet inzien kan.) When you as a Christian present the unbeliever with the fact of miracles performed this has no power of compulsion for him who because of his principle cannot even allow the possibility of miracles (Idem, p. 341).

Kuyper makes a special point of the necessity of holding that Scripture itself is not merely a record of but is itself revelation. One cannot separate cool atmosphere from the ice through which it comes. Without the Scripture as revelation there is no revelation. If one does not take the Scripture itself as revelation then one ends by way of Origen in the philosophy of Plato or of Aristotle (Idem, p. 316).

Similarly the idea of the testimony of the Spirit, too, is part of the special principle the whole of which one makes the foundation of his thought or the whole of which one rejects in the name of the natural principle (Idem, p. 320). With the light of Scripture it is possible for man to read nature aright. Without that light we cannot, even on the Areopagus, reach further than the unknown God (Idem, p. 332).

It is thus that the enlightened consciousness of the people of God stands over against the natural consciousness of the world. For the believers, Scripture is the principle of theology. As such it cannot be the conclusions of other premises, but it is the premise from which all other conclusions are drawn (Idem, p. 517).

From what has been said it is not to be concluded that Kuyper has no great appreciation of the knowledge of God that may be obtained from nature. For the contrary is true. He lays the greatest possible stress upon the idea that the Bible is not a book that has fallen from heaven. There is a natural foundation for it. This natural foundation is found in the fact that the natural is itself the creation of the same God who in the special principle comes to man for his redemption. In form at least Kuyper would therefore agree with Aquinas when he says that the supernatural or spiritual does not destroy but perfects nature. But Kuyper's ideas of the natural and the supernatural are quite different from those of Aquinas. For Aquinas the natural is inherently defective; it partakes of the nature of non-being. Hence sin is partly at least to be ascribed to finitude. For Kuyper the natural as it came from the hand of God was perfect. To be sure there was to be development. And historically, this development has come by way of grace. But for all that it is an "accident," something that is incidental to the fulfillment of the natural. Christ came into the world to save, and in saving developed to its full fruition the powers of the natural. Thus grace is not

reduced to something that is to be naturally expected as a development of the natural. The gradation motif of Aquinas is replaced by the idea of grace as accidental, as the means by which sin, which is wholly unnatural or contrary to the natural, and destructive of the natural, is removed, in order that the truly natural may thus come to expression.

The natural man, working on his principle, working from the principle of his second nature, must not be given the opportunity of destroying the accidental character of redemption. He would be given this opportunity if his principle of autonomy were not challenged. For working on his principle he would destroy the accidental character of grace altogether. He would do what Romanism has so largely done. He would seek to show that the redemptive is to be expected by man. He would show on the other hand that the redemptive is something without determinate character in history so that every man may regard it as he pleases.

It will now be seen that what has been advocated in this syllabus has in large measure been prepared under the influence of Kuyper, or has at least to a large extent been suggested by his thinking. The interdependence of the various aspects of what Kuyper so effectively speaks of as the special principle is something that would seem to be of the essence of a sound doctrine of Scripture. It is difficult to see how else the Scriptures can be presented as self-attesting. As soon as the elements of the special principle, such as the indications of divinity, the testimony of the Spirit, or the words of Christ are set next to one another, as largely independent of one another, the natural man is given an opportunity to do his destructive work. He is then allowed to judge at least with respect to one or more of these elements. And if he is allowed to judge of the legitimacy or meaning of any one of them he may as well be given the right to judge of all of them. If the natural man is allowed the right to take the documents of the gospels as merely historically trustworthy witnesses to the Christ and his work, he will claim and can consistently claim also to be the judge of the Christ himself. For it is only if the Christ be taken as the Son of God that he can be said legitimately to identify himself. If he is not presupposed as such then his words too have no power. Then they too are absorbed in what is a hopeless relativity of history.

Kuyper then has done great service to Christian apologetics by thus stressing the interdependence of the various elements of the special principle, and by stressing also its incidental or accidental nature. It is thus alone that the idea of Scripture as self-attesting and as at the same time based upon the natural as it came from the hand of God is really maintained.

There is one main conclusion that Kuyper has drawn from this his general position, and that is that because of it there is virtually no use in Christian apologetics. Not that Kuyper has himself always been true to his virtual rejection of apologetics. But he frequently argues that since the natural man is not to be regarded as the proper judge of the special principle and since this is true be-

cause his understanding is darkened, there is no use and no justification for reasoning with the natural man at all. The question is whether this conclusion can be harmonized with the fact that Christianity is the true religion, and has the criterion of truth within itself. In his Institutes Calvin greatly stresses that men ought to see God's presence as Creator, Provider, Benefactor, and Judge in nature and in history because this presence is clearly there. Men have not done justice by the facts, by the evidence of God's presence before their eyes, unless they burst out into praise of him who has made all things. And Christ himself says that men should believe him as being in and with the Father because of his words, but if not for his words then for his works' sake. Does not this imply that there is a clearly distinguishable presence of God in history? And does not the doctrine of Scripture itself maintain that this book has in it the marks of divinity so that it is clearly distinguishable from all other books as being the very Word of God? And does not the Holy Spirit testify to the Word with definite content as being the Word of God?

Shall we then simply say that since the natural man is blind there is no purpose in displaying before him the rich color scheme of the revelation of God's grace? Shall we say that we must witness to men only and not reason with them at all? And how would witnessing to them be of any more use to them than would reasoning? If men cannot in the least understand what he who witnesses is speaking of, will the witnessing be any challenge to him at all?

To find an answer to such questions as these it is well that we turn to the objection that Warfield raised against the position of Kuyper. In an introductory note to the work on Apologetics written by Francis R. Beattie (Richmond 1903) Warfield expresses vigorous dissent with Kuyper's view of Christian apologetics. He speaks of the "widespread misprision of Apologetics" that has come about because of rationalism and because of Mysticism. For rationalism religion is expressed only in value judgments; hence it is impossible to know anything of God.

"In a somewhat odd parallelism to this (though, perhaps it is not so odd, after all) the mystical tendency is showing itself in our day most markedly in a widespread inclination to decline Apologetics in favor of the so-called testimonium Spiritus Sancti. The convictions of the Christian man, we are told, are not the product of reasons addressed to his intellect, but are the immediate creation of the Holy Spirit in his heart. Therefore, it is intimated, we cannot only do very well without these reasons, but it is something very like sacrilege to attend to them" (Op. Cit. p. 20).

Warfield recognizes that this mysticism is often the expression of modern irrationalism. As such, he says, it is to be expected.

"The case is very much different, however, when we encounter very much the same forms of speech on the lips of heroes of the faith, who depreciate apologetics because they feel no need of 'reasons' to ground a faith which

they are sure they have received immediately from God. Apologetics, they say, will never make a Christian. Christians are made by the creative Spirit alone. And when God almighty has implanted faith in the heart, we shall not require to seek 'reasons' to ground our conviction of the truth of the Christian religion. We have tasted and seen, and we know of ourselves that it is from God. Thus, the sturdiest belief joins hands with unbelief to disparage the defenses of the Christian religion" (Idem, p. 21).

Then he speaks of the work of Kuyper from which we have quoted as follows:

"He has written an Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology, and in it he gives a place to apologetics, among the other disciplines. But how subordinate a place! And in what a curtailed form! Hidden away as a subdivision of a subdivision of what Dr. Kuyper calls the 'Dogmatical Group' of disciplines—one has to search for it before he finds it, and when he finds it, he discovers that its function is confined closely, we might almost say jealously, to the narrow task of defending developed Christianity against philosophy, falsely so-called" (Ibid.).

Apologetics comes for Kuyper at the end of the process whereby Christianity has been set forth thetically.

"Meanwhile, as for Christianity itself, it has remained up to this point — let us say frankly — the great Assumption. The work of the exegete, the historian, the systematist, has all hung, so to speak, in the air; not until all their labor is accomplished do they pause to wipe their streaming brows and ask whether they have been dealing with realities, or perchance with fancies only" (Idem, p. 22).

Has not Kuyper himself engaged in apologetics of a much more basic sort than he speaks of when he calls it a defense against false philosophy? Has he not defended the idea of the sense of deity independently of Scripture?

"We must, it seems, vindicate the existence, of a sensus divinitatis in man capable of producing a natural theology independently of special revelation; and then the reality of special revelation in deed and in word; and as well, the reality of a supernatural preparation of the heart of man to receive it; before we can proceed to the study of theology at all, as Dr. Kuyper has outlined it. With these things at least we must, then, confessedly, reckon at the outset; and to reckon with these things is to enter deeply into apologetics" (Idem, p. 23).

Then after noting this "inconsistency" in Kuyper he offers his basic criticism. Kuyper shows how the various disciplines of theology are to be organized ending with practical theology. Thus its system of truth may be drawn from Scripture.

"But certainly, before we draw it from the Scriptures, we must assure ourselves that there is a knowledge of God in the Scriptures. And, before we do that, we must assure ourselves that there is a God to know. Thus, we inevitably work back to first principles. And, in working back to first principles we exhibit the indispensibility of an 'Apologetical Theology' which of necessity holds the place of the first among the five theological disciplines.

"It is easy, of course, to say that a Christian man must take his standpoint not above the Scriptures, but in the Scriptures. He very certainly must. But surely he must first have Scriptures, authenticated to him as such, before he can take his standpoint in them. It is equally easy to say that Christianity is attained, not by demonstrations, but by a new birth. Nothing could be more true. But neither could anything be more unjustified than the inferences that are drawn from this truth for the discrediting of Apologetics. It certainly is not in the power of all the demonstrations in the world to make a Christian. Paul may plant and Apollos water; it is God alone who gives the increase. But it does not seem to follow that Paul would as well, therefore, not plant, and Apollos as well not water. Faith is the gift of God; but it does not in the least follow that the faith that God gives is an irrational faith, that is, a faith without grounds in right reason. It is beyond all question only the prepared heart that can fitly respond to the 'reasons'; but how can even a prepared heart respond, when there are no 'reasons' to draw out its action? One might as well say that photography is independent of light, because no light can make an impression unless the plate is prepared to receive it. The Holy Spirit does not work a blind, an ungrounded faith in the heart. What is supplied by his creative energy in working faith is not a ready-made faith, rooted in nothing, and clinging without reason to its object; nor yet new grounds of belief in the object presented; but just a new ability of the heart to respond to the grounds of faith, sufficient in themselves, already present to the understanding. We believe in Christ because it is rational to believe in him, not though it be irrational. Accordingly, our Reformed fathers always posited in the production of faith the presence of the 'argumentum propter quod credo,' as well as the 'principium seu causa efficiens a quo ad credendum adducor.' That is to say, for the birth of faith in the soul, it is just as essential that grounds of faith should be present to the mind as that the Giver of faith should act creatively upon the heart.

"We are not absurdly arguing that Apologetics has in itself the power to make a man a Christian or to conquer the world to Christ. Only the Spirit of Life can communicate life to a dead soul, or can convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment. But we are arguing that faith is, in all its exercises alike, a form of conviction, and is, therefore, necessarily grounded in evidence. And we are arguing that evidence accordingly has its part to play in the conversion of the soul; and that the systematically organized evidence which we call Apologetics similarly has its part to play in the Christianizing of the world. And we are arguing that this part is not a small part; nor is it a merely subsidiary part; nor yet a merely defensive

part - as if the one end of Apologetics were to protect an isolated body of Christians from annoyance from the surrounding world, or to aid the distracted Christian to bring his head into harmony with his heart. The part that Apologetics has to play in the Christianizing of the world is rather a primary part, and it is a conquering part. It is the distinction of Christianity that it has come into the world clothed with the mission to reason its way to its dominion. Other religions may appeal to the sword, or seek some other way to propagate themselves. Christianity makes its appeal to right reason, and stands out among all religions, therefore, as distinctively "the Apologetic religion." It is solely by reasoning that it has come thus far on its way to its kingship. And it is solely by reasoning that it will put all its enemies under its feet. Face to face with the tremendous energy of thought and the incredible fertility in assault which characterizes the world in its anti-Christian manifestation, Christianity finds its task in thinking itself thoroughly through, and in organizing, not its defense only, but also its attack. It stands calmly over against the world with its credentials in its hands, and fears no contention of men" (Op. Cit., p. 25, 26).

The idea that faith comes ultimately by virtue of the testimony of the Holy Spirit upon the minds of men does not exclude apologetics, argues Warfield. He cannot understand why Kuyper should minimize the significance of apologetics since he makes much of sin.

"Perhaps the explanation is to be found in a tendency to make too absolute the contrast between the 'two kinds of science' - that which is the product of the thought of sinful man in his state of nature, and that which is the product of man under the influence of the regenerating grace of God. There certainly do exist these 'two kinds of men' in the world - men under the unbroken sway of sin, and men who have been brought under the power of the palingenesis. And the product of the intellection of these 'two kinds of men' will certainly give us 'two kinds of science.' But the difference between the two is, after all, not accurately described as a difference in kind - gradus non mutant speciem. Sin has not destroyed or altered in its essential nature any one of man's faculties, although - since it corrupts homo totus - it has affected the operation of them all. The depraved man neither thinks, nor feels, nor wills as he ought; and the products of his action as a scientific thinker cannot possibly escape the influence of this everywhere operative destructive power; although, as Dr. Kuyper lucidly points out, they are affected in different degrees in the several 'sciences,' in accordance with the nature of their objects and the rank of the human faculties engaged in their structure. Nevertheless, there is question here of perfection of performance, rather than of kind. It is 'science' that is produced by the subject held under sin, even though imperfect science - falling away from the ideal here, there and elsewhere, on account of all sorts of deflecting influences entering in at all points of the process. The science of sinful man is thus a substantive part of the abstract science produced by the ideal subject, the general human con-

sciousness, though a less valuable part than it would be without sin" (Op. Cit. p. 27).

In this passage Warfield rejects the idea of a twofold science so fully developed in Kuyper's work. We cannot here enter upon a discussion of Kuyper's conception of a twofold science, the one based upon the idea of autonomy and the other based upon the idea of regeneration. His main point is that those who have not experienced the working of the special principle regard all that they see as normal. On the other hand he who has experienced the special principle realizes that due to sin the mind of man has been darkened, and a great disturbance has taken place in nature by which the transparency or clarity of God's revelation has been obscured (Op. Cit. p. 171). But Warfield argues that the difference between the scientific effort of the regenerated and the non-regenerated consciousness is, though a great difference, yet after all no more than a gradational difference. Otherwise "there would be no 'science' attainable at all." The regenerated man himself is not perfect in degree. He remains a sinner.

"Only after his sanctification has become complete can the contrast between him and the unregenerate sinner become absolute; not until then, in any case, could there be thought to exist an absolute contrast between his intellection and that of the sinner. In the meantime, the regenerated man remains a sinner; no new faculties have been inserted into him by regeneration; and the old faculties, common to man in all his states, have been only in some measure restored to their proper functioning. He is in no condition, therefore, to produce a 'science' differing in kind from that produced by sinful man; the science of palingenesis is only a part of the science of sinful humanity, though no doubt its best part; and only along with it can it enter as a constituent part into that ideal science which the composite human subject is producing in its endless effort to embrace in mental grasp the ideal object, that is to say, all that is. Even if the palingenesis had completed its work, indeed, and those under its sway had become 'perfect,' it may be doubted whether the contrast between the science produced by the two classes of men could be treated as absolute. Sinful and sinless men are, after all, both men; and being both men, are fundamentally alike and know fundamentally alike. Ideally there is but one 'science,' the subject of which is the human spirit, and the object all that is. Meanwhile, as things are, the human spirit attains to this science only in part and by slow accretions, won through many partial and erroneous constructions. Men of all sorts and of all grades work side by side at the common task, and the common edifice grows under their hands into ever fuller and truer outlines. As Dr. Kuyper finely says of himself, in the conflict of perceptions and opinions, those of the strongest energy and clearest thought finally prevail. Why is not the palingenesis to be conceived simply as preparing the stronger and clearer spirits whose thought always finally prevails? It is not a different kind of science that they are producing. It is not even the same kind of science, but as part of a different edifice of truth. Through them merely the better scientific outlook, and the better scientific product, are striving in conflict with the outlook and product of fellow-workers, to get

built into the one great edifice of truth ascertained, which is rising slowly because of sin, but surely because of palingenesis" (Op. Cit. p. 28).

From this quotation it seems as though Warfield is altogether ignoring the fact that there is a difference of principle between those who work from the basis of regeneration and those who do not. He seems to regard the fact that there cannot in history be any actually complete manifestation of the victory of one principle over the other as sufficient warrant for ignoring Kuyper's contention that the two types of people spoken of see themselves and all things else differently from one another. Yet Warfield realizes full well that there is a conflict of principle going on in the world. And what he is deeply concerned to avoid is the separation of the Christian from the non-Christian in the field of knowledge, for then the conflict of principles would be stifled.

"And no mistake could be greater than to lead them to decline to bring their principles into conflict with those of the unregenerate in the prosecution of the common task of man. It is the better science that ever in the end wins the victory; and palingenetic science is the better science, and to it belongs the victory. How shall it win its victory, however, if it declines the conflict? In the ordinance of God, it is only in and through this conflict that the edifice of truth is to rise steadily onwards to its perfecting.

"In the fact thus brought out, the ultimate vindication of the supreme importance of Apologetics lies, and as well the vindication of its supreme utility. In the prosecution of the tasks of Apologetics, we see the palingenesis at work on the science of man at its highest point. And here, too, the 'man of stronger and purer thought' - even though that he has it is of God alone - 'will prevail in the end.' The task of the Christian is surely to urge 'his stronger and purer thought' continuously, and in all its details, upon the attention of men. It is not true that he cannot soundly prove his position. It is not true that the Christian view of the world is subjective merely, and is incapable of validation in the forum of pure reason. It is not true that the arguments adduced for the support of the foundations of the Christian religion lack objective validity. It is not even true that the minds of sinful men are inaccessible to the 'evidences,' though, in the sense of the proverb, 'convinced against their will,' they may 'remain of the same opinion still.' All minds are of the same essential structure; and the less illuminated will not be able to permanently resist or gainsay the determinations of the more illuminated. The Christian, by virtue of the palingenesis working in him, stands undoubtedly on an indefinitely higher plane of thought than that occupied by sinful man as such. And he must not decline, but use and press the advantage which God has thus given him. He must insist, and insist again, that his determinations, and not those of the unilluminated, must be built into the slowly rising fabric of human science. Thus will he serve, if not obviously his own generation, yet truly all the generations of men" (Op. Cit. p. 29, 30).

It is well that at this point the criticism made by Warfield of the position of Kuyper be supplemented with a brief statement of what he has elsewhere said on the nature of apologetics. We turn first to his article Apologetics, first printed in the New Schaff Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, and reprinted in his collected works, Studies in Theology. It is from the latter that we take our quotations (New York: 1932).

Apologetics, says Warfield, has its basic justification not in any accident, "not even in that most pervasive and most portentous of all these accidents, the accident of sin; but in the fundamental needs of the human spirit" (p.4). If the Christian is to give an orderly account to himself and to all men of his faith he may conveniently divide his work into five parts:

"(1) ^{Take} The first, which may perhaps be called philosophical apologetics, under-_{akes} the establishment of the being of God, as a personal spirit, the creator, preserver, and governor of all things. To it belongs the great problem of theism, with the involved discussion of the antitheistic theories. (2) The second, which may perhaps be called psychological apologetics, undertakes the establishment of the religious nature of man and the validity of his religious sense. It involves the discussion alike of the psychology, the philosophy, and the phenomenology of religion, and therefore includes what is loosely called 'comparative religion' or the 'history of religions.' (3) To the third falls the establishment of the reality of the supernatural factor in history, with the involved determination of the actual relations in which God stands to His world, and the method of His government of His rational creatures, and especially His mode of making Himself known to them. It issues in the establishment of the fact of revelation as the condition of all knowledge of God, who as a personal Spirit can be known only so far as He expresses Himself; so that theology differs from all other sciences in that in it the object is not at the disposal of the subject, but vice versa. (4) The fourth, which may be called historical apologetics, undertakes to establish the divine origin of Christianity as the religion of revelation in the special sense of that word. It discusses all the topics which naturally fall under the popular caption of the 'evidences of Christianity.' (5) The fifth, which may be called bibliological apologetics, undertakes to establish the trustworthiness of the Christian Scriptures as the documentation of the revelation of God for the redemption of sinners. It is engaged especially with such topics as the divine origin of the Scriptures; the methods of the divine operation in their origination; their place in the series of redemptive acts of God, and in the process of revelation; the nature, mode, and effect of inspiration; and the like" (page 13).

Apologetics therefore has great value.

"Though faith is the gift of God, it does not in the least follow that the faith which God gives is an irrational faith, that is, a faith without recognizable ground in right reason. We believe in Christ because it is rational to believe in Him, not, even though it be irrational. Of course mere reasoning cannot

make a Christian; but that is not because faith is not the result of evidence, but because a dead soul cannot respond to evidence. The action of the Holy Spirit in giving faith is not apart from evidence, but along with evidence; and in the first instance consists in preparing the soul for the reception of evidence" (Idem, p. 15).

From what has been quoted of Warfield's position the following points of importance emerge: (1) Warfield agrees with Kuyper that the natural man is dead in trespasses and sins. It is not because of any lower view of sin that Warfield defends against Kuyper the right and value of apologetics.

(2) Warfield stresses the objective rationality of the Christian religion. This is not to suggest that Kuyper does not also believe in it. But Warfield by pointing out again and again that the Christian faith is belief on evidence, not blind belief, makes plain that Christianity is rationally defensible. And this has direct significance for apologetics. Kuyper seems sometimes to argue from the fact that the natural man is blind to the truth, to the uselessness of apologetics. But Warfield points out that this does not follow. On this point he closely follows Calvin. Men ought to conclude that God is their Creator, their Benefactor and their Judge. They ought to see these things because the revelation of God to them is always clear. The fact that men do not see this and cannot see this is due to the fact that their minds are darkened and their wills are perverted through sin. Such is the argument of Calvin. And Warfield's insistence that we believe Christianity because it is rational, not in spite of the fact that it is irrational, is fully in accord with it. To the extent that Warfield differs on this point with Kuyper he has done great service for Christian apologetics.

That such is the case may be observed from the fact that Romanist apologetics lowers the objective clarity of God's revelation. Romanist apologetics argues that men have done justice by the evidence for God's existence and government of the world if they conclude that God probably exists. But it is of the essence of the Reformed doctrine of God and his revelation to men that his existence is objectively clear to men. Men cannot look at any fact whether within or about them but they must see in it the presence of God. Even when men have fallen into sin they cannot eradicate their sense of the presence of God. Sin is what it is precisely because it is a negative ethical reaction to God's inescapable presence. Sin is not due to some slenderness of being, to some nearness to non-being, to some lack of supernatural grace; it is direct rejection of the known will of God. Accordingly the sinner is a sinner by virtue of the suppression of the revelation of God within him. Only thus can the Protestant doctrine of sin as ethical alienation rather than physical defect be maintained. And only thus can the fact that Christianity is ethical in character, rather than a means by which men are lifted up to a higher place in the scale of being be maintained.

It is therefore of the utmost importance to stress what Warfield stressed, when he said that we believe Christianity because it is rational. When the Scriptures are presented to the natural man and with it the system of truth that it con-

tains, he knows at once that he ought to accept it. He knows that if he rejects it he does so in spite of the fact that he knows its claim is true and just. Scripture speaks in the name of God to the sinner asking that he repent from his sin. He who has usurped authority to himself is asked to recognize his legitimate sovereign. A son that has gone away from home and has been away for a long time might suddenly be put face to face with his father. Would it be possible for him not to own and recognize his father for what he actually is? So impossible is it for the sinner to deny that Christianity is true. The sense of deity within constantly gives the lie to all his theories short of the recognition of God as Creator and Judge. So also when confronted with Scripture as the Word of God the natural man can apply his reductionistic theories only at the cost of an evil conscience. He may be intellectually honest in his research. But at bottom he maintains his theories against better knowledge.

(3) Having stressed the objective rationality of Christianity, Warfield does not adequately stress the difference between the principles of the natural man and the principles of the Christian.

(a) This appears primarily in the fact that he attributes to "right reason" the ability to interpret natural revelation with essential correctness. It is not easy to discover just what Warfield means by "right reason." But it is not the regenerated reason. It is not the reason that has already accepted Christianity. It is the reason that is confronted with Christianity and has some criterion apart from Christianity with which to judge the truth of Christianity. Sometimes it appears that this "right reason" springs from or is identical with the sense of deity that men have within them. There is little doubt but that this is what Warfield has in mind. But then he speaks as though man by virtue of his natural endowments is able to interpret natural revelation correctly. For even though he speaks of the struggle that must go on between the Christian and the non-Christian view of things this struggle must not be regarded as destroying the approach to a unified result between them. Since Christians as Christians have received no new natural endowments they cannot be said, according to Warfield, to have some interpretation of natural revelation that is not open to all men.

In spite of the fact that Warfield as much as Kuyper believes in the ethical alienation of the natural man from God he does not give this fact its rightful significance in Christian apologetics. He criticizes Kuyper for concluding to the uselessness of apologetics from the fact of the depravity of men. We hold this criticism to be essentially just. An Arminian would argue to the uselessness of preaching if one holds that the sinner to whom this preaching comes is dead in trespasses and sins. The Reformed Christian replies that though he is dead in sins, this deadness is an ethical deadness. As endowed with the image of God and with the sense of deity man can very well understand intellectually what is meant when the preacher tells him that he is a sinner and that he ought to repent. He knows God as Paul says so specifically in his letter to the Romans. Yet ethically he does not know God. His mind is darkened and his will perverted, as

Paul says with equal clarity. So then in his preaching the Reformed theologian is anxious to do justice to both aspects of Biblical truth on this matter. He would stress on the one hand the objective clarity of God's revelation to man. He would stress that this revelation is unavoidably present to the natural man since it always enters into the penetralia of his consciousness. On the other hand he would stress the ethical darkness of the mind of man. As a consequence of this darkness of mind, this blindness, he does not know and cannot know of himself without the illumination of the Holy Spirit that which, in the sense above defined, he knows and cannot help but know. Warfield has greatly stressed the former point and sometimes seems to draw from it the illegitimate conclusion that therefore the natural man, disregarding his ethical alienation from God, can give an essentially correct interpretation at least of natural revelation. Kuyper has stressed the second point, the point of man's ethical alienation and sometimes seems to draw from it the illegitimate conclusion that the natural man is unable to understand the intellectual argument for Christianity in any sense.

(b) The fact that Warfield has not sufficiently stressed the difference between the principles of the natural man and those of the regenerate man appears also from the fact that he also attributes to right reason the ability to judge of the credibility of redemptive revelation in terms of principles not taken from this redemptive revelation. Right reason must "establish the reality of the supernatural factor in history" by a method of identification that does not itself come from this supernatural reality.

This second point follows naturally from the first. If right reason, or men "in the natural use of reason" can discover that God, that is the true God, exists, they have therewith already found the possibility of supernatural revelation. And having established the possibility of supernatural revelation he needs only to engage in actual historical research in order to look for the reality of such a revelation. In doing so he will then be asked first to look at the New Testament as a human document written by trustworthy men. He must not be asked directly to regard these records as being the Word of God. The Christian knows that they are that. He is anxious to have the non-Christian also believe that they are that. But for the sake of letting "right reason" judge for itself whether they are, these records must first be presented as being ordinary historical records. As historical records written by the apostles they tell us about the life and labors, the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The picture given in these records leaves the impression of verisimilitude. Jesus of Nazareth appears from them as being the very son of God. And it is then from his authority as the son of God that we come back to the Scriptures. He testified of the Old Testament that it was the Word of God. And he promised to his disciples the Spirit of truth so that they would be inspired to write the New Testament as the Word of God. It is thus that we get to the idea of infallible inspiration by way of a process of reasoning that involves several steps. The doctrine of inspiration is the end result of this process of reasoning. We must not, argues Warfield, begin with it as immediately and directly a part of the Bible that as Christians we present unto men.

In some such way the general argument of Warfield may be summarized. We proceed to show from his writings what he says on the subject.

In an article "The Real Problem of Inspiration," Warfield seeks to show that the rejection of the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of Scripture leads ultimately to the confusion of those who reject it.

"Now if this doctrine is to be assailed on critical grounds, it is very clear that, first of all, criticism must be required to proceed against the evidence on which it is based. This evidence it is obvious, is twofold. First, there is the exegetical evidence that the doctrine held and taught by the Church is the doctrine held and taught by the Biblical writers themselves. And secondly, there is the whole mass of evidence - internal and external, objective and subjective, historical and philosophical, human and divine - which goes to show that the Biblical writers are trustworthy as doctrinal guides. If they are trustworthy teachers of doctrine and if they held and taught this doctrine, then this doctrine is true, and is to be accepted and acted upon as true by us all. In that case, any objections brought against the doctrine from other spheres of inquiry are inoperative; it being a settled logical principle that so long as the proper evidence by which a proposition is established remains unrefuted, all so-called objections brought against it pass out of the category of objections to its truth into the category of difficulties to be adjusted to it" (Revelation and Inspiration, p. 174, New York, Oxford, 1927).

Again and again Warfield falls back on this point that the last basis to which appeal must be made when men are doubtful about the doctrine of inspiration is that they are forced also to reject the apostles as trustworthy guides of doctrine. "Are the New Testament writers trustworthy guides in doctrine? Or are we at liberty to reject their authority, and frame contrary doctrines for ourselves?" (Idem, p. 180). Again: "First, we emphasize the fact that, this being the real state of the case, we cannot modify the doctrine of plenary inspiration in any of its essential elements without undermining our confidence in the authority of the apostles as teachers of doctrine" (Idem, p. 181). Or again, "It follows on the one hand that it [the doctrine of inspiration] cannot rationally be rejected save on the ground of evidence which will outweigh the whole body of evidence which goes to authenticate the Biblical writers as trustworthy witnesses and teachers of doctrine" (Idem, p. 209).

It is by this appeal to the apostles as trustworthy teachers of doctrine that Warfield would avoid the charge of making all teaching of Scripture to depend upon the doctrine of inspiration.

"Let it not be said that thus we found the whole Christian system upon the doctrine of plenary inspiration. We found the whole Christian system on the doctrine of plenary inspiration as little as we found it upon the doctrine of angelic existences. Were there no such thing as inspiration, Christianity would be true, and all its essential doctrines would be credibly witnessed to

us in the generally trustworthy reports of the teaching of our Lord, and of His authoritative agents in founding the Church, preserved in the writings of the apostles and their first followers, and in the historical witness of the living Church. Inspiration is not the most fundamental of Christian doctrines, nor even the first thing we prove about the Scriptures. It is the last and crowning fact as to the Scriptures. These we first prove authentic, historically credible, generally trustworthy, before we prove them inspired. And the proof of their authenticity, credibility, general trustworthiness would give us a firm basis for Christianity prior to any knowledge on our part of their inspiration, and apart indeed from the existence of inspiration. The present writer, in order to prevent all misunderstanding, desires to repeat here what he has said on every proper occasion – that he is far from contending that without inspiration there could be no Christianity. 'Without any inspiration,' he added, when making this affirmation on his induction into the work of teaching the Bible – 'without any inspiration we could have had Christianity; yea, and men could still have heard the truth and through it been awakened, and justified, and sanctified, and glorified. The verities of our faith would remain historically proven to us – so bountiful has God been in His fostering care – even had we no Bible; and through those verities, salvation.' We are in entire harmony in this matter with what we conceive to be the very true statement recently made by Dr. George P. Fisher, that 'if the authors of the Bible were credible reporters of revelations of God, whether in the form of historical transactions of which they were witnesses, or of divine mysteries that were unveiled to their minds, their testimony would be entitled to belief, even if they were shut up to their unaided faculties in communicating what they had thus received' " (Idem, p. 209, 210).

A little later Warfield adds:

"We must indeed prove the authenticity, credibility and general trustworthiness of the New Testament writings before we prove their inspiration; and even were they not inspired this proof would remain valid and we should give them accordant trust. But just because this proof is valid, we must trust these writings in their witness to their inspiration, if they give such witness; and if we refuse to trust them here, we have in principle refused them trust everywhere. In such circumstances their inspiration is bound up inseparably with their trustworthiness, and therefore with all else that we receive on trust from them" (Idem, p. 212).

A point of particular interest is the relation between the written and the incarnate word. As stated above, Warfield would accept what the Apostles say about Jesus Christ on the ground that they are trustworthy teachers of doctrine. For if we trust them at all we will trust them in the account that they give of the person and in the report they give of the teaching of Christ; whereupon, as they report Him as teaching the same doctrine of Scripture that they teach, we are brought fact to face with divine testimony to this doctrine of inspiration.

"The argument, then, takes the form given it by Bishop Wordsworth: 'The New Testament canonizes the Old, the INCARNATE WORD puts His seal on the WRITTEN WORD. The Incarnate Word is God; therefore the Inspiration of the Old Testament is authenticated by God Himself'" (Idem, p. 212).

Once more, and finally, Warfield would base the work of the Holy Spirit in relation to Scripture also upon the apostles as trustworthy teachers of doctrine.

"And, again, the general trustworthiness of the writers of the New Testament gives us the right and imposes on us the duty of accepting their witness to the relation the Holy Ghost bears to their teaching..." (Idem, p. 212, 213).

In summing up this approach Warfield says:

"It is not on some shadowy and doubtful evidence that the doctrine is based – not on an a priori conception of what inspiration ought to be, not on a 'tradition' of doctrine in the Church, though all the a priori considerations and the whole tradition of doctrine in the Church are also thrown in the scale for and not in that against this doctrine; but first on the confidence which we have in the writers of the New Testament as doctrinal guides, and ultimately on whatever evidence of whatever kind and force exists to justify that confidence. In this sense, we repeat, the cause of distinctive Christianity is bound up with the cause of the Biblical doctrine of inspiration" (Idem, p. 213).

Warfield realizes that his method of establishing the doctrine of Scripture as inspired of God can produce no more than probable truthfulness.

"Of course, this evidence is not in the strict logical sense 'demonstrative'; it is 'probable' evidence. It therefore leaves open the metaphysical possibility of its being mistaken" (Idem, p. 218).

This probable evidence is, to be sure, so great as to amount in practice to demonstration itself. Even so it must be stressed that the force of the argument is no more than probable. How else could we with open minds consider the phenomena of Scripture that are sometimes alleged as militating against its divinity?

"...their study is not to be neglected; we have not attained through 'probable' evidence apodeictic certainty of the Bible's infallibility" (Idem, p. 218).

It is not, of course, that Warfield himself entertains any doubts about the plenary inspiration and therefore the divinity of Scripture. On the contrary he was one of its greatest advocates. Nor can we disagree with him when he says that the Christian faith is not a blind faith but is faith based on evidence. At every turn where Warfield militates against mysticism of every sort he has made all believers his debtor. At the end of the article from which the last quotations have been taken he exclaims:

"If then we ask what we are to do with the numerous phenomena of Scripture inconsistent with verbal inspiration, which, so it is alleged, 'criticism' has brought to light, we must reply: Challenge them in the name of the New Testament doctrine, and ask for their credentials. They have no credentials that can stand before that challenge. No single error has yet been demonstrated to occur in the Scriptures as given by God to His Church" (Idem, p. 225).

But if we are to follow Warfield in making this bold challenge we shall have to follow him when elsewhere he asserts his convictions with respect to the system of truth that the Scriptures teach, and the doctrine of Scripture that is involved in that system. That system is the system of the Reformed faith. It is based upon the idea that God is the necessary self-existent Being, the ontological trinity, the God who controls whatsoever comes to pass. All the works proceeding from this one God, whether directly and immediately from the Father, the Son or the Holy Spirit, are yet the works of this one God. All the facts of creation, and all the facts of redemption, objectively through what Christ did in history once and for all, and subjectively through what the Holy Spirit has since done in his work of applying the redemption wrought by Christ to men, is self-attesting. All testimony for the truth of the Word and work of this God is through human agency. Even the writings of Scripture are given through human agency. But this makes them no less the self-attesting Word of God. The identification of Scripture as the Word of God is, of necessity, also the work of the self-attesting God, in this case effected through the testimony of the Holy Spirit. The identity of Scripture as the Word of God can, therefore, be effected no other way than by way of the self-testimony of Scripture. And it can be accepted, in the last analysis, in no other way than through the testimony of the Holy Spirit to the Scripture as self-attesting.

It follows that if we accept this view of theology and of the doctrine of Scripture as Warfield has himself often enough set it forth, it is impossible to follow him in his method of apologetics as outlined above. This method would lead to the very mysticism or rationalism which it is his great desire to oppose. For mysticism is involved in the principle of equivocation and rationalism is involved in the principle of univocism, and they are both based upon the idea of human autonomy.

This idea of human autonomy lies back of the idea of abstract possibility as a substitute for the idea, as defended by Warfield, that God himself is the source of possibility. And Warfield recognized the legitimacy of the idea of abstract possibility in his apologetic methodology. His whole procedure as outlined above is based upon the idea that in studying the facts, either of natural or of special revelation, men have every right to start from the idea that God can possibly not exist and that the Bible at least can possibly be the word of men rather than the word of God. He insists that men have a right and a duty to be open-minded with respect to the claims of God for himself. And the Christian must not claim more than probable certainty for his position.

In thus allowing for the idea of abstract possibility Warfield cannot do justice to the claims of God's revelation either in nature or in history or in Scripture. He cannot do justice to the fact that the God of his own theology is the source of necessity and therefore of necessity self-attesting. He cannot do justice to the evidence of God's existence in nature and history. He cannot say with Calvin that men ought to see God, the true God, in nature and history since this true God and he alone is clearly revealed there. No other God could possibly be revealed there. A theism that is said to be more probably true than its rivals is not the theism of the Bible. It is the God who cannot but exist that is the one who is clearly and unavoidable present to every man created by this God. The sense of deity speaks of this God, not of a god or of a god who probably exists and probably does not exist.

Again, in allowing for the idea of abstract possibility Warfield cannot do justice to his own principle of the trustworthy character of the apostolic witnesses to Christ and his work. For those who use this abstract notion of possibility then do not have the foundation of their thinking challenged. It is allowed that without God, without the Word of God, it is possible to identify the Christ. In fact it is utterly impossible that there should be trustworthy witnesses to the incarnate Word unless these trustworthy witnesses are trustworthy because they are the servants of the self-attesting God, speaking through the Son of God. This is only to say that identification of fact can take place in terms of the truth of the Christian religion alone. It is but to say that Christianity alone is rational. It is but to say that if one leaves the foundation of the presupposition of the truth of the Christian religion one falls into the quagmire of the utterly irrational. No intelligent predication is possible except on the basis of the truth, and that is the absolute truth of Christianity.

How would supposedly trustworthy witnesses meeting the person and the work of Jesus proceed to make a report of it? They would do so in terms of their ultimate principles of knowledge and being. But these principles make it impossible that there should be any such thing as the incarnate Word of the Bible. These principles would require that this supposed Son of God be explained in terms of general laws of which he would be an instance, leaving what uniqueness might remain to spring from the realm of the non-rational. In other words these principles would require such men as used them to think of the incarnate Word as they do of all other phenomenal appearances. From Plato down to F.H. Bradley these phenomenal appearances are said to be the result of some dialectical relationship between abstract logic and pure brute factuality. The incarnate Word would not be allowed to have either the internal and eternal rationality that he is said to have with God the father, or the identifiable and knowable human nature that he is also said to have in the gospels.

Going on from here it follows that by Warfield's method there would be no divine witness given by the incarnate Word to the written Word. Since the incarnate Word could not be identified by those who were merely trustworthy witnesses rather than divinely inspired interpreters, the witness of Jesus would

in turn be no more than that of a trustworthy man as unable to identify himself or the Word of God.

How could this incarnate Word, not knowable as such either by himself or by others, promise the Spirit of truth to his apostles? Or how could the apostles tell us about "the relation the Holy Ghost bears to their teaching" when any witness that would come to them from that Holy Ghost could not be identified by them?

And finally, how could those who are asked to study the evidence for the divinity of Scripture for themselves, with a method that is not itself clearly based upon the presupposition of this divinity itself, be given an opportunity to identify the Scriptures for what they are at all? The only way by which the Scriptures can be placed before men so that they can even intellectually recognize it as being the Word of God is by placing the sharpest possible contrast before men between the principles involved in the idea of divine ultimacy and human ultimacy. The natural man must be shown that on his principle no intelligible identification of any fact in human history is possible. He must not be encouraged to think that he can make such an identification in terms of his principle. If it be allowed that he can make any such identification he is by implication also given the right to identify both the incarnate and the written Word. And the result will be that in identifying it he will destroy it by his principles of univocism and equivocism. He will reduce the Word as found in Scripture to that which is as penetrable to man as is anything else in principle and to something that is as meaningless as is anything else in history.

It has not been possible to avoid a discussion of the difference between the two great modern Reformed theologians. The difference between them on the matter of apologetics is there and it is important. It is impossible to ignore it and speak as though there were only minor differences of emphasis. It is impossible to follow both Kuyper and Warfield, however much lovers of the Reformed Faith may revere them both. On the other hand the difference between them should not be over-stressed. It was only an inconsistency on Warfield's part thus openly to advocate a method of apologetics that is out of accord with the foundation concepts of his own Reformed theology. And Kuyper too was inconsistent when, after rejecting such a method of apologetics, he yet sometimes engaged in it. There is no need here, nor space, to give the evidence for this contention. Both men have also been most fortunately inconsistent in another direction. Warfield again and again in his writings shows how the principles of those who work with the principle of autonomy lead to the destruction of human experience. And he basically does what Kuyper does, appeal to the sense of deity in men, rather than to the principles that follow from the idea of autonomy. In other words Warfield rejects the idea of autonomy. He seems to hold that because of the sense of deity within men they really in practice do not proceed from the idea of autonomy, and that they are therefore in a position to be to some extent ready to recognize the special principle for what it is. And it is this that is also true of Kuyper. He does set forth the idea of autonomy and of

its opposition to any manifestation of the truth of God. But he too stresses again and again the fact that no man is a finished product. Man has the sense of deity within him. And in particular he is the recipient of the common grace of God. In practice he is therefore more ready to give consideration to the presentation of the special principle than one would expect him to be.

With grateful acknowledgment of indebtedness to both Kuyper and Warfield, to Herman Bavinck and other associates and followers of Kuyper, to the various associates and followers of Warfield, to J. Gresham Machen in particular, we would take their common basic contribution to the idea of the full Christian Faith and the self-attesting Scripture and build as best we can upon it. The great contribution of Kuyper discussed in this chapter is that of his analysis of the idea of autonomy. Never again can we forget that the natural man, working from his adopted principle, will seek to weave the special principle into the natural principle, and that he will seek to do this in philosophy and science no less than in theology. The great contribution of Warfield discussed in this chapter is his insistence that Christian theism is the only internally intelligible system of truth.

Combining these two great principles, held by both men, but not equally emphasized by both, we shall claim that the Christian system is undoubtedly true, that it is distinguishable intellectually by men because it has been distinguished for them by God through his Word, and that unless one therefore presupposes its truth there is no theology, no philosophy, and no science that can find intelligible meaning in human experience.

Chapter VIII

COMMON GRACE AND SCRIPTURE

Related to and involved in the question of natural theology discussed in the previous chapter is the question of common grace. We therefore now turn to that question, but we deal with it only in so far as it has a direct bearing upon the question of the Christian view of knowledge and, more particularly, upon the Protestant doctrine of Scripture.

As there is a difference between Reformed theologians on the relation of natural theology to Scripture so there is a similar difference between them on the question of the relation of common grace to Scripture.

The broader question involved in both natural theology and common grace is that of the knowledge of the non-believer. Must he be thought of as rightfully judging in terms of his own autonomous principle whether the Bible is the Word of God? Must Christians approach the non-believer on a neutral basis, thereby admitting that the epistemological principles of the natural man are essentially right at least for the interpretation of general revelation?

In old Princeton apologetics the answer given to these questions was in the affirmative: in the view of Abraham Kuyper and his followers the answer given to these same questions was in the negative.

When Kuyper gave this unequivocal negative answer, however, he did not thereby intend to deny that the unbeliever has any true knowledge in any sense of the term. Disclaiming originality Kuyper closely follows Calvin in insisting that every man knows God. Does not Paul the Apostle plainly teach this in his epistle to the Romans? Every man, said Calvin, has a sense of deity within him. Men have "in their own persons a factory where innumerable operations of God are carried on..." This is revelation within men. It may be called subjective in the sense that it is mediated through the constitution of man himself. It is none the less objective to man as an ethically responsible creature of God. As ethical reactor to God's revelation man must reflect upon himself as made by God in order to own that he comes from God and owes all of his praise to God.

Secondly, man has round about him the clearest possible evidence of the power and divinity of God.

"In attestation of his wondrous wisdom both the heavens and the earth present us with innumerable proofs, not only of those more recondite proofs which astronomy, medicine, and the natural sciences, are designed to illustrate, but proofs which force themselves on the notice of the most illiterate peasant, who cannot open his eyes without beholding them" (Institutes, Vol. I Ch. V, sect. 2).

Thus the knowledge of God is inherent in man. It is there by virtue of his creation in the image of God. This may be called innate knowledge. But as such it must be distinguished from the innate ideas of idealist philosophy. For the innate knowledge as Calvin thinks of it is based upon the idea of man's creation in the image of God. And as such it is correlative to the idea of revelation to man mediated through the facts of his environment which are also created by God. In contrast with this the innate knowledge of Descartes and idealist philosophy is based on the idea of the autonomy of man.

Following Calvin, then, Kuyper did not tone down the clarity of the revelation of God to man. In this respect he is in agreement with Warfield. Both men are equally anxious to follow Calvin as Calvin simply followed St. Paul in the idea that God has never left himself without a witness to men. He witnessed to them through every fact of the universe from the beginning of time. No rational creature can escape this witness. It is the witness of the triune God whose face is before men everywhere and all the time. Even the lost in the hereafter cannot escape the revelation of God. God made man a rational-moral creature. He will always be that. As such he is confronted with God. He is addressed by God. He exists in the relationship of covenant interaction. He is a covenant being. To not know God man would have to destroy himself. He cannot do this. There is no non-being into which man can slip in order to escape God's face and voice. The mountains will not cover him; Hades will not hide him. Nothing can prevent his being confronted "with Him with whom we have to do." Whenever he sees himself, he sees himself confronted with God.

Whatever may happen, whatever sin may bring about, whatever havoc it may occasion, it cannot destroy man's knowledge of God and his sense of responsibility to God. Sin would not be sin except for this ineradicable knowledge of God. Even sin as a process of ever-increasing alienation from God presupposes for its background this knowledge of God.

This knowledge is always that which all men have in common. For the race of men is made of one blood. It stood as a unity before God in Adam. This confrontation of all men with God in Adam by supernatural revelation presupposes and is correlative to the confrontation of mankind with God by virtue of creation. If then the believer presents to the unbeliever the Bible and its system of truth as God speaking to men, he may rest assured that there is a response in the heart of every man to whom he thus speaks. This response may be, and often is, unfavorable. Men will reject the claims of God but, none the less, they will own them as legitimate. That is, they will in their hearts, when they cannot suppress them, own these claims. There are no atheists, least of all in the hereafter. Metaphysically speaking then, both parties, believers and unbelievers, have all things in common; they have God in common, they have every fact in the universe in common. And they know they have them in common. All men know God, the true God, the only God. They have not merely a capacity for knowing him, but actually do know him.

Thus there is not and can never be an absolute separation between God and man. Man is always accessible to God. There can be no absolute antithesis in this sense of the term. In this respect Protestant theology, and in particular Reformed theology, stands over against the analogia entis idea of Romanist theology. On a Romanist basis man might, as it were, escape from the face of God. He might fall entirely into the realm of non-being. He is so near to it to begin with that he is always in danger of falling into it. From the outset of his existence it took supernatural grace to keep him from falling into it. There is therefore no inescapable revelation of God within the constitution of man.

And what is true of God's revelation mediated through man is true also with respect to God's revelation to man mediated through the facts of the universe about him. According to Romanism these too do not clearly and inescapably reveal God to man. They too are too near the realm of non-being, to reveal God clearly. Thus the Romanist principle of discontinuity is out of accord with the teaching of the apostle Paul with respect to the inescapable knowledge that all men have of God. There is no true commonness of knowledge on this basis between men. For each man may individually slip into non-being. Thus no believer can approach an unbeliever knowing that the unbeliever must respond to him in terms of a common relationship that both sustain to God.

And where there is no true basis for a common knowledge there is no true basis for the unity of science. Only in Protestant thought, and more particularly in Reformed thought, with its insistence that God controls whatsoever comes to pass, and with its insistence that every man as man is an addressee of God, is there unity of science. On this basis only the unity of science is guaranteed. Every man can contribute to the progress of science. Every man must contribute to it. It is his task to do so. And he cannot help but fulfill his task even if it be against his will.

It is on this sort of basis that Kuyper and Warfield alike maintained the basic unity of science. God is certain to attain his end with mankind. In the face of Satan, he will cause men to develop and bring to fruition the potentialities that he himself has deposited within the universe. Whether willingly or unwillingly, whether conspicuously or inconspicuously, all men, and Satan too, contribute to the realization of the purpose of God with man and his universe. The last and final song of the redeemed is the song of creation and its glorious consummation (Rev. 4:11).

But from what has been said it has already become apparent that it is through Christ that the unity of science is to be attained. To no good purpose do we speculate on what might have been if Adam had not sinned. To be sure, it is well to use this idea of what might have happened as a limiting concept. When Adam was confronted with the choice of obedience and disobedience it was a real choice that was given him. But this is not to say that God had not determined from before the creation of the world what would actually take place. In the last analysis only that could take place which, according to the ultimate will

of God, was going to take place. Only that was possible in the ultimate sense which God had determined. And God had determined that through Christ as Redeemer mankind would accomplish the task assigned it. Only on the basis of the work of Christ, then, does the unity of science actually exist and will it be actually consummated. True, the work of Christ must be thought of as immediately and directly affecting the salvation of men. But in saving men and in saving mankind Christ saves science. The unity of science may therefore be said to be Christological in a secondary sense.

On a Romanist basis this Christological basis of the unity of science cannot be and is not maintained. On their basis the Christ could not and did not accomplish one finished act of world salvation. Only in a universe that is unified by the plan of God can there be a once-for-all and finished act of redemption, affecting the whole race of man. And only on the basis of a world in which every fact testifies of God can there be a Word of God that testifies of itself as interpreting every other fact.

The unity of science as Romanism conceives of it is not a unity based upon the plan of God inclusive of all things and upon the work of Christ as saving all things. Rome's principle of discontinuity allows for no exclusive confrontation of man with God, for no sin that is exclusively self-conscious opposition to God and for no redemption that is in principle the complete return to and service of God.

Positively the Romanist idea of the unity of science rests upon a principle of continuity that involves the virtual denial of the difference between the Creator and the creature. Romanism has taken over the non-Christian, more especially the Aristotelian, notion of the unity of science. According to this notion all knowledge is of universals. All knowledge is based upon the assumption of an identity of being manifesting itself in both God and man. If Christ is to be fitted into this idea he must be thought of as a universal ideal. He must virtually be reduced to a principle of unity in reality. Christianity then is not "accidental" and restorative in Kuyper's sense of the term; it is merely supplementary to the natural. The natural and the supernatural, the created and the soteriological are only gradationally distinct from one another.

But to understand the Romanist idea of the unity of science one must take the two principles, that of discontinuity and that of continuity, together. These must be taken as correlative of one another. And when they are taken as correlative of one another the idea of the unity of science involves an ever receding ideal of the identity of thought, whether human or divine, with reality as a whole. The ideal is ever receding because reality is utterly discontinuous. The ideal, if realized, would destroy the unity of science because then all the facts investigated would have lost their individuality in one abstract blank being. But the ideal cannot be realized. And the reason for this is that the principle of discontinuity or individuality employed is a wholly irrational one. In other words, the facts to be investigated do not form a part of any system at all. It is useless to

speak of their essence since no one can know what their essence is. No one could ever find a fact and know in what way it differed from other facts.

It is true, of course, that the Aristotelian character of the Romanist position is mitigated by the teachings of the church with respect to man's creation by God. That is, the Romanist position holds to the principles as outlined only in the fields of natural revelation, and philosophy. In these fields it owns the legitimate autonomy of reason. Even so Romanist theology is itself adjusted to the idea of the autonomy of reason in the field of the natural revelation. The total result is that no intelligible or tenable philosophy of the unity of science is offered.

It follows too that Romanism has no adequate challenge for modern thought and its notion of the unity of science. It is of some importance to see what this modern idea is. It is, in short, but a continuation of the Greek idea. But it is more relentless and consistent in working out the Greek idea. To be sure, there is an important difference between the "objective" approach of ancient and the "subjective" approach of modern philosophy. But from the Christian point of view both are still subjective. Modern thought is more consistently subjective than was ancient thought. In the case of Kant's philosophy the human subject is frankly made the source of unity in human experience and therefore the source of unity in science. This was involved in the fall of man. And it was inherent in Greek philosophy, in that of Plato and of Aristotle no less than in that of the Sophists. But in modern times man has boldly asserted that he can identify himself first before he speaks of God. He will identify God after he has first identified himself. And this is not merely a methodological matter, due to the fact that man must psychologically think of himself first before he can think of God. It is a matter of ultimate metaphysics. It is the idea that man is ultimate. Man as ultimate can and must identify himself in terms of himself. He must therefore also virtually use the law of contradiction as means by which to determine what is possible and what is impossible in reality.

It was necessary to say this much by way of introducing the difference between Reformed men on the question of common grace. It would seem clear that any doctrine of common grace that is to be held by Reformed men must be in accord with and a part of the main body of Reformed doctrine. In particular one can scarcely claim to hold intelligently to Calvin's doctrine of common grace unless one sees it in relation to the whole of Calvin's theology, and in particular unless one sees it as it stands in relation to Calvin's doctrine of the clarity of God's revelation to man through man himself. More particularly still, the difference between Calvin's views on man's creation in the image of God and the Romanist view of man as participant in the same being with God is of basic significance for the question of common grace.

It has already been indicated that this difference has a direct bearing both upon the idea of what is properly called natural and what is properly called redemptive. For Calvin creation itself is directly and clearly revelational of the

creative and sustaining activity of God. Man is therefore naturally in contact with the expressed will of God. For the supernatural revelation of God to Adam was natural to him. This supernatural revelation is part of the normal or natural state of affairs for man. For Romanism the natural is that which is participant in the same being with God. But that which is participant in the same being with God is near to non-being and tends to slip back into non-being.

What then is the redemptive for Calvin? And what is it for Romanism? To answer this question a previous question must first be considered. As there are differing views of the natural, so there are differing view of evil or sin. For Calvin sin is self-conscious rebellion on the part of the creature against his Creator and Benefactor. Even those who have sinned "in Adam" but not "after the similitude of Adam" are covenant breakers. They are responsible with Adam for the pre-redemptive supernatural revelation as it was conjoined to original natural revelation. For Romanism sin is only partly disobedience to God; it is also slipping back into non-being. With Calvin the idea of sin is exclusively ethical; with Rome sin as ethical is in large part reduced to a metaphysical lack. It is of the utmost importance to lay great stress on the ethical character of Reformation theology as over against Romanist theology. Reformed theology differs from evangelicalism in the fact that it holds tenaciously to this ethical character of Christianity, while evangelicalism naturally tends to veer to the idea of sin as metaphysical defect. With its conception of the human will as in part autonomous, evangelicalism naturally tends to the idea of Romanism.

For Calvin redemption is exclusively ethical. Sin did not lower man in the scale of being. Sin did not take away from man any of the natural powers that God had given him. Sin did not tend to destroy the metaphysical situation. To be sure, sin had physical effects. It brought disease and death into the world. But the idea that the created world would have been destroyed by sin is an abstraction. It was not God's intention that it should. Hence it was from the beginning ultimately impossible that it should. The created world has no tendency to slip back into non-being. The fact that it needs each moment to be sustained by God does not prove that it has such a tendency. This fact only shows its actually dependent character. God intended from the beginning to uphold the universe as dependent upon himself.

In particular sin did not destroy any of the powers that God gave man at the beginning when he endowed him with his image. To be sure, here too there have been weakening results. But man still has eyes with which to observe and logical ability with which to order and arrange the things that he observes. So far from sin being inherently destructive of the metaphysical situation, it is rather true that the continuation of this situation is the presupposition of sin in its ethical character.

For Romanism redemption is therefore at least in part metaphysical. For Romanism the natural tended even at the outset, before the fall, toward non-being. It therefore needed the supernatural in order to draw it upward away from

non-being. The supernatural must from the beginning remedy a defect inherent in the natural. The supernatural is therefore something that lifts man up in the scale of being. The tendency to slip into non-being is, on the Romanist view, a real possibility. It is an ultimate possibility. Romanism uses the notion of abstract possibility as an aspect of its theory of being. So then the redemptive is still largely what the original supernatural was, viz., a counteracting agent against the tendency of finite being to slip into non-being. Redemption thus is not "accidental," it is not primarily ethical. The distinction between nature and grace as used in Romanist thinking and the distinction between nature and grace as used in Reformation thinking are therefore quite different in meaning.

To set the doctrine of common grace in the proper perspective therefore requires setting off Reformed theology as a whole from Romanist and also from evangelical thinking. On a Romanist basis even special grace is largely thought of along the lines of lifting man in the scale of being. On its basis common grace would therefore be only gradationally different from special or saving grace. No other than gradational differences are possible once one holds to the human will as in some measure autonomous, and once one holds to the idea of man as participant in the same being with God. The idea of saving grace is then the offering to all men or at least to groups of men the real or ultimate possibility of salvation along with the equally ultimate possibility of destruction. In no case can God overcome completely the tendency of finite being to slip into non-being.

What holds for Romanism on this point also holds to some extent for evangelicalism. Here too saving grace is limited by abstract possibility and therefore by man's ultimate ability to resist the will or pleading of the Spirit of God. The idea of grace is in part reduced from its high ethical concept to one of metaphysical gradation.

On the basis of the Reformed view, however, saving grace is conceived of on wholly ethical lines. The metaphysical presupposition of conceiving the idea of grace thus exclusively along ethical lines is the fact that God controls whatsoever comes to pass. This rules out all abstract possibilities. It involves that man is always confronted with the revelation of God's will. It means that when he sinned, man sinned against this known revelation of God. Man is responsible for sin, and he alone is responsible for sin. When man sins he is therefore wholly depraved. There was no excuse for his sinning in the fact that his being, as finite, was inherently defective, or in the fact that God's will for him was not wholly clear. On the other hand, it was God's will that sin should come into the world. He wished to enhance his glory by means of its punishment and removal.

But to hold strictly to man's utter responsibility for sin and yet to the fact that it was God's ultimate intention that it should come into the world through man, requires that one think analogically. And thinking analogically is thinking concretely. It means thinking from the analogical system of truth revealed in Scripture. It involves accepting that which is apparently, though not really, con-

tradictory. All the concepts offered in Scripture therefore are supplemental of one another. It is not possible to begin with one doctrine, and deduce from that one doctrine certain other doctrines that must "logically follow from it," except one at the same time keep in mind that there are other doctrines that are, of necessity, in apparent contradiction to the first doctrine from which the beginning was made.

The difference between Reformed theologians on the question of common grace may now be noted. There are those who do not think it necessary to distinguish thus sharply between the Romanist and the Reformed conception of things in order to have a true conception of common grace and of the purpose it serves in connection with the problem of the unity of science. Dr. S. J. Ridderbos specifically denies the necessity of doing the sort of thing that has been done so far in this chapter. He does so in a booklet dealing with various criticisms of Dr. Abraham Kuyper's concept of common grace. The title of the booklet is Rondom het Gemene -Gratie-Probleem (Kampen 1949). In this pamphlet Ridderbos criticized the present writer's views on Common Grace set forth in a brief publication under that title (Philadelphia 1947). As this criticism represents quite clearly a point of view held by other Reformed theologians besides Ridderbos, it will be dealt with briefly here.

The present writer undertook in his booklet to meet the challenge of Etienne Gilson, a great modern Romanist apologist, which he made to the Calvinistic idea of the sensus deitatis. This was done in connection with Bavinck's conception of the cognitio dei insita.

"The question to be considered here is that of the koinai ennoiai, the notions impressae, the cognitationes insitae. It is but natural that Roman Catholic theology, which holds that the natural reason can discover certain truths about God, should hold that there are ideas about God that are wholly common to the believer and the non-believer. Gilson expresses this point of view when he argues that we can discover the same truths that Aristotle discovered, by the same reason unaided by special revelation. Gilson further argues that Calvin, in holding to an 'impression of divinity' or 'common notion' or 'innate idea' or 'religious aptitude' in man, and in saying that 'experience' attests the fact that God has placed in all men an innate seed of religion, virtually holds to the same position as that to which the Roman Catholic holds. He thinks the Calvinist faces an antinomy in connection with his view on this point.

'At first sight, it would seem that there could not be a better solution. But it is still true that this knowledge is confronted by the problem just as certainly as is the rational certitude which the Thomistic proofs of the existence of God claim to attain. Either it is a natural certitude, in which the right to criticize the Catholic position to suppress pure philosophy is lost; or it is a supernatural certitude, in which case it would become impossible to find a place for that natural knowledge of God, which is exactly what one was pretending to conserve' (Christianity and Philosophy, p. 41).

"The question now is whether the innate knowledge of which Bavinck speaks is of such a nature as to be able to escape the dilemma before which Gilson places the Calvinistic position. We believe Gilson is fair enough in demanding that Reformed theology shall come to a self-conscious defense of its notion of natural theology in general. It cannot fairly limit itself to diminishing the area or reducing somewhat the value of the natural theology of Roman Catholic theology. As long as the natural theology of the Reformed theologians is still the same in kind as that of the Roman Catholic theologians, he will find it difficult to escape the dilemma with which Gilson confronts it" (Common Grace, p. 51, 52).

The question was then asked whether Kuyper and Bavinck, great modern exponents of Calvin's views, have been wholly successful in setting off their thought clearly on the idea of innate knowledge and common notions from that of Romanism. The answer given is that they are not. Though they insist that true natural theology is that which interprets nature in the light of Scripture they have sometimes employed the notions of brute fact and of abstract universals (p. 52). How does this appear in the question of innate knowledge? It appears in the fact that the idea of innate knowledge as Calvin sees it is clearly based upon the idea of man in God's creation. As such it is correlative to the idea of cognition dei acquisita, the gathering together of facts that are also assumed to be created by God. Of course, both Kuyper and Bavinck agree with this view of Calvin. They even set off this notion clearly from the idea of innate knowledge which rests upon the concept of man as ultimate, and from the idea of acquired knowledge as it derives from the idea of Chance. But though they do this, they also at times adopt in their process of reasoning the non-Christian principles of continuity and of discontinuity.

When they do this they seek for common notions between believers and unbelievers that are not exclusively based upon the idea of the sensus deitatis. They then ignore the difference between the idea of fact and logic as it springs from the position that is based upon the notion of the autonomous man, and the idea of fact and logic which springs from the position that is based upon the notion of the ontological trinity.

Yet the idea of fact as it is based upon the notion of the autonomous man is that of utterly irrational differentiation. And the notion of logic as it is based upon the idea of man as autonomous is that of system that is above and inclusive of the distinction between God and man. A Reformed theologian will need to follow Kuyper and Bavinck when they call us back to Calvin in this matter. For the idea of common notions as based upon Romanism is largely that which is based upon the concept of human autonomy. With the acceptance of the Romanist idea of common notions Christianity has lost its uniqueness. For then the natural man is given the right to interpret the words of Scripture in terms of a system that it can exhaustively penetrate. On the other hand the natural man is assumed to be right when he takes for granted that the facts do not at all convey to man the revelation of God. For facts are then irrational in

character. In short, the natural man is then given the right to do what Kuyper says he will surely do when confronted with the Bible and its system of truth, namely, reduce it to naturalistic proportions.

Against this type of argument Ridderbos contends that it was a mistake to accept the challenge of Gilson (Rondom het Gemene-Gratie-Probleem, p. 42). The difference between Romanism and the Reformed faith must be sought in that the former does not and the latter does teach the doctrine of common grace. The Reformed position with respect to the knowledge of sinful man differs both qualitatively and quantitatively from the teaching of Romanism on the same subject because of the doctrine of common grace.

First, he says, there is the qualitative difference. For Romanism the idea of natural knowledge is natural without qualification. Romanism does not believe in the doctrine of total depravity. It therefore thinks that the sinner, though wounded through sin, still is naturally able to know God.

On the other hand Reformed theology does believe in total depravity. In consequence, Reformed theology teaches that man by nature has no knowledge of God or of morality at all. For Romanism natural knowledge of God springs from a human situation which is not totally despoiled by sin.

"If in spite of this according to the Scriptures and the Confession there are remnants of a true knowledge of God to be seen in man, then this must be explained in terms of common grace, through which God has restrained human depravity" (Op. Cit. p. 40).

If we speak exactly, we should therefore place quotation marks about the phrase, "natural knowledge of God." It might better be called "common grace knowledge."

In addition to this qualitative distinction between the Reformed position and that of Romanism there is a quantitative one. The Reformed Confessions speak of small remnants of the knowledge of God and of morality possessed by the natural man. And these small remnants must be upheld by common grace. Not holding to total depravity and not holding to common grace, Romanism works out a natural theology of full proportions.

Of these two points, the qualitative and the quantitative difference between the Reformed Faith and Romanism, the former is certainly for Ridderbos the more important. The difference in quantity is due to the difference in quality.

The question now is whether Ridderbos succeeds in signaling the qualitative difference between Romanism and the Reformed faith by simply inserting the ideas of total depravity and of common grace into a complex of doctrines assumed to be essentially the same for both. Can Romanist theology and philosophy be repaired by thus inserting a block of material here and there into an

edifice that is otherwise left unmolested? Can the ideas of total depravity and common grace be woven into the main motif of Romanism, that of analogia entis? It is that which must be done if one refuses to accept and answer the challenge of Gilson referred to above. Protestants, and especially followers of Calvin, can scarcely afford to allow the legitimacy of the idea that finite being has a tendency to slip back into non-being. Yet it is this which Ridderbos virtually does when he asserts that, were it not for common grace, every last bit of natural knowledge of God and of morality would have disappeared. He argues that except for the restraining force of common grace God's voice, even in general revelation, would have been silenced altogether.

But how could the voice of God's revelation in man be silenced altogether unless man himself were destroyed? Will not men in the abode of the lost have knowledge of God and of morality? Is it not precisely because they then have all too clear a knowledge of God and of morality that they suffer before the face of God? To say so is fully in line with Calvin's views. It is even of the essence of his view that men are what they are as inherently knowers of God. Yet evil spirits and the lost receive no common grace. Common grace is an attitude of favor of God toward men as men, as creatures made by himself in his own image. Common grace is the giving of good gifts to men though they have sinned against him, that they might repent and mend their evil ways. Common grace provides for the doing of relatively good deeds by sinful men who are kept from working out to its full fruition the principle of total depravity within them. Common grace thus is a means by which God accomplishes through men his purpose in displaying his glory in the created world, in history, before the judgment day. So there is no common grace in hell.

Of course Ridderbos knows all this very well. He asserts it plainly. Yet he insists that the whole of general revelation must be suspended from common grace. And he insists that the whole of general revelation would disappear except for common grace. When he then faces the fact that Satan and the lost cannot be thought of as recipients of common grace he avers that even in their case there is a restraining force of God that keeps them confronted with the general revelation of God.

It is this last point that shows conclusively that Ridderbos thinks of the idea of finite, rational creatures as slipping back into the realm of non-being as a serious possibility. He needs a restraining force, in addition to the ordinary providence, in order to keep God's rational creatures from falling into non-being. This restraining force is, in the nature of the case, not ethical in character. It does not intend to restrain the working of the sinful principle in man. It is not the means by which the potentialities of creation are to be brought to light. It is simply and purely metaphysical in character. Without this restraining force Satan and the lost would escape the punishment of God; they would escape him because they would be no more. Sin is therefore a force which, unless restrained, would lead to the destruction of finite rational creatures themselves. Sin is no longer an exclusively ethical opposition on the part of creatures of God

against the will of God. For sin then presupposes a measure of autonomy in man by which he can destroy his own being and with it the revelation of God. Why else should it be necessary for God to introduce a force after the entrance of sin for the maintenance of created reality?

Now for Ridderbos common grace does in the course of human history what this metaphysical restraining force does in hell. To be sure common grace also does more than that. It also gives good gifts to men, makes them love the truth in a sense, causes them to produce civil righteousness. But the point now of importance is that for Ridderbos common grace in history and the restraining force in hell both maintain the general revelation of God to man. In history this force is gracious in character; after history is finished this is no longer the case.

Thus, both the doctrine of total depravity and the doctrine of common grace are in some measure unintentionally adjusted to the Romanist idea of the analogy of being. There is no escaping this so long as one thinks of Protestantism, and especially of the Reformed Faith, as merely adding some building blocks to the edifice which is in part constructed along Romanist lines. Then there is no maintaining of the exclusively ethical character of Reformation theology. To maintain this ethical character one needs, with Calvin, to presuppose the idea that man is inherently and inescapably forever, in history and after the consummation of history, in the realm of the blest and in the realm of the damned, in his very being revelational of the will of God. It is only thus that sin retains its ethical nature. It is only thus that sin can be total depravity both in extension and in intension. It is only thus that fruition of sin can be tasted in the realm of the lost, for only thus is sin seen to be sin against the original gracious revelation of God to mankind.

Only by presupposing this utterly revelational character of man is it possible to maintain the exclusively ethical character of saving or special grace. Christ came to save men from sin. Did he come in part, at least, to maintain metaphysical status quo? Surely not. Sin is exclusively ethical hostility to God. It is this ethical hostility to God that Christ came to remove. To be sure, sin must be spoken of as in intent destructive of the work of God. And since the work of Christ is indispensable as the only means by which the work of God through man in history could be accomplished, this work of Christ is itself a part of the providence of God. In this respect the work of Christ may be said to be "essential" to the plan of God. At the same time this work is "accidental" in Kuyper's use of the term. For it is only because of sin as ethical hostility to God that the work of Christ "became" "essential." These two notions are supplementary of one another. They limit one another.

Once more, only by presupposing the ultimately revelational character of man in the way that Calvin, following Paul and opposing Aquinas, does, is it possible to maintain the exclusively ethical character of the doctrine of common grace. And only by maintaining its exclusively ethical character can common grace be properly related to saving grace. When both are interpreted in ex-

clusively ethical terms then both are seen on the one hand to be "accidental" and on the other hand to be "essential." They are then both seen to be "accidental" in opposition to the Romanist idea that supernatural grace is naturally necessary and "essential" to man as a finite being. And they are then both seen to be "essential" against the Romanist idea that finite existence may slip back into non-being. In other words only by maintaining Calvin's doctrine of the sense of deity, as involved in the idea of the exhaustively revelational character of man as man, is it possible to maintain the distinctively Protestant, and more especially the distinctively Reformed, principles of discontinuity and of continuity over against these principles of Rome.

A word must now be said about the idea of "common notions" referred to in the quotation given above. The present writer made a distinction between notions that are psychologically and metaphysically, that is revelationally, common to all men, and common notions that are ethically and epistemologically common. The reason for this distinction lies in the difference between a view that is based upon the concept of the creation of man in the image of God and who thus has within him the ineradicable knowledge of God, and a view that is based upon man as participant with God in one general being. All men have common notions about God; all men naturally have knowledge of God. In this sense there is, as Calvin points out on the basis of Paul's letter to the Romans, a natural knowledge of God and with it of truth and morality.

It is this actual possession of the knowledge of God that is the indispensable presupposition of man's ethical opposition to God. There could be no absolute ethical antithesis to God on the part of Satan and fallen man unless they are self-consciously setting their own common notions, derived from the folly of sin, against the common notions that are concreated with them. Paul speaks of sinful man as suppressing within him the knowledge of God that he has. How does he do this? He does this by assuming his own ultimacy. For with this idea of his own ultimacy goes the idea that God and man are aspects of the same reality. They are then a part of a Reality that is on the one hand utterly discontinuous with itself, a reality in which Chance is king, and on the other hand a Reality that is in principle exhaustively determined by its own internal relations and is in principle exhaustively known to man and God alike. It is these notions of human autonomy, of irrational discontinuity and of rationalistic continuity that are the common notions of sinful or apostate mankind.

Or else what does the doctrine of total depravity mean?

If these common notions were allowed to come to fruition the mandate given to man by God at the beginning of history could not and would not be fulfilled. There would be no possibility even of finding a single fact in a universe of Chance. Individual men would have no common notions with other men, they would not even be able to distinguish themselves from other men. Observation of facts would be impossible because the idea of a fact is, on this basis, unintelligible. And if facts were found they could not be brought into a pattern. How could logic

ever be said to have any bearing upon reality in a universe of Chance? But if it were granted to have a bearing, this logic would be inherently destructive of the facts of reality and of their individuality. For their identity would be lost in one abstract blank, in some such way as Parmenides said that they would be. There would be no God distinct from man. There would not be creation out of nothing. There would be no Fall. There would be no historic Christianity. There would be one common blur.

Kuyper has well brought out the fact that the natural man, working on the principles of his adoption must, to be logical, deny all that Christianity stands for.

It is this fact, that the natural man, using his principles and working on his assumptions, must be hostile in principle at every point, that was stressed in the writer's little book Common Grace. That all men have all things in common metaphysically and psychologically, was definitely asserted, and further, that the natural man has epistemologically nothing in common with the Christian. And this latter assertion was qualified by saying that this is so only in principle. For it is not till after the consummation of history that men are left wholly to themselves. Till then the Spirit of God continues to strive with men that they might forsake their evil ways. Till then God in his common grace, in his long-suffering forbearance, gives men rain and sunshine and all the good things of life that they might repent. The primary attitude of God to men as men is that of goodness. It is against this goodness expressing itself in the abundance of good gifts that man sins. And even then God prevents the principle of sin from coming to full fruition. He restrains the wrath of man. He enables him by this restraint to cooperate with the redeemed of God in the development of the work he gave man to do.

But all this does not in the least reduce the fact that as far as the principle of the natural man is concerned, it is absolutely or utterly, not partly, opposed to God. That principle is Satanic. It is exclusively hostile to God. If it could it would destroy the work and plan of God. So far then as men self-consciously work from this principle they have no notion in common with the believer.

But in the course of history the natural man is not fully self-conscious of his own position. The prodigal cannot altogether stifle his father's voice. There is a conflict of notions within him. But he himself is not fully and self-consciously aware of this conflict within him. He has within him the knowledge of God by virtue of his creation in the image of God. But this idea of God is suppressed by his false principle, the principle of autonomy. This principle of autonomy is, in turn, suppressed by the restraining power of God's common grace. Thus the ideas with which he daily works do not proceed consistently either from the one principle or from the other.

Ridderbos also says that the natural man's ideas of God and of morality are vague. But for him this vagueness is not due to the fact of the conflict just

now discussed. He has no interest in distinguishing clearly between the knowledge of the natural man that comes from his creation and his knowledge as it is implied in the idea of autonomy. He thinks it is a mistake to distinguish between common notions derived from the image of God in man and common notions that proceed from the idea of autonomy. Thus he cannot take the principle of autonomy in its full seriousness of opposition to the truth. Thus too he cannot account for the unity of science upon clearly Christian principles alone.

That such is the case may be briefly indicated with respect to two matters mentioned by Ridderbos himself.

In the first place there is the question of the non-Christian's contribution to the progress of science. In the second place there is the question of the theistic proofs. Is it not obviously true that non-Christian scientists have contributed largely to the progress of science? Can they not weigh? Can they not count? Can they not see? Do they not have logical powers as good as those of the believer? Did not Abraham Kuyper, the great protagonist of the idea of a twofold science, the science of regenerate and the science of non-regenerate men, himself maintain that in the field of externals and in the field of formal thought the subjective element of regeneration need not and should not be taken into account? How then can one say that epistemologically the believer and the non-believer have nothing in common?

In reply it may be said that only if sin and salvation be thought of along metaphysical rather than along ethical lines is it possible that such questions can arise. If sin is seen to be ethical alienation only, and salvation as ethical restoration only, then the question of weighing and measuring or that of logical reasoning is, of course, equal on both sides. All men, whatever their ethical relation to God, can equally use the natural gifts of God. How could men abuse the gift of God if they could not even use it? And what an easy way of escape for sinners it would be if the result of their folly was nothing more serious than the loss of their natural powers, and with it the loss of responsibility. The presupposition of a modern war is that both parties to it shall be equally able to use the weapons of such a war.

Moreover, only if both parties, the unbeliever and the believer, have equal natural ability to use the gifts of God can there be an all-inclusive antithesis between them. The argument between Christians and non-Christians involves every fact in the universe. If it does not involve every fact it does not involve any fact. If one fact can be interpreted correctly on the assumption of human autonomy then all facts can. If the Christian is to be able to show the non-Christian objectively that Christianity is true and that those who reject it do so because they hold to that which is false, this must be done everywhere or else it is not really done anywhere.

Still further, it is when we presuppose with Calvin that all men inherently know the truth, because they and the universe about them are made by God, and

then if we assert with Calvin that all men are spiritually at enmity against God so that they are anxious always and everywhere to suppress the truth, that we can also speak with Calvin of God's common grace by which men are able to cooperate with believers in building the structure of science. As far as natural ability is concerned the lost can and do know the truth and could contribute to the structure of science except for the fact that for them it is too late. At the consummation of the age the lost will be compelled to own that their efforts to build the structure of science in terms of human autonomy, of chance and determinism, or irrationalism and rationalism, was not an ethically honest effort. Not that they were, while building, wholly self-conscious of their own ethical hostility. They were restrained from being fully self-conscious by common grace. They were restrained by common grace, employing the pressure of God's presence in his revelation to men upon them. With the prodigal son they saw something of the folly of their way while yet they were ethically unable to do anything but walk that way to the bitter end.

It is thus in the mixed situation that results because of the factors mentioned, (1) that every man knows God naturally (2) that every sinner is in principle anxiously striving to efface that knowledge of God and (3) that every sinner is in this world still the object of the striving of the Spirit calling him back to God, that cooperation between believers and unbelievers is possible. Men on both sides can, by virtue of the gifts of God that they enjoy, contribute to science. The question of ethical hostility does not enter in at this point. Not merely weighing and measuring, but the argument for the existence of God and for the truth of Christianity, can as readily be observed to be true by non-Christians as by Christians. Satan knows all too well that God exists and that Christ was victor over him on Calvary. But the actual situation in history involves the other factors mentioned. Thus there is nowhere an area where the second factor, that of man's ethical hostility to God, does not also come into the picture. This factor is not as clearly in evidence when men deal with external things; it is more clearly in evidence when they deal with the directly religious question of the truth of Christianity. But it is none the less present everywhere. It is present in the field of weighing and measuring, in the field of externals as well as in the field of more directly religious import. It is present here in that the natural man attempts to impose his false philosophy of fact upon the things that he weighs and measures. This is not theoretically the case so long as he uses these facts for non-scientific purposes. It is even then practically the case. Even then he does not seek to obey Paul's injunction to men to the effect that whether they eat or drink they should do all things to the glory of God. But it is theoretically the case when they seek to work scientifically. In that case non-believers use a non-rationalistic principle of individuation. They assume that the facts they weigh and measure are not created and controlled by God. They assume this with respect to every fact. Thus they assume that God does not speak to them through these facts. On the other hand they assume that the powers of logic given them by their creator are not so given them. They virtually assume that by these powers they can determine what is possible and what is impossible.

It is this irrationalist-rationalist idea of fact that appears, with variations, in the writers on the philosophy of science. Generally speaking they follow the lead of Kant's philosophy of fact and of logic. There is first the abstract possibility of any sort of fact existing. Facts in this sense have no determinable nature. They belong in Kant's noumenal realm. They are unknown and unknowable. This idea is directly and completely destructive of the doctrines of creation and providence. Secondly the human facts that are known, that is those that somehow come into contact with the human mind, are known by virtue of the original ordering effect of the human mind upon the raw stuff of experience. These are the facts of science. They are taken as much as given. What they are depends not upon the ultimate determinative character of God but upon the ultimate determinative character of man, who virtually takes the place of God. Every fact then that has scientific standing is such only if it does not reveal God, but does reveal man as ultimate. No other facts are allowed as being facts unless they are as raw material generalized into a system that keeps out God. They are "statistically standardized correlations of existential changes." Existential changes as such are irrational. But they are standardized by the original, not derivative, organizing action of man as autonomous. Only then are they facts with scientific standing. It is thus that in the very act of the observation of facts the non-Christian does, so far as he works according to his principle, do what Kuyper says the natural man always does, namely, suppress the truth of God into naturalistic categories.

But the third factor must still come into play. The natural man does not thus self-consciously work from his principles. There is operative within him the sense of deity; he cannot efface it without effacing himself. And the significance of this metaphysical situation is again and again brought home to him by the striving of God's Spirit through common grace. In consequence he cannot but see that God is good; that he has been longsuffering with him in his sins, that the Father is calling him back. God is really good to all men. He deals with them as a class. As such they are the recipients of his good gifts to them. And as such he makes men conscious of his goodness, of his desire that sinners should turn unto him. To be sure their salvation and their conversion is not an ultimate possibility. It is not that any more than the idea of Adam's not falling into sin was an ultimate possibility in the plan of God. But both are significantly real challenges to men as men and the second in particular is a significant challenge to sinners as sinners, but neither were meant as ultimate possibilities by God.

And by the striving of the Spirit men cannot be wholly insensitive to this goodness of God. Their hostility is curbed in some measure. They cannot but love that which is honest and noble and true. They have many virtues that often make them better neighbors than Christians themselves are. And as such they can cooperate with believers in seeking the truth in science. They can contribute by virtue of their metaphysical constitution; they can cooperate by virtue of the ethical restraint of common grace.

Thus it is that the idea of the unity of science is conceived of along Christological lines. For common grace is then itself conceived of along Christological lines. All men have not only the ability to know but actually know the truth. This is so even in the case of those who do not know all the truth that they would need to know in order to be saved. All men know that God exists and is their judge. Secondly, all men have become sinners through Adam's fall. All men therefore suppress the truth that they know. This suppression is perfect in principle. It is due to hatred of God; it is due to deadness in sin. Sinners use the principle of Chance back of all things and the idea of exhaustive rationalization as the legitimate aim of science. If the universe were actually what these men assume it to be according to their principle, there would be no science. Science is possible and actual only because the non-believer's principle is not true and the believer's principle is true. Only because God has created the universe and does control it by His providence, is there such a thing as science at all. Thus the unity of science cannot be built on "common notions" that are common between believers and non-believers because their difference in principle has not been taken into consideration. Common grace is not a gift of God whereby his own challenge to repentance unto men who have sinned against him is temporarily being blurred.

Common grace must rather serve the challenge of God to men to repentance. It must be a tool by means of which the believer as the servant of Christ can challenge the unbeliever to repentance. Believers can objectively show to unbelievers that unity of science can be attained only on the Christian theistic basis. It is the idea of God's controlling whatsoever comes to pass that forms the foundation of science. And no one can or does believe that idea unless by the sovereign grace of God through Christ he has repented from his sin. Thus it is Christianity that furnishes the basis of the structure of science.

If men will not repent and accept Christianity then they will still contribute to the structure of science. But then their contributions will be in spite of themselves as ethically responsible beings. It will be through themselves as creatures of God but it will be in spite of them as alienated from God. If they would enjoy the fruits of their labors they must, by the grace of God, come into the fold of God.

A word may now be said about the theistic proofs. The difference of opinion regarding them between Reformed men is the same in nature as the difference with respect to the idea of "common notions" and "facts." There are those who, like Ridderbos, want to ignore the difference between common notions that are common metaphysically and therefore psychologically and common notions that spring from either the root of the idea of autonomy or from the idea of regeneration. There are those who, like Ridderbos, want to ignore the difference between a Christian and a non-Christian philosophy of fact in certain limited areas of interpretation. They would use the idea of common grace in the interest of an area of commonness with little or no difference.

This position, it has been shown, leads away from Calvin and back to Thomas Aquinas. It is no wonder that Ridderbos, and they who believe like him, also has a view of the theistic proofs that involves a return to a natural theology of the Romanist sort. And this too he seeks to accomplish through the idea of common grace. He does not, indeed, discuss the matter of theistic proofs more than in passing form. But he says in effect that, as the result of ignoring the distinctions between common notions psychologically and common notions epistemologically conceived, it is possible to regard the proofs as having value as witnesses to God (*Op. Cits.* p. 47). They are not then to be regarded as having mathematical cogency but they are means by which the Christian position can be defended before the "natural reason" as well as any other position can.

"Omdat VanTil ontkent, dat gelovigen en ongelovigen kentheoretisch iets gemeenschappelyks hebben, kan hy de 'bewyzen' ook niet als getuigenissen waarden. Maar wannen men met Bavinck terecht ook een zekere kentheoretische gemeenschap erkent, dan kan men de vraag stellen hoever men het op dit terrein met de bewyzen van Gods vestaan kan brengen. En dan zal men tot de conclusie komen, dat hier niets mathematisch te bewyzen valt, maar dat ook voor de 'natuurlyke rede' de Christlelyke positie evengood to verdedigen is als die van anderen" (*Op. Cit.* p. 47).

A few remarks must suffice in this connection. The proofs may be formulated either on a Christian or on a non-Christian basis. They are formulated on a Christian basis if, with Calvin, they rest clearly upon the ideas of creation and providence. They appeal to what the natural man, because he is a creature of God, actually does know to be true. They are bound to find immediate response of inward assent in the natural man. He cannot help but own to himself that God does exist.

When the proofs are thus formulated they have absolute probative force. They are not demonstrable in the sense that this word is often taken. As often taken, the idea of demonstration is that of exhaustive penetration by the mind of man; pure deduction of one conclusion after another from an original premise that is obvious. Such a notion of demonstration does not comport with the Christian system. The system is analogical. Man cannot penetrate through the relations of the Creator to the creature. But this does not in the least reduce the probative force of the proofs. Man is internally certain of God's existence only because his sense of deity is correlative to the revelation of God about him. And all the revelation of God is clear.

If then they are used as witnesses it is because they have absolute probative force. They could not be used as witnesses if they had not probative force. To what God would they witness unless to the true and only living God? And if they witness to the true God they must witness to him as being what he is. And he is that One who cannot but exist as true. And when he is seen to be such the world is, in the same act, seen of necessity to be existing as the creation of God.

Thus the Christian-theistic position must be shown to be not as defensible as some other position; it must rather be shown to be the position which alone does not annihilate intelligent human experience.

In other words Ridderbos tones down the objective claims of God upon men by saying that there is no absolute probative force in the proofs for the existence of God. This is in line with the idea of seeking common notions in some twilight zone of semi-neutrality between believers and unbelievers. And this is in line with the idea that there is an area of factual interpretation where the difference between autonomy and regeneration need not to be taken into account. This is in line, in short, with the Romanist notion of natural theology which holds that man does justice by the evidence if he concludes that God probably exists. But all this is out of line with Calvin's Institutes which stress with greatest possible force that the revelation of God to man is so clear that it has absolute compelling force objectively.

On the other hand the position of Ridderbos virtually allows that the proofs have some probative force even when they are not clearly founded upon a Christian basis. He says that the Christian position can as well be defended as any other. But even if it be said that Christianity is more probably true than is the non-Christian position this is still to allow that objectively something can be said for the truth of the non-Christian position. Something objectively valid can be said for idol worship as well as for worship of the true God. In other words on his general approach Ridderbos cannot show negatively that if one interprets life on the assumption of human autonomy there is no meaning to human experience.

Thus lowering the objective claims of the gospel, thus reducing the challenge of God and his servants upon sinful men by allowing that the principles of these sinful men have a measure of objective validity in them, is the natural result of the doctrine of common grace advocated by Ridderbos.

Herewith we are naturally led back to the question of Scripture as identifying itself as the Word of God and of the system of truth set forth in Scripture as that in terms of which alone human experience in all of its aspects has meaning. The ideas of natural theology, discussed in the preceding chapter, and the idea of common grace, discussed in this chapter, must themselves be interpreted in terms of this self-attesting Scripture. If they are used independently of Scripture in order by means of them to effect a common territory of quasi- or complete neutrality between those who believe in God and those who do not, they are apologetically worse than useless. For then they make it impossible to distinguish clearly between the Christian and the non-Christian position. And in doing so the non-believer is not clearly shown why he should forsake his position. If it be allowed that he can interpret any aspect of experience in terms of his principles without destroying the very idea of intelligibility, he has a full right to claim that there is then no reason why he cannot in terms of his principles

interpret the whole of experience. "Ye are my witnesses." That is the word of the covenant God to those he has redeemed. They are such and can be such only if they bear witness to a God who cannot do otherwise than bear witness of himself by means of himself. Christians can bear witness of this God only if they humbly but boldly make the claim that only on the presupposition of the existence of this God and of the universe in all its aspects as the revelation of this God is there any footing and verge for the interpretative efforts of man.

Chapter IX

OLD PRINCETON AND AMSTERDAM APOLOGETICS

The general difference between the positions of B. B. Warfield of Princeton and of Abraham Kuyper of Amsterdam was indicated in a previous chapter. This difference, it was shown, is limited to the field of apologetics. It is not a difference in theology.

Warfield again and again stresses Calvin's idea that only in the light of Scripture can anything be truly interpreted. Warfield is also wholly in accord with Calvin's idea that nature and history actually do clearly manifest the one true God. On this main and all-important point, then, Kuyper and Warfield are virtually in agreement with one another. They are also in agreement, of course, on the fact that the natural man cannot, because of his ethical depravity, see the facts of nature and history for what they are. Both follow Calvin in saying that as the sinner needs additional objective revelation so he also needs subjective illumination. He needs the regenerating illumination of the Spirit that he may see for what it is that which is in itself perfectly clear.

It is this all-important agreement between Kuyper and Warfield springing from Calvin, and back of Calvin from St. Paul, that is the basis for Reformed apologetics.

But Warfield did not himself live up to his own convictions in his avowed principles of apologetics. This has been pointed out. But neither did Kuyper fully live up to these his own ideas. So though the difference between them seems at first sight to be one of pure negation there is this qualification to be remembered. There is a deep agreement between them which marks off their position from all forms of non-Reformed thought. It is this deep agreement that forms the foundation of what has been set forth in this syllabus. It is their positive conviction that all human thinking must be analogical to divine thinking as expressed to sinners in the Scriptures that furnishes the foundation for all true Reformed apologetics. On the other hand, if there is to be a self-consciously Reformed apologetics that bases itself squarely upon this common agreement of Kuyper and Warfield, it is imperative that Warfield's own probability approach be no longer maintained. And it is equally necessary that the same probability approach, as it is sometimes found in Kuyper, be no longer maintained. If the full value and significance of the positive doctrines that Warfield and Kuyper have in common is to be brought out, that which is inconsistent with these doctrines, though held by these very men, must not be retained. These positive doctrines can be carried forth only if it be maintained that the natural man must be challenged in the very assumptions that he makes. It is his principle of autonomy that must be set over against the Christian principle. To do so the argument must be by way of presupposition. The God of Scripture is such a God as must be presupposed as the source of all facts and as the source of the ex-

planation of all facts that confront man. If he is not thus presupposed it is not he that men speak of at all. His existence is therefore objectively certain. For without this existence there would be no human predication.

Only when thus stated the Reformed method of apologetics stands off clearly against the traditional method, the method of Bishop Butler, the method followed at Princeton in the time of Warfield.

The claim has recently been made by Dr. William Masselink that the position defended in this syllabus is a departure from both Warfield and Kuyper. And back of this lies the contention that there was a well-defined Reformed apologetics on which both the men from Amsterdam and those from Old Princeton were agreed. Dr. Masselink speaks of the present writer's position as being a part of a reconstructionist movement in Reformed theology. And this reconstructionist movement, his contention is, constitutes a serious departure from the position of Kuyper, Bavinck and the men of the "theology of Princeton."

Dr. Masselink quotes Warfield to the effect that Kuyper makes "too absolute the contrast between the two kinds of science, that which is the product of the thought of sinful man in his state of nature, and that which is the product of man under the influence of the regenerating grace of God." He shows that according to Warfield the difference between the science of the unbeliever and that of the believer is not one of kind, but is rather one of degree. He then recognizes the fact that there is a difference between these two positions.

"There is an antithesis between the two. Hepp says, there is but one 'science' and that is the Christian science, into which can be 'incorporated' fragments from the ungodly thinking because of general revelation and common grace. Warfield, on the other hand says that there is but one science, - that of the Christian and the non-Christian. The difference being, 'The Christian by virtue of palingenesis (regeneration) working in him, stands undoubtedly on an infinitely higher plane of thought than that occupied by sinful man as such. And he must not decline, but use and press the advantage which God has thus given him.' I think Kuyper and Hepp are right. Warfield over-emphasizes reason here.

VanTil constantly avers that the non-Christian is entirely unable to produce any science whatsoever. He, therefore disagrees with all the rest" (General Revelation and Common Grace, Grand Rapids 1953, p. 154).

A little later Dr. Masselink makes a similar general statement in the following words:

"The historic Reformed apologetics of which Machen and Warfield are excellent example, successfully contended against the various types of unbelief. This method is anchored in the Scripture. Paul used the very same method at Athens when he reasoned with the non-Christian philosophers. He connected

his apologetics with the general revelation which they had in common. This historic Reformed method of apologetics as believed in and practiced by both old Princeton Theology and the Amsterdam theology was blest by God. If we discard this method, we enter upon a new course of action. Before adopting the new apologetics of Schilder and VanTil, we do well to consider carefully why we change our course of action. It has been indicated that even though Princeton and Amsterdam thinking differed in regard to the point of emphasis in apologetics, they were basically alike in ascribing the contact point for apologetics to general revelation, - more specifically to the twofold witness of the Holy Spirit. With this the new movement is in complete disagreement" (Op. Cit. p. 182).

Over against the virtual agreement of "the historic Reformed position" the reconstructionists find themselves in confusion.

"With the reconstructionists, therefore there exists a great confusion regarding the antithesis. On the one hand they all but deny it, and on the other hand they make it absolute. In saying that natural man, apart from general revelation and common grace, has knowledge of God and morality because of the remaining elements of the original image, they practically wipe out the antithesis. They seem to lean to a depreciation of the doctrine of total depravity. On the other hand, when they affirm that in the present state the antithesis between the Christian and non-Christian is absolute, their pendulum swings to the other extreme. Here they depreciate and even deny general revelation and common grace" (Op. Cit. pp. 159-160).

It is not our purpose at all to deal with these criticisms of Dr. Masselink in any extensive way. The reader can judge for himself to what extent they are valid. The mere enumeration of the following points with reference to the text may suffice at this point.

(1) When Dr. Masselink says that the present writer makes the antithesis absolute he omits to say what the present writer has always insisted on, namely, that this antithesis is ethical, not metaphysical, and that it is in principle, not in degree, even as ethical.

(2) When he says that "VanTil finds the point of contact in man himself" (Op. Cit. p. 158) he omits to mention that according to the present writer, following Calvin, it is in man as the bearer to himself through himself of God's revelation that the point of contact is found. Calvin says the knowledge that man has of himself and the knowledge that he has of God are immediately involved in one another. It is this that furnishes the true point of contact for apologetics.

But the more important purpose of this chapter is to indicate that there has been no such unified historic Reformed view of apologetics as Masselink asserts there has been. This has already been done to some extent in an earlier

chapter. But there the discussion was limited to two men, Warfield and Kuyper. Since Dr. Masselink reasons as though there was only a difference of emphasis between "Amsterdam" and "Princeton" and since he speaks as though this was the case not only with respect to Kuyper and Warfield but with respect to others as well, the following brief discussion is in order.

It will not be possible to deal with more than one or two men of the old Princeton school of apologetics. But their position is clear enough in itself and is so manifestly opposed to the view of Kuyper with respect to the difference between non-regenerate and regenerate science that the claim of Dr. Masselink is readily seen not to be sustained by the facts.

William Brenton Greene, Jr.

When Warfield flourished at Princeton in the field of systematic theology it was William Brenton Greene Jr. who, for some time, occupied the chair of apologetics. He was the present writer's revered teacher.

In what he has written, Greene states and defends the historic Reformed position with respect to Scripture much in the way that Warfield does. Speaking of the Bible he says: "We do not obey it because it is reasonable; we believe it to be reasonable ultimately because it is 'the word' of Him who is the source of all reason" (Christian Doctrine, Philadelphia, 1905, p. 12). On the other hand, and again like Warfield, Greene defends the notion that the idea of the Bible as the Word of God can be made to appear reasonable to "reason" in terms of principles which that reason, though not distinctly interpreted in Christian terms, must itself recognize as valid. In short, Greene follows the traditional method of apologetics as worked out by Bishop Butler and others. (He recommends as an excellent book on apologetics the treatise of George P. Fisher entitled, The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief. He does so in an article under the title "The Function of Reason in Christianity," in the Presbyterian and Reformed Review, 1895, pp. 481 ff.)

By "reason" Greene means "the cognitive faculty, that which perceives, compares, judges, and infers." This definition of reason is taken from Charles Hodge. What is the function of this reason? The answer is as follows: "Within its own sphere it may be a source and ground and measure of religious truth" (Op. Cit. p. 481). And as it has this function in religion in general, reason has a similar function with respect to Christianity. The most important knowledge that man needs lies beyond reason. Reason must, to be sure, function within the limitations that are due to sin and to finitude. Even so it has its own independent function to perform with respect to Christianity.

What then is the function of reason "in relation to the Bible, or Inspired Word of God?" (Op. Cit. p. 498). The answer is:

"For all that logically precedes the Scriptures, as the being and personality of God, the need of a written revelation, etc.; we must go back to philosophy, to reason pure and simple. Even the Romanists admit this... This is evidently true. Though reason is not infallible, yet antecedently to revelation, it is, as we have seen, the only instrument of investigation, the only test. Hence, Henry B. Smith has well said: 'If we cannot construct the foundation and the outworks of the Christian system on impregnable grounds; if we cannot show the possibility of miracles, and of a revelation; if we cannot prove, absolutely prove... the existence of a wise, intelligent, personal, and providential Ruler of all things: then we are merged in infidelity, or given over to an unfounded faith. If we cannot settle these points on the field of open discussion, we cannot settle them at all.' Nor may it be said that reason's results cannot be certain, inasmuch as, since she cannot discover the truths of revelation, she cannot prove the necessity of them. A man may be too sick or too ignorant to find the remedy that he needs, and yet not be too sick or too ignorant to make known what he needs."

"Reason should judge of the evidence that the Scriptures are the Word of God, and so to be received on His authority. Faith in them as such is irrational and impossible without evidence; for faith involves assent, and assent is conviction produced by evidence."

Again,

"Reason should distinguish among the interpretations of the Scriptures between what is above reason in the true sense of beyond it, and what is above reason in the wrong sense of out of relation to it, or contrary to it" (Op. Cit. p. 499). The other points mentioned need not concern us.

In a series of four articles on the Metaphysics of Christian Apologetics (in the Presbyterian and Reformed Review, 1898) the position taken is similar to that of the article just discussed.

The first article of this series deals with the subject of Reality. Says Greene:

"Christian apologetics is that theological science which sets forth the proofs to the reason that Christianity is the supernatural, the authoritative, the final religion, equally for us and for all men; in a word, the absolute religion" (Op. Cit. p. 60).

And metaphysics is, "the science of first and fundamental truths." Accordingly the metaphysics of apologetics must establish to reason the basic principles not merely of truth in general but particularly those that sustain a peculiar relation to Christianity. The truths with which the metaphysics of apologetics is concerned are such truths as are "independent of the Christian revelation," while yet they are "the conditions of it and thus of its absolute vindication" (Op. Cit. p. 62).

Such truths are four in number,

"Reality, or the truth that what we call real existence implies substance, and so is not a succession of mere appearances; Duality, or the truth that substance is of two essentially different kinds, mind and matter; Personality, or the truth of the real existence of mind as intelligent, voluntary self-conscious entities; and Immortality, or the truth that the self-conscious mind or person is fitted for real existence independent of the body and so for life after death. These truths, as it would seem must be evident, and may all be known prior to the Christian revelation, and are all indispensable to the vindication and even to the understanding of it" (Op. Cit. p. 62).

To establish Reality as outlined above, appeal must be made to the "trustworthiness of consciousness." And the "denial of the trustworthiness of the testimony of consciousness to reality is suicidal" (Idem, p. 81).

Under the heading of Duality Greene seeks to disprove first the claims of materialism. Materialism, he argues, "presupposes the mind which it would eliminate" (Idem, p. 268). Then he seeks to disprove idealism. "Logic cannot reason out being," and "logic implies a logician" (Idem p. 271). Psychological idealism "outrages consciousness" (Idem p. 275). Thirdly he seeks to disprove idealistic materialism. "The reality of the soul is the condition of science" (Idem p. 282). Prof. Greene then seeks to prove Dualism positively. "Sense perception seems to imply it" (p. 284). It "has been and is the working hypothesis of the race" (p. 285). The verdict of common sense renders it presumptively true (p. 285). It has "inherent reasonableness." "Duality is the only theory of reality that gives to life and even to existence any true significance" (Ibid).

As to Personality, reasoning presupposes it and "is irrational without it" (p. 473). "The burden of proof rests on those who would deny personality" (p. 493). It is self-evident (p. 497).

When he deals with Morality Greene shows that to deny an "objective obligatory ideal" ends in absurdity (p. 680). The burden of proof is on those who would deny such an ideal (p. 681). The notion of such an ideal "meets the requirements of the case" (Ibid). Men have a clear and distinct "sense of rightness."

We turn now to an important article by Prof. Greene on the "Supernatural." It was published in the Biblical and Theological Studies, which was put out in commemoration of the one hundredth Anniversary of Princeton Seminary (New York, 1912).

What is meant by "the supernatural"? It is "being that is above the sequence of all nature whether physical or spiritual; substance that is not caused, and that is not determined whether physically and necessarily as in the case of

physical nature or rationally and freely as in the case of spiritual nature; in a word, unique reality the essence of whose uniqueness is that the reality is uncaused, self-subsistent and autonomous. We call this supernatural the Infinite to denote the absence of limitation. We call it also the Absolute to express perfect independence both in being and action. We call it, too the Unconditioned to emphasize freedom from necessary relation" (p. 141). "Does it exist? Does it manifest itself? What is its nature? If a person can he reveal himself immediately as such? These are the inquiries which we shall raise" (p. 141).

1. The Reality of the Supernatural

Positivism, monism and pluralism are each seen to be untenable. Should we not then take up the only remaining hypothesis, that of the supernatural "with a presumption at least that it is true? Some world view that really explains the universe there must be, and this would seem to be the only other possible" (p. 167). "This presumption is strengthened by the fact that the Christian doctrine of the Supernatural would, if true, meet all the necessary conditions" (p. 167). "Moreover, the Christian doctrine of the Supernatural is a satisfactory hypothesis in fact as well as in logic" (p. 168). It is the only hypothesis "that has not been proved to be untenable" (p. 169). Moreover "most schools of philosophy declare for the Supernatural" (p. 169). It "is not too much to claim that philosophy on the whole declares for the reality of the Supernatural, if not in the precise form of the Christian doctrine, yet in what approximates and tends towards it. Did not our limits, forbid, nothing could be easier than to illustrate and establish this statement from such masters in philosophy as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Bacon, Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, Hamilton, Lotze and many others" (p. 170).

Again, religion needs the idea of the supernatural. And, lastly, the Supernatural is a necessity of thought (p. 173). Thought requires the idea of causation. Thought requires that when we think of acts we also think of an agent. Every thought of the finite presupposes the supernatural (p. 174). In the realm of the finite our principles of thought are found to be trustworthy. "If then, these principles are thus found to be trustworthy in the sphere of the natural or finite, why should we not trust them in the sphere of the Supernatural or Infinite?" (p. 176). And the Supernatural must be the deepest reality. "If we could ground it in anything deeper and so prove its existence strictly, we should only prove that it was not the Supernatural whose existence we had proved. From its very nature the Supernatural must be incapable of formal demonstration" (p. 180) (1).

2. The Manifestation of the Supernatural

(1) At this point, as at some others, Prof. Greene virtually uses the argument from presupposition.

Has the Supernatural so manifested itself that "though partially, it can be and is known by us" (p. 182)? "There is no a priori impossibility that the Supernatural should manifest itself and should be known as manifested. Admitting that only its bare existence has been established, it does not follow that no more can be established" (p. 186). "The reality of the Supernatural cannot be known and its nature not be known also to some degree at the same time" (Ibid). "In knowing the existence of the Supernatural we know it as that whose nature it is to manifest itself" (p. 187). This is not to be understood monistically. "Still, Infinite Being looks toward finite being, and thus towards manifestation in it, that it can be the ground and condition of it" (p. 187).

3. The Personality of the Supernatural

(a) "The Supernatural can be personal" (p. 190). Without "some such determination as that of personality the Supernatural could not be" (p. 192).

(b) "As there must be a real Supernatural, so he must be at least personal" (p. 192).

(1) This is so because the Supernatural must be "in the nature of a first cause" (p. 192).

(2) It follows from the law of "cause resemblance" (p. 193).

(3) It follows also from "the law of universal development" (Ibid).

"Whence this universal tendency of all that lives toward personality, if it be not the law of the world; and whence this law, if the Principle of the world is an impersonal one? And if personality constitutes the preeminence of man over the inferior creation, can this preeminence be wanting in the highest Being of all?" (1. 193).

(c) "The Supernatural, though he must be at least personal cannot be higher than personal" (p. 194). "Personality is of all possible modes of existence the highest" (Ibid).

4. The Personal or Immediate Manifestation of the Supernatural

"By this we mean, such a manifestation as would be such a direct communication from the Supernatural as it is claimed that the Decalogue is; such Supernatural works as the miracles, if they were wrought, must have been; such a supernatural act as regeneration, if it be a real act, evidently is; such a supernatural person as Christ could not but have been, if he was as he said, both 'the Son of God,' and 'the Son of Man'" (p. 196).

In the cases under consideration, "no instruments are employed, no media intervene" (p. 196). "Could they, then, take place? This is the question of questions to the Christian. If they could not, Christianity is a lie" (p. 196).

"Not only Christianity, but all higher religion is at stake" (p. 197). As sinners

"we need to feel, that God himself is in the midst of us" (p.198). "Even the impression of the Supernatural made in the creation, if it is to abide, needs to be deepened by supernatural interventions in history" (p. 198). "An effect, reason dictates, can be assigned to a particular cause only as it reproduces what is distinctive of that cause. Hence, the necessary inference is that if the Supernatural Person reveals himself, the revelation will be, at any rate, at times, both above nature and in contrast with, if not in opposition to, nature. Accordingly, were such a revelation to be throughout natural, though, as we have seen, necessarily presupposing and thus indirectly revealing the Supernatural, reason would hesitate to recognize it as really supernatural. Though it would be such, it could not be certainly discriminated as such" (p. 198). "Thus belief in the personal intervention in nature, and so above and in contrast with it, of the supernatural Person is indispensable to the highest conviction of the reality of his self-revelation. Without such interventions, the latter, could not be recognized infallibly" (p. 199).

Thus we come to the specific question of miracles. Are they possible? Can they be recognized? We cannot answer these questions by a priori considerations. "We can argue for or against the uniformity of nature only from what nature and the Supernatural have been found to be. Antecedently, there is as much reason to infer that nature must not be uniform as that it must be uniform; and that is no reason. There is no must in the case" (p. 200). "Nor does the objector gain anything, if we concede that the uniformity of nature never has been interrupted. Were this so, we might not infer that it never could be. Induction from individual facts, however numerous or well attested, cannot give necessary truth" (p. 201). The uniformity of nature "is not a principle; it is only the name of a mode of action" (p. 201). It only says that "the same causes acting under the same conditions produce the same results. This is the only principle, the only ultimate truth, the only immutable law, in the case. What is there in this to hinder at any time the personal intervention of the Supernatural?" (p. 201).

As a result it may be said:

1. "The abstract possibility of supernatural interventions in the course of nature cannot be rationally questioned" (p. 202).
2. "This possibility becomes much clearer in view of the fact that the Supernatural as we have already shown, is a person and is constantly acting in and through nature" (*Ibid*). "A being who can use tools can certainly work with his own hands" (p. 203).
3. "It is probable that the Supernatural will choose to do so. This follows from the fact that he is a person" (p. 203).
4. "This conclusion is much strengthened by the consideration that nature would seem to have been constituted with a view to such action by the

Supernatural Person" (p. 203).

5. "But we are not left to inferences like the above, trustworthy though these could be shown to be. We know that the Supernatural has acted in a purely personal manner" (p. 204).
6. "The progressive development of religion is inexplicable unless the Supernatural does continue so to manifest himself. Religion, at least in all its higher forms, presupposes, not only the possibility, or even the probability, but the fact of such personal manifestations of the Supernatural" (p. 204). "Can it be that religion is only the most solemn of all delusions? If so, there is no mystery so great as that of its persistence. Nothing has been able to overthrow it, yet it itself rests on nothing" (p. 204).
7. "This conclusion is much strengthened by the fact that the course of human development, has been interrupted and perverted by sin" (*Ibid*).
8. "Must not, then, directly and exclusively supernatural works, such as we designate miracles, be expected, both to call attention to the messengers bringing the good tidings of the grace of God and to authenticate them as his ambassadors and so to attest the truth of their proclamation? (p. 205).
9. "Nor may it be replied that were the Supernatural thus to intervene directly in nature, such manifestations could not be recognized as such by us. This overlooks the fact that it is the manifestation of a person to persons that is under consideration. Now personality is known immediately by personality, and more especially if there be a moral affinity between the persons" (p. 206).

"What then is the net result of the discussion? It is not that Christianity is thereby established as the supernatural religion. This must be decided by the appropriate evidence. The way, however, has been opened, and the only way, for the fair consideration of this evidence; and this has been done in that we have established the reality of the existence of the Supernatural, of his manifestation through nature, of his personality, and of the possibility and even probability of his personal intervention in nature. It is true that no one of these has been in the strict sense demonstrated. But in the nature of the case this is impossible. Himself the ground and so proof of everything, there is nothing that can be the ground and so proof of the Supernatural. Yet as the building necessarily evidences the foundation on which it rests; so all nature and especially that in it which is highest and surest, namely, reason, demands the reality in the above respects of the Supernatural. This must be granted or reason must be stultified. To have shown this is thus both the utmost that could be shown and in itself enough" (p. 207).

Only a very brief survey of Prof. Greene's position has been given. His method is clearly similar to that of Warfield. There is the same concept of reason, apart from the question of its regeneration, as able to interpret general revelation with essential correctness. And there is the same ability and function ascribed to this reason with respect to determining the factuality of special revelation. When Prof. Greene begins from the abstract possibility of the existence of the Supernatural and goes on to the probability and after that to the actuality of its appearance, he employs the categories of the natural man without challenging them. He seeks to prepare men for an acceptance of the gospel by showing them that the gospel is possible, probable and actual in terms of the principles of continuity and discontinuity of the natural man.

It is this avowed insistence that apologetics must deal neutrally with such questions as the existence of God and the facts of Christianity that marks the old Princeton apologetics. And it is this type of apologetics that is definitely rejected as being out of accord with the principles of the Reformed faith in Kuyper's Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology. It is difficult to see how Dr. Masselink can reduce the difference between "Princeton" and "Amsterdam" to one of emphasis and speak of one historic method of apologetics used by both.

Floyd Hamilton

The old Princeton approach in apologetics may be seen in easy survey in the first edition of the Reverend Floyd E. Hamilton's book The Basis of the Christian Faith (New York, 1927). In his preface Hamilton says: "Special thanks are due to Dr. William Brenton Greene, Jr., former professor of Apologetics in Princeton Theological Seminary, for his assistance in revising and criticising the whole book" (p. ix).

In the first chapter Hamilton deals with The Human Reason.

"Before we can attempt to prove the existence of God or discuss the truth of Christianity, we must show that the soul exists as something distinct from the body. We must show that our reasoning processes can be trusted, and that we have a valid right to reason from our sensations to the real world back of these sensations. And we must also show that when we attempt to deal with questions such as the existence of God and the possibility of His giving a revelation to man in a Book, we are dealing with questions which properly lie within the scope of the human reason. First of all, then, we must discuss the question of the existence of the soul" (Op. Cit. p. 15).

The human mind is shown not to be a mere stream of consciousness (18).
"It is an active agent and not a passive substance" (19).

So here we take our start. We have found and identified ourselves. "Here at any rate we have reality" (Ibid).

Having identified our real selves we examine our reasoning process. We receive sensations. In receiving them our mind is not a blank. "In addition to these space and time forms, which the mind uses in the thinking process, there are certain other 'mind born' or innate ideas which the mind originates upon the occasion of receiving sensations. We will mention only two ideas of this class which particularly concern us in our discussion. They are the ideas of 'being' and 'cause.' We cannot think without unconsciously assuming the existence of something. When we receive a sensation our mind assumes the reality of the sensation and the reality of the fact that we are receiving it. When we think, we assume the reality of at least the mind that is doing the thinking. This idea of existence is thus seen to underlie all thought, and to be a presupposition of thought. We call it by the name of 'being.' It is an idea not received through the senses, but originating in the mind itself upon the occasion of sensation.

When the brain receives a sensation it assumes that there is a cause of the sensation. It may not be able to tell what the cause is, but it never doubts that there is a cause. It is not an idea which comes into the mind through the senses, but is originated upon the occasion of sensation" (p. 21, 22).

Thus we have ourselves as real starting point, and we have the idea of cause which serves us as a bridge between ourselves and the external world. We are now ready to express judgments about the world. "But when is a judgment trustworthy?" (25). When it is made in accordance with the laws of reasoning. Our minds and the facts they deal with must be normal. Our minds must possess the necessary facts. Our minds must not fall into logical fallacies (25). If care is exercised "in checking the process of reasoning it is possible to trust the reasoning process in all ordinary circumstances" (26).

Reasoning must not proceed regardless of facts. And "there are some things which are beyond the realm of reason" (27). Then too our emotions must be kept in control.

"However with these limitations and imperfections guarded against there remains a wide scope of activity for the mind. The mind can take all the evidence which comes to us through the senses and reason about it, building up a splendid structure of logical truth. It has a right to take these facts which come to us through the senses and use them as stepping stones into the realm of cause lying back of them. The mind becomes the judge of evidence presented to the mind in support of the giving to man from God of a supernatural revelation. If the mind, however, after weighing this evidence decides that such a revelation has been given to man, then it has no right to set itself up as a judge to decide what things embodied in this revelation are reasonable, for in the nature of things, if there has been a revelation from God, it will concern those things which cannot be discovered by the unaided human reason. Since the mind has no actual experience with things which do not come to it through the senses, it has no right to deny truth which comes through revelation from a realm where sense perception is impossible. In regard

to revelation, the legitimate sphere of the human reason is to investigate the evidence in support of such revelation and then to decide as to the meaning of that revelation" (p. 28).

In the second chapter Hamilton invites us to advance with him "over the bridge of cause which we have erected" from ourselves to the external world. In the third he leads us even beyond the world by the same bridge to God. We know "that we must have been caused by someone other than ourselves who must have had sufficient power to produce our souls, which are the observed effect" (p. 44). This gives us "our first link in the chain of proof for the existence of God" (p. 46). One by one the other links are forged and soldered to the first. There is order in the universe (p. 47). There is design (p. 48). In man himself there is will. Will there not be a Will back of the universe? (p. 50). Man has a conscience. It is a "certain characteristic innate in the mind which enables a person who has reached the age of reasoning ability, to make a judgment as to the rightness or wrongness of any course of action which may be presented to the mind" (p. 53). "Shall we not then conclude with Bordon P. Bowne that man has a moral creator?" (p. 54).

"The preceding arguments are so plain that the conclusion is inescapable. There is no alternative for thinking man in the face of such evidence but to fall upon his face before the wonderful Being who has created him, and to worship Him. Let it be borne in mind that the arguments cited above are cumulative. Each adds proof to the others, and their force is only felt when they are taken together" (p. 54).

Thus theism is supposed to have been established by a neutral process of reasoning. As has earlier been indicated, such a theism is not the theism of Scripture. Calvin's procedure is quite the reverse of Hamilton's. Following Descartes and others, Hamilton thinks that man can identify himself in terms of himself. Calvin says the knowledge of self immediately presupposes the relation of the self to God as its creator. No identification of the human self is possible in the realm of open chance. And no bridge of cause can be made from that which cannot be identified (the self) to something else that cannot be identified (the external world). The idea of causation cannot be faken as intelligible by itself in order by means of it to show that God has created the world. If God has created the world the idea of cause in the world must be determined from this its derivative nature. If it is first assumed to be working without God it cannot after that be shown to be working only in dependence upon God.

The same point is to be made about the ideas of order, purpose and morality. If any of them can function independently of God at the beginning why do they need God at all?

Moreover, how shall these several autonomous entities be forged into a chain? How shall there be cumulative force in the series of arguments if each argument is itself without force?

The whole procedure followed is out of line with the basic principle of the Reformed faith. Only in God's light is there any light. The Psalmist (Ps. 94) teaches us to begin from above with God instead of from the bottom with man. If even a creature, who is derivative, knows, how much more shall the original know? That is the method of the Psalmist. Descartes assumes that man as the original knows, and that then God also knows. If man's knowledge is not from the outset defined as dependent on God's knowledge it never can be.

It was in line with Arminian and with Romanist thinking to use such a method as Mr. Hamilton uses. Wherever autonomy is hailed in theology why should it not also be welcomed in apologetics? But when autonomy is over and over regarded as the root of all evil in theology why then should it be welcomed in apologetics?

In chapter Five of his book Hamilton deals with the Reasonableness of Supernaturalism.

God is shown to exist; therefore it is possible for him to intervene in the universe (p. 87). He goes on to show the probability of such intervention.

"1. In the first place, it seems strongly probable that God would not create man and leave him alone. A personal God, if He is at all like men in His fundamental characteristics, as the Bible says He is, having created a personal being, would most naturally want to have communion and fellowship with the being He had created.

2. It also seems unlikely that man should be left in ignorance of the ultimate destiny of the human soul. If it is true that there is a Heaven and a Hell, to one of which places every soul will go, then it seems unlikely that God would leave man in ignorance of these momentous facts. Especially is this true, if the corollary is true that man's ultimate destiny is decided by his actions upon the earth during a short lifetime, and that he will have no further chance after death to redeem his mistakes made during life on the earth. Most of all, if God intended as the Bible teaches, to have this redemption applied to a man's life through faith in a risen Lord, then He would most certainly tell men about this fact in some way or other. We thus see that there is a very great probability, if the God represented in the Bible exists, that He would reveal certain vital facts to man" (p. 93, 94).

From the question of probability we go on to that of actuality:

"Now a little reflection on the subject will be sufficient to convince one that the only way we can decide whether or not such a revelation has been given to us by God is by an examination of the evidence tending to show that such a revelation has been given. Since the matter is one purely of fact, and of fact alone, it can be decided only by the evidence. We may have a theory that it is impossible for the earth to revolve upon its axis, but no matter how plausible our theory may sound, our having the theory will not prevent

the earth from turning on its axis once every twenty-four hours! In the same way, if God has given a revelation, no amount of theorizing to the contrary can change the fact. The only way those who do not believe God has given a revelation to man can prove their case, is for them to show that the evidence for such a revelation is worthless" (p. 98, 99).

When we deal with the witnesses to supernatural revelation we ask: "Is the witness competent?" "Is the witness reliable?" "Was the witness in a position to know the facts?" (p. 99). So we are ready as neutral observers to take up "the evidence for the Bible as the Word of God and decide for ourselves whether or not it contains such a revelation" (p. 100). In particular we are prepared to deal with the Bible and its claim to be the Word of God.

To be sure we must not make unreasonable claims for ourselves.

"If God teaches that a certain doctrine is true, then it is not man's place to decide whether or not it is reasonable! It is man's duty to accept it, even though he may not be able to understand all about it or to prove its truth by the human reason! If God has taught it, then all man has a right to do is to accept it. The whole question resolves itself into a question as to whether God has or has not taught it. In deciding this question man has a perfect right to use his reason to the fullest extent in judging the evidence on this point. It is purely a matter of fact, and as such must be judged according to the laws of evidence. But if the intellect is convinced that God actually did teach these doctrines in the Bible through inspired prophets and inspired writers of the various books of the Bible, then the intellect has no right to set itself up as a judge of the reasonableness of the doctrines which God teaches. The intellect can reason about the meaning of the doctrines taught, but it has no right to reason about the truth or falsity of the doctrines themselves after their meaning has been decided upon. To do so would be to put oneself above God Himself and to question His own wisdom. Some men apparently do not hesitate even to do this, but to the man who has at least average intelligence, such a course is nothing less than blasphemy" (p. 133).

It is our rightful business as men then to seek to identify this body of literature as being the Word of God. We do not take it to be self-attesting from the outset. We do not accept it as the Word of God on its own assertion. On the contrary, by means of criteria not taken from the Scripture as self-attesting we test the Bible as to its claim to be the Word of God.

We must "approach the Bible as we would approach any other book" (p. 134). Then we find, step by step, link by link, that it meets all the demands which we legitimately make of any book claiming to be the Word of God. So on the question of Biblical ethics Mr. Hamilton says:

"We now wish to show that Christianity fulfils all the demands which must be made of any system which will work, and that the ethical system taught

in the Bible is superior to any other system of ethics" (p. 147).

In chapter Ten Mr. Hamilton deals particularly with "the historic trustworthiness of the Bible." He tests the Bible by well established philosophical knowledge obtained independently of the Bible.

"The Bible is not a text-book of philosophy, but the Bible in no wise contradicts the theories which are most accepted by philosophers of the present day" (p. 167).

He finds that the historicity of the Bible is not contradicted by "the clearly discovered and well proved facts of modern science..." (p. 168).

In chapter Sixteen there is a discussion of the resurrection of Christ and in chapter Seventeen of the fulfillment of prophecy.

"We have reserved until last the two strongest proofs that the Bible is the Word of God and that Christianity is true. We believe that in fulfilled prophecy and in the resurrection of Jesus Christ we have positive proof that our claims are true. We believe that these two lines of proof are so strong that they will convince anyone whose mind is open to evidence, that we have as much positive proof of just as strong a character that the Bible and its contents are true and in very truth the Word of God, as we have that the Declaration of Independence was a genuine document produced in 1776 in Philadelphia, by the representatives of the thirteen colonies" (p. 283, 284).

In the resurrection of Christ we have a miracle that differs from all other miracles. "Had there been no resurrection there would have been no Christian Church. The Christian Church as we know it was founded absolutely on the resurrection of Jesus Christ and all that it implied" (p. 284). So we turn to the New Testament as containing the only historical documents attempting to explain the origin of Christianity or the belief in the resurrection" (p. 286).

And when we are through we conclude:

"We have examined all possibilities and find that the only conclusion possible is that Christ actually rose from the dead. If he did rise, that fact carries with it, as was said at the beginning of the chapter, all the implications of supernatural Christianity. It is a fact that carries clouds of glory trailing through our Christianity. Nothing but a supernatural Savior is possible after He has risen from the dead. The fact of Christ's resurrection establishes beyond a doubt the truth of Christianity. But not only does it prove that Christianity is the one true religion. It also proves that all that Christ said and did was true, and this in turn proves that the Bible is the Word of God" (p. 295).

The argument from fulfillment of prophecy again points to the truth of Christianity.

"God alone knows the future, and the future can be revealed only by God. When, therefore, we find a book unquestionably written hundreds of years before the prophecies recorded in it were fulfilled, can there be any question but that those prophecies were revealed by God Himself? The prophecies which we shall cite will be those so detailed that there will be no question but that they were actual prophecies, and we shall show that no man unless he were speaking as the mouth-piece of God, could possibly have known or even guessed that the events prophesied would take place, both because of the unlikelihood of such events taking place at all, and because of the impossibility of a human being foretelling the events in such detail" (p. 297,298).

So then after we have identified ourselves, then built a bridge of cause, order, purpose and morality to God, we approach the Biblical writings as we do any other book. The foundation fact to which they testify is the resurrection of Christ. Thus we have reached the risen Christ by neutral approach. After that we stand on his authority. He witnessed to the Old Testament as the Word of God. He promised the Spirit to his apostles so they might write the New Testament as the completion of the Word of God.

After this we bow before the Word of the sovereign God and require men to subject their reason to its verdict.

It was the after this that Kuyper so vigorously opposed in the sort of apologetics we have before us. If reason is not challenged at the outset it cannot fairly be challenged at all. Why should not "reason" be as anxious to suppress the evidence for the fact that the Bible is God's Word as to deny the system of truth of that Word? No one can recognize the fact of Christ's resurrection and the fact of the divinity of Scripture except in terms of the meaning of the resurrection and the content of the system Scripture presents. In all the stress on the fact that true faith is not blind but is faith in response to the presentation of evidence, this indissoluble unity of the that and the what of Christianity is overlooked.

It is impossible to discuss the works of Charles Hodge, Casper Wistar Hodge, Francis Patton and others. Suffice it to have dealt briefly with the sainted Dr. William Brenton Greene Jr., and with his pupil the Reverend Floyd Hamilton.

Even in what has been adduced it is evidenced that the basic loyalty of these men is the full-orbed Reformed faith. None the less it remains true that in their avowed apologetical procedure they embraced a method that resembled that of Bishop Butler, rather than that of Calvin.

To have a balanced view of the relation of the "old Princeton" and the "Amsterdam" apologetics it is imperative that we turn to the question of "inconsistency" in the views of Kuyper and Bavinck. We have stressed the fact that in his main contention Kuyper strongly opposed the idea of a neutral area of interpretation between believers and unbelievers. And we have shown that Warfield was strongly insistent on the necessity of proceeding with unbelievers on a neutral basis with respect to the problem of theism and even with respect to claims of Scripture to be the Word of God. But we have also indicated that Kuyper too sometimes reasons as though he were on neutral grounds with unbelievers. Even in his Encyclopedia, in which he so valiantly defends the idea of a twofold science, even in this work which Warfield so vigorously criticized, Kuyper sometimes does the same thing that Warfield does. Indeed Warfield has pointed out this very inconsistency in Kuyper.

We shall deal briefly with the evidence that indicates the presence of this inconsistency in Kuyper. We shall also deal briefly with Bavinck. As this inconsistency has to some extent been pointed out in Common Grace and in a syllabus Introduction to Systematic Theology we shall here deal with the matter chiefly in relation to the question of Scripture.

Both Kuyper and Bavinck have greatly stressed the fact that Scripture is the objective principle of knowledge for the Christian. The Christian must regard all the knowledge that he obtains from a study of nature and history in the light of the doctrines of creation and providence and of the work of redemption through Christ. Only thus is the Romanist doctrine of natural theology to be avoided. Apologetically this means that the Scriptures must be taken as self-attesting and the system of truth they contain as the light in which all the facts of experience are seen for what they are.

Therefore no corroboration is to be sought for the truth of the idea of Scripture, or for the truth of the system of doctrine it contains, by an appeal to the natural man as he interprets life in terms of his own principles. In fact it cannot be allowed that the natural man can in terms of his principles interpret any aspect of experience correctly. He does, to be sure, contribute to the edifice of true interpretation, but he does this because his principle is false and the Christian principle is true.

Yet while showing that the natural man is bound to seek to destroy the truth of God that speaks to him, Kuyper and Bavinck at times seek comfort in the fact that the natural man will approve their sayings even when he is not asked to change his assumption of autonomy.

Kuyper

That such is the case with Kuyper is apparent from his treatment of the idea of formal faith. In the first section of his Encyclopedia he discusses the idea of wisdom as a check on skepticism. So he also speaks of general faith

as restraining the natural tendency toward skepticism that has come into the world because of sin. He deals with faith, he says, in the purely formal sense of the term (Vol. II, p. 72). As such it is inherent in the human subject. All certainty about our own existence is based on this faith. It is independent of proof, it is prior to all proof (Idem, p. 78). It is also the presupposition of our acceptance of the truth of our sensations of the external world. We must believe in the trustworthiness of our own sensations (Idem, p. 80). Without this faith it is impossible to reach an object beyond ourselves. It is this faith that forms the bridge from the phenomena to the noumena (Idem, p. 80). And this is of basic importance for science since science depends upon observation. Without this faith we should land in the subjectivism of Kant and Fichte (Ibid.).

In addition to furnishing the foundation of certainty with respect to ourselves and with respect to our observations of the facts of our environment, faith is also the foundation of all logical proof. We cannot prove the truth of the ultimate axioms of logic; we must believe in them. It is unquestioned faith in them that forms the foundation of all proof (Idem p. 83). In particular the principle of identity springs from this faith (Idem p. 84). Still further, faith is the motivating power that helps in the building of the structure of science (Idem, p. 84). One must believe in the uniformity of nature and in the idea of the universal knowledge of facts. Previous to investigation one must believe that the facts will fit into one universal pattern.

It will be observed that the procedure here followed is very similar to that of the old Princeton apologetics. Kuyper insists that the concept of faith that he here speaks of is without content. It is inherent in the subject, therefore, not because the subject is unavoidably confronted with God, but simply as such. By means of this purely formal faith the human subject is first to become conscious of its own existence. Then by means of this formal faith a bridge is to be laid to the external world. The laws of thought by which the environment of man is to be manipulated also rest on this formal faith.

All this is clearly at variance with what Kuyper, following Calvin, has taught with respect to the sense of deity. Again and again Kuyper has insisted that man always confronts God in every fact that he meets. There is no such thing as formal faith. To be sure, all men have faith. Unbelievers have faith as well as believers. But that is due to the fact that they too are creatures of God. Faith therefore always has content. It is against the content of faith as belief in God that man has become an unbeliever. As such he tries to suppress the content of his original faith. He tries to reduce it to something formal. Then its content can take any form he wants it to have. Then its content is actually indeterminate. And thus there is no foundation for man's knowledge of himself or of the world at all. Identification of himself as the subject of knowledge is possible to man only in terms of the fact that in his very act of self-identification he identifies himself as the creature of God. If one allows that identification of the human self as the subject of knowledge is possible

without God's identifying himself to man as his Creator and judge in the same act, there is no more basis for knowledge.

It then also becomes impossible to maintain consistently what Kuyper has so stoutly maintained, that the non-regenerate subject will seek, because of its ethical hostility to God, to suppress the truth that comes to it. Kuyper speaks as though the merely formal idea of faith is a dam against skepticism since it meets that skepticism in the subject itself (Idem p. 73). But how can this be? For this very formal idea of faith says nothing about the content or object of faith. Or rather, by its formality it allows for and even demands the correlative notion of pure non-rational factuality and of logic as an abstract system that includes both God and man. Thus the formal idea of faith is the very source of skepticism itself. Skepticism in the subject cannot be met otherwise than by the way Kuyper himself meets it elsewhere, namely, by insisting that faith always has content. And this content is inherently belief in God as man's creator and as the one who controls whatsoever comes to pass. Then when this faith turns into unbelief this unbelief cannot succeed in suppressing fully the original faith in God. Man as man is inherently and inescapably a believer in God. Thus he can contribute to true knowledge of the universe. Add to this the fact of common grace and he can in a measure cooperate with the believer in building the edifice of science.

Kuyper is in any case unable to carry through the idea that faith is merely formal. He says that faith is formal only in the field of the exact or external sciences. In what he calls the spiritual sciences he asserts that the fact of sin makes its presence felt. He speaks of a "unifying power of the object" which operates in the external or exact sciences but which does not operate in the case of the spiritual sciences (Idem, p. 98). And in the spiritual sciences faith always has content. And the moment faith has content diversity appears (Idem, p. 94).

But how are we to draw the line between physical or objective and spiritual sciences? In both cases the human subject is involved. There is no "unifying power of the object" that can do away with this fact. And Kuyper himself has insisted that even in observation of facts the subjective element enters into the picture. There is not the least harm in this. It is a purely metaphysical and psychological fact. It is not the fact that a subject is involved in the knowledge situation that makes for skepticism. It is only when this subject does not want itself interpreted in terms of God that skepticism comes about.

By starting off with the idea of faith as a purely formal something and then turning off into the idea of faith as having content in the spiritual sciences Kuyper caused himself great trouble. It made it impossible for him to present his main contention without ambiguity. His main contention is that, as created, every man has faith in God. Therefore faith always has this content. The only alternative to acceptance of God is the denial of God by means of an effort at suppression. It is this suppression by the sinful subject, it is this ethical sub-

jectivism that must be removed and is removed in principle through Christ in his people. Through Christ's work science is saved, its unity preserved and its object attained. And common grace suppresses the sinful man's attempted suppression of his faith in God and thus enables even sinful men to contribute to the progress of knowledge.

Kuyper's idea of formal faith is out of line with this his main line of reasoning. For by this idea of formal faith he speaks as though the metaphysical subject as such has a tendency to misinterpret the objects of its environment. He speaks as though this tendency can be stopped by means of a "unifying force of the object" which object has in the first place to get its very objectivity from the subject that somehow identifies itself even though it has no content.

The result is that Kuyper cannot carry through the idea that the believer must challenge the unbeliever in his interpretation of the universe at every point. He is vague in his discussion of the natural sciences. His main principle requires him to say that every science is possible only on the presupposition of the truth of Christianity. His main principle therefore requires him to insist that the principle of Scripture be self-attesting. And this involves that man's self-identification and the uniformity of nature be based upon this identification of God's identification of himself to man. If Kuyper is to have an internally consistent picture of the Christian view of things that he has so valiantly set forth he must dispose of the idea of faith as purely formal. Wherever he maintains this formal idea of faith he virtually grants that the man who works on the assumption of human autonomy has the right principle with which to interpret not only the external phenomena but even the causes of things (cf. p. 95).

Ridderbos and Masselink both appeal to Kuyper in support of their idea that there is a territory of interpretation that is virtually common to the believer and the unbeliever. They appeal especially to Kuyper's assertions with respect to weighing and measuring and formal logic. Any man, says Kuyper, can deal with external matters effectively. And man's reasoning powers have not been influenced by the fact of sin. The non-Christian can reason as logically as can the Christian.

So far, then, as scientific knowledge deals only with externals or so far as it is controlled by those subjective factors that did not undergo any change because of the fall of man, it is common to believer and unbeliever (*Idem*, 116).

It will be observed that Ridderbos and Masselink quite rightfully appeal to Kuyper. They might well have added Kuyper's idea of formal faith. For the idea of formal faith and the idea of a virtually common territory of interpretation between believer and unbeliever are involved in one another. It is only if one takes the idea of faith as formal that one can also consistently hold that the creation idea with respect to fact and logic need not be taken into consideration.

Then those who believe that the universe is run by chance and at the same time think that logic is the means by which men should seek the exhaustive penetration of the relation of God to man can cooperate with Christians who believe none of these things. But it should be added that in that case the non-Christian has the logical right to claim that he may interpret the whole of reality in terms of his principles.

It is to this inconsistency in Kuyper that Ridderbos and Masselink appeal in support of their position. But progress in Reformed apologetics will come only if this inconsistency is dropped and Kuyper's main position be maintained. Then there is a sense in which all men have faith and all men know God. All can contribute to science. And there is then another sense in which the same subject becomes "subjective" in the ethical sense through sin. This ethical subjectivism includes weighing and measuring and reasoning. It includes all the activities of the process of interpretation. For then the philosophy of fact and the philosophy of logic maintained is such as would destroy all possibility of identification and of ordering of experience (cf. Kuyper: Op. Cit. p. 562).

Kuyper himself has told us that the natural man lacks true self-knowledge (Idem, p. 564). Only in the light of the Word of God does he know himself for what he really is (Ibid). "Natural theology therefore must not stand next to Scripture but must be taken up into Scripture. Only through the Scripture does it bring us into true contact with nature" (Ibid).

Herman Bavinck

It is from Bavinck as much as from Kuyper that we have learned to stress the Scriptures as the principium unicum of the Christian.

"The true concept of revelation can only be taken from revelation itself; if no revelation has ever taken place, then all reflection on its concept is labor expended in vain; if revelation is a fact then it alone must provide us with its concept and indicate the criterion to be employed in our research with respect to religions and revelations" (Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, Vol. I, p. 309). The ground of faith, says Bavinck, is identical with its content and cannot be separated from it (Idem, p. 644).

When the believer is asked why he thinks of the Bible as the Word of God, he may point to the notae and criteria of Scripture. He may speak of the majesty of its style, the elevated nature of its content, the depth of its thought, the blessedness of its fruits, etc; but

"...these are not the grounds of his faith, they are but characteristics and evidences which are later discovered in Scripture by believing thought, even as the proofs for the existence of God do not precede and support faith, but spring from it and have been devised by it" (Idem, p. 634).

"The Deux dixit is the primum principium, to which all dogmata, including that pertaining to Scripture, can be traced" (Idem, 1. 634).

In spite of this stress on the Scripture as self-attesting and as such the primary principle for the interpretation of man and the world, Bavinck too sometimes reverts to the idea that man can without this principle interpret much of experience truly.

In his Philosophy of Revelation as well as in his work on dogmatics Bavinck stresses the fact that the idea of revelation must spring from revelation itself (Wybegeerte der Openbaring, Kampen 1908 p. 21). Yet when defending this Christian idea of revelation against various forms of philosophy Bavinck leaves this high ground and argues neutrally with them. He wants to reason philosophically with modern philosophers and therefore starts with them from the fact of self-consciousness as such, without at once setting this fact, as he does elsewhere, in the context of its relation to God and Christ.

How shall we show that various modern philosophies, and in particular pragmatism, are mistaken in their views of reality? By pointing out that there are "more elements, more fact" than those with which they construct their universe. "The only path by which we are able to attain reality is that of self-consciousness" (Op. Cit., p. 46). On this point idealism is right. But idealism is mistaken if it deduces from this fact the conclusion that perception is a purely immanent act (Idem, p. 47).

"In self-consciousness, therefore, we have to deal not with a mere phenomenon, but with a noumenon, with a reality that is immediately given to us, antecedently to all reasoning and inference. Self-consciousness is the unity of real and ideal being; the self is here consciousness, not scientific knowledge, but experience, conviction, consciousness of self as a reality. In self-consciousness our own being is revealed to us, directly, immediately before all thinking and independently of all willing" (Op. Cit., p. 61).

In the chapters from which these passages are taken Bavinck seeks incontrovertible reality in the idea of human self-consciousness as such. He does not bring into the picture the fact so greatly stressed in his theology, that the reason why men find reality in self-consciousness is because it is at the same time consciousness of God as creator and controller of all things. Bavinck leaves out this fact in order to meet non-Christian philosophers on their own ground.

Of special interest is the fact that Bavinck thinks he finds in self-consciousness as such the "unity of real and ideal being." On the basis of his theology Bavinck elsewhere asserts that unity of real and ideal being can be found only in God. Of course it is true that the human self has a legitimate consciousness of itself as really existing. It cannot but know that it exists. And it cannot know that it exists unless it knows what its existence means. But the latter man does not know by some immediate, direct identification with "thought" or

"ideal being." Man knows what he is and therefore that he is only if he takes himself as analogical of God. Thus man's self-identification is analogical self-identification. The terms "real and ideal being" are abstractions unless given content in terms of the Christian system. And if we say that in self-consciousness noumenal reality is revealed to us, this revelation must be taken to mean that the self is a self to itself because it speaks the Self of its creator.

Moreover, to abstract the self-consciousness of man from its world as though in this self-consciousness, more immediately or more certainly than elsewhere, reality is found, is again to go contrary to Bavinck's own theology. Has he not shown how innate knowledge and acquired knowledge involve one another? Has he not pointed out that even in the status integritatis God's revelation to man through the facts about him and through his consciousness within him was conjoined with supernatural thought-communication by God to man? (Geref. Dog. I, p. 321). The revelation of God to man through his environment and the revelation to man through his own self-consciousness is equally, and equally clearly, indicative of reality as God has made it and as he controls it. It is this ever and everywhere present face of God that Descartes virtually denied when he made the human self the ultimate starting point in predication. This was forgotten by the old Princeton apologetics; it is also, for the moment, forgotten by Bavinck when he would start with the cogito as such as the foundation of human knowledge.

After Bavinck has discussed the relation of revelation to philosophy, to science, to history and to religion he introduces his chapter on Revelation and Christianity with the following words:

"The arguments for the reality of revelation, derived from the nature of thought, the essence of nature, the character of history, and the conception of religion, are finally strengthened by the course of development through which mankind has passed, and which has led it from paradise to the cross and will guide it from the cross to glory" (Idem, p. 144).

This summation indicates, as the text itself in each instance establishes, that Bavinck has to some extent sought the proof of the identity and significance of the system of truth found in Scripture in an interpretation of the universe in terms other than those of Scripture.

The "course of development through which man has passed" points to the idea of revelation. Tradition points to revelation as back of it (Idem, p. 144). To be sure one cannot speak with certainty on the past. "Nevertheless there are phenomena which point back with great probability to a common origin" (Idem, p. 157). Here again Bavinck seeks to understand the universe first in order to introduce the necessity of revelation for the understanding of it. And in doing so he naturally lowers the claims of God's general revelation on man. His approach on this point is the same as that which he makes again and again in his Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. In it he sometimes grants that Thomas

Aquinas was right in maintaining that supernatural revelation is necessary for man because natural revelation is uncertain.

"For that reason Thomas was quite right when he said that even with respect to those truths, which general revelation makes known to us, there is a necessity for revelation and authority because in natural knowledge is fit only for the few, would take too long a time to search out, and moreover is imperfect and uncertain" (Op. Cit., p. 325, Vol. I).

Bavinck here fails to distinguish between the revelation which is clear and the interpretation of that revelation which is worse than uncertain, but is a perversion of the revelation.

It is in accord with this admission that the theistic position can be said to be probably, but only probably, true when Bavinck asserts that the Christian's belief in Scripture is no less defensible than belief in other religions. The believer has no compelling proofs for his position. He must accept the Scriptures on their own authority. But he has at least as much to say for his defense as others have for their attack.

"Unbelief too, in the last analysis does not rest on proofs but has its roots in the heart. In this respect believers and unbelievers are in the same position, the convictions of both are bound up with their personalities, and these convictions are supported a posteriori by proof and ratiocination. When they debate with one another in this a posteriori fashion, the believers are no worse case than they who do not believe. God is sufficiently knowable to those who seek him and sufficiently hidden for those who flee from him" (Idem, p. 635).

Again Bavinck says:

"Historical and rational proofs will not convert any one, but are for all that as powerful for the defense of the faith as are the arguments of the opposite party in justification of its unbelief" (Ibid).

It is evident that in thus lowering the claims of both general and special revelation, Bavinck is again inconsistent with the main thrust of his own as well as of Calvin's theology. Again and again Bavinck has pointed out that God's revelation to man, whether general or special, is inherently clear. Again and again he has emphasized the fact that whenever God speaks – and he speaks everywhere – men must in spite of themselves admit the truth of what he says. It is their creation in God's image, their sense of deity that compels them to do so.

"It is God himself who witnesses to all men. And it is man himself, created as he is in God's image who must, in spite of himself, listen to this testimony and consent to it. In this light the so-called proofs for the existence

of God must be taken. That will safe-guard both against their over and against their underestimation" (Op. Cit., II, p. 55).

It is when Bavinck reasons thus that he does full justice to the objective claims of God in both general and special revelation. Every man must recognize God's voice. No man can escape it. The Word of God "finds support in the rational and moral nature of man" because man is what he is as the creature of God.

Therefore it is not true that the arguments of those who seek to flee the voice of God are rationally as good as the arguments of those who admit and insist that God's voice is everywhere present.

The former start with the "cogito" as though it were as such anything but a rock in a bottomless ocean. They cannot individuate. They cannot show how one fact, if it could be found, can be related to another fact. They cannot account for the uniformity of nature. They cannot use the law of contradiction except they abuse it, making it destroy individuality as it succeeds in its reduction to abstract unity. They cannot find intelligible meaning in the words cause, substance, or purpose; there is no coherence in all their thought.

It is thus to hold high the claim of God and to point out the utter irrationality of unbelief that is in accord with the main thrust of Bavinck's theology. It is out of accord with this his main view when Bavinck starts from the "cogito" as such, then builds up the theistic position piecemeal, link by link, the causal argument proving one point (Idem p. 61), the teleological argument proving another point (Idem p. 62, 63), and the ontological argument proving still another point (Idem p. 65); but together having failed to bring us to God, the God who alone exists. Of the ontological argument he says that it does not take us across the gulf between thought and being (Over de klove van denken tot zyn brengt het ons niet heen, Idem p. 62). Surely we must follow Bavinck when he presupposes the unity of thought and being in God. The presence of such a God cannot but be clearly apparent to man. And surely we must not follow Bavinck when, starting from man as ultimate, he leads on to an ultimate Cause that is not clearly God, to an ultimate Purpose that is not clearly God's, and to an ultimate Being who does not help us out of the vicious circle of our thought. In this latter case we would also find response in the "rational and moral nature of man" but this time it would be this as interpreted by those who seek, in vain, to flee to God. For it is quite to their liking to be told that the voice of God is not clearly heard and the face of God is not clearly seen in the phenomena of human experience. And they find it quite to their liking too to be told that by faith in God and in his Christ, nothing dissimilar to faith in that which is not yet known or in that which is wholly unknowable is meant.

It is impossible to deal more fully with either Kuyper or Bavinck at this time. And we cannot touch on the works of their colleagues and followers, nor is this necessary for the main purpose in hand.

Our main purpose was to indicate:

1. That the theology of old Princeton Seminary and that of Amsterdam is essentially the same. The Hodges, Warfield, DeWitt, Greene, and others are as insistent as are Kuyper, Bavinck and their followers that the Scriptures are the Word of God and that its system of truth is an analogical system. All of human experience must therefore be interpreted in terms of it. Supernatural revelation was, even before the Fall, supplemental to natural revelation. Hence the Scripture is supernatural revelation providing for men as sinners. Sinners cannot presume of themselves to know their needs. They are bound to misinterpret these needs. They must be diagnosed by the great Physician. Therefore only when the Holy Spirit convicts the sinner of his sin does he in the same act convince him of the Bible as the Word of God. To him whom the Spirit regenerates does the Bible appear for what it really is.

The indicia of divinity in Scripture are therefore part of the same process and act of the self-attestation of God. All the facts of the universe attest God. They are all inter-related in their testimony. If there is a cumulative effect produced by the evidence for the existence of God and for the truth of Christianity it is cumulative because each fact says the same thing, proves the same point in a different manner.

2. Inherent in this common theology there is a common opposition to every form of Romanist or evangelical reasoning in theology. All such reasoning assumes that the Scriptures cannot teach anything that is out of accord with the idea of man's ability to turn aside the plan of God. Romanism and evangelicalism therefore cannot effectively challenge the wisdom of man that is built on the idea of autonomy.

Both the men of Princeton and the men of Amsterdam constantly make this point plain. When either speaks of the "common consciousness" of man, they mean the sort of thing that Calvin means by the sense of deity. When either speaks of the self-consciousness of man they mean what Calvin means on the first page of his Institutes when he says that man knows himself in the same act whereby he knows God. When either speak of the proofs of the existence of God they mean that the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament shows forth his handiwork. They hold to the objective validity of the Christian religion. When either of them reason with the unbeliever they tell this unbeliever that unbelief destroys the uniformity of nature and intelligent predication in any field. Over and over again all of these men do all these things by direct assertion or by implication.

3. It is therefore upon this common basis held by old Princeton and Amsterdam alike, that we build when we contend:

a. That in apologetics we must use the same principle that we use in theology, namely the principle of the self-attesting Scripture and of the analogical system of truth which it contains.

b. That therefore we must not make our appeal to the "common notions" of unbelievers and believers but to the "common notions" that, by virtue of creation in God's image, men as men all have in common.

c. That when appeal is thus to be made to man as man, this can be done only as we set the principle of Christianity squarely in opposition to the principle of the unbeliever. Only when the principle of autonomy with its irrationalist-rationalist principles of identity and contradiction is rejected in the name of the principle of analogy is appeal really made to those common notions which men have as men.

d. That therefore the claim must be made that Christianity alone is reasonable for men to hold. And it is utterly reasonable. It is wholly irrational to hold to any other position than that of Christianity. Christianity alone does not crucify reason itself. Without it reason would operate in a total vacuum.

e. That the argument for Christianity must therefore be that of presupposition. With Augustine it must be maintained that God's revelation is the sun from which all other light derives. The best, the only, the absolutely certain proof of the truth of Christianity is that unless its truth be presupposed there is no proof of anything. Christianity is proved as being the very foundation of the idea of proof itself.

f. That acceptance of the Christian position on the part of sinners who are in principle alienated from God, who seek to flee his face, comes when, challenged by the inescapably clear evidence, the Holy Spirit opens their eyes so that they truly see things for what they are. Intellectually sinners can readily follow the presentation of the evidence that is placed before them. If the difference between the Christian and the non-Christian position is only made plain to them, as alone it can be on a Reformed basis, the natural man can, for argument's sake, place himself upon the position of the Christian. But though in this sense he then knows God more clearly than otherwise, though he already knew him by virtue of his sense of deity, yet it is only when by the grace of God the Holy Spirit removes the scales from men's eyes that they know the truth existentially. Then they know him, whom to know is life eternal.

g. That therefore the remnants of the traditional method of apologetics that have been taken over from Romanism and evangelicalism, in greater measure by old Princeton, in lesser measure by Amsterdam, must no longer be retained.

Standing on the shoulders of Warfield and Kuyper we honor them best if we build on the main thrust of their thought rather than if we insist on carrying on what is inconsistent with their basic position. Then are we most faithful to Calvin and to St. Paul.

340

342

3800



