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I. IDEALISTIC MONISM.

I do not care to prefix a rubric of titles of idealistic authors to this criticism, as could be very easily done after the pretentious and pedantic fashion of some review writers. I could cite quite a list, beginning with Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, down to Herbert Spencer, Kuno Fischer, of Heidelberg, and Paul Deussen, of Kiel, and could profess to give outlines of their several phases of Monism from histories of philosophy. But my object is to instruct students who are guided by common sense and their Bibles in the central doctrines of this pretended philosophy which are common to all its phases, and to expose their common errors. No two idealists are consistent with each other, nor even with themselves; hence the attempt to particularize their different schemes would be tedious and hopeless, and would disappoint my practical aim.

Idealism is, in plain terms, that doctrine which tells us that the whole universe, including ourselves, consists of ideas only, and contains no other perdurable substantive beings, material or spiritual, distinguishable from mere trains of ideas or actions. Monism is the doctrine which insists that there is no distinction of mind and matter, that both are one and that there is no true philosophy until all things are traced to one single principle of being. The monism of idealists is, that the universe exists for me only as my representation in thought. Thought and real being are identical. To think a thing is to give it existence, the only kind of existence which anything has. There is not, and cannot be, any creation *ex nihilo*, even if there were an almighty

God to attempt it. The absolute, eternal, first cause is not an infinite personal Spirit, but an infinite, impersonal, universal Consciousness, the Absolute *Ego*. It produces the worlds with all things in them, physical and mental, including me and my readers, simply by thinking them; and all of us have no other substance or being than this continuous producing thought in this absolute consciousness. So we, deceptively thinking ourselves individual minds, produce all the objective things which we know by perception merely by thinking them; and their objective natures, even when most hostile to our own wills, are really the unconscious self-limitations of our own thought. When a tree, a horse, a crag, presents itself to our eyes, a wall to our impact, a thunder-clap to our ears, these visual, tactual and acoustic perceptions are nothing but the subjective affections of our limited *ego*, somehow self-produced, and they give us no evidence whatever that tree, or horse, or wall, or thunder clouds have any substantive reality, nor do they authorize us to believe that we, who do the seeing, touching and hearing, are substantive beings. For they say consciousness authorizes us to know nothing but that of which we are immediately conscious, *i. e.*, the subjective affections. So that I am not authorized to believe there is any real substantive tree external to me, nor any substantive spirit underlying these subjective affections within me. My ontology, as to myself, is absolutely limited to this: I am merely a series of mental modifications, a non-substantive consciousness.

The pious Bishop Berkeley, indeed, does not go so far in his idealism. After proving, as he thinks, that our perceptions evidence no objective realities causing them, he returns a little towards common sense. Unquestionably we have these impressions in consciousness; whence do they come? We answer, God directly produces them in our spirits. Thus God, not an outward substantive universe, is sole source and cause of all cognitions. And he claims that this is the best way to reëstablish our belief in God and our own spirits; that this way brings God nearest to us in faith and piety. This phase of idealism, whose religiousness entirely fails to redeem its absurdity, we now dismiss; it is too religious to have any followers in our day, among the Ger-

mans at least. We shall aim to make out our criticism by discussing *seriatim* the cardinal points common to idealistic-monists:

I. Examination shows that the very spring-head of all idealism and pantheism, ancient and modern, that of the Eleatics down to Heraclitus, of Plato, of Bruno, of Spinoza, of the Germans to our day, is the false *dictum* that there can be no such thing as really substantive being that is contingent. All real being must be necessary, and therefore eternal being. The creation of real substantive being *ex nihilo* is unthinkable and impossible. Hence it follows by strict logic that no really substantive thing ever begins, or ever ends. Experience seems to show us multitudes of things that both begin and end, including, indeed, everything, even our own bodies, in the objective world. But as these beginnings and endings cannot really be, they must be accounted for in some other way; either as entirely deceptive with Zeno, the Eleatic, or with Heraclitus and Plato in his later moods, as the perpetual recurring of the transition between the becoming and the ending; or with Spinoza, as temporary modifications of the one eternal substance; or with the later idealists, as passing phases of consciousness projected either in thought or will from the Absolute *Ego*. In anywise, all that appear to us common mortals to be temporal and separate things are identified in reality with the eternal necessary One. Thus the desired result of Monism is reached. Reviewing this simple statement we see that it is reached logically, if once the fatal premise be granted. Here, then, is the dividing point between the philosophy of the Bible and that of Monism, Pantheism and Atheism. Is not this the reason why infinite wisdom set the contrary, the true proposition at the very beginning of revelation? (Gen. i. 1.) "In the beginning *God created* the heavens and the earth;" and why the apostle (Heb. xi. 3) propounded this as the first and the fountain-head of all the teachings of Christian faith, expressly avowing it as alien and hostile to all merely human philosophies that "through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear." Thus our Bible rejects as false this prime corner-stone

of the pagan and the idealistic metaphysics. We hear from them no other argument for it than this flimsy assertion, that the creation in time, *ex nihilo*, of real being cannot be true, *because they cannot imagine how even Omnipotence goes about it*. Of course we cannot. But how paltry is this, in view of the facts that not only all philosophy, but all practical knowledge, runs up into mysteries not explicable in our thought, or pictured in our imaginations! The scriptural proposition must be shown to be not only mysterious, but contradictory to the necessary principles of thought, to justify its rejection. It does not conflict with the principle of causation, "no cause, no effect"; for it assigns for dependent beings a cause infinitely sufficient, the creative power of an omniscient and almighty God. That the work should not be comprehensible in our imaginations is just what we are to expect; for no human has ever had or can have consciousness or empirical knowledge of this action. Each human mind began in such a creation; but it had to be created before it could have consciousness or experience. Again, we are not to expect that we can have any *a priori* comprehension of how dependent being begins (but only of the fact that it does begin), because the only knowledge we have of the *essentia* of substantive things is approached by us *a posteriori*, namely, by the empirical perception of their properties. But the evidence which philosophy gives of the fact is sufficient. It appears in the form of this *reductio ad absurdum*, that if we deny it we shut ourselves up to hopeless absurdities and self-contradictions. Our subsequent criticism shall show that this is what idealistic Monism does.

II. We may grant that when our minds perceive an object our immediate consciousness is, strictly speaking, not of the external object but of our subjective perception thereof, and not of the substantive spirit which perceives but only of its act of perceiving. But none the less is the inference of the idealist worthless, that therefore we have no real knowledge of substantive spirit, but only of a train of consciousnesses. For it is an immediate, necessary, universal law of thought, that there could be no consciousnesses unless there were beforehand substantive spirit to think them. Here is a necessary intuition which every human

mind recognizes when not blinded by its crotchet: that there must be a substantive agent in order that any action may be; that there must be a substance present in order that any properties may be. He whose mind had really and wholly lost this first principle of consciousness and perception would be idiotic. Let the universal common sense of men answer these questions. How can action be unless there is already a something to act? How can attributes be thought unless there be already a something to which to attribute them? In the logical sense, the substance must be before all its actions and attributes. It is very true that a kind of being may be thought whose activities are essential: God is such a being. Then, in the chronological sense, the existence of this being and its actions will be coëtaneous. But even here in the logical, or productive, sense the substantive existence must precede its attributes and actions, for it is in order to them.

Let this principle of thought be tested by the common sense of natural minds in any one of myriads of cases such as these: Your fellow-man hears you speak of the attribute white, for instance, and asks you of what white thing you are speaking—of snow? of milk? You answer, I am speaking of a *white nothing*. Then his mind must answer: nay, you are mocking me; if you do not perceive some *white substance* you perceive no white. A rational child comes for the first time from his rural home to the city. He hears for the first time the sonorous clangor of a church bell; he asks: "Father, do you hear that noise; what makes it?" Let us suppose the father's answer to be: "Yes, my son, we hear a great and strange noise, but it is made by a nothing." Everybody knows that this answer is impossible for that child's mind, unless he were idiotic; his answering thought must be: were it only a nothing there could be no sound. Then the father gives the true answer: These sounds are made by a church bell. The child's rational curiosity then asks: "What is a church bell? Of what substance is it made?" Let the father answer: "The bell itself is composed of nothing but sounds; these successive ting-a-lings are themselves the sole material of the bell!" Again, the child's rationality would be confounded; the answer would be impossible for his

mind, unless it were idiotic. These principles of thought we find equally governing the highest conclusions of modern science, the trained logical mind just as much as the rustic. We have seen the Newtonian theory of light give place to the undulatory theory. As soon as physicists deemed the latter proved, they at once postulated the existence of the ether, an imponderable substance diffused through the interstellar spaces. If there are undulations there must be a something to undulate. This ether is described as a substance too refined to be perceived by any sense or tested by any apparatus, the most delicate; yet we are taught its existence throughout the universe. Such is the irresistible power of this intuition. Therefore, although the substance which thinks and the substance which is perceived be not immediately in our consciousness, yet are they, by the mediation of consciousness with rational intuition, as necessarily known as consciousness itself.

III. These points have prepared the way for some account of the historical genesis of the recent idealism. Its teachers usually claim Emmanuel Kant as its father. It has pleased the Germans to reverence this ingenious and acute, but treacherous, thinker as a sort of philosophic demi-god; hence idealists seek to build on his pretended authority. They do so disingenuously. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, with that wilful subtilty which characterizes the author, is pleased to detach our two rational intuitions of abstract or empty space and of duration from their class, and to describe them as merely the thought-forms of the human understanding (the faculty of empirical knowledge). He holds that these two concepts, as he calls them, are merely subjective in our minds, and yet the universally necessary forms of thought for us. He teaches that, on the one hand, nothing but empirical perceptions demonstrate to us any content of true being in any of our concepts; while, on the other hand, it is impossible for us to think any being except as posited in space, or any phenomenal event except as posited in time. But we have no rational warrant for inferring that these forms of thought are valid for any other intelligences than the human in its present state. Kant, like a true philosopher, asserts positively the exist-

ence of real beings as proved to us by our empirical knowledge, but he then, unfortunately and wantonly, admits that we have no sufficient evidence that these beings really are what they appear to our perceptions to be as to their properties. To pure rational minds there is unquestionably a world of real beings, his "noumenal world." But we cannot know that it is like our "phenomenal world," because our two necessary thought-forms of space and time shape and mould all our empirical knowledge of the properties by which alone we know real beings. And as these thought-forms are but subjective in us, they give us no warrant to believe that the real beings of the noumenal world are what they seem to us to be.

Such is the Kantian theory of the human understanding. It is true that when he comes to make his destructive application to our ontological or metaphysical beliefs he also joins the necessary principle of causation, by a sort of after-thought, to the two other thought-forms, space and time. Then, in his famous *Antinomies of Reason*, he seeks to destroy all the certainty of the fundamental rational beliefs, and to lay all metaphysics in ruins. Such is the final result of this famous critique! Setting out professedly to refute the destructive skepticism of Hume, it lands us in a skepticism deeper and, if possible, more ruinous than his. It is true that Kant afterwards, in his *Critique of Practical Reason or Conscience*, professes "richly to restore" the ontological beliefs (in spirit, God, freedom, immortality) which he thinks he destroyed in his *Antinomies*. Sound philosophers have long ago proved that his restoration would be worthless had his destruction of these beliefs been valid. Thus, if the practical reason or conscience is merely an instinctive sensibility, or merely (with H. Spencer, *et al.*) a set of utilitarian inferences from our lower empirical knowledge, then it gives no premises from which to prove any higher rational principles. Man is no more entitled thus to a valid metaphysic than a sensitive horse or dog. On the other hand, if conscience is an *a priori* rational principle, which Kant himself strongly asserts, then it must ever remain as justly subject to the suspicion of being a merely subjective thought-form in us as the other rational intuitions of time, space and causality.

There is for Kant the fatal argument *ad hominem*. We must hold with DeQuincy, that, if the Kantian *Critique of Reason* is correct, it is the utter destruction of all metaphysics for man.

The cry of the recent idealists is, that Kant created idealism. We pronounce this dishonest. When Fichte first claimed this in his *Wissenschaftslehre*, the aged Kant promptly denied it in a public journal, and in his last edition of his *Critique* expurgated the sentences which seemed to give pretext to Fichte's idealism. Kant still held fast to a universe of real objective beings, only teaching that their noumenal reality may always be different from their phenomenal appearances to us. Idealists deny all objective realities, asserting that the universe is literally nothing but the totality of mental modification forever going on in the absolute consciousness, or the finite consciousnesses; and that my universe is to me nothing but my mental representation. Idealists arrogantly claim that because they are Kantians they alone can have any metaphysics. Kant claimed that he had made all metaphysics impossible. This contrast is almost biting enough to chastise the insolence of these men, who, believing in no real being, yet claim that they alone can have a true ontology! That is to say, they alone can construct a science of real being who deny that there is any real being. The only true bricklayers in the world are those who deny that there is any such thing as a brick in the world!

But Kant, while a rational realist, becoming a victim to his own ill-starred subtilty, did give subsequent idealists a partial pretext. This was his doctrine that our intuitions of space and time, while *a priori* and necessary, are no more than the subjective thought-forms of the human understanding. We shall show that here is a wanton leap across a wide chasm, unbridged by any reason. This, we repeat, is our thesis: the *a priori* and necessary character of our rational notions and judgments of space, time and (if you please) causality, *does not prove* that they are merely subjective thought-forms for us, but just the contrary. Here let us signalize the equal ignorance and dogmatism of Deussen, where he reconstructs with great parade of formality the argument for the *a priority* of our time and space cognitions; and then ar-

rogantly turns upon us with these two assertions: that Kant was the first to prove this; and that, proving this, he proved them to be merely the thought-forms of the human understanding. Both assertions are false. Kant was not the first to establish this primariness of these notions. Shaftesbury had asserted it against the great empiricist Locke a hundred years before. Leibnitz and Wolf had taught it. Decartes, the founder of modern philosophy, had taught it virtually. Bishop Butler and Dr. Richard Price had taught it. Dr. T. H. Reid had taught it against Hume. And next, our rational notions of time and space are not mere thought-forms for us, because they are *a priori*; but for that very reason are to be held universal laws of thought, valid for all intelligences; or else our human intelligence is a lie, and practical idiocy our only consistent attitude. Here is the tug of our war. We therefore ask our readers to bear with us while we reproduce some of the refutations, long advanced by sound philosophy, against this Kantian crotchet:

(1.) Here should be noted those golden words of Thornwell: That every necessary law of our thought must be held to be also a universal law of truth and of reality. For why? To dispute this is to teach the deadliest metaphysical skepticism. Between Thornwell's rule and the ghastly nihilism of Hume there is no consistent medium. If apodeictic truth is not immutable, permanent and equal for all intelligences, then there is no logic, no certain knowledge, no philosophy of any school; man is but a brute, more wretched than his brother apes, in that he must live under the perpetual delusion that he knows propositions which cannot be known. If any one necessary law of my thinking, as universal for man as any other, may be found invalid, then I must suspect all my other similar laws of thought. There is opened for me the gulf of absolute skepticism! In fact, all forms of idealism are but skepticisms; and their tendencies need only to be developed to give us blank nihilism. The faculties common to man which give him substantive objective realities and their true essential properties appear to the general intelligence just as valid as man's other faculties. If we must admit that they cheat us, we must think that the rest will do so; *falsus in uno, falsus in*

omnibus. History confirms this. Says Victor Cousin: After idealism has always come skepticism; after the Eleatics in Greece come the Sophists—the New Academy, and Pyrrho. With Berkeley came Hume. After German idealism we have Bakunin and his murderous nihilists. (2.) I next demand, what is this jugglery by which the Kantians claim to separate our rational intuitive cognitions of time and space (and then of causality) from their own proper class, including our other rational intuitions? How was Kant entitled to degrade the first two as the thought-forms of the lower faculty, the understanding, while leaving the others (where he does not ignore them) to the higher faculty of reason? Were there any ground for just distinction between the faculties it could only be this: that the *reason is the faculty of a priori, necessary, supersensuous truths*. If it is not this, what is it, pray, other than any cognitive faculty? But our notions of space and time and of power in cause are as completely supersensuous as any, and, as Kant well proves, as *a priori*, as necessary, as universal for men. It will be well to compare these with the full list. True philosophy finds in the human reason all these primary supersensuous notions and judgments coördinate in rank and quality, not learned *by inference from* sense perceptions, but given forth in the light of the soul's own essential intelligence *upon occasion of* sense perceptions. We state them in pairs:

NOTIONS OF.	JUDGMENTS ABOUT.
1. Substance.	There can be no attributes without substance.
2. Substantive Agent.	There can be no action without an agent.
3. Power in cause.	There can be no effect without an efficient cause.
4. Identity.	I am constantly an identical unit.
5. Abstract Space.	Substantive being exists only in space.
6. Duration.	Every event happens in time.
7. Infinitude.	The finite implies the infinite.
8. Spontaneity or freedom.	I am a free agent.
9. The moral good and obligation.	I am bound to do right.
10. Axioms of pure thought.	Judgments of identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle.

Simple inspection is enough to show that the notions and judgments of time, space, and power in cause belong to this list as thoroughly as any others in it. They are no more subjective, and

equally supersensuous, immediate, necessary, and universal. I press the question, On what pretext are these three detached from their class, and restricted as merely subjective thought-forms of the human understanding, invalid anywhere outside of its sphere? Idealists now babble much about the "spontaneity of the reason." From this they would have us infer that the reason itself is capable of emitting all ideas making up the ideal universe of mere representations in consciousness, without being moved thereto by the sense-impression of any real objective being. Their own Kant shall refute them. By the spontaneity of the reason they here mean, not freedom in willing, but the fact that the "pure" notions and judgments of the reason are not mere effects or products of sense-perception, but are from the reason itself upon occasion of sense-perceptions. This Kant taught, along with previous philosophers; but he also taught that these "pure" cognitions could have no judgment of reality, no "content," until this was furnished to them by some empirical perception. They are, therefore, in themselves, but conditions of knowing, not cognitions of any actualities, and, therefore, according to Kant himself, they alone cannot make any beginning of an actual universe. Our intuitions are, indeed, not caused by our perceptions, but these are their necessary occasion. In the absence of the *conditio sine qua non*, the effect no more takes place than if the cause itself were absent. Therefore, this "spontaneity of the reason" is inadequate to generate an objective world.

When Kant infers that, however clearly we know the attributes of things, we do not know the things in themselves, he mistakes the true connection of attributes with their substances. He seems to imagine it a loose one, like the connection of a man's clothing with his body. To-morrow, the man whom we see may change his apparel, and in his new suit we may not recognize him. The true relation of substance and attribute is wholly different: it is a permanent, not a changeable, relation; an essential, not an accidental, one. The essential properties of things are true causes of our perceptions of them; they are powers inherent in the objects perceived. Therefore, knowing these essential properties, we know things in themselves; else knowledge is impossible, and our intelligence is a delusion.

Our cognitions of space and time are *a priori*, but not therefore one whit more limited to the subjective sphere of our consciousness than any other *a priori* notion or judgment possible to our minds. Indeed, they are less so than some others, as our intuitions of self-identity and freedom. We absolutely know space, not as our attribute, but as an external entity; not, indeed, a substantive entity, yet wholly without the *ego*, the unit-spirit, which, while always posited in space, does not occupy any part of space measurable by extension. Thus we know space as external to ourselves, yea, as extending infinitely beyond ourselves. So we know duration. Now, then, our demonstration against Kant is perfect. Without these *a priori* regulative principles of thought, any true, distinct acts of intelligence would be inconceivable. This, Kant himself teaches. Our space- and time-cognitions are no more subjective than any or all other *a priori* ones. If, then, the supposed subjectivity of these two forbids our knowing things in themselves truly, then, for us men correct knowledge of anything is absolutely inconceivable. The only just inference would be, not idealism, but inevitable nescience.

IV. "True philosophy must be monism." Here we have an instance of wanton dogmatism. Monists tell us imperiously that it must be so, but they never deign to prove why it must be so. Thus Fichte, the earliest, and Herbert Spencer, the latest, among modern monists. The former, in his famous attempt to generate subjective idealism, admits fully (what all sane persons have to admit) that every possible judgment is conditioned on the distinction between subject and object. Take the simplest possible judgment, as that of the child who exclaims, "I see the horse": this perceptual judgment is possible only as the intelligence separates the horse seen from the *ego* which does the seeing. But immediately after this inevitable admission, Fichte proceeds to postulate that, somehow, this subject and object must be reduced to a unity. Either subject must be reduced to object, or object to subject; and, as the former is impossible, a way must be found to do the latter. Common sense asks, *Why must it?* Why not let this distinction between subject and object stand as real, seeing that it is given in the unforced intelligence of every human mind in the

world? No answer or proof is deigned! Thus, Herbert Spencer, in his *Principles*, declares that there is no true philosophy until all the phenomena in the universe are reduced to effects of one substance, "matter," and of one energy, "force." Common sense asks, Why? He condescends to give no proof. These philosophic popes only publish their *bulls* that thus it shall be. Recent idealists are fond of saying: "Oh, the Cartesian dualism is untenable." Why untenable? Their deceptive answer is, to point us to the erroneous theories of sense-perception invented by Descartes's followers: Malebranche, all objects seen in God; Guilinet, occasionalism; and Leibnitz and Wolf, preëstablished harmony. If idealists were not either ignorant or unfair, they would give us the true historical account of these vagaries, which would show that they are mere excrescences, for which the Cartesian dualism is in nowise responsible. But of this, more anon.

If Monism has any pretext, we can find it only in these propositions: That all truths must be permanent and inter-coherent, and therefore the true system of cognitions will possess that degree of unity; that all the departments of nature disclose to scientific observation coherent interactions, showing that they are parts of one plan. All this we grant. And manifestly this unity is abundantly provided for by the doctrines of dualism, creation, and monotheism. This was Descartes's own Cartesianism. Knowledge begins in the indisputable, inevitable recognition of my own substantive existence as a spirit, contained in my constant consciousness of my own acts of spirit. "*Cogito, ergo sum.*" Consciousness indisputably tells me that I have myriads of sense-impressions coming from multitudes of objective things external to, and different from, my *ego*. I know that I am not the voluntary cause of these impressions, and, since there can be no effects without causes, these objective things, the only known causes of these myriad impressions in my consciousness, must be real, and are correctly separated and set over against myself as not self. Next, my *ego* is a substance wholly antithetic in essence to the things in this world of not self. *Ego* is an absolute unit; these exist in multiplicity. To *ego* no attribute of extension can be thought; all these objective things present the attri-

butes of extension, and these alone, since every attribute of spirit—absolute unity, indivisibility, freedom, self-action, feeling, and thought—is absurdly and utterly irrelevant to them. Thus, I truly know the distinction of mind and matter. I know that they form two worlds of temporal contingent substances. From them I rise by necessary lines of thought to the independent, eternal, infinite Spirit, God; and I find the only rational source of existence for the two dependent worlds in his almighty creation. Why did this result in a dualism of beings? “Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.”

Now, against the wilful monistic fancy I urge first the same objection which Cousin advances so wisely and so powerfully against Locke’s sensualistic theory of knowledge. He and the monists raise and decide first that question which should have been handled last, the question of the source and origin of cognitions. The modest, true philosophy begins with the faithful observation and ascertainment of the qualities of our mental action. It places ontology after psychology. The monist begins with his dogmatic ontology, and then tyrannically forces his theory of knowledge into its fetters, though at the cost of breaking up every law of reason and common sense.

“But if mind and matter are substances essentially distinct, then there can be no real, direct interaction of the one substance on the other.” Yes, this had been, for hundreds of years, the unquestioned dogma of the peripatetics. But from this dogma they did not infer a denial of the distinction between mind and matter (monism); but they inferred that mind can have no direct sense-perception of the material world; and hence their representationist theories of perception: that mind does not see outward material things at all, but is looking at some intermediate “*forma*,” “*species*,” “*idea*,” or “*phantasma*” of the thing seen, which has somehow gotten from it into the mind. Now, it was unquestionably this same dogma which betrayed these misguided followers of Descartes into their vicious theories of perception and volition. The analysis and logical consequence can be easily thought out by the reader. *But does it follow* from the distinction between the substance of matter and the substance of mind that direct

interaction between them must be impossible? That is the hinge-point, and there we shall find again a mere *dictum gratis*, which befooled these scholastics, befooled the spurious Cartesians, and is now equally befooled the monists. What was the old argument? Simply this: That the essential distinction between mind and matter is such that all the attributes of extension must be irrelevant to, and impossible for, spiritual substance; and therefore, since the attributes of matter cannot be imprinted on mind, it must be impossible that the ideas of these attributes can be directly produced by matter upon the mind. For instance, should we say that a mind has directly received ideas of the material attributes of size, figure, and weight, this would be as bad as saying that this mind itself is now qualified by the attributes size, figure, and weight. I reply, *This old argument is worthless, because it proves too much.* Were it valid, it would equally prove against the scholastics that their own representationist theory of perception was worthless and impossible; for, let the reader take notice, that theory says that our minds do obtain ideas of the size, figure, and weight of material bodies somehow, namely, through the jugglery of these supposed "sensible species" somehow present in the mind. But I repeat, Were the assertion true that the mind could not have its own spiritual ideas of these properties of matter without being itself qualified by them, this roundabout scheme of perception would be precisely as impossible as the direct, common-sense one. Now let us add the fatal point of Dr. Thomas Reid's immortal refutation: No representationist theory of perception could give any certain knowledge of an objective world, because on its own terms comparison would be impossible between the mind's supposed sensible species and the outward objects of which they are imagined to be pictures. Thus, all these peripatetic theories really tend to the blank skepticism of Hume, and so does modern monism. The true key to the scholastic sophism is this: it is not the same thing for a mind to have its own spiritual cognitions of the attributes of matter and to be itself actually qualified by these attributes. There is the confusion of thought. If that confusion is to be asserted, then the whole vast mass of objective cognitions which men have concerning the objective

world, at least seemingly qualified by attributes of extension, would be an impossibility except for blank materialists; *as impossible for the idealist on his scheme as for us.* Look and see.

Well would it have been for Germany if the notorious egotism of her philosophers had permitted them to look westward (or anywhere out of Germany, except to pagan India and Greece), and learn something from Dr. Reid. He would have taught them that a true theory of knowledge must be built, not upon wilful, dogmatic assumptions, but upon *facts* ascertained by faithful observation in the inner sphere of consciousness and the outer sphere of objective knowledge; that, in fact, there is no evidence of the existence of these sensible species or other intermediate means of intercourse between mind and the outer world, save our own sense organs; that true science must take the facts actually given her, whether mysterious or not, since all science of finite minds begins and ends in mysteries; that the facts we really have are these: Here am I known to myself by an inevitable intuition as a unit spiritual substance; and here are involuntary, distinct impressions on my consciousness, which I know were not self-produced, and therefore must have had real objective sources, which sources must have been real causal powers, named by us essential properties of those objective things. And if anyone says still that the mystery is not explained how material attributes can be revealed to immaterial minds, I add: This mystery is precisely what we are to expect; there ought be for our spirits an interspace of darkness at the point where organic nerve action is translated into cognition, because in that transition point it is ceasing to be merely organic and is only becoming strictly spiritual. The Almighty could provide for the doing of it; our finite minds cannot see through the method. Thus dualism remains indeed a mystery, but we shall show idealistic-monism to be a stark contradiction.

V. (1.) Idealists claim Kant for their father, and they say their idealism is a metaphysic and the only true one. But their father says he has destroyed all metaphysics! They say his critical process is indisputable when he reduces ^{*}our intuitions of space and time to mere subjective thought-forms of the human understanding,

which may be entirely invalid for the pure reason and for all other intelligences (he does, indeed, afterwards attempt to give us back a metaphysic through his criticism of the conscience and will; but we have proved this futile, and we do not find idealists now using it). Kant says that these thought-forms, while thus unsafe, are yet absolutely universal and imperative in all human minds. If human beings are to think at all with their own understandings, they must think in these forms. Idealists also admit that our thought shaped by these forms does lead us to believe in personality, individuality, the principle of causation, and objective realities. Their metaphysic assumes that there is some way by which they properly get beyond and above these spatial, temporal and causal thought-forms, and it is thence they learn their metaphysic of impersonality and idealism. Now, I assert that, according to their own admissions, such a metaphysic must be utterly visionary, and, therefore, no science at all; for it can have no data. It is admitted that every cognition which any human being has ever actually and validly had was under these thought-forms; then no human being can possibly have a particle of ground for supposing that there are any other. It is mere nonsense for him to plead that there must be some other and transcendental forms of thought, though nobody on earth now exercises them or ever did, because the results of our present thought-forms lead to mysteries. For it is far more reasonable to believe in mysterious propositions, supported by valid proof, than to take up imaginary ones supported by no facts at all. If Kant is right in his criticism, then the only possible source for a transcendental metaphysic must be a direct revelation from some higher personal intelligence, entirely superhuman, and absolutely uninvolved in these human thought-forms. But idealists do not admit such direct revelation. Let us take a plain parallel: There was a world occupied wholly by one race of percipient animals. From the very beginning every eye of every one of these animals had been covered perpetually by red spectacles. The consequence was as universal as unavoidable, that all of them had always seen the sky at the zenith to be red. In fact, that zenith might be to unspectacled eyes not red but azure. If we admit that some

being from another planet, where red spectacles had never misled the vision, should visit this first world and tell its misguided inhabitants that the zenith was azure and not red, then there might be much surprise, much inquiry, and possible converts to the azure theory. This would be by direct revelation, which idealists disdain. But if no such visitant ever came, manifestly it would be impossible that any of the red-spectacled beings could ever have even an imaginary concept of azure sky (whence could it come to them?), or that the inquiry whether there were such a sky could ever enter or ever be debated among them, or that there could ever be, in that world any grounds for asserting an azure sky there or anywhere else.

(2.) The most acute attempts of idealists to reduce the subject and the object in thought to unity have proved impracticable and worthless. Do they try to persuade me, for instance, that my perceptive idea of the wall which bars my path does not assure me of an objective wall, as a second reality opposed to myself, but is only a self-produced limitation of my own cognition, wrought somehow by my consciousness upon itself? I reply, no principle of consciousness or common sense informs me of any such self-limitation. Every such principle tells me that I and my consciousnesses are one thing, and that this wall is another and an opposite thing. I know I did not determine myself to think a wall, but something else, not myself, made me think it. I willed no such objective; on the contrary, if I could I know I would will it away, for, I wish to pursue my path. If I say, I will be for the nonce an idealist; I will act towards that "objectified self-limitation," the wall, as only an idea; surely a strong man can walk through a mere idea: that wall bruises and pains me. But I know I did not bruise myself; my whole volition was, and is, not to be bruised if I could help it. I know the cause of this involuntary bruise and pain is not self, but something different from and opposite to self. Have I become idiotic? How is it that self is doing such strange and cruel things to itself, of which yet self knows nothing?

The simple, logical judgment is the universal form of every affirmative cognition of the human mind. But every logician

teaches that the possibility of a judgment is absolutely conditioned upon the distinction of subject and predicate. Must the validity of logical thought be destroyed, then, to make room for this impossible reduction of the two to one? Fichte thinks that he has found a way to do this by applying to all our ideas two of the axioms of pure thought, in the way of a continuous analysis and subsequent synthesis. Hegel, with less pretension of technical exactness, proposes to do the same thing by means of the assertion that the negative proposition implies an affirmative, and therefore the disruption between the two may be united in an implied third. One answer applies to both. Fichte says the first and simplest cognition ranks itself under the first axiom of pure thought, "all A is A." He virtually admits that the distinction of the object from the subject must place the mind under the second axiom, that of contradiction, "no non-A is A." Now, it is the simplest remark in the world to say to Fichte: If the three logical axioms rule the mind to the production of your idealistic result, why do you utterly omit the third axiom, that of "excluded middle"? The answer is quite plain: he could not but see that this third principle is death to his scheme! Between the axiom of identity and that of contradiction, any middle proposition is impossible. All A is A; no non-A is A; any given object of thought is either A or non-A, and the distribution is so absolutely exhaustive as to permit no possible middle. That is to say, this idealistic scheme is rendered impossible by the necessary laws of logic. Take either or both the propositions in our little parable: "I see the wall, or I am bruised by the wall." The object, wall, is distinguished from the subject I in both these first propositions. If A represents me then the wall is non-A, and cannot be A, *i. e.*, cannot be I, and the law of excluded middle utterly estops every process of re-identification. But, says Fichte, at this stage of thought the mind seizes the abstract concepts of quantity and divisibility, and is thus enabled to judge the synthetic proposition non-A the same with a part of A, while different from the remaining part of A. One fatal answer is, that A, *i. e.* *Ego*, has no parts. That which thinks cannot be qualified by either quantity or divisibility; it is a spiritual monad. Here, then, the whole fictitious process breaks down into worthlessness.

(3), The other necessary postulate of idealism is equally false. It says that in its (only true) metaphysic, thought and being are identical; that my world is nothing but my representation in thought; that the universe is nothing but the absolute *ego's* representation in thought. This is denied by the first intuition of reason, that of substance. To think a substance *does not make* a substance. The thought of the inventor does not give existence to the new machine which he is thinking out. The girl's mental image of a new spring bonnet does not place that bonnet on her head. The boy's eager thought-picture of the coveted pony produces no living animal. The imaginary pony, bonnet, machine, remain nonentities until the productive processes follow and execute the thought. Everybody knows that, from the first man to this day, the first instance has never been found where man has brought a substantive thing into actuality by merely thinking its idea. Thus the universal experience and common sense of mankind refute this postulate. Idealists shall not be permitted to resort to the subterfuge that, since the individual *ego* is at bottom identical with the absolute, it is the all-potent thought of the Absolute *Ego*, of which their philosophy says that to think a thing is to give it existence. They even pretend to quote Scripture, where it says: "God spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." We reply that this subterfuge cannot avail them, since they identify the mode of operation of the individual with the absolute consciousness. They say, My thought is God's thought. They shall not play thus fast and loose, thus making the one phase of the world-consciousness *per se* infinitely productive, while experience proves the other phase utterly non-productive. But the Scripture does not ascribe their postulate to the infinite God in their sense. Scriptures ascribe to him a sovereign omnipotence such that his will is always effectuated. They recognize the fact that, being pure spirit, he has no bodily members through which he effectuates his will as we do ours. But they do not represent God as mere thought without will and power; they do not teach that the mere thought of God gives dependent substantive existence without the forthputting of his substantive power as well. Against that idealistic conception of God lie these

fatal objections: (1), If it were true, the necessary distinction between God's *scientia simplex* and his *scientia libera* could not obtain. Search and see. (2), Since God's *scientia simplex* is eternal, the universe would have to be eternal. (3), Since God's *scientia simplex* is infinite, the created universe would have to be infinite. (4), Since God's *scientia simplex* is immutable, from eternity to eternity, it would have to be a universe absolutely without change!

Once more: Were thought and existence identical, the being of any substantive object not endowed with thought must be annihilated whenever conscious thought about it in all other minds was suspended. But, in fact, nothing is more false. All but insane persons, who own horses, for instance, know that these animals exist continuously in their stables, while there are frequent intervals during which neither their owners nor any other persons are thinking of them at all. Should the house-dog, which does not think, enter the stable during any of these intervals, he should see no horse there; but the horse is there, and the dog does see him, although neither the master nor any other human being is there "thinking him into existence." No escape can be found by saying that the Absolute *Ego* is still thinking horse all the time, and that this makes the horse's existence continuous; for, since the thought of God is eternal and unchangeable, this would give us, instead of an actual animal, lately a colt, and now ten or eighteen years old, an eternal, unchangeable horse. Is there such a horse? Plato might say, Yes, in the form of the eternal archetypal idea of generic horse. Must we, then, be Platonic realists?

(4), Hegel was scarcely dead, when this phase of idealism began to fall under these crushing objections of the common sense of scientific men themselves. Then came Schopenhaur with his substitute: It is not the mere thought of the absolute *ego* which generates dependent phenomenal universe, but the will thereof. This infinite, impersonal will is what projects itself in the seeming forms of temporal, dependent being; for it is not thought, but will, which is power, and it is power which creates. And this new theory becomes for a time the refuge of those who are determined to be idealists. But next comes Hartmann, with his

Philosophy of the Unconscious, and tumbles Schopenhaur along with Hegel into ruins. He reasons irresistibly that, as mere thought without power can be productive of nothing, and Hegel's phenomenal universe could be only an aggregate of nonentities, so will without intelligence formulates nothing, and Schopenhaur's phenomenal universe would be a chaos of effects without intelligent plan. Hegel would cheat us with a universe of effects, yet without any efficient cause; Schopenhaur, with another universe without any final cause. We add further, Schopenhaur violates the very conception of rational being by making will the primal source of all things. Hartmann has shown that to the eternal first cause both intelligence and will must be ascribed. While these two attributes, viewed from the chronological point of view, act coëtaneously, from the logical point of view intelligence is before will. Thought must teach the will what to choose, or otherwise will is blind. Once more: Schopenhaur derives all the parts of the phenomenal universe alike from the will of the Absolute *Ego*—rational men, animals, trees, mountains. He must, therefore, represent all the different, the contrasted, energies of all as common manifestations of the one will-power. So his recent followers expressly admit and teach. Volitions in rational men are but the will-power of the Absolute *Ego*. Animal instinct and impulse in brutes are the same. The vegetative power in the tree is still the same. Yea, the attraction of gravitation in the rock and the water, the chemical affinity between molecules in material compounds, are still the same! And consequently all are alive, the rock, the clod, as truly, though not as vividly, as the human soul! For, as the absolute will is the sole original of beings, it is the only life; and wherever it is, there life is. But plainly, in order to admit this, we must deny not only all common sense, but every established principle of modern science, both mental, biological, and inorganic. These all teach us that mechanical and chemical forces are not the same with the vital, but heterogeneous and antithetic. For instance, the grand function of the vital energy in plants and animal bodies is to resist and overrule the chemical attractions. The very signal of the departure of life is this: that the chemical energies now resume their natural force, and begin

to disintegrate what the vital energy had constructed. Consciousness tells us that what the human will has to do with the external world of matter is always to resist its mechanical forces, or to conquer its inertia. Finally, the impassable gulf between rational will and material force is established by this grand fact, that inertia is the first law of matter, while mind is free and self-moved; matter exhibits no motion save that propagated upon it from without, while mind is a true inward source of spiritual actions

(5.) Once more, the whole theory that we generate an external world by the objective limitations of our own thought or will lies under this fatal objection, that consciousness tells us absolutely nothing of such processes in us. It is this, obviously, which drives Hartmann into his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, resolved not to come back to the philosophy of common sense and of personal theism, to which he approaches so near; he has nothing left him but to antedate these wondrous fictitious processes before the rise of consciousness in us or the Absolute *Ego*. He usurps the doctrine admitted by many since Leibnitz and Hamilton, that there are beginnings or rudiments of mental modifications latent to consciousness. To this class, Hartmann holds, belong all those mental processes by which we generate our world as our representation. That long course of events which Christians call creation and providence is to be conceived of as nothing but the continuous struggle of the Absolute *Ego* up from its surd condition to completeness of consciousness. When it reaches this the universe will be consummated. Individuality and personal consciousness will be all merged in the Absolute *Ego*; and with this, sin and suffering will finally cease, and matter and mind be resolved into identity.

Against this we here urge only one point: Hartmann has by this resort virtually pleaded himself clean out of the court of science. It is a confession that idealism is a dream and not a scientific theory, not only without evidence, but by its own hypothesis impossible to be evidenced. Mental science has no other field than that of consciousness. In that field it must get all its *data*, or it can have none. Hartmann might attempt to escape

by asking us: Must there not be some scientific and valid method for ascertaining the facts of those mental processes which are supposed to go on back of consciousness? If not, how did Leibnitz ascertain that there were such processes? There must then be some philosophy of the unconscious. We reply, yes, just so far as there are valid *a posteriori* evidences connecting seen results in the mind with their unseen roots, but no further. The gardener does not see with his eyes the sprouting of his beans, for they are covered from eyesight by the mould during this process. Yet he rightly believes that they did sprout, and that these luxuriant plants above ground are their products. For why? Because he did see the dry unsprouted beans placed beneath the rich soil. He does see the new plants emerging from the same spots and showing the same generic properties with the parent bean-plants of the previous season from which he gathered these dry seeds. Either he or other gardeners can testify that they have seen with their eyes the sprouting of similar beans in the intermediate stage of growth. He has the evidence of a perfect analogy. Now no idealist can pretend that there is any parallel between this evidence and his assumption that we generate our world merely as our representation in this sphere of unconsciousness; there is no *a posteriori* proof. There is not one particle of experience in the whole testimony of sane men on which to ground it. Every experiential cognition of all men points them not within—back of consciousness—for the source of their objective perceptions, but without, to objective realities as the true causes of the sense impressions which our understandings interpret into perceptions. In the sense of the idealist there can be no philosophy of the unconscious; there is no bridge of proof passing from this dreamland to the solid ground of actual, valid cognition.

VI. I write chiefly for Christians. The most serious feature for us in this idealistic-monism is its strong anti-Christian tendency. Many men are cheating themselves into the belief that they may be such idealists and remain Christians. The two creeds are antagonists. No man can attempt to hold them both without forcing his mind and conscience into inconsistencies and mental dishonesties which tend to betray him into infidelity, and

which are more unhealthy to the soul than candid infidelity itself. No man can serve the two masters.

(1.) Monism expressly contradicts Scripture, which, if human words can teach anything, asserts dualism. Gen. i. 26 and ii. 7: "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground" (spirit and body). Eccl. xii. 7: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." Luke xxiii. 46: "And when Jesus had cried with a loud voice, he said, Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." Acts vii. 59: Stephen said, "Lord Jesus receive my spirit." 2 Cor. iii. 8: Paul is "confident" and "willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord," etc., etc. If the Bible teaches anything as its distinctive doctrine it is this: that while the bodies of the saints moulder into dust in their graves for hundreds or thousands of years, their spirits are separated and enjoy a continuous conscious existence with God until the resurrection. This is dualism, and cannot be honestly made monism or materialism.

(2.) The scheme has an irresistible tendency to materialism. Its modern advocates frequently avow this. How can it be otherwise, when they insist upon monism? They say that all the beings in the universe must be held to be of one kind of substance, and all the events in the universe manifestations of one energy, otherwise it is no philosophy. Then, of course, there can be no substantive distinction between mind and matter. Hence all spirit must be resolved into matter, or all matter into spirit. Which? Sense perceptions, which are of matter only, form far the largest part, the earliest part, and the most obtrusive part of our cognitions. What so reasonable, then, if we must be monists, as that matter should take the front in our creed and be the all? Thus we find them more and more boldly teaching that mind is nothing but brain.¹ "Extremes meet." We now see the one extreme, idealism, coalescing with its odious opposite, materialism. Do they seek to console us for the blank horrors of the latter by

¹ See my *Spirituality and Immortality of Mind*. Presbyterian Committee of Publication.

assuring us that their metaphysics lift up matter again and refine and idealize it into spirit? How? By sublimating both into nonentities. Scant consolation this, which invites us to take refuge from the brutish fate of mere matter in the abyss of annihilation.

(3.) For it can consistently allow us no personal immortality. German idealism now delights in its close affinities to Buddhism. The only heaven known to this is Nirvana, the final cessation of desire of life, of consciousness, of individuality, and absorption into the infinite Brahm. So Hartmann defines salvation. With them salvation is but practical annihilation; and this is correct from their deadly premises. Thought and existence are identical. All thought, as all existence, is primarily the consciousness of the Absolute *Ego*. Our concepts of space, time, and causation are but the subjective thought-forms of the human understanding. These are also the "principles of individuation." The true knowledge of being in itself is conditioned on our rising above those thought-forms. Therefore the more we know real truth, the less we shall know ourselves as individuals. So that the real consummation can be nothing but Nirvana.

(4.) The scheme must, of course, tend to drift into pantheism. Most of its advocates of every phase have avowed themselves pantheists. Even the pious Schleiermacher, after becoming a Hegelian, found himself impelled to change his Christianity into a species of pan-Christian. And why not? Their universe must contain but one species of substance: it must be all matter or all spirit. Or rather, since they cannot away with substantive matter or substantive spirit, and admit no being except thought or will, it must be all mere modal manifestations of consciousness in the Absolute *Ego*. Their process must be the same as that of Spinoza, the absolute pantheist, in its starting point and its results; or it must be closely parallel to it.

And hence follow these monstrous and impious inferences, that their God himself is the source and subject of sin and misery. Such are the unavoidable teachings of all pantheism. After one has identified all dependent beings with God, he must also identify their volitions and their miseries with God's. Whose doing was it at first that the human consciousness fell under those mis-

leading thought-forms, the spatial, temporal, and causal concepts, which so hide from us being in itself and transcendental truth, thus making error and sinful volitions man's fated lot in his state of individuation? It must have been the doing of the Absolute *Ego* in its beginning, because we are but the projections of his consciousness, *i. e.*, of his being. It is by his original action that we are necessitated to think and to err in these perverting forms of thought. Should not he bear the responsibility? Or let us say with Schopenhaur, that the will to exist in the Absolute *Ego* is the essence of all being. Then, should not all the evils in the wills of the creatures be charged upon that originating will? *Absit blasphemia.* Again, many of these monists, like Spinoza, subject individuals to a stark necessity, as they are logically constrained to do. Pantheism should allow no freedom to the creature. But without freedom there is no just responsibility. Thus, again, morality is made impossible for the creature. Nor is there any room for surprise that Schopenhaur and Hartmann should announce themselves absolute pessimists. They say this is the "worst possible world." Why should not those think thus who teach that the great First Cause is himself bad and wretched? How can that state of existence be otherwise than evil, which is so conditioned that we can only escape the grasp of the errors which necessitate sin and misery by the cessation of all personal existence? After personality is forever gone, the very possibility of any compensating personal bliss is also gone. The state of Schopenhaur's mankind would be precisely that of a man who had been suffering all his life from a hereditary, and in this life, incurable, disease. There remains one way to deliver him from its pains: that is to cut off his head.

(5.) Idealistic-monism makes all distinction impossible between philosophic thought and Bible inspiration. The individual mind is but a part of the Absolute *Ego*. Hence all the thoughts of all men are God's thoughts. If the thoughts of folly and sin are, in a certain sense, God thinking, much more is philosophic thought God's thought. If the former half of this sentence gives expression to that impiety which is the trait of all pantheism, the latter half remains an equally unavoidable inference. To the idealist

his philosophy is at least as truly inspired as the teachings of Moses and Christ. Plato is inspired in the same sense with Paul. Gautama is as truly inspired as Isaiah. The Bible can never have any higher place than that of an equal alongside of all the other influential theories of pretended philosophy, those of Confucius, Buddha, Brahm, Zoroaster, of Socrates, of Mohammed, of Spinoza. Nay, idealists generally place any or all of these above Christ and his apostles and prophets. They applaud their moon-struck speculations with fewer subtractions and qualifications than those of the sacred Scriptures. Now and then we find them condescending to recognize in one or another text of Scripture some gleam of philosophic truth, but they speedily hasten to qualify their approbation by describing it as only a fanciful or figurative expression, and proceed to show us how it is marred by the mixture of "Jewish myth," or "Christian fable and superstition." But when they quote the speculations of Hindoo Vedantists, of Neo Platonists, or of German Pantheists, they can admire and applaud without drawbacks. The Christian doctrines of a personal God, of sin, of regeneration, of righteousness, of immortality, are to them rather gropings after philosophic truth than realizations of it. But they can speak of the benignant influence of the doctrine of transmigration of souls without any detraction, and they are sure that the Nirvana of the oriental pantheists is much the most scientific and consoling conception of the good man's future existence. Let the Christian reader estimate the outrage thus tacitly offered to our faith and to our God. These dreary dreams of Hindoo moon-calves in the twilight of a barbaric antiquity are rather to be preferred to the divine and holy precepts and doctrines of sacred Scripture, in spite of the contrast in their fruits. Oriental idealism has given to Hindostan polytheism with its millions of false gods; it has given its filthy fakirs, its insane asceticisms, its car of Juggernaut, and its burning of living widows; it has given polygamy, infanticide, and almost universal fraud and falsehood; it cursed the race with ruthless despotisms; while the religion of the Bible gave to Israel and to Christendom the morality of the decalogue and of the "Sermon on the Mount," the purity of Christian homes, and the

charities, the integrity and the political freedom of the Protestant commonwealths. But the philosophy of India is idealistic! Hence their preference.

The reception which this insolent philosophy meets with from many nominal Christians among us is a disclosure of gullibility sufficiently mortifying to sensible people. These teachers condescend to bestow on Christianity a species of disdainful patronage. They borrow the biblical terms God, soul, sin, righteousness, redemption, salvation, by which to denominate their metaphysical propositions. They compliment Christ as a true revelator. They even call their creed the philosophic Christianity! In view of all which, this kind of gullible Christians become extremely happy and grateful that a philosophy so immensely profound condescends to give some sort of recognition to our creed. Book publishers, nominally Christian, expend their capital profusely to give translations of this philosophy to the English-speaking peoples, assuring them that they will find in it new, luminous and valuable supports for the old Bible doctrines (provided these be duly modified to suit!); while they are probably no more qualified to distinguish false philosophy from true than the mechanics in their factories. And silly preachers set to work obsequiously to remould and squeeze the plain old doctrines of the Bible into such novel forms as the spurious philosophy dictates. But its real meaning in all those honored terms is a travesty, or a deadly perversion. Even the venerable name of God means something wholly different from that which Christians see in it, not a true, personal, extra-mundane, infinite Spirit, but a shadowy Something—Nothing, an infinite impersonal consciousness, indistinguishable from aggregate humanity, and consequently as really qualified by the follies, miseries and crimes of mankind as by the partial charities, virtues and wisdom of our race. Let the guardians of our church beware. Here is another subtle stream of poison oozing through even our religious literature and our education.

(6.) Idealistic monism necessarily denies the personality of God. Hear its first founder in our century, Fichte. He asserts that Kant has utterly destroyed all the old rational arguments for the

being of a God—the *a priori*, the cosmological, and the teleological. But Kant then professes to give us back theism by his one famous argument from the imperative of conscience. Now, says Fichte, this rational concept of obligation to duty gives us, not a personal God, but only a principle or rule of action. This, therefore, is the only form in which idealism can recognize deity. It is not a person, but only a general rule of living. Let us pause here to expose the shallowness of this subterfuge. We assert, with Kant and all the sounder philosophers, that necessary, intuitive judgment of obligation to the right does imply, not only a rule, but a personal ruler.

First, what is right conduct? Surely it is that which is conformed to righteousness. But what is our true concept of righteousness? *A personal attribute*, qualifying none other than a perfect person endowed with intelligence and will. Second, an essential part of this intuition of obligation to the right is, as Bishop Butler has shown, our necessary judgment of good desert for right conduct, and ill desert for wrong; of rewards and punishments. Now, how can a mere rule distribute these, without a personal ruler? As well might a multiplication-table work out the problems in arithmetic without any arithmetician. Where rewards and punishments are distributed to persons according to their respective deserts, there must be not only an intelligence to discriminate them, but a personal will to execute them. The utilitarian Paley was but a crude analyst, but the half-truth in his famous definition, "Obligation—the forcible motive arising out of the *command* of another," is nearer to the truth than the false subtilty of Fichte.

Among the latest of monists we find Professor Deussen thus scouting the personality of God (page 31): "Biblical metaphysics conceives being-in-itself as a personality, but retracts the limitations implied in this idea, when it maintains as attributes of God, (1), Eternity, that is, timelessness, (2), Omnipresence, that is, spacelessness, (3), Immutability, that is, exemption from causality." The author had just asserted that "where there is no change there can be no causation." This sophist here begs the question whether there may not be an infinite Person, where he

asserts that when we deny limitations to God we make his personality inconceivable. True philosophy says: Person is an individual substantive thing endowed with rationality and will. The more highly a being is qualified by these, the more thoroughly is it a person. The infinite Person has, of all others, the truest and most perfect personality. This writer then proceeds, with an utter misapprehension of the attributes of eternity, omnipresence, and immutability. He represents us, when we ascribe the first two to God, as stripping him entirely of the space and time relations. In truth, we do just the opposite: he who is eternal occupies the whole of infinite duration; he who is omnipresent fills the whole of infinite space; he is more related to time and space than any other being. Were, then, this author's pet dogma true, that the time and space concepts are the "principles of individuation," it would make God the most individual of all beings. He equally misconceives God's immutability as a mechanical one, such as that of the earth rotating unchangeably upon its axis from west to east, and therefore incapable of revolving from east to west. But it is not such. True philosophy tells us that it is an *immutability in substance, essential attributes, and will*. Therefore it is that the unchangeable God can be cause of every effect conceived in his infinite intelligence and ordained in his sovereign will; can be—what the empty Absolute *Ego* cannot be—universal first cause. On page 313 we read: "If we may give to the most significant of all objects the most significative name; if it is meet to leave to the obscurest thing the obscurest word, it is this principle of denial, and nothing else, which we might designate by the name of *God*. Yet, under this name, nothing less is to be understood than a personal, consequently limited, consequently egoistic, consequently sinful, being. If one tries to understand—which seldom happens—what personality really means, one will be inclined to regard the conception of the Being of beings as personality almost as blasphemy. It is far rather a supernatural power, a world-turning principle, a something which no eye sees, no name denotes, no concept reaches, nor ever can reach. And this Being, in the last and profoundest sense, are we ourselves. For it is we of whom a hymn of *The Rigveda* sings that one part

of our being constitutes this universe, and that three parts are immortal in the heavens."—From *The Elements of Metaphysics*.

On which side the blasphemy lies we leave the reader to judge. *The Rigveda* is here much higher authority than the Bible. How utterly this philosophy contradicts Scripture may be seen thus: Its God is what "no concept reaches, nor ever can reach," but the Holy Spirit says by Job, "*Acquaint thyself* with God and be at peace." The Son of God said, "This is life eternal, that ye *may know God* and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent." The plainest mind can see how this agnosticism equally outrages reason. Those who are not moon-struck know that all emotions, such as love, fear, reverence, are conditioned on some intelligible concept of their object; that no man can have any feeling towards what he knows nothing about, and that there can be no ethical volition where there is no intelligible cognition of any object of will. The briefest reflection will show us, from the self-evident laws of the Spirit, that such philosophy must end in *practical atheism*. He who makes everything God, virtually has no God.

We have carried throughout this criticism the consciousness of this difficulty, namely: that to the good sense of the unprofessional reader idealism appeared, as soon as it was defined, too baseless to need refutation. "Why labor through thirty-two pages to overthrow that which has no foundation but mist?" Our readers may think with sturdy old Dr. Johnson when one detailed to him Bishop Berkeley's ingenious idealism and asked how it was to be refuted; whereupon the great man merely struck sharply upon the pavement with his stout cane, saying: "That is answer enough." The senseless wood was enough to prove to his common sense that the stones were real substances, and not ideas. Let us take any common incident of life and attempt to construe it upon the idealist's plan. Farmer Hodge, for instance, is sitting in his cottage during a moonless evening, when he hears the known voice of a neighbor calling him from his barnyard. He issues from his door, descends his steps, walks toward the barnyard gate, bruises his shins against the unseen wheelbarrow which his careless boy Tom had left in the alley, and falling over it flattens his nose upon the gravel, etc., etc. Now, farmer Hodge

was as certain that his ears received the organic impression of his friend's voice as that he is alive; but in fact there was neither material ear on his head nor atmosphere to pulsate in it, but only a subjective idea of the well-known voice, the product of his own limitation and objectification of his own thought. Yet farmer Hodge knows that he was not thinking about his friend or his friend's voice at all; and he is wholly unconscious of this wondrous self-limitation of this idea non-existent in himself. Farmer Hodge rises from his chair, which is not wooden but ideal, and carefully plants his stout ideas of feet encased in ideas of hob-nailed shoes, not upon his stone door-step, but upon an idea in the figure of a *parallelepipedon*; whereupon his ideal ears are greeted only by the idea of the clank of the supposed steel upon the erroneously imagined stone. He then tramps along heavily, not upon solid ground, but upon ideal horizontality. Then he unwittingly collides with the idea of a wheelbarrow, which makes him most erroneously believe that the material skin is torn from his very material shins. It also appears to him that this idea must have a good deal of real solidity so to bruise his unlucky nose as to draw from it a stream of blood. But no, it is only an idea of blood from an ideal nose. His pains above and below also seem to him very real, and he feels pretty hot anger and discharges some very strong words against that careless scamp, Tom, for setting this trap for him in the dark. But this is all grossly unjust to Tom, for Hodge placed that wheelbarrow there himself, the world being nothing but his own representation, by his own objectified thought. Thus he is the cause of his own pain, notwithstanding he knows perfectly that his whole will and choice were not to hurt himself. Thus the absurdity may be carried out to any extent.

But they will say that by these paradoxes we are only making game of them; for, idealism being true, men's sense-perceptions will, of course, be paradoxical. We will waive, then, this question, and will rise to the higher sphere of their abstract concepts. Here, again, we find their metaphysics bristling, not with mere paradoxes, but with hard contradictions. A true philosophy may lead to mysteries, but not to contradictions. The second of the

axioms of pure thought is the law of non-contradiction. The man who discards this ceases to be a reasoning animal. That of two contradictions one must be false is the premise of every argument by the *reductio ad absurdum*; but this is recognized in the most exact sciences as the surest demonstration. We are required to adopt this metaphysic at the cost of such fatal dislocations as these: I am consciously free, yet I act always under a fatal necessity; the dog that bit me, and his bite, are both thought into existence by my own representing act, yet I know perfectly that I was not thinking dog, and that my whole will was not to be bitten; in Nirvana I shall enjoy perfect salvation, but there will then be no individual nor conscious *ego* to know or feel anything about it; "self-preservation is the first law of nature," but I only attain to the completion of my nature by the utter denial of the will to live; mental action and true being are identical, yet I am to perfect my being by the entire cessation of mental action—which is to say, that I perfect my existence by ceasing utterly to exist; I know by my consciousness that I am an individual, finite person, yet I am identical with the Absolute *Ego*, which cannot possibly be personal or finite; to say that God is personal, that is, limited and individualized by the thought-forms of space, time, and causation, is blasphemy, yet the actual universe, including ourselves, exists only because the Absolute *Ego*, which is the universe, has put itself under these thought-forms; my fellow-man's virtue must consist essentially in this, that he shall equitably and supremely respect my will to exist as he expects me to respect his, but my complete virtue will consist in my own utter repudiation of my will to exist; etc., etc.

When we demur against being reduced to idiocy by receiving into our minds all these contradictions, which are simply destructive to all our laws of intelligence, they propose to comfort us with the assurance that when we rise to that higher stage of cognition beyond these limiting thought-forms, all these contradictions will disappear, and their idealistic monism will be found beautifully consistent. This comfort is ruined, for us, by two thoughts: First, they say that when we get rid of these naughty thought-forms, "the principles of individuation," we shall no

longer know anything or feel anything individually; consciousness will have come to a final end. Compensations which come after a man is dead are too late. Second, how does anybody know that there is any such higher sphere of cognitions? Idealists admit that these spatial, temporal, and causal forms of thought are, and always have been, necessary and universal for us men ever since there was any human consciousness. Therefore it follows necessarily that no human being ever had, or can have, any valid thoughts except under these forms. Therefore this future higher metaphysic must remain, for us, as much a dream as "Utopia," or "the house that Jack built," in our nursery fables. But we are weary. *Eheu! jam satis!*

Yet our sensible readers may be assured that this criticism is not useless. Vain as this philosophy may appear to their common sense, it is widely spread, influential, and aggressive. It is influential in spite of its absurdities, or, probably, by reason of its absurdities; for, unfortunately, most people have this conception of metaphysics, that it is a kind of obscure cloudland, where neither the guide nor the follower can expect to see straight. Consequently, obscurities, paradoxes, and inconsistencies of thought may actually commend a philosophy as signature of profundity. There is, even among Christians and Christian ministers, a species of vainglory keenly prompting them to be "wise above that which is written" in their old-fashioned Bibles. To such persons any novel scheme which puts a new phase upon the plain old doctrines is a seduction. The churches of Christ are to experience in the future a long and harassing warfare from this enemy, in which many who are unstable will fall.

R. L. DABNEY.

II. THE LATEST PHASE OF HISTORICAL RATIONALISM.¹

I. "DOGMA," AND "EXTERNAL AUTHORITY."

MR. G. A. SIMCOX, reviewing Dr. Liddon's recently published *Life of Pusey*, tells us that Dr. Pusey "developed into a great tactician, who kept an academical majority together in face of all manner of discouragement from outside." Nothing is more remarkable, indeed, than the prosperity of Dr. Pusey's leadership, and the success with which he impressed his peculiar modes of thinking upon a whole church. The secret of it is not to be found, however, in any "tact" which he may be supposed to have exercised—as we might be led to suspect by the mere sound of the word "tactician." Dr. Pusey had as great a capacity for blundering as any man who ever lived; and one wonders how his cause could survive his repeated and gross errors of judgment. "What strikes us rather," says Mr. Simcox truly, "is how many false moves he made and how little harm they did him." The secret of it is found in his intensity, steadfastness, and single hearted devotion to what he believed to be divine truth. The mere "tactician" has always ultimately failed, since the world began. The blunderer who lays himself a willing sacrifice upon the altar of what he believes to be the truth of God has never wholly failed. This is true even when truth has been misconceived. The power of truth is the greatest power on earth. Next to it, however, is the power of sincere, earnest, and steadfast conviction.

Dr. Pusey himself lays open to us the secret of his power, in a letter written to Dr. Hook in the period of the deepest depres-

¹ Portions of this paper have appeared in type before, as follows: The sections marked I., III., IV., V., VI., in *The Presbyterian Journal*, of Philadelphia; the section marked II., in *The Presbyterian Messenger*, of Pittsburg; and the section marked VII., in *The Sunday-School World*, of Philadelphia. The editors of these journals have kindly permitted them to be reprinted in a revised form here. The section marked VII. has been copyrighted by the American Sunday-School Union, and can be had at their house at 1122 Chestnut street, Philadelphia, in tract form.

sion of the fortunes of "the party." "I am quite sure," he says, "that nothing can resist infidelity except the most entire system of faith; one said mournfully, 'I could have had *faith*; I cannot have *opinions*.' One must have a strong, positive, objective system which people are to believe, because it is true, on authority out of themselves. Be that authority what it may, the Scriptures through the individual teaching of the Spirit, the primitive church, the church when it was visibly one, the present church, it must be a strong authority out of one's self." Here is the most successful leader of modern times telling us the principles that gave force to his leadership. What do they prove to be? Two: the steadfast, consistent proclamation of an "entire system of faith," strong, positive, objective, which people are required to believe on the simple ground that it is true; and the foundation of this system upon an external authority, an "authority out of one's self." All experience bears Dr. Pusey out. The only propagandism that has ever won a lasting hold upon men has been the bold proclamation of positive, dogmatic truth, based on external, divine authority; and the only power that can resist the infidelity of our day is the power of consistently concatenated dogmatic truth, proclaimed on the authority of a fully trusted, "Thus saith the Lord."

The value of positive truth proclaimed on the basis of divine authority, is not to be measured, of course, simply by its usefulness in propagating Christianity. It has an individual importance which is far greater. Without it Christianity would not be able to acquire or maintain empire over the soul. Adolphe Monod points out, for example, how dependent we are for all adequate conceptions of sin upon the dogmatic teachings of "external authority." "Our own personal meditations," he tells us, "will never reveal to us what sin is; and here I particularly feel the necessity and the reality of the inspiration and the divine authority of the Scriptures, because we should never have learned to know what sin is, unless we learned it from obedience to an outward authority superior to us, independent of our secret feelings, upon which we ought certainly to meditate with study and fervent prayers. But enlightened truth comes from above, is given by

the Spirit of God, speaking with the authority of God himself; for we must begin by believing the horror that sin ought to inspire, before we are capable of feeling it." And he points out equally how dependent we are for a proper basis for faith on the same "external authority." "The more I study the Scriptures," he says, "the example of Jesus Christ and of the apostles, and the history of my own heart, the more I am convinced that a testimony of God, placed without us and above us, exempt from all intermixture of the sin and error which belong to a fallen race, and received with submission on the sole authority of God, is the true basis of faith." "If faith," he says, "has not for its basis a testimony of God to which we must submit, as to an authority exterior to our own personal judgment, superior to it, and independent of it, then faith is no faith." That this witness is true, the heart of every Christian may be trusted to bear witness. But for the moment we may fix our attention on the more external fact already adverted to, that the only basis of an appeal to men which can at all hope to be prevalent is positive truth commended on the credit of "external authority."

What is ominous in the present-day drift of religious thought is the sustained effort that is being made to break down just these two principles: the principle of a systematized body of doctrines as the matter to be believed, and the principle of an external authority as the basis of belief. What arrogates to itself the title of "the newer religious thinking" sets itself, before everything else, in violent opposition to what it calls "dogma" and "external authority." The end may be very readily foreseen. Indefinite subjectivism or subjective indifferentism has no future. It is not only in its very nature a disintegrating, but also a destructive, force. It can throw up no barrier against unbelief. Its very business is to break down barriers. And when that work is accomplished the floods come in.

The assault on positive doctrinal teaching is presented to-day chiefly under the flag of "comprehension." Men bewail the divisions of the church of Christ, and propose that we shall stop thinking, so that we may no longer think differently. This is the true account to give of many of the phases of the modern movement

for "church union." Men are tired of thinking. They are tired of defending the truth. Let us all stop thinking, stop believing, they cry, and what a happy family we shall be! Look into Mr. David Nelson Beach's recent book, which he calls *The Newer Religious Thinking*, but which seems to us to be rather a plea for unthinking irreligion, and see how clearly this is its dominant note. He tells us that God is no more a respecter of religions than of persons; that the doctrine of the Trinity is a mere philosophy and ought no longer to stand between brethren; that access to God is no longer to be represented as exclusively "as a matter of terms," through Christ. In a word, the lines that separate evangelical from "liberal" Christianity, and those that separate distinctive Christianity from the higher heathenism, are to be obliterated. We are no longer to defend anything that any religious soul doubts. We are to recognize every honest worshipper as a child of God, though the God he worships may be but another name for force or for the world.

We find the seeds of this movement towards "comprehension" in the most unlikely places. Even Dr. Schaff, in his latest book, represents himself as occupying a position in which not only Arminianism, Lutheranism and Calvinism, but also Rationalism and Supranaturalism, are reconciled. It is essentially present wherever the concessive habit of dealing with truth has taken root. For what is the "concessive" method of controversy but a neat device by which one may appear to conquer while really yielding the citadel? It is as if the governor of a castle should surrender it to the foe if only the foe will permit him to take possession of it along with them. On this pathway there is no goal except the ultimate naturalization of Christianity, and that means the perishing of distinctive Christianity out of the earth. Dr. Pusey calls attention to the fact that the Rationalists of Germany were the descendants not of the unbelievers of former controversies, but of the "defenders" of Christianity. The method of concession was tried, and that was the result. The so-called "defenders" were found in the camp of the enemy.

Along with this attack on distinctive truth goes necessarily an accompanying attack on "external authority in religion." For if

there be an "external authority," that which it teaches is true for all. This canker, too, has therefore necessarily entered our churches. It exists in various stages of development. It begins by rejecting the authority of the Bible for minor matters only—in the "*minima*," in "circumstantial" and "by-passages" and "incidental remarks," and the like. The next step is to reject its authority for everything except "matters of faith and practice." Then comes unwillingness to bow to all its doctrinal deliverances and ethical precepts; and we find men like Dr. DeWitt, of New Brunswick, and Mr. Horton, of London, subjecting the religious and ethical contents of the Bible to the judgment of their "spiritual instinct." Then the circle is completed by setting aside the whole Bible as *authority*; perchance with the remark, so far as the New Testament is concerned, that in the apostolic age men depended each on the spirit in his own heart, and no one dreamed of making the New Testament the authoritative word of God, while it was only in the later second century that the canon was formed, and "external authority" took the place of "internal authority." This point of view comes to its rights only when every shred of "external authority" in religion is discarded, and appeal is made to what is frankly recognized as purely human reason: we call it then Rationalism. It is only another form of this Rationalism, however, when it would fain believe that what it appeals to within the human breast is not the unaided spirit of man, but the Holy Ghost in the heart, the Logos, the strong voice of God. In this form it asks: "Were the Quakers right?" and differs from technical Rationalism only in a matter of temperature, the feelings and not the cold reason alone being involved: we call it then Mysticism.

Of course men cannot thus reject the Bible, to which Christ appealed as authoritative, without rejecting also the authority of Christ, which is thus committed to the Bible's authority. Accordingly, we already find not only a widespread tendency to neglect the authority of Christ on many points, but also a formal rejection of that authority by respectable teachers in the churches. We are told that authority is limited by knowledge, and that Christ's knowledge was limited to pure religion. We are told

that even in matters of religion he accommodated himself, in the form at least of his teachings, to the times in which he lived. Thus all "external authority" is gradually evaporated, and men are left to the sole authority each of his own spirit, whether under the name of reason or under the name of the Holy Spirit in the heart. As each man's spirit has, of course, its separate rights, all basis for objective doctrine thus departs from the earth.

The attitude of mind which is thus outlined constitutes the most dangerous, because the most fundamental, of heresies. Distinctive Christianity, supernatural religion, cannot persist where this blight is operative. It behooves the church, if it would consult its peace or even preserve its very life, to open its eyes to the working of the evil leaven. Nor will it do to imagine that we shall have to face in it only a sporadic or temporary tendency of thought. It is for this tendency of thought that the powerful movement known in Germany as Ritschlism practically stands. And it has already acquired in America the proportions of an organized propaganda, with its literary organ, its summer schools, its apostles and its prophets. It is something like this Ritschlite Rationalism that Professor George D. Herron teaches in his numerous works, as the coming form of Christianity. It is something like it that Mr. B. Fay Mills is propagating in his evangelistic tours. It is something like it that *The Kingdom* is offering to the churches; and that those whom that newspaper has gathered to its support are banded to make a force in the land. Surely there is clamant need to inform ourselves of its meaning and its purposes.

II. RITSCHLITE RATIONALISM.

"Rationalism" never is the direct product of unbelief. It is the indirect product of unbelief, among men who would fain hold their Christian profession in the face of an onset of unbelief which they feel too weak to withstand. Rationalism is, therefore, always a movement within the Christian church; and its adherents are characterized by an attempt to save what they hold to be the essence of Christianity, by clearing it from what they deem to be accretions, or by surrendering what they feel to be no longer defensible features of its current representations. The name historically represents specifically that form of Christian

thought which, under the pressure of eighteenth-century deism, felt no longer able to maintain a Christianity that needed to appeal to other evidences of its truth than the human reason; and which, therefore, yielded to the enemy every element of Christian teaching which could not validate itself to the logical understanding on axiomatic grounds. The effect was to reduce Christianity to a "natural religion."

The most recent form of Rationalism, the Ritschlite, partakes, of course, of the general Rationalistic features. In its purely theological aspect, its most prominent characteristic is an attempt to clear theology of all "metaphysical" elements. Otherwise expressed, this means that nothing will be admitted to belong to Christianity except facts of experience; the elaboration of these facts into "dogmas" contains "metaphysical" elements. For example, the Ritschlite defines God as love. He means by this that the Christian experiences God as love, and this much he therefore knows. Beyond that, he cannot define God; since all question of what God is in himself, as distinguished from what God is to us, belongs to the sphere of "metaphysics," and is, therefore, out of the realm of religion. Similarly, the Ritschlite defines Christ as Lord, and declares that the saying of Luther, *Er ist mein Herr*, includes all that we need to believe concerning Christ. He means by this that the Christian experiences Christ as his master, bows before his life and teaching, and therefore knows him as Lord. But, beyond what he can verify in such experiences, he knows nothing of him. For example, he can know, in such experience, nothing of Christ's præexistence, and cannot control anything told us about it by any available tests; he can know nothing of Christ's present activities by such experience; but he can know something of the power and worth of his historical apparition, in such experience. All that is outside the reach of such verification belongs to the sphere of "metaphysics," and is, therefore, out of the realm of religion. The effort is to save the essence of Christianity from all possible danger from the speculative side. The means taken to effect this is to yield the whole sphere of "metaphysical" thought to the enemy. The result is the destruction of the whole system of Christian doctrine. Doctrine cannot be stated without what

the Ritschlite calls "metaphysical elements"; a theory of knowledge underlies, indeed, the Ritschlite construction of "Christianity without metaphysics itself." But, however inconsistently, the Ritschlite contention ultimates in an "undogmatic Christianity." Theology, we are told, is killing religion.

But Christianity as it has come down to us is very far from being an undogmatic Christianity. The history of Christianity is the history of doctrine. Ritschlite Rationalism must, therefore, deal with a historical problem, as well as with a speculative and a practical one. What is it to do with a historical Christianity which is a decidedly doctrinal Christianity? Its task is obviously to explain the origin and development of doctrinal Christianity in such a manner as to evince essential Christianity to be undogmatic. Its task, in a word, is historically to explain doctrinal Christianity as corrupted Christianity; or, in other words, to explain the rise and development of doctrine as a series of accretions from without, overlying and concealing Christianity. Ritschlism, in the very nature of the case, definitely breaks with the whole tradition of Christian doctrine, from Justin Martyr down. Adolf Harnack, one of the most learned of modern church historians, has consecrated his great stores of knowledge and his great powers to the performance of the task thus laid upon his school of thought.

The characteristic feature of Harnack's reconstruction of the history of Christian dogma, in the interests of Ritschlite Rationalism, is to represent all Christian doctrine as the product of Greek thought on Christian ground. The simple gospel of Christ was the gospel of love. On the basis of this gospel the ancient world built up the Catholic Church, but in doing so it built itself bankrupt. That is, the ancient world transferred itself to the church; and in what we call church theology we are looking only at the product of heathen thinking on the basis of the gospel. To make our way back to original Christianity, we must shovel off this whole superincumbent mass until we arrive at the pure kernel of the gospel itself, hidden beneath. That kernel is simple subjective faith in God as Father, revealed to us as such by Jesus Christ.

These new teachings have been variously put within the reach

of the American churches. Professor Mitchell, of Hartford Seminary, has given us a translation of Harnack's *Outlines of the History of Dogma*. Mr. Rutherford has published a translation of Moeller's *History of the Christian Church*, in which Harnack's views are adopted and ably reproduced. Williams & Norgate, the great "liberal" publishing-house of London, are issuing a translation of Harnack's great *History of Dogma*. The writings of Edwin Hatch, the Oxford representative of Ritschlism, have had a wide circulation on this side of the sea. But of late years something more has come to be reckoned with within the American churches than such literary importations. Young American students, visiting German universities, have returned home enthusiastic devotees of the "new views." They have been commended to them by the immense learning of Harnack; by his attractive personality and his clear and winning methods of presenting his views; by the great vogue which they have won in Germany; and possibly by a feeling on their own part that they offer a mode of dealing with the subject which will lessen the difficulty of the Christian apologist in defending the faith. The less faith you have to defend the easier it is apt to seem to defend it. At all events, it is a fact that the historical Rationalism of the Ritschlite is now also an American movement and needs to be reckoned with as such. There are in particular three recent American publications in which the influence of Harnack's rationalizing reconstruction of Christian history is dominating, to which attention ought to be called in this connection: The first of these is a very readable *Sketch of the History of the Apostolic Church*, by Professor Oliver J. Thatcher, formerly of the United Presbyterian Seminary at Allegheny, but now of the University of Chicago. Another is the very able *Inaugural Address*, delivered by Professor Arthur C. McGiffert at his induction into the chair of Church History at Union Theological Seminary, New York, which deals with the subject of *Primitive and Catholic Christianity*. The third is a lecture by the Rev. Dr. Thomas C. Hall, of Chicago, pronounced before the students of Queens University, Kingston, Canada, and bearing the title of *Faith and Reason in Religion*. Anyone who will take the trouble to look into these publications

will soon become convinced of the importance of observing what the American churches are now being taught by the pupils of Harnack as to the origin of Christianity.

It will then, doubtless, repay us to look for a moment into this matter. The best way to do so is doubtless to analyze briefly one of these three publications. We select for the purpose Dr. McGiffert's brief and admirably clear paper. And in the following pages we shall attempt to give as clear an account of its contents as the necessity for succinctness will allow.

Dr. McGiffert begins with a few remarks on the function of church history and the duty of the historian of the church. The object of the whole of church history is, he tells us, to enable us to understand Christianity better, and to fit us "to distinguish between its essential and non-essential elements." And the special task of the historian is to "discover by a careful study of Christianity at successive stages of its career whether it has undergone any transformations and, if so, what those transformations are." It is not the duty of the historian to pass judgment on the value of any assimilations or accretions which Christianity may be found to have made. That is the theologian's work. The historian's is only to make clear what belonged to the original form of Christianity and what has been acquired by it, in its process of growth, in its environment of the world. Dr. McGiffert gives us to understand, however, that, in his opinion, the value of an element of our system is not to be determined merely by its origin: whether it belonged to original Christianity or has been acquired by it from the world. Its right to a place in the Christian system is to be determined solely by what we deem its vital relation to, or at least its harmony with, Christianity itself.

He chooses as his subject, the portrayal of "the most vital and far-reaching transformation which Christianity has ever undergone, a transformation the effects of which the entire Christian church still feels, and which has, in his opinion, done more than anything else to conceal Christianity's original form and obscure its true character." This is the transformation of the primitive into the Catholic Church; and it was "practically complete before the end of the second century of the church's life." He

points out that it would be too much to attempt to explain such a momentous transformation in all its features in the limits of a single discourse. He confines himself, therefore, to indicating and explaining as fully as the time at his disposal permitted, the *change of spirit* which constitutes the essence of the transformation.

He begins with a picture of the primitive, that is, of the apostolic church. Its spirit was "the spirit of religious individualism, based upon the felt presence of the Holy Ghost." That is to say, it was the universal conviction of the primitive church that every Christian had, in the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in him, a personal source of inspiration at his disposal, to which he could turn in every time of need. There was, therefore, no occasion for an authority for Christian teaching, external to the individual's own spirit; and there had arisen no conception, accordingly, as yet, of a "rule of faith," or of a "New Testament Canon." The only authority that was recognized was the Holy Spirit; and he was supposed to speak to every believer as truly as he spoke to an apostle. There was no instituted church, and no external bond of Christian unity. There were some common forms of worship, and Christians met together for mutual edification; but their only bond of union was their common possession of the Spirit of God and their common ideal and hope. There was no intervening class of clerics, standing between the Christian and the source of grace; but every Christian enjoyed immediate contact with God through the Spirit. Such was the spirit of the primitive church—of the church of the apostles and of the church of the post-apostolic age, for there was no change of spirit on the death of the apostles. The church of the second-half of the second century believed itself as truly and exclusively under the authority of the indwelling Spirit as the apostolic church and as the apostles themselves. On historic grounds, we can draw no distinction between the apostolic and post-apostolic ages on the ground of supernatural endowment.

The change of spirit which marks the rise of the Catholic Church took place, then, in the second century. In general terms, it was the result of the secularization of the church and of the effort of

the church to avoid such secularization. Among the heathen brought into the church in the second century, gradually more and more men of education were included. Among these were some philosophical spirits of a Platonizing tendency, who brought into the church with them a habit of speculation. Their speculative theories they represented as Christianity, and they appealed to the authority of the apostles in their favor. Thus arose the first theologizing in the Christian church; the Gnostics were the first creed-builders within the limits of the church and the first inventors of the idea of apostolic authority, and of the consequent conception of an apostolic Christian canon. And it was in conflict with them that the church, for her part, first reached the conception of apostolic authority and of an apostolic canon, and gradually developed the full conception of authority which gave us finally the full-fledged Catholic Church.

The steps by which this transformation was made were three: "First, the recognition of the teaching of the apostles as the exclusive standard and norm of the Christian truth; second, the confinement to a specific office (*viz.*, the Catholic office of bishop) of the power to determine what is the teaching of the apostles; and, third, the designation of a specific institution (*viz.*, the Catholic Church) as the sole channel of divine grace." The transformation was, it will be seen, complete. The spirit of free individualism under the sole guidance of the indwelling Spirit, which characterized the primitive church, passed permanently away. The spirit of submission to "external authority" took permanently its place. The transformation to Catholicism means simply, then, that the church had emptied itself of its spiritual heritage, that it had denuded itself of its spiritual power, and that it had invented for itself, and subjected itself to, a complete system of "external authority." The first step was to recognize the exclusive authority of apostolic teaching. Thus Christians laid aside their privilege of being the constant organs of the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and framed for themselves a "rule of faith" (Creed) and a New Testament Scripture (Canon). The next step was to confine to a particular office the power to transmit and interpret that teaching. The believer was thus perma-

nently denied not only the privilege of receiving divine revelations, but also the right to interpret for himself the revelations received and transmitted by the apostles. The last step was to confine the transmission of grace itself to the organized church, so that out of it there could be no salvation. Thus the believer's last privilege was taken from him; he could no longer possess anything save as through the church. When this last step was completed, the Catholic Church was complete.

No "transformations" of the church have taken place since this great transformation. Changes have occurred, and changes which may seem to the casual observer of more importance. But, in fact, the church is still living in the epoch of the Catholic Church. The Reformation was, indeed, an attempt at a real "transformation," and it has wrought a real "transformation" upon as much of the church as has accepted it. It was a revival of the primitive spirit of individualism, and a rejection of "external authority." But the Reformation has affected only a small portion of the church; and it was, even for the Protestant Churches, only a partial revival of the primitive spirit. It "did not repudiate, it retained, the Catholic conception of an apostolic Scripture canon—a conception which the primitive church had entirely lacked." Thus it has retained the essential Catholic idea of an "external authority;" But the Reformers sought to bring this idea into harmony with the primitive conception of the continued action of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of true believers; and it is by this fact alone that Protestants can be justified in retaining the Scriptures as a rule of faith and practice. The true statement of the Protestant position, therefore, is not, That the word of God contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments is the sole and ultimate standard of Christian truth. It is, "That the Spirit of God is the sole and ultimate standard of Christian truth—the Spirit of God, who spoke through the apostles, and who still speaks to his people"; it is, That "the Holy Spirit, which voices itself both in the teaching of the apostles and in the enlightened Christian consciousness of true believers, is the only source and standard of spiritual truth."

This is, as briefly as possible, the gist of Dr. McGiffert's ad-

dress. Two things are to be especially noted in it: First, the whole development of a Christian "authority"—the rise alike of the very conception of authority as attributed to the apostles, and of the conception of a New Testament canon—is assigned to post-apostolic times. The church of the apostles, and the apostles themselves, knew nothing of an authoritative Christian teaching. Thus all Christian doctrine is a human product, and of no real authority in the church. And, secondly, the Christian Scriptures are in no sense the authoritative rule of faith and practice which we have been taught to believe that they are. The apostles who wrote them did not intend them as such. The church which received them did not receive them as such. The Protestant Churches can be justified in declaring them such, only provided they do not mean to erect them over the Christian spirit—"the Christian consciousness of true believers"—but mean only to place them side by side with it as co-source of the knowledge of Christian truth. This is, of course, to deny "authority" to the New Testament *in toto*. If we are to follow Dr. McGiffert, therefore, we are to renounce all doctrinal Christianity at a stroke, and to reject all "authority" in the New Testament, on pain of being unprimitive and unapostolic. These things are, according to his conception, parts of the accretion that has gathered itself to Christianity in its passage through the ages.

This, then, is the question which the introduction of the Ritschlite historical Rationalism has brought to the American churches. Are we prepared to surrender the whole body of Christian doctrine as being no part of essential Christianity, but the undivine growth of ages of human development, the product of the "transformations" of Christianity, or, as Dr. T. C. Hall phrases it with admirable plainness of speech, the product of the "degradations" of Christianity? Are we prepared to surrender the New Testament canon, as the invention of the second-century church to serve its temporary needs in conflict with heresy? Once more, Dr. Hall gives us an admirably plain-spoken account of what, on this view, was actually done when the canon was made: "The need of an infallible authority to interpret a code gave rise to the fiction of apostolic authority, at first confined to

written and spoken messages, and later imbedded in an organization, and inherited by its office-holders." Are we prepared to represent the authority of the apostles, as imbedded in their written words and preserved in our New Testament, as a "fiction"? This is the teaching of the new historical Rationalism; and it is with this teaching that the church has now to reckon.

Let us now enter a little more into detail as to the meaning of this new teaching; and in order to do this, let us examine more fully one or two of the fundamental positions of Dr. McGiffert's *Address*. And first of all let us look a moment at

III. DR. MCGIFFERT'S THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT.

The learning, the ability, and the skill in the presentation of its material, which characterizes Dr. McGiffert's *Inaugural Address*, will occasion surprise to no one. These things have been confidently expected of the accomplished annotator of Eusebius. There will be many, doubtless, however, who will be surprised to find the fundamental thought of so learned an address, delivered by a Presbyterian professor, to be the presentation of Christianity under the form of a development, of a sort not merely outside the ordinary lines of Protestant thinking, but apparently inconsistent with the most fundamental of Protestant postulates.

When the body of revealed truth was committed into the hands of men, it of course became subject to adulteration with the notions of men. As it was handed down from age to age, it inevitably gathered around it a mass of human accretions, as a snowball grows big as it rolls down a long slope. The importance of that committal of the divine revelation to writing, by which the inspired Scriptures were constituted, becomes thus specially apparent. The "word of God written" stands through all ages as a changeless witness against human additions to, and corruptions of, God's truth. The chief task of historical criticism, in its study of Christianity, becomes also thus very apparent. Dr. James M. Ludlow, who delivered the charge to the new professor, and whose charge is printed along with the address, does not fail to point this out. Because "what the truth receives by way of admixture from the passing ages it is apt to retain," therefore; he charges the new

professor to remember that "the most pressing demand upon historical criticism" is "to separate from essential Christianity what the ages have contributed."

The Reformation was, in this sense, a critical movement. The weapon it used in its conflict with the pretensions of Rome was historical criticism. The task it undertook was to tear off the mediæval and patristic swathings in which Christianity had become wrapped in the course of the careless ages, and to stand her once more before men in her naked truth, as she had been presented to the world by Christ and his apostles. "The fittest and most suggestive criticism we can to-day pass on Catholicism," says Adolf Harnack justly, "is to conceive it as Christianity in the garb of the ancient world with a mediæval overcoat. . . . What is the Reformation but the word of God which was to set the church free again? All may be expressed in the single formula, *the Reformation is the return to the pure gospel*; only what is sacred shall be held sacred; the traditions of men, though they be most fair and most worthy, must be taken for what they are—viz., the ordinances of man."

The principle on which Protestantism proceeded in this great and salutary task had two sides, a negative and a positive one. On the negative side, it took the form that every element of current ecclesiastical teaching or of popular belief, which, on being traced back in history, ran out before Christ's authoritative apostles were reached, was to be accounted a spurious accretion to Christianity and no part of Christianity itself. On the positive side, and this is the so-called "formal principle of Protestantism," it took the form that everything enters as an element into the Christian system that is taught in the Holy Scriptures, which were imposed on the church as its authoritative rule of faith and practice by the apostles, who were themselves appointed by the Lord as his authoritative agents in establishing the church, and were endowed with all needed graces and accompanied by all needed assistance from the Holy Spirit for the accomplishment of their task. This is what is meant by that declaration of Chillingworth which has passed into a Protestant proverb: "That the Bible, and the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants."

And this is what is meant by the Westminster Confession, when it asserts that the whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture, "unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men." This is the corner-stone of universal Protestantism; and on it Protestantism stands, or else it falls.

This "formal principle" of Protestantism, of course, does not deny that there has been such a thing as a "development of doctrine." It does not make its appeal to the early church as the norm of Christian truth; and it does not imagine that the first generation of Christians had already sounded all the depths of revelation. It makes its appeal to the Scriptures of God, which embody in written form the teaching of Christ through his apostles upon which the earliest as well as the latest church was builded. Protestantism expects to find, and does find, a progressive understanding and realization of this teaching of Christ in the church. The Reformers knew, as well as the end of the nineteenth century knows, that there is a sense in which the Nicene Christology, the Augustinian Anthropology, the Anselmic Soteriology, their own doctrine of Justification by Faith alone, were new in the church. They thought of nothing so little as discarding these doctrines because they were "new," in the only sense in which they were new. They rather held them to constitute the very essence of Christian truth. They believed in "the development of true Christian doctrine," and looked upon themselves as raised up by God to be the instruments of a new step in this development. Following the Reformers, Protestants universally believe in "the development of true Christian doctrine"; but, as Dr. Ludlow pointedly and truly adds, "not the growth of its revelation, for that we believe was made complete in the New Testament, but its development in the conception of men."

This "development in the conception of men," Protestants are very far from supposing ever to take place, in ever so small a one of its stages, without the illuminating agency of the Holy Spirit. They affirm the activity of the Spirit of revelation in the church

of God continuously through all the ages. And they attribute to his brooding over the confused chaos of human thinking every step that is taken towards a truer or a fuller apprehension of God's saving truth. But they know how to distinguish between "the inward illumination of the Spirit of God," by virtue of which Christian men enter progressively into fuller possession of the truth which was once for all delivered unto the saints, and "new revelations of the Spirit," by virtue of which men may suppose that additions are made to the substance of this truth.

Despite Dr. Ludlow's faithful warnings in the charge which he laid upon him, Dr. McGiffert appears to have failed to make this distinction. In opposition to the fundamental Protestant principle, he teaches that the true system of Christianity has gradually come into existence during the last two millenniums through a process of development. He conceives of "Christianity" (the word has somewhat of the character of an "undistributed middle" in his use of it) as having been planted in "the days of Christ" only in germinal form. From this original germ it has grown through the ages, not merely by unfolding explicitly what was implicitly contained in it, but also by assimilating and making its own elements from without, elements even of late and foreign origin. "The fact that any element of our system is of later growth than Christianity itself does not necessarily condemn it, nor even the fact that it is of foreign growth." For "guarantee of truth" is not given by "general prevalence" or by "age" (as if the question of its tracing to the apostles were a question of mere age!); but the "right of any element to a place within the Christian system is vindicated only by showing its vital relation to, or at least its harmony with, Christianity itself." Though present-day Christianity contains elements "of late and foreign origin," elements which materially modify the forms of expressing the spirit of primitive Christianity, conceptions even which the primitive church (*i. e.*, the church of the apostles) "certainly lacked," it may not be the less pure Christianity on that account. It may even be the more pure Christianity on this very account: it may "mark a real advance" on primitive Christianity.

For we must bear constantly in mind that the right of any ele-

ments "to a place within the Christian system" is vindicated solely by their power to express the Christian spirit. This is the true test alike of elements of late and foreign origin and of the elements which entered into primitive Christianity itself. When speaking of the former, Dr. McGiffert makes a significant addition to his sentence so as emphatically to include the latter also. "By the degree to which they give expression to that spirit" (*i. e.*, "the Christian spirit"), he says, "is the value of such elements, *and of all elements*, to be measured." "If they contribute to its clear, and just, and full expression," he adds, "they vindicate their right to a place within the Christian system; if they hinder that spirit's action they must be condemned." Thus we learn that there were in primitive Christianity itself—the Christianity of "the days of Christ" and of his apostles—both essential and non-essential elements; elements of permanent and universal worth, and others of only temporary and local significance; and the criterion for distinguishing between them is our own subjective judgment of their fitness to express "the Christian spirit"—of course, according to our own conception of that spirit.

Thus Professor McGiffert takes emphatic issue with both sides of the fundamental Protestant principle. As over against its assertion that the whole counsel of God is set down in Scripture, "unto which nothing at any time is to be added," he declares that it is a "pernicious notion that apostolic authority is necessary for every element of the Christian system"; and that elements of even late and foreign origin can "vindicate their right to a place within the Christian system" "by showing their vital relation to, or at least their harmony with, Christianity itself." That is to say, the test of a distinctively Christian truth is not that it is part of that body of truth which was once for all delivered to the saints, as all Protestantism, with one voice, affirms; but whether it seems to us to harmonize with what we consider that Christianity is or ought to be. A subjective criterion thus takes the place of the objective criterion of the written word of God.

Accordingly, as over against the fundamental Protestant principle that "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments are the word of God, the only rule of faith and obedience,"

Professor McGiffert declares that the teaching of the apostles is not "the sole *standard* of truth." He is willing to allow, indeed, that the teaching of the apostles was regarded by the primitive church, and may be rightly regarded by the modern church, as "a *source* from which may be gained a knowledge of divine truth." But that it is "the only rule," or "*standard*," he will not admit; or even that it is more than a "source" along with others. For he tells us that Protestants can be justified "in retaining the Scriptures as a rule of faith and practice" only on the condition that they join with the Scriptures for this function "the enlightened Christian consciousness of true believers," affirming the two to be alike the organs of the Holy Ghost, "the only source and standard of Christian truth." "The true statement of the Protestant position," he adds, "is not that the word of God, contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, but that the Spirit of God, is the sole and ultimate authority for Christian truth—the Spirit of God who spoke through the apostles, *and who still speaks to his people.*" If this be so, the reformers, the first Protestant divines, and the Reformed Confessions, including our own Standards, were not only ignorant of the "true statement of the Protestant position," but in ineradicable opposition to it. When the Shorter Catechism asserts that "the word of God which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments is the only rule" it speaks with the intention and effect of confining the "word of God," which it declares to be "the only rule," to the Scriptures, and of thereby excluding not only the "word of God" which the Romanist affirms to be presented in objective tradition, but also the "word of God" which the mystic affirms that he enjoys through subjective illumination. And, therefore, the Confession of Faith explicitly explains its assertion that "nothing at any time is to be added" to the "whole counsel of God set down in the Scriptures," by adding: "whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men." A theory of development on a mystical basis is no less in open contradiction to the "formal principle of Protestantism" than one on a Romish basis.

We have spoken only of Dr. McGiffert's formal theory of development, and have pointed out its inconsistency with the

“formal principle” of Protestantism. The material development which, under this formal theory, he would ascribe to Christianity, he does not draw out in the present *Address*. The *Address* is consecrated, no doubt, to the depicting of one of the greatest changes which Christianity has undergone; but this change is not one which appears to Dr. McGiffert to commend itself, according to the tests he lays down, as a proper development of Christianity. The material changes in Christianity which are brought to our attention by the *Address*, therefore, are not illustrations of his theory of development, but are instances of the progressive deterioration of Christianity in its environment of the world. Let us, however, attend for a moment to them.

IV. DR. MCGIFFERT'S THEORY OF THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF CHRISTIANITY.

“The subject of study in church history, as in all theological sciences,” Professor McGiffert tells us in the opening of his *Inaugural Address*, “is Christianity itself.” The church historian’s aim is, therefore, “to contribute to a clearer and fuller understanding of Christianity.” In the prosecution of this aim he must learn to distinguish between the “essential and non-essential elements” of Christianity, “between that in it which is of permanent and universal worth and that which is of only temporary and local significance,” (page 16.) He must, further, make it his special task to discover, by a careful study of Christianity at successive stages of its career, whether it has undergone any transformations, and, if so, what those transformations are, (p. 17.) One would think, as we have already pointed out, that the purpose of this discovery would be to obtain knowledge of what belongs really to Christianity, so that the accretions which have gathered to it from without may be rejected, and the original form of that deposit of faith once for all delivered to the saints may be recovered. But Professor McGiffert excludes all passing of judgment on results from the sphere of the historian as such. The historian’s business is merely to present a complete picture of the transformations that Christianity has undergone. The theologian comes after him, and estimates the value and meaning

of the assimilations and accretions which the historian's labor has brought to light. But Dr. McGiffert, as we have seen, cannot resist the temptation so far to desert this rôle of pure historian as to tell us on what such an estimation must turn. It must not turn, he tells us, on the question of the originality of this element or that in the Christian system, but solely on its ideal harmony with the Christian spirit. Doubtless, the "theologian" who comes after him, however, along with the whole body of Christian people, may be trusted to disagree with him in this pronouncement. It is the Christianity of Christ and his apostles alone that they will care to profess; and they will thank the historian for tracing out the transformations of Christianity, chiefly because his work will enable them to recover for their souls the Christianity which Christ and his apostles taught.

Dr. McGiffert devotes his *Inaugural Address* to the discussion of a single one of these "transformations" of Christianity, the one which he believes to be the "most vital and far-reaching transformation that Christianity has ever undergone," the "transformation of the primitive into the Catholic Church," (p. 18.) This transformation, which was "practically complete before the end of the second century of the church's life," was so radical that "it has done more than anything else to conceal Christianity's original form, and obscure its true character"; and it has been so powerful and far-reaching in its influence that "the entire Christian church still feels the effects of it." In fact, in Dr. McGiffert's view, it gave to the greater portion of the church what has proved to be its permanent form. In it the spirit of primitive Christianity permanently disappeared (p. 28), and the spirit which still rules the Catholic Church permanently entered. The Catholic Church is still living in the period inaugurated then (p. 40), the Greek and Roman Churches being but localizations of the one church which had existed in undivided form for some centuries before their separation.

Since this great "transformation" of the primitive into the Catholic Church, therefore, there have been no "transformations" of Christianity. There have been changes. And these later changes have often been such as to "impress the casual observer

more forcibly, and to seem to him more worthy of notice," than this great fundamental transformation itself. He will think of "the cessation of persecution with the accession of Constantine, and the subsequent union of church and state; the preaching of Christianity to the barbarians of western and northern Europe; the development of the Greek patriarchate and of the Roman papacy; the formation of the elaborate liturgies of the eastern and western churches; the rise of saint and image worship, of the confessional and of the mass; the growth of monasticism, which began by renouncing the world, and ended with subjugating it; the development of Nicene trinitarianism, of the Chalcedonian christology, of the Augustinian anthropology, and of the Anselmic theory of the atonement." And as he thinks of these, he may think them "of greater historical significance than any changes which took place during the first two centuries." But he will be mistaken. The transformation of the primitive into the Catholic Church, which took place in the course of the second century, was a far more fundamental change than any of these subsequent changes, or than them all taken together.

Before this great transformation, it was the free spirit of primitive Christianity that reigned; after it, the church was a completely secularized institution. For the secularization of the church "was not due, as has been so widely thought, to the favor shown the church by the Emperor Constantine, or to the ultimate union of the church and state. The church was in principle secularized as completely as it ever was, long before the birth of Constantine. The union of the church and state was but a ratification of a process already complete, and was itself of minor significance," (page 38.) Of all subsequent movements only that one which we know as the Reformation was sufficiently radical to promise a new "transformation." This movement was in essence a revival of the spirit of primitive Christianity, and it did open a new epoch in the church, so far as it produced its effects. But unfortunately Protestantism has affected only a part, and that the smaller part, of the church. The church at large is still living in the epoch which was inaugurated by the great "transformation" which took place in the second century.

If, then, we speak of the "transformations" of Christianity we must have our eye fixed upon changes which took place before the great transformation that gave birth to the Catholic Church—changes greater and more radical than any that have occurred subsequent to that event. In the days of the church's strenuous youth, she rapidly passed through a series of "transformations" of fundamental importance; much, we suppose, as the stages of babyhood, childhood, boyhood, youth and manhood are all run through in some twenty restless years, to be followed by an extended period of unchanged manhood for the better part of a century. If we understand Dr. McGiffert, he would count, including the Reformation, some four such transformations in all, three of which were suffered by Christianity during the first two centuries of her existence. In other words, by the time that two hundred years had rolled over it the introduction of alien ideas had three times fundamentally transformed the gospel of Christ. In quick succession there were presented to the world, each largely effacing its predecessor, first the Gospel of Love, which Christ preached; then the Gospel of Holiness, which ruled in the primitive church; then the Gospel of Knowledge, announced by the Greek spirit not so much converted by, as converting, the church; and, finally, the Gospel of Authority, the proud self-assertion of the Catholic Church. Last of all, after ages of submission, the primitive spirit once more rises in what we call Protestantism, and revolting against authority proclaims anew the Gospel of Individualistic Freedom.

Let us look a little more closely at Dr. McGiffert's conceptions of these several "transformations."

1. "Christ's Christianity was, above all, ethical; the Sermon on the Mount strikes its key-note." According to Christ, "the active principle of love for God and man constituted the sum of all religion," (p. 24.) Christ came, in other words, not teaching a dogma, but setting an example of a life of perfect love; proclaiming the kingdom of God, founded on the fundamental principle of love for God and man; and announcing the law of the kingdom in such language as that preserved for us in the Sermon on the Mount. It was his example of holy love which reveals

God to the world as Father; and all the emphasis of his teaching was laid on the principle of love.

2. But Christianity extended; and, as it grew, it changed its environment from the Jewish to the Gentile world. This change induced in it certain modifications which were of permanent significance, (p. 21.) These modifications centred in a change of emphasis of fundamental importance, "by which, in consequence of the conception of the immediate and constant presence of the Holy Spirit, and in opposition to the moral corruption of the age, the element of personal holiness or purity naturally came more and more to the front, and increasingly obscured the fundamental principle of Christ," (p. 24.) This is the Christianity of the primitive church, or the church of the apostles, though the latter name is the less descriptive one, inasmuch as the death of the apostles and the close of the apostolic age introduced no change of spirit, but the church of the first-half of the second century remained in principle the same church as that of the last-half of the first century.

When Dr. McGiffert speaks of the consequent obscuration of "the fundamental principle of Christ" as "increasing," he seems to refer to the effect of the introduction into the church, early in the second century, of the educated classes of society. Wherever the influence of Stoicism predominated among these, they readily assimilated with the spirit which already characterized the primitive church. For with the Stoics "the ethical element came to the front, and religion lost its independent significance, having no other value but to promote virtue by supplying it with a divine basis and sanction." This tendency, we are told, "was in entire harmony with that of the Hebrew mind and of early Christianity in general," (p. 25.) Primitive Christianity, therefore, was simply an ethical system with a changed ethical ideal from that of Christ—laying the emphasis on holiness rather than on love. It was, in a word, a "Society for Ethical Culture," with a background of monotheism, and looking to Jesus as its founder and example. "It is true that from the beginning belief in one God and in Jesus Christ was demanded of all converts, but such belief was commonly taken for granted—the formula of baptism

itself implied it—and all the emphasis was laid on the ethical element,” (p. 31.)

3. With the introduction of the educated classes into the church, however, another class of philosophers came in besides the Stoics—a class which brought in a speculative tendency grounded in Platonism, and which began to lay stress on *knowledge*. Christianity seemed to these thinkers only a *revelation*; and accordingly they busied themselves at once with its rational investigation and elucidation. Here appeared the first Christian theologians, and they gave the church, for the first time, a “theology.” In their hands arose the first Christian creeds; through their work Christianity became for the first time a system of belief. The transformation of Christianity which they wrought did not come without throes and conflicts. Nevertheless, so far as this it did come; and its coming is marked later on by the approval and adoption by the church of “the speculative theology of the great fathers and doctors.” In this sense “the spirit of gnosticism lived on, and finally won a permanent place within the church.” Here is a transformation as great as it is possible to conceive: the “Society for Ethical Culture” becomes an institution for the propagation of a body of truth.

4. But the temporary dualistic form in which the speculative spirit first entered the church could not, and did not, find acceptance. “And it was in the effort to repudiate it that steps were taken which resulted” in that momentous transformation, to the description of which Dr. McGiffert gives his *Address*—the transformation into the Catholic Church. These efforts to repudiate gnosticism involved an appeal to authority, and the essence of this great transformation consists, therefore, in the substitution of the idea of external authority for the individualistic spirit of earlier Christianity. “The spirit of Catholicism means submission to an external authority in matters both of faith and practice, and dependence upon an external source for all needed spiritual supplies,” (p. 21.)

Three steps are counted in this transformation: “First, the recognition of the teaching of the apostles as the exclusive standard and norm of Christian truth; second, the confinement to a spe-

cific office (namely, the Catholic office of bishop) of the power to determine what is the teaching of the apostles; and third, the designation of a specific institution (namely, the Catholic Church) as the sole channel of divine grace," (p. 29.) When the transformation was complete, therefore, the whole Catholic machinery of "external authority" had been invented, and the last vestige of spiritual freedom had been crushed out. But its earlier stages included the invention of the very first and simplest forms of "external authority" to which Christians bowed, the first recognition of the authority of the apostles as teachers, and the rise of the very conception of an apostolical Scripture canon. The greatness of the transformation that is asserted can be properly estimated only by remembering that it thus includes, not only the completion of the full Catholic system, but, at the other extreme, the very earliest conception of a Christian "external authority" at all. Before this change, Christians had no external law; by virtue of the Holy Spirit dwelling in them, each was a law unto himself. The change consisted in the finding of an external Christian authority. This was found first in the teaching of the apostles, either as written in their extant books (and hence arose the idea of a New Testament), or as formulated in clear, succinct statements (and hence arose the idea of a rule of faith, and of creeds). That it was found afterwards in the bishop, considered as the living representative of the apostles, and still later in the organized church as the institute of salvation, constitutes only a minor matter. The finding of an "external authority" at all was the main thing, and constituted a tremendous transformation in the spirit and the nature of Christianity. This great transformation took place in the course of the second century. Before that there was no external Christian authority at all.

5. It was only after ages of submission to external authority that a partial revival of the individualistic spirit of primitive Christianity arose in the Protestant Reformation. By the Protestants "the Catholic principle was definitely rejected" (page 40); "but elements of Catholicism were retained which materially modified the forms by which the revived spirit of primitive Christianity was expressed, and which have served to make the Protestant a dif-

ferent thing from the primitive church," (page 42.) In so far as Protestantism restored to the individual his spiritual rights, and "made the Holy Spirit, which voices itself both in the teaching of the apostles and in the enlightened Christian consciousness of true believers, the only source and standard of spiritual truth," it is a revival of the spirit of primitive Christianity. But in so far as it did not repudiate but "retained the Catholic conception of an apostolic Scripture canon, a conception which the primitive church entirely lacked," it remains in bondage to the Catholic conception of "external authority." The true statement of the Protestant position is not, then, "That the word of God contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments is the sole and ultimate authority for Christian truth." That is Catholic. But it is, "That the Spirit of God is the sole and ultimate standard of truth—the Spirit of God who spoke through the apostles, and who still speaks to his people," (page 43.) No doubt the voice of the Spirit must always accord with itself, and we may, therefore, allow that the genuine teaching of the apostles is also true; for they, too, had the Spirit. But the true Protestant spirit finds "authority" in the Holy Ghost alone; and he speaks in the hearts of Christians to-day as truly as he ever did to the apostles. It cannot, then, come under bondage to the "external authority" of the apostolic teaching. In a word, the specific Quaker position is the only true Protestant one.

Now there is much that occurs to us to say of this scheme of the "transformations" of Christianity which Dr. McGiffert presents. That in the course of the ages Christianity did undergo very real "transformations" there is, of course, no reason to deny. And no Protestant will doubt that, of these, the most complete and the most destructive to the conceptions of primitive Christianity was that great transformation which gave the world the Catholic Church, with its claim to all the authority of heaven for the execution of its will. But it is another question whether Dr. McGiffert's characterization of the several "transformations" which he thinks Christianity has undergone—or even his characterization of that great "transformation" alone which produced the Catholic Church—is just and accordant with the facts. Had

in proclaiming and defending it? To look back, thus, to the past, is it not to hanker after the leeks and onions of Egypt?

We are told that the whole conception of authority in religion is unprimitive and the invention of the second century, in the effort of the church to conquer its temporary heresies. If we wish to be "primitive," if we desire to be followers of the apostles, we must cast off all "external authority," and especially must we cast off the fancy that the teaching of the apostles is authority. But why should we wish to be "primitive," or desire to be followers of the apostles? It can only be because, in feeling after the authority we have lost, we instinctively look to them as authoritative teachers whom we can trust. We cannot question the truth of their teaching, (page 29.) But in matters of truth, authority consists precisely in the possession of unquestionable truth. How can we fail, then, to recognize and appeal to the authority of this unquestionable truth taught by the apostles, as the standard to which all so-called teachings of the Spirit in the heart shall be conformed? According to Professor McGiffert, however, such an appeal to the authority of the apostles is itself unapostolic. To go back to the apostles is to renounce the authority of the apostles; it is to renounce every "external authority," for they knew nothing of an "external authority," and to submit everything to the internal authority of the Holy Spirit, who speaks in every Christian's heart. This is what the apostles teach us. Is not this to cut the limb off on which he is sitting? He appeals to the authority of the apostles in order to destroy the authority of the apostles. This seems to us a most illogical proceeding. It appears to us that we ought either to renounce all appeal to authority, and cast ourselves wholly on the Holy Spirit in the heart as the sole revealer of truth, or else, making our appeal to the authority of the apostles, roundly to accept their authority as supreme.

To this, indeed, it must come. We cannot have two supreme standards. Either the Holy Spirit in the heart is the norm of truth and the deliverances of the apostles must be subjected to what we consider His deliverances (and then we have Mysticism cooling down into Rationalism), or else the apostolic revelation is

the norm of truth, and the fancied deliverances of the Spirit in our heart must be subjected to the Apostolic declarations (and then we have Protestantism). There can be no doubt which view is Confessional. The *Westminster Confession* (chap. i. 10), for example, tells us distinctly that the Supreme Judge is the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture and that all private judgments are to be subject to it. There can be as little doubt which is apostolic. The Apostle Paul, for example, demands that the reality of all claims to be led by the Spirit shall be tested by their recognition of his claim to speak authoritatively the word of God (1 Cor. xiv. 37). Nor can there be much doubt which is rational. Is it still asked: What difference does it make what the Apostle Paul says, if we have the revealing Spirit as truly as he had it? This much, at any rate, we must reply: If his words were really not authoritative they were not even true, for he asserts them to be authoritative. And if the words of Paul and his fellow-apostles were not true, we do not even know whether there be a Holy Spirit. It is on the authority of the New Testament alone that we know of the existence of a Holy Spirit, or of his indwelling in the hearts of Christians; that we are justified in interpreting inward aspiration as his leading. If their authority cannot be trusted we have no Holy Spirit. After all, we must build on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus himself being our chief corner-stone, or we build on the stand.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

III. INSPIRED ANTICIPATIONS OF SOME CONCLUSIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.*

- "The grass withereth and the flower fadeth; but the word of our God shall stand forever."—ISAIAH xl. 8.

"Dried is the grass, faded the flower, and the word of our God shall stand forever."—J. A. ALEXANDER.

THE imperishableness of the word of God is emphasized by contrast with such frail and perishable objects as grass and flowers. In its original connection and import, this passage of Scripture had distinct reference to the mission of John the Baptist as heralding the appearance of our Lord. The historic occurrences, therefore, seven centuries afterwards verified the declaration to that extent and in that particular aspect of it. But all limitations are absent and must therefore be cast aside. The word of our God is not merely to stand for seven centuries of time, but "forever."

Moreover, the word has, and admits of, no adventitious limitation to history, or to poetry, to promise or to prophecy, or even to the gospel message, but must be understood as denoting "every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." (Deut. viii. 3; Matt. iv. 4.) What is true of every word, *i. e.*, of all the parts, is true of the collected whole; and hence it is a legitimate extension of this language of Isaiah when it is made to embrace the entire canon of inspired Scripture. This is not the proclamation of a finite mortal, of a monarch, however exalted, nor the equivocal oracle of a heathen divinity, but the sure word of "our God," who speaks from the calm and comprehensive depths of omniscience to which omnipotence is always subservient, and for the execution and complete fulfilment of whose "immutable counsel" his veracity is bound by the solemnities of an oath for our encouragement to lay hold upon the hope set before us, which we have as an anchor to the soul. (Heb. vi. 13-20.)

None who hold that the Bible is the word of God question that nature is the work of God. Indeed, *we* reveal ourselves in word

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and also in action. These are the only two ways in which an intelligent being can manifest his existence and character. It is, presumably, just as natural that God should reveal himself in these two ways as that we should. It would be most unnatural and incomprehensible that God should have limited himself to either one of these modes of revelation. If he exist at all, these are the only ways to show it. In the account of creation, there are indications that God spake, or used language, antecedent to creative acts, as in the creation of man, but relative to man the work of creation stands prior to the revelation by word. Hence nature is, properly viewed, relative to ourselves, as the older of the two volumes of revelation.

It is an easy-going presumption that, if nature and the Bible are from the same Author, they must not only be in harmony but coincident to the extent that they cover the same ground. If one of these volumes is more extended in its disclosures than the other, then we reasonably expect that to the extent that they move along the same paths or deal with the same features of their Author's character and doings their teachings would be the same. Hence, we find, in fact, that nature teaches the same truths as to the efficient power, controlling intelligence, tempering justice, goodness and truthfulness of God, its Author, as does the Bible. In the natural order, this harmony of sameness, or coincidence, is in no manner disturbed by the transcendent, supernatural disclosure of the gospel. The individual voice may coincide with the grand organ in the utterance of certain notes, but fail of touching the full depth and height of its transcendent scales. The notes sounded in common are the same notes, and the transcendent notes agree or harmonize with them. The harmony is properly within and between that and what lies without and invests the identity.

May it not be practicable to trace the coincidences of biblical and scientific teaching beyond what has hitherto been done or attempted? Would it not be a pardonable and commendable use of the present occasion to venture on something of that kind?

The teachings of nature and of the Bible rest primarily in facts, and the student of each must reach his views either by intelligent apprehension or by inferences and conclusions gained inductively

and verified deductively. The combination of these three methods—the intuitive, the inductive and the deductive—constitutes the complete method which dominates the inquiries of the present in all departments of research. This is preëminently a scientific and a critical age. I make bold to assert as my thesis, that *the leading valid conclusions of modern science and philosophy have been anticipated by the writers of the sacred Scriptures.*

Let us draw down this general statement to the sphere of particulars and single out such topics in verification of it as are pregnant with human interests. Please notice this practical limitation, and consider, 1, the Sphere of Science; and 2, that of Philosophy. *First*, then, the domain of science claims attention; and from it eight topics will be singled out for brief consideration:

1. The first of these is, *The Unity of the Origin of the Human Race.* Please notice that our point is not the unity of the race. Professor Agassiz held this view, but stoutly denied the unity of the origin of our race. He recognized all varieties of the human family as sufficiently alike to be grouped as one species, but held to diverse origins and centres of development, and that the Bible gave only an account of the origin of the white races, with special reference to the Israelites—a view which even some of the Israelites of our day are so progressive as to deny. (*Christian Examiner*, July, 1850, pp. 135–137.)

But when we take the Old and the New Testaments together, the doctrine of the book, that all mankind have descended from a single pair, is indisputably set forth in explicit utterances and embodied in its whole texture. In the gospel scheme every human being is viewed as sustaining a filial relation to Adam; and Paul, at Athens, taught the Greeks that their origin was the same as that of the barbarians: that God “made of one blood every nation of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth.” (Rom. v. 12; Acts xvii. 26.)

But what say our scientists? There are two theories of speculative ethnology devised to explain the facts respecting the resemblances, differences, and distributions of mankind. The polygenists hold that men sprang originally from many stocks. But

Professor Huxley, in his essay on ethnology, says that "they (the polygenists) have as yet completely failed to adduce satisfactory, positive proof of the specific diversity of mankind." (*Critiques and Addresses*, page 162.) He also says: "The assumption of more than one primitive stock for all is altogether superfluous"; and in the same connection adds: "The chief philosophical objection to Adam being, not his oneness, but the hypothesis of his special creation." (Page 163.) And again, as showing that the polygenist conclusion is a *non sequitur*, he says: "Granting the polygenist premises . . . you may yet, with perfect consistency, be the strictest of monogenists, and even believe in Adam and Eve as the primeval parents of all mankind." (*Idem*, page 163.)

After combating the Bible doctrine for centuries upon centuries, local and sectional prejudices and imagined interests sometimes adding fuel to the flames, at last the most extreme scientists have become the devout advocates of this scouted doctrine of the unity of the origin of the human race.

Of course it should be noted that this conclusion of the scientists is in the interest of evolution. In the arbitration of the Behring Sea Seal Fisheries' dispute between the United States and England, Sir Charles Russell somewhat caustically reviewed the positions taken by the commissioners from the United States, but announced that, in certain of their conclusions, he quite agreed with them for the reason that they had drawn true conclusions from false premises.

The application of the same dialectical principle is, I respectfully submit, allowable in the present case.

2. *The Dual Constitution of Man.* This is the second position to be considered at present as held in the firm grasp of modern science, which has been anticipated by the sacred writers. Man is not a mere material organism, nor is he purely a spirit. He consists of body and soul. This is as certain a determination of philosophic science as that materialism, on the one hand, or idealism, on the other, is false. Of these extremes Professor Tait remarks: "They are both attributed to that credulity which is characteristic alike of ignorance and of incapacity. Unfortunately there is no cure . . . whether it show itself in the

comparatively harmless folly of the spiritualist or in the pernicious nonsense of the materialist. Alike condemned and contemned, we leave these to their fate—oblivion.” (*Recent Ad. in Phys. Sci.*, page 25.)

Oliver Wendell Holmes, M. D., for more than thirty years Professor of Anatomy in the Medical Department of Harvard University, thus writes: “For a certain period, then, the permanent human being is to use the temporary fabric made up of these shifting materials. So long as they are held together in human shape they manifest certain properties which fit them for the use of a self-conscious and self-determining existence. But it is as absurd to suppose any identification of this existence with the materials which it puts on and off as to suppose the hand identified with the glove it wears, or the sponge with the various fluids which may in succession fill its pores.”

“The doctrine of an immortal spirit will never come from the dissecting-room nor the laboratory, unless it is first carried thither from a higher sphere. Yet there is nothing in these workshops that can efface it, any more than their gases and exhalations can blot out the stars from heaven.” (*The Mechanism of Vital Actions.*)

Even the ancient Greeks distinguished between the soul and the body as between the harper and his harp, but the refinements of modern science place the doctrine, not on a rhetorical basis, but on a clean-cut pedestal of scientific discrimination.

In the Bible narrative of man’s creation, it is said: “And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life.” (Gen. ii. 7.) In 1 Cor. xv. 47, Paul comments on this history, and says: “The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second man is of heaven.” The Bible knows of no other constituents of man than his body and his soul. The prayer of Paul (1 Thess. v. 23): “May your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame, at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ,” does not teach the doctrine of three components in man’s make-up, but simply uses two words, spirit and soul, for diverse functions of the same immaterial part which is often designated by the one word soul. This doctrine of man’s

dual constitution is an important doctrine of the Bible in its relation to the incarnation, to the resurrection and to the future life, as well as to the duties of the present life, for we are not our own, having been bought with a price, and are bound, therefore, to glorify God in both body and soul, which are God's.

Pascal is an acute Bible student, and his view of man is expressed thus: "Man is to himself the mightiest prodigy of nature; for he is unable to conceive what is body, still less what is mind, but least of all is he able to conceive how a body can be united to a mind; yet this is his proper being."

3. *The Blood is the Life of the Animal.* It was not till within the first quarter of the seventeenth century, A. D., that Harvey, the court physician of Charles I., of England, discovered, taught, and published the doctrine of the circulation of the blood. Servetus had, in the preceding century, discovered the pulmonary circulation, and Harvey completed the doctrine by the discovery of the systemic circulation. This was the birth of modern physiology and of scientific medicine. There is an operation, extremely delicate and not of frequent occurrence, now very well known to the profession as that of transfusion. It consists of the transference of the blood of a living animal directly into the blood vessels of a human being. But if a single bubble of air enters, it churns the blood into a froth and is certain death. Dr. Brickel, of New Orleans, died a few years ago, deservedly eminent in his profession. Soon after he went to New Orleans, a young man, to engage in practice, a consultation was held by some of the most eminent physicians of that city over a young lady whose case was judged to be so desperate that the only hope of saving her life was transfusion. But no one of the distinguished gentlemen cared individually to risk it. It was suggested that this young man should be called in as he had no reputation to lose. Very well, young Brickel had the courage and the skill, notwithstanding the crudeness of his instruments, to successfully transfuse the blood of a living lamb into the system of that young lady. She revived, and when, twenty years afterwards, he related the incident to his medical class in Bellevue Hospital Medical College, New York city, she was still living.

This incident is given as illustrating and enforcing the idea that the blood is the life of the animal as a comparatively recent and most valuable scientific discovery. Some growler might suggest that perhaps the girl would have recovered without the operation. But it is unreasonable to question the united judgment of these competent men in the line of their own profession. The abstraction of the blood from the system gives an equally conclusive negative proof.

Now, I ask special attention to the anticipation of this remarkable scientific discovery contained in "the word of our God." In the seventeenth chapter of Leviticus, beginning at the tenth verse, we read as follows, to-wit: "And whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, that eateth any manner of blood; I will set my face against that soul that eateth blood, and will cut him off from among his people. For *the life of the flesh is in the blood*: and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life. Therefore I said unto the children of Israel, No soul of you shall eat blood, neither shall any stranger that sojourneth among you eat blood." (Lev. xvii. 10-12.)

"Ye shall eat the blood of no manner of flesh; for *the life of all flesh is the blood thereof*; whosoever eateth it shall be cut off." (Verse 14.)

Here is a fundamental physiological fact wrought into the whole sacrificial system of the Old Testament dispensation, extending from the blood of the sacrifice offered by our first parents at the threshold of Eden down through the centuries to the bloody sacrifice on Calvary. The significance of the patriarchal and of the Mosaic ceremonials centred in the blood, which impressively proclaimed that the soul that sinneth it shall die; and the substitution of life for life; and that without the shedding of blood there is no remission. "But Christ having come a high priest of the good things to come . . . through his own blood entered in once for all into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption. And for this cause he is the mediator of a new covenant." (Heb. ix. 11, 12, 15.)

This anticipation of the physiological significance of the blood plainly entered into and predetermined its ceremonial significance which has vitalized the whole scheme of redemption in all the ages. This vital character of the blood is as central a fact to the physical existence of the human race as gravitation to the system of astronomy or atonement to the salvation of man. This is no chance nor fanciful matter.

4. *Creation.* This word *creation* has two entirely distinct meanings: (1), In its primary and highest sense it means to bring into existence what prior to the creative act had no actual existence whatever; and (2), In its secondary sense it means to bring what already exists into a new state. This house is a creation in the secondary sense, but not in the primary sense, as not a particle of matter was brought into existence in its production, whereas pre-existent matter was in all its parts merely brought into new forms and relations. Man's body was originally and is still a mediate or secondary creation, being formed from preëxisting material; but his soul is an immediate or primary creation. The scientists, A. Russell Wallace and St. George Mivart, stepped out of the ranks of thorough-going evolutionists to give in their adhesion to the doctrine of the primary creation of the human soul. (Gen. i. 27, 28.) The English word creation is used in both these senses in the Bible, and hence the need of discrimination to avoid confusion. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." Hebrew scholarship has settled the meaning of the word ברא, here translated created. The verb ברא, in the *kal* species as found here, "has acquired," says Delitzsch in his *Commentary on Genesis* (page 91), "the idiomatic meaning of a divine creating, which, whether in the kingdom of nature, or of history, or of the spirit, calls into being that which hitherto had no existence. It never appears as the word for human creations, differing in this from עשה, יצר, ילד, which are used both of men and of God." (Delitzsch, Gesenius, Aben Ezra, Mühlau and Volck, Dillman and Ewald.)

The heavens and the earth, as we know them, are not in their primary state of formless waste and emptiness. There are about sixty-six varieties of ultimate atoms, by the combinations of which

all material bodies known to us are formed. Given these elements, as the product of the act of primary creation in the first verse of Genesis, and the entire material cosmos naturally and easily works out as the consequence of their secondary combinations. The word (*yom*) translated day, which is used to mark the first stage of progress from the elemental state, primarily means heat or temperature, and not, as subsequently, an interval of time. The supposition that these atoms, the original stuff out of which the material universe is made, were in a heated state as at first produced, commends itself to our physical conceptions. In his essay on the "Chemistry of the Primeval Earth," Dr. T. Sterry Hunt observes that "heat, under ordinary conditions, is favorable to chemical combination, but a higher temperature reverses all affinities." (*Essays*, page 36.) In such an initial state of indifference of the various elemental atoms one for another, relative to human vision, the physical conditions of darkness would first prevail. But at a lower stage the chemical affinities would assert themselves and general luminosity would result from the combinations, as we see it illustrated on a small scale in the reactions of the laboratory. That there should be light during the first so-called day prior to the allotted service of the sun on the fourth day, was, therefore, both natural and inevitable; and there is also seen a logical ground for the order: "There was evening and there was morning, one day."

It was felt important to accompany with some expository and confirmatory evidence the view that the exact idea or doctrine of the first verse of Genesis, of the Bible, is the clean-cut production, by immediate creation of the ultimate atoms or elements, out of which the entire physical universe has been built. This is not simply the doctrine of a passage, but of the entire book, confirmed by an induction of a multitude of details.

But is there herein any valid anticipation of the sure conclusions of modern physical science? The question fairly and legitimately turns on the evidence that science has led up to the same doctrine of the creation of these atoms. I will cite some witnesses. And, first, from *A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy* by Sir John Frederick William Herschel

(paragraphs 28, 29), a passage to which vague reference is sometimes made, to-wit:

“The discoveries of modern chemistry have gone far to establish the truth of an opinion entertained by some of the ancients, that the universe consists of distinct, separate, indivisible *atoms*, or individual beings so minute as to escape our senses, except when united by millions, and by this aggregation making up bodies of even the smallest visible bulk; and we have strongest evidence that, although there exist great and essential differences in individuals among these atoms, they may yet all be arranged in a very limited number of groups or classes, all the individuals of each of which are to all intents and purposes *exactly alike* in all their properties. Now, when we see a great number of things precisely alike, we do not believe this similarity to have originated except from a common principle independent of them; and that we recognize this likeness, chiefly by the identity of their deportment under similar circumstances, strengthens rather than weakens the conclusion. A line of spinning-jennies, or a regiment of soldiers dressed exactly alike, and going through precisely the same evolutions, gives us no idea of independent existence; we must see them act out of concert before we can believe them to have independent wills and properties, not impressed on them from without. And this conclusion, which would be strong even were there only two individuals precisely alike in all respects and *for ever*, acquires irresistible force when their number is multiplied beyond the power of the imagination to conceive. If we mistake not, then, the discoveries alluded to effectually destroy the idea of an *eternal self-existent matter*, by giving to each of its atoms the essential characters, at once, of a *manufactured article*, and a *subordinate agent*.

“But to ascend to the origin of things, and speculate on the creation, is not the business of the natural philosopher.”

It should be observed that the distinguished astronomer does not use the word “manufactured” in the sense of a secondary creation of atoms out of preëxistent stuff, but in the primary sense of being “originated” from a common source without and “independent of them.” The idea is that of an immediate super-

natural creation. The argument is an enthymeme of the third order, where the premises are indisputably laid down by him strictly as a scientist, and the conclusion is only indicated and not formally drawn, as that would, in strictness, transcend the technical boundaries between science and philosophy.

It is now proposed to place by the side of this testimony that of the late J. Clerk Maxwell, one of the most distinguished mathematical physicists in the history of science, professor of experimental physics in the University of Cambridge, England; "a philosopher as remarkable for the subtlety of his intellect as for his vast knowledge," says Professor Huxley, in expressing his reluctance to dispute any dictum of his. (*Adv. of Sci.*, page 32.) These brief extracts are taken from his article on the "Atom" in the 9th ed. *Brit. Encyclopedia*.

After noting by means of the subtlest mathematical processes, that physical molecules of various kinds all have identically the same time and space constants in their vibrations, and that, while untold variations are possible, yet, nevertheless, none of these variations have ever arisen in any of the processes of nature, he then proceeds thus :

"The formation of the molecule is, therefore, an event not belonging to that order of nature under which we live. It is an operation of a kind which is not, so far as we are aware, going on on earth, or in the sun, or the stars, either now or since these bodies began to be formed. It must be referred to the epoch, not of the formation of the earth or of the solar system, but of the establishment of the existing order of nature; and till not only these worlds and systems, but the order of nature itself is dissolved, we have no reason to expect the occurrence of any operation of a similar kind."

He continues: "Whether or not the conception of a multitude of beings existing from all eternity is in itself self-contradictory, the conception becomes palpably absurd when we attribute a relation of quantitative equality to all these beings. We are then forced to look beyond them to a common cause or common origin to explain why this singular relation of equality exists, rather than any one of the infinite number of possible relations of inequality."

Then we have this telling conclusion, to-wit: "Science is incompetent to reason upon the creation of matter itself out of nothing. We have reached the utmost limit of our thinking faculties when we have admitted that, because matter cannot be eternal and self-existent, it must have been created."

These passages from Herschel and Maxwell are like scientific comments on the first verse of the Bible in defence of its doctrine of the creation of matter—of all matter—of the material universe.

But it is not forgotten that there is now under discussion a new and novel hypothesis of the intimate constitution of ordinary matter, as consisting of vortex-atoms of æther, which promises to revolutionize all previous hypotheses and theories. The question arises at once: What is the bearing of this new speculation as to the vortex-atoms upon the question of creation? Does it threaten to subvert or to supplant it? I will take the answer from Prof. P. G. Tait, who says: "Sir William Thomson's splendid suggestion of vortex-atoms, if it be correct, will enable us thoroughly to understand matter, and mathematically to investigate all its properties. Yet its very basis implies the *absolute necessity* of an intervention of CREATIVE POWER to form or to destroy one atom even of dead matter." (*Ad. Mod. Sci.*, page 24.)

And thus, turn which way we may, we see the physical science of the present led up to the footstool of the Creator by its most powerful expounders. In the setting forth of this doctrine of creation, in the morning twilight of the history of our race, as from the lips of the Creator himself, it was not a prophecy, but equally wonderful in anticipation of what was possible to and might be accomplished by discovery in the freest and fullest exercise of those powers of the human mind which are in the image of the Creator and which are godlike.

The origination of the constitutive elements of the physical world, the origination of vegetable life, of animal life, and of the human life of man as a moral agent, are the only acts of primary creation in the Mosaic cosmogony; and it should be observed that special secondary creations of the organisms of new species, it may be, in no manner impinge on the postulate of the fixed

quantum of matter in existence, determined by the primary creation of the elements; and also that these vital forces, brought into play in special animate creations, in no manner impinge on the postulate of a fixed quantum of mechanical energy, which doctrine does not apply to mind and life forces. The truth is, that the doctrine of creation read aright is a profound forecasting and anticipation of these latest and boldest generalizations which, properly understood, are thoroughly accepted and defended by adherents of the word of God.

But there are other topics claiming our attention.

5. *The End of the World.* This is the fifth topic to be noticed on which we find the dual teachings of science and the Bible. Creation declares the beginning, but we also have to do with the end, of this world. Has our advanced knowledge discredited or supplanted Bible teaching on this point?

Our present science has ascertained with mathematical certainty that our bodily system is continually running down because of waste. Every beat of the heart, every step in walking, every adjustment of the organs of speech in uttering words, every motion of the hand or expression of face, causes more or less waste of tissue. All the movements of our world transform and waste its energies. Every tick of the watch is a step towards the end of the series which will exhaust the force deposited in its mainspring. Says Dr. C. A. Young in his work on *The Sun*: "The whole course and tendency of nature, so far as science now makes out, points backward to a beginning and forward to an end. The present order of things seems to be bounded, both in the past and in the future, by terminal catastrophes, which are veiled in clouds as yet impenetrable." (*The Sun*, page 277.) Again, "We are inexorably shut up to the conclusion that the total life of the solar system, from its birth to its death, is included in some such space of time as thirty millions of years." (Page 277.) But only one-third of that time remains to us. "Newcomb's conclusion, therefore, is, that it is hardly likely that the sun can continue to give sufficient heat to support life on the earth—such life as we now are acquainted with, at least—for ten million years from the present time." Let me assure the reader that in calling his atten-

tion to this bounding and cheerless outlook of the sciences into the future, I have no thought of dampening the zeal or discouraging the enterprising and laudable ambition of the hopeful youth of either sex. After all, ten millions of years are "a right smart time," and a great deal can be done in it if we are diligent.

There is a very current system of philosophy, however, which professes to ground itself on the present inductions of science, and then confidently projects such appalling and pernicious deductions into the future that it seems to demand a passing notice. Those acquainted with the evolution of Herbert Spencer—and there is no other properly deserving the name of evolution—are aware that in the twenty-third chapter of his *First Principles* he sets forth the culmination of his universal evolution and life in universal dissolution and death. As the race of men, including every individual member of it, is the product of evolution, it is to be entirely swept away out of existence. The whole evolved universe, and all its parts, is to fall into such a catastrophe of dissolution as to be completely resolved back into a heated, attenuated, lifeless, mindless, soulless star-dust such as that from which it all evolved; and then automatically enter on some sort of another evolution which may be like or unlike the present. This succession of evolutions and dissolutions is to be repeated in endless, recurring cycles to all eternity, and that, too, not only in a godless universe, but in a universe in no manner under the guiding influence or control of intelligence, goodness, justice, or truth, but solely the sport of an unknown and unknowable, absolutely naked and unqualified Force. There is in this horrid fatalism, which has been so extensively foisted on our youth, no immortality, no spirituality, no substantial reality of mind or of matter, both being but the empty phenomenal phases of Force. It is godless, religionless, soulless, hopeless, without even the remotest prospect of ending in the perpetual sunshine of hope but in the unrelieved blackness of despair, its consummation being a more absolute annihilation than the Nirvana of Buddhism.

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But the fundamental principle and assumption of the self-sufficient autonomy of the physical system to begin, complete, and

again begin and complete successive series of movements, which is pervasive of this system of Spencer, cannot go unchallenged. In refutation of it I will quote some counter propositions from Sir W. Thomson, a man of the highest authority and of gigantic endowments, who is not a speculator but a profound and practical philosophic scientist, entitled to incomparably superior regard, especially in the case in question, as it falls within the legitimate purview of his professional lines of investigation. He says:

“(1.) There is at present, in the material world, a universal tendency to dissipation of energy.

“(2.) Any *restoration* of mechanical energy, without more than equivalent dissipation, is *impossible to inanimate material processes*, and is probably never effected by means of organized matter, either endowed with vegetable life or subjected to the will of an animated creature.

“(3.) Within a finite period of time past the earth must have been, and within a finite period of time to come the earth must again be, unfit for habitation of man, as at present constituted, unless operations have been, or are to be, performed which are *impossible* under the laws to which the known operations going on at present in the material world are subject.”

According to this teaching, nature, as known by us, is not self-sufficient but dependent, so that the automatic restoration of nature from a catastrophe into which it may run from the waste of energy is “impossible” to the existing constitution of things. In a word, nature is like this watch: When it has expended the energy deposited in its mainspring, it is dependent on some *ab extra* source of supply of force to wind it up and set it going again.

Now, this sounder position is exactly the teaching of the Bible. There are therein four events held forth as destined to occur at the same time in the future: the second coming of Christ, the general resurrection, the general judgment, and *the end of the world*. “But forget not this one thing, beloved, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some men count slackness. . . . Seeing that these things are thus all to be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye to be in all holy liv-

ing and godliness, looking for and earnestly desiring the coming of the day of God, by reason of which the heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat? But, according to his promise, *we look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.*" (2 Peter iii. 8, 9, 11-13.)

In this, as in other cases, we see how the Bible teaches the same and all that is contained in the lesson of science, and then transcends it in rationalness and completeness. Our destiny is not left to the unguided and uncontrolled autonomy of nature, but as Miriam watched the little ark "in the flags by the river's brink," so God watches his children, and for their sakes and for his own glory, which shall be revealed to usward, "the creation itself also shall be delivered from corruption." Indeed, God awaits the destined catastrophe as a special occasion for the manifestation of his recreative power and love in our full fruition of his promises. And then a new and more glorious abode than that of Eden shall arise out of the ruins of the present groaning earth as by divine enchantment, this earth itself becoming, it may be in part, our heaven. (Rom. viii. 18-25.)

6. *Æther.* The sixth topic noted for consideration in this line of thought claiming our attention is æther. Perhaps the most mysteriously wonderful aspect of our present physical science is its hold on this subtle, intangible, invisible, and incomprehensible element. It eludes every one of the bodily senses which place us in relation with the ordinary matter of the gross, material world. Although so elusive, yet one of our ablest scientists is reported as declaring that we are now better acquainted with it than we are with our atmosphere or with water. But this is hardly true of the average citizen. We have long known that our vision of light is due to the vibrations of this invisible æther. That single circumstance indicates how widely it is diffused through the stellar spaces. Within a few years (1888)—what was previously conjectured—it has been proved by beautiful experiments that light, heat, electricity, and magnetism are closely related phenomena of a single group of forces, and depend on transverse vibrations of æther. (Heinrich Wertz was the experimenter.) This had been conjectured by Faraday. However perfectly a

glass receiver is exhausted of such gross matter as our atmosphere by an air-pump, yet the phenomena of light remain as before. This is seen in the Crook's vacuum tubes.

Here, then, we have an inconceivably subtle substance which pervades our bodies, our houses, all material objects, as light shines through glass or the atmosphere. The atoms of all ponderable matter are separated by this homogeneous cosmic æther that fills all space, so that there is no known nor knowable space empty of it.

We stand, then, in the presence and in the midst of an invisible universe in which the visible universe is immersed, and by which it is pervaded and enveloped, like fishes in the sea. Has the Bible any intimations and anticipations of such a discovery; of such a state of fact as this new-born knowledge contemplates? The interest of the Bible lies preëminently in the invisible world, but it is the invisible world of spirits. Of this world of spirits we cannot possibly know by scientific processes. It is beyond the domain of the senses much more completely than is the partially-discovered ocean of æther. The processes of reason cannot disprove it, but on the contrary point confidently to it and hand it over to our faith; and sporadic human experiences confirm the testimony of Scripture. We are able now to assert, as a matter of scientific conquest, that "the visible, gross universe cannot comprehend the whole material works of God. It had its beginning in time and will also come to an end. Perhaps, indeed, it forms only an infinitesimal portion of that stupendous whole which is alone entitled to be called *the material universe*." (*The Unseen U.*, p. 96.) It may be that the invisible universe of æther is only an intermediary between the gross universe of our bodily senses and the universe of spirits, good and bad, which "walk the earth both when we wake and when we sleep." These finite intelligences are familiarly named and known by us as angels. In Bishop Whately's work, *Scriptural Revelations Respecting Good and Evil Angels*, he calls special attention to "the circumstance that the notices there occurring of angels are few and very brief and scanty." (Page 11.) He must mean "few" as compared with what curiosity would have suggested or writers of fiction

would have given. Their number is very great, and yet the names of only two are given, Gabriel and Michael. Michael is alone spoken of as "the Archangel." Notwithstanding the circumspect and dignified reserve of the sacred writers, the references to the ministrations of angels are not infrequent—in fact, they are too frequent for us to attempt even the briefest summary of them in this connection. In general it may be noted that, "while the angels mentioned in the New Testament seem always to have been personal agents," yet in the Old Testament it has been observed that the so-called angels are, for the most part, the sensible manifestations of Jehovah himself through the medium of some impersonal emblem, such as flame or the human form or some other visible semblance, such as the pillar of cloud and fire that led the wandering Israelites in the desert by day and by night, which is named the Angel of Jehovah. It was none other than Jehovah thus veiled in a transient, human form who was one of the "three men" who appeared unto Abraham by the oaks of Mamre as he sat in the tent door in the heat of the day (Genesis xviii.), and was the one who unfolded to the patriarch the covenant counsels of God to be realized in his own family and descendants, and made known the doom of the cities of the plain.¹ In like manner did he appear with the three Hebrew youths in the fiery furnace. Again: "Then Nebuchadnezzar the king was astounded and rose up in haste; he spake and said unto his counsellors, Did not we cast three men bound into the midst of the

¹ 2 Kings vi. 8-23.

The kings of Syria and of Israel were at war, and the king of Syria becoming satisfied that the insight of Elisha was of such service to the king of Israel as to thwart all his movements, sent a strong force to surround Dothan, where the prophet lived, and to capture him. When the Syrian host had surrounded the place, "his (Elisha's) servant said unto him, Alas, my master! what shall we do? And he answered, Fear not: for they that be with us are more than they that be with them. And Elisha prayed and said, Lord, I pray thee, open his eyes that he may see. And the Lord opened the eyes of the young man, and he saw; and, behold, the mountain was full of horses and chariots of fire round about Elisha."

To say the least, this passage forcibly suggests that creatures invisible to the gross bodily vision walk the earth both when we wake and when we sleep, whose ethereal corporeities are not the shadows of departed ghosts, but veritable realities. It is when this passage is grouped with others that its ethereal significance is suggested.

fire? They answered and said unto the king, True, O king. He answered and said, Lo, I see four men loose, walking in the midst of the fire, and they have no hurt." (Daniel iii. 24, 25.) The angel through which the Son of God manifested his presence and saving power in this as in the former instance given was the impersonal human form. In like manner various temporary and transient epiphanies of the Jehovah occurred during the Old Testament dispensation and prior to his permanent incarnation, when he was born of a woman and dwelt among us. There is strong reason for believing, as some think, that it was no doubt in this human form that Adam had frequent and probably protracted intercourse with Jehovah in the garden, and from whose presence the offending pair vainly attempted to hide themselves amongst the trees of the garden. There was, of course, no permanence nor personality in these passive and instrumental forms or media of communication. Fichte, one of the leaders of modern pantheism, used the following language: "Who educated the first human pair? A spirit interested himself in them, as is laid down by an old, venerable, primeval document, which, taken altogether, contains the profoundest, sublimest wisdom, and discloses results to which all philosophy must at last come."

When the angels appeared as finite personalities in the old or in the new dispensation under human form and garb, it was always by divine authorization, and never in their individual discretion. And the door is now open for rational and sober conjecture, whether these forms were miraculously or supernaturally provided for them, or whether they naturally possess a refined ethereal embodiment or corporeity susceptible or capable of manifested resemblance to our gross bodies but very different from them. With Jacob an angel wrestled; in the garden an angel strengthened the wrestling Saviour. "And, behold, there was a great earthquake: for the angel of the Lord descended from heaven, and came and rolled back the stone from the door and sat upon it. His countenance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow. And for fear of him the keepers did shake, and became as dead men." There is a suggestion here of the presence of something more sublimated than the ordinary human body. It

must also be considered that the persons thus dazed were coarse, hardened, brutalised Roman soldiers. When the disciples entered the tomb, "behold, two men stood by them in shining garments." Likewise on the occasion of the ascension, not to multiply suggestive instances, "While the disciples looked steadfastly toward heaven as he went up, behold, two men stood by them in white apparel; which also said, Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven? This same Jesus which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven." (Acts i. 10-11.) These apparitions were evidently supernatural appearances of personal messengers from the spirit world sent to render a specific and important service.

It is also evident that their bodily functions were such as are not possible to our gross bodies. They seem to be quite like the spiritual body of the resurrection spoken of by Paul (1 Cor. xv.) as differing so greatly from our present bodies; and in 2 Cor. v. 1, he says: "That, if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we *have* a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." Butler, in the first chapter of his *Analogy*, seems to catch a floating glimpse of the bearings of the invisible ethereal world on the destiny of our gross bodies.

Conjectures must not be mistaken for dogmatism; and it is fair to say that if the indications or anticipations of Scripture in this case are filmy, nevertheless they are quite as substantial as are the present gropings of science, and open up suggested extensions of ethereal science into the domains of ethereal theology quite unexplored and as yet undreamed of in the laboratory. "While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal." (2 Cor. iv. 18.) (*Huxley's Fifty Years' Sci.*, page 45.)

It should be remarked, before leaving this topic, that, about twenty years ago, a little book by Professors B. Stewart and P. G. Tait was published anonymously under the title, *The Unseen Universe*, which, under the guidance of the postulate of continuity, extravagantly elaborated æther into a thorough-going system of refined pantheistic materialism. I undertake to say

that that postulate is a *delusion* and inevitably works out, wherever applied, a system of monism or philosophic Unitarianism, whether dynamic as by Spencer, idealistic as by Bowne, or materialistic as by Haeckel, to stay by some living representatives of different systems. But all are alike vitiated by the principle of continuity, for this world is built on the discreet scale of natural dualism, of the equally substantial reality of both mind and matter, which do not glide or transform into each other, neither being continuous of the other.

As we have seen, these professors, however, in the latest edition of this book concede, that "in the production of the vortex-atom from a perfect fluid, *i. e.*, from æther, we are driven at once to the unconditioned, to the great first cause; it is, in fine, an act of creation and not of development. But from our point of view," say these authors, *i. e.*, from the postulate of continuity or of evolution (Art. 86), "creation belongs to eternity." (Page 156.) In another connection they "regard the whole universe as eternal, and so in like manner," they say, "are we led to surmise that evil is eternal." (Page 268.) As the theory of vortex-atoms necessarily implies creation in time, they dissent in favor of the absurdity of an eternal creation, which is simply an euphemistic denial of creation. It would be better to accept creation than to plunge into absurdity in the vain attempt to escape from it.

These extravagant deductions from æther carry their own corrective, for an eternal creation is a palpable absurdity, and eternal evil is subversive of the character and existence of a holy God. The recognition of æther, as the stuff or original element from which ordinary matter was formed, therefore, gives promise of simplifying our biblical theology and of elucidating especially the doctrines of the ministry of spirits of creation and of the resurrection.

7. There remain two additional topics which lie in the subjective domain of psychology in its relations to Bible doctrine: The first of these, which is the seventh of our list, is the analogy of the relations of the Spirit of God to Christ's spiritual body and the relations of the spirit of man to man's physical body. That portion of the human body which is in proximate relation to consciousness is the nervous system which puts us in immediate rela-

tion with the external world. But this nervous matter is so minutely and thoroughly distributed to all parts of the organism that the omnipresence of the soul throughout the body is thereby abundantly provided for. Hence every operation and every pain, in the several individual organs of the body, are known and noted by the spirit. It is the same individual spirit of the human being that is conscious of it all.

It looks like a fair presumption that this solid fact, embedded in our individual experience and scarcely yet developed fully into practical and scientific recognition, was thoroughly anticipated and presupposed by the scriptural teachings respecting the spiritual body of Christ: "For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For in one Spirit were we all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, whether bond or free; and were all made to drink of one Spirit. For the body is not one member but many. . . And whether one member suffereth, all the members suffer with it; or one member is honored, all the members rejoice with it. Now ye are the body of Christ, and severally members thereof." (1 Cor. xii. 12-14, 26, 27.) As it is the same conscious spirit that animates the head and all the members and organs of the natural body, so the same Holy Spirit that dwells in and animates Christ, the Head, resides in and vitalizes, with new life, every member of the church, which is his spiritual body. Our life is hid with Christ in God, and this is the true communion of saints.

The fact of the natural body being so fully used in illustration of the spiritual body was a præintimation and anticipation of this catholic doctrine of our psychology as illumined by modern science. The spirit that dictated the Scriptures apprehended the same truth that modern science has discovered and upholds.

8. The eighth and last point of scriptural and scientific significance noted for present consideration is the relative bearing of *subconscious states*. The fact of subconscious or unconscious states of both body and soul is not to be argued here. Since the days of Leibnitz, who died one hundred and seventy-eight years ago, the attention of the students of psychology has been steadily and

firmly fixed on this point; and to some of us it seems strange that it does not yet command unquestioned assent. But there is, perhaps, no truth touching the workings of the human mind more capable of thorough vindication on strictly scientific grounds. There are certain teachings of "the word of our God" which stand among its deep things, that seem to point to it and to unequivocally imply and anticipate it: "Jesus answered and said unto him (Nicodemus), Verily, verily I say unto thee, Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God. . . The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the voice thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit." How many are conscious of the new birth at the moment of its occurrence? It is true that some claim to have such knowledge. Dr. Finney tells us the day, and the time of the day, and the log on which he was sitting in the woods when he experienced regeneration. Without disputing such experiences, it must be confessed that they are exceptional. We do not question the reality of natural birth because of its occurrence not being distinctly recorded on the tablets of conscious memory. The experiences of life presuppose and certify it. And as to the new spiritual life, "We speak that we do know, and bear witness of that we have seen: and ye receive not our witness. If I told you earthly things and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you heavenly things?" (John iii. 3, 8, 11, 12.) The only rational explanation of the divine touch that changed and reversed the whole current of life must be found in the latency of the change produced till developed into experience. We are not conscious of our native and latent powers till in action. Life asserts itself in growth and action.

By virtue of these subconscious states, God's influence may be most positively and constrainingly exerted in harmony with and in confirmation of the freedom of the creature. The will is perfectly free when it acts in accord with the dispositions which are as strictly subconscious states as are our latent powers of body and soul. This is the deep depth of the soul where efficient grace so certainly and irresistibly accomplishes the work of regeneration and sanctification and providence. It is here that divine sov-

ereignty and human liberty embrace each other. The fact of everyone being the subject and also the agent of unconscious influence is a matter of actual experience and of observation. "The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a man that sowed good seed in his field; but while men slept his enemy came and sowed tares also among the wheat and went away. But when the blade sprang up and brought forth fruit, then appeared the tares also." The man did not know just when the evil influences were planted, and the same may be true of good seed. This sword turns every way.

Having passed under rapid review the scientific aspects of our subject, it remains to take some note of philosophy from the same point of view. There is an elementary and radical distinction between these two departments of knowledge. All the sciences without exception fall within the definition that *Technical science is the systematic classification of the laws of phenomena*. Merely classified knowledge is not technical science. It is only when the laws of phenomena, or *the established modes* of their concurrence and succession, have been discovered and reduced to systematic order that we have attained to science in any case. Wherever such knowledge of laws and their classification is absent there is no science.

On the other hand, philosophy penetrates beneath the surface of phenomena and back of laws, and searches into the causes and nature of things. After all, the sciences, strictly considered, are superficial and shallow, and hence all thoughtful scientists are impelled to give in their adhesion to some system or to some principles of philosophy. They are not mere scientists but are philosophic scientists. Philosophers are not mere philosophers, but, in their best form, they are scientific philosophers. Physics, chemistry, and biology necessarily sink their shafts down to the deep fountains of metaphysics. Hence, the attempt, in this day, to eliminate metaphysics or philosophy from academic curricula has proved to be a foredoomed failure. The bonds of union between the natural sciences of matter and of mind and between science and philosophy are indissoluble. Therefore, if the light of anticipation shines from the pages of the sacred writers on the ma-

turest and most advanced conclusions of the sciences of the present, a like illumination might rationally and soberly be expected to fall on the salient problems of philosophy. Such a realization may be confidently asserted as an interesting matter of fact. Only a glance at this matter can now be given.

There are five leading topics handled, with more or less fulness, in every known system of philosophy. These topics are: (1), Mind; (2), Matter; (3), God; (4), Duty; (5), Immortality. These subjects constitute the very foundation of existence, of light, of activity, and of destiny. From first to last they are questions of fact. Our ignorance or misconception of them does not change them. Our conception of them does not make nor unmake them. We conceive but do not constitute them. It is truth that pervades them and gives them stability and knowableness and utility. Speculative truth consists in the conformity of our convictions to the reality of things; just as our practical truthfulness, or veracity, consists in the conformity of our expressions by word and act to our convictions. We cannot always be absolutely sure of the conformity of our convictions to realities, but we can always be sure of honorably maintaining our veracity by conforming our expressions by word and act to our convictions. However, no such weakness and imperfection, and consequent liability to vacillation, can be allowed to attach to the word of an omniscient and holy God, touching even the abstrusest issues and subjects.

Now, the circumstance to be especially noted at this time, and in this general connection, is that, while there is not a technically scientific statement, nor a single formal philosophical proposition, in the Bible, from Genesis to the Apocalypse, inclusive, yet more satisfying light is shed, upon the five fundamental topics of philosophy named, from the pages of this one book than from the pages of all other books known in the world—ancient, mediæval, or modern. Of course, such a broad statement has to be made according to one's best knowledge and belief. It is certainly *veracious* and is believed to be absolutely truthful.

The Bible speaks with no uncertain sound of matter and of mind as the components of man's complex constitution. The soul is set forth as a self-conscious personality, having a real sub-

stantial existence and as destined to a deathless immortality in an exalted and glorified state. And the body is set forth as having equally substantial reality of existence, with possibilities of refined exaltation, to be finally realized in an everlasting and befitting re-union with the soul. Man, thus transformed to his best estate, does not in any manner lose, but fully retains, his individual, conscious personality and identity, and in the highest sense images forth or manifests the attributes of his Creator. Hope, then, becomes fruition, faith becomes sight, and knowledge, love, and obedience blend in one spontaneous flowing stream of activity, equally dutiful and joyous. The conditions of happiness, which consist in the conscious unimpeded activity of all our powers of soul and body, being fully in possession, the consequent stream of bliss must flow without a ripple.

This is not a piece of gushing exuberance, but a sober, prosaic, and concise summary of the salient points of philosophy as bathed in the light of didactic and prophetic biblical teachings and anticipations.

From the philosophic point of view the transcendence, as well as the sober reality of the anticipations of the highest attainments of human genius, is perhaps more remarkable and impressive than from the strictly scientific point of view.

But as human patience has its limitations, these reflections must now be hurried to a conclusion. In doing so, however, there are two corollaries or inferences which must be briefly mentioned, as they are too important to be omitted:

1. The *first* is that the marks and characteristics which have been held up to view, with sobriety and without fanciful exaggeration, plainly indicate that *these sacred writings have proceeded from superhuman intelligence*. The writers did not have, and in the ages when they wrote could not have had, the knowledge which is impressed on and shines from their pages. In no one of the cases considered is it set down as prophecy, but as an insight into and comprehension of a then present state of fact. It is just such a discernment and penetration as one, thoroughly familiar with a subject, unconsciously reveals in speaking or writing on it. How could Moses, or, for that matter, any one else of limited finite

intelligence, have had such a knowledge of the intimate nature of matter in those early ages, even conceding the most extravagant claims of the neologists as to date of composition, as to deny its eternity and assert for it a positively derived existence, both the denial and the assertion being now found, after the intervention of an interval of thousands of years, in accord with the latest and best conclusions of philosophic science? How did he dare assert the existence of light, in contrast with darkness, before the ordination of the sun? How use a transitive verb in a species or conjugation where it is never used of human actions, and that without any direct object as the material on which its action should be expended, as must have been the case in creating, in the secondary sense, out of some preëxistent stuff? How use this same verb for the creation of animal life and the soul of man in complete abnegation of abiogenesis? How is it that vegetable life is on record as created prior to animal life, whereas it has only become known by the scientists of these later ages that vegetables alone can manufacture protoplasm from the elements, and yet animals are dependent on it for food, and hence their very existence on our planet presupposes and is dependent on the prior existence of plants? It is, nevertheless, only of late that the scientific geologist has found imbedded in the earth's crust the anticipated evidence that plants in the natural order preceded animals. How is it that the simple narrative of man's creation, on which myth-mongers have broken their teeth, is such as to meet the requirements of our present scientific physiology and psychology as to the dual constitution of man? and also by anticipation to settle rationally the controversy among ethnologists as to the unity of the human species and of the origin of that species? Where did the information come from, millenniums before Harvey, as to the vital character of blood, in such sense that, on the very threshold of Eden, and in the first sacrifice, it should be singled out and sanctified with such portentous moral significance? Where did the unlettered fisherman, Peter, become so wise as to the winding up of this world's affairs, and the indispensableness of an *ab extra* ground on which to base a rational hope of a new heavens and a new earth wherein should dwell righteousness, as to stand in accord with the highest mathe-

matical physicists of this age in repudiation of nature's automatic self-sufficiency?—a wisdom which his contemporaries scoffed at, saying, "from the day that the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the creation." How absurd, then, to be prating about a day of destruction and the end of the world and a day of judgment! Did Paul learn in the schools of Cilicia, or from the lips of Gamaliel, the unique structure and functions of the nervous system and of the omnipresence of the consciousness of the human soul in all the members of the bodily organism, so that he could so intelligently and faithfully use this means (in 1 Cor. xii. and elsewhere) for conveying with precision the profound doctrine of the omnipresence of the same conscious Holy Spirit in Christ the head, and in all the members of his spiritual body, the Church? Where did the unlettered fisherman, John, learn the doctrine of the subconscious modifications of the human soul, so intimately underlying his teachings and those of other apostles, on regeneration and sanctification, human freedom and divine sovereignty?

It is remarked by the venerated Dr. Charles Hodge, one of our ablest theologians, my venerated teacher, that "there is nothing more characteristic of the Scripture, and there are few things which more clearly prove its divine origin, than that it takes for granted and authenticates all the facts of consciousness."

When, passing beyond the sciences, we reflect that it is required of every system of philosophy, come whence or from whom it may, that it shall explain everything known, whether finite or infinite, human or divine, we can understand why the history of philosophy is a history of disappointed hopes and of wrecked pretensions. When, therefore, the student of the Bible finds so many of the great philosophic problems of life satisfactorily solved by its simple, non-technical teachings, how natural the thought and the inquiry, as he reads the sacred writers severally: "Whence hath this man this wisdom?" (Matt. xiii. 54.) And when, in its unconscious and unpretentious simplicity, he finds this teaching so suggestive and helpful touching problems and questions of legitimate and unavoidable natural inquiry, in even the most advanced and tangled walks of investigation and specu-

lation, the demand becomes imperative and must be met. Is it antecedently reasonable and probable that these writers, in the age and under the circumstances of their writing, had personally and severally the knowledge and intelligence embodied in their writings? Such a proposition staggers our belief. But we must believe they spoke in their own wisdom or in the wisdom of another. The entire consistency and organic unity of these implications stamp them as having unity of origin from God.

Although briefly indicated on this occasion, it is evidently a case of cumulative evidence. A single isolated instance might be passed by as a happy guess or an accidental hit, however extraordinary. But the number, variety and profundity of the disclosures and anticipations seem plainly to exclude the hypothesis of the guessing of finite individual impulse and intelligence, or of chance coincidence. There is unity, comprehensiveness and consistency, which point to the sameness of the superhuman source. It is submitted that this is a unique group of the objective internal evidences in the book itself, as distinguished from the subjective internal evidences in the heart of each believer, testifying that the Bible is not the word of man, but "the word of our God." The induction is legitimate and sufficiently complete to be valid and entitled to our respect and deference. The fact is too palpable for rational denial. It cannot be ignored, and how else can it be explained?

2. The *second* corollary or consequence to be noted is, that *the teachings of Scripture*, so interwoven with all other knowledge, *must be as lasting as the human intelligence and as the truth itself*. It is by no chance shufflings that these wonderful correlations and interlacings are seen to exist. It is like the work of the explorer's spade disclosing the unexpected depth and breadth of the foundations, imperfectly known, on which the superstructure of our religion is based. When it is seen that all true progress of human knowledge, instead of validly antagonizing, falls into line with the divine word, and that no exception has as yet made good its pretensions, the talisman is found for exorcising the demon of infidelity which questions THE PERMANENCE OF CHRISTIANITY and speciously forebodes that it is to pass away and

give place to some form of human knowledge as a substitute. Bring us something better than Christianity, and we are pledged to receive it, for we propose always to go for the best. But please do not ask us to give up what we have, till you show us something better suited to our wants as sinners, and resting on better evidence, to fill the void that would be caused by its loss.

The permanence of our religion, however, does not rest on any arbitrary fiat or transient utility, but on its truth. There is inherent weakness and darkness in error. It flies and perishes before the light. "Truth, like a torch, the more it's shook it shines." The Christ, in one breath, says: "*I am the light* of the world: he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have *the light* of life." (John viii. 12.) In another breath, the same Christ says: "*I am the way, the truth, and the life.*" (John xiv. 6.) "I am the truth," "I am the light." If our Christ is the concrete embodiment of the truth, then all discoveries of truth in whatever domain must serve to confirm and to strengthen his claims. For it is an axiom, not to be questioned, that all truths are harmonious. It is error that loves the darkness rather than the light, and dies amidst its worshippers.

In the Saviour's prayer to the Father, when he prayed not that his followers should be taken out of the world but sanctified in the truth or by means of it, he added, "*Thy word is truth.*" And this is the same word of which Isaiah speaks when he says: "The grass withereth, the flower fadeth: but the word of our God shall stand forever."

The possessive pronoun "our," in Bible idiom, contains the assuring implication that God is under covenant engagement to maintain his word. To that perpetual maintenance his veracity, his honor, his oath, his entire character are irrevocably pledged. But this maintenance has not been without conflict; indeed, it has been, is, and shall be, in the midst of unceasing warfare. Christianity is a fighting religion, opposing all falsehood and error in the hearts, minds, and lives of men; it makes no compromises and offers no terms to its foes but unconditional surrender. It does not live nor flourish by favor, nor by might, nor by power, but by

my Spirit, saith the Lord. (2 Cor. x. 4-5.) It is not a war of sentiment, nor of passion, but of truth against falsehood; and as certainly as truth in science and philosophy shall ultimately triumph over ignorance and error, so certainly is the truth of God destined to triumph and endure. The pretence that the progress of knowledge—of the synthetic philosophy, for example—is destined to supersede Christianity and the word of God is less rational and plausible than that the flickering arc light will supplant the glorious sun in lighting up this world and the starry heavens. The visionary speculator who should ask you to take stock in that enterprise would be set down as a lunatic. I should consider him no wiser who should take stock in any substitute for Christianity and risk in it all his interests for time and for eternity.

How readest thou? “Everyone, therefore, which heareth these words of mine and doeth them—not forgetteth or neglects, but *doeth them*—shall be likened unto a wise man which built his house upon the rock: and the rain descended, and the winds blew and beat upon that house, and it fell not, for it was founded upon the rock.” (Matt. vii. 24-25.) It might be well for those who are crouching and shivering in their shanties down on the sand lots to come up higher and mount the walks that encompass the city of our God. “Walk about Zion, and go round about her; tell the towers thereof; mark ye well her bulwarks, consider her palaces; that ye may tell it to the generations following. For this God is our God forever and ever; he will be our guide even unto death.” There is no thought nor sign of retreat or of surrender in this stronghold with its well appointed and impregnable citadel and gorgeous palaces and Almighty Captain who is able to save to the uttermost. The word surrender or defeat is not known in its vocabulary. The blood-stained banner of the cross floats in defiance and in triumph from every tower. It is only occasionally that a pitiable victim of Satan’s wiles or a self-deluded traitor struggles from the outworks over to the camp of the enemy. But the powers of hades shall not prevail. Yet the soldiers of the cross are sometimes sorely straitened. But their deliverer ever faithfully comes to their rescue.

Some twenty years ago I saw in the halls of the Palmer House,

Chicago, a medium-sized man with a deep depression in one cheek, the mark of a severe wound. His name was given as Colonel ———. Within a fortnight, in riding from Nashville to Atlanta, the Kennesaw Mountain was pointed out in full view from the cars. A fort on those heights was charged with holding an important vantage ground and defending valuable stores. The enemy knew well the importance of capturing the position, and made a determined, and what threatened to be an irresistible, assault. A signal of extreme peril was flung out, and human endurance seemed well-nigh exhausted, when the Colonel, commanding, who was on anxious lookout, saw through the riven and lifting clouds of smoke the signal of his commanding General, "Hold the fort, for I am coming."

Man's extremity is God's opportunity. The word of our God shall stand forever. "To bring out the truth in the Bible is a true way to defend the Bible."

"There are great truths that pitch their shining tents
Outside our walls, and though but dimly seen
In the gray dawn, they will be manifest
When the light widens into perfect day."

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IV. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDGMENT IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

“AND inasmuch as it is appointed unto men once to die, and after this cometh judgment; so Christ also, having been once offered to bear the sins of many, shall appear a second time, apart from sin, to them that wait for him, unto salvation.” (Heb. ix. 27, 28, R. V.) In these words the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews depicts the future of the individual and of the race. The fixed points in the life of every man are death and judgment; in the history of the world, the return of Christ and the general judgment.¹ Upon the mystery that veils the future the Scripture alone throws light. The torch of philosophy is extinguished in the tomb. To that undiscovered country which lies beyond, experience affords no guide. Only the light of revelation can illumine the grave and penetrate the darkness that hides the world to come. Scripture constantly appeals to the hopes and fears that gather about the life that awaits us there, and no questions concern us more deeply than those which touch upon our immortal state.

In considering the doctrine of judgment, as presented in the Fourth Gospel, we make no distinction between the words of our Lord and those of the evangelist. It is Christ who speaks throughout, now in his own person, now through his Spirit. Yet the individuality of the writer is never lost. The Scriptures are, on the one side, the record of a divine revelation; on the other side, a transcript of human experience. The discourses of our Lord preserved in the several gospels furnish a clue to the character of the evangelists, for each of them portrays those aspects of the life and teaching of the Master with which he was most in sympathy. The more widely the discourses of this gospel differ from those of the earlier gospels, the more plainly does this appear. The same hand presses the keys of the organ, but each

¹ The thought of judgment, though not expressed, is implied in the limitation of salvation to “them that wait for him.”

yields its proper and peculiar tone. The Holy Spirit does not, in mechanical fashion, guide the lips to speak and the hand to write; he inspires the mind to think and the heart to feel, and the mode of expression is determined by the personality of the prophet.

It has been confidently asserted that the eschatology of the Fourth Gospel is irreconcilably at variance with that of the other gospels and of Paul; that John knows nothing of a second coming of Christ such as they foretell, of a literal resurrection, of a general judgment. With him all is inward and spiritual.

How far this interpretation is in accord with the facts will appear in the course of our examination, to which we may now proceed.

L. THE JUDGE.

Though God is one, the several operations of the Trinity are predominantly and peculiarly referred to one or other of the Divine Persons. Judgment, which in general belongs to God, is the prerogative of the Father. This is directly affirmed in viii. 50: "There is one that seeketh and judgeth"; and is plainly implied in v. 45: "Think not that I will accuse you *to the Father*; there is one that accuseth you, even Moses"; and in the figure of the vine in chapter xv.: "My Father is the husbandman. Every branch in me that beareth not fruit, he taketh it away." Upon the cross Christ prayed his Father to forgive his murderers. In 1 John ii. 1, Christ is represented as the Advocate of his people, and the Father as the Judge. (Comp. 1 Peter i. 17: "And if ye call on him as Father, who without respect of persons judgeth according to each man's work"; and ii. 23: (Christ) "committed himself to him that judgeth righteously." Matt. x. 32, 33, and xviii. 35.)

The exercise of judgment, however, the Father commits to the Son—v. 22: "For neither doth the Father judge any man, but he hath given all judgment unto the Son."¹ (Comp. Acts x. 42: "And he charged us to preach unto the people, and to testify

¹ Augustine's explanation of the passage is inadequate. "This is said because none will appear to men in the judgment but the Son. The Father will be hidden, the Son will be manifest."

that this is he which is ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead." Rev. i. 18: "I have the keys of death and of hades." Matt. xvi. 27.)

It is characteristic of John, that with equal clearness he sets forth both the true and proper divinity of Christ and his subordination to the Father. That subordination is twofold:

(a.) In his estate of humiliation, as he assumed the nature and the place of man, he was wholly obedient unto the will of God. He spoke (xii. 49; xiv. 10), acted (v. 19, 30; vi. 38; viii. 28), lived (vi. 57), only by the Father. "The Father is greater than I." (xiv. 28.) His whole life on earth was a doing of God's will. (iv. 34; xvii. 4.)

(b.) This temporal subordination rests upon another, inherent in the divine nature. The Father, in the language of the old theologians, is the *fons deitatis*, or *trinitatis*. The Son is eternally begotten of the Father. Sonship involves derivation or communication of life,¹ likeness of nature, subordination of rank. The Son is of the Father, like the Father, subordinate to the Father. That the divine nature common to the persons of the Trinity is self-existent and eternal, while yet the Son is begotten of the Father, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, is the mystery of the Godhead.

It is sometimes difficult to determine in a particular passage whether the reference is to the temporal or the essential subordination of the Son.² For our present purpose the distinction is not important. The Father gives all to the Son, the Son renders all again to the Father, in unbroken fellowship of love: "Even as thou gavest him authority over all flesh, that whatsoever thou hast given him, to them he should give eternal life." (xvii. 2.) "All things that are mine are thine, and thine are mine." (xvii. 10.) "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand." (iii. 35.) (Comp. xiii. 3.)

¹ On the meaning of *μονογενής* see Hort, *Two Dissert.*, p. 63; Westcott, *Eps. of John*, add'l note on iv. 9.

² For example, v. 26: "For as the Father hath life in himself, even so gave he to the Son also to have life in himself," is interpreted of the eternal generation of the Son by Augustine and Athanasius, and among modern writers by Westcott and Godet; while Theodoret, Calvin, and Meyer refer it to his humanity.

The full statement of the doctrine of Scripture is given in Rom. ii. 16: "In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men, according to my gospel, by Jesus Christ"; and in Acts xvii. 31: "Inasmuch as he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom he hath ordained." As the Father created the world through the Son (i. 1; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Heb. i. 2, "through whom also he made the worlds"), and redeems the world through the Son (iii. 16, 17; 1 John iv. 14, "the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world"; v. 11, "and the witness is this, that God gave us eternal life, and this life is in his Son"), so he will judge the world through the Son. "For as when we learn concerning the God of the universe, from the words of Scripture, that he judges all the earth, we say that he is the judge of all things through the Son; and again when we hear that the Father judgeth no man, we do not think that the Scripture is at variance with itself (for he who judges all the earth does this by his Son, to whom he has committed all judgment; and everything which is done by the Only Begotten has its reference to the Father, so that he himself is at once the judge of all things and judges no man, by reason of his having, as we have said, committed all judgment to the Son, while all the judgment of the Son is conformable to the will of the Father; and one could not properly say either that they are two judges, or that one of them is excluded from the authority and power implied in judgment.") (Gregory of Nyssa, on *Not Three Gods*.)

We read, therefore, of the judgment-seat of God (Rom. xiv. 10, true text; comp. Rom. iii. 6), and of Christ. (2 Cor. v. 10. Comp. 2 Tim. iv. 1, "Christ Jesus who shall judge the quick and the dead.") Father and Son are united in judgment in Rev. vi. 16, 17: "And they say to the mountains and to the rocks, Fall on us, and hide us from the face of him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb: for the great day of their wrath is come"

It follows from the relation between them that the Son judges according to the will of the Father: "I can of myself do nothing: as I hear,¹ I judge: and my judgment is righteous; be-

¹ Evidently, the meaning is, as I hear from the Father.

cause I seek not mine own will, but *the will of him that sent me.*" (Ch. v. 30.) Thus Isaiah foretold: "His delight shall be in the fear of the Lord: and he shall not judge after the sight of his eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his ears." (Isa. xi. 3. Compare John vii. 24.) "Yea, and if I judge, my judgment is true: for I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent me." (John viii. 16.) The life that Christ imparts ("As the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father; so he that eateth me, he also shall live because of me," vi. 57), and those to whom he imparts it ("All that which the Father giveth me shall come unto me," vi. 37; "I manifested thy name unto the men whom thou gavest me out of the world: thine they were, and thou gavest them to me," xvii. 6; comp. xvii. 2, 9, 11, 24,) are both given him by the Father. He treads the wine-press to execute the fierceness of the wrath of Almighty God upon the nations. (Rev. xix. 15; Isa. lxiii. 3.)

In representing Christ as the Judge, the Scripture never loses sight of his relation to the Father. This appears in those passages which most vividly portray his divine power and glory. In Matthew xxv. 31-46 he is seated upon the throne of judgment, and all the nations are gathered before him. His voice pronounces sentence, and assigns to the evil and the good their eternal portion. But those whom he summons to inherit the kingdom are the "blessed of *my Father.*" (Verse 34.) And in the epistles to the seven churches, which depict him clothed with all the attributes of deity, he is still the Son of God (Rev. ii. 18); the authority which he promises to him that overcometh, he has received of the Father (Rev. ii. 27); the name of the victor he will confess before the Father (Rev. iii. 5); four times in a single verse he uses the term *my God* (Rev. iii. 12); and the closing words of promise are: "He that overcometh, I will give to him to sit down with me in my throne, as I also overcame, and sat down with my Father in his throne." (Rev. iii. 21.) Compare Matthew vi. 21, where also Christ is represented as the judge: "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of *my Father* which is in heaven."

The office of judge thus committed to Christ he exercised symbolically in the cursing of the fig-tree (Matt. xxi. 19), and in the cleansing of the temple at the opening (ii. 15, judgment beginning at the house of God, 1 Peter iv. 17), and again at the close of his ministry (Matt. xxi. 12-17). Here, too, observe that the temple is the Father's house, and therefore belongs to the Son. He claimed and freely exercised the power to forgive sins. Ministerial and declarative power he committed to his disciples: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whosoever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them; whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained." (xx. 22, 23.) (Comp. Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 18.) This is a figure of the authority which they shall receive hereafter. "Know ye not that the saints shall judge the world? . . . Know ye not that we shall judge angels?" (1 Cor. vi. 2, 3.) "Verily I say unto you, that ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." (Matt. xix. 28.) (Comp. Rev. ii. 26, 27; iii. 21.)

Christ is appointed to the office of judge because he is Son of man. ("He gave him authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of man," v. 27.) Elsewhere throughout the four Gospels the phrase Son of man has invariably the article with both nouns. Here only it is omitted with both *υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου*. In Rev. i. 13, and xiv. 14, are found the only other instances in the New Testament of the omission of the article in both cases. There, however, the expression is, "one like a son of man." (R. V.) By the omission of the articles in the present instance the emphasis is laid rather upon the nature than the person of Christ. He is constituted Judge by virtue of his office as Mediator; he is Mediator by virtue of the fact that he has added the human nature to the divine. Because he is the only Mediator between God and man, the character and destiny of men are determined by their personal relation to him. This is the ultimate ground of his appointment as Judge.

The purpose of his appointment is stated in v. 22—"that all may honor the Son, even as they honor the Father." The glory of the Triune God, in which is comprehended the highest good

of the creature, is the final cause of creation and of redemption, of the universe and of the mediatorial kingdom of Christ: "I glorified thee on the earth, having accomplished the work which thou hast given me to do." (xvii. 4.) "When all things have been subjected unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subjected to him that did subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all." (1 Cor. xv. 28.) "Wherefore also God highly exalted him, and gave unto him the name which is above every name; that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." (Phil. ii. 9-11.)

Since Christ is the full and perfect revelation of God, his glory and that of the Father are one. He is "the effulgence of his glory, and the very image of his substance." (Heb. i. 2.) Of Lazarus he said, "This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God may be glorified thereby." (xi. 4.) "Now is the Son of man glorified, and God is glorified in him; and God shall glorify him in himself, and straightway shall he glorify him." (xiii. 31, 32.) "Glorify thy Son, that the Son may glorify thee. . . . And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." (xvii. 1, 5.) "He that honoreth not the Son honoreth not the Father which sent him." (v. 23.)

Judgment thus holds a conspicuous place among the offices of Christ. Yet the purpose of his mission was not judgment but salvation. This is often affirmed: "For God sent not the Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world should be saved through him." (iii. 17.) "Ye judge after the flesh; I judge no man." (viii. 15.) "And if any man hear my sayings, and keep them not, I judge him not; for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world." (xii. 47.) But judgment, though foreign to the purpose, is the necessary result of his mission wherever unbelief prevails. The world is already under condemnation by reason of sin: "He that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God *abideth* on him." (iii. 36.) "He that heareth my word . . . hath passed out of death into life." (v. 24.)

A new and more heinous sin is added in the rejection of the Saviour: "He that believeth not hath been judged already, because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten Son of God. And this is the judgment, that the light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light; for their works were evil." (iii. 18, 19.) If the salvation which he proffers were accepted by all, no place would be found for judgment, for there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus. (Rom. viii. 1.) He speaks, therefore, not of the purpose, but of the inevitable issue of his mission, when he says, "For judgment came I into this world, that they which see not may see; and that they which see may become blind." (ix. 39.) "I judge no man. Yea, and if I judge"—if judgment be forced upon me by the unbelief of men—"my judgment is true." (viii. 16.) (Comp. viii. 26, "I have many things to speak and to judge concerning you.")

The distinction thus drawn between the design and the effect of his coming is indicated also in Matt. x. 34: "Think not that I came to send peace on the earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword."

II. THE TIME OF JUDGMENT.

In chapter v. a twofold resurrection is described: (*a*), Spiritual, of souls dead in trespasses and sins (verses 24–27); (*b*), The resurrection of the body (verses 28, 29). There is likewise a twofold judgment: (*a*), Inward and spiritual. In this sense judgment is spoken of as past or present: "The wrath of God abideth on him" (iii. 36); "He that believeth not hath been judged already" (iii. 18). The judgment of the world is pronounced when the Son of God is put to death: "Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out" (chap. xii. 31); "Of judgment, because the prince of this world hath been judged" (chap. xvi. 11). During his earthly ministry Christ read the hearts, ordered the lives, declared the destiny, of men. (Ch. i. 42, 47, Peter and Nathanael; ii. 25, "He himself knew what was in man"; iv. 18, the woman of Samaria; vi. 64, "Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who it was that should betray him"; viii. 44, 47, "Ye are of your father the devil"; xxi. 18, 22, Peter and John.) Judas is

declared to be a devil (vi. 70), the son of perdition, already condemned (xvii. 12). (Compare Matt. xxvi. 24, "Good were it for that man if he had not been born.") As will be shown hereafter, the destiny of the soul is finally determined at death.

It has often been affirmed that this is the only judgment recognized by John; that he knows nothing of a general judgment; that "the world's history is the world's judgment." But he plainly teaches in harmony with Scripture throughout.

(b), That there is a time appointed in which all men shall be judged: "The hour cometh in which all that are in the tombs shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done ill, unto the resurrection of judgment." (v. 28.) The whole man, body, soul, and spirit, shall stand before the judgment-seat.

That time is designated as the last day (vi. 39, 40, 44, 54; xii. 48: "The word that I spake, the same shall judge him in the last day"). In 1 John iv. 17 it is termed the day of judgment; in Revelation xiv. 7, the hour of God's judgment. Elsewhere in Scripture it is the day of judgment (Matt. x. 15; xi. 22, 24; xii. 36: "Every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment"; 2 Peter ii. 9: "To keep the unrighteous under punishment unto the day of judgment"; 2 Peter iii. 7: "The heavens that now are, and the earth, by the same word have been stored up for fire, being reserved against the day of judgment and destruction of ungodly men"); the judgment (Matt. xii. 41, 42; Luke x. 14; xi. 31, 32; compare 1 Tim. v. 24); "The day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God." (Rom. ii. 5.)

The day of judgment follows the coming of Christ (xiv. 2) and the general resurrection (v. 28), which is heralded by the last trump. (1 Cor. xv. 52.) The precise time is known only to God: "But of that day and hour knoweth no one, not even the angels of heaven, neither the Son, but the Father only." (So the Rev. Ver. in Matt. xxiv. 36, following the weight of MSS. authority. Mark xiii. 32. Comp. Acts i. 7: "It is not for you to know times or seasons, which the Father hath set within his own authority.") These words of our Lord must be taken in their

plain and obvious sense, as an acknowledgment of ignorance. Many attempts have been made to force upon them another meaning, but in vain.¹ We must beware, however, of enlarging the sphere of his ignorance beyond the bounds which he has himself described. He was fully aware of the limitations of his knowledge, whatever they may have been, for they were self-imposed. Because he owns himself ignorant upon this point, we are not to assume that he may be at fault elsewhere, as is often done, for example, when the value of his witness to the Old Testament is in question. Insoluble as is to us the problem that springs out of the union of the divine and human natures in him, with respect to knowledge as to all other attributes of his complex person, he was clearly conscious of the limits of his knowledge during his earthly life; he alone may define those limits, and whenever he speaks he must be heard with absolute confidence and obedience. Always it is true of him: "We speak that we do know, and bear witness of that we have seen." (iii. 11.) These words, therefore, which have sometimes been employed to undermine his authority as a teacher, when rightly apprehended serve only to confirm our faith in him by assuring us that he taught that only which he knew. He is the one man in history who could draw the precise line between what was hidden from him and what was revealed. His word is, therefore, in every case the absolute and final authority, which admits of no question from any source, and of no appeal.

III. THE RULE OF JUDGMENT.

The standard is the word of God, the Scripture which "cannot be broken." (x. 35.) The law and the gospel are parts of one divine revelation. "For if ye believed Moses, ye would believe me; for he wrote of me." (v. 46.) Moses, therefore, is the accuser of those who do not accept Christ. (v. 45: "There is one that accuseth you, even Moses, on whom ye have set your hope.") Men shall be judged by the word that Christ has spoken, because his word is the word of God, who, "having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers por-

¹ So Augustine, *De Trin.* i. 12: "He is ignorant of this, as making others ignorant; that is, in that he did not so know as at that time to show his disciples."

tions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son." (Heb. i. 1, 2.) "He that rejecteth me, and receiveth not my sayings, hath one that judgeth him; the word that I spake, the same shall judge him in the last day. For I spake not from myself; but the Father which sent me, he hath given me a commandment, what I should say and what I should speak." (xii. 48, 49.) "For he whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God." (iii. 34.) Therefore the words of Christ are spirit and life. "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I have spoken unto you are spirit, and are life." (vi. 63. Comp. vi. 68: "Thou hast the words of eternal life.")

It is of interest here to note the terms which are used to designate the word of God in whole or in part in the Fourth Gospel. The term Scripture is employed eleven times (ii. 22; vii. 38, 42; x. 35; xiii. 18; xvii. 12; xix. 24, 28, 36, 37; xx. 9); in v. 39, the Scriptures; in x. 35, a passage is cited as the word of God; the law is named and assigned to Moses in i. 17; vii. 19, 23. (Comp. the words of Philip i. 45. Circumcision is traced to Moses, and beyond him to the fathers. vii. 22. Comp. ix. 28, 29, the words of the Jews to the blind man healed.) The law is named without indicating the author in viii. 17, x. 34, and xv. 25. The *law*, indeed, is sometimes broadly used to cover other parts of Scripture than the books of Moses. "Jesus answered them, is it not written in your *law*, I said, ye are gods?" (x. 34.) The quotation is from Psalm lxxxii. 6. "But this cometh to pass, that the word may be fulfilled that is written in their *law*, they hated me without a cause." (xv. 25.) The words cited occur in Psalm xxxv. 19, and Psalm lxix. 4. The prophets are named in vi. 45: "It is written in the prophets, And they shall all be taught of God." These are the words of Christ. (Comp. the words of Philip in i. 45: "We have found him of whom Moses in the law and the prophets did write.") With the phrase, It is (was) written, citations are introduced from the Psalms (ii. 17: "His disciples remembered that it was written, The zeal of thine house shall eat me up." Psalm lxix. 9. Comp. the words of the people in vi. 31, "Our fathers ate the manna in the wilderness; as it

is written, He gave them bread out of heaven to eat"—a free rendering of Psalm lxxviii. 24, 25), and from the prophets (xii. 14, 15: "And Jesus, having found a young ass, sat thereon; as it is written, Fear not, daughter of Zion; behold, thy king cometh, sitting on an ass's colt," Zech ix. 9); while Isaiah is named by John the Baptist (i. 23: "I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Make straight the way of the Lord, as said Isaiah the prophet"), and by the evangelist ("But though he had done so many signs before them, yet they believed not on him; that the word of Isaiah the prophet might be fulfilled, which he spake, Lord, who hath believed our report? . . . For this cause they could not believe, for that Isaiah said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and he hardened their heart. . . . These things said Isaiah, because he saw his glory; and he spake of him." xii. 38-41.)

Our Lord thus set his seal in this gospel not only to the Scripture in general ("the Scripture cannot be broken," x. 35), but to each of the three divisions of the Scripture recognized by the Jews, the law of Moses, the prophets, and the Psalms. (Luke xxiv. 44.)

As the word of God is the rule of life, obedience, of course, is the condition required. And the first commandment of the word is faith in the Christ of God, the word made flesh. "This is the work of God"—the work on which eternal life depends, as the context shows, "that ye believe on him whom he hath sent." (vi. 29.) Faith is not simply believing, but believing *on*, commonly εἰς, denoting resting on and union with. Never is salvation attached to mere belief. Passages like v. 24 ("He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life"), and 1 John v. 1, 5 ("Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is begotten of God"; "And who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?"), must be interpreted in the light of the clear and repeated teaching of John, as of all Scripture, that a belief which leaves the heart and life untouched is vain, and is even found among the lost. (Jas. ii. 19.)

Faith in Christ is represented as receiving him (i. 12: "As many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of

God, even to them that believeth on his name"); and under the figure of eating his flesh and drinking his blood, as partaking of his life. (vi. 51-58.) It issues in following him (viii. 12: "He that followeth me shall not walk in the darkness, but shall have the light of life"), and in keeping his word (viii. 51: "If a man keep my word, he shall never see death"). Because in him alone is life for men, (i. 4; 1 John v. 11, 12: "And the witness is this, that God gave unto us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son hath the life; he that hath not the Son of God hath not the life,") faith in him and eternal life are everywhere presented as inseparable. (iii. 15, 16, 18, 36: "He that believeth on the Son hath eternal life; but he that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." vi. 40, 47: "He that believeth hath eternal life.")

The terms repent, repentance (*μετανοέω, μεταμέλομαι*, etc.) do not occur in the Gospel or Epistles of John, though *μετανοέω* is often found in the Apocalypse. The reference, in 1 John i. 9, is to believers. "If we confess our sins, he is faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." Repentance is, therefore, nowhere expressly named as a condition of salvation; yet it is clearly implied in the contrast drawn throughout the gospel between the attitude of men toward sin before and after conversion. Christ is "the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world." (i. 29.) "Every one that committeth sin is the bondservant of sin." (viii. 34.) Believers are not of the world. (xvii. 14, 16.) To the impotent man healed at Bethesda was given the command: "Behold, thou art made whole; sin no more, lest a worse thing befall thee." (v. 14.) That putting away of sin, in which repentance essentially consists, is constantly enjoined. "Ye know that he was manifested to take away sins. . . . Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not; whosoever sinneth hath not seen him, neither knoweth him. . . . He that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous: he that doeth sin is of the devil. Whosoever is begotten of God doeth no sin. . . . In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil." (1 John iii. 5-10.)

Love is represented, in harmony with all Scripture, not as the condition, but as the fruit of salvation. It is the evidence of the new life to the world ("By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another," xiii. 35), and to the individual believer ("We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren," 1 John iii. 14). In the First Epistle, which may be termed a doctrinal unfolding of the historical contents of the gospel, love appears as an essential element of the new life. "Whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother." (iii. 10.) "He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love. . . . If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar: for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen." (iv. 8, 20.) The attempt is sometimes made to set at variance the doctrine of Paul, of James, and of John, but however Paul may emphasize faith, and James works, and John love, they all recognize the one condition of salvation expressed in the pregnant phrase: "Faith working through love." (Gal. v. 6.)

The conception of John as the apostle of love, it should be observed, is drawn, so far as his teaching is concerned, rather from the Epistles than from the Gospel. In his Gospel, which precedes the Epistles logically, if not chronologically, faith is decidedly more prominent than love, with the exception of chapters xiv.-xvii., and is urged as repeatedly and as emphatically as by Paul. The work of God is faith (vi. 29). The purpose of the Gospel is to produce faith: "These are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have life in his name." (xx. 31.) The historical development of the Gospel lies in the unfolding of faith and of unbelief.

An examination of John's use of the terms *love* and *faith* is interesting and instructive, especially when compared with the usage of Paul. *πίστις* is not found in the Gospel, and in the other writings of John it occurs only five times: in his First Epistle v. 4, and in Revelation ii. 13, 19; xiii. 10; xiv. 12. Elsewhere in the New Testament it is often found. But *πιστεύω* occurs 99 times

¹The text of Westcott and Hort is used.

in the Gospel, 9 times in the Epistles, and nowhere in the Revelation—a total of 108 times. In the other Gospels it is found in 34 instances; in the Epistles of Paul, 55; in the Acts, 37; in Hebrews, 2; in James, 3; in Peter, 3; in Jude, 1—a total of 135 in the whole New Testament apart from the writings of John. *πίστις* occurs 142 times in Paul's Epistles (Hebrews not included), and *πιστεύω* 55—a total in Paul's writings of 197 times. As, in the Greek text of Westcott and Hort, the Gospel of John occupies 53 pages and the Epistles of Paul 126 pages, it appears that *πιστεύω* is, proportionately, rather more frequent in the Fourth Gospel than *πίστις* and *πιστεύω* combined in the writings of Paul. On the other hand, *ἀγάπη* is found 7 times in the Gospel, *ἀγαπάω* 37, *φιλέω* 13—a total of 57; in Paul's Epistles, *ἀγάπη* 73, *ἀγαπάω* 34, *φιλέω* 2—a total of 109, a proportion nearly the same as in the former case. And it will be noted that, while *πιστεύω* is found 99 times in the Gospel, the various words for love occur only 57 times. Obviously, the emphasis of the Gospel is rather upon faith than upon love. The proportion is very different in the Epistles. There we find *πίστις* once and *πιστεύω* nine times, a total of 10 times; while *ἀγάπη* occurs 21 times and *ἀγαπάω* 31, a total of 52 times. (*φιλέω* and *φιλία* are not found in the Epistles.) The love that springs in the heart of man is traced to the love of God: "We love, because he first loved us." (1 John iv. 19.)

The thought of judgment according to works, as in Paul ("who will render to every man according to his works," Rom. ii. 6. Comp. the parables of the talents and the pounds, and the representation of the judgment in Matt. xxv. 31-46), appears in v. 29 ("all that are in the tombs shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done ill, unto the resurrection of judgment"), and there only in the gospel. In these good or evil works faith, indeed, is included. Faith is preëminently the work of God. (vi. 29.) Works are the revelation of character, and moral character is determined by the presence or absence of faith. "If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the works of Abraham. . . . Ye do the works of your father. . . . Ye are of your father, the devil, and the lusts of your father it is your will to do." (viii.

39, 41, 44.) "Whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God." (1 John iii. 10.) "He that doeth good is of God; he that doeth evil hath not seen God." (John iii. 11.) (Comp. Rev. xx. 12-14: "And the dead were judged out of the things which were written in the books, according to their works. . . . And they were judged every man according to their works.") The condition of salvation is not works, but faith manifested by works. So is Matt. xii. 37 to be understood: "For by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned." Believers do not obey that they may be saved, but because they are saved. They serve not for wages as servants, but for love as children. Obey and live is the word of the law; live and obey is the word of the gospel.

The ground of salvation, then, is nothing meritorious in man, in his character, or in his works. The believer is drawn by the Father (vi. 44, "No man can come to me except the Father which sent me draw him"), born again of the Spirit ("Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God. . . . Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God," iii. 3, 5), and finds in Christ the way, the truth, and the life. (xiv. 6.) Life is the gift of Christ: "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life." (x. 27.) (Comp. 1 John v. 11.) The fine linen in which the bride, the Lamb's wife, is arrayed, which is the righteous acts of the saints (Rev. xix. 7, 8), is washed and made white in the blood of the Lamb (Rev. vii. 14), and to him is rendered all the praise of their salvation by the redeemed in heaven. (Rev. v. 9-14; vii. 10. "Salvation unto our God which sitteth on the throne, and unto the Lamb.")

The gospel makes no specific reference to those who have not heard of Christ, though it teaches that all men shall be judged. (v. 28.) The emphasis is laid upon the sin of unbelief, and the case of those to whom the offer of salvation has not been made known is not, therefore, directly considered. (See Rom. ii. 12: "For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law," and the verses following. Scripture in general has little to say upon this theme.)

IV. THE ISSUE OF JUDGMENT.

“All that are in the tombs shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done ill, unto the resurrection of judgment.” (v. 28, 29.) (Comp. Deut. xxx. 19: “. . . I have set before thee life and death, the blessing and the curse.” Dan. xii. 2: “And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt.”) Life and judgment are here opposed; life and death in v. 24: “He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgment, but has passed out of death into life.” (viii. 51: “If a man keep my word, he shall never see death.” 1 John iii. 14: “We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren.”)

(a.) The portion of the righteous, then, is eternal life. This life, according to John, begins with the new birth (iii. 3, 5; 1 John iii. 9: “Whosoever is begotten of God doeth no sin.” 1 v. 1: “Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is begotten of God.” See also verses 4, 18); consists essentially in the knowledge of God as he is revealed in Christ (“And this is life eternal, that they should know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ,” xvii. 3) (comp. 1 John iii. 2); and is the present possession of the believer. “He that believeth on the Son *hath* eternal life.” (iii. 36.) “He that heareth my word . . . *hath* eternal life.” (v. 24.) “He that believeth *hath* eternal life.” (vi. 47; vi. 54; xi. 25, 26. 1 John v. 12: “He that hath the Son hath the life.” 1 John v. 13.) Eternal life is never represented in the Fourth Gospel as future—the predominant representation in the Epistles of Paul—yet it still awaits its consummation, which shall follow the resurrection and the judgment: “And if I go and prepare a place for you, I come again, and will receive you unto myself, that where I am, there ye may be also.” (xiv. 3.) “Father, that which thou hast given me, I will that, where I am, they also may be with me; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me.” (xvii. 24.) (Comp. 1 John iii. 2.)

In the consummation of the life everlasting in the heavenly kingdom are included being with Christ ("Where I am, there shall also my servant be," xii. 26; xiii. 36; xiv. 2, 3), and being like Christ. Already believers share his glory in part ("And the glory which thou hast given me I have given unto them," xvii. 22); hereafter they shall behold his glory with open face (xvii. 24); shall enjoy with him the Father's love ("And I made known unto them thy name, and will make it known; that the love wherewith thou lovedst me may be in them, and I in them," xvii. 26); and shall be made like him because they shall see him as he is. (1 John iii. 2.) (Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 18, and the promises of the epistles to the seven churches.)

(b.) The portion of the wicked is eternal death. As life in the Scripture sense is not bare existence, death is not merely the cessation of existence. It is a present spiritual condition. Apart from Christ, in whom alone is life, the soul is dead. Thus by nature men are in the state of spiritual death: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, ye have not life in yourselves." (vi. 53.) (Comp. v. 24; 1 John iii. 14; 1 John v. 12, "He that hath not the Son of God hath not the life.") The state of nature is a state of death; life is of grace alone.

Yet the death of the wicked, as the life of the righteous, finds its consummation hereafter, following the resurrection and the judgment; and may therefore be represented as future, especially as the way of escape lies open during the present life, and the destiny is not finally determined until the hour of death: "Except ye believe that I am he, ye shall die in your sins." (viii. 24.) "If a man keep my word, he shall never see death." (viii. 51.) "There is a sin unto death." (1 John v. 16.) The striking phrase, *second death*, is employed in the Revelation, and there only, to describe the final state of the ungodly. (ii. 11; xx. 6; xxi. 8.)

The phrase *eternal death* does not occur in the gospel; and such expressions as eternal punishment (Matt. xxv. 46), eternal sin (Mark iii. 29, true text), eternal destruction (2 Thess. i. 9), eternal judgment (Heb. vi. 2), are not found in the Gospel or Epistles of John. Eternal torment is represented in Rev. xiv. 11. The *doctrine* of eternal death, however, is clearly taught: "Except a man be

born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God." (iii. 3.) (Comp. iii. 5.) "He that believeth on the Son hath eternal life; but he that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." (iii. 36.) Here is plainly declared the total and final exclusion of the unrighteous from the kingdom of God. Neither in this gospel nor elsewhere in Scripture is the hope held out of a place for repentance beyond the grave. The judgment of the last day is the ratification of the sentence which is pronounced upon the soul at death.

Such is the doctrine of judgment in the Fourth Gospel. Judgment belongs to the Father, and by him is committed to the Son, on the ground of his mediatorial office, that all may honor the Son as they honor the Father. The exercise of judgment, which does not belong to the *purpose*, but is the inevitable *result* of his mission by reason of the unbelief of men, found place in his earthly life, and in the last great day all men shall stand before him for final sentence. The standard of judgment shall be the word of God, which requires faith in Christ as the condition of salvation. The issue of that judgment shall be to the unbeliever eternal death, to the believer eternal life. John strikes no discordant note in the inspired chorus, and his teaching upon this theme, as upon every other, blends in harmony with the teaching of all Scripture, which came not by the will of man, but from holy men of God, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

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V. THE GOSPEL AND THE REVELATION OF PETER.

FROM the paucity of reference thereto in its most representative journals, it is rightly to be inferred that the study of patristic literature is almost entirely, if not wholly, neglected in the Southern Presbyterian Church. The cause of such neglect is, perhaps, not far to seek: the failure of her seminaries to provide instruction, and the scarcity of pertinent volumes in her libraries, go far towards drawing the student to other fields of research. And yet a few notes on recent noteworthy discoveries in this important field of scholarly investigation cannot come wholly amiss. Deny it or not, most of us, like the Athenians of old, delight to hear or to tell some new thing, provided only it touch not our religion to the quick.

And new things are now the order of the day. The Tell El Amarna finds and the excavations in Egypt are causing the precious historic truths of inerrant record to shine as never before. After the lapse of centuries, the classic world reads again the *Mimes* of Herodas, the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* of Aristotle, the *Antiope* of Euripides, a new oration of Hyperides, and finds many of its pet theories done to death by the unwelcomed presence of fresh facts. There seems to be no limit to what we may expect at any time. The tireless search of such men as Rendel Harris, F. G. Kenyon, Dom G. Morin, A. H. Sayce, and Flinders Petrie may at any time give us back the long-lost treasures of the literature of the early Christian centuries. In 1883-'84 the Christian world was fluttered by the publication of less than a dozen pages of an ancient Christian book from an Eastern library, for Bryennius gave us then the *Teaching of the Apostles*. Since then the recovery of the *Diatessaron* of Tatian has told us in unmistakable language that the Fourth Gospel is substantially a message from that disciple whom JESUS loved. The new works about to be mentioned will not make, as they have not made, the stir caused by Bryennius's find, but they will tell most effectually on the settlement of questions mooted in scholarly circles. The real im-

portance of writings and opinions is not, as Socrates observed some time since, to be judged by the effect produced on the multitude, but by the commendation and study they receive from the hands of competent authorities. Judged from its real utility, the *Teaching of the Apostles* is not to be mentioned by the side of the *Gospel According to Peter*, for that justly takes its place as most noteworthy among recent finds.

1. Seven years ago there was dug up from an old monk's tomb at Akhmine, in upper Egypt, a parchment codex that now rests in the Gizeh Museum at Cairo. The French Archæological Mission have the honor of its discovery, of its identification, and of its tardy publication. For more than five years the manuscript waited until U. Bouriant, the director of the aforesaid mission, could find time to print it. And when it came, it came appended to a treatise on arithmetic, which was published in photo-fac-simile, while the old monk's treasure-trove had not a line to show the style of the handwriting, and its most important parts had no separate head-lines. But when once Bouriant's volume came into the hands of patristic students, the old monk's book received prompt and proper attention. Two fac-similes, numerous editions, translations, articles, and dissertations attest its value and the gratitude of scholars, while the mathematical treatise has apparently sunk back to its wonted silence. Captive to the car of Rome, France cares naught for the word of God, or for human writings that elucidate it.

The Akhmine MS., $6x\frac{3}{4}$ inches in size, is written in uncial characters, in a sloping hand current in manuscripts of the seventh to the ninth century, and contains on 33 vellum leaves (66 pages) fragments of three works, all in wide use in the early church: the *Gospel According to Peter*, the *Revelation of Peter*, and the *Apocalypse of Enoch*. The *Enoch* we already had in an Ethiopic version, and it is of great value as showing the lines in which men's ideas moved in the days of Jesus of Nazareth. It is one of the books which influenced our Lord and his apostles, is supposed to be cited by Jude, is part of the bridge between Jesus ben Sirach, *Tobit*, and the *Talmud*, and is indispensable to students of Jewish pseudepigraphy. The phrase "Son of man,"

coined by Ezekiel and used by Daniel, is worked over in *Enoch* until it becomes ready for the fulness of its development in the very personal application made of it by Jesus of Nazareth; and on *Enoch*, likewise, is based, in large measure, that apocalyptic literature which culminates in the sublime compositions of Italian Dante. The fulness of its influence on early Christian thought cannot now be measured. When allowance is fully made for the Sibylline books, *Enoch* and others of the same ilk, we shall be ready to strike the line of originality in much that now passes for patristic genius. Neither can we estimate fully the value in days of old of the *Gospel According to Peter*." Origen, indeed, tells us that he had read it; Jerome and the Decree of Gelasius repudiate it as heretical; Theodoret attests its use among the sect of the Nazarenes; but it is to Eusebius, who seems to have divined by quasi-inspiration what would be most useful to latter-day students, that we owe the fullest account. In his *Ecclesiastical History*, VI., 12, he transcribes for us a letter of Serapion on its use in the churches. Serapion was Bishop of Antioch, and his letter was addressed to the church at Rhossus, on the coast just below Antioch. He, on a visit, found the church agitated over the use of this work in public service, and he permitted its use in order to end the quarrel. But afterwards he borrowed the book, read it, found that it contained traces of the Docetic heresy, and now writes to entirely prohibit its use. From this epistle the natural implication is, that it was no new thing, but that it had been for some time in use in the churches; and no one can well put its composition later than A. D. 170. Is it not earlier? That depends upon the question whether Justin Martyr used it; references and coincidences in his writings seem to imply that he did; Harnack, Lods and Martineau confidently assert that he did; it is denied by Swete and Zahn. If Justin did use it, the date of the work cannot be later than A. D. 130. Where it was written cannot now be determined; most probably it comes from Syria.

At any rate, the work is to be dated before 170 A. D., and we want to know what position the new Gospel holds to the four. Here lies the chief value of the writing—its use in the solution

of the synoptic problem. The author's acquaintance with our four Gospels is unmistakable. To him they all stand on the same footing; he uses, misuses and abuses them all as suits his purpose; neither is there any proof that he knew of an Urevangelium Logia, handed down by oral tradition, or any other gospel record than those the church pronounces canonical. If we take John's Gospel—which seems to be least used or abused of the four, owing, no doubt, to its unfathomable deepness—we find: "1, A very considerable number of verbal resemblances; 2, A certain number of incidents which occur in John alone of the canonical Gospels; 3, Resemblances to John in the order of the narrative; 4, Coincidence with John as to the date of the Passover and crucifixion." Now, since such writers are not given to direct references to their sources, this evidence is most valuable. Harnack wavers in regard to the use of the Fourth Gospel, but Robinson, Swete, Zahn and Schurer regard the use of all four as certain; and the case can be accepted as proven until unexpected evidence comes to the contrary. And, as Robinson puts it: "The new facts are just as they should be if the church's universal tradition as to the supreme and unique position of the four canonical Gospels is still to be sustained by historical criticism. The words of Irenæus are as true as ever to-day, and they have received a new and notable confirmation by our latest recovery: 'So strong is the position of our Gospels, that the heretics themselves bear witness to them, and each must start from them to prove his own doctrine. Since, therefore, those who contradict us lend us their testimony and use our Gospels, the claim we have made in their behalf is thereby confirmed and verified.'" At 130 A. D. the four Gospels were thus accepted by the church as canonical, equally inspired with the writings of the Old Testament of the blessed God.

The new Gospel is also to be set down as a valuable contribution towards the textual criticism of the New Testament. The cry of Jesus in section 5 of the text, "My Power, my Power, hast thou forsaken me?" is evidently to go on the list of witnesses that support *'Hlí* as against *'Elwí* in Matt. xxvii. 46 and Mark xv. 34, but the problem cuts deeper than that. The ques-

tion is that same one to which we owe the brilliant monographs of Dr. J. Rendel Harris, the origin of what Griesbach named the Western text of the New Testament. The peculiar readings of the Western text originate from a desire for completeness, and section 7 of the Gospel much resembles peculiar readings in the Codex Sangermanensis, the Curetonian Syriac, and perhaps in Tatian. Harnack examines the "Pericope of the Woman taken in Adultery," found in D. at John vii. 53-viii. 11, in ten cursives at the end of John, and in the "Ferrar Group" at the end of Luke xxi., and decides that it must have been taken originally from this Gospel. Perhaps, also, the singular addition in D. as to the man working on the Sabbath, and certainly several *agrapha* in the *Didascalía*, the *Teaching of the Apostles*, Justin and Clement, of Alexandria. This being granted, and the reasons adduced seem sufficiently cogent, all these variations seem to find a natural place in Peter, and the inference is that Peter is responsible for some, at least, of the distinctive readings of the Western text. Had the old monk a perfect copy of the Gospel, we should have been at the bottom of the textual problem. As it is, we can definitely trace a few variant readings to its influence.

The fragment begins with that point in the trial of Jesus where Pilate rises to wash his hands of the blame for innocent blood, and follows the history down to the Resurrection. The condition of the MSS. favors the opinion that it was only a fragment the monk had to copy, though there is evidence in the two blank pages between the Gospel and the Revelation that the scribe intended to add something further. Whether the addition was to be made to the Gospel or not we cannot tell; but certain it is that there was little else to copy; whatever else there was could have been put on two pages. From the translation given by the present writer in *The Union Seminary Magazine*, Vol. V., No. 1, October, 1893, the purport of the whole writing can be easily gathered. It contains some new facts that can be taken as genuine truths, and legendary matter enough to demonstrate the unique preëminence of the four Gospels. The story that Jesus' head reached to heaven as he went from the tomb, that

the cross followed him and uttered intelligible words, will at once be dismissed as traditional. That the centurion's name was Petronius, that the Jewish elders watched also by the sealed tomb, that Peter and the rest grieved and fasted until the Sabbath, may well be credible. That the Jewish elders went about beating their breasts, denouncing woe on themselves, and looking for Jesus' disciples as malefactors who sought to burn the temple, may well be questioned; but it appears certain that Joseph of Arimathea was a friend of Pilate, and that crowds came from Jerusalem to see the tomb.

The position of the Jews and Pilate and Herod is quite different from that in the canonical Gospels; and, the Rev. John MacPherson to the contrary notwithstanding, it seems due to an anti-Jewish feeling on the part of the author, who has striven to vilify Herod and the Jews and to whitewash Pilate. Of course the four put the odium on the proper persons, but their way of doing so is somewhat different, the difference being largely due to later events in the history of the church. This anti-Jewish standpoint is in good consonance with the evident delight taken in the miraculous, and both point to a date of composition when the age of miracles was already past. But what especially strikes the reader is the occurrence of expressions capable of a Docetic signification. When Jesus was crucified "he was silent, as though he had no pain." On the cross our Lord cried: "My Power, my Power, hast thou forsaken me? And when he said it, he was taken up." A recent writer would have it that these words are due to interpolation; but we have it on the authority of Eusebius that the *Gospel According to Peter* was Docetic, and a disposition to cook documents in the aid of theory means untenableness of the theory in question. The best scholars are those who take ancient writings at their surface value, and these recognize the fragment as heretical in tendency. The departure from the norm may not be serious; yet it is a departure, and must be treated as such. And the view that underlies these statements and accounts for the singular omission of the words "I thirst" from section 5 is, that the divine Christ came down upon the human Christ at his baptism "as a dove, and abode upon him," and departed from him

when upon the cross. Irenæus, too, denounces those who assert "that one Christ suffered and rose again, and another flew up and remained free from suffering." To our author the words "I thirst" would have been inconvenient, and he removed them; and found room for the statement of Christ's painlessness in suffering by the omission of his prayer for those very Jews whom the author so cordially disliked. The gospel thus resolves itself into a tendency document, written to defend certain doctrinal views and to set forth the basis of heretical teaching. The omissions and additions are such as a Docetic writer would be bound to make. And we cannot see how the author of *Supernatural Religion* can say that, "If you cannot prove from this fragment that the so-called Gospel of Peter was earlier than the canonical Gospels, neither can you prove that it was later. They and it stand, in fact, on a level, both as to date and quality, and it was nothing but ill-luck that kept it out of the canon. For 'it is neither better nor worse than the more fortunate works which have found a safe resting-place within the canon of the church.'" Is not? Then the judgment of the author of *Supernatural Religion* is worthless in matters of religion. Perhaps he has never even read the canonical Gospels. For the merest tyro in patristic Greek, the merest ignoramus in Biblical Criticism can see for himself the great gulf fixed between the two. Had the new Gospel been written complete on its present scale it would have contained more matter than all four others, and that is enough to show that it belongs to the time of the legendary. The simplicity, directness, and conciseness of the four is gone; their doctrinal purity has departed; we are now in the realm of haggada. No; the four stand unparalleled, unrivalled, unequalled, immaculate in their simple grandeur and sublime beauty. The church of God has done wisely in refusing to canonize the *Epistle of Barnabas*, the *Shepherd of Hermas*, and the *Gospel According to Peter*.

2. With the *Apocalypse of Peter* we pass into another department of theological speculation and are reminded at once of the unfathomable deepness of Talmudic bosh; for the same ideas appear in it as are found in that thesaurus of rubbish, and it

needs no Vischer to tell us that the author was a Jew. The *Apocalypse of Peter* is a specimen of what real, genuine constructive criticism can do in the hands of sober-minded men. Seven years ago Mr. Montague Rhodes James, M. A., Dean of King's College, Cambridge, began to collect and study the fragments thereof preserved in the early church historians and dogmaticians. As he worked through those poor relics and fragments and most meagre citations, he began to see his way clear to a reconstruction of the general plan and purpose of that long-lost work, and to an estimate of its influence on later works of the same class, until finally his convictions were assured enough to lecture on the subject and to print his views in the edition of the *Testament of Abraham*. Hardly had he done so when Bouriart's volume came, and we know that he was right. The *Apocalypse* is what Mr. James said it would be; and so fully did he write about it when the fragment came that no one since has been able to approach his little book. Harnack confesses that he cannot follow him, and no doubt much of the parallel literature is but remotely connected with Peter; but the influence it once wielded was unmistakably great.

The *Apocalypse* is first mentioned in the well-known Muratorian Fragment dated about 170–200 A. D., with the implication that it was not in universal use at Rome. References also are made to it in Clement of Alexandria and Methodius of Olympus, so that at 300 A. D. it seems to have been in wide use in Lycia, Alexandria, and Rome. Eusebius of Cæsarea, the great church historian, assigns it to the list of such disputed works as were certainly spurious and yet not distinctly heretical; and Sozomen tells us that it was read in certain churches up to his time (440 A. D., say) "once a year on the Friday during which the people most religiously fast in commemoration of the Lord's Passion." From the lists of Nicephorus, and of the *Codex Claromontanus*, D₂ we gather that the whole writing contained from 270 to 300 lines, of which 131 survive, counting 36 letters to the line. But, short as it was, it made a great impression on the superstitious in the early church. We know it was widely current from history, and we infer more from comparison with other

writings of eschatological import. Robinson, James, and Harnack all agree that traces of it are to be found in Hippolytus *Concerning the Universe*, the *Passion of S. Perpetua*, and in *Barlaam and Josaphat*: "Blood-related with our Apocalypse are some sections in the second book of the *Sibylline Oracles* and in the *Shepherd of Hermas*"; and noteworthy parallels are to be found in the *Apocalypse of Baruch*, the *Ascension of Isaiah*, and the *First Book of Clement*. There are also striking resemblances to the canonical Second Epistle of Peter. It appears probable that the author designedly imitated the style of Second Peter to help out his forgery, and thus bear witness to its genuineness, while the use of his book shows how great a hold Jewish fancies had on Christian ideas. Much of Peter's matter reappears also in the *Acts of Thomas*¹ and the *Apocalypse of Paul*, which is a mosaic composed from earlier books. In the latter case the resemblances are quite marked, and Paul gives himself away by his utter failure to comprehend Peter's meaning; the result of all which is, that Enoch and Peter are the probable ultimate sources from which comes the great mass of speculation concerning hell and heaven current in the Middle Ages; and James even goes so far as to say that "when we sing in church of a land where

" 'everlasting spring abides,
And never-withering flowers,'

we are, very likely, using language which could be traced back with few gaps, if any, to an Apocalypse of the second century"!!

¹From the *Blickling Homilies*, A. D. 971, edited by R. Morris for the Early English Text Society, pages 208-10, I transcribe the following, as yet, to my knowledge, unnoticed, parallel to the Apocalypse, section 17, as edited by James: "As Saint Paul was looking towards the northern regions of the earth, from whence all waters pass down, he saw above the water a hoary stone; and north of the stone had grown woods very rimy. And there were dark mists; and under the stone was the dwelling-place of monsters and execrable creatures. And he saw hanging on the cliff opposite the wood many black souls with their hands bound; and the devils in likeness of monsters were seizing them like greedy wolves; and the water under the cliff was black. And between the cliff and the water there were about twelve miles (he means twelve miles from top of cliff to surface of water); and when the twigs brake, then down went the souls who hung on the twigs, and the monsters seized them. These were the souls of them who in this world wickedly sinned." Section 17 seems to be the germ from which this, by the aid of other similar writings, has grown.

Between the Gospel and the Apocalypse no relationship can be established, and the hypothesis that the Apocalypse once formed a part of the Gospel has no good foundation. There is a close connection between Second Peter and the Apocalypse; what, the critics have hesitated to say, mainly because the saying would be inconvenient for a certain critical theory as to Second Peter. To the writer it is clear that the author of the Apocalypse found eschatological statements in Second Peter, and that on them as a basis he built up, with materials gathered from the folk-lore fancies current around him, his own writings, consciously imitating the style and phraseology of Second Peter in order that his forgery might more readily be palmed off upon a gullible public eager for such superstitious papulum. The indications are that it was written during a period of persecution, or when the memory of one was still fresh in the minds of men, and when errors in doctrine were beginning to appear. That the author was a simple-minded Christian with little or no acquaintance with the outstanding facts of the Christian religion, the writer does not believe. Not all his materials were current among Christians of that date, though many of his ideas were, and to say that they were expressed then, "apparently for the first time," is to forget that there is a historic background to Christianity, and that the impressionable Jew came in contact with Zoroastrianism in Babylon and the *Ritual of the Dead* in Egypt. In Egypt, then, it is most probable, this Apocalypse originated; and from Egypt the ancient world got more than grain.

As to contents the fragment falls into three divisions, viz.: an eschatological discourse, a description of Paradise and another of Hades. Of the first division we have but a few lines indicating a revelation of the Lord Jesus to his twelve disciples. False prophets, he says, will arise and be sons of perdition. Then will God come to judge the sons of lawlessness. Then at the request of the Twelve the Lord shows them two inhabitants of the celestial land, whiter than any snow, redder than any rose, beautiful beyond description; and their land, a very great space outside this world, shining with light, full of ever-blooming flowers, sweet odors and trees of blessed fruit. The dwellers wore angel raiment, and their

raiment was like their land. "And the glory of the dwellers there was equal." But it is in the torments of Hades the author seems to have had most delight. Near to Paradise was the place of chastisement, very squalid, and the angels of torment had their raiment dark according to the atmosphere of the place. Commensurate with the guilt and kind of their sins is the punishment of the sinners: Blasphemers of the way of righteousness hung up by their tongues and biting their lips; perverters of righteousness pressed down by angels into a lake of flaming mire; adulterers hung by their feet and adulteresses hung by their hair over and in the sea of mire and filth; murderers smitten by reptiles, wallowing in torment, watched with glee by the souls of the murdered; women*who caused the abortion of their children, up to their throats in the common cesspool of hell where all its filth accumulated, and their children so born out of due time near them howling dismally; persecutors of righteousness scourged by evil spirits and having their entrails devoured by never-resting worms; false witnesses gnawing their tongues with flaming fire in their mouths; the wealthy who trusted in their wealth and pitied not the poor, here roll in filthy rags upon red hot pebbles sharper than any sword; they that lent money on compound interest standing up to their knees in a great lake full of pitch and blood and boiling mire; lewd sinners continually hurled down from a high cliff; men and women smiting each other with rods, burning and turning themselves and being roasted; these are the pictures over which our author gloats. But at best, 'tis but a sorry hell he has to delineate, and it was very little he knew about it; had he lived a century or so later his colors would have been deeper and the refinement of his torment more complete. Slime and mud and fire are about all the materials he had to build up tortures with, for the hell of mediæval glory was not yet come. This is but the beginning of Infernos, and the author has done his work well, with an artist's delight in it, with keen pleasure and enjoyment. And so his little book has moulded the superstitions of ages, and bids fair yet to give its unknown author glory.

This all too brief account will serve to show the reader the general character and evidential value of these newly-recovered

fragments. And as the writer studies these and other remnants of patristic lore he can but think, why should not the study of patristic literature be assiduously prosecuted in the Southern Presbyterian Church? Lo these four years this QUARTERLY has printed not a solitary item on this subject! And the reason — Well, Pearson's *Vindiciæ Epistolarum S. Ignatii* was a great book in its day, and its publication made John Pearson a bishop, and under its shadow the Church of England peacefully slumbered for near two hundred years; yet Dr. Cureton tells us: "In the whole course of my inquiries respecting the Ignatian epistles I have never met with one person who professes to have read Bishop Pearson's celebrated book; but I was informed by one of the most learned and eminent of the present bench of bishops (Kaye) that Porson had expressed to him his opinion that it was a 'very unsatisfactory work.'"

R. B. WOODWORTH.

VI. EARLIER LICENSURE.

AFTER many years of agitation and discussion, the principle of earlier licensure has been endorsed by the General Assembly, and is now fairly before the Presbyteries for decision.

HISTORY.

Not to go farther back than 1888, in the fall of that year the Synod of North Carolina adopted the following overture to the General Assembly:

“The Synod of North Carolina respectfully overtures the General Assembly to consider and answer the following question, viz.: Is the formal licensure of a candidate for the ministry an indispensable prerequisite to ordination?”

“The reasons which move the Synod to ask for an authoritative decision of the point are three, briefly:

“*First*, The practice now prevalent in the church of permitting its candidates to try their gifts in preaching from the time they enter upon their theological course in the seminary, and of employing them as preachers in established churches, and in mission fields, during the summer vacation—all which answers to virtual licensure.

“*Second*, A Presbytery in this Synod did see its way clear under all the circumstances to ordain a candidate without previous technical licensure, and the Synod at its present meeting did decide that action to be irregular and unconstitutional only by a bare majority vote, evincing a very wide difference of opinion upon the point in question.

“*Third*, The Synod is of the opinion that this whole subject of licensure needs a careful revision; either our practice must again be conformed to that which was the customary one when the constitution was framed, or the law itself changed so as to legalize the present practice.”—*Minutes*, 1888, pp. 212, 213.

To this overture the Assembly made answer:

“Our law plainly supposes that licensure should precede ordination.”—*Minutes*, 1889, p. 587.

To this answer, however, was added a recommendation of the committee, adopted by the Assembly, to appoint a committee to report to the next Assembly “on the whole subject of licensure, of the holding of services by unlicensed persons, of the preaching of ruling elders, with the end in view of reducing our practice to uniformity.” (*Ibid.*)

At the next Assembly (1890) this committee reported:

“*First*, That trials for licensure of probationers to preach the gospel remain as at present.

“*Second*, In view of the fact that there are many destitute fields greatly in need of the preached word, and that these are increasing yearly; and whereas we have many young men of ability and undoubted piety, who have the ministry in view and have partly fitted themselves for this work; we would recommend that they be permitted to conduct religious services under the jurisdiction of Sessions and Presbyteries, but at no time to assume the regular functions of the ministerial office in administering the sacraments, or in blessing the people in the name of the Lord. We would further recommend that, so far as practicable, all such unlicensed persons submit their discourses to some Presbyterian minister for criticism before their public delivery.”—*Minutes*, p. 16.

There was a minority report advocating extensive changes, but all in the direction of modifying academical requirements. Both reports were referred to a special committee, whose report was rejected (*Ibid*, p. 53), but its purport is past finding out from the Minutes. It is known, however, that it favored a change.

The subject of licensure came up again before the Assembly of 1891 in response to overtures from many Presbyteries and memorials from individuals. Two reports were returned from the Committee of Bills and Overtures, each signed by eight members of the committee. The first paper recommended two classes of changes in the constitution—one class having reference to academic requirements, and the other to the relations of licensure to ordination. The following is an extract from the preamble:

“The grounds of complaint against our present system as appears from the papers before us, are— *Second*, That the requirements for licensure being the same as those for ordination, the latter trial has in most cases become merely nominal, while a new mode of practical licensure, unknown to the constitution, has become the prevalent practice of the church, and has received the endorsement of the General Assembly.”—*Minutes*, pp. 247, 248.

A full set of amendments was then submitted, embracing the following provisions:

The minimum term of licensure was made two years; the requirements for licensure had reference only to a man's soundness in doctrine, his familiarity with the Scriptures, and his ability to use his knowledge in preaching and exposition—such acquirements as he could obtain in one year at the seminary; while dignity and emphasis were given to the examination for ordina-

tion by adding to the present requirements the "parts of trial" now required at licensure. (See *Minutes*, pp. 248, 249.)

This paper was never voted on by the Assembly, but the vote on the substitute offered by Dr. W. W. Houston for *Paper No. 2*, was, by the Moderator's ruling, made to settle the whole question. The forty-two negatives votes may be considered as the votes in its favor. While thus decisively rejected, it will be noticed that *Paper No. 2* makes no reference to any changes but to those affecting the academical requirements, and the same was true of the speeches opposed to it. The hue and cry was against "lowering the standard." The question now before us was in no sense settled.

In 1893 a judicial case came before the General Assembly. The Presbytery of Ouachita had empowered a church to employ an unlicensed man as "stated supply," and had been rebuked by the Synod of Arkansas. The Presbytery complained, and the General Assembly sustained it in the following decision:

"That inasmuch as Mr. Geo. Lacy was a candidate for the ministry under the care of Ouachita Presbytery; that inasmuch as he was expressly put under the care of the Home Mission Committee of the Presbytery to do such work as the General Assembly has enjoined upon the Presbyteries as desirable and proper for our candidates to perform; and inasmuch as there is nothing in our standards prohibiting such work on the part of our candidates; therefore, our judgment is, that the Presbytery of Ouachita did not err in granting permission to the church of Mt. Holly to engage Mr. Lacy to perform such services."—*Minutes*, p. 33.

The decision called forth vigorous protest, first in the commission appointed to try the case (*Ibid*), and afterwards in the Assembly (pp. 46, 47). Dr. Samuel A. King, who presented the protest against this action as in violation of our present law, was also chairman of the Committee of Bills and Overtures, and introduced from his committee the following recommendation, which was adopted:

"In view of the manifest desire in many parts of the church to have such change in the matter of licensure as will authorize those seeking the gospel ministry to try their gifts in a regular and orderly manner at an earlier period in their course of preparation than is permissible under the present law of the church; also, in view of the fact that so many of our candidates are now preaching under a seeming authority which Presbyteries have no constitutional right to grant—

“*Resolved*, That an *ad interim* committee be appointed to consider and report to the next Assembly the advisability of making such changes in the requirement for licensure as may be necessary to correct what seems to be a growing irregularity.”—*Minutes*, p. 28.

It thus appears that the protest against the decision of the judicial case was not based upon opposition to student-preaching, but to student-preaching without license. And it further appears that so great was the dilemma growing out of the *unconstitutionality* of the thing and the *desirability* of the thing, that the same General Assembly practically contradicted itself in two different utterances. This state of things the Assembly wisely proposed to end by revising the constitution. It is as a result of the report of the *ad interim* committee thus appointed that the last General Assembly recommended the amendments now before the Presbyteries.

ARGUMENTS.

1. *The beneficent results of student-preaching.* Student-preaching has passed the stage of experiment in our church. From the employment of a candidate here and there to do mission work during his vacation, the practice has grown until it has become the settled policy of the church. Churches, Presbyteries, Home Mission Committees—both in Presbytery and in Synod—have been employing this agency for years. Seminary professors have become bureaus of information to bring students and fields into correspondence. The General Assembly has repeatedly recognized the propriety of thus putting into use the energies of our candidates. Thus practically the unanimous voice of the church is in favor of student-preaching.

The beneficent results that have followed have been twofold. *To the church* there have come the blessings of vacancies supplied, of dying organizations revived, of struggling congregations strengthened, and of souls born into the kingdom. Towards the close of the summer season nearly every paper that one picks up has such notices as these: “Mr. —, a student of Union Seminary, is spending his vacation with the churches of Royal and Fire Creek, in Greenbrier Presbytery. . . . At Royal twenty-four were received on profession of faith, and at Fire Creek two.” “Barboursville.—This church has recently enjoyed a sea-

son of reviving. Mr. —, a candidate of West Hanover Presbytery, assisted Rev. — for a week in services, morning and night. There were ten or twelve professions of faith." "Olivet church.—It has been my privilege during my vacation to minister to this very promising mission of the First Church, Staunton. . . . The attendance on all the services during the summer has been excellent, and on many occasions the house has been more than filled. . . . The services were concluded on last Sunday afternoon by a very delightful communion, at which time three united on profession of faith." These three notices are all from one paper. In each case the fruits were gathered in by an ordained minister holding a meeting after the seed-sowing by the candidate. From another paper we take the following: "Candidate — labored in these two churches during the summer, and the increased activity seems to be the fruit of his faithful labors. This leads to the reflection that other candidates are doing good work of the same kind every year. Their labors generally seem to be blessed to the good of the churches they serve, and certainly tend to develop those gifts that are requisite to successful work in the ministry. We cannot afford to do without their work, and they cannot afford to give up this important part of their education. *Why not, then, have some provision for doing LEGALLY what must and will continue to be done?*"

But perhaps the best evidence of the good results of this work is, that even those who oppose this constitutional revision are so fruitful in distinctions that will allow it to go on; and none, or almost none, have the hardihood to say, Away with it.

But the other benefit is to *the candidate himself*. The experience of students, the observation of on-lookers, and the testimony of professors is, that students come back to their studies with greater zest, that they have a more intelligent conception of their needs, and a more serious purpose in the prosecution of their course of preparation, in consequence of their practical experience of the work for which they are preparing themselves. It is true that a contributor to this discussion upon the other side has produced the high authority of Phillips Brooks in testimony to the injurious effect upon the student of preaching during the prosecu-

tion of his studies. But an examination of his testimony shows that it is not *ad rem*. It refers wholly to the dissipation of the student's energies when he should be at his books, and has no relation whatever to vacation work. On the other hand, one of our most successful pastors and preachers, and the successful manager of the Home Mission work of one of our largest Synods, gives this testimony: "I was a student-preacher myself, and for several years I have had unusual opportunities for studying the field work of student-preachers and for noting the reflex influence of such work upon the students so engaged. The result of my combined experience and observation is the decided conviction that student-preaching is an unqualified blessing both to the students and to the church at large." With his experience accords that of all who have close relations with our young ministers. They come to the full work of the ministry with a better knowledge of its needs, and a better equipment to meet them, than those of us who came out ten or twelve years ago.

2. *The danger of unconstitutional practices.* To a Presbyterian this head needs no argument to support it. Whatever encourages lawlessness is fruitful in all evils. It is only necessary to apply the principle to this case. To authorize a candidate to preach is virtual licensure. Hence churches send up to Presbyteries calls for his services. He has been with them now two successive seasons, perhaps. His seminary course is finished. The churches need the full ordinances of the church, and clamor for his ordination. There is no need of any further probation, for all the ends of probation have been reached. So the Presbytery proposes to license at the morning service and to ordain him at night, allowing the afternoon to try his gifts and receive a good report from the church! Some of the members refuse to take part in such a farce accompanied with the solemnities of religion. So the Presbytery extends his probation until the next morning! The next case that arises, Presbytery dispenses with licensure altogether, and is rebuked by Synod therefor. These are actual cases, and others like them have occurred all over the church. Authority to preach is licensure, and preaching under that authority is *probation*—the trial of one's gifts. We have already seen the

contradiction in which the Assembly became involved, pronouncing the practice constitutional and unconstitutional in the same Assembly. Another serious evil is the mental effect upon those who do not want to change the constitution and who dare not oppose the practice. As a venerable minister expresses it, "These brethren are deceiving themselves by hairbreadth distinctions between *preaching* and *preaching*." It is a serious matter when the leaders and teachers of the church are driven to use terms in a sense that plain people do not, and cannot, understand. To tell one of our plain elders that a student whom the Presbytery has authorized to do everything in his church that he has ever seen a minister do, except bear rule, administer sacraments, and pronounce the benediction, is *not licensed to preach*, is simply to insult his intelligence. It is true, the distinction is made that in the case of its licentiates and ordained ministers the church is responsible for their teachings. But in what sense responsible? That it endorses everything they say? *Not at all*. Only that it pronounces them safe. And if it has not ascertained that its students are safe, it ought *not to permit them to preach at all*. This suggests the most serious evil of all. There being no prescribed conditions for student-preaching, there are none of the safeguards around it that are necessary to protect the church against unfit men. Our brethren who are so opposed to opening the gate a little wider to formal licensure, *leave the whole fence down* for practical licensure. There are, then, only three possible alternatives, as one has put it:

First, To leave both our book and our practice unchanged, and thus encourage lawlessness. *Second*, To conform our practice to our book by putting a stop to student-preaching and to all the benefits to students and the church at large which do accompany or flow from it. *Third*, To conform our book to our practice by changing the conditions of licensure so as to secure an earlier day for it, thus allowing our students to make *lawful* trial and exercise of their gifts during the course of their three years' preparation, instead of only at the end of it.

3. *The unfortunate working of our present law, and its effect upon our ministerial standard.* The present law requires sub-

stantially the same examination for licensure and ordination. This twofold barrier to a candidate's entrance into the ministry, so far from increasing the safeguards thrown about the sacred office, has precisely the opposite effect. The first is frequently and notoriously slighted, on the ground that there will be a second and decisive test. The second is yet more universally slighted, on the ground that substantially the same examinations have already been passed. This is not theory, it is fact—a fact which the experience of most of our ministers will confirm. It may be said that the remedy is not to change the law, but to obey it. But a law that renders itself so open to violation by such fair specimens of human nature (regenerated) as Presbyterian ministers and elders must have some defective principle in it. But yet more serious is the effect in removing altogether the idea of probation from the relation of the probationer to his Presbytery. The fact that licensure and ordination are put upon the same plane in the examinations required leads to the theory (openly avowed) that the probation is only before the church, and that *if the man gets a call* Presbytery has nothing further to do with the matter except to register the voice of the church and ordain him. Now, in these days of many vacant churches, and of impoverished churches, the view often prevails that any sort of a preacher is better than no preacher. Hence any man that the Presbytery licenses can get some kind of a call, or, if he does not, Presbytery will call him as evangelist for some destitute field. Thus many enter the ministry who, as subsequent events show, were never called of God to preach the gospel; for if they were, *they would be preaching*. The Presbytery has tested, it may be, their scholastic attainments fairly well; but it has deprived itself of all power over the decision of the great question of all: Does the man's work stand the test and show that he is commissioned of God? The only wonder is that we have not more uncalled men in our ministry. This leads to—

4. *The true theory of licensure.* One of the ablest of our opponents puts the matter thus: "The reception of a candidate is in order to training; training, to licensure; licensure, to a call; a call, except for unforeseen circumstances, to ordination." This

involves (1), that the candidate must go through the whole of the long and expensive course of training without any test of his gifts for his own satisfaction or that of the Presbytery; (2), that the practically final decision of Presbytery must be made without any trial of his gifts, except the formal preaching and examinations before the body; (3), that the trial of his gifts that follows licensure is only a trial before the church—like the “trial sermon” of a candidate for a vacant pulpit. That there may be no doubt on this point, we quote from another eminent divine: “The book, as it now stands, makes the object of licensure to be to authorize the licentiate to make trial of his gifts before the church, that the people of God may determine whether or not he possesses requisite ministerial qualifications. The only question pending before Presbytery after licensure is, whether the licentiate shall be invested with the full responsibilities of the ministry? and this is to be determined by the voice of the church.”

These brethren, from trusting to memory and the cadence of familiar expressions, have fallen into a very common mistake. The constitution does not speak of the probationer’s trial of his own gifts as the end of licensure, but of the Presbytery’s trial of the probationer’s gifts. The confusion arises from the use of the plural pronoun to refer both to the Presbyteries and the probationers. But a glance at the article in question shows that they who ordain are they who try: “Presbyteries shall license probationers to preach the gospel, in order that, after sufficiently trying their gifts, and receiving from the church a good report, they may, in due time, ordain them to the sacred office.” (F. of G., Chap. VI., Sec. VI., Art. I.) This settles the whole question. *Licensure is in order to probation*, and it is the Presbytery that is to prove or try, not trusting to formal examinations, but requiring the test of experiment. Of the success of that experiment Presbytery is the judge, though the report from the church is one of the elements entering into the final decision. The *theory* of the book is correct, but the practical working of its machinery has caused that theory to be lost sight of. Licensure has no meaning, and no lawfulness, except as it is a *probation*. Its scriptural authority is only the command not to ordain a novice, and to “lay

hands suddenly on no man." *The Form of Government adopted by the Westminster Assembly had no provision for probationers at all.* Yet our very machinery for licensure, down to the minutest detail, is contended for as a part of the *jus divinum* of Presbyterianism! That form of licensure which gives the best test, the truest *probation*, is the true form. The whole matter is so admirably put by one of our most venerable and thoughtful ministers, that we give his language: "In my solitude many questions are suggested by the discussions: (1), Ordination is a scriptural institution, but is licensure equally so? (2), What reason exists for such a provision, except as a test of qualification, that the candidate may exhibit to the Christian public and the Presbytery his fitness for ordination? (3), If so, ought not this public exhibition to be made *after* licensure? (4), Inasmuch as this test requires time for its satisfactory application, ought not a reasonable interval to be prescribed between licensure and ordination? (5), Since the whole process of candidacy up to ordination has for its object to satisfy the judgment of the church as to the qualifications of the probationer, including *experience in preaching*, ought not the interval to be sufficiently long to avoid the installation of *novices* in the pastoral office? (6), Ought not the Presbytery to regard the crucial test of several years' authorized preaching as the best possible security against the "lowering of the standard," and the most satisfactory of all proofs that the candidate may be safely entrusted with 'the care of souls?'"

5. *The true theory of education.* Education is not a force-pump process by which the tank is filled with that which it is subsequently to emit. True education is a process of *growth by assimilation*. It is a *drawing out (e-ducere)* of the inherent powers under proper conditions. The conditions for assimilation are *nourishment* and *exercise*. This is as true of the mind as it is of the body. Hence the best educational methods are based on this principle. The recitation-room is next door to the laboratory; field work follows the text-book; the clinic follows the lecture. To *know* one must *use*. Application must follow acquisition, and precept must be succeeded promptly by practice. If theology were merely an abstract science it might constitute an exception

to this rule. But theology is not merely a science, it is a *life*, and must be subject to the rules that govern all life and growth. The Christian life is preëminently a process of education. "The grace of God hath appeared to all men, training us; in order that . . . we may live soberly, righteously, and godly." (Titus ii. 11, 12, Grk.) What is the method of its training—to teach us a fully rounded theology, and then send us forth to live it? Not at all, but, "whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule." (Phil. iii. 16.) If the work of the ministry is the fullest exemplification of the Christian life, should not the training for it observe the same law—to turn our knowledge into practice as rapidly as circumstances will permit? This is likewise the rule observed by those who train for other Christian work than that of the ministry. By constant practice they prove, they assimilate, they appropriate, what they acquire. Hence, with far inferior equipment, they are often so much *readier* than our carefully trained ministers. This leads to—

6. *Our Lord's example.* In the training of the Twelve our Lord pursued the truly scientific method of education. We will not go into any quibbling as to what constituted "licensure" and what constituted "ordination" in the experience of the apostles. We have no patience with the effort to trace every detail of method and organization to the Scriptures. Principles are what we are after, and principles are what we find. The training of the Twelve, and their enduement for their work, was not complete until Pentecost. But less than a year after his choice of the Twelve our Lord sends them forth to preach the elementary doctrines of the kingdom (Matt. x. 2, 7; Mark vi. 7, 12; Luke ix. 2, 6). Then they return to him and tell him all that they had done and taught (Mark vi. 30; Luke ix. 10), and he withdraws with them into the desert for another season of instruction and intercourse (Mark vi. 31, etc). The same method is observed with the seventy (Luke x. 1, 17). At this time both of these classes were very far from being thoroughly trained. Even at the end of the Lord's ministry there were many things that he had to tell them that they were not prepared to receive, and which they could only understand after his death and resurrection and the descent of the

Spirit (John xvi. 12, 13). Many of these things are what we rightly consider the fundamental principles of the gospel, that we expect even our Sunday-school children to know. But, nevertheless, Jesus sent them forth to preach what they knew, and they brought back joyful tidings of success; *and the closer our training conforms to his, the more certainly may we look for the same results.*

OBJECTIONS.

“It is a bad plan to cure an evil by licensing it.” Very true, if the evil is in the *thing* and not in the law. We think we have shown this evil to be in the law.

“It is not Presbyterianism to license a candidate to edify the church for three years without probation.” The very *essence* of the proposed law is probation. The present system, as now interpreted, cuts out the element of probation altogether, or almost altogether. If the probationer gets a call Presbytery has only to say, *So be it*. Neither before nor after licensure is there any real probation according to this theory; but the proposed law puts the probationers on probation for the whole time. The three years’ term is not an absolute license for that period. Art. XII. still remains in force, making the license revocable at the will of the Presbytery. But the fixed term is a *limit* upon what is now unlimited. The license expires by limitation at the end of that time, and throws upon the candidate the burden of proof why it should be renewed, instead of leaving upon Presbytery the burden of proof why it should be taken away.

“These three-year probationers would constitute another order of the ministry—a set of irresponsible rulers.” Why more than present licentiates? Or, if you say the average life of a licentiate would be longer, why more than our present candidates, who fill our vacant churches and mission fields during their vacation, and are, for all practical purposes, what these new probationers would be, except that they are under less restriction and have less responsibility to the Presbytery? And if the influence of any prove evil, is it not better to discover it when license can be removed by a mere resolution, instead of after ordination, when a long judicial process is necessary?

“These one-year students would not be orthodox—they would not have touched theology.” There is no reason why students should not have a comprehensive grasp of the outlines of theology in a single term at the Seminary, and, as most of our courses are now arranged, they do. Whether they are orthodox or not, it is the Presbytery’s business to find out. As a matter of experience, there is no class so intensely conservative and so fearful of the slightest doctrinal divergence as the average theological student.

“If high requirements for ordination are scriptural, they must be equally necessary for all teaching; if they are wrong for licensure, they are equally wrong for ordination.” The answer is, that licensure gives no office in the church; it is simply an expedient for testing the fitness of candidates for office. As soon as there is *probable evidence* of fitness and sufficient preparation to *begin upon*, it is proper and right to begin the testing process, and to this we are encouraged by our Lord’s example.

“The change is radical, sweeping, revolutionary.” If it cuts at the root of what is false, sweeps away what is *effete*, and revolutionizes what is wrong, so much the better. But the revolution has already taken place in the practice of the church, silently, gradually, and beneficently. All that is needed is the stroke of the legal pen to recognize what God has wrought and his Spirit has blessed.

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VII. LICENSURE AND ORDINATION.—THE PROPOSED CHANGES.

THIS paper has been written by request, and, by agreement of publisher and writer, is limited as to space.

A preliminary examination of each of the amended articles touching Licensure and Ordination is necessary to show the force of the objections following:

I. THE CHANGES AS TO LICENSURE.

Article I. adds the sentence: "Every man who feels called of God to undertake the work of preaching the gospel shall go before the Presbytery within whose bounds he resides, and obtain license before he begins to preach." This addition, in view of our whole law and practice from time immemorial, contains nothing new. The same Article substitutes for "shall license probationers to preach the gospel" the phrase "shall license *candidates* as probationers," etc. This change seems intended to intensify the idea that our licentiates are to continue *candidates*, an idea fundamental in the new plan. Article I. also changes the *time* of licensure, making it after the first year in the seminary, instead of after the second.

Article IV. omits the requirement of any examination, at licensure, on Hebrew; omits the Latin thesis and the Greek critical exercise. It substitutes for the examination on theology, ecclesiastical history and government and the sacraments, at licensure, an examination on "the system of doctrine contained in the Confession of Faith and the Shorter Catechism," not, as will presently appear, to test the candidate's *knowledge* of the theology in the standards, but to test only "his soundness" in the little that he does know. (See Article VIII.) It prescribes an examination on "*his knowledge* of the English Bible." He is to be examined on the Confession of Faith merely to test his soundness; on the English Bible alone is he to be examined to test his knowledge.

Article VI. omits the requirement that the candidate must have studied theology for two years. It adds the sentence making the license on the basis of Article IV. valid for three years and no more, with the privilege, however, of renewal for three years longer.

Article VII. substitutes for "If the Presbytery be satisfied with his *trials*" the phrase "If the Presbytery be satisfied with his *examinations*." Manifestly, because his "trials" have been largely dispensed with.

Article VIII. substitutes for "We do license you to preach the gospel, as a probationer for the holy ministry, wherever God in his providence may call you," the clause "We do license you, *as a probationer for the holy ministry, to preach the gospel under the direction of Presbytery, wherever,*" etc. This change foreshadows the policy, afterward more clearly revealed, of holding the licentiate *as a candidate* for three or six years, to work in vacant churches while pursuing his studies. Again: Article VIII., in the record of licensure, substitutes for "proceeded to take the usual parts of trial" "*proceeded to subject him to the usual examinations*"; it adds "and the sciences" to the record of the things of which the candidate has given satisfaction; it omits from that record the statement that he has given satisfaction "as to his proficiency in divinity," thus excluding from the record any attestation of his knowledge of theology; it inserts, instead of such an expression, merely the general statement "*as to his soundness in the faith*" in the much or little that he may know, thus showing conclusively, as already stated, that the object of his examination on the Confession (prescribed in Article IV.) is merely to see if he *accepts* it—whether he is proficient in its theology or not. If he is "sound" in respect to it—*i. e.*, accepts it and holds nothing inconsistent with it—he may be licensed. Lastly, Article VIII. fixes it that the licensed candidate is to be "*a probationer for the holy ministry to preach the gospel, for a period of three years, under the direction of Presbytery.*" This provision serves due notice upon two parties: (1), Upon the Presbytery, that, on the face of its own record, this man has license to preach for three years, and his license cannot fairly be with-

drawn within that time, unless the Presbytery can show legal cause; (2), Upon the young man, that he is to be held a licentiate in training for at least two years. (See Article XI.)

Passing over Article IX. as containing only insignificant changes which have already been adverted to, we find Article XI. almost entirely new: "*Except in extraordinary cases, Presbyteries shall require probationers to continue their regular course of study at some approved seminary, or under some approved teacher of theology, and, while engaged in the same, to exercise their gifts in preaching, under such restrictions as may, in the judgment of their respective Presbyteries, be necessary to preclude interference with their studies.*" Note here, (1), The repetition of the notice served on the student in Article VIII.: he may expect to be held as licentiate for two years; (2), The mandatory language to the Presbyteries: they "*shall require*" this thing; (3), They shall also "*require*" that these student-licentiates intermix preaching with seminary study for two years. This is the plan. The boat appears calked in every seam. But, alas! as with the flirting of a whale's tail, the whole craft may be thrown into the air by the modifying clauses, "*except in extraordinary cases,*" and "*under such restrictions as may to the Presbyteries seem necessary.*" In impracticable legislation all the cases come to be "*extraordinary cases.*"

II. THE CHANGES AS TO ORDINATION.

Under this head Article I. retains the provision that "when a call has been presented to the Presbytery, if found in order and the Presbytery deem it for the good of the church, they shall place it in the hands of the person to whom it is addressed." It then adds this provision, to-wit: "But no probationer, except in extraordinary cases, shall be ordained until he shall have taken a regular course in divinity at some approved theological seminary, or the equivalent of the same under some approved teacher of theology." Departure from this rule, and the reasons for it, are to be recorded. This settles beyond dispute, that, in all ordinary cases, the licentiate is to be held as such until he finishes his seminary course, two years after he has been licensed to preach three

or six years. The call of God's people can avail nothing; the young man's convictions, nothing; the Presbytery's own conviction conceded in licensing him to preach, nothing. God himself by all three of the concurring evidences of a divine call may say, "Separate me this man." The Presbytery's answer, riveted upon her by her usurpation of legislative function, must be: "It is written in our law: 'no probationer shall be ordained until two years after he has been licensed'!"

Article III. substitutes for "a careful examination" "a close, particular, and thorough examination." Some readers may prefer this redundant rhetoric. The Article also receives from the omitted provisions for licensure the requirements for the exercises in Exegesis, the examination in Hebrew, Church History and Government, Theology and the Sacraments, all transferred from licensure to ordination.

This examination of the changes proposed is believed to be very nearly exhaustive. It is time to offer, suggestively, as the limits of this article require, objections to these constitutional amendments.

III. OBJECTIONS TO THE CHANGES.

1. Amendments to organic law should be of obvious necessity, and to meet a very general demand. Each minister and elder in our church has been asked, "Do you approve of the government and discipline of the Presbyterian Church in the United States?" and he has answered, "I do." This is the basis and bond of our covenant. The movement toward annulling or altering it should have the marks of spontaneity. But nothing of that kind can here be found. Again and again, by overwhelming majorities, the Assemblies have declared that they see no reason for the changes proposed. In language almost minatory, the agitators have declared, "This thing shall come up again." The movement has all the appearance of having been forced upon the church. It is in evidence that letters have been written to influential men in Presbyteries urging overtures to the Assembly. It is also in evidence that some of these wisest men and strongest Presbyteries declined. It is furthermore on record that out of

the seventy-three Presbyteries only six could be influenced to overture the last Assembly in favor of the changes, and two or three of these contained the original agitators who have all along declared that the agitation shall not cease. There is not the least appearance of spontaneousness about this movement.

2. When a General Assembly recommends to the Presbyteries grave changes in organic law, that recommendation, to carry weight, ought to be by a large majority. But in this case there is no decided recommendation at all. The minority report, offered as a substitute for that of the majority, lacked only nine votes of being adopted, the vote being seventy to seventy-eight. The Assembly, therefore, makes her voice heard here only in faintest whisper of uncertain sound. Nor can it be forgotten that the Assembly had no proper opportunity for a discussion of this question. A matter of paramount importance, threatening the very being of the church, distracted thought, consumed time, and exhausted energy. Still further, the recommendation manifestly slipped through the Assembly by a peculiar coincidence. The measure was advocated almost solely upon the ground that it was intended to "stop this unlicensed preaching."¹ This secured for it the vote of many who have become disgusted with the excesses of lay evangelism, and these, uniting with those who have all along desired the changes for other reasons not so good, barely passed the recommendation. All things considered, it is easy to see that the action of the Assembly lacks the weight which should characterize a proposition to change radically the constitution of the church. The deliverances of former Assemblies, made after full deliberation, and despite the presence and advocacy of the warmest and ablest friends of the measure, are on record. Let their overwhelming majorities be put against the eight votes which passed the recommendation at Nashville.

3. These amendments, if adopted, must change the fundamental doctrine of the Presbyterian Church with reference to the

¹ How it can effect this it is impossible to see. The "unlicensed preaching," so called, generally begins with the sophomore class in college, and is a sophomoric symptom. To cure the evil by licensing it, the law must reach downward to the second collegiate vacation.

ministry. In our ecclesiasticism, throughout all our history, the parity of ministers of the word has been recognized as essential to our system. The controversy between Episcopacy and Presbyterianism has ever been over the oneness or plurality of orders in the clergy. The germ of plurality is inherent in these proposed changes. Indeed, it is openly urged that distinctions of classes *should* be made, both as to the degrees of education that should be given and as to the eminence or inferiority of scholarship that may be anticipated; and we are expected to adapt legislation to these higher and lower classes. It is undeniable that the man licensed to preach three years or six years is in the rank of the gospel ministry just as truly as is an Episcopal deacon or a Methodist local preacher. But he is in the rank, both as inferior and as subordinate: inferior, because he has not equal qualifications; subordinate, because under the control of a higher class of the very same officers—the preachers of God’s word. In the church of Japan this very thing of licensing men to preach and holding them as licensed preachers for a definite term of years, has given rise to more jealousy and heart-burnings in the ministry than any other feature of their polity. To hold Presbyterian preachers thus subordinate by legislation would be simply impossible. Presbyterians believe that the power of the church is solely ministerial and declarative. They will never be bound by any mere enactment which contravenes the teaching of God’s word; and they have ever held, and ever will hold, the parity of ministers as a part of the truth of Holy Scripture. The constitution which makes a law against that *doctrine*, universal in Presbyterian faith, will bring forth a dead letter; it cannot be enforced. It can only awaken in the souls of our Episcopal brethren the fond but delusive hope that, as we have adopted two orders of clergy, we may soon be in full union with them under the “historic episcopate.”

4. These amendments undermine and overthrow the settled doctrine of our church with reference to vocation to the gospel ministry. That we have such a doctrine clearly taught in our works of theology and breathing through our Form of Government will not be denied. Its fundamental postulate is that none

but the King can appoint to office—none but God the Holy Spirit call to the function of preaching. Another thing is just as true: none may restrain from preaching him whom God calls. The instant that awful voice is clearly recognized by competent authority, that instant the man and the court must alike bow in willing obedience. No reasons of expediency may urge delay. "Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them" leaves no option as to a three or six-years' temporizing: the thing must be done when God's call is clearly evidenced. Now, what evidences it? (1), The man's Spirit-wrought conviction; (2), The voice of the same Spirit speaking through the church court; (3), The voice of the same Spirit speaking through God's people, who, in an important sense, are the body from whose womb courts and rulers alike spring. When these three elements of evidence, authenticating a call as divine, concur in a given case, the court ought to render its solemn finding. There is no more proof to wait for. Ordination is the act by which in formal manner the court renders its decision upon the evidence adduced, to the effect that God has called the man to preach and, for that reason, he is set apart to the full work of the gospel ministry.

Now, see how this proposed law utterly undermines these doctrines: (1), It changes the whole meaning of licensure, which no more signifies that the man is on trial to discover whether he can get the third and last element of evidence of God's call—the approbation of his people—and now means "we license you to preach at least three years without having had the remotest reference to God's people in the whole matter." It is true that the Presbytery may *afterward* have respect to the people. But the point is that licensure for a definite and prolonged period antecedently to such an expression of the people practically inducts the man into the regular work of preaching, utterly ignoring this element of evidence essential to knowing whether God calls him or not. Such a call comes, therefore, from the Presbytery and the man. It *may* come from God; but it may not. The objection that the present law does the same thing may be successfully refuted. The present law does not license a man to preach through the years irrespectively of the call of God's people. No

such thing as licensure for a definite time is known to us. Nor can it be, for (2), according to the foregoing principles, the man must be ordained as soon as the proof of God's call is before the court. But this law deliberately proposes that the Presbytery shall have before it (*a*) the man's conviction that he should preach, (*b*) its own conviction expressed in giving him license to preach for many years, and (*c*) even the call of a church [see amended Article I. of Ordination]; and even *then* shall be bound by its own legislation to say to God himself, speaking through all these recognized channels of evidence, "We positively decline to set this man apart; we will hold him, to educate him two years more!" And when asked, "By what law can even a Presbytery decline to obey God on admitted evidence of his call?" the only possible answer must be, "Upon *our* law. We made it. The candidate and ourselves deliberately entered into a compact that he should not be ordained for two years after we admitted he could preach and licensed him to do it." If it be urged that under the present law licentiates sometimes preach for years before ordination, the answer is: (1), Such cases are exceptional; (2), They are not deliberately enacted; (3), They, unless for peculiar providences, are in spite of the law and not because of it. Our whole doctrine implies that the court must not delay to find its verdict after all the evidence has been adduced and weighed—and the formal rendering of that verdict is, ordination. To enact a long stretch of training between a license to preach for three years and ordination is, therefore, to erect a human invention against our divinely revealed doctrine of vocation. What is even a Presbytery, that it can arbitrarily decide that God must not call men to the full work of the ministry until two years after licensure?

5. The new movement is irreconcilably at variance with the historical teaching of our church, to the effect that, so far as preaching is concerned, the qualifications for licensure and for ordination ought to be the same. That this has always been our teaching is not denied. Rather, the advocates of the new measure impeach the wisdom of the doctrine, and declare that a candidate ought to be licensed to preach (even for years) on a lower basis, and ordained to preach on a higher. We wonderingly inquire,

Why? Is not the function, preaching, identical? Is not the responsibility in the one case as great as in the other? Is it not the same man, handling the same word of the same God? Does he not in both instances bear authority to preach from the same Presbyterian Church? And if the Presbytery licenses him to preach on a lower basis of qualification and ordains him still to *preach* on a higher, has she not, in making a difference of qualification for the same function, done an unscriptural thing in the one case or the other? Has she not, somewhere in this proceeding, transcended her declarative power and obtruded her methodizing, upon grounds of expediency, into the forbidden realm of human legislation for a divine kingdom? Surely, if she licenses to a function on one examination and ordains to the same function on another and higher, she cannot have found and applied the scriptural qualifications in both. This point, so clearly and forcibly made by one of the ablest of the younger men of our church through the press, seems to this writer absolutely unanswerable.

6. This movement must inevitably lower the standard of ministerial education. Here the advocates of the changes are not in unison. Some declare that the standard *ought* to be lower, and they urge the changes in the hope of having one class of preachers for one kind of work and another for a more scholarly kind. Others repudiate this, and say, sincerely, that they are seeking to elevate the standard. Their favorite plea is, that Presbyteries neglect the examination for licensure in anticipation of that for ordination, and then fail as to the latter because they have passed through the former. Now (1), nowhere on earth, in things temporal or things spiritual, has God given any remedy for "neglect" except to *stop neglecting*. (2), If the Presbyteries have two opportunities and neglect them both, how can the giving of only one opportunity diminish the danger of neglect? (3), If the Presbyteries are thus loose in the enforcement of law, with such a spirit in them, is it not morally certain that, having licensed a man to preach on a lower standard, they will never refuse him ordination for the lack of a higher, especially after he shall have preached with possibly some success for two years? (4), If the man shall obtain a call, and he and the representative of the church appear

and ask installation, can the Presbytery consistently refuse, even though the man have no more education than when he was licensed? He has been preaching in the Presbytery's name, with *her* commission in his hand, for two years. During all this time the Presbytery has been saying to saints and sinners, "Look to this man for bread." How can she now venture the plea, "He is not educated"? It is safe to predict that such a plea will never be made. Low licensure will lead straight to low ordination.

7. This movement is expected to work radical changes in some of the oldest, most warmly-cherished and most fully-blest enterprises of the church. It stands in close connection with the action of the General Assembly recommending that our theological seminaries have four sessions of six months each rather than three sessions of eight months each. That the two (the changes as to licensure and as to the sessions) are nearly related is easily proved: (1), The same Assembly recommends both. (2), The distinguished and much-loved chairman of the Committee on Theological Seminaries (the committee recommending the change in the length of the sessions) is, if not the originator, at least one of the earliest friends, of the changes as to licensure. It can hardly be possible that the relation between the two things escaped his acute observation. (3), The friends of the change as to the length of the seminaries' sessions are universally the friends of the new movement as to licensure. (4), The most prominent and aggressive advocate of the movement as to licensure, after discussing it and the recommendation to theological seminaries and their interrelation, writes: "This is the Assembly's plan. If the Presbyteries shall adopt the one part of the scheme and the directors of our seminaries the other," etc. The movement is one, and now stands before us in all the aspect of revolution. Our doctrines, as we have seen, are to be contravened. Our time-honored practice is also to be radically transformed; our seminary sessions, six months in length, are to be extended over four years. At the end of the first year the student is to be licensed. His license is to be valid during the remaining three years of his student-life. Meanwhile he is to preach, thus making money in vacation with which to support himself the next session. Beneficiary education is to be

“reduced to the minimum”; vacant churches are to be ministered to by these licensed students, and by them the “destitutions” are to be supplied; and there is not one party involved in these transactions whose interests are not bound to suffer: (1), The interests of the student: He will scarcely have begun one thing before he will be called to stop and go into an entirely different thing. He will do neither well. (2), The interests of the seminaries: Their students will be smatterers. Study will wait on the convenience of preaching and sermon-writing. Professors will hardly begin the short session before they must quit teaching and take a long vacation. (3), The interests of vacant churches: The food they feed upon will be poor. The habit of not employing pastors, but of being content with preaching six months a year, will become fixed upon them. (4), The interests of beneficiary education: That cause which, in proportion to the money expended, has yielded a larger revenue to the church in contributions, in spiritual gifts and energies, than any other, will be crowded out by the dubious experiment of making the candidates self-supporting. Faith in the cause will fly just as soon as it is announced that the church has practically disowned it in favor of another plan. (5), The interests of Presbyterian scholarship: Other denominations are elevating the standard; we appear to be degrading it. The tendency in all educational institutions is now to make the sessions longer, and not so numerous. We propose to fly against the wind and buffet along for four years in sessions of six months each, after having had our students in college the four years preceding. Add to all this the danger of putting nearly the whole body of our seminary students under the support and patronage, and, largely, the control, of our Home Mission committees, and the growing power of those committees by reason of their special pecuniary relation to this ever-multiplying class of preachers, and who can fail to see that these stupendous changes ought to “give us pause”? We honor our Home Mission agents and committees for their zeal in their own line of work, but we cannot close our eyes to the tendency of every specialist to see all interests in the light of the particular one to which he is devoting his energies and his prayers; nor can we repress the thought that the natural

eagerness to "supply the destitutions" may make us impatient under providential delays and impel us to lay the hand of human intervention upon the ark of our divinely-revealed doctrine and our divinely-blest practice. Should this occur, history would but repeat itself, and again it would be seen, as in the case of our Cumberland brethren, that an uneducated ministry would develop an un-Calvinistic church. If it be claimed that these evils must be imaginary since the proposed changes are the work of able men, the candid answer must be, that the thing to be changed, our constitution, is possibly the work of men not less able. The soul of Thornwell breathes through it; the minds of Adger and Dabney approved it; the solid judgment of Peck endorsed it and deprecated any interference with it almost unto his dying day. The book gives us law as the evolution of deep principles in God's law, and no mere methodizing to meet the changing aspects of human events should be permitted to set it aside.

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VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

WATTS' NORTHRUP'S "SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD."

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD: *A Discussion by President G. W. Northrup, D. D., LL. D., Chicago, and Professor Robert Watts, D. D., LL. D., Belfast.* Baptist Book Concern, Louisville, Ky. 1894. Pp. 360.

Early in the year 1892 a series of articles on the Sovereignty of God appeared in *The Standard*, an able Baptist paper published in Chicago. These articles were from the pen of Dr. Northrup, President of the Baptist Theological Seminary, then at Morgan Park, but now in Chicago. The aim of the writer seems to have been to criticise consistent Calvinism, and to offer certain modifications of the divine sovereignty which might render that doctrine more acceptable to men.

These articles attracted some attention, and, in Baptist circles especially, called forth a good deal of criticism. Prominent among these critics was *The Western Recorder*, a strong Baptist paper published in Louisville, and edited by Dr. Eaton. In defence of consistent Calvinistic doctrine *The Recorder* secured a series of articles from Dr. Watts, of Belfast, a well-known Presbyterian champion of orthodoxy.

To the articles of Dr. Watts, Dr. Northrup made reply again in *The Standard*, and Dr. Watts rejoined in *The Recorder* to the strictures of Dr. Northrup. Then, finally, Dr. Northrup made a second and rather extended reply, and the discussion thus ended. There were thus five series of articles in all. The editor of *The Recorder* has gathered these together and issued them in the volume before us. They form a volume of three hundred and sixty pages, and the ability of the discussion, as well as the importance of the subject of which they treat, justifies their publication in permanent form.

The discussion, as here published, is divided into three parts. In the first part we have Dr. Northrup's first series of articles; in the second part we have the first series of Dr. Watts, the rejoinder of Dr. Northrup, and the reply of Dr. Watts; and in the third part Dr. Northrup's second rejoinder stands alone. This arrangement seems somewhat defective, but, as is explained by Dr. Eaton in a brief preface, this was due to the circumstances under which the publication was made by *The Western Recorder*.

It will be noticed also that Dr. Northrup has three series, while Dr. Watts has only two. This, of course, was in accordance with the usual conditions of debate. Dr. Northrup having opened the debate, it was proper that he should close it, although in his closing series he has not confined himself entirely to answering what had already been adduced in the debate. Moreover, Dr. Northrup has written at much greater length than his critic, for while he has written two hundred and thirty-eight pages, Dr. Watts has occupied only one hundred and twenty-two.

From the nature of the case it is not easy to do justice to a book like this in an ordinary review notice. To go fully into all the points raised in the discussion would be almost like fighting the battle over again. This we cannot now attempt, and so must content ourselves with a brief presentation of the main outlines of the debate, and with offering a few remarks of a general nature upon it.

Dr. Northrup's first series of five rather long articles lies before us. In the first article he enumerates five views which have been held regarding the sovereignty of God. He sets two of these aside entirely, and says that the others are unsatisfactory. Among those described as unsatisfactory is the following: "The sovereignty of God is his absolute right to govern and dispose of all his creatures according to his own good pleasure, or according to his absolute perfection." He quotes Shedd, Hill and Edwards to illustrate the consistent Calvinistic view which he deems unsatisfactory, and enumerates five particulars involved in this view: "1, God decreed to elect a part of mankind and to reprobate the rest, and remains God, infinitely blessed and glorious. 2, Had he reversed these decrees as regards the individuals included in them, electing those whom he reprobated, and reprobating those whom he elected, he would have remained God, infinitely blessed and glorious. 3, Had he decreed to include in either of these purposes any number of individuals less than the whole human race, he would have remained God, infinitely blessed and glorious. 4, Had he decreed the damnation of all, he would have remained God, infinitely blessed and glorious. 5, Had he decreed the salvation of all, he would have remained God, infinitely blessed and glorious." We have been careful to give in these five particulars Dr. Northrup's own language. How far it is a correct summary of consistent Calvinism remains to be seen later on.

Then, after seeking to show that these particulars involve certain serious consequences in regard to God's nature and his procedure with men, and after examining, in a hurried way, some of the reasonings in support of consistent Calvinism in order to point out their fallacies, Dr. Northrup states what he takes to be the true view of the sovereignty of God as follows, p. 23: "The sovereignty of God is his right and power to constitute and govern the universe according to his absolute ethical perfection; it implies supremacy, independence, and infinite moral excellency, but not optional power in the sense that he is entirely free to will the exact opposite of that which he does will. He exercised his sovereignty in adopting the plan of the existing universe because of its supreme excellency as including those methods of action most worthy of himself." "God is a sovereign and the highest of all, not because he possesses a prerogative, in the exercise of which he is free to choose any one of an infinity of systems of creation, whether equal or unequal in point of excellence; but because he possesses the power and right to govern and dispose of all his creatures according to the dictates of his infinite intelligence, making himself his own highest law, and highest good, and highest end. We deny that the Bible justifies the ascription to God of a prerogative in virtue of which he was entirely free to ordain to eternal life those whom he will consign to the congenial companionship of the devil and his angels." These two statements will give the reader a fairly complete view of the sovereignty of God which Dr. Northrup would present as more satisfactory than that which is set forth by consistent Calvinistic writers.

In the second article of this series Dr. Northrup deals with the statement of

consistent Calvinism, that nothing in men grounds or conditions their election. Here his doctrine comes clearly into view. He holds that there must be some moral differences in those men who are chosen to salvation. His own language, printed in italics, on p. 47, is: "*That there is some difference or differences between men to which God has respect, which are, if not moving causes, yet conditions of his decisions.*" Otherwise he says that the divine procedure "cannot be vindicated from the charge of arbitrariness." This is the very core of the view which Dr. Northrup adopts and seeks to establish. The difficulty to be met is, to provide an ethical ground for the discrimination between individual men which election implies.

Dr. Northrup briefly alludes to various solutions. The Arminian finds this ethical ground in the foreseen faith and obedience of the believer. Most Calvinists hold that this ground is to be found in the glory of God, in which is revealed the perfection of the divine attributes. Some Calvinists prefer to discover this ground in the ethical perfection of God, which leads him to secure the highest good of his creatures, and to find something in those who are chosen to life and salvation which conditions that choice. Dr. Northrup takes his place in the last class, and states his conclusion at length on pp. 58, 59.

In the third article Dr. Northrup seeks to show that consistent Calvinism necessitates the inevitable perdition of the lost, and that his proposed modification of view relieves Calvinism of this serious difficulty. He points out the three types of Calvinism which here emerge, as supra-lapsarian, infra-lapsarian, and moderate. The second is that usually held, but the third is the one Dr. Northrup prefers. Of this there are, he adds, two forms, the one affirming and the other denying that men are under condemnation prior to the age of moral responsibility. The view of Dr. Northrup, though not very clearly stated, seems to be that men are under condemnation prior to the period of conscious moral responsibility.

Dr. Northrup then quotes from many Calvinistic authors to show that the perdition of the non-elect is inevitable, and he also gives some reasons which he thinks prove the same thing. Pages 90-91. Some of these have the ring of quotations from Arminian writers.

The fourth article seeks to show that God cannot be moved with compassion for the non-elect, and that he cannot deal with them in good faith in offering to them the gospel. Dr. Northrup discusses various phases of view here as to the relation and effect of the truth of the gospel and of the Holy Spirit in the case of the non-elect. The general conclusion reached is, that consistent Calvinism cannot make a *bona fide* offer of the gospel to all men, and that his (Dr. Northrup's) proposed modification of Calvinism, which denies the fact of special grace, and holds that all men have given to them common grace prior to regeneration, which, if they use aright, will render the gift of regenerating grace at least possible, if not probable, is free from this objection. Page 116.

The fifth article deals with the perplexing subject of infant salvation. Dr. Northrup here seeks to show that consistent Calvinism implies belief in infant damnation, and that his view gives relief from this dreadful conclusion. It is not necessary to follow him here, for the discussion is full of confusion, and it ignores entirely the idea of the covenant relation which alone provides the basis for the true doctrine of infant salvation, and makes it evident that consistent Calvinism is beset with fewer difficulties than any other form of doctrine upon this subject.

We have dwelt at some length on Dr. Northrup's first series of articles, for the reason that most of the main points raised in the discussion are brought forward in this series.

We now pass to the second series of articles, and enter on our notice of Dr. Watts's first series. These articles are shorter than those of Dr. Northrup, but they are clear, concise, and of no uncertain sound. At the outset, Dr. Watts points out that Dr. Northrup's proposed modification of the consistent Calvinistic doctrine of the sovereignty of God amounts to neither more nor less than an attack upon Calvinism such as an Arminian would make. With good reason the position is taken by Dr. Watts, that nearly every criticism which Dr. Northrup makes involves the principles of Arminianism. In regard to unconditional election, in regard to the perdition of the non-elect, and universal offer of the gospel, and in regard to infant salvation, we are satisfied that the general charge made by Dr. Watts can easily be sustained. There is, in fact, no middle ground to take.

In the second article Dr. Watts turns the tables on his antagonist, and shows that the proposed toning down of Calvinism involves us in much more serious difficulties than consistent Calvinism. Dr. Watts shows from Scripture, and from Christian experience, that this is the case. In a most effective manner he also shows that the modifications proposed by Dr. Northrup logically lead to a denial of the divine omniscience. Moreover, it is made evident at this point also that he has willingly or unwillingly passed over to the ranks of the Arminians.

The third article of this series argues that the denial of the divine sovereignty in the strict sense leads to fatalism. If God does not foreordain whatsoever comes to pass, events may be determined by blind mechanical fate. Even those experiences pertaining to the experience of salvation may become a matter of fate. The guarantee eventually of man's true free-agency is the sovereignty of God. The closing pages of this article are very fine.

In the fourth article Dr. Watts vindicates the federal relationship of Adam, and with this weapon in his hand he lays bare the radical defects of Dr. Northrup's views. He shows that Dr. Northrup has no solution that is better than that of the Arminian of the problem. Why it is that men are children of wrath prior to the stage when personal moral responsibility is reached. If the federal relation be denied, only the personal relation remains, and men are born in depravity without any basis of guilt to ground it. Each man's probation is then under such disabilities as render it certain that when personal responsibility is reached he will inevitably fall under actual transgression. Dr. Watts further points out that experience is against Dr. Northrup's views, for there is no consciousness of personal guilt prior to the fact of depravity, so that once more Dr. Northrup is shown not only to be on Arminian ground, but to take a position which involves the Pelagian principle that responsibility is limited by ability. The criticism of Dr. Watts is exceedingly acute and effective at this point.

The fifth article deals with the federal headship of Christ, and shows the bearing of Dr. Northrup's views upon this important doctrine. Dr. Watts undertakes to show that Dr. Northrup takes entirely too narrow a view of the one act of righteousness which supplies the ground of the believer's justification.

The sixth article discusses plenary ability. Dr. Watts here points out that the theory he criticises is not according to the facts. Dr. Northrup had stated

that every man by the gracious touch of the Word and Spirit has plenary ability to repent and believe. In various respects Dr. Watts shows that this view is not justified by the facts in the case. If, as in the case of the heathen, there is no knowledge of the gospel, what about their plenary ability? And as regenerating grace comes only to those who strive to use this plenary ability, how about those who never possess the conditions which provide this plenary ability? This article is strong and unanswerable, in our judgment.

The seventh article is the last of Dr. Watts's first series. In it Dr. Watts charges Dr. Northrup with unscientific procedure, inasmuch as he simply lodges objections against consistent Calvinism, but does not examine the basis on which it rests, and the proof by which it is supported. On pages 60-61 Dr. Watts gives an outline of the main points involved in the scheme he defends, which is very complete and entirely scriptural. There is much force in what Dr. Watts here adduces.

With the eighth article in this series the rejoinder of Dr. Northrup begins. He first rehearses the main positions of his previous articles, and next accuses Dr. Watts of making "half a dozen palpable and inexcusable misrepresentations." He especially repels the charge that his doctrine is Arminian in its principles and tendencies. But in addition he instances quite a list of additional details of misrepresentations, such as the following: the relation between faith and regeneration, the divine decree and fatalism, the sovereignty of God in redemption, the view of the divine nature as to benevolence and holiness, the atonement, and the gratuitous nature of salvation. This is rather a formidable category, and in our judgment many of the accusations are far-fetched. Moreover, Dr. Northrup does not treat of the positive aspects of the debate as fully as he should have done to make anything like a sufficient reply to the articles of Dr. Watts. This article concludes with an exposition of the ninth of Romans, which greatly confirms the charge of Arminianism against Dr. Northrup's views. To us the exegesis of this difficult chapter is far from adequate.

In the ninth article of this series Dr. Watts begins his reply. With a keen thrust at the difficulty which writers of a certain type have in making themselves clearly understood, he deals with the charges of palpable misrepresentation. At almost every turn he wards off the charge, and exhibits some additional features of Arminian complexion in the views of Dr. Northrup. He defends Dr. Cunningham from the use made of his writings by Dr. Northrup, and shows that Dr. Cunningham taught the opposite of what Dr. Northrup states.

In a most effective way Dr. Watts shows that no middle theory can be successfully constructed and defended. He concludes by pointing out that if God be a being of infinite ethical perfection, in other words, a God of holiness and love, the difficulty is to see how it comes to pass that, if provision has actually been made for all in the same sense and with the same intention, in Christ, all are not actually saved.

In four additional articles of great ability Dr. Watts pursues his critique of Dr. Northrup's views, and presents the defences of strict Calvinism in a manner that really leaves nothing to be desired in the way of discussion. The views of universal grace, of plenary ability, of the federal headship of Adam, of the divine foreknowledge, of the moral possibility of the salvation of the non-elect, presented by

Dr. Northrup, are dealt with in a most thorough manner. At every turn we find Dr. Watts defending strictly Calvinistic doctrine, and warding off the objections raised by Dr. Northrup. Nothing more need here be said than that Dr. Watts without hesitation undertakes the vindication of consistent Calvinism in every case, and shows no sympathy with the attempt to render the doctrines more acceptable by toning them down in various ways.

The third part of the treatise contains Dr. Northrup's second rejoinder, which consists of a single article of over sixty pages. In this much of the same ground is covered as in the articles already noticed, so that no further extended notice is necessary. The main feature of this part of the discussion is an attack upon the federal status of Adam, in which Dr. Northrup, in our judgment, exposes his doctrine is open to more severe criticism than anywhere else.

What has already been said may supply our readers with some general idea of the scope and nature of the debate under review. At the same time the whole discussion should be carefully read to obtain a clear grasp of all the details of the vigorous debate. We conclude with a few inferences which occur to us :

First, It is worth while noting the fact that this is a discussion between two professed adherents of the Calvinistic system of doctrine. Dr. Watts represents the strict, and Dr. Northrup the moderate, Calvinists. In the latter we have a representative of that type of so-called Calvinism that is anxious to modify the doctrine in several respects, and revise those doctrinal standards in which strict Calvinism is stated. In many respects the attempt of Dr. Northrup is marked by ability and an earnest purpose. Still, after reading the critique of Dr. Watts, the failure of the attempt is evident to our mind.

Secondly, The perusal of this discussion has more than ever convinced us of the utter futility of any attempt to state a middle view between the basal principles of Calvinism and Arminianism. God either is absolute sovereign or he is not. He either grounds election in his good pleasure or he does not. He either provides for the assured salvation in Christ of the elect or he does not. Calvinism takes one alternative, and any views which imply the other alternative are essentially Arminian. The practical force of this in relation to the attempt recently made to revise the Confession of Faith is evident. It is far easier to defend strict Calvinism than it is to even state, much less defend, those proposed modifications of it which are not true to Scripture, nor in harmony with religious experience.

Thirdly, We are fully convinced that Dr. Watts has good reason for asserting that Dr. Northrup's fundamental position is really Arminian. When Dr. Northrup takes the position that the ethical perfections of God require us to hold that there must be *something*, he does not say what, in the elect which is the condition foreseen upon which their choice rests, then the condition is transferred from the sphere of the divine to that of the human. It is no longer the good pleasure of God, but something in man, which, after all, conditions the choice. This may be refined Arminianism, but it is Arminianism. So, again, if all men receive common grace which endows them with plenary ability, and if men by the struggle to use this grace procure their regeneration, then, again, the ground of regenerating grace is found on man's side. This, again, is at least half-way to Arminianism. So with the other points at issue in this debate. And even if Dr. Northrup should admit that the *something* in the elect which grounds their election has been put

there by God, the question would then be, What grounds the divine purpose to place this in some and not in other men? This places us at once on an infinite regress, in which there is no resting-place till we rest in the good pleasure of God. This, however, is simply the view taken by strict Calvinism.

Fourthly, We are glad that Dr. Watts has presented the federal idea or principle so fully in his critique. Though beset with difficulties, we are convinced that the federal principle is the key which best solves the mysterious problem of human guilt and depravity, and the problem of the redemption which the elect secure in Christ Jesus. Scripture, reason, and Christian experience, we believe, confirm this position.

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VAUGHAN'S "GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT."

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT TO BELIEVERS AND UNBELIEVERS. *By C. R. Vaughan, D. D.*, of the Synod of Virginia. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1894. Pp. 415.

This excellent treatise is from the pen of the present teacher of Systematic Theology in Union Seminary, Virginia, and it is dedicated to Rev. Dr. Dabney, for many years teacher of Theology in the same institution. In a well-written *Preface* the origin and purpose of the book is explained. The object is practical rather than speculative. The purpose it is intended to serve is the development of Christian experience rather than a formal statement of Christian doctrine. And yet all through the treatise there are found clear and important statements of the great doctrines which stand related to Christian experience. The statement and application of these doctrines is made by our author in order to the increase of Christian comfort among the servants of Christ by means of the glad tidings of great joy.

As the title indicates, the theme of the treatise is *The Gifts of the Holy Spirit*. The scope of the discussion, however, is really wider than this title may at first suggest to the reader. It is really a treatise on the whole inward or subjective side of religion, as will appear more fully later on in this notice. Very naturally the treatment of the subject falls under two main heads: First, The Gifts of the Holy Spirit to *unbelievers*; and secondly, The Gifts of the Holy Spirit to *believers*. The whole discussion thus falls into two almost equal parts. In both, the vital doctrines which relate to Christian experience in its various stages are handled in a manner which reveals alike a clear grasp of the doctrines and a deep insight into Christian experience. Perhaps we can do our readers no better service, and accord our author no fairer treatment, than to present a brief outline of the discussion, only adding a few comments as we proceed in company with him along the path he has so well marked out.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT TO UNBELIEVERS.

In this part of the book there are nine chapters. These may now to be passed briefly under review. They deal with various phases of the Spirit's work in the human soul until regeneration is effected.

Chapter I. treats of the restraining influence of the Holy Spirit on human depravity, and of his moulding effect on the moral nature of man. After explaining in general the nature of this restraining influence, our author mentions some

particulars. The Holy Spirit prevents the moral element in human nature from running into complete paralysis, preserving moral knowledge and some just conception of the nature and authority of moral truth. The Spirit has also a beneficial effect in preventing abnormal wickedness in individual men. He also, by his restraining influences, renders the development of civilization possible. The Holy Spirit is also the author of all the evangelical influences of every kind and degree brought to bear, previous to conversion, on the views and character of unconverted men in the world.

Chapter II. deals with the *awakening* influence of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of men. The difference between the *awakening* and *convicting* work of the Spirit is indicated. In awakening the sense of *danger* is prominent; in conviction the sense of *guilt* prevails. They generally go together, but may be considered separately. The awakening work of the Spirit consists chiefly in breaking up the natural insensibility of men's souls to their real condition as spiritually dead and blind. The sense of peril, the fact of exposure to danger arises, and remorse for a time may follow. The work of the Spirit here does not create the danger but merely reveals it, and the sense of danger may be in various degrees.

Chapter III. takes up the *convicting* influence of the Holy Spirit. The meaning of the term *convict* is first explained; then the basis of all conviction in the law of God is pointed out, both in regard to its precept and penalty, its criminality and danger. The difference between natural and spiritual conviction is indicated in the view taken of the nature and peril of sin. True conviction admits the justice of the penalty, and makes no excuse or defence. It blames self, and offers no palliation. It is permanent in its nature and purifying in its effects. It is wide in its scope and marked by deep humility. This chapter is of great value.

Chapter IV. discusses *repentance* which follows conviction. Conviction is the knowledge of the evil, repentance is feeling and action in consequence of this knowledge. Natural conviction will be followed by remorse, but repentance is the fruit of true conviction. The distinction between true and false repentance is brought out very clearly in this chapter, and the necessity of repentance is emphasized both from the evil nature of sin and the permanent obligation of the law of God. True repentance considers the *wrong* of sin, false repentance its *danger*. The former is *just*, the latter is *selfish*. The one terminates on God, the other on self. Shame has a large place in true repentance also, and a feeling of self-abasement is present. Then true sorrow for sin, and hatred of sin, with self-condemnation, follow. God's justice and goodness is also recognized in true repentance. This chapter closes by pointing out that the root idea in repentance is *change of mind*, followed with change of heart and of action.

Chapter V. takes up at length the important subject of *faith*. The generic nature of faith is the *belief of testimony*, the *credit of evidence*. To believe a thing is to accept it as *true*. But this faith may be modified by both moral and intellectual qualities, and different kinds of faith come into view. The Scriptures exhibit four species: *historical* faith, *temporary* faith, the *faith of devils*, and the *faith which saves*. Our author discusses each of these in a very lucid and instructive manner, bringing out the true nature of *saving* faith. This faith accepts the testimony of God given in his word, and trusts in the person of the Saviour. It is belief of testimony, and trust in a person. As an act of the soul it combines

moral and intellectual qualities, and yet, while obligatory on all men, has in itself no special merit. Our author also intimates that in order to the exercise of faith the *depraved heart must be changed*. This, as is proper, puts regeneration prior to faith, as also it must be placed antecedent to true spiritual repentance.

Chapter VI. emphasizes the *necessity* of regeneration. The testimony of our Lord is first adduced in the case of Nicodemus. Man must be born again, born of the Spirit. Man in his natural state cannot conform to the law, hence he must be changed. The actual moral condition of man's nature makes the same demand, as also does the absence of spiritual life in man's soul. The understanding and the affections need renovation. To see God holiness is necessary, and the new birth is needed to secure this holiness. This chapter is complete and convincing.

Chapter VII. deals with the *nature* of regeneration, and is a very full presentation of this topic. The whole man is affected by the change. Our author treats of it as a *moral*, not a *physical* change; as a *real*, not an *imaginary* change; as a *supernatural*, not a *natural* change; as not a change of *faculties*, but of *capabilities* in existing faculties, and as a *universal* change. Each of these contrasts is explained at length and with suitable illustration.

Chapter VIII. continues the discussion of the *nature* of regeneration, beginning with the fourth contrast stated in the previous chapter, which is carefully expounded. The universality of the change is considered at length. It effects all the energies of man. The passions and acts, the dispositions and habits, the memory, the conscience, the imagination, the sense of humor, as well as the whole intellectual faculties are energized in the experience of the new birth. This is the kingdom of God *within the soul*.

Chapter IX., the last in the first division of the book, sketches the *evidences* or proofs of regeneration. The need for such evidence lies largely in the fact that regeneration itself is not a matter of consciousness, but is known rather in its results. The fruits of the Spirit are proofs of regeneration. The first change is towards *Christ as the Saviour of sinners*. Then the love which centres on the Saviour flows out to his followers. The law of God is seen and loved. And then obeyed. There is delight in prayer, and in meditation on sacred things; and not only is there love, but joy and peace follow, and long-suffering and gentleness are also to be found. To complete the list of the fruits of the Spirit, goodness, faith, meekness, and temperance are mentioned as evidences of the new birth, from which valid inference as to the fact may be made.

GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT TO BELIEVERS.

This brings us to the second division of the treatise, which consists of fourteen rich and suggestive chapters. Our limits permit only a brief outline of each, though extended exposition is needed to do justice to our author's able discussions.

Chapter I. treats of the special gift of the Holy Spirit *himself* to believers. This is different from the gift of the Spirit in regeneration and saving faith. This is *that other gift* promised by Christ to believers. He is the Paraclete, the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, and he himself is a personal special gift to believers. In this chapter the basis of the subsequent discussions is laid, and on this account detailed exposition of what our author sets forth at this stage is not necessary.

Chapter II. discusses the Holy Spirit's gift of a peculiar knowledge or intui-

tion to believers. Here the *illuminating* influence of the Spirit on the understanding is presented so that the believer is able to comprehend more and more fully the great truths of the gospel. This knowledge is spiritual apprehension of the truth already revealed, not fresh truth given by inspiration. By this illumination of the Spirit believers are led deeper and deeper into the truth.

Chapter III. takes up the Spirit's gift of *knowledge of three particular truths* to believers. The first is the knowledge of the *hope* of their calling. The believer's hope is an *active* one, resting on *the work of Christ*, and having relation to *faith* and *experience*. The second truth which the Spirit enables believers clearly to discern is the *inheritance of God in the saints*. This is not the inheritance of the saints in God, but of God in the saints. The saints are of meaning and value to God and to the work and glory of Christ. The third truth is the exceeding greatness of his power to usward who believe.

Chapter IV. treats of the *sealing of the Spirit*, and has a very important subject to discuss. Our author shows that the sealing is really the same as what is by some termed the anointing of the Spirit, but he thinks that the two should be distinguished. He explains the seal as a symbol of authority and a pledge of safety. This sealing of the Spirit is not regeneration, nor is it the same as sanctification in general. It is rather the Spirit's work in giving stability and strength to all the exercises of the renewed soul. Hence there is given permanence to the desire of the regenerate soul for salvation, and a deep sense of our spiritual necessities. At the same time the sealing work of the Spirit also embraces the great doctrines of the covenant as facts, and confirms the promises of the covenant to believers. He also gives the spirit of prayer, and the evidences of conversion in the renewed heart. He finally develops all the energies of the renewed soul and seals the hope of heaven to the believer.

Chapter V. takes up the closely related topic of the *unction* of the Holy Spirit as one of his special gifts to believers. Our author explains the general and special significance of this gift. The *inward impression* produced by the outpouring of the Spirit is the unction in its special sense. It enlarges the spiritual vision of the renewed soul, it brings comfort to it also, and gives strength, vigor, and efficiency for any kind of work. It also adds to the enjoyment of all lawful things, and exerts a beautifying influence on the character and life.

Chapter VI. deals with the *witness* of the Spirit. This gift in its special sense refers to *the testimony borne by the Spirit to what he has done*. It is a certain, clear, and enlivening influence of the Holy Ghost, shining on the effects and evidences of regeneration as they appear in the exercise of these graces in a Christian heart, so as to make them clear and certain in consciousness. This witness relates specially to the privilege of sonship, alike in its legal and personal aspects. The result of the witness of the Spirit is to prove this sonship.

Chapter VII. treats of the *earnest* of the Spirit. An earnest is explained to mean a part of a thing promised or pledged by contract. The design of the earnest is to secure a ground for the hope of the future. The earnest is the first fruit of the full harvest. The work of the Spirit which makes him an earnest is regeneration and faith. This earnest of the beginning of the new life in the soul, is a proof and a security of the believer's salvation. The possession of a part of the inheritance is a pledge for the whole in due time. The result in the believer's

heart is peace for the present and good hope for the future. Complete redemption shall be his in the future, and assured heaven shall be his home.

Chapter VIII. outlines the *leading* of the Spirit. This topic is closely related with the Spirit's witness to sonship. The leading of the Spirit is the influence which he exerts in guiding all the active powers of the man to the right discharge of all his appointed functions. The activities of the soul are all subject to this leading in the case of the believer.

Chapter IX. considers the *intercession* of the Spirit, and brings up a very important topic, for prayer is a vital religious exercise for the renewed soul. As Christ intercedes for us, so the Spirit intercedes in us, and teaches us how to pray and what to pray for as we ought. Both the *manner* and the *matter* of prayer is from him. He kindles right *desires* in our hearts, and sets proper *motives* before us. He also shows us the pleas by which we may urge our petitions, and controls the manner in which we offer our pleas.

Chapter X. treats of the *comfort* of the Spirit, and is a very precious topic. The word comfort denotes a peculiar form of enjoyment which is imported into life by the Spirit. Over against the evils of life this fact is of great consolation. The Spirit by what he teaches, by what he does, by what he imparts, and by what he guarantees, ministers comfort to believers. He unfolds the love of the Son and of the Father, and also his love for souls. Other points are also brought out, but we cannot enlarge.

Chapter XI. considers the Spirit as a *reminder*. He brings all things to the remembrance of believers by his influence in their memory. The work of the Spirit in giving the Scriptures is here to be considered in relation to the human memory. But in each believer the Spirit also affects the memory in a helpful way in the knowledge of duty and the privilege of prayer.

Chapter XII. sets forth the *love* of the Spirit as a tender, personal affection towards believers. This love for sinners under the gospel dispensation is essentially the love of the Spirit. But the sweetest aspect of this love is displayed towards his own believing people. This love expresses the delight which the Spirit has in all his work, and it gives assurance to the believer of freedom of access to a throne of grace.

Chapter XIII. deals with the Spirit in *public worship*. The presence of the Spirit in public worship is more than his omnipresence. It is his special relations to all parts of divine worship in accordance with the provisions of the covenant of grace. The Spirit is first in the official order of divine worship, and he enables us to offer right service. This chapter closes with a fine outline of the ways in which the Holy Spirit aids directly in public worship in the use of the ordinances, in the spirit of reverence, in the expectation of blessing, in the spirit of gladness, in the spirituality of the worship, and in looking beyond the ordinances to the Spirit himself to give them efficacy.

Chapter XIV. takes up the *personality* of the Spirit, a topic which some might think should have been discussed at the beginning of the treatise. The usual pertinent proofs are here briefly outlined, and the importance of the doctrine in regard to Christian experience fittingly concludes the discussion.

We have thus allowed Dr. Vaughan to speak largely for himself, and in this we hope to have given the reader some idea of this valuable treatise. It is worthy

of a place beside our choicest doctrinal and devotional literature, for it combines both features in a most excellent manner. It is one of the very best books we know on the experimental side of religious life, and no one can peruse it without profit.

The style is good, being clear and elegant throughout, and the work of the book-makers is well done. Union Seminary may count herself favored in having such a teacher in the chair of theology, and the church should be grateful for this valuable addition to her religious literature.

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PATTISON'S "HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE."

THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE. *By T. Harwood Pattison, Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology in the Rochester Theological Seminary.* Pp. 274. Cloth. Philadelphia: Charles H. Barnes, 1420 Chestnut street. 1894.

The aim of this work is to tell the story of the English Bible from Anglo-Saxon times to our own day, and to trace some of the influences which it has exercised upon our intellectual, national and spiritual life. Our century is not wanting in literature upon this subject. Christopher Anderson, Dr. Eadie, Canon Westcott, Dore, Mombert and Stoughton have unfolded at length the fascinating story which it is here sought to recount in a briefer and more popular way. Our author, in treating at once upon the history and the influence of the English Bible, is attempting two lines of study that have never been pursued hitherto in one volume. Nine chapters are devoted to the former of these themes and three to the latter, which follow as the natural complement of those which deal with the history. This blending in one treatise of such closely connected themes is an attractive feature of this bright and animated volume, and, in view of the strong disposition in this day to lay stress upon this kind of evidence as an argument for the divine origin of the book, gives it special value in the apologetic line.

One chapter is devoted to manuscript versions in the early English before the invention of the art of printing. The work of translating began at an early day. The historian Gildas relates that when, during the persecution under the Emperor Diocletian, A. D. 303, English Christians went to their death, "all the copies of the holy Scriptures which could be discovered were burned in the streets." When, a century later, Alaric took Rome, the efforts of Christianity were diverted to disciplining the savage hordes whom he introduced, and, as a consequence, the task of translating Scriptures among the northern nations was suspended. There exists, however, at this day in the National Library at Paris a manuscript of the English Psalter made by Aldholm not later than 709 A. D. Then follow the translations of Caedmon, Bede, King Alfred and others, till we reach the times of De Hereford and Wycliffe, when printing began to supersede the making of manuscripts.

Beginning with Wycliffe we have sketches of the personal history of the successive translators whose labors have immortalized their names, the circumstances of favor or difficulty under which their work of translating was pursued, an estimate of the relative excellence of the work of each, with specimens of their renderings of familiar passages, which serve also to show the condition of the language at that stage of its growth. Slight mention is given to the labors of Taverner, and the Rheims and Douay version is dwelt on but briefly. Ample justice is

done to the heroism and piety of those Continental fugitives who, by reason of the hostility of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities in England, were compelled to prosecute their devoted labors on foreign soil.

We are glad to see that Professor Pattison gives more credit for the Authorized Version to the Puritans than to King James, whose name it wears and to whose initiation and patronage it is popularly believed to be due. No sooner was James recognized as king over England than the Puritans, met at Wilton, appealed to him to deliver them and the national church from the tyranny of their rivals, the Ritualists. All his sympathies being with the High Church party, this complaint was denied; yet the further request of Dr. Reynolds, President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and the representative of the Puritans, that he would authorize a revision of Scriptures, was granted, in spite of the opposition and greatly to the chagrin of Bancroft, Bishop of London and leader of the Ritualists. Scrivener, in his introduction to the *Cambridge Paragraph Bible*, truthfully says: "Never was a great enterprise like the production of our Authorized Version carried out with less knowledge handed down to posterity of the laborers, their method and order of working." How the scholars who were to be responsible for the task were chosen no one knows. We are told, however, that the list, fifty-four in number, was approved by the king, who styled them: "All our principal learned men within this our kingdom." If James is not entitled to the credit of originating the movement, neither is he to be credited with generosity in remunerating the translators. He did induce certain patrons of church preferments to settle some of them in more comfortable livings. Their immediate expenses, on the objection of some of his opposing lords, went unpaid by him, though he recommended collections for their benefit. "He did none of the work, paid nothing towards its cost, and took to himself all the credit of it." The subscriptions were a failure, and all that the translators received was free entertainment when they met. If regard is had to the truth of history, our current English Bible might as justly be styled "Reynold's Version" as to retain the popular title of "King James' Version." Westcott objects to its being called the "Authorized Version." No evidence, he says, has yet been produced to show that the version "has ever been publicly sanctioned by Convocation or by Parliament or by the Privy Council or by the King." That before fifty years had passed it won its way to the hearts of the English people was not because the king, the bishops and the universities lent it the sanction of their august names, but because it was intrinsically superior to all previous versions.

One chapter is devoted to the arguments, *pro* and *con*, as to the necessity and desirability of the revision which King James' Version received during the last decade at the hands of the British and American revisers. In discussing the quality of their work, our author justifies the strenuous attacks on the English of the revisers made by Dean Burgon and Matthew Arnold, and the milder and juster criticisms upon the same from such authorities in good English as Spurgeon, Gladstone, John Bright and Howard Crosby. He expresses regret that the cultured Greek and Hebrew revisers of 1881 did not have associated with them as part of their working force such acknowledged masters of pure and elegant English as Tennyson, Ruskin, Arnold and Bright, whose styles had all been more or less moulded by the unapproachable English of our Authorized Version, and who

would have exerted a conservative influence in checking needless departures from the phraseology of that classic standard.

The last three chapters are given to a discussion of the influence of the English Bible on the history, the character and the literature of the English people, and on the intellectual vigor and richness of the language. This is illustrated by copious citations from our leading poets, dramatists and romancists. The influence of our Bible on national life, on English patriotism, industry and commerce; most of all, its influence in kindling and maintaining spiritual life, is eloquently told.

This work is embellished with pictures of Wycliffe, Tyndale and Coverdale, of Lutterworth church and Wycliffe's church in 1340, and a fac-simile of Tyndale's prologue. Accompanying a description of the Jerusalem Chamber of the Westminster Abbey is a picture of the entrance to the same. Account is given of the introduction of textual divisions, running titles, summaries and marginal chronology. We are favored with a good index to the volume, also with an index to the literature of the subject.

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BURTON'S NEW TESTAMENT MOODS AND TENSES.

SYNTAX OF THE MOODS AND TENSES IN NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. *By Ernest DeWitt Burton, Professor in the University of Chicago.* Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Pp. 215. University Press of Chicago. 1894.

The first edition of this work appeared as a pamphlet in 1888. The design of this enlarged edition is to assist English-speaking students in the task of translating the Greek New Testament into English forms of thought and expression. It looks upon grammar not as an end in itself, but as one of the indispensable auxiliaries of interpretation. It is written, not in the interest of historical, but of exegetical, grammar. It is an exposition of the functions of the verb in New Testament Greek, so far as those functions are expressed by the distinctions of mood and tense. With forms it has nothing to do. The functions of a particular form or group of forms are not to be learned from the name given to that form or group. Such name is usually derived from some prominent function of the form or group. For example, the term Aorist reflects the fact that the forms thus designated most frequently represent an action indefinitely, without reference to its progress. The name Optative reminds us that one function of the forms so named is to express a wish. While, therefore, the names of the forms were originally intended to designate their respective functions, they cannot now be regarded as descriptive of the actual functions, but must be taken as conventional, and, to a considerable extent, arbitrary, names of forms. The functions must be learned, not from the names, but from observation of the actual usage. A Greek grammar may be written, not for the grammarian as such, but with reference to the wants and uses of the interpreter. It should take the forms as it finds them, and, without any attempt at tracing their origin or development, should define their functions from the point of view of the English New Testament interpreter, for the purpose of enabling him to reproduce the thought conveyed by the form. It would, therefore, be as much concerned with the forms and modes of English expression as with those of the New Testament writers. For every student of the

New Testament who would acquire facility in the work of interpretation must possess a knowledge of the distinctions of thought which are marked by the different moods and tenses of the Greek verb, and at the same time a knowledge of the modifications of the English verb which serve to express the same distinctions of thought. It is not enough to have at hand for reference an encyclopedic treatise on the subject. For this purpose he needs a book which, availing itself of the assured results of comparative and historical grammar, shall enumerate, in as succinct a way as possible, the various functions of each mood and tense, exhibit in some degree their relative importance, and define each clearly. Definition should be constructed with reference to the point of view of the interpreter. English usage must be defined and compared with Greek usage. To provide such a book has been the aim of Professor Burton, and we are more than pleased with the success which has crowned his efforts.

The method of construction that he has adopted is admirable. Those usages which are of most importance are emphasized by being set in largest type, with a title in bold-faced type. The table of contents has also been so constructed as to make prominent a conspectus of the leading uses, and so greatly add to the value of the volume, whether for reference or as a text-book. Less frequent usages are put in smaller type. To aid in elucidating the force of a Greek tense, discussions of the English usage, which would have no place in a work on Greek grammar pure and simple, are introduced, and add greatly to the clearness of the distinctions sought to be drawn. For example, to exhibit the difference between the idioms of the two languages, the author, on page 24, places side by side the definitions of the English perfect, pluperfect and past, and of the Greek perfect, pluperfect and aorist, and he shows by such comparison that the English perfect has a larger range of use than the Greek perfect, and the English pluperfect than the Greek pluperfect; while, on the other hand, the Greek aorist has a wider range than the English past, since it performs precisely those functions which the Greek perfect and pluperfect refuse, but which in modern English are performed, not by the past, but by the perfect and pluperfect. The aorist thus not only covers the ground of the English past, but overlaps in part upon that of the English perfect and pluperfect.

The Greek text quoted is that of Westcott & Hort. In the English translation of examples the Revised Version of 1881 is followed, save where the revisers used a different Greek text from that of Westcott & Hort, or where they made what must be regarded as unquestionably an error of translation. As our older standard grammars are generally based on the text of Stephens or that of the Elzivirs, we recognize this citation of examples from the most approved of modern critical texts, now almost exclusively used by students, as a decided gain, and calculated to add to the usefulness of this grammar, if it is not indispensable to the accuracy of its discussions and its acceptability with scholars.

In elucidating the various uses of the moods and of the forms employed after particular conjunctive particles, the author besides giving the usage which obtains in the New Testament, almost invariably states the classical usage, and frequently also that of later or ecclesiastical Greek. Not only may the history of the idiomatic changes of the language, through the transition of centuries, be thus learned, but it serves to make his whole discussion of almost as much value to readers of

classic Greek as to those who seek to interpret the New Testament. In the discussion of these differences between Attic and Hellenistic usage many interesting questions arise. For example, that on pp. 94, 95, whether *ὅσα* in the New Testament is always to be understood in the telic sense (*in order that*), which is the only force it has in earlier Greek writers, or whether it is ever ecbatic (*so that*). Meyer insists that it is always the former. To this view leans Winer. While Professor Burton inclines to stand with these, he yet concedes that in Rev. xiii. 13 we have a probable instance of this particle denoting actual result, and quotes approvingly the language of Buttmann, that "although it never stands in the strict ecbatic sense (for *ὅσα* with the finite verb), it has, nevertheless, here (in the New Testament) reached the very boundary-line where the difference between the two relations disappears, and it is nearer to the ecbatic than to its original final sense." This constant comparison of New Testament idiom with that which obtains in Homer, Pindar and the Post-Aristotelian authors is both gratifying and instructive.

The author's classification of conditional sentences is substantially that of Professor Goodwin. Taking his clew from an article by Professor W. G. Hale, of Chicago, in the *American Journal of Philology*, our author has worked out the clearest statement of the idiomatic differences between Greek and English usage as to moods in indirect discourse that we have ever seen. His power of analysis, of simplifying an obscure and difficult subject, in no part of his grammar appears to better advantage than in what he has written on this subject. He refuses to concede the position of Meyer that *ἐτις* with the infinitive, and *τοῦ* with the infinitive always signify purpose. As to whether the aorist is ever in the New Testament used to express customary action and general truth (called the gnomic aorist), he differs with Meyer and contends that it does, and cites as instances: 1 Peter i. 24; Luke vii. 35; John xv. 6; James i. 11, 24. In treating the aorist tense as respects the point of view from which the action is looked at, he distinguishes the historical or indefinite, the inceptive and the resultative aorists. These uses belong to the tense in all its moods. Besides these he assigns to the aorist indicative three other occasional uses, expressed by the terms gnomic, epistolary, and dramatic aorists. He attacks the idea that all participles with an article are equivalent to the relative pronoun with the corresponding tense of the indicative. That such phrases may often be resolved in this way, and the sense essentially preserved, is true. But that this is not a general principle is evident from the fact that the tenses of the indicative express time-relations from the point of view, not of the principal verb, but of the speaker, while the participle on the other hand is in itself timeless, and gains whatever suggestion of time-relation it conveys from its relation to the rest of the sentence. The classification of participles with reference to logical force into adjective, adverbial and substantive is substantially that of Professor William Arnold Stevens.

This is an easier book to study than the larger standard works like those of Buttmann and Winer. Its examples are fewer. The tedious and pedantic references to other works and authorities that so disfigure their pages and make the examination of them a burden are here wanting. The unusually full table of contents, the index of subjects, index of Greek words commented on and index of Scripture passages referred to, are all that could be desired. The least satisfactory part of the work is that on the use of negatives with verbs. But here the difficulty

is rather in the subject than in the treatment of it. We commend this work to the use of New Testament students, and express the hope that following up this discussion of moods and tenses we may some day have from this same careful and scholarly pen a discussion of the whole field of New Testament grammar.

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PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHURCH HISTORY.

PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHURCH HISTORY. Vol. VI. New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1894.

The meeting of the American Society of Church History, held in December, 1893, was the first since the death of its distinguished founder and president, Rev. Philip Schaff, D. D., LL. D., the most eminent church historian of the present day.

Dr. Schaff ended his useful career on the 20th October, 1893. He was a native of Switzerland, was educated in the leading universities of Germany, and at the early age of twenty-four came to America as a professor in the German Reformed Theological Seminary in Pennsylvania, of which Dr. John Nevin was the president. He afterwards transferred his membership to the Presbyterian Church, and at the time of his death was the professor of Church History in Union Seminary, New York city. As was eminently proper, the Society, at its late meeting, passed a series of resolutions in honor of Dr. Schaff, and devoted a considerable part of its sessions to hearing read a number of warm and well-merited tributes to his memory. It is interesting to note that these tributes were paid not only by those who were connected with him by denominational ties and partialities, but by those also who could have admired him only for his great personal worth and his contributions to Christian learning.

The interesting papers of Dr. Chambers, of the Dutch Reformed Church; Bishop Hurst, of the Methodist Church; Dr. Jacobs, of the Lutheran Church; Dr. Tiffany, of the Episcopal Church; Dr. Shahan, of the Roman Catholic Church; Dr. Richardson, of the Presbyterian Church, and Dr. Allen, of the Unitarian Church, are given in full in this volume, and are worthy of preservation.

Dr. Schaff was eminently catholic in his feelings towards the church at large. He was free not only from the bitterness and narrowness, but from the intensity, of denominational feeling. In his churchly and doctrinal sentiments he verged towards broad churchism. The description which he gives in his *Church History*, of Eusebius of Cæsarea, the leader of the middle party in the Council of Nice, may be taken as the unconscious description of himself. "The satisfactory solution of Eusebius's apparent inconsistency," he says, "is to be found in his own indecision and leaning to a doctrinal latitudinarianism, not unfrequent in historians who become familiar with a vast variety of opinions in different ages and countries."

Besides the tributes to Dr. Schaff, several interesting and valuable papers were presented. Among these may be mentioned that of Rev. Thomas O'Gorman, D. D., of the Catholic University of America, on the *Life and Work of St. Thomas Aquinas*. This article evinces no original research, but tells in a pleasant style the story of the life and works of that great schoolman of the thirteenth century, whom Pope Leo XIII. has declared *ex cathedra* to be the master and prince of all

scholastic doctors, and whose writings he prescribes as the standard and text-book of the Catholic faith.

St. Thomas is pronounced by Dr. Gorman "the most perfect mind the world has ever seen" A singular mistake is made by the writer in describing the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa as "learned, sensual, generous, half-Christian, half-Mohammedan, and as the founder of the University of Naples"; all of which is true of Frederick II., but not of Barbarossa.

Another valuable paper, by Dr. McGiffert, of Union Seminary, New York, discusses the *Apocryphal Gospel of Peter*, fragments of which were discovered a few years since in a tomb in Egypt, the manuscript containing also fragments of an apocalyptic work of equal antiquity. It is shown with reasonable certainty that the so-called gospel was known and used by Justin Martyr in the second century.

The seventh paper, by Henry C. Vedder, of New York city, shows conclusively that the *jure divino* theory of episcopacy, the doctrine of apostolic succession, was not held by the early Reformers of the Church of England. In their controversy with the Puritans, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, "they fought their opponents, not by proclaiming a *jure divino* theory of episcopacy, but by maintaining that the Bible teaches no particular form of government of the church, and that episcopacy is lawful as not being prohibited and being clearly of very ancient origin." The theory that an imperative form of church government was laid down in the New Testament was maintained by such Presbyterians as Cartwright, but not by such Episcopalians as Hooker. The high church Episcopalians have changed their ground since that day.

It will be seen, from what has been said, that the most variant opinions in theology and church polity are discussed from a historical point of view in the papers of this society. The papers are not the less valuable on that account.

Southwestern Presbyterian University.

ROBERT PRICE.

CHANNEY'S "AGNES."

AGNES, DAUGHTER OF WILLIAM THE BAPTIST; or, The Young Theologian. *By Rev. J. M. Chaney, D. D.* Pp. 129. Price, 75 cents. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1894.

Agnes is worthy of her distinguished parentage. She, though but a child of thirteen years, possesses a quick perception, a broad comprehension, and good logical powers. She is an apt learner, and a skilful Socratic in propounding questions. Yet she is not an exaggeration. There are many children whose powers are stronger than their parents and teachers admit, and their faculties are weakened, perhaps permanently, because truth has been given to them in homeopathic quantities. Because of the excessive dilution, there exists an enfeeblement which is the result of intellectual inanition. Dr. Chaney believes that children have the capacity to understand the cardinal doctrines of theology, and that patient and skilful efforts to impart these articles of our faith would yield happy results. We are of the same mind. Much of our Sabbath-school literature is distressingly deficient in that it contains a maximum amount of story and a minimum amount of truth. The narrative, instead of being the mere vehicle of sound doctrine, too often becomes the chief end of the volume.

In this little volume, of beautiful type, Dr. Chaney discourses about sin, re-

demption, the authority of the Scriptures, church rights and privileges, predestination, the final perseverance of the saints, etc. His style is narrative and readable. We were entertained and edified. We hope the author will give our children other books of this character. We would like to see him and other writers reform our Sabbath-school literature, and expel the wretched Sunday novel from the book-cases that stand in our churches.

The author's method of delivering his thoughts, while, in the main, clear and excellent, is perhaps too rapid. Agnes grasps his meaning and fetches her conclusions too promptly. Many of his readers will not be so alert. Agnes ought to tarry longer before some of the topics, for the thought to gradually enter her mind, and then the author's young readers, through her, would more certainly catch the point of the exposition, or feel the force of the argument. But the author has performed his task wonderfully well. He is particularly happy in the quotations from Scripture and in the use which he makes of them.

We dissent from an incidental doctrine which we find on page 47. There, all unfulfilled threats of punishment made by parents against their children are characterized as "lies." Under a purely parental form of government there is a legitimate place for unconditional pardon. God's government is not parental but magisterial. He cannot absolutely pardon. But a parent may forgive his child without any atonement, even after threatening. Of course this pardoning prerogative may be very injudiciously and harmfully employed, but the parent has the authority to forgive, and need not lie in order to recall a threat, or to exempt his child from punishment.

There is a doctrinal point which is not put exactly to our notion, page 55: "Our State law says a man shall not shoot quails between the first of January and the first of October. There is a penalty of five dollars for the violation of this law." The question is now raised, "In how many ways may a man comply with this law?" To this there are two answers: "1. By not shooting a quail in the time mentioned; 2. By paying the penalty." The conclusion is a fallacious one, that a man keeps a law by paying the penalty. It is an utter misconception of the nature of penalty. If Christ, for example, had offered nothing more than penal obedience to the law, would there have been any justification? The law's demands are not the alternative—either obedience or penalty. Its original demand is for obedience; that failing, then it demands penalty; that supplied, then it continues to demand obedience. To redeem us, Christ had to obey both the preceptive and penal elements in the divine law. Dr. Chaney does not deny this.

Our author's exposition of the temptation of Christ is very interesting. He takes the broad ground that Christ, as a man, as a second Adam, endured the whole redemptive probation unaided by his divinity; that he did not discharge the obligations of man by drawing upon his divinity; that his success as the second Adam proved that the first Adam could have stood his probation, and so the responsibility of sin is squarely fixed upon humanity, and humanity in Christ relieved that portion of the race for which he acted. Along this line there are some fresh and helpful suggestions. But our author does not attach sufficient importance to the divinity of Christ. (P. 89.) The theology of the book is federal, and it is in the main sound, and very strong.

The book was written for young people. It is a good book. It ought to be put at once in every Sabbath-school.

R. A. WEBB.

MCDONALD'S "OLD PATHS."

THE OLD PATHS: Questions and Answers About the Good Old Way. *By Angus McDonald.* Nashville, Tenn.: University Press. 1894. Pp. 176. Price, cloth, \$1.00; leatherette, 75 cts.

Dr. McDonald is the industrious and beloved pastor of the Moore Memorial Presbyterian Church in Nashville, Tenn. He has wrought his book on his own anvil, but the material which he has beaten into shape is not his opinions, but texts of Scripture. His style is delightfully popular, and there is scarcely an expression which would puzzle the rudest peasant. His object has been to make the "paths" plain to the unlearned in a way that would not be displeasing to the learned. He has good reason to felicitate himself upon the result. The book is like the author, and there be many who love and praise him. We hope his deserving little volume will have as many friends as he has.

Dr. McDonald discourses upon such topics as faith, repentance, the duty of joining the church, the church, church government, the standards, election and free agency, the perseverance and perfection of believers, family government, women preaching, the mode of baptism, instrumental music, the Sabbath, the tithe, and missions. We have mentioned these topics in the author's order of treatment. Inasmuch as the human mind is naturally logical, in our judgment something would have been gained by following a more logical succession of subjects. The title, while Scriptural, is weak, because there is nothing unique or striking about it. There is a great deal more in the volume than its title prophesies. A more pretentious effort—severer thinking upon the topics themselves until they yielded some felicitous unity—would have been more successful.

The method of treatment consists in the selection of some unique and relatively unused text which contains the topic in seminal form, and then the development is made by an appeal to Scripture texts for the individual "points." The amplification is of the nature of a "Bible reading" upon the subject. The church, for example, is discussed from the words, "And Moses took half the blood and put it in basons." Election and Free Agency are developed from this passage, "And they called Rebekah and said unto her: Wilt thou go with this man? And she said, I will go."

In his chapter on Faith he is simple to the comprehension of a child and orthodox to the satisfaction of a Martin Luther. In Repentance he sees the idea of reformation essentially involved. The church is "called out" as a separate organization, and men are "called out" from among sinful men to join it. The church is distinguished from all other organizations by the fact that it "has blood in the basons." The author is very forceful in his criticism upon all societies, in or out of the church, which have no blood in the basons. We wish he had been even more aggressive. It was bad enough when we had benevolent orders and secret societies outside of the lines of the church "throwing rocks at" that society which has a divine head, and a divine constitution, and a divine mission; but to-day the most persistent fault-finders with the church, the most acrid critics upon its modes of propagating the gospel, the most restless protestants against its authority and discipline, are the inter-denominational societies which exist by the sufferance of the church, are the daily beneficiaries of its influence, and whose sense of gratitude is manifested in the usurpation of church prerogatives and the abuse of those

ministers and those ecclesiastical bodies who do not quite abdicate in their favor. The blood is in the church's basons, but there are many who fret if they are not permitted to sprinkle and spill it in an irresponsible way.

The chapter on Election and Free Agency is delicious. God does not exert his efficiency against the non-elect either in time or eternity. They are carried down to woe by the inexorable working of that evil principle which they imported into their hearts and to which they tenaciously cling. Abraham selected Rebekah for Isaac; he was under no obligation to accept any other woman; and Rebekah freely chose Isaac upon the testimony of his servants. So is the case between God and the sinner.

Dr. McDonald makes a strong argument against the preaching of women, and in favor of the tithe as God's financial system for his church. We would like to notice many points of real interest. The author's weakest chapter is the one on instrumental music. He fails to see that David introduced it in the tabernacle worship of God by express command; that it existed in the tabernacle and temple alone, and not in the synagogue; and that, at the rending of the veil, instrumental music went the way of all that was ritualistic and symbolic in the Jewish church.

We have read the author's book with great interest and profit. It is the very thing which a pastor needs to place with a doubting member of his flock. Because of its very simplicity, it would be of untold value to Sabbath-school workers.

R. A. WEBB.

IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

OLD TABERNACLE THEOLOGY FOR NEW TESTAMENT TIMES. *By R. Bruden Moore, D. D.* 8vo, pp. 440. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-School Work. 1894.

This work is a study of the tabernacle from within rather than from without. The author has had a twofold object in view: One has been to learn what the tabernacle was designed to signify and to teach; the other has been to apply what might be learned from the ancient symbolism to the present time, and in blending the lights of the old and the new, not only to make plain the relation of Mosaism to the gospel, but also to make the blended lights practical. The author has sought to make each chapter complete in itself, even though this has resulted in more or less of repetition, because of the same symbol or truth insinuating itself into the discussion of several doctrines. These statements, drawn from the author's own words largely, will indicate the nature, purpose, and plan of the book.

The author most properly introduces his study with two chapters devoted to the consideration of the question whether there was a tabernacle, in which he discusses with discrimination and ability the position of the destructive critics that the tabernacle was an invention of unscrupulous priests and scribes, the writers of the priest-code, of about 441 B. C. He shows the demoralizing tendency of such a teaching, arrays and weighs the testimony of Christ and the apostles, and sets forth a sound theory of inspiration. The subsequent chapters consider such subjects as, The Object of the Tabernacle, The Doctrine of the True God, The Character of God, The Doctrine of Sin, of Divine Mercy, of the Coming One, of Atonement, of the Holy Renewer, of Forgiveness, of Consecration, of Prayer, The Divine Ideal of the Ministry, and of the Support of the Ministry, etc. In the elaboration of the topics, and the application of symbol and type, the author realizes both the difficulties and temptations which attend minute application of symbolism, and makes the Scriptures themselves his chief guide and main resort, especially the Psalms and the Epistle to the Hebrews. He realizes the value of the advice of Dr. Junkin, in his similar work, to "keep the symbols separate," but yet shows clearly how many of these symbols were related to each other and to the tabernacle as a whole, and that many truths are found in the several parts, or many of the doctrines involved are connected into a system. In noting a similar principle of Fairbairn, he claims that the fact that when the mind is treated to many and different notions under one symbol it necessarily takes in none distinctly, is true only of that method in which the symbols or types are treated seriatim; whereas, in the tracing of the doctrines seriatim, rather than the symbols, and in the finding them wherever they are manifest in any symbol or service, the mind will be concentrated on these doctrines, and will be materially aided rather than doubtfully divided. A full topical index at the close of the volume adds greatly to its practical value.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. *By Henry M. Harman, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Greek and Hebrew in Dickinson College.* 8vo, pp. 798. \$4.00. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis.

The incorporation of this volume, in its recent tenth thousand, into the "Biblical and Theological Library," published under the auspices of the Methodist Episcopal Church, brings it within the purview of these pages, although it has been for a number of years known to the theological world. It is written from the conservative standpoint. It shows the most painstaking examination of authorities and the original sources. It brings out fairly the arguments and opinions of the critics of the rationalistic school. His view of inspiration is uncertain. He says that verbal inspiration in every part of the sacred Scriptures would give them more sanctity and authority, but "even if we could determine with complete certainty the original reading in every case, the mass of the Christian world who read the Scriptures would not be profited by verbal inspiration." The subjects of the establishment of the canon, the language of the Scriptures, the condition of the text, the manuscripts, versions, etc., are fully considered. The unity and Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch are maintained. The views of the new critical school are fully examined. The Book of Job is attributed to some Jew living as late as Solomon's day. Ezra and Chronicles are attributed to Ezra. The Davidic authorship of many of the Psalms for which Bleek and others would find another author, is maintained. Without naming another for the work, he is not willing to ascribe Ecclesiastes to Solomon, nor to fix its date earlier than some time after Malachi. Of the Song of Solomon, he thinks it would have had no place in the canon had its aim been nothing higher than to set forth the mutual love of two persons of different sexes. The unity of the authorship of Isaiah is supported, and the arguments against this fact carefully examined and refuted. The general trend of the author's thought and the nature of his work may be seen from these specimens.

A HARMONY OF THE GOSPELS, in the Revised Version, with Some New Features. *By John A. Broadus, D. D., LL. D., with Notes by A. T. Robertson, D. D.* 8vo. Pp. xviii., 265. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1893.

Anything from the pen of Dr. Broadus may well be regarded as valuable. This last work of his is to give us a Harmony of the Gospels, in the text of the Anglo-American Revision, constructed or rather arranged upon a somewhat different order from Harmonies with which scholars have been most familiar. This new arrangement relates chiefly to the division of the Lord's ministry. The usual method has been to divide that ministry into periods determined by the several Passovers occurring during its progress. Because of the uncertainty attending the determination of these Passovers, growing largely out of the difficulty connected with John v. 1, and hence of the length of the Lord's ministry, and because of the relative unimportance of the feasts, except the last Passover, and because of the needlessness of following an exact chronological order, especially when this cannot be definitely ascertained, Dr. Broadus prefers to regard the Lord's life as dividing itself into three well-defined periods, in each of which one may trace a gradual progress. In the first of these the chief characteristic is our Lord's self-manifestation; in the second, the hostility of his enemies; in the third, the train-

ing of the Twelve. The line of development followed, therefore, is the inner movement of the history of Christ towards its culmination on Calvary and at Joseph's tomb. Some of the more important questions of detail that have long been under debate are considered in Notes appended to the volume. Other questions are considered in very brief foot-notes, but not with that fulness which we could desire. While substituting the inner movement of the history for the outer, our author still indicates, here and there, his views as to chronological questions, holding, for instance, to the interpretation of John v. 1 as a Passover feast, and hence to the longer period of the ministry, placing Levi's call and feast just after the first circuit through Galilee, making the time of the arrival at Bethany on the last journey from Jericho Friday afternoon and the public entry into Jerusalem Sunday, the institution of the Supper Thursday evening (the beginning of the Jewish Friday), etc. In reference to all such points, however, the author's position is, that however glad one would be to settle them, yet it really does not matter what be the decision, so far as regards our understanding of the Lord's recorded history and teachings.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOKS OF EZRA, NEHEMIAH, AND ESTHER. *By A. H. Sayce, M. A., Deputy Professor of Comparative Philology at Oxford; Hon. LL. D.; Dublin author of "Fresh Light from the Ancient Monuments," "Assyria: Its Princes and People," etc.* Third edition. 12mo. Pp. 144. \$1.00. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1894.

Those who are familiar with Professor Sayce's contributions to the intelligent study of the Bible in the light of the monuments need not be told that in this little book one will find most valuable testimony to the books which they embrace. It is a brief account of the books themselves and of the history of the times to which they belong. As the preface rightly claims, its distinguishing peculiarity is the use made in it of recent monumental discoveries, more especially of the inscriptions of Cyrus. As to the authorship of Esther, Professor Sayce argues that it could not have been Mordecai, nor Ezra, but can indicate no other. He ably defends the historical credibility of the book against the critics.

MOSES AND THE PENTATEUCH: A Popular Statement of the Theories of the So-called Higher Criticism, with Some Reasons for not Accepting Them. *By Rev. Howard Agnew Johnston, Ph. D., Pastor of the Forty-first Street Presbyterian Church, Chicago.* 120 pages. Price, bound in cloth, 50 cents; in paper, 25 cents. Cincinnati, O.: Monfort & Co. 1893.

This most concise and unpretentious little book deals in a popular way with the questions which the times thrust upon us. It will be found very useful by Sabbath-school teachers and scholars. It gives a clear, brief account of what the modern advanced Criticism is and of how it is to be met.

BIBLICAL ESCHATOLOGY. *By Rev. Henry T. Cheever, D. D.* Boston: Lee & Shepard, publishers, 10 Milk street. 1893.

This volume of 241 pages consists of a review of the writings of a former Presbyterian divine, Mr. L. C. Baker, who withdrew from the Presbyterian Church because his views in eschatology were out of harmony with the Westminster Con-

fession. Dr. Cheever withdrew from the same church for the same reasons, and so very naturally sympathizes with the views of Mr. Baker. The central doctrine of the book is that all men, by nature, are the sons of God, and will finally acquire a character in harmony with God's. The penalty of sin consists of death and hell, and is followed by the redemptive resurrection of all the lost in order to their re-birth or re-incarnation for another trial or probation here in this world. If they fail in this second trial, the author does not tell us what the next expedient will be; but his principle would require successive re-births until a righteous character was acquired. He proposes this eschatology instead of the doctrine received by the patristic, mediæval and modern orthodox churches of the endless punishment of the incorrigible and impenitent. We think there is no light shed upon the dark destiny of the lost in this volume, and we would recommend to its author the careful exegeses of Christ's deliverances upon this solemn and awful subject rather than such fruitless and idle speculations as those with which he has filled these pages. The book is not destitute of ability, and theologians who desire acquaintance with a novel theory, destined, doubtless, to attract attention in the future, will do well to read the volume.

A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH. *By Oliver J. Thatcher, of the University of Chicago.* Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co, 1893.

This is one of the most interesting and readable manuals on the history of the Apostolic church issued in recent years. The style is clear and forcible. The author has evidently worked carefully through this period in biblical history, and is master of the literature of the subject. We do not know where the scholar, who is well established in the faith, can find within the same compass so careful and thorough a discussion of this most important field. We regret that the doctrinal views of the author prevent us recommending for popular use his work, which is so valuable in many respects. Nor can we agree with him in quite a number of his points in the construction of his history. While Paul was doubtless the greatest of the apostles, yet Mr. Thatcher scarcely does justice to the eleven, and especially to Peter, whom he seems to us to mention but seldom, except for purposes of depreciation. Nor is the author correct in the opinion that Paul's interpretation of the law would "do away" with the Old Testament, whose inspiration the great Apostle to the Gentiles so cordially recognized and emphasized. We think that the learned author does injustice to the Patristic church when he says that Paul's interpretation of the law was not accepted, for it seems to us that early church history is a confirmation of his complete success in his great controversy with the Judaizing Christians. Despite these blemishes, Mr. Thatcher gives us a very valuable book, and we should be glad to see its circulation amongst those who are prepared to appreciate his usually careful and balanced statements and to profit by his patient and thorough work.

NONE LIKE IT. A Plea for the Old Sword. *By Joseph Parker.* Fleming H. Revell Co.: Chicago, New York, Toronto. 1894.

We have read this work of Dr. Parker's with great satisfaction. It is written largely as a reply to the volume of Mr. R. F. Horton, and its nine chapters con-

tain much keen argument and instructive statement expressed in admirable literary form. We think Dr. Parker goes too far in admitting the possible inspiration of some of the present day prophets, but possibly this is only an illustration of that subtle vein of fine irony which runs through the whole book. While not claiming to be an expert, the accomplished author shows himself fully competent to measure swords with the critical Prof. Bennett or Mr. Horton.

The skilful preacher, trained in the art of putting things, appears on every page. We have marked a few sentences for quotation: "A man is not necessarily 'thoughtless' because he differs from me. He may be only modifying my omniscience." "We are wisely cautioned against reading meanings into the Bible. We should also be cautioned against reading meanings out of it." "We infinitize ourselves and call the issue God." "Tell angels of examples, but to the sinner preach a Saviour." "Even bibliolatry may be preferable to self-deification."

We wish all of our ministers would read his admirable chapter entitled "Ad Clerum," and we cannot forbear quoting the following:

"I have sometimes thought of making a list of words not necessary to salvation and of hanging it up in the pulpit. The list would contain such words as—Absolute, Relative, Hypothesis, Phenomena, Agnostic, Positivist, Synoptic, The Johannine Problem, Assurbanipal, The Septuagint, Psychology, Assyriology, Orthophonic, Targum, and Hegelianism. . . . The sort of preaching which I describe as the Gospel-made-difficult, never did me any good. Nor did I ever wish to speak to the preacher. He always seemed to me to be preaching out of a cloud into a cloud, and to be writhing with intellectual and verbal pain."

Let our ministers take due notice and conduct themselves accordingly.

ASSYRIAN ECHOES OF THE WORD. *By Rev. Thomas Laurie, D. D.* With Illustrations. 8vo. Pp. 380. \$2.00. New York: American Tract Society. 1894.

This work is a gathering together of the results of Assyrian exploration, archæology, and monumental evidence as they bear upon the Scriptures. The author is specially qualified to appreciate the results of such investigation by long residence as a missionary at Mosul. Unlike any work of the kind with which we are familiar, he presents the subjects considered in alphabetical order, making this volume really an Assyro-Scripture Encyclopedia. Personal sympathy, residence near the scene of the ancient life and literature described, acquaintance with many of the explorers and archæologists, whose work he cites, and a wise and discriminating use of the materials in hand, enable the author to give us an admirable collection of facts and testimony bearing upon the word of God.

THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS. *By John Bunyan.* 12mo. Pp. 341. 75 cts.

THE HOLY WAR. *By John Bunyan.* Preface by Alexander Whyte, D. D. 12mo. Pp. 311. 75 cents. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-School Work. 1894.

These two books are especially notable for the very low price at which they are published. The print is clear and distinct, the paper good, and the binding substantial and in good taste. The editions are most valuable for general distribution.

STUDIES IN ORIENTAL SOCIAL LIFE; and Gleams from the East on the Sacred Page. By *H. Clay Trumbull*, author of "*Kadesh-Barnea*," "*The Blood Covenant*," etc. Cloth. 450 pages. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 6$ inches. Price, \$2.50. Philadelphia: John D. Wattles & Company. 1894.

Few men have made as valuable contributions to the history of oriental customs and places as Dr. Trumbull. This last volume is worthy of those which have preceded it. The range of subjects considered is not large, but they are exhaustively treated, especially those in which the author considers Betrothals and Weddings, Hospitality, and Funerals and Mourning. Other topics are the Voice of the Forerunner, The Primitive Idea of the Way, The Oriental Idea of Father, Prayers and Praying, Food in the Desert, The Pilgrimage Idea, The Samaritan Passover, etc. Many passages of Scripture are explained or illuminated by these rich pages. A Topical and Scriptural Index at the close of the volume adds greatly to its practical value by making the material available to the student by ready reference.

OUR JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD. An Illustrated Record of a Year's Travel of Forty-one Thousand Miles Through India, China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, Palestine, Greece, Turkey, Italy, France, Spain, etc. By *Rev. Francis E. Clark, D. D.*, President of the United Society of Christian Endeavor. With Glimpses of Life in the Far-Off Lands, as Seen Through a Woman's Eyes. By *Mrs. Harriet E. Clark*. Illustrated with steel plate portraits, upwards of two hundred engravings, etc. 8vo. Pp. 641. Hartford, Conn.: A. D. Worthington & Co. 1894.

The foregoing full title will tell the nature of this book. "Father Endeavor Clark," the author, is too well known to need any introduction. This volume is the record of his recent journey around the world. His trip was taken chiefly in the interest of the Society of which he is the founder, but that special feature figures but little upon these pages. The narrative is such as any ordinary traveller gifted with strong perceptive powers, living interest in humanity, a warm heart and Christian principles could have written. It is not written for "Endeavorers," so-called, but for all readers. It is as "pleasant reading" as we have encountered in a long while. The modes of travel, the novelties in custom and life in the countries visited, the incidents of the journey, the needs of the people of different parts of the earth, are graphically portrayed, and all in a style remarkable for its lack of affectation or assumption of piety. The chapters added by Mrs. Clark are of special value. The illustrations which adorn almost every other page are clear and well executed, adding greatly to the interest of the book.

This valuable and attractive work is sold only by subscription. Copies can be had in no other way. We recommend it as one of the best books of travel that we have met.

BUNYAN CHARACTERS. Lectures Delivered in St. George's Free Church, Edinburgh. By *Alexander Whyte, D. D.*, author of "*Characters and Characteristics of William Law*." 12mo. Pp. 281. \$1 00. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-School Work. 1893.

A series of twenty-six lectures, suggested by some of the leading characters of

Bunyan's works. They are rich in suggestion and practical thought, as well as in elucidation of the Scriptures. They are in many cases compact and forcible sermons. Pastors would do well to read one occasionally to their people, and for pastorless churches we know of no book of discourses or lectures that ruling elders could better use when, as our Book of Government directs, they assemble the people for regular worship.

THE YOUNG MAN FOURSQUARE. *By Rev. James I. Vance, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Norfolk, Va.* Cloth, 12mo. Pp. 104. 50 cents. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1894.

The Young Man in Business, The Young Man in Society, The Young Man in Politics, The Young Man in Religion, are the titles of the four chapters of this admirable little book. The young Norfolk pastor shows here the secret of his success in winning and holding the young men of his church. He deals plainly, practically, forcibly, and in a most attractive manner with those very subjects in which young men are interested; and the glowing interest and sympathy that pervade every page make his words reach the hearts of those whom he addresses. The style is crisp and clear, the appeals direct, the remarks pointed and pungent, and the whole treatment of the practical themes of the book characterized by vigor and strong common sense. We should like to see a copy of this book in the hands of every young man in the land.

HYMNS OF THE AGES, for Public and Social Worship. Second Edition. With FORMS OF SERVICE [Optional] For Baptism, A Public Profession of Faith, Marriages and Funerals, Together with the Westminster Catechism, the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, and the Apostles' Creed. 24mo. Pp. 576. Roan, red edge, 65 cts.; gilt edge, 80 cts.; turkey morocco, gilt, \$1.65. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1894.

The special feature of this new edition of Dr. R. P. Kerr's *Hymns of the Ages*, the use of which was recommended to the churches by the Macon Assembly, 1893, is the incorporation in it of the optional forms adopted with the revised Directory for Public Worship by the General Assembly of 1894. No one can question the desirability of such a combination in one volume, so that those who worship in praise may also become familiar with those parts of the general Directory for Worship which will be in most common use. The addition of the Catechism, etc., is also most valuable. The whole forms, in the word edition of the hymns, a very handy little volume, compact, clearly printed, and worthy of general use. The price, also, adapts it to all. The edition containing these Forms, etc., costs but fifteen cents more, in each style of binding, than the edition without the appended matter.

THE WEDDED LIFE. *By J. R. Miller.* \$1.00. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-School Work. 1894.

Most daintily bound in white and gold, beautifully printed, and in all respects tasteful and elegant, this book, of which the present is a new edition, is the handsomest form in which an officiating minister can give a certificate to those whom he has united in marriage. The first page contains a beautifully engraved, but

simple and quiet form of certificate; following this are pages for the entry of the names of congratulating friends; then two forms of marriage service are given; and following these are chapters on *The Wedded Life*, *The Husband's Part*, and *The Wife's Part*. All are written in the well-known and attractive style of Dr. Miller, and are full of wise suggestions and thoughts.

IN FAIR SILESIA. Translated from the German of Gustav Nieritz. *By Mary E. Ireland.* 12mo. Pp. 156. Cloth, 60 cents. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1894.

HOW A-CHON-HO-AH FOUND THE LIGHT. *By Annie Maria Barnes, author of "Ninito," "Life of David Livingstone," etc.* 12mo. Pp. 266. \$1.00. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1894.

These two recent issues of our own publishing house are pure, wholesome books, which can be safely placed in the hands of our children. The first is a translation of a simple little German story, weaving in some phases of modern life and present-day troubles among manufacturing people. The second is an account of the conversion of an Indian girl, with some description of the customs and views of the uncivilized tribes of our West. The author evidently has much acquaintance, from reading or otherwise, with the "Wild West," but we think she has not improved her story by the foot-notes, which say "this actually occurred," or "this is not overdrawn," etc. Fewer ohs! and ahs! throughout the book would also greatly improve it. We hardly think so much of the ejaculatory is characteristic of the Indian.

THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS for December is, as usual, full of special features. Under the head of "The Progress of the World," it treats of the recent elections, the approaching session of Congress, the banking question, the tariff outlook, the progress of civil service reform, the "Greater New York," the Populists in the late election, the war in China, international arbitration, the report on the Chicago strikes, and many other questions of the day. Its portrait gallery, always full and entertaining, presents President Cleveland, Nicholas II. of Russia, Dr. Shedd, Dr. McCosh, and many others. The new Governors recently elected are also pictured. Mr. W. T. Stead has an article on Alexander III., the Peace-Keeper of Europe. The citations from the leading articles of the month, the review of periodicals, and indexed list of the best articles, is, as always, exceedingly valuable.

THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

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I. THE LATEST PHASE OF HISTORICAL RATIONALISM.

IN the last number of the QUARTERLY (pp. 36 *et seq.*), we undertook to give some general account of the new historical rationalism which is being now introduced to the American churches by certain enthusiastic pupils of Adolph Harnack; and then, for its better elucidation, began a somewhat fuller exposition of one or two of the more fundamental positions assumed by Dr. A. C. McGiffert in his *Inaugural Address*, in his advocacy of it. We pointed out in that section of our article Dr. McGiffert's conception of Christianity as a development, and gave some account of the "transformations" which he conceives Christianity to have undergone since its origination by Christ. The most important of these "transformations" he represents, certainly with the best of right from his point of view, to be that from the primitive to the Catholic Church, to the better understanding of which his *Address* is devoted. For our better estimation of the significance of his teaching here, we should next consider more closely:

V. DR. MCGIFFERT'S THEORY OF THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH.

One of the most striking passages in Dr. McGiffert's *Inaugural Address* is that in which he draws a picture of "primitive Christianity" as it is conceived by him, preliminary to expounding what he calls the momentous "transformation of the primitive into the Catholic Church, of the church of the apostles into that of the old Catholic fathers." That important changes did take place

in the spirit, teaching, and organization of the church during the first two centuries of its life is, as we have said, of course, undoubted. Whether these changes were, however, of the nature which Dr. McGiffert represents them to have been is a different matter, and depends very largely upon the truth of his picture of "primitive Christianity." We desire now to look for a moment at this picture.

He sums up his conception of "primitive Christianity" in the brief formula: "The spirit of primitive Christianity is the spirit of religious individualism, based on the felt presence of the Holy Ghost." There are combined in this statement the recognition of a fundamental truth of the first importance and the assertion of a fundamental error of the utmost seriousness. The truth is, that all vital Christianity was conceived by the apostles and their first converts as the product of the Holy Spirit working upon the hearts of men. The error is, that the result of this conception was "religious individualism" in Dr. McGiffert's sense, that is, in the sense that each individual Christian felt and asserted himself to be, by virtue of his possession of the Spirit, a law unto himself, independent of the objective revelation of God's will through the apostles, of the objective means of grace provided in the ordinances of the church, and of the objective discipline exercised by the organized Christian societies; which three things Dr. McGiffert brings together under the somewhat contemptuous designation of "external authority." The diligent reader of those documents of "primitive Christianity," which we call the New Testament, will scarcely need to be told that the effect of the work of the Holy Spirit upon the hearts of Christians is represented in them to be to draw and to bind Christians to these "external authorities," not to array them against them.

It is impossible to exaggerate the emphasis which is placed, in these primitive documents, upon the presence of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of believers as the indispensable condition of their becoming or remaining Christians. They were Christians by virtue of their new relation to Christ. Christ was preached to them, and that as crucified; the truth concerning him was made known to them, and accepted by them. They were Christians because

they accepted him as their Prophet, Priest, and King. But no man could say Jesus is Lord but in the Holy Spirit. It was only by the work of the Holy Spirit, therefore, that Christians were made Christians, and he remained the immanent source of all spiritual life. It was this feature of the new covenant which had engrossed the attention of Joel when he foresaw the glories that should come. It was this great promise that the dying Master had presented as the comfort of his people. It was by the visible and audible descent of the Spirit that the church was constituted on that first great Pentecost. It was by receiving the Spirit that men became Christians, in the Spirit that they were baptized into one body, by his presence within them that they were made the sons of God, and by his leading that they were enabled to cherish the filial spirit. Christians were taught to look to the Spirit as the source of every impulse to good and of every power to good. In him alone was the inspiration, the strength, the sphere of the Christian's whole life.

The presence of the Spirit of God in the apostolic church was, moreover, manifested not merely by the spiritual graces of Christians, of every one of which he was the sole author, but also in a great variety of miraculous gifts. It is no exaggeration to say that the apostolic church was a miraculous church. It is not easy to overestimate the supernatural character of either our Lord's ministry or the apostolic church. When the Son of God came to earth, he drew heaven with him. The signs which accompanied his ministry were but the trailing cloud of glory which he brought from heaven, which is his home. His own divine power, by which he began to found his church, he continued in the apostles whom he had chosen to complete this great work; although their use of it, as was fitting, appears to have been more sporadic than his own. And they transmitted it, as a part of their own miracle-working and the crowning sign of their divine commission, to others, in the form of what the New Testament calls "spiritual gifts," that is, extraordinary capacities produced in the primitive communions by direct gift of the Holy Ghost. The number, variety, and diffusion of these "spiritual gifts" are, perhaps, quite commonly underestimated. The classical passage concerning them

(1 Cor. xii.—xiv.) only brings before us a chance picture of divine worship in an apostolical church; it is the ordinary church service of the time, and we have no reason to suppose that essentially the same scenes would not be witnessed in any one of the many congregations planted by the apostles in the length and breadth of the world. The exception would be a church without, not a church with, miraculous gifts. Everywhere the apostolic church was marked out among men as itself a gift from God, by manifesting its possession of the Spirit through appropriate works of the Spirit: miracles of healings and power, miracles of knowledge and speech. The apostolic church was characteristically a miraculous church.

In such circumstances, it would seem very difficult to exaggerate the supernatural claims of the "primitive church." But Dr. McGiffert has managed to do so. How he has managed to do so, and with what serious consequences to the fundamental bases of our religion, it will now be our duty to point out.

1. He exaggerates the supernatural character of the apostolic church, in the first place, by representing the enjoyment of the "spiritual gifts" in it as absolutely universal. This is the constant assumption of the *Address*, and is expressed in such statements as this: "It was the universal conviction of the primitive church that every Christian believer enjoys the immediate presence of the Holy Spirit. The presence of the Spirit . . . meant the power to work miracles, to speak with tongues, to utter prophecies," (p. 19.) "The consciousness of the possession of supernatural gifts" is made, accordingly, the characteristic of the primitive Christian.

But, widespread as the supernatural gifts were in the apostolical church, they were not universal. They were the characteristic of the apostolical church, not of the primitive Christian. The circumstances attending the conversion of the Samaritans are recorded for us, in the eighth chapter of Acts, apparently for the very purpose of teaching us this. The first converts were all brought into the church by the apostles, and the primitive Christians themselves were, it appears, in danger of supposing that the possession of miraculous gifts was the mark of a Christian. There-

fore, it was ordered that the conversion of the Samaritans should take place through non-apostolic preaching, that all men might learn (and Simon among them) that "it was through the laying on of the hands of the apostles that the Spirit was given." In a word, the miraculous gifts are, in the New Testament, made one of the "signs of an apostle." Where he conveyed them they existed; where he did not convey them they did not exist. In every case where there is record of them they are connected with apostles; usually they are conferred by the actual laying on of the apostles' hands. In no recorded instance are they conferred by the laying on of the hands of one not an apostle. In fine, the supernatural gifts of the apostolic church are attestations of the apostles' commission and authority. By detaching them from the apostles, and representing them as the possession of the primitive Christian as such, Dr. McGiffert depreciates the apostles relatively to other Christians, and assimilates Christians as such to the apostles. He can gain no authority for this from the New Testament record.

2. The seriousness of this error is exhibited so soon as we note the stress which Dr. McGiffert lays, among the supernatural gifts, on the special gift of revelation as the universal possession of primitive Christians. This, again, is the constant assumption of the *Address*, and comes to expression in such statements as this: "Christian believers had from the beginning believed themselves in immediate contact with the Holy Spirit, and had looked chiefly and directly to him for revelations of truth, as such truth might be needed," (p. 33.) Accordingly, we are told that the "original conception" was that "of continuing divine revelations"; and the "communion with God through the Holy Ghost," enjoyed by the primitive Christians, is spoken of as involving "the reception of revelations directly from him" (p. 21); and this is sharply emphasized by contrasting it with "the submission to an external authority in matters both of faith and practice," which characterized later times. In a word, Dr. McGiffert teaches that the primitive Christian as such, by virtue of his communion with God through the immediate presence of the Holy Spirit with him, needed no source of knowledge of God's truth and will ex-

ternal to himself: "The Holy Spirit was in the church, imparting all needed truth and light" (p. 29), and spoke as truly to the other Christians as to the apostles themselves.

Certainly, however, this is not the state of affairs reflected in those documents of the primitive church gathered into our New Testament. In them, the gifts of prophecy, interpretation, revelation, do not appear as the universal possession of Christians as such. They are expressly confined to some, to whom the Spirit has imparted them as he distributes his gifts severally to whom he will. In them, the authority over all Christians of the apostolic declarations of truth and duty is expressly and reiteratingly affirmed, and is based upon the possession of the Spirit by the apostles in a sense in which he was not common to all believers. In them, so far from the apostolic word being subjected to the test of the Spirit in the hearts of all Christians, it is made the test of their possession of the Spirit. In a word, in them the "external authority" of the revelation of truth and duty through the apostles is made supreme; and the recognition of it as supreme is made the test of the presence of the Spirit in the heart of others. (1 Cor. xiv. 37.) Neglecting the whole body of apostolic assertion of authority, and the proof of the acceptance of that authority by the whole body of Christians which pervades the New Testament, Dr. McGiffert represents the common gift of the Holy Spirit to Christians as constituting every Christian a law to himself, and so depreciates the apostles and the apostolic word relatively to other Christians, and assimilates Christians as such to the apostles. He can obtain no warrant for this from the New Testament.

3. The seriousness of this error is still further increased by the circumstance that Dr. McGiffert extends what we may call the supernatural age of Christianity, or what a writer of the same school of thought with himself calls "the Spirit-permeated community," far beyond the limits of the apostolic period. He expressly tells us that no change of spirit took place synchronously "with the passage of Christianity from the Jewish to the Gentile world," nor yet synchronously "with the death of the apostles, and the close of the apostolic age," (p. 22.) "The church of

the first half of the second century," he tells us, "believed itself to be just as truly under the immediate control of the Spirit as the apostolic church. There was the same consciousness of the possession of supernatural gifts, especially of the gift of prophecy. * * * No line, in fact, was drawn between their own age and that of the apostles by the Christians of the early second century. They were conscious of no loss, either of light or power," (p. 22.) "The only authority that was recognized," we are told again, "was the Holy Spirit, and he was supposed to speak to Christians of the second century as truly as he had ever spoken through the apostles," (p. 33.) Accordingly, we are told that it is only on *a priori* or dogmatic grounds, not on historical ones, that a line can be drawn between the apostolic and post-apostolic ages, so as to "emphasize the supernatural character of the former as distinguished from the latter," (p. 22.)

This is again, however, certainly not the impression which the contemporary records make on the reader. Those records do draw the line very sharply between the apostles and any leaders, however great, of the second century church. To the apostles alone, the Christians of this age conceived, did Jesus give "authority over the gospel," as Barnabas phrases it. They alone were conceived of as in such a sense the mouthpieces of Christ that Ignatius, for example, could say that "the Lord did nothing without the Father, either by himself or by the apostles." It does not mark the personal humility of the men, but the recognized proprieties of the case, when Polycarp, for instance, wrote to the Philippians: "These things, brethren, write I unto you . . . because you invited me; for neither am I, nor is any one like unto me, able to follow the wisdom of the blessed and glorious Paul;" or when Ignatius wrote to the Romans: "I do not enjoin you as Peter and Paul did; they were apostles, I am a convict." From the beginning, therefore, the writings of the apostles are appealed to by name, quoted as "Scripture" along with, and with equal respect with, the Old Testament, and bowed to with reverence and submission. No one apparently dreamed of claiming that equality with the apostles which Dr. McGiffert ascribes to every Christian, as a channel of knowledge concerning divine things; everybody submitted to the "external authority" of their writings.

Nor do these records permit us to believe that the supernatural gifts extended into the second century in an unbroken stream. Who can fail to feel the gulf that yawns between the clear, detailed and precise allusions to these gifts that meet us in the New Testament, and the vague and general allusions to them which alone are found in the authentic literature of the second century? As was long ago pointed out triumphantly by Conyers Middleton, the early second century is almost bare of allusions to contemporary supernatural gifts. The apostolical fathers contain no clear and certain allusions to them. And so characteristic of the age is this sobriety of claim, that the apparently miraculous occurrences recorded as attending the martyrdom of Polycarp, in the letter of the Church of Smyrna, are an acknowledged bar to the admission of the genuineness of the document; and it is only on purifying the record of them, some as interpolations, some as misinterpretations, that Dr. Lightfoot, for example, thought himself warranted in assigning to it as early a date as A. D. 155. When references to supernatural gifts occur, as in Justin and Irenæus, they are couched in general terms, and suggest rather a general knowledge that such gifts had been common in the church than specific acquaintance with them as ordinary occurrences of the time. The whole evidence in the matter, in a word, is just what we should expect if these gifts were conferred by the apostles, and gradually died out with the generation which had been brought to Christ by their preaching. The copious stories of supernatural occurrences in writings of the third and later centuries have their roots, not in the authentic literature of the second century, but in the apocryphal Gospels and Acts. Dr. McGiffert can obtain no warrant from the contemporary records for his assimilation of the Christians of the early second century to the apostles, and his consequent depreciation of the apostles, both in their personal authority and in the authority of their written word, relatively to the Spirit-led Christian, as such.

4. The whole effect, and, we ought, perhaps, also to say the whole purpose, of the speculatively reconstructed picture of "primitive Christianity" which Dr. McGiffert gives us, is to destroy the supreme authority of the New Testament in the church

as the source and norm of truth and duty, and to reduce Christianity to a form of mystical subjectivism.

Dr. McGiffert admits, indeed, inconsistently with his fundamental conception but consistently with historical fact, that "from the very beginning the Jewish Scriptures, to which Christ and his apostles had so frequently appealed, had been appropriated by the Christian church," although not, possibly, in their native sense. He admits, also, that the truth of apostolic teaching was unquestioned, and that "the apostles were universally recognized as the divinely-commissioned and inspired founders of the church" (p. 29); and because they were thus looked upon, "their teaching was everywhere regarded as a *source* from which might be gained a knowledge of divine truth," (p. 32.)

But he very justly points out that thus to look upon the teaching of the apostles as one of the sources from which a knowledge of truth may be obtained is a "very different thing" from "making the teaching of the apostles the sole *standard* of truth," and "ascribing to their teaching exclusive normative authority," (p. 33.) Accordingly, he is able to tell us that "the primitive church entirely lacked the catholic conception of an apostolic Scripture canon" (p. 42); that the church attained the conception of an authoritative "apostolic Scripture canon" only deep in the second century and as a piece of borrowed goods from Gnostic heresy; that the early church needed no New Testament, "especially since the Holy Spirit was in the church imparting all needed truth and light" (p. 29); and accordingly that "the only authority that was recognized was the Holy Spirit, and he was supposed to speak to Christians of the second century as truly as he had ever spoken through the apostles," (p. 33.)

The ideas thus attributed to the "primitive church" are the ideas of Dr. McGiffert; and therefore he tells us that the Protestant churches do not speak the truth when they make "the word of God, contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, the sole and ultimate authority for Christian truth," since the Spirit of God is this sole and ultimate authority—as he speaks still to his people as well as formerly through his apostles, (p. 43.) He tells us, therefore, plainly, that the Holy Spirit still reveals

himself to the members of the several churches "if they keep themselves in touch with him, as truly as to members of the primitive church" (p. 39), and that is, as we have seen, "as truly as he had ever spoken through the apostles," (p. 33.)

Thus the upshot of Dr. McGiffert's speculative reconstruction of the primitive church is to set aside the authority of the New Testament altogether, and to enthrone in its place the supreme authority of an "inner light." This is most excellent Quaker teaching, but it is a direct onslaught upon the very basis of Reformed, and, indeed, of the whole Protestant, theology. It seems to be incumbent upon us, therefore, to scrutinize with some care, before we bring these observations on Dr. McGiffert's teaching to a close, what he has to say regarding the origin of the New Testament.

VI. DR. MCGIFFERT'S THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW TESTAMENT CANON.

The task of Dr. McGiffert's *Inaugural Address*, as we have seen, is to trace the steps in what he thinks "the most vital and far-reaching transformation that Christianity has ever undergone"—"the transformation of the primitive into the Catholic Church, of the church of the apostles into that of the old Catholic fathers." One of the steps in this "momentous transformation"—a step which is justly spoken of as "of stupendous significance," if it can be made good that it constituted a part of a transformation which took place in the church of the second century—is represented to be no less an one than this: "the recognition of the teaching of the apostles as the exclusive standard and norm of Christian truth," (p. 29.) In this was included, as one of its chief elements, what may be called, without exaggerating Dr. McGiffert's conception, the invention by the second century church of the New Testament canon. We must now give some consideration to this astonishing representation.

According to Dr. McGiffert, the primitive church "entirely lacked" the "conception of an apostolic Scripture canon." Its spirit was in fact wholly alien to such a conception. Its spirit was "a spirit of religious individualism, based upon the felt pres-

ence of the Holy Ghost." As all Christians possessed the Spirit, he was "the only authority which was recognized"; and he was supposed to speak to all Christians "as truly as he had ever spoken through the apostles." The apostles were no doubt "reverenced" as "divinely guided and inspired"; they "were universally recognized as the divinely-commissioned and inspired founders of the church;" and "their teaching was consequently everywhere regarded as a *source* from which might be gained a knowledge of divine truth." But we will remember that we are very justly told that "that is a very different thing from making the teaching of the apostles the sole *standard* of truth—a very different thing from ascribing to their teaching exclusive normative authority." All Christians were as truly "in immediate contact with the Holy Spirit" as the apostles; to him directly and not to the apostles they looked "for revelations of truth, as such truth might be needed;" and having him always with them, and having, moreover, along with him, the Old Testament, "they needed no New Testament."

But Gnosticism arose, and the church joined in combat with it. In the effort to repudiate the spirit of Gnosticism it was, that steps were taken which resulted in the disappearance of that spirit of individualism which was the spirit of the "church of the apostles," and the introduction of "the spirit of Catholicism," "which means submission to an external authority in matters both of faith and practice." Three steps were taken towards this consummation. The first of these was "the recognition of the teaching of the apostles as the exclusive standard and norm of Christian truth." And in this step were included the formation of a New Testament canon, and the formation of an apostolic rule of faith.

"The Gnostics were the first Christians to have a New Testament." In seeking to commend their bizarre doctrines, they were led to appeal to the authority of the apostles transmitted orally or in writing. "Hence, they felt themselves impelled at an early date to form a canon of their own, which should contain the teachings of Christ through his apostles, which should, in other words, be apostolic." This was a new thing in Christendom. But no one could deny that what the apostles taught was true; the

apostles, as well as other Christians, had the Spirit. The Gnostics' appeal to apostolic authority could be met, therefore, only by determining what was truly apostolic. Thus "the church reached the conception of an authoritative apostolic Scripture canon and of an authoritative apostolic rule of faith." Thus it was led to gather into one whole all those writings which were commonly regarded as of apostolic origin; in other words, to form an authoritative and exclusive apostolic Scripture canon, which all who wished to be regarded as Christian disciples must acknowledge, and whose teachings they must accept." "The conception of an apostolic Scripture canon had arisen, and the appeal to that canon had been widely made, before the close of the second century."

This is the account which Dr. McGiffert gives of the creation of the New Testament canon. It will be seen that it is very comprehensive. It includes an account of the origin of the ascription of "authority" to the apostolic teaching; an account of the rise of the very conception of an apostolic canon of Scripture; an account of the collection into such a canon of the writings "commonly regarded as of apostolic origin"; and an account of the imposition of this body of collected writings upon the church as its law of faith and conduct. It includes an account, in a word, of the whole "stupendous transformation," from a state of affairs in which every Christian man, by virtue of the Holy Spirit dwelling in him, was a law to himself, and knew no external apostolic authority at all; to a state of affairs when, "under the stress of conflict, they had resigned their lofty privileges and made the apostles the sole recipients (under the new dispensation) of divine communications, and thus their teaching the only source (the Old Testament, of course, excepted) for a knowledge of Christian truth, and the sole standard and norm of such truth." This whole stupendous transformation from beginning to end, is included in the course of the second century, that is, belongs to distinctly post-apostolic times. And it was due to the pressure of the Gnostic controversy, and, indeed, was a following by the church of Gnostic example. In a word, the ascription of any "authority" as teachers to the apostles at all, and the very conception and existence of a New Testament canon, and much more the erection

of such a canon as, along with the Old Testament, the exclusive standard of faith and practice, were no part of primitive or apostolic Christianity at all. They were inventions of the second century church, as expedients the better to meet her difficulties in controversy.

What is to be said of this theory of the formation of the New Testament canon?

1. This is to be said, in the first place: That the cause which is assigned for this stupendous transformation is utterly inadequate to bear its weight.

We are asked to believe that a church which had hitherto known nothing of apostolic authority, and much less of a canon of authoritative apostolic writings, but had depended wholly upon the living voice of the ever-present Holy Spirit speaking to Christians as such, suddenly invented this whole machinery of external authority, solely in order to meet the appeal of the Gnostics to such an external authority. That is to say, in conflict with the Gnostic position, the church deserted its own entrenched position and went over to the Gnostic position, horse, foot, and dragoons. The church, we are told, made its sole appeal to the internal authority of the Holy Spirit, speaking in the hearts of living Christians. The Gnostics appealed to the external authority of the apostles, and were the first to do so. If the situation was in any measure like this, the church was assuredly entitled to meet, and most certainly would have met, this heretical appeal to external authority with the declaration that the Holy Spirit of God which it had was greater than the apostles which the Gnostics claimed to have; and that the living and incorruptible voice of that Spirit in the hearts of Christians, was more sure than the dead, corruptible word of the apostles. Yet instead of doing this we are told that the church weakly submitted to the Gnostic imposition of an external authority upon it, and made its sole appeal to it. This construction is an impossible one. The facts that the Gnostics appealed to apostolic authority, and especially to a body of authoritative apostolic writings as against the church, and that the church appealed to apostolic authority and to an apostolic canon as against the Gnostics, do not suggest that the Gnostics

were the first to appeal to apostolic teaching and to make a New Testament; but rather prove that the authority of apostolic teaching and of the apostolic writings was already the settled common ground on which all Christians of all names stood.

This is not to be met by saying that just what we have supposed the church would do in the circumstances assumed was done—by the Montanists. The Montanists were not the church; but from their first origin were in violent conflict with the church. Nor did the Montanists represent a revival of the primitive spirit. The main reason for fancying so arises from the exigencies of the theory at present under discussion; and they were certainly not recognized as doing so by the men of their time best qualified to judge of their affiliations. They are uniformly represented as smacking more of Phrygia than of Palestine, more of Cybele than of Christ. Nor yet did they essay to do what in these circumstances we should have expected the church to do; but something very different indeed. They, too, accepted the external authority of apostles and canon. They themselves rested in this external authority, and did not seek to add to the deposit of truth handed down by it. They claimed only to “develop” the “practical” side of Christianity; and that not by means of a universal teaching of the Spirit, but by means of the sporadic continuance of the specific prophetic office, and by a series of requirements laid by this external authority upon the consciences of men.

Nor is the case met by the remark that the surrender of the church to the point of view of the Gnostics in this matter of external authority no doubt does presuppose “a partial loss of the original consciousness of the immediate presence of the Holy Ghost.” Of course it does; if such an original consciousness ever existed in the sense intended. The point at issue is whether any such “original consciousness,” in the sense intended, ever existed. The point urged is that if this consciousness existed it could not but have shown itself in the conflict against Gnosticism. The point yielded is that it must indeed have already been “partially lost.” The point claimed is that there is no proof, then, that it ever existed, but every proof that the Gnostics and the church stood on common ground in their common appeal to “external authority.”

2. It is to be said, secondly, that the origin of this stupendous transformation is assigned by this theory to a most unlikely source.

The Gnostics were not just the people whom we can naturally suspect of the invention of the idea of an external apostolic authority. They are known in history as men of speculative intellect, pride of knowledge, rationalistic methods. They are known in history as rejecters of external authorities, not as the creators of them. It is allowed that the Old Testament had from the beginning been accepted by the church as the authoritative voice of God. The Gnostics repudiated the Jewish Scriptures. Marcion is represented to us, by every contemporary witness, as a man who discarded part of the New Testament canon which had come to his hand; and he certainly mutilated and curtailed the books of his "Apostolicum." To such men as these we can scarcely ascribe the invention of the fiction of an apostolic canon. That they held and appealed to such an "external authority" can be accounted for only on the supposition that this was already the settled position of the church, which they sought to rationalize and so to reform.

3. It is to be said, thirdly, that to assign the origin of the New Testament canon to the Gnostics is to contradict the whole body of historical testimony which has come down to us as to the relation of the Gnostics to the New Testament canon.

The fathers, to whose refutation of them we are indebted for well-nigh our whole knowledge of the Gnostics, are unanimous in representing them as proceeding with the church canon as their point of departure, not as first suggesting to the church the conception of a canon. They differed among themselves, we are told, in their mode of dealing with the church's canon. Some, like Marcion, used the shears, and boldly cut off from it all that did not suit their purposes; others, like Valentinus, depended on artificial exegesis to conform the teaching of the apostles to their own views. For all alike, however, an authoritative apostolic canon is presupposed, and to all alike this presupposed authoritative apostolic canon constituted an obstacle to their heretical teachings, and accordingly would not have been presupposed by them could it have been avoided.

4. And this leads to saying, fourthly, that this whole theory of the formation of the New Testament canon involves a serious arraignment of the trustworthiness, or, as we should rather say plainly, the truthfulness, of the whole body of the great church fathers who ornament the closing years of the second century.

Take such a man, for instance, as Irenæus. It is positively impossible to believe that anything like the origination of, or any essential change in, the New Testament canon occurred in his lifetime without charging him with conscious falsehood in his witness concerning it. For Irenæus not only testifies to the existence and estimate as divinely authoritative of the New Testament at the close of his life, but repeatedly asserts that this same New Testament had enjoyed this same authority from the apostles' day. Now, Irenæus was already a young man when Marcion provided his followers with his mutilated New Testament. He had himself sat as a pupil at the feet of John's pupil, Polycarp, in Asia Minor. He had served the church of Lyons as presbyter and bishop. He had kept in full communication with the churches both of Ephesus and of Rome. And he tells us that so strict had been the church's watchfulness over its New Testament that not even a single text of it had been corrupted. It avails nothing to say that, nevertheless, many texts had been corrupted. Irenæus could be mistaken in some things; but in some things he could not be mistaken. If such a thing as the New Testament had been invented in his own day he could not have been ignorant of it. Here the dilemma is stringent: either Irenæus has borne consciously false witness, or else the church in Ephesus, in Rome, and in Gaul, already had in the days of Marcion the same New Testament which it is confessed that it had at the close of the century. And practically the same argument might be formed on the testimony of Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Theophilus of Antioch, or, indeed, the whole body of the church writers of the close of the second century.

5. It is to be said, still further, that the whole theory of the origin of the New Testament canon in post-apostolic circles is inconsistent with the acknowledged position of the church during this period.

It is acknowledged that from the beginning the church received the Old Testament at the apostles' hands as the word of God. (p. 28.) From the beginning, therefore, the church had an "external authority," and possessed already the idea of a "canon." How could it help adding to this authoritative teaching the writings of the apostles, whom, as is admitted, it recognized as the divinely commissioned and inspired founders of the church (p. 29), and whom it revered as divinely guided and inspired? (p. 32.) The whole dealing of the church with the heresies of the day betrays the fact that apostolicity and authority were to it synonymous terms. Every step which Dr. McGiffert traces in the opposition to these heresies is an outgrowth of this conception, and is recognized by Dr. McGiffert as an expression of this conception. Apostolicity was indeed the war-cry in all the church's battles; and yet we are asked to suppose that this was a *borrowed* war-cry—borrowed from her enemies!

6. Finally, it is to be said that there is quite as much evidence from this whole period of the church's possession and high estimate of the New Testament, as the nature of the literary remains from the time would warrant us in expecting.

It is nothing to the point to say that we cannot, with full historical right, speak of a New Testament "canon" until deep in the fourth century, since this word was not applied to the New Testament in this sense until then; or that we cannot, with full historical right, speak of a "New Testament" until late in the second century, for not until then was this name applied to it. We are not investigating the history of names, but of things. The term "instrument" which Tertullian applies to the New Testament is just as good a designation of the thing as the term "canon" that Jerome uses. And there was an earlier name for what we call the "New Testament" than that now hoary and sacred title. Over against "The Law and the Prophets," which was the name then given the Old Testament, men had a "Gospel and Apostles," which was the name they gave the New Testament. And as they commonly called the one-half of the canon briefly "The Law," so they called the other half for similar reasons, "The Gospel." The name still remains in Augustine; it is the common name

for the New Testament in the second century. It was clearly already in use in the days of Ignatius, and of the authors of the so-called second epistle of Clement and the epistle to Diognetus. New Testament books are among the "Oracles" in the days of Papias and of the author of 2 Clement. To Polycarp, Ephesians was already along with Psalms in "the sacred letters." To Barnabas, Matthew was "Scripture"; and indeed, already to 1st Timothy Luke was as much "Scripture" as Deuteronomy (1 Tim. v. 18), and to 2 Peter Paul's letters as much Scripture as "the other Scriptures" of the Old Testament. Dr. McGiffert gives some hint (p 27), indeed, that he may deny that 1 Timothy was a letter of Paul's, or even a product of the first Christian century. Whether he would make 2 Peter also of post-Gnostic origin, he does not tell us. But too many adjustments of this kind will need to be made to render it "historical" to deny that the church had an authoritative New Testament from the beginning of its life.

What color of historical ground remains, then, for the asserted "stupendous transformation" in the church during the second century, by which it acquired not only the actual possession but the very conception of an apostolic Scripture canon?

There is, first of all, this fact: that in the latter part of the second century the evidence that the church possessed a New Testament canon first becomes copious. But this is not because the church then first acquired a canon; the evidence is retrospective in its character and force. It is simply because Christian literature of a sort which could bear natural testimony to the fact first then becomes abundant. It is a great historical blunder to confound such an emergence of copious testimony with the historical emergence of the thing testified to.

Then, secondly, there is doubtless this fact: that in its controversies with the Gnostic sects the church was thrown back upon its New Testament and its authority as before it had never had occasion to be. When the gospel was preached to Jews and Gentiles the simple story was told; and there was no occasion to appeal to books, save in the former case to the prophecies of the Old Testament. When Christianity was defended before Jews or

before Gentiles, the common ground of appeal was necessarily restricted to the Old Testament and to reason; and any allusion to Christian books was necessarily only by the way and purely incidental. But when new gospels were preached, then the appeal was necessarily to the authority of the authoritative teachers of the true gospel. There is a sense, then, in which it may be said that, in these controversies, the church "discovered" its New Testament. It learned its value; it investigated its contents with new zeal and new insight; in the process it strengthened its sense of its preciousness and authority.

Harnack in one place uses phraseology in describing what took place with the New Testament in the second century, which, if we could only be allowed to take it in its strict verbal meaning, would express the exact truth. The transformation, he tells us, must be looked upon as "a change in interest in the Holy Scriptures brought about by the Gnostic and Montanistic conflict." This is just what happened. But this is not what Harnack and his followers demand of us to believe to have happened. They demand that we shall believe that in these controversies the church created these "Holy Scriptures" of the New Testament. They do so without historical warrant, and in doing so they destroy the New Testament as "Holy Scriptures": that is, they reduce its authority as "Holy Scriptures" to the authority of the second century church, which they would have us believe created it "Holy Scripture" in its controversies, and which, indeed, as they would teach us, even created some of the books themselves (*e. g.*, 1 Timothy) out of which this "Holy Scripture" was constituted.

How, then, are we to conceive the formation of the New Testament canon? After so much said as to how we are not to conceive it, it is but right that before we bring this paper to a close we should try to place clearly before us the actual process of its formation. Let us now essay to do this in the simplest and most primary way.

VII. THE FORMATION OF THE CANON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

IN order to obtain a correct understanding of what is called the formation of the canon of the New Testament, it is necessary to

begin by fixing very firmly in our minds one fact, which is obvious enough, and to which attention has been already called, but the importance of which in this connection cannot be over-emphasized. That is, that the Christian church did not require to form for itself the idea of a "canon," or, as we should more commonly call it to-day, of a "Bible"—that is, of a collection of books given of God to be the authoritative rule of faith and practice. It inherited this idea from the Jewish church, along with the thing itself, the Jewish Scriptures, or the "Canon of the Old Testament." The church did not grow up by natural law; it was founded. And the authoritative teachers sent forth by Christ to found his church carried with them as their most precious possession a body of divine Scriptures, which they imposed on the church that they founded as its code of law. No reader of the New Testament can need proof of this; on every page of that book is spread the evidence that from the very beginning the Old Testament was as cordially recognized as law by the Christian as by the Jew. The Christian church thus was never without a "Bible" or a "canon."

But the Old Testament books were not the only ones which the apostles (by Christ's own appointment the authoritative founders of the church) imposed upon the infant churches as their authoritative rule of faith and practice. No more authority dwelt in the prophets of the old covenant than in themselves, the apostles, who had been "made sufficient as ministers of a new covenant"; for (as one of themselves argued) "if that which passeth away was with glory, much more that which remaineth is in glory." Accordingly, not only was the gospel they delivered, in their own estimation, itself a divine revelation, but it was also preached "in the Holy Ghost" (1 Pet. i. 12); not merely the matter of it but the very words in which it was clothed were "of the Holy Spirit." (1 Cor. ii. 13.) Their own commands were, therefore, of divine authority (1 Thess. iv. 2), and their writings were the depository of these commands. (2 Thess. ii. 15.) "If any man obeyeth not our word by this epistle," says Paul to one church (2 Thess. iii. 14), "note that man, that ye have no company with him." To another he makes it the test of a Spirit-led man to recognize that

what he was writing to them was "the commandments of the Lord." (1 Cor. xiv. 37.) Inevitably, such writings, making so awful a claim on their acceptance, were received by the infant churches as of a quality equal to that of the old "Bible," placed alongside of its older books as an additional part of the one law of God, and read as such in their meetings for worship—a practice which, moreover, was required by the apostles. (1 Thess. v. 27; Col. iv. 16; Rev. i. 2.) In the apprehension, therefore, of the earliest churches, the "Scriptures" were not a *closed* but an *increasing* "canon." Such they had been from the beginning, as they gradually grew in number from Moses to Malachi; and such they were to continue as long as there should remain among the churches "men of God who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

We say that this immediate placing of the new books, given the church under the seal of apostolic authority, among the Scriptures already established as such was inevitable. It is also historically evinced from the very beginning. Thus, the Apostle Peter, writing in A. D. 68, speaks of Paul's numerous letters, not in contrast with the Scriptures, but as among the Scriptures, and in contrast with "the *other* Scriptures" (2 Peter iii. 16), that is, of course, those of the Old Testament. In like manner, the Apostle Paul combines, as if it were the most natural thing in the world, the Book of Deuteronomy and the Gospel of Luke under the common head of "Scripture" (1 Tim. v. 18): "For the Scripture saith, 'Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn' (Deut. xxv. 4); and, 'The laborer is worthy of his hire.'" (Luke x. 7.) The line of such quotations is never broken in Christian literature. Polycarp (c. 12) in A. D. 115 unites the Psalms and Ephesians in exactly similar manner: "In the sacred books, . . . as it is said in these Scriptures, 'Be ye angry and sin not,' and 'Let not the sun go down upon your wrath.'" So, a few years later, the so-called second letter of Clement, after quoting Isaiah, adds (ii. 4): "And another Scripture, however, says, 'I came not to call the righteous, but sinners,'" quoting from Matthew, a book which Barnabas (*circa* 97–106 A. D.) had already adduced as Scripture. After this such quotations are common.

What needs emphasis at present about these facts is that they obviously are not evidences of a gradually-heightening estimate of the New Testament books, originally received on a lower level, and just beginning to be tentatively accounted Scripture. They are conclusive evidences, rather, of the estimation of the New Testament books from the very beginning as Scripture, and of their attachment as Scripture to the other Scriptures already in hand. The early Christians did not, then, first form a rival "canon" of "new books" which came only gradually to be accounted as of equal divinity and authority with the "old books"; they received new book after new book from the apostolical circle, as equally "Scripture" with the old books, and added them one by one to the collection of old books as additional Scriptures, until at length the new books thus added were numerous enough to be looked upon as another *section* of "the Scriptures."

The earliest name given to this new section of Scripture was framed on the model of the name by which what we know as the Old Testament was then known. Just as it was called "The Law and the Prophets and the Psalms" (or "The Hagiographa"), or, more briefly, "The Law and the Prophets," or, even more briefly still, "The Law," so the enlarged Bible was called "The Law and the Prophets, with the Gospels and the Apostles" (so Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* vi. 11: 88; Tertullian, *De Præs. Hær.* 36), or, more briefly, "The Law and the Gospel" (so Claudius Apollinaris, Irenæus); while the new books separately were called "The Gospel and the Apostles," or, most briefly of all, "The Gospel." This earliest name for the new Bible, with all that it involves as to its relation to the old and briefer Bible, is traceable as far back as Ignatius (A. D. 115), who makes use of it repeatedly (*e. g.*, *ad Philad.* 5; *ad Smyrn.* 7). In one passage he gives us a hint of the controversies which the enlarged Bible of the Christians aroused among the Judaizers (*ad Philad.* 6): "When I heard some saying," he writes, "'Unless I find it in the *Old [Books]* I will not believe the *Gospel*,' on my saying, 'It is written,' they answered, 'That is the question.' To me, however, Jesus Christ *is* the *Old [Books]*; his cross and death and resurrection, and the faith which is by him, the undefiled *Old [Books]*, by which I

wish, by your prayers, to be justified. The priests, indeed, are good, but the High Priest better," etc. Here Ignatius appeals to the "Gospel" as Scripture, and the Judaizers object, receiving from him the answer, in effect, which Augustine afterwards formulated in the well-known saying that the New Testament lies hidden in the Old, and the Old Testament is first made clear in the New. What we need now to observe, however, is that to Ignatius the New Testament was not a different book from the Old Testament, but part of the one body of Scripture with it; an *accretion*, so to speak, which had grown upon it.

This is the testimony of all the early witnesses, even of those which speak for the distinctively Jewish-Christian churches. For example, that curious Jewish-Christian writing, *The Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs* (*Benj.* 11), tells us, under the cover of an *ex post facto* prophecy, that "the work and word" of Paul, *i. e.*, confessedly, the Book of Acts and Paul's epistles, "shall be written in the Holy Books," *i. e.*, as is understood by all, made a part of the existent Bible. So, even in the *Talmud*, in a scene intended to ridicule a "bishop" of the first century, he is represented as finding Galatians by "sinking himself deeper" into the same "book" which contained the Law of Moses. (*Babl. Sabbath*, 116 a and b.) The details cannot be entered into here. Let it suffice to say that, from the evidence of the fragments which alone have been preserved to us of the Christian writings of that very early time, it appears that from the beginning of the second century (and that is from the end of the apostolic age) a collection (Ignatius, 2 Clement) of "New Books" (Ignatius), called the "Gospel and Apostles" (Ignatius, Marcion), was already a part of the "oracles" of God (Polycarp, Papias, 2 Clement), or "Scriptures" (1 Timothy, 2 Peter, Barnabas, Polycarp, 2 Clement), or the "Holy Books," or "Bible." (*Testaments XII. Patriarchs.*)

The number of books included in this added body of New Books, at the opening of the second century, cannot, of course, be satisfactorily determined by the evidence of these fragments alone. From them we may learn, however, that the section of it called the "Gospel" included Gospels written by "the apostles and their companions" (Justin), which there is no reason to doubt

were our four Gospels now received. The section called "The Apostles" contained the Book of Acts (*The Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs*) and epistles of Paul, John, Peter, and James. The evidence from various quarters is, indeed, enough to show that the collection in general use contained all the books which we at present receive, with the possible exceptions of Jude, Second and Third John, and Philemon; and it is more natural to suppose that failure of very early evidence for these brief booklets is due to their insignificant size rather than to their non-acceptance.

It is to be borne in mind, however, that the extent of the collection may have—and, indeed, is historically shown actually to have—varied in different localities. The Bible was circulated only in hand-copies, slowly and painfully made; and an incomplete copy, obtained, say, at Ephesus in A. D. 68, would be likely to remain for many years the Bible of the church to which it was conveyed, and might, indeed, become the parent of other copies, incomplete like itself, and thus the means of providing a whole district with incomplete Bibles. Thus, when we inquire after the history of the New Testament canon, we need to distinguish such questions as these: (1), When was the New Testament canon completed? (2), When did any one church acquire a completed canon? (3), When did the completed canon, the complete Bible, obtain universal circulation and acceptance? (4), On what ground and evidence did the churches with incomplete Bibles accept the remaining books when they were made known to them?

The canon of the New Testament was completed when the last authoritative book was given to any church by the apostles, and that was when John wrote the Apocalypse, about A. D. 98. Whether the church of Ephesus had a completed canon when it received the Apocalypse, or not, would depend on whether there was any epistle, say that of Jude, which had not yet reached it, with authenticating proof of its apostolicity. There is room for historical investigation here. Certainly the whole canon was not universally received by the churches till somewhat later. The Latin Church of the second and third centuries did not quite know what to do with the Epistle to the Hebrews. The Syrian churches for some centuries may have lacked the lesser of the Catholic

Epistles and Revelation. But from the time of Irenæus down, the church at large had the whole canon as we now possess it. And though a section of the church may not yet have been satisfied of the apostolicity of a certain book, or of certain books, and though afterwards doubts may have arisen in sections of the church as to the apostolicity of certain books (*e. g.*, of Revelation), yet in no case was it more than a respectable minority of the church which was slow in receiving, or which came afterwards to doubt, the credentials of any of the books that then, as now, constituted the canon of the New Testament accepted by the church at large. And in every case the principle on which a book was accepted, or doubts against it laid aside, was the historical tradition of apostolicity.

Let it, however, be clearly understood that it was not exactly apostolic *authorship* which constituted a book a portion of the "canon." Apostolic authorship was, indeed, early confounded with canonicity. It was doubt as to the apostolic authorship of Hebrews, in the west, and of James and Jude, which seems to underlie the slowness of the inclusion of these books in the "canon" of certain churches. But from the beginning it was not so. The principle of canonicity was not apostolic authorship, but *imposition by the apostles as "law."* Hence Tertullian's name for the "canon" is "*instrumentum*," and he speaks of the Old and New *Instrument* as we would of the Old and New Testament. That the apostles so imposed the Old Testament on the churches which they founded as their "instrument," or "law," or "canon," can be denied by none. And in imposing new books on the same churches, by the same apostolical authority, they did not confine themselves to books of their own composition. It is the Gospel according to Luke, a man who was not an apostle, which Paul parallels in First Timothy v. 18, with Deuteronomy, as equally "Scripture" with it, in the first extant quotation of a New Testament book as Scripture. The Gospels which constituted the first division of the New Books—of "The Gospel and the Apostles"—Justin tells us, were "written by the apostles and their companions." The authority of the apostles, as founders of the church by divine appointment, was embodied in whatever

books they imposed on the church as law, not merely in those which they themselves had written.

The early churches received, as we receive, into their New Testament all the books historically evinced to them as given by the apostles to the churches as their code of law; and we must not mistake the historical evidences of the slow circulation and authentication of these books over the widely-extended church for evidence of slowness of "canonization" of books by the authority or the taste of the church itself.

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II. THE BIBLE IN THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM.

THIS is an age of investigation and progress. In no sphere of human thought and activity is this fact more apparent than in the sphere of education. From the primary school to the university, text-books and methods have been subjected to the most thorough examination by the ablest educators. That this examination has resulted in progress, great progress, will scarcely be questioned. One of the results of this earnest spirit of inquiry in the educational world has been to suggest the claims of the Bible to a place in the college curriculum. Upon investigation these claims have been acknowledged as valid and just by a number of the leading institutions of the land. Among others, a regular Bible course has been introduced into the curriculum of Yale, Chicago University, Southwestern Presbyterian University, at Clarksville, Tennessee, Davidson College, North Carolina. Such a course has also been introduced into a number of leading female institutions of the country: Smith College, Massachusetts; Wellesley; Agnes Scott Institute, at Decatur, Georgia. Nor is this all. There are indications that the movement thus begun in the highest educational circles is growing. Recently one of the institutions of the country sent out letters of inquiry to about five hundred other institutions of learning in this country, with a view to ascertaining how many had a regular Bible course. The responses from about two hundred and fifty brought out this fact, that a large proportion of the best class of institutions which had no Bible course desired to have it, and would introduce it as soon as practicable, thus showing that the trend of opinion among the ablest educators is decidedly in favor of a Bible course in the higher institutions. It is, therefore, evident that the subject with which this paper proposes to deal is a living subject, as well as one of great practical importance. In order that it may be fully considered, let us study it in the following order:

I. SHOULD THE BIBLE HAVE A PLACE IN THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM?

The special point of inquiry is not, whether there shall be a weekly recitation *in* or *on* the Bible, nor whether the Bible shall be recognized in a general way, but whether or not a regular course of Bible study should be introduced into the college curriculum. This question we answer in the affirmative, and for the following reasons:

First, Because a well-arranged Bible course is admirably adapted to secure a very high order of mental development. One of the objects of the college curriculum is the development, training, and strengthening of the intellectual faculties. This is assigned as one of the reasons for introducing Latin, Greek, and higher mathematics; and the value of these studies as a mental drill is unquestionable. But what is the object of this drill? Obviously, to enable the mind to investigate and consider great subjects, and to reach satisfactory conclusions. In other words, drill is in order to work; training, in order to practice. What, then, so desirable as to bring the mind from this drill into actual contact with great subjects, where the student will be called to use the powers which have been in process of training, where all the mental drill received in other studies will be put into practice, where the mind will be called to consider great subjects? Such an exercise of the mental powers while they are in the process of drilling and training would certainly be highly conducive to mental development. And now, for this exercise and practice of the mental powers, what book can equal the Bible? Consider the subjects which it presents: God, his character, majesty, and glory; creation; providence; redemption; immortality. In all the range of thought, are there any subjects so deep and so high, so grand and so stimulating, as these? Any subjects so well adapted to elevate, strengthen, and quicken the expanding intellect? It has been well said by a recent writer: "We cannot too much remember that the questions on which the Bible compels the employment of the mind are the large questions; and, therefore, they are enlarging to the mind itself."—*The Bible in the World's Education*, p. 214. But add this most important fact, that these

great subjects are presented in the Bible by the omniscient God, for the Bible is his work. Here we find presented for our consideration the greatest subjects ever presented to the human mind, and these subjects are discussed and elucidated by men who wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. Surely a book which presents such subjects in such a manner should be adapted to the highest mental development.

Second, Because the knowledge which the Bible alone can impart is of such great value. Another object of the college is to impart knowledge, to furnish the mind with important, trustworthy, and stimulating information. It is considered essential to a liberal education to have a knowledge of the great facts of history and science, and a reasonable acquaintance with the names which have done most to mould human thought and history, as well as with the great works of literature. This being true, how strong are the claims of the Bible to a place in the college course! What history so important, trustworthy, and fundamental as Bible history? It contains the only written and authentic history of the world before the flood, a period of 1656 years. It contains the history of the true religion, a knowledge of which is absolutely necessary to any adequate understanding of the history of the world, and of the highest civilization and progress. Again, this Bible alone gives clear and reliable information concerning the most important subjects: *e. g.*, creation; man, whence, what, whither; the fall; the flood; ethnology; sacrifice; redemption. These are some of the great subjects presented in the Bible, and concerning which no man or woman professing to have a liberal education can afford to be ignorant. Again, in the department of biography, what names in all history have done more to shape the destiny of the race than Moses and Joshua, and Samuel and David, or than Peter, John, and Paul, and, above all, than Jesus Christ? Can any liberally-educated person afford to be ignorant of what these names stand for in the world's history? In view of these facts, how can the claims of the Bible to a place in the college course be reasonably denied?

Third, Because the Bible sustains such important relations to other branches of knowledge, and to the further prosecution of

learning. No college pretends to compass the whole field of possible attainment in education. What it does aim to do is to lay a broad and solid foundation for higher attainment; to give such mental training and such fundamental knowledge as will prepare the student for the further prosecution of learning. Now, what is here claimed is, that the Bible does sustain most important and fundamental relations to the most successful prosecution of other branches of knowledge and higher advancement. Take, for example, the branch of history. Not only is biblical history most valuable in itself, but it is fundamental to any proper understanding of the history of the world. Says Dr. Price: "We have here the oldest history of mankind. It contains an epitome of the world's history from the beginning down to the call of Abraham, and a condensed history of Abraham's descendants down to the close of the fourth century before Christ. It is brief, but exceedingly comprehensive. It sweeps through centuries of important and epitomized events. It is the most complete history of the oriental world in our possession. It is not confined to one people, but is full of references to many and great peoples. In fact, it is the only trustworthy source of information regarding several of those almost prehistoric nations. It is the beaten track through oriental times, to which and from which numerous pathways lead. Taking it as a starting-point, and making it our own, we shall have little difficulty in increasing our knowledge of the contemporaneous history of the surrounding peoples."—*Syllabus of Old Testament History*, p. 6. Again, concerning the tenth chapter of Genesis, Dr. E. P. Humphreys says: "It is received by archæologists as the most valuable ethnological chart in the possession of mankind. It is entitled to that preëminence by its antiquity, being more than three thousand years old. Then, again, it is the only trustworthy account in existence of the settlement of the earth after the deluge. Sir Henry Rawlinson says this is 'undoubtedly the most authentic record we possess in the department of ethnology.' Bunsen says: 'It is the most learned among all the ancient documents, and the most ancient among the learned.' Schröder says: 'From this chapter must the whole universal history of the world take its beginning,' and with him

Von Müller concurs. Moreover, this document of less than fifty lines exhausts the science of the origin of nations, as no other races have ever existed. All the springs of history are here, the real beginnings of the old-world empires, Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Judæa, Syria, Greece, and Rome."—*Sacred History from Creation to the Giving of the Law*, p. 145.

But not only does the Bible sustain such important and fundamental relations to the study of history, it also sustains important and fundamental relations to other branches of learning. This is true as to law. The Bible has had more to do with determining and shaping the laws of Christendom than any other or all other books. This book has largely moulded our civilization. Again, the Bible sustains important and fundamental relations to psychology. The starting-point of a true psychology is Genesis i. 27.

But there is still another most important fact to be mentioned concerning the relation of the Bible to the successful prosecution of learning: the Bible alone can furnish us with the great criteria by which we may judge between the true and the false in philosophy. The man who undertakes to explore the great ocean of knowledge without the Bible is like one who undertakes to navigate the wide Atlantic without chart or compass. On this point Dr. Charles Hodge says: "Philosophy, in its widest sense, being the conclusions of the human intelligence as to what is true, and the Bible being the declaration of God as to what is true, it is plain that, where the two contradict each other, philosophy must yield to revelation; man must yield to God. It has been admitted that revelation cannot contradict facts; that the Bible must be interpreted in accordance with what God has clearly made known in the constitution of our nature and in the outward world. But the great body of what passes for philosophy or science is merely human speculation. . . . So far, then, as those speculations agree with the Bible they are true; and so far as they differ from it they are false and worthless."—*Theology*, Vol. I., page 58. Of what inestimable value would it be to our young men and young women to go forth from our institutions of learning equipped with the infallible criteria of truth furnished by the Bible! What a safeguard would such an equipment be to them in this age of

many books and theories and speculations! In their own independent pursuit of knowledge they would be guided in the path of truth and safety. We ask, then, if it is not true that a book which sustains such important and fundamental relations to other branches of learning and to the successful prosecution of learning should not have a place in the college course?

Fourth, Because the literary value of the Bible is preëminent. The college seeks to give a high degree of literary culture; hence the department of English literature occupies a prominent place in all our leading colleges. It is the great aim of this department to give as thorough a knowledge as possible of the purest and most vigorous English; to form the most exact, perspicuous, and forceful style, and to lead the student to appreciate the best thought of the best writers. With this end in view, the masterpieces of literature are studied, the thought, expression, language, and style being carefully considered. That this object of the college is a proper and commendable one cannot be denied.

But what book is so well adapted to meet the great end of this part of the college curriculum as the Bible? Not that the Bible is the only book which should be used in the study of English literature, but that its claims in this department are preëminent. Is any book studied for its influence in forming the English language? Then, should not the Bible be studied? Is any book studied because it is a well of purest English? In this respect the English Bible is confessedly greatest. Is any book studied for its historical style? Many of the historical portions of the Bible are unrivalled for a simple, exact, clear style. Is any book studied for its poetry? Can any poetry be found to surpass that of Job and the Psalms? Is any book studied for its figures of speech, its beautiful and expressive illustrations? In this respect the parables of Christ are unapproachable. Is any book studied for its beauty of thought, or its vigor of thought, or its sublimity of thought, or the value of its thought? Then, surely, the Bible is easily preëminent. Dr. Stalker says concerning Paul: "He gave to mankind a new world of thought. If his epistles could perish, the loss to literature would be the greatest possible, with only one exception, that of the Gospels."—*Life of Paul*, pages

105, 106. If this be true of Paul, what may be said when we add Moses, David, Isaiah, Mark, and John? As to the literary value of the Bible, Bishop Warren says: "Are we proud of our varied and exact English speech? The Bible largely made it; and no student seeking forceful speech can neglect the legal exactness, the ornate imagery, the peerless rhetoric, the sublime words of the Bible. Many are the testimonies of men to this truth. When we are surprised at the compact, simple, vigorous style of any writer, we are sure to find that he owes it largely to the Bible. Many have gladly confessed it. Ruskin is, without question, the great master of pure, eloquent English prose. . . . Whence came that pure, idiomatic, vigorous speech? He himself has told us that he owes it to the Bible."—*The Bible in the World's Education*, page 210. If, then, the Bible has done more than any other book to fix and mould the purest and best English speech, to form the best style, to supply the most "ornate imagery," to kindle the fire of the poet, to stimulate the deepest and best thought of the ages, what book has so strong a claim to a place in the college course! Moreover, if the Bible has confessedly influenced more of the fine literature of the world than any other book; if it is so interwoven with much of the finest literature as that it cannot be appreciated, or even understood, without a knowledge of the Bible; if it has directly produced such a vast amount of fine literature, then are not its claims to a place in the college curriculum preëminent?

Fifth, Because it is necessary, in order that the college-bred man or woman may continue to have a true and adequate appreciation of the Bible. Consider what takes place in college: The boy who enters college at the age of sixteen or seventeen years comes out at the end of four years a man; and if his physical development has been marked, much more marked has been his mental development. He no longer thinks as a boy or acts as a boy. The books which interested him as a boy he does not care for now. The things which delighted him as a boy delight him no longer. His aspirations, hopes, and purposes are upon a vastly higher plane. Marvellous development has taken place in his intellectual powers, in his tastes, and in his acquisitions. Now, suppose that this development has taken place along all other lines

except biblical lines, in all other kinds of knowledge except in the Bible, what will be the result? Obviously, this: he will still have his boyish ideas of the Bible and his boyish knowledge of the Bible, while he has a man's ideas and knowledge of other books. Hence, in many cases we find that the college graduate has lost his interest in the Bible, if not his faith. Why? Because he has outgrown the Bible? By no means, but because he has outgrown his *boyish ideas* of the Bible, ideas which, in most cases, are exceedingly shallow and superficial. In order, then, that the college-bred man or woman may continue to have a true and adequate appreciation of the Bible, what is necessary? Put the Bible in the college course, and during that most critical period of mental development which takes place in college let the ideas of the Bible be enlarged, let its treasures of knowledge and wisdom be opened, let its beauty and force and value be shown. Let such instruction be given as will lead the college graduate to appreciate and trust the Bible more intelligently and fully as a man than he did as a boy. If, then, the Bible is to maintain its place in the appreciation, in the faith, and in the life of college-bred men and women, the Bible course in the college seems to be of the greatest importance.

Sixth, Because it is supremely adapted to form and to develop the highest type of moral character. What, now, are the elements of moral character? They are the great moral attributes of justice, goodness, truth, and purity. In order that such a character may be formed, the first thing necessary is a correct knowledge of what is just and good, and true and pure. Still further, in order to the highest type of moral character, this knowledge must be full and adequate. Nor is this all: this full and adequate knowledge must be believed, must be held as the firm convictions of the soul. Should it not be one of the chief aims of the college to form and develop this type of moral character? What is education worth to the individual or to the world without a moral character which shall utilize it for just and good and true and pure ends? And what a power for good is a thorough education joined with the highest type of moral character! How, then, is this highest type of moral character to be formed and devel-

oped? Through the study of the Bible. Here are the divine conceptions of righteousness, and goodness, and truth, and holiness; and in order that the boy's ideas and convictions of these moral attributes may continue to dominate his soul and life, let him continue, by the study of the Bible, to get clearer and fuller and higher ideas of them during the period of his college life. To form and perfect moral character is one of the great objects for which God gave the Bible. (Psalm cxix. 9; John xvii. 17.)

These are some of the reasons why the Bible should be introduced into the college course. Let us sum them up: *First*, Its adaptation to produce mental development. *Second*, The great value of the knowledge which it alone is able to impart. *Third*, The important relation which it sustains to other branches of knowledge and to the further prosecution of learning. *Fourth*, Its preëminent literary value. *Fifth*, Because it is necessary in order that the college-bred man or woman may continue to have a true and adequate appreciation of the Bible. *Sixth*, Its supreme adaptation to form and develop the highest type of moral character.

II. HOW SHOULD THE BIBLE BE TAUGHT IN COLLEGE?

To this question different answers may be given. The answer suggested below is not offered in any dogmatic spirit, but only as the result of the writer's study and experience:

First, The Bible itself should always be the main text-book. Other books will probably be found necessary, but these should always be used as helps in the study of the Bible, and not as substitutes for the Bible. As a rule, it should be necessary for the student to study the Bible itself in the preparation of the lesson; and the teacher should so conduct the recitation as to ascertain if the class has really studied the Bible. The object of the course should thus be emphasized: to teach the Bible, and not merely what men have taught concerning the Bible.

Second, The Bible should be taught systematically, that is, according to a plan. This is exceedingly important as an aid to memory. It is much easier to remember facts which are arranged according to a plan. Moreover, it will be found that a judicious plan in the study of the Bible will enable us to understand it

much better. There is a steady progress and development in the history and in the revelation. A plan will enable the student to see this progress, and to understand the successive stages of the revelation, and the relation of the facts and of the books and of the periods. Thus the interest is very greatly increased. Thus definiteness is given to the study of the Bible, and thus, also, the teacher is able to give a view of the Bible as a whole. As an example of a plan for the study of the Bible, the reader is referred to Dr. Price's *Syllabus of Old Testament History*. On page 24 the author gives an outline of the plan he proposes to follow in the study of the Old Testament. He here divides Old Testament history into twelve periods, as follows:

"I. Ante-diluvian. 4004-2348. Creation to the Deluge.

"II. Post-diluvian. 2348-1921. Deluge to the Call of Abraham.

"III. Patriarchal. 1921-1706. Call of Abraham to the Descent into Egypt.

"IV. Egyptian. 1706-1491. Descent into Egypt to the Exodus.

"V. Wanderings. 1491-1451. Exodus to Crossing of Jordan.

"VI. Conquest. 1451-1400. Crossing of Jordan to the Appointment of Judges.

"VII. Judges. 1400-1095. Appointment of Judges to Establishment of Kingdom.

"VIII. Kingdom. 1095-975. Establishment of Kingdom to Division of Kingdom.

"IX. Dual Kingdom. 975-722. Division of Kingdom to Fall of Samaria.

"X. Judah Alone. 722-587. Fall of Samaria to Fall of Jerusalem.

"XI. Captivity-Exile. 587-537. Fall of Jerusalem to Fall of Babylon.

"XII. Restoration. 536-445. Fall of Babylon to the Close of the Old Testament."

It is not claimed that this is the only plan for the study of the Old Testament. But it has much to commend it. It is clear and clean-cut; it is made according to the epochs in the history; it is

comprehensive, and yet sufficiently minute for a general outline. The names of the periods are all descriptive. The beginning and end and length of each period may all be seen at a glance. It will enable the student to remember and locate what books of the Old Testament and what great events belong to each period. But whether this plan or some other be adopted, by all means let us have a plan for the study of the Bible.

Third, The Bible should be studied historically. The Christian religion is founded upon facts, historical facts. The Bible is really a history of the origin and progress of the kingdom of God in the world. Consider what a large proportion of the Bible is history. Seventeen books of the Old Testament are classed as historical. Of the remaining twenty-two, the five major prophets and the twelve minor prophets contain a large historical element. In the New Testament, the four Gospels and the Acts are classed as historical, while in the epistles there is a large historical element. It will, therefore, be seen that there is abundant reason for a historical study of the Bible. Concerning the importance of Old Testament history, Dr. Price truly says: "It is the history of God's chosen people. Genesis i.-xi. 9 is the biblical introduction to the history of Israel. With the call of Abraham the chosen people are set apart. From this point to the end of the Old Testament we are following Israel. They are the peculiar objects of care. Around them Jehovah makes everything revolve. Other peoples are mentioned only in so far as they come in contact with, or are related to, the house of Jacob. The history of Israel is full of instruction, admonition, encouragement, warning, promise, and benediction to every one who will make of it a careful study. It is the soil out of which grew the prophetic and poetical writings of the Old Testament. It furnishes us the conditions of this growth, and gives us the principles by which it was made. The prophetic utterances of the Old Testament are not isolated, but are vitally connected with some period and time." "It" (Old Testament history) "is essential to any true method of interpretation of the Old Testament. No one can understand the import, the full significance, of the words of the prophets without a reasonably complete knowledge of the times

which called out their utterances. Their prophecies and predictions cannot be understood without a comprehension of the times in which they grew up. The ignorance current regarding Old Testament history has been the most fruitful source of bad and false interpretations in this portion of Scripture. Out of isolated and disconnected passages, regardless of the historic background, men have woven theories, spiritualized and allegorized, until in many minds the Old Testament is a mere jumble of uncertain sounds. On the other hand, the history gives us the events and the customs of the people which provoked the words of the prophet; it gives us the basis for his utterances, and the only true data by which we can rightly interpret his words. Old Testament history is the basis and background of a correct interpretation of the Old Testament."—*Syllabus of Old Testament History*, pp. 6, 7.

What Dr. Price has said concerning the importance of Old Testament history may be as truly said concerning New Testament history. Jesus Christ is a historical person, and the great facts of his life are historical facts; and just as truly is the New Testament history "the basis and background of a correct interpretation" of the New Testament. No one can properly understand the epistles of Paul separated from the history which called them forth. Seeing, then, that "the religion of the Bible is historic; its home upon the surface of the earth; its dwelling-place with the children of men; that, considered as a system of religious doctrine and worship, revealed religion is not less real than Mohammedanism" (Humphreys), how important for us to know the facts of that history, and something of their deep significance!

Fourth, The Bible should be studied in the light of biblical geography. Very closely connected with any historical event is the place where it occurred. The location of an event not only makes it more real, and helps to fix it in the mind, but often enables us to understand it. Hence, biblical geography must go hand in hand with biblical history. "Bible history has been too long suspended in mid-air. Much of the current ignorance of its facts has been due to a neglect of the study of the geography

of Palestine and adjacent lands. In other words, the background of the picture was lacking; there was no local coloring. Readers and students rambled through a mass of chaotic facts, and brought out with them only a very general impression of all that they had seen. . . . An important essential to a proper understanding of Old Testament history is a knowledge of the lands of the Bible." (Price.)

Fifth, The Bible should be taught analytically. Having adopted our plan and made a general outline, our work now begins in earnest. We take up each period in order. The first thing to do is to examine our Scripture material on the period, and to analyze the period by dividing it into general heads; *e. g.*, we may arrange the Scripture material in the first period under the following general heads: I. Creation; II. The Fall; III. The Protevangelium; IV. Cain and Abel; V. Seth and his Descendants. We next take up these general heads for further analysis. Concerning the subject of creation we inquire, Who created; the meaning of create; what he created on each day; the peculiarities of man's creation, etc. As far as our time and opportunity will permit, we try to do some work in book-analysis and in the analysis of chapters. In all this analysis it is deemed important to ascertain the connection of the different parts. After thus analyzing the period, it is well to review it and make a condensed summary. After such an analysis the subject or period will have a very much fuller and deeper meaning to the student than ever before.

Sixth, The Bible should be studied exegetically. Exegesis is the scientific interpretation of the Bible, that is, the application of true methods and laws of interpretation to the Scriptures, with a view to ascertaining their meaning. In this sense, all study of the Bible should be exegetical. But especially should a Bible course in college have as one of its great objects a sound exegesis. It should be pointed out to the student how a comprehensive survey of the whole Bible bears upon a sound exegesis; that the Bible is a unit, a consistent whole, and never contradicts itself, and hence every part of the Bible must be interpreted in accordance with the analogy of faith. It should be shown, also, how each book

in the Bible should be studied as a whole, in order to the correct interpretation of any part of that book. Again, it should be made evident how the history bears upon the interpretation: the history of the period, of the author, and of the circumstances under which he wrote. It should be seen, also, how the geography bears upon the interpretation. What a striking background it furnishes for many a Bible scene, and what force and clearness it gives to many passages! Moreover, we should be able to see how the analyses we have been making bear upon the interpretation, exhibiting to us the relation of part to part and of truth to truth, and showing the progress and design of the revelation, and that the understanding of the separate parts is necessary to any adequate understanding of the whole. Thus in the exegesis we find the application and culmination of all our work in the Bible course. We find that the Bible course has been arranged in accordance with the great laws of interpretation, and to teach and illustrate those laws. Thus, also, in addition to the knowledge imparted, another valuable end is accomplished by the Bible course, namely, that of teaching how to study the Bible.

Seventh, It should be so taught as to exhibit something of the manifold importance and value of the Bible. For this abundant opportunity will occur during the progress of the course. In the study of Genesis the great value of the history should be shown. Again, the opportunity will occur for showing the variety of its literature, the style, the felicity and beauty of expression, the aptness and force of illustration, the sublimity of thought, the Bible conception of God, the vast superiority of his laws, the true conception of sin and of holiness, of human greatness and destiny; and, above all, the supreme value of the Christian religion. Almost daily the opportunity will occur of calling attention to some important characteristic, or some element of value, of the Bible. Thus the teacher will be daily exalting the Bible, daily showing what a rich storehouse of knowledge it is; what a wonderful and interesting and valuable book it is. What a great work will the teacher accomplish if he has the tact in this way to inspire the student to love and honor and trust the Bible, and to appreciate its supreme value!

III. OBJECTIONS TO THE BIBLE COURSE CONSIDERED.

There are some who offer objections to the introduction of the Bible into the college course. Let us hear their objections, and then carefully and candidly consider them :

First Objection. It would degrade the Bible in the estimation of the students, leading them to class it with other college studies.

Answer. This would depend upon the manner in which it should be taught. If it should be taught in an irreverent and careless way, by one who did not himself thoroughly believe and honor and reverence the Bible, then this objection would be valid. But if it should be taught as the infallible word of God, by one who himself believed it and loved it, surely no irreverent manner or depreciating word would ever lower the Bible in the classroom. More than this, if he should be a competent teacher, he would be able to show the intelligent student that there was far more in the Bible than he had ever dreamed of before: more of profound and important truth, more of sublime thought, more of deep and absorbing interest, more of elegance of style and beauty of expression. And so, instead of the Bible being lowered in the estimation of the student, he would have a higher and more intelligent appreciation of it than ever before. So far from this objection being valid, there is strong reason to believe, as has been previously shown, that the introduction of the Bible into the college course would have a powerful influence in preserving the faith and interest of college-bred men and women in the Bible.

Second Objection. It amounts to a theological course, and nobody except preachers need to take such a course.

Answer. This objection is evidently based upon a misapprehension. The objector assumes that the Bible course is virtually a course in systematic theology. This is a great mistake. Systematic theology undertakes to formulate in logical order the doctrines of the Bible, and then to prove and vindicate them. The college Bible course undertakes nothing of this kind. The objects of this course are: to give the student such a knowledge of the Bible as shall, at least, be in keeping with his knowledge in other branches of learning; such a knowledge as no one claiming a liberal education can afford not to have; such a knowledge as shall

inspire the college graduate with an intelligent faith in and appreciation of this wonderful book, and to acquaint him with the fundamental laws of biblical interpretation. We study the Bible in college, not to formulate a system of doctrine, but to learn something of the contents of the sacred volume, and to interpret its pages. Is not such a study of the Bible desirable for everybody as well as for preachers? Are preachers the only class who should really and carefully study a book which has done more to mould our civilization than all other causes; a book which has done more to form and develop the highest type of character than all other influences; a book which was designed to be the only infallible and authoritative rule of faith and practice for all men, all others as well as preachers? Are preachers the only class who should be expected to have anything like a full and accurate knowledge of the great facts of the Bible, the most valuable histories of the Bible, the great characters of the Bible, the fine style of the Bible, the rich and varied literature of the Bible, the sublime and vital truths of the Bible? But especially, shall the college graduate, claiming to have a liberal education, have only a smattering of this greatest, and oldest, and best, and most potential book the world has ever known? And is the college student to be turned aside from the Bible course, because somebody misapplies to it the word "theological?"

Third Objection. The Bible course in college implies the sectarian teaching of the Bible. If the teacher is a Presbyterian, he will make the Bible course Presbyterian; if the teacher is a Methodist, he will make the course Methodist, and so on. This objection is made against patronizing a denominational institution having a Bible course by those of other denominations.

Answer. That the Bible course could be made sectarian may be true; but that it need not be, and ought not to be, made so is equally true. When a college invites the patronage of all denominations, fair dealing demands that the Bible course should carefully avoid all controverted points; and when one makes a thorough investigation of the subject, he will be surprised to find what a very small proportion of the biblical material is held in controversy by the evangelical denominations. Not only is the

great mass of the material held in common by us all, but upon the fundamental principles of interpretation all are agreed. Moreover, from what has already been said in this article, it will be seen that the Bible course is framed along such lines as to afford the least occasion for sectarian teaching. The leading text-books are non-sectarian. Price's *Syllabus of Old Testament History* is extensively used as a text-book in the college Bible course, but there is nothing in this book to indicate to what denomination the author belongs. Hurlbut's *Biblical Geography and Manual of Bible History* is extensively used, but there is nothing in his book to indicate that Dr. Hurlbut is a Methodist. Blaikie's *Bible History* is extensively used, but no one can say that this is a Presbyterian history. The fact is, that the teacher who would make a college Bible course sectarian would not only be violating good faith with the members of other denominations who might be in his class, but he would be himself very narrow; and those persons who can see nothing in a college Bible course except sectarianism are uninformed and narrow.

Fourth Objection. The church, and not the college, should teach the Bible.

Answer. There are only two agencies by which the church may teach the Bible—the ministry and the Sabbath-school. Let us consider what these two agencies are accomplishing in teaching the Bible:

1. *The Ministry.*—That the minister should teach the word in his preaching, expounding it and faithfully declaring it, is true. But how few sermons are expository, how few are really instructive, and, even when the sermon is instructive, how seldom is it so constructed that the instruction can be carried away and retained! Nor is it the object of preaching to teach a Bible course, but to meet the varying demands of a congregation. It may be that the condition of the congregation will call for comfort one Sabbath, for encouragement another, for warning another, for a call to repentance another; and so the preacher will find his texts in different parts of the Bible. Obviously, it is impracticable and undesirable for the minister in his weekly ministrations to teach a Bible course, to teach the Bible in any systematic or thorough

way. But may he not do so in the Wednesday-night lecture? True, he might at this service deliver a course of lectures and find a better opportunity for systematic instruction. But he encounters two insuperable difficulties: (1), A comparatively small proportion of the people, especially of the young people, attend this service; (2), The time allotted to this service is too short to do much in the way of instruction, one hour once a week to be devoted to singing, prayer, reading Scripture, and exposition. But there is another great reason why the ministry cannot do anything equivalent to teaching a Bible course, they cannot get the people regularly to coöperate with them. The best teacher on earth could not succeed in teaching a class which would do no work, and which would not regularly and heartily coöperate with him. Evidently, the ministry cannot do the work contemplated in the Bible course.

2. The Sabbath-School.—The Sabbath-school is an exceedingly important institution. Not one word of discouragement or disparagement should be spoken concerning it. In spite of many difficulties and trials, it is doing a great work. But there are many reasons why it cannot do the work in Bible study proposed by the college Bible course. The following are some of these reasons:

(1), The Sabbath-school teacher has only about one half-hour each Sabbath in which to instruct his or her class. How little is possible in so short a period recurring at so long an interval every one must at once recognize.

(2), There is great difficulty in securing competent and faithful teachers.

(3), There is great difficulty in securing the coöperation of the scholars, in getting the scholars to study the lesson, to attend regularly, and to take an interest in the recitation.

(4), The teacher cannot exercise any authority or discipline.

(5), By the time the scholars reach the age when they are capable of engaging in the more advanced study of the Bible it is found difficult to retain them in the Sabbath-school and to enlist their interest.

These are some of the reasons why the Sabbath-school work

must, as a rule, be superficial and unsatisfactory, and that, too, notwithstanding the earnest efforts of a noble band of church workers. It is impossible for the Sabbath-school to give such thorough and extended instruction in the Bible as is needed to satisfy the demands of the times and to satisfy the demands of the college graduate.

Fifth Objection. It is the prerogative and duty of parents to teach the Bible to their children.

Answer. This is indisputable. But we are now dealing with actual conditions, and not with theories. What are the facts?

(1), Parental instruction is confined to a comparatively early period of boyhood or girlhood. After the boy or girl passes the age of twelve or fourteen years very little parental instruction is attempted.

(2), Very few parents feel themselves competent to give anything like thorough instruction in the Bible.

(3), Parental instruction of any kind is sadly neglected in many, many homes.

It is very evident that parental instruction does not and cannot do the work proposed in the college Bible course.

Sixth Objection. There is danger that the Bible course in college may be taught by unsound teachers, and so poison the minds of our educated classes.

Answer. This is, to my mind, one of the strongest objections to the Bible course. Can we secure safe teachers, whom we can trust to teach the Bible to our sons and daughters? A thousand times better have no Bible course than to have it taught by one who does not believe in the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, or who does not treat the Bible as the authoritative and infallible word of God. But this difficulty is not insuperable. There are true men and women who can be trusted to teach the Bible. Let the trustees of the college make it an indispensable qualification for a teacher of the Bible course that he or she believe in the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures and be acquainted with the system of truth taught therein. Let them see to it that this course is taught by one who is entirely trustworthy and competent. The solution of this difficulty, then, must rest in the

hands of the college trustees, just as a similar difficulty in the Sabbath-school must be solved by the pastor and the superintendent.

We pass next to consider the last phase of our subject:

IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE BIBLE COURSE IN COLLEGE.

If the reasons for introducing the Bible course into the college are valid, then it is easy to see how each one of these reasons implies an advantage; *e. g.*, if it be true that the Bible course secures mental development, then one of the advantages of the Bible course would be mental development; and so of the other reasons. It is, however, to other and additional advantages that attention is now called, to advantages accompanying and resulting from such a course:

First, It would secure the study of the Bible at a very critical period in life. The period of college life is the period of great mental development, of the acquisition of important and awakening knowledge, of great mental activity; and, as the awakened soul gains wider and yet wider views of the great world of human thought and knowledge, the question becomes an important one, What is to be the effect of all this upon his faith? His views on every other subject are enlarging and changing, and taking new shape and new directions. In passing through such a crisis, what could be more valuable and salutary to him than the Bible, guiding and strengthening and confirming? Again, college life is critical in another sense, it is a period of temptation. The boy has, perhaps, passed for the first time from the sheltering and guarding influences of home. He feels all the buoyancy and the fresh interest and enthusiasm of youth. He goes out for the first time in his life to think and act for himself, to form new acquaintances and associations, and to meet strong enticements to evil. If left to himself, there is great danger that he will neglect the one only book which can, under God, guide and strengthen and keep him. What a salutary influence must the study of the Bible have upon the young man in this period of temptation! Again, the period of college life is the period when character is rapidly reaching the final stage of its formation. Habits are

forming, views are crystallizing, and purposes are taking shape. How important at such a critical time to study the Bible! Again, this is the period when the young man or woman is considering the question of life-work; and how important, when such a question arises, the guiding influence of the Bible! Thus it is seen that by putting the Bible into the college course it secures the study of the Bible at a most critical time in life; and, if taught in the right spirit, it cannot fail to exercise a salutary influence.

Second, It will have a tendency to fortify our young people against heresy. This is a time when the Bible is being assailed, when loose and dangerous views are being propagated. We cannot keep our young people from reading and hearing these things, and, if they read and hear heresy without being able to resist it, the danger is great. What is the remedy? Let them have such instruction in the Bible by sound teachers as will enable them to withstand the power of error. As Dr. Dabney used to tell his class, "Fill the half-bushel with the Lord's wheat, and there will be no room for the devil's chaff."

Third, It will be an important preparation for Christian usefulness. One of the most interesting and hopeful signs of the times is the activity of the young people in church work. Their zeal and energy, and strength and hopefulness are all elements of power. But what are all these if not tempered and guided and regulated by the word of God? What is so much needed, then, to render the young people's movement powerful and successful is a correct knowledge of the Bible. Will not this great essential to Christian usefulness be met in a large measure by the college Bible course? But not only would it contribute very largely to the success of the young people's movement, it would also help to train more competent teachers for our Sabbath-schools, more efficient church workers in every department of church activity, more capable elders and deacons; and, still further, it would prepare our young people for the responsibilities of the home when they shall have homes of their own. Behold what an important bearing the Bible course would have upon Christian usefulness!

Fourth, It would exercise a most salutary influence in the college. Let us notice some of the reasons for this:

(1), The study of the Bible would keep the thought of God before the minds of the students. The Bible is God's book, and in it he reveals himself. The student of the Bible must be constantly reminded that God is; that he is the Creator, the God of providence and redemption; that he is all-wise and almighty and omnipresent, and clothed with all majesty, and possessed of all moral perfections. To have this great thought of the true and living God kept fresh in the minds of the young men and young women can scarcely fail to exert a most salutary influence.

(2), The study of the Bible would keep before the minds of the students the great standard of right. Here is revealed the perfect law of God. Here we see what sin is and what righteousness is. Here we find the great rule which is to regulate human conduct. To study from week to week this infallible and authoritative rule of human faith and practice could scarcely fail to exercise a powerful influence upon the characters and lives of the young, and to elevate the standard of morals and of living in the institution.

(3), The study of the Bible would strengthen the faith in, and increase the appreciation of, the Bible. If the Bible course is properly taught, it cannot fail to give a more intelligent and stronger faith in the Bible, and to increase vastly the appreciation of the Bible. And this would be to give the Bible additional power over the minds and hearts and lives of the students.

(4), The study of the Bible would certainly bring the great truths of the Bible before the minds of the students; would, to a certain extent, familiarize them with the contents of the Bible, and give them a truer and fuller understanding of those contents. Now, add this most important fact: the Bible is the sword of the Spirit. Through scriptural truth this divine Spirit regenerates, comforts, and sanctifies souls. The Bible course, then, puts the college student in a condition in which the Spirit of God can reach and move him. No advantage of the Bible course could be more potential than this. How, then, can it fail to exercise a mighty and salutary influence in the college?

Fifth, The Bible course in college would be a strong testimony to the word of God. What would be this testimony? That the

Bible is a book of such value and importance that it ought to be studied as a part of a liberal education, and as an important part of preparation for life. Let it be noted that this testimony would be borne by the college, by the most learned and capable men, by those who are regarded as the most competent to pass judgment, by the most influential. The effect of such a testimony would, obviously, be very great. So far as the student-body is concerned, this testimony would tend powerfully to establish the Bible in their confidence, while with all others the testimony would have great weight. And is not such testimony needed in this age, an age in which the enemies of the Bible are doing so much to disparage it and overthrow it? And might we not confidently expect the blessing of God to rest upon that institution which in thus honoring the Bible honors the God of the Bible?

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III. "GO—TEACH"; OR, THE CHURCH'S DOUBLE COMMISSION.—MATT. xxviii. 19.¹

THERE is a great deal in the press and in the pulpit of the day about the "Church of the Future." In newspapers, both secular and religious, in magazines and reviews, in sermons and addresses, a favorite topic for discussion and speculation is "The Church of the Future."

Three simple thoughts suggest themselves right here:

1. "The church of the future" (the true church) must be what our great Head commands us here, in this commission, to make it to be.

2. "The church of the future" will be what the rising young ministry of the present day will help to make it to be.

3. Neither the nineteenth century nor the twentieth is to assume a right of special exemption from the rule laid down by the Lord in his commission here, for all time, by which the ministry of the church in every age must work, in order rightly to make and to mould the "church of the future." We have here, then, the church's commission for all time: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen."

Note: it is a double commission. Those two words "go—teach" sum up the command. Not the one word "go," mark it, but the two words, "go"—"teach." This simple discrimination presents the two great divisions of the subject offered for consideration in this article, namely:

I. THE DOUBLE COMMISSION OF THE CHURCH.

First, We are commanded to "go." "Aggressiveness" is the spirit of the age. It is seen everywhere and in everything; in things material, scientific, social, and political. Particularly is it

¹The substance of an address delivered in Union Theological Seminary, Hampden-Sidney, Virginia, to the graduating class of 1893.

seen in things “social,” “reformatory” or “educational,” as they are called; for example, in the rise of “womanism,” or the “awakening” and “rise” of woman from that sphere in which Bible Christianity placed her when she was lifted thereby out of the mire of heathenism; in the “rise of socialism” and of its antagonist, “organized capital”; in the legion of “reformatory” and “educational associations.”

Again, the religion and the church of the day are aggressive. Never before did the world see such activity concerning sacred things. The “organized church” in all its branches is intensely aggressive. I use the word “church,” here and throughout this article, in the narrow, and yet broad, sense of our Confession and other standards, namely, as made up of all those denominations “which maintain the word and sacraments in their fundamental integrity,” or “all those that profess the true religion.” Now, in all the various branches comprehended by these terms, “the church,” through her agencies, is all astir, and in both home and foreign fields those agencies are constantly increasing.

But “independent” moral and religious movements are also in existence, and their name is “legion.” We have them both “male” and “female”: “The Young Men’s Christian Association”; “The Young Women’s Christian Association”; “The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union”; “The Salvation Army”; “The King’s Daughters”; “The Young People’s Society of Christian Endeavor,” etc., etc.

Once more: aggressiveness is the spirit of Christianity. It is right to be aggressive. It is our duty to “go.”

With all sincere reverence for our fathers, yet let me say that the position of Presbyterianism in former years as to the office of “evangelist” seems to have been an error. The old position was, that “the evangelist” was an “extraordinary” and “temporary” officer, like the “apostle” or the “prophet.” The present position, and what seems to be the true one, is, that he is, indeed, an “extraordinary” officer, but a permanent one; necessarily so, because the spirit of Christianity is aggressiveness. Sufficient proof, not to mention others, is seen:

(a), Here, in the very commission of the church, in our Saviour’s command, “Go.”

(b), In the unlimited nature of the command ("into all the world").

(c), In the apostles' steadfast policy.

(d), In the Protestant Reformers' steadfast policy.

But what is the true spirit of an "aggressive Christianity"? The "scope" is plain. The "field is the world." The application of this to "foreign missions" is also plain. But it applies to "home missions" as well. Look at the destitute frontiers, or waste places even in the Atlantic States. Look at the heavy per cent. of non-church-goers in every city, every town, and every country neighborhood.

The true spirit of an aggressive Christianity, then, is what? It is "universal," not "class" nor "professional"; it is "Christian," not merely "ministerial." It is the spirit the early church members showed, when, "being scattered abroad," they "went everywhere preaching the word." We must manage somehow to get our church members to open their mouths for Christ and for the souls of men, not in "preaching," but, as the first church members did, in those ways consistent with their prerogatives as private Christians and with their constant and advantageous position in the very midst of life. And our Presbyterian ministers must themselves learn to "mix" with men; yes, with all classes, ages, races! I notice the words of Dr. J. W. Pratt in *The Union Seminary Magazine* (March-April, 1893) on "Pastoral Visiting": "Your post of duty," says he to the seminary students, "is *in your study*!" Ah! but we must "study" men; and, to do this, we must "mix" with them. With the greatest deference to that honored name, but with the greatest emphasis, I repeat it: *we must study men!* It is the Presbyterian minister's peculiar and constant temptation to drop this and to shut himself in with his books alone. But he must resist it. Moses, Luther, Calvin, and Knox had to be driven out of retirement, forced from their seclusion out into the great, wicked, weary, perishing world. And what were the consequences? Immeasurable. Said Farel to Calvin: "You may put forward your studies as a pretext, but the curse of God will light upon you if you refuse to go" (to Geneva). The pastoral work is what helps us to adapt and send

home our study work. Wherever we may go, whether to the home or to the foreign field, we must be aggressive; we must “go” to men.

But there is an overlooked and neglected, yet indispensable, sphere of “aggressiveness,” namely, “the Christian home”!! Scriptural aggressiveness is twofold, namely, through the church and through the Christian home. Says Dr. Stalker: “By saying, ‘Suffer little children to come unto me,’ Christ converted the home into a church, and parents into his ministers; and it may be doubted whether he has not by this means won to himself as many disciples in the course of the Christian ages as even by the institution of the church itself.” The reason is simple: God is a covenant God, that is, the God of the family, the home. “I will be a God to thee and to thy seed after thee” is his language. Is it a wonder, then, that he means the family to be a chief means of the increase of the church? Hence the main object of marriage, namely, “that he might seek a godly seed.” Hence his promise: “I will pour out my Spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thy offspring; and they shall spring up as among the grass, and as willows by the water-courses.” Hence the vicegerent power given to parents during the childhood, the formative period, of their offspring. Let us seek, then, to revive the *Christian home*, now fast becoming a thing of the past; to have our church made up of Christian homes, if we would indeed exemplify fully the spirit of true Christian aggressiveness.

II. “TEACH”!

The second division of our commission is, “Teach”!! Note this well. The church’s commission, therefore, is a double one!

The real commission of the church is to “Go—Teach”!! Not merely “go,” but “teach”; to “go” in order to “teach,” that is, to teach the “truth”; to “go” in order to “make disciples,” that is, “learners,” of “the truth”! Profoundly significant is that language! It gives us the sole reason for “aggressiveness,” the sole reason for its exercise, for its existence. If we take not along with us the truth, then we have lost all reason and justification for “going.” Therefore, the church’s care and duty is to

preserve the equilibrium. I deny that aggressiveness alone is the church's commission; I deny that we are even to "go" at all, unless we take along with us the truth; nay, we are to "go" only so fast and so far as we can carry along with us the truth.

Times have often come upon the church when the church has been compelled to stop "going" for a while, and to give herself up to "teaching" and to contending for the truth. Such times may come again: they may be near; I do not say that they are, but this I say: the great danger threatening the church to-day is the abandonment of the equilibrium, that is, the ignoring of the second and chief part of the double commission, viz., "Teach"!! I speak of the church at large, of the church looked upon as a whole; nay, I narrow it down to the Protestantism of our own land; and, doing this, we see this tendency, the tendency to sacrifice truth to aggressiveness, to sacrifice the chief part of the church's commission. It is like a soldier starting with a cup of cold water to a wounded comrade on the battle-field, but getting there with the empty cup, the water all leaked out.

I call it the "chief part" of our commission, and it is, for the truth of God is the most precious heritage we have. The love of the truth is far more important even than the love of souls, just as love of God is more important than love of man. This was the apostles' position, when as yet they had done nothing in the way of aggressiveness, and stood, but a handful, face to face with the whole world. This was the Reformers' position. There had been aggressiveness, aggressiveness for centuries, but it was without the truth. The Reformers were aggressive, too, but it was with the truth. There was a *re*-formation back to the truth. This must be our position now. It must be the church's policy in every age, for all time.

The proofs that the "abandonment of the equilibrium," namely, the ignoring of the chief part of the church's commission, is the great danger of the day, are so abundant as to be unwieldy. I can merely mention them for the most part. Before I do so, let me say that we of the South are hardly in a position to appreciate the gravity of the statements that I am about to make. Most of the "proofs" about to be mentioned exist in the North.

We of the South, as a rule, have little or no realization of the ferment going on in the North, nor of the fearful strain there is upon the noble souls up there who still hold fast to the simple, but sufficient, religion of their fathers. And yet, while this is true, the North is the dominant influential section of the country, and it is impossible to prevent the evils that are now rotting out her social and religious character from filtering down into our own social and moral fabric.

Consider, then, the ominous features of the day in which we live. I grant readily all the concessions that may be desired as to the many attractive, inspiring, magnificent characteristics of our times: the splendid aggressiveness which we see, the growth of benevolent, philanthropic, reformatory movements; the countless schools, colleges, universities, etc., that dot the land; the consequent amelioration of ignorant and suffering humanity. Nevertheless, all of these things must be, will be, short-lived if the truth of the living God is abandoned or ignored. And now, is there any danger of this? Look, then, at the more ominous features of the day: the threatened degeneracy of democracy, now becoming world-wide and undermining every throne in Europe, into anti-biblical socialism, menacing all existing law and order, social, political, religious; the spread of materialism, not so much scientific materialism, but practical, that kind spoken of by John, "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, the pride of life"; the threats against the "organized church" in the swarms of unordained, irresponsible preachers; the rapid increase of independent, irresponsible religious societies; the assaults from within, in every branch of the church, on her very foundations as an organization; the threats against the Christian home, in the near triumph of woman suffrage, the fearful and increasing prevalence of divorce, the universal presence and progress of vile literature in the homes of the land (yes, Christian homes) and in the hands of the young, male and female; the decay, well-nigh universal, of family and home religion, on the one hand, and the publicising (to coin a word) of all religious methods, on the other: for example, the increase of public speaking of women in the "Woman's Christian Temperance Union," the "King's Daughters," the "Christian

Endeavor," the "Young Women's Christian Association," the church societies of the Northern Presbyterian Church and other northern churches, the multiplication of public "church activities" of all kinds, leaving little or no time for privacy or meditation. But chiefly, if discrimination is possible, we see three features of the times affecting directly the preservation and operation of God's truth:

1. The sacrificing of divine truth to so-called "unity," as illustrated in the anti-creed revolt both at home and in the foreign mission field; in the rise of powerful inter-denominational and extra-denominational independent societies, male and female, uniting in the name of Christ, and to do Christ's work, Evangelicals, Unitarians, Universalists, all together, and on colorless, creedless platforms, illustrated in the "King's Daughters," the "Woman's Christian Temperance Union," the "Christian Endeavor Society." The climax was seen at Chicago in the "World's Parliament of Religions." Here the spirit of "unity," not content with "unity of Christendom," that is, Romanism, Hellenism, Unitarianism, Mormonism, Universalism, etc., overleaps, and embraces all the religions of the world! Says John Henry Barrow, chairman of the "Congress," quoting and applying Tennyson, in an article on "The Parliament," in *The Review of Reviews*:

"I dreamed
That stone by stone I reared a sacred fane,
A temple, neither pagod, mosque, nor church,
But loftier, simpler, always open-doored
To every breath from heaven; and Truth
And Peace and Love and Justice came
And dwelt therein."

Says Dr. Abbott, in an interview:

"According to the programme sent me by the general committee of the parliament, the parliament will discuss a religion that will be satisfactory all around. On the fifteenth day the subject 'The Religious Reunion of Christendom' will be discussed. On the sixteenth day the subject will be 'The Religious Union of the Whole Human Family,' etc., etc. On the last day of the conference there will be discussed 'The Elements of a Perfect Religion (!) as Recognized (!) and Set Forth (!) in the Different Historic Faiths' !!!

Here, then, is the apotheosis of "unity"—the grand object-lesson of the growth of Theodore-Parkerism!

Two words just here: We can admit readily that no harm might come from all getting together and discussing amicably the differences between the various religions. But is not such an experiment, in a latitudinarian age of free thought like this, apt to be an expression of latitudinarianism? The proof is seen in the spirit shown on the occasion, namely, a “Brotherhood of Religions,” and in the mischief that subsequent events have revealed.

2. The second serious menace to divine truth is the substitution of Unitarian hermeneutics in place of Evangelical, and the application of them to current church and social problems. What are “Unitarian hermeneutics”? In a word, bringing God’s word to our reason, instead of our reason to God’s word; bringing God’s wisdom to man’s, instead of man’s wisdom to God’s.

This is traceable, for example, in the rise and course of “Womanism,” especially in the sphere of religion; in the “W. C. T. U.” literature on “Temperance” and “Communion Wine”; in “Briggsism.” Note: “Briggsism” is not the same as “higher criticism.” The central position of Briggsism is that “reason is a coördinate source of authority” with the sacred Scriptures. What that means the history of the church teaches us. It means the ultimate subordination and degradation of the Scriptures as “authority.”

Now, all these things are consistent with “Unitarian hermeneutics,” but not with “Evangelical hermeneutics.”

3. The third menace to truth, perhaps the most ominous of all, is the minimizing and the growing neglect of one vital and fundamental work of the church, namely, the transformation of character and life. The church is intended and adapted, not merely to gather in, but to transform, men; not only to “call” men, but to “change” them. (Isa. lxi. 1–3; Eph. iv. 11–13; Rom. xii. 1, 2.) Here, then, is the main “fly in the ointment” of the present-day church methods. Here, again, is seen where the second and chief division of the church’s commission is sacrificed to the first; “teaching” to “going”; the “truth” to “aggressiveness.” Let me illustrate. Two sets of obtrusive, yet contradictory, facts appear before us:

(1), In society, the existence and multiplication of extra-eccle-

siastical, and, in some cases, of extra-gospel, reformatory agencies side by side with steady and rapid deterioration of morals. Note, for instance, the prevalence and increase of—

Divorce,	Intemperance and violence,
Licentiousness,	Train-robbery,
Gambling,	Lynch law,
Defalcation,	Strikes,
Unpunished murder.	

Now, the point is, that these and other evils are steadily increasing, in spite of the multitude of extra-gospel agencies; and when I say this, I mean increasing beyond that proportion to the population in which such things have heretofore existed in this country. I think you will find that an examination of the facts will bear out this statement.

(2), In the church. We note the existence of almost unprecedented accessions to the church side by side with marked decline in discipline, marked decline in doctrinal preaching, especially as to the great facts of sin, the atonement, and eternity; an alarming increase of worldliness, and the almost universal decay of family religion and Sabbath observance. Here, too, an examination of the facts will, I think, bear out these statements.

What, now, do these facts indicate? Manifestly this: that religion, for some reason, is losing its transforming power; that the church is "gathering in," but not training, moulding, developing; is "calling" men, but not "changing" men; in other words, that she is, in her haste to cover territory and to add numbers to her membership, overlooking a fundamental part of her work and commission. The danger before her, the "*terminus ad quem*," is "a form of godliness without its power"!

Such, then, are some of the things which menace the truth at the present day; such are some of the facts the coming ministry will have to face when they go out to the work. Note here, that the menace from these things is against the essentials of Bible religion; the assault is on the very foundations.

Of course, I admit freely two things: (1), We cannot expect everything always to be running in the same mould. Every age

has its “diversities of operations” in religion, as in everything else. But, however different the methods be by which we build God’s church, the materials must in every age be the same, and the foundation especially must not be tampered with, must remain the same.

Again, (2), I admit freely that our age is even magnificent in the character and multitude of its achievements, material, social, scientific, moral, and religious; nevertheless, “if the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do?” If the foundations be destroyed, all these things will prove but hay and stubble; they will prove inadequate, and will inevitably perish.

This review of the salient features of our age seems to lead to pessimism. Yet from such a conclusion I must dissent, for in the service and cause of God there is no such thing as pessimism. If you say that such a review calls for faith, and the courage and patience of faith; if you say that such a review calls for a fearless, wise, and godly ministry, then I agree with you. There is no place for pessimism, for, mark it, there is a remedy, an adequate remedy, a remedy furnished by him whom we serve, who speaks to us in the words before us, who foresaw all these things which cause us disquietude, and who gives us here instructions concerning them.

What then, is the remedy? The answer is: Restore the equilibrium! “Teach”! Obey orders, the orders of our Lord. “Teach”! Be teaching preachers, not “orators,” not mere public speakers about religious or church matters, but proclaimers of God’s will! Explain, “open up,” lay on the heart and conscience, the truth of the living God. Teach “doctrine,” that is, the “whatsoever I command you” of the Saviour here, the truths in their proportion which the Lord Jesus commands us to teach. Teach “morals,” the morals springing out of the “doctrine,” out of the truth, our Lord has given us. Nothing else, nothing else will really reach and heal the open sores of society. The Bible, the Bible is the sole hope of a lost and fallen world.

III. ENCOURAGEMENTS TO “TEACH.”

The encouragements to teach are abundant. I can but summarize a few:

Recall the repeated past emergencies of the church from the deluge of heresy and corruption. Call up, for instance, the swarms of heresies through which the church at the very start, in its feeble infancy, had to struggle. If we, when young students of church history, were shocked at the wickedness and falsehood therein revealed so often within her fold, now is the time to remember that she has had strength to survive them all. What she has done repeatedly in the past she will do again.

Again, the appetite of the masses of men is for Bible truth. There is a practical adaptation of God's truth to the souls of men. It is, indeed, the bread of life. True, you must make it palatable to them; but so, too, must you do the same with the bread for their bodies. It is the "bread of life." Prepare it aright, and they will feed upon it. Observation during any "awakening" or "revival of religion" abundantly confirms this. If you wish to "reach the masses," savingly, that is, reach their souls, feed them with the bread of life. A vast body of the population in the South is almost solidly Anglo-Saxon and almost solidly Protestant. A great reverence for the Bible, and faith in it as the word of God, still exists. Again, there has been recently a revival of Bible reading and Bible study. One result of the Moody movement, whatever else may be said about it, has been this renewed interest in the Bible, increased sales thereof, increased distribution, increased reading and study.

A third encouragement to "restore the equilibrium," to "teach" as well as to "go," to be a "teaching preacher" as well as an "aggressive" one, is found in this, namely, the gospel religion is an exception to an oft-quoted rule. The "rule" is, "A people conquered in one thing is conquered in all." For example, here is the South. Thirty years ago she was conquered in war. Will she be conquered in all things else? Must it necessarily be? Nearly all of these ominous signs and features of the times which I have mentioned, social, moral, religious, belong to the North. But they are filtering, percolating, down upon us, gradually, but surely, into and through our press, our schools, our homes, our churches. These things are coming, and the coming ministry must face them. Now, must it be, indeed, that we are

to be conquered by them, are to yield to them, are to accept them? I deny any such conclusion; and I deny that a people conquered in one thing must necessarily be conquered in all; for,

First, It has not been so always, as a simple historic fact. Rome conquered Greece in war; but did Rome impose her civilization and literature upon Greece? Nay, Greece, on the contrary, imposed her literature and civilization upon Rome. The barbarians poured down upon early Christianity, and conquered it by force of arms; but did they impose their social and religious customs and opinions upon early Christianity? Nay, early Christianity in time imposed her social and religious customs and opinions upon them.

Second, And this suggests the second fact, namely, the “rule” above quoted *cannot apply to the possessors of divine truth*. Mark you, we may lose the truth through our own unfaithfulness; our candlestick can be removed because we ourselves are untrue to our trust; but it can never be that the simple type of gospel truth and religion now existing in the South must be necessarily swamped in the coming deluge from the North, merely because it is a rule that a people conquered in one thing is inevitably conquered in all; for the simple and sufficient reason that it is not our religion, but God’s, and it is in its nature unconquerable and eternal. We may be conquered in our social thought and customs, our domestic, our political thought and customs; but in our religion? Never, because it is not ours, but God’s; and yet it is ours in one sense, a sacred, solemn, and significant sense: it is ours in trust! We are the guardians of the only saving truth in this world; not the only guardians, yet guardians; and the truth that we guard is “*The Truth*,” the only Truth, the Truth which alone can save. How imperious is the nature of the trust thus imposed upon us! And now, are we sufficient for these things? Yes, through him that loves us!

And here we come to the last, the chief, the all-sufficient encouragement to “Teach,” namely:

The personal superintendence of us by a faithful, living, loving, omnipresent Lord!

“Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and, lo, I am with you *always, even unto the end of the world. Amen!*” With us personally; with us in our own private Christian life; with us in our “going”; with us in our “teaching”! The promise is to us if we “teach” his truth, if we be faithful to our trust, to the “Double Commission”! For the promise is to the Christian ministry for all time, “to the end of the world”! Here, then is our “Help”!

In what spirit, then, is the coming ministry to “Go—Teach”? In what spirit are they to make and to mould the “church of the future”? In what spirit can they hope to be successful, in what spirit hope to meet their Lord’s approbation, hope to fulfil his commission, hope to fill their sphere? The answer is, “In the simple spirit of faith,” for according to their faith will be their fidelity. “And this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.” Quite sure may they be that “without him they can do nothing.” Equally sure can they be that, unless they are true to his commission, they cannot have him with them; for the promise of his presence is conditioned on their preserving the equilibrium. But just as certain, also, is it that, if they be faithful, nothing can withstand them; and the reason is, that nothing can withstand him who will be with them. Let the “church of the present,” then, obey orders, and so will “the church of the future.” Let it “Go—Teach.”

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IV. PAUL ON THE LORD'S SUPPER, IN FIRST CORINTHIANS XI. 17-34.

It is assumed that Paul wrote this epistle to the church in Corinth, which he had founded, and that he wrote it some two or three years after he had left Corinth to labor elsewhere. Moreover, it is assumed that he wrote, not of himself, but as he was moved by the Holy Spirit, so that its teachings are the mind of Christ, and that what he wrote has been transmitted with substantial accuracy. The aim of this article is to determine the meaning of the above-cited paragraph, and especially to settle questions of its interpretation.

I. TEXT. In verse 18 the correct reading omits "the" before "church." So in verse 24 "Take, eat," should be omitted. Whether "broken," in the same verse, should be omitted, is an interesting question. It is omitted in the Vatican, the Sinaitic (original scribe), the Alexandrine, and the Ephraem (original scribe) manuscripts, that is, in all manuscripts as old as the fifth century. And in only one manuscript as old as the sixth century, Claramontanus, is any word for "broken" found; and in that it is not *klōmenon*, the word found in all other manuscripts that contain a word for "broken," but *thryptomenon*. It is likewise omitted in the following ancient versions: Coptic (which has *given*), Armenian (which has *given*, but some of the copies had no expression for "broken"), and the Vulgate (which has *delivered*). It is found in the Syriac and Gothic versions, but it is probable that the Old Syriac omitted it here as in Luke xxii. 19. It is omitted by Athanasius, Cyril, and Fulgentius, and in seven out of eight references in Cyprian. The disputed reading occurs in no manuscript before the ninth century, in no father before the fifth century (Theodoret being the first to present it), and in no version before the fourth century. And it must be remembered that the existing text of this version is in manuscripts of the sixth century. It is manifest that Paul wrote simply, "which for you," a familiar Greek idiom, but intolerable in many languages, as in English;

that in filling out the expression, while the simple verb "to be," or, at most, "be given," was the proper word to supply, the word "broken" was, at first not at all, then sometimes, and at last generally, supplied; and that this has reacted upon the Greek text, and has caused the wrong insertion therein by copyists of later times.

In verse 26 the "this" with "cup" should be omitted, as also the "this" in verse 27. In verse 27 "the" before "blood" should be inserted. "Unworthily" belongs in verse 27, but should be omitted in verse 29. It is important to observe that in verse 29 "the Lord's" should be omitted. The omission is demanded by the four great uncials, by the Sahidic and Ethiopic versions, and even by some manuscripts of the Vulgate. "But" should be substituted for "for" in verse 31. The "the" before "Lord" in verse 32 belongs there. Verse 34 should begin with "if," the copulative being omitted. The omissions of "broken" and "the Lord's" in verses 24 and 29 are important corrections of the text, and necessary to correct the most serious misinterpretations of it.

II. TRANSLATION. Verse 17. "But in giving the following exhortation I do not praise you, because ye come together, not for the better, but for the worse. 18. For first, when ye come together in an assembly, I hear that there are schisms among you. And I partly believe it; 19. For there must be also heresies among you, in order that the approved may become manifest among you. 20. When, then, ye come together at the same place, it is not possible to eat *Lord's* supper. 21. For each one his own supper taketh before, another in your eating; and one is hungry, and another is intoxicated. 22. For have ye no houses for eating and drinking? or God's assembly do ye despise, and put to shame the destitute? What shall I say to you? Shall I praise you in this? I praise you not.

"23. For *I* received from the Lord that which I also delivered to you, that the Lord Jesus, in the night that he was betrayed took bread, 24. And, giving thanks, brake it, and said, 'This is my body that is for you; this do for my remembrance.' 25. Likewise also the cup, after they had taken supper, saying, 'This cup is in my blood the new covenant; this do, as oft as ye drink it, for my remembrance.'

“26. For as often as ye eat this bread and drink the cup, the Lord's death ye show till he come. 27. And so whoever eateth the bread or drinketh the cup of the Lord in a way unworthy will be guilty as to the body and the blood of the Lord. 28. But let a man prove himself, and thus let him eat of the bread and drink of the cup; 29. For he who eateth and drinketh, eateth and drinketh condemnation for himself if he do not thoroughly judge his body.

“30. On this account, among you are many weak and sick, and quite a number fall asleep. 31. But if we judged ourselves thoroughly, we should not be judged. 32. But when judged by the Lord, we are chastened, that we may not be condemned with the world.

“33. And so, my brothers, when ye come together for the eating, wait for one another. 34. If any one is hungry, let him eat at home; that ye may not come together unto condemnation.”

III. NOTES. At vii. 1, Paul began to treat of certain things that the Corinthians had written to him about, and he is occupied with these things through chapter xi., remarking that the other things of which they had written him, and of which he had not treated, he would set in order whenever he should come. (xi. 34.) It is manifest that these inquiries concerned the relations of the sexes and matters of worship. In the passage immediately preceding the one we are studying he was able to praise them for remembering and observing his instructions. (xi. 2-16.) Thus conciliating them, he now (verse 17) proceeds to correct an evil in their assemblies for eating the Lord's Supper. But first, and preliminary to this, he refers to the reports which had come to him of schisms or divisions occurring in their assemblies, that is, discords arising in their meetings; and he remarks that there must be even permanent separations, great as is the evil of them, because thereby God will test and approve his true people.

In verse 20 his reason for referring to these alienations and divisions into cliques becomes apparent: they make it impossible for them really to eat the Lord's Supper according to its true meaning and intent. Then, in verse 21, he points out the precise evils, which are two: they do not partake together; mere appetite is indulged. Not only does each one provide his own supper, in-

stead of there being a common meal provided for all, but they do not even wait for one another, so as to eat at the same time; so they utterly fail to partake together; and some go so far as to get intoxicated, while some are left hungry; it being thus manifest that they have converted the institution into a feast for the gratification of appetite. The apostle is outraged, especially that they have turned God's sacred assembly into a riotous picnic, and, in their anti-communion spirit, made the poor ashamed.

To correct these evils, he first (verses 23-25) sets forth the original institution in its simple purity. He anticipates all objections to the correctness and authority of this statement by asserting that he did himself receive it from the Lord. Whether he had received it from the Lord by immediate revelation is not the exact point, but this, that he no more originated the institution than did they; but in delivering it to them he was but passing on what originated from the Lord himself. It was, therefore, beyond the authority of even apostles to alter.

And Jesus threw around this institution a peculiar pathos by establishing it the very night of his betrayal; and that he did it then, and in the full certainty of being about to be offered up, is the key to its meaning. Only as the crucified for our sins could he have truthfully said what he did say.

If the record were "*took the bread,*" it would mean the bread on the passover table, the passover bread, and might be a reason for insisting upon the use of unleavened bread in the Lord's supper. If the Greek were *one loaf* (*hena arton*, or *hena tōn artōn*), emphasis would be laid upon the use of one rather than of parts of several loaves. But as the Greek is simply *bread*, attention is directed neither to the special kind of bread, nor to its being all in one piece of baking, but to its being bread, the nourisher of man's life, man's prepared food. Hence the bread of the Lord's supper represents Christ as the prepared food for man.

His next act was to give thanks. Matthew and Mark use here the word "bless," but it is evident that they mean by "bless" "give thanks for," "bless God for." This word "bless" has the same meaning also in connection with the cup. Nor was this blessing or giving thanks anything other than Jesus always did

when receiving food. This conveyed no blessing to the bread. It did not even make it more wholesome, much less did it change it into something else. There is a sense in which this thanksgiving consecrates the elements, but it is no other sense than that in which it is true that the same thanksgiving consecrates any gift of God. God's appointing anything for our use, and our receiving it with grateful prayer, sanctify that gift in the only sense in which anything of use can be holy. (See 1 Tim. iv. 3-5.) And the bread and the cup of the Lord's Supper are no otherwise holy or sacred than any other food or drink received with thanksgiving. Consequently, the form of prayer so often used, that God would set apart the elements from a common to a sacred use, has no meaning, or wraps up an error; and "set apart so much of the elements as may be used" is still worse. The notion that the blessing does anything to the elements, or does something concerning them different from what thanksgiving for food and drink always does, is the germinal error out of which all the errors of sacerdotalism and Romanism as to the Supper have sprung.

After the thanksgiving came the breaking of the bread. This, also, Jesus always did when about to distribute bread to be eaten, and, therefore, to make it mean here something altogether different from what it meant on other occasions is an unwarranted assumption. Now, the bread was broken on other occasions, in order that it might be distributed among the partakers, just as we now more frequently cut the bread at our tables; and doubtless Jesus had just this reason for breaking the bread on this occasion. No parallel act was done in the case of the cup, because a liquid can be distributed among many without thus dissevering it. The breaking of the same bread among several, that they might all partake of the same bread together, being necessary to their communion, was suggestive of it; and this exhausts the whole meaning of the breaking of the bread, that it suggests communion of the same bread. And the custom of breaking the bread in the administration of the Lord's Supper is beautiful and unobjectionable, but it can hardly be made an essential part of the ordinance. To make the breaking of the bread serve as a pictorial image of the lacerating of the flesh of Jesus in the crucifixion and the prelimi-

nary scourgings is really absurd. It may not be easy to determine whether this notion grew out of the gloss "broken" in verse 24, or the false reading out of this notion; but certainly the notion is without ground of support. Not only is it true that the body of Jesus was never "broken" in this sense, *klōmenon*, but Jesus became bread by his crucifixion; and the bread for which we give thanks before it is broken is then the symbol of a crucified body, not of a body to be crucified. Otherwise the thanksgiving ought to come after the breaking of the bread.

We come now to the saying, "This is my body." To enact a ceremony in which a thing is called what it is not is to make that thing stand for that which it is called. If the Lord's Supper is not a ceremony, a teaching symbolism in action, then these words mean that the bread is the body in other than a ceremonial or symbolic sense; but if the supper is a symbolic ceremony, then these words mean that the bread is the body in a symbolic sense. Protestants must maintain rigidly that it is a ceremony, and all should be willing to let the nature of the Lord's Supper regulate the interpretation of these words, and not make the interpretation of these words determine the nature of the Supper. And that the Lord's Supper is a ceremony is evident from these four facts: that it is a development from a ceremony, the paschal supper; that those who partook of it at its first institution must have understood it to be such, a kind of parable in action; that the Corinthians manifestly saw in it only either a ceremony or an ordinary meal, which would have been impossible if Paul had taught them that it was an eating and drinking of the real body and blood of Christ; and that Paul, although here endeavoring to awaken in them a due regard for the solemnity of the Supper, gives no hint that it is other than a ceremony.

When we come to the cup, we read here, "This cup is the new covenant"; but in Matthew and Mark we read, "This is my blood"; and Luke has the same phraseology as Paul. In all of these four forms the cup is evidently put for what was in the cup, and the words "in my blood," as reported by Luke and Paul, do not belong with "covenant," making it "the new covenant which is in my blood," but with the copula "is," making it "this cup is

the new covenant by reason of its being my blood." In other words, what is reported by Paul and Luke means, "What is in this cup, being my blood, is the new covenant." And just as his saying of the bread "this is my body" makes the bread stand for the body of Christ, so his saying "this cup is my blood" makes the cup stand for his blood. But to say that his blood is the new covenant is a strong way of exalting his blood into a place of the greatest importance in the terms of the covenant: *his blood is the principal thing promised in the new covenant.*

It is this primary importance of the blood that grounds the special emphasis here laid upon receiving it with due appreciation every time, "as oft as ye drink it," and also grounds the special injunction given elsewhere, that all should drink of it; and there was more danger of drinking the cup for mere appetite and without due appreciation, than of thus miseating the bread.

Having thus set forth the original institution in its purity, Paul next infers from its significance with what mind it should be celebrated. (Verses 26-29.) It is a showing of the Lord's death. It is not a repetition of that death, but an exhibition of it. To call two separated things the one the body and the other the blood of a man, is to exhibit him as dead; and, since this commemoration is to be perpetuated till he come, it follows that whoever, at Corinth or elsewhere, in that age or in any other, shall eat and drink unbecomingly, that is, for the gratification of appetite, and not with appreciation of the death exhibited, will be guilty of a sin, the sin of treating with disrespect the body and the blood of the Lord as they are shown in this ceremony to have been offered to God for us, that they might be offered by God to us. It is a sin of the same nature as the sin of hearing the same truth exhibited in words, as in a sermon, without appreciating it.

How is one to guard himself against the commission of this sin? "Let a man prove himself." He is not to test his worthiness to partake; it is absurd for a man to test his worthiness to do what he is commanded to do. But it is proper for him to test his fitness at a given time, with the intention of putting himself in condition to perform the duty enjoined; and Paul means simply that one should test his state, and, if he finds, say hunger, first

remove it by eating, "and so," in the state to which this proving has brought him, "let him eat of the bread and drink of the cup" along with the others.

"For he who eateth and drinketh, eateth and drinketh condemnation for himself if he do not thoroughly judge his body." The word rendered "discern" in the common version is the first word rendered "judge" in verse 31; and manifestly it has the same meaning in both places in this same discussion; and when we correct the false reading here, "the body of the Lord," by omitting "of the Lord," it is manifest that "body" in the corrected text designates the body of the person partaking of the supper. The apostle here has in mind, as the occasion of one's eating and drinking unbecomingly, the interference of bodily appetite with the mind's appreciation of the truth set forth.

He next, verses 30-32, shows that these principles find a confirmation in evils suffered by the Corinthians, and explain the occurrence of those evils. He ascribes the physical weakness and sickness of many, and even the death of a considerable number, not, indeed, wholly to excesses in the Lord's Supper, but to the lack of thorough mastery of their appetites, which lack found its most shocking manifestation in their excesses in the Lord's Supper; for "on this account" refers to the immediately preceding "if he do not thoroughly judge his body." Yet he speaks with a divine kindness that ought to have prevented all misinterpretation of his teaching into a fencing of Christ's trembling saints from his table. "But when we are judged of the Lord," for the sin here rebuked as well as for other sins, "we are chastened," not that we may be cast off as guilty of an unpardonable sin, but "that we may not be condemned with the world."

And now, verses 33-34, he closes by explicitly stating the two injunctions needed to correct their practice: to eat together, and not to eat for the satisfaction of appetite. The Lord's Supper is not a meal in reality, but in form; a ceremony, and a ceremony of communion.

IV. RESULTS. 1. The idea of any consecration of the elements in the Lord's Supper, other than the consecration which any appointed gift of God receives by our thanksgiving for it, is superstition.

2. The breaking of the bread in the institution of the Lord's Supper was in order to its distribution, and it ought never to be treated as a pictorial or other symbol of the lacerating of the body of Jesus in his passion.

3. "Discerning the Lord's body" is not a phrase of scriptural origin, and is an unhappy and misleading combination of words unless used with caution. As it is wrong for us to partake of the Lord's Supper for the gratification of bodily appetite, the truth on which Paul is here insisting, so it must be a sin to partake of the Lord's Supper with a mind of contempt or indifference for its significance, or without humbly and purposely at the same time accepting Christ as he is offered to us for our salvation; but to understand the plan of salvation, or to have attained unto assurance of faith, is not necessary to a profitable partaking of the Lord's Supper.

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V. ORDINATION IN HEATHEN LANDS.

THE subject presented by the title of this article is of such importance as to merit the sober attention of the entire church. It is said that "consistency is a jewel"; and in settling this matter as laid before us by the General Assembly, it will require skill to pursue a course so consistent that it will not wreck a great principle of Presbyterian polity upon the Scylla of congregationalism or the Charybdis of prelacy. Analysis of the question discloses three modes of ordaining ministers in heathen lands as possible: (1), Let some church do it; (2), Let the session of some church do it; (3), Or let it be done by one or more evangelists sent out from Christian lands. Dr. H. M. White, in his very readable notes on the late Assembly, published in the QUARTERLY for July, 1894, seems to lean toward the second of these three modes. He does not plainly declare his preference for either of the first two modes, but he makes it reasonably clear that, in his judgment, ministers should be ordained by the session of some church, in the absence of a Presbytery. However, it is very clear that the amendment to our Book of Church Order as proposed by the Assembly is disapproved *in toto*. The proposed amendment is: "That section 40 [of our Form of Government] be amended by inserting the following words: 'And to ordain ministers in the foreign fields when ordination in the usual way is impracticable; said newly-ordained minister to be reported and enrolled in the Presbytery of the ordaining minister.'" And as the Assembly's plan strikes the writer as both the most practicable and the most scriptural, he begs leave to submit some remarks in support of it:

(1), It brings our practices into harmony with apostolic practices as to ordination. When Paul and Barnabas decided to close their first missionary tour, and were retracing their steps to Antioch, "they ordained them elders in every church." (Acts xiv. 23, 24.) Here are *two* teaching elders ordaining elders in new churches, without the slightest intimation of the others belonging to the other class alone. We are left to infer that, of course, teaching elders as well as ruling elders were ordained, because

the people needed instruction equally as much as control. To Titus Paul says: "For this cause left I thee in Crete, that *thou* shouldst set in order the things that are wanting, and *ordain* elders in every city." Here *one* elder (not one of the twelve apostles) was authorized to ordain elders, and the failure to specify which kind forbids the supposition that it was to ordain ruling elders alone. In reply to this argument, as substantially set forth in the last Assembly, Dr. White says that Timothy was ordained "by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery." So he was; but Paul did not mean to say that under no circumstances could it be done save by a plurality of elders, as the authority he gave to Titus clearly showed; and, moreover, he did not say how many elders it took to constitute a Presbytery. The idea, that three teaching elders and one ruling elder are necessary in every case, is a suggestion of expediency and not a teaching of Holy Scripture. And while Timothy may have been ordained by a plurality of elders because it was possible, the men in Crete were ordained by one elder because a plurality was not possible. So right here we see that while, ordinarily, presbyterial power is "a joint power," because all presbyters are of equal authority, yet there may be cases where it may be exercised by one presbyter in the unavoidable absence of others. To deny this would be to condemn one of the plainest teachings of apostolic example.

(2), And the Assembly's plan would "work better." There might be cases where no organized session could be found to ordain, or where the candidate for ministerial ordination was the only member of the session; and he could not ordain himself. Or, if we should direct the church to ordain to the ministry, there might be cases where no organized church was in existence, the only believer in that region being the would-be minister himself. But there could never be a case where an evangelist could not be procured. For "how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent? What! came the word of God out from, or came it unto, you only?" says Paul. "Spontaneous generation" is no more true in the spiritual than in the natural world. In the march of Bible truth around the earth we have not yet found one man who had discovered the gospel in its necessary features for himself. Where there lives a

believer, there has come a preacher. So, when a believer desires to preach, the evangelist, who brought him the gospel, can authorize him to preach the gospel. Dr. White says: "The radical idea of Presbyterianism conceives of it as a seminal principle, which, if planted in Central Africa, may grow *of itself* into a church as large as this planet of ours." Certainly. But the evangelist who plants the seed, according to the great source of Presbyterianism, not only cultivates it himself, but ordains men to assist or to succeed him in cultivating the planted seed.

(3), And the Assembly's plan is decidedly safer. Dr. White's plan would leave the new churches in heathendom far more open to the inroads of doctrinal error. Doubtless this danger was in Paul's mind when he wrote: "For this cause left I thee in Crete," etc. The Christians of this island could easily tell whose manners were the most pleasant, and whose discourses were the most eloquent; but to judge of the doctrinal soundness was not so easy. So Paul leaves Titus, a man "grounded and settled" in the faith, to "ordain elders in every city," *if any* "were pure in doctrine as well as life." New converts from heathenism, with their lingering traces of idolatry and their crude notions of Christian theology, would be among the last persons to decide upon the fitness of men to break unto men "the bread of life." Their rulers and teachers would then be little, if any, more than a reflection of popular sentiment. Right here I anticipate a probable rejoinder: "To leave it unreservedly to the people would be disastrous; but let the people select their pastor, subject to the approval and ordination of a session composed of elders who have themselves been approved and ordained by the evangelist." To this we can oppose two ponderous objections: *First*, If the evangelist should ordain their ruling elders, why should he not also ordain their teaching elders? If it is important that he should see to the doctrinal soundness of ruling elders, it is far more important that he should see to the doctrinal soundness of those "who labor in the word and doctrine"; and it would be just as easy to secure him to examine and ordain the latter as the former. *Secondly*, Ruling elders are often not competent to decide upon the doctrinal fitness of a pastor. Very commonly their education is limited, and their minds are not trained to analyze a doctrinal belief and determine its true

character and proper place among the systems of theology; and, in fact, if they should be ordained in heathendom as in Christendom, after merely subscribing to our system of doctrine and form of government, they might themselves hold very un-Calvinistic views. Some might subscribe to what they had not previously read, like the New York elder who threw himself so fiercely into the van of the revision movement a few years ago. Others would read the Confession without comprehending it, as did a lawyer elder with whom the writer once conversed, and who was unconsciously a believer in one of the pivotal doctrines of Arminian theology; and "if they do these things in the green tree" of Christendom, "what would be done in the dry?" There must be an examination of ministers touching their doctrinal views, and the examiners must be, not fresh converts from heathenism, but one or more evangelists endorsed by the home church as "sound in the faith." So here we see the practical importance of this question to be settled by the Presbyteries before the next Assembly. If we reject the Assembly's overture, and adopt sessional or church ordination in heathen lands, we turn loose our heathen converts just when, as babes in Christ, they are in greatest need of nurses endorsed as trustworthy by his church. We would leave a gate open to every pestilential error. But in evangelistic ordination we would give them a bulwark against error in a class of men sound in the faith themselves, and obligated to raise up a ministry of similar character.

(4), However, Dr. White says, "This is prelacy." Just where the prelatie feature lies I must confess that my perceptive powers are not able to see. The word "prelate" is derived from the Latin participle "*prelatus*," which means "borne or placed *before*." So a prelate is an ecclesiastical officer who stands before others in authority. But where would there be a minister for the solitary evangelist to stand before in authority? As soon as he ordained a heathen convert, that new-made minister would stand alongside his ministerial father in authority, and together they would ordain the next candidate for ordination; and right there would begin the exercise of presbyterial power as "a joint power," and prelacy would have no chance to lift its hydra head in Presbyterian polity. It might be objected that it provides no part for

ruling elders to take in ministerial ordination. But the sufficient reply is, that it is a provisional law, intended to operate during the infancy and ignorance of heathen churches, and to become obsolete on the formation of a regular Presbytery. And as it was clearly the practice in apostolic mission fields to ordain without the coöperation of ruling elders, we can feel perfectly safe in adopting this amendment as a provisional law.

(5), Dr. White also argues against the proposed amendment as giving opportunity for evangelists to be "lords over God's heritage." He says: "When your evangelist in heathen lands converts a heathen, he has the inherent right to say who shall rule over him." And he quotes Neander as saying: "When Paul empowers Titus to set presiding officers over the communities who possessed the requisite qualifications, this circumstance decides nothing as to the mode of choice, nor is the choice by the community itself *thereby* necessarily excluded." But we can accept both his statement and his quotation from this great historian as strictly true, and still not be logically forced to change our position one inch. The proposed amendment simply says that an evangelist, under certain circumstances, can "ordain" ministers. It leaves untouched the whole question as to who shall *elect* the ruling and teaching elders. That question has already been decided. The Book of Church Order already declares that the people of God have an inherent and inalienable right to choose their own rulers and teachers. The veto power of a session or a Presbytery is simply to preserve sound doctrine and character. In no case can a ruling elder, a deacon, or a pastor be forced upon an unwilling people; and what we now do at home we would do among the heathen. The evangelist would say to the people, in language similar to the words used at Jerusalem, "Look ye out among you . . . men . . . whom we may appoint over this business." (Acts vi. 3.) And, when suitable men were looked out, he would ordain them, as Paul and Barnabas did in Asia Minor, and as Titus did in Crete. The principles of Presbyterian polity would remain intact, and we would "hew to the line" in following that Book from which we believe all those principles to have been drawn.

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VI. MADAME DE MAINTENON.

It is often said, and not without reason, that this is a white-washing age. This fact is partly owing to the growth of charity, partly to moral relaxation of judgment. A third cause, however, and certainly not the least influential, has been the simple fact that such a flood of new sources of information has been discovered, and so many forgeries, interpolations, and falsifications have been rectified, as to present many famous characters, for the first time, in the white light of truth. It is a happy fact, though speaking sadly for human dispositions, that these rectifications seem to modify prevailing estimates more frequently *in meliorem* than *in pejorem partem*. The most noted woman of French history—setting aside the sublime figure of the Maid of Orleans—has reaped the advantage of this charity of facts. The following presentation is substantially that given by Dr. Döllinger, according to the genuine text, recovered at last, of documents which had been shamefully falsified to her disadvantage.

It has been wittily said that in France there is nothing Salic but the monarchy. Certainly in no other country of Europe have women had so constant and powerful an influence on public affairs. Confining ourselves to the immediate neighborhood of the throne, we find, beginning with the illustrious Blanche of Castile, mother of St. Louis, various long female regencies: that of Blanche; that of the elder sister of Charles VIII. (an excellent ruler); that of the vicious Catherine de Medici; that of Marie de Medici, and that of Anne of Austria, to which we may add the virtual regency of Louise of Savoy, the mother of Francis I. Queens-consort do not seem to have had much control, but royal mistresses so much the more, especially Agnes Sorel (by far the best of them) and Diana of Poitiers and, towards the end of the old monarchy, the notorious Pompadour. But the typical instance of female influence in the state may be regarded as exemplified in the remarkable woman whose name we have put at the head of our paper, who, under an almost superhuman sense of duty, con-

sented for a generation to sustain towards the King of France so ambiguous a relation that, notwithstanding a great many indications and intimations of her real position, it was not until our own time that the publication of her unfalsified correspondence, and especially her correspondence with her spiritual director, the Bishop of Chartres, has dispersed the last lingering cloud of surmise, and has shown beyond further controversy that she was the sacramentally-wedded wife of Louis the Fourteenth, and, therefore, the real, though unacknowledged, Queen-consort of France.

Whatever may yet turn out to be true of the political influence of women as exercised through democratic suffrage, the public influence of women under the absolute monarchy of France must be pronounced to have been, on the whole, eminently pernicious. Joan of Arc does not come into this account, for her mission, vital as it was, was a passing one, and she hoped soon to return to her cottage. But the favorites and kinswomen of the kings, if religious, wrought mostly to inflame persecution; if profligate, to inflame vice; and if, like Diana of Poitiers, both profligate and devout, to inflame both. Catherine de Medici, who was neither, stands forth as a simple fiend. Marie de Medici, though not, that I know, a patron of persecution or of profligacy, was a promoter of hatred and high treason against her unhappy son. The Pompadour brought the rottenness of France to its culmination. Marie Antoinette, whatever we may think of her as a woman, was purely and solely an influence of mischief to France and to her husband. The Spanish woman of our own time has been the same. And even the subject of our paper, though she is now shown to have been a woman of the rarest unselfishness, of boundless affectionateness, and of the sincerest piety and noblest intentions, has reaped no such advantage from the latest researches into her public policy as from those into her private worth. The best that can be said for her on this side is, that she appears to have had much less influence in matters strictly political than was once supposed, and that in matters of religion she was, by her own principles, and far beyond any doctrinal obligations, so entirely bereft of personal independence that she can hardly be esteemed a free agent. Her one great po-

litical act, so nearly fatal to France, the recognition of the young James III. as King of England, we will consider further on.

Françoise d'Aubigné was a granddaughter of the eminent Protestant historian, Theodore Agrippa d'Aubigné, and was born in 1635. Her father, a man of worthless character, who lay, at the time of her birth, under a capital sentence, but was released, carried his family to America, and died in a few years. Her mother returned to France with her boy and girl, and, in her straitened circumstances, gave over the young Frances to a relative, who brought her up a Protestant. She was afterwards, however, sent by another relative to school in a convent, where, after having, as she herself relates, given the priests no small trouble for two years with her Bible arguments, she finally made up her mind to become a Catholic. The profession thus reluctantly embraced was, once made, a thorough-going one, and in later years Frances showed not the slightest accessibility to Protestantism, or even understanding of it. Perhaps, however, its influence may be negatively detected in that blind horror of heterodoxy, or the suspicion of it, in every form, which has made her, notwithstanding her personal nobleness of character, so fatal an influence in French history.

Frances left the convent at the age of fifteen years. Young, beautiful, already giving earnest of her great abilities, of a most winning disposition, and wholly without means, she attracted the affection and compassion of the poet Scarron, and consented to become his wife. The marriage with the aged paralytic was merely nominal, but it secured to him a delightful and sympathetic companion and devoted nurse, while he, in return, contributed essentially to the development of her intellect and literary taste, and secured to her the society of the brightest minds of France. He also taught her Latin and two modern languages, probably Italian and Spanish. He died in a few years, leaving her poor, but above want, and universally esteemed in the selectest circles of the capital. At last Madame de Montespan offered her the charge of the children whom she had borne to the king, but who were not yet acknowledged.

This was the turning-point of Frances d'Aubigné's life, for this

first brought her to the notice of Louis the Fourteenth. She only accepted Madame de Montespan's offer after it had been confirmed by the king. When, therefore, in 1673, Louis acknowledged these illegitimate children, and had them thenceforth brought up near himself in Versailles, Madame Scarron was transferred to the court, which she found at first very attractive. The king himself for quite a while took little notice of her. Indeed, he rather disliked her, fancying that she looked down on every one who was not of literary note, which might, by implication, apply even to him, whose education was very imperfect, and his literary, though not his political, gifts, commonplace. But his esteem was finally conquered by her quiet, but unreserved, devotion to his children, a devotion which remained unabated during the whole of her long life, and, indeed, towards the end of it, prompted her to encourage the father's abortive attempt to thrust his spurious offspring into the regal succession. The adulterous mother, it is true, whose conscience reproved her doubly in view of the spotless life of her children's instructress, soon began to disparage her to the king, but unavailingly. His sensuous passion for his married mistress continued, indeed, for several years longer. But besides the worm of self-reproach that is always gnawing at the root of such an evil alliance, Montespan, who seems to have had no very eminent mental gifts, was perpetually tormenting him by her sudden mutations between tender devotion and stormy outbreaks, varied by witty, but malicious, sallies at the expense of others. Madame Scarron, on the contrary, three years his senior, soon convinced him that her superior intellectual cultivation had left her absolutely unpretending and serviceable, and he began to enjoy her society more and more. She showed him, as her friend Madame de Sévigné remarks, "a wholly new land," friendship with an eminent and eminently refined and cultivated female mind and character, unstained by guilt and unvexed by outbreaks of passion. His new friend afforded him the delight of conversation always affluent, but never fatiguing, resting on sound sense void of pretentiousness, on piety and sound principle void of self-exaltation, illumined by sportive wit, and pervaded by a thorough charity. Lord Macaulay happily compares her society to the ef-

fect of a refreshing green on eyes dazzled by glaring contrasts of color.

The king, besides many other proofs of favor, gave her the estate of Maintenon, to which, then or subsequently, was attached the rank of marchioness, the highest formal rank which she ever bore, even when she was in reality Queen-consort of France. She used her growing influence to reconcile Louis with his long-neglected Spanish wife. For this the estimable, but unhappy, queen cherished the warmest gratitude, which she expressed almost with her dying breath. The years from 1680 to 1683 were, perhaps, the happiest period of Madame de Maintenon's whole life. Released from dependence on the Montespan, honored by the king, beloved by the queen, exercising a supreme influence at court, yet one on which no breath of detraction had yet fallen, except from a few jealous courtiers like Saint-Simon, or from the absolutely insane hatred of Elizabeth Charlotte of Orleans, she enjoyed thus a sunny breathing-space between the obscurity of her early and the ambiguous greatness of her later life, to which she must often have looked back with desire.

The queen's death, which occurred July 30, 1683, determined Madame de Maintenon, out of regard for her reputation, to leave the court. Louis, however, by this time found it impossible to let her go, and, after some two months of perplexed irresolution, this proudest of monarchs bent his pride to secure to himself by indissoluble wedlock the society of the humbly-born daughter of a heretic house and widow of a plebeian poet. The promise was given to her in September, 1683, and was fulfilled early in 1684, when, by a private ceremony, the Archbishop of Paris married the marchioness to the king. She was now in her forty-ninth year, but still a handsome woman; Louis was three years younger.

It was long imagined that the main object of Madame de Maintenon's life, after her marriage to Louis, was to obtain formal recognition as queen. This notion, as Dr. Döllinger remarks, is contrary to the clearest evidence. Her correspondence with her spiritual advisers, above all with her director, the Bishop of Chartres, shows incontestably that she had from the first accepted, in the clear foresight of all its inconveniences, ambiguities, and hu-

miliations, the position of a sacramentally-married, but unacknowledged, wife of the King of France. Some intimations, indeed, of her true relation to him were permitted to transpire. She was supreme in the school of Saint Cyr, which she had founded, but the official right of visiting which was reserved to the Queen of France. Occasionally, as it appears (perhaps only in her own apartments), she assumed the regal mantle lined with ermine and adorned with the golden lilies. In visiting the exiled Queen of England, she and Mary Beatrice alone occupied easy-chairs, while even the Dauphiness had to be content with a chair without arms. In visiting her, even duchesses were remanded to a seat on the tabouret. On the other hand, on all public occasions she took only the rank and precedence of a simple marchioness.

So far, indeed, was Madame de Maintenon from craving recognition as queen, that before long she destroyed every document which could give witness of her marriage. "It shall never be known," she writes to a friend, "what I have been to the king." When we consider that, as she herself declares, and as Fénelon says to her, the leading feature of her character was an intense thirst of being loved and esteemed, and that hitherto, during her life of forty-eight years, including her ten years at court, she had never been subjected to the slightest breath of rational suspicion, we may judge what a self-immolation it must have been to her to assume towards the king a position which, veiled as it was, even though transparently veiled, left the court itself in some hesitation how to regard her, while at a distance, especially outside of France, it left her exposed to the most wounding suspicions and the coarsest calumnies.

That she should have married Louis is, of course, not strange, for it was impossible that a simple subject of the absolute King of France should refuse so unexampled an honor. Besides, Louis, the handsomest and most majestic man of the kingdom, and, hard as he was in his government, of the most winning amiability in private society, had secured, and always retained, her unreserved affection. The marvel lies in her complete renunciation of the rank of queen. But the sense of religious duty was absolutely controlling with her through life, and was main-

tained in full activity by her religious guides, above all by the Bishop of Chartres, Godet des Marais, who was her director for thirty years, until his death in 1709. It was she that raised him to episcopal rank and made him the most powerful bishop in the Gallican Church. In most respects he used his power well, but, unhappily, towards Protestants and Jansenists he, and she through him, showed only a face of persecution.

Frances d'Aubigné abhorred the religion of mere form which prevailed around her. She aimed to be a through-and-through Christian in temper and aim, to have a religion solidly settled on the love of God and the love of man. Most Catholic Frenchwomen of these higher aims at that time had a director, over and above their confessor, a sort of court of conscience of the second instance; and Madame de Maintenon, in choosing Godet, chose a man eminently fitted to be a guide of consciences, himself a priest of devoted and enlightened piety, and, though decidedly inclined to excessive eulogy of his eminent penitent's good qualities (of which she gently complains), showing in his control of her conscience a judicious mingling of strictness and mildness much superior to Fénelon, who propounded to her a standard, especially of public duty, above human possibilities of achievement, and in some respects liable to be interpreted as most unchristian in its ascetic divorce of divine love from human affection.

The three great objects which Madame de Maintenon proposed to herself, and which her religious guides proposed to her, in consenting to an unacknowledged marriage with the king were: *First*, The hope of converting Louis himself from the religion of slavish fear and abject superstition with which his mother and his Jesuit confessors had taught him to be content; *Secondly*, The hope of bringing him, for the good of his people and of mankind, to retrench from his enormous extravagances and his endless wars; *Thirdly*, The advantage of the church in the depression of Jesuitism, and the extinction of Protestantism and Jansenism in France. Some of these objects proved incompatible with others, and in the conflict it was, unhappily, the worse that inclined to prevail, while the better went to the wall.

The personal conversion of the king himself to a Christianity

worthy of the name was, naturally, something which his wife had more agonizingly at heart than Godet, who, though of course greatly desiring his conversion and salvation, valued him chiefly as an instrument of wider plans, and joined the clergy generally in eulogizing Louis, that hater of heresy, as eminently worthy of his title of "Most Christian King and Eldest Son of the Church," hoping of him, only too warrantably, great achievements against Protestantism and Jansenism. Fénelon, however, although perfectly willing to see Protestantism, and eagerly desirous to see Jansenism, persecuted out of existence, could never reconcile himself to the king's selfish despotism, to his unscrupulous waste of human wealth and human life. Louis, during his long reign of seventy-two years, never had any remonstrance addressed to his conscience to be compared in searching terribleness with the letter which Fénelon wrote to him in 1694. In it he tells the king that his reign had thus far been one long series of unrighteous wars, the offspring of ambition, rapacity, and vaingloriousness. His perfidy, it declares, made it impossible for his neighbors to trust him, and they warred on, even at a loss, finding peace with him only a still more embarrassing war. He has turned France into a vast hospital, but one without consolation or remedies. He has destroyed the prosperity of the nation, to bring into his court a monstrous and incurable luxury, after having drawn the wealth of the whole land into his own hands, and encircled himself with swarms of discontented mendicants. Population is declining under famine and epidemics; the people are beginning to mutiny; but to all this, blinded by his craving for glory, he seems insensible. His ministers, hard, haughty, unscrupulous men, flatter him with the show, while they retain the substance, of power, and employ this to crush all resistance or criticism, however well warranted. His religion, the letter goes on to say, consists only in fear and superstition. He has promoted a confessor of equivocal value (the Jesuit La Chaise) into an incapable minister of state, besides committing to his unequal hands the whole vast patronage of the Gallican Church. The letter winds up with a sharp criticism on the want of courage shown by Madame de Maintenon herself and by the king's friend, the Duke of Beau-

villiers, in not having communicated these most necessary, however unwelcome, truths to him before.

The marchioness soon became acquainted with this tremendous letter, whose unnamed author she had no difficulty in surmising. She complains that it is too hard, and declares that such representations either irritate or deject the king, but accomplish no good. It is easy to see that she recognizes to herself the truth of the terrible portrait, but that she has become convinced that essential amendment is something past human hope, as she was also obliged to make up her mind that personal conversion to vital Christianity was a necessity to which it was not granted her to open the king's eyes. As she bitterly says, his mother, Anne of Austria, had brought him up in the strictest school of Spanish orthodoxy, but this, unhappily, included neither repentance nor the love of God. The king's abject fear of hell, to be mitigated only by senseless repetitions of prayers and the wearing of relics, and principally by frequent confession to a Jesuit who was sure to absolve him, drew the attention even of foreign ambassadors. So absolutely ignorant was he of the first principles of the gospel, that we are told he took great offence when he first heard it said that Jesus Christ spoke the language of the humble, in which respect, indeed, he has many to bear him company among the staunchest Protestants of England and America.

Madame de Maintenon, after years of faithful effort, was at last obliged, with a sigh, to give up the thought of making a different man of her husband, and to content herself with the hope that his illustrious efforts for the promotion of the Catholic faith might be remembered to his advantage before God. She could not, however, forgive the Jesuits, whose control over his mind she regarded as the greatest obstacle to his true conversion. She, therefore, gave the full weight of her influence to Godet, Bossuet, Noailles, and other great bishops and divines of the Church of France, who, with good reason, attributed the prevailing formalism of religion and shallowness of morals in large part to the Jesuit teachings. The Society of Jesus, it is true, had then, as it has always had, many members of true devoutness, as almost all have been of spotless life. In its corporate capacity, however, it

has always been inclined to treat spiritual religion, strict moral teaching, even the immovable landmarks of Roman Catholic doctrine—nay, that very theory of papal power which it is vowed to defend—as interests entirely subordinate to the advantage of the Society itself. Dr. Döllinger points out that the famous four articles of 1682, which for a hundred years kept the Gallican Church almost on the point of a secession from Rome, and which have been a thorn in the flesh to Ultramontaniam until our own day, were carried through under the influence of the Jesuits, to secure control in France, and to revenge themselves on Innocent XI. for his known dislike of them. The Society is patient and astute, but there has been no limit to its occasional fits of reckless violence against everything in the church, from the papacy down, that has stood in its way. It has had one, and only one, invariable principle, “Rule or ruin.” Fénelon, it is true, was a friend to the order, viewing it, of course, on its better side, and the order stood by him in the great quietistic controversy as long as it dared without hazarding the loss of the king’s favor. But, with a few exceptions, the best parts of French Catholicism then held that the choice for France lay between the permanent depression of Jesuitism and the ruin of Christianity. The end of the century only too well justified their forebodings.

Louis, happily for his wife’s purposes towards the Jesuits, was absolutely ignorant of theology, as of almost everything else, while the marchioness, though never giving herself any airs of learning, was regarded, not only by Godet, but by the unflattering Fénelon, as of a strong and penetrating judgment in even the subtleties of doctrine. Louis, accordingly, when she represented to him that it was very important that the Jesuit doctrine of attrition should be condemned in the National Assembly of the Clergy, consented, evidently not knowing, as the Stadtholder Maurice said of predestination, whether attrition was red or green. He would have negatived her proposal very promptly had he suspected that “attrition” expressed simply the invariable practice of his own confessors to require as a condition of absolution only the servile fear of hell and such indisposition to sin as that might imply, dispensing entirely with the love of God. His

wife also greatly helped her case by reading to him a long catalogue of lax propositions in morals, too much even for him, extracted from Jesuit works. Accordingly, he gave consent that the Assembly should condemn these, together with the unknown monster, "attrition"; and the marchioness, sustained by the great bishops and aided by Rome, carried through an action which for a century very essentially limited the power of the Jesuit poison in the ethical and theological field, and, indeed, has permanently crushed a good many shameless propositions of shameless divines. This great service to Catholicism and to general Christianity is a pure title of hers to renown.

Nothing more clearly signified to the world that Madame de Maintenon was actually the king's wife than her relation to the church. The king, who was really, as Fénelon himself said, more truly pope in France than the Roman Pope, not only administratively, but also doctrinally, gave over into the hands of the marchioness, and that before all the world, an extraordinary measure of control over the church. He had never admitted his mistresses to any measure of influence in public matters, ecclesiastical or civil. Here, however, those grave and austere bishops who had disdained to make their court to criminal favorites, no longer hesitated to avail themselves of the influence of a woman whom they, of course, well knew to be the lawful wife of Louis. She, indeed, had advantage from both sides: on the one hand, she could hold absolutely unembarrassed communication with the holiest men; on the other, she could use a much greater freedom of action than an avowed queen-consort, inasmuch as her acts did not come so near to bearing the formal stamp of sovereignty. Accordingly, her ante-chamber was always filled with bishops, and might, as Dr. Dollinger says, well have been called the council-chamber of the Gallican Church. The pope himself sent to her the most confidential letters, and extolled her virtues in terms such as are usual only in canonizations. The king's Jesuit confessor, it is true, by no means gave up his rights of patronage; and the king himself, whose whole soul and temper had been moulded by the Society, which in turn made itself the champion of his claims from Madrid to Constantinople, and nowhere more than at Rome, had no

thought of disgracing it, though he did not mind obliging his wife and displaying his own power by administering to it an occasional mortification. She succeeded in wresting from the confessor the appointment to a good many leading bishoprics. She made Godet Bishop of Chartres, Fénelon Archbishop of Cambrai, and Noailles Archbishop of Paris and Cardinal, besides various bishops and cardinals of less note. Her penetration in the judgment of character showed itself here to good account. Towards her end, while sadly lamenting that most of the good which she had endeavored to do had either collapsed or turned the other way, she was able to comfort herself with the thought that not one of the bishops whom she had moved the king to promote had proved unworthy. She chose them chiefly from the Sulpician School, which agreed with the Jesuits in hatred of Jansenism and in theoretical exaltation of the papacy, but was very hostile to the Jesuit looseness of moral teaching and facility in the confessional.

Two of her episcopal promotions, those of Fénelon and Noailles, caused her in the end poignant sorrow, not by unworthiness, but by what she regarded as doctrinal aberrations. Fénelon, as we know, espoused the quietistic opinions of Madame Guyon, which Madame de Maintenon regarded as plunging the soul into an abyss beyond all comprehensible human relations of either time or eternity. That these errors, as she esteemed them, and as Rome, though reluctant, was coerced by Louis into pronouncing them, had been embraced by the great man whom she herself had drawn to court, had made instructor of the heir-apparent, and had raised to an archbishopric, distressed her beyond measure, especially as the king was excessively displeased that she should have thus promoted a man whose way of thinking, he was convinced, she must have known already. He only forgave her when she fell ill of chagrin, and he was afraid that he might lose her. When Fénelon subsequently crowned his offences by writing the *Télémaque*, in which the portrait of an odious despot is drawn in strokes every one of which found illustration in the king's own government, Madame de Maintenon, who had already broken off correspondence with him, found this fresh offence un-

pardonable. To us it seems the height of moral courage, but to her and to the king it seemed the consummation of unthankfulness. Yet her last reference to Fénelon, years after, extols his noble independence in the face of princes. "Such men," says she, "shall never be confounded."

Noailles, whom she translated from the see of Chalons to the archbishopric of Paris, thus placing him virtually at the head of the French Church, and reinforcing his dignity by the cardinal's hat, became to her a yet greater sorrow. It had been agreed between them, in concert with other leaders of the church, that he should use his influence as the king's pastor to give Louis a yet greater confidence in his wife's judgment, and she hers for his advantage, and that both and all should work to the one end of depressing Jesuit control, and advancing living piety and sound morals.

As to sound morals, in the one point of personal purity, Louis, after his second marriage, seems never to have given any ground of offence. No other woman, indeed, appears to have gained any influence whatever over him, although he remained, as ever, fond of general female society, and loved to have his wife and other ladies with him even in the camp. His court, however, remained, and apparently without giving him any great shock, a place of infinite corruption, corruption so deep that ordinary profligacy might be described as virtue by the side of it, the king's own brother, the Duke of Orleans, and his abominable minions leading the way. Lewdness, as so often, was mated with murder. The first Duchess of Orleans, the young and beautiful Henrietta Stuart, sister of the King of England, was poisoned by one of these minions, with her husband's privity; and yet Louis, her cousin-german and brother-in-law, found nothing in this crime to stand in the way of his afterwards advancing the murderer in his favor. Indeed, poisoning seems to have been practiced almost as a fine art in the service of the nobility. Louis, and that of set purpose, had impoverished his nobles by the ostentatious splendor of his court, so that to the murderous jealousies of dissoluteness were added the murderous cravings of impatient heirs. In short, this magnificent court is now shown to have been a thin glaze of re-

finer courtesy over an abyss of infernal vice and crime, amid which the Jesuit confessors serenely made their way, dispensing absolutions to right and left upon men and women who had been guilty of gross, or even monstrous, wickedness the day before, and were pretty sure to relapse into it the day after, on the sole condition of giving some reason to hope that they might abstain for the one day current. As to living piety, we may judge how far that flourished, remembering that some Jesuit writers maintained that, with the help of attrition and confession, it was at least possible that a man might be saved who had never loved God in his life, and that even their great Suarez, while warmly recommending and exemplifying a much higher standard, admitted that it was not strictly obligatory to love God more than once in five years. But hereupon, as Saurin says, a shudder of horror went through the Christian world, and Rome herself shook in her seat to hear such monstrosities propounded as Catholic verity. Louis had been devoted to the order, but he had already shown that there was a limit to his patronage. Had Rome, Bossuet, Godet, Noailles, and the queen (as we may rightly call her) held firmly together for ten or twelve years, perhaps two generations of wasting controversy would have been avoided, which at last delivered up Christianity in France helpless to the forces of unbelief. But in 1704 Bossuet died; in 1709, Godet. Her two main helpers were gone. Still, even with Noailles, in his semi-papal eminence, she might have accomplished much. But now the Jesuits, who had been momentarily stunned by the thunders of episcopal displeasure, reëchoed from Rome, recovered themselves, and, to save their order, threw a brand into the temple of French Christianity, which in the end consumed the whole fabric.

That which has always distinguished Western from Eastern Catholicism (Professor A. V. G. Allen to the contrary notwithstanding) has been a far deeper sense of sin, of redemption, of divine grace. Therefore, the Western Church has shown both a moral and a spiritual energy and depth of which there have been few signs in the East. But even in the West, for one that has taken the gospel in earnest there have been many that have taken it as a means of saving men, after lives of worldliness or of crime,

from reaping the harvest which they have sown. With us, this takes the form of trust in a few parting flashes of feeling; in the Catholic Church, of trust in the last sacraments. The doctrinal notions differ, but the disposition is the same. On both sides, however, a death-bed repentance is acknowledged to be a doubtful matter. Notwithstanding the sacerdotal theory, the Catholic Church had always encouraged the more earnest view; and seriousness and devoutness of life, even in the laity, had been honored as a mark of saintliness. But at last, in France, in the reign of Louis the Fourteenth, the Jesuits seem to have become impatient of anything in either clergy or laity which looked like serious personal devotion and religious thought. It foreboded spiritual independence, and the overthrow of their reign. How should they meet it? The way soon opened. In opposition to their own shallow Pelagianism, earnest religion very commonly took the form of an emphasis laid on the victorious power of grace, which, although it was nothing more than a clear development from Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, and, therefore, acknowledged by the Jesuits themselves, yet, in the writings of Jansenius of Belgium and his French friend Saint Cyran, took on some slight shadings which they sprang to denounce as heretical. Thenceforth, if any man or woman displeased them by pure devotion and strictness of life, not bearing their peculiar stamp, he or she was cried down as a "Jansenist," above all, if known as a friend of the saintly monastery of the Ladies of Port Royal, whom the Jesuits detested, and who were well known to detest the Jesuits.

We all know what it is to see two parties in one church storm at each other for years over vanishing differences, so slight, indeed, that the two sides often take up one another's peculiar vocabulary, or, at least, say the same thing in a slightly different form, almost without perceiving it. Still, there is usually a marked difference of tendency, however trivial may be the differences of formula. The Jesuits knew that the greater part of earnestly Christian men and women disliked them, and, as they could not denounce them on the ground of their piety, they found it easy to denounce them on the ground of heresy. Rome helped them, for it suited admirably with her plans of breaking down

the independence of the French Church that she should have frequent opportunities of putting forth catalogues of errors to be condemned, and the less these differed from confessedly orthodox opinions, the more she emphasized the obligation and the merit of yielding, without proof or judgment, to her simple word of authority. Precisely what Jansenism was, or whether there was such a thing as Jansenism, mattered little to her. Innocent XI., himself, it is true, a friend of Port Royal and no friend of the Jesuits, declared Jansenism to be a chimera. But the popes before and after him found it convenient to believe in its existence, for it engendered a century of controversy which drove both parties to appeal continually to them, to their very great satisfaction.

These continual appeals to Rome pleased both Godet and Fénelon, who were both thorough Ultramontane papalists; and both, notwithstanding the indefinableness of Jansenism, were always, in their correspondence especially, harping on the terrible dangers to sound doctrine to be feared from allowing it to prevail. Madame de Maintenon, who saw everything theological through Godet's eyes, took fright, and, although she herself admits that "Jansenist" had come to be a nickname for almost every earnest Christian, she finally lost her head as completely as the Jesuits intended that she should. Bossuet, whose steady judgment might have balanced her, was gone. Godet himself, whose masculine character might, at least, have been somewhat slower to move, died five years after. Then her feminine fear of the phantom called Jansenism entirely swallowed up her so much better founded fears of the Jesuits, and these knew that they had carried the day. Evening after evening she would entertain her husband with long extracts from all sorts of works reflecting, as she fancied, this imaginary heresy, which, indefinable as it was, Godet had set forth to her as the most dangerous that had ever sprung up in the church! Pope Joan, we know, is a fable; but, had she been a reality, she would have been less virtuous, but much more harmless, than Pope Frances turned out to be, with her lunatic fears of such men as St. Cyran, Blaise Pascal, Antoine Arnauld, and Innocent XI., her truest and noblest allies against the Ignatian plottings.

Moved by their common frenzy, she and the king applied to the only too willing Clement XI. for an edict which should crush the dreaded heresy, and obtained the notorious Constitution *Unigenitus*, condemning one hundred and one propositions extracted from the edifying and highly esteemed meditations of the Oratorian Quesnel on the New Testament. At least a fourth part of the propositions condemned are the simple alphabet of the gospel. What are we to say when Rome condemns the proposition that fear of an unjust excommunication ought not to restrain a man from doing his duty; or, that the Scriptures are for all; or, that God commands in vain, unless he gives what he commands; or, that without inward grace outward exhortations only harden; or, that all graces come through faith; or, that faith is the first and fountal grace; or, that there is no good work without the love of God; or, that increase of faith is a pure liberality of God; or, that God is doing his utmost for a man's holiness when he suffers him to be wrongfully denounced as a heretic? If Jesus Christ was ever crucified afresh, it was surely when the bull *Unigenitus* was issued. But had Louis the Fourteenth and Frances d'Aubigné commanded Clement to denounce the Lord's Prayer, or the Ten Commandments, he would have had to brace himself up to refuse. Frances herself, an earnest and thinking believer, would have been exceedingly shocked, had she allowed herself to reflect on the true meaning of the bull. But she, who four years before had consented to the last brutal outrage against the relics of Port Royal, who, notwithstanding her habitual tenderness and uprightness of feeling, had been willing to see the prisons filling up with blameless priests thrown into them on the vague charge of Jansenism, having now obtained the thunderbolt she had solicited, must needs see it crashing recklessly alike over things that she hated and things that she loved. She had set in motion a vast enginery of destruction, and she could no longer control it. Indeed, during the six remaining years of her failing life (the bull was issued in 1713, and she died in 1719, aged eighty-four years), trouble upon trouble ensued so fast (her husband's death coming midway) that she had small time to think. Besides, she had at last become such a thorough papalist that, presumably, she found

a merit in forcing the *Unigenitus* upon France, without considering what it meant. The propositions that should have shocked her she doubtless evaded, or juggled with their meaning in that way which enables our Catholic friends to save so many precious principles of Christianity, somewhat at the expense of straightforwardness, from sudden Jesuit inroads coming by the way of Rome.

Being now entirely taken up with the eager hope of crushing this portent of Jansenism, Madame de Maintenon expected of Cardinal de Noailles, as Archbishop of Paris, that he should show the same eager zeal on this new scent which she had previously expected of him, and had found in him, against the Jesuits. But in this she was bitterly disappointed. The cardinal had already undergone terrible anguish of conscience that he had been, though most reluctantly, an accomplice in the final and brutal destruction of the holy monastery of Port Royal. He recoiled from taking any further steps in that evil way. Like others of the best and most thinking bishops of France, at whose head he stood, he was utterly aghast at the shameless impiety of the *Unigenitus*, which, under Jesuit inspiration, seems to have been drawn up as if to show with what effrontery the chief Christian bishop could deal Christianity blow after blow in the face. Noailles positively refused to receive the odious Constitution. He braved the anger of the king during the three years that Louis still lived, and the mingled anger and grief of his patroness until she, too, died, in 1719, although this falling away of the man on whom she had chiefly leaned as her hope for the church seemed to her more bitter than death. Not until nine years later did he throw away all the glory of his long resistance by a complete collapse.

When these controversies began, the Catholic Church of France could boast more learned divines than all the rest of Christendom put together. But, with almost the sole exception of Fénelon, deep knowledge, eminent talents, and earnest character, outside the Society, were enemies to it, as the Society, for its part, has always known how to file down almost all its own theologians into a uniform mediocrity. And now that the Jesuits were once more at the head, they soon brought it about that the clergy of France

became as ignorant and feeble as it had been learned and able before. Accordingly, when the terrible forces of unbelief were let loose in the encyclopædists, French Catholicism could do nothing against them. For this result Madame de Maintenon must be held mainly responsible. Louis, it is true, hated Jansenism, as he hated every form of independent and earnest religion, and he would have persecuted it, with or without her. But it was she chiefly that turned a slow and smouldering persecution into an active and crushing one.

For the persecutions of the Protestants she cannot be held accountable in the same degree, though she is only too largely accountable for them, too. Her husband had fixed his eye unwaveringly on the extirpation of French Protestantism from the moment when he personally assumed the government at eighteen years of age. He had ever since been steadily trenching on the rights granted the Huguenots by the Edict of Nantes, so that his revocation of this, in 1685, only crowned a work that had been long in progress. His wife wholly approved of the revocation, but was distressed over the cruelties of the dragonades. She made some representations to him, but was rebuffed with the remark that early impressions seemed to cleave to her still. This frightened her out of further intercession, except as she could here and there, with great precaution, secure, as she expresses it, some "imperceptible mitigations" of the persecutions. Indeed, she says that neither she herself nor any one else dares let the king know all the atrocities committed in consequence of his orders, atrocities, indeed, so great, that when the chief agent in them went to Rome, the cardinals would not speak to him. The cruelties inflicted by the law itself she seems, not, indeed, to have prompted, but to have accepted. She did not remonstrate when Protestants intercepted at the border were sent for life to the galleys. She was content that religious firmness—obstinacy she would have called it—should involve confiscation of goods. She even suggests to her brother that now was the time to buy lands, when they were going so cheap. The double desolation of the Protestant Palatinate calls out no pity. It is impossible, says Dr. Döllinger, to avoid the conclusion that a certain fanatical

hardness was stealing over her, and helping to give, even to her correspondence, that "dryness of heart" of which her countrymen complain, and which ill agreed with the natural warmth of her affections and with her benevolence towards the poor and afflicted.

She concurred actively in the suppression of Madame Guyon's mystical opinions, although I do not know whether she had much to do with this lady's long imprisonments. Even in religious matters her power over the king was far from being as complete as was imagined. Especially was her intercession for mercy more apt to fail with him than her intercession for severity.

Bossuet and other churchmen, while approving of the suppression of French Protestantism, had desired to see many concessions made to the Protestants. They were even willing, it appears, to abstain, in their favor, from enforcing the doctrinal decrees of Trent, accepting, instead, a general profession of Catholic faith; and as to points of ritual, they wished Rome to consent to the celebration of mass in the vernacular, to administration of the communion in both kinds, and to a general simplification of worship. But neither king nor queen would hear to this. To the insane pride of Louis it was intolerable that his subjects should enjoy religious privileges beyond himself. His wife did not share this feeling, but she had long lost all appreciation of Protestant rights or sentiments, and would consent to no infringement of the uniformity of doctrine and ritual to be enforced upon them.

In one point only she energetically opposed even her oracle, Godet. He insisted that the Huguenots should be forced to mass, and even to the communion. He admitted that this would result in numberless acts of sacrilege, but urged that it was impossible to allow the following generations to grow up without religion, and declared that the responsibility of the sacrilege rested, curiously enough, not on the persecutors, but on the persecuted. Madame de Maintenon, however, recoiled from forcing the Protestants to commit what, in their consciences, could only be acts of impiety. The result seems to have been a long vacillation of policy, sinking at last, very slowly, into a disdainful apathy to-

wards the feeble remains of the Reformed religion in the kingdom. All these persecutions, however, the dragonades, the confiscations, the condemnations to the galleys, the expulsion of so many of the best educated, most moral, most industrious and thriving citizens of France, the cruel distortion of justice against them by the courts, which bent even the odious laws to unpermitted severities; the profanation of the holiest acts, in order to force them into outward compliances from which their souls revolted,—all this together, says Dr. Döllinger, not only helped to impoverish the kingdom, but helped to harden the hearts of the Catholics themselves, and to engender in them a cynical contempt of religion and religious rites, seeing them so shamefully abused. A century lay between the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the Reign of Terror, but the former was a preparation for the latter.

Thus Frances d'Anigné, so solicitous for the advancement of pure and enlightened piety, had yet, by her blind horror of heterodoxy, crushed it in its three great forms of Protestantism, Jansenism, and Mysticism; had enthroned ignorance in the place of knowledge, a blind rage of heresy-hunting in place of calm examination, and ceremonial magic in place of spiritual religion. What a lesson to the Christian church in all her forms and schools!

Madame de Maintenon was disinclined to interfere in matters strictly political. Indeed, Fénelon tells her that she carries her dislike of them too far. He credits her with a solidity of political judgment greater than she was conscious of. The king was of the same mind. He gradually got into the way, much to her discomfort, of having his desk placed at her bedside, and of consulting there with his ministers for hours together, often exclaiming, "What does Madame Reason say to this?" or, "What is the judgment of Your Solidity?" In this way she unquestionably accomplished a great deal for the rectification of details. But the main lines of the king's administration it was beyond her power to bend. Louis remained, as before, a self-adorer, persuaded that in him, as king, a special divine illumination rested; that France existed for him, and for herself only in him; that any sufferings

inflicted on her for his glory were only another way of glorifying her also; that his wars of ambition redounded to the advantage of the Catholic faith, and, therefore, of France, by the mere fact that they exalted the "Eldest Son of the Church"; that he was the real owner of all the wealth of France, and that it was well to keep the people in a certain poverty in order to hold them in docility. What could be done with the man who, when his exactions had driven the people of Brittany to insurrection, sent orders to hang twelve hundred of them first, and then to look into the matter; or who, having, in utter contempt of international law, overrun and conquered Lorraine in time of peace, sent to the galleys those who had simply obeyed the call of their native prince to defend him! Indeed, Louis plainly avowed that he accounted treaties only a courtesy granted by him to his neighbors. He was much too great a king, he thought, to be bound by them when inconvenient. Such a man was incorrigible. Yet the bishops, with a few exceptions like Fénelon, but with the great Bossuet at their head, extolled him from the pulpit as the glory of the Catholic faith. He persecuted Protestants at home, and plundered Protestants abroad; and this double zeal, like charity, covered the multitude of sins. The Jansenists maintained an obstinate silence before such ways of advancing the faith, and thereby increased the anger of the king and of the king's wife against them. Thus borne down, blinded, and bewildered in her judgment by her husband and by the bishops alike, the marchioness at length abandoned the hope of the king's political, as of his religious, conversion, and here, too, fell back on her policy of "imperceptible ameliorations." More she could not do, and her range in this was very restricted. When France was gasping for breath during the Spanish War, a mere suggestion of hers that the king might do well to retrench in his enormous building outlays procured her a sharp rebuff, a very unusual thing. Still, by constant watchfulness of opportunities, she succeeded in a saving here and a saving there, in ever and anon ending or shortening an unjust imprisonment, in removing an unworthy or advancing a worthy subordinate, and occasionally, though with doubtful results, in promoting a minister of higher place. Yet here, too, her

unhappy bigotry worked mischievously. She was determined that no one infected with Jansenism (except a few men of letters like Boileau or Racine) should come near the king. Now, most men of any depth either were, or were declared to be, Jansenists or Jansenizers. The result was, that the range of choice was narrowed in the state as in the church, and that in both mediocrity found its account in this. Indeed, finding that the Chancellor, Pontchartrain, would not support her in extolling the papal authority to the king, she not only drove him out of office, but into a monastery.

In three great political acts Madame de Maintenon had a potent voice. In 1697 the Nine Years' War had so exhausted France that Louis, who saw the Spanish War impending, was the more easily persuaded by his wife, notwithstanding his steady career of victories, to make peace and to surrender most of his conquests. This noble intercession brought upon her a storm of unpopularity from the nation on whose miseries she had had pity.

Her next intercession helped to procure for Spain that French dynasty which is reigning there to this day, and whose reign has been to the peninsula vastly more beneficent than that of the house of Austria had been. The dying Spanish Hapsburg, Charles II., wavering between his Austrian cousin and his French grand-nephew, the grandson of Louis, asked the pope to which, being without near kinsmen, he should leave his dominions. Rome had received affront on affront from Louis for many years, but his wife's credit stood so high there, and she had so smoothed the way for the concessions which he was now disposed to make, that the papal sentence was promptly given for the young Duke of Anjou, whom, once seated, confederated Europe was not able to drive from his throne. As Dr. Döllinger remarks, for this Spain, at least, may well honor the memory of Louis the Fourteenth and of Madame de Maintenon, as also of Innocent XII.

Europe would not have suffered the alliance of France and Spain under the two Bourbon lines without a vigorous effort against it. The new league would have been headed by William III., but could the dying king persuade England, who alone had the wealth, and in Marlborough the general, required, to enter into

it? It was doubtful. The English unreasonably were tired of William and more reasonably of his continental wars. Let France and Spain both have Bourbon kings, they still remained separate kingdoms. Louis would soon die, and the two kindred lines would at most only maintain a general accord of policy, as happened in fact. Louis had pledged himself to acknowledge the Protestant line in England. Had he kept his word, he might easily have defied the continent, when, even with England added, he finally succeeded in holding his younger grandson on the Spanish throne.

At this moment the banished English Stuart died, and Madame de Maintenon, moved by the anguish of his widow, extorted from the compassion, the chivalry, and the family-feeling of her husband, as well as from his religious sympathy, a recognition of the young Prince of Wales as King of Great Britain and Ireland. This threw all England and Scotland into a flame, and France paid, by twelve years of desperate war, by defeat after defeat, by famine after famine, by distress and exhaustion almost to the point of national collapse, for that one movement of female zeal, thrown into the scale of a wavering regal will. Such are the fruits of personal government, whether the monarch in question is Louis the Fourteenth or Napoleon the Third, whether the woman that sways him is named Françoise d'Aubigné or Eugénie de Guzman.

We are apt to suppose that a woman in Madame de Maintenon's place, the wife of a king, yet not herself charged with royal rank or responsibilities, would have had a measurably easy life. In fact, the thirty years of her unavowed dignity were absolutely crushing in their weight of cares. That she could have held up under them for a generation gives proof of a wonderful vigor of body and mind. The mere physical fatigue of the hours of standing during the endless visits of ceremony received by her, of itself threatened to break up her health. Then, too, the king, who seemed himself only when she was with him, as if, says Dr. Döllinger, a certain exhalation of health and consolation breathed from her upon him, and who was selfishly inconsiderate in his affection as in everything else, dragged her with him almost

wherever he went, from country-seat to country-seat, to city and to camp. His new chateaus, she complains, are built all for effect and nothing for comfort. Sleeping so frequently in newly plastered rooms, she added new ailments to old. Only a miraculous power of will, which she shared with Louis himself, enabled both of them to appear vigorous in public, at whatever strain of effort. Then, too, the king looked to her to keep peace in the royal family, and this cost her hours and days of perpetually renewed exertion, to gain influence over these personages, of whom many were vicious, and the best impracticable. The princesses, empty-headed creatures, when once they came to her rooms, never knew when to leave them. The king's right there was unquestionable, and he made more and more use of it, as infirmities and calamities multiplied upon him, until at last, as she complains, she is as good as dead to her dearest friends, since she can find neither time to visit them nor receive them. Like St. Paul, she might declare that on her rested "the care of all the churches." Averse as she was to public affairs, the king threw more and more of them upon her, although her two formal visits to the Council of State filled her, as she avows to Archbishop de Noailles, with an invincible disgust; so odious were the principles of administration which she found to prevail, and so infinite the arts of oppression, extortion, and chicanery by which these principles were carried out. Then there was an infinity of claimants on the king's liberality, for he had virtually compelled his nobility to beggar themselves by unbounded ostentation, reducing them in the end to a throng of high-born dependants on his mere bounty. As she had the reputation of being all-powerful with him, every refusal of a favor was laid up against her. As the resources of the state began to drain away under endless wars, these refusals could not but multiply, and her burden became heavier. Moreover, by a tacit convention of king and courtiers, she, whose inventiveness was in fact almost unlimited, was expected to find infinitely varied amusement for a sovereign and a court shallow in aim, unfurnished with the means of thought, capable of nothing but pastime. Of course pleasure pursued as a business becomes fearfully dreary in the end, which extorted from her at last the well-known exclaima-

tion: "Oh! the misery of having to amuse an aged king who is no longer amusable!"

When the calamities of the war of the Spanish succession began to multiply upon Louis, accompanied, or followed, by stroke upon stroke of domestic bereavement, the pride of the man, and his confidence in his own infallibility gave way so far that he allowed his tears to flow freely in the presence of his wife, and once of Marshal Villars. To all the rest of the world he remained the same hard, proud, unpliant king as before. Yet the unwearied diligence in state affairs which had distinguished him through all his life gave way at last to disgust and discouragement, and the burdens which he laid down his wife had to take up. It was not a wholly unjust retribution, that in her age she should be bowed down under the weight of a war which she had done so much to bring on. For years she was consumed by an almost irresistible longing for death. How any Christian could fear what to her appeared as such an unspeakable relief, she could not understand.

As Dr. Döllinger remarks, the one thing that gave her an occasional asylum of rest was her school of Saint Cyr, founded for the education of portionless daughters of the nobility, which, at her suggestion, the king had amply endowed, and placed under care of the ladies of St. Louis, ladies of thorough cultivation and piety, whose occasional society was an unspeakable refreshment to their patroness, upon whom, in their turn, they and their pupils looked with profound affection and reverence, almost with awe, as if on a superior being. The king had given her leave to spend here all the intervals of her leisure, and these occasional breathing-times kept her alive. Here the mother's heart with which she was so amply endowed, and all the more so from never having been granted children of her own, found abundant room to expand, and also her extraordinary capabilities as an educatrix, which, if not equal to those of Fénelon himself, seem to have been worthy of comparison with them, and, of course, to have had advantages for her own sex unattainable by him. Of course Saint Cyr was not, like Port Royal, a school of the martyrs. It stood, like the character of Madame de Maintenon herself, on a far lower plane. But it trained three generations of modest and devout nuns, and of

faithful and enlightened wives and mothers. It went down at last in the storms of the Revolution.

Yet Saint Cyr, too, was a sorrow to her, as well as a joy. Most of the young ladies, portionless, but noble, were destined to marry. Inexorable usage required that their husbands, too, should be noble. Yet Louis had almost stripped his nobility of its wealth, and was fast stripping himself of the means of giving pensions. "Where shall I find sons-in-law?" exclaims the marchioness. Besides, the unspeakable and unnatural vices of the young men of the court filled her with distressing forebodings. How could she give her daughters to such husbands? She doubtless had to make many a sad compromise between ideal and necessity.

Madame de Maintenon's love of service did not exhaust itself at Saint Cyr. She taught the peasant children near Versailles their catechism, nursed the peasants' wives in sickness, and in short did what she could find opportunity to do to actuate her yearning instinct of beneficence.

It must be added, however, that her devotion to the children of Madame de Montespan, especially to the eldest son, the Duc du Maine, seems to have rendered her somewhat stepmotherly towards the king's authentic descendants, and as Fénelon tells her, where she dislikes, she becomes an exceedingly dry and ungracious personage.

The marchioness was always careless of her own interests, and did not even stipulate for a jointure. "What will become of her?" said the king on his deathbed, "she has nothing." Yes, she had her beloved Saint Cyr, and in that place of deep repose and spiritual refreshment she spent the four years of her widowhood. The final stroke which hastened her death was the news that her favorite, the young Duc du Maine, whom she had encouraged the king to declare a prince of the blood, capable, if his great-grandson Louis XV. should die without sons, of succeeding to the throne itself, and finally to name joint-regent over the infant king, had been at the death of his father contemptuously stripped of his new honors, thrust out of the regency, and finally thrown into prison. Du Maine, when a boy, had been of great promise, but had grown up into a dull and awkward man, and, the

last disgrace in a French prince, had turned out an arrant coward. Frances had paid a heavy penalty for having lifted the base-born youth into an elevation that affronted the dignity of the legitimate princes, and violated the fundamental laws of the kingdom.

Thus authenticated sources show us this "most influential woman of French history," as Dr. Döllinger has good reason to call her, cleansed from the foul stains which implacable malice or bold fabrication had thrown upon her, a woman of noble heart, powerful mind, and upright will, a true and deep Christian, loving God and her neighbor unreservedly, and sparing neither effort nor means in their service, with entire and even sublime neglect of herself. Dr. Döllinger says that she may be fairly described as uniting the mind of a man with the heart of a woman. Yet, greatly as her personal character and intentions are exalted by a better knowledge of the facts, her ecclesiastical policy remains almost as calamitous and odious as ever. With a different husband, or a more tolerant director, her public history would have answered to her private biography. What has been said of Isabella the Catholic is certainly true of Frances d'Aubigné, that most of the good she has done is genuinely her own, and most of the evil has been a reflection from the two *men* to whom she gave her chief confidence.

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VII. THE SINGLE TAX UPON LAND.

TAXATION is one of the difficult and perplexed questions of economics. It is so both to the scientific student and to the practical statesman. This is seen in the divergent views entertained by theorists and in the various systems of taxation adopted by the civilized nations. The *a priori* thinker is confounded by the practical inefficiency of his theory, and the legislator no less so by results he had not foreseen.

The trouble lies, partly, in the assessment of values for taxation. Some of these, as land, are comparatively fixed, always open to inspection, and incapable of concealment; others, certain forms of personal property, are like fairies, visible or invisible, as their masters may or may not wish them to be seen. When values are subject to serious fluctuation, or else are seldom determined by actual sales, there is a further difficulty of assessment in the accurate estimate of the values when found.

Another serious embarrassment to just taxation lies in the fact that the burden does not always remain where it is first laid. Some taxes, indeed, do not shift; but the incidence of others is quite uncertain. The non-shifting taxes are, for other reasons, objectionable.

He would be hailed as the economic Moses who should succeed in leading us out of this wilderness into the promised land. Mr. Henry George holds this to be his mission, and believes that he has discovered the way across the Jordan. His great merit as a rhetorician and a reasoner cannot be justly questioned, as he has drawn to himself the interested attention of the economic world, and has succeeded in rallying to his standard a considerable body of respectable thinkers. These have formed themselves into the Single Tax League, for the dissemination of his theory and its practical establishment in legislation. The official lecturer and propagandist of the League is Louis F. Post, Esq., of New York,

whose exposition of the doctrine is a marvel of clear and attractive teaching. It is the purpose of this paper to state and refute the theory of the single tax.

THE THEORY.

I. By it government is held to be a blessing, and anarchy is rejected as an evil.

Their view of the nature of government is peculiar, and fundamental to their theory. It is not regarded as a political agency, but as an economical institution, whose benefits are extended to land alone, and whose burden of taxation is, therefore, to be borne by land-owners, as the sole economical beneficiaries of society.

Government is not held to be an abstraction, and cannot, therefore, meet its needs by fiat money. It is a concrete reality, made up of houses to be built and repaired, of officers and pensioners, who, as ordinary men, are to be supplied with food, clothing, shelter, servants and luxuries.

II. The common source from which the wants of government are to be met is wealth, which consists, in the last analysis, of two things: 1. Natural, simple things; things as nature has made and left them. These are land, unmodified by human effort. 2. Artificial, combination things; the products of man's energy and skill; natural things combined with human effort. These are called by Mr. George wealth, but by Mr. Post labor, which includes everything of value except land in its natural state.

III. Their theory of taxation is now intelligible. The principle of taxation is not ability to pay; this is positively discarded. Compensation for benefits conferred by society is the only true basis for taxes. Beneficiaries alone, and in proportion to the benefits received, are to be taxed.

According to this principle, it is held that labor, receiving no economical benefits from society, is to bear none of its burdens; and land, deriving all its value from society, is to be the sole support of government.

REFUTATION.

We shall now endeavor to state and answer the arguments presented by Mr. Post in support of the theory.

I. THE PRINCIPLE OF TAXATION.

1. The theory of government upon which it is based is not correct. Government is not an economical, it is a political, institution, whose purpose is to administer justice, to protect the rights of men, to defend the weak against the encroachments of the strong; the weak individual against his strong neighbor; the strong individual against a combination stronger than himself. Its benefits are intended for all, and do reach to every member of society; while the helpless and unfortunate are its chief beneficiaries.

As all are benefited by government, all are interested in its support. As the defenceless classes are the principal beneficiaries, according to Mr. Post's principle of compensation, they should bear the chief burdens. On the contrary, the true principle is that the strong are to bear the burdens:—the physically strong, the burdens of road-making and war; the intellectually strong the burden of teaching; the morally strong, the burden of social purification; and, like the rest, the financially strong, the burden of taxation; all according to their ability.

2. Mr. Post, however, claims that it is unjust and repressive to tax ability. If unjust it would not be the basis for all social charities and for all contributions to the church.

He asserts that it is repressive in its influence upon men in their efforts to produce, to make them pay taxes in proportion to their success; it is laying a penalty on enterprise, good judgment and frugality. This is the assertion of an alleged fact; is it a real fact? Mr. Post thinks so, and we accordingly make him this proposition: We will agree to pay all the taxes society may impose on his accumulations, if he will allow us one-fourth of those accumulations. It is easier to pay a thousand times as much tax on a million of values, than it is to meet the smaller amount on a thousand dollars worth of property.

If government were merely a joint-stock corporation, then Mr. Post's principle of compensation would be correct. That it is not is shown in the fact, that in a joint-stock corporation each member votes the value of his stock; while in a government, some have no vote, and those who have a vote are equal. Government

is so far like such a corporation, that the property, represented in it and protected by it, should pay for that protection on the principle of compensation, in proportion to its ability. As we shall see hereafter, labor is benefited by society, and needs protection more than land, and, therefore, on Mr. Post's principle of compensation, should, like land, pay for that benefit and protection in proportion to its ability.

II. LAND, NATURE'S GIFT TO THE RACE.

The argument here is, that land, unlike labor, is God-given and not man-made; God-given to the race, and not to the individual holder. It was, therefore, designed for the benefit of society and not of the individual, and should accordingly meet the common expenses of society.

1. That we may see the proper force of this argument, we should bear in mind that land becomes valuable and taxable only when it is appropriated by the individual for his private use. So long as it remains in the hands of society, unused by the individual for his own benefit, it pays no taxes. It must become private property, that is, the individual must enjoy the usufruct of it, before it is taxable. Mr. Post, as the official exponent of the theory, declares that the League holds to private property in land. It is then admitted that land, though nature's gift, must become private property to be available for taxation.

2. Land, then, is not peculiar in this respect. On the contrary, it is true that every utility is primarily God-given and not man-made; God-given for the benefit of the race; and becomes valuable and taxable, like land, only when appropriated by the individual. Let us see if this is not true.

The power to labor, with muscle or nerve, with mind or body, is a utility God-given and not man-made; God-given for the benefit of the race; for Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism and Christianity agree as to the sanctity of the Golden Rule, the moral obligation of every man to the race. This gift, like land, becomes valuable and taxable only as it is used for the private benefit of the individual.

The same is true of all the other natural agents besides land

proper. They are all, both animate and inanimate, God-given to the race and not man-made, and become valuable and taxable only on appropriation. On the principle of this argument, therefore, all natural agents and labor-power, when private property, should be taxed equally with land.

Moreover, even products, which this theory calls labor, contain two elements, one of which is God-given and the other man-made. Why should not the former be taxed? The tree in the forest is land and taxable; the same tree as wood, or lumber, or furniture is labor, and non-taxable by the theory. Coal in the mine is land and taxable; the same coal in the warehouse is labor and non-taxable. How is it that these cease to be gifts of nature for the race as soon as they are made available to meet the wants of the race? Like land (indeed, they are a part of land), they have become valuable by appropriation.

3. Strictly taken, there is very little land that is purely nature's gift, unmodified by man. If the timber ceases to be land as soon as man shapes it into lumber, then the soil itself must cease to be land and become labor, as soon as it is modified by man; for labor, by the theory, is a natural thing modified by man. Here, in the first place, it is manifest that the farm is a product of labor. Not only must it be fenced and the forests converted into houses, but the very land itself must be upturned and cultivated, in order that it may be ready for production.

The same is true of the city, which is clearly not God-given, but man-made. We do not refer to the buildings alone, but the very land itself must be laid off, must be graded, and must be shaped into foundations. There is not a foot of land in the city which has not been modified by human effort. If, therefore, a tree becomes labor when made into a house, and coal by mere removal from its primeval bed, the land surface itself must become labor, when, combined with human effort, it is made into a foundation.

Should we deduct the farm and the city, as products, from the category of land, we shall have to go to the mountains and swamps for objects of taxation. Mr. George, however, says that mountains and swamps are not to be taxed, but that the fertile, well-located farms and choice city lots are.

III. SOCIETY APPRECIATES LAND.

The owner of natural land does, and can do, nothing to increase its value. The increase is due entirely to society; as society confers this additional value, it has in equity a right to it, which it may enforce by taxation. Such is their argument.

1. It is not only true that society increases the value of land; it also gives to land all the value it has. Land had no value on Robinson Crusoe's island, and it would have none to any man where there was no society. It has utility without society, but no value whatever.

Moreover, there is a condition in which society may, and sometimes does, give an immense value to land, as in the heart of New York, where Mr. Post says that land is worth fifteen million dollars an acre. Every economist understands that this is due to the limited supply of land so located, the impossibility of increasing that supply, and the intense demand for such land. Excessive demand, without an absolutely limited supply, gives what are called monopoly or scarcity values.

We further observe, that it is demand which creates value, demand in the economic sense of desire with ability to gratify the desire. Effort does not condition value, except relatively through its influence on supply; demand, including supply, does so absolutely. Let a man put forth immense effort on that for which there is no demand, and the result is no value. Let another put forth little or no effort and yet secure that for which there is an excessive demand, and the result is great value. Let a man by the most expensive machinery and with the most skilled labor manufacture air; he can sell it for nothing, because the supply is already in excess of demand. Let a man pick up a diamond as large as an egg, and he has made his fortune without effort. Thus we see that society creates the value of land by its demand for it, and by that alone, even the protection which it affords is an element or condition of the demand.

2. Society not only increases the value of labor, but, as in the case of land, it gives labor all the value it has. What value was Robinson Crusoe's labor to him? Was it a whit more than his land? Labor is as valueless without society as land is. Demand

by society creates all the value land has, and demand by society creates all the value labor has; there is no difference in the two cases.

“Yes,” says Mr. Post, “there is a marked difference: the supply of land is limited, the supply of labor is unlimited.” No, we repeat, there is no difference; the supply of some land is limited, and of other land practically unlimited; the supply of some labor is unlimited, and of other labor limited. The land that is in limited supply with reference to the demand for it is but a trifle in comparison with that where the supply exceeds the demand. The real estate of this country, which includes both the land and the labor on it, is valued by the census of 1890 at but a little more than fifteen and a half dollars an acre. If this be so, there must be millions of acres that are not worth a dollar. There is doubtless a hundred times as much land where the supply exceeds the demand as where the conditions are reversed.

On the other hand, there is much labor that is in limited supply with an excessive demand. This is true not only of old and rare editions of books, paintings and sculptures by the old masters, of coins, china, furniture, etc., where the supply is as absolutely limited as that of New York land, and where extreme value is the like result; but it is also true of living, coexistent labor. The President of the United States has a salary which, with its perquisites, amounts to about one hundred thousand dollars; the presidents of some of the great corporations are paid as much or more. Some lawyers receive a fee of fifty thousand dollars for a single case. So it is with doctors, editors, and even teachers and preachers. The supply of first-rate ability in any calling is below the demand, and the result is that in every department of labor there are monopoly values.

But it is said that labor earns its value. In a sense, this is generally true, for it usually puts forth an effort, and in some way modifies its products. We have already learned, however, that effort does not create value, that it is due to demand. The market does not pay for effort; it pays for service. Moreover, there is much labor value that is no more earned than land value is said to be. If there is such a thing as natural talent and natural advantages of time or location, then, in so far as such conditions exist,

the resultant value is not earned. Moreover, let a man build a mill where he has no neighbor within fifty miles of him, and his mill is valueless. He runs it one day in the year for the supply of his own needs. Immigrants, however, settle around him; railroads are built, running by his mill; a town, a city, springs up, and his mill is in the centre; it has appreciated a hundred, a thousand fold, and by no effort of his. This does not happen as often as in the case of land, for the manifest reason that few men are so unwise as to locate their labor where there is no demand for it, whereas land is not located by human will. This is clearly to the advantage of labor, and greatly to the detriment of land, whose owner must wait for society to benefit him.

Moreover, labor is valuable, and sometimes greatly so, from the very incipiency of society; whereas land must generally wait many years, and sometimes forever, before it becomes valuable. Indeed, society, taking the whole of labor and land into consideration, appreciates labor more than it does land.

3. It is alleged that the owner never earns the value of his land, and therefore has no equitable right to it; it is to him an absolutely unearned increment. Let us see if this be true. The owners of land in this country are of two well-defined classes: First, there are the original proprietors. It is a rule, both in law and morals, that every man is entitled to the consequences of all his free acts. Did the original proprietors become possessed of their land by their own free acts? Did society forbid some and allow others? Did society allot the lands, giving choice portions to some, refuse portions to others, and none at all to a third class? This is not true; but, on the contrary, one man chose to locate in the gorges or on the sides of the Alleghanies; another in the fertile valley of the Mississippi. One man chose to settle himself where Stringtown was afterwards built; another preferred to locate on Manhattan Island. One man thought it wise to put all his means into land; another preferred to have none. The original distribution of land was, therefore, by the free choice of the people themselves, and so each man is entitled to the consequences of his own acts, according as his choice was wise and fortunate, or the reverse. The man that preferred the Alleghanies or Stringtown earned

the right to live there and occupy the land of his choice. The man that chose the Mississippi Valley or Manhattan Island equally earned the right to live there and occupy that land. The man that wished no land at all has earned the right to do without it. Each man receives the consequences of his own free acts.

There is a second class of land-owners, doubtless very much larger than the first. It is probable that but a small moiety of the valuable land of this country is in the hands of the original proprietors.¹ Most of it has been sold time and time again. How is it with the present proprietors, who have become owners since the land has appreciated? Is the value of their land to them an unearned increment? They have bought it with the products of labor; it is to them the investment of their labor; it is to them their labor. With many of them, their land is the embodiment of the labor of a life-time. A tax on their land is a tax on their past labor, on their accumulations, to which Mr. Post object's

4. The contention is, that the land-owner does not earn the increased value of his land by any effort of his own; that he has, therefore, no equitable right to it; that the unearned increment belongs to society. The point then is, that the owner has not earned the increment, because he has made no effort for it; increment, like any other value, must be earned by effort. Let us now apply this same principle to society; has society earned the increment by effort? If so, how? Society is the individuals composing it, or it is the organization.

Have the individuals that compose society earned the incre-

¹ This may be what Mr. George means (*Progress and Poverty*, p. 349): "In all the newer States, and even to a considerable extent in the older ones, our landed aristocracy is yet in its first generation." If, however, he means that the greater part of the land is still held by the original patentees or their descendants, he is manifestly mistaken. An expert in land titles in Virginia tells me that it is an exception to find such a case. Another in Missouri writes, "I believe that over 5 per cent. of the lands in this county are still in the hands of the patentees or their descendants." Still another in Montana writes, "About 95 per cent. of the agricultural land in this country, of which there is very little, is still held by the original patentees or their descendants. Of town lots and mining claims, about 5 per cent. is so held." These testimonies would seem to indicate that nearly all the valuable land in this country is now the property of those who bought it from the patentees.

ment of other men's land by their effort? Not one of them has put forth an effort on this land, or near it, for which he has not been paid according to its value. No individual has earned the increment by effort.

Has society as an organization earned the increment by effort? Society has put forth no effort to increase the value of land; has done nothing for land which it has not done for labor; indeed, labor has required all the effort of society in the way of protection and defence of its rights. Labor and products need and receive the fostering care of government, while land is able to take care of itself.

The appreciation of land is not due to the effort of society at all; therefore society has no more earned the increment than have the owners. Society appreciates land by demand and not by effort; it appreciates labor in exactly the same way, as we have already learned.

5. So far as society appreciates land, it registers the fact on the tax books. If land in the centre of New York is worth fifteen million dollars an acre, then society will note that fact in the assessment of its value, and so up and down the scale. Land ought to pay, and is made to pay, according to its value, and it makes no difference from what cause or source that value may arise. If society fails to tax increment, whether earned or unearned, it has no one but itself to blame. It rarely, if ever, fails to tax the increment of land.

IV. INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE.

Tax on labor interferes with trade, and should therefore be discouraged, so Mr. Post argues.

1. This is undoubtedly true. Any tax on labor, no matter how necessary or how justly laid, interferes with trade, and should be discouraged to the point, that not one unnecessary dollar should be taken from labor; and when it must be taken, the utmost care should be observed that it be done in the way most equitable and most easy for labor to pay.

Protective tariff taxes interfere unnecessarily, unevenly and unjustly with trade, and should not be levied at all.

2. Tax on land also interferes with trade, because it interferes with production. Land alone is unable to produce food, clothing, shelter, servants, and luxuries for the government. Labor alone is equally powerless. These indispensables must be provided by the joint effort of land and labor. It now requires nearly a billion of dollars annually to maintain the various governments of this country; a billion dollars worth of food, clothing, shelter, services and luxuries must be provided every year by taxes. Let this immense sum be taken from labor, and labor must sorely feel it, and be greatly weakened in its productive capacity. Let it be taken from land, the other factor of value, and land must sorely feel it, and be greatly weakened in its productive capacity. Let it be taken from both, as each is best able to bear it, and both will feel it and be weakened; but less in their joint productive capacity than if one of them was fatally injured. They are like a pair of shears; break an inch off each blade, and their capacity is abridged one inch; break both inches off one blade, and their capacity is abridged two inches.

V. SOME OF THE WEAK POINTS IN "PROGRESS AND POVERTY."

1. The root of the whole matter lies in the question of the right of private property in land. Is there such a right? Mr. George contends that there is but one basis for the right of property, and that is production; each one has a right to what he produces, and to nothing else. The individual does not produce land, therefore he has no right of property in it. Very well, society, or the people, do not produce land, therefore the people have no right of property in it; God does produce land, therefore it belongs to him. But, Mr. George will say, he did not mean land, but land value; the individual does not, and the people do, produce land value. The producer, says Mr. George, is the owner; whoever produces a value owns that value; the people by demand produce land value, which must therefore belong to the people. Well, the people by demand produce labor value, which also must belong to the people; the people by demand produce all value; therefore all value belongs to the people, and private property of all kinds is, like that of land, a robbery of the people. But Mr. George denies that he is a communist.

God as the producer is the absolute owner of the universe in whole and in its parts; his creatures all hold under him. What, then, is his primary natural and universal law of property? It is appropriation; each individual from the bounty of nature appropriates what he needs and can. In the inorganic world this law prevails, each element appropriating by elective affinity what it needs and can, thus forming mixtures, like air, or compounds, like water. In the vegetable world the law holds, each plant appropriating what it needs and can. The law is equally manifest in the life of the lower animals, each individual of which appropriates what it finds and needs. The continuance of organic being, and all changes in inorganic being, depend on this law. The law is not abrogated for man, it is merely modified; it is for him, as for lower nature, the primal, basic law. So far as nature's bounty goes, it is the one law, modified alone by the ethical law of the Golden Rule; in the application of which society may put a limit to the extent of appropriation and regulate it by law, but cannot properly annul the law itself.

Appropriation is the law of property for Mr. Post's natural things, or land; production is the corresponding primal, basic law for artificial things, or Mr. Post's labor. The secondary laws are purchase and gift.

2. Mr. George bases his theory on Ricardo's Law of Rent, which rests on the Law of Diminishing Returns. We do not question either of these laws, but we do question the wide reach of application which is given to them. The Law of Diminishing Returns is not a complete nor a universal law. There are three laws of returns in production: the Law of Proportional, the Law of Increasing, and the Law of Diminishing Returns. The Law of Proportional Returns is the ordinary and presumptive law, universally applicable where neither of the others operates. Carey's Law of Increasing Returns is undoubtedly a real law, and applies wherever, in advancing civilization, improved methods and processes are employed. The Law of Diminishing Returns does not seem to apply to manufactures, transportation, or exchange; and, in the extractive industries, it supersedes the two other laws only when the limit of quantity and quality is reached.

Within each circle of exchange the Law of Diminishing Returns will come into play when the limit of quantity in the best or the most productive natural agencies has been reached by the most efficient processes. As the circle of exchange enlarges, this limit retreats, so that when freedom of exchange and perfected transportation shall have become universal, this circle will be coterminous with the earth. Civilization thus postpones the Law of Diminishing Returns. The practical conclusion, bearing on Mr. George's theory, is, that but little influence is exerted by this Law of Diminishing Returns, except in the most congested parts of the country.

3. Mr. George asserts that, under the present system, wages and interest are falling and rents are rising, so that laborers and capitalists are suffering for the enrichment of landlords. He quotes with approval (*Progress and Poverty*, page 352) Senator Wade's prediction that "by the close of this century every acre of ordinary agricultural land in the United States would be worth fifty dollars in gold." There were 623,218,619 acres in farms by the census of 1890, and these lands, with all improvements, were valued at \$13,275,959,068 (not for taxation, but for advertising purposes), which is something over twenty-one dollars an acre. Every observant man knows that this is an excessive valuation, and yet it is less than half Mr. George's adopted prediction. Mallock, in his *Labor and the Popular Welfare*, says that in 1814 the incomes of the landlords and farmers in England were 56 per cent. of the total assessed income-tax; in 1851, 37 per cent.; in 1880, 24 per cent.; and now, only 16 per cent.

Capital, Mr. George says, is depressed under the present system. Where are the signs of it? On the contrary, while it is true that the percentage of profits tends to decrease, the aggregate has largely increased, so that capital is far better off than it was fifty years ago. There are in this country probably not less than ten millionaire capitalists to every millionaire landlord.

Wages have not fallen, but have risen, both nominally and really, in the past fifty years; as Mr. Giffen has shown, over two hours a day less work, and wages on an average about seventy per cent. higher. From the report made by the Committee on Finance to

the Senate, second session, Fifty-second Congress, it is seen that the wholesale prices of the means of living declined, with fluctuations, from 116.8 in 1840 to 92.2 in 1891, while wages, with fluctuations, have risen from 87.7 in 1840 to 160.7 in 1891.

4. We have an object-lesson in this country, which exemplifies Mr. George's ideal condition of society. It is found in the Indian Territory, where private ownership of land is ignored, and all land is free for occupancy. According to Mr. George, the various races of the earth are substantially equal, and, under similar environment, the Indian is equal to the Teuton. The ideal environment is furnished by free land; we may, therefore, see humanity at its best in the Indian Territory. We wonder why the Single Tax Leaguers do not emigrate thither to enjoy its unadulterated blessings.

5. Should the single tax on land be adopted, there will continue to be, as now, two classes of persons, the landless and the landholding; this classification will then be identical with the non-tax-paying and the tax-paying. At present every property-holder and almost every consumer is a tax-payer, and in most States many that own no property pay a capitation tax. This makes nearly every one interested in the governments which he supports, and concerned that they shall be prudently and economically administered. Under the single tax, however, there might and would be a large element, intelligent, thrifty, and wealthy, holding no land, and, therefore, paying no taxes. These would, naturally, be indifferent to the amount of tax levied, and would favor lavish expenditures on rivers, harbors, public buildings, pensions, official salaries, etc. By our system of general suffrage the substantial tax-payers are now largely at the mercy of those who hold little or no property; the evil would be greatly increased, and might become intolerable, under the single tax *regime*.

6. Mr. George's strongest point in arguing the injustice of private ownership of land is his assertion that it is virtual slavery to the laborer. His ground is, that whoever owns the conditions of labor owns the labor itself, and as the landlord owns that which is indispensable to labor, he is the virtual master of the laborer. If the fundamental proposition is true, then the conclusion surely follows. Is it true, that he who controls the conditions of labor

owns the labor itself? If so, then every one is more or less both a master and a slave in production. The landlord owns the conditions on which capital and labor can be made productive therefore the landlord is the master, and the capitalist and the laborer are his slaves. The capitalist owns the conditions on which land and labor can produce, therefore the capitalist is the master, and the landlord and the laborer are his slaves. The laborer owns the conditions on which land and capital can produce, therefore the laborer is the master, and the landlord and the capitalist are his slaves. Each is alike dependent on the others for production. The capitalist enjoys an advantage over the other two, not for production but for consumption, in so far as his capital is already in a condition for the sustenance of life. Both the others enjoy an advantage over the laborer as such, because their land and capital are so much saved and accumulated labor.

7. Mr. George is a pessimist. In his view, the economical tendencies are injurious to all but a favored few, the landlords. In sociology, the negro in slavery and the peasant in feudalism were in a happier condition than the free laborer of to-day. Labor, in his view, is a curse. In religion, the church is losing, if it has not already lost, its hold upon the masses. Civilization has the mere glitter of tinsel to hide the base metal beneath. It is the madness of folly to send missionaries to the barbarous.

Many earnest, good men are Jeremiahs, weeping over the present, despairing of the future. Solomon, however, never spoke more wisely than when he wrote, "Say not thou, What is the cause that the former days were better than these? for thou dost not inquire wisely concerning this." The good lives, the evil perishes; the good is cherished and remembered, the evil is distasteful and forgotten. The bitter of the present cup we taste, the worse bitter of a former cup has gone.

If there be a God, optimism must be true. A calm, patient, critical survey of facts justifies not only the belief that the present is better than the past, but the hope that the future will be better than the present. Facts show not only that civilization raises rent, but wages and the aggregate of interest also. Intelligence

and virtue are increasing. The poor have advantages to-day that their fathers never dreamed of. We have better laws, more justly and efficiently administered than ever. Slavery is no longer known in Christendom, and pure religion is gathering under her beneficent wing more and more of the sin-ruined children of Adam.

DISPROOF.

Having stated the arguments of Mr. Post for the single tax, and shown that they do not sustain his position, there will now be presented some considerations which seem more or less fatal to it.

I. THE SINGLE TAX IS UNCALLED FOR.

1. The first consideration which points in this direction is, that there is already a discrimination against land (which must continue to be) in the assessment and collection of taxes. There are many forms of so-called labor, which easily elude official search, and so are not found upon the tax-books. Money, notes, bonds, mortgages, incomes, exemplify this class. These and other forms of labor can be hid; and, as many otherwise honest people think it merely shrewd and not wrong to evade taxation in every possible way, the result is, that a large part of this kind of property is kept from the assessor's eyes. Moreover, as the value of this species of wealth is fluctuating and uncertain, it is quite frequently under-estimated in the valuation.

Land, on the other hand, is permanent, visible, and of a valuation comparatively steady. No acre in the farms nor foot in the city escapes the eye of the tax-gatherer. It is all on the books, and at a value approximating, at least, what it is really worth.

As a consequence, it is now true, and must remain so, until the standard of strict personal honesty prevails amongst the owners of labor, that land bears the chief financial burden in the maintenance of government. It needs relief rather than additional burdens.

2. There is but very little land in this country of high value. The census of 1890, as already stated, shows that the average value of real estate in the United States is a fraction over fifteen and a half dollars an acre. In the centres of a few cities and in

rare spots in farming districts land has probably reached a maximum value, under Ricardo's Law of Monopoly; but such cases are the smallest fraction of the lands.

On the contrary, we hear a wail from the farmers all over the country, South, North, East, West, in the most fertile as well as least-favored sections, that they are not only not prosperous, but can barely make a frugal living from their farms. The *New York Nation*, in one of its December numbers of 1893, showed statistically that wheat-raising in 1893, both in the winter and spring belts, was a disastrous loss to those engaged in it. The farmers already have a yoke which they find hard to bear; we cannot properly add to their difficulties.

3. There is little or no pressure of population upon subsistence in the United States. Mr. George declares, in his *Progress and Poverty*, that Ireland, China and India are not suffering from an unduly congested population. He is right; this is not the cause of their troubles. Indeed, as he has shown, Malthusianism is a mere spectre; frightful to theorists alone, and vanishing into air as the light of facts falls upon it. So far from its being true, the most prosperous portions of the earth, other conditions being equal, are those where population is at the maximum. It is so in Europe; it is so in Asia; it is so in America; it is so in the United States. Take the most congested spot in our country, Manhattan Island, and the rich have more of luxury there, and the industrious, virtuous poor more of comfort, than anywhere else on this continent. The indolent and vicious, as a rule, are the sufferers.

But, allowing over-population to be as great an evil as it is represented to be by the school of Malthus, it is still true that the United States are not sufferers from it. The census of 1890 shows that we have an average population of 21.31 persons to the square mile; whereas Mr. George says, in his *Progress and Poverty*, that Saxony, Belgium and England have each about 440. The population of the entire globe could be put into the United States, and the average would not exceed the rate of these countries. It is manifest that we are far from the time, if, indeed; it will ever come, when population will press upon subsistence in our country. With free trade and perfected transportation, it will be a vanishing evil in the civilized world.

II. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES.

1. The practical adoption of the theory would tend to prevent improvement upon and in land. If the tax should be made a fixed sum for a term of years, like the rental of a long lease, then the owner would be able to make his calculations for that length of time, and could improve the land as he might judge most expedient. Mr. George, in *Progress and Poverty*, advocates a lease of twenty-five years. This would reduce the inconvenience of the single tax to a minimum. This arrangement, however, is inconsistent with the principle of the theory, for it may easily and frequently happen that the land would greatly appreciate early in the period of fixed taxation, and, as a result, society would lose, and the owner gain, the unearned increment.

If, on the other hand, the tax should be levied annually, as now, and as would seem to be necessary in order that the varying expenses of each year may be met, then the holder of land can have no assurance what the demands of the government in the future may be, or what estimate future assessors may put upon his land, and so will be deterred from putting expensive improvements on the land he occupies, for, as Mr. George says, "Fixity of tenure is necessary to improvement."

2. Difficulties of assessment. The first is drawing the line between bare land and the improvements on it and in it. A farm is worth five thousand dollars; how much is land, and how much improvement? Improvements on it are houses, fences, trees, fruits, vines, meadows and roadways. Improvements in it are removal of stones, trees and roots, drains, loosening of the soil, irrigation and fertilizing. What are these improvements worth? They have cost, it may be, as much or more than the land is now worth. Is the bare land, then, valueless?

Again, Mr. George says that the single tax is not to be laid upon land, but upon land values. He accepts Ricardo's doctrine of rent, and holds that the lowest grades of occupied land yield no profit, and, therefore, pay no rent. It is the more valuable grades of land alone that are to be taxed, and these not upon their entire value, but upon their value in excess of that possessed by the poorest occupied lands; that is, economic rent shall pay the ex-

penses of government. The task, then, for the assessor is to draw the line between the land that yields profit and that which does not. Rejecting the latter as non-taxable, he must then estimate the various degrees of economic rent yielded by the former. It is manifest that assessors, in that day when the single tax abolishes poverty, will have to be gifted with practical omniscience.

3. The single tax will discriminate against the poor. Many of the present owners of land are men of moderate means and moderate ability. They are barely able to meet the demands of life by what they can extract from the soil. As a result, it is a struggle with them to save money enough to meet their present taxes, and often they are unable to do so. Let the tax-burden of this large and comparatively helpless class be doubled, and the consequence will be the loss of their lands, and hopeless poverty.

Again, in our towns and cities there are many cases where men of small means have succeeded in buying for themselves a lot, on which they hope to build a house and make for themselves a home some day; for the present they are unable to do so. There are many other, indeed, there are practically numberless, cases in which a man has, by economy, succeeded, not only in buying a lot, but in putting a small house on it, where he enjoys the inestimable privilege of feeling that he is at home. Right by the side of these vacant lots and modest houses of the poor are the stately mansions of the rich. In the one case, it is the hard-earned all of the struggling masses; in the other, it is but a pittance of the bonded, moneyed, personal wealth of the successful. The single tax makes these worthy poor not only pay the same tax on their vacant lots and small homes that their rich neighbors pay on their palatial residences, but, it may be, as much as their millionaire neighbors pay altogether. The men successful in making fortunes rarely invest largely in land, but prefer stocks, bonds, transportation, traffic, manufacturing.

Still, again, as to the future use of the valuable lands, the poor will be at a disadvantage under the single-tax theory, the same disadvantage that he is under now. What shuts out the poor from the possession or use of valuable lands now? Manifestly, their value forbids his purchase, and even his leasing, of them. Will they

become less valuable under the single-tax *regime*? How can they, if Ricardo's law be true? The pressure of population will be the same then as now, and so monopoly or scarcity values will be as great as now. How, then, can the single tax relieve poverty from the disability which now shuts it from the best lands? Let us suppose that the tax absorbs the economic rent, the State then becomes the virtual proprietor of the rentable lands. Will it be any easier to pay the State's tax than it was or is to pay the landlord's rent? The amount will not be less in the latter case.

4. The single tax will tend to increase, rather than to decrease, the monopoly of land. A large part of the better lands are now held by owners who find in them a home and the means of a frugal livelihood, but who do not realize from them a money income beyond their needs. Let this large class be compelled to double their annual payment of taxes, and they will find it impracticable, with the result that their lands, sold for taxes, will pass into the hands of the few who have management and capital sufficient to work farms on a large scale. Thus the small holdings will be absorbed by the capitalistic land-sharks, as they are called, and "*latifundia Americam perdidere*" will be our fate, as it was said to be that of Rome. Mr. George thinks otherwise, and says that the crowded poor will leave the cities and occupy the vacant lands. If so, why have these poor left the country, where land is cheap, and gone to the city, where it is dear? Why do not these poor now leave the cities, and homestead government lands, which can be had for the mere occupancy?

Will the laboring poor be benefited by the single tax? There is more land cultivated now than pays, for wheat is grown at a loss, and corn is burned for fuel. If, then, land continues private property, as Mr. George prefers, the present owners will continue to hold all that pays. If the government takes possession, the same result will follow, for the thrifty farmers will lease all that will pay the taxes, and the thriftless poor will be as they are now. Now the laborer gets wages, and the landlord gets the rent; under the single tax, the government will get the rent, and the laborer will still have nothing but wages. In neither case does he pay taxes.

5. The final and fatal practical difficulty in the way of the single tax on land is the fact that land does not yield a sufficient revenue to pay the taxes. The theory is that economic rent should pay all taxes. Mr. George accepts Ricardo's theory and, therefore, means by economic rent just what that theory means.

REVENUE FROM ECONOMIC RENT.

Economic rent first interests us now as to its exclusions. It does not include waste or unoccupied lands. Those tracts unsold by the government, all swamps, desert and rocky sections, all lands that for any reason are not eligible for occupancy or cultivation, are excluded. None of these do or can furnish any rent to be applied to taxes. It would be useless to include them, for they furnish no revenue.

Again, no rent is obtained from the lowest grade of occupied lands. This is the basic doctrine of Ricardo's theory, and is accepted by Mr. George, who says distinctly that he does not propose to tax land, but land values, that land values are determined by rent, and that rent is revenue from all grades of occupied land except the lowest. Land is valuable for fertility or situation. Those farming lands, now tilled, which have the least fertility and the poorest situation, merely pay the cost of cultivation and do not yield any rent. There is a similar grade of land in town and city lots, whose locality is so disadvantageous as to neutralize the benefits of occupancy, and therefore cannot pay rent. Not only are these lands excluded, but a similar value in all the occupied lands.

Again, the revenue from improvements *on* land is profits, not rent, and, therefore, cannot be used for taxes. Mr. George not only admits but contends for this exclusion, on the ground that improvements are not the unearned gift of nature, but the laborious product of man.

Still again, and for the same reason, we must exclude all improvements *in* land. Improvements on land embrace houses, fences, bridges, fruit trees, vines, crops, shade trees, roadways, etc. Improvements in land include clearing of trees, shrubs, roots and rocks, grading, draining, tillage, irrigation, fertilizing, etc. As already said, these improvements must be excluded from economic

rent on the very same ground as the other class; they are not the unearned gift of nature, but the laborious product of man. Only the natural fertility and situation are to be taxed.

To sum up the exclusions: We first cut off all unoccupied lands, then the lowest grade of values in occupied lands, then all improvements *on* the higher grades of occupied land, and, finally, all improvements *in* the higher grades of occupied land. There is left the bare land, as nature made it, and valuable by virtue of its natural fertility and its situation. It is difficult to determine accurately the value of these exclusions. We desire to be not only just, but liberal, to the single-tax theory.

Let us take one hundred as the aggregate value of all the lands in the country, what proportion are unoccupied? Excluding Alaska, not yet surveyed, the entire land surface of the United States is 2,970,000 square miles, or 1,900,800,000 acres, of which about one-third, or 623,218,619 acres were in 1890 in farms. Of the farm lands something over half were improved, that is, 357,616,755 acres, while nearly one-half remained unimproved by the census of 1890. The remaining two-thirds of the land surface constitute the public domain and the area of lots in cities and towns. We have no data as to the aggregate area of lots in cities, nor as to the ratio of the occupied to the unoccupied.

By the census of Massachusetts, taken in 1885, the land surface of that State, 8,040 square miles, or 5,145,600 acres, has 3,898,429 acres in farms, and the remainder, about one-fourth, is in town and city lots, etc. Of the farm lands, 939,261 acres, valued at \$59,891,808, are classed as cultivated; 1,389,501 acres, valued at \$25,279,209, are woodland pasture; and 1,569,667 acres, \$25,529,690, are put as uncultivated. Here the uncultivated lands are about two-fifths of the area of the farms and are reckoned at nearly one-fourth of the value.

Let us take Massachusetts rather than the entire country, as the statistics are more complete and probably more accurate, but we should remember that this State is probably above the average of the country in favor of the single-tax theory, by reason of its disproportionate amount of economic rent and its frugal taxes. The unoccupied farm lands of this State were rated at nearly one-

fourth the value of all the agricultural lands. We are not given the ratio of the unoccupied city lots to those occupied, but the entire real estate was assessed at \$1,287,993,899, including city lots; of which the assessed value of the unoccupied farm lands alone is nearly two per cent. We shall be within bounds, therefore, to place the exclusion for unoccupied rentless lands at three per cent.

The second exclusion is for the lowest grade of occupied lands, which Mr. George agrees furnishes no rent, and therefore can yield no tax. In Massachusetts the land known as woodland represents this grade, inasmuch as it pays nothing for cultivation. Then of the cultivated land there is a grade corresponding to this, though more valuable, as it justifies the labor of tillage. Above these are the farm land values that yield rent. The woodland is assessed at \$18.20 an acre; this will put the rentless grade of cultivated land at not less than \$20 an acre. The woodland is valued at \$25,279,209; to which adding \$20 an acre on the cultivated lands, \$18,785,220, we have an aggregate rentless value of occupied farm lands alone of \$44,064,429; about forty per cent. of the farm values, and nearly three and a half per cent. of the total real estate valuation. We are safe then in putting this exclusion at five per cent.

The third exclusion, for improvements *on* land, is divided into two parts:—Buildings, on the one hand, and fences, roadways, fruit and shade trees, on the other. The buildings on the real estate in Massachusetts, including farms and city property, are not separately given in the census of 1885, but are for every year since then. From 1886 to 1893, both included, the assessed value of the buildings is about fifty per cent. of the whole.

Strange to say, neither the government records at Washington nor the census of Massachusetts give any data as to the value of fences. We have not been able so far to find any from any quarter; and yet we know that this is a serious item of expense; so much so, that some counties and cities seek to minimize it by laws dispensing with fences so far as possible. The only item found is the cost of building and repairing fences for the year 1880 in the United States census, which for Massachusetts is put at

\$618,503. If this is an average, we may capitalize it at five per cent. and it will give a fence value of \$12,370,060. Then we have roadways on the farms and streets in the cities; and here again we have no data as to either their value or cost. Fruit trees and vines were valued by the Massachusetts census of 1885 at \$6,658,282, while the orchards themselves, of 23,800 acres, were rated at only \$2,182,836, less than one-third. Thus the fences and fruit trees, outside of the roads, streets and shade trees, have a value of over nineteen million dollars, about one and a half per cent. of the total valuation of the real estate; making altogether an exclusion of fifty-one and a half per cent. for improvements on the land.

The fourth exclusion is for improvements *in* the land; and here we shall consider, first, the cost of making a farm or a city. Farm-making depends on the locality. On the prairies, the cost is least, and yet there it is worth one year's crop. In timbered regions, it involves the labor not only of removing the trees (which generally pays for itself), but also of freeing the land from stumps and roots. In rocky soils, the stones must be gathered and removed. In wet lands, drains must be made. In arid sections, irrigating ditches, pumps, or artesian wells must be supplied. The making of a city, besides the buildings and the pavings, includes the shaping of the ground by grading, often an expensive item. As already suggested, this improvement in land varies greatly, and it is correspondingly difficult to make an estimate of it. An intelligent, careful friend informs me, that on his farms he allows the use of a field three years as a recompense for clearing it of timber for cultivation. Estimating interest at five per cent. and taxes at one, this would aggregate eighteen per cent. Using this as a basis, in Massachusetts it would amount to one and a half per cent. of the whole real estate valuation.

Again, the farm lands of Massachusetts have been improved by fertilizing. Several facts show this. The uncultivated lands and woodland pastures are valued at about \$17 an acre, while the cultivated are assessed at nearly \$64. This difference is due, of course, partly to natural fertility and advantage of situation, but it is partly the effect of fertilization. From the partial reports

of 1885, it is probable that over four millions of dollars were expended that year in manures and other fertilizers. A striking collection of facts, revealed by government reports, shows conclusively the great improvement in these farms. The New England States produce the largest average yield of Indian corn per acre of any section of the country! The average of the United States from 1870-1889 was 25.6 bushels per acre. For 1892 the average of the six Southern States, Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida and Alabama, was 14.55 bushels; of the six chief corn States of the Mississippi Valley, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa and Missouri, 31.87 bushels; and of the six New England States, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, 40.74 bushels. The average yield of Massachusetts for the three years, 1890-'92, was 41.33 bushels per acre, while that of Illinois for the same time was 35.83 bushels. These facts show conclusively that in Massachusetts, and in all the better lands of the older States, the value of the rent-producing lands is largely due to artificial improvement.

We are now ready to make a final statement as to the fertility of Massachusetts and of all parts of the country settled twenty-five or more years ago: that *all* the fertility of the farming lands is due to labor, and none of it to primitive condition. This seems a startling statement, but it is probably none the less true. Let us suppose that nothing is done to renew the soil, no fallowing, no grassing, no fertilizing, but that successive crops are taken from it each year, how long will it last? In some sections, ten years; in some, twenty; in some, thirty; in some, forty. On an average, they would all be exhausted in twenty to thirty years. Nearly all the rent-producing lands have been tilled not less than fifty to seventy-five years, so that their natural fertility has long since been exhausted, and all they possess now is due to the renewing efforts of the husbandman. Especially is this true in Massachusetts. This exclusion will absorb the remaining value of the cultivated farm lands, or \$59,891,808, less \$18,785,220, already taken out as the rentless grade, \$41,106,588—about three and one-fourth per cent. of the whole value of the real estate.

Summing up these exclusions, we have three per cent. for unoccupied land, five per cent. for the rentless grade of occupied land, fifty per cent. for the buildings, one and one-half per cent. for other improvements *on* the lands, and four and three-fourths per cent. for improvement *in* farming lands chiefly, making a total of sixty-four and one-fourth per cent. As the entire value of the real estate in Massachusetts in 1885 was \$1,287,993,899, after deducting sixty-four and one-fourth per cent. as not properly taxable by the single-tax theory, we have a balance of \$459,177,819 as a principal from which to draw a revenue to meet all the expenses of government.

What rate per cent. may we reasonably expect to receive upon this principal in the shape of rent? A few years ago Mr. Edward Atkinson gave, in the *Century*, an opinion to the effect that rent does not reach an average of five per cent. in this country. This is doubtless a full estimate, when we consider that the average rate of profits, including interest and risk, is not over six per cent. for the entire United States. Thus we would have as our revenue for Massachusetts in 1885 five per cent. on \$459,177,819, or \$22,958,891.

EXPENSES TO BE MET.

The total State, county, city and town taxes levied in Massachusetts on real and personal property for 1885 were \$25,850,317. To this must be added other taxes, such as licenses, which, as shown by the census of 1890, will amount to at least \$10,000,000 more, making a total of not less than \$35,850,317. The entire economic rent would thus fall nearly thirteen millions short of meeting the expenses of the State government alone. As the census of 1890 shows that the Federal taxes are nearly equal to those of the State, the total economic rent would not furnish more than one-third enough revenue.

Mr. George attempts to meet this difficulty by the assertion that lands are not assessed at their full value. This is true; and yet, when we see the farming lands of Massachusetts rated at an average of sixty-four dollars an acre, and its orchards at nearly one hundred dollars an acre, with an additional assessment of

nearly three hundred dollars an acre for the trees, we are sure that the rate is quite up to the selling or yielding value. The assessment, however, must be about trebled in order that the necessary revenue may be raised.

All rise in rents, says Mr. George, is at the expense of wages and interest, or of labor and capital. As it is manifest that the present rents will not pay the expenses of government, under the single-tax *regime*, rents must rise at least one hundred per cent., which, according to Mr. George, will result disastrously to labor and capital.

The total value of taxed real estate in the United States is put by the census of 1890 at \$35,711,209,108, and the total assessment of real estate for taxation for the same year at \$18,956,556,675. This makes the estimated real value not quite twice as much as the assessed value. It is true, however, that, while values are usually rated low for taxation, they are also usually rated high for a census, as every community has an ambition to be considered as rich as possible. It is curious, moreover, to see how much greater the difference is in some States and sections than it is in others. In the North Atlantic States, the real valuation is about 50 per cent. more than the assessed; in the South Atlantic, about 66 per cent. more; in the North Central, about 250 per cent. more; in the South Central, about 85 per cent. more; and in the Western, about 110 per cent. more.

Looking at particular States, the lowest comparative assessments are found in Washington, a little over one-third of the real; in Florida, Nevada, Idaho, and Oregon, about one-third; in Iowa, Kansas and Colorado, less than one-third; and in Illinois and Nebraska, less than one-fifth. Maine and the District of Columbia have the same valuation for taxation as for the census. Massachusetts, in which we are now specially interested, has substantially the same valuation for both purposes:—for the census, it is \$1,673,052,797; for taxation, \$1,600,137,807. This shows clearly that the economic rent of Massachusetts would not nearly pay all its taxes. If, as Mr. George asserts, rents should fall as the result of the single tax, owing to the stoppage thereby of land speculation, then this insuperable difficulty would be aggravated.

Moreover, there is the further trouble, growing out of the occasional lessened capacity of the land to yield rent, due to excess or lack of rain, the depredation of insects, etc. Again, what provision can be made under this theory for extraordinary needs? When more than all is wanted for ordinary demands, how shall emergencies, such as wars, be met? Thus, for instance, in 1866, when land values were about one-half what they are now, the needed national revenue alone was \$619,600,000.

It is manifest that, were the theory practicable, it would involve the ownership of land by the government; for no one would be willing to bear the burdens and risks of property, all of whose proceeds would go to another; especially, when he would be expected to make good any deficit in its profits. Thus other practical difficulties emerge. The property itself and production from it would lose all the benefits attendant upon ownership; and the occupiers would no longer be subject to the moral influences of proprietorship.

The question would at once arise, which of the governments shall own the land? Local ownership would be impracticable, on account of the difficulties connected with the equalization of values and the collection of taxes for the State and Federal governments. The national government must own the land; and then we shall have an increase of centralization, paternalism, and of the hungry horde of officials. With our complex civilization, it is preposterous that the central government should undertake to own, manage, rent and collect its revenues from some five millions of farms, besides an untold host of town and city lots. It is well known that the government pays two prices for all it gets, and the result would be, that economic rent would be frittered away as the spoils of contending parties; and, at the same time, would be greatly increased to the occupiers of land, in order that these spoils might furnish fatter feed for the cormorants that prey upon the treasury.

THE ETHICS OF THE CASE.

Economics lies next to ethics, and the territory of ethics sometimes overlaps that of economics. When it does, as Kant says,

ethics speaks with a categorical imperative. We propose, therefore, finally to show that the single tax, in its revolutionary remedy, would violate the principles of justice. This will be done by first calling attention to the fact that private land titles in this country originated in accordance with Mr. George's theory, and by then showing that the single tax would be an act of repudiation and unjustifiable confiscation.

I. THE ORIGIN OF LAND TITLES IN THE UNITED STATES.

1. The thirteen original States and Texas held or hold all the land within their respective boundaries as a common public domain belonging to society in each of these commonwealths. All the land in the remaining States, in the Territories, and in the District of Columbia, was or is held by the United States as a public domain belonging to society in the United States. This is in exact accordance with the theory of Mr. George; society, not private individuals, was or is the possessor of every foot of land in this country.

2. Much of this land is still held by the States, or by the United States, in trust for society. Much of it, however, has passed from the possession of society to the ownership of individuals. How was the change of ownership effected? Did individuals steal or seize the lands they hold, against the wish and protest of society? This would have been impossible, and has never occurred. Did the agents of society prove recreant to their trust, and divide this land among themselves and their favorites? Had such frauds been practiced, the courts would and should annul the titles. No; every acre of land in this country now held by private parties was deeded by society, through its legal agents, to those under whom these individuals now hold their titles. Society owned the lands, and society, knowingly, voluntarily, and, as a rule, for value received, deeded them by solemn covenant to private individuals. Every acre of land in the United States not now held by society was granted by deed of patent to the present proprietors, or to those from whom their title comes.

3. If A sells B a tract of land, and executes to him a deed of warranty, there is no question that it is A's duty, not to claim the

tract from B, but to defend B's title against all that would attack it. Is the obligation any less sacredly binding on society to protect the titles which society itself has conferred on its individual members?

4. A sells B a horse for \$150, and considers himself fully paid. There arises a very extraordinary demand for horses, or else the horse develops unexpectedly superior qualities, and B sells him for a thousand dollars; is A entitled to the unearned increment? Do not increments of value belong to the buyer? Have they not been relinquished by the seller? The United States sell and deed to a citizen a tract of land for one thousand dollars; in a few years its value has increased twenty-fold; surely, the citizen buyer, and not the government seller, is entitled to the unearned increment.

5. Mr. Post, however, demurs to all this. In his official lecture he says that the League believes in the expediency of the private ownership of land; and yet, in a letter to the writer of this paper, he says: "Cannot the victims of the tribute" [*i. e.*, labor-owners] "repudiate the mere legal obligation to pay tribute for the use of what the Creator intended as much for them as for their landlord?" That is, the Single Tax League believes it expedient and right for society to repudiate the legal obligation of its own sovereign deed of patent, and to reclaim, *without compensation*, from those to whom it has sold them the lands now held by private owners! Thus the League accepts Mr. George's teaching, that it is just and proper to dispossess, without compensation, the present owners of land, whether original patentees, or those who have bought their land with their labor. This seems a moral monstrosity.

More than this, Mr. George not only thus outrages our notion of justice in advocating the robbery by society of land values, but also goes so far as to violate his own theory in his extreme repudiation of private right to land. According to him, as land, nature's gift, belongs to society, so wealth, man's product, belongs to the individual. Cases occur, however, in which the individual's labor becomes indistinguishable from land. With reference to these cases, Mr. George says (*Progress and Poverty*, p. 308), "Very well; then the title to the improvements becomes blended with the title to the land; the individual right is lost in

the common right." He would have society, in these cases, not only appropriate the individual's land, but his labor also, without compensation.

Mr. George makes a plausible point in defence of this spoliation (*Progress and Poverty*, pp. 328, 329), where he says that the common law gives to the legal owner what an innocent purchaser has bought from one holding a defective title. The legal owner of land, he says, is the people, the present landlord is the innocent purchaser, and the original landlord had the defective title; the people, therefore, by the common law can dispossess the present land-owners. There is a radical fallacy here: the assertion that the original landlord had a defective title; this cannot be so in this country, because his title came from the people, who, as Mr. George says, are the legal owners. To put it another way, the common law gives the innocent purchaser recourse on the parties from whom his title comes; and, in this case, his title originated with the people, the alleged plaintiff.

II. VIRTUAL CONFISCATION.

The mode in which Mr. George and the Single Tax League propose to apply their scheme is not to dispossess the present land-owners, but to require them to pay all the taxes needed for the maintenance of local, state, and national governments. This will be tantamount to a forfeiture of the land by the holders, and a confiscation by the government.

1. As is well known, some taxes do not rest on those who first pay them, but are shifted to other shoulders. It is equally well known that it is held by most economists, that tax on land does not shift, but remains a burden on the owner. Mr. George says that it does not shift.

2. We shall now apply the single tax, and see what its effect will be, bearing in mind that all other taxes are to be abolished, and that all the revenues of every government, town, city, county, state, and federal, are to come from land alone. We will make the application first to the whole country.

We have already seen that the entire rent of the land would not nearly pay the taxes of Massachusetts. We shall now show

that the same is true of the entire country, so that the proposal to make land pay all the expenses of government will not only absorb all the rent, but much more besides; that is, it will not only rob the land-owners of their land values, but will make them pay an additional penalty under the forms of taxation.

The entire real estate in 1890, including land and its improvements, is assessed for taxation at \$18,956,556,675. What proportion of this value is land and what proportion improvements, is, as we have seen, a difficult question to settle. On this point Mr. Post kindly requested Hon. Thomas G. Shearman to give me the results of his investigations. He has courteously complied with the request, as follows: "As the result of a very extended inquiry and as close an investigation as it is possible for one having no official power to give, I am fully convinced that the value of bare land, absolutely irrespective of all improvements, is never *less*, in any civilized country, than fifty per cent. of the entire value of real estate. In England, Massachusetts, and most of the North-eastern States, the value of the bare land is about sixty per cent. of all real estate values, and my judgment, upon the whole, is that this is the proportion throughout the United States, taken collectively; or, to put it on the other side, the value of all buildings, fences, growing crops, and improvements of every kind and description, is never *more* than fifty per cent. of the entire value of real estate in any considerable district, and is generally not more than forty per cent." How greatly mistaken Mr. Shearman is, was seen in our examination of Massachusetts. Mr. Post says: "I have made it a point to inquire wherever I have been, and results are so different in different places, that I doubt if any reliable statistics exist at present. In western New York, for example, I found that the value of farming land relatively to its improvements was about one to four, whereas in eastern Kansas it is about half-and-half. In New York city the ratio varies from about half-and-half to a ratio in which the land value is expressed by a very small figure. One of the most expensive buildings in this city—the Madison-Square Garden—although it stands upon land that is very far from being of exceptional value, is said to have cost not much more than half as much as the land. Of

course, respecting vacant land (which is a large share of land in the aggregate), the relation of improvements to land value is as 0 to almost any figure from 1 upward." These are single-tax opinions. H. C. Carey and Professor A. L. Perry, of Williams College, on the other hand, take the ground that land of itself is valueless.

From these statements, and from what we have seen in the case of Massachusetts, it would seem a too liberal estimate to allow land half the aggregate value of real estate, or \$9,478,278,337.

By the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1890, p. 107, the expenditure of the national government for that year was \$630,247,078.16. According to the Extra Census Bulletin, No. 70, the total expenditure of the several local governments of this country for 1890 amounted to \$563,735,441. The total public expenses of the United States for the last census year, therefore, aggregated \$1,193,982,519.16. This is more than 12½ per cent. upon the entire assessed valuation of the bare land for that year.

Land for taxation is undervalued. From the eleventh census we learn that the real estate of this country was valued, not for taxation but for advertising purposes, at \$35,711,209,108. This is possibly as much too high as the taxation value is too low. Accepting it, however, and deducting one-half for improvements, we have as the extreme value of bare land \$17,855,604,554, of which the expenditures above given would be nearly seven per cent. The average rent of land throughout the country probably does not average five per cent. The single tax would, therefore, more than consume the rent on land values, and thus entirely dispossess the owners and leave a balance of tax for them to pay.

Applying the theory to individual cases, A and B are two brothers, with a patrimony of \$10,000 each. A invests his in a town lot, which he leases to B for \$500. B builds on the lot and rents it for \$1,000. Each now pays \$100 in taxes, and has a net income of \$400. The single tax is adopted and A is saddled with a tax of \$600, while B is released from taxation and enjoys the full amount of \$500.

3. Such a case was put to Mr. Post, who said in reply, "If the

single tax were ideally applied, it would leave the lot-owner nothing, and it would leave to the house-owner the full value of his house. To use your word [it is Mr. George's word], we would 'confiscate' the entire value of land, because we see that until that is done land-owners confiscate the earnings of labor."

The Single Tax League thus, through its official exponent, admits that its theory, ideally applied, would confiscate all property in land, and maintains, with Mr. George, that such confiscation, under the guise of taxation, would be expedient and just. What is confiscation? Bouvier confines it to the appropriation by government of the property of its alien enemies. Black, however, says that it is properly condemnation, and that confiscation is the appropriation by government of the property of its rebellious subjects. All agree that it carries the idea of penalty. A penalty in this case for what? Are land-owners alien enemies, rebellious subjects, criminals? If guilty of that for which they should forfeit their property, have they been judicially convicted? Surely the proposed single tax on land, by legislative enactment, would be an act of spoliation, a confiscating bill of attainder for no crime!

The manifest conclusion is, that land should, in proportion to its ability, bear its share of the taxes, and that Mr. Post's labor, or Mr. George's wealth, should do the same.

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VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

SHEDD'S DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. By *William G. T. Shedd, D. D.* Vol. III. Supplement.
New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894. \$4.00.

This is the last volume from the pen of the venerable Dr. Shedd, published a few months before his death, and therefore represents the ripest product of his fifty years of theological study and scholarship. In the opinion of the present writer, the three greatest theologians which the American Church has yet produced are Jonathan Edwards, W. G. T. Shedd and R. L. Dabney, and the careful student of the writings of these great masters in philosophy and theology can discern the kinship which exists between their imperial intellects and saintly hearts. Edwards on *The Will*, and the *Religious Affections*, Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology* and *Sermons to the Natural Man*, Dabney's *Theology*, and especially his *Sensualistic Philosophy* are works worthy of a place beside Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* and Turretine's *Institutes*, and none of these will ever be outgrown by the progress of metaphysical speculation or theological learning.

Dr. Shedd tells us that "the purpose of the present volume is to elaborate more carefully some of the difficult points in specific unity, partly by original explanations by the author and partly by extracts from that class of theologians who have advocated it. The volume contains an amount of carefully selected citations from works in the Ancient, Mediæval and Reformation periods, and also from the English and Continental divines of the 16th and 17th centuries, that are not so easily accessible, and are an equivalent for a large library of treatises beyond the power of most clergymen and students to possess or have access to. The original matter connected with this endeavors to clear up the obscure features of an actual existence in Adam, and a responsible agency in him." We think that this statement scarcely represents the true contents of this valuable and interesting volume. Only 129 out of the 528 pages are devoted to anthropology, while 160 pages are devoted to theology proper (Trinitarianism), and the remaining topics in a theological system receive considerable attention. One acquainted with the first two volumes of the *Dogmatic Theology* will find no new views advanced, but will find the same views presented in the same style of crystalline clearness, intense energy and severely simple beauty.

Dr. Shedd's system differs from some of the more modern schools of Calvinism in holding to the Augustinian and Elder Calvinistic theology; he agrees with Augustine (though this is unsuccessfully disputed by some), Anselm and Edwards in being a Traducianist. He furnishes the proof that there is just as truly room under the Westminster Confession and in the Presbyterian Church for theologians of the type of R. W. Landis and S. J. Baird, as for theologians of the type of the Hodges and

Thornwell. The present writer thinks Dr. Shedd unduly emphasizes the natural union at the expense of the federal or representative union, while Dr. Hodge unduly emphasizes the representative union, to the neglect of the natural union. We believe that no better statement has ever been made on this subject than Turretine's, which is substantially reproduced in the system of Dr. Dabney, but there is room in the Presbyterian Church for all three schools, the pronounced Traducianist, as was Shedd, the pronounced Creationist, like Hodge, and the theologian who refuses to determine the conflicting claims of Traducianism and Creationism, as we understand Dr. Dabney to do. We agree exactly with Dr. Dabney, but we rejoice that Presbyterian theology has been enriched by the noble works of Shedd and Hodge, and the question as to their relative orthodoxy ought never to be raised. Calvinism, while a distinct, homogeneous, well-articulated system, is not a razor's edge upon which standing is as difficult as passage through the needle's eye, but it is an ample thoroughfare upon which travellers may pass and re-pass without needing to put their feet down at every step in the same spot pressed by the feet of others. All of the theologians mentioned held with equal clearness to the Calvinistic system, while as independent thinkers they differed upon some points not essential to the integrity of the system.

We propose no extended critique on this volume, but we would be glad to recommend the three volumes constituting Dr. Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology* to the ministers and reading people of our church, for the following reasons:

1. The unequalled excellence of his style. During seven years of his earlier life Dr. Shedd was the Professor of English Language and Literature at the University of Vermont, and his studies there and afterward contributed to the formation of that noble style which gives so unique and great charm to all of his philosophic and theological works. We believe no American writer in the field of philosophy or theology has excelled him in the clearness, force and beauty of his style, and in a certain subtle, vital quality hard to describe, but easily recognized in the products of some minds. Contrast with him in this respect the writings of either the elder or younger Hodge, and the admirable English in which Shedd's system is clothed will, we think, guarantee the life of his *Dogmatic Theology*, when the sound, able, logical and learned treatises of the Drs. Hodge will command attention only from the laborious student of the history of Christian doctrine. There has been very general recognition of this great merit in Dr. Shedd's works by literary writers of the highest eminence, and one of the leading directors of that great institution, Columbia College, told the writer that Dr. Shedd's recognized mastery of the choicest and noblest English had led that institution to seek him on several occasions for its professorship of English Language and Literature.

2. The extent and selectness of his scholarship. His five volumes of translations from the Latin, German and French, and his fourteen volumes of original works, covering a very wide field in theology and philosophy, show the amplitude and grasp of his scholarship. The varied positions he so successfully filled as Professor of English Language in the University of Vermont, Homiletics and Pastoral Theology in Auburn, Ecclesiastical History in Andover, Biblical Literature and afterwards of Dogmatic Theology in Union, New York, together with his work in the pulpit as co-pastor and then successor to Dr. Gardiner Spring, of the Brick Church, show his versatility and the extent of his attainments. There

can be no doubt that he deserves the title of one of the greatest American scholars. The selectness of his scholarship is no less admirable. In poetry, science, literature, philosophy and theology he had obeyed his own advice to his theological students to hold "daily, nightly and everlasting communion with the great authors." His scholarship, while encyclopædic, was of the choicest and most select type. He dared to be ignorant of the lucubrations of many second and third-rate minds, that he might share the thoughts of the great thinkers and scholars of the race. The student who desires to bring his mind into contact with the very best thinking of the recognized masters in all departments of thought can accomplish this end through these volumes better than through any equal number of printed pages with which the present writer is acquainted. That man would have no mean acquaintance with the best thoughts of many of the best thinkers who had thoroughly mastered Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology*. The benefit conferred on the student would be still further increased if the select quotations which Shedd gives him should lead the inquiring student to extend his acquaintance with the authors quoted, and it is certain that he would be introduced to no literature of a low or common order.

3. The profound philosophy underlying his system of doctrine. It is the fashion among shallow and superficial thinkers who, by lack of mental endowments, or on account of the character of their attainments, are incapable of appreciating the profound problem of metaphysics, to decry philosophy as barren of all practical result and certain conclusion. But the greatest minds in the history of thought have been prevailingly metaphysical in their tendency, and these master-spirits have always held a homogeneous system. Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, Reid, and Hamilton, in common with Augustine, Athanasius, Anselm, Calvin, Edwards, and Shedd, hold one philosophic system whose unity is not destroyed by their divergence upon many points of importance, and no man can be a good theologian unless he is first a sound and rational philosopher. There is a profound harmony between the pure teachings of human reason and revelation or the deliverance of the infinite reason of God; and while revelation furnishes the only infallible source of truth, it is the business of the systematic theologian to evince this harmony, to prove that human reason finds the best solution of the standing problem of philosophy in this inspired revelation. We know of no theologian who is more intensely biblical, and at the same time more profoundly rational, than Dr. Shedd. We do not believe it has as yet been given to man to frame statements and explanations which are more satisfactory to reason and to the philosophic mind upon the great subjects of the trinity, the atonement, and eternal punishment, than Dr. Shedd has given us in these volumes. Of course no one would claim originality for him here, for he is building upon the historic doctrines of the church, but we believe him to be in advance of all English theologians, unless it be Dr. Dabney, in showing the intrinsic reasonableness of these doctrines; in justifying them before the forum of the human reason. Such a theology is needed to-day, for while it seems to be a temporary "fad" to depreciate metaphysics, the human mind demands profound and consistent views of truth, and superficial thinkers, whether they call themselves biblical theologians or by some other self-chosen title, cannot satisfy this demand. In fact, there is a philosophy underlying the whole content of revelation; and the rational coördination and systemization of its inspired teachings produces a philosophy just as truly as it

does a theology. Indeed, a theology without a presupposed and involved philosophy is an impossibility. We regard Dr. Shedd's distinguishing merit as a theologian and his certain title to a permanent and commanding influence as found in his masterful and consistent union of philosophy and theology.

4. The conservatism and soundness of his views. Dr. Shedd possessed in large degree the historic spirit, and had little respect for those self-sufficient theologians who imagine themselves able, irrespective of the achievements of the theologians and church of the past, to complete by their unaided efforts the systemization of the doctrines contained in the Scriptures. This author, with the conservatism which a profound acquaintance with the history of the development of Christian doctrine naturally produced, built his own system upon the doctrinal attainments of the past, the Nicene Trinitarianism, the Christology of Chalcedon, the Augustinian Anthropology and the Anselmic and Reformation Soteriology. He was too wise a man to ignore the providential labors of such representative theologians as Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, Calvin, Turretine, Owen, Howe, and Edwards, those great master-spirits whom God has raised up to give the most accurate and scientific expression to the system of revealed truth. One of the great merits of this great teacher of theology was that his *Dogmatic Theology* was based upon the results of his *History of Christian Doctrine*, and the conviction was wrought in the minds of his students that the Augustinian or Calvinistic system was the combined product of the ablest and saintliest spirits in the history of the church, and this, united in his instructions with the vindication of its intrinsic reasonableness and with the careful biblical exposition which showed it to be the system contained in the Scripture, gave the force of absolute demonstration to its certain and necessary truth.

We do not believe we could do a better service for our church than to induce many of our ministers to enter upon the careful study of this massive product of one of the most imperial intellects and saintly spirits which God has given to his church in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

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THORNTON WHALING.

MILEY'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. *By John Miley, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey.* Two volumes, 8vo, pp. 1105. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. 1893 and 1894. \$3.00 per volume.

Learning, philosophy, logic, and skill have each waited upon the author in the production of these volumes. In their mechanical preparation the publishers have delighted the eye of the most exacting reader.

The first volume was reviewed by Dr. B. B. Warfield, in this QUARTERLY, July, 1893. In that notice Princeton's distinguished professor said many laudatory things. They ought to have been said. They were neatly said. The merits of the second volume compel their reiteration and extension to the whole work. Dr. Warfield also passed some adverse criticisms upon the volume which he noticed. They had to be passed. They were courteously passed. There is no need of our repeating them.

Dr. Miley is an Arminian. His conscience, his intellect, his heart, are all

Arminian. He has read widely; he has thought earnestly; he has made the Scriptures his final authority; he is generally fair and intelligent in stating the positions of those from whom he differs. As a polemic, he moves straight against the enemy's centre. He asks no quarter. He offers none to others. He believes Calvinism to be both unphilosophical and unbiblical. He accepts Arminianism upon logical and ethical grounds as well as upon supposed scriptural grounds. His Arminian reader is bound to rejoice at the ability of the exposition and at the logical defence of his system. The Calvinist is bound to love his own system all the more as he sees this antithetic exhibition of it. At every point the antithesis is direct and unambiguous. This is a long stride towards ultimate truth. The Calvinist has for a long time complained that the Arminian would not define his doctrine in technical terms. Dr. Miley almost silences this complaint. He assures us, for example, that original sin is not guilt, and insists that this is the historic position of his church. Several of his positions are radical and revolutionary departures from current Wesleyanism.

From the nature of the case, we cannot notice all the points of interest, nor even all the vital matters, in these volumes. Inasmuch as we write for Calvinistic readers, we shall confine this notice to Dr. Miley's views of anthropology, atonement, and free-agency.

I. As to the origin of man, his antiquity, and the unity of his species, our author's views are traditional and orthodox, but his defence is weakened by a conciliatory tone. As to the constitution of man, he is a "bichotomist." As to the image of God in which Adam was created, there are three features of likeness—spirituality, personality, holiness. (Vol. I., p. 407.) As to the Adamic holiness, the fact is admitted, but its ethical quality is denied: "The holiness of Adam, as newly created and before any personal action of his own, was simply a subjective state and tendency in harmony with his moral relations and duties. But such a state, however real and excellent, and however pleasing to the divine mind, could not have any truly ethical quality, or in any proper sense be accounted either meritorious or rewardable." (P. 410.) As to probation, it was real, and the test was made at this precise point, namely, Will Adam, by a personal act of his very own, put an ethical quality into his natural holiness? Under extraneous temptation he failed to convert his natural, unethical holiness into a moral quality, and so fell into sin. (Pp. 423-440.)

Depravity is the subjective state of the soul of Adam's posterity after the fall. It is the result of the deprivation of native holiness, and consists precisely in "a disordered state of the sensuous and moral nature." (P. 445.) But is this sensuous and moral disorder technically known as depravity, sin? "This," says Dr. Miley, "is not disputed." (P. 511.) But according to our author, depravity is sin when sin is used in its metonymical sense of abnormality and disorder. It is not true of depravity, when sin is used in the sense of demerit and ill-desert. Upon this negative the author is vigorous and vehement. He charges inconsistency upon many Arminian writers who have carelessly or ignorantly permitted themselves to employ language which can be construed as implicating moral ill-desert in the notion of Adamic depravity. The descendants of Adam "could not be born with any sin amenable to an eternal doom." (P. 521.) The formula for the true Arminian doctrine is, "Native depravity without native demerit." (P. 521.) "Such is the doctrine of the Methodist Episcopal Church." (P. 524.) But while an in-

herited "nature cannot be the subject of guilt—cannot be sinful in the sense of penal desert" (p. 527), it is none the less a state of moral ruin. (P. 529.) In his second volume, Dr. Miley says (p. 243), "Man is utterly evil : all the tendencies and impulses of his nature are toward evil ; he is powerless for any good, without any disposition to the good, and under a moral necessity of sinning." When viewed simply in its Adamic relation, without thinking forward to the atonement, such is the state of the race—ruined, utterly evil, having all tendencies to evil, having no tendencies to the good, powerless, under a moral necessity of sinning. How, Dr. Miley, did the race come into such a state of moral impotency? By a blunder, you must say, and do say, when you deny the demerit of depravity. Through some misfortune the race has come under the moral necessity of sinning. It would be an outrage in God, according to Armenian theology, to inflict such a moral state as a judicial judgment upon the race for participating federally in the guilt of Adam, but it is right and proper in God to create the race in this moral state when it was in no sense guilty or ill-deserving. The view is as damaging to providence and to God's moral character as it is to Calvinism. We do not believe the author represents the Methodist Episcopal Church in thus denying the demerit and guilt of native depravity. We believe his position is necessitated by the logic of Arminianism, but we cannot believe that the great church of Wesley is so far gone towards semi-Pelagianism. We hope that church will continue to maintain the inconsistency of holding to the guilt of original sin.

II. Soteriology is summed up under two formulas: "Atonement in Christ" and "Salvation in Christ." (Vol. II. p. 65.) The atonement is considered first as a fact, and second as a doctrine. The fact is proved from Scripture texts and terms. (Pp. 70-79.) The necessity of the atonement is grounded primarily in the needs of God's moral government (p. 90), and secondarily in the necessity of penalty where there is sin. (P. 93.) The main reason for an atonement rises out of governmental expediency, but resort to such an expediency would be legitimate only in cases of sin. This leads the author, of course, to adopt the theory of atonement known as the governmental. He does so avowedly and by name.

The Calvinistic reader will be interested in the heads of argument by which he seeks to clear the field of the theory of satisfaction: (1.) It is an impossibility. (P. 142.) (2), It is self-destructive. (P. 148.) (3), It implicates the punishment of Christ. (P. 148.) (4), It implicates the guiltlessness of the redeemed. (P. 149.) (5), It implies a limited atonement. (P. 153.) (6), It rests upon the notion that God's justice is commutative. (P. 153.)

Dr. Miley not only adopts the governmental theory for himself, but to it he commits all Arminians and Wesleyans, Watson, Whedon, Minor Raymond and Bledsoe. But what is the theory?

Public justice can administer penalty to sin only upon the ground of demerit (p. 171), and this for two reasons: to satisfy retributive claims, and to conserve the ends of government. (Pp. 172, 173.) Penalty may be remitted not only absolutely and unconditionally, but also when the ends of government would be advanced by such a remission. (Pp. 175, 176.) Now, it is not expedient to remit the penalty absolutely, but it is expedient to remit the penalty in consequence of the sufferings of Christ. The deepest necessity for an atonement is in its effects upon government. (Pp. 176-178.) The author illustrates his view by the measure adopted by Bronson Alcott in the government of his school. Under that plan the

master, instead of chastising the offending pupil, required the disobedient boy to flog his teacher. "This, therefore, is a true case of atonement through vicarious suffering, and in close analogy to the divine atonement." (P. 182.)

The opportunity is too good for asking Dr. Miley two or three hard questions:

(1), If penalty can be administered only to sin (p. 171), how can God administer penalty to Christ, except he be a sinner in some sense? And in what sense could he be a sinner but in one of two, putatively or personally? If there is any truth in the analogy, God flogged Christ for the sake of sinful men. Why? Just for the influence of the example upon the world, replies our author, and not because Christ was federally guilty. Then, in his case, penalty was administered where there was no sin.

(2), Again, everybody instinctively feels that the boy deserved the flogging which the master graciously took in his stead. The master got the thrashing the boy ought to have had. If the analogy holds, we must conclude that God inflicted upon Christ the precise punishment which the sinner deserved. But such is a Calvinistic conclusion.

(3), Again, if depravity is not so demeritorious as to make man amenable to an eternal doom, if depravity is not sin in the sense of guilt, what was the bearing of atonement upon original sin? If it carried away any fact of original sin, what fact was carried away? We have been accustomed to think that it was precisely the guilt of original sin which was removed, according to Arminianism, from the race by the atonement of Christ. According to Dr. Miley, we cannot see what the practical effect of atonement upon depravity was. Yet the author says atonement presupposes sin.

(4), Again, if the deepest necessity of atonement is in its effects upon government, then the deepest meaning of the atonement is its influence upon moral government. Was the atonement made for government, or for man? Was the atonement but a stroke of Gamalielian state policy? The Arminian generally traces its origin to the love of God for the world; Dr. Miley's logic grounds it in God's love of government.

III. Free Agency. The question is precisely and definitely as to the "power of self-action." (P. 278.) But what is the power of this power? How does it operate to the production of a choice? Not in consequence of the domination of some motive (pp. 276-279), nor in consequence of a determining disposition. (P. 282.) The mental facts in any act of choice, comprehensively and analytically stated, are four: (1), Some end to be chosen; (2), Some rational motive to this end; (3), A rational judgment as to the desirability of this end, and (4), An elective decision of that end. (P. 286.) Such is the complex cause of a mental choice, and the fourth is the vital element generally omitted in the enumeration. (P. 284.) Given the end, the motive, the rational judgment, must the "elective decision" follow? *No*, answers our author, for there may be "a rational suspension of the choice" while the judgment is being made up. (P. 291.) But we are bound to ask our author if the rational suspension is not itself a choice based upon motive? What, then, is gained in the argument? There is no progress. Dr. Miley sees this, and to meet the point lays down the further proposition that the mind has the power to set aside all motives, and make its elective decision independent of them. (P. 296.) Motives disappear when the objective relations are destroyed, and by the dismissal or replacement of the present object the

mind controls the whole motive state. (Pp. 297, 298.) But, we ask, if the mind dismiss the object in order to change the motivity, was not that decision to dismiss itself a choice based upon some motive? Then where is the progress in the argument? Or, again, if the mind may dismiss all motives, what becomes of Dr. Miley's analysis of the mental facts which he characterizes as the elements of choice? Or, again, if the mind dismiss all motives, and the act of dismissal was not based upon some motive, then was not at least that act an arbitrary volition? But the author denies that volition is arbitrary. (P. 306.)

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STEVENS' JOHANNINE THEOLOGY.

THE JOHANNINE THEOLOGY: A Study of the Doctrinal Contents of the Gospel and Epistles of the Apostle John. *By George B. Stevens, Ph. D., D. D.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1894. Pp. 387, 8vo. \$2.00.

In 1892 Dr. Stevens published his *Pauline Theology*. In a notice of it (January Number of THE QUARTERLY for 1893) we complained that the author, not infrequently, forced the technicalities of the orthodox and traditional theology to stand for new and original ideas. We do not find this fault, to the same degree, with the volume which is before us. There was not an equal occasion. It is easier to pervert John than Paul, because Paul employs, to such a large extent, legal terms whose meanings are more fixed than the more philosophic language of John. It manifestly took more labor to write *The Pauline Theology* than it required to write *The Johannine*, but of the two books we like the latter much better.

The intellectual power, the ripe scholarship, the critical skill, the literary art, the width of reading, are all shown to be the possession of Yale's Professor of Criticism in the very highest degree. The reader feels that the influence of the higher criticism is in the sub-consciousness, if not in the consciousness, of the author. He surrenders to them passage after passage which, like monuments, have marked doctrines which the church has laid in its faith. But it is a satisfaction to know that the author generally finds some text which, by the laws of language and all the canons of criticism, yields the true Johannine doctrine as God's people have been accustomed to understand it. He reduces the number of our proof texts, but it is comforting to know that the essence of the doctrine is generally left. In this volume Dr. Stevens is a better defender of the faith than in his former treatise.

The aim of the volume is to present the theological contents of the Gospel and Epistles of John. The Apocalypse, because of the peculiarity of its form and type of teaching, is not a "source" in these conclusions. Taking these documents and insulating himself from every other writer of Scripture, the author concludes that the teachings of John are the most distinctive in their type, and the most truly and originally theological in their form, of any of the New Testament monographs. Among the more salient features, he finds in John an intense tendency to group his thoughts around certain great central truths; that he is contemplative, mystical, and emotional, yet not vague and shadowy; that his Scripture is neither a barren intellectualism nor yet a dreamy unpractical mysticism, but a penetrating, life-influencing realism; that the author's thought moves among antitheses, presenting those ethical and spiritual conceptions of religion which blend

this world with the spiritual order. "Theology is theory, religion is life." John writes not so much in the interest of theology as he does in the interest of life. We must remark just here that a sound philosophy depends upon the theory of knowledge; that a sound government depends upon the theory of the state; and so a sound ethical and spiritual life depends upon the theory of life, that is, upon theology.

There are a great many topics to which we would like to draw attention, and make an exhibit of the author's views upon them, but from the nature of the case this cannot be done in a notice of this length. Among these topics of interest are the following: The relation of John's theology to the Old Testament, where the author shows that the Johannine theology is founded upon the Old Testament; the union of the Son with the Father, where the author shows that John made a distinction between the monogenetic and the mediatorial sonships of Christ; the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, of the appropriation of salvation, of the nature of spiritual life, of love, and of eschatology. In his last chapter, the author compares the theology of John and Paul. This is too interesting not to notice it more particularly, for they "represent the two most distinctive types of apostolic doctrine":

1. Both apostles have an intense sense of the direct efficiency of God in all things. But how do these two writers differ in their conception of the sovereign will of God? In Paul "God is conceived of in a more legal way than in John; he is a judge on the throne of the world. The problem of religion is, how man may appear before him so as to be accepted and acquitted. To John, God appears rather as the being in whom all perfections are met. The problem of religion is, whether men will desire and strive to be like him." "Paul emphasizes more the will of God, John, more his nature. Paul thinks it enough to ground events in the choices or acts of God; John goes farther, and grounds them in his essence."

2. Both writers emphasize the pre-existence of Christ; but Paul "contemplates the Saviour chiefly in his historic manifestation . . . It remains for John to seek out some term which shall designate his essential, eternal, nature. This term is the *Logos*, by which the apostle would express the nature of one who sustains an inner, changeless relation to God, which underlies the incarnation and saving work of the Redeemer."

3. Both agree in ascribing a sacrificial significance to the saving work of Christ. "For Paul, his death on the cross is the central point of his work, and for John he is the Lamb of God whose death takes away the world's sin, and the propitiation of the sins of the world. But John appears to conceive of the idea of sacrifice more comprehensively than Paul. For Paul, Christ's death is a ransom-price by which men are redeemed."

4. Both agree upon the main features of sin. But "Paul connects sin in its origin and diffusion with the transgression of Adam, while John—so far as he intimates any view of sin's origin—appears to ascribe its introduction into the world to Satan. Both ideas rest upon the narrative of the fall in Genesis."

5. These two apostles differ more clearly as to the mode of salvation than in any other particular. Paul's great words are *justification* and *righteousness*; John's *birth from God* and *life*. Paul casts the doctrine in "juridical forms," and conceives of the method "as a mere court-room process." John conceives of salvation "as the result of a divine impartation of life," bestowing upon its subject "character."

6. Both apostles coincide closely as to the doctrine of faith. It is mystical, and not merely formal, with both. Paul associates it with such phrases as "in Christ," "dying with Christ," and "newness of life"; John associates it with "abiding in Christ," "living through Christ," and "eating the flesh and drinking the blood of the Son of God." With both faith is a "new life-force."

7. Both apostles magnify the love of God. "For Paul, love best summarizes that which is perfect; it is the very essence of goodness"—the law and motive-principle of human life and conduct. John goes beyond Paul in representing love as "the law of the divine nature as well as of the human—a universal principle or law of being."

Our author concludes that Paul and John supplement each other in many particulars. We may add that the same is true in respect to all writers of Scripture, and that the recognition of this fact shows the superiority and greater safety of the systematic method as compared with the biblical.

The *Johannine Theology* is the product of a very high grade of scholarship, exceedingly entertaining, full of instruction, but too divergent from orthodox interpretations to be entirely safe and satisfactory throughout.

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COCKE'S STUDIES IN JOHN'S EPISTLES.

STUDIES IN THE EPISTLES OF JOHN: or the Manifested Life. *By A. R. Cocke, D. D., Author of "Studies in Ephesians," Etc., Pastor at Waynesboro, Va.: Professor of Philosophy in the Valley Seminary.* Richmond, Va.; Presbyterian Committee of Publication; 1895. Pp. 159.

A little over two years ago Dr. Cocke published his *Studies in Ephesians*, and a few months later he issued two pamphlets on *Immersion in the Bible*. The former of these showed him to be a clear and devout expositor of Scripture, and the latter evinced him to be a fair and effective controversialist. These publications also gave good promise that we might expect something even better from his pen, and we have pleasure in saying that the volume before us goes far to fulfil this promise.

For the "Studies" in this volume Dr. Cocke has chosen those precious passages of Scripture, the Epistles of John. These Epistles are simple, tender and devout, and at the same time lofty, profound and difficult. It was, therefore, no ordinary task which our author ventured on when he took up these Epistles for a series of "Studies" rather than for a continuous exposition. To say that he has succeeded well is to render real praise to his work. Its exposition is careful and correct, its literary style simple and lucid, and its tone is spiritual and devout. To read the book will minister strength and comfort to heart and life.

In the volume there are nine studies or chapters. Seven of these are founded on the first Epistle, and these are followed by a single one based on each of the other Epistles. In this way the whole ground of the Epistles is covered in accordance with the author's plan.

The titles of the studies are as follows: Fellowship, Tests of Fellowship, Degrees in Life and Fellowship, Character of the Life in God's Children, Confidence and the Holy Spirit, "Let us Love one Another," The Testimony Concerning Eter-

nal Life, The Second Epistle of John, The Third Epistle of John. These titles, though quite comprehensive, give but little idea of the real scope and contents of the discussions, for every chapter is rich with thought.

The sub-title—The Manifested Life—gives the key-note to all the studies, and leads our author to unfold the deep underlying truths of the Epistles. The chapters on Fellowship and its Tests illustrate this. Fellowship has its foundation in a manifested life, fellowship reveals the character of the life, and the manner in which this fellowship is revealed. The tests of fellowship are keeping his commandments, walking as he walked, and loving our brethren. Each of these points is well worked out.

The degrees of life and fellowship are developed from these words, "I write unto you fathers," "I write unto you young men," "I write unto you little children." The life and character of God's children is expounded along such lines as these: Righteousness in being and in act is one of the forms in which the divine life unfolds itself, the true children of God will love one another, and in various particulars these two lines are opened up.

Under the Confidence of the Holy Spirit, the filial, prayerful spirit is enlarged upon, and the indwelling, renewing Spirit abides in them ever. From the words "Let us love one another" we have one of the very best studies in the series. The love of God in Christ is the great motive prompting our love to God and for one another. The testimony concerning eternal life leads our author to speak of the witnesses, the reception of the testimony, and the testimony itself. This is twofold: God has given us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. In this connection the truth is well brought out that the believer may have this full assurance, though all may not as a matter of fact possess it. It is their privilege, but may not be their possession.

The chapters on the Second and Third Epistles are brief, but practical and very readable. We can make no attempt to give even an outline of them in the space at our disposal.

We congratulate the author on his good work, and we rejoice in the clear evidences which this volume affords of his ability, learning and devout spirit. We congratulate the congregation that sits under such ministrations of the word, and do not wonder that they are a people who are intelligent, and liberal in their gifts to the Lord.

It is a matter of cheer also to find one and another of our younger ministers devoting themselves with marks of ability and scholarship to biblical studies. This gives good promise that our church will not want for men to maintain her standard of learning and devotion in the Master's service.

We only add that for devotional reading this book is admirable, and should have a place in Sabbath-school libraries. The publishers have done their work well in every respect.

FRANCIS R. BEATTIE.

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BRIMM'S MAN AND THE BIBLE IN THE LIGHT OF REASON.

MAN AND THE BIBLE IN THE LIGHT OF REASON. *By William Waldo Brimm.*
Franklin Printing and Publishing Company, Atlanta, Ga. 1894.

This volume is from the pen of one of the Presbyterian ministers of the Synod of Georgia, and will attract attention on the patriotic ground of special interest in

the production of Southern authors, as well as for the sake of its own merits. The design of the author is to show the intrinsic reasonableness of the Christian revelation, to prove that the system of truth taught in the Scriptures solves in the most satisfactory manner the standing problem of the human reason, and satisfies, as does no other system, the deepest needs of man's nature. The volume consists of fourteen interesting and suggestive chapters, presenting some profound subjects in a manner level to the popular comprehension. The thought is clear, though sometimes abstruse, and any man of average intelligence ought to be able to follow the course of the reasoning.

The first four chapters of the volume discuss the nature of man in the light of reason, showing that he is a free, moral, religious, and yet fallen, being, possessed not simply of a body, but of a soul, which is spiritual as to its essence. The next three chapters present the rational evidence for man's origin, design and future existence. The remaining seven chapters discuss various topics connected with revelation, such as, need of a revelation, origin of the Bible, supernatural evidence of its divine origin, the harmony of the Bible with all truth, etc. The careful reader will find in these chapters much to interest and instruct. The ablest part of Mr. Brimm's volume is found in the chapter entitled "The Religion of the Bible the Religion of the True Philosophy." The author gives us here some admirable statements upon a most difficult subject, and yet in simple and popular style.

We would like to see the thirteenth chapter, entitled "Christianity and Infidelity Contrasted," published as a tract and given a wide circulation among all classes. In fact, this book is sure to exert a most salutary influence upon all its readers, and we hope it will secure the wide distribution justified both by its merits and beneficial influence. We commend especially the successful attempt which the author has made to throw his thoughts upon these abstruse topics into such form that the popular mind can easily grasp them. We like the company which the author keeps; Hamilton, McCosh, Dabney, Calderwood, Bp. Butler, the Duke of Argyle, Cocker, Tiele, Hodge, *et al.*, appear by quotation or suggestion; and while the book is not scholastic or technical, it yet indicates good and sufficient scholarship.

We would not be hyper-critical, yet we hope that in the second edition our author will correct the use of the word "eternal" on the 9th and 204th pages. We suggest, also, that there is too much valuable material collected on these pages to be practically wasted for purposes of future reference on account of the lack of a good and satisfactory index. These are blemishes, however, which can be easily removed. We congratulate Mr. Brimm upon his first venture into the field of authorship, and hope for him great success in this and all future efforts.

THORNTON WHALING.

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DRUMMOND'S "ASCENT OF MAN."

THE ASCENT OF MAN. *By Henry Drummond, LL. D., F. R. S. E., F. G. S.*
New York: James Pott & Co., 114 Fifth Avenue. 1894. Pp. 346.

This book is the Lowell Lectures which were given by Professor Drummond two years ago in Boston. When they were delivered they produced a very pain-

ful impression upon many who were admirers of the author, and hence it was with anxious interest that the full text of the lectures was looked for. Not a few were inclined to hope that the publication of the lectures would, in part at least, dispel the unfavorable effect which the first reports had produced almost everywhere. In our judgment, the full text of the lectures in the volume before us utterly obliterates the last ray of hope which even the most sanguine continued to cherish, that our author's views were not so extreme as reported. In this notice, which cannot be made as complete as we would desire, we shall seek to show that this is the case, by a fair and candid presentation of Professor Drummond's views and by some criticism of them.

When *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* first appeared, a little more than ten years ago, it attracted much attention, and received almost unstinted praise. However, after a few years this favorable judgment was greatly modified, and the conclusion generally rested in, that while Drummond had wrought out many analogies between the natural and the spiritual in an eloquent and attractive way, he had entirely failed to establish identity of law in the two worlds, and consequently the book did not succeed in making good the claim which it boldly put forth in its elaborate introduction. In addition, many thoughtful minds were convinced that some of the principles and many of the methods of this book had tendencies which, if followed out, would lead to a minimizing of the supernatural factors in the spiritual sphere, and which would reduce the two worlds to identity largely, if not entirely, on the side of the natural.

Since this first book appeared several booklets on the ethical side of religious life and experience have come from the same facile pen. The best known of these, perhaps, is *The Greatest Thing in the World*, which contains a brilliant exposition of the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians. This has had a wide circulation, and much praise has been bestowed upon it and the author's other similar writings. In all these books it requires no very careful reading to observe that there has been a constant tendency, which becomes more and more marked, to exalt the subjective side of religion at the expense of the objective, and thus to put the results of mere natural human effort in the place of the renewing grace of God. Thus, there has been progress in the case of the author, as exhibited in his books and booklets, but it has been "down grade" to naturalism. The book before us confirms this conclusion in various ways.

Fifty-seven pages of the 346 are devoted to introductory topics, and this makes a rather large portico for the building itself. In this respect this book resembles *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*.

This introduction deals with four separate topics : Evolution in general ; The missing factor in current theories ; Why was Evolution the method chosen ; and Evolution and Sociology.

As to the first of these topics, we would naturally expect that some definition of Evolution would be given, but we look in vain for it. The principle of continuity is assumed, and Evolution is "the story of creation as told by those who know it best." (P. 3.) Then, as if this were insufficient by way of definition, our author says that Evolution is merely "the history of the steps by which the world comes to be what it is." Further, to make matters plainer, as the soul of our author glows with his theme, he says that Evolution is "after all a vision." Failure to give scientific accuracy is confessed by the various ways in which Evolution is

described by our author. The most significant thing in this section is the fact that if man comes under the sweep of Evolution it must include the whole man, body and soul.

In discussing the missing factor, Professor Drummond makes a rather severe critique of his fellow-Evolutionists. He thinks that Darwin and others have overlooked or disregarded the real facts in the case. Too much has been made, he thinks, of "the struggle for life," and not enough of "the struggle for the life of others." This our author regards as the specially new and good thing in his theory, and he frequently alludes to it in his work.

But our impression is that this altruistic principle is nothing new. Herbert Spencer and others set it forth years before Drummond announced it. And over eighteen hundred years ago a remarkable teacher in Palestine, who spake as never man spake, expounded it in its highest and distinctly ethical form. Our author says that "the path of progress and the path of altruism are one," and that "Evolution began with protoplasm, and ended with man." These are but random hints, showing how completely our author is dominated by his own theories.

The body of the book consists of ten chapters, with titles as follows: The Ascent of the Body; The Scaffolding left in the Body; The Arrest of the Body; The Dawn of Mind; The Evolution of Language; The Struggle for Life; The Struggle for the Life of others; The Evolution of a Mother; The Evolution of a Father; Involution. Under these several headings a wide range of topics bearing upon the supposed ascent of man from his protoplasmic original state up to his complete human form and attainments are discussed in a very attractive manner.

The first chapter tells how the body was evolved, and therein we have the usual reasonings of organic evolution boldly and bravely presented. Man began as a cell, and by slow degrees the differentiation went on, as Embryology is supposed to prove, till at length the multicellular structure of the human body was produced. The absurdities of Haeckel, and the theories of Darwin, Wallace, F. Müller and others are spoken of with favor, and man is made out to be the highest of the beasts of the field, but a beast after all.

To criticise this chapter at length would be to criticise organic evolution in relation to man at length, and we have little space for this. Suffice it to say that many assumptions are made, and again and again mere analogies are made the basis of identities, and the whole is clad in poetic language. The most glaring instance of this is the supposition that the ontogeny of the individual is the exact representation of the phylogeny of the species. But we submit that the embryonic history of the individual is one thing, and the race history of the species is another thing. The former may be a good analogy of the latter, while their identity cannot be proved. But the greatest difficulty we feel in this whole chapter is its relation to the Biblical account of the origin of man. The poetic effort at the close of this chapter to harmonize our author's theory with the Scripture narrative only serves to reveal the fact that it cannot be harmonized. There is something wrong somewhere. Will our author tell us?

The second chapter seeks to show that there are now relics or remnants of the lower forms of animal existence through which man has passed still visible in the human body. The firm grip of a baby's hand, the relics of fish gills or gill slits, neck-ears, the twitching of the skin, the relic of a tail, and other things are dwelt upon in a way which indicates either a somewhat amateur knowledge of

science or a fixed determination to prove man's genetic connection with the lower animals. This chapter limps badly on the scientific side.

This being the case no particular criticism is needed. Our author thinks that he is proving the ascent of man rather than his descent, but much of his reasoning goes to show that apes may be regarded as degenerated men, rather than to prove that men are matured monkeys, or the genetic natural outgrowths of any brute species. This chapter, too, on the purely scientific side, has been severely criticised in several quarters, and the result has been to discount very much Drummond's reputation as a careful and accurate scientist.

The third chapter undertakes to show how the development of the body ceased at its present human form and complexity. The whole explanation is found in the fact that mind was developed, we are not told how, and tools of various sorts were invented and utilized by men. Many curious facts are presented in this chapter, and not a few things are stated which we would by no means deny, but it must still remain an open question as to whether the development of the human body was arrested in the manner and at the stage our author asserts by the discovery and use of tools. Then, too, a great many curious and difficult questions arise on our author's theory. The genesis of new organs, why do some other animals not use tools, how will the extensive use of tools and machinery affect the development of the physical nature of man, and why, on evolutionary principles, should the progress cease with man's body, or, indeed, anywhere else? The theory solves no problem and raises many others.

In the fourth chapter the exceedingly difficult problem for the evolutionist, the dawn of mind, is faced. In a very obscure way does our author deal with the nature and origin of mind. He asks, "Is it an evolution from beneath or a gift from above?" He hesitates to give the answer. He sees that his own principles would lead him to take the former alternative, and yet he seems to shrink from this view. He thinks it probable that there is evolution of mind in some sense. He finds proof of this, he thinks, in the phenomena of child life, in animal intelligence, in primitive man, in modern savages, and in the testimony of language. Feeling the serious nature of the task before him in this chapter, our author labors hard to make out a case for the evolutionary explanation of mind as distinct from matter. To criticise the chapter as it deserves would require the writing of another chapter at least as long as the one before us. At every turn disputed scientific theories are assumed as true, and in many cases there is a conflict with the Scriptures which cannot be reduced.

In the fifth chapter the question of the evolution of language is taken up. The faculty of speech was "no sudden gift," but a slowly matured product. Animal sign and sound language is dwelt upon in this connection, and an effort is made to show how human speech came out of this by slow degrees. Gesture language and other traits of savage man are adduced as witnesses to the evolutionary origin of language. But no clear statement of the precise opinion which our author really holds is anywhere given by him.

The sixth chapter treats of the "struggle for life," and the seventh of the "struggle for the life of others." These may be briefly considered together, and after what was said in noticing the introduction but little need now be added. It may only be noted that our author lays great stress upon the principle or agency which he terms the "other-regarding function," or "the struggle for the life of

others," and some very fine things are stated in this connection. An attempt is made to develop ethical qualities out of this phase of the struggle, and thus derive the moral good from the natural good. Self-sacrifice is supposed to be in nature, and it appears in the principle of altruism. This is another point where the theory is put to a severe test and strain. The ethical significance of sex and maternity is expounded at length in terms of evolution.

Then follow two chapters, the evolution of a mother, and the evolution of a father, which are really the curiosities of the whole work. Among the lower animals there are really no mothers; and in the human race, as the outcome of the altruistic principle, mothers were evolved in the human species. The "other regarding function" was called into exercise in caring for offspring, and in this way the instinct of the mother was produced.

The evolution of a father came later. Eve was first, then Adam, so far as the instincts now under consideration are concerned. All through these chapters, though there is much to sustain the interest of the reader, still in our judgment the reasonings do not make good the conclusion which they are intended to confirm. There is more of sentiment than of science in these chapters.

The tenth and last chapter is a brief, but far from satisfactory, chapter on Involution, a topic which if wrought out carefully would go far to spike the guns of the evolutionist at once. For if by involution we must assume that all that comes out by evolution was originally there by involution, then it is clear that evolution has produced nothing new. Evolution, according to this view, may be progress, but progress unexplained, while the causality of the progress is still needed. This can only be supplied by the presence and agency of God.

The sketch of the ten lectures which we have given is far from complete, still enough has been stated to show the general nature of the contents of the book and to lay a basis for some criticisms of a general nature, with which we conclude this notice. The criticism would naturally run along two lines. The soundness of the scientific and philosophical views might be assailed, and the dangerous theological and religious tendency of the book might be pointed out.

In regard to the first of these lines of criticism we shall not say very much. There are evident signs of haste and lack of caution, and at the same time a readiness to regard hypotheses as established truths of science, which betrays absence of that care and patience which the true scientist should exhibit. Dr. Dallinger, who is well qualified to express an opinion, has, in *The British Weekly*, pointed out with intelligent but merciless severity the scientific defects and blunders of Drummond's science.

We might very well add that poetic modes of thought and fine writing are apt to betray their possessor into hasty conclusions and one-sided views. The field of science is one of facts and legitimate conclusions therefrom, and one of the radical weaknesses of all Drummond's writings appears just in this connection. So far as the scientific result is concerned, we may safely conclude that the "Ascent of Man" has proved the "descent of Drummond." His reputation as a man of science has no doubt suffered seriously by the publication of the book under notice.

It is on the religious side that the most serious criticism must be made by one who holds to the reality of the supernatural factor in the Scriptures and in Christianity. We have tried again and again to see how the theory of the book could

possibly be brought into harmony with the Scriptures, and the account they give of the nature and origin of man. The account in Genesis must be modified, and regarded as a poetic myth of some kind, there is no possible place for sin, and there is really no need for a redemptive scheme, for evolution can lead man on to his highest destiny, even as it has led man from his brutal origin up to his human estate. The objective redemptive facts of the gospel can have no place, so far as man is concerned, and God is put so far in the background that we have nothing more than bald deism left us. How all this can be reconciled with adherence and hearty loyalty to the standards of the Presbyterian Church, passes our comprehension; and how the church of which he is a member can allow him to continue as one of her accredited teachers, is a serious question.

We write thus with deep pain, for it does seem such a pity that one who has so much ability and so many fine gifts should use them as this book shows he is ready to use them. With a power over young men, with a large circle of readers, and with an opportunity of immense usefulness, it does seem a pity that such sad signs of degeneracy are so evident in his case. This book cannot compare in any favorable way with his *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*; and so it would seem that Evolution, according to its natural law of degeneration, is operative in his case. A trumpet-toned warning is surely sounded against the dangers of naturalistic principles, especially in the sphere of religion.

The book is gotten up in excellent style and the letter-press is very good. If the contents were as good we would be better satisfied.

FRANCIS R. BEATIE.

Louisville.

DAWSON'S "MEETING PLACE OF GEOLOGY AND HISTORY."

THE MEETING PLACE OF GEOLOGY AND HISTORY. *By Sir J. William Dawson, LL. D., F. R. S., President of McGill University, Montreal.* 12mo. Cloth. Illustrated. \$1.25. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1894.

We have in this little work the latest contribution by its eminent author to the study of early man in the light of recent geological discoveries and theories. It is founded upon the course of lectures recently delivered by President Dawson before the Lowell Institute, Boston.

Its object, as stated in the preface, is "to give a clear and accurate statement of facts bearing on the character of the debatable ground intervening between the later part of the geological record and the beginnings of sacred and secular history."

This meeting place cannot, from the nature of the case, be a point, but many points and lines of contact.

The earliest well-established relics of man are found in the last period of the last age of geological history—the pleistocene period of the cenozoic age, following what is known as the glacial or ice era. Until recently, many geologists have put the end of the glacial three hundred thousand to thirty thousand years ago. The recent well-established data as to the rate of the cutting back of Niagara Falls gives it as not more than eight or ten thousand years.

No human remains are known of older date than this, as a maximum, and

these oldest remains show man as large and fully developed, with as large brain as any modern race. There is nothing whatever about them tending to prove or even suggest evolution from the lower animals.

This pleistocene period seems to have been one of extensive continents, greatly exceeding present limits, mild climate, an abundant fauna and flora. Many gigantic mammals, now extinct, abounded, such as the mammoth and woolly rhinoceros, besides others of modern species. Of man, three different types can be made out, which may be called: (1), The "Cro-Magnon"; (2), The "Caustadt"; (3), The "Truchère." The first of these were very large and powerful, almost gigantic, having strong frames and large skulls, but probably semi-savage and nomadic. They were probably a mixed race, derived from the other two. The Caustadt type is both smaller and of lower order. The third, of Truchère, while smaller than the Cro-Magnon, was probably of a higher and more civilized type. There seems a suggestive parallelism between these three types and the Cainites, the Sethites, and the "mighty men" or Nephilim, who arose from a mixture of the other two, as recorded in the Book of Genesis.

Abundant evidence is found of the sudden disappearance of these races from Western Europe and Syria, and along with them disappeared the mammoth, woolly rhinoceros, etc.; the cause of the disappearance being a great, though probably short, submergence of the continents, followed by a re-elevation of the lands, though not to the former height, leaving the continents about of their present dimensions. This corresponds wonderfully to the Noachian deluge.

The author shows, as is generally admitted, that all the more important nations of antiquity had records or traditions of a universal deluge, and also that there is much geological evidence tending to prove a sudden and violent catastrophe separating the time of the earliest human remains from the later, after which there is an unbroken series down to the present time. Two whole chapters out of thirteen in all are given to a very interesting discussion of the deluge.

The claims for the very high antiquity of Egypt and Babylonia cannot be allowed, as we have certain proof that at the time when many claim these civilizations were already old, those regions were covered several hundred feet deep by arms of the sea. Archæology adds her testimony to the fact that the very earliest relics of man in Egypt, Chaldea, and Palestine, give about as much evidence of civilization as those long after them in time. So it is more probable that the savage tribes are *degraded*, than that they are the ancestors and predecessors of civilized men of early times.

In a chapter on the Dispersion, it is shown that the account given in Genesis of the migrations of the descendants of Noah agrees substantially with early history from the monuments, now coming to light.

On the whole, we rise from a careful reading of the book feeling that the latest results of inquiry in geology and archæology give to the reverent believer in the revealed word of God no reason to feel that his old Bible is slipping away from him. On the contrary, judging the future by the past, we may hope and expect that further investigation will but bring additional proofs of its verity. In this little book President Dawson has again done valuable work in showing the harmony which must always exist between true science and revelation.

BUTLER'S "BIBLE WORK."

THE BUTLER BIBLE WORK. *Prepared by J. Glentworth Butler, D. D.* The Old Testament. Vol. VII. 1 Kings xii-xxii., 2 Kings, 2 Chronicles x-xxxvi., Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Isaiah, four Chapters, Jeremiah, eighteen Chapters. Pp. 637. Vol. VIII. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Lamentations. Pp. 625. Vol. IX. Ezekiel - Malachi. Pp. 657. The New Testament. Vol. I. The Fourfold Gospel. New York: The Butler Bible Work Company, 85 Bible House. 1894.

These four splendid volumes have been received since our last notice of this work. They bear out fully all that the earlier volumes promised, and justify the praise accorded in advance to the entire series.

Vol. VII., on the Old Testament, embraces such portions of the Old Testament Scriptures as give a complete view of the history of God's people from the division of the kingdom until the return of the remnant of Judah, together with a brief account of the history and literature of the four centuries from Malachi to John. Preliminary to the history, the compiler has given us a collection of valuable thoughts, from the ablest and most evangelical writers, on the relation of the Old and New Testaments as two phases of one revelation, on the historic basis of both Testaments, on the unity and development of the Scriptures, on the structural characteristics of the Old Testament, the order of its books, and the credibility of its history, and on the fact that redemption is the central theme of both Testaments. Following these are testimonies to the truth of the Scriptures drawn from monumental sources. In the next section Dr. Butler gives the views of those authors who maintain the authorship of Kings by Jeremiah, of Chronicles by Ezra. A chronological table of the kingdom, embracing the history of the nations around them, follows. The unfolding of the text is next accomplished in the same manner, by weaving together most skilfully the views of the best known authors and scholars. It is to be noted, with gratification, that Dr. Butler's citations are almost without exception from those who are recognized as conservative, who are not yet ready to give up the old Bible to the new criticism. The section on the inter-Biblical period is drawn almost exclusively from Dr. Blaikie's excellent *Manual of Biblical History*.

Vol. VIII. embraces Isaiah, Jeremiah and Lamentations, each in the Revised Text, with critical expositions and comments from the best thought of the Christian centuries. The office of prophet and function of prophecy are first considered, and plenary inspiration is maintained. Isaiah is given credit for all the book commonly known as his, the compiler preferring here to follow the example of Christ and his apostles rather than the wisdom of modern criticism. The exposition is a beautiful mosaic, in which are wrought the brightest and richest gems of thought and illustration, and joined and bedded in the soundest doctrine.

Vol. IX. covers all the books from Ezekiel to Malachi. Here the conservatism of the compiler emerges more clearly than ever; for while he does not hesitate to present, and fairly present, the theories of the advanced criticism, he as fairly refutes them, and shows the preponderance, in numbers, quality of judgment, spirit and method, and result, of the conservative school. Especially in the introduction to Daniel will the reader find a full, careful study of the issue joined between the two schools.

The volume on the Gospels gives us the four Gospels consolidated in a single

narrative. It is also embellished with many illustrations, maps and diagrams. The introductory sections enter fully into the subject of the relations of the four Gospels, their distinctive characteristics, etc., the views of Wescott, Bernard, and especially Gregory being largely presented. Of the practicability of making a single narrative out of four accounts possessed of such different characteristics, we have serious doubts; but the compiler's efforts in this direction have been unusually successful and happy. His purpose and the scope of the work do not admit of the discussion of the mooted points in the chronology, or of many such questions as those of one blind man or two blind men at Jericho, the going out or the coming nigh to that city, the reference to the prophecy of Judas' betrayal money, etc.

To the student of God's word who wishes a commentary for homiletic purposes, and who would have the best thoughts of the best men and on the soundest lines, we heartily commend these rich compilations. In clearness and beauty of typography the volumes cannot be surpassed. It is a delight to read them. The most favorable terms are offered for the purchase of the entire series.

GEORGE SUMMEY.

IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE. *Edited by Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, LL. D.* THE BOOK OF NUMBERS. *By Robert A. Watson, M. A., D. D., Author of "Gospels of Yesterday," "Judges and Ruth," "The Book of Job," "In the Apostolic Age," etc.* CROWN 8vo, pp. viii., 414. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1894. THE PSALMS. *By Alexander Maclaren, D. D.* Vol. III. Psalms xc.-cl. Crown 8vo, pp. viii., 461. \$1.50. The same publishers.

In these volumes the same general method is pursued as in others of the series. In the work on the Book of Numbers the author devotes but little attention to critical matters. He is careful to show, however, and that most plainly, that the religious observances and priestly ministrations set forth in the Mosaic books were necessities to the proper development of Israel, and not a development out of Israel's growth. He accepts the idea that the basis of the book was contemporary records of incidents and traditions early committed to writing, and admits a recension of these ancient documents by some unknown hand or hands. He dismisses the discussion of the date of the "compilation" as of little moment, accepting, however, the antiquity of the original records and enactments, and holding that the main legislation of the Pentateuch must have existed in the time of Josiah, and even then possessed the authority of ancient observance; and maintaining, further, that many of the features of the Levitical code can be traced back beyond the time of David, even independently of the testimony of the Books of Moses. He earnestly contends for the reality and literalness of the record throughout.

To this third volume on the Psalms we need only repeat the commendation given to the two volumes which have preceded it, and which came from the same hands. Dr. Maclaren's ability as an expositor, and the richness and suggestiveness of his writings, are as manifest here as elsewhere.

THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCORDANCE TO THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. *By Rev. J. B. R. Walker.* With an Introduction by M. C. Hazard, Ph. D. Pp. 922. \$2.00. Boston and Chicago: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society. 1894.

The features of this concordance are: that it is a concordance simply, and not a commentary nor a dictionary; that it is rigidly alphabetical in its arrangement; that it gives the references in their strict biblical order; that proper names and appellations are found in the body of the work, instead of being placed by themselves; that proper names are accented; that irrelevant and needless matters, as references to unimportant words, are omitted; that the type is clear and distinct, the volume a compact and handy one, and the price for it most moderate. A careful examination of the volume shows that these claims are all well sustained. The Introduction contains a concise, but interesting and scholarly, treatise on the bibliography of the subject.

THE PARCHMENTS OF THE FAITH. *By Rev. Geo. E. Merrill.* 12mo. Pp. 288. Price, \$1.25. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1420 Chestnut street.

In a singularly luminous and direct style Mr. Merrill tells us of the manuscripts of the Old and New Testaments from which our present perfect copies of the Scriptures are made. We read in his pages of the industrious work of the Massoretes, those indefatigable copyists and editors of the Old Testament MSS., of the formation of the Septuagint, of the origin of the Samaritan Pentateuch and of the different versions of the Old Testament. He also gives a very interesting account of the finding of the great Sinaitic Codex by Tischendorf at the monastery of St. Catherine.

His work on the New Testament is equally full and satisfactory. All the different MSS. of any importance are spoken of, and their influence on the present text of the Scripture indicated. The work is also quite full, and is scholarly as to the scope and nature of textual criticism, and in all respects is one which any student of the Bible desiring the fullest and freshest information as to its sources will want to possess.

Mr. Merrill is fully qualified for this work, having given attention for years to this branch of study. A few years since he issued a book entitled *The Story of the Manuscripts*. The present work, however, is entirely new, and presents all information respecting the manuscripts of the two Testaments up to the present date. The book contains *fac-similes* of some of the famous codices of the New Testament, which greatly add to its interest. It forms a splendid companion treatise to Professor Pattison's *History of the English Bible*, and is the pioneer along the line which that follows. Together they give a better and more intelligent treatment of the sources of knowledge and the various processes by which we have our present Bible than can be found in any other equally concise treatises. The publishers have given the book a unique and attractive dress, and in all respects it is one which should attain a very large circulation.

OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMA. *By Dr. Adolph Harnack.* Translated by Edwin Knox Mitchell, M. A. Funk & Wagnalls. New York. 1893.

This volume is from the pen of the distinguished Professor of Church History in the University of Berlin. He is the great historian of the Ritschlian school, and, perhaps, the most widely known living representative of this influential type of theologizing. Many accounts of his power and magnetism as a teacher, with the eager hundreds of students who throng his classes, have been published on this side of the water, and have intensified the desire of the American public to become acquainted with him through the printed page. Prof. Mitchell has met this demand by his translation, which seems to be a good one, though the abstruseness of the thought, and the involved style of the original, have prevented him from making a very readable volume.

The fundamental thesis of Harnack's book is found in the statement that "dogmatic Christianity (the dogmas) in its conception and in its construction was the work of the Hellenic spirit upon the gospel soil." He supports this proposition under four principal divisions :

I. The Origin of Dogma. II. The Development of Dogma in accordance

with the Principles of its Original Conception, *i. e.*, the Oriental Development from Arianism to the Image Controversy. III. The Occidental Development of Dogma under the Influence of Augustine's Christianity and the Roman Papal Politics. IV. The Threefold issuing of Dogma in the Churches of the Reformation, in Tridentine Catholicism and in the Criticism of the Rationalistic Age.

He who follows the author over this course thus mapped out will be convinced of his ability, scholarship and enthusiastic spirit, but will see signs also of that sophistry and special pleading by which the author, in common with the entire Ritschlian school, endeavors to accomplish the impossible task of forcing the church from dogmatic Christianity. We find nothing new in these pages, for the English public has already received an introduction to these same views, through the writings of Dr. Hatch and others, and especially through a recent volume, which in point of amplitude of intellectual grasp and breadth and depth of scholarship is superior in our judgment to Harnack's publication, *viz.*, Fairbairn's *Place of Christ in Modern Theology* (reviewed in the PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY, October, 1893), a work which we fear will exert a wide and injurious influence on English and American theology.

Certainly the English student who desires to become acquainted with the genius of Ritschlianism can do so far better through the abler volume of Fairbairn than through Harnack's *History of Dogma*. The American church must reckon with this type of theology (or rather no-theology). Prof. McGiffert, at Union, New York, Prof. Thatcher of the University of Chicago, the *Kingdom* with its corps of able editors, including Geo. D. Herron, Thos. C. Hall (son of Dr. John Hall), B. Fay Mills and others, are introducing the new rationalism of Ritschl into the various churches of our American Christianity. It is time that all the churches should take account of these facts and awake to the gravity of the issues involved. For a good refutation of this later phase of rationalism we refer the reader to the excellent articles of Dr. Warfield now appearing in this review.

THE MINISTRY OF THE SPIRIT. *By Rev. A. J. Gordon, D. D.* 12mo, 225 pp. Price, \$1.00. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1420 Chestnut Street. 1895.

A melancholy interest attaches to this work in the fact that it had scarcely appeared before the public when the distinguished author's death was announced. At the same time, however, it was fitting that the closing effort of so useful and helpful and spiritual a life should be the gift to the world of a treatise on the Ministry of the Spirit.

The purpose of the book is to consider the subject, not in the relations of the Holy Spirit before or after his time-ministry, but in his office and work as the Paraclete now present in the church, under whose dispensation we are living. "The Ministry of the Spirit" refers to the work of the Comforter from Pentecost to the end of this dispensation. The several chapters deal with the subject of the Spirit's advent; his names; his indument in sealing, filling, anointing; the communion of the Spirit in regeneration, sanctification, transfiguration; the administration of the Spirit in the ministry, government, worship, service, and missionary enterprise of the church; the inspiration of the Spirit in his giving us an infallible, verbally-inspired word; the conviction of the Spirit. In that portion of

the work dealing with the Spirit's relation to the believer's sanctification, the author, while repudiating the doctrine of "instantaneous sanctification," as the term is popularly understood, endorses the idea that it is possible for one to experience a great crisis in his spiritual life, in which there is a total self-surrender to God, and such an infilling of the Holy Ghost that he is freed from the bondage of sinful appetites and habits, and is enabled to have constant victory over self, instead of suffering constant defeat. We confess that we can see but little practical difference between this doctrine and the most pronounced "sinless-perfection" notion, and it is obnoxious to all that lies against the last-named delusion of the devil. It has been our observation, from careful investigation and analysis of the condition of the claimants to this "self-surrender" fiction, that most of them are insufferable in their spiritual pride; that they read their own views into God's word, and lay upon the Spirit the responsibility for vagaries of life and doctrine without number. While thus excepting certain views of our author, however, we must express our profound conviction of the value of such treatises, and our rejoicing in the fact that enlarged attention seems to be paid by the church and her writers to the office and mission of the Holy Spirit. That rich volume which recently came from the pen of one of our own accomplished teachers, followed by this, indicates that the church inclines to magnify the gift of the Holy Ghost.

THE ARGUMENT FOR CHRISTIANITY. *By Rev. George C. Lorimer, D. D.* 12mo, 480 pp. Price, \$2.00. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1420 Chestnut Street. 1894.

This contribution to apologetics is characterized by the direct, forcible style for which Dr. Lorimer is well known, and, while dealing with an old theme, presents it in new light and freshness. The argument for Christianity is drawn from history, Christ, testimony, miracles, prophecy, humanity, achievement, concession, comparison. Rightly regarding the present attack of Christ's enemies as being directly against the supernatural, and their present aim as one to disprove the possibility of revealed religion by discrediting the supernatural, in this including those who would impair the trustworthiness of the sacred documents in which the history of revealed religion is recorded, the author makes the chief object of his book the support of the doctrine of the faith as supernatural in its origin, and as revealing a supernatural redemption, of which Jesus Christ is the soul and the source. Without going into the details of the book, we heartily commend it as a faithful, learned, and striking exposition of the truth.

IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE REASONABLENESS OF THE DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY. *By Professor E. Schultz.* 12mo. Pp. 264. \$1.25. Published for the author. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. 1892.

This book is the author's answer to the question, "What shall we believe?" It shows, first, that man has to believe something, and traces the efforts which have been made to evade this. Man is responsible. There is a consciousness distinct and different from the tangible world about him. What is it, whence comes it, whither does it go, what will be its condition? These are the questions which one cannot escape. The author shows that neither experience, logic, systems, definitions, explanations, deductions nor inductions can be relied upon to

guide one without fail in his judgment as to what is natural and what is supernatural. A supernaturally inspired faith is the only criterion; it only can remove the mountains and gulfs which reason only sees and measures. From this standpoint the author then proceeds to show the reasonableness of the personality of God, of the Trinity, of man's sin and accountability, of the necessity for a change of heart, of the person and work of Christ, of the necessity of atonement, of the union of Christ and believers, of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. These points are all fully elaborated and set in the light of both reason and revelation. The style is oftentimes vague, and the points not sharply and clearly brought out, but the spirit in which the chapters are written is admirable. The book will be heavy reading to any but those who are specially interested or who are inquiring along just the lines followed by the author.

ANTI-HIGHER CRITICISM; or, Testimony to the Infallibility of the Bible. *By Professor Howard Osgood, D. D., LL. D.; President W. Henry Green, D. D., LL. D., and others. Edited and compiled by Rev. L. W. Munhall, M. A., author of "Furnishing for Workers," etc.* Cr. 8vo. Pp. 354. \$1.50. New York: Hunt & Eaton. 1894.

This volume embodies the addresses delivered before the Sixth Annual Interdenominational Seaside Bible Conference, at Asbury Park, August, 1893. By previous arrangement on the part of the president of the Conference, Mr. Munhall, all the papers of that year's Conference were directed against the assaults made in recent years upon the integrity of the Bible. The result manifests the arrogance of those who think that all the scholarship of the day is on the side of the rationalistic criticism. The papers of Dr. Osgood on "Learned Doubt and the Living Word," by Dr. Green on the "Unity of the Pentateuch" and the "Mosaic Origin of the Pentateuch," by Dr. Chambers on the "The Book of Psalms," by Dr. Bishop on "The Book of Daniel—Its Authorship, Integrity and Structure," are of special value. The volume should be widely circulated.

ELEMENTS OF RELIGION. *By Henry Eyster Jacobs, D. D., LL. D., Norton Professor of Systematic Theology in the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia.* Philadelphia: G. W. Frederick. 1894.

A Lutheran work, and therefore presenting that church's views, especially as to the church and the sacraments. The book is a faithful and successful effort to present the round of theological truth to untheologically educated people. It is therefore written in untechnical language, as far as possible. It presents the elements of religion under the five heads of the Prerequisites of Redemption, the Preparation for Redemption, the Application of Redemption, the Effects of Redemption, and the Administration of Redemption.

PROTESTANT MISSIONS—Their Rise and Early Progress. *By A. C. Thompson, author of "Moravian Missions," etc.* 12mo, pp. viii., 314. \$1.75. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1894.

The secondary title describes the real purpose of this work. It is a collection of lectures delivered to the Hartford Theological Seminary on the Rise and Early Progress of Protestant Missions. The lectures begin with the Reformation epoch,

or, strictly speaking, at the close of its first period, when, as early as 1535, or within about fifty years of its discovery, Brazil received its first missionary force, through the intercession of the French Admiral de Villegagnon, and the activity of John Calvin, to whom he wrote. Thence, tracing the early Dutch Mission, English movements, Eliot's Mission to the Indians, and other movements down to the Moravian Missions of the eighteenth century, he shows that the prevailing idea that modern missions took their rise near the close of the last century is incorrect and historically misleading. Taken with the author's other works, *Foreign Missions*, and *Moravian Missions*, this volume is of special value as one of a series which we trust he will complete. In itself it sheds much and valuable light upon a time and work of which most of us are painfully ignorant.

THE STUDENT MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE. Addresses and Discussions of the Second International Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Held at Detroit, Mich., Feb. 28, to March 4, 1894. *Edited by Maxwood Moorhead.* Royal 8vo, pp. xx. 373. \$1.50. New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1894.

The sub-title declares fully the nature of this volume. The record of a meeting of more than a thousand chosen students, full of missionary zeal, and representing nearly three hundred institutions of learning, it is well worthy of preservation. In addition to the account of the convention, the volume also contains the record of various sectional conferences, as the Educational, the Medical, Woman's Work, conferences on special fields, as China, Japan and Corea, Africa, etc.

PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS. *By Grover Pease Osborne.* Robert Clarke & Co. Cincinnati. 1893.

This is an attempt at a construction of economic science from an entirely new standpoint. Instead of the usual definition of political economy, our author treats of it as the science which is concerned with the satisfaction of human wants, so far as this satisfaction depends on material resources. The definition is original, and the treatment of the subject is equally so. In fact, three things are undoubtedly true of this volume, first, its ability; second, the force and beauty of its style; third, its unquestioned originality. In fact, our chief criticism rests upon this third point. Our author seems to have cut loose from all preceding economists and all economic schools, and to have wrought out a new system for himself. We have found but five economic writers referred to in our examination of his book: Adam Smith, Malthus, John Stuart Mill, Henry George and Edward Belamy. Political economy like any other science has its history, and no man can advance the territory of his chosen science save by building upon the work of other laborers in the same field. The weakness of Mr. Osborne's volume, in our judgment, is that it so largely ignores all preceding and even all present schools of economic thought. We wish to say, however, that he is an able, interesting and striking writer, who has much to say worthy of attention and thought in this original and admirably written volume.

TRAVELS IN THREE CONTINENTS, EUROPE, AFRICA, ASIA. *By J. M. Buckley, LL. D.* 8vo. Pp. xviii, 614. \$3.50. New York: Hunt and Eaton. 1894.

A volume made up of all that an entertaining account of travel, clear description of places visited, natural weaving in of history and art, profuse and ele-

gant illustrations, and charming letter press, on choicest paper and in fairest binding, can contribute, is this splendid specimen of work from our Methodist friends' great publishing house. The volume is a huge one, but we could not leave it until we had at least cursorily read every page as we followed the author's journey from place to place. In vigorous style, and with rare descriptive powers, he transports the reader with him everywhere and gives him a clearer, brighter view of foreign lands than the vast majority of those who think that because they have crossed the seas they must write a book. The illustrations, most of them full page, and nearly one hundred in number, are of the highest type of art. The volume is worthy a place in every well appointed library and home.

RAGWEED. *A West-World Story.* By *Julia McNair Wright.* 12mo. Pp. 317. \$1.25. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-School Work. 1894.

JACOB'S HEIRESS. By *Annette L. Noble, Author of "The Ryhoves of Antwerp," "The Professor's Girls," etc.* 12mo. Pp. 310. \$1.25. *The same Publishers.*

These are two pure, beautiful, interesting stories for our young people. The best proof of this statement is that an earnest and loving Christian mother who has taken possession of them tells us that she has found it to be true; and that they are interesting is evinced by the fact that the same mother has been besought to read them over and over again aloud to the same listeners. Mrs. Wright's books, especially for young people, are always charming and wholesome. These volumes are daintily bound and will delight the eye by the clearness and beauty of their typography.

BROKEN BREAD FOR SERVING DISCIPLES. By *Mr. and Mrs. George C. Needham.* 12mo. Pp. 224. \$1.00. New York, Chicago, and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1894.

This volume, in most tasteful binding and handsomely printed, contains thirty-six short discussions or outlines of Scripture topics, such as The Bread of God, The Nativity, Christ Our Life, The Christian Soldier, The Christian Armor, Flesh and Spirit, The Shepherd Psalm, The Wonders of Grace, etc. The discourses are clear, suggestive and helpful, but here and there show a lack of that precision which should characterize an interpreter of the word, especially in dealing with such terms as imputation, justification, etc. Like other books of its class, unfortunately too numerous of late, this volume will prove a sore temptation to the idle preacher, but a valuable helper to one who will think and work for himself. For "laymen's" use, in conducting services in the absence of the pastor and such uses, it is of the best.

DAISY. By *Marshall Saunders, author of "Beautiful Joe."* 16mo. Pp. 57. Price, 75 cts. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1420 Chestnut street.

This is a very sweet little story, and one that will be read by the older folks as well as by the children. Daisy is thoroughly original, and in herself, no less than in her romantic attachment to the young man Robertson, cannot fail to

attract. The strain of temperance teaching woven in and the final outcome of the struggle between a pure emotion and a low passion is full of instruction. The final enthronement of Daisy in the home of Roland, which is foreshadowed, the conversion of the somewhat neglected wild flower into the cherished house plant, seems the appropriate ending. Miss Saunders has written a charming little household idyl, and the publishers have put it into a beautiful dress.

TONY.—The Story of a Waif. *By Laisdell Mitchell.* 16mo. Pp. 58. Price, 75 cts. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1894.

As dainty a book for children as we have ever seen, in cover, illustration, and print. In its entire make-up it is a companion book to that last noticed, and with it will make a delightful pair for holiday gifts.

“The Progress of the World” in the March *Review of Reviews* is a chapter of running comment on the important events of the past month. These are some of the topics treated: The Loss of the *Elbe* and the Safety of Ocean Travel, The New Government Loan, The Incapacity of Congress, The Future of Gold Production, American Confidence, Engineers and Public Works, Our Governmental Architecture, Decorative Art in the Boston Public Library, New York City’s New Administration, The Brooklyn Street Railway Strike, Japan’s Recent Victories, The Trial of the Hawaiian Conspirators, President Cleveland’s Arbitration Between Brazil and the Argentine Republic, British Politics, London Council Elections, French Affairs, The Late M. de Giers of Russia, Crispi and the King of Italy, George Peabody’s Anniversary, and the great names on the month’s necrology roll. There are portraits of Capt. von Goessel, of the *Elbe*; Capt. Baudelon, of *La Gascogne*; August Belmont and Lord Rothschild, Dr. George S. Morrison, president of the American Society of Civil Engineers; Col. Craighill, of the Army Engineers; Mr. E. A. Abbey, the mural designer for the Boston Public Library; Col. Waring, of New York; the late Marshal Canrobert, M. Ribot, the late M. de Giers, the Rev. Dr. A. J. Gordon, the Rev. Dr. Henry M. Taylor, Prof. J. R. Seeley, Dr. Alfred L. Loomis, and the late Douglas Putnam, of Marietta, Ohio. Illustrations are given of the city halls of Vienna and Philadelphia (by way of contrast), the new Boston Public Library, the Putnam House at Rutland, Mass., and other interesting buildings.

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I. PRIMEVAL MAN.

DURING recent years the science of anthropology has made notable progress. Some workers in this field have been careful and conservative; others, perhaps, have been hasty and heedless. In certain quarters far-reaching conclusions are confidently announced, and but little regard is paid to what the sacred Scriptures have to say about some of its topics.

Great diversity of opinion has also been expressed in regard to some of the great questions with which anthropology is concerned. In reference to the length of time man has been upon the earth, as to whether there were races of men prior to the time of Adam, in regard to the relation of man to some brute species, and concerning man's actual primitive state, opinions differ widely. Some of these opinions, as set forth in recent books and periodicals, are evidently inimical to certain plain statements of Scripture. Hence, the theologian has important interests at stake on this field.

Of these questions, perhaps that of man's primeval condition is of greatest moment at the present day to the theologian in the light of modern science, and the purpose of this article is to discuss some of the problems raised by the inquiry concerning man's primitive status and endowments. In itself this inquiry is of absorbing interest; but its importance is greatly enhanced when we consider the fact that the conclusions to which we may be led by this inquiry will largely determine our opinions regarding the other questions just named. For if it be made out that man was at first a rude, untutored savage, it will be easy to establish his

great antiquity, and it would not seem so hopeless a task to prove his genetic connection with some lower animal form. But if it be shown that primitive savagism is not the true view to take of the earliest periods of human history, then it becomes exceedingly difficult to render even plausible some scientific theories concerning these other topics already mentioned.

The inquiry, then, is, What was man's primeval state and endowment? What was his general mental and moral status at his first appearance on the earth? How should we regard his religious attainments in the very early stages of his existence? Was he a rude, unlettered, and unthinking savage or barbarian, devoid of even the rudiments of mental, moral, and religious life, or was he possessed of such attainments in these respects as found expression in a suitable primitive civilization? Must we adopt the views of Lubbock, Spencer, Tylor, and a host of others who assure us quite confidently that primitive savagism was man's original state, and that his upward progress from this low barbaric condition has been slowly effected in a purely naturalistic way? Or, have we good reasons, even on the side of science, for holding that man at the first was neither a rude barbarian nor an untutored savage, but that he was already a religious being fully endowed, and fairly well civilized? That an affirmative answer may be given to these questions will be the attempt of this article to justify.

At the outset a few things should be set down regarding the teaching of the Scriptures upon this subject. It is to be observed that this teaching is not adduced at this point to prove any theory as to man's primitive state; but it is presented simply as a matter of fact. It is assumed that the biblical narratives are historical and not mythological in their nature. These narratives, especially in the Book of Genesis, have something to say about man's early state, and it is proper to keep these utterances before us at the outset. Even if we do not take into account at all the inspiration of the biblical narratives, still, the general view which they present of primeval man cannot be disregarded in the study of this question.

In general, the impartial reader of Genesis must admit that the very first men there described possessed a good degree of intelli-

gence, and were capable of religious communion with God. The account of Adam in Paradise clearly proves this, and the offerings of Cain and Abel after the expulsion from the Garden in Eden confirms the same view. The narrative concerning Noah implies that he was surely no untutored savage, and that he evidently had even more than the rudiments of religion. Moreover, the sad state of the antediluvians was due to a lamentable moral degradation, which in itself implies a previous better state from which they had declined. The picture of the patriarchal ages after Noah, given in Genesis, exhibits the same general view of man's early state, and no fair reading of this account can justify any other verdict than that man was made in the image of God, was under conscious moral relations to his Maker, and possessed a goodly degree of mental, moral, and religious culture. By this it is not meant that man was then civilized in the sense which we now understand by that term. It is simply meant that his status in all essential respects was far above that of savage peoples, either ancient or modern.

A little reflection upon some simple facts noted in Genesis will greatly confirm this view. It is said that Cain tilled the field and Abel tended the flock. Both of these occupations denote a stage of human progress in advance of pure barbarism. The sons of Cain originated several mechanical arts. Thus tents, harps, organs, brass and iron, are all alluded to in a way which implies a measure of civilization quite removed from savagery. In Noah's day the building of the ark implied considerable skill in several trades not known among barbarians. The tower of Babel and the city built by Nimrod point to the same conclusion. There is no possible way to evade this verdict unless we look upon the Scripture narratives as myths, or hold that there were pre-Adamic races of which the Bible knows nothing.

This brief outline of the contents of the biblical narrative bearing upon man's early condition enables us to state clearly the real point at issue in this discussion. It is simply this: Did man begin his career in the world in a condition of ignorant barbarism or savage paganism, or was he from the first endowed with those essential elements of his nature which belong to a condition of

culture and comparative civilization? The debate upon this question assumes special importance at the present day from the fact that several anthropologists of note both in Britain and Germany, are pressing upon the scholarly world the view that man began his career in a very low state, that he was at first but little removed, and perhaps derived, from the brute, that he was in his early career as rude as modern savages, and that he only by slow degrees and by natural means acquired his culture. The main object of this article is to examine fairly and candidly some of the reasonings by which this view is supported, and to adduce some facts and arguments which may justify the contrary opinion. We first examine the reasonings in support of primeval savagism.

In the first place, we consider those radical theories in regard to man's primitive state which connect him wholly or in part with the lower animals. It is clear that all of these theories, if consistent, must maintain primeval savagism to have been man's first estate. If man has come by natural descent or ascent from the brute, then his first state could only be slightly removed from the brutal. For a long time the differences between man and his animal ancestors could not have been very marked.

This theory of natural descent for man, carrying with it primitive savagism, is set forth in various ways by the advocates of organic or biological evolution. Herbert Spencer seeks to find the principle of continuity in nature unbroken from the primitive homogeneous up to the highest type of civilized man. Wallace, and perhaps Huxley, confine the theory chiefly to the sphere of biology, and conclude that man's body is from the brute but his higher nature must come from another source. Romanes, and perhaps Darwin, seeks to bring man entirely under the scope of organic evolution. Drummond, in his last book, seems to take almost the same extreme position. These, and hosts of others who find man wholly or partly the product of mere natural organic evolution, are bound to hold that primitive, rude savagism marked his early stages. We cannot, therefore, allow the evolutionary origin of man to be assumed without careful scrutiny. This being the case, a few obvious things must be seriously considered.

If the hypothesis of continuity in nature be assumed, and

natural organic evolution be posited as the mode, if not the cause, of the upward, onward progress towards man, then several yawning chasms, yet unbridged, appear: First, the chasm between the inorganic and organic forms of existence must remain unbridged till spontaneous generation is proved, either as a fact now, or as having actually taken place long ago. Then the breaks between the vegetal and animal kingdoms, between the brute and man, between the physical and mental in man, and between the mental, moral, and religious in mankind are still impassible. Not only are the bridges not built, but the materials are not yet on the ground to construct the bridges. If, therefore, organic evolution be but an unproved hypothesis in regard to man's origin, it affords a very insecure basis upon which to rest a theory of his original state.

To confirm more fully what has just been stated, it is worth while noting some things that are ignored by those reasonings which seek to establish a genetic connection between different biological species, and especially between the highest animal and man. The evident fixity of species is, at least, ignored, and a purely artificial view taken of biological species. The radical differences between natural and artificial selection are also overlooked. Due regard is not paid to the fact that, when domestic birds or beasts are turned out into the state of nature, the tendency is to return to the original type. The fact seems to be forgotten that no really new species, but only varieties, have ever been produced by the hand and skill of man. The unyielding facts of hybridism and infertility between distinct species are admitted, even by Huxley, to be inexplicable by this theory. The transitional forms by which the passage has been made from one species to another are not found, either now existing, or in fossil form in the record of the rocks. Rudimentary or nascent organs, together with the facts of atavism, or reversion to type, hinder rather than help the theory. Widely differing forms of living things, and the world of invisible life revealed by the microscope, are left unexplained in their genetic relations. There are facts in embryology and in the geological record which are not accounted for by this theory; and, above all, the theory can, at best, but

describe processes, and is never able to provide causal efficiency.

In the light of all this, we are surely justified in concluding that, if it has not yet been proved that organic evolution alone can account for the origin of new species, still less can it explain the genesis of man, and prove his origin to be from some brute form; and, if the theory has not been proved as to man's bodily organism, still less can it show that his intelligence is developed from animal instinct; and, when the higher facts of man's moral and religious nature are considered, the utter inadequacy of organic evolution to explain these is self-evident.

If, therefore, the theory of evolution be, at best, an unverified, and, perhaps, an unverifiable, hypothesis, it can never afford a solid basis upon which to advocate primeval savagism as to man's early condition. This consideration leaves without any stable foundation many reasonings in favor of the early barbaric condition of the human race.

In the second place, the pre-Adamite hypothesis is used to establish the low and savage state of man in his first stages of existence. In general, this theory argues that all existing races of men have not descended from Adam, or even from Noah; that the dark-skinned races especially are not Adamic. It claims that the time from the biblical Adam is too short to have secured the wide dispersion of the races which we find in early ages. Adam, it maintains, was not the first man, for there were men on the earth before his time, and from among these Cain got his wife. Some further contend that Adam was the first white man, and the father only of the white races; and some of the advocates of this theory, as, for example, Winchell, discover, as they think, the cradle of the human family in a continent named Lemuria, now submerged in the Indian Ocean.

This theory, it is claimed, explains facts which cannot be explained otherwise, and from this theory it is argued that primeval savagism was man's first estate among the early pre-Adamic races. We are told that what the Bible says has reference to Adam and his descendants alone, and that they were, no doubt, intelligent, religious, and to a degree civilized. But in the case

of the pre-Adamites, there must have been a long period of low barbarism, from which, by a slow and difficult process, they by degrees emerged. In this way the whole theory is made very plausible, and is even said to explain some things in the Bible better than the other view. Quite recently a minister of the gospel in this country published a book on Anthropology, in which this view is advocated and made the basis of a plea not to send the gospel to these pre-Adamic peoples, for they were not concerned in Adam's sin, and have no need of the gospel, and are not even included in the command to preach it to all men.

No thorough examination is here possible, so that only a few things are mentioned. It is, at best, an hypothesis built on hypotheses, and has neither history nor tradition in its favor. It assumes that race-distribution is not possible in the Adamic period, and in this even Darwin is against the theory. It assumes, without proof, that the deluge was partial, even so far as the races of men are concerned. The submerged continent is a mere creature of an excited fancy. To suppose that Adam was the first white man is not to speak sober sense, and to provide a wife for Cain is scarcely sufficient to support such a theory. Then, too, the unity of the human races, as taught in Scripture and as confirmed by science, is a refutation of pre-Adamitism. It need only be added that, if so many men belong to another race, or set of races, it is strange that, as we trace back the streams of history, of tradition, of language, and of religion, these streams seem to converge towards one common source. These things tell forcibly against pre-Adamitism, and against the diversity of origin implied therein, so that we feel justified in removing it from the list of proofs for primeval savagism.

In the third place, various forms of reasoning, based on certain facts, and used to prove man's early savage state, will be considered. In some cases the facts now to be adduced are taken first to prove man's great antiquity, and, by implication, to establish his primitive imperfection in culture. As a matter of fact, it is not easy to keep the questions of antiquity and of his primitive condition entirely separate. If his high antiquity be proved, then more time is afforded for him to rise from his first savage state.

This enables the advocate of primitive barbarism to render his views more plausible. Then, on the other hand, if primeval savagism be established, high antiquity is indirectly confirmed, so that these questions run into each other, though they should be kept apart in our discussion of them.

The first class of facts here adduced by the advocates of the theory now under review consists in the remains of various sorts of implements and utensils made and used by men long years ago. These are usually termed archæological human remains. No full account of them can possibly be given in this article. A few descriptive outlines may suffice to exhibit the general character of these remains.

The most abundant of these remains consist in different sorts of flint and stone implements. These are of great diversity in size and shape, and they were evidently used for various purposes. They are found in almost every country, but especially in Europe and America. Among these are also many fragments of pottery, sun-dried or fire-baked, and not a few bones are to be included also. These remains consist of arrows, hammers, scrapes, axes, spear-heads, clubs, awls, pots, pins, needles, in endless variety. They seem to have been used as implements, utensils, weapons, and ornaments.

Many of these remains are found about the lakes of Switzerland, Ireland, and other places in Europe. The lake dwellings on the shores of these lakes have supplied many of the remains of which we are now speaking; and the refuse heaps of Holland have yielded many similar relics. From peat-bogs, in many places in Europe, like remains have been brought to light. The Indian mounds of America, and alluvial and drift deposits, are also interesting sources of the remains now under consideration.

From the nature and apparent uses of these remains, it has been concluded by many observers that the men who made and used them must have been in a very primitive condition of culture: At the same time, it is quietly assumed that these rude, untutored men were the first or earliest men. In some cases writers grow quite eloquent in their descriptions of man's early career in this state. Eking out a precarious existence, contending with the

stubborn elements of nature, and fighting with the wild beasts of the forest, the rude, half-naked, early man is minutely described in a vivid way. He had no knowledge of the arts of life, his moral nature had scarcely taken form at all, and his religious sentiments were not even awakened. He was simply a rude savage, little better than the wild beasts with which he so often had to contend. What shall we say to these reasonings?

First, it must be shown that the races of men from whom these remains came were connected with the first members of the human species at its original centre of dispersion. Sufficient evidence must be presented to justify the belief that the races of Europe and America, whose status of culture is represented by these relics, are to be connected with the first men. And further, it must be made clear that the culture of the races which have left behind these remains is the exact counterpart of the civilization of primitive man. Unless these things are done, no assured conclusion can be drawn from these remains regarding the actual culture of the human species in its earliest stages. If, for example, about 1500 B. C., Egypt, Chaldea, Phœnicia, and perhaps India and China, were far in advance of the rude peoples who were then in Europe in mental and moral culture, some explanation of the difference must be given. Have both come from a common stage of culture or savagism, marked by progress in the one case and decline in the other? That there has been no real decline in the case of the lower, and real progress in the case of the higher, must be established by the advocates of primitive savagism. Moreover, we find really no such rude remains of human art in Egypt and Chaldea similar to those found in Europe. The chief remains which recent research is bringing to light in oriental lands indicate an early civilization of comparatively high order, and this fact tells against early barbarism, at least at those early scenes of human habitation. Migration from these oldest scenes of man's abode, and decay in culture, together afford a natural explanation of the culture represented by the remains found in Europe and America.

Secondly, the doctrine of *autochthony* must be proved before these archæological remains can be taken to prove primitive

savagism. This doctrine asserts in general that the races now found on the different continents are indigenous to their several localities, and that no general migration has ever taken place. The men of early Europe were always there, and so with the aborigines of Africa and America. Men in these several regions began and developed their career in the countries where they are now found. Now, it is evident that this theory must be proved in order to establish primitive barbarism, for it may be that these very remains in Europe are the product not of the first men there, but of men who came there, and whose original culture in the lands whence they came was formerly very much higher. Autochthony, then, must be proved, and many scientists are unwilling to accept it as true. At this point, and in very many instances in this discussion, the utmost care is necessary to make sure of the facts, and equal caution is needed not to make our conclusions wider than our facts. We fear that not a few anthropologists of some repute forget this. When we find Tylor stating that the negroes at Savannah, Ga., are exempt from yellow fever, and that the French in Canada are dying out, we surely have our faith in the accuracy of such a writer greatly shaken, for neither of these statements is correct.

A second general class of facts used to prove primeval savagism consists in fossil human remains. By fossils we mean either actual human remains or petrefactions of the same. Here we find many interesting facts. Human skeletons entire, or almost entire, skulls and scattered bones of men who lived long ago, have been found in many places. Skeletons from the caves and shelters of Canstadt, Cro-Magnon and Furfooz, and skulls from Eugis and Neanderthal, have been carefully examined and fully described. Fossil men, or parts thereof, have been found in limestone rocks and coral reefs, in alluvial and drift deposits, and under lava beds.

From these skeletons, skulls, and bones, it is argued that the men represented by them were rude and uncultured. It is claimed that since these human remains are found in caves that seem to have been used as dwellings, they must represent men whose condition was quite rude. This conclusion, it is said, is

confirmed by the fact that the remains of extinct animals, together with rude stone implements, are found beside the human remains.

In estimating the bearing of these fossil human remains on man's primitive state, what was stated in regard to archæological remains has force. Autochthony must be proved, or the relation of the cave men to the original centres of distribution must be shown, before any solid conclusions in favor of primeval savagism can be made. In addition, it need only be remarked that so far as these skulls and skeletons are concerned, there is no proof of the savage or barbaric condition of the men they represent. These fossil remains are usually well developed, and but little different from the skeletons and skulls of existing civilized races. The Eugis skull may have been "that of a savage or a philosopher," while the Neanderthal skull is generally supposed to have been abnormal, but not more so than that of many idiots at the present day. The same is true of the cave men of Caustadt, Cro-Magnon and other places. None of these skeletons are radically different from existing races in Europe. This being the case, no evidence is provided by these fossil men, whatever their antiquity may have been, in favor of primeval savagism. In addition, it may not be forgotten that the men represented by these fossil remains may have lived long centuries after the origin of the human species, and if this be the case, then still less do these cave remains prove anything in regard to man's primitive condition of culture or savagism as the case may be.

A third set of facts, not, indeed, entirely different from some of those mentioned already, remains to be briefly considered. This brings before us the theory of the *archæological ages*, which are supposed to have successively appeared in pre-historic periods of the human race. According to this theory, as expounded by Lubbock, Lartet, Tylor, and others, there are certain periods of human culture wherein the earliest was the rudest. The facts upon which this theory is founded consist in different kinds of implements used by men in successive ages. The ages named are sometimes three—the stone, the bronze, and the iron ages respectively. Lubbock mentions four ages—palæolithic, neo-

lithic, the bronze and iron ages. Lartet makes five ages—the drift, the glacial, the neolithic, the bronze, and iron ages. In each case the distinction of the ages is based upon the kind of utensils, weapons, and implements men seem to have used during these successive ages. Some advocates of this theory are able confidently to tell us how long each of these ages lasted, as, for example, Lubbock does. Others are more cautious and speak only in general terms. The point in the theory which bears upon the subject under discussion is, that the earliest in time was the rudest in form. Hence, when rude, unpolished stone implements are found to be earliest in any given place, they represent a rude degree of culture among the men of that early age and place. From this initial primitive barbarism and lack of culture men have by slow degrees been raised up till the dawn of history is reached.

A remark or two is all that is necessary to enable us to make a general estimate of the truth of this theory, and consequently of the strength of the inference for primeval savagism which is based upon it. The advocates of this theory do not claim for it, as a rule, universal application. Lubbock is careful to say that it applies chiefly to Europe, and Lartet and Tylor are ready to admit that these periods may not always be regularly successive. These admissions weaken the argument built upon the theory of the *ages* in favor of primeval savagism. History, too, tells against this theory, so far at least as its general application is concerned. These supposed ages are not historically successive in any large area, much less in regard to the race as a whole. Suppose that it was the stone age in Europe in 1000 B. C., at that date it was bronze and iron age in Egypt, Chaldea and Phœnicia, and in these countries there are few traces of the stone age itself. When America was discovered over four centuries ago, it had been bronze and iron age in Europe for centuries. Such being the case, no proof of man's primitive savagism can be found at this point. And, in addition, the whole theory of the ages is artificial and often arbitrary. It is freely admitted that men at various stages of their career used stone, bronze and iron implements, but that the use of these implements indicates everywhere a settled

order of human progress may be seriously questioned. The way in which these stone and other weapons are arranged in museums is often artificial and quite misleading. To place the rough and polished stones first in order, to be followed by the bronze and iron may be a very pretty sight to the eye, but unless this order reproduces the real order it has no scientific value. To put a flint arrow-head from America and one from the Somme Valley together simply because they are stone and shaped alike may be an ornamental arrangement, but it proves nothing more than that men at a certain time in a certain country used those weapons. It proves little about the successive ages of prehistoric culture, and still less does it establish primeval savagism.

Having thus far examined some of the main lines of reasoning used to prove man's primeval savagism, we proceed in the remainder of this article to exhibit some considerations which go far to establish the opposite conclusion concerning man's early estate. This is the second part of our task, as indicated at the outset of this paper.

In the first place, it is necessary to understand as precisely as we can what particular kind and degree of culture or civilization is to be connected with the status of man as he first appeared on the scene. This is no easy thing to do, owing to our exceedingly limited sources of information upon this subject. This being the case the temptation to indulge in flights of fancy is very great. As a matter of fact the Sacred Scriptures give us more definite and reliable information regarding man's early condition and endowments than is to be discovered anywhere else. Even unbelieving science is compelled to acknowledge that the biblical account of man's primitive state is the most ancient historical narrative bearing upon the question. The Book of Genesis, therefore, may be regarded as our most important source of information upon the subject now in hand. Secular history nowhere goes back to the cradle of the race, tradition may give some hints, but cannot afford clear proof, and the human remains already described in this article, always being of uncertain antiquity, can never speak with certain assurance regarding the actual state of the first men.

With the Scriptures as our main guide we frankly admit, on the negative side, that primitive man was not civilized in precisely the same sense as advanced modern nations are civilized. Modern civilization is complex and implies that knowledge of the various arts and sciences which the most progressive nations possess, and which is not entirely the product of any single age, but, in part at least, is a heritage from past ages. In maintaining man's early culture we do not undertake to show that Adam, Seth, Cain, Enoch, Noah, and the men of their time, were acquainted with the inventions and discoveries which make up so large a part of modern civilization. Nor do we maintain that society was then as definitely organized as now, or that social culture had become so complex as it is to-day. Still with all these admissions we are prepared to argue that man at first was not a barbarian, but was endowed with mental, moral, and religious qualities which place him far above the savage state.

On the positive side, we undertake to defend the view that man had from the beginning of his career substantially the same mental endowment, moral sentiments, and religious instincts which separate him so widely from the brute, and lift him above the savage. We are prepared to establish the position that man did not begin his history in a condition scarcely intellectual, and alike non-moral and non-religious. It is freely granted that from age to age man has, in some directions, been adding to his stores of knowledge, but it does not follow from this that man's first estate was rude, simple, barbaric or savage.

In the second place, it is worth while asking how far scientific research can really go in dealing with the question before us. This is important in itself, and its significance becomes the greater when we observe that most of the arguments in favor of primeval savagism are drawn from the resources of scientific inquiry. It is necessary to know how far science is competent to deal with a question like this. Strictly speaking science has to do only with facts which lie before it for observation. It may ascertain the facts, and explain and classify them, and it may within proper limits make inferences from these facts. It must be scrupulously careful not to manufacture its facts, and it must refuse to trans-

mute mere working hypotheses into truths of science till they are fully verified.

Now in regard to man's early condition and degree of culture, science manifestly finds serious difficulty in getting at the facts. Her difficulty is all the greater if she ignores the Scriptures, as is only too often the case. No written record has been left by primitive man, and history does not take us back to the beginnings of the race, so that no definite historical data are in our hands. Then when we enter the fields of archæology, ethnology, philology, and geology the difficulty of getting at the actual facts always stares the scientist in the face. It is not enough to get facts which indicate a low stage of culture, but this low stage must also be shown to have been the earliest stage in the history of the human race. The facts of a thousand years from the genesis of the race are not competent to reveal the degree of primitive culture which man first possessed, for these facts may be the product, to a large extent, of degeneration. To make inferences regarding man's early state from his supposed genetic relation with the brute, or from his high antiquity, or based upon the pre-Adamite theory, or upon fossil and other human relics can lead to no certain results, so long as these questions are subject of debate in the scientific circle itself. To build a theory of man's first estate upon unproved hypotheses is entirely unscientific. Keeping this in mind, science, apart from the Scriptures, has indeed scanty materials to use in its reasonings, and she should certainly not assume an air of dogmatic omniscience.

And, further, science has no right to find fault with the teaching of the Scriptures upon this topic. If she objects to the biblical statements about man's first estate and leans upon her own understanding, she can never be perfectly sure that she is not dealing with anthropological remains that are newer by twenty centuries than the men the book of Genesis speaks of. Instead of evidences of what man was at first, the scientist may be dealing with relics of a state of culture when degeneration had done its dreadful work. To say the least, the scientist who ignores the Scriptures, and who would prove primeval savagism with an old bone in one hand and a flint arrow in the other, should be quite

modest, and when he enters a cave in the Somme Valley or stands upon the site of an old lake-dwelling in Switzerland, he should be clothed with humility. Science, therefore, cannot impugn the Book of Genesis at this point without going quite beyond her proper bounds, and pronouncing a verdict when she cannot produce the facts.

In the third place, mythology and its proper interpretation has important bearing upon this subject. No outline even of so vast a theme as that of mythology can be now given, nor need we stretch the various theories set forth to explain its origin. For our present purposes it will not affect the conclusions we reach whether we hold the euhemeristic, the animistic or fetichistic theory of the origin of mythology. The conclusions we reach in reference to man's original state of culture depend rather upon the facts of mythology as they exist, than upon any theory of their origin. It is clear that if we hold that all mythologies are the result of decline in various ways from monotheism, then a case is made out against primeval savagism. We are inclined to think, however, that our case can be established no matter what view is taken of the origin of mythology among pagan peoples. In the mythologies of Egypt, India, Greece, and Rome, two important facts which cannot be easily reconciled with primeval savagism appear:

First, mythology shows that in very early times men had reached the notion of a spiritual element in man. This is shown by the place which the belief in the transmigration of souls has in mythology, and by the strong hold which ancestor worship has upon masses of people whose religion contains a large mythological element. Along with all this, we find a sense of moral responsibility involved in the doctrine of transmigration, inasmuch as the dignity or degradation of the soul in its various changes is a reward or a punishment for its conduct in this life. All this surely shows a stage of moral culture quite removed from a purely savage state, and it is to be observed that this mythological element is found in the most ancient peoples.

Secondly, mythology reveals the fact that in the very earliest ages men exhibited the phenomena of religion. We find an all

but universal belief in some sort of deity or deities, and we observe also that this belief expresses itself in various religious rites and ceremonies. Sometimes the belief is very vague, and the rites utterly rude, still the roots of religion are there in every case. Now, no man, however rude, could ever have called a stock or a stone, a carved image or a natural object, his dead ancestor, or a great hero his god, unless he had in his mind already the notion of deity. The very existence of this notion and belief indicates primitive culture of a somewhat advanced stage. If in the earlier stages of his career man had no such notion, then the advocate of primeval savagism is bound to show how primitive man was able to pass from a non-theistic to a theistic state of mind, or from a non religious to a religious stage of belief and practice. Still further, the pagan mythologies show again and again that there has been decline or decay in the type of religious belief and practice, for it often appears that the older beliefs and practices are purer and nobler than the later. Indeed, a strong case can be made out for primeval monotheism in such lands as Egypt, Persia, and India. In that case the argument for a comparatively high culture among primitive men is absolutely unanswerable.

In the fourth place, those peculiar traditions concerning a *golden age* which prevail among so many nations are full of meaning in relation to the question under discussion. This tradition appears in various forms among many peoples, but all forms of it agree in representing that at the dawn of the history of man on the earth, the general condition was far better than it came in later ages to be. It was a bright and happy day, long before history really began, when the earth was more fertile and the seasons were more kindly, when the beasts of the field were not so fierce and the heavens were not so stormy, and when men were more gentle, the earth was full of joy and peace, and the gods held familiar converse with men. Such in general is the description of the golden age which is found in the traditions of many pagan races. Even the rudest peoples have sometimes this tradition, and in more advanced pagan peoples it has a large place in their literature, as is the case in Greece, Rome, and India.

Now, it is evident that all these interesting traditions have

great force against primitive savagism. They may not amount to positive proofs, yet they are clear indications of a wide-spread belief which cannot be well reconciled with original barbarism. If it be said that these traditions are a dim reflection from the glory of the biblical paradise, we may justly say that the biblical narrative is confirmed and primeval savagism is refuted. This enables us to place, prior to the iron, bronze, and stone ages, a glorious golden age, when men were in no sense barbarians. Then the decline from this age, which the tradition implies, also agrees with what the Scriptures have to say about man's sad apostasy and decline in religious culture prior to the deluge. Did space permit extended illustration of this tradition, great force would be added to the argument against primeval savagism.

In the fifth place it is important to consider what the natural law of race development among men really is. Most advocates of primitive savagism make much of natural development, and of man's latent capacity for improvement. Human progress is mere natural development. But is this the true philosophy of race improvement among men as we find them on the earth? Let us consider a moment.

It is freely admitted that men have made, and are still making, progress in culture generally. Still we are prepared to believe that this development is not purely natural, but is the result of the supernatural, redemptive, and rejuvenating agencies which Christianity has introduced into the sphere of humanity. This is the secret and the source of all true human progress. At the same time we are prepared to defend the position that the law of man's merely natural development is *degeneration*. Tylor in his *Primitive Culture*, a work of real ability, argues that improvement is the law and degeneration is the exception in human progress. We are inclined to reverse the statement. The uplift which Christianity has given to the world is the grand exception to the great natural law of degeneration. History confirms this at every turn. The terrible religious decline which induced the deluge, and the decay of so many ancient pagan nations, clearly prove this law of natural degeneration. Even where there is promise of mental progress, as in Greece and Rome, moral decay sets in,

and soon the tide ebbs to low water mark again. In this law the philosophy of the decline and fall of nations is to be found. So potent is this law that even the church has at times suffered from its blighting effects, till radical reformation became necessary to save her from ruin.

Making application of this law to the subject of man's primitive state, it is evident that it must have been the very reverse of primitive savagism, and in like manner the true philosophy of the genesis of modern savages is to be discovered in the operation of this law.

In this connection, it is worth while to emphasize the fact that the dire results of moral evil in man must not be overlooked in this discussion. It is a striking fact that the leading supporters of primitive savagism either ignore or minimize the influence of moral evil. But scientific method demands that all the facts are to be taken into account. It is not necessary to hold any definite theological doctrine regarding sin, but any adequate theory of human progress must give due place to the dark facts of moral evil, which have scattered such sad wreckage on the shores of time.

Many modern treatises on history, sociology, and ethics are entirely defective at this point. Lecky writes a history of European morals, Tylor gives an elaborate account of primitive culture, and Spencer unfolds an extensive scheme of sociology; and not one of these writers gives any proper place to moral evil. Their conclusions are all one-sided and are almost valueless. If, on the other hand, the historian, ethnologist, and moralist be true to the facts, he will give moral evil its proper place; and, if he does so, he can explain race-degeneration, account for modern savages, and refute primeval savagism.

In the sixth place, the exact status of modern savages must be clearly defined in this discussion. Are modern savages the exact types of primitive men? Much of the reasoning in favor of early barbarism assumes that they are. In fact, we are all but assured that when we now look upon a rude, half-naked savage, we have a fair sample of what man was at first. Books on sociology take this for granted, without giving any proof whatever. Spencer is often guilty of this oversight. We do not hesitate to affirm that

this is unwarranted, and that proof may properly be demanded at Spencer's hands. Moreover, as man's primeval condition is the very question in debate, we ought not to begin by assuming that modern savages represent the first men. If race-decline has taken place, modern savages may be much lower than the earliest men. If race-progress, as the result of Christianity, has taken place, modern men may, in certain respects, be in advance of primitive men. If some races thus decline and others advance, the difficulty of finding anywhere now the counterpart of primitive man must be encountered. If any peoples have maintained stable equilibrium, and we could know what these peoples are, then we might discover our type of the earliest men. This cannot be proved of any existing race, and so the analogy between modern savages and ancient men fails entirely.

In the last place, some interesting facts connected with race-distribution cannot be easily reconciled with primeval savagism. We have only space to note some of these very briefly. Near the sources of the most ancient historical races we find the remains of the highest civilization which belongs to the earliest ages. On the other hand, we find the lowest savages at the utmost ends of the continents, with no remains of an early civilization found where they now are. Think of Egypt, Chaldea, and Phœnicia, on the one hand, and of Patagonia, Zululand, and Malacca, on the other. If primeval savagism be the true doctrine of primitive man, migration must have taken place from the lowest, which were the earliest, and that would be from the ends of the earth to the centres of ancient civilization. That would be from Patagonia to Phœnicia, from Zululand to Egypt, and from Malacca to Chaldea. Now, as a matter of fact, almost everything points to the conclusion that the migration has taken place the other way, and with migration came degeneration.

There are social, historical, and linguistic considerations, which might properly be adduced in this connection, against primeval savagism. What Tylor calls "survivals" of what once had a place among early races of men, the purer traditions which men evidently brought with them from some older abode, the relation of languages to each other, and the fact that the oldest races known

to history were in a measure civilized, all go to indicate the direction in which race-distribution has likely moved, and thereby indirectly to refute the view that men were at first rude, untutored, and devoid of religious sentiments. Then, too, if men were at first in this low stage of culture, and if mere natural evolution is the principle of their development, the time is not long enough to produce the degree of civilization found in the early centres of human activity. Egypt in 2700 B. C., Chaldea in 2500 B. C., and Phœnicia in 2000 B. C. had many marks of civilization which could not have been the product of natural development, unless we assume a much greater antiquity for man's origin than either science or the Bible requires. This consideration has weight against certain forms of the theory under discussion.

In conclusion, we point out the fact that all the facts and reasonings which have been adduced are to be treated as a cumulative argument. If this be done, we venture to think that any candid reader will be prepared to give a verdict against primeval savagism. This verdict will agree with what is gathered from Scripture, wherein it is said that man was made in the image of God, that sin has introduced a principle of degeneracy, and that redemption has brought in an agency of recovery. It will also be found that man was not a rude savage or a wild barbarian, but that his genealogy is correctly given in the Scriptures, which assert that Seth was the son of Adam, and that Adam was the son of God. The meaning and function of redemption is also suggested, inasmuch as it comes in to restore man to the golden age of his estate, wherein the paradise of the covenant of grace is more glorious than the paradise of the covenant of works. Milton's *Paradise Lost* may be a grander poem than his *Paradise Regained*, but the paradise which grace regains for sinful man is grander far than the paradise which by the fall he lost. FRANCIS R. BEATTIE.

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II. RATRAMN'S PART IN THE FIRST CONTROVERSY RESPECTING TRANSUBSTANTIATION.

THE name of Ratramn or Bertram is now seldom mentioned, and his treatise *On the Body and Blood of the Lord* is read by few in the present day. There was a time when English-speaking Protestants, and their enemies too, were more familiar with the author and his famous little book. It was, we believe, first published in an English translation in the year 1549, under the title of *The Book of Bertram the Priest*. It had already been printed in the original Latin in Cologne in 1532 under Protestant auspices. About the year 1545 it fell into the hands of Dr. Nicholas Ridley. This was an epoch-making event. The effect of its perusal on the illustrious bishop and martyr is thus stated by his biographer, Dr. Gloucester Ridley: "Few books have drawn after them such salutary consequences as this has done. It first opened Ridley's eyes, and determined him more accurately to search the Scriptures on this article [of the Lord's Supper], and the doctrine of the primitive fathers." His investigations brought him to the conclusion that transubstantiation was not the doctrine of the ancient church, and not fully developed and made an article of faith till after the ninth century, the age of Bertram. Ridley, a few months before he was burned at the stake, in his "*Protestatio*," delivered in Oxford on the 20th of April, 1555, before the commissioners of Queen Mary appointed to examine him, makes particular mention of his indebtedness to Bertram for his knowledge of the truth in opposition to prevailing error on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. After speaking of Bertram as a man learned and orthodox, who had for seven hundred years been always esteemed Catholic, Ridley expresses his astonishment that any one who feared God could with a good conscience contradict what Bertram had written on the Eucharist. "This man," said Ridley, "first pulled my ear, and was the first to compel me to turn from the common error of the Roman Church to the more

diligent examination of Scripture and ancient ecclesiastical writers in this matter. This I speak in the sight of God, who knows that I do not lie in the things which I affirm."

Ridley, then, may be said to have been led to reject transubstantiation by the reading of Bertram's book; and it was to Ridley that Cranmer acknowledged himself indebted for enlightenment in regard to this gross error. As is well known, the influence of Cranmer and Ridley was paramount in the formation of the Articles of the Church of England; and it is not too much to say that it is largely to the impression made on their minds by Bertram's book that we are to trace the strong testimony borne against transubstantiation in the twenty-eighth of these articles. A book that has so powerfully affected the Protestant creed of England, and of the nations that owe their origin to English colonization, ought to awaken in us a lively curiosity to ascertain its real character, and is certainly deserving of our earnest study.

Of the life of Bertram or Ratramn little is known. He was a monk of the Benedictine monastery of Old Corbie in Picardy in France. He was also a priest, while his great antagonist, Paschasius Radbert, though abbot of Corbie, remained all his life only a Levite or deacon. The statement that Ratramn became abbot of Orbay has been shown to be an error. The time of the appearance of his celebrated book, *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, has been a matter of controversy. Boileau¹ contends that it could not have been written before 875, on the ground that in ancient manuscripts the treatise bears the inscription "*Ad Carolum Magnum imperatorem*," and Charles the Bold did not attain the title of emperor till 875, dying by poison two years afterwards. But this argument is not conclusive. It is perfectly allowable to suppose that transcribers, accustomed to speak of the dead Charles as emperor, may, in accordance with a common practice, by a prolepsis have described Ratramn's book as dedicated to the *Emperor* Charles, though at the time of dedication Charles may not have borne the imperial crown. About the date of the publication of this remarkable work we must be content with these particulars: It was in the year 844 that Paschasius Radbert be-

¹ Cf. Dissertation in Migne's *Patrologia*, Vol. CXXI., Col. 174.

came abbot of Old Corbie. In 851 he resigned this office. It was while abbot that he sent the second and improved edition of his book, *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, to Charles the Bold. This sending of the treatise to the king could not have been earlier than 844. It may have taken place later than this year. It was by command of King Charles, and probably shortly after his receipt of the work of Paschasius, that Ratramn set forth the views which he held on the Eucharist. We are not warranted in fixing on the year 844 as the exact date of the issue of his reply, as some have done; but it is likely that Ratramn's treatise appeared some time near this date. It is of small compass, and might have been prepared for the king on short notice.

A difficulty meets us in the variety of names borne by him whom Protestants of old invariably called Bertram, and who bears this name in the writings of Sigbert of Gemblours and Trithe-mius. Scholars are now agreed that Ratramn is the proper designation of the renowned opponent of transubstantiation in the ninth century, and the name Bertram is hardly ever used by modern authors.

But how could this change of name have arisen? The following explanation commends itself to our judgment. Every reader of ecclesiastical Latin is aware that *Beatus* is a common epithet prefixed to the names of saints and illustrious sons of the church. Hence Ratramn could be spoken of as *Beatus Ratramnus*, abbreviated into B. or Be. Ratramnus. It would be easy for a transcriber to contract this into Bertramnus, whence Bertram. Certain it is that there is no author of note in the catalogue of writers of the ninth century who bears the name of Bertram, while Ratramnus appears in the most ancient manuscripts as the author of the work *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*, which was afterwards attributed to Bertram. Hincmar,¹ Archbishop of Rheims, who was his cotemporary, spells his name Ratramnus, and this we take to be his true name. A much weightier and more interesting question than the last relates to the genuineness of the work ascribed to him, *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*. It was, as we have stated, first printed in Cologne by a Protestant in 1532. A

¹ *De Prædestinatione*, Cap. 5.

German translation of it, with a preface by a reformed divine, Leo Judae, was published in the same year at Zürich. It soon produced a profound impression. Roman Catholics at once admitted that its testimony was against them. Protestants on the strength of it maintained that transubstantiation could not have been a fundamental article of faith in the ninth century, as there is no evidence that Ratramn was ever accused of heresy. On the contrary, he was accounted the ablest defender in his age of the Latin church against the attacks of the Greeks. The Greek and Oriental bishops had charged the Roman church with falsely teaching that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Son as well as from the Father, with not keeping the proper fasts, with fasting on the Sabbath, with forbidding presbyters to perform the rite of confirmation, and confining its administration to bishops, with imposing celibacy on the clergy and making them shave their beards, and with other departures from what was judged orthodox practice. Pope Nicholas I. appealed to Hinemar of Rheims and to the other archbishops and bishops of the Frank Kingdom to repel these charges. This task was undertaken by Ratramn. Others attempted it too, but Ratramn's work, *Contra Graecorum Opposita*, was regarded as the most successful vindication of the Latin church, and it gained for its author universal applause in the West. That such a man should have written a book against transubstantiation, without being called to account for it, was a most effective argument against the boast of Roman Catholics as to the uniformity of the faith of the church in all ages respecting the Eucharist. The first and readiest way of parrying the attack that suggested itself was to pronounce the work that had been published under the name of Bertram or Ratramn a daring forgery of Protestants. Some controversialists went so far as to name the alleged forger. The Dominican, Sixtus of Sienna, in a work published in 1566, declared the book ascribed to Bertram *perniciosum Oecolampadii volumen*. Other Roman Catholic writers repeated the same charge of fabrication against Oecolampadius, the eminent Reformer of Basel, who had died in 1531. The highest authority in the Roman church stamped the work with the brand of heresy. The censors appointed by the Council of

Trent placed in the year 1559 on the index of prohibited books *Bertrami liber qui inscribitur de Corpore et Sanguine Domini*. The judgment of the Tridentine censors was immediately published by Pope Pius IV. Pope Clement VIII. renewed the prohibition. The heretical character of the book ascribed to Bertram was affirmed also by the leading polemical writers of the church of Rome, among them being Cardinal Bellarmin.

But we have now to give a striking illustration of the Protean nature of Roman controversialists. It was soon seen that the accusation brought against Protestants of having impudently attempted to palm off a forgery on the world could not be maintained. The absurdity of the charge became manifest, and it had to be abandoned. So approved a Catholic divine as Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, had quoted from a manuscript of Bertram's book in a treatise which he wrote in 1526, without any suspicion that it was heretical. Old manuscripts, too, of Ratramn's book were found in places that could not be suspected. It was vain to attempt to resist such stubborn facts. The divines of Douay were the first Roman Catholics to acknowledge the genuineness of the published treatise *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*, bearing the name of Bertram or Ratramn. They admitted that they had little esteem for the work. But they thought that the best course was to allow the genuineness of the book, and to correct and interpret it so as to bring it into harmony with the doctrine of the church, as had been done with the writings of other ancient Catholic authors in which errors had been discovered. The great Benedictine scholar, Mabillon, settled beyond doubt the genuineness of the work and the purity of its text. He discovered one old manuscript of the book which must have been written about the latter part of the ninth century, and another manuscript only a century later, both of which bore the name of Ratramn. Other manuscripts of a more recent date helped to establish incontrovertibly the genuineness of the treatise and the correctness of its text, points which had once been stoutly opposed. But Mabillon and the French Benedictines saw that it would be ill for the church if a genuine work of Ratramn, the renowned monk of Corbie, should be acknowledged to favor the Calvinistic doc-

trine of the Eucharist. It was a necessity for them, therefore, to try to make out that Ratramn's book *On the Body and Blood of the Lord* had been generally misinterpreted, and was really conformable to the Tridentine dogma of transubstantiation. Though it had been officially condemned by the Council of Trent, and though one and another pope had concurred in the condemnation, and though for a considerable time Roman Catholic controversialists were unanimous in judging it heretical, nevertheless, to the astonishment of the world, learned Roman Catholic scholars became zealous in seeking to prove the obnoxious treatise to contain sound doctrine on the Eucharist! The most elaborate attempt of this nature was made by James Boileau, a doctor of the Sorbonne. But it is a significant circumstance that the Archbishop of Paris, De Harlay, prohibited the publication of the French version of Ratramn's book which Boileau had prepared.

The attempt of De Marca, Archbishop of Toulouse, and of Hardouin, the Jesuit, to prove that Joannes Scotus Erigena was the real author of the book *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*, ascribed to Ratramn, has not found much favor. It is discredited by the authority of manuscripts. Internal evidence, too, is against it. The style of the book is very different from that which characterizes Erigena, while it is entirely in harmony with that of the undisputed works of Ratramn. At the same time it is altogether probable that the book on the Eucharist, condemned at the Synod of Vercelli in 1050 as a heretical work of Erigena, was really the book of Ratramn. Laufs¹ by a variety of considerations very ingeniously applied, has, in our opinion, made good this contention. But his argument that Erigena did not compose a separate treatise (now lost) on the Lord's Supper is not equally convincing. That Erigena was decidedly opposed to transubstantiation and the corporal presence of Christ in any manner in the Sacrament is, however, placed beyond doubt by his statements in a writing of his lately recovered, and by the testimony of authors living near his own age.²

The occasion of the composition of Ratramn's treatise, *De*

¹ Laufs in *Studien u. Kritiken*, Vol. I., Heft 4.

² Cf. Christlieb in Herzog's *Real-Enc.* Vol. XIII., p. 790. 2 *Auf.*

Corpore et Sanguine Domini, is stated in its introduction. The author, addressing the King Charles the Bold, tells him that he wrote by his command. Ratramn evidently enjoyed the monarch's confidence. In the controversy on predestination, which Gottschalk excited, the king consulted Ratramn; and it was in obedience to the wish of the monarch that he composed his treatise on predestination, a work which we venture to think might in our own time be read with profit. It contains a few misinterpretations of Scripture, and some needless repetitions, and is largely made up of quotations from Augustin and other fathers. But it is a clearer and more scriptural and consistent work than Ratramn's smaller book *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*. It admirably answers the common objections against Augustinianism, and we would call the special attention of our readers to it as an excellent and very readable and judicious disquisition on the profound question of which it treats. But we must confine ourselves now to the book which sets forth Ratramn's doctrine of the Lord's Supper. It was composed, as stated in the preface, in response to the wish of King Charles to know what Ratramn thought "regarding the mystery of the body and blood of Christ." The king's interest in this question is accounted for by a book *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*, which had been presented to him by its author, Paschasius Radbert, abbot of Corbie, the monastery in which Ratramn was a monk. Ratramn does not mention the name of Paschasius; but that it was in opposition to him that Ratramn composed his treatise is testified by Gerbert, afterwards Pope Sylvester II., who died in 1003.¹ Paschasius taught transubstantiation in the work which Ratramn undertook to controvert. And yet Paschasius makes statements which it would be hard to reconcile with this dogma. Dwelling on these inconsistencies with which he is chargeable, some old

¹The long uncertain author of a writing on the Eucharist, which the Jesuit Cellot, in *Append Ad. Hist.*, Gotteschalki, first brought to light (formerly spoken of as *the Anonymous of Cellot*), is now known to be Gerbert. A manuscript of the treatise bearing Gerbert's name was discovered by the Benedictine Bernard Pez. The style and method of the writing strongly indicate Gerbert as its author, and this point is now admitted by scholars. Gerbert expressly declares that Ratramn, as well as Rabanus Maurus, refuted Paschasius.

Protestant writers, and even Ebrard in the present day, deny that he taught the monstrous doctrine of which so many Protestant authors have accused him of being the inventor. But we are satisfied from an examination of his treatise, that the common opinion regarding his teaching is right; and the ridiculous stories which he relates of Christ's flesh and blood having sundry times appeared visible in the Sacrament should remove all doubt on this question.¹ Certain it is that what Paschasius taught concerning the Eucharist called forth strong protest from the most influential men of the age. But nothing was then done to settle the controversy by the intervention of church authority. It was not till two centuries later that freedom of opinion on this question was prohibited by a synod of the Latin church. Paschasius often refers to dissentients from his teaching. Among contemporary authors who openly controverted his views the best known are the famous Rabanus Maurus, Joannes Scotus Erigena, and Ratramn. To the doctrine on the Lord's Supper, set forth by the last-mentioned in opposition to Paschasius, we now direct attention. His treatise, *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, with a historical preface, notes and dissertation vindicating its genuineness and orthodoxy, by James Boileau, doctor of the Sorbonne, is contained in volume CXXI. of Migne's *Patrologia*. The treatise itself is divided into one hundred and two short sections. In our references to it we quote according to this edition and its numeration of sections. After four sections, which may be called introductory, Ratramn states that the king had proposed the question, "Whether that which is received in the church by the mouth of the faithful is made the body and blood of Christ in a mystery or in truth?" "In a mystery" obviously means sacramentally in opposition to truth (*veritas*), or reality. Ratramn then expands and divides the foregoing question thus: (1), "Whether it (what is received by the mouth of the faithful) contains something secret which is open only to the eyes of

¹ Dr. Schaff's statement (*Church History*, III., p. 493, note 1), that "the technical term *transubstantiatio* was introduced by Paschasius Radbertus toward the middle of the ninth century," is incorrect. The word does not occur in his writings, though he set forth the doctrine that was afterwards thus designated.

faith, or whether, without the veil of any mystery, the sight of the body sees that outwardly which the sight of the mind sees inwardly, so that all which is done is clear in the light of manifestation; and (2), Whether it is the very body which was born of Mary, and suffered, died, and was buried, and which, rising again and ascending into heaven, sits at the right hand of the Father?" The first half of the treatise is devoted to the discussion of the first question, and the latter half to the consideration of the second. In discussing the first question, Ratramn begins by explaining what he understands by a figure (*figura*), and what by the truth (*veritas*). He gives these illustrations of the use of a figure: A figure is employed when we call the Word bread, as in the Lord's Prayer in asking for daily bread. Like Augustin and others, Ratramn conceived the bread asked for in the Lord's Prayer to be the Personal Word, the Son of God, the Bread of Life. So, again, when Christ says, I am the living bread that came down from heaven (John vi. 41), or when he calls himself the vine, and the disciples the branches. (John xv. 1.) These are, according to Ratramn, examples of the use of a figure. They say one thing and signify another (*aliud dicunt et aliud innuunt*, Section vii.). The truth, as distinguished from a figure, is exemplified when we say, "Christ was born of the virgin, suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried." Here there is plain truth without a figure. But in the former examples it is not so; "for substantially neither is bread Christ nor is a vine Christ, nor are branches apostles." (*Nam substantialiter nec panis Christus, nec vitis Christus, nec palmites apostoli*, Section viii.) He next applies the distinction thus made and illustrated between figure and truth to the body and blood of the Lord in the Eucharist. He describes the senses as not discovering, after consecration of the elements into the body and blood of the Lord, anything but bread and wine. Hence he concludes: "It is plain that that bread and wine are the body and blood of Christ figuratively." (*Claret quia panis ille vinumque figurate Christi corpus et sanguis existit*, Section x.) We call attention here to this point, that the illustrations employed by Ratramn show that he understood Christ's declaration in instituting the Supper, "This is my

body," as of a like figurative character with his saying, "I am the vine." But "substantially the vine is not Christ." How, then, could he have understood the bread to be "substantially" Christ's body?

In Section xxxv. Ratramn adduces the following illustrations from Augustin's epistle to Boniface: We say at the approach of the Passover, to-day, or to-morrow, or the day after, is the Lord's passion, though the Lord suffered many years ago, and that only once. So on the Lord's day we say, To-day the Lord rose from the dead, though many years have passed since his resurrection took place. No one is so senseless as to charge us with falsehood when we thus speak, because we call these days according to their resemblance to those on which these things were transacted. So, on account of the resemblance between the sacraments and the things of which they are the sacraments, the sacraments receive the names of the things themselves. "As, therefore, in a certain sort the sacrament of the body of Christ is the body of Christ, the sacrament of the blood of Christ is the blood of Christ," etc. (*Sicut ergo secundum quemdam modum sacramentum corporis Christi corpus Christi est sacramentum sanguinis Christi sanguis Christi est*, Section xxxv.) Ratramn thus remarks on the foregoing words of Augustin: "We see that Augustin says that the sacraments are one thing, and the things of which they are sacraments are another thing. Now, the body in which Christ suffered, and the blood which flowed from his side are things. But the mysteries of these things, he says, are the sacraments of the body and blood of Christ, which are celebrated in memory of the Lord's passion (*quæ celebrantur ob memoriam Dominicæ passionis*), not only yearly at every festival of the Passover, but also every day in the year." (Section xxxvi.) In the next following section (xxxvii.) Ratramn goes on to say: "And while the body of the Lord in which he once suffered is one, and the blood which was shed for the salvation of the world is one, yet the sacraments have received the names of these very things, so that they are called the body and blood of Christ, while they are thus called on account of their similitude to the things which they signify." (*Attamen sacramenta ipsarum rerum vocabula sumpserunt, ut*

dicantur corpus et sanguis Christi, cum propter similitudinem rerum quas innuunt, sic appellantur.)

According to Augustin, sacraments are signs relating to divine things. (*Signa, cum ad res divinas pertinent, sacramenta appellantur*, Aug. Ep. 138.) As quoted by Ratramn, Augustin expressly says that the sacraments, or sacred signs, have received the names of the things signified by them. Hence, Ratramn calls the eucharistic signs the body and blood of the Lord; and that these eucharistic elements, while so-called, still remained bread and wine as to their substance is what he always assumes, and even explicitly affirms. In Section liv. he employs these words: "For, according to the substance of the creatures, what they were before consecration, this they continue afterwards." (*Nam secundum creaturarum substantiam quod fuerunt ante consecrationem, hoc et postea consistunt.*¹) Ratramn knows nothing of accidents or qualities existing without a substance; and he never ventures to question the testimony of our senses to which he often appeals. He does admit a change to be effected by the consecration of the elements; and the nature of this change we shall afterwards consider; but it does not involve either transubstantiation or consubstantiation.

The truth is that Ratramn held and taught distinctly that there could be the eating of Christ's body and the drinking of his blood without partaking of the Eucharist. According to him, believers under the Old Testament were made partakers of the body and blood of the Lord. This doctrine he professes to find in the words of the Apostle Paul, 1 Cor. x. 1-4. In the manna and in water from the rock our fathers had the same spiritual meat and

¹Ratramn speaks of the *species* of bread and wine being seen after consecration of the elements. Much has been made of this by Roman Catholic writers. But by *species* Ratramn does not mean *mere appearance*; for immediately after affirming in the place above quoted that as to their *substance* the elements remain after consecration what they were before it, he adds, *Panis et vinum prius existere, in qua etiam specie jam consecrata permanere videntur*. His applying the term *species* to the consecrated elements gives no countenance to the notion that only the appearance of bread and wine remains. *Species* denotes kind, sort of things, as well as appearance. In later Latin, *species* denotes fruits of the earth, *fruges*. (*Ducange*, S. V.) The elements can be called *species* before consecration, as, *e. g.*, by Ambrose De Initiandis, Cap. 9. (*Ante benedictionem verborum celestium alia species nominatur, post consecrationem corpus significatur.*)

the same spiritual drink given to them which we have furnished to us in the bread and wine of the supper. Here is what he says (Section xxiii.): "It is one and the same Christ, who made the people in the desert, who had been baptized in the cloud and in the sea, to eat his flesh and to drink his blood, and now in the church feeds his believing people with the bread of his body, and makes them drink the stream of his blood." That our fathers in the wilderness ate Christ's body and drank his blood is a conclusion which he draws from the apostle's saying that they did all eat the same spiritual meat, and did all drink the same spiritual drink. (*Per escam spiritualem potumque invisibilem ejus corpus manducabant et ejus sanguinem bibebant.*) Nay, he goes on to say that, "He who now in the church by his omnipotent power spiritually converts the bread and wine into the flesh of his body and the stream of his own blood, then also invisibly caused the manna given from heaven to be his body, and the water poured from the rock to be his own blood." (Section xxv.) Ratramn has much more to the like effect. He repeatedly and emphatically affirms that Christ changed the manna and the water from the rock into his own flesh and blood. But he gives us to understand that the change was of a spiritual character. It could not be other than spiritual. He who believed that under the Old Testament the body and blood of the Lord Jesus were as really partaken of as they are now under the Christian dispensation, could not possibly have supposed that the body born of the Virgin and crucified is actually present in a corporal manner in the Eucharist. It is idle for Boileau to say that such statements fully demonstrate that nothing seemed impossible to our author in the mystery of transubstantiation. To make Ratramn assert a real transubstantiation of manna into the historical body of Christ is to father on him an absurdity too wild for any rational being to have seriously entertained.

It is worthy of note that the Magdeburg Centuriators and the early Lutheran theologians spoke slightly of Ratramn's treatise *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*. They saw that the doctrine of the corporal presence of the body of Christ *in, with, and under* the bread of communion could not be reconciled with the

plain teaching of Ratramn. They had not the same powerful motive which the Romanists had for wresting the words of the great orthodox doctor of the ninth century to prove his agreement with the creed of their church. They, therefore, did not claim Ratramn as on their side. It was the Reformed, or Calvinistic, Church that took pains to publish and to circulate Ratramn's book, and that confidently appealed to it as a witness in their favor.

In the latter half of his treatise Ratramn formally discusses the second question which he had proposed to consider: whether the very body which was born of Mary, and suffered, and died, and was buried, and which is seated at the right hand of the Father, is that which is daily, through the mystery of the sacraments, received in the church by the mouth of the faithful? (Section 1.) This was what Paschasius Radbert had maintained. Ratramn meets the question openly, argues against it, shows that it cannot possibly be true, and rejects it utterly, and so declares plainly his disbelief in the doctrine afterwards called transubstantiation. In treating this question, he first of all makes some quotations from Saint Ambrose. One might suppose that Ambrose is the last of the Latin fathers to whom Ratramn would have appealed. He is, with reason, held to be the one who did most to further the development in the church of a belief in the conversion of the elements of bread and wine into the real body and blood of the Lord, though he did not fully evolve this doctrine. Perhaps it was because Ratramn regarded the teaching of Ambrose as seemingly most unfavorable to his own view of the supper that he undertook to show that Ambrose and he were not in antagonism on the second question proposed. But it is not our business to set forth the doctrine of Ambrose, but that of Ratramn, on the Lord's supper; and for this purpose it is sufficient to attend to his comment on a passage which he had adduced from Ambrose: "How carefully, how judiciously, is the distinction made! Of the flesh of Christ, which was crucified, which was buried, that is, according to which Christ was both crucified and buried, he [Ambrose] says: 'It is the true flesh of Christ.' But of that which is received in the sacrament he says: 'It is truly the sacrament of

that flesh,'—distinguishing the sacrament of the flesh from the truth of the flesh." (Section lvii.) He makes Ambrose teach that there is a great difference between the sacramental body and blood of Christ and the body in which Christ suffered and the blood which he shed from his side when hanging on the cross. (Section lxix.)

Ratramn next gives a quotation from Jerome, and draws this teaching from the quotation, that "the spiritual flesh which is received by the mouth of the faithful, and the spiritual blood which is daily presented to believers to drink, differ from the flesh which was crucified, and from the blood which was shed by the soldier's lance, as the authority of this man [Jerome] testifies; therefore they are not the same." (Section lxxi.) Then follows an argument in which the different and opposite properties of the body of Christ in the communion, and of the body which was born of the Virgin, and died, and rose again, are dwelt upon; and after contrasting them Ratramn declares the supposition of their identity to be inconceivable. (Sections lxxii., lxxvi., lxxvii.) Next, Ratramn makes his appeal to St. Augustin, and after adducing several of his statements he says of him: "By the authority of this doctor discussing the words of the Lord concerning the sacrament of his body and blood, we are manifestly taught that those words of the Lord are to be understood spiritually, and not carnally." (Section lxxxii.) And in the next paragraph (lxxxiii.) Ratramn thus sums up the teaching of Augustin on this subject: "We see, therefore, that that meat of the body of the Lord, and that drink of his blood, are truly his body and truly his blood in a certain respect (*secundum quid*), namely in this, that they are spirit and life." Boileau could not leave this last sentence without an attempt to turn away the mind of the reader from its true significance. So he has this curious comment on it: "That is, not in that carnal manner in which the food and drink we ordinarily use are taken." This note, as every one can perceive, is altogether irrelevant as an explanation of what Ratramn had said. But it has a relevancy if we have regard to the aim of Boileau to shield from observation Ratramn's antagonism to what is now adjudged orthodoxy in the Roman Church.

We have already mentioned that Ratramn's treatise, *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, was put on the index of prohibited books by the censors appointed by the Council of Trent. In the Netherlands under the dominion of Spain, the Roman Catholic censors extended to it more toleration. In the *Belgian Index Expurgatorius*, issued by the command and authority of Philip II., the publication of the work was allowed with the omission of certain passages which were considered too heterodox to be suffered to fall under the eyes of the public. We will give one of these omitted parts which embraces almost five sections or paragraphs (lxxiii.–lxxvii.) of the authentic text. Our readers will not find it difficult to divine the reason of its suppression. In fact, the perusal of it alone is sufficient to determine the question of Ratramn's attitude towards the Tridentine standard of orthodoxy:

“It ought to be considered that in the bread [of the Eucharist] not only the body of Christ, but also the body of the people believing in him, is represented (*figuretur*), and hence it is made of many grains of corn, because the body of believing people is increased in the multitude of the faithful by the word of Christ.”

“Wherefore, as in a mystery that bread is accepted as the body of Christ, so also in a mystery the members of the people believing in Christ are signified; and as that bread is not corporeally, but spiritually, called the body of believers, so also it is necessary that the body of Christ be understood not corporeally but spiritually.”

“So, also, in the wine which is called the blood of Christ, water is ordered to be mingled, nor is one without the other permitted to be offered, because neither can the people exist without Christ, nor Christ without the people, as neither the head can exist without the body, nor the body without the head. Accordingly, water in that sacrament represents the people. Therefore, if that wine, which is consecrated by the function of the ministers, is corporeally converted into the blood of Christ, the water, too, which is equally mingled, must necessarily be corporeally converted into the blood of the believing people. For where there is one consecration there is, consequently, one operation, and where there is an equal reason there follows a mystery that is equal also. But

we see that in the water nothing is changed as respects the body (*secundum corpus*), consequently, then, in the wine also nothing is corporeally shown to us. Whatever is signified in the water concerning the body of the people is taken spiritually; it is, therefore, necessary that whatever is signified in the wine concerning the blood of Christ be taken spiritually."

"Moreover, things which differ among themselves are not the same. The body of Christ which died and rose again, and being made immortal, dieth no more, death will not further have dominion over it (Rom. vi. 9), it is eternal, it is not now capable of suffering. But this which is solemnized in the church is temporal, not eternal; it is corruptible, not uncorrupted; it is in the way, not in the country. They differ, therefore, from one another. Whence they are not the same. How is it called Christ's true body and true blood?"

"For if it is the body of Christ, and it is said truly that it is the body of Christ, it is in verity the body of Christ; and the body of Christ is incorruptible, and is incapable of suffering, and hence eternal; then this body of Christ which is celebrated in the church must be incorruptible and eternal. But it cannot be denied that it is corrupted, because, having been broken into parts, it is distributed to be received, and having been ground by the teeth it is passed into the body."

It is not an original idea of Ratramn (we find it in the early fathers), that the body of believers, or the church, as well as Christ's own body, is represented in the eucharistic bread. Whatever we may think of this notion, it is manifest that Ratramn runs the parallel between the body of believers and the body of Christ, both of which he sees in the sacramental bread, in such a way that neither can be thought of as substantially there. If every communicant in the celebration of the Eucharist swallows the real body of Christ, then, according to Ratramn, he must be held to swallow at the same time the body of believers, the whole church of God! To such an absurdity he reduces the doctrine of the real presence of the Lord's body in the sacrament. And when he makes the water, which in the ancient church was usually mingled with the sacramental wine, to represent the people of Christ and

reasons: If the wine of consecration is corporeally converted into the blood of Christ, then the water mixed with it must be corporeally converted into the blood of the believing people; for where there is one consecration, there is consequently one operation—is it possible, we ask, in the face of such statements, to entertain a doubt that the real sentiments of Ratramn were utterly opposed to the dogma of transubstantiation? His argument, in brief, is this, that as the water used in the communion cannot be believed to be literally changed into the blood of the people of God, so the wine of the communion cannot be believed to be literally changed into the very blood of the Redeemer. Ratramn reasons *ex concessis*. His premises were universally granted in his age, and he demonstrates from them the preposterousness of supposing a material transmutation of the sacramental elements.

The Belgian censors, who corrected Ratramn's treatise by the expurgation of the foregoing and other obnoxious passages, did not profess to have any manuscript authority for this procedure. The portions omitted are just as well authenticated as any other parts of the text. But their testimony to Ratramn's fundamental disagreement with the modern Roman Catholic Church was too clear and pronounced to be mistaken by any one, and it was deemed politic to suppress the evidence that rank Calvinism was taught in the ninth century by one of the most honored doctors of the church, without any charge of heresy being preferred against him.¹

We forbear to adduce further evidence to prove that the early reformed divines were fully justified in claiming with all confidence Ratramn as a witness that their rejection of transubstantiation was no novelty. There are, we admit, some statements in his book, which, if isolated and considered by themselves, might be held to favor the Roman doctrine of the Eucharist. But in the same way Calvin² might be quoted as maintaining what is commonly known as the doctrine of the *real presence*.

¹ Cf. Daillé On the Right Use of the Fathers. Chap. IV.

² Cf. *Instit. Lib. IV., Cap. XVII., 19. Quicquid ad exprimendam veram substantialem que corporis ac sanguinis Domini communicationem, quæ sub sacris Cœnæ symbolis fidelibus exhibetur facere potest, libenter accipio.* A study of the context prevents our misunderstanding these words.

Ratramn in his book, *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, quotes only Latin authors. These are Augustin, Isidor of Seville, Ambrose, Jerome, and Fulgentius. He might have referred to a distinguished expositor of Scripture of his own monastery of Corbie, Christian Druthmar, who, in the early part of the ninth century, wrote a commentary on Matthew, in which he gave the symbolical interpretation to the words of Christ, "This is my body." And while neither Ambrose nor Jerome were admitted by Ratramn to confound the signs with the things signified, he could find in Augustin, Isidor, and Fulgentius (who was called *alter Augustinus*) positive statements of a doctrine clearly contrary to transubstantiation. There can be no reasonable dispute that Augustin, under whose mighty influence Ratramn's theological views were formed, interpreted our Lord's words in instituting the supper, not in a grossly literal, but in a spiritual and figurative, sense. Calvin could truthfully say of Augustin on this question that he was wholly on his side. (*Sine controversia totum esse nostrum.*) The wonder is, that in the Latin church, with her reverential regard for the authority of Augustin, the doctrine of transubstantiation should have finally prevailed. If Augustin's observations on the Eucharist were published anonymously, Roman Catholics ignorant of the source whence they were taken would certainly pronounce them Calvinistic and heretical.¹ Ratramn, in opposing Paschasius, wrote with the boldness of a man who was persuaded that he did not stand alone, but had the support of Augustin and of the best teachers of the church in all ages, and that it was Paschasius, and not he, who was the innovator.

¹ A striking illustration of the truth of this remark is given by Schröck. (*Kirchengeschichte*, XXIII., p. 506.) Fulbert, the famous bishop of Chartres, in the beginning of the eleventh century, quotes the comment of Augustin on Christ's words. (John vi. 53.) In this comment Augustin observes that here a crime seems to be commanded. It is, therefore, a figure which commands us to communicate of the passion of our Lord, and sweetly and profitably lay up in our memory that his flesh was crucified and wounded for us. The editor of Fulbert, who was Charles de Villiers, a Parisian doctor of theology, did not perceive that this passage proceeded from so orthodox a teacher as Augustin. So after the words, "It is, therefore, a figure" (*figura ergo est*), he actually added, "A heretic will say this" (*dicet haereticus*)! When he discovered his mistake, he put his interpolated remark, "A heretic will say this," among typographical errors, and added that the whole passage contains a mystical interpretation.

We have now to inquire into the nature of the change in the elements, which, according to Ratramn, is effected by their consecration. He allows that the elements remain the same in substance after consecration as they were before it. (Section liv.) The historical body of Christ is not in the bread, but in heaven. (Section xxx.) Yet the sacramental symbols are held by him to have undergone objectively a change through the ministry of the priest, so that they are more than they were before. He compares the change effected in the eucharistic elements with that which he supposes to take place in the water of baptism. He maintains that the baptismal water after consecration possesses a power of sanctification (*sanctificationis virtutem*), otherwise it could not wash away the stain of vices; and also a force of life (*vigorem vitæ*), otherwise it could not give life to the spiritually dead. We do not stop here to refute Ratramn's erroneous doctrine concerning baptism. He assumes it as currently believed in his day, and he employs it for the purpose of showing the nature of the change wrought in the eucharistic symbols by the consecration of the priest. The bodily sense sees in the baptismal water a fluid element subject to corruption, with the power of washing only the body. But through the consecration of the priest there is added to it the power of the Holy Ghost (*accessit sancti Spiritus per sacerdotis consecrationem virtus*), and thus it is made efficacious to wash not only bodies, but also souls, and to remove spiritual uncleanness by a spiritual power. (Section xvii.) There is in one and the same element of water that which is cognizable by the bodily sense, and, therefore, mutable and corruptible; and there is that which faith alone sees, and which, therefore, cannot be corrupted or destroyed. That which washes superficially is the element, but that which cleanses inwardly is a vital power, a power of sanctification, a power of immortality. (Section xviii.) "So, also," he adds, "the body and blood of Christ, considered superficially, is a creature subject to change and corruption. If, however, you consider the power of the mystery, it is a life imparting immortality to those who partake of it." (Section xix.) So the sea and the cloud in which our fathers were baptized (1 Cor. x.) contained invisibly the sanctification of the

Holy Spirit. (*Invisibiliter sancti Spiritus sanctificationem continebant.*) In them inwardly a spiritual power shone which did not appear to the eyes of the flesh, but to the eyes of the mind. (Section xxi.) So with the manna and the water that flowed from the rock. There was in these corporeal substances the spiritual power of the Word. (*Inerat corporeis illis substantiis spiritualis Verbi potestas.*) (Section xxii.) The bread and the wine are called the body and blood of Christ because they are received not as what they are outwardly seen to be, but what they are inwardly made by the working of the divine Spirit. (Section lxiii.) The Word of God, who is the living Bread invisibly existing in that sacrament, invisibly feeds the minds of believers, vivifying them by the partaking of himself. (*Verbum autem Dei, qui est panis invisibiliter in illo existens sacramento, invisibiliter participatione sui fidelium mentes vivificando pascit.*) (Section xliv.) Under the cover of corporeal things a divine power secretly works the salvation which comes through these sacraments. Secret powers belong to the sacraments. (Section xlvi.) An inward divine power is represented as "existing" or "contained" in the elements. It is called also an invisible substance (*invisibilis substantia*), the power of the divine Word, by which they feed and sanctify the minds of the faithful. (Sections xlvi.—xliv.) So (section lxiv.) the bread or the manna is held to be the body of Christ, because there is in it the spirit of Christ, that is, the power of the divine Word, which not only feeds but also cleanses the soul. (*Patenter ostendit secundum quod habeatur corpus Christi, videlicet secundum id quod sit in eo Spiritus Christi, id est divini potentia Verbi, quae non solum animam pascit, verum etiam purgat.*)¹

¹ "In attempting to explain," says the Roman Catholic historian Alzog, "the constituents of the sacrament, Ratramn appears at times to admit that the substance of the bread is changed into the body of Christ by the words of consecration; but he also appears to maintain that the divine Word or logos takes the place of the body of Christ in the sacrament, and nourishes the soul; and even goes the length of asserting that the Israelites received the body in the manna." (Alzog's *Universal Church History*, Vol. II., p. 435.) The above statement as that of a Roman Catholic historian is interesting. But he ought to have conceded that Ratramn, with all explicitness, denies that the body of Christ in the sacrament is the body which was born of Mary, and died, and was buried, and rose again, and is now at the right hand of the Father.

The references to Ratramn which we have given show that Ratramn made the bread and wine of the Lord's supper the body and blood of Christ for believers only. He teaches that they possess a secret, inherent, sanctifying and saving power for believers. An objective virtue or power resides in them. At one time he says that the Spirit of God is in them; at another, that Christ the Word, the logos, is in them. In opposition to the doctrine of the Reformed Church which teaches that "the sacraments become effectual means of salvation not from any virtue in them," Ratramn insists that there is a virtue in them. Steitz¹ remarks truly that consistency ought to have led Ratramn to place the operative power of the Spirit and of the Word in the soul of the believer, and not in the consecrated elements. But we must not misrepresent his views to uphold his consistency, or to make him more in agreement with the truth, as it is taught in the Reformed Church, than he is. But though he does make a saving power to be resident in the bread, still that which is divine and heavenly in it, that is, the body of Christ, can neither be seen nor received, nor eaten, save by the believer. (*Ast interius longe aliud multo pretiosius multo que excellentius intimatur, quia celeste, quia divinum, id est Christi corpus, ostenditur, quod non sensibus carnis, sed animi fidelis contuitu vel aspicitur, vel accipitur, vel comeditur.*) (Section ix.)

We regret Ratramn's confusion of thought. It involved him in serious error. Readers of Calvin know how earnestly he opposes those who attributed to the sacraments a secret saving power by which they justify and confer grace on those who do not place the obstacle of mortal sin in the way. This opinion Calvin characterizes as deadly, pestilential, diabolical; and the more so because it has so long prevailed in the church to her great detriment.²

Neander, in introducing his history of the controversy respecting the Lord's supper in this age, observes that that which is divine, and which in the observance of this ordinance fills the religious consciousness, was transferred to the external sign; and

¹ Herzog's *Real Encyc.* XII., p. 539. 2 *Auf.*

² *Instit. Lib.*, IV., Cap. XIV., 14.

this was regarded as the bearer of a divine power communicated through the consecration which the priest uttered over it. From this error Ratramn was not free. Pity it is that he did not clearly grasp and set forth the truth so well expressed by Hooker that "the real presence of Christ's most blessed body and blood is not to be sought for in the sacrament (*i. e.*, in the elements), but in the worthy receiver of the sacrament." It ought, however, to be remembered, as extenuating Ratramn's error, that though he admits an objective, saving virtue to be immanent in the sacrament, he at the same time contends that faith is necessary to receive this virtue, and to partake of Christ's body and blood with their benefits. He makes unbelievers receive only the bare signs. He did not regard the Eucharist as a propitiatory sacrifice offered for the sins of the living and of the dead. He represents it as celebrated in memory of the Lord's passion. (*Ob memoriam Dominicæ passionis.*) (Section xxxvi.) He does indeed call it a sacrifice; but he takes care to let us know that sacraments receive the names of the things which they represent. "Thus we can say that the Lord is sacrificed when the sacraments of his passion are celebrated, since he once was sacrificed in himself for the salvation of the world." (*Sic etiam dicamus Dominum immolari quando passionis ejus sacramenta celebrantur, cum semel pro salute mundi sit immolatus in semetipso, sicut Apostolus ait.*) (Section xxxviii.) He quotes the following words from Fulgentius: "In this sacrifice there is thanksgiving, and the commemoration of the flesh of Christ which he offered for us, and of the blood which he shed for us." (Section xc.) This sacrifice, he tells us in the next paragraph, is "a *figure* of things past." In what Ratramn has written in regard to *this* question he is most satisfactory. He makes no acknowledgment of a repeated offering of Christ as a propitiatory sacrifice by the priest. It is only believing partakers who receive any profit from the sacrament. The idea of non-communicants being benefited by its solitary celebration by a priest was altogether foreign to his mind. His doctrine is in every point diametrically opposite to the third canon on the sacrifice of the mass promulgated by the Council of Trent.¹ It is impossible to read his treatise and believe that communion in one kind was practiced in

¹ This canon runs: *Si quis dixerit, Missæ sacrificium tantum esse laudis, et*

his day, or that the host was elevated for the people to adore it. These practices are natural consequences of transubstantiation, and their absence is a clear indication that that dogma had not yet established itself in the consciousness of the church.

Variety of opinion in regard to the nature of the Lord's supper was tolerated in the age of Ratramn. Ratramn himself recognized as Christian brethren those who held the views which he antagonized (Section ii.), while at the same time he affirms that they were divided by a not unimportant schism (*non parvo schismate dividuntur*) who uttered discordant sentiments regarding the mystery of Christ's body and blood. So, too, Paschasius Radbert, whom Ratramn opposed, frequently admits that doubt and contradiction were encountered by him in his teaching on the Eucharist. The writings of Paschasius abundantly testify that a denial of transubstantiation was not judged sufficient to exclude a man from the fellowship of the church. More freedom of opinion was allowed on this question in that age than on the question of predestination, as is shown by the persecution of Gottschalk. It was not till two hundred years later (and we are to remember that the tenth century, one of unparalleled darkness and disorder, intervened) that Berengar was condemned as a heretic for advocating views on the Lord's supper similar to those set forth by Ratramn. Berengar, in his epistle to Ascelin, accused Paschasius of having invented the notion that the substance of the bread does not remain in the sacrament. (*Solus sibi confingit sacramento Domini corporis decedere panis omnino substantiam.*) Protestants, not without reason, charge Paschasius with having first formulated the doctrine of transubstantiation, though this name is not given to it by him. As Steitz expresses it,¹ there had been playing with the notion of transubstantiation up to the time of Paschasius.² He was *in earnest* with it, hence the epoch-making significance of this theologian. Even Bellarmin declares that he "was the first author who wrote seriously and copiously concerning the truth of

gratiarum actionis, aut nudam commemorationem sacrificii in cruce peracti, non autem propitiatorium; vel soli prodesse sumenti; neque pro vivis et defunctis, pro peccatis, penis, satisfactionibus et aliis necessitatibus offerri debere: anathema sit.

¹ Article "Transubstantiation," Herzog's *Real Encyclopædia*, XV., p. 811.

² For proofs that Paschasius was an innovator, see Claude *On the Eucharist*, Book VI., chapter ix.

the body and blood of the Lord in the Eucharist." But contradiction of his extravagance was still permitted, and we have the evidence that he was boldly opposed by teachers of the greatest eminence then living, such as Rabanus Maurus, Joannes Scotus Erigena, and Ratramn. Even a century and a half afterwards, Pope Sylvester II. only ventures to make a modest apology for what he calls the "simplicity" of Paschasius.

The celebrated Jansenist Nicole, in his treatise on the *Perpetuity of the Faith of the Catholic Church touching the Eucharist*, makes this argument, which, though fully refuted by Claude, is still repeated: In the eleventh century the church declared against Berengar, and against his Calvinistic doctrine of the supper. The church doctrine of that century must have been also the church doctrine of preceding centuries. It is impossible that the church could have varied in so essential a dogma. Such variation would have occasioned disputes and disturbances which could not have passed away, leaving no trace of their occurrence. Such is the scope of Nicole's boasted argument. He craftily ignores the disputes that took place in the ninth century, when the treatise of Paschasius appeared advocating the view that the body of Christ in the sacrament is identical with the body which was born of the Virgin, and was crucified, and rose, and ascended into heaven. How daring, too, is the assumption that there is no trace of any variation in the doctrine prevailing in the church on the Lord's supper! Was not infant communion once the established usage in the Latin, as well as in the Greek, church? Was it not believed and taught that no infant could inherit eternal life without having partaken of the Eucharist? In the Greek church infant communion still prevails. In the Latin church the practice has been abolished, and the Council of Trent has pronounced against it. The doctrine of the Latin church has varied on this point, by the consent of all. Augustin could teach that infants who had not received the communion as well as baptism were liable to eternal punishment.¹ It cannot be contended that this is an unimportant question. It involves both doctrine and ritual. It is wonderful that, with such an admitted fact, Roman Catholic controversialists will still persist in declaring that the doctrine of

¹ *Nullus qui se meminit Catholicæ fidei Christianum negat aut dubitat parvulos*

the church on the Lord's supper has been uniform and unvarying. Unprejudiced inquirers find in ancient Christian literature two opposite tendencies manifested in speaking of this sacrament, some of the fathers favoring what is called the metabolic, the realistic, the grossly literal, view of Christ's words in instituting the Eucharist; others declaring for the symbolic, the figurative, the spiritual, view of them. Up to the time of Paschasius the conflict between the two diverging conceptions had not reached an acute stage. The age that succeeded was the best fitted for the triumphant establishment of the greatest absurdity that has ever been promulgated as a Christian doctrine. Any one who studies the memorials of the tenth century will not be so much astonished that what Berengar called the senselessness of the multitude (*vecordia vulgi*) should have embraced so unreasonable and unscriptural a delusion as transubstantiation. "This doctrine," Tillotson says truly, "hath been the occasion of the most barbarous and bloody tragedies that ever were acted in the world. For this hath been in the Church of Rome the great *burning article*; and, absurd and unreasonable as it is, more Christians have been murdered for the denial of it than, perhaps, for all the other articles of their religion."

At a time when, in a large and influential branch of the Protestant Church, which pays an extravagant reverence to everything that has been received by tradition from the fathers, there is displayed a strong reactionary spirit in favor of the revival of the doctrine of transubstantiation, it is useful to study its history; and we cannot but value highly the treatise of Ratramn, *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*, as an irrefragable witness that the doctrine is an innovation in the faith of the Church Catholic.

DUNLOP MOORE.

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non accepta gratia regenerationis in Christo sine cibo carnis ejus et sanguinis potu non habere in se vitam, ac per hoc pœnæ sempiternæ obnoxios. (Epist. 106.)

Döllinger and his friends thus refer to this subject (*Janus*, p. 51): "Innocent I. and Gelasius I., the former writing to the Council of Milevi, the latter in his epistle to the bishops of Picenum, declared it to be so indispensable for infants to receive the communion that those who died without it go straight to hell." (*S. Aug. Opp.* II., 640; *Concil. Coll.* (Ed. Labbé), IV., 1178.) A thousand years later the Council of Trent anathematized the doctrine.

III. ANSELM.

IN the year 1839, Rev. Robert Wharton Landis was residing in Allentown, Pa. While on a visit to Philadelphia, he explored, according to his wont, the musty treasures of a book-stall situated, we believe, on Seventh street. He fished out from a lot of rubbish a quarto in vellum cover, printed on heavy linen-laid paper, its exterior embossed prettily with leaves, flowers, and some figures resembling the *fleur de lis* of France. It proved to be a copy of Anselm's works. He turned quickly to the back of the book in search of a famous passage whose very existence had been disputed. This passage, if there, would give an ancient tradition concerning the personal appearance of Jesus Christ and also of his mother Mary. He found it on the last page following a passage under the title "*Invocatio matris virginis Marie simul et filii ejus.*" Overjoyed with the find, he asked the price of the book. "Nothing. You may have it." "But I do not wish to get it for nothing." "Well, you have been a good customer of mine, and are welcome to it for nothing. But if you insist on my naming a price, I will say one dollar." The tradition varies at this point, like a river dividing about an island, only to come together again below. One account is that Mr. Landis paid the dollar down, the other that he had not so much as a dollar with him, but sought and obtained permission to take the book to his lodgings and bring back the money to the bookseller. But both accounts agree in this, that he never let go the book.

So few men of this kind are left in the world that they have become a study and their memories should be cherished. We think of Charles Lamb lugging home from a London book-stall the long-coveted folio of Shakspeare, for which he had been saving up odd shillings and pence for such a while, then carefully unwrapping it beneath the pleased eyes of his sister Mary.

After these fifty-four years, the precious volume lies before me. The clasps are gone, though leaving their traces quite visible on

the cover, near the top of which is written in the now familiar chirography, "*Ex Bibliotheca Roberti W. Landis, An. 1839.*" On the title page we find printed, "*Opuscula beati Anselmi, archiepiscopi Cantuariensis ordinis sancti benedicti.*" The letters are in black ink, with some adornments in blue and red. Over this, pen-printed, is the inscription, "*Liber Canoniorum cathedrae Sancti Gothardi in Marsburg.*" At least, if the third word, *cade*, with a long, straight dash over the a and the d, does not represent *cathedrae*, we have been unable to decipher it.

Under the printed title, we find, in pen-print again, "*Johannes Kramer Breviarius Sancti Martini dedit*"; *i. e.*, it was a gift of John Kramer, a breviary, which we take to mean a reader of the breviary or daily service of the Romish church. There is no printed date to the book, but Dr. Landis has written across the middle of the title-page, "*Printed An. Dom. 1490.*" Why did we never ask him his reasons for assigning this date? He is reported to have said that there were only four known copies of this edition in the world. If so, we hope that one or more of the owners or custodians will report possession to the writer of this article. In hope of this, we shall be more minute in our description of the book than might be necessary to the general reader.

Next in order on the title page we read, "*Vide Biblical Repository, Vol. II., pp. 369, 797, and Vol. VI., pp. 349, 350.*" Anselm was born at Aosta, in the year 1034 (says Firaboschi), and studied under Lanfranc at the monastery of Bec in Normandy, where he afterwards, in his twenty-seventh year, devoted himself to a religious life. In three years he was made prior, and then abbot, of this monastery, whence he was taken, in the year 1093, to succeed to the archbishopric made vacant by the death of Lanfranc. Here he remained till his death in 1109, though often disturbed by dissensions with William II. and Henry I. respecting immunities and investitures. His theological works have much precision and depth; and it is an observation of many modern writers that the demonstration of the existence of God, taken from the idea of a supreme Being, which Des Cartes is thought to have originated, was first suggested by Anselm. Leibnitz himself affirms this. (*Opp. Tom. V., p. 570. Edit. Genevae, 1768. R. W. Landis.*)

As the different editions of Anselm's works vary so much in their contents, it may be stated that the page succeeding the title gives a list of twenty-eight distinct treatises in this volume, to which must be added the before-mentioned "Invocation of the Mother Virgin Mary and also of her Son," and especially the very last passage under the heading "*Ex gestis Anselmi colliguntur forma et mores beatæ Mariæ et ejus unici filii Jesu.*" We give the Latin here because it indicates that Anselm is not the author of the passage, but had copied it from some older source. It contains the statements that our Saviour's hair was of the color of an unripe Avellan nut, *i. e.* a filbert, for which the city of Avella or Abella seems to have been noted; that it lay smooth on his head nearly back to his ears, whence it flowed in a curling manner down to his shoulders; that after the custom of the Nazarenes (*Nazareorum*) it was parted in the middle; that his forehead was smooth and most serene; his face without wrinkle or spot; his complexion somewhat ruddy; his features faultless; his beard copious, manly, and divided in the middle; his eyes gray-blue, lively and bright. To which is added the non-scriptural and incredible statement which still lingers in the pulpit, that he was never seen to laugh, but often to weep. *Qui nunquam visus est ridere; flere, autem, sæpe.* The common pulpit tradition is that he was never seen to *smile*, which is farther from the truth than the original *ridere*.

These ancient statements are of no historic value, but they tally with modern supposititious pictures of Christ, and show what many people believed long ago.

LIFE OF ANSELM.

This was written by his friend Eadmer. We have not as yet seen a copy of either the original Latin or of Dean Church's translation; but we have read so many more or less direct quotations from it that we feel almost as if we had personally known Anselm. Eadmer was a monk of Canterbury. Anselm says of him (Letter 22, to Boso): "The book I have written, of which the title is "*Cur Deus Homo*," is being copied by Master Eadmer, my very dear son and the staff of my old age, a monk of Bec, to whom my

friends are indebted in proportion to their love for me, or rather to the church of Bec, whose son he is."

Anselm was born in or near Aosta at the foot of the Graian Alps, and, we think, in the year 1033. His father, Gundulf, did not give much attention to him in his boyhood; but his mother, Ermenberga, faithfully instructed him in piety. Before Anselm reached the age of fifteen, he warmly desired to enter the monastic life. Not getting his father's consent to this, he gradually lost his zeal, and after the death of Ermenberga fell into worldly and even immoral habits. A decided unpleasantness grew up between him and his father, and he left home, crossed the Alps, spent three years in Burgundy and France, dwelt some time at Absinca, a city of Normandy, and finally was drawn to the famous monastery of Bec, which was presided over by the illustrious Lanfranc. At the age of twenty-seven he assumed the monkly dress, A. D. 1060. Three years after, A. D. 1063, he was made prior; fifteen years later, A. D. 1078, he was unanimously elected abbot; and fifteen years thereafter, in 1093, succeeded Lanfranc as Archbishop of Canterbury. High positions are not always the most quiet and peaceful. Anselm became involved in controversies with William Rufus, the reigning king of England; he left the country and took refuge in Rome. An arrow of Walter Tyrrel, that had been aimed at a stag, glanced from a tree and slew William the Red. His brother Henry succeeded to the throne; the English greatly desired the restoration of Anselm to his archiepiscopal see, for he was a man much beloved wherever he lived; and so in A. D. 1100 he was honorably recalled to England. But a dissension having arisen between him and Henry on the question of lay or clerical investitures of presbyters, Anselm was compelled to leave England again in the year 1103. The strife having been at length composed, he once more returned to Canterbury in 1106, "with great joy of all the people"; and there, at the dawn of the morning a few days before Easter, A. D. 1109, his soul passed peacefully into the day that knows no night. The annals of the church are adorned with few more attractive characters. The mediæval Augustine, as he has been well called by Neander, he combined wonderful acuteness of intellect with un-

common sweetness of disposition. Humble, devout, tender-hearted, self-denying, firm, courageous, and, excepting some few Romish vagaries, orthodox in the main and sound in the faith. Such is the estimate a Presbyterian of A. D. 1895 would put upon this venerable man.

Mr. Hume, in his history of England, has occasion to advert to Anselm and his contests with William Rufus and Henry I. Mr. Hume undertakes to ridicule the illustrious father of the scholastic theology in an ungracious sort of way. It is probable that Anselm held no opinion with which Mr. Hume was in sympathy.

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

Few questions in apologetics have awakened more interest in the minds of theologians than that which respects the validity of Anselm's famous argument for the being of a God. Six centuries before his birth a casual remark had fallen from the pen of Augustine, in his treatise on the Holy Spirit, to the effect that God is something than which nothing greater can be thought: *Quo nihil majus cogitari potest*. The great Latin father does not seem to have employed the phrase in any apologetic way, and never could have dreamed that more than half a millennium after his death the seed of this thought would take root in the heart of an Anselm. The argument, as stated in the second chapter of the *Prosologion*, is as follows: "And certainly that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be in the understanding alone. For, even if it is in the understanding alone, it can be thought to be also in thing [*in re*, in reality, in actual existence], which is greater. If, therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But certainly this cannot be. There exists, therefore, without doubt, something than which a greater cannot be thought, both in understanding and in reality."

This is a purposely close translation. We give "understanding" as the rendering of *intellectus*, to correspond with "understand" as the proper English of *intelligo* in the unquoted context.

This, then, is the argument; and we think that this is all of it, and that no substantial addition to it is made anywhere by Anselm, while he says much in the way of illustration and explanation.

Gaunilo, a monk, wrote a respectful, and, we think, an able, answer, which has been preserved, and is found in full in the Landis copy of Anselm's works. Anselm had quoted from the fourteenth or the fifty-third Psalm, "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God," and had endeavored to show that the fool was inconsistent with himself. Gaunilo playfully styles his own tract *Pro Insipiente (A Plea for the Fool)*. Immediately after this comes Anselm's reply. The English reader will find a translation of these two tracts in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October, 1851. It is wonderful how acutely they reasoned in the eleventh century.

Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274 A. D.) rejected Anselm's argument. René Descartes (1596-1650 A. D.) gives the following as one of his arguments for the being of a God: "And as from this that the mind perceives, for example, that in the idea of a triangle it is necessarily contained that its three angles are equal to two right angles, it plainly persuades itself that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, so from this alone that it perceives that a necessary and eternal existence is contained in the idea of a most perfect being, it ought to conclude plainly that a most perfect being exists." (Quoted from Hagenbach's *History of Doctrine*, II., 316.) If this is not absolutely identical with Anselm's argument, it is very closely akin to it. See, however, Shedd's *Theology*, I., 235-'36.

Ralph Cudworth (A. D. 1617-1688) gives the arguments for and against Anselm, and inclines to Anselm's side. (*Intellectual System*.) John Howe leans the same way, as quoted by Dr. Shedd from *The Living Temple*.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, takes ground strongly adverse to Anselm. Kant's name does not weigh much with theists in this controversy; his arguments, however, must be allowed to stand for themselves, and they are certainly very forcible.

Coleridge, of England, Neander, of Germany, and Dr. Charles Hodge, of America, are anti-Anselmists. Indeed, we think Anselm's argument would have been given up, but for the powerful advocacy of Dr. W. G. T. Shedd in his *History of Christian Doctrine*, and more recently in his great work on *Dogmatic Theology*.

The following suggestions are offered to such of the readers of this review as have not already made up their opinions on the subject:

We might hesitate about rejecting this argument of Anselm, if all the objectors were atheists, and all the theists were favorers. But when theistical metaphysicians like Kant and Coleridge, and theologians like Thomas Aquinas and Charles Hodge, deny the validity of the argument, we may well question its logical worth. The bias of judgment in all defenders of the faith would naturally be on the side of Anselm. Quite a good thing would it be, to have a short and easy argument which in half a dozen lines would overthrow atheism. It was this which recommended it to Anselm, as well it might. But it has seemed so unreliable, that many of the champions of the faith unhesitatingly cast it aside. Some of its advocates, too, as Cudworth, lack clearness of conviction; Howe thinks the argument might be so modified, or so stated, as to command our assent. This is not the language of assurance. On the other hand, the opposers of the argument are positive in the assertion of its non-validity.

After repeated examinations of the matter in Anselm's own works, we have arrived at moral certainty of conviction that the argument is ill-founded, and resembles those old Greek sophisms which everybody knew to be sophistical, but of which it was so hard to detect the fallacy. Everybody, sophists included, knew that the swift-footed Achilles could overtake the tortoise; but a Whately gave a wrong solution of the puzzle, and, we believe, Coleridge thought it involved something beyond human powers, while light was thrown on it by the consideration that the sum of an arithmetical series having an infinite number of terms is often a finite number; or thus: conceding the infinite divisibility of matter, if a yard-stick be subdivided into an infinite number of

atoms, and the atoms be put back into their original positions, the restored stick will be, as before, just one yard long. And so of an hour, or a minute. Yet where does the successive division pass from the finite to the infinite? Some way or other infinitude transcends us.

Another familiar instance is furnished by the argument to prove the impossibility of motion: "A body must move in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not. But both of these are impossible, and there are no other places than these two. Hence motion is impossible."

The old—may it not be said, the stupid—answer was, *solvitur ambulando*, it is solved by walking. Now the sophists could walk as well as other people, and doubtless did walk; and knew perfectly that there was a fallacy in their argument, but where and what was the fallacy? The best answer hitherto given is that there may be more than two horns to a dilemma; and in this case a third horn is, that a body may move from a place where it is now to another place where at present it is not. These humorous puzzles of antiquity are not without their utility. They point to that peculiar psychological condition in which we may be absolutely sure that a fallacy is involved in a course of reasoning, while we cannot for the life of us find just where the fallacy lies. If we have no direct and indubitable means of disproving the error, as "solving by walking," two methods of procedure are open to us. The first is very patiently to scrutinize the sophism until we can put our finger on the narrow line which separates truth from error, and sound from unsound ratiocination.

In the present instance we discover that the fallacy is a failure to distinguish between a *conception* and a *belief*. This is, substantially, the main objection urged by the illustrious philosopher of Königsberg: "If I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still remains, whether this being exists or not." The same thought is implied in his lucid and important distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. But our space forbids us to dwell on this. Coleridge, again, sees the point, though he does not present it so clearly as Kant does: "The Cartesian syllogism ought to stand

thus: The *idea* of God comprises the *idea* of all attributes that belong to perfection. But the idea of existence is such; therefore the idea of existence is included in the idea of God. Now, existence is no *idea*, but a *fact*. . . . The *idea* of the fact is not the fact itself." For our own purposes, however, and for reasons which will appear in the sequel, we direct special attention to the before-mentioned distinction between a conception and a belief, that we may not fall into the same trap into which the great father of the scholastic philosophy fell in the eleventh century.

The forming of a conception, or, if you please, the construction of a concept, is largely volitional. We may form the conception of a God as a spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being and in his natural and moral attributes; and we may frame a definition in accordance therewith. Indeed, we *must* form some sort of conception of a God before we can affirm or deny his existence, that is, if our words are to have any meaning. Most of the readers, like the writer, of this article could neither affirm nor deny the truth of a page of Sanscrit or Chinese. We could neither believe nor disbelieve it. Anselm's fool, who "said in his heart, There is no God," must, of course, have attached some meaning to the term "God" before saying that he was not.

The next step is a very important one. If the great thinkers to whom we have referred have overlooked anything, it is just here. We must *conceive* the meaning of the second, as well as of the first, word in the phrase GOD IS. Kant saw very clearly the distinction between *is* as a word of definition and *is* as a statement of a real, objective existence. The writers on logic emphasize the same distinction. Anselm, too, understood it well. But this is not the point just now. We call special attention to the extremely simple, and hence liable-to-be-disregarded, thought that we can conceive of a thing's existing, as well as of any attribute comprised in its concept. Not only so, but we *must* have that conception in our minds—in *intellectu*, as Anselm so often expresses it—before we can either believe or disbelieve that it exists *in re*. Before the fool could say, "There is no God," in a blameworthy way, and expressing his opinion, he must have known what it is

to be. (Of course we are aware that the words "*There is*" are supplied by the translators. They are implied by the terse Hebrew.)

To conceive that a substance with its attributes really exists, and to believe that it does, are two quite different mental acts. We cannot believe without first conceiving, but we may conceive without either believing or disbelieving. We conceive at will—at least, in very many cases; we believe under more or less constraint, and on evidence. The two mental states approach each other closely, like two curves which osculate, but do not cut. The line which separates conception and belief may be so fine that it has length only, without breadth or thickness; as two pieces of porcelain may be so neatly fused together and so nicely glazed that neither sight nor touch shall detect the seam, which, indeed, is detected by the difference in color of the pieces themselves.

We hold that this distinction is the key to the puzzle, and we select from Anselm's own statements of his argument that which appears to be the most puzzling. As above mentioned, it occurs in the second chapter of the *Prosologion*: "And certainly that than which a greater cannot be thought (*cogitari*) cannot be in the understanding alone." That is, it cannot be a mere subjective conception, but there must be a corresponding objective reality. Why? "For even if it is in the understanding alone, it can be thought (*cogitari* again) to be also in reality (*in re*), which is greater." Will our readers please notice the employment of those innocent-looking, but slippery, words *cogito* and *sum*? *Cogito* may mean either to conceive or to believe. Let us stick to one of its meanings, and paraphrase the quotation: "For even if the conception of that than which a greater cannot be conceived, namely, the Deity, be a mere subjective conception, it, namely, the Deity, can be conceived of as actually existing, which is greater." The last clause, "which is greater," we take to mean that an actually-existent thing is greater than the subjective conception.

We now come into the kernel of Anselm's argument: "If, therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot

be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But certainly this cannot be. There exists, therefore, without doubt, something than which a greater cannot be thought, both in understanding and in reality."

To which we offer the following answer along the lines already indicated. For a thing to be in the understanding is a figurative expression, and means simply that we think of it, or conceive of it, in our minds. Thus we may conceive of something than which a greater cannot be conceived; as Anselm so often expresses it, we understand the words "that than which," etc. That something turns out to be God. We can understand the Westminster definition, or that of Sir Isaac Newton in the grand Scholium to his *Principia*, or any other of the accepted ones, or the Augustino-Anselmic one just given. We can do this without considering the question whether or not such a being exists. Next, we can conceive that he exists, or that he does not. As we please about this; only we cannot believe or disbelieve in his existence without the prior conception of that existence (or its negative, non-existence). Now, if this second step enlarges our previous conception, it shows merely that the previous conception lacked one additional element, viz., that of existence; in other words, we had thought what *God* means; but not what *is* signifies, when it does not indicate a definition, but affirms a positive, objective existence.

We cannot conceive of anything more on this line. A greater cannot be thought. We are at the end of conception. The next step is belief; and we can believe no more than we have conceived. Belief is absolutely limited by conception. Much as we admire the great abilities and worth of an Anselm, we cannot surrender the ultimate principles of all belief either here, or in the doctrine of transubstantiation. Belief may fall short of conception, but it cannot go beyond it. This is ultimate and axiomatic.

Another method may suit some readers better. Let us state the argument briefly thus: "A substance, than which a greater cannot be conceived, is greater than the conception of that substance. Therefore, the substance actually is." Answer: The premiss is a solecism. How can an actually existing substance be

greater, truly and literally greater, than a mere mental conception? A flower or its stem, greater than a thought in our minds? God, greater than a nonentity? A comparative term like greater can be used only of things of the same class. Again, by what legerdemain does the conclusion follow from the premiss? Finally, the verb *is* must not be used in different senses in the premiss and in the conclusion. In the conclusion it affirms real, objective existence. If it does so in the premiss, the real existence of the substance is taken for granted. But, as Coleridge says, that is the very point to be proven.

Let us apply the same method of reasoning to prove the existence of an independent principle of evil, as taught in the Zendavesta. Instead of *majus*, greater, write *pejus*, worse. "And certainly that than which a worse cannot be thought cannot be in the understanding alone." That is, cannot be a mere subjective conception. "For even if it is in the understanding alone, it can be thought to be also in reality, which is worse, etc. There exists, therefore, without doubt, something than which a worse cannot be thought, both in understanding and in reality." It is well that Zoroaster never thought of this argument for the Persian theosophy, for he would certainly have made some additional converts to his faith.

Every one knows that we are very apt to believe that which we wish to be true. We turn our eyes away from the arguments against it, while the arguments for it are received without question. At all events, this is the least irrational method of procedure. The camera receives the impression; it is receptive, but it may be turned away from one object and directed full upon another. But there are cases in which we pass from conception to belief without any process of ratiocination. This occurs in the phenomenon of dreams—a part of our mental economy at which we never cease to wonder. The same thing takes place in insanity. A friend of mine who had been cured of an attack of insanity, told me that while he was in that condition he *believed everything he thought*. This is a well known part of the pathology of the mind.

Then there is the field of fiction, especially of the drama, in

which, under superior acting, the illusions are so remarkable. Actor and audience alike are under a spell; but the actor first, and then the audience. On such occasions there is a kind of double consciousness not always easy to maintain. Thus one of the most gifted of the English tragedians was quite dangerous in some of the sword combats of the stage; he lost sight of his own personality. Once, indeed, in the rôle of Richard III. he mounted his horse and rode through the streets of London in his royal apparel. We should never believe what we have conceived without just cause and reason.

Coleridge having alleged that "existence is no idea but a *fact*," Dr. Shedd says (I. 233): "This objection holds against the Cartesian form of argument, but not against the Anselmic. The idea of 'existence,' it is true, is one to which there may be no corresponding reality or fact. But the idea of 'necessary existence' is not."

So, too, on page 224, in stating Anselm's argument, "But such perfection as this implies *necessary* existence; and necessary existence implies *actual* existence; because if a thing must be, of course it is." See also p. 225. On all which we offer the following remarks: (1), This thought of the necessity of the divine existence was fully before Kant's mind and is commented on by him. It did not change his opinion at all.

Dr. Hodge, also, says (I. 205): "If this argument has any validity, it is unimportant. It is only saying that what must be, actually is." Dr. Hodge's argument here is an enthymeme, and omits the minor premiss. The full syllogism would be: whatever must be, is; God must be; therefore God is. The fallacy lies in the minor; no proof is given that God must be.

(2), When we speak of "necessity of existence" as "an attribute of being," we must not overlook the point that the "necessity" is an attribute of the "existence," not of the being, *i. e.*, the substance which underlies the attributes. A necessary *existence* is as much a fact, and not a mere idea, in Coleridge's sense of the terms, as a contingent existence is.

(3), While we apprehend that the distinction just made goes to the root of the subject, the following considerations may be more

satisfactory to some of our readers. The origination and the continuance of man's existence depend ultimately on the will of God. We express this by saying that man's existence is contingent; and as all sound Calvinistic thinkers hold, contingent does not mean uncertain. The existence of every man that now lives or ever has lived on the earth has been as certain from all eternity as the existence of God himself. But God never had any origination, and his existence at the present moment and its continuance into the future, do not depend on the will of any other being whatsoever.

This is the negative side of necessary existence. On the positive side, be it said with humility, yet, with conviction, that the wondrous Essence which we denominate God has strength to ENDURE; strength in and of himself. This strength inheres in the infinite Essence, and it cannot be diminished, much less annihilated, by any other force in the universe. It is, indeed, the foundation of all other forces uncreated or created. All the uncreated forces reside in God. The Son being the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person, made the world, made all things visible and invisible, and upholds all things by the word of his power. By him all things consist, *συνέστηκε*, stand together, are not dissolved, are a cosmos, and not a chaos. This self-sustained being possesses a necessary existence in the combination of the negative and the positive ideas just given. His existence does not depend upon the will of another, but is upheld by an infinite and persistent energy all his own. But in the order of thought, the essence must exist prior to its possession of any attribute, even of strength to endure. God said to Moses, I am he who is. So the LXX. and the Vulgate render the Hebrew. First, Jehovah, who is; then Elohim, who is strong. So profound are the thoughts which God hath concerning himself.

It will be observed that we reject the Augustinian notion of the divine existence as a *punctum stans*, an existence without succession. This view seems to have had a singular fascination for some great minds. Carlyle says, I think it is in his *Sartor Resartus*, "The curtain of yesterday rolls down; the curtain of to-

morrow rolls up; but yesterday and to-morrow both are." We quote from memory, and are far from sure that Carlyle really believed it. Kant, of course, must say that, "Neither yesterday, nor to-morrow, nor to-day ever is, except in human phantasy."

To us the onward march of the deity through the ages is like Goethe's sublime description of the sun, in the prologue to *Faust*, moving forward "with thunder-step," *mit donnergang*, an expression which Bayard Taylor says had been used before, but which Goethe employs with rare felicity.

To vary the illustration slightly: The sun is where it is at any instant, because it was at the contiguous point the moment before; and it will occupy the position of the next instant because it is now in the precedent position. So God is, because he was; he shall be, because he is. We are sure that by an instinct which has its counterpart in our nature, he, too, desires "to live, to labor, and to create"; but whether there is any conation, any conscious effort to endure, is a mystery beyond our ken. There is none in our own case, for we are upheld by him. But how is it with the divine essence? This is a problem over which a finite spirit can only linger and muse, as Augustine was so wont to do in the presence of the supreme mysteries of life and being.

The conception of this glorious being is greater than that of any being sustained in existence by him. To use Anselm's favorite phrase, it is the conception of that than which a greater cannot be thought. But does this conception found a belief? Is it like the conception of infinite space, which immediately and irresistibly awakens in us the belief that space is unlimited?

We answer, By no means. If it were, our belief in God's existence would be an intuition. It would not admit of argument. How could we prove what is intuitively true? If this sublime truth is axiomatic, why adduce an ontological argument for it?

We are aware that some thinkers incline to the view that we know the existence of the eternal one by a God-consciousness, a *Gottesbewusstseyn*. Be their contention right or wrong, Anselm attempts not to *intuit*, but to *prove*. He has given to mankind an ontological *argument*; and only as such can we treat it.

Let it be conceded, then, that inherent strength to endure is an element of our concept of a deity; that it is not a fact (we know no better word), but is an attribute of the infinite essence whose existence is under discussion; and that we can *conceive* that a divine essence, clad with this almighty power, endures; are we thereby authorized to infer that it actually is? We answer, No! For to do so would be to make the perilous mistake of substituting a belief for a conception. We must have a reason for every inferential belief. Our conceiving a thing to be true is no reason for our believing it to be true. That is the illusory process of dreams and of insanity.

There is a manifest slip in Dr. Shedd's argumentation here. He says: "The *idea* of necessary existence implies the *idea* of actual existence." Yes, it may imply the *idea* of it, but it does not imply the fact. The idea of an absolutely perfect being may contain, as an element of the concept, the idea of necessary existence; and this again may imply the *idea* of actual existence, but it does not prove the absolute existence itself.

HOW ANSELM CAME TO DEVISE THIS ARGUMENT.

First of all, he was fitted to excogitate it by a native subtlety of intellect not often surpassed in the church. This was whetted up by a long course of dialectics until it took on what may be termed a wire-edge, the penalty which such men under such a training have so often had to pay.

Then, as he modestly states in the introductions to the *Prosologion*, the *Monologion*, and the *Cur Deus Homo*, he was importuned by the brethren to write out his views on various points in divinity. The *Prosologion* especially seems to have stuck to his mind like a burr, like a chess or mathematical problem. "On a certain occasion, when Anselm was profoundly reflecting how everything that belongs to the doctrine concerning God, his essence, and his attributes, might be summed up and comprehended in one brief argument, the thought haunted him everywhere, so that he could neither eat nor sleep quietly. Even his devotions at matins, and other seasons of church worship, were thereby disturbed. Already he was on the point of repelling all these

thoughts as a temptation of Satan. But the more he struggled against them the more importunately they thronged in upon his mind. And one night, during the celebration of vigils, his thoughts all at once became clear, his heart swelled with delight, and he immediately recorded the train of reflection which had given him this high satisfaction, and this was the origin of his *Prosologion*." (Neander IV., 368.)

To this must be added a slight tendency to enthusiasm. On the same page Neander relates that while Anselm was prior in the monastery of Bec, he awoke one morning before matins, and was absorbed in thinking how the prophets had viewed the past and the future at once as something present. "With his eyes fixed on the ground he saw, directly through the wall, the monks, whose allotted business it was, passing about in the church, going up to the altar, putting everything in order for the mass, lighting the candles, and at length one of them ringing the bell to awaken the rest."

So we have in this end of the nineteenth century men who avow that they have had one or more personal interviews with Christ in his glorified body, not to mention numbers who credit the vagaries of Swedenborg. Even some ministers need more knowledge of the pathology of the mind, particularly as it is affected by states of the nervous system. Anselm fasted much, meditated much, was wearied at times, doubtless; he himself says: "On a certain day, therefore, when by vehemently resisting its importunity, I was *wearied* in the very conflict of (my) thoughts, that of which I had despaired [viz., the ontological argument] so offered itself that I earnestly embraced the thoughts which I was solicitously repelling." We may learn much from the mistakes of great men, not in order to vaunt ourselves against their strength, but to guard ourselves against their weakness.

OTHER VIEWS OF ANSELM.

These must be stated briefly. He teaches that earth is to be the future abode of the saints. (*Cur Deus Homo*, I., 18.) That the seats of the fallen angels shall be refilled from the human race. (*Cur Deus Homo*, I., 17.) That the whole human nature

was in our first parents, and that it all was vanquished in them. (I., 18.) That the sinner's inability does not excuse him. (I., 24.) That the active obedience of Christ was not a part of his atoning work; that he atoned by his sufferings only. That the human nature in Christ was omniscient. (II., 13.) That the Virgin Mary was not originally sinless. "That Virgin of whom was assumed that Man of whom we are speaking was of those who before his birth were cleansed by him from sins, and in that same purity of hers was he assumed of her." (*Virgo autem illa, de qua ille homo assumptus est de quo loquimur, fuit de illis qui ante natiuitatem ejus per eum mundati sunt a peccatis, et in ejus ipsa munditia de illa assumptus est.*—II., 16.) That she became sinless through faith prior to the conception of Christ. (*De Conceptu Virginali*, xv.) Still more clearly in *Cur Deus Homo*, xvi., Boso asks: "How, from the sinful mass, that is, from the human race, which was all infected with sin, God assumed humanity, as though unleavened were taken from fermented dough? For, granted that the conception of that Man himself is pure, and free from the sin of carnal delight, yet the Virgin herself, from whom he assumed humanity, was 'shapen in wickedness,' and 'in sin did her mother conceive her,' and she was born in original sin, since she herself sinned in Adam, in whom all have sinned." Again, the Virgin never could have been sinless, "except by believing in *his* true death." (Chap. xvii.) Anselm teaches, however, that Mary excels all other creatures, human or superhuman. He addresses a long prayer to her: "Intercede, therefore, most pure lady, that it may be effected for us, because our God, of thy most chaste womb being made Man, came among men." (Intercede, ergo, domina purissima, etc.—*De Excellentia Beatæ Virginis Mariæ*, xii.) From all which we learn that Anselm's Mariolatry, though objectionable, had not reached the superfluity of naughtiness of *Pio Nono* and the nineteenth century. The oft-recurring phrase, "Mother of God," is not scriptural, but can be borne by Protestant ears as a protest against Nestorianism. We still sing,

"God, the mighty Maker, died,"

holding, of course, that the death of our Lord appertained solely to his manhood.

Anselm held that infants dying unbaptized were condemned (*damnari*). This is lamentable, but we see no way to escape the conviction that he held this frightful tenet. At the beginning of each of his treatises there is a list of the headings of the particular treatise; and these seem to have been prefixed by another hand. Thus, at the beginning of the treatise *De Conceptu Virginali et Peccato Originali* we find *Incipiunt capitula in librum beati Anselmi ordinis sancti benedicti*, etc. The twenty-sixth heading is: *Contra illos qui putant infantes non debere damnari*. When we come to the twenty-sixth chapter, we find the singular misprint, *Contra illos qui non putant*, etc., which flatly contradicts the previous heading. We wondered whether Anselm's remarkable goodness of heart had not lifted him above the old traditions of the Latin church; but the body of the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth chapters leaves no room for doubt. For instance, he answers the objector: "Infantes debere damnari qui sine baptismo moriunt ob solam injusticiam, quam dixi, non vult accipere"; that is, who is not willing to admit that infants dying unbaptized ought to be condemned. He illustrates by a supposed case of a man and his wife, who had attained to some great dignity and possession, by no merit of their own, but by grace alone, who had then inexcusably committed a grievous crime, and had been reduced to slavery on account of it; their sons, born in that condemnation, ought to be subjected to the same slavery, and not to the benefits which their parents had justly lost. (Chap. xxvi.)

What Anselm meant by the word *damno* we may infer from the following extract: "*Denique omnis homo aut salvatur aut damnatur; omnis homo qui salvatur, ad regnum cælorum admittitur; et omnis qui damnatur, ab eo excluditur.*" Further quotations might be made, but they are unnecessary.

On this painful subject the writer has reached the following conclusions, which are offered for the consideration of his brethren:

The doctrine of the perdition of infants dying without baptism is a poisonous plant that sprang up from the foul soil of Ritualism before Augustine's day. The early Pelagians, too, were pressed by those Scriptures which affirm the necessity of baptism. Pelagius taught that infants were born *in puris naturalibus*, with-

out any taint of sin. But if they died unbaptized, what became of them? To this he made his famous answer, "*Quo non eant, scio; quo eant, nescio.*" Whither they do not go, I know; whither they do go, I know not.

It was natural to invent some sort of *Limbus Infantum*, an intermediate place or state between hell and heaven, and this is possibly what Celestius intended by what he said on the subject. Augustine himself at one time inclined to a similar opinion; but finally at the Council of Carthage, in 418 A. D., the North African Church, with his concurrence, condemned the doctrine of an intermediate state for unbaptized children, and "according to the doctrine of this council, the eternal perdition of all unbaptized infants was expressly affirmed." (*Neander's Church History*, II., 669.) Augustine's vast intellect reminds one of a broad principality, which contains noble mountains, fertile plains, and miasmatic morasses. The draining and clearing up of these pestilential swamps has been the work of the very best theologians of the church since the Bishop of Hippo fell on sleep.

The Romish church, however, turned aside to semi-Pelagianism and retained ritualism. Hence we find in their authorized formularies such statements as these: "*Si quis dixerit, baptismum liberum esse, hoc est non necessarium ad salutem; anathema sit.*" (Council of Trent, Sessio VII., Art. 5. Streitwolf's Collection.) "*Cum itaque per Adæ peccatum pueri ex origine noxam contraxerint, multo magis per Christum dominum possunt gratiam, et justitiam consequi, ut regnent in vita: quod quidem sine baptismo fieri nullo modo potest.*" (Roman Catechism, Chap. II. De Baptismo, Quaestio 26.) See also Quaes. 31: What is the chief effect of baptism? and 2, 33, 35, etc., as confirmatory in general.

How fully Romish theologians accept these teachings, and whether they attempt to explain them away by any subtillies, we are not able to say.

It is a singular corroboration of the preceding view of the case that individuals in this nineteenth century severely condemning Rome, but stoutly maintaining that sin is (ordinarily) forgiven only in baptism by immersion, have closed the gates of heaven to

the non-immersed. Nothing is more remorseless and intolerant than ritualism. The Calvinistic theology provides the only way by which infants can be saved. Pelagianism teaches that they do not need salvation, and of course that they are not saved at all. If they *are* saved, it must be by God's electing grace, and the Holy Ghost acting when and as he will. As to the coarse and revolting calumny that we hold "that there are infants in hell not a span long," our church will do well if it shall stamp it out by the end of the twentieth century.

The following tenets of Anselm will be more acceptable to our readers: That foreknowledge and predestination are consistent with free-agency; that the satisfaction of Christ is of infinite merit; that this satisfaction was rendered to God and not paid to the devil. It has been boldly and repeatedly affirmed in Kentucky, and, we suppose, elsewhere, that Anselm was the first theologian who ever taught the last-mentioned doctrine, while all who preceded him held that the price of our pardon was paid to the devil!

Now it is well known that this detestable doctrine had its adherents especially among the early Greek fathers. Sometimes it would seem to have been held along with sounder views notwithstanding the incongruity. But Hagenbach and Shedd in their histories of doctrines give ample illustrations of the Anselmian view centuries before Anselm was born. Thus Gregory of Nazianzum (328-389 A. D): "I would ask to whom was it [the ransom] paid in this case? And for what reason? Perhaps to Satan himself? But *φεν τῆς ὑβρεως* [*i. e.*, shame on such insolence]. For in that case the robber had not only received *from* God, but received God himself (in Christ) as a ransom and an exceedingly great recompense of his tyranny."

He teaches, however, that the Father did not "demand or need" the ransom, but received it "on account of the divine economy." (Hagenbach I. 377-'8; Shedd I. 245.) Dr. Shedd gives the words of Athanasius much more fully than Hagenbach does. "Christ as a man endured death for us, inasmuch as he offered himself for that purpose *to the Father*." "Desiring to annul our death, he took on himself a body from the Virgin Mary, that by offering this *unto the Father* a sacrifice for all, he might deliver us all."

The Logos "saw how inadmissible (*ἀτοπον*, out of place) it would be for sin to escape *the law, except through a fulfilment and satisfaction of the law.*" Of this and other passages Dr. Shedd says, "This is the strongest possible statement of the doctrine of penal satisfaction. . . . He joins on upon the biblical idea of a sacrifice to satisfy offended law and justice, with as much clearness and energy as any theologian previous to the time of Anselm." And yet Athanasius died in 373, *i. e.*, six hundred and sixty years before Anselm was born. So idle and frivolous is the assertion that Anselm was the first to teach that the sacrifice of Christ was not offered to Satan.

As illustrative of the astounding vitality of error, it may be mentioned that Barton W. Stone, the well-known leader of the "New Lights" in Kentucky, revived this hideous doctrine in his discussion with that very gifted man, Dr. John P. Campbell. Commenting on Hebrews ii. 14, Stone said, "Here we see that the devil had the power of death, and he got the price, which was the death of Christ." "What," cried Dr. Campbell, "What! was the blood, the 'precious blood' of Christ given to a foul, abominable fiend? was God so deeply indebted to the prince of hell, that the richest blood in the universe must flow out in payment? Was the supreme being so weak, so devoid of resource, so thwarted and baffled in his measures, as to be obliged to compound with a poor, damned rebel, who is reserved in chains of darkness to the judgment of the great day, and pay him such a price for the ransom of sinners? Was the Almighty Father so merciless, so lost to tenderness, as to deliver up his own, *his only Son*, to glut the malice of a blood-thirsty demon? Was the innocent Lamb of God made a victim, and immolated upon the altar of hell to appease the wrath of the devil? O sacred God! how low is thy power reduced, how is thy character stigmatized, how is thy glory tarnished by such a doctrine! What a *libel* on TRUTH and the cross! Its worst enemies could wish no more to render it contemptible. No feature of infamy could be imposed on Christianity that would make it more disgusting, more shocking, more repulsive, than the hideous one we now contemplate." (Davidson's *Hist. Pr. Ch. Ky.*)

This was in 1806; and it is truly wonderful that in less than a century and a quarter from the time when Daniel Boone settled in the "Dark and Bloody Ground" of Kan-tuck-kee, this detestable vagary of the early Greek fathers should be advocated on two widely separate occasions and in the most public way. The war-whoop of hostile tribes of Indians fighting for the use of the thickly-wooded hunting grounds south of the Ohio had scarcely died away, until a voice was heard advocating the just right of the devil to the most stupendous sacrifice in the universe; and seventy-five or eighty years later it was echoed with defiance in churches and court-houses. So false to history is it that "Error dies amid her worshippers."

Anselm being a personal disciple of Lanfranc, the great antagonist of Berengarius, would naturally uphold the real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Eucharist. We have found only brief intimations of this—brief but sufficient. Yet he denies that our senses ever, properly speaking, deceive us. His chief illustration is drawn from looking through colored glass; red, for instance. The *exterior* sense reports truly; the *interior* sense may be deceived.

In the *Dialogue on Free Will* he maintains, (1), "That the power of sinning does not pertain to freedom of will." His meaning is, of course, that God and the elect angels are free and yet cannot sin. (2), "That nevertheless man and angel have sinned through this power and free will; and although they have been able to serve sin, sin has not, however, been able to rule over them." (3), He explains "How, after they made themselves the servants of sin, they had free will; and what free will is." (10), "That the sinner is a servant of sin, and that it is a greater miracle when God restores that rectitude to one forsaking (it), than when he restores life to a dead man." (11), "That that servitude does not take away freedom of will." (13), "That the power of preserving rectitude of will on account of the rectitude itself, is a perfect definition of free will."

On the difficult topic of imputation, Anselm teaches, (1), That sin is the lack of the righteousness due to God. (2), That all Adam's descendants, except Christ, were in Adam seminally. In-

fants were in him causally and naturally [*i. e.*, as to cause and nature], as in a seed. They were in themselves personally [as to person]. "In him they were not others (*alii*), but from him; in themselves, they were other (*alii*) than he. In him they were he; in themselves, they are themselves. They were therefore in him, but [they were] not themselves when they themselves not yet were." This purposely close translation will give an idea of Anselm's metaphysical style. He denies that being (existing) in Adam is nothing, and not to be named being. (3), With the Vulgate he translates Rom. v. 11, ἔφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, *in whom* all sinned. (4), The sin and the ills (*mala*) of Adam descend to infants. There is a sin by nature and a sin by person. As the personal passes over into the nature [referring to Adam's first transgression], so the natural passes over to persons [*i. e.*, from Adam's nature] to the persons of his children. Human nature sinned in Adam, and lost original righteousness. This want of righteousness (*nuditas justitiæ*) merits condemnation (*damnationem*). Adam's offspring are condemned for their own sin, not for Adam's. When Adam sinned, human nature sinned. When an infant is condemned for original sin, he is condemned not for Adam's sin, but for his own. For if he had not his own sin, he would not be condemned. But the infant has not sinned after the likeness of Adam's prevarication; *i. e.*, not so grievously as Adam, and hence his condemnation is not so severe. Baptism blots out (*delet*) all pre-baptismal sin in adults or infants.

FINAL IMPRESSIONS.

We have aimed to give our readers the facts, and they can form their own judgments. The general impressions to which the study of Anselm and his times has conducted the writer are the following:

1. Anselm suggests to us not so much the miner as the smelter. He does not so much dig out the ore as reduce it. Where he essayed strictly original work, as in his Ontological Argument, he was led astray by his very acumen. This was said to have occurred in the case of perhaps the ablest judge that we have ever known personally, a man not unlike Anselm in acuteness, in men-

tal activity, and in prolonged meditation. He was not to any great extent a maker of law, but was for many years a judge of law, and it was said, in an address at his funeral by an able lawyer who knew him well: "His great mind sometimes led him astray." But we must remember that Lord Bacon rejected the Copernican theory; so did Tycho Brahe, for want of a telescope. Napier, the famous Scotch mathematician, is thought to have had some leanings toward a belief in the black art. The wonderfully sound-headed John Calvin devised a vagary touching the Eucharist. Nearly all the great thinkers have gone astray on something,—the men who shall be remembered when our words, works, and names shall be forgotten on the earth.

The judicial and eminently conservative mind of Anselm clung to the Trinity, and the christology of the early Greek church, to the anthropology of Augustine, and, indeed, we believe, to his eschatology; to the Latin father's views on predestination and grace, in the midst of a general backsliding toward semi-Pelagianism; to the early heresy of baptismal regeneration; to the later, yet, alas! too early, heresy of transubstantiation; and to the superior holiness of the monastic state. It is in soteriology that his crucible burnt away all the dross of unsound doctrine, until the gold came out pure and beautiful.

2. We find in Anselm the union of the devout, the metaphysical and the humanly tender and lovely. Rare and charming combination! It is not strange that at Bec and at Canterbury, in France and in England, all men loved the Italian monk. His mother, Ermenberga, like a second Monica, had "studied to imbue with piety the heart of the child who was to become the Augustine" of the eleventh century. A dreamy, contemplative boy, who fancied that the dome of the sky, as it rested on the summits of the Graian Alps round about his native Aosta, was heaven itself. Eadmer, the monk of Canterbury, is so devoted to him in his later life that he forsakes all and follows Anselm into exile. Gaunilo, who answers, and, we think, really overthrows, the *Pro-sologion*, still speaks of "the other things [besides the Ontological Argument] described in this little book with so much truth, clearness, and splendor," as "useful, and fragrant with the odor

of pious and holy feeling." Neander is captivated by his goodness and sweetness, and is for dealing gently with an argument which he is compelled to pronounce illogical.

In the brief sketch of his life prefixed to the English translation of the *Cur Deus Homo* we read: "Gradually his strength failed; he felt no pain; only would have liked to live till he had solved a question he was thinking of, as to the origin of the soul. On the Tuesday in Holy Week, 1109, he was seen to be dying; they read him the gospel for the day; on the Wednesday, as day was breaking, he passed away, April 21, 1109. He was buried in the minster at Canterbury, of which he had been nominally, sixteen years, archbishop; much of the time an impoverished, wandering exile." Neander says: "He died reconciled with all his enemies, and bestowing his blessing on all with his expiring breath."

3. Theology is a science, a body of true, orderly, and co-related knowledge. Like the sciences of the heavens above us, and of the atmosphere about us, and of the earth and its waters beneath us, theology has grown, and will yet grow. The best way to understand the steam-engine is to begin with the Marquis of Worcester, and to come down the years by way of Papin, Savary, Newcomen, and Watt; and the telegraph, from the Chinese, by way of Oersted and Ampere, and Henry and Morse. So of all other human sciences; and why not so of theology?

Men of old time were warmed and lighted by the sun and guided by the stars; they breathed the air and viewed the rainbow with delight; they were nourished by the wheaten loaf and the flesh of kids and kine. But we certainly know more of the natural sciences than the patriarchs did. And the Westminster Assembly was far in advance of Anselm, as he was in advance of Origen. The Westminster men had on their side the slow, but relentless, logic of time. We cannot understand them except by first understanding those who went before them. We must use Anselm, as a climber of the Alps would use a Swiss chalêt half way up the mountain side, as a place of rest and refreshment, and of noble glimpses of the far distance, in the cool of the morning, while night and mist still slumber in the valleys. But after

the foregoing resumé of Anselm's opinions, every true Protestant and especially every true Presbyterian must feel that the Reformation was a necessity. It was an absolute need of the church; and this is apprehended most clearly by those who read Anselm's own words. For invaluable as are Hagenbach's and Shedd's histories of Christian doctrine, and various systems of theology and histories of philosophy, nothing quite takes the place of the original works of the old masters; which leads to a parting word on old books. It was a standing joke on Dr. Landis, behind his brawny back, of course, that he cared nothing for any book that was less than a thousand years old. Possibly he may have made a fetich of the archaic and the antique. If so,

"The love he bore to learning was in fault."

A slight flavor of this, or a fondness for an Elzevir edition, might surely be pardoned in so eminent a scholar. But if we desire to comprehend the science of theology, the old books are indispensable in their place, just as Wallis's *Arithmetic of Infinites* and Newton's *Opuscula* (both of which Dr. Landis had picked up somewhere) are to a student of mathematics.

Neander calls attention to the fact that from and after Anselm there was a divergence in theological methods. Bernard, of Clairvaux, took the mystico-practical direction, and the brilliant, but erratic Abelard, the dialectic. It is, however, much more important to observe that Anselm occupied the point from which the Reformed and the Romish theologies diverge; the Reformed, of all the Protestant communions, holding most firmly and most fully the truth which he taught, and the Romish church not only falling away toward semi-Pelagianism, but pushing his ritualism, mariolatry, and submission to the papacy to the extreme types of our present day. Calling the Reformed the right wing and the Papists the left, other systems of doctrine occupy intermediate grounds. So that we have in theology a *quasi* reproduction of the deltas of the Nile and the Mississippi in physical geography; nor will it be easy to get a broader and more comprehensive view of theological science than by watching its development from the system and from the times of Anselm.

L. G. BARBOUR.

Richmond, Ky.

NOTE.—If there are three other copies of our edition of Anselm's works in the world, we should be pleased to hear from their holders. They may be interested in this note.

Allibone, in his *Dictionary of Authors*, gives the date of the first edition as MCCCCLXXXI (1491). To another edition, he says, neither date nor place of publication is assigned on the title-page. It contains two treatises, *De Miseria Hominis* and *De Excellentia Virginis Marie*, which are not in the edition of 1491. Both of these are in the Landis copy. In fact Allibone's description fits it very closely, except that he styles it a folio. The Landis copy measures $10\frac{3}{4}$ inches by $7\frac{1}{2}$. Each page has two columns, each $7\frac{1}{2}$ by $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches. Should not this be considered a quarto? Let antiquaries decide, *quorum non magna pars sumus*. That the volume is very ancient and probably older than 1491 is favored by two or three considerations. It seems to have been printed directly, uncritically and without emendation, from a manuscript copy. We have detected at least two manifest blunders, one of which is corrected in a nineteenth century edition of the *Cur Deus Homo*. The printers had not learned that the multiplied and often perplexing abbreviations of the old MSS. were no longer necessary. The illuminations in red and blue ink or paint are profuse. For the important headings vacant squares were left for ornamental initials; vacant, except that about the middle of each square the desired letter was printed of small size in black ink, evidently as a guide to the illuminator. The spelling is archaic, as *nichil* for *nihil*; *Aphrica* for *Africa*, *Prosologion* for *Proslogion*. The genitive singulars in *æ* uniformly omit the *a*; thus we have *Marie*. If the final *e* here is pronounced like our *a* in *mate*, as the French *e* so often is, it may give us a hint as to how the Norman French sounded the diphthong *æ*. Some of the broad portions of the illuminated capitals have a glistening stripe down the middle. It has been thought that this was done with salts of gold or silver.

These things smack of antiquity. But it may be more satisfactory to state that the editor always calls Anselm, *Beatus*. According to the old custom of the Romish church, a man was declared *Beatus* before he was declared *Sanctus*. Now Anselm

was canonized, or officially made a saint, in 1494. Hence Dr. Landis may have been right in assigning the date of 1490 to the printing of his treasured copy.

All our readers are forbidden to peruse this note, except the holders of the three copies, and such other honest gentlemen as have felt the magical touch of vellum.

IV. YOUNG PEOPLE'S SOCIETIES AND OUR CHURCH.

SHALL it be Scylla or Charybdis? Shall we drift into the gurgling whirlpool or drive upon deceitful shoals and rugged rocks? Is it wise policy to let the young people's movement, so called, take care of itself? Would it be better for our Assembly to take up the matter and decide yes or no to its demand to be incorporated into our system as a part of our church? Or would it be wiser to let the whole movement alone and to direct our efforts toward the attainment of better and wiser ends by means in more perfect accord with that system which has been handed down from the fathers to their children among the faithful from the beginning? To the question, "What course shall we pursue with respect to the efficient training of our young people in church work?" it seems to be taken for granted with many that there can be but one answer, and *that* the adoption of the principles in some form which underlie the Young People's Christian Endeavor Society. The wonderful growth, success, and popularity of this movement are constantly appealed to as arguments in its favor. The alternative as persistently brought forward is the deplorable lack of Christian zeal and consecration on the part of those who are already filling positions in the church which demand activity, skill, zeal, and liberality to do the Lord's work. But there is another wise and efficient means of God's own appointment. The family is God's school for the proper and godly training of our children and young people. It is the foundation, so to speak, of the church. It is God's ordinance. To set aside God's ordinance for human means and institutions is to place the creature above the Creator. The scheme is deceitful and full of danger.

The Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor asks nothing less than to be incorporated as a part of the church. This demand for recognition in an official and most vital way is the question before our church; for Art. IX. of the constitution of the Christian Endeavor Society has this language: "This society

being a part of the church, the pastors, deacons, elders, or stewards and Sunday-school superintendents shall be *ex-officiis* honorary members. Any difficult question may be laid before them for advice." It is the Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor which is seeking admission into our church. The mark and brand of that society is upon every form of young people's society which we might adopt. Efforts hitherto made to imitate its commendable features and to reject objectionable elements have been fruitless. The Synod of Virginia failed to adopt the constitution of its *ad interim* committee. The Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in America abandoned last year its attempt to establish a denominational league. There are many Endeavor Societies in the Methodist Church, notwithstanding that denomination has established and nourishes the Epworth League. The matter has been under discussion in our own church for some time. The Christian Endeavor Society, however, seems to be the more popular form. In the meanwhile the question is being practically settled for many of our churches. At least two of our papers afford space for information concerning societies for young people. Some of the more advanced advocates of this movement in a late Assembly are throwing the weight of their influence in favor of the Y. P. S. C. E. One of the elders who was zealous for this cause in the Assembly at Macon has been made a trustee of the United Society of Christian Endeavor. The manager of the column devoted to the Young People's Societies in the *Christian Observer*, soon after the Assembly when this column was first opened, advocated liberty in the organization of these societies. His language in one issue of that paper is, "She [speaking of the church] may not, and doubtless should not, adopt the Christian Endeavor pure and simple. She may not, and perhaps should not, adopt any cast-iron form of organization." Notwithstanding this wise caution given in that department of the *Christian Observer*, Christian Endeavor Societies are reported from week to week, and very little is said about denominational societies, leaving room for the inference that the Young People's Christian Endeavor Society is proving the more popular and successful. This, it is believed, is the legitimate conclusion to which all must

come. The writer has had an experience of several years with societies in his church. It has been found to be almost impossible to avoid the evils which belong to the Christian Endeavor Society pure and simple.

There is one aspect of this whole question which may cast doubt upon a long-cherished institution. It is claimed by the advocates of these societies that they have the same right to exist in our churches, and to be fostered by us, as the Sabbath-school. Why not? The instruction and training of our young people is the purpose of both. It is claimed that the Sunday-school fails to reach the young people. In the meantime the young people are growing up without being trained for Christian work; and when they join the church, having nothing to do and none to direct them, they lapse into indifference. Thus the neglect of the church, if it is the church's neglect, to care for its young people is made an argument for the church's doing and authorizing to be done what it has always hitherto refused, namely, to foster voluntary societies. But these societies do not stand on the same footing in our church as the Sabbath-school. There are, perhaps, few scriptural Sabbath-schools even in the Presbyterian Church. The modern Sunday-school has, no doubt, gathered much which is useless, harmful. Its abuse may, in part, be credited with many of the evils which these societies for young people seek to correct. But the evil lies deeper than the remedy proposes to reach. It is hard to understand how a voluntary society with no power of discipline, with no divine sanction, is going to accomplish what the church has failed to do, for this is the meaning of the movement. How is it possible that the love of Christ can constrain our Christian young people through a voluntary society, but cannot constrain them through the church? How is it possible that Sunday-school superintendents and teachers can accomplish more real, earnest, Christian work in this way with the same young people, and can secure greater self-denial, than in the Sunday-school? What new elements of Scripture truth are there to stimulate activity? Perhaps, after all, the manner and method of the modern Sunday-school is directly blamable for many of these evils. Too much rivalry has had a bad effect. Too much neglect of children

at home has thrown more on the Sunday-school than was right. The evils might be corrected in the family and in the Sunday-school by leaving each to do its own proper work, by a more efficient oversight of the church over the young, and by holding parents responsible to the church, in a larger measure than at present, for their children. Without the full and earnest coöperation of parents we cannot but fail. It would seem that a more reasonable and hopeful organization would be that of parents pledged to redeem the family. But, alas! fathers and mothers are overlooked. Here is, doubtless, one fruitful source of the disorders complained of. This is far more true of others than it is of Presbyterians, for Presbyterians, as a general thing, train their children. Honor ought to be done those who are faithful, notwithstanding the prevalent evil example of other Christians claiming far greater piety and making louder boasts of spirituality and power.

The arguments chiefly urged in favor of this movement are specious. Statistics are largely dealt in. Promises are made which we have no right to expect to see, and ought to have no expectation of seeing, realized. But, on the other hand, we are warned that the forces of young people thus organized may be turned against any great moral abuse, or may be sent to reinforce any great moral reformation. Temperance, prohibition, the two-wine theory, woman's suffrage, the anti-lottery cause, are some of the great so-called reforms. Are these causes indiscriminately to enlist the energies of our young people? The church is not a unit on this point; and while a part of it is thus engaged, what will the other part be doing?

One must look deeper than the ostensible motives which give rise to a movement. The Holy Ghost commands us to try the spirits whether they are of God. (1 John iv. 1.) When we recall the fact that we wrestle against principalities, against powers, against spiritual wickedness in heavenly places (Eph. vi. 12), we need not hesitate to call in question the motives underlying any great movement. We ought to look beyond the human agents who have started the movement. There is uneasiness among the sober and thoughtful. The trend of our vessel is not true. There

is an undercurrent tugging at our keel, the final force and direction of which cannot be rightly made out. It is persistent, and rushes along uneasily.

One condition which gives force, if not origin, to this great movement is *wide-spread unbelief*; for, if the true motives which ought to be all-powerful be lacking, what good will all other effort avail? The great motive for church work among the young and the old is love for Christ. All else is emptiness, vanity. The activities of the church, without the animating spirit, are but the hideous contortions of a galvanized corpse. The great question with us now is, Does God's Spirit lead us to do his work in this way? If so, where is the authoritative instruction? Is it in the word which he caused to be written for our guidance? Is it in a new light which has just arisen? Expediency has never been one of the principal sources of light to Presbyterians, except in the hour of unbelief and of sinful treason against our King and Head. That there is, taking the Christian world into account, great need for very earnest effort, no one can deny. But the great trouble lies deeper than the remedy proposes to go. To substitute the phalanstery for the family is a poor experiment. Yet this is the principle. To shift responsibility is but a poor amendment of wrong by neglect. The truth of God's word is the only solvent. If they speak not according to it, it is because there is no light in them.

I. The great need is the turning of the hearts of the fathers to their children, and the hearts of the children to their fathers. (Mal. iv. 6.) There is to-day a sad variance between the fathers and their children. The secular virtues and affections are with assiduous care cherished and cultivated. Many things keep these alive and active. It is the higher virtues and affections that need attention. Man lives not for this world alone. It is the unseen things which may fail of recognition. This is a civilized age, but not a spiritual one.

The wide reign of lawlessness is, no doubt, in a large measure to be attributed to the variance between the fathers and the children. There is a wide sense in which this is true; for it applies to the state and church as well as to the family. There is also a nar-

rower sense in which the fact will have to be admitted. If it were true that an alien class, and a large ignorant population, are responsible for the many outrageous crimes committed among us, still, as a people, we are responsible; but unfortunately this is not wholly true. In 1892 an editorial in one of our daily papers said, "No civilized country on earth ever had more revolting crimes committed in it than three or four of the Southern States have had during the year. . . . With thoughtful people this truth is a source of deep discouragement and distress; but there is some solace in the reflection that when things come to the worst they usually take a turn for the better, and it is hardly conceivable that they can reach a worse stage than the present." An eminent law professor in speaking of lynchings and other great crimes against law says, "As sure as there is a God in heaven our people will have to give an account for the terrible murders that are now being constantly committed. We are thereby put on a footing with the most barbarous people of the earth." Anarchy seems to have already set up its throne among us; but not less evident is the same spirit as seen in the crimes against property. The first principles of ownership are called into question. In the minds of great masses there is the most perplexing confusion with regard to property rights. The marriage relation, too, has become with many a mere contract for convenience; perhaps the frequent suits for divorce, and the many sins against the marriage relation, are due more apparently to the variance between the fathers and their children. This does not admit of doubt. In many, perhaps most, of the cases, the trouble can be traced directly to this source; but these crimes show the fearful state of unbelief. The crimes of the first chapter of Romans seem to be re-enacted among us in this nineteenth century. Every part of that chapter finds illustration in this Christian land. The laws on our statute books need the backing of wholesome public sentiment; but public opinion is on the side of lawlessness to too great an extent.

Jacobinism is not consistent with true liberty. The abettors of the emancipation of the slaves of the South were not the promoters of true freedom. They removed the corner-stone of American liberty. They placed their unholy hands upon the

representative idea which underlies all our civil institutions, and by doing violence to this fundamental principle they have spread confusion everywhere. Woman seeks emancipation and enfranchisement. The cry for the enfranchisement of minors will ere long break loose. In fact, the notion with many even now is that this is a pure democracy and not a republic. The angry political debates mean this if they mean anything. This is the meaning of the movement among the young people in the churches. This is the significance of the matter to us. Shall we stand up for Presbyterian faith and practice? or shall we allow ourselves to be swept on by the current? Sooner or later our church will adjust herself, and doubtless will ride out the storm; but the present is a moment of trial.

There is much that is inculcated in the name of religion which is false, and which should be treated as such. This is an age of religiosity. There is no need to discredit any really earnest and consecrated effort, nor is there any intention to do so. There are true and faithful workers in other churches than our own. God speed every effort sincerely made to lead men to the Saviour of sinners. There is, however, too much rash and impetuous zeal; mistaken, perhaps, much of it; much of it the outworkings of schemes on the part of ambitious men. Many things gain passport under the name of religion that otherwise must fail.

Many so-called reforms must be included in this indictment. They or the methods of conducting them are at fault. The reform that calls the wife and mother away from the domestic duties of her home is premature or wrong in principle, or misunderstood; yet how many women have learned to think that they were called upon to neglect for a while their home and go out to lecture, and in other ways labor for what they were taught to believe to be the call of morality and religion. The evils are manifold. The substitution of public work for private domestic duties is only one of many. Much whipping into line has been required in some instances to overcome convictions of right and duty and the real preference. The unsettling of domestic ties and obligations in this way will certainly overbalance the good done. After all, the mother of a family can do much towards

promoting peace and order in the state and the world by securing it at home and insuring it in her offspring for time to come by that careful Christian training about which she can have no question, while at the same time she has but little promise of accomplishing anything in a public way. These very movements called reforms add to the confusion of thought and opinion. Who can compute the evil done in this way by some of these so-called reforms? The Woman's Christian Temperance Union has brought into prominence the equal suffrage question. It has forced upon some denominations the question of woman's preaching and ruling in the church. All sympathize with the object for which it ostensibly contends; but where are its successes? its evidences of permanent victory over the rum power? True there has been much talk, many great claims laid; but the triumphs made have been too often at the cost of truth and righteousness.

In the name of religion, a chronic excitability of temper has been superinduced upon certain classes of our people, so that they are equally susceptible to the unfair logic of the political demagogue, the querulous and quibbling harangue of the irresponsible evangelists, or the hue and cry of the lynching mob. There are blind leaders of the blind, and many falling into the ditch. False and very unwholesome doctrine is at the bottom of all this disorder. Certain denominations are almost unanimously opposed to capital punishment. Creedless systems are Pandora boxes. How long will the Presbyterian Church—the only church that really takes the Bible as it is, and seeks in its creed to express its holy truth—remain true to its doctrine, true to God's truth, by subjecting itself to any kind of alliance in which she will be inevitably overwhelmed by numbers of adverse forces! We need not be deceived, we stand alone, so far as any true sympathy or help is concerned. It may be that we are no purer nor better in any sense than others; but when we give up our distinctive position, we ought not only to unite with other denominations, but also to lose our identity. For then we shall no longer have a right to exist. A large part of our title to exist is that we are not like other denominations, unless they lose their identity and approximate more nearly to the true form, and to the love of the truth

as we profess and seek to maintain them. Why then should the sneer, so oft repeated, so poignant in its scorn, that Presbyterians are straight-laced, fail to be true of us? It is not true that it has altogether failed to be a just remark that Presbyterians are strict. It is a wonder that in the midst of so much evil example there is so much fidelity on the part of parents. It may be that as other denominations so outnumber us, they do not take notice of us in the count. But we need not overlook ourselves; and while we confess with shame and sorrow our sins with regard to the training of our children, at the same time we will repel the charge of unfaithfulness.

The young people's movement is but another grand assault upon our lines. It is surprising that it is so bold, persistent, and so well masked. It seeks to carry the whole fortress by one assault. It demands a surrender. A surrender of what? It demands that we shall remove and destroy the family as a unit in our system, the very corner-stone; it requires us to give up the idea of representation as it is now defined and guarded in our system. It demands of us that we shall give up our weapons of defence, the commission under which we battle; abandon every safeguard, and give ourselves over to the enemy bound and gagged. It demands that we shall desert the well-ordered ranks of a disciplined and veteran host, and join the mob of lawlessness and riot. It asks us to contend no more for crown and covenant; for it is the covenant which is in jeopardy, and the right of Jesus to reign according to his will and law.

The remedy is irrelevant. It helps along the disease. It will effect no cure. The movement itself is out of conformity with law. It is insubordination itself, in that it seeks to dictate its terms. It threatens direful things if it is not received into our church and given a place. For if the worst has come, and parents have universally failed to do their part, until the care of the young is left upon the church, the parents are rebellious both against God and the church's laws. If on the other hand it be argued that the young people cannot be retained, that they will wander away, this is insubordination again. Those persons who are pushing the matter with so much zeal have outstripped the church,

and have assumed an untried and unsafe leadership. Thus, in whatever aspect we view the matter, despite all the professed good intentions, there is a lurking motive power which needs only to have full sway in order that its true nature may be revealed.

II. The movement is strange to our system, and alien from the theory and practice of our church in many particulars. If the Presbyterian system is scriptural, then it embraces all it needs. The fact that our church does not accomplish what other churches seem to accomplish need not discourage us, nor make us impatient; for, after all, only God's elect ones will be saved. All the paraphernalia with which so-called churches may cover their members will not be the true wedding garment. We may as well cease to criticise our system and its workings, among the first works of repentance which we ought diligently now to set ourselves to do. If the Presbyterian Church is not apostate, it is Christ's; and we, its members and ministers, commit great wrong against Christ and his church when we join with its enemies and abuse and slander the old Presbyterian Church for its faults and failures. It needs not that we borrow from others; for, like Israel, we shall not borrow anything which will be for our honor, or which will really help along Christ's work.

Societies for young people have been organized and conducted for many years in some of our churches. Their success has been precarious. Their good has been doubtful. The principle has been tested fully. The writer has had experience for years with societies in these churches for the children and young people, and has had more of perplexity and doubt as to the best way to manage them than with all the other machinery of the church. Then, the best of machinery will wear out. New elements, novelties, are required to keep up the interest. The element that proves so attractive in the Christian Endeavor Society is the prominence that is given to the female part of the organization. The pledge taken by all alike requires a promise to take some part, *aside from singing*, in every Christian Endeavor prayer-meeting, unless hindered by some reason which can be conscientiously given to the Lord and Master. This pledge is too sweeping. It brings the minor young people to pass judgment upon the requirements

of the father and the mother, in that it requires them to attend every Christian Endeavor prayer-meeting. It requires them to be ready to take some part in the meeting other than singing, or forces them to be perfunctory; for they are bound. This is not freedom; it is an unwholesome advantage taken of the conscience. Besides, it binds the female as well as the male, and binds her to do what her church and her Bible forbid her to do. For what else can she do but lead, talk, pray, or read? If our church is ready for this whole movement, then she has made greater advancement towards so-called liberal ideas than almost any denomination in the land; not that she has actually gone further, but that the change from her former views to this state of mind is really a long stride.

There is no doubt but that the discipline of the church, brought to bear in the proper way upon the head of the family, and upon the young people in this way, will accomplish more and better results than any so-called "young people's movement." If parents should, by the church session, be held responsible for the ignorance and waywardness of their children, the evil would be corrected in a large measure. This was the law in the Mosaic dispensation. This is still the law. It has always been felt to be just that the father should pay the fines of his minor children, and be held responsible for their misdoings. Men instinctively trace the wrong-doing of sons and daughters to parents, directly or remotely. Now, if the church adopts the principle that the church itself is responsible for the children, while they are freed in a large measure from the restraints of home, it will be nothing less than an entire revolution. The results of the Sunday-school as it is now operated are by no means reassuring. The adoption of this principle to too great an extent in the Sunday-school has been the cause of much mischief.

The constitution of the Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor makes the society a part of the church. (See Constitution, Article IX., *Relation to the Church*.) The adoption of the society by our church as a part of itself, then, would be a radical measure; for just as this definition is found in the constitution of the society, in its fundamental law, so does the society itself de-

mand a fundamental footing in the church. Hence the persistency of its efforts to be incorporated; hence, also, the demand for new interpretations of Scripture. It lays a bold hand upon polity and doctrine, and demands a change to conform to a new element, which seeks in time to supplant the whole system.

The movement is congregational. Not only is it so in its origin, but it has all the characteristics of congregationalism. This is true, however, only in a local sense, for the United Society has sufficient directive power to shape the general movement. The spiritual rulers of our church are the eldership; but here any person, male or female, may speak and vote in all business transactions, and all things are conducted as if it were a pure democracy. Now, if this society, when organized, becomes a part of the church, where does it find a place in our polity? Under what branch of church government will it fall? Will not those who have been trained in this school insist on bringing in the new ideas which they have learned? But why is it a part of the church? Why this claim, and why that other, also, that these parts, the prayer-meeting and the committee work, are essential to the Christian Endeavor idea, and that wherever these are, there is the Christian Endeavor idea?

On the other hand, it is episcopal. There is a head. That head is in Boston. True, the semblance of the representative idea is maintained. Have we not ourselves, in the person of an honored elder in Kentucky, a representative among its trustees? But then there is an editor with his literature, who is at the same time president. He is, in a measure, in a position to be all-powerful, should he take it into his head to be so—a veritable pope. He must be a godly man, indeed, not to use any more power than belongs to him. Such organizations are not safe; they are not safe, at least, for the Presbyterian Church.

But this feature does not end here. Our representative himself may assume powers that do not belong to him; he may throw the weight of his influence to this or that measure. His appeal will come to our young people with more than ordinary weight. It may be a perfectly legitimate cause for which he pleads, as is the cause in behalf of which he makes an appeal in the Young

People's Societies' column of one of our own church papers. But it might just as well be otherwise. Moreover, such an official is in no sense an official of our church in the capacity in which he has acted. He was not elected by the church to that position. The General Assembly has not authorized him to act as a general agent for this or that one of our committees. What other powers has this trustee in reserve? Has he power to direct the action of all the young people's societies within our bounds? Then where does the control of the session come in? If there is some one to direct the young people as to what funds they collect, and for what cause, what becomes of the churches' directing and ruling power? The occupation of the elders will be taken away, for the society must be able to choose somewhat for themselves. There is obliged to be a certain controversy. (See Const., Art. VI., § 4.) But discussion is discouraged. This is the gist of the whole question. The young people must feel that they are doing something themselves. Here, then, is a conflict of authority. There must be a choice as to which ought to be obeyed. The matter will not be long in doubt. Besides this, the means by which moneys are raised may cause trouble. Those means pointed out are pledges, and entertainments approved by the church. Some churches complain that there is a great drain upon their funds through this society. But the argument which speaks of money seems to have more weight than it deserves; for if the active members are really members of our church, then what they give is really given by members of the church; and if it is true that they will give more in the name of the society for the church, it is because there is some other motive present than love for the church, the bride of the Lamb, or for Jesus Christ, the head of the church. Why should the money be thus given indirectly? Why should the zeal which belongs of right to the church be deputed to it through a society? Is this following Christ? (See John ii. 17; cf. Psalm lxxix. 9.) One wonders what the pledge means when it says: "I promise him that I will strive to do whatever he would *like* to have me do." He loved the church, and gave his blood to *redeem* it; yet our sons and daughters are to be taught to work for it only indirectly. If the money

is raised outside the church, then it is proposed to organize, and to incorporate as a part of the church, something which has always been held in question, against which our church has always delivered its testimony. If the money is to be raised by pledges, even this is subject to grave doubt and suspicion. Who is to exact the pledges? Who is to handle the money? Whose authority is to determine the matter—that of the local society, one or more of the trustees, the union Endeavor Society, or the officers of the church? Why should the Presbyterian Church sign away the power of the purse, and agree to share its authority with irresponsible voluntary associations?

But the pledge involves the law of the Presbyterian Church in another point more vital yet. The female member as well as the male member pledges herself to take some part, aside from singing, in every Christian Endeavor prayer-meeting. This, I believe, is generally interpreted by the more conservative advocates of this new measure to mean that she may read or recite a verse of Scripture previously selected and committed to memory. Others, however, who have made an entire surrender, boldly declare that, if a woman may sing, she may read, or talk, or pray, or even be a leader of a Society of Christian Endeavor. Reading Scripture, praying, or expounding Scripture, or talking, in a promiscuous assembly gathered for the worship of God singles out the one voice. For the time this voice is that of an official or teacher. This is precisely the function that is forbidden in First Corinthians xiv. 34. But, then, suppose that a female member be allowed to read a passage of Scripture, and be required to confine herself to that; then, how long a passage? Must she read sitting or standing? May she not offer one word of comment? But, after she has once begun, who shall hinder her from proceeding to speak all her mind? But, then, the distinction is unwarranted. Has she not taken the pledge, also? In this one particular, therefore, she is to be restrained; in all other matters she is equal to all other members in her privileges. But, then, if she reads, why may she not speak a word of comment? If she speaks a word of comment, then why may she not lead the devotions? Then, while she leads the devotions, does she uncover her head, or keep it

covered? The argument in First Corinthians about a woman's praying with her head covered is evidently a prohibition to pray in public in a promiscuous assemblage at all. It is difficult to see any meaning in the passage at all, if it be not regarded as a prohibition for a woman to lead the prayers in a promiscuous assembly of males and females. That abandoned women should go into public with their heads uncovered is no explanation of this prohibition, for Paul is evidently writing to members of the church about things to be done or not to be done in the church, and hence he says (1 Cor. xi. 13): "Judge in yourselves: is it comely that a woman pray unto God uncovered?" "But if any man seem to be contentious, we have no such custom, neither the churches of God." (Vs. 16.) But the advocates of woman's preaching make their fight at this point. They say that if a woman may pray in public, then she may preach. The contention is consistently made. Then ruling, as one function of preaching, follows naturally. Then woman usurps authority over the man, which God forbids. (See 1 Tim. ii. 12.) Now, some of our ministers are bold enough to admit all these consequences, and to avow them. Some, however, maintain that a woman may take part in these society meetings and exercises, just as she does in a Sunday-school teachers' meeting, or in a ladies' aid society. The only true way, then, would seem to be to abandon those promiscuous meetings of all kinds in which women must speak or pray before both men and women; for the young people's societies in every form involve this question concerning the position of woman with relation to church work and worship.

THE DOCTRINAL ASPECT OF THE MOVEMENT.

III. The advocacy of this movement in our church has not only introduced this very vital and practical question concerning the place of woman in the church, but it has forced upon us the question of the inspiration of God's word. The writer has never yet seen or heard of one of these advocates for the advanced position of woman who has not, sooner or later, abandoned faith in the plenary inspiration of God's word. The usual way in which the matter is presented is, that Paul wrote by permission. This

contention is made in seeming utter forgetfulness of the fact that, even if Paul were permitted to write, the fact that it was written in an epistle which was inspired would vitiate such an epistle so as to make the whole of it worthless. But in connection with none of these passages in Corinthians or in Timothy is there any note to this effect. The assumption is violently gratuitous. Then another plea is, that no writer but Paul forbids women to speak or to pray in the church. Now, the fact is, that Paul was inspired to write, or he was not. If he was not, that ends the controversy. If he was inspired, his word ought to be sufficient, for it is God's word, whether uttered through the mouth or the pen of one or of a dozen speakers or writers. But, cut off from this plea, they proceed to speak very ugly things about Paul himself, but do the thing which is forbidden, at any rate. Now, this is just like any other sin, it is disconformity with an express command.

One would hardly look in a constitution of a society for a theological statement of views made the basis of the organization, but it would seem that any attempt to set forth a theological basis ought to be sufficiently clear. A resolution unanimously adopted at the Minneapolis Convention reads thus:

“Resolved, That, as from the beginning, we stand upon an evangelical basis (meaning by ‘evangelical’ personal faith in the divine-human person and atoning work of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, as the only and sufficient source of salvation); and we recommend that, as in the United Society, only societies connected with evangelical churches be enrolled on the list of state and local unions.”

Now, as this is an attempt to define “an evangelical basis,” we confess dissatisfaction with it. One does not learn from the parenthesis whether “evangelical” includes more than personal faith in Jesus Christ. He does not even know whether this statement regards Jesus Christ as Deity. One cannot take the slippery language of the parenthesis as meaning anything in particular. It stops short. Does “evangelical” involve the belief in the Trinity? Not even a Unitarian or a Campbellite could object to that language. It is sufficiently broad. The truly evangelical cannot stand safely upon that plank of the platform, because it

goes just far enough to make going further a complete necessity for him. The whole constitution ignores the Holy Spirit. Not once is there any allusion to him or to his work. The means relied upon seem to be the prayer-meetings, work, the committees, the pledge, and the consecration meetings. Nor is there any reliance placed upon God's Spirit. He is the leader of God's sons. (See Rom. viii. 14.) It may be said that the leaders, pastor, and others will supply this lack, and will teach the young people to depend upon God's Spirit. The fact, nevertheless, still exists, that the Spirit of God has been overlooked. Whatever machinery could be devised has been gotten ready to take his place. The machinery is practically the Holy Ghost of the movement. The definition given in the above-quoted resolution is essentially Unitarian.

The action of the International Union last spring in Canada in repudiating an utterance of an Oriental, who compared the idolatry of the false religion of India to the Roman Catholicism which he saw in Canada, is not a very hopeful promise of the evangelical character of this movement. It would seem to an outsider that in an evangelical meeting such a comparison was not only not worthy of repudiation, but that it ought to have been defended and maintained. The fact was never denied. The repudiation was to save the feelings of Catholics, and to retain the popularity of the society, even at the cost of evangelical truth.

Those who have been brought up in the Christian Endeavor Society are likely to ignore the sacrificial work of the Lord Jesus Christ. The very language of the pledge ignores this. It says: "Trusting in the Lord Jesus Christ for strength, I promise him that I will strive to do whatever he would like to have me do." But Jesus Christ bought his people, and their service, not to do what he would like for them to do, but what he commands them to do. The very pains which are taken in the pledge and in the whole constitution to secure by promise, by mere human effort, the obedience which Christ only can furnish, and the life which only the Holy Ghost, the Sanctifier, can give, is painful evidence of the absence of Christ's atoning work and of the want of recognition of the Spirit's sanctifying grace. The blood is not

there; the covenant mark is not upon it; no Holy Ghost to affix the seal. It gives us hopeless, dead machinery.

All this machinery is merely the methods suited to the Arminian system of theology, woven together in one new and imposing piece of mechanism, which cannot but be hurtful to a pure Calvinism; for that the belief will follow the practice can be clearly seen in the effect on the views of those who resort to the Arminian meetings—so-called revival meetings—and work according to the measures so common throughout the country. We can see clearly what to expect. One result will be an entire misconception of the new birth, repentance, and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. The doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, as taught in our Confession, is already impugned by the business given to the committee (the Lookout Committee) to look after those who absent themselves from the prayer-meetings; by the renewed pledge and roll-call at the consecration meetings; by the binding force of that pledge. Oaths and pledges are unwise when made too common.

The power and the sufficiency of the church of Jesus Christ as a saving instrumentality are impeached. The work of the church is discounted. Its authority is defied. There is a distinction made among its ministry of progressive and non-progressive, which is unwarranted and unjust, but which is even now playing havoc with pastoral relations, and disturbing with wanton recklessness the work which our church ought to be doing. The great conflict of this age is over this head of theology, the church. We may depend upon it that the very existence of our church, with the mission which hitherto we have felt that we were called upon to discharge, and the testimony which we have felt that it was our great duty, in our peculiar situation, to deliver, are in jeopardy. The spiritual nature of the church, the kingdom of Jesus Christ, is involved in our church through an integral part of itself, as this society wishes to be and as it affirms that it is, which busies itself in temperance or prohibition and other moral reforms. To lend the sanction of our church's authority in any way to this movement is to involve ourselves inevitably and unavoidably in complications from which it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to extricate ourselves.

Besides these doctrines to the discussion of which a part of this head has been devoted, and which, one can readily see, are immediately involved, there are others which will soon gain access: the possible salvation of the heathen, the future restoration of the soul, and the other rationalistic notions which usually accompany the system to which all this machinery belongs. The denial of original sin would come as the natural consequence of those positive or negative views which we have already seen to inhere in the constitution. The supercilious pride and arrogance of this movement, together with its boastful spirit, well become the spirit of this age. It deals in statistics, and makes its wonderful progress one argument for its right to a place in every fold. It is obstreperous. Its self-applause does not well become the infant of a decade. Its manners are like those of a spoiled child. It has become a very serious question, What shall we do with this overgrown society? Shall we teach our own children, or shall we sit at their feet? Shall we train our own young people, or hand this task over to others? Or shall we quietly turn over the church to their hands—doctrine, work, polity, all?

The Presbyterian Church has weathered many storms in the past, guided by that wise hand which never makes any mistakes. Whether this storm which now blows so furiously will leave her mast or helm, God is able to take care of his own; and if *she should go down* beneath the murky waters, God is able, and will doubtless rescue his own cause in due time.

The desire to be like others and to imitate their success is partly the cause why many are adopting this chimerical scheme. The fact that many of our people have been brought into the church by high-pressure revivals is doubtless another cause. Let none of our preachers covet the success of so-called evangelists; this will prove to be a snare. The evangelist and the organizer go hand in hand; their methods are much alike; the fruits of both are wormwood and gall.

The movement is called "young people's," but one cannot but see that, while the young people are used, and possibly often benefited, there are older ones who profit in the way of honor and other most tangible and satisfying rewards. There is a notion

quite prevalent among the successful evangelists, that the church which captures the children will be the church of the time to come, and there is a disposition prevalent, also, to ignore the grown-up men and women. But it will be found to be impracticable to train a whole generation of young people to any degree of efficiency without the hearty and earnest coöperation of the older people and of the parents at home. There are older heads urging on and pressing this movement. There are doubtless sinister motives behind it all. If certain theological views can be thus engrafted into our system, or, rather, inculcated into the minds of our young people, there may be a possibility of weaning them away from the faith of their fathers. The wiles of the devil are very cunning.

We, as Presbyterians, by our government, by our time-honored and divinely-blessed customs—God's ordinance—by the standards of our church, by our covenant vows to train up our children in the knowledge of God, by all the history of the past, and the achievements which God's providence and grace have enabled us to work out—by all these, and, moreover, by the very fact that God has preserved us so long, are forbidden to sign away our rights by delegating our privileges to any association whatsoever, howsoever great may be its pretensions. This effort to have this society engrafted into our system is a bold stroke. It is a daring attack upon the very citadel. There must be a breach in the outer wall, the storm of battle has begun to rage so fiercely within.

But there is an implied slander in all this agitation against our church's faithfulness. There is no doubt that we have departed far from the strictness of our forefathers; but it is far from true that our people are wholly recreant to their high duty and privilege to teach and to train their own children. It is wonderful that our people should be so faithful, in view of such universal defection. The evil example of a free and unrestrained life in this particular, the oft-repeated sneer of "strait-laced ways," the boasted piety and superior excellency of many who seem to feel no care or responsibility for their children, and the difficulty of making out the difference in the effect upon the sons and daugh-

ters who have grown up surrounded with these restraints and those who know nothing of them, have all been insufficient to completely alienate our people from Presbyterian practice. It must be confessed, also, that our church courts have not given the attention to this matter which its importance demands. Far too much honor has been bestowed upon the faithful Sunday-school worker in comparison with the faithful father and mother. If the Sabbath-school teacher is worthy of honor, the wise and faithful parents are worthy of double honor.

It may be said here that reforms never go backward; that to go back to the austere methods of fathers and mothers of two or three generations ago would be going backward indeed. The writer has no doubt that their failings have been greatly exaggerated. But we need now to go forward to a higher sense of responsibility than even they had. It is verily believed that, if our Assembly, Presbyteries, and sessions should take up this matter and deal with it honestly and courageously, our people would respond willingly; for there is a wide-spread feeling of distrust of this movement, and at the same time a very extended apprehension that this or something else demands the attention of the church.

There is great need of a rebaptism of the church, its families, its ministers. That service which is now sought in these strange ways would come with far greater power from hearts overflowing with gratitude and love. The Spirit of God alone can give us what we need. To pray for his power and grace is one thing. To rigidly refuse to be consoled by any imitation of his works is, perhaps, one duty of the hour, to which, in what seems to be the trying period of his absence, his people are called. Certain it is that success seemingly obtained in any other way will not suffice.

Now is our church's opportunity to reassert its ancient practice of the family training of children and of family worship. In the face of a people losing faith in God and in his promises, let us cling to the covenants of Israel. Steadfastly refusing to be comforted by any half-measures, let us restore, as far as in us lies, the family to its place in the state and in the church. The great command of these times is the fifth. The Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor does not lead back to it, but further on

toward rationalism, Jacobinism, disintegration. The testimony which has been delivered in the past with such great and good results needs only to be delivered the more faithfully now.

Our answer to all claims that, unless we use policy, expediency, in order to conciliate the world—for that is what “making the church attractive” means—others will outstrip us, and we shall fail of doing what we had an opportunity to do, is, that God is able to take care, and will take care, of his own cause; and, moreover, he will take care of us and of our church if we, as preachers, are worthy and will trust him, and if our church does not apostatize. If the church does forsake the truth, why should she not be cast aside, as has been so often the case with other churches? When we, as a church, surrender government, doctrine, and worship into other hands, then our testimony will have been finished, and our church will lie like some corpse in the street: the world will triumph over it, and the prince of darkness will gloat over the ruin.

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V. KIDD'S SOCIAL EVOLUTION.¹

IN his recent book on *Darwinianism* Mr. Stirling quotes from a letter of Dr. Thomas Brown to the elder Darwin, as follows:

“SIR: In acknowledging the delight which I received from the perusal of *Zoönomia*, I only agree with the public voice. I am, however, surprised, that while every one has been delighted, no one as yet has answered. The transition is natural from passive admiration to a strict examination. Such, at least, was my mental history on reading. The reasoning appeared to me in some passages more specious than solid. I, therefore, for my own amusement, marked down my observations.”

Thus “expatiating Brown,” then at the mature age of eighteen, modestly expressed himself in regard to the then celebrated work of the great Erasmus Darwin. The quotation not unfairly expresses our own impression of Mr. Kidd’s *Social Evolution*, and may serve as a fitting introduction to our comments upon it.

Mr. Kidd’s book proved an immediate success. It received speedy and flattering recognition from the public. It has been widely read and much talked of; the daily and weekly press has praised it highly. It has been called a remarkable book; certainly it is an able and stimulating book, and its success has been deserved. There is ample reason for the popularity of *Social Evolution*. It treats a live subject, and meets a demand of the time. It treats a difficult, not to say an abstruse, subject, yet it is not a hard book to read. Though needlessly repetitious, and by no

¹A paper read before the Sociological Society of Princeton Seminary. Although this paper was written before the appearance of Mr. Kidd’s article in the February number of *The Nineteenth Century*, I have not deemed it necessary, after reading what is practically a brief restatement of his argument, to make any changes in what I had written; nor do I find it necessary to add anything; which is, perhaps, fortunate, since, though the subject is boundless, the space at my disposal is limited. On the contrary, Mr. Kidd’s article has rather confirmed me in the positions that I had taken. I venture, moreover, to think that I have avoided the error into which Mr. Kidd, not unjustly, complains that his critics have for the most part fallen, the tendency, namely, “to draw off attention into subsidiary channels and upon merely side-issues,” to the neglect of the fundamental theses and central argument of the book.

means free from inelegancies and inaccuracies of diction, it is written in a plain, straightforward style which carries the reader easily along. Mr. Kidd is certainly not a stylist—far from it—but he moves on. His treatment of his subject is popular in character, yet with all the appearance of being scientific in method. He has a great theme, and he treats it in broad outline. He is mowing over a big field, and he cuts a wide swath. He belongs to the impressionist school, and is working on a large canvas in bold, strong strokes. Details are so unimportant that he can afford to be inaccurate in regard to them, provided the *ensemble* is vivid, provided he makes you see and feel as he felt and saw; and in this he succeeds admirably. The picture is clear and strong enough; the only question is, Is it true? Can water be such a blue, grass such a green, shadows such?

I suppose that a book which did not provoke thought, and that did not raise many more questions than it answered, would not amount to much. Mr. Kidd's book, as already remarked, certainly stimulates thought and is fertile in suggestion; hence it is well worth reading. To us, moreover, it is interesting as another illustration of the fact that religion (whatever may be true or false of it in its various different forms of manifestation) is, at all events, a phenomenon that has come, and has come to stay, and that it is a tremendous social force, with which every one, willingly or not, has to reckon. We admire especially the fine spirit in which Mr. Kidd writes. If we cannot join in the unstinted praise of his book, it is because we do not find ourselves in agreement with two or three, at least, of what we take to be his fundamental theses. *Social Evolution* is open to, and is likely to meet with, some pretty severe attacks. No doubt the very fact of its general popularity would imply that the specialist will not treat it kindly, even as Mr. Stirling's brilliant book above mentioned, after being warmly praised by the many who rejoice in his style of "elevated recklessness," was fanned by the whirlwind of the biologists' criticism; for scientists write "no admittance," in letters large enough, over the entrances to their particular specialties, however ready they may be to make excursions into other provinces—nay, to construe the universe by running it into the groove of their own

departments. For our own part, I trust that we are not so jealous. We like, for example, to hear what Professor Huxley has to say about ethics, especially when he comes, as it were, modestly under the mantle of an ancient moralist, as in his recent Romanes Lecture, to which he prefixes the very proper sentiment from Seneca: "*Soleo enim et in aliena castra transire, non tanquam transfuga, sed tanquam explorator.*" But we have changed all that since Seneca, and in these days, when one scarcely dares call his soul his own, for fear of the specialists, I see nothing for the theologian and the biblical critic to do except to do as the rest—to stand up for the dignity of his department; to insist that he, too, is a specialist; and to smile pityingly upon the outsider who ventures to intrude with his opinion. Why should Mr. Huxley discourse to us of Semitic tradition, or the Gadarene swine? Or why should any one give the least heed to him, if he does?

Mr. Kidd's aim is to apply the Darwinian method to man in society. The book opens with an admirable *resumé* of the present social situation: "Despite the great advances which science has made during the past century in almost every other direction, there is, it must be confessed, no science of human society, properly so called." Science, which has accomplished such splendid achievements during the last century, when she ascends in the scale of life and comes to man, stands helpless in his presence. The reason of this is, that science has not been true to her calling. At the very place where she ought to apply her method most thoroughly, she has stopped short. The historian especially, though he is "dealing with the record of life in its highest forms," . . . strange to say, feels "it scarcely necessary to take any interest in those sciences [namely, the biological] which, in the truest sense, lead up to his subject." The only hope for history and for social science is, "for the biologist to advance over the frontier and carry the methods of his science boldly into human society, where he has but to deal with the phenomena of life, where he encounters life at last under its highest and most complex aspect." This, then, is what Mr. Kidd attempts. We cannot help thinking: What a pity it is that Gibbon was not a biologist; and what a splendid account of the Sicilian expedition Thucydides

might have given us, had he only been acquainted with the Darwinian hypothesis!

We may, perhaps, at the outset raise a query as to the legitimacy of Mr. Kidd's so-called new method. Will the biological method suffice to explain the social organism? Will an examination of the lower forms of life suffice to explain the higher? Are we to explain a development in terms of its lower or of its higher stages? The answer to these questions would introduce us to one of the main points at issue between Hegelians and Spencerians. Here it must suffice to say that the idealists undoubtedly have the best of the argument. We can only know what man is by seeing a full-grown human being. One who saw a child could not possibly predict what he would become, unless he had already seen one that *had* become. Study of the acorn would not lead us to a knowledge of the spreading oak.

This, of course, does not mean that we are not to derive all the help we can from the study of the lower stages in the development of that which we are trying to interpret. It does not mean that we are not to get what light we can by tracing the historic growth of the moral sentiments; nor that there is nothing to learn in seeking the genesis of the idea of God. It does not mean that the study of comparative anatomy is unessential to a knowledge of the human body. It does not mean that a knowledge of the process will not help us to an understanding of the product. It only means that antecedence is not identical with causality, and that similarity is not identity. It means that, having traced g back to f , and f to e , and so on back to a , the origin, we are then to find the key to the process, not in the starting-point, but in the whole process as seen from the end to the beginning. In other words, the true nature of anything can be known, not from the $\xi\tilde{\xi} \text{ o}\tilde{\nu}$, but from the $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$.

On the other hand, this does not mean that, because what is last in time may be first in thought, we are therefore first to study the finished product, and then to read into the beginning of the process everything that we have found at the end; that we are to attribute sensation to plants, or thought to shell-fish, or conscience to birds of prey. Professor Drummond's rhapsody on

the death of the flowers, or his discovery of the first great act of the moral life in "the conscious self-sacrifice of protoplasmic fission," speaks very highly for his poetic imagination, but will not increase his reputation as a man of science. It may be worth while to remark in passing, that, while it is customary to twit theists and Christian theologians with making their God in their own image, the anthropomorphism which does this (and there is sufficient reason for it, apart from Scripture) is nothing to the anthropomorphism which attributes to plant and brute creation all the characteristics which are properly distinctive of man. It may be that "man, who was made in the image of God, was also made in the form of the ape"; but it by no means follows that the ape, or the insect, or the oyster is a ζῷον λογικον πολιτικον φιλάλληλον.

If, for example, it can be shown that conscience in man presents points of similarity to instinct in brutes, it by no means follows that there is no more in conscience than there is in instinct, so that to trace the former back to the latter is to give a final explanation of the idea of obligation. It makes small difference whether (with Mr. Spencer) you begin with instinct, and derive conscience from it, or whether (with Professor Drummond), starting from the other end, and finding moral obligation in man, you give a moral value to the instinctive acts of brutes, if, after all, conscience and instinct are only different names for the same thing. Most certainly they are not the same; and we cannot see that Professor Drummond gains very much by taking his science from Mr. Spencer and reading it backwards by the light of Professor Caird's evolutionary philosophy, while practically ignoring (though he quotes Professor Caird at length on this very point) what is just here the most important point of all; for, as Professor Caird shows, the very notion of development should carry with it the implication that there is *more* in the later steps than there was in the earlier; and if these accretions bring with them not only quantitative, but qualitative additions as well, as undoubtedly they do, it is obvious that what may have been an adequate account of the earlier and simpler form may leave untouched the new elements which have come in.

The bearing of this on *Social Evolution* is not far to seek. It

means that what is a right scientific method for one branch of science, for one stage in a development, is inadequate for another and higher stage. No one would assert that the method of the pure mathematician would suffice for the chemist, or the chemist's method for the biologist. The higher sphere implies greater complexity, new factors to deal with; hence, changed methods. Now, with the advent of man certain new factors come into play, with which the biologist has not had to reckon. These are: man's social capacities, his reason, and his religious instincts. Mr. Kidd, indeed, fully recognizes this, and is at great pains to emphasize the fact; yet, so far, at least, as method is concerned, he practically ignores it; for he first determines what are the conditions of progress in the sphere of biology, and then transfers these conditions bodily from biology to the social organism, tacitly assuming that what is true in the lower sphere is necessarily true also in the higher, which by no means follows. It by no means necessarily follows, for instance, that because, in the non-human world, progress may be comprehensively defined in terms of "the struggle for existence," that the struggle for existence is the sufficient explanation of progress in the world of man. It is rather curious; however, and, perhaps, worthy of remark, that this very idea of "the struggle for existence" was first suggested to Darwin by reading Malthus *On Population*; so that now Mr. Kidd, borrowing his constructive principle from biology, and applying it to man in society, is only returning to Darwin's starting-point.

The chief peculiarity of Mr. Kidd's book consists, however, not so much in the application of the biological method to man in society—for that had been done before—as in the fact that he builds upon the hypothesis which represents the most advanced thought at the present time in biology. The biologists, as every one knows, are divided into two camps in regard to the very important point as to whether or not inherited characteristics can be transmitted. If they can, then it is easy to see how Mr. Spencer can build up his moral system on the principle that ethical ideas grow *pari passu* with the development of society, this society being an organism so constituted that the interests of the individual members of it and the general interest of the whole tend to come

into equilibrium. Altruism is not only as natural as egoism, but it is as essential to the well-being of the individual. The Weismannists, on the other hand, emphasize the idea of struggle; they admit no disinterested, altruistic actions, scarcely even coöperation. Here we have a fundamental difference of much significance upon a point as to which few of us have any right to an opinion. Here the roads part, and it is, obviously, of the greatest consequence which one we choose to follow. If sociology be only "biology 'writ large,'" it makes all the difference in the world to the former what the small letters spell. If the foundations are utterly dissimilar, the superstructures cannot present the same proportions. What are we to do when the doctors of science disagree; when, for example, Professor Huxley and Mr. Kidd define progress in terms of "the struggle for life," and tell us that there is nothing ethical about nature; that "the cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends"; that "the imitation of it by man is inconsistent with the first principles of ethics"; while Mr. Spencer and Professor Drummond, making much of altruism and the struggle for the life of others, would teach us that "all nature is on the side of the man who tries to rise," and that nature is "henceforth to become the ethical teacher of the world"? If the temple of truth in the sphere of social science is to be builded upon the foundations of biology, we fear that the time has not yet come. Until there is more agreement than at present exists among naturalists, they can scarcely contribute much toward the solution of social problems. "Physician, heal thyself." If the Weismannists are wrong, it is obvious that many of Mr. Kidd's conclusions must be vitiated for us at the start, since he builds his entire system upon their (as yet unproved) hypothesis, unless the results he reaches can be separated from his method; and this, I think, is to some extent possible. Indeed, it seems to me that his book is valuable just in proportion as it is possible to separate its results from the method employed in reaching them, and that most of the author's paradoxes result just from an imperfect method.

For suppose we admit that the doctrine of natural selection is sufficient to account for progress from the beginning up to and

including man the individual, it by no means follows that this principle will apply to man in society. Mr. Kidd assumes that society is an organism; but, if so, it is difficult to see how the interests of the individual can always be antagonistic to the interests of the organism, and *vice versa*, as Mr. Kidd says they are. We do not so reason in regard to other organisms. Physicians endeavor to build up the system, in order to overcome local disorders; and, conversely, inflammation or disease of the members affects the health of the whole body. So, also, the different parts are dependent upon each other. "The eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee; nor the head to the feet, I have no need of you." Here Mr. Spencer, who was in this particular point anticipated by Paul, is certainly more self-consistent than Mr. Kidd.

Again, Mr. Kidd assumes that the interests of the organism are of paramount importance, and that it does not matter about the individual, except, of course, to the individual himself. We need some one to show that the organism exists for the individual, as well as the individual for the organism; and certainly, on the basis of a materialistic evolution, this would seem to be more logical and natural: for, if there be no intelligence back of the process for which the organism could be said to exist, then man is the highest intelligence in the universe, and it is right that he should be regarded as the end for which the universe exists, the goal toward which the cosmic process has been working. It would seem strange to make the highest life in the universe subordinate to a life such as that manifested in an unteleological cosmic process. If the individual exists for the organism, this theory needs a God, a Higher Intelligence, to help it out; otherwise what is highest in the order of life would be only means to end: intellect, spirit, will, would be the servants of matter.

If, however, it be said that the individual exists, not as subordinate to an unintelligent cosmic process, but as a part, a member of society, and that it is the social organism as constituted by individuals, and not the individuals themselves, that is of importance, then it may be asked: Why am not I as worthy of consideration as my neighbor? Why should I consider the organism with its future unborn millions? My own interests, my own

pleasure and happiness, are of as much account as the happiness of the human beings who shall live five hundred or five thousand years hence. In other words, we find here the same antinomy that exists between egoistic and universalistic hedonism. If you define conduct in terms of pleasure and pain merely, it is difficult to make the transition from one's self to one's neighbor. When individual and social interests are harmonious, well and good; there is then a rational sanction for conduct in the nature of things. But suppose interests clash. Humanity is the fruit and flower of nature, the highest life in the universe, the end toward which nature has been striving; but why one man rather than another? Why my neighbor rather than myself? As we shall see later, Mr. Kidd feels this difficulty, and, in order to solve it, he is forced either to abandon materialism, or to dethrone reason. Even Mr. Spencer admits that "the welfare of the species is an end to be subserved only as subserving the welfare of individuals." "But," he adds, "since disappearance of the species, implying absolute disappearance of all individuals, involves absolute failure in achieving the end, whereas disappearance of individuals, though carried to a great extent, may leave outstanding such numbers as can, by continuance of the species, make subsequent fulfilment of the end possible, the preservation of the individual must, in a variable degree according to circumstances, be subordinated to the preservation of the species, where the two conflict." In this statement it is to be noticed, in the first place, that though preservation of the species is enjoined, this is only in order that, though many individuals may disappear, other individuals may remain to fulfil their ends. It is, after all, the individual that is of paramount importance. In the second place, Mr. Spencer has here brought in a new element, namely, the end. What, then, is the end? It is the welfare of individuals. It can, indeed, never be anything else. But there we are back at the old question, Why the welfare of one individual rather than of another? Still further, suppose you say that this welfare is not happiness, but self-development; or suppose you say that it merely is spiritual growth—"that ye may have life, and may have it more abundantly": then we may hold that the kind of life which we iden-

tify with spiritual growth would facilitate the preservation of the species. We do hold that; we should quite agree with Mr. Leslie Stephen in refusing to recognize as moral such conduct as could be shown to lead to the extinction of the species: but that is a very different thing from saying that the preservation of the species is the end. It would seem to be necessary to determine what the end of conduct or of life is, before laying down rules looking to the attainment of that end. And here, again, a metaphysic, a theory of the universe, is involved; and it ought not to be quietly assumed that economic or social progress is the end for which nature is striving.

We can better understand how those who put a spiritualistic construction upon the universe should make the individual subordinate to the organism, for in that case the whole cosmic process, the whole world of nature, inorganic, organic, human, all would be but the visible manifestation of spiritual life; the whole universe of mind and matter would exist through and for the spirit back of things—very much as the Calvinist says that all things exist for the glory of God. Man in this case might be, as it were, but a button on the garment of Deity, and, as such, of infinitely less importance than the garment itself. The garment would exist for the wearer; the button would exist for the garment.

But it is not true, Professor Haeckel to the contrary notwithstanding, that it is dualism which gives an anthropocentric construction to the universe. On the contrary, it is only a materialistic monism which can assert that "man is the central point of the universe, the last and highest final cause of creation, and that the rest of nature was created merely for the purpose of serving man." (*Monism*, p. 14.) This is at least as bad theology as it is bad science. Paul and the Hebrew prophets were as violently opposed to the anthropocentric view as were Darwin and Copernicus, though the latter names, no doubt, carried more weight, speaking as they did in the name of science, while the former spoke only by inspiration of the Most High. Dualism may teach that the individual man is of greater consequence than the sum of all the elements that enter into his non-human environment; but it does not teach "that the rest of nature was created merely for the purpose of serving man."

So much as to method. What are the results according to Mr. Kidd of the application of these principles? I shall state them very briefly. In the first place, then, the life of man is a continual struggle for existence, his own interests being invariably antagonistic to the interests of the social organism of which he forms a part. "We have a rational creature whose reason is itself one of the leading factors in the progress he is making, but who is nevertheless subject, in common with all other forms of life, to certain organic laws of existence which render his progress impossible in any other way than by submitting to conditions that can never have any ultimate sanction in his reason." "If progress is to continue, the individual must be compelled to submit to conditions of existence of the most onerous kind, which, to all appearance, his reason actually gives him the power to suspend—and all to further a development in which he has not, and in which he never can have, *qua* individual, the slightest practical interest."

And yet, strange to say, man has not ceased to make progress. He has persistently disregarded the voice of reason telling him to look out for himself. How do we explain this strange resistance on the part of man to the urging of reason and interest combined? Mr. Kidd answers it is to be explained by the phenomena of religion. Religious belief is the integrating force in the social organism, and provides "a sanction for social conduct which is always of necessity ultra-rational, and the function of which is to secure in the stress of evolution the continual subordination of the interests of the individual units to the larger interests of the longer-lived social organism to which they belong." In other words, reason teaches pure individualism, selfishness, which would put an end to progress. Yet, as a matter of fact, progress has been continuous, and is bound to continue. This is owing to the subordination of individual interests to the wider social interests. Egoism has given way to altruism, because religion has taught the latter and has enforced its teaching with positive sanctions. Yet these sanctions have themselves no foundation in reason. There is no such thing as a rational religion. "A rational religion is a scientific impossibility." What, then, does Mr. Kidd

mean by saying that there is no such thing as a rational religion? There is certainly clumsiness of statement, if not confusion of thought, here. How, in the first place, if one be a thorough-going Weismannist, can there be for such an one any such thing as a supernatural sanction? For does not Weismannism just mean that everything that is has come to be simply through the working of the cosmic process—the grinding of the wheels of nature—and are not our ideas, then, even our idea of the supernatural, simply the product, and at the same time a part, of this process? Certain arrangements of the molecules of matter have at last produced mind—or, let us say, rather, ideas, thoughts—for mind itself is only a series of thought-images strung together—“a series of feelings aware of itself.” Now what right have these ideas, these simple products of a mechanical process which distributes and arranges matter in space—what right have these misbegotten little creatures to tell us to believe in something outside or beyond (supernatural) the cosmic process (nature) which has given them birth, whose they are and whom they serve? In short, if you start with an empirical theory of knowledge, how can you ever get beyond the world of sight and sound and taste and smell? Or, to put the matter in another way, if Weismannism is materialistic, it would make the cosmic process sum up and include the universe. Nature would embrace everything that has been, is, and will be. How, then could there be anything beyond what is everything—any supernatural?¹ We, indeed, are not warranted in asserting that Weismannism is necessarily materialistic. Weismann himself tells us that “the mechanical conception of nature very well admits of being united with a teleological conception of the universe,” and that “without teleology there would be no mechanism.” “The consciousness,” he says, “that behind that mechanism of the universe which is alone comprehensible to us there still lies an incomprehensible teleo-

¹ Mr. Kidd says, in the Nineteenth Century article above cited, that it was his purpose “to state in simple, scientific terms, *and without the necessity for starting with any equipment of teleological assumption*, that which presents itself to me [him] as a natural law of human evolution hitherto unenunciated.” But it is one purpose of this article to indicate that such a simple limitation of the subject as Mr. Kidd proposes is impossible.

logical universal cause, necessitates quite a different conception of the universe—a conception absolutely opposed to that of the materialist.” This is plain enough; the mechanism of natural phenomena may be but the manifestation of the plan of an intelligent first cause—may be “purpose” externalized and made to live in space, as it existed before only in thought. But Weismann does not say that he himself believes in the existence of this “Universal Cause.” What he does make clear is the statement that if there be any directive power in the universe “we must not imagine this to interfere directly in the mechanism of the universe, but to be rather behind the latter as the final cause of this mechanism.” The fact of the existence of matter and of the laws which govern it, does not satisfy our intellectual need for causality, and if we choose to *assume* a universal cause underlying the laws of nature, no one could show that such assumption is erroneous. But we can not prove that there is any “spiritual first cause of the universe,” and if there be, it is inconceivable in its nature, and of it we can say only one thing with certainty, namely, that it must be teleological. But it is certain that directive power and mechanical causes cannot work together. In other words, if there be any teleology in the universe it must reside in the mechanic who made the machine and set it going; but the machine once set in motion, cannot have crank, lever, or screw-pin touched from without. It cannot be oiled or regulated in any way. To do this would stop the natural working of its wheels. This God the clock-maker theory of the universe is not atheistic. It is nineteenth century scientific Deism; but so far as its practical bearing on morality is concerned, we may doubt whether it is so very much better than atheism. If, moreover, Weismann be asked “whether the development of the mind can be conceived as resulting from purely mechanical laws,” he answers “unhesitatingly with the pure materialist,” though he does not agree with him as to the manner in which he derives mental phenomena from matter, but would rather, as Haeckel does, attribute consciousness to matter. Further than this, in his theory of knowledge he is agnostic. His essay sums up to this: that if there be any teleological power in the universe it can only be con-

ceived of as a first cause, but by no means as a "phyletic vital force" or directive power. Thus conceiving of it, it would not be inconsistent with the mechanical conception of nature, but its existence can only be assumed, not proved.¹

Our author's position is much less definite than his master's, and we can only judge his vague statements on this point by their implications. We may, therefore, ask: if the mechanical conception of nature be not inconsistent with teleology; *i. e.*, in other words, with the belief that there is a *plan* back of the developmental process, this plan implying intelligence, and religion being but the belief in and feeling of dependence upon this supreme intelligence, how, then, can religion be irrational? Teleology implies a plan. A plan implies the existence of an intelligent being. If there be such a being it cannot be irrational to hold that he exists, with whatever implications, moral or otherwise, such a belief would involve. Professor Drummond tells us that "instead of giving up nature and reason . . . Mr. Kidd should have given up Darwin." Perhaps; but allowing him to keep Darwin, if he would only concede the rationality of religion the whole thing would work out simply enough.

Mr. Kidd insists that the essential element in all religions is the conception of the supernatural. Here he undoubtedly strikes at the root of the matter, and his discussion of this point cannot be too highly praised. The chapter in which he pictures the visit of an inhabitant of another planet to our western civilization and describes the impression produced upon the visitor by the various phenomena connected with our religious life, and the chapter on "the function of religious beliefs in the evolution of society," are both admirable. We need not pause to question his right to impose his own meaning on the phrase "social organism," nor to remark upon his somewhat clumsy definition of religion—perhaps any one is foolish to attempt to define religion—and perhaps Mr. Kidd's definitions are adequate for the purpose he has in view. Neither shall we pause to inquire into the meaning of the word progress—important as such an inquiry is—it would take us too

¹ Weismann, essay on "The Mechanical Conception of Nature," in *Studies in the Theory of Descent*, Vol. 1.

far afield. Mr. Kidd uses the word to indicate a change of social conditions, to signify the difference, *e. g.*, between society as it is to-day, and as it was, say a century or ten centuries ago. Such an idea of progress as this invites scrutiny, analysis. Is mere change of external conditions, mode of life, complexity of social intercourse, progress? What is progress? Does it imply that the sum total of happiness is greater than formerly? or of wealth? Has progress any moral quality? or intellectual? or is it merely economic? These are interesting and important questions, but Mr. Kidd does not touch upon them. For our present purpose it is, however, sufficient that with his fundamental contention at this point we are in most hearty agreement; the contention, viz., that ethical systems always have rested, and do rest, upon the supernatural sanctions of religious belief, and that progress has been due to the conduct imposed by these sanctions. So much is clear and strong. This is a tremendous concession to religion.

But what does Mr. Kidd mean when he says that religion is irrational? Does he only mean that religion leads us into a world where the pure reason fails to penetrate? If so, he only holds with the schoolmen who said: *Fides non est contra rationem, sed supra rationem*. There may be rational grounds for the belief in the supernatural, though that belief carries with it certain ultra-rational implications. Or, does Mr. Kidd mean that the belief in the supernatural, upon which such great issues hang, is itself contrary to the dictates of reason? It is impossible to tell what he himself holds. For a man who pretends to scientific accuracy, his use of the words "rational," "irrational," "ultra-rational" and "supernatural," is bewilderingly vague. If he is intentionally non-committal, as his statement that "the question of real importance is not whether . . . these beliefs are without any foundation in reason, but whether religious systems have a function to perform in the evolution of society," would seem to imply, he has succeeded admirably in his effort to involve this point in obscurity. But the point cannot be thus evaded. If it be said that Mr. Kidd means right and that in making him pronounce belief in the supernatural to be contrary to reason we are only setting up a straw-man for a target, the answer is, that we have no desire to

misrepresent Mr. Kidd, but only to demand consistency and clearness upon a very important point. For it is not enough to say that religious beliefs "must have some immense utilitarian function to perform in the evolution which is proceeding." This is good as far as it goes, and instead of saying that religion is irrational, we would make this concession serve as an argument for the reasonableness of the belief in the supernatural; *i. e.*, just as Kant founded a moral argument for the existence of God on the necessity of finding a supernatural sanction for individual conduct, so we would say that the necessity that the social organism is under of finding a supernatural sanction for such conduct as will insure its continued life and progress is *ipso facto* an argument for the rationality of that sanction; unless, indeed, progress itself be irrational. But if progress be a good (as I take it all evolutionists must hold) then that which makes it possible must be a good, which the belief in the supernatural can scarcely be if it is founded on a lie. This is another of Mr. Kidd's paradoxes. He states the same thought in another way when he says: "The most distinctive feature of human evolution as a whole is that through the operation of the law of natural selection the race must grow ever more and more religious." We do not know how much Mr. Kidd was striving after effect in stating the matter in this way, but to those who have regarded the Darwinian hypothesis as the sworn enemy of supernatural religion this statement is sufficiently striking.

Still, the real question is, not whether a belief in the supernatural is necessary to social progress, but whether there is rational ground for such belief. Mr. Kidd shows small appreciation of the subject when he says that "this is not the question at issue at all." For suppose, in explaining the phenomena of religion, you explain religion away. The well-being and progress of society in the past and in the present has been dependent upon a morality conditioned by supernatural sanctions. But how long will these sanctions prove binding when they are shown to be irrational? Will men fear God if they believe that he is dead, or that he sleepeth, or is gone on a journey? Men have hitherto believed in religions and acted under their sanctions. How did

they come to have these beliefs? If you can explain the belief in the supernatural in a naturalistic way, you may satisfy the demands of the historic spirit by showing how these things came to be, but you may at the same time leave nothing to believe in except the belief that belief is impossible. We are in hearty sympathy with Mr. Kidd in his "impatience at the triviality and comparative insignificance of the explanation offered" by Mr. Spencer to account for our religious beliefs. But on this fundamental point Spencer's position is luminous with insight compared with Mr. Kidd's. If Spencer, in accounting for the genesis of our religious ideas, explains them away, he at least does not attempt to rear the structure of his ethical system upon the baseless fabric of a vision. On the contrary, he tells us that it is his specific object to establish rules of conduct on a scientific basis, independent of all religious sanctions. Whether he succeeds in doing so is another question. But it is beyond conjecture how Mr. Kidd, of all men, holding as he does to the religious basis of morality, of all altruistic action, holding that "if our conscious relationship to the universe is measured by the brief span of individual existence, then the intellect can know of only one duty in the individual, namely, his duty to himself to make the most of the few precious years of consciousness he can ever know," holding that without a supernatural sanction for conduct self-indulgence would reign supreme, and that nations, by neglecting the moral law, which is the law of progress, and which is founded upon the sanctions of religion, would degenerate and disappear; holding all this as the teaching of science, it is beyond conjecture, I say, how he can regard it as beside the question whether or not these religious beliefs have any foundation in reason.

Indeed, it seems to me that alike the fundamental weakness and the greatest strength of *Social Evolution* lie right here: its greatest strength in the recognition of the necessity of religion as a social factor; its fundamental weakness, more serious even than the building of the whole argument upon an unproved hypothesis, in the position the author takes in regard to the rationality of religion; for this is to build upon foundations of sand. It is to saw off the limb on which he is sitting. For to what, after all, does

his contention come? Simply to this: that what has been, will be; that because religious systems have hitherto been necessary to the working of the cosmic process in the various stages of social development, therefore they will continue to play the important part in the future that they have played in the past, because without them social progress could not continue. But why, we may ask, should progress continue? And if it does continue, whither is it tending? What is the goal, the end, the aim? This, again, is a question of metaphysics, and is beyond the sphere of the biological method. So true is it that we cannot learn from nature—*i. e.*, external, mechanical nature—alone, but must bring with us to nature the clue to its interpretation. So far as the present inquiry is concerned, it is sufficient that reason and religion made their advent together, and have always existed side by side, sometimes in harmonious coöperation, sometimes in friendly rivalry; now in armed neutrality and again in open conflict, but still together. Man has universally been a religious animal, and has acted under supernatural sanctions. But, now, suppose you de-rationalize religion, destroying the supernatural sanctions of conduct, what will happen? One of two things, either progress will stop or it must go forward under new conditions. We cannot say that either alternative is *a priori* impossible. Because a certain thing has been is no guarantee that it will continue eternally. Astronomers tell us that the planets are burning themselves out. If so, the time must come when they can no longer support life. Progress, therefore, in the sense in which we now use the word, could not be everlasting, and man must be destined sooner or later to disappear from the face of the earth. This period may be distant by millions of years. It may be that we are destined to go on developing a higher civilization, a more perfect humanity, "for a period longer than that now covered by history." We may realize many of the lofty visions of the future which Mr. Frederic Harrison so eloquently pictures, even though they do not come to pass under the religion of humanity. But we have no guarantee of this. The bloom of the flower is of short duration compared with the life of the plant which bears it. And so the flower of our civilization may endure but for a moment in com-

parison with the infinitely longer life of the world in which we live. What guarantee have we that nature, which has hitherto been as cruel to "the type" as she has been to the individual, will act more kindly toward man than toward the countless species that have forever vanished? Hitherto the disappearing type has but vanished in yielding to a higher type, one better adapted to its environments. But some day the zenith of ascent will be reached, and by the reverse process the descent toward the nadir will begin.

"Many an æon moulded earth before her highest, man, was born;
Many an æon, too, may pass when earth is manless and forlorn."

The fact that man had outgrown religion might indicate that in the next stage of the world's history, for that "crowning race" of whom the poet speaks, morality might be fostered under new conditions, and without the aid of supernatural sanctions; but it might just as well indicate that with the loss of religious faith would begin the decay of morality and the general reverse process. Who shall say that the first step toward the time when

"Many a planet by many a sun may roll with the dust of a vanished race"

may not be taken with the derationalizing of religion? The pendulum has swung to the end of its reach; it may now swing back. The onward movement has thus far had a certain impetus, a propelling force, back of it; take that away, and may the movement not cease? Certainly it may; nay, it inevitably must cease unless some new impetus be found to take the place of the old one. Electricity might take the place of steam, but the engine could not run without any motive power whatever. Everybody, apparently, recognizes this fact, except Mr. Kidd. Hence it is that serious-minded, thinking men who have lost their own religious faith and are trying to rob the rest of the world of theirs, are endeavoring in various ways to provide a substitute for that which has been lost. Hence, too, it is that we, who do not believe in either the rationality or the practical efficacy of any of these substitutes, tenaciously cling to, and zealously defend, that belief in the supernatural which always has been, and which, it seems to us, always will be, the only rational sanction for moral-

ity and the only hope for the human race. Professor Huxley pitting the microcosm against the macrocosm, and giving the youth not even a sling with which to fight against the giant; Mr. Frederic Harrison bidding us worship humanity, and Professor Huxley replying that he would as soon worship a wilderness of apes; Mr. Spencer resolving our gods into ghosts, and telling us that duty and pleasure tend to become identical, though right be only conformity to custom; Professor Drummond following Mr. Spencer in assuring us that we need not look beyond nature for the highest sanctions for conduct, and then covertly introducing the idea of the divine (which, if it means anything at all, must mean pretty much what Mr. Kidd means by the supernatural) by including it in the environment in which the evolutionary process takes place; or Mr. Charles H. Pearson lamenting "the decay of character" and "the decline of family life," and seeking a substitute for an obligatory morality in the "religion of the state"—what if we cannot accept the doctrine of these new teachers of righteousness? The voice may be the voice of Jacob, but the hands seem to us like the hands of Esau.

Nevertheless, it is conceivable that progress may continue, though the conditions of progress may change, just as a calculating machine, as Babbage showed, might be constructed to work for any fixed length of time according to a certain law, and then might, from a certain point, proceed according to an entirely different law. To us it does not seem so strange that social progress should take place up to a certain point under ape and tiger instincts, and that beyond that point progress may continue only by letting the ape and the tiger in us die (though Professor Huxley has been criticised for splitting up "the world-order into two separate halves," and going back on his fundamental principle of continuity). This only means that with the advent of man came in certain new elements, namely, reason and conscience, in virtue of which what was before a natural or non-moral world was converted into an ethical world. Instead of the thorn has sprung up the fir tree, and instead of the brier has sprung up the myrtle tree. But the strange thing is, that these latest coëxisting products should, according to the present theory, be inherently

antagonistic. In other words, suppose we admit that progress is necessary, and say that the cosmic process, whether there be mind back of it or not, is working out its own ends in developing conscience; with the advent of conscience came also reason, which must also have a part to play, and an important part, in this great drama. But here nature seems to be divided against herself in making conscience dictate one thing and reason another. Reason says, "Strive only for self"; conscience says, "Consider your neighbor." What shall we do? The parable reminds us that this division-status is an unstable one. Nature has conceived and brought forth twins, which, instead of furthering life, seem bent upon destroying each other. Thus Professor Huxley and thus Mr. Kidd, only with this difference: that the former chooses the nobler part, and says that man must ally himself with conscience and combat the cosmic process, while the latter says that man *will not* act contrary to the dictates of reason.¹

Now it is obvious that there may be two ways out of this dilemma. In the first place, we may refuse to admit the validity of the distinction between the "ethical" and the "natural"

¹ It is a little curious that I should have expressed my opinion here in words so similar to those subsequently used by Mr. Kidd in a foot-note to the article above cited in deprecation of the very criticism here offered. Says Mr. Kidd: "I do not know whether any reader of *Social Evolution* who has done me the honor to study the book closely will feel that what has been said here suggests a criticism that I have taken pains to answer beforehand in the book itself, namely, that I might be taken to have represented the nature of man as a house divided against itself. I have endeavored to make it clear throughout that the religious feeling, that is, the willingness to submit to sanctions beyond reason, is not only just as much part of man's nature as any other, but that it is the most characteristic part of it—a part which is being continually developed by the process of evolution in progress. The sanction for submitting to the cosmic process is in man; it is not in his reason. It is not beyond him; it is simply beyond his reason." To which we may reply, substantially in the words of Mr. Balfour, that this resolves the religious feeling into an instinct, which is "nothing better than a device of nature to trick us into the performance of altruistic actions." It is one of nature's devices to insure the survival of the species and to further social progress, and may be fittingly compared "to the protective blotches on the beetle's back." (*Foundations of Belief*, pp. 16, 18.) The question, then, still remains as to the relation between reason and this "religious instinct;" as to whether reason can invalidate or "circumvent" this instinct, as it has already circumvented some of the most important of them. (Cf. *The Nineteenth Century*, February, 1895, p. 229.)

world, as well as the antinomy between reason and conscience. In other words, we may insist that the "struggle for the life of others" is as natural and as rational as the "struggle for life," and may seek to show not only that the interest of the individual and the welfare of the organism are always identical, but also that the moral life begins with the amœba or the oyster or the ape, as the case may be. Authorities differ. Haeckel is less complimentary to the brutes than Drummond, for the German professor holds that "it is only in the most highly developed vertebrates—birds and mammals—that we discern the first beginnings of reason, the first traces of religious and ethical conduct." Or, in the second place, we may follow Professor Huxley in refusing to see any morality in the workings of non-human nature. Ethic begins with man and not with lamprey-eels, or monkeys. This is the view taken by our author, and we have no hesitation in following him here. There remains, then, the antagonism between reason the egoist, and conscience the altruist. And this, again, can be settled in one of two ways: either by showing that there is no *casus belli* and that the would-be enemies should be friendly allies, or by the lawful, rational submission of one of the parties.

As to the former alternative, it may be said that there is some truth in Mr. Spencer's view. We do not believe that the individual's interest and the interest of the organism are commonly at variance. We hold that honesty is not only right, but is, ordinarily, the best policy also; that a man shall reap as he sows; that God's ordinary way of punishing is by the working of natural law and not by miracle, so that if a man abuse the laws of health he will suffer; if improvident he may starve, and will certainly have to beg. There is much rational sanction for conduct in the nature of things. Further than this, there is the fear of social ostracism, and the danger of falling into the hands of the police. These furnish wholesome restraints upon conduct. Again, Mr. Kidd probably over-emphasizes the pure selfishness of man. Doubtless there is at least a modicum of altruistic feeling which is natural to man. He is not wholly vile. This is one thing we had in mind in saying that Mr. Kidd's method could to some ex-

tent be separated from his results. For it is one thing to say that conscience is only developed instinct and that the idea of obligation has its origin in experience, and quite a different thing to say that the idea of oughtness being ultimate, experience has educated the conscience and filled up the categories of obligation. The former view would no doubt invalidate the moral argument and undermine the authority of conscience. For suppose we grant that conscience is a growth, a development from experience, and that we see its rudimentary forms in the instincts of animals; man then follows his instincts, *i. e.*, his conscience, just as animals do. But the difference is, that man has also his reason to reckon with, and if he finds that his instincts are irrational, or, in other words, if he explains away his conscience, he will no longer follow what it dictates. On the other hand, it is conceivable that we may have an obligatory morality based upon a theistic conception of the universe, without at the same time excluding the idea of development and the function of experience from the moral life. Given conscience, it may be that God speaks through it with increasing clearness, just as, for example, he spoke to the Jewish people with ever-increasing fulness of revelation.

Mr. Spencer and the evolutionary ethic may be right in contending that experience has played an important part in developing the moral sentiments. But, as M. Molinari, in his little book on *Religion*, points out, the conscience must be armed as well as enlightened, and while it may be the function of science and political economy to enlighten the conscience, it is only religion that can arm it with authority. Experience can teach expediency but not obligation. It may back up its teachings by the sanctions of worldly prudence expressed in very high terms. It may teach that the individual's interest is in the majority of cases identical with the interest of the social organism. But what we want is an ethic that will explain the ultimate ethical problem, the idea of obligation, without destroying the feeling of obligation, and will (in order to secure progress, so far as the present discussion is concerned) compel the individual to subordinate his own interests to the interests of the social organism in those cases where they seem to be at variance.

This leads us to the second of the alternatives mentioned above, namely, the conflict between reason and conscience. How can we settle this difficulty?

Our position is analogous to that of the theologian who makes his final appeal to the teaching of the church or to the words of Scripture. Not that in so doing he dishonors reason: in a certain sense reason must be the "seat of authority in religion," the final court of appeal, for it is only by the use of the reason that we decide that the teaching of the church or of the Scriptures is to be accepted as authoritative and ultimate. But having once constituted the church or the Bible as the ultimate authority in matters of religious faith, having once by the use of reason found an infallible norm, it is illogical to appeal back again to the reason to correct the norm. There cannot be two norms. The difference between rationalists and their opponents is not that the former make their appeal to reason while the latter walk by faith (the one appeals to reason as much as the other), but rather that the ratiocinative faculty demands of the latter that they submit to the decision of the higher court, while the former do not see sufficient ground for this submission. Either position is rational enough. The irrational position is that which first sets up the Bible or the church as the constituted norm of religious truth and then, having accepted such truth *in toto*, rejects it *in partibus*, or which having declared "Lo, here is a greater, let us hear him," turns again from Master to disciple. Just as the consistent theologian, having "proved all things," and having decided upon rational grounds that the teaching of the Scriptures or of the church is infallible in all matters of faith and practice, does not then seek to wrest the things therein which are hard to be understood; so here, having convinced ourselves by a broad survey, by a study of all the elements concerned, that the higher reason tells us to follow the dictates of conscience, we will no longer be troubled that the lower reason speaking only in the name of present worldly interest bids us pursue a policy of selfish individualism. This is, of course, only another way of saying that the individual's apparent present interests are disregarded only in order to further his real welfare. The individual submits to supernatural sanctions

of conduct, not perhaps because such conduct as is enforced is pleasing, but because it is rational; because, that is, everything considered, such conduct is best for him, will contribute most to his welfare.

We are not now seeking to show that there can be no adequate basis for morality apart from the sanctions of religion. We do not believe that there can be—and the agnostics' recent answer to the question, "Why lead a moral life?" has not tended to weaken our opinion—but this is not here the question. What we here maintain is, that in order to arrive at the knowledge of man's true welfare, *everything* must be taken into account; and, if our world-view includes the ideas of God, and immortality, and the authority of conscience, then the antinomy between conscience and the lower or hedonistic reason vanishes. The apparent antinomy which exists between conscience and the lower reason, which is identical with self-interest, is swallowed up in the higher unity of the practical reason. Scale this height, and the whole outlook is wonderfully changed. Stand upon this vantage-ground, and Mr. Kidd's paradoxes disappear.

Take socialism, for example: Mr. Kidd holds that "the only social doctrines current in the advanced societies of to-day which have the assent of reason for the masses are the doctrines of socialism. These doctrines may be utterly destructive to the prospects of future progress and to the future interests of society; but this is no concern of the individual whose interest it is, not to speculate about a problematical future for unborn generations, but to make the best of the present for himself, according to his lights." In other words, the conditions which favor the progress of the race are distinctly antagonistic to the welfare of the masses of that race, and these conditions, therefore, have no sanction in reason. It seems a paradox that the conditions under which social progress is possible are without the sanction of reason, while social conditions which reason does justify are not only impracticable, but would effectually stop progress. Is progress, then, an evil? Or is rationality an evil? Or is there something the matter with the thesis that the only conditions under which progress is possible are irrational? At any

rate, the fact remains, that man has continued to progress, and with the full use of his reason. Take the view above indicated, and man's long and weary uphill march is justified; otherwise his toil was unreasonable and foolish. May it not be that it is the existence of conditions which would stop progress that is unreasonable as well as impracticable?

For if it be true, as Mr. Kidd acutely points out, that the materialistic socialism of the school of Karl Marx is really the purest kind of individualism, why not consistently carry out the principle? These men are socialists, not from love of their fellow-men and the disinterested motive of promoting their welfare, but from the desire for "happiness in the Benthamite sense of plenty of pigs' wash." If, then, we proceed on the principle of individualism, selfishness, competition, struggle for life (that is, under conditions of progress); if we adopt

——— "the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can,"

why not, then, let the masses and "the four hundred," labor and capital, the have-nots and the haves, fight it out as best they can, and so insure progress? But if, on the other hand, the strong yield to the weak through the operation of altruistic sentiment, then why not extend the application of this principle to the furthest limit, so as to take into consideration the future conditions and progress of the race? If it is the interest of the individual simply "to make the best of the present, according to his light," why, then, should I consider the masses? But, if I do consider the masses, why not consider the condition of the whole social organism, say two hundred years hence?

Social Evolution will be of value, not so much for the worth of its constructive results as for its illustration of one or two important principles. In the first place, it shows that social science must be approached from the side of ethics, and is to be treated in connection with moral philosophy rather than as a branch of political economy. I suppose it would be generally admitted that, as Professor Flint well says, "any proposed solution of a social problem would be sufficiently refuted as soon as it is shown logic-

ally to issue in immorality." The same writer continues, in the words of the Duke of Argyll: "In mathematical reasoning, the 'reduction to absurdity' is one of the familiar methods of disproof. In political reasoning, the 'reduction to iniquity' ought to be of equal value." (Flint, *Socialism*, p. 344.) If "the moral law is the law of progress," as all men, from Mr. Lecky to Mr. Lilly, seem to admit, it would seem to be necessary, first of all, to turn our attention to the study of conduct. What are right, and what are wrong, acts? Why are certain acts right, and certain others wrong? What is the ethical ideal? Has it changed; and, if so, how and why? What ought I to do, and what to leave undone? And *why ought I* to do either? Granted that a certain line of conduct will bring about certain results, how insure such conduct? The answer to these questions involves much. It involves a theory of the universe. One cannot get rid of metaphysic by turning one's back upon it. The fundamental social problem is an ethical problem, and the fundamental ethical problem is metaphysical.

Again, Mr. Kidd's book is an illustration of the vagueness and uncertainty attaching to the study of social phenomena. Men, young men, college men especially, are continually turning away from the study of metaphysics and theology to social science and political economy, because, they say, they want something practical, substantial, solid; they want less speculation and larger results. They complain of the unfruitfulness of metaphysics and the uncertainty of theology, not seeing that if there is ever to be certainty and agreement about anything it must begin with those primary convictions which underlie all social systems, and that just in proportion as there is disagreement as to fundamental questions will there be divergence and confusion in the systems built upon them. And not only so; not only do men apply different principles, but they read the facts very differently. So that in social science we have not only the variant systems arising from the various standpoints of their authors, but we have in addition to this the manifold differences arising from disagreement as to the facts themselves. I have spoken of the divergence between Mr. Kidd and Professor Drummond. But what are we

to think when Mr. Kidd attributes progress to the influence of religion, and Mr. Charles H. Pearson regards it as one evidence of progress that religion is dying out; when Mr. Kidd holds that progress is inevitable and has been due to altruism which has brought about increased rivalry and competition, and Mr. Pearson asserts that state socialism is unavoidable and with it the cessation of competition? The recent discussions of social questions by Mackenzie, Drummond, Flint, Pearson, and Kidd furnish sufficient illustration of the divergent views that prevail in regard to human society. A recent experience in reading these books has made me long to flee from this region of "noise and smoke" back to the peace and certainty of the "eternal verities" and has convinced me more than ever that one needs to have a comprehensive grasp of the problems of philosophy and Christian theology before attempting to grapple with the difficulties of social science. One should have his lamp lit and his loins girt and his bearings fixed before setting out for this misty, confusing region.

Finally, it is only in the light of a Christian theology that social problems can be solved. Grant the rationality of religion and the truth of Christianity, and Mr. Kidd's paradoxes disappear and his book furnishes an ingenious witness to the presence of "God in history." Instead of saying that progress depends upon ethical ideas which derive their sanction from a theistic construction of the universe, we may say that God works in history by putting in the hearts of men certain intuitive ethical ideas which, acted upon, lead to progress. Thus far apart from Revelation. But we may go a step farther and use the same line of argument in reference to the nature and mission of the church, and say that the church is the line along which God works in history toward the redemption of the world, since the church is the medium which God has chosen for the spread of those ethical ideas on which moral growth and social evolution depend. Still further, the Christian view of the world harmonizes for us what our author considers an inherent antagonism, since the view of life which the Christian ethic presents, while insuring the continually developing life of the social organism, at the same time provides a way of salvation for the individual. The Christian

scheme not only rationalizes altruism; it glorifies the individual. The individual in order to realize his own best interests (pure individualism) is, according to the Christian scheme, bound also at the same time to manifest that "brotherly love" (altruism), which is the life of the community and the condition of progress. And conversely, in the manifestation of that "love of the brethren" which has its root in "the love of God," the individual attains to that perfect happiness which passeth knowledge. It is along such lines as these, and along such lines alone, that the problems of social evolution can be solved.

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VI. NOTES.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN ASSEMBLY, 1895.

THE meeting was held in Dallas, Texas, May 16-25, 1895. The commissioners found the church building hung with the drapery of sorrow: the congregation, on the Sabbath preceding, had laid to rest their distinguished and beloved pastor, the Rev. Andrew Pickens Smith, D. D. Recognizing that a prince and a great man had fallen; that a trusted leader of our sacramental host had departed; that a brother, large and warm of heart, clear in head, devoted to conviction, prudent in judgment, conservative in policy, and esteemed by all, had gone to his grave, the Assembly promptly held a memorial service, and testified to its sense of loss, and expressed its sympathy to his bereaved flock.

The Rev. James R. Graham, D. D., preached the opening sermon, on "The Kingship of the Messiah." His text was Psalm xlv. 1-6. In the introduction he sought to throw the dynamic spell of the poet upon the audience, that it might see the theme in white light. He announced his purpose to avoid nice distinctions and fields of controversy. He then laid out his grand divisions, and proceeded with their development.

I. The sphere of Christ's kingly authority. He occupies many thrones and wears many crowns. Of which kingdom does the Psalmist sing—of creation, of providence, or of grace? A distinction must be drawn between the absolute kingdom of Christ as he is a consubstantial person in the Godhead and the mediatorial and special kingdom which he has as Theanthropos. It is of the latter that the Psalmist here discourses. But the mediatorial kingdom itself has two distinct aspects, presenting Christ to us as "the King of nations" and as "the King of saints." These two aspects differ from each other in three respects: (1), As to the time of origin. The kingdom of grace dates back to the assumption of the mediatorial commission; the kingdom of power dates back to the ascension and triumph of Christ. (2), As to recognition. The church actually admits, and submits to, the authority of Christ; but many in the world say, "We will not have this man to reign over us." (3), As to ends. His gracious authority

is exercised for the perpetuity, enlargement, and well-being of the church; his universal authority is put forth to restrain and conquer his enemies.

II. The constitution of Christ's kingdom. To understand its nature we must recall its design. This is two-fold: (1), To fulfil on a grander scale the destiny of the first Adam; (2), To repair the ruin which his fall had entailed upon his posterity. To accomplish these ends we have the singular and anomalous constitution of a kingdom within a kingdom; the independent and underived kingdom of the Trinity, and within that the dependent and derived kingdom of redemption. Between the two there can be no conflict, because of the constitution of the person of Christ.

III. The duration of Christ's mediatorial kingdom. Here there is an apparent contradiction in Scripture. Daniel says that the Messianic dominion is an "everlasting dominion that shall not pass away," while Paul just as distinctly teaches that the Son shall "deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father." The explanation lies in the distinction between that kingdom of grace which began at the formation of the redemptive covenant, and that universal dominion which dates its rise at the ascension of Christ. It is the latter, the headship of Christ over all things to the church, that is to be delivered up at the end of the mediatorial economy; but as to the headship of Christ over his people, this throne is "for ever and ever."

IV. The present aspects of Christ's kingdom in the world. His claim is universal, but that claim is admitted by only a few. Limited as to its subjects, this kingdom has started on a career of unlimited and universal conquest. Success is assured by the power that sustains the kingdom; faith is assured by the prophecy which Christ has made concerning the final triumph of his dominion.

The audience which sat down before the Moderator on this occasion expected a sermon of high intellectual and evangelical power. The preacher sustained his reputation, edified and delighted his hearers.

OVERTURES.

More than forty overtures were sent up to this Assembly, and, as far as they asked for changes, nearly every one was declined. The Assembly was asked to change the schedule of collections for systematic beneficence; to change the form of certificate of dismissal of members; to change the number of meetings of Presbytery from two to one annually; to send an evangelist to the Jews; to furnish a cheap

religious newspaper; to make several changes in the Form of Government; to modify our relations to the Northern Church. The Assembly showed its conservative spirit by declining to grant almost every change that was requested. If the result should be fewer overtures hereafter, and those few better considered, many would call this Assembly blessed.

The Presbytery of Macon brought a serious matter to the attention of the Assembly. It believed the hiring of professional singers for choir service to be an evil; that this evil was on the increase; and it asked the Assembly to utter itself against the custom. In reply, the Assembly directed attention to that provision of our law which requires the session of each church "to take the oversight of the singing in the public worship of God," and then the Assembly enjoined the sessions to make the music conform to the Standards of the church. This answer is not close enough to the question. Without regard to their personal character and religion, and purely on account of their musical gifts and culture, churches not infrequently hire professional musicians who are worldlings, atheists, infidels, Jews, Romanists, and other irreligious people. The object is to satisfy a morbid desire for æstheticism in the worship of God, or to compete with some rival church for attendance and popularity. The principle is wrong. The tendency is to convert the church into a sacred concert-hall. Many attend the public services of the sanctuary, are regaled with classical and operatic music from a choir of professional singers, experience delightful sensations, and return to their homes felicitating themselves upon the spiritual joys which they have had; as a matter of fact, all their pleasant sensations were but sensual emotions produced by the artistic music of the day. These professional musical services delude worshippers into believing that they have experienced holy emotions of true spiritual pleasure in the house of God, when the nervous system alone has been excited by sweet sounds. Professionalism in the choir logically leads to professionalism in the pulpit. When the chief end of the singing is the gratification of the æsthetic feelings of the congregation, it is but natural for the pew to claim entertainment of the pulpit. The worship of God's house in all its parts is, primarily, a practical art, a means to the chief end of man. Besides this, these professional musical services are extravagantly costly, and are growing more so. We have known a congregation to pay twelve hundred dollars a year for its choir service, and fifteen hundred dollars for its pastoral service—the choir worked less than

two hours a week, while the pastor gave his entire time to the cause of the congregation. We have known this source of expense to prevent almost entirely contributions to beneficence. The Assembly ought to have delivered itself with force and directness against such services. Their tendency is to worldliness and unspiritual worship. The delegation of the praises of God's house to hired professionals, in order to get a higher artistic effect, is an iniquity that needs severe rebuke. The Assembly meant to rebuke it. It meant to say that such services are not in accordance with our Standards, and did enjoin sessions to prevent all such corruptions of the Lord's worship.

THE INDEPENDENT COLORED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

This matter was brought up by an overture from Charleston Presbytery. Inasmuch as this Assembly ordered the erection of this colored church, the history of this movement will be interesting. During the war between the States, our church repeatedly expressed its good-will towards the negroes, then the slaves of its members, and took such action as was practicable in the disturbed state of the country for their spiritual and ecclesiastical welfare. During the years immediately succeeding the war, our Assembly, distracted and dismantled by that struggle, continued to express its solicitude for the negroes, and to agitate the question of some definite policy towards them, a policy which would insure the best results in their spiritual history. In 1865 the Assembly said: "It is highly inexpedient that there should be an ecclesiastical separation of the white and colored races." In 1867 the Assembly revoked this declaration, and declined "to make any declaration respecting the future ecclesiastical organization of such freedmen as may belong to our communion." The Assembly then asked the Northern Assembly (Old School) to co-operate with it in work among the colored people, but this effort failed. In 1869 an *ad interim* committee, of which the Rev. J. L. Girardeau, D. D., was chairman, reported a plan to the Assembly, which was adopted, as follows:

"The prominent view which has impressed itself on the minds of the committee, and which they respectfully propose for the consideration of the Assembly, is, that the colored people who adhere to us be allowed a formative organization, a sort of gradually maturing process, to be arrested at a certain point, until, under proper training, it is prepared to pass on towards completion. To be more explicit, what they need is, for the present, separate, particular churches, with their own deacons and elders, and at the same time instruction by an edu-

cated white ministry, until they can prove their ability to produce a competent ministry of their own."

In 1874 the Assembly modified this plan, so as to provide for a speedier separation of the two races into independent churches. Presbyteries and sessions were recommended "to encourage and aid in the formation of colored churches, . . . with the view to form these churches in due time into Presbyteries. . . . When two or more such Presbyteries exist, they may unite to form a Synod. As was the case in our own history, this may, for a time, continue to be their highest court. A time, however, may arrive when, from the increase in the number of its churches and Presbyteries, said Synod may find it expedient to divide, and combine into a General Assembly." To further this object, the Assembly established, and has operated, the "Colored Evangelistic Fund" and the "Tuskaloosa Institute." It is the opinion of many that the time has come to execute this historic intention of our church; and the last Assembly took the following action:

"I. In response to the overture from Charleston Presbytery asking for the immediate organization of an independent colored Presbyterian Church, this Assembly answers: That the ultimate organization of an independent colored church has always been the policy of our church, and that during the past five years steady progress has been made toward this goal:

"1. In order to ascertain whether, in the judgment of the church, the time has come for such an organization, this Assembly orders that a collection be taken in our churches during the month of August, 1895, for the purpose of raising the funds necessary to defray the expenses connected with the organization of said independent colored Synod, said collection to be forwarded to W. A. Powell, Treasurer, and to be expended under the direction of the Executive Committee of Colored Evangelization.

"2. That the question of this organization be referred to Presbyteries and Synods concerned for their action as they see proper. If their concurrence be obtained and if the funds raised justify such organization in the judgment of the Executive Committee of Colored Evangelization, this Assembly appoints Rev. J. L. Girardeau, D. D., Rev. A. B. Curry, Rev. A. L. Phillips, E. H. Sholl, and J. W. Lapsley as its commissioners to decide upon the place and time for effecting the proposed organization, and to represent the Assembly upon said occasion.

"II. In reply to the overtures from Mecklenburg and Orange Presbyteries, this Assembly authorizes the Executive Committee of Colored Evangelization to confer, through its proper channels, with the Reformed Church of America as to the basis upon which any or all of them may coöperate with our church in the work of colored evangeli-

zation, and to report the result of said conference to the next General Assembly."

It would be a glorious thing for the colored race if the Northern Presbyterian Church, and all other Presbyterian and Reformed bodies in this country, would coöperate with us in the erection of the independent colored Presbyterian Church. (1), This policy is in harmony with that providence which has drawn deep and ineradicable distinctions between the two races, which makes their ecclesiastical amalgamation incongruous and impossible. (2), If self-reliance and independence are moral virtues, then this policy is in harmony with ethics as it is with providence. (3), The bulk of the colored people are in the South; toward them this is the deliberate and resolute policy of the white people of the South; upon it they are more than willing to give the negroes their sympathies, their counsels, and their money; upon any other they will do almost nothing; the policy harmonizes with expediency as well as with providence and ethics. Upon this policy the white people will do more for the negroes, and the negroes can do more for themselves, than upon any other. It is to be hoped that our churches will give the money necessary to set up this church, and that all other Presbyterian bodies will unite with us in this enterprise.

EXECUTIVE AGENCIES.

In spite of the great financial depression felt over the whole country, and by every business, the Executive Committees came up with gratifying reports of the year's operations. The Foreign Missions Committee received during the year \$132,332.90; disbursed \$133,710.97. There was a falling off in contributions, an increase in disbursements, a decrease in expenses, but the fiscal year closed with a balance in the treasury of \$16,865, a part of the balance from last year's receipts. Two missionaries have died—Rev. F. A. Cowan and Mrs. R. A. Haden. No new missionaries were sent out.

The Home Missions Committee has had in its hands \$32,867.36. "Of this sum, \$20,095.02 were expended in the support of eighty missionaries and two candidates. The sum of \$1,266.25 was expended in support of seven teachers; \$1,468.33 were donated, and \$600 were loaned, to aid in erection of fourteen church buildings in ten Presbyteries; \$938.50 were expended in the purchase of Calvin Missionary Institute—school property—in Durant, Choctaw Nation, and \$40 in purchasing ground and building at Wahpanucka, Chickasaw Nation, making an outlay from this fund for the field work of \$24,408.10." The balance on hand is \$7,268.21.

The Invalid Fund amounted to \$12,520.85. This fund aided thirty-three infirm ministers, ninety-eight widows of ministers, and three orphan children of ministers. The fund is sadly inadequate.

The Committee of Education began the year in debt \$4,458.50. This debt has been cancelled, and the committee is out of debt. Total receipts, \$22,305.16. With this amount two hundred and forty-two candidates for the ministry have been aided, in amounts ranging from \$25 to \$75.

The total contributions to Publication, \$6,523.18, were less than for many years. But the committee shows an increase in its assets, placing them at \$103,849.04. The Synod of Nashville and the Presbytery of Nashville endeavored to have the publication business moved from Richmond to Nashville, but the Assembly declined to make the change.

None of the Assembly's committees are in debt; some of them have a balance to their credit; and all of them have done a good work. The church has cause to be thankful to God for such a condition of its affairs. The management of them all must be wise and energetic. The Assembly declined to make any changes in men or methods.

AMENDMENTS.

The last Assembly sent down to the Presbyteries three overtures, and recommended that they be enacted as parts of the constitution of the church. One of these related to the ordination of an evangelist in the foreign field; another proposed a change in the law of licensure; and the last proposed a change in the provision for the ordination of ministers. All of them were rejected by large majorities. There is a general feeling that there is need of some legislation on these subjects; but it is also plain that the mind of the church is not yet clear enough to formulate a satisfactory answer. Matters stand as they did years ago. Irregularities in the preaching of unordained and unlicensed men are recognized, but the church prefers to tolerate them rather than to attempt the new legislation that they make necessary. The Assembly was asked by several Presbyteries to propose to the Presbyteries legislation affecting this matter; but it declined, in every instance, to do so. There was a feeling in this Assembly that a period of rest from change and agitation would be a great boon.

REPORTS OF AD INTERIM COMMITTEES.

The last General Assembly raised three *ad interim* committees, and referred to them questions of grave importance, too serious to be

decided in the hurry of our supreme judicatory. To one of these committees was referred certain aspects of the Sabbath-school; to another, the educational policy of the church; and to a third, the formulation of the principles of Sabbath observance, which shall both give satisfaction to the church at large, and at the same time be in entire accord with the teachings of the Scriptures. All these committees sent in reports carefully prepared, exhibiting much thought and labor. They were able treatises upon the topics discussed. They were all read to the Assembly, but none of them received that careful consideration by the Assembly which their subject-matter, and the labor expended upon them, fairly entitled them to have. They were each, after reading, referred to special committees raised from the floor of the Assembly. The most distressing matter presented to the Assembly was contained in the report of the Permanent Committee on Sabbath Observance. It said:

“The general trend is in the direction of looser views and practices, and, whatever may be affirmed by God’s people, the day is unmistakably losing its hold upon the masses. If, however, in this respect the line was sharply drawn between the churches and the world; if the demoralization and decline were confined simply to the outside world, there would be little or no ground for uneasiness. But, unfortunately, this is not the case. The spirit of indifference is likewise invading the ranks of the church. There is a large class among all denominations, perhaps not as large from our own church as others, who, with the exception of business and the more servile forms of labor, would not scruple to use the Sabbath as any other day, especially in the direction of recreation and pleasure, as evidenced in one of the reports, which mentioned the case of a professed minister of the gospel, not of our church, however, who actually sat as umpire in base-ball games on the Lord’s day. It is this seeming indifference as well as palpable disloyalty to the day, on the part of so many of its professed friends, that so much emboldens the world in setting aside its authority. Only let the churches and Christian people be true to their professions, and the enemies of the Lord will never be able to shake, much less to overturn, this stronghold of Christianity. If ever overthrown, it will be more through the perfidy of its friends than the assaults of its foes. Not until all the different denominations of Christians stand shoulder to shoulder in the breach, and unitedly maintain the absolute and perpetual sanctity of this day of the Lord, can we really and truly expect the outside world to render that reverence and respect which are justly its due.”

This committee also referred to the decision of the last Assembly in the “Telephone Case” as causing widespread uneasiness in the church about the Sabbath. Concerning this alarming state of the

Sabbath, the Assembly took the following action, too mild, if the facts are correctly and calmly summarized in the report:

“*First.* That this Assembly reaffirms and emphasizes its belief in the divine authority and universal and perpetual obligation of the Sabbath.

“*Second.* That in view of the fact that the sacred functions of the pulpit cannot be fulfilled without a fearless declaration of the claims, sanctity, and obligation of the Sabbath, the Assembly urges upon all the ministers of the church to lay this whole subject upon the mind, consciences, and hearts of their people with more fidelity, and do everything in their power to bring about a better observance of God’s holy day.

“*Third.* That the Assembly, while it would not interfere with the liberty of conscience granted by the New Testament, and would not place a yoke of bondage upon Christianity, yet declares that in its judgment, in view of the facts before it, many of God’s professing people are abusing their freedom and injuring the cause of the Sabbath by their example. Christians are, therefore, urged to study this subject prayerfully for themselves, and, for the sake of the general cause, if for no other, to be more careful in their conduct on God’s day.

“*Fourth.* That the Assembly commends all wise legislation for the protection of the Sabbath.

“*Fifth.* That the report of the Permanent Committee on the Sabbath, with the exception of the reference to its violation by a minister of another denomination and to the judicial case before the last Assembly, be approved and printed in the appendix of the minutes, and that the diligence of the committee be commended.”

The question may here be raised as to whether there is any profit in *ad interim* committees commensurate with the labors exacted of their members. Succeeding Assemblies do not, for one reason or another, usually give these reports any extended consideration. At any rate, *ad interim* committees were not a “favorite” with this Assembly, and it declined to create any of this kind. The endowment of the Invalid Fund, a Sabbath-school secretary, and a constitution for young people’s societies, to be known as the “Westminster League,” were recommended to the church. It is to be hoped that these matters will receive very careful attention, and be fully safeguarded by the Presbyteries.

RELATIONS TO THE NORTHERN CHURCH.

When the Assembly convened there was deep feeling on this subject. Many were anxious. The Nashville Assembly had declined to appoint a committee to meet a similar committee from the Northern Church to confer on the subject of organic union between the two

bodies. There had been a great deal of adverse criticism in the press, both secular and religious, of our Assembly for its course in this respect. Synods and Presbyteries had overtured the Dallas Assembly to take the opposite action, while other Presbyteries asked that the course be reaffirmed. There was a feeling, shared, apparently, by every one, that there would be a struggle over this matter. Many feared bitterness would manifest itself. The late pastor of the church where the Assembly met had made a request, almost a dying request, that there should be no acrimonious debate of this matter—that there should be no debate at all. The matter, coming up on overture, went into the hands of the Committee on Bills and Overtures. An attempt to take it out of their hands failed. This failure seemed to settle the whole question. The committee in due time made the following report:

“Overtures from two Synods and five Presbyteries, bearing on our relations with the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America, have been placed in the hands of your committee. One of these overtures (viz., from the Synod of Florida) looks to organic union with that church. Another (from the Synod of Georgia) asks for a conference in reference to ‘the differences now separating the two churches.’ Another (from the Presbytery of Columbia) desires that ‘closer relations between the two churches’ be established. Still another (from the Presbytery of New Orleans) asks that a ‘pastoral letter’ be issued ‘setting forth fully the reasons for our continuous separate existence as a church of Christ.’

“Besides these there are overtures from the Presbyteries of Mecklenburg, Central Texas, Lexington, and New Orleans, praying this General Assembly not to reopen the question of organic union with our brethren of the Northern Assembly.

“Your committee has carefully considered these various overtures, and now reports to the General Assembly that we do not think it necessary to answer them in detail, but recommend to the Assembly the following action, viz :

“This Assembly does not deem it wise, under existing conditions, to agitate the questions submitted in these overtures. It avails itself of this occasion, however, to place again on record its sentiments of sincere regard and Christian affection for that honored branch of the great Presbyterian family, between whom and ourselves close fraternal relations already exist. And we now renew the expression of our desire that the plan of coöperation in Christian work both at home and abroad, which has been agreed to by our respective Assemblies, may be always faithfully and cordially observed by both these churches.”

This report was, after a calm and wise statement by Dr. Graham, chairman of the committee, adopted without debate and without a dissenting vote. There was some applause, unusual in our Assembly,

a proposition to sing the long-metre doxology, and the Moderator exclaimed, "Thank God." The long suspense was over. The Nashville action, and the historic position of the church, had been confirmed. Men felt that this troublesome question had been quieted for a long time, perhaps forever. We assured our Northern brethren of our fraternal spirit of willingness to cooperate with them in prosecuting the work of our common Master, but that the way to organic union was for the present closed.

What a glorious day would dawn if our Northern brethren would heartily reciprocate our spirit, unite with us in the establishment of a church for the negroes, encourage their organizations in our territory to merge with ours, and counsel their people at the South to enter our churches! The need is, not so much for theories and declarations of fraternity, as it is for such harmony of practice and of policy as will best advance the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom. Such fraternal relations as prevent attrition on the border, and such as economize men and money, and do not merely expend themselves in sentimental rhetoric, are the great need of the hour. Such would be a profitable and serviceable brotherliness. Now let our Northern brethren withdraw their white organizations from our territory, and cooperate with us in the negro work, and so show a spirit of fraternity by discontinuing a war of aggression.

THE JUDICIAL CASE.

The Rev. B. D. D. Greer had been deposed for heresy by the Presbytery of Western Texas. He had voluntarily presented to the Presbytery a written statement of his conception of the teachings of the Confession of Faith on certain doctrines, and then showed his divergence from the Standards. The Presbytery construed it as a "case without process," and, though Mr Greer desired to plead "not guilty" and to go to trial, the Presbytery declined to permit the case to take this course. Judgment was rendered, the sentence of deposition was passed without blemishing his personal character, and without allowing him a hearing in his own defence. He appealed to the Synod of Texas. That court found the Presbytery in error in deciding the case to be one "without process," and remanded it for a hearing; but the Synod at the same time declined to restore Mr. Greer to the ministry. From this judgment both Mr. Greer and the Presbytery appealed to the Assembly—Mr. Greer, because he was not restored to office; the Presbytery, because its ruling, that the case was one "without process," had been reversed. The Assembly found the appeal of the Pres-

bytery regular, and tried it by a commission. The commission presented its minutes, containing a judgment in favor of the Presbytery and reversing the Synod. After a warm discussion of the powers of a commission, mixed with many arguments touching the merits of the case and the wisdom of the decision, the report of the commission was adopted and was admitted to record. The effect of this action was to confirm the deposition of Mr. Greer, and his appeal was dismissed without judgment upon the merits of his case. This discussion made it obvious that our law needs amendment, in order to absolute plainness upon two points: (1), The power to "review" the decision of a commission needs to be made so clear that there can be no reasonable misunderstanding of its significance. There were some who held that the Assembly had the power to review the entire proceedings of the commission, and even to reverse its judgment. Others maintained that the power of review was to be defined by that reviewing of the records of lower courts provided for by our law. Still others took the ground that the Assembly could go no further in reviewing the records of a commission than to see that they were correctly kept, analogous to the reading of minutes by the body which makes them. If this obscurity were removed, much needless debate would be often avoided. If we mistake not, Dr. Thornwell held that the law needed clarifying in this particular. (2), In a similar way, the definition of "parties" could be made more explicit. The Assembly admitted the appeal of the Presbytery of Western Texas, and thus made that Presbytery a party to a case which involved the ministerial life of Mr. Greer. In deciding the case of the Presbytery, the Assembly virtually pronounced judgment upon Mr. Greer, who was not, technically, a party to the cause. It seemed clear to many that the appeal of the Presbytery ought to have been modified into a complaint. The title given to this case by the Presbytery—The Church *vs.* Greer—ought to have ruled it all the way to its final issue by the Assembly. However, there was a general feeling that substantial justice had been done, even if there had been a slight violation of technical law.

This case raises another question, namely: What is a case without process? Mr. Greer admitted the departure of his views from those of the Confession as he understood it, but denied that he was guilty, and did not ask his Presbytery to render judgment. If one comes into court and confesses the fact that he did the killing, but denies that he was guilty in what he did, the court, it is obvious, must try the question of guilt. Mr. Greer, it seems, admitted his departures,

but denied their guilt. It would appear that he was entitled to be heard in defence of himself, not against the fact, but against the guilt, of his departures from the Confession. This appeared to be the view of the Synod, but the Presbytery and the Assembly viewed the matter in another light.

Much more could be written about this Assembly, which was important more for what it did not do than for what it did do.

R. A. WEBB.

VII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

WHITE'S ORIGIN OF THE PENTATEUCH.

THE ORIGIN OF THE PENTATEUCH IN THE LIGHT OF ANCIENT MONUMENTS. *By Henry Alexander White, M. A., Ph. D., D. D., Professor of History in the Washington and Lee University.* Cloth, pp. 304. Richmond, Va.: B. F. Johnson Publishing Co. 1894.

This volume is based upon lectures given by the author during several sessions to his class in Bible history. He expresses the hope that it may be found available in connection with the study of the English Bible as a text-book of history in our colleges. His treatment falls into five parts: I., The Witness of the Ancient Monuments. II., The Beginnings of Divine Revelation contrasted with Heathen Folklore. III., Divine Revelation in Opposition to Heathen Nature Worship. IV., Divine Revelation in Conflict with Heathenism. V., The Divine Charter of Deliverance from Heathen Superstition.

The introductory chapter sketches the downfall in one century (621-521 B. C.) of the five great empires of the East, to-wit: Egypt, Babylon, Nineveh, Lydia (the last living fragment of the Hittite empire), and Judah. In this short period the sceptre of the world was transferred forever from the Hamitic and Semitic to the Aryan races under Cyrus; Judah alone of the five was raised up to live again. Persia, "the hammer of the nations," reëstablished Jerusalem upon Mt. Zion. The other four kingdoms remain dead and buried unto this day. It is the monuments of these countries that our author sets out to investigate

Nineveh was first to succumb. A few years before she was sealed up forever in the tomb, a scholar-tyrant was her king. Sardanapalus "transformed Nineveh, the arsenal, to Nineveh, the national library." All the records gathered by him into his palace were buried under its crumbling ruins. Nineveh and Judah fell before Babylon. Babylon, in turn, with Lydia, fell before Cyrus. The end of this "century of wonders" saw Darius, the organizer of the first completely centralized government, ascend the throne. Its beginning was signalized by the discovery of the Book of the Law of Moses in the temple at Jerusalem by King Josiah, and its end by the discovery in the palace at Ecbatana by Darius of the decree of Cyrus granting permission to the Jews to rebuild Jerusalem. This decree Darius at once reissued, and it was the agency employed by Jehovah in raising to life again the buried kingdom of Judah. The documentary theory of the origin of the Pentateuch finds its chief corner-stone in the assumption that the book which Josiah found was the single Book of Deuteronomy. It assumes that the priestly narrative (the bulk of the laws in Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers) dates from a period after the return from captivity, and consequently later than the discovery of this book. But references in Chronicles to the contents of this discovered book include details not found in Deuteronomy, but found in Exodus and

Leviticus. So that the theory that God's revelation of himself in the alleged priestly narrative was not yet written is not in conformity to facts.

With the documentary theory of the structure of the Pentateuch and its late and piece-meal origin is bound up by every tie of affinity the radical assumption that the religion of Israel was wrought out by the genius of the people, and not spoken once for all by God at Sinai. It is denied that the chosen people were ever guilty of apostasy. Their growth was steadily upward into the realm of spiritual truth. But this assumption is refuted by the testimony of the ancient monuments that the chosen people did make alliances with heathen nations and pay them tribute. This was rank apostasy.

Our author takes a glance at the civilizations of the great empires which beset on all sides the Hebrew theocracy. The successive dynasties of Egypt are traced. The monuments that publish their achievements are interrogated and the distinctive features of the Egyptian religion are unfolded. Their earliest word for God, like *El* in Hebrew, meant *power*. It referred, however, to an impersonal force in nature, while the Hebrew *El* was the name of the God who was seen and heard by the patriarchs. In its earliest form, then, the Egyptian religion marks a step downward from the knowledge of God, as he was known in Noah's day, while the Hebrew religion of the time of Abraham marks a step upward. Then one by one the powers of nature that surrounded the Egyptian's home and centred about the Nile were personified and clothed in the garb of deity, while the king was regarded as the sun-god's representative on earth. Then the climax of vanity is reached in the identification of Pharaoh with the sun-god. As to the insistence that the Hebrew religion was the result of a course of natural development, Dr. White shows that Judaism was based upon a series of facts, while the Egyptian religion was developed by the imagination of man. The Egyptians began with the knowledge of God, but lost it. There could be no permanent force in a creed whose development was always downward.

The first of the three great empires that flourished in Mesopotamia was the Accadian. Ur, on the Persian Gulf, was its capital. Its people were descendants of Ham. They developed a commerce and a literature that lay at the basis of all later Babylonian civilization. On papyrus and on clay they wrote treatises on religion, science, law and language. Then Semitic tribes poured in and took possession of the empire, and the Accadian religion and literature were absorbed into the great system of civilization that now began its course as the Babylonian. The Semites became worshippers of the gods of the star-gazing Accadians, the moon being the first god in their pantheon. Now the pick and spade have brought to light the long-buried wealth of all these ancient capitals. The story which these tablets tell, as traced by Dr. White, presents many wonderful confirmations of the word of God, besides enabling us to observe the transitions which these ancient faiths experienced. These faiths, like that of the Egyptians, deified external nature. From one nature-god sprang other nature-gods. This idea of a process of emanation passed onward to the Greeks and became the first principle of the philosophy of Thales, and, perhaps, the basis of the modern theory of evolution. This evolution, as on the Nile, was all downward, and marked by the parallel development of a system of idol-worship. The Babylonian religion began its course before the time of Abraham. It grew until its gods were beyond number, and its devotees at the bottom round of human debasement and ignorance. That the

growth of Judaism was not downward, but upward, is because it came by revelation, and not as a result of a course of natural development.

Fifty years ago the Babylonian inscriptions, which were hidden beneath the debris of abandoned cities, began to be opened up to view by Layard, the excavator of Koyunjik (ancient Nineveh). What Layard unearthed, George Smith deciphered. The library of Sardanapalus, which is thus thrown open to us, consists of ten thousand volumes in clay, the records of both Nineveh and Babylon. As to contents, these folios embrace grammars and lexicons, histories, treatises on mathematics, astronomy, magic and divination. The discovery that unlocked the riches of Egypt was the Rosetta stone, found in the Nile sand by Bouchard, an officer of Napoleon, in 1799. The key to this was furnished by Champollion, in 1824, who compiled an alphabet of hieroglyphic writing. To Sir Henry Rawlinson are we indebted for the recovery of the lost key to the Persian cuneiform inscriptions. In 1846, by a fortunate translation of the writings on the Behistun Cliff, he gained through the known Persian dialect light on the lost cuneiform dialect and characters, in which the tablets of Sardanapalus were written. These tablets were found to contain the Chaldean account of the seven days of creation. It is, in many respects, parallel with that of Genesis. Yet the Genesis narrative is infinitely superior to the cuneiform account. The latter is clearly upon the plane of human imagination, while the record of Genesis is just as clearly upon the plane of divine revelation. Chaos, the mother of heaven and of earth, according to the Chaldean Genesis, is a deity; according to the Pentateuch, "the deep" and chaos are the first among created things. Trace minutely the details of God's formation of the sky, sun, moon, etc., the work of the first four days, and we see the "entire constellation of Babylonian gods twinkle into sight like stars in the evening sky." The Chaldean imagination never dreamed of so exalted an origin for man as coming last and noblest from the Creator's hand, bearing his image and the breath of his life. The spiritual nature of man is a fact of which the heathen imagination took no account in its order of creation. This difference is equally striking if we consider the facts concerning the Creator. The Mosaic narrative affirms the unity of God. Elohim in the first chapter is Jehovah Elohim in the second. The God of eternal power and personality, who reveals himself through his works, is the same with the God who communes with his creatures and holds vital fellowship with them. The effort to find here two narratives with distinct aims is vain, since the two accounts make one unit, and all the facts of the two are necessary to the statement of a single purpose. The new school of criticism claims to deal only with the form of biblical narrative and not to assault the fact of revelation. This is the weak point in its armor, for "the form and the fact are bound in unbreakable bonds."

The Babylonian creed assigned to evil a physical origin. In it the idea of holiness as an attribute of the gods did not exist. The narrative in Genesis, however, recognized with emphasis the holiness and mercy of Jehovah. That the records of the fourth and fifth chapters of Genesis, which give the genealogies of Cain and Seth, are two ancient documents pieced together, is disproved by the fact that the two genealogies are given to illustrate by their contrast God's holiness and hatred of sin. The idea of holiness in human character springing from God's holiness was a thing undreamed of in heathen mythology. God had to reveal it, and in doing this he must needs dictate the form of the narrative. In

this parallel narrative we have a unity of thought and purpose that shows it to be God's message by one writer.

The testimony of the monuments as to the story of the Flood is next compared with the inspired record. Xisuthrus and Deucalion are measured with Noah, and the absolute originality of the biblical account is exhibited. The imaginative Babylonian legend is embellished by all the details of a debased mythology. But that the repetition in certain lines, observable in the Genesis narrative, discloses diversity of authorship and a want of unity, is disproved by a fact utterly foreign to the cuneiform narrative, to-wit, the assignment of a moral cause for the Deluge. To save the earth as the abode of righteous men, Jehovah must purge it of corruption. He must vindicate his righteousness and his holiness. This connects the narrative with the earlier chapters of Genesis. Of that patience and mercy which, amid multiplied warning and exhortation, bore with men one hundred and twenty years, the cuneiform version knows nothing. What cause does it assign? The caprice of the elements! As for ultimate purpose, it assigns no moral or rational cause whatever. Our author thinks that the narrative of the first eleven chapters of Genesis, as it came down to the time of Abraham and Moses, was most probably a divinely corrected tradition. From time to time God appeared, imparting new messages and recalling and emphasizing correct views of those preceding. Our author distinguishes this from the Romish view of an infallible tradition in the church. The Babylonian myths are uncorrected tradition. The Genesis record needs no correcting at the hands of modern critics. It was rectified by the Almighty before it was written.

As the story of the Deluge with the passing of the centuries lost its essential character as a narrative of judgment upon the sins of the race, other gods came to supplant Jehovah. Iniquity again lifted its unholy power against his government. From the banks of the Euphrates, Jehovah singles out Abraham, and leads him away to be his pupil in learning his covenant mercies. Yet he and his sons for generations were kept in close contact with heathen men, in order the more clearly to learn their need of dependence on Jehovah. Our author aims to trace the peculiarities of this environment, the special forms of the forces that warred with their faith and the successive advances in the minuteness and fulness of the divine disclosures to them. Was Canaan promised to Abraham as a home? Famine drives him to the banks of the Nile, and into contact with the sun-worshippers. But it was only to "sojourn" there. He would neither surrender his land nor his God. In the rescue of Sarah from Pharaoh, he learned that not human device or dissembling, but Divine Providence, must be his safety. He returned a stronger and wiser man. But this growth of knowledge and of God-like character runs parallel with a line of heathen opposition. In the very presence of heathen power and heathen beliefs, God trains the father of the faithful. He was hedged about by the idolatrous populations of the land. But he holds aloof from them. He refused to place himself under obligation to Sodom's king, at the time of Chedorlaomer's invasion. He would put no confidence in earthly wealth and power. Then it was that divine assistance enabled him to defeat the invader. He becomes Jehovah's champion against the moon-god, and against Baal and Ashtoreth. Then, lest he should fear that in the future some Babylonian army, with bristling spears, might cross the desert to take vengeance upon him, Jehovah says to him in vision: "Fear not, Abraham, I am thy

shield and thy exceeding great reward." Dr. White is right in holding that there is no adequate evidence to show that circumcision was practiced among Babylonians or Egyptians before the time of Abraham.

The discipline of the patriarchs is the theme of several chapters. Even secular records show how the civil and religious life of those peoples whom they touched must have contributed to this providential discipline.

By the migration into Egypt the family of Jacob learned the advantages of a system of statute laws. Yet the Egyptian statutes, elaborate as was their system, do not form the basis of the code of laws given at Sinai. That code was framed in the court of heaven. Egyptian law educated the Israelite up to the point of appreciating a code of laws. But that which Jehovah framed for them bears no resemblance to the laws of Egypt.

The question is often asked, Were the divinities of Egypt, against whom Jehovah heaped up his judgments, real spiritual beings? Milton, in his *Comus* and in *Paradise Lost*, holds that they were the fallen angels cast out from heaven along with Satan, the demons of the New Testament. Dr. Charles Robinson, in his "*Pharaohs of the Bondage and the Exodus*," accepts that view. The deeds of the magicians represent real effects and not slight-of-hand results. But Dr. White thinks it more probable that these deeds were simply the handiwork of skilful sorcerers. The rod, for example, which they produced was a live serpent, made torpid for the moment, so that it could be passed off as a stiff rod.

The period of symbolism in revelation was inaugurated with the sacrifice of the Passover. With this also began the life of Israel as a nation. That a rite so significant as a memorial, a prophecy and a sacrament is found thus fully developed at the very beginning, flies in the face of all theories of development, and attests both the institution and the record of it as divine.

The "mixed multitude" that went up with Israel, our author thinks, were fragments of old Semitic peoples dwelling in Egypt from the time of the Hyksos. The journey from the sea to the mount witnessed a series of miracles directly opposite in kind to those wrought on the bank of the Nile. There a land of fruitfulness was made like unto a desert. Here a waterless waste was made to furnish fountains of sweet water, while Jehovah, and not the soil of the country, fed his people. At Sinai, Jehovah's great purpose in the delivering and training of Israel, the establishment of his covenant with them, is effected. Here, for the first time in history, the infinite God speaks to a whole race of people in terms intelligible.

The remainder of the Pentateuch, after the twentieth chapter of Exodus, is a written constitution, confirming unto Israel the freedom wrought out for the nation. Here is the first charter of liberty ever recorded in the language of men, the basis of the charters of all free governments established throughout the earth since that time. Here, for the first time, is the preservation of the rights of the individual stipulated for and guaranteed. This was not the discovery or devise of man. It was the gift of God. The twenty-fourth chapter of Exodus gives us an account of the great mass-meeting which accepted the divine charter and concluded the holy compact by a feast and communion of peace offering, "a kind of Old Testament Lord's Supper."

The national covenant at Sinai was something more than the establishment of a form of government. It was a revelation of the nature and character of God.

The first truth presented in the narrative, the one great fact that binds together the Book of Genesis with the remainder of the Pentateuch into one unbroken history, is that Jehovah is king because he is deliverer. The entire history is the story of deliverance promised and deliverance completed. The subject-matter of the decalogue works no new revelation, for every duty it enjoins is found revealed in the Book of Genesis and the early part of Exodus. The first three injunctions, those against polytheism, image worship, and blasphemy, affirm the unity and sanctity of God's purpose and the sanctity of his name, and these underlie the entire history recorded in Genesis. The Sabbath was enjoined from the beginning. The duties enjoined in the remaining commandments are amply illustrated in the lives of the patriarchs.

In Egypt the people had become familiar with a system of sacrifices by a national hereditary priesthood. In contrast, however, with the multitudes of altars by the Nile, but one national altar was established at Sinai. In the character of the offerings to be brought, the Mosaic code, by establishing the sin offering, introduced a new principle. Burnt and peace offerings were voluntary, but the sin offering was commanded in every case of violation of the law. It was meant to preserve the majesty of the law. The time for its introduction was therefore at the giving of the law. It stands first in the sacrificial service in importance and logical order. The laws of defilement and purification were intended to reveal the sinfulness of men in their native condition, thus passing far beyond the meaning of similar laws in Egypt, which laws were purely sanitary.

The solemnities of the great day of atonement, among other things, gathered up and expressed the meaning of all the sin offerings of the year. There could have been no long period of development between the establishment of the sin offering at the giving of the covenant and the origination of the ceremonial of this day. There is no advance in meaning. Here is the highest spiritual teaching of Leviticus. Why, then, suppose a course of development in the pilgrimage feasts, the law for which is found in Leviticus? Where is there room for development when the supreme and final import of Jehovah's system of government was declared from the first?

The government of Israel was monarchical in that Jehovah was absolute sovereign. In spirit it was partly a democracy, for the covenant itself was ratified by the general assembly of the nation. In actual organization and operation it was a representative commonwealth. The caste system of Egypt was discarded. The power was in the assembly. Priests, elders and judges were but representatives. Here, for the first time in history, the rights of the people as a body politic were made the corner-stone of a form of government. Students of statecraft to-day may study to advantage the charter of the Hebrew commonwealth.

Over against the theory that the law as an expanded code was not given at Sinai, but was developed by the nation from the outline given in Deuteronomy, we set the great fact which runs through Moses' first address in Deuteronomy, that the national covenant had been already completed and in operation nearly forty years. Deuteronomy presupposes all the details of the covenant at Sinai as to national organization, and Moses tells in this address how the life of the organization already completed depends upon keeping in contact with him who made the organization. The assumption that the middle books of the Pentateuch have arisen out of Deuteronomy is set aside again by the evident reference in Moses'

third address to the entire legislation contained in these three books. The law which the people were told to write on the plastered stones of Ebal is that very law which we have seen is the bond of the national unity.

The last and highest stage of Moses' activity as the messenger of God was his writing the law. He thus became the teacher, not only of his own age, but of ages yet to come. For this crowning work his entire past training had fitted him. Dr. White sums up his argument in three heads: 1. The Pentateuch is a unit. 2. It was complete in the age of the exodus, before permanent occupation of Palestine. 3. Moses was the only man of that age equal to the task of writing this great national record. The claim that we have here the production of some post-exilian editor, or that this is all the result of a national development in government and religion, is a flat denial of the historical credibility of the Pentateuch.

Our author shows himself throughout to be modest, orthodox and well informed. He is not pedantic, does not confuse his reader with a parade of authorities, but having matured his views he states them as his own. He does not bewilder you with discussions of P., E., J., E., etc. He makes no claim to original research. But he has mastered his argument, and in a way that cannot be resisted he deals sledge-hammer blows upon the pretentious and destructive criticism of the day. His book is a book for the people. It is rich in descriptions. His analysis of the doctrinal contents and progress of revelation in the Pentateuch is admirable. There is little or nothing in this book that we would except to. Perhaps on p. 303 the term miracle is too loosely used. The period of actual residence in Egypt our author speaks of as four hundred and thirty years. It is better to explain Gen. xv. 13 and Ex. xii. 40 in the light of Gal. iii. 17, and make the period of expatriation include the previous wanderings in Canaan, and date from Abraham. The period of the final sojourn in Egypt may be then computed at about two hundred and ten years.

W. A. ALEXANDER.

Clarksville, Tenn.

BEATTIE'S RADICAL CRITICISM.

RADICAL CRITICISM, An Exposition and Examination of the Radical Critical Theory Concerning the Literature and Religious System of the Old Testament Scriptures. By Francis R. Beattie, Professor of Systematic Theology and Apologetics in the Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary, and Author of "An Examination of Utilitarianism," and "The Methods of Theism," with an Introduction by W. W. Moore, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Old Testament Literature in Union Theological Seminary, Virginia. Fleming H. Revell Company. Chicago, New York, Toronto. Price, \$1.50.

Those who are conversant with the previous writings of Professor Beattie will be prepared to find this last and most valuable issue from his pen marked with the same striking characteristics. The first of these is thorough scholarship. Dr. Beattie never attempts to write upon a subject until he has informed himself fully upon it, and by patient investigation made himself master of it. His thorough acquaintance with the literature of the Higher Criticism is apparent upon every page. It is manifest that he has taken nothing at second hand, but knows by personal reading whereof he affirms.

A second characteristic is systematic treatment. Beginning with definition,

first of the Higher Criticism in general, then of that form of it known as the Rationalistic or Radical Criticism, the author passes to the history of the Higher Criticism movement, which he traces carefully and accurately from the days of Spinoza to the present time. Then follows a lucid exposition of the principles and methods of the advanced or rationalistic wing, with the various hypotheses it has from time to time put forward.

Having thus set forth clearly the position and claims of the radical critics, the remainder of the volume is occupied with a minute and searching criticism of the principles of interpretation, the philosophical presuppositions, the historical assumptions, and the whole tenor and tone of this class of writers, who are shown to be regardless alike of the testimony of inspiration, history, and archæology.

A third characteristic of this volume, and one that is pleasant to note, is its philosophic calmness. Dr. Beattie is not wrought up to a pitch of intense excitement over the thought that the waves of Radical Criticism are about to sweep away our Gibraltar. He recognizes the fact that the assaults are being made upon "the central keep of Protestantism, the supreme authority of the Bible in matters of religion." But he has faith in the autopistic character of the word. His heart does not "tremble for the ark of God." He realizes the peril to misguided souls, but he has implicit faith in the final vindication of the historicity, integrity, and plenary inspiration of the whole body of Scripture. As the result of this calm equipoise of spirit, we note in the last place the fairness and frankness with which the whole subject of the Higher Criticism is treated. Conscious of the strength of his own position, he is prepared to admit the obligations of Christian scholarship to the work of the higher critics, whilst he is careful to let it be seen that there is equally high scholarship amongst the ranks of the conservative critics; and whilst he rebukes unsparingly the arrogance of men like Kuenen, Briggs, and others who tacitly assume that they are the people and that wisdom will die with them, yet he gives full credit to all the work that even the radical critics have done, and shows how much more valuable their work would have been if it had been freed from those evolutionary preconceptions and vicious methods by which it is characterized.

The book is timely, admirable in spirit, thorough, yet popular rather than scientific in treatment, safe and conservative in tone. Its arrangement as to the number and brevity of its chapters, and the frequency of its recapitulations and summaries, is explained by the fact that it was first sent forth in brief articles from week to week in the columns of the *Christian Observer*. Whilst some economy of space might have been gained by recasting, there is an advantage for many readers in the form in which the work now appears. The mechanical execution is admirable. It is a comfort to hold a book in hand that falls open and lies open at any page, instead of requiring, as most of our cheaper books do, to keep a constant strain on thumb and forefinger to prevent the lids from shutting like the jaws of a steel-trap.

Our ministers and ruling elders would do well to possess themselves of this book, and if they have young people in danger of being carried away with the vagaries of Rationalistic Criticism, no better service could be rendered than to place a copy of it in their hands.

T. D. WITHERSPOON.

BRIGGS'S MESSIAH OF THE GOSPELS.

THE MESSIAH OF THE GOSPELS. *By Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D.* Charles Scribner's Sons. New York: 1894.

This volume is the second of a series of three. The first, styled *Messianic Prophecy*, attracted much attention when it appeared, and was the subject of a notice in this review. The author promised in a second volume "to show how far this ideal has been fulfilled by the first advent of the Messiah, and how far it remained unfulfilled, and was taken up into New Testament prophecy and carried on to a higher stage of development."

For the third volume he has given us two announcements, to-wit:

<p>"Should trace the history of the Messianic ideal in the Christian church, and show its importance in the development of Christian doctrine."</p>	<p>"Will discuss the Messianic ideas of the Jews of the New Testament times, and the Messiah of the epistles and the Apocalypse."</p>
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The use of the word development in connection with all three volumes is significant when taken in connection with his methods of inquiry and discussion. Those who read the first volume will remember how intimately the author's scheme is interwoven with and dependent on the assumptions of the Higher Criticism which find not only the books of the Old Testament, but the laws, the morals, the religious rites, the doctrines, and the prophecies, to be the developing products of naturalistic processes and evolutionary laws.

In the first chapter of this second volume he traces this development (partly progressive, partly retrogressive) in "Pre-Christian Judaism," including prominently Ecclesiasticus, Maccabees, Tobit, Judith, the Book of Enoch, the Earliest Sibylline Oracle, the Psalter of Solomon, etc. While some of these seem to be introduced as a foil or background for the truth, others seem to be, in the author's view, of equal value and authority with the views presented in the canonical books. For example, he finds a "combination of ideals" in the similitudes of Enoch by which he supposes that Christ was influenced to call himself the "Son of God." (P. 25.) This comports with his doctrine of development in the "Christian consciousness." And if it be true that this book presents "glimpses of the Christ of the throne," not heretofore seen, then this volume will be quoted in future centuries along with Enoch and Christ in tracing the "history of the Messianic ideal in the Christian church," and will be a prominent milestone in the "development of Christian doctrine."

Apropos of this, our author has scant respect for the Christian consciousness of our fathers which has destroyed the "proportions of the faith;" "has been looking backward and downward;" "has been grubbing in the eternal decree;" "has been dissecting the corpse of the first Adam"—"sad, gloomy, and sour." The mintage of our author gives us such coins as these: Original sin "has been destroyed once for all and forever in the second Adam." "The ransom price was not paid to God, who claimed no such ransom. . . . It was paid to sin and evil as their ransom price, in order to deliver his disciples from the penalty of sin and evil which threatened them from the whole order of nature, and the whole constitution of human affairs;" and these: Baptismal Regeneration (in a sense), Second Probation, Limited Punishment of the Wicked, etc., etc. It need hardly be

said that such coinage would hardly pass except with such a debased currency. "Whither?" Ah! whither?

The reader of the book is not surprised at the scholarship of the author, for he has sampled it before. A scholarship which analyses the Pentateuch into E., J., P. and R., and assigns every scrap and word to its appropriate place under these four letters and their several permutations and combinations, with proper dates and conditions, which reconstructs mutilated psalms into original trimeters, supplying or rejecting what may be necessary, and which liberates Jonah, Isaiah, Ecclesiastes and Daniel from the chains of the traditionalist, such scholarship need not hesitate to pass the Four Gospels through its critical alembics. It makes Mark the original Gospel, gathering up the common traditions. Matthew and Luke copy Mark, and add other matters, original or derived from other sources more or less accurately, superadding to Mark their own later and maturer conclusions, presenting "a constant advance in conception, in the order, Mark, Matthew, Luke, John. But the advance is much greater from Luke to John."

The pet product of this scholarship, however, is the "*Logia of Matthew*," written in Aramaic, a collection of short poems or songs, the Three Annunciations, the Songs of the Mothers, the Songs of the Fathers (Zacharias and Simeon), and the Herald of the Messiah. Unfortunately this *Logia* is lost. But all the evangelists used it more or less accurately, and interwove it with other matter of objective or subjective origin. The very triumph of this scholarship is found on page 67, where our author reconstructs a sample of this lost *Logia*. If it should turn out one of these days that the morning papers announce in flaming headlines, "The Lost *Logia* Recovered; Higher Criticism Vindicated," oh, how the doubters would rush forward to render tardy allegiance to this lordly scholarship.

Does the present volume fulfil the promise of the former in solving the problems of Messianic prophecy along the lines proposed? Let us see.

The scheme was fascinating and stimulating, and gave much promise. The Messianic ideal was made to consist of eleven separate and distinct ideals belonging to two lines, "the human and the divine," and starting from germs at widely different times, and expanding with the experience of prophet and people. These eleven ideals combine into a growing and advancing organism, constantly advancing along the original lines, so vast and complex that the wisest sages of Israel could not comprehend it, and impossible to be unified until Christ was born, and not yet fully realized, because the horizon of prophecy includes the second advent and final judgment, and all that intervenes before them. This view is claimed to be at once scientific, scriptural, accurate, exhaustive and satisfying. We had a right, therefore, to expect much from the present book aside from the author's critical and doctrinal vagaries. The severest logic was necessary to make out the case against the charge of pretentious novelties in the form of a mere new nomenclature, itself not logically coherent.

In groping for a method he says he would prefer a chronological scheme, but says that Luke succeeded in this only partially. How a successful chronological scheme would dovetail his eleven ideals into one is more than can be easily seen.

He says that an effort might be made to group the Messianic material about several great themes, such as the "Kingdom of God," the "Rejected Messiah," etc. But Matthew failed in carrying out this method consistently. This, however, is just what we did have a right to expect, and that he would arrange all the

Messianic material under the eleven ideals of the Old Testament, and then combine them all in such a way as to show us that vast and complex and still growing organism he calls the Messianic Ideal. He declines to attempt it.

He adopts a third method as the easiest and the best, to "follow the method of the Gospels themselves and give the Messiah of each by himself." He plausibly proposes to discover the Messiah (Messianic ideal) of Mark, of Jesus himself, of Matthew, of Luke, and of John—five Messiahs (or Messianic ideals), each incomplete and inadequate—and then at the close to combine them all in such a way as to verify his former work, eleven ideals in one.

This scheme is far too complex and elaborate for easy solution and comprehension, even if practicable, and even when traced with the utmost logical accuracy. It is just here that his work is most unsatisfactory. He fails utterly to give the specific differences between the five Messiahs (ideals) of Mark, Matthew, Luke, John, and of Jesus himself. Nor is it competent to study the "Messiah of the Apocalypse of Jesus" as one of the five, because the material is found in Matthew, Mark, and Luke.

His method breaks down when applied to the evangelists themselves. The synoptic Gospels are practically one in the main outline, and the specific features of Matthew's Messiah are, on examination, just as distinctly Mark's and Luke's. Besides, there is a quiet assumption that each wrote all he knew either directly or by implication, and that fuller statement or comment in any case implied new sources of knowledge and variant views. *E. g.*, he says, on page 123, "Julicher and Spitta are doubtless correct in their opinion that the earliest Christian tradition represented by Mark and Matthew knew nothing of an institution of the Lord's Supper by Jesus on the night of his betrayal, as a sacrament to be observed continuously in the future." His theory of its continued authoritative observance is curious in the extreme. To analyze it is outside our present purpose.

It would be tedious to trace the fallacies into which our author falls in the use of paronymous words, idea and ideal, Messiah and Messianic, and then in his two uses of the same word ideal, if, indeed, not three. This grows out of a general lack of clear-cut definition.

The promise of the last chapter is disappointing, if, indeed, hope has not already forsaken the reader by reason of previous logical failure. He promised to construct the great ideal, but he in vain tries to construct only so much of it as was fulfilled at the resurrection of Christ, evidently hoping to be able to supply the whole in the third volume. If the problem of Messianic prophecy needs any new solution, we submit that the author has not solved it. It is pleasant to say that the separate expositions of specific fulfillments of prophecy are most admirable, and in most beautiful harmony with traditional interpretations, except as they involve his peculiar views of the second advent, and even here he is far more conservative than a host of his predecessors of that school, thanks to his truly magnificent scholarship. Even here we note one serious blemish, he studiously ignores the "gall," the "vinegar," the "casting lots" on his garments, the "piercing," and other minute details of predictive prophecy and fulfillment. In this he is consistent with his postulate in the former volume, that such details are "beyond the prophet's horizon" and impossible of foresight, and that all such details are only symbolisms to express the prophet's expanding ideal.

If the two volumes had been put forward as helpful analyses and classifica-

tions of prophecy and fulfilment, and not as an exposition of their very essence and of the divine method, few would have the heart or even the right to criticise, but would sit at his feet and quaff the sweetness of his loyal words, ignoring much as quaint conceits which add zest and flavor. Even as it is, the severest critic must be blinded indeed by prejudice if he fail to be greatly benefited by such careful study of both volumes as will entitle him to write at all.

Davidson, N. C.

J. B. SHEARER.

MEAD'S CHRIST AND CRITICISM.

CHRIST AND CRITICISM. Thoughts Concerning the Relation of Christian to Biblical Criticism. By Charles Marsh Mead, Ph. D., D. D., Professor in Hartford Theological Seminary. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Company. 16mo, pp. v. 186.

This is not Dr. Mead's first appearance as an author. In 1889 he published his book on *Supernatural Revelation*, a series of lectures delivered before the Faculty and students of Princeton Seminary. More recently, under the pseudonym of "E. D. MacRealsham," he presented the public with *Romans Dissected*. Both of these books attracted wide and favorable attention. It is true that certain critics did not take kindly to *Romans Dissected*; but many thought that a sufficient explanation of their surly superciliousness might be found in the fact that—

"No man e'er felt the halter draw
With good opinion of the law."

The present work, as we are informed in the preface, "is in part an expansion of the last chapter" of *Supernatural Revelation*. Dr. Mead was "moved to write it, inasmuch as, in spite of what might well seem to be clear enough statements, my [his] views have been misapprehended by some, and have been represented as hostile to the Higher Criticism." This misapprehension Dr. Mead, naturally and properly, deprecates. Hence, while it can scarcely be said to be the object of this treatise to correct this false impression, nevertheless Dr. Mead is careful to say at the very outset: "I regard the Higher Criticism as not only entirely legitimate, but as very useful, and indiscriminate condemnation of it as foolish. Genuine criticism is nothing but the search after truth; and of this there cannot be too much." Safe and sensible as is this position, it is to be feared that with many the term "Higher Criticism" stands, if not for all that is evil, at any rate, for what is only evil. This is certainly an error; and the sooner it is perceived to be such, and corrected, the better. It would be well if, even at this late day, conservatives, when referring to radical writers or radical views, would be careful to speak of them as "radicals," and of their positions as "radical criticism," or "pseudo-criticism." They put themselves and their cause at a certain disadvantage when they refer to their opponents as "the higher critics"; and they are themselves grievously misrepresented when they are called, as by a recent writer, "anti-critics." Paul showed his usual wisdom when, in the teeth of the impudent and unfounded assumptions of the Judaizers, he said of himself and of those who stood with him, "We are the circumcision." But to return: having defined his own attitude towards criticism, Dr. Mead proceeds to administer a mild, but effective, rebuke to certain of the neo-critics. He says: "On the other hand, higher critics and their champions are scarcely less foolish when they denounce every animad-

version made on their methods or their alleged results as an illicit infringement upon freedom of research. Surely the right to criticise a critic's theories is as sacred as the right of the critic to propound them." This seems obvious; and yet there are certain radical critics who are so sensitive to criticism, and so intolerant of dissent from the "assured results" of *their* investigation, as to brand as "bleared-eyed dogmatists" those who prefer to see the Bible through their own eyes rather than through those of the neo-criticism, and to suspect those who do not think with them of being "destitute of a fresh and honest mind."

The special object of the present treatise is declared to be "to aid in the general work of getting at the truth as regards the Bible, by setting forth how far the authority of Jesus Christ should be allowed to modify or regulate the process of biblical criticism," or, as stated in another place, "to point out some of the limits beyond which the theories of critics can no longer rightly ask to be accepted by Christians." In other words, Dr. Mead has undertaken the useful, but delicate and difficult, task of indicating the very utmost bounds to which liberty may go before passing into license, and to show that much of the prevailing pseudo-criticism transgresses even these utmost bounds. This being the general line along which the book is projected, the reader needs to bear in mind the fact that what Dr. Mead would tolerate is one question, and what he would approve is another and very different question.

The contents are distributed under three main topics, followed by a chapter designed to sum up the results of the discussion. The first topic handled is "The Search after Assurance." The ultimate ground for this he finds, not in the infallibility of the church, nor in that of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, but in "the supreme, infallible authority of Christ." The reader must be on his guard against inferring from this that Dr. Mead accepts as well grounded the shallow distinction which some seek to make between the teachings of Christ and those of his apostles; or, speaking loosely, between the Gospels, on the one hand, and the Epistles, on the other. He does not, but, on the contrary, maintains that "the Epistles (are) as legitimate sources of information (in reference to the mind of Christ) as the Gospels." Having settled the question of "the supreme, infallible authority of Christ" as the very basis of the Christian system, he proceeds to treat, in turn, of "Christian Faith and New Testament Criticism" and "Christian Faith and Old Testament Criticism." The aim in each case is to indicate the bounds beyond which criticism cannot go without becoming definitely and distinctly *un-Christian*, if not, indeed, *anti-Christian*.

We cannot follow him in these discussions. It must suffice to say that, throughout, the spirit is admirable, the style clear, and the argument vigorous. His subject brings before him a number of problems, the importance of which is equalled by their difficulty. The views which he announces in reference to some of these, as, for instance, the question of verbal inspiration and inerrancy, are not such as will commend themselves to "the most strictest school" of conservatives. They are, however, views which a large, possibly a growing, number of conservatives are inclined to accept. The book is inexpensive, and is valuable, not only on account of the intrinsic merit of its subject-matter, but as showing the trend of thought both without and within the conservative ranks. "*Verbum sat sapienti.*"

It is due to the editors of THE QUARTERLY to say that this book-notice is over-

due about nine months. The public not being specially concerned with the reasons for this, none need be given. It is hoped that it is still in time to call attention to a useful book.

W. M. MCPHEETERS.

GOOD'S REFORMED CHURCH OF GERMANY.

HISTORY OF THE REFORMED CHURCH OF GERMANY, A. D., 1620-1890. *By Rev. James I. Good, D. D.* Reading, Pa.: Daniel Miller, Publisher. 1894.

This volume, the preface informs us, is the continuation of a work by the same author, entitled *The Origin of the Reformed Church in Germany*. It takes up the history at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, and brings it down to the present time. It will be of interest mainly to the members of the German Reformed Church in America, nearly all of whom derive their national, as well as their ecclesiastical, pedigree from Germany. It will not be without interest, however, to all students of church history, especially to those of the Calvinistic and Presbyterian connections. Early in the history of the Reformation the German Protestants were divided into two denominations, Reformed, or Calvinistic, and Lutheran, the latter greatly preponderating. Unfortunately, the dissensions between these greatly checked the progress of the Reformation, and furnished a pitiable spectacle of contention and persecution. The Lutherans especially distinguished themselves by their persecuting spirit. The intolerance of Luther himself towards the Zwinglians is well known. Luther's nature was noble and generous, but his convictions were intense, and he was constantly haunted by the fear that the great movement which he had started would degenerate into fanaticism and fatal heresy. His experience with Carlstadt and the prophets of Zwickau, and the violence of the Peasants' War tended to increase this apprehension. The sacramentarian views of the Reformed were, no doubt, associated in his mind with the radical revolutionary spirit, and for that reason should be uncompromisingly resisted. That clause in the peace of Augsburg, which was afterwards confirmed in the peace of Westphalia, allowing the civil ruler of each state to determine the religious connections of his subjects, *cujus regio, cujus religio*, opened the way for unlimited oppression. Cases are mentioned in this book in which Reformed princes were succeeded by Lutherans, when the people were forced to conform to Lutheranism or subjected to persecution.

If such things were true between the two Protestant denominations how much more was it to be expected when Catholic princes came to reign over Protestant States, as was the case in the Palatinate in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Two of the most important lessons which we learn from this history are, first, the hatefulness and destructiveness of denominational bigotry; and, second, the evils resulting from the union of church and state. These were the two causes of the Thirty Years' War, of the misfortunes of the Protestants, and of the decay of piety and the growth of infidelity which ensued on its termination. The crowning glory of the American Republic is the establishment of the principle of perfect religious liberty. Even now, with all the progress which has been made throughout the world in liberal ideas since the Reformation and the French Revolution, ours is the only country on the globe in which perfect religious equality prevails. Even in England, and in blessed Presbyterian Scotland, there are state churches, and, as a necessary consequence, discrimination against dissenters.

In the very nature of the subject there is a lack of unity in this book, as there has always been a lack of unity in the political, national, social, and religious life of Germany. Nevertheless the author tells his story, generally a sad one, in an interesting style. The Thirty Years' War with its unparalleled calamities, by which Germany was set back a hundred years; the emigration of the French Protestants on the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, their reception by the noble Elector of Brandenburg, and their settlement in other parts of Germany as well; the devastation of the Palatinate by the armies of Louis XIV., one of the greatest crimes ever perpetrated; the Pietistic movement, and the rise of Rationalism; these are topics which pass beyond the confines of denominationalism or nationality, and possess a universal interest.

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I. DR. BRIGGS' HIGHER CRITICISM OF THE
HEXATEUCH.¹

THIS is in some respects a notable book. The recent, though possibly passing, notoriety of its author, and the importance of the event which was the more immediate occasion of its publication, would, of themselves, be sufficient to give it some claim to this distinction. We must confess, however, that in calling it a notable book, we had reference to claims grounded in other circumstances, which, if not less adventitious, are certainly of even greater moment and graver significance. We refer to the fact that Dr. Briggs' book is one of the latest, and, in our judgment, one of the ablest, attempts to bring the results of radical criticism before the popular mind, and commend them to popular acceptance. Few, comparatively, seem to be aware of the extent, the vigor, and the persistency of the efforts now being put forth for the attainment of this end. Those, however, who have occasion to notice such matters know the tireless energy and ceaseless activity of the representatives of the neo-criticism. Journals like the "*Biblical World*," series of books like "*The International Theological Library*," dictionaries like that now being put forth under the editorship of Drs. Brown, Driver, and Briggs, series of commentaries like the one soon to be issued from the press of Messrs. T. & T. Clark, are exerting a

¹ *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch.* By Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Pp. xii., 259. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1893.

constant and powerful pressure upon an ever-widening circle of students and ministers. Not only so, but these agencies have been deliberately devised for the very purpose of propagating the radical criticism. They are the expression of a zeal, which, inexplicable and ill-directed as it may appear to many of us, is none the less real, none the less active, and which is likely to be none the less fruitful of results.

But the zeal of the radical critics is not content with the slow process of indoctrinating so conservative a body as the clergy. It feels that it has a mission directly to the people. Hence we find a distinguished canon of the English Church pressed in conscience first to preach and then to publish two series of sermons, the purpose of which was, in a word, to prove, first, that we need not go to the Old Testament expecting to find there the truth of history; and second, "that good as the truth of pure history may be, the truth of poetry, of that poetry which is idealized history, may, for purposes of edification, be even better." The second of these series, by a most felicitous infelicity, he entitled, "Aids to the Devout Study of Criticism," thus indicating not obscurely the name of the idol at whose shrine he himself is in the habit of burning incense. Later, a distinguished scholar of our own country has delivered before large audiences twelve exceedingly able and interesting lectures, the object of which seems to have been to convince the laity, first: That, looking at considerable sections of the Old Testament as history, they could not do better than consign it to the waste-basket; and second, That, after having made this disposition of it as history, they would be guilty of an inexcusable mistake not to see in it the inspired word of God, the best and safest of guides in the affairs of the soul.

This book from the pen of Dr. Briggs falls into the same category. It is an appeal to the people. In his preface the author says: "The book has been written for the general public rather than for Hebrew students." (P. viii.) "It is evident that these questions of the Higher Criticism can no longer be confined to theological schools and professional circles. The people desire to know them and consider the answer to them." (P. viii.)

Further, it is written in the interest of religion. It aims, as

we are distinctly informed in the preface, "to contribute . . . to a better understanding and higher appreciation of the most ancient documents of our holy religion." (P. viii.)

We mention and even emphasize this point for two reasons: First, because, while we will feel compelled to call in question the methods which Dr. Briggs has seen fit to employ for the attainment of his very worthy end, we do not wish to be understood as for one moment calling in question his motives. Where a man of his high character affirms explicitly that he is aiming at such and such results, then, no matter how obvious it may be to others that his methods are suited to bring about results just the reverse of those aimed at, still we maintain that we are bound to believe his explicit affirmation. In miscarriages of this kind, of which history records not a few, it is proper to remember that motives are a matter of the heart, while the adaptation of means to ends is wholly a matter of the understanding. The fact that Paul made havoc of the church of God does not warrant us in denying that he designed to do God service. Nor does the fact that Dr. Briggs' book is likely to make havoc of the word of God warrant us in questioning the statement that "It is the earnest desire of the author to contribute . . . to a better understanding and higher appreciation of the most ancient documents of our holy religion." Our second reason for emphasizing this point is, that some careless reader might fail to scan the preface, and then he would be in danger, not only of failing to perceive the real aim of the book, but even of supposing that its aim was anything but "to contribute to a higher appreciation of the most ancient documents of our holy religion."

This, then, is the first, and one of the most significant and important, points to be noted in regard to Dr. Briggs' book. It is an effort to secure the popular ear for, and popular acquiescence in, the positions, methods, and results of the radical criticism. It is conceived and executed in the spirit and style of Rabshakeh's address to the men upon the wall. The great gap between the anticipations of the Assyrian and the actual historical event cause us of to-day to smile softly as we read his utterances. His address, however, was none the less a masterpiece. It aimed to

produce a profound impression. It did produce a profound impression. And just as a matter of fact, it was suited to produce such an impression. If the event did not correspond with the expectations of Rabshakeh, the fault cannot be laid to the door of his speech. The tone of confidence which pervades it was well calculated to carry conviction to the popular mind. The extravagance of its claims was only too well sustained by facts which were not one whit less unpalatable for being wholly unimpeachable. It held out alluring hopes to compliance, and both mocked at resistance and threatened it with certain and speedy humiliation and punishment. And even the unpleasant savor of arrogance and insolence which characterized it throughout, hard as it may have been to bear, only served to remind those to whom it was addressed that, while they themselves were like birds in a cage, Rabshakeh stood before them as the representative of a great conqueror flushed with uninterrupted triumphs. And—audacious and amusing as it may appear in the light of after events—most amazing and alarming of all to the men upon the wall must have appeared the assertion that the demands of the Assyrian had the sanction of heaven. Now, it would be excessive praise to ascribe to Dr. Briggs' brief for the radical criticism a merit in all respects equal to that of Rabshakeh's address. But, considering the differences between the two situations, it is within bounds to say that it is on the whole a meritorious imitation. To elaborate in every detail the comparison here suggested would be tedious. It must suffice to say that Dr. Briggs' book, like Rabshakeh's address, is a peremptory demand for immediate and unconditional surrender, backed up by considerations which need not utterly dismay us, but which none the less are worthy of, and demand, our serious attention.

The limits of this article make anything like a detailed examination of this book an impossibility. We must content ourselves with laying before the reader an outline of the scheme or argument of the book, and following this up with some comments and criticisms of a general character.

Dr. Briggs very properly begins by stating "The Problem" (Chap. I.) with which the Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch has

to do. It is substantially the same as that presented in dealing with any other ancient book. It involves the determination of the questions of its integrity, its authenticity, its literary form, and of its credibility. In this connection he gives a useful, though scarcely a complete, summary of the "several lines of evidence upon which" the Higher Criticism "relies for its conclusions." They are as follows (p. 4), viz.:

"(1), The writing must be in accordance with its supposed historical position as to time and place and circumstances.

"(2), Differences of style imply differences of experience and age of the same author, or, when sufficiently great, differences of author and of period of composition.

"(3), Differences of opinion and conception imply differences of author when these are sufficiently great, and also differences of period of composition.

"(4), Citations show the dependence of the author upon the author or authors cited.

"(5), Positive testimony as to the writing in other writings of acknowledged authority is the strongest evidence.

"(6), The argument from silence is often of great value. If the matter in question was beyond the scope of the author's argument, it either had certain characteristics which excluded it, or it had no manner of relation to the argument.

"If the matter in question was fairly within the scope of the author's argument, he either omitted it for good and sufficient reasons, or else was unconscious or ignorant of it, or else it had not come into existence."

The discussion proper is introduced by an examination of "The Testimony of the Holy Scripture." The author would have done well to state precisely the point upon which he designed this testimony from Holy Scripture to bear. Apparently it is designed to bear exclusively upon what Dr. Briggs calls, though with questionable propriety, the question of "authenticity," that is, the question as to whether Moses is or is not the author of the books usually attributed to him. This testimony he examines under five heads, viz., "The Testimony of the Hexateuch." Here he passes in review about eight passages from the Pentateuch, and three from the Book of Joshua. Those from the Pentateuch all speak of Moses as writing, or as being specially commanded to reduce to writing, certain specific covenants, documents, or the like. The conclusion reached is, "All that the Pentateuch says as to Mosaic authorship we may accept as valid and true; but we cannot be asked to accept such a comprehensive inference as that

Moses wrote the whole Pentateuch from the simple statements of the Pentateuch that he wrote out the few things distinctly specified." (P. 11.) From the passages in Joshua he concludes, "Therefore, the Book of Joshua could not have been compiled in its present form before the dedication of the temple. If, now, the Book of Joshua is inseparable from the Pentateuch, and makes with it a Hexateuch, and if the four documents from the Pentateuch run right on through the Book of Joshua, then it is evident that the Pentateuch could not have been compiled by Moses, but must have been compiled subsequent to the dedication of the temple of Solomon. But this connection of Joshua with the Pentateuch can be established by indubitable evidence from the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua; therefore, it is the evidence of the Hexateuch itself that Moses did not write the Pentateuch." (P. 13.) "The Testimony of the Prophets," which comes up for consideration next, is reduced to a single passage. Dr. Briggs says here: "We are surprised by the lack of reference to the Mosaic law in the prophets of Israel. The most important passage in the discussion is Hosea viii. 12." (P. 13.) It is admitted that, if the translation of the American revisers is correct, this passage "would imply a very extensive body of law or doctrine written in or before the time of Hosea, and here referred to by him." (P. 14.) But he will not hear to the translation of the American revisers, insisting that the hypothetical rendering of the imperfect, אִכְתָּב, "is best suited to the Hebrew tense and the context of the passage." (P. 14.) To further safeguard his own interpretation he feels it necessary to maintain that "in the usage of the Old Testament" the word "Thorah . . . refers to any divine instruction, any teaching from God" (p. 14), rather than to a well-known and clearly-defined body of truth given through Moses. He even goes so far as to say that "Jeremiah viii. 8 refers to a law of Yahweh as coming through false prophets." (P. 14.) This passage the reader might profitably examine for himself, with a view to forming his own opinion as to how safe an exegete Dr. Briggs is when he has a position to defend. The next head of "The Testimony of the Holy Scripture" brought before us is the so-called "Law Book of Josiah." The ground is taken that "the most

important passages in the Old Testament in evidence for the composition of the Pentateuch are 2 Kings xxii. 8, 11; xxiii. 2, 21, 25, and their parallels, 2 Chron. xxxiv. 14, 15, 19, 30; xxxv. 3, 6." (P. 15.) We are told that "critical scholars," which, by the way, is a constant euphemism with Dr. Briggs for radical critics, "are agreed that this law-book is the Deuteronomic code." (P. 16.) And, in the words of Prof. H. E. Ryle, of Cambridge, England, we are further informed that for this position "the evidence is twofold: (1), The description which is given of the book found in the temple shows that in its characteristic features it approximated more closely to portions of Deuteronomy than to any other section of the Pentateuch. (2), The historian from whom we obtain the account appears, when he speaks of 'the law,' to have in view the Deuteronomic section, and scarcely to be acquainted with any other." It would be interesting to follow the elaboration of these two positions by Professor Ryle, but a lack of space forbids. We may say, however, that they give us in a nutshell the strength, or the weakness, of this central position of radical criticism. We are next introduced to "The Testimony of the Exilic and Post-exilic Literature." (P. 17.) It is with some surprise that one learns that "in the psalter the only sacred writing referred to is the roll of the book concerning the king, Psa. xl. 8." (P. 20.) As clearing the way for a consideration of the evidence of the chronicler the statement is made: "We have thus far found no recognition of a Mosaic Pentateuch in any writing prior to the restoration from the exile. We have found nothing more than the Pentateuch itself gives us in the passages cited, a Mosaic law-book of limited dimensions, a covenant code and the code of Deuteronomy." (P. 21.) It is admitted that in the time of the chronicler, who is assigned to the Greek period, "the Pentateuch existed in its present form." The question is raised whether the use by the chronicler of such expressions as the "Law of Moses," "Written in the law of Moses," "Written in the Book of Moses," "Written in the law in the Book of Moses," implies the "Mosaic authorship of the book and all its contents." (P. 23.) Dr. Briggs insists that it does not, and raises the counter question, "Why may we not conclude that the chronicler, who wrote after these

three compilations had been made of the minor psalter of David, the Proverbs of Solomon, and the laws of Moses, used these three names in exactly the same way; and that he knew that no one of the three implied authorship, but only that Moses was the father of the law, as David was the father of psalmody, and Solomon was the father of the wisdom?" (P. 24.) He concludes this part of his discussion by a solemn and tender warning to those who "may not be able to explain these things, as" he does to "beware lest they risk the canonicity of the writings of the chronicler by bringing him in conflict with the mass of evidence that may be presented from the Pentateuch itself to show that if the chronicler held their opinion he was altogether mistaken." (P. 25.) We may pass by the discussion of "The Testimony of the New Testament." It contains nothing specially new or significant. It will be only fair, however, to relieve the mind of the reader by informing him that Dr. Briggs kindly refrains from shaking his rod over the head of Christ as he shook it over that of the chronicler, for which forbearance "the Lord grant unto him to find mercy of the Lord in that day." "The conclusion of the whole matter" from his point of view is summed up in two brief statements: We may either hold that Jesus did not know who wrote the Pentateuch, and then "Those who understand the doctrine of the humiliation of Christ and the incarnation of Christ find no more difficulty in supposing that Jesus did not know the author of the Pentateuch than that he did not know the day of his own advent" (p. 28); or we may suppose that Jesus knew as much about the composition of the Pentateuch as, let us say, Dr. Briggs; and then we must remember that "Jesus was not obliged to correct all the errors of his contemporaries." (P. 29.) The results of his examination of "The Testimony of the Holy Scripture" are summed up by Dr. Briggs in the following statements, viz.: "We have gone over the evidence from Holy Scripture, and have found no direct testimony sufficiently explicit to prove the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. But we have found indirect evidence to show that much of the Pentateuch is of a date considerably later than Moses."

The next section of the book, embracing chapters III.-VI., is

mainly historical. Chapter III. deals with "The Traditional Theories" as to the authorship of the Pentateuch. Its purpose, apparently, is to show that from the beginning the traditions upon this subject have been divergent, and even conflicting. Thus, having given the statements of the Mishna and the Gemara, he adds: "The Talmud elsewhere contains other conflicting statements." (P. 32.) And, apparently in order to impress his readers with the untrustworthiness, not to say the grotesqueness, of Jewish traditions upon this subject, he declares that "The ordinary Jewish view is, that Moses also wrote the last eight verses [of Deuteronomy, containing the account of his own death] by divine dictation." (P. 32.) It is further said that "It would be difficult to define a consensus of the fathers in regard to the authorship of the historical books of the Old Testament," and that "on these literary questions the symbols of the Reformation take no position"; which last remark calls to our mind another fact, which, singularly enough, Dr. Briggs seems to have overlooked, namely, that neither do these venerable symbols take any position upon the question, "Who was the father of Zebedee's children?"

Chapter IV. treats of "The Rise of Criticism." It covers the period between the times of Carlstadt (1521) and those of Astruc (1753). The following statement is of interest, as bearing upon the origin of a movement which is now receiving the endorsement of many who still bear the name, and receive the emoluments, of evangelicals, namely: "The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch was first questioned in modern times by Carlstadt, who left the author undetermined. The Roman Catholic Masius and the British philosopher Hobbes distinguished between Mosaic originals and our present Pentateuch; but the Roman Catholic priest Peyrierius, and especially Spinoza, first arranged the objections to the Mosaic authorship in formidable array, the latter reviving the doubts of Aben Ezra." (P. 36.) The interest attaching to this statement grows in part out of the fact that Dr. Briggs himself frankly tells us that "Spinoza and Hobbes were animated by a spirit more or less hostile to the evangelical faith" (p. 41); and that "Carlstadt and Clericus were heterodox in other matters." (P. 41.) It would certainly be a hasty and unwarranted procedure

to conclude that these facts as to the origin of the radical criticism prove that it is itself false and pernicious. It would be equally hasty and unwarranted, however, to conclude that these facts may be dismissed as having no bearing in this connection. Facts are, doubtless, facts, from whatever source they may come to us. But, in a question like this, which involves not only facts, but, more than all, and above all, an interpretation of facts, we do well to inform ourselves as to the mental and moral bias of the interpreter. Whatever the facts in the case, it would scarcely enhance our confidence in the nebular hypothesis, as an explanation of those facts, to learn that it originated with Satan, and was put forth by him with the purpose and expectation of destroying among men a belief in the existence of a Creator and moral Governor of the universe.

The history of radical criticism from the times of Astruc to the present is divided by Dr. Briggs "into three stadia: the documentary, supplementary, and development hypotheses." (P. 45.) We cannot follow the movement in detail. It will not be amiss, however, to give an extract with which Dr. Briggs concludes, and in which he summarizes the results of his discussion of the documentary and supplementary hypotheses. It presents us with the conclusions which he supposes to be justified by critical researches and discussions during these two stadia. It is as follows:

"In a critical examination of the supplementary hypothesis we must distinguish between the theory and the facts upon which it is grounded. We should not allow ourselves to be influenced by the circumstance that many of the scholars who have engaged in these researches have been rationalistic or semi-rationalistic in their religious opinions, and that they have employed the methods and styles peculiar to the German scholarship of our century. Whatever may have been the motives and influences that led to these investigations, the questions we have to determine are: (1), What are the facts of the case? and (2), Do the theories account for the facts?

"(1), Looking at the facts of the case, we note that the careful analysis of the Hexateuch by so large a number of the ablest biblical scholars of the age has brought about general agreement as to the following points:

"(a), An Elohist writing extending through the Hexateuch, written by a priestly writer, commonly, therefore, designated by P. (b), A Jahvistic writing, also extending through the Hexateuch, designated by J. (c), A second Elohist writing, in close connection with the Jahvist, designated by E. (d), The Deuteronomic writing, chiefly in Deuteronomy and Joshua, with a few traces in the earlier books, designated by D. (e), These writings have been compacted by redactors, who first combined J with E, then J, E, with D, and at last J, E, D,

with P. Notwithstanding the careful way in which these writings have been compacted into a higher unity by these successive editings, documents may be distinguished by characteristic differences, not only in the use of the divine names, but also in language and style; in religious, doctrinal, and moral conceptions; in various interpretations of the same historic persons and events, and in their plans and methods of composition; differences which are no less striking than those which characterize the four Gospels." (P. 67.)

Chapter VII. deals with "The Analysis of the Hexateuch," and presents "some of the arguments for the differences of documents." The most valuable part of the chapter is the author's brief exposition of the nature of the "argument from language."

Chapter VIII. discusses "The Date of Deuteronomy." The important relation which this sustains to the validity of the supplementary hypothesis appears from the statement that "the pivot of the whole is the theory of DeWette, that Deuteronomy was composed shortly before the reform of Josiah." (P. 81.) The arguments for this theory are summarized from Riehm and Driver. The objections to it are also passed in review. One of these objections is based upon the language used in Deut. xxxi. 9-11, 24-26. We quote Dr. Briggs' reply, because it gives us his point of view, and illustrates the argumentative methods to which he finds himself compelled to resort. Let the reader first look up the passage itself, and then with it before his mind, or, better still, with it where his eye can revert to it easily, let him note Dr. Briggs' answer. It is as follows: "This seems to imply the Mosaic authorship and composition of a code of law, but was that code the Deuteronomic code in its present form? The view of Delitzsch can hardly be regarded as doing violence to the text when he represents that Deuteronomy is in the same relation to Moses as the fourth Gospel to Jesus, in that as the Apostle John reproduces the discourses of Jesus, so the Deuteronomist reproduces the discourses of Moses, giving more attention to the internal spirit than to the written form, and thus presents the discourses of Moses in a free, rhetorical manner." (P. 89.) The full, far-reaching significance of this view of the matter will probably be best appreciated in the light of the following statement of Dr. Driver when treating of this very same subject. He says, "The true 'author' of Deuteronomy is thus the writer who *intro-*

duces Moses in the third person; and the discourses which he is represented as having spoken fall in consequence into the same category as the speeches in the historical books, some of which largely, and others entirely, are the composition of the compilers, and are placed by them in the mouths of historical characters." (*O. T. Lit.*, p. 84.) It is unnecessary to stop to point out the bearing that such views must have upon our attitude towards John's Gospel.

From chapter IX. to the end, Dr. Briggs' book is taken up with the discussion and defence of "The Development Hypothesis." As to the origin and author of this hypothesis we are told, "Edward Reuss is the chief who has given direction and character to this stadium of the Higher Criticism. As early as 1833 he maintained that the priest-code of the middle books of the Pentateuch was subsequent to the Deuteronomic code. This came to him, he says, as an *intuition* in his biblical studies," etc. (P. 90.) It is through the labors of the pupils of Reuss, however, and notably through those of Heinrich Graf, that in recent times this theory "has won its way to so wide an acceptance." The alleged facts upon which this hypothesis is based are these:

"(1), Our Pentateuchal legislation is composed of several codes, which show throughout variation one from another. (2), If we take the Pentateuchal legislation as a unit at the basis of the history of Israel, we find a discrepancy between it and the history and literature of the nation prior to the exile in these two particulars: (a), A silence in the historical, prophetic, poetical, and ethical writings as to many of its chief institutions; (b), The infraction of this legislation by the leaders of the nation throughout the history in unconscious innocence, and unbuked. (3), We can trace a development in the history of Israel from the conquest to the exile in four stages, corresponding in a most remarkable manner to the variations between the codes. (4), The Books of Kings and Chronicles in their representations of the history of Israel regard it, the former from the point of view of the Deuteronomic code, the latter from the point of view of the priest-code. (5), The prophet Ezekiel presents us a detailed representation of the institutions which seem intermediate between the Deuteronomic code and the priest-code."

Having given the alleged facts upon which the development hypothesis rests, Dr. Briggs proceeds to show us how the hypothesis attempts to explain these facts and bring them into harmonious relation one to another. He says:

“The theory of the school of Reuss attempts to account, (1), For the variation of the codes by three different legislations at widely different periods of time; *e. g.*, in the reign of Jehoshaphat, of Josiah, and at the Restoration; (2), For the silence and infraction, the discrepancy between the Pentateuchal legislation and the history and literature, by the *non-existence* of the legislation in those times of silence and infraction; (3), For the development of the religion of Israel in accordance with these codes by the representation that the *origin* of these codes corresponds with that development; (4), For the difference in point of view of the authors of Kings and Chronicles, on the ground that the author of Kings knew *only* of Deuteronomy, while the author of Chronicles was filled with the spirit of the new priest-code; (5), For the peculiar position of Ezekiel's legislation by the statesmen that his legislation was in fact an *advance* beyond that Deuteronomic code, and a preparation of the priest-code, which was post-exilic.” (P. 97.)

In regard to this theory of the school of Reuss, Dr. Briggs makes the following candid admission: “It is evident that the school of Reuss propose a *revolutionary* theory of the literature and religion of Israel.” (P. 95.) The italics here are his own. Having made this admission, he proceeds to define his own attitude towards that theory. He says:

“How shall we meet it but on the same evangelical principles upon which all other theories have been met, without fear and without prejudice, in the honest search for the real truth and facts of the case? In a critical examination of this theory, it is important to distinguish the essential features from the accidental. We must distinguish between the rationalism and unbelief that characterize Kuenen, Wellhausen, and Reuss, which are not essential to the theory itself, and such supporters of the theory as König, Lenormant, in France, Robertson Smith, in Scotland, and C. H. Toy, in this country. We have still further here, as throughout our previous investigation, to distinguish between the theory and the new facts which have been brought to light. for which this theory proposes to account better than any previous ones.” (P. 95.)

As throwing additional light on Dr. Briggs' attitude to the development hypothesis, we may note the following: “No one can examine this *theory* in view of the facts which it seeks to explain without admitting at once its simplicity; its correspondence with the law of the development of other religions; its apparent harmony with these facts, and its removal of not a few difficulties.” (P. 97.) With these statements before him, the reader cannot be surprised to learn that, as a matter of fact, Dr. Briggs commits himself, practically without reserve, to the theory of the school of Reuss, and that, too, even in its most revolutionary features. In chapter X. he traces “The Development of the Codes.” These he finds to be four in

number. He regards them as having originated in the order and at the dates assigned by Reuss. Of these codes he says: "These four codes, therefore, present us the judicial, the prophetic, and the priestly points of view, which determine the variation in aim, form, structure, and character of the three codes." (P. 100.) In chapter XI. Dr. Briggs points out what he conceives to be the "Discrepancy between the Codes and the History," and adduces what he speaks of as "The witness of the literature as to the non-observance of the law," and finally he expounds what he conceives to have been the relation between an assumed "Religious Development of Israel" and the assumed development of the four codes. His point of view and the postulates which underlie and control all of his attempts to interpret the history and the literature of Israel come distinctly to view when speaking of the Deuteronomic and priest-codes. He says: "The providential historical circumstances did not admit of obedience to such elaborate codes before we find them in the times of Josiah and Ezra. A priestly code seems to require its historical origin in a dominant priesthood. A prophetic code seems best to originate in a period when prophets were in the pre-eminence. A theocratic code suits best a prosperous kingdom and a period when elders and judges were in authority. . . Would God inspire holy men to codify these codes of legislation centuries before they could be used?" (P. 124.) To which question we may with some confidence return answer, Certainly he would not, if he had thought it worth his while to call in the advice of Dr. Briggs. Dr. Briggs, we believe, belongs to a school who pride themselves upon nothing quite so much as upon being "scientific" in their methods; but every now and then, as in the present instance, a voice—which is neither that of Esau nor yet that of Jacob—greeted our ears and betrays what is under their lion's skin. It is naught but the old *a priori* method which our "scientific" critical brethren hold in such profound and deserved contempt.

We cannot follow Dr. Briggs through his chapters on "The More Recent Discussions" of the development hypothesis, "The Argument from Biblical Theology," and "The Results of the Argument." Enough has been said, we trust, to give the

reader a fair and fairly complete view of the plan and contents of the book. Before leaving the subject we wish to add a few things in the way of commendation and criticism:

Dr. Briggs' book unquestionably has many excellent points. Its style, while not faultless, is generally clear, and even where it halts, the reader can generally see that it is the author's logical faculty which is at fault, rather than his literary culture. The extensive Appendix and Indexes are other valuable features of the book. They are exactly what one wants in a book of reference. Our only regret here is that the "Index of Names and Topics" was not made fuller on its topical side. Even apart from the great body of the contents, there are what might be called incidental discussions, here and there throughout the book, which the reader will find very useful. We have an illustration of this in the opening chapter. This states the nature of the problem to be handled, and the lines of evidence upon which the radical critics rely to establish their conclusions. This, as already indicated, is certainly a very natural and proper introduction to such a discussion as Dr. Briggs has in hand. In our judgment, he would have been fully justified in devoting considerably more space to this important topic. He could then have been more explicit and exact in his treatment of several points. But we feel more disposed to thank him for what he has done here, than to criticise him for not doing all that we could have desired. What he has done, however, useful as it is, only serves to emphasize a need that the writer has often felt. We refer to the need of a full, formal statement of the postulates, principles, and methods of criticism, together with suitable illustrations of their application to cases outside of the biblical field. Until this ground has been thoroughly canvassed, the way seems scarcely to be open for either an intelligent assent or dissent from the conclusions reached by any particular school of critics. We may remark, in passing, that the reader will find some valuable material bearing upon this point in Dr. Briggs' book on *Biblical Study*, chapter IV., but even there the treatment is wholly inadequate to the vital importance of the subject.

The extent of Dr. Briggs' acquaintance with the literature of

his subject is another feature of his present volume that will arrest attention and elicit admiration. In fact, some will feel that he would have done wisely had he read less and thought more. He reminds one of a man whose appetite is wholly out of proportion to his powers of digestion, the former inordinate and insatiable, the latter scarcely, if at all, more than mediocre. But before indulging in any harsh judgments here, it will be only fair for the reader to make due allowance for the difficulties of the situation in which the distinguished Union Seminary professor finds himself. Canon Cheyne, who, in his book on *The Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, a volume of some three hundred and seventy-two pages, devotes something less than a half of one page to Dr. Briggs, may not esteem him a great critic, but no one can carefully read Dr. Briggs' writings without lighting upon much that indicates that he is at least a good man. This crops out in his somewhat awkward and hesitating attempt to save the credit of the chronicler for veracity. It appears again in his clinging so tenaciously to the idea that the Bible is in some sense or other the word of God; and also in his pleasing, though not specially probable, fancy that not only E, J, D, P, and the whole series of R's were inspired, but that they were inspired to produce that most remarkable literary "Joseph's coat," known as the Hexateuch. Now, when a man holding such views attempts to appropriate bodily, and to assimilate, the "revolutionary theory" of the school of Reuss, which scouts at the fetich of inspiration, and relentlessly shatters the historical credibility of the Old Testament, it will be seen at once that to succeed in his attempt he must needs have powers of intellectual digestion superior even to the digestive endowment attributed to the ostrich. Under these circumstances, therefore, however much our judgment may condemn the folly of the attempt, we should be sufficiently generous to make the largest allowance for the foredoomed failure of the result. But to return:

The plan of Dr. Briggs' book is wholly admirable. For a bird's-eye view of the entire field, embracing both the history and the argument of radical criticism, it would be difficult to find its equal. His resumé of the history of radical criticism, while far

brief, is, in our judgment, in every way superior to Canon Cheyne's more bulky volume. The reader puts down the book with a pretty distinct idea of the significance of the several stadia in the history of the movement, and of the relation of each stadium to the others. His presentation of the radical argument is also vigorous. By eliminating the multiplicity of details with which it is frequently loaded down, he enables his readers to obtain a tolerably clear view of its leading elements, and of their mutual relations, and combined force. At the same time he gives, either in the body of the book or in the Appendix, sufficient in the way of details to enable the reader to form an intelligent idea of the grounds upon which it rests, and to estimate its validity. We might mention other excellencies of the book, but it must suffice to say that we would earnestly advise our ministerial brethren, who wish to post themselves in regard to the radical position in the controversy now waging, to buy this book of Dr. Briggs', and study it; for it is not only readable, but will bear and will repay careful study. It remains to point out as briefly as we can some of the defects which characterize the book as a whole.

And here we may notice, first of all, the fact that Dr. Briggs is essentially an advocate. He sadly lacks judicial balance, calmness, and fairness. One perceives this at the very beginning, and feels it all through the book. In this respect he stands in contrast with such a writer as Dr. Driver, or Bleek. His confidence in his cause is interesting, and his enthusiasm for it pleasing, but they sometimes betray him into statements which provoke a smile by their utter abandon of extravagance. Thus, with sweetest seriousness, he tells us that the radical criticism "of the Hexateuch vindicates its historical credibility. It strengthens the historical credibility, (1), By showing that we have four parallel narratives, instead of the single narrative of the traditional theory; and (2), By tracing these narratives to their sources in the more ancient documents buried in them. . . . It finds minor discrepancies and inaccuracies, such as are familiar to students of the Gospels; but these increase the historical credibility of the writings, as they show that the writers and compilers were true to their

sources of information, even where they could not harmonize them in all respects."

On reading this, one finds himself sadly puzzled to know what, according to Dr. Briggs, constitutes "historical credibility," and in what it grounds itself. We feel quite sure that the more than Assyrian assurance of this claim must have startled some of Dr. Briggs' co-critics, and have left them wondering, "What next?" We cannot but question whether it has secured for him their unqualified admiration and thanks; for they can scarcely fail to reflect that when human credulity has been taxed beyond its utmost capacity, nature herself provides relief in one or the other of two ways, neither of which is likely to be wholly agreeable to the person who has been so unkind or so unfortunate as to outrage our sense of the possible. This reaction, which is necessary and inevitable, takes the form of anger or of mirth, according as our sense of injustice or our sense of the ludicrous gets the upper hand. Here, but for the gratuitous insult put upon the Gospels in bringing them down to the low plane of what the radical criticism is pleased to call "prophetic histories," we would expect relief to come in the form of a serene, derisive smile. This extravagance of Dr. Briggs' will, however, serve a useful purpose if it only reminds his co-critics of the same school that there is, in every properly-constituted soul, a craving for *truth* in writings claiming to be a revelation from God, and for *historical credibility* in writings purporting to be *bona fide* histories; and that the impassable gulf between truth and falsehood, between historical fact and religious fiction, no matter how well meant the latter may be, cannot be bridged by inventing a nondescript *tertium quid*, which, like the legs and toes of the beast in Nebuchadnezzar's vision, is "part of potter's clay, and part of iron," and dubbing it "prophetic history." Oleomargarine may be not only cheaper and more easily produced, but also sweeter and more wholesome, than the best product of the old-time dairy. This last point is clearly, in part, a matter of opinion; and in all mere matters of opinion the largest liberty should be allowed, since the maxim "*de gustibus*," etc., still holds; but commercial honesty, to say nothing of justice to those of a different opinion, demands that oleomarga-

rine, when put upon the market, be branded "Oleomargarine," and not "Elgin Creamery Butter." And just so, if this new compound, which radical criticism has produced by working over the remains of E, J, D, P, and the Great Redactor, is to continue to be circulated among us, we insist that it ought to go under its own proper, prolonged, complex, and, in the eyes of some, contemptible, name of "Religio-Historico-Philosophico Fiction," and not be palmed off upon an unsuspecting public under the seductive title of "prophetic history." As well call oleomargarine "prophetic butter." If our only legacy from the past in the way of so-called religious literature is a collection of pretty, pious stories, or, for that matter, if any one prefers so to consider them, of "grand, religious stories," let us not blink the fact; on the contrary, let us, by all means, look it squarely and bravely in the face; let us hold them in such reverence as we may be able, and make the most of them for ethical purposes; let us even, if possible, regard them as in some vague sense inspired; but let us not deceive our own selves, impose upon others, insult the muse of history, and make the memory of the poor dead prophets a butt for ridicule by calling them "prophetic histories." History is one thing, and the product of the religious imagination, however precious, is another and wholly different thing. Our only contention—and surely it must commend itself to the intelligence as an important, and to the conscience as a righteous, one—our only contention is, that things so radically different ought to be done up in separate packages, and each package branded according to the real nature of its contents.

We have referred to Dr. Briggs' confidence in and enthusiasm for the cause which he has espoused. Beautiful and important as are these characteristics in themselves, yet for lack of being properly regulated and controlled they are the occasion of certain minor blemishes in his book. Thus he habitually speaks of those who dissent from the critical views which have commended themselves to his own mind as "anti-critics," and of those who accept his "doxy" as "all critics"; his style of criticism is the "Higher Criticism," and all dissent from it is opposition to the "Higher Criticism." It is true that these and similar conceits are harmless,

but there is, nevertheless, a tinge of the ridiculous about them that might with profit have been avoided. When the reader is forced to smile at the author, he is less apt to smile on the argument. Moreover, this over-confidence of Dr. Briggs' sometimes betrays him into an unseemly impatience with those who, as he himself expresses it, "are incapable of being influenced by any arguments of criticism or by any weight of authority, however great." (P. 145.) Thus, speaking of men like Drs. Green, Osgood, Bissell and others, he says, "In view of such facts as these, is it not time that these American professors should have scholarship sufficient to deter them from calling the compiler's work in our Hexateuch a piece of patchwork?" (P. 142.) This, again, is a minor blemish; no doubt Drs. Green and Osgood will have sufficient of piety to forgive, and of magnanimity to despise, the aspersion put upon their attainments; no doubt a generous public will be more ready to condone this outburst as a passing spasm of irritability, than to condemn it as a piece of wanton insolence; still, Dr. Briggs should for his own sake have a care, or even his admitted scholarship may be largely lost sight of in the dazzling impression left by his extreme self-importance. It would be especially galling to him to find himself reduced in the public opinion to the low level of certain "southern slaveholders" of the lesser sort, who, while not without their good points, yet left the public no time to discover these, by absorbing attention upon their imperious self-assertion. With all his learning, Dr. Briggs has something yet to learn. The fact is, while he possesses all of Canon Cheyne's soul-satisfying sense of self-appreciation, he lacks the good canon's self-command, and his dainty, icy superciliousness, which, to a moderately well-informed and self-contained conservative, lend such a peculiar piquancy to his writings without lacerating the æsthetic sensibilities. If Canon Cheyne can treat with gentle and gracious condescension what, in his estimation, are the frailties and foibles, not to say the falsehoods, of all inspired men from Moses to Malachi, surely Dr. Briggs might rise to the dignity of treating with forbearance the backwardness of those whom he regards as his less gifted brethren.

Another marked defect of the book before us lies in its author's

singular lack of, let us not say acquaintance with but insight into the conservative position. Take a specimen. When examining the testimony of the Hexateuch to its authorship, he says, "In Numbers xxi. 14 a piece of poetry is cited from the Book of the Wars of Yahweh. . . . It is not said who was the author or compiler of this book. Is there any reason to think of Moses? or shall we not rather conclude, in accordance with the methods of reasoning of the anti-critics, that because this piece of poetry was taken from the Book of the Wars of Yahweh the whole Pentateuch was taken from that book, and was written by its author?" (P. 12.) Again, he says, "All that the Pentateuch says as to Mosaic authorship we may accept as valid and true; but we cannot be asked to accept such a comprehensive inference as that Moses wrote the whole Pentateuch from the simple statements of the Pentateuch that he wrote out the few things distinctly specified." (P. 11.) We shall not pause to show that the conservative position rests upon no such "comprehensive inference" as is here supposed. To do so would, in the case of others, be unnecessary, and in the case of Dr. Briggs it would be useless. If after studying with Hengstenberg in 1886, and working over "the chief authorities" on the conservative side, he has gotten no clearer conception of the conservative position than is implied in such statements as these, the only possible explanation seems to be some constitutional idiosyncrasy which renders him incapable of a correct understanding of conservative ideas. With his crude notions of the conservative view, it is no wonder that he found himself compelled to reject it. The wonder is, that there was ever a time, as there seems to have been, after he had passed adolescence, when his mind was still so immature as to entertain it, and that it should be so tenacious of misapprehensions once conceived as to retain them despite all the studies of his maturer years. We shall only add in this connection that Dr. Briggs' discussion of "The Traditional Theories," in chapter III., is ingeniously inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. It ought surely to have occurred to Dr. Briggs, that while "conflicting statements" as to the authorship of "the eight verses of the law" might confuse some simple mind and distract attention from the main issue,

they in nowise impinge upon the uniformity of the Jewish tradition making Moses the author of the Pentateuch. Equally vain is his endeavor to chop up this one and uniform tradition into two or three, speaking of the legend about the restoration of the law by Ezra as though it presented a different tradition as to the authorship of the Pentateuch from that contained in the Talmud; and the view of Irenæus as though it were a tradition differing from both of those just mentioned.

The last defect which we shall notice relates to the argumentation of the book. This is, of course, a much more serious defect than any of those yet mentioned. It affects the contention of the book at its very core. To put the whole case briefly, we may say that a conservative who will carefully study the book will be apt to heave a sigh of relief when he finishes it, and say, "Surely the bitterness of death is passed." While he cannot fail to perceive and admire the distinguished author's vigor and learning, he will also find abounding evidence that Dr. Briggs' mind is acute without being really discriminating, argumentative, without being really logical. The learning by which the argument is adorned will only serve to enhance his feeling that the argument itself is destitute of breadth and let us not say candor, but fairness. Dr. Briggs shows himself continually to be a swift witness for the neo-criticism; and his argument has all the weakness that vitiates special pleading. Let us notice some specimens.

He is speaking a good word for Reuss' revolutionary theory. He urges us to "distinguish the essential features from the accidental," and seeks to allay our fears of "the rationalism and unbelief which characterize Kuenen, Wellhausen, and Reuss"—the men, by the way, who gave being and character to the whole neo-critical movement. Now let the reader guess, if guess he can, the names which Dr. Briggs uses to conjure away our fears of the unbelieving rationalism of this "revolutionary theory" of Reuss. He had as well give up the attempt, for who could have supposed that the names used to allay our fears would be those of "Robertson Smith in Scotland, and C. H. Toy in this country"? We readily enough admit that underlying such an appeal as that here made by Dr. Briggs is a question of judgment and taste. But,

if this is a specimen of Dr. Briggs' judgment and taste in these matters, where our knowledge of the facts enables us to put them to the test for ourselves, certainly few will feel encouraged to rely upon them in untried paths.

Let us next look at his manner of dealing with the testimony of the so-called Hexateuch to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. Passing by the very large number of passages in the Pentateuch which speak explicitly of the Mosaic origin, not only of its manifold rites and ceremonies, but also of the minute and extensive ritual connected with them; passing by all internal incidental evidences of the Mosaic authorship of narratives in this or that part of the Pentateuch; passing by all inferences from the admitted UNITY of the Pentateuch; passing by the fact that the contexts of the passages which he quotes are in their turn each and all integral and inseparable parts of much wider contexts; passing all of this by, he contents himself with noting those passages of the Pentateuch and Joshua, and only those, which speak expressly of authorship, that is, which speak of some covenant or document as actually reduced to writing by either Moses or Joshua. Summing up the evidence from several of these selected passages, he says: "From all these passages it is plain that Moses wrote one or more codes of law, but they give no evidence that Moses wrote all the laws of the Pentateuch contained in other codes and those which are embedded in the historical narratives." (P. 9.) This style of argumentation may be scientific and scholarly, but it is certainly insipid and jejune. Dr. Briggs could hardly expect every code to be signed by Moses and countersigned by Aaron, after the fashion of the legislative enactments of our own day.

In summing up the evidences of Mosaic authorship found in the Pentateuch as a whole, he reaches this conclusion: "When the author of the Pentateuch says that Moses wrote one or more codes of law, that he wrote a song, that he recorded a certain memorandum, it would appear that, having specified such of his materials as were written by Moses, he would have us infer that the other materials came from other sources of information." This would be more plausible but for the fact that the reader finds himself wondering and regretting that the worthy Great Redactor

did not follow his own excellent example just a little further and give us the names of a few of his other principal "sources of information." He cites the "Book of the Wars of Yahweh" by name, and also the Book of Jasher by name; why, then, we find ourselves asking, is he so painfully reticent in reference to the "four parallel narratives," in regard to which the neo-criticism, with less light, we may suppose, than he, has so much to say? Had he spoken it would at least have saved the authors of these narratives from the mortification of being represented to modern readers under the suspiciously algebraic-like symbols E, J, D, and P, which would, in mathematics, *ex gratia*, and by a purely conventional agreement, be supposed to stand for known quantities, but which in reality may stand for whatever anybody pleases, and, as a mere matter of fact, usually stand for *no real quantity whatever*.

At the outset we referred to the pious zeal which now characterizes certain propagandists of the neo-criticism. In concluding, we must confess that to us this zeal seems both inexplicable in itself and sadly misdirected in its aims. We can understand, from their point of view, why the Roman soldiery should strip Christ of his raiment, scourge him, spit in his face, clothe him in mock purple, crown him with thorns, put a miserable reed into his hands for a sceptre, and then bow the knee before him and cry, "Hail, King of the Jews!" Their praise was of a piece with the rest of their treatment of Christ. It expressed their contempt for him, and was designed and suited to bring him into contempt with all the people. But when radical criticism, *in the name and interests of religion*, subjects the written word to treatment not one whit less ignominious and degrading than that to which Pilate's minions subjected the incarnate Word, and then in all seriousness and with much enthusiasm clasps it to the heart, crying, Hail! oracles of the living God, inspired word of God, fountain of all our hopes, source of all spiritual life and light—we say, that when we witness this performance, we have to confess ourselves wholly unequal to the solution of the psychological problems which it involves.

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II. A MISSIONARY COVENANT.

A COVENANT is an agreement between two parties. The parties need not be equals in any sense. One party may be a beneficiary, the mere recipient of a gift, coupled with conditions and obligations, expressed or implied.

The covenants of the Bible are of divine origination, proposed to man and accepted by him. They are all beneficiary, and made with and for the race, except the covenant of grace, made between the Father and the Son from eternity for the divine glory. All the other covenants are subsidiary to this and promotive of it, while the race are made partakers of *its* benefits in so far as we are members of the body of Christ.

The party to all the other covenants on the divine side is the Lord Jehovah, the Second Person in the Trinity, and the Mediator of all the covenants. We shall seek to discover the parties on the human side as we proceed.

There are found four covenants in the Book of Genesis—two secular, and two spiritual or religious. The first secular covenant is the creation covenant, giving man dominion over nature, bidding him to multiply and subdue the earth, and assigning him food and his social life. The other secular covenant was made the day that Noah went out of the ark. Here the creation covenant was re-stated in express terms, with certain important additions, and was sealed with the bow in the cloud. These two secular covenants were made with Adam and Noah, not as individuals, but as representatives of the race. They do constitute the bill of rights of the race on the secular side.

The two religious covenants were made, one with Adam, and one with Abraham. It need hardly be said that the "covenant of works" was made with Adam as the representative of his posterity, and that all have been materially affected by it. The Abrahamic covenant marks the great religious epoch of the ages, and there is reason to believe that his descendants kept the anniversary of its confirmation for many centuries. We propose to con-

sider this covenant in its trend and scope as made for the recovery of the race from the wreck and curse of the former covenant, the covenant of works.

We have glimpses of an earlier covenant, or dispensation, or hierarchy, which the Abrahamic covenant overlapped and finally superseded. There was a church, no doubt, before the flood, in which the patriarchs were both priests and prophets. After the flood we have evidence of an ecclesiastical system, in which Melchizedek, the great type of Christ, "called of God," was a hierarch; and perhaps Potipherah, priest of On, and Jethro and Balaam later on. The blight of decay and apostasy was upon this hierarchy, and it became necessary, in the economy of grace, to set up a covenant of universal and permanent adaptation.

Four hundred years after, the theocratic or Sinaitic covenant was engrafted on it, partly secular and partly spiritual. This was designed to be temporary, worn as a garment till it should decay and wax old, and then be folded away, to be superseded by the new covenant in Christ—the gospel dispensation, itself foreshadowed in all the ages by prophet and type. Neither the old nor the new in anywise modified or made of none effect the covenant with Abraham, either by their pulling down or their setting up. In due time the synagogue system arose, overlapping the old and the new, and subserving a purpose to be noted later on.

Our theme, therefore, is the *Missionary Character of the Covenant with Abraham*.

Let us examine its terms: "I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee, and make thy name great; and thou shalt be a blessing: and I will bless them that bless thee, and curse him that curseth thee; and in thee shall all families of the earth be blessed." (Gen. xii. 2, 3.) "And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." (Gen. xxii. 18.)

Who are this seed? The natural seed? Hardly. Isaac and Jacob were counted, Ishmael and Esau rejected. John the Baptist said: "Think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father, for I say unto you, God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." And yet *partly* the natural seed, which is necessary to the right apprehension of history.

There is a visible side to all the covenants, just as we talk of the visible church.

Who are this seed? The spiritual seed? Largely so. "They which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham." (Gal. iii. 7.) "They which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham." (Verse 9.) He received the sign and seal of circumcision "that he might be the father of all that believed." (Rom. iv. 11.)

But who is this seed? Paul says *Christ*: "Now to Abraham and his seed were the promises made. He saith not, And to seeds, as of many; but as of one, And to thy seed, which is Christ." The promises culminate in him and become efficient through him. He is Abraham's natural seed and the object of his faith, of the faith of every believer. Paul, therefore, made no mistake, and did not contradict himself when he added, "If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." Who, then, are the beneficiaries and parties? Believers of each and every age.

It were a mistake to suppose that Abraham and his seed were parties to this covenant for their own sakes. The outlook for the covenant is the race, in all the working of it from Abraham to Christ. The beneficiary feature has been too much emphasized by poor, selfish human nature. "I do not this for your sakes, O house of Israel, but for my holy name's sake." (Ezek. xxxvi. 22.) "The heathen shall know that I am the Lord, saith the Lord God, when I shall be sanctified in you before their eyes." (Verse 23.)

But more than this, the beneficiary in receiving a benefit becomes a party to a covenant obligation. It is so in the family. The son who does not lavish on others an hundred-fold the wealth of love and blessing poured into his own bosom is a churl indeed. The daughter whose heart and life are not radiant with a mother's love and blessing is wretched in her selfishness, and blights the happiness of all around her. This is the true altruism, "Freely ye have received, freely give." It is so in Abraham's family. Prophecy becomes obligation. "In thee shall all families of the earth be blessed" lays all the peoples of the earth a sacred trust on the hearts of his covenant people. It would be easy to show the liberality and the missionary spirit of this covenant by

large quotations from the Law, the Psalms, and the Prophets, though it is not always easy to distinguish that which was strictly Messianic from that which was strictly within the horizon of the writer. I prefer, however, in this discussion to ascertain the trend and scope of the covenant as shown by the historic facts discovered in its administration.

Let us trace the catholicity of this covenant from the first. Peter summed it all up when he said: "The promise is to you and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even to as many as the Lord our God shall call." Abram was a cosmopolite, equally at home everywhere, and a good neighbor to all. His enormous household, of perhaps two thousand slaves, was gathered from Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. These *all* were parties to the covenant by circumcision before ever Isaac was born, and equally with Isaac and Jacob. And if you suppose that the sign and seal of that covenant was an empty thing to them, consider the faith of Eliezer, his trusted steward, when he prayed at the well in Padan-aram; or consider the further fact that Abram commanded his "household after him," so faithfully and successfully that the Lord assigned this as the reason for making him his confidential friend and counsellor. Isaac and Jacob were also cosmopolites, rich in men-servants and maid-servants, who were parties to the same covenant by circumcision. Steady manumission and intermarriages made them all a homogeneous people, unified by a common faith and worship. It might easily be shown that the genealogical tables do not contradict this. Assimilation was the law of their growth, as they expanded into a people, and not purity of blood. Judah's wife was a Canaanitish woman, and he begat Pharez, by Tamar, the defrauded widow of his two dead sons. Joseph married Asenath, of unknown blood, and she became the mother of the two great tribes, Manasseh and Ephraim. Egypt was a composite people—the centre of travel, trade, and civilization. When the Exodus came, there emerged a somewhat homogeneous people, two millions strong, besides a "mixed multitude" that followed them and cast in their fortunes with them. These all constituted the visible side of the covenant at Mt. Sinai.

- Forty years in the wilderness completed the assimilation,

purged away the unbelieving, and made faith the homogeneous bond, sealed with circumcision at Gilgal, and winning its first triumph at Jericho.

Just before this, however, God gave them rules to guide them in making war and capturing cities (other than the condemned nations), that the women and children should be saved alive and distributed as spoil. And when Moses punished the Midianites for the agency in the seduction by Moab, thirty thousand female children were saved alive, distributed as spoil, and introduced into the families of Israel. And soon after the fall of Jericho, the Gibeonites, a royal city, with her towns, were incorporated by treaty, and were placed near to the covenant by being assigned to tabernacle service, and were no doubt finally assimilated. The unconquered remnants of the condemned nations were probably assimilated in the time of David and Solomon. Many of the Philistines also became their staunchest and most trusted adherents. During the period of the Asmonean princes, when theocratic faith reached its culmination, the Geshurites, Moabites, Ammonites, and Edomites were proselyted and absorbed into Judaism.

It is a most significant fact in this connection that the blood of the Canaanite, Moabite, and Hittite flowed in the veins of the Son of man through Tamar, and Ruth, and Bathsheba.

From all these historic data we conclude that the covenant was a universal blessing in its earliest unfolding. But one will say, What mean the exclusive rites of Judaism, such as meats and drinks? The answer is easy. They were intended to shut the door of paganism against the Jew, while the door of Judaism was left wide open to the pagan to come into Judaism by proselytism and circumcision.

The visible side of the covenant reached its meridian during the kingdom. Palestine was the seat of the strongest kingdom on earth. For eighty years other great kingdoms seemed to pass into eclipse. By tribute, caravan-trade, and commerce by sea, the choicest treasures of Asia and Africa were poured into her lap, and Jerusalem became the centre of learning and culture for all nations. Kings and queens sat and learned wisdom from the son of the sweet singer of Israel. If ever the promise is to be

fulfilled and all nations receive the blessing, surely now is the set time. But no. They knew not that they "came to the kingdom for such a time as this." Instead of saving the nations, they are themselves corrupted by the seductions of wealth and luxury, and by contact with the heathen. The failure was most lamentable, and their opportunity was taken away. The kingdom was divided, and the story of decay and punishment is perhaps the saddest in history. It became a question whether the covenant they had betrayed would survive internal treachery and external hostility. There was a prolonged struggle between the two great politico-religious parties, the covenanters and the apostates, and orthodoxy sometimes seemed to be doomed. The kingdom of Israel went down in darkness in one hundred and eighty-five years, and the kingdom of Judah survived her only seventy-two years. Jerusalem was left in heaps, the land was left desolate, without tillage or vine-dressing. All seemed lost. The hope of Israel seemed perished, save to the eye of faith, confirmed by the vision of the major prophets.

When we examine the conditions we find that the apostate party had been largely exterminated and the power of their allies permanently broken. The orthodox party were deported and placed in conditions most favorable for fixing their faith and for eradicating the last traces of idolatry, with Ezekiel as their prophet, and Daniel as their friend and the prime minister in perhaps five dynasties. Nebuchadnezzar slew their false prophets, and the idolatrous king Jehoiachin languished in prison for thirty-seven years. By the captivity Judaism was purged of her apostates and took a new lease of life.

It was during this period that the synagogue was grafted on to Judaism for worship, doctrine, and discipline. Up to this time a modified patriarchy prevailed. The church was in the home, and the congregation was the family. The patriarchal system was broken up by the captivity, and congregations of fourteen or more were organized everywhere, each with its chosen officers, constituting what Gibbon calls a powerful commonwealth. This synagogue system was the catholic or universal feature, adapted to all climes and conditions, overlapping their crippled and waning cere-

monial and ritual system, and destined to live, as the dress and form of the covenant, after Sinai's covenant should be superseded.

So the synagogue, with the Law, Psalms, and Prophets, became to the Jews of the dispersion their church home. They built houses as we build churches, and every synagogue was a centre of religious light and life, a mission station among the heathen, with doors wide open to proselytes from every people, both proselytes of the gate and proselytes of justice.

But you say that the despised and persecuted Jew had scant hope of making proselytes. But was he despised and persecuted? Sometimes. Antiochus Epiphanes, in Syria, and Ptolemy Physcon, in Egypt, tried to persecute and destroy them, but were themselves riven and blasted by him who said, "Him that curseth thee I will curse." The Jews of the dispersion were a favored people and a trusted people. Nebuchadnezzar's settled policy for his empire was this. Cyrus the Great established this as the policy of the Medo-Persian empire against the machinations of all the peoples from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean. Alexander the Great adopted the same traditional policy in the Greco-Persian empire for reasons of his own; and he left this policy as a legacy to the four consolidated kingdoms that sprang out of the ruins of his empire. The same policy prevailed in imperial Rome, if we can believe Juvenal, Strabo, and Seneca. Did they make no proselytes? When Haman, the Amalekite, plotted the destruction of all the Jews in the one hundred and twenty-seven provinces of the Medo-Persian empire, and was thwarted because Mordecai the Jew sat in the king's gate, and Queen Esther, the beautiful Jewess, lay in the bosom of King Ahasuerus, "The Jews had light, and gladness, and joy, and honor." "And many of the people of the land became Jews." (Esther viii. 16, 17.) "For Mordecai the Jew was next unto King Ahasuerus, and great among the Jews, and accepted of the multitude of his brethren, seeking the wealth of his people, and speaking peace unto his people." (Esther x. 3.)

During the dispersion, then, from Daniel to Christ, the Jews were missionaries of the covenant to the race, for they went everywhere. Immense numbers became proselytes, especially

women, who sought rest in Israel's hope from the despair of heathenism. The simple monotheism and pure morality of the synagogue served to loosen the shackles of a waning paganism and check a growing skepticism. They prepared the world for Christ and furnished the matrix for the gospel. May we not say that the covenant to bless all nations had its best Judaic fulfilment in that period of apparent decadence and eclipse?

When the gospel was preached by apostolic missionaries, beginning at Jerusalem, the great ingatherings consisted largely of pious Jews and devout proselytes, who were mightily convinced that "Jesus was the Christ"; the rest apostatized. The synagogue here parted into two streams, to be reunited some day in furtherance of the covenant.

The believing synagogue was and is the church, with the same aggressive instinct, stimulated by faith realized, by the charisms of the Spirit and by Christ's last commission. Every believer becomes in the very act of faith a party to the covenant. "If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise."

The promise in its entirety of benefit and obligation belongs to the church and is transmitted from seed to seed for the salvation of men. You and I are only means to an end, links in the great chain of causation. We are not mere beneficiaries of a salvation scheme. Was Abraham a party to the covenant to bless all nations? So are we. Was Christ a party to the same covenant? So are you. The great commission may be new in its terms, but not in its significance. What says the covenant? "Abraham, go bless all nations; Moses, David, Daniel, go bless all the families of the earth." The Father said to the Son, "Go bless all nations" "Thou shalt see of the travail of thy soul and be satisfied." "I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession." He transmits the charge and the obligation to his immediate disciples, and they hand it down the centuries to all the seed. Have you realized that you are personal parties to the covenant, as distinctly so as Abraham or Paul or Christ? The very name of Abraham has been an inspiration in all ages and to all peoples, notably the Bedouins, and Jektanite Arabs, and the Magians of Central Asia.

The Shasters of India do him honor; the Mohammedans swear by his beard; the Jew's only hope is in Abraham his father. Much of this may be superstition, but it is a spontaneous loyalty to the man that God blessed, and made a blessing to all nations. Christians sometimes forget that he is our father also. Did Lazarus go to his bosom? So shall we, and not alone; we shall carry the nations with us.

But one will say that we have overlooked the secular side of the covenant, which promised a land that flowed with milk and honey, a goodly land of rest from all their long and weary wanderings and oppressions. True. And the promise still is, "The meek shall inherit the earth." "The righteous have the promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come." And "there remaineth a rest for the people of God," of which Canaan was only a type. The covenant still has its visible and secular side to us, and all the more if we be faithful to win others to him.

You remember the history of the covenanters of Scotland—their patriotism, their fidelity to kings and princes, their adherence to the rights of conscience, their sturdy fortitude in adversity, their bravery in battle, and their heroism. Yet their covenants were largely earth-born. They often made serious mistakes; but they won the blessedness of him "that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not." Many of us are the sons of those covenanters by direct descent or by adoption. All of us have a heaven-born covenant, God-given and oath-bound. Our only allegiance is to the Prince of Peace. We have battles to fight for our King; a warfare to endure, persecutions to face, and martyrdoms to suffer. Will we "quit ourselves like men"? "Cursed is he that doeth the work of the Lord deceitfully, cursed is he that keepeth back his sword from blood."

"Who is sufficient for these things?" There stands one behind the covenant who says, "Him that blesseth you I will bless, and him that curseth you I will curse." "Lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."

We have victories to win. The covenant is aggressive, and the nations shall be blessed by conquest. But "we do not war after the flesh; for the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but

mighty through God to the pulling down of strongholds; casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ." Christ the Lord is our captain and leader, and the triumphal day is coming. Paul says, "Now thanks be to God which always causeth us to *triumph* in Christ, and maketh manifest the savor of his knowledge by us in every place." A Roman triumph was a proud day for the emperor returning from successful war with long processions of captives and spoils taken in battle; and a proud day it was for his veterans, by whose valor he achieved it all; and a proud day it was for the loyal populations from all parts of the empire, which lined the Appian Way and made the heavens ring with their glad acclaim. May we not imagine something like this in the final triumph of our Lord and King? But when? The throne has been set, the archangel's trumpet has sounded, the dead, small and great, have stood before God; we who remain have been caught up to meet him in the air; the books have been opened, and the judgment is ended. The wicked are swept by the breath of his vengeance into chains and darkness forever. And now he is ready to lead his people home, and celebrate the triumphs of his grace along the streets of the golden city, where twelve legions of angels await his coming at the gates, and the walls, and the battlements, and the streets, and all the winged upper air are eager for his appearing.

Who will be marshal of the day? Michael? Gabriel? Hardly. One of his tried lieutenants, I am sure; perhaps Joshua, perhaps John the Baptist, perhaps Knox or Carey; we care not who. "*Fall into line,*" a great multitude that no man can number, as the sand of the seashore, as the stars in heaven. First Abel and his mother, and Seth, and all the antediluvian "sons of God." Fall into line, Noah walking almost alone at first, and his following for a thousand years, far more numerous than some suppose. These are the vanguards of the great procession.

Fall into line, Father Abraham, faithful Abraham!

"His faith is sweetly lost in sight
And hope in full supreme delight,
And everlasting love."

Then Isaac and Jacob, and the twelve patriarchs and all the

tribes of Israel, prophets, priests, and kings, and judges, and all their faithful following.

But who is this that cometh, "meek and lowly, sitting on an ass, on a colt, the foal of an ass? And the multitude about him cry, Hosannah." 'Tis Zion's king, King Jesus, "with garments dyed from Bozrah." "He trod the wine-press alone."

Next to him walks John, and Mary leaning on his arm.

Fall into line, apostles, prophets, evangelists, teachers, and helps, each with their trophies of grace, and the whole army of martyrs arrayed in white—Luther, and Calvin, and Knox, and Wesley, and all the redeemed to our day; and the procession is only begun.

There shall be in line China, Japan, India, Africa, South America and the isles of the sea. These all are His, and shall be His! Imagination fails to tell the story. But methinks that mighty host shall sing, as they march to seraphic music, Psalm xxiv.:

"The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof;
The world, and they that dwell therein.
For he hath founded it upon the seas,
And established it upon the floods.
Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord?
And who shall stand in his holy place?
He that hath clean hands and a pure heart;
Who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity,
And hath not sworn deceitfully.
He shall receive a blessing from the Lord,
And righteousness from the God of his salvation.
This is the generation of them that seek after him,
That seek thy face, O Jacob. Selah.
Lift up your heads, O ye gates;
And be ye lift up, ye everlasting doors;
And the King of glory shall come in.
Who is the King of glory?
The Lord strong and mighty,
The Lord mighty in battle."

And the assembled universe of God shall catch up the refrain:

"Lift up your heads, O ye gates;
Yea, lift them up, ye everlasting doors;
And the King of glory shall come in.
Who is this King of glory?
The Lord of hosts,
He is the King of glory. Selah."

III. THE WORLD VIEWED AS THE SUBJECT OF RUIN AND REDEMPTION.

ONE of the most literary of our ministers remarked to the writer, some years ago, that he never read anything on the Second Advent; evidently, I thought, complimenting himself the while on his good sense. As he was an omnivorous reader, his remark might be construed to mean that he read upon all subjects, except that on which Christ and his apostles had most to say! I suppose that he was not alone in his opinion and practice. Yet how can a reasonable man expect to thoroughly understand the teachings of the New Testament while systematically overlooking the subject about which it says most? The alleged difficulty of understanding the special teachings alluded to, which serves many as an excuse for neglecting them, may perhaps be due to looking at them from a wrong point of view; and if there be a right one, as doubtless there is, it is surely worth our while to try and find it. If we can come to look at the matter from the point of view of Christ, his prophets and his apostles, we shall doubtless see things in a more satisfactory light.

The great controversy about the extent of the atonement, which fifty years ago or more raged in the Presbyterian Church, and about which men appear to be as far apart as ever, though more tolerant of the contrary opinion, seems to be an apt illustration of the remark just made; for what I take to be the real solution of the difficulty can only be seen in the light of our Lord's "coming the second time, without sin, unto salvation"; though possibly the men who discussed, and still discuss, it with most zeal may never have imagined that the second advent had anything to do with the question. I propose in this paper to show, I think convincingly, that on this point of doctrine we are quite at sea, till we come to look at it from this, the only proper point of view. Many other doctrines, doubtless, are in the same case.

In this inquiry I propose to take the Scriptures, the whole

Scriptures, and nothing but the Scriptures; and we shall see where they will land us. I begin with the familiar text of texts, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." (John iii. 16.) Now, who is "the world" in this greatest and most frequently quoted of gospel texts? I suppose that none will be found hardy enough to affirm that it means "the elect." On the other hand, those who argue passionately against what they call a "limited atonement," regarding it as both false and dishonoring to God, exclaim, all in one breath, that it means "the whole race of mankind, elect and non-elect alike!" But are they right in this opinion? Will they regard themselves as right, when they take a fair, full and honest view of the situation, as the Scriptures present the subject?

Did our Master, then, mean to say that God so loved the whole race of mankind that he allowed almost all the adult members of the race to perish before he gave his Son for them, and has allowed nine-tenths of the same to perish in ignorance of that fact, during the eighteen hundred and ninety years that have elapsed since that time? Hardly!

But let our Lord explain his own meaning, in the very next verse: "For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved." Now, he certainly did not send his Son into the elect, nor yet into the whole race of mankind; *he sent him "into the world," in the same sense in which we are born into it;* and all the principles of sound interpretation require us to understand "the world" in verse 16 in the same sense as in verse 17, which explains it, unless insuperable obstacles forbid. But further, "the world" is used three times in verse 17 alone; and we have no right whatever to understand it in one sense the first time, and in a very different sense the other two. "*The world*" into which God sent his Son is doubtless "*the world*" which is to be saved through him!

Our English Version is misleading in this case, and perhaps to this fact is due the misunderstanding noted above. Most readers of the English Bible understand this passage to teach that the pur-

pose indicated was *to give to all the world a chance to be saved*; and as this can only apply to creatures endowed with the power of a rational choice, they restrict the word unconsciously to the rational inhabitants of the world, including the whole race of mankind. But the most cursory glance at the original Greek of the passage dispels that illusion, for it reveals the fact that there is no potential mood in the case, nor anything answering to it. King James's translators had probably no such thought themselves, and only proposed to avoid an awkward and very un-English rendering of a Greek idiom, the meaning of which is transparently clear. It reads thus: "For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn¹ the world, *but that the world through him be saved.*" There are no conditions about it, no chances nor possibilities about it, but absolute certainties all the way through. What our Master teaches with absolute precision and explicitness is, that *God sent not his Son to condemn the world, but to save the world!* And if sent to save it, he will doubtless save it!

But to leave no shadow of doubt on this point, we turn on to First John iv. 14, where the apostle says in so many words, "*We*

¹ The allegation that *xpíwv* does not mean to "condemn," but only to "judge," is pedantry, and not scholarship. The absurdity of it comes out in the very next sentence, rendering the words as they would have it: "He that believeth *is not judged*; he that believeth not *is judged already*, because he hath not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God." The fact that the Revised Version has it so does not help the matter at all, for that Version studiously avoids rendering the sense of Scripture into the most appropriate terms of modern English, and so declares. In all such cases, the word, in Greek, and in the uniform rendering of the Revised Version, means *condemnatory judgment*. The pretence, therefore, of the Plymouthists, and of some others, that justification being a *judicial act*, the justified man can *never be judged any more*, so that John v. 24 ought to be read, in the ordinary sense of the words: "He that heareth my words and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, *and shall not come into judgment* [that is, is exempted from trial in the day of judgment], but is passed from death unto life," is contradicted by the uniform teaching of the word of God, which, with every form of emphatic repetition, teaches that "God will bring every work into judgment, and every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil." (Eccl. xii. 14.) But the allegation proves too much even for their own ends; for according to the rendering they contend for, in the ordinary English sense of the words, *there will be no day of judgment for the unbeliever either, he having been "judged already"!*

have seen, and do testify, that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world"; so that the Samaritans put the case exactly right when they said, "We have heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, *the Saviour of the world.*" (John iv. 42.)

Now, if, as with so much confidence many assert, "the world" means "the whole race of mankind," then Christ will sooner or later be, or become, the Saviour of the whole race of mankind; and second probation, or third probation, or as many probations as you please, will become an allowable supposition until the whole race of mankind is in fact saved! But the truth about it is that "the world" does not mean "the whole race of mankind" in the Bible, and never means it anywhere else, outside of theological and polemical literature. God did not send his Son into the whole race of mankind, nor do the Scriptures anywhere teach that it was his purpose either to save the whole race, or to give the whole race a chance to be saved, but positively *to save the world, into which he sent him for that specific purpose.* I do not suppose that in the nature of things it was possible; once God had purposed to allow the entrance of sin into the world, any longer to save the whole race. If sin did not work death, spiritual, temporal and eternal, it would be no longer sin; any more than would arsenic be arsenic if it did not kill, or than fire would be fire if it did not burn.

That by "the world" is not here meant "the whole race of mankind" is implied in the limitation in verse 16, "that whosoever believeth in him should not perish"; and it is distinctly asserted in other teachings of our Lord; as where he says of his appointed mission: "I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me. And this is the will of him that sent me, *that of all that he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.* For this is the will of him that sent me, that every one that seeth the Son and believeth on him may have [*Gr.*, shall have] eternal life: and I will raise him up at the last day." (John vi. 38-40.) Again, where using the term "world" in a secondary and modified sense, of the unreconciled, unsaved and ungodly in general,

he says: "I pray for them [his people]: I pray not for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me." (John xvii. 9.) This latter is not "the world" Christ came to save; for of his people he says, in verse 16, "*They are not of the world*, even as I am not of the world"; but rather that world of which he three times says that Satan is its prince, and of which Paul says: "But when we are judged, we are chastened of the Lord, *that we should not be condemned with the world.*" (1 Cor. xi. 32.)

But reverting to "the world," in its ordinary sense, I remark that other texts, not a few, teach the same doctrine. "Behold the Lamb of God, who *taketh away the sin of the world!*" (John i. 29.) Now, any one can see that when he has in fact "taken away the sin of the world" there will be no sin left in the world; and when neither sin, nor any of the effects and consequences of sin, are found in the world, "the world," as such, will assuredly have been saved. If any one should insist on taking the other sense of the Greek word and saying, "*who bears the sin of the world,*" that would only remove the consequence one step further off; for he bore the sin of the world only to atone for it, and that, to take it away. This is just what Paul teaches explicitly in Hebrews ix. 26, 28, where he says that Christ was once manifested "*to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself,*" and that the second time he will appear, "without sin, for salvation unto them that look for him." If this sense be chosen,¹ then we have two texts which explicitly assert that the death of Christ was an atonement for the sins of the world. Either way, it is "the world" whose sin he puts away, bears, atones for, or takes away. And when he has in fact "put away sin," or "*taken away its sin,*" what will be left but "*a saved world?*"

On this point John desires to be distinctly understood, for he says once more: "And he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, *but also for the sins of the whole world.*" (1 John ii. 2.) Whether, therefore, the former text be regarded as teach-

¹ This sense can hardly be admissible here, since Christ was not then bearing the sin of the world; though at any period of his life he might be pointed out, as he was by John the Baptist, and may still be referred to, as "the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world." This was his work, his mission.

ing this or not, the latter distinctly asserts it. Now it has been unanswerably contended by the soundest class of theologians, that if the death of Christ was a real and effective atonement for sin, then it could not have been offered for the whole human race alike and without distinction, else the whole human race alike and without distinction would receive the benefit of it, and the Scripture would contradict itself; for the guilt of their sins, including their unbelief and rejection of him, having been once borne by Christ, they could never be required to suffer therefor in their own persons; because divine justice could never exact satisfaction twice for the same sins—both in the sinner and in his Substitute. So that if, when the apostle says, in Galatians iii. 13, 14, that “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; . . . that so we might receive the promise of the Holy Ghost,” we are to understand by the word “us,” not merely believers, but the whole race of Adam, without difference or distinction, then it will doubtless be applied to the whole race of Adam, without difference or distinction; if not here, then elsewhere.

I suppose that those persons who, in all ages since the times of Origen, have held to the ultimate restoration of all the lost, have based that opinion on the erroneous belief that “the world” for which Christ died, and which he was sent to save, means “the whole race of mankind.” Possibly, or, better said, probably, the persistent rise and diffusion in our own day of a dozen different theories of probation after death are the legitimate fruit of the same view. For such as hold that erroneous belief as to the term “the world,” the only escape from the logical conclusion is to corrupt the whole conception of the atonement, and to deny that it was, in any proper sense, a satisfaction to divine justice for the sins of men. And this is just what is, in fact, done. Popularly, the death of our Lord is set forth as a real atonement for our sins, with all the comfort and strength it brings; but the moment one begins to argue about the matter, many go back on themselves, and the supposed atonement becomes merely a governmental provision against the inconveniences of gratuitous pardon, which secures the salvation of none, but only makes it possible for all

men, without distinction, to be saved, provided they want to, and have the opportunity!

But the testimony of Scripture on this point is by no means exhausted. Jesus says, in John vi. 51: "I am the living bread which came down from heaven; if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever; and the bread which I shall give is my flesh, which *I will give for the life of the world.*" This certainly must be efficacious, if anything can be efficacious. He gives his flesh—his human nature—for the life of the world! Surely, then, the life of the world is positively secured by that sacrifice, made on its behalf, and is, therefore, infallibly certain! Does the term "the world," then, mean "the whole race of mankind"? If so, then you are at liberty to suppose as many probations as you please, provided you do not stop till the whole race of mankind, from the bloody-handed Cain downwards, not overlooking even Judas Iscariot, is possessed of life, eternal life; though the contrary is implied in the condition expressed in the passage itself, and is positively asserted by Christ just two verses further on (see verse 53), and is his uniform teaching everywhere else. And still it continues true, as the Master repeats it yet again, that "the bread of God is he that cometh down from heaven, *and giveth life unto the world.*" (Verse 33.) The truth of the matter is, that "the world" does not mean "the whole race of mankind," either in common parlance or in the Bible.¹

The doctrine of the ministry of reconciliation, as preached by Paul, was this: "That God was in Christ, *reconciling the world unto himself*, not imputing their trespasses unto them." (2 Cor. v. 18, 19.) Now, even if it could be proved that "to reconcile" means here "to receive into the divine favor through the atonement of Jesus Christ," it would not materially modify or weaken my argument; but any Greek Lexicon will show that the word translated "to reconcile" means "to turn from enmity into friendship"; and the whole context calls for this as its appropri-

¹ In Acts xvii. 31 and Romans iii. 6 the term "world" *includes* the whole race, the living and the dead, but it does not *mean* it; for a reasonable man will hardly contend that *οἰκουμένη* ("the habitable world"), the word used in the former case, *means* "the whole human race."

ate meaning in this place. God is bringing back this revolted province of his dominion, and restoring it into friendship with himself; and the non-imputation of sin is the very core of the doctrine, and the secret of its success. "I, even I, am he that blotteth out thy transgressions for mine own sake, and will not remember thy sins!" "I have blotted out, as a thick cloud, thy transgressions, and, as a cloud, thy sins: return unto me, for I have redeemed thee!" (Isaiah xliii. 25; xlv. 22.) Not that its sin was, or is, cast out to the winds, and so got rid of; but, as Isaiah puts it, "*The Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all*"; so that, as Peter declares, "*He bare our sins in his own body on the tree*"; and John affirms that "He is the propitiation for our sins"; and Paul, that "we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our sins," he "having made peace through the blood of his cross." "God therefore was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself," imputing its sin to Christ, and not imputing their sins to men. Now, if "the world" here means "the whole race of mankind," then the whole race, both the living and the dead, and the yet unborn as well, will be brought, sooner or later, into friendship with God, and the sins of none—not even their wilful and final rejection of Christ—will be imputed unto them; and Universalism is again the result, in spite of scores of texts which assert expressly the contrary. I suppose it is this circumstance which makes orthodox commentators so anxious to find some other meaning for the word translated "reconcile." But no other possible rendering materially alters the case; so that the effort is not worth the labor expended, especially as the same thing is taught in so many other passages, as the reader now sees for himself. Far better, it seems to me, to discard a meaning of "*the world*" to which it has no right whatever, and take the word in its proper and natural sense; the difficulty will then vanish of itself. The Master teaches, in words too plain to be misunderstood, once you eliminate the potential mood from our English version of the passage, that "God sent his Son into the world, not to condemn the world, but to save the world"; and John asserts that this was just the sum of the apostolic testimony: "We have seen, and do testify, that the Father sent the Son to be

the Saviour of the world"; and if to save it, then to reconcile it to himself *in its solidarity, AS A WORLD*. Now, if this was done, or is being done, through the atonement of Jesus Christ, on whom the Lord laid the iniquity of us all—all his reconciled people—then it is beyond all controversy that *the atonement was made for "the world," in its solidarity, as a world*; which is just exactly what John elsewhere affirms, to-wit, that "*He is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world.*"

Unless, therefore, we are prepared to concede that the Bible repeatedly contradicts itself, teaching at one time the salvation of the whole race, and at another, the perdition of ungodly men, it is plain that "the world," "the whole world," is wrongly supposed to mean "the whole human race," and equally plain that the atonement, the reconciling sin-offering, was made (so far as persons individually are concerned) for the people of God, as such, and not for the race of Adam, as such. When the prophet Isaiah said, "The Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all," it is demonstrably certain that he is speaking of himself *as one of the chosen people of God*, and not as one of the lost race of Adam. No reflecting man can bring himself to believe that when the prophet said, "All we like sheep have gone astray, . . . and the Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all," he classed himself with the Gentiles of his day, and confounding the seed of Abraham with the surrounding heathen nations, meant to say that the God of Jacob laid on the predicted Messiah and sin-bearer the iniquities of Egyptians and Edomites, Assyrians and Babylonians, as well as those of his people Israel!

If the reader will fix in his mind the correct rendering of John iii. 17, and remember that neither there nor elsewhere does the Bible teach that Christ died to give to every man a chance of salvation; and if he will further observe that in this immediate connection our Lord teaches that the universal condemnation of men, in China as well as in England, in Africa as well as in America, is "that the light is come into the world and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil," so that it is not the rejection of the gospel that condemns men, but anterior to and aside from the offer of the gospel, *it is the rejection of what light*

they have, be it little or much; he will then not regard the postulate that Christ died for all the race of Adam alike as essential to his peace of mind, nor will he allow himself to be hard pressed to avoid the conclusion from that premise, that either all men will ultimately be saved, or that at least the heathen, and others who, like them, have not had "a fair chance" in this world, will be accorded one after death; the logical outcome of which, and the one unconsciously aimed at all the while, is the conclusion that not merely the heathen, but every man, should be allowed as many chances as he wants, in spite of the fact that the Scripture affirms that "it is appointed unto men *once to die*, and after that *the judgment*."

The subject is much too profound for our slender capacity, and it becomes us, therefore, to hold ourselves strictly within the limits of what God has revealed in his word. Little as we can understand of this matter, it is yet plain, and plainly revealed, that the atonement has no essential connection with the condemnation of men, and was not intended to have. *They were already condemned without it*. Their refusal to believe in Christ reveals, as nothing else could do, "the exceeding sinfulness of sin," in that men had rather be damned, or "take their chances of it," than be saved from wrath through Jesus Christ, and by him be brought back to God! Paul declares the heathen to be "*without excuse*," before Christ as well as after Christ. God did not send his Son with a view to perfecting or justifying the condemnation of any. "*God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world*." The aggravated condemnation of his rejecters is quite aside from its main purpose. If so, then his death was not at all with a view to the case of such as perish (any further than to reveal the true nature and the desperate malice of sin), but rather with a view to such as obtain eternal life. Indeed, who that believes in the atonement at all can bring himself to affirm that Christ died for Cain in the same sense that he died for Abel; for Pharaoh as much as for Moses; for Goliath as much as for David; for Sennacherib as much as for Hezekiah; for Antiochus Epiphanes as much as for Judas Maccabaeus, and for Judas Iscariot in the same sense as for Simon Peter; and that he gave

himself for all these "sons of perdition," who knew nothing of redemption through his blood, in no other sense than for us, who trust in the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life!

In the preceding exposition I have given exclusive attention to showing the falsity of the opinion that "the world" means "the whole human race," simply because the assumption that it means "the elect" is too unreasonable to merit attention. Take, for example, a passage that has given arduous and most unsatisfactory work to many sound, orthodox theologians: "He is the propitiation for our sins, *and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world.*" Who will affirm that this means, and was intended to mean, "not for our sins only, but also for the sins of all the elect"? Nor will it do to say that it means that he died for the sins of Gentiles as well as Jews, because the apostle was not writing to Jewish converts, but to Gentile believers. Who, then, will seriously maintain that he means "not for our sins only, but also for the sins of some men of all sorts and conditions among all nations"? Men have said this when they could find nothing else to say; but neither they, nor anybody else, believe that this is a fair and satisfactory handling of the word of God. Besides, that was not true, in the sense intended, at that time; nor is it yet true, unless you bring into view "elect persons dying in infancy"; for there are many nations of which no adult member has till this day believed and obeyed the gospel. The persons alluded to cling to this sense, only as *less bad* than the other, which logically leads to the most inadmissible and unscriptural conclusions. Would it not be well for them, therefore, to shift their ground and find some better way of making the Bible self-consistent? I am sure that the natural and proper sense of the term "THE WORLD," coupled with the oft-repeated Scripture teaching, that—to put it in the words of Calvin—"God will restore the world, now fallen, into perfection," will solve the difficulty completely, and leave the Bible in entire harmony with itself.

The trouble about it is, that while premillennarians run to unscriptural extremes, often so extravagant that sober-minded men are shut up to their rejection in the interests of sobriety, as well as for the word of God's sake, most of our ministers, on the

other hand, have satisfied themselves, as intimated at the beginning of this paper, that second-advent studies are of no practical utility, however much Christ and his apostles may have to say about it; many judging that a man is either a fool when he begins them, or is likely to become one before he is done; and as for the opinion that this material world is as truly the subject of redemption as man himself, and is destined to be the abode of redeemed and immortal man, they regard that (though taught in every conceivable way in the word of God) as a piece of "curious speculation" on which "sober-minded Christians" should not waste their time. They quite overlook the fact that "sober-minded Christians" are such as believe that "all Scripture is profitable," and especially those things about which the Bible has most to say. And I ask, as I asked before, how can any man expect to thoroughly understand the teachings of the New Testament, while leaving out of view the things about which it says most? For no one who has given the subject due attention will hesitate to affirm that Christ and his apostles have said more about his second coming, the resurrection of the body, the day of judgment, and the kingdom of glory and of life eternal that day to be inaugurated, than about any other subject whatever. If the reader doubts the statement, instead of taking anybody's word for it, let him go himself carefully through the New Testament and score with red ink the passages bearing on these matters, which the Bible binds up inseparably with the advent of the Lord; he will open his eyes with amazement that he never saw it before.

"The world" in these passages, and in others like them which might be cited, has always, I think, its natural and proper meaning, to-wit: THIS EARTH OF OURS, TOGETHER WITH ITS RATIONAL AND ACCOUNTABLE INHABITANTS, and I maintain that the doctrine of its liberation from the dominion of Satan, and its restoration to God (who made it for himself), under Jesus Christ as its Saviour, Head and King, not for a thousand years, but for ever and ever, at the coming of our Lord in power and glory, is the ordinary staple of Scripture teaching, which only a wonderful and indefensible style (you cannot call it a *system*) of spiritualizing has hidden from the view of ordinary Bible readers in our day, though held and

preached by the Reformers as part of the gospel of the grace of God. And so far are these from being matters of "curious speculation," that they are the only thing that will induce the Church to keep always in sight her Lord's return, as numberless times he bids her do. They form, in fact, the very core of the Mosaic, prophetic, apostolic, post-apostolic, reformation, Lutheran, Calvinistic, Westminster, and Presbyterian conception of the kingdom of God, the relaxing, or apparent giving up of which menaces the popular Christianity of our day with a great peril.

I have found after nearly thirty years' writing on this general subject, contending for nothing but what was the common Reformation doctrine of our fathers, that it is extremely hard for Christians in general to take hold of it. "The millennium" has in suchwise preoccupied the whole field of promised "good things to come," except a general expectation of dying and going home to heaven and rising again at the last day, that the idea that they personally have anything to do with the glowing predictions of the prophets about the latter-day glory seems little better than idle dreaming, and the man who seriously contends for it passes with some of them as more or less lacking in common sense.

It will not be amiss, therefore, at this stage of our investigation, to state precisely what is the conclusion at which the preceding argument is aiming. It is, that "the world," in that grand statement of our Lord's, does not mean the whole race of Adam, the larger part of which probably was then dead; nor does it mean the elect merely, but rather this world of ours, considered as apostate from God, and consequently full of every species of sin, false worship, and enmity against God and his holy law; wet with the tears of the wretched, soaked with the blood of the slain, and vocal with the groans of the oppressed; a world where Satan's seat is, where he rules as a great king and does his pleasure in the willing hearts of the children of disobedience, which all by nature are; a world so ruined that nothing prevents its having become a hell long ago save the dreadful but kindly hand of death that sweeps away generation after generation, before the evil becomes absolutely intolerable. This world, then, it was which God loved and sent his Son to save, a salvation which, as Peter says (1 Peter i. 5),

is "*ready to be revealed in the last time,*" or *day*. It is not questioned, for one moment, that God loved and pitied men, as such. That is often asserted, and is everywhere assumed as true; indeed, he loved the world because of the human beings in it. But what our Master teaches in this particular passage, and it is often repeated elsewhere, is that God loved this world, viewed as ruined, and sent his Son to save it—save it till it is so full of the knowledge of God that "one shall not need to say to another: Know thou the Lord!" so full of righteousness and truth, that "the will of God shall be done on earth even as it is done in heaven"; so full of health, that "the inhabitant shall no more say, I am sick!" so full of life and gladness, that "there shall be no more death," and "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes."

Now for the proof that this is the true and orthodox conception of the kingdom of God as our fathers held it:

Calvin concludes his comment on Matt. v. 5 with the remark that "*at the resurrection the meek shall be put into everlasting inheritance of the earth.*" Luther held the same doctrine, and delighted to talk of it. So did Knox, and so did all of the Reformers. THIS WAS THE REFORMATION DOCTRINE OF THE LIFE EVERLASTING. If you doubt it, read Calvin's two wonderful chapters on The Final Resurrection and The Future Life. (*Institutes*, Book III., chapters 9 and 25.) Samuel Rutherford, one of the great lights of the Westminster Assembly, would be said by worldly-minded Christians "fairly to rave over it" in his Letters; and his frequent "homesickness" was not, as one of our religious papers has recently spoken of it, an ardent desire to die and go home to heaven, but a longing for the coming of the heavenly Bridegroom, and for the long-promised marriage of the Lamb, when, on his bridal day, Christ shall make the old world new.¹

¹ Rutherford possibly passes with some for a premillennarian; but I have searched his Letters from end to end without finding the word "millennium" in them. What the premillennarians limit to one thousand years, he, in common with the Reformers, understood of "The Saints' Everlasting Rest"; just as Richard Baxter did. (See chapters 4 and 10, Unabridged edition.) Faucet's Abridgment of the *Saints' Rest*, published by the American Tract Society, disingenuously combines chapters 4 and 10 in one, making the promised rest begin at death, which Baxter himself is careful not to do.

Paul said that the whole creation was groaning for just this thing eighteen hundred years ago, and that he and his fellow-believers, who had as yet received but "the first-fruits of the Spirit" (*the fulness* lies beyond death and the grave), were "likewise *groaning* within themselves, *waiting for* THE ADOPTION, to-wit: the redemption of our body"—the material part of us. (Romans viii. 22, 23.)

Jesus himself also speaks of this as "*the adoption*," and makes the promised "recompenses" stand waiting "the resurrection of the just": "The children of this world (or age) marry and are given in marriage, but they that shall be accounted worthy to obtain *that world* (or age), and *the resurrection from (among) the dead*, neither marry nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more, for they are equal unto the angels, and *are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection.*" (Luke xx. 34-36.) Up yonder in heaven, "with Christ" in glory, Paul has *ceased "groaning,"* but he has not *ceased "waiting"*; and his affirmation is still in force, and is as true of himself as it is (or should be) of us, that "if we hope for that we see not, *then do we with patience wait for it.*" He is waiting still, then; and no wonder, if Christ himself, the leader of the expectant host, is also waiting for the same thing! "This man, having offered one sacrifice for sin, forever, sat down at the right hand of God, from henceforth expecting—WAITING—till his enemies be made his footstool." (Heb. x. 12, 13.) And from his Father's throne he sends down the message, "To him that overcometh will I grant—in the great hereafter—to sit with me in my throne, even as I overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne!" (Rev. iii. 21.) How easy it seems to be for us to forget that the great day of his grace and glory, and of the promised "salvation" of his people, *is as future to him as it is to us*; and that when he bids us look and wait for it, he bids us do only what he himself is doing!

To the same purpose our Master tells us, in Matt. xxv. 23, that "when the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all his holy angels with him, *then shall he sit on the throne of his glory,*" and the judgment shall begin. So, also, in chapter xix. 28, he teaches that it is "*in the regeneration,*" or new creation, "*when the Son*

of man shall sit on the throne of his glory," implying that he will sit on "his Father's throne" till then; as he asserts in the passage just quoted. It is true, therefore, that Christ is waiting for it, just as he bids us wait for it.

Peter speaks the common faith and hope of the apostolic church when he says, that, beyond death, beyond the resurrection, beyond "the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men," "we, according to his promise, *look for*—are looking for—*new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.*" (2 Peter iii. 13.) If we, in our day, are not looking for that, nor, with Paul, "waiting for the adoption, to-wit, the redemption of our bodies," then it is plain that somehow or other we have got away from the great object of apostolic faith and hope! In 1 Peter, first chapter, the same apostle tells us that just this ("the salvation ready to be revealed in the last time," or at the last day) is what the old prophets were inquiring about and searching diligently to understand, poring over their own predictions of the coming glory, in the ever-recurring passages which in our day are popularly understood of "the millennium"; which also he says the preachers of that day, preaching with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven, were testifying about; and which the angels, also, with intensest gaze, were endeavoring to look into. (1 Pet. i. 4–13.) The connection forbids the common assumption that he here refers to the mystery of Christ's personal sufferings; his language, also, is totally different from that in which he does refer to these in chapter v. 1. The "unto Christ's sufferings," as Calvin shows, has reference to *the sufferings of the people of God* down to a fixed time, called "unto," or "until Christ," and the glory that was to follow those sufferings. (Verse 11.)

Paul, like Peter, looks distinctly to the "new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness," when he says (following the original Greek of the passage) that "unto the angels hath he not put in subjection *the habitable world, the one that is to be, whereof we speak*" (Heb. ii. 5); that is about which believers in that day had so much to say; for he himself had made no reference to anything of the sort in what goes before. That world,

a world of human abode—*οίκου μένῃ*—is Christ's world by redemption even more than by creation, by new creation rather than by the old creation; to which fact he himself seems to allude when he said to Pilate: "*My kingdom is not of this world*"; his kingdom was and is *of the world to come!* This is not a matter of doubtful inference. Paul writes to Timothy: "I charge thee before God, and before Jesus Christ, *who shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and his kingdom!*" (2 Tim. iv. 1.)

The Larger Catechism of the Presbyterian Church also teaches this expressly, where, in its exposition of the Lord's Prayer, it says, that in the second petition, "thy kingdom come," we pray, among other things, "*that Christ would hasten the time of his second coming, and of our reigning with him forever.*" And in the very last paragraph and sentence of the Westminster Confession it is affirmed, and is therefore Presbyterian doctrine, that it was Christ's purpose, that from the beginning to the end of the Christian dispensation, however long or short it proved to be, his people should regard the day as *indefinitely near* rather than *indefinitely remote*, attaching a corresponding importance to the *uncertainty of the time* as to the *certainty of the event*: "As Christ will have us to be fully persuaded that there shall be a day of judgment, both to deter all men from sin, and for the greater consolation of the godly in their adversity, *so will he have that day unknown to men*, that they may shake off all carnal security and be always watchful, because they know not what hour the Lord will come, but be ever ready to say: 'Even so, Lord Jesus, come quickly!'"

Unto this, which is in truth "the day of redemption," believers are "sealed by the Holy Spirit of God, who is the earnest of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchased possession," which Christ will that day bestow on his people, the living and the dead alike. "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit (take possession of) the kingdom prepared for you FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE WORLD!" This fair world God did not make for the devil, nor for the wicked, but for the just; and that day, Christ, "the righteous Judge," will give it to them: "and the kingdom and the dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom *under the*

whole heaven [not above it] shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High; whose kingdom is *an everlasting kingdom*, and all dominions shall serve and obey him!" (Dan. vii. 27.) That surely is not the "millennium," but rather the period Paul indicates, when he exclaims: "Unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us; to him be glory in the church by Jesus Christ, throughout all ages, world without end!"—*Gr.*, "unto all the generations of the age of the ages." (Eph. iii. 20, 21.)

Many a reader of the Bible is non-plussed at finding the Second Person of the Trinity called the "Everlasting Father," in Isa. ix. 3: "Unto us a child is born, to us a son is given; and the government (or dominion) shall be upon his shoulder, and he shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, *Everlasting Father*, Prince of Peace," etc. The Latin Vulgate more aptly renders it, "Father of the world to come." But "Father of the eternal age," or "the world without end," as above given, would be nearer the original, which reads, "Father of eternity," or "*of eternal duration.*" There is no confusion of the persons of the godhead in the words of the original. The first Adam was the father of this world (or age) of sinful and dying men; the Second Adam is the Father of that coming and unending world (or age) of sinless and immortal men. They are all of "HIS SEED," bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh, and the first transgressor will have no more any part in them, soul or body forever. "*We are members of his body,*" says Paul (thirty years after his ascension), "*of his flesh and of his bones.*" (Eph. v. 30. Compare Gen. ii. 23.)

Far back in the ages of the past, long before the clearer light of the gospel dawned, old Jacob, in the few and evil days of his mortal pilgrimage, sadly sighed: "I have *waited for thy salvation*, O Lord!" (Gen. xlviii. 18.) Seventeen hundred years later we find the same class of persons "*waiting for redemption* in Jerusalem." (Luke ii. 38.) That the advent of the Messiah to suffer and die was not what they were waiting for, as many Christians strangely imagine, is clear from the fact that the greatest of the prophets, John the Baptist, had no such expectations, nor had the

apostles of our Lord, after three years of daily intercourse with him. But it is doubly evident from the fact that many years later we find Paul "groaning within himself *waiting for*" the selfsame thing. The Corinthians, also, "came behind in no gift, *waiting for the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ.*" (1 Cor. i. 7.) The Thessalonians, likewise, "turned from idols unto God, to serve the living and true God, *and to wait for his Son from heaven, . . . even Jesus who delivers us from the wrath to come.*" (1 Thess. i. 9, 10.) Peter means to tell us the same thing when he says of himself and his fellow-believers: "Nevertheless we, according to his promise, *look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.*" (2 Peter iii. 13.)

But Paul it is who gives us the full-length portrait of a believer of the first century (who I imagine was neither premillennarian nor postmillennarian), thus: "The grace of God, which bringeth salvation to all men, hath appeared; teaching us that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, *looking for that blessed hope and the glorious appearing of our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ; who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a people peculiarly his own, zealous of good works!*" (Titus ii. 12, 13.) The "looking for that blessed hope," etc., is generally left out, for some reason or other, in modern citations of this text, which is just leaving out the core of it. Some people seem to think that is out of place in our day!

One of the Psalmists reveals clearly the faith and hope of the godly in his day, when he exclaims: "Oh let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end; but establish the just!" (Ps. vii. 9); while yet another predicts, and uses the prediction to strengthen and console the godly in their adversity: "Evil-doers shall be cut off, but they that wait upon the Lord, they shall inherit the earth. *For yet a little while, and the wicked shall not be:* yea, thou shalt diligently consider his place, and he shall not be (there). But the meek shall inherit the earth; and shall delight themselves in the abundance of peace." "*The seed of the wicked shall be cut off.*" Root and branch, the wicked are to be exterminated from the

face of the earth! (Ps. xxxvii. 9, 10, 28.) There are men who profess to find no promise of the life to come in the Old Testament. Such would do well to "anoint their eyes with eye salve, that they may see!" Even Solomon, who is justly regarded as the least spiritual of the Old Testament writers, speaks of it as what nobody put in doubt in his day, and uses the same as a solemn dissuasive against vice and a moving exhortation to the practice of virtue, in Prov. ii. 20-22: "That thou mayest walk in the way of good men, and keep the path of the just; for *the upright shall dwell in the earth, and the perfect shall remain in it; but the wicked shall be cut off from the earth, and the transgressors shall be rooted out of it!*" The arbitrary rendering of "the land," instead of "the earth," in this passage, and in several others of the same character, hides the full force of its meaning from the reader of the English Bible.

Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that this is what Peter intends, when he speaks of "the day of judgment and *perdition* (or *destruction*) of ungodly men" (2 Pet. iii. 7), not meaning the day when ungodly men are to meet their doom—Dives did not wait till then, nor Judas; nor yet the day when they are to be annihilated; but the day that is *to destroy them from out of the world* (see Rev. xi. 18), "cut them off from the earth," root out and extirpate the entire stock of evil-doers, and make a perpetual "end of them." "*When the wicked are cut off, thou shalt see it!*"—as was said to distressed and sorely tempted saints nearly three thousand years ago. "*For yet a little while* (comp. Heb. x. 37), *and the wicked shall not be; yea, thou shalt diligently consider his place, but he shall not be*" [there]! No wicked man, nor wicked thing, will any more be found in "the world," when Christ shall have in fact "put away sin by the sacrifice of himself" on Calvary, "taken away the sin of the world," "made an end of sins and brought in everlasting righteousness," "swallowed up death in victory, wiped away tears from off all faces, and taken away the reproach of his people *from off all the earth!*" (Isa. xxv. 8.)

Page after page might be quoted to prove that this is the Bible ideal of "the kingdom of God," "the kingdom of heaven" on

earth, which our Master and his apostles were ever preaching, and that the Scriptures of truth hold out no other ideal whatever. But the parable of the tares of the field sets it forth in our Lord's own word:—"The field is KOSMOS"—this material world; "the good seed are the children of the kingdom," to whom the field of right belongs; "the tares are the children of the wicked one," who occupy the field together with the just till the harvest; "the enemy that sowed them is the devil; the harvest is the end of the AION"—the age (not the kosmos spoken of above), "and the reapers are angels." "So shall it be in the end of this age (AION). The Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them that do iniquity [they shall sever the wicked from among the just, vs. 49]; and shall cast them into a furnace of fire: . . . then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. WHO HATH EARS TO HEAR, LET HIM HEAR!" (Matt. xiii. 38-43.) "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you (the just) from the foundation of the world"—the Kosmos again. (Matt. xxv. 34.) Then, but not till then, the world will be in fact saved, being brought back to God and restored to the purpose for which it was designed from its very foundation!

The time when all this shall take place, the Master tells us the Father holds securely in his own keeping. No man, nor angel, nor any other creature, in earth or heaven, nor even Christ himself, considered as the Prophet of his people, knows when the time shall be! If that was God's purpose about it eighteen hundred years ago, we have no reason to believe that he has changed his mind about the matter since that time; so that we are as far from possessing the secret now as then. THE TIME, THEREFORE, IS A MATTER OF NO CONCERN TO US; the only important thing about it is, that we be "*looking for and hastening unto it*"; that we keep it always in view, take it into all our calculations, and shape our characters, and govern our lives and our families with reference thereto. The day will be as great, and will signify as much to us, if Christ at his coming wake us from our graves as from

our beds. The apostles, therefore, and our Lord as well, committed no mistake in insisting so much on this topic eighteen hundred years ago, to men who have been counted among the dead for eighteen centuries; their brief handbreath of time, just like our own, was their only opportunity to form their characters and shape their lives on the high ideal he sets before us,—that of men who, in a world of unbelievers, “wait for their Lord,” as the expectants of great things: “waiting for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life!”

Let us, however, suppose the day come and past; the work of redemption fully accomplished; the elect in peaceful possession of the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world; “Abraham and his seed inheriting the world,” the world, as such, being in fact saved; “death and hades cast into the lake of fire,”—completely and forever destroyed; the wicked gone away into everlasting banishment from the blissful presence of God; the mediatorial kingdom delivered up to God and the Father, and Jesus the Messiah, the World-Redeemer, reigning on the throne of David, and over the house of Jacob (our father Jacob) forever, in the midst of his redeemed people, in the land of the living, possessed of “the life that is life indeed,” where death, and danger, and sin (the source of all our woes) are known and to be known no more forever! As we gaze on this imperfect representation of that “eternal salvation of which *Christ is the Author* to all them that obey him,” we ask, What was its cost? There is no question as to this. It cost the labors and the life-blood of the Son of God. It is not true, therefore, that he became man, died and rose again to save an elect people merely. Granted freely and fully that the elect (all that the Father gave him), and no others, are the inheritors of this glory and blessing, it is plain that THE SALVATION OF THE WORLD embraces far more than that of its intelligent inhabitants. Christ died to accomplish far more than to save from ruin any number of individuals, even though you increase the number far beyond the power of man to compute them. “*The world*” is much more than the people that live in it. “Behold the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world!”

I have at hand no books of reference,¹ nor even a copy of *Cruden's Concordance* with which to verify the statement, and therefore I would make it with becoming diffidence; but I have it on my mind that the atonement is never said to have been made specifically with reference to the elect. The only passages that I remember which seem to teach it, are John x. 11, 15, and Eph. v. 25-27, "The Good Shepherd *giveth his life for the sheep*," "*I lay down my life for the sheep*," and "Husbands love your wives, even as *Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it*, that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word, that he might present it unto himself," etc. But atonement, or satisfaction to divine justice for the sins of men, is not the thing had in view in either case. In the former two, it is the love and self-forgetfulness of the true Shepherd, as contrasted with the self-interest and cowardice of the hireling; and in the latter, it is the love of Christ toward his bride, as an illustration of the way that husbands ought to love their wives. Atonement is implied, but it is not stated. And so it is implied all along and everywhere, that Christ laid down his life for his people, definitely, as his people, co-heirs with himself of the coming inheritance of glory and immortality, and the blessed companions of his endless life; and the purpose for which he came into the world, the express will of the Father who sent him, as stated by himself, was "that of all whom the Father hath given me, I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day." But still the passages which speak of his expiatory death and the virtue of his atoning blood do not limit that to his people, but rather, as we have seen, extend it to "the world," "the whole world," which he was sent to save.

It would be disingenuous to omit here some passages which I recall that are claimed to teach that Christ did die for all men alike; as Rom. xiv. 15, "*Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died!*" and the same, repeated under another form, in 1 Cor. viii. 10, 11, "For if any man see thee which hast knowledge sit at meat in the idol's temple, shall not the conscience of

¹The article was written while the author was doing evangelistic work among the Mexicans in southwest Texas.

him which is weak be emboldened to eat of those things which are offered to idols; *and through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died?*" This, though a point-blank statement that Christ died for one who is supposed to perish, is really only a powerful dissuasive against an unbrotherly act. The weak brother is by profession a child of God and an heir of glory, and should he perish by your unbrotherly conduct, it is as if you had caused to perish one of Christ's own, for whom, of course, his blood was definitely shed. The texts, therefore, prove that Christ died for his people, as such (and presumably for such as profess so to be), rather than for the whole race of mankind in general. Again, in 1 Tim. iv. 10, "We trust in the living God, WHO IS THE SAVIOUR OF ALL MEN, *especially of them that believe.*" As the reference here is clearly not to Christ as the Redeemer, but to the Divine Being as the upholder and preserver of all things, the word "Saviour" has naturally and properly this reference here. Atonement, or propitiation for sin, was not in the apostle's thought.

It is mentioned, however, in 1 Tim. ii. 3-6, which makes this the strongest passage that can be quoted on the other side: "This, to-wit, supplications, prayers, and intercessions, for all sorts and conditions of men, is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth;"—expressive of God's (not specifically Christ's) good-will and benevolence towards all men. "For there is [for all] one God and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; *who gave himself a ransom for all*, [the same] to be testified in due time." As a popular statement, assigning reasons why "supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks should be offered for all men," including kings and all that are in authority, to whom the gospel is to be preached and the offer of salvation made, I do not think a thoughtful man would convert this into a didactic statement as to the extent of the atonement; the more so, as it was undeniably true that Christ "was sent to be the Saviour of the world," and shed his blood as "the propitiation for the sins of the whole world." Christ gave himself a ransom for all who will accept him; and our commission is

to "preach the gospel to every creature," with the certainty that "whosoever will may take of the water of life freely." It is, I think, at most only one of the many statements that "God our Saviour" loved the world, and Christ our Saviour was sent to save it, and *paid its ransom with his own blood*.

Let us look now at one of the most difficult passages in the Bible and see what light this doctrine of *world-salvation* throws upon it. In Rom. v. 12-21 Paul institutes a studied comparison between Adam and Christ, the man who damned the world, and the divine man who saves it; the man by whom came sin and death, and the man by whom comes the gift of righteousness and eternal life; just as in 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, he contrasts the man by whom came death, and the man by whom comes the resurrection to a deathless immortality. Now, if you look at this comparison as referring to men as individuals, the difficulties of the passage become very great, and it seems impossible, in verse 18, to avoid the baldest statement of universal salvation, though in conflict with the scope of Paul's argument here, and with the teachings of Scripture everywhere in general. But look at it, as the apostle delights to present it, as a scheme of *world-salvation*, and at Jesus, the Messiah, as a *World-redeemer*, and the difficulties vanish of themselves. We must put ourselves in the position of the writer, if we would rightly understand him.

In Romans iv. 13 he strikes the keynote of the argument when he says that "THE PROMISE to Abraham (and to his seed with him) was that he should be THE HEIR OF THE WORLD"—the Kosmos; and no other promise whatever is mentioned or referred to. The promise of eternal salvation, therefore, is embodied in this; and *his belief of this divine promise it was*, when all natural things stood against it, *that was imputed to him for righteousness*: "Against hope, he believed in hope, that he might become the father of many nations, according to that which was spoken, so [like the stars] shall thy seed be!" Of course this means the many nations of redeemed and resurrected men, the nations of the world to come, who are to "walk in the light of the heavenly Jerusalem, which cometh down from God, out of heaven" (Rev. xxi. 24, 26); for the aspect under which the divine Promiser is

viewed throughout is that of "*God, who quickeneth (gives life to) the dead (Gr., dead men) and calleth the things that are not, as though they (already) were.*" (Verse 17.) If I can rely on memory, the thought, as developed by Calvin *in loco*, is just this: That through a son yet unborn he was to become the father not of one nation merely, but of "many nations," the "all nations who were to be blessed in him"; who, justified, sanctified, glorified, were, together with him, through Christ, the promised Seed, *to become the heirs of the world*, or (to use the language of the final Judge) to "inherit the kingdom prepared for them (the just) *from the foundation of the world.*" This hope, which nineteen hundred years after Christ appears to multitudes who bear his name as the wildest extravagance, nineteen hundred years before Christ was the basis of that wonderful act of faith by which Abraham was justified and became the father of all them that believe, whether of Jewish or Gentile stock. We believing Gentiles claim to be as good and lawful children of Abraham as the best that Jewry can boast. A lesson that some premillennarians would better try and learn!

This much premised, let us now examine this most interesting but difficult passage, in which Paul shows how the damage done by that one man, by whom sin entered into the world, was repaired by that other man, whom he sets in sharpest contrast with him. He speaks throughout of the ruin and the redemption as WORLD-WIDE, embracing totalities in each case; and the scene of each is identically the same, to-wit: "THE KOSMOS"—this world of ours. And further, in chapter viii. 19-25, he again speaks of it as *a world-redemption and a world-deliverance*, of which he says in the plainest terms that *the whole groaning creation waits for it*, nor waits in vain, "because the creation itself also shall be delivered out of the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God."

In the light of the world-wide scope of the redemption treated of, we shall have little difficulty in making clear the terms of this intricate passage, which, without this clew, will always baffle our endeavors to see it in a self-consistent and satisfactory light. In my present wandering life of evangelist among the Mexicans, I

have no copy of the Revised Version to cite from, but I give the passage substantially as rendered in the Modern Spanish Version:

Romans v. 12: "Therefore, as by means of one man *sin entered into the world*, and death by means of sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned;—(13) for until the Law, *sin was in the world*, but sin is not imputed when there is no law; (14) nevertheless, death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression, who is a type of him that was to come [the promised Messiah and *World-deliverer*]. (15) But not as the transgression has been the gift; for if by the transgression of the one, *the many* died, much more the grace of God and the gift, which is by the grace of the other [*Gr.* "the one," a common Hebraism] man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto *the many*. (16) And not as it was by means of one that sinned has been the gift; for the judgment was of one transgression unto condemnation, but the free gift is of many transgressions unto justification. (17) For if by the transgression of the one, death reigned by means of the one, much more, those who receive the abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness shall reign in life by means of the other [*Gr.* the one], Jesus Christ. (18) Therefore, as by means of one transgression sentence *came upon all men unto condemnation*, so, also, by means of one act of righteousness, sentence *comes upon all men unto justification of life*. (19) For as through the disobedience of the one man, *the many* were constituted sinners, so by means of the righteousness of the other [*Gr.* the one], *the many* shall be constituted righteous. (20) The law entered besides that transgression might abound, but *where sin abounded* [that is, in the world], *there* grace did much more abound; (21) in order that as sin had reigned unto death, so also grace should reign, through righteousness, unto eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord." (Rom. v. 12-21.)

Here, as in so many other places already cited, "the field is the world," and in the contrast which Paul presents between the man who damned the world and the man who saves the world, the several work and interests of each are presented *in their solidarity, as world-wide*, and therefore embracing totalities in each case, "the many" of

the one and "the many" of the other—the totalities of the individuals concerned in each; though the totalities are not identical, but rather all who are Adam's in the one case, and all who are Christ's in the other. "The world" is in a certain sense the same, though the individuals who people it are not all the same in each case. This should not occasion us any difficulty. When in our daily life we speak of "the world" and "the whole world," we do not include Adam, or Noah, or Nimrod, or David, or Julius Cæsar; *we count out the departed*, without one thought of them; so when "the wicked are driven away in their wickedness," when "the evil-doers are cut off," as is so often predicted of them; when, as Moses declared, "it shall come to pass that every soul that will not hearken unto that prophet *shall be destroyed from among the people*" of God (Acts iii. 22, 23), "*the world,*" "*the whole world,*" *will be just as complete without them as it is to-day without the dead.* In either case, they are simply counted out.

From this standpoint, therefore, let us study the question of the extent of the atonement. For what, and for whom, was it made? For just this, the salvation of "the world," "the whole world." But who are the denizens, the heritors of "the world"? who make up the *personnel* of the kingdom? The elect, "Abraham and his seed, to whom the promises are made"; all whom the Father gave to the Son, and whom he engaged, without loss of one, to raise up to eternal life at the last day. Are there any besides? None whatever; for such is the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and such the desperate wickedness of the hearts of men, that left to their own election they will surely choose the broad way that leads to destruction, and thank God, or thank men at least, for the privilege of being left alone, to do, unmolested, as they please! We need but to open our eyes, to see this enacted around us every day. If men would elect life, God would be spared the necessity of election. His only reason for choosing any is, that without his sovereign choice all would alike shun the way of life, and choose the road to death. Sad as it is to believe it, no thoughtful person who takes any part in the work of winning souls can shut his eyes to the fact that the great bulk of the Protestant world had rather "take their chances" of eternal ruin than "take Christ's

yoke and learn of him and find rest to their souls!" The Roman Catholic world is worse off still: Bible-burning is an old business with them, and is one they still indulge in. "Who hath believed our report?" has been the sad complaint of God's messengers from age to age.

But, going back to that imperfect picture of "good things to come," we ask: Does the death of "the Redeemer of God's elect" make a full and proper atonement for their sins, a true satisfaction to divine justice on their behalf? Certainly, as scores of Scriptures teach: "He is the propitiation for our [sins." "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our sins, according to the riches of his grace." "The Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all." "His own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree." "By his stripes we are healed." But was the atonement made *with definite reference* to them? This is expressly stated in every conceivable way, and it constitutes the peculiar bond that binds his people to himself, however partisan controversy and polemical tactics may sometimes obscure the theological statement. On this point, all branches of the Christian church use popularly one and the same forms of speech, no other would at all suit their purpose: "Having loved his own that were in the world, he loved them unto the end." "*Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, . . . to him be glory and dominion forever and ever. Amen!*" But was the mediation and atonement of Christ LIMITED to the purpose of securing eternal life to them? I think it has been conclusively shown that Christ did not come into the world and die merely to secure the salvation of any number of *individuals, as individuals, nor even of the church, as a church*, but, in addition thereto, to secure the salvation OF THE WORLD, AS A WORLD. *As the world in its solidarity was the subject of ruin, so the world in its solidarity is the subject of redemption.*

But is the death of Christ, in this sense also, as definite and true an atonement, and as really a satisfaction to divine justice, as when viewed in reference to the sins of his people, individually and collectively considered? Just as much so, I think. He came into the world to save the world; and now the world through him

is saved! Go where you will, in the length of it, and the breadth of it, you find no sin, no sorrow, no death; no want, nor poverty, nor rags, nor wretchedness; no violence, nor lawlessness; no graves nor dying beds; nothing that defileth, or worketh abomination, or maketh a lie. Over earth's wide domain, the gospel has reëstablished the law of God (Rom. iii. 31), and his will is done on earth as it is done in heaven. God's tabernacle and dwelling-place is again and forevermore with men. *Earth is at last as clean as heaven; AND IT IS THE BLOOD OF CHRIST THAT HAS CLEANSED IT.* We talk of Noah's flood washing away the filth of the antediluvians; but that is a figure of speech; water can never wash away the filth of sin, whatever baptismal regenerationists may think or say. So, too, we talk of the fires of the last conflagration purging the earth of the former abominations wrought thereon; but this is as much a figure of speech as the other; fire can never purge away sins, even if Romanists are taught to believe it. "Blood, it defileth the land; neither can the land be cleansed from the blood that is shed therein, except by the blood of him that shed it." (Num. xxxv. 33.) It is not a mere figure of speech, then, when we affirm that Christ's blood cleanses the world from guilt and pollution. He "*taketh away the sin of the world!*"

This view of the atonement meets, I think, all the conditions of a good and satisfactory exposition of the case. First of all, it is scriptural, and it takes the Scriptures, without wresting or forcing, in their simple and natural sense. Then, it is definite; it was made with specific reference to the end that it effects—to save an elect people, and to bring back a lost world to God. It is efficacious, too, securing absolutely the salvation of Christ's God-given people, and also of the world, as such, together with all the means necessary to the accomplishment of this purpose in its season. Still further, it is a true and proper atonement, meeting and answering all the demands of the violated law of God, and making it in the highest degree consistent therewith that God "should be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus"; making it just and proper, also, that the curse pronounced on the earth for man's sake should be revoked, and converted into the plenitude of the divine favor and blessing.

But, and in addition to all this, IT IS AS GENERAL AND UNLIMITED AS IT IS PARTICULAR AND DEFINITE. It is a *world-salvation*, "as long as the earth, and as broad as the sea." From this point of view, none need ever find himself hampered in preaching a definite atonement, by feeling that it in anywise restricts its world-wide application as "good news to be preached to every creature." God loved the world, and sent his Son to save the world; the world is, in fact, being saved through him; *and anybody and everybody in the world is welcome to take his part therein*. There is no reason why any one should be "cut off," except his own wilful preference of darkness to light, and of sin to holiness. Christ, *the World-Saviour*, is taking away its sin, and may "cut short the work in righteousness" and "make an end of sin" much sooner than any of us expect; and he will take away any man's sins and every man's sins who finds them a burden, and wants to get rid of them, and will come to him as he is freely offered to us in the gospel. His complaint is, "Ye will not come to me that ye might have life!" The offer of salvation, with the accompanying "command to repent," and to believe and obey the gospel, is made in good faith to "all men everywhere" (Acts xvii. 30, 31); so much so, that they will be punished for disobedience to this command just as much as to any other. Christ, the *World-Redeemer*, has enjoined on us that his "gospel be preached to every creature"; and, for further assurance, he adds: "Him that cometh to me I will in nowise cast out"! "Whosoever will, let him take of the water of life freely"! Those who choose to stand on the side of the first transgressor, who brought sin and death into the world, showing thus their approval of his deed, will have themselves to blame; for all who repent of and forsake their sins, renouncing the first Adam and his deed, will find a ready welcome, with pardon and healing, from the last Adam, who came to repair, and more than repair, the ruin wrought by the first. Here, then, is a gospel free for all to preach, and free for all to accept!

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IV. THE LIMIT OF THE CHURCH'S POWER TO MAKE DECLARATIONS.

IT is assumed in this discussion that the threefold distinction of church power adopted by Calvin is exhaustive; and that it is either (*diatactic*) law-making, or (*diacritic*) judicial, or (*dogmatic*) doctrinal. Further, we take it for granted that the first, in its subject-matter, is confined to circumstances of time, and place, and of order and decency, and that the second involves only the application of the truth, and the administration of the sacred and holy discipline of the Lord's house, and that both as to their objects extend only to members of the church. It follows that the only kind of power belonging to the church, which in its purview goes beyond church members, and has direct relation to the outside world, is that of prophesying or declaring truth. This includes authority to speak to its own people about their conduct in all the departments of life, and to testify to all men the gospel of the grace of God. But authority to declare the truth and the principles of holy living in every department of life, and authority to declare what is the good and the right in every problem that may arise in every department of life, are not the same thing. It is one thing to teach the principles of moral rectitude which should govern the mind in advancing to a conclusion, and another to make a conclusion for the mind to be adopted as settled by external authority, as a father may do in many or most cases for his non-adult child. To say you should strive to promote morality is not the same as to say you should approve a certain enterprise professedly designed to promote morality, and give it your praise and adherence, whatever you may think of its methods or its real tendency. The doctrine that the church should enjoin upon its members the duties which belong to their secular and political relations does not imply that it has any authority whatever over these relations themselves, whether to establish, change or control them. Grant that the church should declare the Decalogue as

the law of God binding upon the nation and upon all citizens, it does not follow that the church may ally itself with the state in relation to coercive means for the enforcement of the church's decrees. But surely the distinction betwixt speaking about a thing authoritatively, and deciding every problem which that thing suggests, is broad and practical enough, and is observed in all the relations of civilized man. Yet men bent on defending error have sometimes succeeded in obscuring the widest differences between objects of thought.

This suggests that it may not be wholly unnecessary to call attention to the distinction between the church considered as a divine organism, constituted of officers, and the church considered as consisting of Christians in their individual capacity, whether acting severally or in voluntary association. The former is, properly speaking, the subject, the latter the object, of church power.

The question arises, Does it pertain to the church to set her seal of testimony to all which may seem to it to be true, or is it restricted to a specific department of truth as the subject-matter of its deliverances?

This question calls up the antecedent one, What is the work which Christ has committed to his church?

1. Many professing to be Christians apparently feel sure that the church is a society ordained for directly promoting all good, and that it should take charge of all that pertains to human welfare, even of the whole physical department of human life, and make declarations not only about, but deciding which is the best, food and clothing. To a social science lecturer of high literary standing and professed Christian belief, whom the writer heard lately addressing a learned audience, it appeared very reprehensible that ministers did not from the pulpit instruct the people as to the relative nutritive properties of beef and pork, and of bread and Irish potatoes.

2. There is a second class of professors who, unwilling to be extremists, hold that there is a limit to the teaching work of the church, but that this limit is its own discretion, to be exercised in any case where it is requested to speak. They do not think that

the church should declare on every subject pertaining to human happiness, but only on such subjects as it may deem proper to handle. This is really no limit at all. It leaves the question of making a declaration to the discretion of the majority of a church court—to fallible men, subject to human passions and prejudices, liable to respond to the call of public opinion, to be carried off by the tide of partisan fervor, to feel the pressure of political zeal, and to allow their pleasure to blind their wisdom and misdirect their judgment. If at one time the church makes a deliverance on a secular question on which there would seem to be no room for disagreement between the righteous, at another time, under pressing circumstances of a temporal nature, it will be prompted to handle and decide a matter concerning which even right-minded men do not all agree, and which seems false and unwarranted to some of its own members, till, ultimately, whatever interests the outside world in any community will claim successfully a deliverance from the church, grown tyrannical in self-sufficiency; and mere human feeling will decide whether a matter is fit to be handled by the church, dictate the church's testimony, and bend to its own pleasure the mind and will of the majority in the church court.

This expansive tendency of discretionary power was signally illustrated by the Presbytery of New York not many months ago. The defeat of Tammany Hall, in relation to the government of the metropolis, was, whether correctly or mistakenly, attributed to a man who is a member *ex-officio* of that ecclesiastical body. The means used by this gentleman to change the government of the city were, in the estimation of all his fellow-citizens, degrading to the divine office, and in that of many, and perhaps most, of the good people of New York, positively immoral. . Even the secular papers, noted for plainness of speech in their reports, forebore, through shame, to give full accounts of the clerical detective's adventures, experiences, and conduct night after night and week after week in the palaces of impurity. The *New York Sun* says: "They (the reporters) were ashamed to hear even the description of the proceedings and practices of which Parkhurst was the voluntary witness for hours together in the companionship of a pink-

faced young man of his flock. It was not enough for him, though it would have been ample for proof, that there was the readiness to give such exhibitions for his hire, but he remained throughout the revolting performances, drank beer with the loathsome performers, and watched his youthful companion dancing with them in their nakedness." No wonder that the report of the Rev. Dr. Parkhurst's testimony in court abundantly substituted asterisks for information, and says that the evidence he gave was "so unspeakably revolting that the reporters were distressed because their official duty compelled them to listen to it." In his efforts to utilize these detective results as a means of reformation, the only immediate success he achieved was the dismissal of a few constables and of a subordinate officer or two from their place in the police force, and the sentence of one captain to Sing Sing for receiving a basket of fruit from a man whom he had permitted to encumber the sidewalk with his merchandise. How much Dr. Parkhurst has contributed towards ousting Tammany Hall, and even how much better off New York city is under the new *regime*, are questions on which a majority of her citizens, and of Republicans as well as Democrats, are not at all decided in their opinions. It is certain that there never was more complaint of city officials, or more quarreling and vituperation on account of official city positions, or more squabbling for leadership, in any community than there is this day in the metropolitan city of the great western republic. It is also true that Tammany Hall was no more responsible for corruption in the police force than was the Union League or any other prominent Republican organization in the city. The Board of Police Commissioners was bi-partisan, composed of Republicans and Democrats; the Superintendent (Byrnes), who has accumulated vast riches in the service, and the wealthiest Inspector (Williams), were strong Republicans, and it is not improbable that the whole body comprised more Republicans than Democrats. Very many saw in the election of Mayor Strong only the action of the ground-swell of change manifested of late in the ocean of opinion throughout the whole Union.

But Parkhurst and the Lexow Committee had been the sensa-

tion for months, and hence to Parkhurst and the Lexow Committee were ascribed the political revolution in New York City, and to Parkhurst, the victorious, in their excitement, looked for speedy millennial perfection.

The preachers, on the Sabbath before the day of election and previously, gave specific instruction and exhortation as to the candidates before the people, and the party with which they should vote. Thus the churches and their leaders were already moving down the secular grade, and after a month had been providentially given to this great Presbytery, through a postponement of the discussion of the Strong resolution, to consider the question of making itself subsidiary to the detective reformer, such was the power of partisan newspapers, and such the éclat of the late success in downing Tammany, deemed, as it was, to be due to the preacher's excursions into the realms of Venus, that not a member, save one—and he was a Southerner, trained by Thornwell—dared to raise a voice in opposition to a motion giving glory to the preacher who had had the sensational part in the drama just enacted. The fact that this preacher never attends the meetings of Presbytery—except that he attended to vote for Professor Briggs, when charged with impugning the divine authority of the Scriptures—and that he goes beyond Briggs in contempt of the Confession of Faith (which, when the Briggs case was on, he said in his pulpit he had never read, and never intended to read), and in the denial of inspiration, was nowhere in the minds of the great majority of the Presbytery of New York, when called to give glory to the secular reformer. The feeling of political triumph, the attainment of municipal dominance, the joy of victory over a hated organization, made many forget the decorum of a court of Jesus Christ, silenced others who previously had not concealed their agreement with the protest of the man from the South, at least from him, and carried the resolutions which identified the Presbytery and the Reform League to a most triumphant adoption.

Thus it is seen that discretion did not keep the great Presbytery of New York from making a declaration which involves approbation of the principle, let us do evil that good may come; and of which the Nestor of the Press in the United States says in his

editorial columns: "The decision as expressed in the resolutions passed, with the single dissenting voice of Dr. Mullally, is particularly, that in disguising himself and visiting houses of ill-fame the Rev. Dr. Parkhurst proceeded in strict accordance with the spirit and teaching of 'the gospel of Christ as the supreme remedy for every form of evil, and the church of Christ as the agency by which the world is to be regenerated and saved.' It is, that by such methods 'the moral teachings of Christ must be applied to every sphere of life,' and that consequently 'the church should,' by justifying and applauding them, 'bear her testimony for righteousness and purity in all human affairs.' Parkhurst's example, moreover, is especially commended to 'the Christian young men of the city,' as tending to arouse them to 'a realizing sense of their moral and religious duties as citizens,' 'binding them together in efforts for the purification of our civil and social life.' Incidentally, therefore, the course of the minister in taking along with him in his nocturnal prowlings a pink-faced young man of the church to witness 'circuses' got up at his provocation and expense, and to carouse and dance with naked harlots, is held up for youthful admiration as 'noble,' 'faithful,' and 'heroic.' The members of the Presbytery 'rejoice' in it, express 'gratitude' to Dr. Parkhurst because of it, and contemplate the proceeding with 'pride.'"

It is very desirable that the public should know exactly the moral standard of the Presbyterian Church, so that everybody may be able to determine whether it suits him, and whether he wishes his children brought up according to it. The religious belief of the New York Presbytery is not definable in this radical variation from the Westminster Confession, and hence whoever likes its moral standard, now so precisely established, is eligible for admittance to the churches, without regard to his doctrinal opinions. The existence of a large number of disreputable houses in town indicates that this Presbyterian moral standard will not fail for lack of support, and many people may be attracted to a church which makes deceit a virtue, and moral uncleanness beautiful and spotless purity, so long as they are practiced in a truly religious spirit. All people who think differently, and who feel

it incumbent on them to live, and to teach their children by precept and example to live, decently, honorably, and in obedience to principle, never compromising with evil under the false pretence that the end justifies the use of vicious means, are, of course, out of place in a church which formally and officially, by its representative Presbytery, holds up for them as their example a minister who went about in disguise, and in company with a young man of his flock, visiting, and inciting, and paying for, exhibitions of naked harlots, "for the purification of our civil and social life"!

The *Charleston News and Courier*, a paper noted for its freedom from all sensationalism and extravagance, while naively saying that it does not believe that the Presbytery *meant*, by its endorsement of Dr. Parkhurst's methods, to establish a new standard of ministerial conduct, adds: "But we fear that some of the weaker and more fleshly brethren may follow his lead, not in the same good cause, but for the purpose of seeing the seamy side of a very wicked world; at any rate, the impression which the action of Presbytery has made on one very acute mind" (that of Charles A. Dana) "would seem to suggest such a regrettable possibility."

Plainly, if there is *no* principle, or only that of her own discretion, to limit the church's authority to make declarations, it will be more and more diverted from its office of co-laborer with God in saving souls, more and more assimilated to temporal societies, and more and more distracted by the clamor of contending human opinions, till it shall have become but a co-laborer with one class of citizens in its opposition to another class.

It is very apparent that there is an innate tendency in preachers and church courts to go off on the secular, which is apt to prove the sensational, track. To illustrate again by the metropolitan Presbytery: There is upon its records no resolution of glorification, or praise, or thanks to the member of that body who for over thirty years has preached faithfully the doctrines of grace to more than a thousand, perhaps to two thousand, people twice every Lord's day, and whose preaching is the food and stimulus of a congregation that contributes, probably, more than a fourth of all the money given by all the congregations of the Presby-

tery to carry on the Master's work at home and abroad. Not long ago an eminent lawyer, laboring as one of a faithful committee appointed by the body, succeeded in purging the church of deadly heresy, at great expenditure of thought and time. Others within its jurisdiction, very remarkably successful in spiritual work, are too numerous for individual mention. Yet the only member of the body singled out for signal laudation is a minister whose audiences are not drawn by the preaching of the doctrines of Presbyterianism, but by dissertations on the speculations of humanitarianism, and whose efforts are directed rather to bringing criminals to punishment than to guiding souls to the cross. The Presbytery of New York, in this respect, is not an exception, but a specimen. When special praise is bestowed on a man by a church court, it is almost always for some secular success, real or apparent. The Rev. Dr. Henry Van Dyke, of the Brick Church, said in *The New York Herald*, and repeated the judgment on the floor of Presbytery without provoking the faintest sign of disapprobation, that it is more necessary to the Presbytery to be endorsed by Dr. Parkhurst than it is to Dr. Parkhurst to be endorsed by the Presbytery. In this Dr. Van Dyke manifested the tendency of the human heart, even in the best men, to exalt the secular above the spiritual, and the necessity of a substantive, authoritative limit to church work and to the exercise of ecclesiastical power.

A fourth class says there is such a limit, and it is this—the only secular questions which the church may concretely handle are those that involve morality. This again gives the largest scope to dogmatic church power. In all questions pertaining to man, there is necessarily a moral element, for man is a moral being, and is bound in all things to glorify God. If the church may handle all concrete moral questions, she may handle all social and political questions. This also gives full play to passion and prejudice, and makes the church lord of the conscience, an infallible judge and divider in questions of allegiance, of law, of inheritance, of disputed right, and of methods from the highest to the lowest relation. It makes the church the arbiter of right and wrong, and of the more desirable and the less desirable, where she has

only the light of nature to guide her. It would make the church a society of universal good. It is utterly incompatible with the Bible doctrine of church unity. According to Paul, a man's nationality and secular policy, so long as it does not contravene the revealed law of Christ, are not to be considered at all in the idea of the church. The only question in settling its essence is that of being in Christ Jesus.

These animadversions are deemed suitable to prepare us to receive the Bible principle which limits clearly, and to the spirit of obedience, satisfactorily, the church's power to make declarations.

This principle is contained in many biblical affirmations:

1. Christ is the head of the church, and exercises his headship by his Spirit and his word. The Spirit makes no new revelation, but only makes the word felt and known. If so, the church is the organ of Christ to think and speak and act his dictates, and should say only what he has said. The church as such, should have no will, no opinion, of her own, but should only give its testimony to him, and keep and declare his sayings. \

It follows that *the church should be silent, when its Divine Master is silent*, that the Bible is the divine rule and limit of church power, and that when the church goes beyond it, the church assumes the prerogative of its Divine Head, and makes itself his substitute and plenipotentiary. This is precisely the *proton pseudon* of Rome. It is sent to preach the preaching that he commands, and no more. It is, strictly speaking, his organ rather than even his messenger, and therefore to speak only the things which it may be sure Christ speaks through it.

It may be asked, Has the church, as such, nothing to say to its members in respect to philanthropic, and political, and reformatory questions? Certainly it has. It should deal with its members as individuals, and teach them to obey the law of Christ in the exercise of their will, their judgment, their affections, and the whole employment of their powers, and of their time. It pertains not to the church to say what profession the individual shall choose, but it does pertain to the church to declare that man should work, and prayerfully find and do his appropriate work; to say what is the best system of banking, but it should teach that

the banker should be honest; to point out the best way of applying human law to society, but it should tell its children to act their part as moral integers in the social structure, for the good of man and the glory of God, as responsible creatures. Having no revelation on the subject, it must not say which party's professions in an elective contest are most worthy to be believed, or which party's platform most worthy of support, but it should insist that its members diligently use their own judgment about men and measures, and vote in the way they deem best for the moral and material advantage of the community. The church is precluded from the work of settling constitutional questions, or deciding in a disputed case who Cæsar is, but it is bound to teach its children that using the best light they have they must decide conscientiously to whom their allegiance is due, and be obedient to the government which they deem to be in reason and right entitled to their allegiance.

Two Christian men ought to be able to pray together, although they belong to governments at war with each other, and meet after a battle, where they fought under hostile flags which yet float invasion and defiance from opposing lines of martialled forces. If they take the Bible as the directory of prayer, they can pray in common for all dearest to their hearts, because all is included in the one petition, "Thy will be done," "Not as I will, but as thou wilt"; they might both belong to the same church, and the one be in as good standing as the other. Their political views are their own, for them they are responsible only to God, and the church may neither control nor complain of the same.

Another way in which the same principle is taught in the Bible is, that the church's only weapon is the sword of the Spirit, that its prophetic work is confined exclusively to instruction and persuasion, and that it is a kingdom not of this world. If so, it is forbidden all alliance with the state, all resort to coercive machinery for accomplishing any purpose, all ends to be achieved by mere human skill, or judgment, or effort. The church, as such, must always act with the sword of the Spirit in the right hand, and the index finger of the left hand pointing to Christ himself, the centre of the eternal world. It is of "the truth," the truth to

which Christ came into the world to bear witness, and which pertains to man's eternal well-being.

If the church were practically convinced that it is the body of Christ, that he is its head, that apart from him it is nothing but a headless carcass, and, claiming to be anything, lies with horrible presumption; that its office is to speak in his name, and represent his authority; that the Bible is the counsel he gives through it to men; that Christ speaks through it only as it declares the gospel; that its only weapon is the word, and its only work instruction and persuasion in the doctrine and to the life taught in the Scriptures, then it would be silent when the word is silent, and spiritual in its ordained work, as it is in its ordained end and origin and methods and commission, and would not "render its courts, which God ordained for spiritual purposes, subsidiary to the schemes of any association founded in the human will, and liable to all its changes and caprices."

One has called attention to the distinction between advisory declarations of the church, and those decreeing terms of communion. But if the church is the organ of Christ, it should always speak with divine authority and expect to be heard with reverence and submission, not only for the agreement of its utterances with the word, "but also for the power whereby they are made as being an ordinance of God, appointed thereunto in his word." The voice of the church should always be the voice of God, and this is never so emphatic and solemn as when it comes through it. It is idle to say that the church may declare what it pleases so long as it does not claim to bind the conscience. It always binds the conscience, except when it can be shown that it transgressed its divine rule. So long as it claims to be the church at all, by virtue of this claim it asserts a right to be heard as the prophet of God, and it ought not to issue recommendations to regulate manners or gain the adoption of methods without the warrant, explicit or implied, of the revealed will of God.

But it has been said that secular societies operating for moral ends are often great helps to the church in respect to her spiritual work, and that, therefore, the church should ally itself with them.

If this argument in favor of secular deliverances on the part of

the church is good in one given case, then it is good as an argument in favor of the handling by the church of all secular matters. Money helps the church, therefore the church may tell her people how to make money, and laud the successful accumulator of riches. Health helps the church, therefore it should make scientific deliverances on hygiene and *materia medica*; and therefore the benefit of education authorizes ecclesiastical deliverances on the best system of government for schools and colleges and universities, and on pedagogy and kindred topics in general.

Dr. Thornwell's answer to this plea for secularity in pulpits and judicatories is conclusive. Writing to his friend, the Rev. John Douglass, he says, speaking directly in relation to temperance societies: "I regard them as secular enterprises for temporal good, having no connection whatever with the kingdom of Christ, a mere embalming of the corpse to arrest the progress of putrefaction. In this light I think it well that the potsherders of the earth engage in them. They are a great service to society. *Others* regard them as really helps to the cause of Christ, instruments of building up his kingdom—that is, as a *means of grace*, for the kingdom of Christ on earth consists in grace. In this sense I oppose them, because they are not appointed by Christ. Their true position is among the institutions of civil society. There I cordially recommend and encourage them." Acting as a citizen, the great theologian recommended societies for moral ends, if they were useful to society, but acting as a preacher and presbyter, he could not recognize them at all, because they were not appointed by Christ as means of grace.

Such means of grace instituted by man are very dangerous. To propose any other good to the sinner than Jesus Christ is very apt, if the sinner complies with the proposal, to result in making the man a self-righteous moralist, and erecting between him and the Saviour the barrier of decency and self-complacency, than which perhaps none affords so great security to unbelief. The work of the church is to bring men to Christ, and that, in no round-about-way of reform, but directly and immediately by faith in him, even though the sinner be a Philippian jailer, a Corinthian drunkard, or a persecuting Pharisee, or even a greater sinner than either.

“The church of Jesus Christ is a spiritual body to which have been given the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God for the gathering and perfecting of the saints in this life to the end of the world. It is the great instrumentality of the Saviour, through which, by his eternal Spirit, he dispenses salvation to the objects of his love. Its ends are holiness and life, to the manifestation of the riches and glory of divine grace, and not simply morality, decency and good order, which may to some extent be secured without faith in the Redeemer, or the transforming efficacy of the Holy Spirit.” Is it not enough for the church, enough in respect to honor and to time and means, enough in respect to the affections of the Christian heart in the hour of preaching and hearing, and in the season of Presbyterial attendance, to be charged with the work of gathering and perfecting the saints, and fitting them for heaven? Do Parliament and Congress find that the work of advancing and maintaining secular happiness is enough to engross all their attention, and shall the man or the body charged with the cure of souls long for more, or turn aside to other work?

“’Tis not a cause of small import,
The pastor’s care demands ;
But what might fill an angel’s heart,
And filled a Saviour’s hands.

“They watch for souls, for which the Lord
Did heavenly bliss forego ;
For souls, which must forever live
In raptures, or in woe.”

FRANCIS P. MULLALLY.

New York, N. Y., March 8, 1895.

V. THE SOCIAL AND CIVIL STATUS OF WOMAN.¹

THIS, beyond all others, is the age of democracy. Its achievements well entitle it to be called triumphant. Absolutism is dead, or doomed, the world over. The divine right of kings has yielded place in the minds of men to the divine right of the people; the idea of magistrate and sovereign is being lost in that of public servant, and the greatest good of the greatest number has become the object, professed at least, of every legislator.

Jefferson's maxim, that all men are created equal, promulgated as a fundamental principle of government, has become axiomatic in the world's thought, and its influence most potential and far-reaching. It has swept chattel-slavery from the face of the earth. It has undermined, and is fast subverting, all distinctions of birth and caste, and is everywhere transforming the slave, the serf, the vassal, the subject, into the citizen, and absolute despotisms into free commonwealths.

Flushed with success and buoyant with anticipation, the new democracy cherishes vast designs for the future. It looks forward to a time when wars shall cease; it expects to realize, far off it may be, the poet's dream of the brotherhood of man and the federation of the world; it hopes to abolish poverty, ignorance, vice, and crime; and fondly dreams of a golden age that is yet to be, when none shall want, and none shall do or suffer wrong.

The new democracy is essentially radical and revolutionary. It has no respect for mere rights of prescription. It cherishes no blind reverence for the past. It pays slight regard to established custom or immemorial usage. It challenges every existing institution and social condition, and hales them to the bar of public opinion, there to give account of themselves, and show the reason for their being. None thus challenged need hope to escape the condemnation of that tribunal, unless it show itself founded in

¹ An address delivered in the Southwestern Presbyterian University, and published by request of the Board of Directors.

justice and right, and in harmony with the immutable laws and principles of nature.

Among the things thus challenged, whose right to be is now on trial, is the existing social and civil status of woman. It is strenuously contended by some that her existing status is essentially wrong; that the received limitations of sex are mostly conventional; that the restraints which have heretofore shut woman off from the larger and more public life of the world, and confined her to the privacy and seclusion of home, are unjust and oppressive; that woman's condition is little better than one of servitude; and hence it is demanded, with a great flourish of trumpets, that she be emancipated; that all distinctions of sex which are not purely physical be ignored or abolished; that all conventional barriers be broken down, and that she be admitted to a full share of all the rights, duties, and responsibilities of man, to co-equal headship of the family, to absolute identity of civil and political privileges and functions, and in every vocation to an open field and fair competition, with no favors to be asked or shown.

It is my purpose to-day to discuss the principles involved in this contention, and, if possible, to contribute in some degree to its elucidation and right settlement. Which of the two conditions, that which now exists, or that with which it is proposed to supersede it, most accords with nature? Is the distinction of sex purely physical, or does it also affect and sharply discriminate the intellectual and spiritual natures of men and women?

Does the distinction of sex indicate a difference of social and civil functions, and different spheres of activity and usefulness?

The right answer to these questions must prove decisive of the issue at bar. For we cannot get away from nature. We will not, if we are wise, ignore her. She is a kind, but yet a stern mother, and her will must be obeyed.

Our heedless neglect of her behests she may for a time but gently chastise, but contempt for her authority she smites with condign punishment; and visits upon open rebellion penalties which are lasting and disastrous.

Amid all the innovations of radical democracy there is one institution that must stand. The family, as springing from the life

union of one man with one woman in pure and honorable wedlock, is a social necessity. It is the strongest social bond, the surest guaranty of social order. It is the nursery of every grace that adorns, and of every virtue that dignifies, human life. It is the indispensable condition of social purity, of genuine religion, and of high civilization. It is necessary not only to woman's happiness, but also to the development of all the finer qualities of her womanhood. It affords the sole relations in which she can dwell with man without at once forfeiting his respect, and sacrificing her own purity, delicacy, sweetness, and womanly dignity. As long as the family remains our most important social institution, woman's relations to the world must be determined by her relations to the family and her offices and functions therein. Whatever restraints these impose, whatever disabilities these involve, are natural, not arbitrary, are essential, not conventional, are social necessities, not the oppressive impositions of superior power. Woman's chief relation in the family is that she bears her child. Her grand office and function is motherhood. All others are incidental, collateral, subsidiary, and comparatively unimportant. This is supreme and indispensable. The God of nature has honored woman above all his earthly creatures in giving to her, chiefly, the guardianship and tutelage of immortal intelligences. He has committed to her keeping the life of humanity in the weakness, the tenderness, the helplessness, the utter dependence of infancy. In this she finds a work which demands her supremest affection, her unwearying devotion, her utter self-effacement, and which calls into constant exercise all her mental faculties, and all the high instincts and sentiments of her heart. The care of the physical well-being of the child-life alone were no light burden nor trivial responsibility. To properly guard its health, to provide the conditions needed for its full physical development, would make no light demand upon her time and attention, and involve no small degree of self-sacrifice.

But the physical is only the lower and grosser form of this relationship. We are not wholly nor chiefly animal. Our mental faculties, the capabilities of our moral and spiritual natures, prove for us a noble origin, and augur a high destiny. When consid-

ered upon this side of our natures we seem indeed creatures of another sphere and closely akin to the divine.

“ Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar.
Not in entire forgetfulness
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.”

It is in the cultivation, the right training and proper development of this immortal and spiritual part of us that woman finds her truest mission and does her best work for the world. It is her privilege to watch the first unfoldings of the infant mind, to aid it in its first efforts to grapple with the mysteries of life and nature, to help it to arrive at correct conceptions of itself and the wonderful world in which it is placed, to guide it into correct mental habitudes, to stimulate, not repress, and to guide into proper channels, its strong natural curiosity, without which there can be no learning and no intellectual excellence. The stimulating effect upon the childish mind, all open to impressions, whose habits of thought are all unformed, of constant association with a superior woman of high intelligence and generous sympathies, who has not lost the child-like in the larger mind, is beyond all estimate. It is claimed, and I doubt not, correctly, that there is no record of a great man who did not have a great mother; and it is a well-known fact that great intellectual power is always largely due to the mother, and this, as I believe, not less by reason of association and unconscious assimilation, than of inheritance.

It is the mother's privilege, also, and her duty, to aid the child in the formation of character. She can make of it largely what she will. The child-life is committed to her, not only innocent and lovable, but pliant and plastic. It is a twig which she may bend, clay which she may mold, marble which she with tireless effort may chisel and polish into beauty. The child must learn from her, if he ever learn it well, the great lesson of obedience to, and reverence for, rightful authority. He must learn from her to restrain the appetite, passions, and impulses of his animal na-

ture, and to place them under the dominance of reason and conscience. He must learn from her honor, truth, justice, integrity, and duty. She must teach him to be gentle, generous, magnanimous. Nor can she leave off here. If she do, her highest, holiest, and most needed work will be left undone. The child must be taught of God, his awful majesty, his power, his holiness, his inflexible justice, that will by no means spare the guilty. He must be taught of sin, its heinousness, that he himself is a sinner, member of a fallen race, involved in its guilt and depravity, exposed to the vengeance of God's violated law, and utterly unable of himself to do anything to merit God's favor or forgiveness.

These are dreadful truths. They fill the souls of men with awe and foreboding. They cut up pride by the roots and humble men into the very dust. There is none from whom a child can so learn them as from his mother, none who can so impress them and make them so much a part of the child's thoughts and his very life—but the child-mind must not be left here, a prey to horror and despair.

He must learn of the tenderness of the divine heart, of God's pity, his boundless love, of the wideness of his mercy like the wideness of the sea. He must be told the old sweet story of Jesus, how he loved us, how he came, the son of Mary, and dwelt among us, knowing our sorrows and acquainted with our griefs; how he endured the derision and contumely of men; and how he died at last, upraised upon the tree, an offering for our sins, and not for our sins only, but for the sins of the whole world.

And from whom can a child so learn these gracious truths as from his mother? What can so interpret for him the love, the mercy, the forgiveness of God, as the warm, tender, compassionate, forgiving heart of his own human mother? And the child must be brought to Jesus, that he may know him, love him, trust him. He must be made to sit at his feet, and learn from him humility, unselfishness, compassion, forgiveness, mercy, and melting charity.

A true mother, the highest type of mother, who loves her child supremely, will do for him all these things, will teach him all these great truths. Nor will she merely teach them; she will

help the child to live them. Under her watchful eye and guiding hand, cheered by her sympathy, and encouraged by her example, he will translate these teachings into deeds, which repeated will grow into habits; and these after a time will become transmuted into character, fixed and unchanging. A child so taught and so trained is saved, and saved now; saved for the life which now is, and for that which is to come. The everlasting rock is beneath his feet, and he stands, amid all the winds and billows of life, steadfast, immovable.

Need I enlarge upon the importance of this mother's work? It is all-important to the child for this life and for the next. It gives the best possible preparation for life; the education to be had in college and university is not worthy to be compared with it. The child who misses it enters life at a disadvantage, from which he never fully recovers. A great merchant who had built up a great business with multiform ramifications, involving the employment of great numbers of men, when asked what was the greatest difficulty with which he had to contend in the management of his business, replied, "the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of young men who have had the right kind of mothering."

Children who have had this mother's training have had wrought into them the essential elements of success, and always, everywhere, they press to the world's high places, and win and hold them by sheer force of superior merit. This mother's training is also the best preparation for eternity. The child that misses it misses God's best and surest means of grace. The child that has received it has, in the years when character is forming, been saved from vicious influences and shut up to that which is pure and good. Such an one is never very far from the kingdom, and to enter is always easy. I am told by a well-known minister that when he, with four others, entered the Theological Seminary at Columbia, they were asked by the venerable Dr. Leland whose influence had brought them to Christ. They each replied, "My mother's." He then told them that he had asked the same question of one hundred and fifty-four others, candidates for the ministry, and one hundred and fifty had answered it as they did. And

I doubt not, if the long roll of God's saints on earth were called to-day, and the same question propounded to each, by far the greater number would reply, "My mother's."

This same mother's training of the children is also essential to the welfare of the state; for it insures good citizenship; it makes the child a blessing, and not a curse, to his fellows; it fits him for honor and usefulness. It makes of him an ally of social order, obedient to and an upholder of the law. And to the church it is indispensable. It is her right arm, the chief source of her power, her great nursery of piety. It is to-day her most urgent need. The cry is coming up all over the land, "How shall we reach the young?" If the church would reach them, she must learn anew a lesson which she seems to be forgetting. If she would save the children, she must save them in God's appointed way, in and through the family, and by means of the training about the hearth-stone and around the mother's knee. If she would reach the rising generation, she must reach them not through Epworth League, nor Westminster Band, not through Y. P. S. C. E. nor Y. M. C. A. She must reach them through their mothers. If these fail her, her task will indeed be an arduous and well nigh a fruitless one. The extent of the mother's influence cannot be exaggerated. I am convinced that it is not fully appreciated even by woman herself. It is true that many beautiful things are said about it, but these are often, I fear, but the language of compliment, and not the expression of serious and profound conviction. Woman herself needs to learn more fully the dignity and responsibility of her station. She needs to be convinced that her life in the home and her work there are the two things which the world can last and least afford to lose; and that if the world is ever to be lifted to a higher plane; if society is ever to be renovated and purified; if the spiritual in man is not to be utterly overwhelmed in the swelling tide of gross materialism, the uplifting, the renovating, the saving power must come from the woman, must come specially from the mother and the home which she creates, the home training and the home culture which she makes possible.

That woman was designed for the home life becomes more evi-

dent when we consider the distinctive natures of men and women. The distinction of sex pervades the whole nature. Woman differs from man in body, mind and soul. She is physically frailer and weaker. Her nervous organization is finer and more delicate. Hence she is more modest, shrinking and retiring, more timid and fearful when confronted with physical danger. She instinctively looks to man for protection, and feels dependent upon him for security. Nor is the distinction of sex less marked in the higher nature. I have no patience with a saying which has received the sanction of some eminent names, that there is no sex in mind. A greater error or one more at variance with a true psychology it would be difficult to conceive. The mind of woman is not as the mind of man. It, like her nervous organization, is finer than his. It is more sprightly and imaginative, more vivid, and in the better sense of the word, more sentimental. If the reason proper ever acted alone, absolutely dissociated from all other mental states and operations, it might be true that in the process of ratiocination, in the drawing of inference and conclusion, the mind of woman would be precisely as the mind of man. But this is a condition which does not and cannot exist. Every act of the reason is accompanied by, blended with, colored and modified by imagination, memory, sensation, some degree of sentiment and feeling. And herein lies the grand distinction between the masculine and feminine intellect. Woman's mind is more enlivened by imagination, more warmed by sentiment, more swayed by emotion; and hence she is mentally more attractive and charming than man. Her mind is more specially adapted to deal with the concrete, with things in detail, and, within her sphere, is more practical than man's, and more to be trusted in the guidance of the individual life, and specially of the child-life. But while this is true, it is equally, and, from the premises, necessarily, true, that her mind is not so well fitted as man's for dry abstraction, for patient analysis, for broad generalization. Here imagination and sentiment must be held in abeyance, and all feeling, as far as possible, suppressed; here is needed to insure truth and certitude, as far as it can be had, the dry, cold light of reason; here sentiment may prove misleading, and partiality, predilection, passion, and

prejudice rush the judgment headlong into error; here the mind of man, because less quick and of somewhat coarser texture, because less imaginative, and less swayed by sentiment and feeling, is generally the safer guide. Hence his judgment is more to be trusted in the larger and broader affairs of life, in the building of states, the founding of institutions, the framing of laws, the administration of justice, the adopting of great social and civil policies. Nor is this disparaging to woman, nor does it argue her mental inferiority. Equal, unequal, can be predicated only of those things which, resembling each other in kind, differ, if at all, only in degree. Between things which differ in nature and in the uses they were intended to sub-serve, such a comparison cannot be properly instituted. The swan is not equal, nor is it unequal, to the eagle, the rose to the cabbage, the fleet courser to the draft horse; and so the mind of woman is not equal to that of man, nor is it superior, nor yet is it inferior, but diverse. It differs from it in nature because designed for different uses and adapted in social economy to different functions.

The distinction is even more marked in the moral and spiritual nature. The moral sentiments of woman are naturally finer than those of man. Her affection is purer, more unselfish, more enduring. Her sympathies are tenderer and more responsive. She is more open to pity, to compassion, to forgiveness. Her moral perceptions are clearer, and her intuitions of what is pure, good, and right are far more unerring. She is more amenable to the behests of conscience, and keeps her grosser feelings more completely under control of her will. She is more loyal to duty, and capable of sublimer self-renunciation in her efforts to discharge it. And she is more spiritual than man. In her weakness and her fears she seems to turn instinctively to religion for support. Her faith in its eternal verities is unquestioning. Her mind is well-nigh a stranger to doubt. Her confidence in God grows stronger with misfortunes and reverses; and in the hour of sorrow and bereavement, when all earthly helps have failed her, she leans most strongly upon his gracious promises. And thus it is that woman is religion's chief promoter. It is through her influence chiefly that it is kept alive and propagated in the world. She is,

in a very true and a very real sense, its anointed priestess. As Tennyson has finely phrased it, she is interpreter between the gods and men. And so she is fitted to be, not merely the household's queen, but, what is more, its spiritual guide and helper.

If the principles which I have attempted to develop be true—and few, I think, will be found to question them—there are certain conclusions which are logically involved. Woman's grand office of motherhood, her physical limitations, the peculiarities of her mental and spiritual nature, all prove that God designed that the home should be the sphere of woman's activity, and the moral and spiritual tutelage of the family her grand office and mission. This being settled, we can now advance with confidence to some other conclusions, which are corollaries of the one deduced.

And first, from the necessities of the case, in any normal condition of society man must provide for the maintenance of the family, he must be its bread-winner, he must provide the things necessary for its physical life and well-being. He must be, also, the guardian of its physical security, and its protector against external aggression and physical menace and danger. He must, of necessity, be responsible for the family in its relations to the world, and guardian of its rights and interests in the social body; and hence he must be vested with authority, he must be the recognized head of the family, he must be its duly-accredited representative in all its relations with the outer world; and his authority as such head of the family and as its representative must, of necessity, within its legitimate sphere, be revered and obeyed. And for this headship and authority he is specially qualified by nature, by reason of his greater physical strength, his firmer nerve, his cooler courage, his calmer judgment, less swayed than is woman's by impulses of sentiment and of feeling. And so we are brought back to that scheme of social order which is as old as the race itself, and which has been tersely, though somewhat bluntly, summed up by Tennyson in these lines:

“Man for the field, and woman for the hearth;
Man for the sword, and for the needle she;
Man for the head, and woman for the heart;
Man to command, and woman to obey;
All else confusion.”

This is the divine scheme of social order as revealed to us in nature. Upon this allotment of duties and activities society was first formed and government organized. In accordance with these distinctions civilization has been evolved out of barbarism, and true religion has been substituted for idolatry and superstition. It must continue to prevail, for it is necessary to woman's welfare and happiness. Through it alone can be preserved unimpaired her dignity and purity; and, being necessary to woman, it is indispensable to the welfare and further progress of the race itself.

The abandonment of this natural, this immemorial, order for one so revolutionary as that involved in this modern movement for woman's rights, would be followed by certain results which must be held pernicious in the extreme. It would be impossible for woman to invade man's distinctive sphere, and to share his duties and responsibilities, without neglecting her own. These are onerous enough, important enough, and involve responsibility enough, to demand her time, to engross her thoughts, and to fill her heart and life. If she do her own work well, if she accomplish her own great mission, the world will have no right to make any further demands upon her; and it will be most unjust and oppressive if men unload upon her already heavily-burdened shoulders any part of the duties and responsibilities which nature has imposed upon them. If woman do her own work well, she will have no time for the fierce competitions of business life, no time for a professional career, no time for politics and legislation. If she enter upon any of these spheres of activity, and meet with any tolerable degree of success, the home will suffer, and the moral and spiritual welfare of the family will suffer, by reason of the division of her time, the distraction of her thoughts, and the alienation of her interest and sympathy. But it will be said that there are many gifted women who do not care to wed, and who prefer another career to that offered to them in marriage; and that, while for wives and mothers the received limitations of sex and the old barriers are all well enough, and might be endured, yet for the exceptional and superior woman they should all be broken down and swept aside. Ah, indeed! And have we not

here the real motive which underlies and animates this whole movement? Is it not impatience with the limitations and restraints of nature? Is it not a vague desire on the part of some to reform nature? Is it not the ambition of a few to win success and distinction in careers which they know instinctively to be utterly inconsistent with woman's true mission? Is it not a desire to shirk the duties and responsibilities for which woman was specially designed? But the answer to this demand is easy. If the existing order is abolished for one class, it will, in the end, be abolished for all. If it stand for one, it should stand for all. In adopting great principles of government and social order, regard must be had to the wishes and interests, not of a class, but of all the people. Nor can we adopt the policy of holding out inducements or offering premiums for departure from the general order, for this would invite its entire abandonment. If society would not commit moral suicide, it will not tempt woman to a life of celibacy; especially will it not so tempt the gifted, the superior woman. The wives and mothers of the future should be the noblest and most excellent of their sex; and if any discriminations are to be made, they should be the ones most highly honored and rewarded.

The neglect of the home, of home training and home culture, and the consequent diminution of woman's most beneficent influence, could not possibly be compensated by anything which the world would gain by her entry upon its broader, but lower, life.

Woman now occupies the most important and responsible position in society. Her hand is on the springs of influence. She sits by the living fountains, and can make their stream sweet or bitter as she will. She is the household's queen, religion's priestess, childhood's guardian, and man's chief solace and helper. She can, if she will, abdicate her throne. But what can she or the world hope to gain by it? It would be as if a princess of the blood royal should lay aside the purple to serve in the kitchen, the philosopher abandon his studies to feed swine, or a king renounce his crown to dig ditches. The princess might, I grant you, succeed fairly well as a scullery-maid, the philosopher as a swineherd, or the king as a ditcher; but where were the gain of it?

If it be claimed that woman's help is needed as a wage-earner and a bread-winner, I reply, that there are men enough in the world to make a living for the women and children; that this is the normal order and condition, and should be maintained as far as it possibly can be. Woman's invasion of this sphere results in injury to herself, and in positive economic loss. Thousands of men walk the streets of our great cities each winter without employment, while pitiful charity keeps them and their families from starvation; and why? Because of tariff legislation, in part or expected? In some degree, maybe. Because silver has been demonetized, and the volume of currency unduly contracted? In some part, perhaps. But largely because, in shop and factory, in store and office, in a hundred vocations, men have been supplanted as wage-earners by women, who take their places for half their pay, while they are turned off to starve with their wives and little ones.

Whenever woman in large numbers becomes man's competitor for employment, the competition which now tends to force the laborer to a scale of wages barely sufficient to support him and his family in decent comfort will be tremendously intensified; woman and the home will be sacrificed; and yet the two together will receive less for their labor than the man might have earned alone. If it be contended that woman should be emancipated and enfranchised, in order that she may assist in bringing about certain great moral and social reforms, I reply, that there is not now a reform in which woman is interested which she cannot have for the asking. As society is now constituted, woman can get anything which will contribute to her welfare and happiness, if she will but demand it with any degree of unanimity and insistence. Great reforms are brought about, not by the mere depositing of ballots in a box, but, back of all that, by popular opinion, by public sentiment, making possible, necessitating, the result. In the formation of public opinion on all questions affecting her, woman wields the controlling influence. I instance the great temperance reform which, within the last fifteen years, has been accomplished in Mississippi, and which has so revolutionized our sentiments and habits. It came because woman needed, desired, and asked

it. If she had had the ballot in her hands, it would have come no sooner. I verily believe that fact alone would have indefinitely delayed it.

If woman can get what she wants without the ballot, she has no need for it, and ought not to be burdened with the heavy responsibilities which it would impose. If she cannot, if men will not yield to her freely what is needed for her welfare and happiness, and through her, for the welfare and happiness of the race, she could not extort it from them even with the ballot. A majority of men could always find means to render inoperative any legislation passed over their protest by a majority vote of women; and even though they fail in this, the social friction involved in the effort, the antagonisms aroused, the mutual feelings of resentment and antipathy provoked, would prove most harmful to the highest interests of both sexes, and socially disintegrating. But they would not fail. The ballot, in its final analysis, is, at best, only a conventional substitute for the sword. It represents force. The verdict of the ballot-box is respected only as it represents the superior force in the state. Where it does not do this, the ballot becomes absolutely ineffective and worthless. In proof of this proposition, I cite the fact that the white race in Mississippi now controls its destinies. If it were not true, a woman's wish, that she might see black heels on white necks, would have been fully gratified.

It is sometimes claimed that woman's help is needed for the purification of our politics, and that this result would follow if she shared with man his political privileges and duties. But if the stream of our political life is ever to be purified, the work must be done at the fountain-head, and not at the mouth. It were idle to attempt to clarify the waters of the Mississippi at Memphis, while the Missouri, the Ohio, and a thousand lesser tributaries are pouring in, unimpeded, their turbid torrents. If all mothers would teach their sons truth, honor, purity, justice, integrity, and patriotism, and thus prepare them for a full appreciation and a proper discharge of the duties of citizenship, our politics would not need to be purified. And can we be sure that, instead of purifying politics, woman would not be herself there-

by corrupted? There is a homely saying, that no man can handle pitch without being defiled; and it is much to be doubted whether woman can dabble in the dirty waters of politics without contamination. To say the least of it, she should not be exposed to so serious a risk, unless the necessity were more urgent and imperative.

If the existing order should be abandoned, and woman, in great measure, freed from the protecting restraints of the home life, to share, in larger measure, the activities of the outer world, she would inevitably suffer in her own character. While it is true that her moral sentiments are finer than man's, and she is capable of rising to a higher pitch of moral and spiritual elevation, it is also true that the taint of sin is on her, as on him; that her nature, like his, has been corrupted in all its parts; that she, too, is full of weaknesses and imperfections; that she is liable to temptation, can be moved by evil influences, and corrupted and ruined by vice. In the shelter of home, shielded from too close a contact with the rough world without, fenced in from all influences that would sully her purity or coarsen her moral fibre, guarded against all approach that would offend her modesty or tempt her virtue, she enjoys the most favorable conditions and the fullest opportunity to develop all that is most noble and lovable in her womanhood. If she abandon these, and, brushing aside the old restraints, force her way into the world without, a man in skirts, she will, in its conflicts and rough uses, grow stronger, perhaps, but she will also grow coarser; she will become more self-reliant, but also less delicate and refined; she will gain in courage, but lose in modesty. Temptation and opportunity will lead her too often into sin, and the moral defection and fall of any considerable proportion will discredit the sex.

The character of woman, as we love to contemplate it, pure, refined, spiritual, is not indigenous to earth nor native to our race. It is an exotic of rare beauty and priceless worth. It is of delicate fibre, and cannot bear that the winds of heaven should visit it too roughly. It will not endure exposure to Arctic frosts nor branding summer suns. It will not grow with weed or thorn in wood or field. It must needs be sheltered. It must be nourished up with care. It must have painstaking and assiduous cultiva-

tion. If these conditions are afforded it, it will bloom in perfection, and its beauty and fragrance prove rich reward for all the effort needed to bring it into flower.

If woman suffer in character, she will, to the same extent, lose the confidence, the regard, the reverence of man. Man does not admire the masculine woman—the loud, bold, coarse, self-sufficient, self-assertive woman. He requires that woman, to win and hold his regard, should be modest, somewhat retired, fenced off by native reserve from rude approach or pert familiarity. He expects in woman delicacy and refinement of thought and sentiment. He demands, as the condition of his love and reverence, a virtue that is above suspicion or thought of doubt. And even though he himself be vile and wicked, he loves to see in woman goodness and piety exhibited in reverence for God and holy living. Men revere such a woman as they revere nothing else on the hither side of heaven. This reverence of men for true womanhood is a means of grace for them, restraining, refining, and elevating them. It is the chief source of woman's power for good over men. If she lose it, the loss is irreparable. If she lose it, woman herself is lost. She will then, indeed, step down from her place of household queen to become the vilest and most despised of slaves. There is not lacking evidence that, as woman's relation to the world changes in the direction of this new tendency, and as her character changes with it, she loses somewhat of the high regard in which men hold her. She loses their reverence, their homage, their knightly courtesy, their self-sacrificing devotion.

Colorado has recently conferred the elective franchise upon woman. At the annual banquet, some months ago, of the Colorado Bar Association the following toast was drunk: "Our fellow-citizens, the ladies, once our superiors, but now become our equals." To my mind this is most significant, as expressing the opinion of a body of gentlemen of high intelligence and representative character. It was merely the polite way of saying that the change was lowering to the dignity, the character, and the influence of woman, and to the regard in which men hold her. I have no doubt that all who have travelled in the sections of our country where the views I am combatting have been most generally

accepted and acted upon have noticed the lack of respect which men evince for woman. If, in places of public resort, and in public conveyances, a gentleman offers his seat to a lady, it attracts attention, and often causes the suggestion that he must be from the South. I remember one instance of this, with which I was much impressed. At the World's Fair I had succeeded one evening at dusk in getting a seat in an elevated car bound for the city. I was wearied with the day's sight-seeing, and counted myself fortunate in getting a seat. I had hardly gotten comfortably seated when I noticed standing in the aisle a venerable lady of delicate, refined features, surmounted by silvery white hair, which set them off like a halo. She was leaning upon the arm of a courtly gentleman, whom I took to be her son, and seemed utterly exhausted. Seeing there was no vacant seat for her, I promptly offered her mine, as a matter of course, and because, as a gentleman, I could do no less. She at first refused to take it, saying she would not deprive me; but when I insisted that I would suffer in my self-respect if I sat while she stood in my presence, she accepted the seat and thanked me most graciously. When she was seated, the gentleman accosted me and asked me if I lived in Chicago. I told him I did not. He then inquired if I lived in the North. I told him my home was in Mississippi. "Ah!" he said, "that explains it. The Mississippians are a chivalrous people." "Yes," I said, and there was pride in my heart and hardly suppressed exultation in my voice, "we have been so taught." May the time never come when it will not be said of Mississippi and of all the South, "They are a chivalrous people," and, under God, it will never come, so long as our women remember the traditions of the past and are true to our old ideals of womanhood.

The abandonment of the old order for the one proposed would involve disloyalty to God's written word, the discrediting of its authority, and its ultimate rejection as an infallible guide for human life; for its teaching upon this subject, to him who will but read it, is too clear to be denied or explained away. The record shows that in the beginning God created them male and female and set them in families; that woman was created after man, and as a help for man; that immediately after the fall God declared

to the woman that her will should be subject to her husband, and he should rule over her. There is not the slightest intimation, from Genesis to Revelation, that this divine decree has ever been revoked, or this divine scheme of social order ever abrogated or modified. It underlay both the patriarchal and Mosaic economies. It was reasserted with all its logical corollaries, and that with tremendous emphasis, when Judaism gave way to Christianity. It is the fundamental principle of Christian sociology.

The Scriptures of the New Testament, in numerous passages, teach that the man is the divinely-constituted head over the woman, even as Christ is head over the church; that this headship is natural, official and rightful, and entitled to respect and reverence; that it does not dishonor woman, but dignifies and exalts her, and makes her a worthy type of Christ's fair bride, the church. The usual answer to this is the flippant sneer that Paul was a crusty old bachelor, and did not appreciate woman's true nature and real worth; that he wrote and taught under the prejudices of a thousand years; that he could not anticipate the wonderful changes to be made in woman's nature by nineteenth-century culture, and so *ad nauseam*.

And this of Paul, chiefest of the apostles, directly chosen and commissioned by our Lord after his resurrection to bear his gospel to the Gentile world, author, under divine inspiration, of a great part of the New Testament Scriptures, mighty intellect, who first reduced to logical coherence and scientific statement the sublime doctrines of grace, scholar of wide learning, philosopher, before whom Socrates and Plato might well stand uncovered as in the presence of a master. And yet some intellectual weaklings of to-day, who are not worthy so much as to sit at his feet, would sneer at him, revise him, correct his sociology, teach him the right relation of the sexes. It would be less absurd if some cross-roads haranguer should venture to criticise the faultless eloquence of Demosthenes, or some literary hack from Grub street presume to sneer at the poetry of Homer, or some presumptuous tyro undertake to set aside the analytic of Aristotle or the principle of Newton. But if Paul is discredited, what then? Peter must be also, and Moses, for the testimony of each upon this question is

too clear for dispute. In fact, nothing will logically answer the purpose of this insidious and dangerous infidelity short of the utter discrediting of the whole volume of Scripture as an inspired book and a true guide for human life. For it is a consistent whole, and its parts must stand or fall together. And if the Scriptures must go, what becomes of Christ? They were written by his prophets and apostles, through them alone we know of him, and they are indispensable to the longer continuance of his religion in the world. If the Scriptures are taken away, Christ is lost to the world as its mightiest and most benign influence.

It was a woman's voice that centuries ago wailed out on the morning air, "they have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him." If now the ambitious ones of her sex, because his Scriptures confute their teachings, and his church stands in the way to bar the further progress of this revolution, will take him away out of the world's heart and life, how shall the world be saved? And where, oh! where, shall woman find a friend and helper?

"He was lowly to woman,
For maid Mary's sake,
He lifted our sister from the dust, to take
Her equal place in homes, the household queen
Crowned and august, who sport and thrawl had been."

If the Christ be taken away, and the sway which he has wielded over the brutish passions of men be broken, woman will become again what she was before her Lord upraised her, what she is yet in Turkey and Persia, in India and China, and wherever else his glad gospel has not been heard and obeyed, a despised thing, scorned and down-trodden, man's sport and thrall.

Over against these miscalled rights of woman I set certain rights, which are founded in nature, and whose denial means moral confusion and social ruin. And I insist first upon the right of every true man to a wife, a pure woman whose destiny is linked with his for life, and who will be to him not a competitor in business, nor a rival for professional success or political honors, but a helpmeet for him, his home-maker, his chief comfort and solace, his moral guide, and spiritual exemplar and inspiration. I know of no sweeter picture of her than Wordsworth's:

“She was a phantom of delight
 When first she dawned upon my sight,
 A lovely apparition, sent
 To be a moment's ornament.
 Her eyes like stars of twilight fair,
 Like twilight, too, her dusky hair,
 But all things else about her drawn,
 From May time and the cheerful dawn,
 A laughing shape, an image gay
 To haunt, to startle, and waylay.

“ I saw her upon nearer view,
 A spirit, yet a woman, too,
 Her household motions light and free,
 And steps of virgin liberty ;
 A countenance in which did meet
 Sweet records, promises as sweet.
 A creature not too bright or good
 For human nature's daily food ;
 For transient sorrows, simple wiles,
 Praise, blame, love, kisses, tears and smiles.

“And now I view with eye serene
 The very pulse of the machine,
 A being breathing thoughtful breath,
 A traveller betwixt life and death,
 The reason firm, the temperate will,
 Discretion, foresight, strength and skill.
 A perfect woman nobly planned
 To warn, to comfort and command,
 And yet a spirit still, and bright
 With something of an angel's light.”

I insist next upon the right of every good woman to the shelter of a home, that safe harbor in which she may rest secure from the tempests and commotions of the outer sea. And as a condition to this, I insist upon her right to the honorable love, the unshaken confidence, of a worthy man, one whom she can love and honor, and, if need be, obey, and that without sacrifice of self-respect or loss of dignity. But if she would have these she must renounce ambition, and relinquish her aspirations to win for herself wealth, power, and fame.

“ Come down, O maid, from yonder mountain height;
 What pleasure lives in height (the shepherd sang),
 In height and cold, the splendor of the hills ?
 But cease to move so near the heavens, and cease

To glide a sunbeam by the blasted pine,
 To sit a star upon the sparkling spire;
 And come, for love is of the valley, come,
 For love is of the valley, come thou down
 And find him; by the happy threshold, he,
 Or hand in hand with plenty in the maize;
 Or red with spirted purple of the vats,
 Or fox-like in the vine; nor cares to walk
 With death and morning on the silver horns.
 Nor wilt thou snare him in the white ravine,
 Nor find him dropt upon the firths of ice,
 That huddling slant in furrow-cloven falls
 To roll the torrent out of dusky doors:
 But follow; let the torrent dance thee down
 To find him in the valley; let the wild
 Lean-headed eagles yelp alone, and leave
 The monstrous ledges there to slope, and spill
 Their thousand wreaths of dangling water-smoke,
 That like a broken purpose waste in air:
 So waste not thou; but come; for all the vales
 Await thee; azure pillars of the hearth
 Arise to thee; the children call, and I
 Thy shepherd pipe, and sweet is every sound,
 Sweeter thy voice, but every sound is sweet;
 Myriads of rivulets hurrying thro' the lawn,
 The moan of doves in immemorial elms,
 And murmuring of innumerable bees."

Have you ever heard a sweeter idyl? And it breathes a true philosophy. If the maid would find contentment and happiness, her woman's destiny and her woman's reward, she must leave the barren heights of pride, ambition and selfish isolation, and be content to come and make her home with love in the valley.

And I insist finally upon that most sacred of all human rights, that right which is fundamental, and to which all conflicting pretensions must yield, the right of a child to a mother; and she not a woman immersed in business, a lawyer, doctor, editor, politician, nor even, if you please, a preacher, or any other feminine man of the world, engrossed with its cares, rivalries, ambitions, worn with its toil, distracted with its tumult and confusion, making of home maybe a stopping place for the night, while the unhappy children are turned loose like young animals to grow up on the street or common; but an old-fashioned mother, a home-keeping mother,

a type which I fear will go sadly out of vogue with the incoming of the new order, such a mother as you and I had, to love him, to live in and for him, to find her supremest delight in training him up for the Lord, to teach him the lessons which you and I learned at our mother's knee, to point the road to heaven, and lead the way.

“Not learned, save in gracious household ways,
 Not perfect, nay, but full of tender wants.
 No angel, but a dearer being, all dipt
 In angel instincts, breathing paradise.
 Interpreter between the gods and men,
 She looked all native to her place, and yet
 On tip-toe seemed to touch upon a sphere
 Too gross to tread, and all male minds perforce
 Swayed to her from their orbits, as they moved,
 And girdled her with music. Happy he
 With such a mother ! Faith in womankind
 Beats with his blood, and trust in all things high
 Comes easy to him, and tho' he trip and fall,
 He shall not blind his soul with clay.”

And now if it were not that the limits of this address are already reached, and your patience and attention sufficiently taxed, I would be glad to show that, while woman's present social and civil status is in principle right, her condition is far from ideal perfection, and should be improved by broader culture, by a more general recognition of her worth and her peculiar needs, and by affording every possible opportunity to develop at all points her distinctive womanhood. But what I would say has been so much better said by my favorite poet, that I venture again to quote, and somewhat at large, from “The Princess.” The Princess Ida had rebelled against nature and had failed. She had dreamed of the emancipation of woman, and had dared to undertake it; but she sits now beside her lover in sweet submission and acknowledges herself beaten. He consoles her :

“Blame not thyself too much,” I said, “nor blame
 Too much the sons of men, and barbarous laws,
 These were the rough ways of the world till now.
 Henceforth thou hast a helper, me that know
 The woman's cause is man's. They rise or sink
 Together, dwarfed or godlike, bond or free :

For she that out of Lethe scales with man
 The shining steps of nature, shares with man
 His nights, his days, moves with him to one goal,
 Stays all the fair young planet in her hands.
 If she be small, slight-natured, miserable,
 How shall men grow? But work no more alone:
 Our place is much, henceforth as far as in us lies,
 We two will aid them both in serving her;
 Will clear away the parasitic forms
 That seem to keep her up, but drag her down.
 Will leave her space to bourgeon out of all
 Within her; let her make herself her own
 To give or keep, to live and learn and be
 All that not harms distinctive womanhood.
 For woman is not undeveloped man,
 But diverse: could we make her as the man,
 Sweet love were slain: his dearest bond is this,
 Not like to like, but like in difference,
 Yet in the long years liker must they grow.
 The man be more of woman, she of man:
 He gain in sweetness and in moral height,
 Nor lose the wrestling thews that throw the world.
 She, mental breadth, nor fail in childward care,
 Nor lose the childlike in the larger mind;
 Till at the last she set herself to man
 Like perfect music unto noble words,
 And so these twain upon the skirts of time,
 Sit side by side, full summed in all their powers,
 Dispensing harvest, sowing the to-be,
 Self-reverent each, and reverencing each.
 Distinct in individualities,
 But like each other, even as those who love.
 Then comes the statelier Eden back to man,
 Then reign the world's great bridals, chaste and calm,
 Then springs the crowning race of humankind,
 May these things be."

Sighing, she spoke,

"I fear they will not."

"Dear, but let us type them now

In our own lives, and this proud watchword rest
 Of equal: seeing either sex alone
 Is half itself, and in true marriage lies
 Nor equal nor unequal, each fulfils
 Defect in each, and always thought in thought.
 Purpose in purpose, will in will, they grow
 The single pure and perfect animal,
 The two-celled heart, beating with one full stroke, Life."

VI. NOTES.

PROF. JOHNSON'S "THE NEW TESTAMENT LAW FOR THE CHURCH'S EFFORT AT PROPAGANDISM."

ACTS i. 8: "But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you: and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth."

These words seem to be an epitome of the Acts. They emphasize three things: the power of the church, the work of the church, and the field of the church. The power of the church is the Holy Ghost; the work of the church, for each and all, is to be witnesses unto Jesus; the field of the church is both far and near—the home land and the foreign.

The Acts, taken as a whole, emphasize these three things:

(1), Acts is the book of the Holy Spirit. Fifty-one times that divine person is mentioned and his work illustrated—fifty-one times! It has well been called "The Acts of the Holy Ghost." His divine presence is felt at each turn of the history. At the first great council they said: "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us." When Peter rebuked Ananias he asked: "Why hath Satan filled thine heart to lie to the Holy Ghost?" In the church at Antioch the Holy Ghost said: "Separate me Barnabas and Saul," etc.

(2), Acts is the book of *witnessing*. The word occurs fourteen times. The apostolic church sought to make converts, not by argumentation, nor by mystic philosophy; not by "Christian schools," nor by pompous ritual, but by plain, clear witness-bearing. So Peter on Pentecost day: "This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses." So, again, to the throng at the Beautiful gate: "Ye killed the Prince of life, whom God hath raised from the dead, whereof we are witnesses." And, again, before the Sanhedrin: "The God of our fathers raised up Jesus. . . Him hath God exalted. . . We are witnesses."

A man must know something before he can be a witness. These men knew. They had seen and their hands had handled the Word of life. So they were qualified witnesses to him and to the great facts

of his history. Twenty-four times they declare the resurrection fact, for instance.

(3), The field in which they labored is the field appointed in this verse. They began in Jerusalem at Pentecost. Chapters i.-vii. describe the work in Jerusalem and Judea; chapter viii., the work in Samaria; chapter ix. to end, the work of foreign missions—to the end of the known world. By no great stretch of fancy the whole Book of Acts may be seen in miniature in this verse, or it might be likened to a life sermon, which develops the strong points of this text.

What are these points?

(1), The power of the church is the personal, divine Spirit who is in it.

(2), The work of the church, in its nature, is not culture, nor philosophy, nor reform, but to be witnesses (plural, distributive) to Jesus, to tell what we know of Jesus.

(3), The field of the church's effort is both at home and abroad. It includes the nearest and the farthest—all who live, and all while they live. The apostolic church anticipated the motto of the Student Volunteers: "The evangelization of the world in this generation."

It would seem to be a perilous thing to fix upon any one verse of the Scriptures as "the New Testament law for the church's effort at propagandism," since the whole New Testament, not to say the whole Bible, is "profitable," to the end that the man of God may be complete, thoroughly furnished unto all good works.

The peril to truth becomes very great when that one verse is interpreted by reading that between the lines which the Spirit has not expressed, in disregard of that which the Spirit has made emphatic.

This is the method of Professor T. C. Johnson in an exposition of Acts i. 8 in the October QUARTERLY, entitled, "The New Testament Law of the Church's Effort at Propagandism." He seeks from these words to learn "as to how and where the church of God of to-day should bear its witness, and as to when it shall bear it somewhere else." The logical conclusion from his argument would be the withdrawal of every missionary from China and Africa.

Prof. Johnson seems to hold that the church should first evangelize the most accessible peoples; and after that work is fairly well accomplished, or, at the least, in a good state of advancement, the missionaries should pass on to lands more difficult. He gives this not as the suggestion of expediency, but as the behest of "law"—Christ's law; Christ's one law for propagandism to the end of time. The faith and

courage apparent in this new "law" had illustration in the last century, when a stern divine said to the glowing Carey: "Sit down, young man; when God is ready to convert the heathen, he will do so without your help or mine."

The slender scriptural support for this new law is found in the fact that in the first seven chapters of Acts we read of missions to the Jews, the eighth chapter treats of work in Samaria, and the rest of the book tells of Paul's work among Gentiles. Prof. Johnson assumes that the Judean work prepared the way for the Samaritan work, and that the Samaritan work prepared the way for foreign missions. He states the law for all time in italics, as follows: "*The church filled with the Holy Spirit, shall, in its efforts at propagandism, seek to witness where its witnessing will result in the most efficient additional army of witness-bearers.*" If his method of interpretation is sound, the writer of this Note has learned from Dabney and Broadus in vain. If his conclusions are correct, the church would have been better off had A. T. Pierson and A. J. Gordon never been born! Therefore, we make bold to question both the methods and the conclusions. When the article first appeared it struck us as speculative and misleading. That unhappy impression has just been confirmed on reviewing the article while preparing a sermon upon foreign missions.

This Note is written as an offering of love to the cause of foreign missions. And with the earnest prayer that Professor Johnson may be led to reconsider his attitude to this cause. Men of his splendid abilities should be in accord and in line with the noble hosts who regard the "great commission" as the supreme duty of the hour.

I. THE METHOD. It is the first canon of interpretation that the Holy Spirit, speaking in the Scriptures, is a sound rhetorician. The things he emphasizes are the things emphatic.

From this safe old canon Prof. Johnson departs. His plan is (p. 533): "In the study of the outworking of the law of the church's effort at propagandism in apostolic history we shall ask 'why?' at every step. Why wait at Jerusalem? Why bear witness, first, in Jerusalem and in all Judea? Why bear witness, second, in Samaria? Why bear witness, last, to the Gentiles? What is the principle which the church should apply over and over?"

He seeks to get at the plans and motives of the apostles, not by the teaching of other Scriptures, but by the exercise of the "historic faculty." Now, there is a legitimate province for the historical imagination. It helps to get a clear grasp upon the people of old when we

mentally reproduce their environment and imagine what were their feelings and motives. Then they become of flesh and blood to our thinking—real men, not mere algebraic signs. In historical sermons before the popular audience, imagination is invaluable. The people go away with an idea, a mental picture, of the old hero or saint who was under discussion. The idea may not be exact, and probably is not; it has come through a fallible man's mind, but it is approximately correct; and the worshippers accept it as the view of a sober, reverent student of God's word. They may, or they may not, adopt it as their own.

But Prof. Johnson seems to demand of us more than this: First, by the exercise of the historic faculty he declares the unrecorded motives and plans of the early church. Next, he gravely sets forth his idea of their plan and motives as the pattern for all time—as “the New Testament law for the church's effort at propagation.” In doing so, he urges many things which are very true, very important, but he does not urge the things which the Spirit has made emphatic. Said the great lawgiver, “The secret things belong unto the Lord our God: but those things which are revealed belong unto us.”—Deut. xxix. 29.

II. THE CONCLUSIONS. 1. In answer to the question, “Why the period of waiting?” Prof. Johnson gives three reasons. Very interesting they are, and likely enough to be correct. But, strange to say, he barely mentions that one reason which Jesus made emphatic. That one reason is, you have no power without the Spirit. You are helpless. Without him, “work is waste.” Let the paragraph be quoted in full:

“*Third.* They were to wait because they could not work with effect until God had sent down upon them the Holy Ghost; until God had made them forever certain that he was with them, and had made clear forever to their minds the true nature of Christ's work. The outpouring of the Holy Ghost at Pentecost was a blessed rain that washed out the atmosphere. It was the glorious sunlight chasing away the darkness, and enabling the church to *see the truth and that it had the truth.* It was something more, but chiefly this—a filling with the truth.”

Observe, stress is laid on the truth, rather than on the Spirit who applies it. Is not that an error? The Spirit is the power; the truth is the instrument, only the instrument. The truth is a sword; the Spirit the hand that wields it. Apart from the Spirit, the truth is as helpless as any other handless sword.

It is the fashion to say, "Truth is mighty and will prevail," but truth is not mighty. They crucified him who said, "I am the truth." After nineteen centuries, truth is still a whisper in the world closet, not yet proclaimed upon its housetop.

Into this maze the poet sees further than the professor:

"Truth forever on the scaffold,
Wrong forever on the throne;
But that scaffold holds the future,
And behind the dim unknown
Standeth God within the shadow,
Keeping watch above his own."

If God stands within the shadow, well for us, well for the church. God the Spirit stood with the apostles, hence their power. He will be with us, at our side, our Paraclete, if we honor him, wait upon him, obey him.

2. In answer to the question, "Why witness, first of all, in Judea?" Prof. Johnson gives five reasons. Some of them are certainly correct. But how about—

"*Third.* Jesus bade his disciples bear witness, first of all, in Jerusalem and in all Judea, that he might secure a missionary host with which to speedily take the rest of the world."?

Is there a hint of this anywhere in the Bible? On the contrary, the most efficient evangelists named in the New Testament were secured and trained by means of the foreign work—*e. g.*, Timothy, Titus, and the eloquent Apollos.

How about—

"*Fifth.* The disciples themselves had need of being baptized into universal Christianity before they could witness to others than Jews (?) . . . Their after-history makes it plain that they were warped by the narrowest prejudices."

Narrow they were in sad truth. But the history shows that they got their best lessons in universal Christianity in the school of foreign missions! When Peter came before them with the report of his mission to the Gentile Cornelius (xi. 18), "they held their peace and glorified God, saying, Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life." When Paul and Barnabas came up from Antioch to the first General Assembly at Jerusalem and testified that God had given the Holy Ghost to the Gentiles, the council decided that circumcision was no longer necessary. For their emancipation from prejudice those Jews must say, with Paul, "I am debtor both to

the Greeks and to the barbarians." (Romans i. 14.) Participation in the world-wide work made them world-wide men.

3. In answer to the question, "Why witness next in Samaria?" Prof. Johnson assumes that the work in Judea had prepared the way. But the record shows that failure in Judea drove the workers to Samaria. They were scattered abroad by persecution. (Acts viii. 4.)

He *assumes* that the Samaritans were more approachable than the heathen. But this seems doubtful, in view of John iv. 9, and Luke ix. 52-54.

The fact is, that that same generation attempted the whole world work. They seem to have tarried in Jerusalem not longer than a few months before the work began abroad. There is not one shred of evidence that successes in Judea paved the way for success abroad!

The burden of a world's sin and need which bore upon the Saviour's heart seems to have borne upon the heart of the church, which is his body. They "attempted great things for God, and expected great things from God." They obeyed him.

They marched around the Jericho walls of heathenism and blew their trumpets, when God said march, and God was with them and the walls fell down.

The home work helped the foreign, and the foreign work helped the home. The Spirit was the power in both. The Spirit was with them because they attempted both; because they obeyed. (Acts v. 32.)

"Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why!"

Would that we had faith and courage to go into "all the world"—this land, all lands; to go at once; to go in simple reliance upon the living, personal Spirit, with whom "one can chase a thousand, and two can put ten thousand to flight."

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VII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

THE EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE.

THE EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE. *Edited by Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, LL. D.* THE BOOK OF EZEKIEL. *By the Rev. John Skinner, M. A., Professor of Old Testament Exegesis, Presbyterian College, London.* Crown 8vo, pp xii 499. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1895. THE BOOK OF DANIEL. *By F. W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Archdeacon of Westminster, etc.* Crown 8vo, pp. xii. 334. \$1.50. The same publishers.

Professor Skinner's thirty expository discourses on the Book of Ezekiel are grouped in this volume under five heads, or parts, viz., The Preparation and Call of the Prophet, Prophecies Relating Mainly to the Destruction of Jerusalem, Prophecies Against Foreign Nations, The Formation of the New Israel, and the Ideal Theocracy. The first part gives an admirable though succinct account of the historical situation just prior to Ezekiel's work as a prophet and when that work began, special attention being given to the events connected with Josiah's reign, which seemed to be the turning point in the history of that disastrous period. A chapter is devoted to a consideration of the relations of Ezekiel and Jeremiah. The author regards the personal influence of Jeremiah as the most fruitful of Ezekiel's youth. He shows their agreements, especially in their conception of the prophetic office, their estimate of Israel's sin, and the form of their Messianic hope, though he maintains that Jeremiah had a higher conception of the spirituality of true religion than Ezekiel possessed, and that the latter's teaching, while full of evangelical truth, was that "the end of God's dealings with his people was to bring them into a condition for fulfilling his law. . . . Instead of a purely spiritual anticipation expressing the essential nature of the perfect relation between God and man, Ezekiel presents us with a definite, clearly conceived vision of a new Theocracy—a state which is to be the outward embodiment of Jehovah's will, and in which life is minutely regulated by his law." This conception of the prophet's attitude and purpose determines our author's interpretations in the following chapters, and will enable the reader to know what he may expect. Unlike the majority of this series of expositions on the Old Testament, there is not opportunity here for that complete surrender to the modern critical theories which is so serious a fault with almost all the volumes of this otherwise most delightful and valuable series.

In DANIEL, however, the fullest opportunity is offered for the ventilation of the destructive criticism, and it is vigorously used. The author, Dr. Farrar, need but be named to assure the reader that the volume coming from his pen is charming from beginning to end. The attractiveness of the style, however, and the

ability of the author, only make the more dangerous the error that comes in such specious form. The opening paragraph tells us that the author does not expect his conclusions as to the origin of the book and its place in the Sacred Volume to command the assent of all. He states, on the same page, that he regards the book as a work which, in its present form, first saw the light in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes, and that its six magnificent opening chapters were never meant to be regarded in any other light than that of moral and religious *Haggadoth*. In the face of this, he asserts that there is scarcely a book of the Old Testament which can be made more richly profitable for doctrine, for reproof, etc. His claim that the religious lessons of writings which are thus impugned are in no way impaired by the results of criticism will be rejected by all right thinkers, by all who accept Christ's emphatic endorsement of the integrity and authenticity of such Scriptures. The character of the Hebrew and the appearance of three Greek words in the text are the author's chief reliance for the late date theory which he holds. One would think from the manner in which he parades these three poor little Greek words that he regards them as enough to upset Christ, tradition, history, and everything else. They are a mare's nest to him, truly. Delitzsch and Driver are his favorite guides in his critical views, and he pauses to pay a special tribute to the former for that "open-minded candor" which led him to advance with advancing thought, and to correct, modify and reverse his earlier conclusions. About one-third of the volume is taken up in the consideration of the questions at issue and the maintenance of the advanced critical views. The remainder is an unfolding, in an expository manner, of what the author conceives, with his view of the unauthentic nature of the writing, to be the great lessons of the book.

SAYCE'S "HIGHER CRITICISM AND THE MONUMENTS."

THE "HIGHER CRITICISM" AND THE VERDICT OF THE MONUMENTS. *By the Rev. A. H. Sayce, Queen's College, Oxford.* Second edition. 8vo. pp. xiv., 575. \$3. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge; New York: E. & J. B. Young & Co. 1894.

This second edition of Professor Sayce's work is not different from the first, but was brought out solely by the great demand which immediately followed the latter's appearance. The attack made upon its author as not fairly representing the Higher Criticism and as not a thoroughly reliable authority upon archæological subjects, or at least in his application of the findings of exploration, only contributed to the wider circulation of his book. Viewed from the strictly conservative standpoint, this work cannot be regarded as wholly satisfactory. The author yields entirely too much, in view of the mere "probabilities" involved, to the modern views of the Chronicles and Daniel. His views sometimes seem to coincide too closely with the critics, and his attack upon them is too closely confined to the strictly historical side of criticism. On the whole, however, it will be found greatly helpful to those who resist the destructive theories. The special value of the work is in the proof which the author finds in the monuments of the existence in the earliest times, prior to the Exodus under Moses, of a literary culture in Syria, Phœnicia, Palestine and Arabia, as well as in Egypt and Assyria, which made possible the origination of the sacred writings at the date assigned them by con-

servative scholarship as well as by the records themselves. The author deals with the questions considered from the standpoint of the archæologist strictly, treating the books of the Hebrew Bible as he should any other oriental literature which lays claim to a similar antiquity. He carefully guards against converting the terms "probable" and "it seems" into positive assertions and inferences. He characterizes the treatment of both apologists and higher critics as unscientific in that it is, as a rule, a treatment of the Old Testament books and their contents as if they had been written in England or France or Germany, and in that it approaches them from a modern and western point of view and reads into the language and narration the ideas which seem natural if not necessary to us who have received them by education and inheritance. He also shows how difficult it is for us to realize the intellectual point of view and beliefs of those by whom the Old Testament was written and first read. In view of these facts he contends earnestly for oriental archæology as a corrective. We could wish that, in following his method of using the contemporary records to test or correct the writings of the Old Testament instead of using the Old Testament to "elucidate and correct the contemporary histories," he had avoided the snare of deriving the Biblical account of the creation and deluge from the Babylonian, and a few other such surrenders to the advanced views which do not seem to have been at all necessary. A valuable feature of the work is found in the large quotations which the author makes from the monuments. He lets them speak for themselves and tell their own story. The rich "finds" of recent years, especially the Tel-el-Amarna tablets, and those of Edward Glaser, found in lower Arabia, are all freely used and applied. The volume as a whole is a valuable contribution to the more orthodox views, but must be read with great care.

HORTON'S "CARTOONS OF ST. MARK."

THE CARTOONS OF ST. MARK. *By Robert F. Horton, A. M., D. D.* Fleming H. Revell Company, New York, Chicago, Toronto. Pp. 306. 1894.

Eighteen sermons on the Gospel by Mark, reported by shorthand, revised and corrected, but not rewritten. The author characterizes the pages as "unpolished," because of the liberties and irregularities of extemporaneous style which he has permitted to remain in the permanent published form of his book. Utterly indifferent to literary fame, he prints his sermons for the same reason for which he originally delivered them—to promote a better understanding and a more intimate communion between the Christian and his Lord. For the fine arts, the word *picturesque* expresses what is fit to be put into a picture. If there were such a word as *evangelesque*, that which is fit to be put into a gospel, then Mark's Gospel would be to Dr. Horton simply but beautifully *evangelesque* and his aim would be to intensely and earnestly seize these facts and give them such an artistic and interpretative ordering as would make them serviceable, memorable, and beautiful. With his own brush he seeks to paint with Mark's colors. The incidents recorded by Mark are employed as so many windows of vision, through which the preacher would show his congregation some "bits" of spiritual scenery in the life of Christ. The Cartoon of Forgiveness fairly represents the author's work. In drawing it, the materials are taken from the second chapter of Mark, and wrought into three

panels in such a manner as to produce a unity of effect. On the first panel there is spread the scene of the healing and forgiveness of the paralytic man who had been let down through the roof of Simon's house at Capernaum, "in order that we may see that the luminous meaning of his presence in the world is precisely this incredible, this transcendental truth, that the forgiveness of God underlies the whole of humanity." On the second panel he sketches the call of Levi to show that the forgiveness of God extends to the most vicious publican. On the third panel he throws the several incidents in the remainder of the chapter in order to show that this new doctrine of forgiveness is a strong, freshening, glad-denning ferment which "the churchiness of Judaism" can no more hold than the old skins can hold the new wine. There are other cartoons of Healing, Rejection and Acceptance, Demons and Death, Crucifixion and Resurrection, and so on. The pictures are incomplete, suggestive "studies." They interest. They will improve the personal piety of the spiritual reader. There is a great deal in doctrine and sentiment that is eccentric. The sermonic divisions are fancifully denominated panels in the picture, and there is an average of three panels in each cartoon.

DROYSEN'S "OUTLINE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY."

OUTLINE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY. (Grundriss der Historik.) *By Johann Gustav Droysen, late Professor of History in the University of Berlin.* With a Biographical Sketch of the Author. Translated by E. Benjamin Andrews, President of Brown University. Boston: Ginn & Company. 1893.

The author of this work was a typical German scholar. He lived, and moved, and had his being in the atmosphere of the study and the lecture room. He was born in 1808, the son of a minister. He studied at the University of Berlin, with which he was afterwards connected as a professor. He attained high distinction as a philologist and a classical scholar, and to this class of subjects his first efforts as a teacher and an author were directed. Meanwhile, however, he developed a remarkable talent and inclination for historical investigation and exposition. His first work in this line was upon Grecian history, but the great work of his life was a *History of Prussian Policy* in fourteen thick volumes. That this "path-breaking work" was the result of prodigious toil expended in accumulating, sifting, and working into form "a prodigious plenitude of material" we may well believe. As a teacher of history, Droysen was pre-eminent. "He held you spell-bound," says his admiring biographer, "in his lectures, which moved upon the middle line between free utterance and literal delivery from manuscript. He did this by his splendid diction, by his sharp and ingenious exposition, by his extraordinary art of letting, at the right time and place, and often only by a brief hint-like remark, a surprising blaze of light flash upon special personalities. Great, also, was the effect of the powerful, manly spirit which got expression in all these ways." It is the opinion of the translator of the little book before us (who was also his pupil) that in real grasp upon the nature and meaning of history Droysen was the superior of Ranke, best known to English readers by his celebrated *History of the Popes*. He also pronounces Droysen's *Historik* the weightiest book of its size composed in our century. This brief work is devoted to the discussion of

the principles which underlie and control the investigation, criticism, form, and interpretation of history. It consists mainly of a series of condensed paragraphs which seem to have originally constituted the outline or heads of his lectures to his classes on the *Encyclopædia and Methodology of History*. The amplification of these paragraphs, we suppose, formed his lectures. This feature of the work accounts, no doubt, largely for the extreme difficulty on the part of the reader in understanding the author. The mind of the reader must go through somewhat the same processes which the lecturer performed in the delivery of his lectures, amplifying the hints and supplying the connecting ideas. In addition to this, the writer's thoughts are so peculiar, original, profound, and recondite, and his language so foreign in its signification from the phraseology of common life, that he is thoroughly intelligible only to scholars and thinkers. To such, however, the patient study of this condensed essay will yield many profound, suggestive, and stimulating thoughts.

SMITH'S "HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY."

THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE HOLY LAND; Especially in Relation to the History of Israel and of the Early Church. *By George Adam Smith, D. D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow.* With six maps. 8vo, pp. xxvi., 692. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1895.

We have read every word of this splendid volume with the deepest interest, and some portions of it over and over again. In it are found rare scholarship, painstaking research, faithful use of material, and withal a facility, clearness, and attractiveness of style which make it a charming book. Its setting, in typography, maps, and binding are worthy of so notable a work. And to us a still greater beauty of the work lies in the fact that the author has signally failed, so far as we can see, to accomplish anything in the way of applying the results of advanced criticism to the geography of the Holy Land. This application is declared to be his purpose. With the exception of an occasional statement, however, and these mainly in the somewhat terse foot-notes, which deal with purely historical, rather than historico-geographical questions there is little effort in this direction. The author confesses, that while fully accepting the critical methods, and that while it would be futile to think of writing the geography of Palestine on any other principles, he has felt forced by geographical evidence to contest some of the textual and historical conclusions of recent critics. In condemning Stade's theory of Israel's invasion of Palestine, which, by the way, he fully presents and discusses in an Appendix, he states (p. 275) the relations of geographical evidence to the Scripture narrative in such terms as to disprove his own critical principles. The chief general objection which is to be urged against the book is that it makes too much of naturalism and its effect upon one and another phase of the Israelites' development and career. Supernatural power and spiritual forces seem to be ignored. Had we space to individualize passages, many might be pointed out which reflect the author's views, but which the mass of our readers will not be prepared to endorse. A striking specimen will be found on page 289, where, following Lagarde, and accounting Tamar to be a collective term,

meaning the Canaanites, and Pharez the Hebrews, he asserts that in the intermarriage of the Israelites with the Canaanites of the Shephelah we have the meaning of the extraordinary adventures related in Genesis xxxviii. : *Judah went down from his brethren, and turned in to a certain Adullomite, whose name was Hirah* ; adding, "To all lovers of the Bible this result of criticism must surely come as a relief, that the following verses relate, not to the intercourse of individuals, but the intermarriage of families"! The great bulk of the book, however, is worthy of the utmost confidence, and even for homiletic purposes will be found admirable. Some of the chapters there is some variability in them—are strikingly beautiful and suggestive. Those parts which deal with eastern Palestine and the Shephelah are of special interest, because summarizing the results of exploration not yet popularly known.

THOMPSON'S "HISTORY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES."

A HISTORY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES IN THE UNITED STATES. *By Robert Ellis Thompson, D. D.* 8vo, pp. xxxii., 424. \$2.50. New York: The Christian Literature Co. 1895.

This is the sixth volume of the "American Church History" series of denominational histories. It is misnamed, for it is the history of but one branch of the "Presbyterian Churches in the United States." It touches upon several other branches, however, by relating the causes of their separation or the basis of their reunion. The treatment of the separation of the body popularly known as the Southern Presbyterian Church is unusually full, and for a Northern pen, unusually fair. The author gives at length not only the Spring Resolutions, but the Protest of Dr. Hodge and others, and the "Address of the Southern General Assembly to All the Churches of Jesus Christ." The treatment of the "Declaration and Testimony" matter and the events leading thereto is good. The author takes pains to show the inconsistencies of the decided old-school men of the border States who led in the *ipso facto* proceedings, and declares that the events of 1865-'67 are not those upon which Presbyterians generally look back with gratification. We could wish that among the many documents given us in full in this volume, the Declaration and Testimony had been included. It is almost too manifest to even prejudiced historians that the free giving of these historic documents would lead to a more correct view of the principles and acts involved, and would put shame upon the career of many who allowed themselves to be carried away by the tide of excitement and popular politics from the safe moorings of the word of God and the constitution of the church. The author brings the history down to the present time. In doing this, he finds occasion in a most unhistoric manner to fling very many harsh epithets at the supreme court of his church. He severely criticises the Northern assembly's action in the Briggs case, the inerrancy question, semi-nary relations, etc. The final paragraph of the book will show something of the author's spirit and attitude. "The closing pages of the story of American Presbyterianism are a tale of agitation and of friction. Better this, however, than stagnation and dull acquiescence in traditional beliefs and usages. Even this evidences life and looks to a future in which

'. . . . Generations yet unborn
Shall bless and magnify the Lord.'"

WESTON'S MARSHAL NEY.

HISTORIC DOUBTS AS TO THE EXECUTION OF MARSHAL NEY. *By James A. Weston, Rector of the Church of the Ascension, Hickory, N. C.; Major Thirty-third North Carolina Regiment; Honorary Member of the North Carolina Historical Society, etc.* With numerous illustrations. 8vo, pp. x., 310. \$3.00. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1895.

This volume, in the most perfect dress as to all its material parts, beautifully printed, handsomely bound, superbly and expensively illustrated, may be thought by some out of place on our table. As a fine piece of literary work, however, and as the recoual of incidents and thoughts in which very many of the QUARTERLY'S readers have a personal interest through the connection with them of many of their friends and kindred, the best names in the Old North State, the book is of too great local and personal interest to be passed by.

For several decades there has been current in certain sections of North Carolina and South Carolina, a tradition that one Peter S. Ney, a man who appeared in Georgetown, South Carolina, early in 1819, and a year or two later in Mocksville, N. C., and who resided in adjacent sections in North Carolina until his death in 1846, was the veritable Marshal Ney, of France. It is this tradition that Mr. Weston traces, with all the kindred subjects that will in any way bear upon it. It is his firm conviction that the identification is complete. The chief difficulty in the way is, of course, the historical account of the execution of Marshal Ney, in December, 1815. The author naturally devotes special attention to this. He maintains that immediately after the sentence of condemnation, numbers of the peers who had voted to condemn Ney openly declared that they did not desire his death, and that they had voted for it in obedience to the royal wish, but under the tacit understanding of a commutation of the penalty, and that they conjured the prime minister to solicit from the king exile to America; that the Cabinet formally and unanimously petitioned for a commutation; that many honored men came to plead for Ney's life, but were ignominiously dismissed; that a very large number of his friends, soldiers and citizens, had secretly sworn that he should not die by the hands of Frenchmen; that none of his old soldiers, all of whom idolized him, could have been induced to fire the fatal shot; that Ney was under the protection of the articles of capitulation, and all dealings with him subject to the revisal of the Duke of Wellington; that Wellington did everything in his power, short of forcible interposition, to save Ney's life, speaking freely to the king and his ministers; that the king became alarmed at Wellington's boldness, and finally, on the very evening of the condemnation, at a royal reception, whither Wellington went, as he stated afterwards, to ask for Ney's life, deliberately insulted him and caused him to leave the palace with a declaration that he would never again enter the royal presence; that a scheme was then arranged for a mock execution; that one month after the alleged execution certain British officers, among them Sir Robert Wilson, assisted in the escape of a condemned man, General Lavalette, for which they were punished in only a formal manner, for appearance's sake; that Sir Robert Wilson, writing to Earl Grey in defence of his action and describing the purpose and method of it, declared that "it was necessary to find some persons of trust who might facilitate the necessary dispositions, and our choice fell

upon ——— as well on account of the confidence we placed in their honor, as because we knew that they had already, once before, *engaged in a business of the same nature*”; that Lavalette immediately after his escape repaired to the home of Ney’s supposed widow; that the soldiers drawn up to put Ney to death and their officer knew the plan, and at Ney’s own command were to fire, but considerably above his head, while he would at the same moment fall; that contrary to the usual rules, his supposed body was immediately borne off in a carriage, and shortly afterwards privately buried in Pere la Chaise, under circumstances which render all the acts suspicious; that Madame Ney never erected a monument at his grave, though amply able to do so, and full of loyalty and devotion to his memory during all her subsequent life; that Ney, four days after Waterloo, publicly declared his purpose to go to the United States, and repeated this declaration during the few months’ hiding in Switzerland prior to his detection and arrest; that the studied silence of the man now supposed to have been the Marshal, and his continued residence away from France and his family, were, according to his own account, due to his unwillingness to betray those who had saved his life, and whose great name and reputation would have suffered by his speaking or return. On the other side of the question, our author shows from undisputed testimony that the man Peter S. Ney bore a striking resemblance to the Marshal; that he was recognized by some of his old soldiers, and on that account disappeared for a time, and yet was recognized later again; that his disposition and intellectual traits, and especially military habits and training, were such as Ney’s; that the similarity of handwriting was so striking as to lead the best known experts in New York and elsewhere to certify to its identity, plates showing the writing, as well as the testimony of the experts, being given in this connection; that the man bore upon his body precisely the wounds which were upon Ney’s, in face and legs particularly; that when occasionally in too much wine, the only vice to which the man was addicted, he declared that he was the Marshal; that on his death-bed, when in full possession of his senses, and with the knowledge that he was about to die, and with a full sense of the responsibility which he assumed, he calmly and deliberately declared to the attending physician and others that he was the Marshal Ney, of France. All these likenesses and declarations are testified to by people of the highest repute, ministers, lawyers, nurses, and others. It is also shown that Peter S. Ney had resources, received from Washington, D. C., in some unknown way. Once, too, there came to him at night a stranger, a young man, whom he recognized, and with whom he remained in consultation the whole of the night, and who secretly departed early the next morning. In an appendix in the last pages of the book our author, after repeating this incident, adds this remarkable paragraph: “Since this book went to press the author has received a letter from a foreign gentleman of high character and position, in which he says: ‘I am acquainted with the history of Peter S. Ney prior to his escape to the United States of America. Many years ago, when I was a young man, I visited your country for the express purpose of communicating with him. I found him in Rowan county, North Carolina, teaching school. He was boarding with a plauter . . . We spent the night in talking over past matters. I never saw him afterwards. The identity of Peter S. Ney has been a profound secret. He was a fugitive from justice, and many persons in France were accessory to his escape. If Peter S. Ney had re-

vealed his indentity in America, his friends in France who aided in his escape would have suffered death. Even now, perhaps, his identity cannot fully be made known. . . . He was born January 10, 1769.' The name of this writer cannot be given. It is known only to my publisher, Mr. Thomas Whittaker, and myself." Marshal Ney's birthday was January 10, 1769. His father was Peter Ney, a cooper ; on one side he was of Scottish descent. His familiarity with the French, his remarkable knowledge of the details of the Retreat from Moscow, his appearance first in that part of America which was the refuge of his fellow-countrymen, the Huguenots, his military bearing and traits, his intense interest, hidden by him, but too manifest to remain concealed, in French affairs, and many other facts are brought out to prove the author's belief and to substantiate a tradition which has long been acknowledged and accepted by many. Even if the position of the author be rejected, this work will rank among the best which the present Napoleonic literary revival has produced. In any advent, it traces a rare and curious bit of history and tradition which will interest all our readers.

VIII. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE BREATH OF GOD. A Sketch, Historical, Critical, and Logical, of the Doctrine of Inspiration. *By the Rev. Frank Hallam, author of "The Supreme Rite," "The Devil's Masterpiece," etc.* 12mo, pp. vi. 103. 75 cents. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1895.

We need add nothing to the sub-title of this little book by way of explanation of its purpose. The manner of accomplishing the end is peculiar. The author is quite picturesque in his style, and not always in good taste. The first chapter is in allegorical style, "King Liber" the hero, and this similitude is sustained more or less throughout the entire book. There is nothing new given us nor personal convictions set forth. Indeed, the author disclaims such an intention. He merely states his position towards the Higher Criticism as opposed to it, regarding it as an immature and incomplete science. The book evinces soundness in the main and reverence, but not thoroughness of study or that intensity of conviction which would shine out in spite of the effort to withhold it. He disdains the definition or description of the divine operation upon the minds of Scripture writers.

JESUS THE MESSIAH. *By Alfred Edersheim, M. A., Oxon., D. D., Ph. D., Sometime Grinfield Lecturer on the Septuagint in the University of Oxford, etc.* Author's edition, with Illustrations by Hoffman. 8vo, pp. xviii. 645. \$1.75. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., L't'd; London: Longmans, Green & Co.

An abridgment of the author's larger work, by the skilful hand of Professor Sautay. The reader will find practically all that was contained in the greater work, now so familiar to Bible students, and justly making Dr. Edersheim's one of the best of all the works on the life of Christ.

THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF JESUS CHRIST. A Devotional History of our Lord's Passion. *By James Stalker, D. D.* 12mo, pp. xvi. 321. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1894.

The distinguishing feature of this work, as compared with similar ones, is the author's effort, successfully made, to produce a devotional history free from the declamatory and interrogatory style, the *oh's* and *ah's*, of the ordinary devotional books. He believes that the subject of our Lord's Passion is to be studied with the heart as well as with the head, but that the stirring of the depths of the heart is best attained "not by the narrator displaying his own emotions, but, as is shown in the incomparable model of the Gospels, by the faithful exhibition of the facts themselves." The author begins at the point where our Lord fell into the

hands of his enemies, and thus was deprived of voluntary activity, and closes with the burial of Christ. Those who are familiar with Dr. Stalker's previous works, and especially his more extended *Life of Jesus Christ* and *The Life of Paul*, need not be assured that they will find here a most suggestive and profitable study and presentation of facts. Here and there will be encountered, perhaps, theories to which all will not agree, but they are rare and unimportant.

ARE THE BOOKS OF MOSES HOLY SCRIPTURE? or, The Modern Theory of the Pentateuch Anti-Biblical. *By the Rev. Charles Jerdan, M. A., LL. B.* 8vo pp. 46. Edinburgh: Macniven & Wallace. 1895.

In this tract the reader will find a clear and vigorous setting forth of the evils of the advanced criticism as to the Pentateuch. The special evil set forth in the glaring inconsistency of those who propose to receive the Holy Scriptures as a revelation from God and who profess to be disciples of the Lord Jesus, the great Teacher, in accepting a theory which depreciates the utterances of this Teacher and takes from his word that authority with which it is endowed as the infallible word. The modern theory is especially contrary to the better interests of those who claim to accept the Scriptures in that it is anti-biblical in respect to history, in its bearings upon doctrines, in the invalidation which it brings of revelation and inspiration, and many other equally important respects.

GOD'S WORLD. *By B. F. Mills.* Fleming H. Revell Company: Chicago, Toronto. Pp. 326. 1894. \$1.25.

This volume contains fifteen sermons by one of the most popular evangelists in the United States. These sermons are of three distinct varieties. The first five were preached on ordinary occasions; the next five were addressed to professed Christians, urging them to a more consecrated and consistent life; and the last five were delivered to those who had never confessed Christ, or, who, having been his disciples, had fallen away. The style is the familiar style of modern "evangelism"—earnest, urgent, colloquial. There is nothing striking, unique, or sensational in the titles of the sermons; the divisions of the themes, while not profound, are popular and very clear; the amplification is made by illustrations from Scripture, and by anecdote and incident from history and the author's personal experience, impressively told. The theology is in the main evangelical and orthodox. It is no wonder that great audiences hung upon the delivery of these discourses: the reader feels their spell the instant the eye traverses the first page. It is a good book. The preacher who seeks to popularize his sermons, without sacrificing the truth, could study this volume with profit. The man who is seeking the way of life, or who is aspiring after a higher life, would be helped by reading these sermons.

OUTLINES OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. *By Cornelius Walker, D. D.* New York: Thomas Whittaker. Pp. 246. 1894. \$1.59.

There is not much to be said about this volume. It was written by the Professor of Systematic Theology in the Episcopal Seminary at Alexandria, Virginia. The object was the presentation, in brief outline, of the leading topics in a course

of theological study. There is nothing in the execution of the task particularly to commend it. It cannot even be compared with *The Outlines*, by Dr. A. A. Fodge. The author refers to Knapp, Dorner, Martensen, the two Hodges, Buel, Shedd and Strong, as the principal sources from which he has drawn the outlines. He adopts the definitions of inspiration given by Hodge and Shedd. He finds three theories of atonement—the judicial, the administrative, and the paternal. He adopts the latter, but does not develop it sufficiently to give the reader any very clear idea of its nature. As to the sacraments and orders, he is delightfully low-church. In the volume, many questions are started, but few answered. The volume reads like the briefs from which the author lectured to his classes. His students will, no doubt, enjoy the book.

THE DAWN OF CHRISTIANITY; or, Studies of the Apostolic Church. *By Henry C. Vedder.* 16mo, pp. 208. 90 cents. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1894.

The author's introduction is on the Fullness of the Time. The First Part recounts the Founding of the Church; the Second Part tells of the Gospel in Asia; the Third Part, of the Gospel in Europe, and the Fourth Part, of the Establishing of Churches. The whole, as one will see, is a popular unfolding of the facts of the Book of Acts. Barring the fact that the author puts on Baptist glasses when he comes to inspect all matters which his church has made subjects of controversy, and through which he sees and reports these matters, he has given us an admirable exposition of the founding of the New Testament church. Hints for original investigation accompany each chapter and directions as to the literature of the different topics materially increase the value of the book. An Appendix gives a discussion, from the anti-pædobaptist standpoint, of "Household Baptisms."

MISSIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD. Papers and Addresses Presented at the World's Congress of Missions, October 2-4, 1893. *Compiled by Rev. E. M. Wherry, D. D., Corresponding Secretary of World's Congress of Missions.* 12mo, pp. 486. \$2 00. New York: American Tract Society. 1895.

However questionable the "Congress of Religions" may have been in principle, methods or results, the "Congress of Missions" at Chicago in 1893 was admirable. It brought together able representatives of the work for Christ in both home and foreign missions, and gave to the world a series of papers bearing upon almost every phase of the subject. The best of these papers have been gathered in the volume before us. On City Missions there are papers by Dr. Burrell, of New York, and Prof. Graham Taylor; on Home Missions, by Dr. W. C. Roberts and Dr. S. E. Wishard; on Foreign Missions, by Dr. H. C. Haydn, Dr. J. S. Dennis, and Dr. H. H. Jessup; on Auxiliary Agencies in Missions, as Bible societies, medical missions, etc., by Drs. S. H. Virgin, G. L. Shearer, A. S. Hunt, and F. E. Clark; on Money and Missions, by Thomas Kane, Esq., and Peter Sinclair, Esq.; on Coöperation in Missions, by Drs. George William Knox, W. E. Griffis, and others. This is by no means an exhaustive statement of the contents of the book, but will fairly indicate what one will find in its pages. It is a volume which should be in every missionary library.

THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS PROGRESS. *By Daniel Dorchester, D. D.* Revised edition, with New Tables and Colored Diagrams. 8vo, pp. 768. \$2.75. New York: Hunt & Eaton. 1895.

Dr. Dorchester is justly regarded one of the best students of statistics and writers upon the lessons derived from them. He gives us the volume above named not as a new work, but as a new edition, bringing the data down to the present year, including points of inquiry and discussion as to "recent phases of moral and social evolution," and making special use of the last census and its unusually full data concerning the churches of this country. Colored diagrams are given, illustrating the different matters discussed, as lynchings, divorce, immigration, crime, pauperism, popular education, use of liquors, etc. The work, as stated by the author himself, is an attempt to show, first, that under some kind of religion the world is better than under no religion; secondly, that under Christianity the world is better than under Paganism; and thirdly, that under Protestantism the world is better than under the Roman Catholic or Greek churches. A new chapter, entitled "Christianity an Increasing Force in the World's Conscientiousness and Life," is of special interest and value.

A HAND-BOOK FOR RULING ELDERS. *By Rev. John S. Watkins, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Spartanburg, S. C.* 12mo, pp. 128. 75 cents. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1895.

We can give this little book our hearty and unqualified commendation. It is exactly what it purports to be. It is simple and clear in its statements and proofs. Its suggestions are practical and wise. It should be in the hands of every ruling elder. Each Session should have its own copy. The book contains two parts. Part I. gives a brief statement of the scriptural authority for the office, the duties of elders in family, business, society, the church, the higher courts, and the qualifications of elders. Part II. comprises forms, helps, and suggestions, as selections of Scripture and forms of prayer for the sick-room, for the chamber of bereavement, for a service at the grave. It contains also directions for conducting a service for a Sunday-school, suggestions in regard to public worship in the absence of the pastor, an order of service for a prayer meeting, how to call a pastor, a docket for sessional use, a constitution for a Christian worker's association, and rules of parliamentary order. Prepared by an active and successful pastor, it sets forth just those things which the earnest, consecrated ruling elder desires to know.

THE RULING ELDER. *By James W. Lapsley, of Alabama, Moderator of the General Assembly of 1893.* Pp. 54. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1895. 10 cents.

A lecture delivered before the Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary. It treats of the genesis of the office of ruling elder, the history of the eldership, the Scripture warrant for the elder's exclusive power in ruling the church, and the duties and power of these officials and the manner of their practical administration of the office. Judge Lapsley has compassed an immense amount of reasoning and good sense into this brief address. It is worthy of study and general circulation.

HEBREW SYNTAX. *By Rev. A. B. Davidson, LL. D., D. D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, New College, Edinburgh.* 8vo, pp. x., 233. \$2.75. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 1894.

The volume is the second half or completion of the author's *Introductory Hebrew Grammar*. The main principles are printed in large type and the less common, poetical, or anomalous usages are thrown into the form of notes. There is an abundance of illustrative examples, multiplied, the author says, under the impression that they might be useful in forming exercises for prose composition. Dr. Davidson pays pleasant tribute to the works of Dr. Green, of Princeton, and Harper, of Chicago. An unusually full index of passages referred to and of subjects treated adds to the practical value of the work.

PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF MARTIN B. ANDERSON, LL. D. *Edited by William C. Morey, Ph. D.* 2 vols. 12mo. Price, \$2.50. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1895.

These two well-printed volumes contain an admirable collection of short papers and addresses of the lamented president of Rochester University. The editor has gathered them together in five groups, the first containing Educational Papers and Addresses, the second, Commencement Addresses, the third, Religious Papers and Addresses, the fourth, Philosophical and Scientific Papers, and the fifth, Miscellaneous Papers and Addresses. Many of these collected writings are familiar to the public. They are all characterized by the strength and wisdom as well as sweetness of temper and tone for which their distinguished author was noted and which gave him such power in moulding men's hearts and minds in his long and useful career. Dr. Anderson pleads nobly for the higher education under Christian auspices. His papers on religion show his great interest in missions, and his aversion to adjusting our faith to the hypotheses of so-called science. Christianity he regards "not as a curiously-wrought system of metaphysical theories, but as a divinely-appointed way of life." Few collections of the kind that we have ever read contain so much as these volumes to stimulate thought and strengthen one's faith.

LETTERS TO A YOUNG PRESBYTERIAN. *By James A. Waddell, D. D.* 12mo, pp. 119. 75 cents. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1895.

A series of twenty letters designed to confirm young Presbyterian readers in the Christian faith as Presbyterians understand that faith. They discuss the question of rites and ceremonies, particularly "confirmation," the history of the Reformation and the bearing upon the inheritors of its victories, the forms of church government, and many kindred topics. If we may judge from the author's emphasis, we should say that he has been specially troubled in his pastorate by the efforts of formalists and the arrogant claimants of "apostolic succession," and it is to guide his young friends safely through these that he writes so forcibly and tenderly. The little volume is full of sound words and truth as well as characterized by a lovely spirit.

BUNYAN CHARACTERS. Lectures Delivered in St. George's Free Church, Edinburgh. *By Alexander Whyte, D. D., Author of "Characters and Characteristics of William Law."* 12mo, pp. vi., 307. \$1 00. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. 1894.

Twenty-six lectures or discourses on as many of the famous characters of Bunyan, embracing some from Christiana's as well as from Christian's company. The volume is the second series of a work already noticed in this review.

THE WAY OUT. A Solution of the Temperance Question. *By Rev. Hugh Montgomery.* With an Introduction by Daniel Dorchester, D. D. 12mo, pp. 320. \$1.00. New York: Hunt & Eaton. 1895.

We have seldom encountered or read a more pronounced piece of self-laudation and vanity than this book, an autobiography. So far from its being "a solution of the temperance question," it is simply a string of incidents, not well put together either, and altogether lacking in that modesty and simplicity which characterize the true reformer, illustrative of the extreme "smartness" of the author. About half the book is made up of sermons and lectures by the author.

THE THEATRE. An Essay Upon the Non-Accordancy of Stage Plays with the Christian Profession. *By Josiah W. Leeds.* 12mo, pp. 85. 40 cts. Boston: H. L. Hastings.

The sub-title indicates the nature and purpose of this vigorous monograph. The author shows, from the testimony of godly people, ancient and modern, of leading actors as Mrs. Siddons, Frances Kemble, Macready, Edwin Booth, Janauschek, and many others, that the theatre is evil, and only evil. Incidentally he treats also of the agency of pernicious literature in making the theatre popular, and utters some sound and faithful warnings against such literature. He administers a just rebuke to those who favor church theatricals, and asserts, rightly, that the step from the church fair to the amateur opera and stage has been proven to be not a long one. Even the "church sociable," he fears, looks in the same direction. The little treatise is valuable for its collection of the best testimony on the subject with which it deals.

SOUTHERN LITERATURE, FROM 1579 TO 1895. A Comprehensive Review, with Copious Extracts and Criticisms, for the Use of Schools and the General Reader. Containing an Appendix with a Full List of Southern Authors. *By Louise Manly.* Illustrated. 12mo, pp. 514. Richmond: B. F. Johnson Publishing Company. 1895.

The character of this volume is so fully set forth in the above title that we need do little more than refer to it. It is designed to furnish the reader with material for becoming acquainted with the development of American life and history as found in Southern writers and their works. One is impressed, on examining it, with the prolific literary yield of this section. With such an abundance of material, the work must be somewhat fragmentary. We note the absence of the names of many of the strongest Southern writers, as Noah K. Davis, Richard Collins, John L. Girardeau, C. W. Tyler, A. H. Redford, Miss Garland, and many others, authors of repute in philosophy, history, fiction, etc. Many who are named, too,

are hardly to be reckoned among the writers of the South, as literary reputation is made to rest, in this book, simply upon fugitive papers or even single addresses. Nevertheless, the book is worthy of hearty support. It will foster a sympathetic knowledge of our own literature and testify to the mental activity of our own section.

A SCHOOL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. *By Susan Pendleton Lee, author of Life of General William N. Pendleton.* With Questions and Summaries for Reviews and Essays, by Louise Manly, Teacher of Literature and Languages, and author of *Southern Literature*. 8vo, pp. 612. \$1.50. Introduction, \$1.25. Richmond: B. F. Johnson Publishing Company. 1895.

The special feature by which this history is distinguished is the space and attention devoted to the Southern half of our country. Most of the school histories have treated this section with scant care and scantier justice. The author has made an honest effort to write truthfully of both divisions, without sectional passion or prejudice, and has succeeded. The author is an accomplished writer, the daughter of one of the principal actors in the scenes described in the book, General William N. Pendleton, a man who, like Bishop Polk, went into the service of his State from the pulpit, and preached to the soldiers on Sundays and on the week days led them in the contest for what they thought right. She was the sister of a member of Stonewall Jackson's staff, and is the widow of General Edwin G. Lee. As a successful teacher of long experience, she knows the needs of the school-room and the best manner of reaching them. The result of her effort is unquestionably the fullest, fairest, and most instructive school history of the United States yet produced. We are glad such a book has been produced and hope it will be adopted everywhere. The time has come when even in the North the heroism, courage, and devotion of the Southern people will be regarded as the grandest proofs of American manhood, and when people of all sections, without respect to their own views, will point with pride to the Southern people who struggled against fearful odds, and with the loss of everything, for four long years, not for territory or conquest, but for what they thought right, for a principle. Such a struggle was an honor to American manhood as well as a proof of it.

The mechanical features of the book are admirable. The large clear type, of various sizes, the arrangement of subjects, the questions, summaries, reviews, and index are just what one would wish to make the work practical, complete, and easily used. The great profusion of illustrations adds to its attractiveness and holds the attention of the youthful mind.

THE SIBERIAN EXILE. Translated from the German of Gustav Nieritz. *By Mary E. Ireland.* 12mo, pp. 122. \$1.00. Richmond. Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1894.

THE SCHOOL ON LUNEBURG HEATH. Translated from the German of Gustav Nieritz. *By Mary E. Ireland.* 12mo, pp. 148. 60 cts. Same publishers. 1895.

CHRISTIAN BECK'S GRANDSON. Translated from the German of Gustav Nieritz. *By Mary E. Ireland.* 12mo, pp. 232. \$1.00. Same publishers. 1894.

Three wholesome, pure books for the children, suitable for Sunday reading, and inculcating the best principles. They will be found well adapted to Sunday-school libraries, and worthy of a place in every Christian home.