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EDITORS: G. B. STRICKLER, D. D., AND E. H. BARNETT, D. D.

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# THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

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## I. THE TESTIMONY OF GOD.\*

WHEN Paul wrote to Timothy concerning “the holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus,” adding in the next verse the supplementary statement, “All Scripture is given by inspiration of God,” the Old Testament had been completed, and the New Testament was in process of composition. These two Testaments are the Holy Scriptures—the sacred writings—of the Christian church. They are the product of the inspiration of God. They are able to make wise unto salvation. They are infallibly and inerrantly correct in every detail of statement. These are high claims for these particular writings.

I. As to literary form, these Scriptures are a *record of testimony*. They purport to be testamentary documents—the authentic record of the witness-bearing of the Three Persons in the Godhead upon the questions which are embraced as their subject-matter. (1). They are the testimony of the Father: “And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God.” (1 Cor. ii. 1.) (2). They are the testimony of the Son: “Even as the testimony of Christ was confirmed in you.” (1 Cor. i. 6.) (3). They are the testimony of the Spirit: “And it is the Spirit that

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\*The substance of this article was originally delivered as an extemporaneous sermon, and its publication has been requested by some who heard it. It has been recast for THE QUARTERLY under the special request that its *sermon* features should not be wholly removed.

bearth witness, because the Spirit is truth." (1 John v. 6; John xv. 26; 1 Cor. ii. 10-13.) The Bible is thus the conjoint and concurrent testimony of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. It is, in the language of our civil courts, their sworn statement as to their personal knowledge and belief. Behind the Bible lie both the competency and the credibility of the Trinity as witnesses.

The respective personal agency of the Three in the production of the Bible is to be determined by their general economic relations to each other. Creation, providence, and redemption are equally ascribed to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Father creates, the Son creates, the Spirit creates; the Father is the God of providence, the Son is the God of providence, the Spirit is the God of providence; the Father redeems, the Son redeems, the Spirit redeems; the Bible is the testimony of the Father, the testimony of the Son, the testimony of the Spirit. This statement of the relation of the Three Persons of the Godhead may be generalized into a universal proposition, covering all God's extrinsic and transient acts. As to those acts which are immanent and intrinsic in the Godhead, that circle is too holy for speculation, and the pious mind is too reverent and timid to attempt a reduction. But as to the operations of the Trinity *ad extra*, they are all alike and invariably, both for their being and for their well-being, said to be dependent upon the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Each person of the Trinity has an agency in production, preservation, government, and redemption. The formula which expresses these personal relations is: *Of the Father, through the Son, by the Spirit*. The Father is always represented as the primal source, the Son as the universal medium, and the Spirit as the universal efficient. The prepositions, *of, through, by*, express the idea. The Son, *as such*, as he is the consubstantial and coequal Second Person in the Godhead, is the universal mediator of all divine energy *ad extra*, the middle term everywhere between the thought of the Father and the execution of the Spirit. The Son, as *Christ*, as the Theanthropic Person of the covenant of grace, is the specific mediator of the redemptive purpose and power of God. The conditions of the problem

of redemption required a mediator peculiarly constituted, a mediator unifying humanity and divinity upon one Personality, an *Incar-nate God*. These mediatorial requirements are fully met in the *Christ* of the gospel, but the *Christ* of the gospel, while the same person as the Son of the Godhead, is not exactly coincident with the Second Person of the Trinity. The failure to recognize this distinction has given rise to the *Christo-centric* theology. The Son, *as such*, may be regarded as a universal mediator, but *Christ, as such*, is the mediator of grace. Creation was of the Father, through the Son, by the Spirit; providence is of the Father, through the Son, by the Spirit; redemption is of the Father, through the Son, by the Spirit; the Bible is of the Father, through the Son, by the Spirit. With the Father the Bible was a *mental* word, with the Son it was a *personal* word, with the Spirit it was a *written* word. The word that was in the thought of the Father is the same word which was personalized in the Incarnation: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. . . . And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us." (John i. 1, 14.) This personalized Word is the same word which was translated by the Holy Spirit in the Scriptures. The Scriptures are the word of God, spoken through the Son, by the power of the Holy Ghost, into the ear of the world. *Christ* is a *personal Bible*; the Bible is an *impersonal Christ*. Personalize the gospel, and the result would be the historic *Christ*; depersonalize the historic *Christ* into a book, and the result would be the Bible. This testimony, which is delivered to the world for its salvation, takes its rise in the Father's mind, is lifted by the Son out of the infinite abysses of the Father's thought, and revealed to the world in personal, incarnate form, and by the Spirit that personal word is interpreted, and the interpretation is finally recorded in the Scriptures by certain select human personalities who are employed as the Spirit's stenographers.

This testimony was not delivered all at once and recorded at a single sitting. There were sixty-six different depositions. They were made at different times during a period of some sixteen hundred years. These depositions relate to a great variety of subjects, and yet they are all pertinent to the case between God and

man. In recording these sixty-six depositions the services of some forty (?) different writers were employed, under the infallible guidance of the Holy Ghost. "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds." But these witnesses—the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—have concluded their testimony. There remains nothing more to be said. They have told "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," and the Holy Spirit has sealed up the volume of testimony, and forbidden the addition to it or the subtraction from it of one single statement: "For I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book: and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book."

That influence of the Holy Spirit by which he secures a correct record of the testimony of God is technically called inspiration. There are five theories as to the mode by which this influence is exerted upon the human employees of the Holy Ghost—the personal clerks who make the record of the testimony of God.

1. The mechanical, or dictation, theory. It maintains that the human writers were but the "pens," the "hands," the "amanuenses" of the Spirit; that the human authors were but so many typewriters, whose keys were struck by the finger of the Holy Ghost. This theory is *too divine*, in that it leaves small place for the human personality, and fails to explain the individuality of style in the different compositions. It depersonalizes the employees.

2. At the opposite pole is the naturalistic theory. It denies the supernatural element in inspiration, and does not distinguish it generically from the ordinary operations of the Holy Ghost upon the minds and hearts of men. The writers of the Bible are highly-gifted thinkers and accomplished *litterateurs*, and the Bible is the product of their genius. This theory is *too human*. It



makes the writers not the recorders of the testimony of God, but the authors of a volume on the subject of religion.

3. Between these two is the partial theory. It assumes that the writers are afforded such spiritual assistance as the exigencies of the case may require, such as the elevation of their faculties, the superintendence and direction of their ideas, and the suggestion to them of seminal thoughts. This view is to be discarded as *neither sufficiently divine nor human*.

4. Another middle theory is the degree theory. This is the theory which denies that "the Bible is the word of God," and affirms that "the Bible contains the word of God." It is to be rejected because it permits the recorders of the testimony of God to inject into the record their own personal ideas and statements, and to make editorial comments, without marking them, upon what they write. The theory is *too mixed* of human and divine elements. Only the genius of the higher critics can detect the human and divine statements in a volume which purports to be the testimony of God.

5. The dynamical theory is the most satisfactory. It embodies all the truth that is in the foregoing four hypotheses. It holds that, as there is a divine sovereignty and a human free agency, both operative in the world without contradiction of each other, so in the production of the record of the testimony of God there is such a coöperation of the divine and human agency as that neither is transfused into the other, nor in any way mixed and confused, yet so as the result is an infallible and inerrant record of the mind of God. "As a skilful musician, who has to execute a long score, will avail himself by turns of the funereal flute, the shepherd's pipe, the dancer's bagpipe, or the warrior's trumpet, thus the Almighty God, to proclaim to us his eternal word, has chosen of old the instruments into which he would successively breathe the breath of his Spirit. He chose them before the foundation of the world. . . . It was sometimes the sublime and untutored simplicity of John, sometimes the excited, elliptical, startling argumentative energy of Paul; sometimes the fervor and solemnity of Peter; it was the majestic poetry of Isaiah, or the lyrical poetry of David; it was the simple and majestic narra-

tive of Moses, or the sententious and royal wisdom of Solomon. Yes, it was all that; it was Peter; it was Isaiah; it was Matthew; it was John; it was Moses; but it was God." (*Gaussen.*) The divine and human elements, blending in the production of the record of the testimony of God, result in our infallible and inerrant *Theanthropic Bible*.

The foregoing is a general statement of the method of the delivery of the testimony of God.

II. The next question relates to the *confirmation* of the testimony of God. Is it confirmable? Are we bound to believe the contents of the Bible to be true upon the naked and unassisted affirmation of God, or are there some collateral or supplementary evidences which we may employ to fortify and encourage faith in its truths?

1. From the nature of the case there can be no rebutting testimony by which to disprove the statements made in the Bible. The Bible is a revelation of the consciousness of God. Where is the witness who can say of his personal knowledge that its thoughts are not God's thoughts? Testimony must be set aside by testimony. Where are the witnesses who can affirm, not upon ethical and speculative grounds, but upon the grounds of personal knowledge, that the testimony of God contains false and inaccurate statements? The first collateral fact which sustains the testimony of God is this: It cannot be disproved. Some minds may not like the allegations of God in the Scriptures; some of these allegations may be inconsistent with some human theories and sentiments; but the opposition is challenged to parole one solitary witness who can furnish a testamentary evidence against the testamentary evidence of God.

The reliability of testimony depends upon two things: (1), The competency of the witness; (2), The credibility of the witness.

(1). In civil nomenclature *competency* has a narrow and technical meaning. It signifies the legal admissibility of the testimony. If, for example, the statutes prohibited a near kinsman from testifying in favor of his relative, that kinsman would be an incompetent witness, albeit he might know more about the case than any being alive. Outside the courthouse, competency has a far wider signification. It covers the whole question of the ability of the

witness to make the statements which he does make. Manifestly an idiot would be an incompetent witness. Obviously that witness, who is so conditioned at the time the event is alleged to have occurred that he could not possibly have known it, is an incompetent witness. Within the realm of his ignorance no man can testify. Is the witness, as to mental endowment and circumstantial surroundings, able to make the statements which he makes? This question covers the ground of competency.

(2). The credibility of testimony depends upon the character of the witness. No liar can be believed. Contradictory testimony cannot be credited, for of two contradictories one or the other must be false. Contradictions in testimony are due to ignorance or to wickedness.

These two—competency and credibility—ground the reliability of testimony.

To disprove the testimony of God, it must be shown to be unreliable either because he is incompetent or incredible. His knowledge or his character must be destroyed. Where are the witnesses who can prove either ignorance or wickedness? The testimony is everywhere self-consistent and homogeneous; it nowhere crosses itself; it survives the severest cross-examination. The testimony of God in nature at no point contradicts the testimony of God in the Bible. Sometimes the two testimonies are upon different points, but when the witness speaks to the same point he is everywhere self-consistent and nowhere self-contradictory. All attempts to disprove the Bible are attempts to make God deny himself—attempts to tangle the witness. His enemies do not, for they cannot, oppose testimony with testimony. They seek to overturn testimony with speculative theories. It is as if one party to a cause before our civil courts offered the testimony of three competent and credible witnesses, while the other party, without adducing one single witness, risks his whole case upon an effort to theorize away the testimony of the three able and reputable witnesses. Such a procedure would disclose desperation. So the world's attempt to set aside the testimony of God by *a priori* and intuitional speculations is an attempt to destroy facts by theories.

The first great fact confirmatory of the testimony of God is the

fact that the learned world has for weary centuries been doing its utmost, by every species of searching and cross-searching—critical, historical, scientific, philosophic, sentimental—to “pick a fatal flaw” in the testimony of the Three in One, and has up to this date wholly and miserably failed. Testimony which cannot be contradicted and destroyed must influence the jury. Until destroyed, the world, upon the lowest principles of fairness and common honesty, must believe the statements which are in the Bible.

2. The testimony of God is incidentally, yet forcibly, confirmed by the effects which follow it. “By their fruits ye shall know them,” is, under some circumstances, an unimpeachable maxim of judgment. Men do not gather grapes from bramble-vines, nor figs from thistle-bushes. If this testimony is false, how comes it to pass that it has possessed such peculiar attractions for some of the greatest men that have ever lived either in ancient or modern times—men whose minds were strong, whose sentiments were highly refined, whose consciences were acute, whose scholarship was extensive, whose investigations were thorough, and whose conclusions were honest—men of philosophical spirit and accomplishment, men of scientific tastes and exactitude, *littérateurs* of the highest grade, and poets of the finest grace? If the testimony of God is a fabrication, how is it that the Jewish rabbi, the Greek philosopher, the modern free-thinker cannot expose the imposture, and disillusionize a large and the best portion of mankind? How comes it to pass that the intelligent class which rejects the testimony is, as to numbers, a “beggarly element”? How comes it to pass that this Bible story—God’s story told on the witness-stand—so easily “lifts empires off their hinges, and turns the stream of centuries out of their channels,” changing the political and moral face of the whole world? How comes it to pass that this record of what purports to be the testimony of God—the Bible—is everywhere such a potent and potential factor in the world’s best civilization? How comes it to pass that this narrative of God transforms and transfigures so many individual characters, turning them from vice and deformity to virtue and beauty, causing lives that once broke in malediction upon their homes and their communities to break in benediction and blessing everywhere? How is it that this story,

upon the supposition that it is not the word of God, has the power to take the gloom out of sorrow, the despair out of life, and the sting out of death for increasing millions as they track their way across the world, sun-browned, burden-bent, foot-sore, dusty travelers, to the mysterious boundaries of eternity? This is the problem. This Bible, which purports to be the testimony of God, commands the humble discipleship of increasing millions of earth's greatest and most learned sons, transforms nations, societies, and individuals into brighter and better conditions, and carries after it, like a starry train, the best virtues of the best civilization. Do men gather figs from thorn-bushes? Do they gather grapes from the bramble-vine? Let the traducers of the Bible point to some true testimony that can do half as much for the world as is done by the testimony of God, alleged by them to be false and incredible. The highest honor ever paid to Satan was paid when the Jews called Christ Beelzebub; and the highest compliment ever paid to error is paid when men call the Bible—the mightiest of all benevolent and beneficent agencies in all our civilization—false.

The Bible is the testimony of God as to the state of his own mind—as to his plans and purposes in creation, providence, and redemption—as to his knowledge of the past, the present, and the future of man—as to his views of sin and the conditions upon which he is willing to be reconciled to transgressors—as to the state of his heart as he contemplates his guilty and miserable creatures who have opposed themselves to his will—as to immortality, resurrection, judgment, heaven, and hell. Upon these matters—states and views of the divine mind—what witness can either confirm or deny the statements of God? Those other matters in the Bible—matters of historical fact—their external nature is nothing, their value is in their bearings upon the plan and purpose of God, their exposition of the state of the divine mind. What witness can, or his own knowledge, either confirm or deny the bearings of these historical events upon the mind of God? God's consciousness belongs exclusively and sacredly to himself. There is no witness who can come out of the consciousness of the Trinity and report it to us, save Jesus and the Spirit. Only through these can we know that consciousness, and their

story is the story of the Bible. Our faith in their story may be strengthened by the fact that it cannot be disproved, and by the fact that the fruits are of such a character that they cannot be borne upon a corrupt tree.

III. Having considered the method of the delivery of the testimony of God, and the reliability of that testimony, the third topic is *the reliability of the record of that testimony*. The testimony itself and the record of that testimony are two very different things. The statement which is made by the lips of the witness is one thing; the record of that statement which the clerk makes with his pen is another thing. The two ought to be exactly coincident. They may differ materially. They may contradict each other outright. There are those who tell us that there are differences and disagreements between the original testimony of God and the biblical record of that testimony. Drawing a distinction between infallibility and inerrancy, they affirm that the testimony is infallible and that the record of the testimony is errant—made errant because the stenographers were not infallibly guided in the preparation of the original autographs; or were not prevented from injecting into the record as they prepared it their own thoughts, opinions, and assertions; or through the creeping in of corruptions in the transmission of the record down the centuries. Our record, according to this allegation, is a mixed record, like the Samaritan people, a mongrel of truth and error; and the detection of the true and the false statements in the Bible must be by human genius and critical scholarship.

It deserves to be noted as one of the evidences of original sin that man presumes to review the testimony of God when much of that testimony, if not all of it, relates to the mental states of the divine being. That pure rationalism which boldly denies the possibility, or the probability, or the fact of divine testimony, is not so hard to overthrow as that dogmatic and ecclesiastical rationalism which masquerades under the name of "higher criticism," and which, admitting the fact that the Bible is the record of the testimony of God, proceeds to pass judgment upon it upon *a priori* grounds, and according to ethical and sentimental and literary dicta. This form of rationalism assumes an editor's

rights over the sacred page, and runs its deleting pen through statements here and there, until, as children say, "the book is all marked up." This form of rationalism ought to meet with toleration by no friend of the Bible. It is presumptuous and treacherous. Unmasked in theological seminaries and elsewhere, it ought to be expelled from the pale of the church, and be compelled to occupy the position of an enemy on the outside. The Holy Spirit is responsible for the original record of the testimony of God. If there be mistakes in the autographs of his employees, he is blameworthy. Hence the allegation that the original manuscripts of the writers of the Old and New Testament Scriptures is a judgment of censure upon the Holy Spirit, and an accusation of incompetency or unfaithfulness to his trust. The old position of the Bible's enemies was: Both the testimony and the record are fabrications. The modern position is: The testimony is infallible, but the record is errant.

Under this head of the reliability of the record of the testimony, two topics fall to be considered: (1), The making of the original record; and (2), The transmission of the record to successive generations.

1. The original record was so made, under the dynamical influence of the Holy Ghost, as to be not only substantially, but *verbally*, exact. The expression, "God said," and its equivalents, are used in the Pentateuch *five hundred* times, in the Psalms *three hundred* times, and in the prophets *twelve hundred* times. The expression is like oft-recurring quotation marks, calling the reader to remember that the language is the exact language of God. Moses told God that he could not speak of himself, and the Almighty assured him that he would be mouth and wisdom to him. David said, "The Spirit of the Lord spake by me, and his word was in my tongue." (2 Sam. xxiii. 2.) Inspiration touched the *tongue* of the sweet psalmist of Israel, and the *word* of the Spirit was put upon that tongue. In a similar manner Jeremiah declares that he was "touched" in his *mouth*, and that the *words* of the Lord were put into it: "Then the Lord put forth his hand, and touched my mouth. And the Lord said unto me, I have put my words in thy mouth." (Jer. i. 9.) When the Lord put

forth his hand to touch the son of Hilkiah, he did not touch alone his mind to arouse his genius, or to elevate his faculties, or to suggest ideas, but he touched his *mouth*, the organ of words, and the result of that touch was the putting of the *words* of his prophecy into his mouth. The New Testament endorses the Old: "O fools and slow of heart to believe ALL that the prophets have spoken." (Luke xxiv. 25.) The prophets spoke words, and all that they spoke Christ declares was credible. The Revised Version translates Matthew i. 22, "which was spoken by the Lord through the prophets." Words alone are spoken, and the Old Testament was the word of Christ spoken through the prophets. In sending out the twelve, our Lord said, "It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you." (Matt. x. 20.) The Spirit spoke the speech to them which they spoke to the world. This expression is often employed, "Wherefore the Holy Ghost saith." (Hebrews iii. 7.) Concerning himself, that apostle who had been brought up at Gamaliel's feet said, "Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." (1 Cor. ii. 13.) The "things" were revealed by the Spirit, as the context shows, and Paul uttered those things, not in human language, but in the language of the Holy Ghost. The argument for a plenary verbal inspiration in the production of the original record of the testimony of God rises high when it discovers that Christ himself did not venture to use his own language, but spake the words which had been put into his mouth. Concerning the predicted Messiah, Moses quotes the Lord as saying, "I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth; and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him." (Deut. xviii. 18.) Concerning this same Prophet, Isaiah quotes the Lord as saying, "I have put my words in thy mouth." (Isa. li. 16.) When this Prophet became incarnate he said, "The word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father's which sent me." (John xiv. 24.) But the argument for verbal inspiration rises to its climax when it is discovered that even the Holy Spirit did not employ language that was original with him: "Howbeit, when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth:



for he shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak: and he will show you things to come. He shall glorify me: for he shall receive of mine, and shall show it unto you." (John xvi. 13, 14.) Who, then, is the original author of the language of the original record of the testimony of God? The human writers disclaim that authorship; Christ disclaims it; the Spirit disclaims it. They all refer it to the Father. The very phraseology of the record is the phraseology of God, when, as a witness on the stand, he delivered his testimony through his Son and by his Spirit. It is difficult for us to see how this language, originating with the Father, and coming through the Son and by the power of the Spirit into the mind of the human writer, took upon itself the stamp of each writer's personality without altering the original words; but it is no more mysterious than are all the operations of the divine will upon and through the human will without destroying or interfering with its freedom. In making up the record, the clerical employees of the Holy Spirit quoted the language of God. The inspiring grace of the Spirit secured accuracy.

2. The second question has reference to the *transmission* of the record, and inquires as to the reliability of that record to-day. The original records are lost. We have only copies; and worse than that, we have only copies of copies. How far are our copies reliable? How far do they deviate from the originals, and can the deviations be traced? Have we to-day an infallible Bible? And if it is not infallible, have we a reliable Bible?

(1). There are "various readings" and many superficial "discrepancies" in the various copies of the record of the testimony which are in our hands to-day. We can gain nothing by denying these results of textual criticism. But the inferences drawn from these variations and discrepancies against the integrity of our canon and against the reliability of our Bible are illogical and unnecessary. An honest and fair criticism reduces both the quantity and the quality of these variations and discrepancies to a minimum.

(2). These variations and discrepancies do not affect the doctrine of inspiration, of plenary verbal inspiration. That doctrine

affirms that the original autographs which came immediately from the human employees of the Spirit were plenary and verbally exact reproductions of the testimony of God. These original manuscripts, thus prepared, were committed to the custody of the church, as "the oracles of God" were entrusted to Israel. The grace of inspiration and the grace of preservation are different. The one is special, supernatural, and miraculous; the other is natural and providential. Inspiration made the record of the testimony; providence preserves that record. Inspiration pledged inerrancy; providence pledged substantial preservation. That pledge has been fulfilled, else the Bible would not be existent to-day.

(3). Though the variations and discrepancies in our copies are many, the copies substantially reproduce the originals. "We do not need the wood of the true cross that we may have redemption through the blood of Christ; nor do we need the identical manuscripts that proceeded from the apostles and their companions, since we have the contents of these manuscripts handed down to us without corruption in any essential particular. This appears from various considerations. *First*, Several hundred manuscripts of the gospels, or of portions of them, have been examined, two of them belonging to the fourth century, and two, with some fragments, to the fifth. All these, though written in different centuries and coming from widely different regions, contain essentially the same text. In them, not one of the great facts or doctrines of the gospel history is mutilated or obscured. *Secondly*, The quotations of the church fathers from the last part of the second to the end of the fourth century are so copious that from them almost the entire text of our present gospels could be reconstructed. . . . *Thirdly*, We have two versions of the New Testament—the old Latin or Italic, and the Syriac called Peshito—which learned men are agreed in placing somewhere in the last half of the second century. The testimony of these witnesses to the uncorrupt preservation of the sacred text, from the time when they first appeared to the present, is decisive. . . . The substantial identity of the sacred text, as we now have it, with that which has existed since about the middle of the second

century, is thus shown to be a matter not of probable conjecture, but of certain knowledge." (*Barrow's Companion*, pp. 61, 62.)

(4). Are there any facts to prove the substantial integrity of our text, or copy, backwards from the middle of the second century? The same author quoted above gives the following: "The first fact to be noticed is the public reading of the gospels in the Christian churches, a custom which prevailed from the earliest times. . . . Intimately connected with the above is a second fact, that of the great multiplication of copies of the books of the New Testament, especially of the gospel narratives, since these contain the great facts which lie at the foundation of the Christian system. Every church would, as a matter of course, be anxious to possess a copy. . . . A third fact is the value attached by primitive churches to the gospel narratives, and their consequent zeal for their uncorrupt preservation. . . . A still further fact is the want of time for essential corruptions. . . . Finally, no evidence exists that the text of the gospel narratives has been essentially corrupted." (*Barrow's*, pp. 63-65.)

(5). The New Testament endorses the Old. The New Testament copy in the hands of the church to-day is essentially exact. Therefore, the Bible which is in use to-day is a reliable copy of the original testimony of God.

(6). The variations and discrepancies, when examined as to number, and when the list is honestly purged, are greatly reduced, many of them being only apparent.

(7). When considered as to their quality, nearly all these variations and discrepancies are trivial, such as any transcriber uninspired is liable to make in copying. For example: differences in dates, in methods of computation, in the view-points of the writers, in peculiarities of oriental idiom, in the plurality of names, whether *and* ought to be omitted or inserted, whether the original was *but* or *for*. None of them seriously modify any statement in the testimony. Worse discrepancies occur in every original record of testimony in our civil courts, and they do not destroy or invalidate that record. These Scripture discrepancies are in their nature trifling; they are not in the original record; they are in copies of the original; they are in copies of copies of the original; they

are unintentional; they do not materially change the meaning of the testimony; they do not fairly and justly destroy the reliability and practical utility of that record.

(8). Translations and copies of the Bible are not verbally inspired, but they are substantially inspired.

(9). The Scriptures discover their own discrepancies. They are self-detective. This proves them honest.

(10). They are self-corrective. Put all the copies into comparison, and there is circumstantial evidence as to which reading is correct.

Put all these facts together, and the attempt to invalidate our record of the testimony is nothing less than childish and cowardly. The wonder is, not that there are some discrepancies in a record which has been copied and re-copied (parts of it) for more than two thousand years, but that these discrepancies are not more in number and worse in kind. *No other record as old even exists.* The Bible, in this respect, has not fared as badly as other books of more recent date. The Latin and Greek classics exhibit a great variety of readings and many discrepancies. Notwithstanding all the alleged discrepancies, the text of the New Testament is better established than that of any other book—than that of Shakespeare.

IV. A few practical inferences will close this paper.

1. The Bible is not, in form, a philosophy, a rationalized system of the fundamental and causative principles of religion, formulated by the thought of God, and delivered to the world by his inspiration. It does indicate the primary grounds of all being and the essential principles of all certitude; but it does not give them in philosophic form. Neither is the Bible a science, an organized classification of the facts and phenomena of religion. It furnishes the materials for such a science, but does not deliver them in scientific form. But the Bible, precisely and exactly, is a *record of the testimony of God*. The witness delivers testimony; the attorney handles the testimony, endeavoring to weave all the statements together in such a manner as to form a consistent and satisfactory theory of the case, with which theory he hopes to unify the mind of his jury. The figure is not strained. The

Bible is the solemn deposition of the Trinity. The prophets and apostles were the clerical recorders of those depositions under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. As the attorney is bound by law and honor to handle the whole testimony, and nothing but the testimony; as he is rigidly forbidden to amend the testimony in any particular, by way of addition or subtraction; so the theologian and the preacher are bound to deliver the testimony of God as it is, construe it into a consistent theology, and argue the cause before the world, and plead for a judgment according to the record. The record must furnish the materials of all theologizing and sermonizing. The statements of the record are ultimate facts in the case. Every fact has a bearing upon the cause, and must be duly considered in the formulation of a theory of the case of God against the sinner.

2. Faith, in the widest sense of the word, is the belief that a thing is true. This conviction, or belief, may be set up in the mind either by *testimony* or by *reasoning*. These two heads cover the whole case. We believe some things as the result of some inductive or deductive reasoning process; that is, the psychological result of the reasoning process is the setting up in the mind, with some degree of certitude, the belief that the conclusion is true. We believe other things upon testimony: the testimony of our senses, or the testimony of our natures (all *a priori* beliefs are such), or upon the testimony of men, or upon the testimony of God. Testimony furnishes all original facts and truths, which become the materials of our reasoning processes. The intellectual convictions which result from testimony are primary, and those from reasoning are secondary. Some witness must furnish to thought the materials which it manipulates, and that witness may be the senses, the consciousness, the constitution of the soul, for authority is expert testimony, men, or God. All the facts of nature are delivered by the testimony of God. All the facts of revelation come in the same way. It is irrational not to receive the results of sound reasoning. It is equally irrational not to receive the facts of competent and credible testimony. Saving faith, as a specific sort of faith, is the reception of the Bible as the testimony of God. We believe it and act upon it precisely as the jury receives the testimony of witnesses

in the courthouse, and makes up its verdict according to that testimony. Saving faith, therefore, is not a speculative, but a testamentary product—a psychological result, not of reasoning upon metaphysical, scientific, or literary data, but of the authoritative testimony of God delivered through the Son, and recorded in the Bible by the Spirit through human employees of his sovereign selection. The jury is not permitted to deal with the human testimony upon *a priori* grounds and after *a priori* methods, but is required to accept the statements in the testimony as so many facts, or to reject them as false. In a similar manner we are bound to accept the contents of the testimony of God as so many facts, or we must reject that testimony as false. They are facts, or they are not facts. Saving faith rests upon authority, or it has no basis at all, and cannot exist. It is a testamentary product, not a speculative or theorized product.

3. Criticisms upon the Bible are assaults upon the competency and veracity of God as a witness. Criticism upon copies of the Bible, when restricted to the clerical work of the copyists, are both legitimate and important in order to furnish us with a correct text; but that “destructive criticism” which alleges that there are errors in the original record, as it was prepared by the Holy Spirit, or which pronounces false some of the statements which that Spirit made to his employees, is an impeachment of the intelligence or the character of the Three in One, who made these statements as matters of their personal knowledge. To “tamper with” a court-record of testimony is a high crime. To “break down the character of a witness” is serious business, and ruins that witness. To prove that a witness has blundered, is to that witness, if he have the proper regard for himself, grievous, and his only comfort is in the fact that “it is human to err.” Do the rejecters of the Bible understand the logic of discarding “the testimony of God”?

ROBERT A. WEBB.

Clarksville, Tenn.

## II. THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION OF THE WESTMINSTER DIVINES.

“CONTROVERSIALISTS in general,” says the late Principal Cunningham, in one of his essays, “have shown an intense and irresistible desire to prove that their peculiar opinions are supported by the Fathers, or by the Reformers, or by the great divines of their own church, and have often exhibited a great want both of wisdom and of candor in the efforts they have made to effect this object.” This device has in no sphere of doctrinal discussion been made more use of than in recent controversies concerning the inspiration of the Scriptures. “The theory of a literal inspiration and inerrancy was not held by the Reformers,” is the first remark which Dr. Schaff makes in a recent incidental attempt to controvert this doctrine,<sup>1</sup> and it is the first remark that falls to be made by most writers of his school. It was so good and learned a man as Tholuck who has, as Professor Pieper points out,<sup>2</sup> “*sit venia verbo*,—deceived a whole generation of scientific theologians” into so unhistorical an assertion. Tholuck misquoted and misinterpreted Luther in the article on inspiration in the first edition of Herzog’s *Encyclopædia*, and has been copied ever since.

A certain palliation may be admitted for this particular error. There is a difference between the Reformers’ treatment of Scripture and that of the theologians of the seventeenth century, a difference arising from the differing points of view from which they approach the subject. The Reformers, striving for very life, had little time or heart to do more than to insist on the sole divine authority of Scripture, and the facts involved in and underlying that authority. The Systematists of the seventeenth century, intrenching a position already won, sought to give these facts an indelectible foundation in a special theory of the mode of inspiration, the theory of dictation. The Reformers, though using language

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<sup>1</sup> *The Independent*, July 20, 1893.

<sup>2</sup> *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for January, 1893, pp. 261–263.

conformable to, or even suggestive of, the theory of dictation, do not formally present that theory, as do the Systematists of the seventeenth century, as the fixed ground-work of their doctrine of Scripture. They were concerned rather with the facts which the seventeenth century writers put this theory forward to explain and safeguard; and their thinking concerning Scripture appears, indeed, to be rooted in a theory of *concursum* or *synergism* rather than in one of *dictation*. Observing this, over-eager controversialists may be possibly misled into supposing that the Reformers were no more strenuous as to the facts involved—the facts as to the plenary or verbal inspiration and infallibility or inerrancy of the Scriptures—than as to the theory of the mode of inspiration which would best safeguard these facts. It is a prodigious historical blunder so to suppose. The fully-developed theory of dictation as applied to inspiration seems to be a product of seventeenth century thought; but the Reformers are as strenuous as the Quenstedts and Buxtorfs as to the facts of detailed divine authority and inerrancy which that theory was intended to secure. Yet one can at least conceive how such a blunder can be made, especially by men who are accustomed to assert that it is only on a theory of verbal dictation that detailed divine authority and inerrancy can be defended for the Scriptures. For us to understand the origin of their error, gross as it is, it is only necessary to suppose that they imagine the doctrines of verbal inspiration and inerrancy to be corollaries of the theory of dictation, instead of the theory of dictation to be, as it was historically, an attempt to supply for these necessary doctrines a firm and impregnable basis.

It is otherwise with the desperate contention which has lately been put forth by Dr. Briggs that the seventeenth century divines themselves were adherents of the modern “liberal” doctrine of Scripture. Such a contention as this, as the French say, brings us stupefaction. Pressed with the obvious fact that the Westminster Confession teaches the verbal or plenary inspiration and infallibility or inerrancy of the original Scriptures, Dr. Briggs seeks on the one hand to explain away the obvious meaning of the docu-



ment, and on the other to undermine it by the round assertion that the British theologians of the Westminster age did not believe the doctrine of the verbal inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture. He has given himself repeatedly to the justification of this extraordinary assertion—the assertion, in effect, that the Reformed theologians of Britain were in violent (though assuredly unconscious) opposition to their brethren on the Continent, in the most fundamental postulate of their system. The most formal attempt to supply proof for it is to be found, however, in two sections in *Whither?*<sup>1</sup> entitled respectively, “Verbal Inspiration” and “Inerrancy of the Scriptures,” where Dr. Briggs represents the doctrines so described as “false doctrines,” which are not only extra-confessional, but wholly shift the ground of confessional doctrine. These assertions he supports by quotations from seventeenth century and especially Westminster divines.

As to verbal inspiration, he presents a catena of six quotations under the caption: “We shall give the opinions of a few Presbyterians of the seventeenth century on this subject, in order to show how far modern divines have departed from the Westminster doctrine of the Bible.” It is perhaps not altogether clear to what immediate antecedent the words “this subject” here refer. The subject of the section is “verbal inspiration,” and the subject of the immediately preceding sentences is the outcry of certain modern divines against rationalizing critics for destroying the “scholastic theory of verbal inspiration.” In any event, the catena of citations is meant to show that the Scriptures were not esteemed by the men who influenced the formulation of the Westminster doctrine of the Bible, as inspired in their “verbal expression,”—a mode of statement which Dr. Briggs for himself also declares to be “entirely false.” The doctrine of the inerrancy of the Scriptures, he declares, to “come into conflict with the historical faith of the church,” on the basis of two quotations. One of these, from Rutherford, is introduced by the statement: “The Westminster divines did not teach the inerrancy of the original autographs. The saintly Rutherford thus expresses their views.” The other is from Baxter and is introduced with the statement:

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<sup>1</sup> Pp. 64-68 and 68-73.

“Richard Baxter was the leading Presbyterian of his time. He knew what he was about in his warning”—which is then quoted.

In all these quotations, without exception, Dr. Briggs falls into what has been called the “Fallacy of Quotations,” which a recent writer describes as one of the most dangerous of fallacies, because one of the most difficult to detect. “It consists,” this writer continues, “in alleging passages from well-known authors as proving some disputed point, when they do not prove it at all, but something resembling it as far as the words go, but quite different from it in reality.” It may perhaps be worth our while to exhibit the fallacy of these quotations. It might indeed be safely left to the general impossibility of the position asserted, to refute even so formal a presentation of proof. But as it appears that men unacquainted with the history of the doctrine of inspiration, and specifically with the writings of the Puritan divines, may be and have been misled; and as it is in any case a matter of considerable interest to observe how tolerably careful and logically exact writers can be misunderstood and made to testify against their fundamental convictions; it may be useful to subject Dr. Briggs’ proof-passages to a sufficiently close scrutiny at least fully to understand them.

#### DR. BRIGGS’ QUOTATIONS EXAMINED.

Let us take up the catena on verbal inspiration first, and (on the principle of *ex pede Herculem*), let us begin with the last quotation. It is from John Ball’s *Catechism*, a famous work of great repute among the Puritans, and reads as follows:

“The testimonie of the Spirit doth not teach or assure us of the Letters, syllables, or severall words of holy Scripture, which are onely as a vessell, to carry and convey that heavenly light unto us, but it doth seale in our hearts the saving truth contained in those sacred writings into what language soever they be translated.”

In adducing this as a proof that the seventeenth century divines did not believe in verbal inspiration, Dr. Briggs has obviously been misled by his own point of view. For there is a single assumption on which such a passage might seem to assert that only the matter of Scripture is inspired, or, at least, that we can be

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<sup>1</sup> R. F. Clark, S. J., in *The Nineteenth Century*, for January, 1893, p. 85, while reviewing Mr. Mivart on *The Happiness in Hell*.

assured only of so much,—the assumption that the sole conclusive evidence that the Scriptures are the word of God, is the witness of the Holy Spirit in the heart. But though this may be Dr. Briggs' point of view, it is not John Ball's. The very object of the passage quoted is rather to guard against this overworking of the testimony of the Spirit: it is one of six rules which are given professedly "to prevent mistaking" in the use of this evidence. The immediately succeeding rule warns us that "the Spirit doth not lead them in whom it dwelleth, absolutely and at once into all truth, but into all truth necessary to salvation, and by degrees"; and one of the previous ones warns us not to forget that it is "private, not publique; testifying only to him that is endued therewith." Ball's object, thus, is not to suggest that the Scriptures are not verbally inspired, but only to deny that this can be proved by "the testimonie of the Spirit." By other forms of testimony, however (he teaches), it can be proved; and resting upon them as giving a "certainty of the mind," he unhesitatingly teaches verbal inspiration. Let us hear his statement of it:—

"Q. What call you the word of God?"

A. The holy Scripture immediately inspired, which is contained in the Books of the Old and New Testament.

Q. What is it to be immediately inspired?

A. To be immediately inspired is to be as it were breathed, and to come from the Father by the Holy Ghost without all means.

Q. Were the Scriptures thus inspired?

A. Thus the holy Scriptures in the Originals were inspired both for matter and words."

Examination of the other quotations given in this catena would lead to similar results. Let us take the first. It is drawn from William Lyford's *Plain Man's Senses Exercised*, and runs as follows:

"All language or writing is but the vessel, the symbol, or declaration of the rule, not the rule itself. It is a certain form or means by which the divine truth cometh unto us, as things are contained in words, and because the doctrine and matter of the text is not made unto one, but by words and a language which I understand; therefore I say, the Scripture in English is the rule and ground of my faith, and whereupon I relying have not a humane, but a divine authority for my faith."

Here, again, the fault in quotation arises from the fact that a passage is given in which the writer is not speaking to the specific

subject for which he is quoted. Lyford is not here discussing directly the matter of inspiration at all, but is arguing the widely different question of the value of translations of Scripture—whether the word of God, that is, as he defines it (p. 46), “the mind and will of God,” is so competently conveyed in translations that the unlearned may have in them a divine foundation for faith. But though he holds that “Divine Truth in English is as truly the word of God as the same Scripture delivered in the Originall Hebrew or Greek,” he feels bound to add: “yet with this difference, that the same is perfectly, immediately and most absolutely in the Originall Hebrew and Greek, in other Translations, as the vessels wherein it is presented to us, and as far forth as they do agree with the Originalls.” The difference between the originals and the translations arises from the fact that “the Translators were not assisted immediately by the Holy Ghost,” while “such extraordinary assistance is needful to one that shall indite any part of Scripture” (p. 50). With all his tendency to defend the value of translations, therefore, he does not assimilate the inspiration of the originals to the divine element common to the two.

This enhancement of translations is carried, perhaps, a step higher by another of Dr. Briggs' witnesses, Richard Capel, whom we may take as our third example, representing the middle of the catena. The following is the passage which Dr. Briggs quotes:

“Now what shall a poor unlearned Christian do, if he hath nothing to rest his poore soul on? The originals he understands not; if he did, the first Copies are not to be had; he cannot tell whether the Hebrew or Greek copies be the *right Hebrew* or the *right Greek*, or that which is said to be the *meaning of the Hebrew or Greek*, but as men tell us, who are not *Prophets and may mistake*. Besides, the transcribers were men and might err. These considerations may let in Atheisme like a flood.”

The effect of this quotation is somewhat spoiled, as Dr. Briggs gives it, by the omission of the italicizing (restored here), which indicates words borrowed by Capel from his opponent. For Capel is not stating his own view here, as the unwary reader of this extract only might be misled into believing, but controverting another's view. He is inveighing against the carelessness of the welfare of human souls which is shown by those who dwell upon the uncertanties of copies and the fallibilities of scribes and translators, as if the saving word of God did not persist through all

these dangers. It is this mode of procedure which he says "may let in Atheisme like a flood"; the passage quoted by Dr. Briggs being a positing of difficulties which he at once sets himself "to help" by laying down a series of contrary propositions. Accordingly he had said at an earlier point (p. 38):

"I cannot but confesse that it sometimes makes my heart ake, when I seriously consider what is said, *That we cannot assure ourselves that the Hebrew in the Old Testament and the Greek in the New are the right Hebrew and Greek, any further than our masters and tutors, and the general consent of all the learned in the world do so say, no one dissenting, . . . . all infallibility* in matters of this nature having long since left the world. . . . And to the like purpose is that observation, *That the two tables written immediately by Moses and the Prophets, and the Greek copies immediately penned by the Apostolical men are all lost, or not to be made use of, except by a very few. And that we have none in Hebrew or Greek, but what are transcribed. Now transcribers are ordinary men, subject to mistake, may faile, having no unerring spirit to hold their hands in writing.*

"These be terrible blasts, and do little else when they meet with a weak head and heart, but open the doore to Atheisme and quite to fling off the bridle, which only can hold them and us in the wayes of truth and piety: this is to fill the conceits of men with evil thoughts against the Purity of the Originals: And if the Fountains run not clear, *the Translation cannot be clean*"

Capel's purpose, in a word, is not to depreciate the infallibility of the autographs, but to vindicate the general purity of the transmission in copies and translations. The originals were in his view "the dictates of the Spirit," and their writers being "indued with the infallible Spirit," "might not erre" (cf. *Remains*, pp. 12, 38, 43, 55). His tendency was thus not to lower the autographs towards the level of the translations, but to elevate the translations, so far as may be, towards the originals, claiming, in effect, for them a kind of secondary (providential) inspiration. Accordingly, although he would confess that the transmitters of Scripture had "no unerring spirit to hold their hands in writing," he yet asserted that God so assisted them "that for the main they should not erre," and "so held the hands and directed the pens of the Translators, that the translations might well be called the Word of God" (p. 31). No student of the history of doctrine need be told that the affinities of this view are with the highest, even the most mechanical theory of inspiration. (Cf. Ladd, *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*, Vol. II. pp. 182 sq.)

The remaining three quotations in the catena on verbal inspira-

tion, taken from Poole, Vines and Wallis, are of precisely similar character to those already investigated, and we need not spend time in showing what must now be obvious to every careful reader, that they do not bear at all on the point in support of which they are quoted. Let us turn rather to the passages quoted to prove that the "Westminster divines did not teach the inerrancy of the original autographs." The first of these is from Samuel Rutherford, who proves to be only another representative of the same type of thought that Capel stands for. Indeed, if the reader will read the long passage given in *Whither?* with an eye to the italics which mark the phraseology borrowed from John Goodwin, whom Rutherford is here refuting, or the longer passage given in *The Bible, the Church and the Reason* (pp. 221, etc.), with the same care, he will not fail to catch a hint of Rutherford's high doctrine. And if he should read with those passages the preceding and succeeding contexts, and the intervening omissions, so as to catch the drift of the whole argument, he would scarcely be able to repress his astonishment that Dr. Briggs could have so misapprehended his author. Rutherford here, in a word, is almost bitterly attacking Goodwin's assertions of the fallibility of the transmission of Scripture; over against which he posits an "unerring and indeclinable providence" (p. 370) presiding over it. So far is he from suggesting that the autographs are not inerrant that he is almost ready to assert that all the copies and translations are inerrant too. He evidently feels himself to be making a great concession, and to be almost straining the truth, when he admits that there may be "errors of number, genealogies, etc., of writing in the Scripture as written" [*i. e.*, in the manuscript form] "or printed." Though God has used means which, considered in themselves, are fallible in transmitting the Scriptures, yet he has not left the transmission to their fallibility, but has added an unerring providence, keeping them from slipping. He urges that Goodwin's argument "makes as much against Christ and his apostles as against us," for they too had but copies of the Old Testament, the scribes and translators of which were "then no more than now, *immediately* inspired *Prophets*," and were consequently liable to error; so that "if ye

remove an unerring providence, who doubts but men might adde or subtract and so vitiate the fountaine sense? and omit points, change consonants, which in Hebrew and Greek both might quite alter the sense?" Yet both Christ and the apostles appeal to the Scriptures freely, with such phrases as "as David saith" and the like, staking their trustworthiness on the true transmission. Nor will he allow the argument that it is the inerrancy of the quoters, not of the text quoted, which is our safeguard in such cases. This, he says, presumes "that Christ and his apostles might and did finde errors and misprintings even in written" [*i. e.*, manuscript] "Scripture, which might reduce the church in after ages to an invincible ignorance in matters of faith, and yet they gave no notice to the church thereof."

To Rutherford, therefore, all the Scriptures, whether in matters fundamental or not, were written by God (p. 373); he quotes them with the formula, "The Holy Ghost saith" (pages 353, 354 *bis*); he declares that the writers of the New Testament were "immediately inspired" (p. 361), a phrase of quite technical and unmistakable meaning; represents it as the part of an apostate to deny "all the Scriptures to be the word of God" (page 349); and looks upon them as written under an influence which preserved them from error and mistake (pp. 366, 369, etc.), and as constituting a more sure word than an immediate oracle from heaven (p. 193). In the immediately preceding words to those which Dr. Briggs extracts, he declares that: "The Scriptures resolve all our faith on *Thus saith the Lord*," which is "the only authority that all the prophets allege, and Paul"; and adds that, if it were so as Mr. Goodwin averred, "all our certainty of faith would be gone"; wherefore he praises God that "we have *βεβαιότερον λόγον*, a more sure word of prophecy, surer than that which was heard on the Mount, for our direction and the establishment of our faith"

It is an interesting indication of the universality of high views of inspiration, that John Goodwin, Rutherford's adversary in this treatise, himself held them. So far as the points we are here interested in are concerned, indeed, the dispute was little more than a logomachy, since Rutherford and his friends admitted that the providential preservation of Scripture is not so perfect but that

some errors have found their way into the several copies, and that the translations are only in a derived sense the word of God, and only so far forth as they truly represent the originals; while Goodwin was ready to allow that God's providence is active in preserving the manuscript transmission substantially pure, and that the truth of God is adequately conveyed in any good translation. In Goodwin's reply to his assailants it is made abundantly apparent that he, too, believed in the inerrancy of the autographs, his objection to calling copies and translations the word of God, in every sense, turning just on this,—that no one extant copy or translation is errorlessly the word of God (see his *The Divine Authority of the Scriptures*, pp. 8, 9, 11, 12, 13).

But what about Richard Baxter? Dr. Briggs tells us that he "was the leading Presbyterian of his time," and that "he knew what he was about in his warning," which is quoted as Dr. Briggs's final proof that "the Westminster divines did not teach the inerrancy of the original autographs." But the passage that is quoted has again really nothing to do with the inerrancy of the autographs. It is only one of Baxter's frequently repeated statements of his sound apologetical position as to the relative value of different portions of Scripture, and the relative importance of the sense and the letter. It is partly on account of his firm grasp and clear expression and defence of this apologetical position, that we think of Baxter as one of the wisest and soundest writers on the subject of Scripture in his day. Here is the passage:

"And here I must tell you a great and needful truth, which, . . . Christians fearing to confess, by overdoing tempt men to Infidelity. The Scripture is like a man's body, where some parts are but for the preservation of the rest, and may be maimed without death: The sense is the soul of Scripture; and the letters but the body, or vehicle. The doctrine of the Creed, Lord's Prayer, and Decalogue, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, is the vital part, and Christianity itself. The Old Testament letter (written as we have it about Ezra's time) is that vehicle which is as imperfect as the Revelation of these times was: But as after Christ's incarnation and ascension, the Spirit was more abundantly given, and the Revelation more perfect and sealed, so the doctrine is more full and the vehicle or body, that is, the words are less imperfect and more sure to us; so that he that doubteth of the truth of some words in the Old Testament, or of some circumstances of the New, hath no reason therefore to doubt of the Christian religion, of which these writings are but the vehicle or body, sufficient to ascertain us of the truth of the History and Doctrine."



This is admirably said, we say, and despite the fact that it is re-quoted by Dr. Briggs in *The Bible, the Church and the Reason*, to show that Baxter allows errors in the Scriptures, it really has no bearing on that question. Not that it is at all doubtful what attitude Baxter held on that question. He has been frequently misunderstood and misquoted, but most gratuitously. He did not for a moment doubt the verbal inspiration and autographic inerrancy of Scripture. It is one thing to refuse to make the verbal inspiration of Scripture the ground of all religion; another to deny its reality or importance: and it is the former of these that Baxter did, and the latter that Dr. Briggs says he did. Baxter's chief works are accessible to all in Duncan's London edition of his practical writings, published in 1830, so that we may content ourselves here with the adduction of a passage or two, which will put his position on the exact point at issue beyond doubt, leaving it to the interested student to work out the details for himself. This is Baxter's pervasive testimony:

"Those that affirm that it was but the doctrine of Christianity, that was sealed by the Holy Ghost, and in which they were infallible, but that their writings were in circumstantials and by-passages, and method and words, and other modal respects, imperfect and fallible, as other men's (in a less degree), though they heinously and dangerously err, yet do not destroy or hazard the Christian religion by it."—Vol. xx. p. 95.

"Though the Apostles were directed by the Holy Ghost in speaking and writing the doctrines of Christ, so that we know they performed their part without errors, yet the delivering down of this speech and writing to us is a human work, to be performed with the assistance of ordinary providence."—Vol. xx. p. 115.

"All the credit of the gospel and Christian religion doth not lie in the perfect freedom of the Scriptures from all error; but yet we doubt not to prove this their perfection against all the cavils of infidels, though we can prove the truth of religion without it."—Vol. xx. p. 118.

"All that the holy writers have recorded is true (and no falsehood in the Scripture, but what is from the error of scribes and translators)."—Vol. xv. p. 65.

"No error or contradiction is in it but what is in some copies, by the failure of preservers, transcribers, printers and translators."—Vol. xxi. p. 542.

"If Scripture be so certainly true, then those passages in it that seem to men contradictory, must needs be true; for they do but seem so and are not so indeed."—Vol. xx. p. 27.

#### THE REAL WESTMINSTER DOCTRINE.

The Westminster doctrine of inspiration has probably emerged before this from the confusion into which Dr. Briggs' unfortunate

quotations would immerse it. Doubtless it will be more satisfactorily visible, however, if we adjoin a clear and succinct statement of it from the pen of some representative writer. Probably no one man has a better right to be quoted as an exponent of the doctrine of the Westminster divines as a body, on this subject, than "the Patriarch of Dorchester," John White. He was chosen by them at the outset of their labors to serve as one of the two assessors, whose activity was expected to supplement the little public capacity of Twisse. His book—*Directions for the Profitable Reading of the Scriptures* (1647)—was introduced to the world by one of the leading Westminster divines, Dr. Thomas Goodwin, in a glowing eulogy. And Baxter (Vcl. xxii. p. 335) names it among the works on the divine authority of the Scriptures which he especially recommends to the English reader. It is, therefore, a truly representative book. We cannot do better than to adduce White's general statement as a fair representation of the prevalent view of his time. He founds his remarks on 2 Pet. i. 20, 21, and writes as follows:

"The Apostle . . . describes the kinde of assistance of the Holy Ghost in the delivery of the Scriptures, two ways, *First*, by way of negation, that they were neither of private interpretation, nor came by the wil of man. *Secondly*, he describes the same assistance affirmatively, testifying that they spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

"In the former of these, wherein he expresseth their manner of delivering the Scriptures by way of negation, the Apostle excludes the working of the naturall faculties of man's mind altogether: *First*, the understanding, when he denies that the Scripture is of any private interpretation, or rather of men's own explication—that is, it was not expressed by the understanding of man, or delivered according to man's judgment, or by his wisdom. So that not only the matter or substance of the truths revealed, but the very forms of expression, were not of man's devising, as they are in Preaching, where the matter which men preach is not, or ought not to be, the Minister's own that preacheth, but is the word of truth (2 Tim. ii. 15), but the tearms, phrases, and expressions are his own. *Secondly*, he saith that it came not by the wil of man, who neither made his own choice of the matters to be handled, nor of the forms and manner of delivery. So that both the understanding and the wil of man, as farre as they were merely naturall, had nothing to doe in this holy work, save onely to understand and approve that which was dictated by God himselfe unto those that wrote it from his mouth, or the suggesting of his Spirit.

"Again, the work of the Holy Ghost in the delivery of the Scriptures is set down affirmatively, when the Penmen of those sacred writings are described to speak as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, a phrase which must be warily un-

derstood. For we may not conceive that they were moved in writing these Scriptures, as the pen is moved by the hand that guides it, without understanding what they did; for they not only understood, but willingly consented to what they wrote, and were not like those that pronounced the Devil's oracles, rapt and carried out of themselves by a kinde of extasie, wherein the Devill made use of their tongues and mouths to pronounce that which themselves understood not. But the Apostle's meaning is that the Spirit of God moved them in this work of writing the Scriptures, not according to nature, but above nature, shining into their understandings clearly and fully by a heavenly and supernatural light, and carrying and moving their wils thereby with a delight and holy enhancing of that truth revealed, and with a like desire to publish and make known the secrets and counsels of God, revealed unto them, unto the church.

“Yea, beyond all this, the Holy Ghost not only suggested unto them the substance of that doctrine which they were to deliver and leave upon record unto the church (for so far he usually assists faithful ministers in dispensing of the word in the course of their gospel ministry), but besides, has supplied unto them the very phrases, method, and whole order of those things that are written in the Scriptures, whereas he leaves ministers in preaching the word to the choice of their own phrases and expressions, wherein, as also in some particulars which they deliver, they may be mistaken, although in the main fundamentals which they lay before their hearers, and in the general course of the work of their ministry they do not grossly erre. Thus, then, the Holy Ghost not only assisted holy men in penning the Scriptures, but in a sort took the work out of their hands, making use of nothing in the men but of their understandings to receive and comprehend, their wils to consent unto, and their hands to write down that which they delivered. When we say that the Holy Ghost framed the very phrase and style wherein the Scriptures were written, we mean not that he altered the phrase and manner of speaking wherewith custome and education had acquainted those that wrote the Scriptures, but rather speaks his own words, as it were in the sounds of their voice, or chooseth out of their words and phrases such as were fit for his own purpose. Thus upon instruments men play what lesson they please, but the instrument renders the sound of it more harsh or pleasant, according to the nature of itself. Thus amongst the Pen-men of Scriptures we finde that some write in a rude and more unpolished style, as *Amos*; some in a more elegant phrase, as *Isay*. Some discover art and learning in their writings, as *S. Paul*; others write in a more vulgar way, as *S. James*. And yet with all the spirit of God drew their natural style to a higher pitch in divine expressions, fitted to the subject on hand.” (Pp. 59-62.)

It is almost pathetic to observe White's efforts to mitigate the effects of his somewhat mechanical conception of the mode of inspiration in the matter of the style of the authors. Others made similar efforts and sometimes with more success. But the time had not yet come when the true *concursum* of inspiration, by which we may see that every word of Scripture is truly divine and yet every word is as truly human, had become the common property

of all. In this, too, White is a fair exponent of his day, and reminds us anew that so far from denying verbal inspiration and the inerrancy of Scripture, the tendency to error of the time was in the opposite direction; and in the strenuousness of its assertion of the fact of an inspiration which extended to the expression and secured infallibility, it was ever in danger of conceiving its mode after a mechanical fashion. That this was the ruling attitude of the middle of the seventeenth century among the Continental theologians, whether Reformed or Lutheran, everybody acknowledges. It is clear from what we have seen that the English Puritans and Scotch Presbyterians were not an isolated body cut off from the currents of thought of their day; but were in harmony with the best theologizing and highest conceptions of their Continental brethren.

With this result we might fairly close the present discussion as, in a sense, formally complete. We are loath to leave the subject, however, without completing it still further by adjoining a tolerably full exposition of the doctrine of inspiration as it was held by some one of the Westminster men, who was more of a biblical scholar than a dogmatist. In such a one, if in any one, we might expect to find a different view as to the origin and character of the Bible from that which had become the common property of the Protestant systematists of the day. No one offers himself for such a study more favorably than John Lightfoot, who was probably the greatest biblical scholar that took any large part in the discussions of the Assembly, and who does not appear to have busied himself much with studies in technical dogmatics. If in any one, in him we might expect, then, to find that lowered view of Scripture which Dr. Briggs declares to belong especially to biblical scholars, and wishes us to think characteristic of the Westminster men. Certainly Lightfoot's distinguished services to biblical study should make him an honored teacher to even our later and, we would fain believe, wiser age; while his general eminence, ability and learning will give us increased confidence in appealing to him to tell us just what was the doctrine of inspiration recognized by students of the Bible in his day as scriptural.

A subordinate interest in ascertaining Lightfoot's attitude to-

wards and thought of Scripture is added by the facts that Dr. Briggs thinks highly of him as an exegete<sup>1</sup>, and has included his name among those to whom he bids us look for a lower and (in his view) truer doctrine of inspiration than that which esteems the Scriptures as in the fullest sense the utterances of God, and as such free from all error.<sup>2</sup> "The Westminster divines," Dr. Briggs writes in the latter of these passages, "knew as well as we do that the accents and vowel points of the Hebrew text then in their possession did not come down from the original autographs pure and unchanged. They were not in the original autographs at all. . . . They knew as well as we know that there were variations of reading and uncertainties and errors in the Greek and Hebrew texts in their hands . . . They knew that there were errors of citation and of chronology and of geography in the text of Scripture. Luther and Calvin, Walton and Lightfoot, Baxter and Rutherford, and a great company of biblical scholars recognized them and found no difficulty with them." There are some things about this passage, indeed, which might justify one in paying it no attention. It is not clear from it just what is intended to be asserted as to Lightfoot's view of Scripture and its fallibility. Is it of the Scriptures "as God gave them," or of the Scriptures "as we have them" that Dr. Briggs means his final assertion to be taken? The company in which Lightfoot is here placed is certainly a company who did not recognize errors of any sort in the genuine "text of Scripture,"<sup>3</sup> but labored to explain all apparent inaccuracies which the enemies of the Bible pretended to find in it—not how-

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<sup>1</sup> *Biblical Study*, p. 344.

<sup>2</sup> *The Bible, the Church, and the Reason*, p. 96.

<sup>3</sup> This has been sufficiently shown as to Baxter and Rutherford above. For Luther, see *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for April, 1893, pp. 249, sq. For Calvin, see *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for January, 1893, pp. 49, sq. We have been less careful to ascertain the exact opinions of Bryan Walton on this subject; but a somewhat close familiarity with the *Prolegomena* to his Polyglot and with his reply to John Owen's ill-considered attack upon it, leads us very strongly to doubt whether he held any lower view of Scripture than that of his fellows in this list. He represents himself to have "labored to assert the *purity, integrity, and supremacy* of the *Original Texts*," and speaks of the matters more especially alluded to by Dr. Briggs thus: "The *Hebrew* points (that is, the

ever without "finding difficulty with them." Moreover, Dr. Briggs himself has elsewhere recognized the fact that Lightfoot held the highest conceivable doctrine of verbal inspiration. "Relying upon them"—*i. e.*, apparently the book Zohar and other Cabbalistic writing—he tells us,<sup>1</sup> "the elder Buxtorf with his great authority misled a large number of the most prominent of the Reformed divines of the Continent to maintain the opinion of the divine origin and authority of the Massoretic vowel points and accents. In England, Fulke, Broughton and Lightfoot adopted the same opinion. These rabbinical scholars exerted in this respect a disastrous influence upon the study of the Old Testament." Were our impulse to be taken from Dr. Briggs's representations, therefore, we might be a little puzzled to know what we are bidden to look into Lightfoot to find. He is, however, worthy of our study for his own sake, and for the sake of the history of the doctrine of inspiration in Britain in the Westminster age; and one of the incidental results of our study will be to inform us which of Dr. Briggs's Lightfoots is the true one—the Lightfoot who freely recognized errors in the text of Scripture, or the Lightfoot who held that even the Hebrew vowel points

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*modern forms now used, not the vowels and accents themselves, which are acknowledged to be coeve with the other Letters, and that the reading of the text was never arbitrary, but the same before and after the punctuation) were devised and fixed by the Masorites about five hundred years after Christ.*" "The whole *Prolegom.* 7 is spent in proving that the *Originall Texts* are not corrupted either by Jews, Christians or others, that they are of supream authority in all matters, and the rule to try all Translations by, That the copies we now have, are the true transcripts of the first ἀπογράφαι written by the sacred Penmen, That the special providence of God hath watched over these books, to preserve them pure and uncorrupt against all attempts of Sectaries, Hereticks and others, and will still preserve them to the end of the world, for the end for which they were first written, That the errors or mistakes which may befall by negligence or inadvertency of Translators or Printers, are in matters of no concernment (from whence various readings have arisen), and may by collation of other copies and other means mentioned be rectified and amended." "I do not only say, that all saving fundamentall truth is contained in the Originall Copies, but that all revealed truth is still remaining entire; or if any error or mistake have crept in, it is in matters of no concernment, so that not only no matter of faith, but no considerable point of Historicall truth, Propheties or other things, is thereby prejudiced, and that there are means left for rectifying any such mistakes when they are discovered." (*The Considerator Considered*, 1659, pp. 2, 11, 14, 66.)

<sup>1</sup> *Biblical Study*, p. 142.

and accents were from God. At all events, we invite our readers to a tolerably full exposition of Lightfoot's doctrine of inspiration as a proper close to our study of the doctrine as held by the Westminster men. We shall make this exposition by means of a copious series of quotations from Lightfoot's works,<sup>1</sup> arranged in an order which will bring his doctrine of Scripture before us in something of a systematic form.

#### LIGHTFOOT'S DOCTRINE OF SCRIPTURE.

The *canon of Scripture*, according to Lightfoot's conception, was *determined, both in its extent and its details, by the inspiration of God*, Scripture being nothing other than the revelation of God's will to man. He says:

“So that the Spirit of God inspired certain persons, whom he pleased, to be the revealers of his will, till he had imparted and committed to writing what he thought fit to reveal under the Old Testament, and when he had completed that, the Holy Ghost departed, and such inspiration ceased. And when the Gospel was to come in, then the Spirit was restored again, and bestowed upon several persons for the revealing further of the mind of God, and completing the work he had to do, for the settling of the Gospel, and the penning of the New Testament: and that being done, these gifts and inspirations ceased, and may no more be expected than we may expect some other Gospel yet to come.” (III. 371.)

The Scriptures are thus the product of the energy of God operating on certain selected men endowed for their production. It follows, of course, that they contain all the will of God.

“When the inspired penmen had written all that the Holy Ghost directed to write, ‘all truth was written.’” (III. 369.)

And it follows equally that no further revelations are to be expected.

“Now was the whole will of God revealed and committed to writing, and from henceforth must vision and prophecy and inspiration cease forever. These had been used and imparted all along, for the drawing up of the mind of God into writing.” (III. 368.)

On this latter matter he was led to speak fully and repeatedly in opposition to the “new spirits” of the sectaries of his day. Thus he writes in another place when commenting on Judges xx. 27:

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<sup>1</sup>Quotations will be designated according to the volume and page in Pittman's octavo edition of Lightfoot's *Works*.

“How may Christians inquire of God in their doubtings, as Israel did, here and elsewhere, in theirs? I must answer briefly, and that in the words of God himself, ‘To the law and to the testimony’: to the written word of God, ‘Search the Scriptures.’ As you might appeal to Balaam to bear witness concerning the blessedness of Israel, whereas he was called forth to curse them;—so for the proof of this matter,—viz., that there is now no other way to inquire of God, but only from his word,—you may appeal to those very Scriptures, that they produce, that there are revelations and inspirations still, and that God doth still very often answer his people by them. . . . To speak fully to this matter I should clear this,—I. That after God had completed and signed the Scripture canons, Christians must expect revelations no more. . . . II. I should show that the Scripture containeth all things necessary for us to know or to inquire of God about.” (VI. 286.)

He did speak “fully to this matter” in his disputation for the Doctor’s degree, delivered in 1652, in which he defended the thesis, *Post Canonem Scripturæ consignatum, non sunt novæ Revelationes expectandæ* (V. 455 sq.) As to the sealing of the canon, he treats the three matters of the canon that is sealed, and the time and the mode of its sealing. The *time* of the close of the canon, he teaches, was determined by the withdrawal of the inspiring Spirit; which also determines the *mode* in which it was done: “*quod nempe ipsa ultimi calami, per ultimum hunc Spiritus Sancti amanuensem, scriptis inspiratis appositio, fuerit ipsissima consignatio*” (p. 457.) The canon had been written at the impulse of God, through instruments selected from time to time for the revelation of his will; and as they wrote it, it gradually grew to its completion.

“*Prophetæ sancti, et divino Spiritu afflati, in unoquoque seculo a Deo ad conscribendum sacrum canonem ordinati et edocti, ab impiis et nefariis hominibus licet pro ludibrio et derisu haberentur, a piis tamen et deum timentibus pro veris prophetis et habiti sunt et honorati. Quaecumque ergo illi ex dictamine Spiritus Sancti conscripserant, in manus piorum hominum ab ipsis tradita, pro divino verbo et canone ab illis recepta, æstimata et servata.*” (V. 457.)

So, too, with the New Testament: “When the last of the theopneustic writers had applied the last pen to his writings, the canon was, as it was completed, so also by this very act, sealed” (p. 457.) Thus “the New Testament grew gradually, just as the Old Testament had grown” (p. 457–458.) The whole truth was therefore written, the canon of Scripture sealed, and revelations were no longer to be expected, *cùm scripsissent illi omnia ea quæ ab*



*is scribi voluit Spiritus Sanctus*" (p. 458.) This happened, as a matter of fact, when John wrote the Apocalypse, which Lightfoot makes the latest-written of New Testament books, while yet placing its composition before the destruction of Jerusalem. He says:

"The last of those celestial writers was John the Evangelist and Apocalyptic. He wrote the Apocalypse last of all his writings; and when it was completed as a crown, the canon of the New Testament was perfected and sealed, and that of the whole Scriptures as well" (p. 459).

It necessarily results from this doctrine of the canon, as we have already seen, not only that no new revelations are to be expected, but also that it is to Scripture itself, and to it alone, that we are to go for spiritual guidance; and that we are to treat it with due reverence and to approach it with all confidence:

"Divinæ Scripturæ oracula pro oraculo colimus, extra quod nihil vel sciscitandum, vel expectandum, vel æstimandum, quod ad fidem pertineat, aut mores, aut bonam conscientiam. Sacrosanctum hunc canonum veneramur, ut verum, solum, perfectum omnium fidei articulorum pennarium, perfectam omnium actionum nostrarum regulam et normam." (p. 460.) "Illi [*i. e.*, Pontificii] 'ecclesiam' statuerunt, nos 'ipsam Scripturam'; atque hoc non sine summa ratione, ac summa ipsius Scripturæ auctoritate. Ad hoc nempe oraculum, quasi ab ipso Dei digito, diriguntur homines ad omnia quaerenda et cognoscenda, quæ ad Deum cognoscendum, et ad salutem acquirendam, faciunt" (p. 461.) "At nos firmissimum habemus verbum Scripturæ, ad omnia hæc, quæ nobis scitu opus est, deligenda, et aptum, et datum." (V. p. 462.)

Inspiration having been thus made the principle of the canon, it becomes at once *the criterion of canonical books*. An instructive passage occurs when Lightfoot is commenting on the prologue of Luke's Gospel:

"From those men's sermons and relations, many undertook to write Gospels, partly for their own use, and partly for the benefit of others: which thing though they did lawfully and with a good intent, yet, because they did it not by inspiration, nor by divine warrant; albeit what they had written were according to truth, yet was the authority of their writings but human, and not to be admitted into the divine canon. But Luke had his intelligence and instructions from above (*ἄνωθεν*, ver. 3.)" (III. 19).

This criterion is applied of course, however, especially to *the exclusion of the Apocryphal books*:

"The Apocrypha speaks for itself, that it is not the finger of God, but the work of some Jews. Which got it so much authority among Christians; because it came from them, from whom the lively oracles, indeed, came also. But the

Talmud may be read to as good advantage, and as much profit, and far more." (II., p. 9.)

"The words of the text are the last words of the Old Testament,—there uttered by a prophet, here expounded by an angel; there concluding the law and here beginning the Gospel. . . . Thus sweetly and nearly should the two Testaments join together, and thus divinely should they kiss each other, but that the wretched Apocrypha doth thrust in between. . . . It is a thing not a little to be admired, for this Apocrypha could ever get such place in the hearts and in the Bibles of the primitive times, as to come and sit in the very centre of them both. . . . But it is a wonder to which I could never yet receive satisfaction, that in churches that are reformed, they have shaken off the yoke of superstition, and unpinned themselves from off the sleeve of former customs, or doing as their ancestors have done,—yet in such a thing as this, and of so great import, should do as first ignorance, and then superstition, hath done before them. It is true, indeed, that they have refused these books out of the Canon, but they have reserved them still in the Bible: as if God should have cast Adam out of the state of happiness and yet have continued him in the place of happiness." (VI., p. 131.)

The *unity* of the canon which is touched on in the last extract is in another place largely dwelt upon. He is commenting on Luke ix. 30, 31 :

"Remember that Moses here is the law, and Elias the prophecy: and you have an emblem of the Scriptures, which is, that 'lex atque omnis prophetarum chorus Christi praesentat passionem.' . . . Marcion, the heretic, did once maintain, that the Old Testament was given by one God, and the New by another; the Old by a God of cruelty,—the New by a God of mercy. . . . If he will but take the Bible and read, he shall evince his own conscience of this truth,—that both Testaments breathe from one Spirit; that both mainly aim at one thing; though the letter of the Old be different from the letter of the New, as death from life, yet that the Spirit of both is the same, as there is a life under death; that the Old is the New under a cloud, and the New is the Old with sunshine; that not only upon this mount, but even throughout the Old Testament, Moses and Elias, law and prophecy, talk to Christ, 'and speak of his decease which he should accomplish at Jerusalem.' . . .

Moses' law is the ground of all divinity; so was it to Israel, so must it be to us; the rest of the Old Testament was a divine exposition of Moses' law; so was it to Israel, and so must it be to us. The New Testament is a sweet commentary upon both; so should it be to us, and so in time shall it be to Israel. God, when he had left in writing as much as his divine wisdom knew to be necessary for Israel's salvation under the law; and when the Holy Ghost (for his familiar expressions) ceased from Israel and departed; when now they had neither vision nor prophecy to instruct them, till He should come who should seal vision and prophecy,—God by this last prophet sends them back to remember the law of Moses. . . . These [the five books of Moses, the Prophets and the Hagiographa] were Israel's Evangelists, instructing them concerning Christ, and all things of Christian religion necessary to their salvation. And all these were not only written for them, but also for us, upon whom the ends of the world are come; even as they, so must

we lay herein, Moses and Elias, law and prophets, the groundwork of all our religion, and, in Christ, or the Gospel, finish it: in the law to make the seed-plot of all doctrines necessary to salvation; in the prophets to water it,—and in the Gospel, to gather the increase. God himself hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what the law doth require of thee, in the manner of reading of Scripture, even by his matter of writing it. As Moses, or the law, begins, so the Gospel ends; and as Elias, or prophecy, ends, so the Gospel begins; ‘Atque in se solvitur,’ God rolling the Scripture even in itself, and showing us Moses, and Elias, and Christ, talking together on the outside of the tabernacle; much more do they within. . . . Thus God even by His own method, hath showed thee, O man, what is good, and what method the Lord requireth of thee in thy reading of the Scriptures; he brought Moses and Elias to talk to Christ in Scripture, even before Christ came; he set Moses, and Elias, and Christ to talk together in person upon this mountain; and he hath left Christ to talk with Moses and Elias in Scripture again ever since, and ‘Quos Deus conjunxit nemo separet,’ and, ‘those whom God hath thus joined together let no man put asunder.’ As oft as thou takest the Scripture in hand to read, thou goest up into a mountain to see Christ in glory; if Moses and Elias talk not to him there, if thou seest him in glory, thou seest more than did his own disciples. Thou mayst hear them talk together, if thou wilt; for God hath put them together.” (VI. 200, *sq.*)

The *nature of the inspiration* which Lightfoot thus made the pinciple of the canon of Scripture must already have appeared in general outline in the extracts which have been given. We have seen him speaking of it as a special gift to specifically chosen men: “The Spirit of God inspired certain persons, whom he pleased, to be the revealers of his will” (III. 371), who, therefore, wrote what he directed to be written (III. 369), at his dictation (V. 457). The Scriptures are thus naturally looked upon as the “drawing up of the mind of God in writing” (III. 368), and the writers as the “amanuenses” of the Spirit (V. 457); their work is the “finger of God” (V. 462, II. 9), and God’s oracle, He having committed to writing what He saw fit to reveal” (III. 371), or “left in writing what his divine wisdom knew to be necessary” (VI. 203). Let us look a little more narrowly at Lightfoot’s conceptions thus brought before us. In his doctorate thesis, of which we have already spoken, he dwelt largely on the two contentions, that inspiration was a gift to specially chosen men, and that it was specifically different both from sanctifying grace and that illumination of the Spirit common to Christians by which God leads them into truth, and which may be loosely called “revelation.” We may have new illumination of Scripture

doctrine, he taught, but not by immediate revelation, but only through deeper study of Scripture; we are certainly given the same Spirit of wisdom and of revelation which the apostles possessed, but not to make new revelations through us, but only to quicken divine knowledge in us through the medium of the word; we are to have to the end of time the guidance of the Spirit, but not by means of direct revelations of duty to us, but only through the prescriptions of the written word—for, “*nos firmissimum habemus verbum Scripturæ, ad omnia hæc, quæ nobis scitu opus est, deligenda, et aptum et datum*” (V. 462). This distinction is necessarily much emphasized in opposition to the pretensions of the sectaries of the day to “inner light.” It is very strongly asserted in the following passage:

“I might observe ‘obiter’ how great diversity there is betwixt the Spirit of prophecy and revelation, and the Spirit of grace and holiness. The same Spirit, indeed, is the author of both; but there is so much diversity in the thing wrought, that a Balaam, a Caiaphas, have the Spirit of prophecy, who are as far from having the Spirit of sanctification as the east from the west, hell from heaven.” (VII. 308.)

The need of revelations is superseded by the gift of the Scriptures, for—

“As the great Prophet he [Christ] teacheth his church himself, by giving of the Scriptures, and instructing his holy ones by his Spirit.” (VI., p. 261.)

The whole case is argued at length at VI. 235 *sq.*, from which we extract as much as will serve our purpose:

“For the prosecuting this argument, you must distinguish between the false pretence to the Spirit of sanctification, and to the Spirit of revelation. By the former, men deceive themselves,—by the latter, others. . . . I shall strip this delusion naked, and whip it before you, by observing these four things:—I. No degree of holiness whatsoever doth necessarily beget and infer the Spirit of revelation, as the cause produceth the effect. . . . I clear this: . . . First; from the nature of the thing. The Spirit of holiness and revelation are far different: therefore the one is not the cause of the other. . . . 1. They are impartible to different subjects: holiness only to holy men; the Spirit of revelation sometimes to wicked men. So it was imparted to Balaam; so likewise to Judas and Caiaphas. 2. They are bestowed upon different ends:—holiness for the good of him that hath it; revelation for the benefit of others. 3. They are of different manners and operations. The Spirit of sanctification changeth the heart; Paul is a Saul no more: revelation doth not; Judas is a Judas still. 4. They are of a different diffusion in the soul: sanctification is quite through,—revelation only in the understanding. 5. They are of different effect: sanctification never produceth

but what is good; revelation may produce what is evil; knowledge puffeth up. . . .

II. The Spirit of revelation is given indeed to saints, but means little that sense, that these men speak of, but is of a clean different nature. The Apostle prays, 'That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give unto you the Spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of him,' Eph. i. 7. And God gives this Spirit; but in what sense? Not, to foresee things to come; not to understand the grammatical construction of Scripture without study; not to preach by the Spirit: but the Apostle himself explains, verse 18, 'The eyes of your understanding being enlightened, that ye may know what is the hope of his calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints.' So that the revelation given to the saints, is this,—that God reveals the experience of those things, that we have learned before in the theory from Scripture,—a saving feeling of 'the hope of his calling, and the riches of the glory of his inheritance.' Here let me speak three things:—1. To feel the experience of grace is not by a new light, that was never known before, but by application of what was known before. . . . As common grace is called grace because it is above the ordinary working of nature,—so this is called revelation, because above the work of common light. 2. How do men come to assurance of pardon and salvation? Not by the Spirit of revelation in their sense; not by any immediate whisper from heaven; but another way: as in Romans xv. 4. . . . In Scripture is your comfort, and in your own conscience; and in them is your assurance. A saint makes this holy syllogism. Scripture, major, 'He that repents, believes, loves God, hath the pardon of his sins.' Conscience, minor, 'Lord, I believe; Lord, I love thee.' Saint, from both, makes the conclusion, 'Therefore, I am assured of the pardon of my sins, and my salvation.' . . . 3. I may add, A saint in heaven finds nothing but what he knew before in little. . . . III. There is no promise in Scripture whereupon the Spirit of revelation is to be expected after the fall of Jerusalem. . . . At the fall of Jerusalem, all Scripture was written, and God's full will revealed; so there was no further need of prophecy and revelation. IV. The standing ministry is the ordinary method that God has used for the instruction of his church." (VI., pp. 236-240, cf. vi. 211.)

The common *distinction between revelation and inspiration, in the stricter senses of those words*, which confines the former to the direct impartation of truth from God, and the latter to the divine work of securing the correct communication or record of the truth, is not drawn by Lightfoot. The obvious distinction which this usage of the words is intended to express, is not, however, overlooked by him; he draws it in his own way as follows:

"But we may observe a double degree in rapture; as inspired men may be considered under a double notion; viz. those that were inspired with prophecy, or to be prophets and to preach,—and those that were inspired to be penmen of divine writ, which was higher. John [in Revelation] hath both." (III. 334.)

This may not mean, precisely, that "inspiration" is a higher notion than "revelation" in the now current senses of those words:

but it does mean that there was a superadded grace of the Spirit above the impartation of the truth, when it was granted to one to fix the truth in written form for the instruction of all ages. The dignity of Scripture as the word of God fixed in written form, is the underlying conception; and Lightfoot is never weary of insisting on this. Take but a single example. When commenting on John v. 39, he says:

“In what he addeth, ‘They are they which testify of me,’ the emphasis may not be passed by unobserved. He saith not only, ‘they testify of me,’ but ‘they are they that do it:’ as intimating that the Scriptures are the great, singular, and intended witnesses of Christ, the fullest and the highest testimony of him (as 2 Peter i. 19). . . . And thus doth Christ read unto us: 1. The dignity of the Scriptures as his choicest witness. 2. The end of them, himself. 3. Their work to bring men to him. And 4. The fruit of all, eternal life.” (V. 273.)

Upon this conception of the origin of Scripture, *the matter of it is looked upon as a dictation from heaven.* This comes out repeatedly. For example, when speaking of the prologue of Luke’s Gospel, he writes:

“He maketh his own undertaking of the like nature with theirs, when he saith, It seemed good ‘to me also’:—but he mentioneth these their writings, as only human authorities (undertaken without the injunction of the Holy Ghost), which his divine one was to exclude. . . . Verse 3: ‘It seemed good to me also, having had perfect understanding of all things *from above.*’ For so might *Ἀνωθεν* be best translated; and so it signifieth, John iii. 3, 31, and xix. 11; James i. 17, &c. And, thus taken, it showeth Luke’s inspiration from heaven, and standeth in opposition to the many gospels mentioned, verse 1;—which were written from the mouths and dictating of men, verse 2; but his intelligence for what he writeth was ‘from above.’” (IV. 114–115.)

Here inspiration is made to include an injunction from God to write, and the reception from above of what is to be written; so that the writing is “from the mouth and dictating” of God. This is the conception everywhere cropping out more or less fully, *e. g.:*

“Now, why the three evangelists should be so unanimously silent in so great a matter, for so long a time, needs not be questioned, since the Holy Ghost hath provided that, by a fourth, that should be supplied which they had omitted.” (IV. 386.)

“Neither can I, nor dare I think of any such superiority and inferiority in the writings of the evangelists.” (IV. 429.)

(On 1 Kings xv. 14), “A human chronicler is not able to say, ‘Such a one’s heart was perfect with God’; because he is not able to discern what the heart is. He

writes the story of a man's actions; he cannot write the story of his heart, because he cannot know it. But he that held the pen, and wrote these sacred chronicles, the Holy Ghost, saw the carriage of all actions, saw the secret frame and temper of all hearts; and he was able to give judgment of them whether they were good or evil; and he could not but give true judgment." (V. 376.) . . . . "That his heart was so, is confirmed by the mouth of two witnesses, the Book of Kings and Chronicles; and the mouth of the Holy Ghost hath spoken it twice over, here and there; and his word is truth and no falsehood in it." (V. 378.)

The conception here is of course not merely an inspiration of the matter of Scripture, but such a divine gift of Scripture that it is *in its matter and form alike, down to its words and even letters, from God*. This is constantly illustrated in Lightfoot's writings. Take such a passage as the following as an instance. He is speaking of Balaam, in 2 Pet. ii. 15, and animadverts on the fact that he is called the "son of Bosor," whereas the Old Testament has it "son of Beor." He says:

"Those that are apt to tax the originals of Scripture of corruption and interpolation, may chance to think it is so here; and that some carelessness or unhappy dash of the pen, made it Bosor here, where it should have been Beor." He then adduces the Chaldee sentence in Jer. x. 11, saying that it "came not into the Chaldee by chance, or any inadvertency, but by sound wisdom," and so it is here. "The change of the name *Beor* into *Bosor* relishes of the Chaldee language too. . . . And our Apostle doth neither mistake himself in so pronouncing the name, nor hath any transcriber miswritten it after him: but he altered it according to the Chaldee idiom and propriety; and, by this very word gives intimation that he was in Chaldea, when he wrote this epistle." From this he draws three observations, of which the second and third are the following: "*Secondly*: That no tittle in Scripture is idle, but ought to have its consideration: according to the saying of the Jews, 'That there is no tittle in Scripture, but even mountains of matter hang upon it': and, as our Saviour saith, 'one jot or tittle of the law shall not perish;' so not one jot or tittle in Scripture but hath its weight. Here is one poor letter, which, one would think, was crept in by some oversight, yet that carries with it matter of important and weighty consideration. *Thirdly*: How necessary human learning is for the understanding and explaining of Scripture, which is so much cried down and debased by some." . . . . (VII. 79-81.)

There are a number of points brought out in this extract which should interest us. We perceive that Lightfoot was not unfamiliar with the science of textual criticism, though he himself was a critic of conservative tendency. We see that he was zealous for the value and necessity of human learning in the interpretation of Scripture, as over against the enthusiasts who expected to accomplish all by the inner aid of the Holy Ghost. But our present

concern is to observe that his doctrine of inspiration led him to attribute everything in Scripture to the Holy Spirit, whose inspiring influence extended to the very words, and even to the several letters in them. To Lightfoot *the Spirit of God was, in the highest and strictest sense, the author of Scripture*; and therefore everything in it, down to the very letters, was held to be significant and important. Let us observe, somewhat in detail, how he deals with Scripture under this conception. One of the commonest of his locutions is to quote the Scriptures as the words of the Holy Ghost. Here are a few scattered examples which will exhibit his usage:

“Search and study the Scripture, because it is the Scripture, the writing of God.” (VII. 207.)

“The Holy Ghost that gave the Scriptures.” (VII. 212.)

“The Holy Ghost hath spoken” Rom. xiii. 2. (VII. 109.)

“The Holy Ghost, in that story, bids us look on him,” *i. e.*, Cain. (VII. 339.)

“And the Holy Ghost doth point as it were with the finger,” quoting Rev. vii. (VII. 356.)

“And here the Holy Ghost, to hint his distaste of such idolatry, blots out his children to the third, nay, fourth generation, out of the line and genealogy of our Saviour.” (VII. 357.)

“In reading of the New Testament, never take your eye off the Old; for the New is but again that in plainer phrases. God himself hath taught us by the writing of the Scripture, what is the best way to read: for he hath folded the two Testaments together; so that as the law begins, so the Gospel ends; and as the prophets end, so the Gospel begins; as if calling upon you to look still for the one in the other.” (II. 44.)

“Notwithstanding the Holy Ghost would conclude the story of their offering altogether.” (II. 125.)

“The Holy Ghost doth tell us when it was that he [Hezekiah] began his reign.” (II. 258.)

“The Holy Ghost setteth a special mark upon these forty years of his [Jeremiah’s] prophesying, Ezek. iv. 6.” (II. 275.)

“And the Holy Ghost tells us,” Psalm lxxiii. 56. (V. 292.)

“When ye rehearse this, ‘The Holy Catholic Church’ in the Creed,—let your thoughts first recoil to your Bibles, and see how the Holy Ghost pictures them there. . . . Nay, yet the divine limner lays on more precious colours.” (VI. 51–52.)

“And so I have given you the sense of this place; and, as I conceive, the very sense of the Holy Ghost.” (VI. 175.)

“As it was foretold by the Holy Spirit in the Prophets, . . . so was it also foretold by the same Spirit.” (VI. 231.)

“And thus you have the words unfolded to you, and I hope according to the meaning of the Holy Ghost.” (VI. 260.)



“For so doth the Holy Ghost himself explain it,” Rev. xix. 8, and vii. 14. (VI. 296.)

“It is not unprofitable to observe, how the Holy Ghost, at the story of great actions, doth often intimate the Trinity: ‘Let *us* make man.’ ‘Let *us* confound their language.’ And at Genesis xviii. you read of three men that stood by Abraham, who are called afterwards Jehovah. And at the setting of the service of the tabernacle, the form of blessing that was prescribed to the priests to use, intimated a Trinity. . . . But to spare more instances, at Christ’s entry into the ministry, the Trinity is at his baptism; and now at the end of it he proclaims it, and requires it to be professed at every baptism.” (VI. 405)

“The Holy Ghost intendeth, in this book [the Acts], to show. . . . The Holy Ghost should tell us. . . . The Holy Ghost, which in all the Bible, never, . . . no, not when he was intentionally writing of . . . should do it now, when he is purposely upon a story of. . . .” (VIII. 71.)

“The second Psalm, which owns not its author in the title, the Holy Ghost ascribeth here to David.” (VIII. 74.)

“That the Holy Ghost, reckoning the porters as they were disposed after the return,” 1 Chron. ix. 23, 24. (IX. 231.)

This constant usage exhibits the fact that, to Lightfoot, to say the Scripture says, was equivalent to saying the Holy Ghost says: the two locutions were convertible. This identification of the Scripture and the Holy Spirit comes out very plainly in cases where he passes from the one to the other mode of speech, as it were, unconsciously. Thus when speaking of the anticipation in the narrative at Joshua xv. 8, he says it was “because *the Holy Ghost* would take special notice of . . .,” while just below, on the same page, with reference to a similar difficulty, his mode of speech is that it was, “because *the text* would give account of their whole inheritance together, now it is speaking of it” (II. 141). Hence also such passages as the following:

“*The Holy Ghost* hath given a close intimation, that Uzziah’s left him in the last year of his reign and not before, 2 Kings xv. 50 . . . Why, here is the hint that *the Holy Ghost* giveth of the time of Uzziah’s being struck leprous . . . for here, by this very expression, is showed; . . . and *the text* plainly expresseth the occasion.” (II., p. 247.)

“Therefore *the Holy Ghost*, in the New Testament, sets himself to speak to this thing, and to show who these ‘sons of God’ are. *John* shows who are and who are not . . . (John i., 12, 13.) . . . *The Holy Ghost* sets the regeneration in opposition to natural generation.” (V., p. 323.)

“Unless the *Spirit of Christ himself in Scripture* tell us.” (VI. 10.)

“Behold a greater than Aristotle is here, and sets me a copy,—and that is *the Holy Ghost in the mouth of Joshua*: Joshua xxiv. 19, ‘Ye cannot serve the Lord’ (*saieth Joshua*).” (VII., p. 211.)

“The *Evangelist hath done it*” (*i e.*, written Acts) “with a divine pen.” “How sparing the *Holy Ghost* through all that book to express the circumstance of the time, with the relation of the things.” (VIII., pp. iv. and v.)

No wonder then that Lightfoot calls the Scriptures “the divine oracles,” and cautions men not to pick and choose among them or read their own fancies into them (VII., 288): to him *they were all, in all their elements and parts, the utterances of the Holy Ghost*. Observe how he ascribes every element and detail of Scripture to the Holy Spirit.

Is he studying the *chronology* of the Bible? It is cared for by the Spirit:

“For the Holy Ghost reckons by round sums,”—quoting Daniel xii. 12, 13. (VII. p. 217.)

“The Holy Ghost draws up a chronicle of times from the creation to the redemption.” (VII. p. 221.)

“See how the Holy Ghost reckons the year of the flood.” (II. p. 4.)

“The Spirit hath given undoubted helps,” to draw up a chronological order. (II. 4.)

“Now the Holy Ghost reckoneth from that date rather than any other, because. . . .” (II. p. 244.)

“For I cannot but conclude that the Holy Ghost, naming the several years of these kings, hitherto, intendeth . . .” (II. p. 326.)

“Here is the standard of time that the Holy Ghost hath set up in the New Testament; unto which, as unto the fulness of time, he hath drawn up a chronicle-chain, from the creation; and from which, as from a standing mark, we are to measure all the times of the New Testament, if we would fix them to a creation date.” (III. 34.)

“When he shall also see (and that, I suppose, not without admiration) the wondrous and mysterious, and yet, always, instructive style and manner of accounting, used by the Holy Ghost, in most sacred majestickalness, and challenging all serious study and reverence.” (IV. p. 98.)

“The Holy Ghost chooseth rather to reckon by holy Jotham in the dust, than by wicked Ahaz alive.” (IV. p. 108.)

“The Jews reckoned their year by the lunar months. . . . This computation made their years to fall eleven days short of the year of the sun; and this the Holy Ghost seemeth to hint and hit upon, when, in reckoning the time of Noah’s being in the ark, he bringeth him in on the seventeenth day of the second month, and bringeth him out on the twenty-seventh day of the same month, in the next year; and yet intendeth him there but one exact and complete year by the sun, but reckoned only by the lunar months.” (IV. p. 135.)

Or is it a question of *the order of the narrative*? This, too, in all its flexions, is attributed directly to the Holy Ghost. In the

preface to the *Harmony, &c., of the New Testament*, for example, he writes :

“I shall not trouble the reader with any long discourse to show, how the Scriptures abound with transposition of stories; how the Holy Ghost doth, eminently, hereby show the majesty of his style and divine wisdom; how this is equally used in both testaments; what need the student hath carefully to observe these dislocations; and what profit he may reap by reducing them to their proper time and order.” (III. p. vi.)

So, elsewhere :

“The Holy Ghost hath, in divers places, purposely and divinely, laid stories and passages out of their proper places, for special ends.” (II. p. 3.)

“The same Spirit, that dictated both the Testaments, hath observed this course in both the Testaments alike; laying texts, chapters, and histories sometimes out of the proper place, in which, according to natural chronological order, they should have lain. And this is one of the majesticknesses wherewithal the Holy Ghost marcheth and passeth through the Scriptures. Not that these dislocations are imperfections,—for they ever show the greatest wisdom: nor that to methodize these transposed passages, is to correct the method of the Holy Ghost;—for it is but to unknot such difficulties as the Holy Ghost hath challenged more study on; nor that it is desirable that our Bibles should be printed in such a methodized way, and such Bibles only to be in common use,—for the very posture of the Bible, as it now lieth, seemeth to be divine, and that the rather from Luke xxiv. 44.” . . . (II. p. lxii.)

Accordingly, in his detailed explanations of the order of Scripture, he uniformly ascribes it to the Holy Ghost, and seeks a divine reason for it. For example :

“The Holy Ghost, as soon as he had related how Shimei had obtained his pardon, comes and relates this conference betwixt David and Mephibosheth;” . . . giving “us a hint by this strange placing of this story.” . . . “This is not done at random, or by any oversight, as if the Holy Ghost had forgot himself, as we poor fumbling creatures are many times lost in our tales; but the sacred Spirit hath purposely thus methodized the story with such a dislocation, for our own more narrow observation and clearer instruction.” . . . (VII. p. 203.)

“But about this we need not much to trouble ourselves; since as to the understanding of the stories themselves, there can be but little illustration taken from the time. . . . We shall not, therefore, offer to dislocate the order of the stories from that wherein they lie; the Holy Ghost, by the intertexture of them rather teaching of us, that some of them were contemporary, than any way encouraging us to invert their order.” (III. p. 207, on Acts xii. and xiii.)

Arranging Exod. xviii. between Numbers x. 10, 11, he says: “Now that the Holy Ghost might show that Jethro,” &c. (II. p. 127.)

“Now the reason why the Holy Ghost hath laid these stories, which came to pass so soon, in so late a place, may be supposed to be this.” (II. p. 150.)

“But the Holy Ghost hath laid it in the beginning of his (Solomon’s) history, that—”. (II. p. 199.)

“Because the Holy Ghost would mention all Solomon’s fabrics together.” (II. p. 201.)

Jeremiah xxxix. 15–18 is placed after the story of the taking of the city, though Jeremiah prophesied it before, “because when the Holy Ghost hath showed the safety of Jeremiah in the destruction, he would also show the safety of Ebed-melech, according to Jeremiah’s prophecy.” (II. p. 296.)

The institution of the Sabbath is mentioned before the fall of Adam, “partly because the Holy Ghost would mention all the seven days of the first week together.” (VII. 378.)

The principle thus employed in the matter of the order of the narrative is extended to *all the phenomena of Scripture* which may cause the reader difficulty; they are all part of the majesty of Scripture, and occur by design of the Holy Ghost for good and sufficient reason. Thus we are told in a comment on 2 Peter iii. 15, 16:

“He citeth Paul’s Epistle to the Hebrews, and giveth an honorable testimony to that, and to the rest of his epistles: but acknowledgeth that, in some places, they are hard to be understood, and were misconstrued by some unlearned and unstable ones, to their own ruin; yet neither doth he nor Paul, who was yet alive and well-knew of this wresting of his epistles, clear or amend these difficulties, but let them alone as they were: for the Holy Ghost hath so penned Scripture as to set men to study.” (III. p. 327.)

“It became the Holy Ghost, the penner of Scripture, to write in a majesty.” . . . “If the Holy Ghost wrote the Scriptures, we must needs conclude, that he wrote them like the Holy Ghost, in a divine majesty” . . . (VII. 212.)

Just because, however (as this last extract expresses it), the Holy Ghost is “the penner of Scripture,” who “wrote the Scriptures” in his own way, not merely the special disposition of the matter and the general contents and mode of presentation is from him, but *the very style is determined by the Holy Ghost*. This is very clearly brought out in a passage parallel to one already quoted, based on Peter’s commendation of Paul’s epistles:

“The Holy Ghost hath purposely penned the Scriptures so as to challenge all serious study of them,”—quoting Matt. xxiv. 15 . . . “Peter tells us that there are divers things in Paul’s epistles hard to be understood; and why did the Holy Ghost dictate them so hard by Paul? . . . Because the Holy Ghost hath penned Scripture so as to challenge all serious study. He could have penned them all so plain that he that runneth might have read them; but he hath penned them in such a stlye that he that would read them, must not run and read, but sit down and study.” (VII. p. 208.)

“Observe that passage, Mt. i. 8, and see whether the style of the Holy Ghost

Ghost do not hint the very same thing" . . . "These and other things of the like nature, may be observed in the very style and dialect the Holy Ghost useth in Scripture. Whereby he setteth a brand upon idolatry." (VII. 357.)

The "style and dialect" of Scripture is the Holy Ghost's, because he dictated Scripture. Accordingly, *the very words of Scripture are the words of the Holy Ghost*. This is, of course, capable of copious illustration :

"The Helps that it" [*i. e.*, Scripture] "affordeth for explaining of itself are various. The first to be looked after is the 'language:' the Spirit of God, upon the same occasions, using the same words in the original." (II. 3.)

"The Holy Spirit seldom or never using these" [*i. e.*, other languages than Hebrew or Greek, as, *e. g.*, Chaldee], "but intimating something of note, if our eyes be but serious." For example, in Hosea v. 5, "He" [*i. e.*, the Spirit] "useth the Chaldee form, to teach when that affliction and seeking must be." (II. 3.)

"Abijah is also called 'Abijam,' and his mother is both called 'Maacah' and 'Michah;' and his grandfather by his mother's side is called 'Absalom' and 'Uriel.' Such changes in names are frequent in Scripture: and sometimes so altered by the Holy Ghost, purposely to hint something to us concerning the person; and sometimes so altered by the people among whom such persons lived." (II. 209.)

"The Virgin had obtained the highest earthly favour that ever mortal did, or must, do,—to be the mother of the Redeemer: and the Holy Ghost useth a singular word to express so much."—Luke i. 28. (IV. 161.)

On the word 'repentance': "The word which the Holy Ghost hath left us in the original Greek, *μετανοεῖτε*, is exceeding significant and pertinent to that doctrine and occasion." . . . "Now the Holy Ghost, by a word of this significancy, doth give the proper and true character of repentance, both against the misprisions which were taken up concerning it by their traditions in those times, and those that have been taken up since." (V. 157.)

"So when the Holy Ghost proclaimeth in the words of the text:" John v. 16. (V. 331.)

The *very letters are from the Spirit*. We have already quoted from VII. 9, a passage so asserting with reference to the spelling of "Bosor" in 2 Peter ii. 15 (see above, p. 44). The following is a similar one. Speaking of Ezra ix. and x. he says:

"This matter was done in the seventh year of Darius, . . . as the text seemeth to carry it on; unless by the strange writing of the word *שׁוֹרֵרִים* ver. 16, the Holy Ghost would hint Darius's tenth.—Let the learned judge." (II., p. 324.)

Indeed, Lightfoot goes further, and *attributes directly to the Holy Spirit the very pointing of the Hebrew text*, as it stands in the current copies :

"It cannot pass the eye of him that readeth the text in the original, but he must observe it, how in [Deut.] chap. xxix. verse 29, the Holy Ghost hath pointed

one clause, לָנוּ וּלְבָנֵינוּ “to us and to our children belong the revealed things,” after an extraordinary and unparalleled manner; to give warning against curiosity in prying into God’s secrets; and that we should content ourselves with his revealed will.” (II., p. 137.)

He expresses disbelief in the vowels and accents having been invented by the Massorettes (IV. 19), and argues their antiquity (IV. 50), adducing our Lord’s declaration that not “one iota shall pass away” as evidence that the vowels were there in his day, and urging that it would be beyond the skill of man to point the Ten Commandments, the “pricking” of which would puzzle the world. At a later point he expresses himself on the last matter thus:

“I omit the exquisiteness of the pricking of this piece of Scripture, of the commandments, extraordinarily: some special thing in it.” (IV., p. 84.)

He even doubts if “the marginals,” *i. e.*, the various readings placed by the Massorettes in the margin of the Hebrew Bible, “are not only human corrections.” (IV., p. 14; cf. XI. 103.)

The primary fact in Lightfoot’s doctrine of Scripture is, then, that it is God’s word, in such a sense that the Divine Spirit is the author of it in its minutest detail. On this hangs all his thought concerning the Scriptures. It is because they are divine that they are *authoritative*. The authority of Scripture is to him incontestable, and is allowed by Christ himself, though he was God. In commenting on Matt. iv. 4, “It is written,” he writes:

“This is the first speech, that proceeded from our Saviour’s mouth, since his entrance into his ministerial function, that is upon record; and though it be very short, yet it is very material for observation of these things:

1. That the first word spoken by Christ in his ministerial office, is an assertion of the authority of Scripture.
2. That he opposeth the word of God as the properest encounter against the words of the devil.
3. That he allegeth Scripture as a thing undeniable and uncontrovertible by the devil himself.
4. That he maketh Scripture his rule though he had the fulness of the Spirit above measure.” (IV., p. 362.)

This authority of the Scriptures *rests on nothing else than on their divine origin and character.*

“The Scriptures are to be believed for themselves, and they need not fetch their credit from anything else, Dan. x. 21. . . . They are the truth.—See John

v. 39. . . . Observe the bent of Christ's discourse. . . . He concludes in Scripture, as the most undeniable testimony. . . . See also 2 Peter i. 17-19. . . . A voice from heaven might possibly deceive; the Jews feigned such; but the word of prophecy is sure; that is a 'more sure word.' The reason of the Scriptures' credibility is because they are the word of God: 1 Thess. ii. 13. . . . They received it as the word of God. How knew they that? From the Scriptures themselves.—Therefore it is said that they are the formal object of faith, as well as the material. They contain what is to be believed, and the reason why to believe them; and that is especially two-fold: I. The majesty of the Spirit of God speaking in them. II. Their powerful working. I. The majesty of the Spirit of God speaking in them such things, as man cannot speak. . . . 1. How impossible is it for man to reveal the deep mysteries of salvation, *i. e.*, the mind of God. 1 Cor ii. 16. . . . In Scripture we have it; and ver. 7-9 of that chapter. 2. The majesty of the Spirit in Scripture appears in that it reveals the very thoughts, and commands the very heart of man (Heb. iv. 12). . . . 3. The majesty of the Scriptures appears in that it discovers the very subtleties of Satan. . . . Thus doth the Scripture reveal itself to be the very word of God, by its divine majesty, wherein it speaketh,—and by the wisdom wherein it shows itself. II. In its powerful working; breaking hearts, converting souls, conquering the kingdom of Satan. . . . Thousands of experiences have showed what the divine word of God in Scripture can do against him" [that is, the devil]. "And thus do they evidence themselves to be the word of God, and so to be believed for themselves, because they are the word of God." (VI. 56-59.)

After asking whether the church gives us the Scriptures, and answering that the Church of Rome rather sought to hinder us from having the Scriptures, he continues:

"No, it was the work of the Lord, and the mercy of the Lord; and it is marvellous in our eyes. . . . As far as we owe our receiving of Scripture to men, we are least beholden to the Romish Church. They put us off with a Latin translation, barbarous and wild. But we have a surer word, the sacred Hebrew, and divine Greek. And the Hebrew we owe to the Jews, and the Greek to the Greek Church rather than the Roman. . . . 'Unto them [the Jews] were committed the oracles of God.' And from them we received the Old Testament; and not from them, neither; for, could they have prevented, we had not had it. Consider how many copies were abroad in the world. The Old Testament was in every synagogue: and how many copies would men take of the New? So that it is impossible but still Scripture must be conveyed. Could all the policy of Satan have hindered, he had done it; for the word of God is his overthrow; so that it was owing to a divine hand. And our faith stands not on the church to believe the Scriptures; but God hath carried the authority of them from age to age." (VI. 60-63.)

"It is not proper to say, We believe the Scriptures are Scriptures, because of the church, without distinguishing upon believing. As Austin's 'Non credidisse Scripturis,' &c., 'I had not believed the Scriptures, had not the church told me'; that is, while he was unconverted. But we may satisfy this by an easy distinction, betwixt believing that Scripture is Scripture, and believing that the church all

along hath taken them for Scripture. . . . A good soul desires to build up itself by the rule of faith and life. He finds that the church hath counted Scripture so; and that he believes. But as yet he believes not they are Scriptures on that account: but he reads, studies, meditates on them, finds the divine excellency, sweetness, power of them: and then he believes they are the word of God. And that now is not for the church's sake, but for themselves. The Church of England, in the Thirty-nine Articles, hath determined such books canonical. Why? Because the church hath ever held them so? That is some furtherance to their belief, but not the cause of it. They first believed the church held them so, but they saw cause and reason in the books themselves to believe they were so. . . . So we believe the church owns the Scriptures; but he is a poor Christian who believes the Scriptures are Scriptures on no other account." (VI. 62-63).

"God gives his word; and whether men will hear, or whether they will forbear, it is, and will be, the word of God forever. And if men will not believe it, God will not be beholden to them to believe it: let them believe it at their own peril. A Papist will not believe the divine authority of the Scriptures for themselves; God and the Scriptures will never be beholden to him to believe it; but let him look to it, if he do not believe it. . . . When God gave the Scriptures he never intended that they should stand at the courtesy of every curious, carping atheist, whether they should be of authority, and be believed, or no: but God gives them in their divine authority and majesty: and laid them a sure foundation in Sion, elect, precious and glorious; and he that will build upon them, may build and prosper. But if any cross, or quarrelsome, or wilfully blind, Bayard, will stumble at them when he might walk plain,—let him take his own hazard, and stumble, and fall, and be broken, and snared and taken: while, in the meantime, the foundation of God remaineth sure, and the divine Scriptures will be the divine Scriptures, and retain their truths and Author, when such a wretch is dashed all to pieces. . . . 'God will be God, whether thou wilt or no,' as Scripture will be Scripture, whether thou believest it or no." (VI. pp. 351-352.)

That is, as Lightfoot held the doctrine of inspiration which was universally taught by the Reformed theologians of his day, so he held likewise the common Reformed doctrine of the authority of Scripture, founded on its divine origin and character. The extracts we have just given teach the precise doctrine taught in the Confession of Faith, I. 4 and 5, and constitute an excellent commentary on those sections, from the pen of one of the Westminster men.

To him and them, the Bible, and the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants. We have found him so saying in his Doctorate disputation:

"*Illi [pontificii] 'ecclesiam' statuunt, nos 'ipsam Scripturam'; atque hoc non sine summa ratione, ac summa ipsius Scripturæ auctoritate. Ad hoc nempe oraculum, quasi ab ipso Dei digito, diriguntur homines ad omnia quaerenda et cognoscenda, quae ad Deum cognoscendum, et ad salutem acquirendam, faciunt.*" (V. p. 461.)



So again he writes :

“The other [*i. e.*, the Church of Rome] brags of antiquity, universality, visibility, succession, and other bravadoes; whereas the Protestant church has but this to glory of, (and it is enough), That she is built upon the prophets and Apostles. Ingenious was that picture: in one scale you see all the trinklements of Popery, and the pope and friars hanging on; in the other the Protestants put the Bible, and it outweighs them all. This is the glory and sure friend of a church, to be built upon the Holy Scriptures, although there be no visibility of that church to the eyes of men at all. . . . That church which is built more on traditions and doctrines of men, than on the word of God, is no true church nor religion. . . . The foundation of the true church of God is Scripture.” (VI. pp. 44, 45.)

The *infallible truth of Scripture* which is thus strongly insisted on is treated everywhere as a first principle (see above, page 43) :

“It is not all to believe a thing is true; but farther to believe so as the soul may have advantage. Take one instance: one of the first things in religion to be believed is, ‘That the Scriptures are the word of God and divinely true.’ This, who believes not? The devil himself cannot deny it: nay, he cited Scripture as the word of God to our Saviour. And there are thousands in hell that never made a doubt of this. Therefore the believing of this must have a further reach, that the soul may receive benefit upon so believing.” (VI. 50.)

“Whosoever speaks not according to the truth of God in Scripture, he is but a liar, and the truth is not in him. You understand that I speak of things of faith and religion. In historical, natural, civil, moral things we deny not but that they<sup>1</sup> speak much truth. But that is to be tried by our reading and reason. But in the things of divine discernment there is no truth, but that of Scripture, or what speaks agreeable to it.” (VI. p. 59.)

This is, of course, the common Reformed doctrine of the *completeness, perfection, or sufficiency of the Scriptures* as taught in the Westminster Confession, I. 6, or Q. 2 of the Shorter Catechism. In full harmony with these formularies, Lightfoot teaches :

“The Scriptures contain all things needful for faith and life; as that in Isaiah viii. 19, 20. . . . so may I say also in this case: if they say to you, Seek to councils, fathers, canons, determinations of the church,—‘To the law and to the testimony;’ to Scripture and holy writ: that contains everything you need to inquire after for salvation; what is to be believed, and what to be done. . . . Whithersoever you need to walk for the pleasing of God doing your duty to men,

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<sup>1</sup>“They,” *i. e.*, “men,” according to the context. Lightfoot is not confining the truth of Scripture to matters of “faith and religion,” but confining the truth which men may acquire apart from Scripture to matters of history, nature, etc. There is truth to be had outside of Scripture on these matters, but Scripture is the sole rule of faith and practice.

or to your own souls, the word of God is a light sufficient. . . . Prophecy was then ceasing. People might complain, 'What shall we do for instruction?'—Why, go to the word of God, which you have in your hands, to the law of Moses, that will teach you.—Dives desires Abraham to send one from the dead to teach his brethren, that they might escape that place of torment. No, that needs not: Moses and the prophets will teach all things needful. . . . The Apostle speaks this fully, 2 Timothy iii. 16, 17." (VI. pp. 54, 55.)

He, of course, also held and teaches the common Reformed doctrine of the *perspicuity of Scripture*. "Scripture," he tells us, "is plain." (VI. 10.) But he is more concerned, in opposition to the sectaries of the time, with the other side of this doctrine—the need of careful *interpretation*. In harmony with the Confession of Faith I. 9, he holds that Scripture is to be interpreted by Scripture: "But the Scripture, which is ever the sure expositor of itself." (IV. 215.) And he lays down several rules of interpretation, as *e. g.*: "The Scripture word is to be interpreted according to the Scripture idiom," (IV. 217); "It is the best rule to come to the understanding of the phrases of Scripture, to consider in what sense they were taken in that country and among that people where they were written" (VI. 414.) Here are two sound and scholarly rules which Lightfoot, the Talmudist, was especially bound to dwell on. The scholar Lightfoot is also very naturally concerned to show against the sectaries, the need of human learning in interpreting Scripture. He says, for example:

"The greatest difficulties of the Scripture lie in the language: for unlock the language and phrases, and the difficulty is gone. And, therefore, they that take upon them to preach by the Spirit, and to expound the Scripture by the Spirit, let them either unlock to me the Hebrew phrases in the Old Testament, or the Greek in the New, that are difficult and obscure,—or else they do nothing. Now, to attain to the meaning of such dark and doubtful phrases, the way is not so proper to put on them a sense of our own, as to consider what sense they might take them in, to whom and among whom, the things were spoken and written in their common speech." (VI. 335.)

In expounding John x. 22, 23, he goes into the whole question of *the need of human learning in interpreting Scripture*, very fully:

"To the expounding of which, the very way that I must go, cannot but mind me to observe this to you:—*That human learning is exceeding useful, nay, exceeding needful, to the expounding of Scripture.* The text gives the rise of this observation,

and it gives the proof of it. Here is the mention of the feast of dedication, and not one tittle else in all the Scripture concerning it. And so there is the bare mention of Solomon's Porch; and, indeed, it is mentioned again in Acts iii. 11; but neither here nor there, any more but the bare name. Certainly the Holy Ghost would never have mentioned these things, if he would not have had us to have sought to know what they meant. But how should we know them? The Scripture gives not one spark of light to find them out; but human learning holds out a clear light of discovery. . . . Here is a text fallen into our hands occasionally (a thousand others of the like nature might be produced); let any of those that deny human learning to be needful in handling of divinity, but expound me this text without the help of human learning, and I shall then think there is something in their opinion. Two things lead them into this mistake:—1, Because they conceive the New Testament, (which part of the Bible Christians have most to deal withal) is so easy of itself that it needs no pains or study to the expounding of it. 2, And the less, Because, say they, the Spirit reveals it to the saints of God, and so they are taught of God, and can teach others. Give me leave, partly for our settlement in the truth about this point, and partly for the stopping the mouths of such gainsayers, out of many things that might be spoken, to commend these four unto you:—

“I. *That in the time when prophecy flourished, the standing ministry, that was to teach the people, were not prophets, but priests and Levites, that became learned by study.* . . . It is but a wild thing now, when prophecy has ceased so many hundreds years ago, to refuse learning and a learned ministry, and to seek instruction we know not of whom.

“II. *There is no ground in Scripture to believe, nor promise to expect, that God doth, or ever will, teach men the grammatical or logical construction of the Scripture text.* It is true, indeed, that he gives to a gracious saint, ‘the Spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Christ,’ as it is Eph. i. 17. But how? Revealing to him by experimental feeling, that which he knew, indeed, before in Scripture, but only by bare theory. As, for example,—a man, before his conversion, knows, by reading and hearing, what faith and repentance are in their definitions; but when he comes to be converted, the Spirit of grace reveals these to him in feeling and experience. And farther revelation, as to the understanding of Scripture, there is not the least groundwork in Scripture whereupon to expect it.

“III. *When God had committed the New Testament to writing, he had revealed all that he would reveal to men on earth of his will and way of salvation.* . . . .

“IV. *The main difficulty of the New Testament, requires study to unfold it, rather than revelation.* . . . . The main difficulty of the New Testament is in the language; unlock that clearly and the sense ariseth easily. . . . Now certainly, it is more likely to obtain knowledge of languages by study, than to attain it by revelation; unless any one will yet expect that miraculous gift of tongues,—which I suppose, there is none will make himself so ridiculous, as to say he expects.” (VI., pp. 210-212.)

On the *preservation, or the integrity, of the Scripture-text*, Lightfoot also teaches the ordinary Reformed doctrine, as it is formulated, for instance in the Confession of Faith, I. 8. He was con-

servative, as a critic of the text; but as the fellow-worker of Walton in the preparation of the great Polyglot, he was in no ignorance of the facts as to the transmission of Scripture. He knew that no one copy of Scripture was perfect; but he believed that the correct text could not be lost. "Consider," he says:

"Consider how many copies were abroad in the world. The Old Testament was in every synagogue: and how many copies would men take of the New So that it is impossible, but still Scripture must be conveyed. Could all the policy of Satan have hindered, he had done it; for the word of God is his overthrow; so that it was owing to a divine hand." (VI. p. 60 *seq.*)

But though it was by the "singular providence" of God alone that Scripture has been preserved pure, yet God has accomplished its preservation through means, and we can observe the suitability of the means to the end. When speaking of the scribes, he tells us of the care they exercised in the preservation of the text:

"They were the men who took upon them to copy the Bible for those, that desired to have a copy. For so great and various is the accuracy and exactness of the Scripture text in the mystical and profound significance of letters, vowels, and accents, that it was not fit that every one should offer to transcribe the original, or that every vulgar pen should copy things of so sublime speculation. Therefore there was a peculiar and special order of learned men among the Jews, whose office it was to take care of the preservation of the purity of the text, in all Bibles that should be copied out, that no corruption or error should creep into the original of sacred writ: . . . some set apart for this office, which required profound learning and skill: namely, to be the copiers of the Bible, when any copy was to be taken; or at least, to take care, that all copies, that should be transcribed, should be pure and without corruption. . . ." (IV. 222.)

He praises the work of the Massorettes, and looks upon their methods and exactness as the guarantee of the text. Apropos of the *nun inversum*, at Numbers x. 35, he remarks concerning such phenomena:

"If they show nothing else yet this they show us,—that the text is punctually kept, and not decayed; when these things (that to a hasty, ignorant beholder might seem errors) are thus precisely observed in all Bibles." (IV. p. 19.)

"Admirable is their [the Massorettes'] pains, to prove the text uncorrupt, against a gainsaying Papist. . . . So that, if we had no other surety for the truth of the Old Testament text, these men's pains, methinks, should be enough to stop the mouth of a daring Papist." (IV. p. 20.)

The marginal readings, may no doubt, "seem to tax the text

with so many errors." But these readings are only variant readings of different copies; and though Lightfoot is inclined to doubt if "these marginals are not only human corrections," yet he treats them with sobriety:

"A second question might follow concerning Keri and Kthib: and a suspicion might also arise, that the text of the law was not preserved perfect to 'one jot or tittle,' when so many various readings do so frequently occur. Concerning this business, we will offer these few thoughts only. . . . It is, therefore, very probable that the Keri and Kthib were compacted from the comparing of the two copies of the greatest authority, that is, the Jewish and the Babylonian: which when they differed from one another in so many places in certain little dashes of writing, but little or nothing at all as to the sense,—by very sound counsel they provided that both should be reserved, so that both copies might have their worth preserved, and the sacred text its purity and fulness, while not 'one jot,' nor 'one tittle' of it perished." (XI. 103.)

That this result was attained, he thinks is attested by our Lord in Matthew v. 18. For though he considers it plain that our Saviour "did not only understand the bare letters, and the little marks that distinguish them" in this declaration, yet—

"It appears enough hence, that our Saviour so far asserts the uncorrupt immortality and purity of the holy text, that, no particle of the sacred sense should perish, from the beginning to the end of it." (XI. p. 99-100.)

He argues stoutly that the Jews could not, in the nature of the case, have corrupted the Scripture:

"[1.] It was their great care and solicitude . . . to preserve the text in all purity and uncorruptness . . . [2.] Yet could they not, for all their care, but have some false copies go up and down amongst them, through heedlessness and error of transcribers. . . . [3.] In every synagogue they had a true copy; and it was their care everywhere to have their Bible as purely authentic as possible . . . [4.] Had they been ever so desirous to have imposed upon Christians by falsifying the text, they could not possibly do it. For—

"First," [every synagogue having a true copy, and many Jews being converted, it could not be done]. "Secondly," [there were so many learned men in the Christian church that detection would have been certain].

"[5.] To which may be added, that the same power and care of God that preserves the church would preserve the Scriptures pure to it; and he that did, and could, preserve the whole—could preserve every part, so that not so much as a tittle should perish." (III. 405-408.)

We have already remarked that Lightfoot was a very conservative textual critic. He speaks somewhat impatiently of the bold critics, "who are apt to tax the originals of Scripture of corrup-

tion and interpolation" (VII. p. 79); who, whenever for want of knowledge they are "not able to clear the sense," "have been bold to say the text is corrupt, and to frame a text of their own heads." (III. vii.) And he consistently refuses to assume a textual corruption, at Matthew xxvii. 9 for example, in order to ease the difficulty of the text (III. p. 157 and XI. p. 344.) An example of his methods and powers *as a textual critic* may be found in the several passages where he discusses Mark i. 2 (IV. p. 246 and XI. p. 377.) In the former of these passages he argues against the reading "in Isaiah" on five grounds; and in the latter he conjectures as to the origin of the various readings, that the Jewish Christians introduced the reading "in Isaiah" in order to conform the mode of quotation to the Talmudic rules of quoting. His use of internal evidence is exhibited again, in a comment on Acts iii. 20, "Which was before preached unto you":

"The very sense of the place confirmeth this reading: for though Beza saith that all the old Greek copies that ever he saw—as, also, the Syriac, Arabic, and Tertullian—read it *προεξεγερσμενον*, 'foreordained'; yet, the very scope and intention of Peter's speech, in this place, doth clearly show that it is to be read, *προεξεγγρημενον*, 'which before was preached unto you,'—namely, by Moses or the law; and by all the prophets." (VIII., p. 66.)

The same qualities and methods as a critic came out in several defences of the genuineness of the pericope of the adulteress intruded into John's Gospel (III., p. 112; VI., p. 302; XII., p. 312.) In the former passage he says:

"The Syriac wants this story: and Beza doubts it; a man always ready to suspect the text, because of the strangeness of Christ's action, writing with his finger on the ground: 'Mihi, ut ingenue loquor [saith he] vel ob hunc locum suspecta est haec historia.' Whereas it speaks the style of John throughout, and the demeanor of the scribes and Pharisees, and of Christ, most consonantly to their carriage all along the Gospel." (III., p. 112.)

In another place he accounts for its omission as follows:

"There is hardly any commentator upon the Gospel, or this chapter, but he will tell you that this story of the adulterous woman was wanting, and left out of some Greek Testaments in ancient times, as appears by this,—that some of the fathers setting themselves to expound this Gospel, make no mention at all of any part of this story. So Nonnus, turning all this Gospel into Greek verse, hath utterly left out this whole story; and so hath the Syriac New Testament first printed in Europe; and so Jerome tells us did some old Latin translations. When

I cast with myself whence this omission should proceed I cannot but think of two passages of Eusebius. The one is in his third book of Ecclesiastical History, the very last clause in that book,—where he relates that one Papias, an old tradition-monger, as he characterizes him, did first bring in this story of the adulterous woman, out of a book called the ‘Gospel according to the Hebrews.’ For so is that passage of Eusebius commonly understood. The other is in his fourth book of the Life of Constantine; where he relates that Constantine ‘enjoined him and committed to his trust to get transcribed *πεντήκοντα σωματίδια*’ . . . Now, if Eusebius believed that this story was introduced by Papias, as he seems to do,—you may well conclude that he would be sure to leave out this story in all his ‘fifty copies,’ as having no better authority than the introduction of it by such a man. Or if the ages before Eusebius were of the same belief with him in this matter, you may see why this story might also be wanting in those times. But I shall not trouble you about this matter, which is now past all dispute. For I believe, it is hardly possible in all the world, to find now a printed New Testament, either in the original Greek, or in any other language, either Eastern or Western, wherein this story is not inserted without any question. Nor had the thing been ever disputed, if the story itself had been searched to the bottom; for then, of itself, it would have vindicated its own authority to be evangelical and divine.” (VI., p. 302.)

It is apparent that, though of an extremely conservative temper, Lightfoot was a remarkably well-furnished and able critic for his day. The school of criticism to which he would belong, indeed, has scarcely advanced beyond him in either resources or capacities since his time; and all that was known of the state of the text or of materials for its study in his day was in his easy control.

*The difficulties of Scripture* formed, in a sense, the main matter of Lightfoot’s studies. He has, indeed, formally treated the subject in a single sermon only (VII. p. 201, *seq.*) But all his Talmudic studies were undertaken and are justified by the light which he hoped and found that they would throw upon the obscurities of the Biblical text; and his several expository treatises are specially busy with expounding the difficult passages of Scripture. In fact, his chief interest, after the determination of what may be called the background of the scriptural revelation—the chronology, topography, geography, historical consecution, and the like, of the Biblical story—seems to have been what he would call the ‘clearing of scruples’ in the text of Scripture. There is hardly a difficulty which had been started, from a harmonistic, chronological, or historical point of view, which he has not treated, sometimes more than once. In a study of his doctrine of Scrip-

ture, his treatment of these scriptural difficulties cannot be neglected. On the contrary, they exhibit his conception of Scripture in action; and a review of them will enable us to look upon his conception of Scripture in the most searching light that can be thrown upon it.

Lightfoot is very far from denying that *difficulties exist in Scripture*. If he is at fault in any respect here, it is in exaggerating their number and their intractableness. Nevertheless, he does not allow that these difficulties are really errors of Scripture, or even blemishes on the divine face of Scripture. Not only are all of them capable of satisfactory explanation; but each several one of them has been purposely introduced into Scripture by the Holy Ghost for a high and good end, and this end is discoverable by the careful and diligent student. The difficulties of Scripture are thus transferred from blots into beauties; from obstacles into aids to faith; from marks of human infirmity into examples of divine wisdom. In the preface to his *Harmony, etc., of the New Testament* (III. pp. vi., vii., xvi.), he speaks as follows on the general subject:

“I shall not trouble the reader with any long discourse, to show, how the Scripture abounds with transposition of stories; how the Holy Ghost doth, eminently, hereby show the majesty of his style and divine wisdom: how this is equally used in both testaments; what need the student hath carefully to observe these dislocations; and what profit he may reap by reducing them to their proper time and order. . . . .

“I have not set myself to comment; but in a transient way, to hint the clearing of some of the most conspicuous difficulties,—and that, partly, from the text itself,—and partly, from Talmudical collections. . . . . Multitudes of passages are not possibly to be explained but from these records. For, since the scene of the most acting in it, was among the Jews,—the speeches of Christ and his apostles were to the Jews,—and they Jews, by birth and education that wrote the Gospels and Epistles; it is no wonder if it speak the Jews’ dialect throughout; and glanceth at their traditions, opinions, and customs, at every step. . . . . Though it be penned in Greek, it speaks in the phrase of the Jewish nation, among whom it was penned, all along; and there are multitudes of expressions in it, which are not to be found but there, and in the Jews’ writings, in all the world. They are very much deceived that think the New Testament so very easy to be understood, because of the familiar doctrine it containeth,—faith and repentance. It is true, indeed, that it is plainer as to the matter it handleth, than the Old, because it is an unfolding of the Old;—but for the attaining of the understanding of the expressions that it useth in these explications, you must go two steps further than you do about the Old:—namely, to observe where, and how, it useth the Septuagint’s Greek, as it doth



very commonly;—and where it useth the Jews' idiom, or reference thereunto, which, indeed, it doth continually. . . . The greater part of the New Testament might be observed to speak in such reference to something or other commonly known, or used, or spoken, among the Jews; and even the difficultest passages in it might be brought to far more facility than they be, if these references were well observed. There are diverse places where commentators, not able to clear the sense for want of this, have been bold to say the text is corrupt, and to frame a text of their own heads; whereas the matter, sufficiently handled in this way, might have been made plain." (III., pp. vi, vii., xvi.)

In his sermon on the "Difficulties of Scripture," he tells us that the Holy Ghost purposely introduced difficulties into Scripture to challenge serious study of them; that they are all capable of solution; and that it is our business, and it will be our profit, to search out the solutions and their lessons.

"The Holy Ghost," he says, "hath purposely penned the Scriptures so as to challenge all serious study of them." . . . "Peter tells us that there are divers things in Paul's epistles hard to be understood; and why did the Holy Ghost dictate them so hard by Paul? . . . Because the Holy Ghost hath penned Scripture so as to challenge all serious study. He could have penned them all so plain that he that runneth might read them: but he hath penned them in such a style that he that will read them must not run and read, but sit down and study." (VII., p. 208.)

Accordingly these difficulties, which belong to the majesty of the Scriptures (VII. p. 212), both can be and are to be understood, for—

"God never writ the difficulties of the Scripture only to be gazed upon and never understood: never gave them as a book sealed and that never could be unsealed." (VII. p. 216.)

They may be great and numerous, so great that the Old and New Testament may now and again seem to be "directly contrary," "as if the two Testaments were fallen out and were not at unity among themselves" (VII. p. 210.) Yet this is but an incitement to the discovery of the underlying unity, and Lightfoot has nothing but scorn for those who

"have taken upon themselves to pick out some places in the Bible, which they say are past all possibility of interpreting or understanding." (VII. p. 211.)

These principles are repeatedly insisted upon. After enumerating such difficulties in another place, he continues thus:

"For resolution of such ambiguities, when you have found them, the text will do it, if it be well searched. . . . This way attained to will guide you itself in

what else is agreeable to profitable reading; as in marking those things that seem to be contradictions in the text, or slips of the Holy Ghost (in which always is admirable wisdom.) . . . Strange variations, yet always divine. . . . Admirable it is to see how the Holy Spirit of God in discords hath showed the sweet music. But few men mark this, because few take a right course in reading of Scripture. Hence, when men are brought to see flat contradictions (as unreconciled there be many in it), they are at amaze and ready to deny their Bible. A little pains right spent will soon amend this wavering, and settle men upon the Rock; whereon to be built is to be sure." (II. pp. 8, 9.)

In Peter's reference to the difficulties in Paul's epistles, he thinks he sees a proof of the intentional character of them:

"He citeth Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews, and giveth an honorable testimony to that, and to the rest of his epistles: but acknowledgeth that, in some places, they are hard to be understood and were misconstrued by some unlearned and unstable ones to their own ruin; yet neither doth he nor Paul, who was alive and well-knew of the wresting of his epistles, clear or amend these difficulties, but let them alone as they were: for the Holy Ghost has so penned Scripture as to set men to study." (III. p. 327.)

A few examples of his dealing with these difficulties will be instructive. The following are some *Old Testament cases*:

"Divers psalms in the original are alphabetical; but few of these have the alphabet true, for some reason or other admirably divine: so one letter in Jeremy's alphabetical Lamentations, is altered constantly, for secret and sweet reason." (II. p. 39.)

"Men frame intricacies and doubts to themselves here, [Gen. xi. on the age, birth, and call of Abraham], "where the text is plain, if it be not wrested." He proceeds to solve the several difficulties. (II. p. 88.)

On 2 Kings xxiv. 8, 9, and 2 Chron. xxxvi. 9, as to the age of Jehoiachin when he began to reign: "Now in expressions that are so different, propriety is not to be expected in both; but the one to be taken properly, and that is, that he was eighteen years old when he began to reign; and the other that he was the son of the eighth year, or fell in the lot of the eighth year after any captivity of Judah had begun: for the beginning of his reign was in the eighth year of Nebuchadnezzar; and in the eighth year of the seventy of captivity. And so the Holy Ghost dealeth here, as he doth about Ahaziah as we observed there." (II. p. 288.)

Accordingly, when speaking of 2 Kings viii. 26, as compared with 2 Chron. xxiii. 2, he had said: "The original meaneth thus, 'Ahaziah was the son of the two-and-forty years, — namely, of the house of Omri, of whose seed he was, by the mother's side; and he walked in the ways of that house, and came to ruin at the same time with it.'" (II. 227.)

Whatever we may think of the reasonableness of such harmonizing, its serious presentation exhibits Lightfoot's conviction of the harmonizable character of the whole Old Testament text,

and shows how far he was from readiness to allow that it contained errors.

Let us note now a few *cases from the New Testament* :

“Only there is some difference betwixt Matthew and Luke, in relating the order of the temptations: which Matthew having laid down in their proper rank, . . . Luke, in the rehearsing of them, is not so much observant of the order [that being fixed by Matthew before], as he is careful to give the full story; and so to give it, as might redound to the fullest information. . . . As our mother Eve was tempted by Satan, . . . so by these, had it been possible, would the same tempter have overthrown the seed of the woman. . . . Luke, for our better observing of this parallel, hath laid the order of these temptations answerable to the order of those.” (III. p. 41, cf. IV. p. 348.)

On Luke v. 12 seq.; Matt. iv. 18 seq.; Mark i. 16 seq.: “In the order of Luke there is some difficulty: 1. He relateth the calling of these disciples differently from the relation given by the others . . . They say, he called James and John at some distance beyond Peter and Andrew; but he carrieth it as if he called them all together. But this is not contrariety, but for the more illustration; they all speak the same truth, but one helps to explain another. . . 2. A second scruple in the order of Luke is this,—that he hath laid the two miracles of casting out a devil in Capernaum-synagogue, and the healing of Peter’s mother-in-law, before the calling of these disciples; which apparently by this evangelist were after. But the reason hereof may be conceived to be, especially, this, . . . having an eye, in that his relation, rather to the place than to the time. And so we shall observe elsewhere, that the very mention of a place doth sometimes occasion these holy penmen to produce stories out of their proper time, to affix them to that, their proper place.” (III., pp. 52-53.) “And thus the scope of his (Luke’s) method is plain. And here again we see an example of what was said before,—namely, that the mention of a place doth oftentimes occasion these holy penmen to speak of stories out of their proper time, because they would take up the whole story of that place all at once or together.” (III., p. 58.)

As to the Gadarene miracle: “The main doubt lies in this; that whereas Mark and Luke speak but of one possessed, Matthew speaks of two. So I observe that Matthew speaks of two blind men begging at Jericho, whereas Mark speaks of but one; and so likewise Matthew speaks of both the thieves mocking Christ, whereas Luke speaks of but one of them so doing”—[He gives several possible views of the harmony and then continues]: “But the other examples adduced, where Matthew speaking of two, Mark and Luke speak but of one, it is plain and satisfactory that these two latter, writing after Matthew, and he having given the story before them, numbering the persons concerned in it,—they have not been curious so much to specify the number of the persons on whom the miracles were wrought, which he had done before, as careful to record the miracle done,—that none of Christ’s workings might be left unrecorded, as to the nature of the thing done.” (III., p. 84.)

As to the place of singing the hymn at the Passover: “Which, indeed, is neither contrariety nor diversity of story, but only variety of relation for the holding out of the story more complete.” (III., p. 151.)

On Mark's "third" hour and John's "fifth": "Mark, therefore, in that calculation of time, takes his date from the first time that Pilate gave him up to their abusings; and his phrase may be taken of so comprehensive an intimation, as to speak both the time of his first giving up, 'at the third hour' of the day, and the time of his nailing to the cross, 'the third hour' from that. And much after the same manner of account that our Saviour's six hours' suffering, from Pilate's first giving him up, to his dying, are reckoned, so the four hundred and thirty years of sojourning of the children of Israel in Egypt (Ex xii.) are computed; namely, the one half before they came into Egypt and the other half after." (III., p. 162.)

On the inscriptions on the cross: "In the expression of which the variety of the evangelists shows their style, and how when one speaketh short, another enlargeth, and what need of taking all together to make up the full story . . . Their variety is only in wording this for the reader's understanding." (III., p. 165.)

On Luke v. and its parallels: "Now, though there seem to be these different, yea, contrary circumstances in the evangelists' relation, yet is the story but one and the same, but only related more largely by Luke than by the others." (V., p. 149.)

One of the most common internal difficulties in the Scriptures arises from what Lightfoot calls "*transposition and dislocation of times and texts.*" Of this he speaks as follows:

"The same Spirit that dictated both the Testaments hath observed this course in both the Testaments alike: laying texts, chapters, and histories sometimes out of the proper place, in which, according to natural chronological order, they should have lain. And this is one of the majestiknesses, wherewithal the Holy Ghost marcheth and passeth through the Scriptures. Not that these dislocations are imperfections,—for they ever show the greatest wisdom: nor that to methodise these transposed passages is to correct the method of the Holy Ghost;—for it is but to unknot such difficulties as the Holy Ghost hath challenged more study on; nor that it is desirable that our Bibles should be printed in such a methodised way and such Bibles only to be in common use,—for the very posture of the Bible as it now lieth, seemeth to be divine". . . (II., p. lxii.)

An example or two should be given also of Lightfoot's mode of dealing with *historical difficulties* in Scripture:

Of Cyrenius: "Either Cyrenius came twice into Syria to lay taxations, as Funcius contendeth, or else Josephus faileth here, as he doth not seldom elsewhere, in chronology." (IV. p. 193.)

Of Theudas, more fully: "This were a very ready and easy interpretation of these words of Gamaliel, if this great scruple did not lie in the way:—namely, that this Theudas, mentioned by Josephus, was about the fourth or fifth year of Claudius; but this Theudas mentioned by Gamaliel, was before Judas the Galilean, which was in the days of Augustus. There is a great deal of ado among expositors what to make of these two stories, so like in substance, but so different in time. Some conceive that Josephus hath missed his chronology, and hath set Theudas'

story many years later than it fell out. Others refuse Josephus' story as not applicable to the Theudas of Gamaliel, [though they hold that he hath spoken true in it], because the time is so different; but they think Gamaliel's Theudas was some of those villains, that so much infested Judea in the time of Sabinus and Varus,—Joseph. Ant. lib. 17, cap. 12: though Josephus hath not there mentioned him by name. A third sort conceive that Gamaliel's Theudas was not before Judas the Galilean, who rose about the birth of Christ, but a long while after,—namely, a little before Gamaliel speaketh these words: and they render  $\pi\rho\delta\ \acute{\eta}\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{\omega}\nu$  in the strict propriety,—namely, that it was but 'a few days before:' and  $\mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\delta\tau\omicron\nu$ , not 'post eum,' 'after him,'—but 'praeter eum,' 'besides him.' In these varieties of opinions and difficulties, it is hard to resolve which way to take; and it is well that it is a matter of that nature that men may freely use their conjectures in it and be excusable." (VIII. p. 82.) He goes on to give it as his own opinion that Josephus' and Gamaliel's Theudas are not the same, but two different men; the second possibly a disciple of the other. This was published in 1645. In a posthumous book he adopts another opinion, as follows: "Josephus makes mention of one Theudas, an impostor, whose character, indeed, agrees well enough with this of ours; but they seem to disagree in time. . . . Those that are advocates of Josephus, do imagine there might be another Theudas, besides him that he mentions; and they do but imagine it, for they name none. I could instance, indeed, two more of that name; neither of which agrees with this of Gamaliel, or will afford any light to the chronology of Josephus. . . . Can we suppose now that Gamaliel could have either of these Theudas in his eye? Indeed, neither the one nor the other has any agreeableness with that character, that is given of this Theudas about whom we are inquiring. That in Josephus is much more adapted; and grant only that the historian might slip in his chronology, and there is no other difficulty in it. Nor do I, indeed, see why we should give so much deference to Josephus in this matter, as to take such pains in vindicating his care and skill in it. We must (forsooth) find out some other Theudas, or change the stops in the verses, or invent some other plaster for the sore,—rather than Josephus should be charged with the least mistake; to whom yet, both in history and chronology, it is no unusual thing to trip or go out of the way of truth. I would, therefore, think that the Theudas in Josephus is the same in Gamaliel; only that the historian mistook in his accounts of time, and so defaced a true story by a false chronology." (VIII. p. 401.)

The difficulties that arise from the quotation of the *Old Testament in the New* furnished Lightfoot, naturally, much material for the exercise of his harmonistic skill. We give a few examples of his dealing with them.

With reference to the application of the *Old Testament passages* in the New:

On Matt. ii. 15 and 18: "The two obligations produced here out of the Old Testament . . . are of that fulness, that they speak of two things apiece, and may very fitly be applied unto them both and show that the one did resemble and

prefigure the other." (IV., p. 231.) "The Holy Ghost, therefore, doth elegantly set forth this lamentation by personating Rachel." (IV., p. 232.)

On Acts i. 16: "Now the application of these places so pertinently and home to Judas, showeth the illumination and knowledge, that the breathing and giving of the Holy Ghost had wrought in the disciples." (VIII., p. 36.)

With reference to the New Testament dealing with *Old Testament facts* :

Commenting on Acts vii. 4 and 7: "The Holy Ghost indeed hath ascribed the conduct of this journey to Terah. . . . This clause [Acts vii. 7] is here alledged<sup>1</sup> by Stephen, as if it had been spoken to Abraham; whereas it was spoken to Moses four hundred years after. But the Holy Ghost useth to speak short in known stories; as Mat. i. 13; 1 Chron. i. 36; Mark i. 3, 2." (VIII., pp. 110, 111; cf. 112.)

On Luke xi. 51, on Zecharias, son of Berachias, whom he identifies with Zechariah, son of Jehoiada, referring to Isaiah viii. 2 (cf. XI. 288): "If any one hesitates about the changing of the name, let him say by what name he finds Jehoiada recited in that catalogue of priests set down in 1 Chron. vi. . . . If by another name, you will say (supposing he be also called Barachias), he was then a man of three names. This, indeed, is no unusual thing with that nation, for some to have more names than one: nay, if you will believe the Jewish doctors, even Moses himself had no less than ten." (XII., p. 123.)

With reference to *the freedom of quotation* by the writers of the New Testament from the Old:

"The evangelists and apostles, when they take on them to cite any text from the Old Testament, are not so punctual to observe the exact and strict form of words, as the pith of them, or sense of the place, as might be instanced in many particulars: so that the difference of the words would not prejudice the argument in sense, were there not so great difference [between Mark i. 2 and its Old Testament original] of person, as *we* and *thee*." He then argues that this variation is intentional, not "to cross and deny," but to explain and illustrate: "The majesty of Scripture doth often show itself in requoting of places, in this,—that it alledgeth them in difference of words and difference of sense; yea sometime sin contrariety. . . . Wherein the Holy Ghost, having penned a thing in one place, doth, by variety of words and sense, enlarge and expound himself in another." (IV. p. 246.)

On Luke i. 17, from Malachi: "But, first, the Holy Ghost is not so punctual to cite the very letter of the prophet as to give the sense." (IV. p. 155.)

On Matthew ii. 6: he notes the differences and undertakes to investigate<sup>1</sup> them clause by clause. On the substitution in the first clause of "in the land of Juda," for "Ephratah," he remarks: "First, there are some that give the general answer to all the differences in this quotation, that the scribes and the evangelists tie not themselves to the very words of the prophet, but only think it well to render his sense. And this answer may be very well entertained, and give good satisfaction, especially

<sup>1</sup> The reader will, of course, remember that "alledged" means "adduced" or "quoted", not "affirmed," "asserted."

since that, in allegations from the Old Testament, it is usual with the New so to do,—but that the difference between the text and the quotation is so great, that it is not only diverse, but even contrary. Some, therefore, Secondly,” . . . [attribute the change to the error of the scribes, whom the evangelist accurately represents ; but Lightfoot rejoins that the scribes knew their Bible too well to fall into such an error] . . . “Thirdly, Whereas some talk of a Syriac edition, which the Jews used at that time more than the Hebrew, and which had this text of Micah as the evangelist has cited it” . . . [he objects that this rests on two unsupported conjectures, and finally determines as follows :] . . . “The scribes or the evangelists, or both, did thus differently quote the prophet, neither through forgetfulness, nor through misleading of an erroneous edition, but purposely and upon a rational intent”—viz., to convey their meaning better to Herod. The variation in the second clause : “but not the least” is met by an exegesis of the Hebrew, showing it to be consonant ; then, “The text of the prophet, then, being rendered in this interpretation, this allegation of the evangelist will be found not to have any contrariety to it at all, but to speak, though not in the very same words, yet to the very same tenor and purpose . . . And thus doth the evangelist express the prophet’s mind, though he tie not his expression to his very words, alledging his text to its clearest sense, and to the easier apprehension of the hearer” . . . The change in the third clause, “princes,” is shown to be, with a difference of words, the same sense ; and so with the fourth clause : “But here again doth he differ from the letter of prophet, but cometh so near the sense, that the difference is no difference at all.” (IV. p. 224.)

On Matt. iv. 12, where “only” is inserted ; “But first, our Saviour applies the text close to the present occasion. . . . Our Saviour doth reduce it to such a particular, as was most pertinent and agreeable to the matter in hand. And so parallels might be shown in great variety: where one place of Scripture, citing another, doth not retain the very words of the portion cited, but doth sometimes change the expression to fit the occasion; as Matt. ii. 23, translates Netzer,—‘a branch,’ in Isaiah liii. 4,—‘a man of Nazareth.’ . . . Secondly, although the word *only* be not in the Hebrew text, yet it is in the LXX.; . . . and it is most ordinary for the evangelists to follow that copy. And that translation hath warrantably added it, seeing (as Beza well observeth) so much is included in the emphatical particule *hunc*; and is also understood by comparing with other places.” (IV. 346).

The complication of the problem of New Testament *quotation*, through the use of the *Septuagint*, alluded to in the last extract, is always kept in mind by Lightfoot. Thus :

“The Apostle” [in Hebrews xi. 21] “there follows the LXX.; that in their unprieked Bibles read ‘matteh,’ ‘a rod,’ for ‘mettah,’ ‘a bed’” (II. 107).

One of the most striking cases of the New Testament’s agreement with the *Septuagint* text concerns the insertion of a second Cainan in the genealogical tables, which appears also in Luke’s genealogy of our Lord. This is repeatedly referred to by Lightfoot:

On Genesis xi. 11, 13: "Arphaxad. . . . The LXX. makes him the father of Cainan, which never was in being; and yet is that followed by St. Luke, for special reasons." (II. 90).

On Luke iii. 36: he speaks of the insertion of Cainan, of there being no mention of him in the Old Testament genealogies, "nor, indeed," he adds, "was there ever any such a man in the world at all"; and remarks that it is easy to see that Luke obtained him out of the LXX. Then he adds: "But when this is resolved, the greater scruple is yet behind,—of his warrantableness so to do, and of the purity of the text when it is done." "And from hence" [the LXX.] "hath St. Luke, without controversy, taken in Cainan into this genealogy,—a man that never was in the world; but the warrantableness of this insertion will require divers considerations to find it out." He sets forth that the Seventy were forced to translate the Bible against their will, and did it as ill as they could, using an "unpricked Bible" as one device to mislead; and that they inserted the "said name," Cainan, as one of their tricks. God used the LXX. "as the key for the admission of the heathen, and as a harbinger to the New Testament." Luke writes with a universal interest and intent. Now, he argues:

"This being the intent of the pedigree's placing here, as the very placing of it doth inevitably evince, it is not only warrantable, but also admirably divine, that Luke taketh in Cainan from the Seventy. For, first, writing for heathens, he must follow the heathens' Bible in his quotations. Secondly, in genealogies he was a copier, not a corrector. Thirdly, and chiefly, In following 'this insertion of the Seventy, he embraceth not their error, but divinely draweth us to look at their intent.

"When Jude mentioneth Michael's striving with Satan about the body of Moses, he approveth not the story as true, which he knew to be but a Talmudic parable; but, from the Jews' own authors, he useth this as an argument against them, and for their own instruction.

"So, though Luke, from the LXX., the Bible of the heathen, have alleged Cainan the son of Arphaxad, he allegeth it not as the truth, more than the Hebrew; but from the LXX's own authority, or from the matter which they inserted in distaste of the calling of the heathen, he maketh comfortable use and instruction to the heathen concerning their calling. . . . Thus are the censers of Korah and his company, though ordained for an evil end by them, yet reserved in the sanctuary for a good, by the command of God." (IV. p. 325.)

The same argument, in essence, is repeated much more fully in another passage; and as the matter is important to help us to estimate Lightfoot's methods, we shall quote it pretty much at large. He is sure that Luke here follows the LXX:

"I cannot be persuaded by any arguments, that this passage concerning Cainan was in Moses's text, or, indeed, in any Hebrew copies which the LXX. used . . . But now if this version be so uncertain, and differs so much from the original,—how comes it to pass that the evangelists and apostles should follow it so exactly, and that even in some places where it does so widely differ from the Hebrew fountain?"



“*Ans.* I. It pleased God to allot the censers of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, to sacred use, because they were so ordained and designed by the first owners;—so doth it please the Holy Ghost to determine that version to his own use, being so primarily ordained by the first authors. . . . So the Greek version, designed for sacred use, as designed for the Holy Bible,—so it was kept and made use of by the Holy Ghost.

II. Whereas the New Testament was to be wrote in Greek, and came into the hands chiefly of Gentiles,—it was most agreeable,—I may say most necessary, for them, to follow the Greek copies, as being what the Gentiles were only capable of consulting; that so they, examining the histories and quotations that were brought out of the Old Testament, might find them agreeing with, and not contradicting them. . . .

III. . . . *Object.* But the clause, that is before us (to omit many others), is absolutely false; for there was neither any Cainan the son of Arphaxad; nor was Jesus the son of any Cainan, that was born after the flood.

*Ans.* I. There could be nothing more false as to the thing itself than that of the Apostle, when he calleth the preaching of the gospel *μωροίαν*, ‘foolishness,’ 1 Cor. i. 21: and yet, according to the common conceptions of foolish men, nothing more true. So neither was this true in itself, that is asserted here; but only so in the opinion of those for whose sake the evangelist writes. Nor yet is it the design of the Holy Ghost to indulge them in anything that was not true; but only would not lay a stumbling-block at present before them. ‘I am made all things to all men that I might gain some.’

II. There is some parallel with this of St. Luke, and that in the Old Testament, 1 Chron. i. 36: ‘The sons of Eliphaz, Teman, and Omar, and Zephi, and Gatam, and Timnah, and Amalek.’ Where it is equally false that Timnah was the son of Eliphaz, as it is that Cainan was the son of Arphaxad. But far, far, be it from me to say, that the Holy Ghost was either deceived himself, or would deceive others! Timnah was not a man, but a woman; not the son of Eliphaz, but his concubine; not Amalek’s brother, but his mother, Gen. xxxv. 12. Only the Holy Ghost teaches us by this shortness of speech, to recur to the original story, from whence those things are taken,—and there consult the determinate explication of the whole matter: which is frequently done by the same Holy Spirit, speaking very briefly in stories well known before.

The Gentiles have no reason to cavil with the evangelist in this matter; for he agrees well enough with their Bibles. And if the Jews, or we ourselves, should find fault, he may defend him from the common usage of the Holy Ghost, in whom it is no rare or unusual thing, in the recital of stories and passages well enough known before, to vary from the original, and yet without any design of deceiving, or suspicion of being himself deceived; but according to that majesty and authority that belongs to him, dictating and referring the reader to the primitive story, from whence he may settle and determine the state of the matter, and inquire into the reasons of the variation. St. Stephen imitates this very custom while he is speaking of the burial of the patriarchs, Acts vii. 15, 16; being well enough understood by his Jewish auditory, though giving but short hints in a story so well known.

III. It is one thing to dictate from himself, and another thing to quote

what is dictated from others, as our Evangelist in this place doth. And when he did without all question, write in behalf of the Gentiles, being the companion of him, who was the first apostle to the Gentiles,—what should hinder his alleging what had been dictated in their Bibles?

When the apostle names the magicians of Egypt, Jannes and Jambres, 2 Tim. iii. 9, he doth not deliver it for a certain thing, or upon his credit assure them, that these were their very names, but allegeth only what had been delivered by others, what had been the common tradition amongst them, well enough known to Timothy, a thing about which neither he nor any other would start any controversy.

So when the apostle Jude speaks of Michael contending with the devil about the body of Moses, he doth not deliver it for a certain and authentic thing; and yet is not to be charged with any falsehood, because he doth not dictate of his own, but only appeals to something that had been told by others, using an argument with the Jews fetched, from their own books and traditions."

[IV. Argues that if fault is to be found for adding Cainan, it is to be found with the Seventy and not with Luke.] (XII., pp. 54-62)

In estimating the meaning of such a passage as this, we must remember that, for our present purpose, the question is not whether Lightfoot succeeds in saving the credit of the sacred writers, on the grounds which he alleges; but whether he considered himself to succeed in doing so. We are not investigating the real value of his arguments; but the value which he placed upon them. We may possibly ourselves think that the method which he here adopts, and the explanations which he offers, will leave the New Testament writers chargeable with faults and errors, which impinge upon their infallibility; but it is quite evident that Lightfoot did not think so. On the basis of the explanation which we have just quoted, he felt able to say that there "never was in the world" such a man as Cainan mentioned in Luke's genealogy of Christ, that the story of Michael's striving with Satan for Moses' body was "but a Talmudic parable," that Jannes and Jambres were but invented names of the Egyptian magicians; and yet to declare in the same breath that the whole of the books which make mention of them, in all their parts and words and letters, were the dictation of the Holy Ghost, who is incapable of error. He declares that Luke's following the LXX. in the insertion of Cainan was "not only warrantable, but admirably divine," and that in doing so "he embraceth not the error, but divinely draweth us to look at the intent." In such matters the Holy Ghost acts "according to that majesty and

authority that belongs to him;" and the sacred writers are not to be "charged with any falsehood" on their account.

The principles on which Lightfoot bases these explanations are those of accommodation and of the *argumentum ex concessis*. He supposes that the sacred writers, in making use of such material, do it in order to avoid arousing the opposition of their readers or to refute and convince them out of their own mouths; and that this use of such material does not commit the sacred writers to its truth. There can be no question that the *argumentum ex concessis* is a legitimate form of argument; and none that the sacred writers make use of it: and if Lightfoot can succeed in subsuming the present instances under this argument, he has no doubt succeeded in his explanations of them. The point of doubt is whether these are cases of this kind of argument. He held that they are. He argues this indeed with iterated persistency. Let us gather some of the chief passages together:

"Whence had the apostle these names, [Jannes and Jambres]? From the common-received opinion and agreement of the Jewish nation, that currently asserted that the magicians of Egypt were called by these names. . . . So that the apostle takes up these two names neither by revelation, as certainly asserting that the sorcerers of Egypt were of these names; but as he found the names commonly received by the Jewish nation, so he useth them.

Such a passage is that of the apostle Jude about 'Michael's contending with the devil about the body of Moses:' which he neither speaketh by inspiration<sup>1</sup> nor by way of certain assertion,—but only citing a common opinion and conceit of the nation, he taketh an argument of their own authors and concessions." (VI. p. 90.)

Commenting on Jude, 9th verse, elsewhere: "Not that ever such a dispute was betwixt Michael or Christ, and the devil about Moses' body; but the Jews have such a conceit and story, and we meet it in their writings: and the apostle useth an argument from their own saying to confute their doing." (VII. p. 179.)

"In citing the story of 'Michael the archangel contending with the devil about the body of Moses,' he doth but the same that Paul doth in naming Jannes and Jambres; merely allege a story which was current and owned among the nation, though there were no such thing in Scripture; and so he argueth with them from their own authors and concessions. . . . His alleging the prophecy of Enoch is an arguing of the very like nature; as citing and referring to some known and common tradition, that they had among them to this purpose. . . . And in

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<sup>1</sup>Lightfoot's use of "inspiration" as equivalent to "revelation" just above, must not deceive us into supposing that he means that Jude did not do this under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. See the further passages, and compare above, for his use of the word "inspiration."

both these he useth their own testimonies against themselves; as if he should thus have spoken at large: 'These men speak evil of dignities,' whereas they have sown a story for current, that even 'Michael the archangel' did not speak evil of the devil, when he was striving with him about the body of Moses, &c. And whereas they show and own a prophecy of Enoch, of God coming in judgment, &c., why, these are the very men to whom such a matter is to be applied,' &c. It is no strange thing in the New Testament for Christ and the Apostles to deal and argue with the Jews upon their own concessions." (VII. 328.)

This "useful principle of interpreting" is further illustrated in connection with a former passage (VII. p. 179) by an exposition of Acts vii. 53, where Lightfoot translates "*unto* the disposition of angels."

"As if Stephen did rub their own opinion upon them, as is frequently done by the apostles, and that his meaning should be this: 'You say, and conceive, that the very receiving of the law did translate and dispose them that heard it into the predicate and state of angels; and yet this brave law you have not kept. The law that you conceit made others angels . . . . hath had no good effect upon you at all: for ye have not kept it.'" (VIII. p. 179.)

He then cites another case of the Apostles arguing thus, "to confute them from their own opinions and tenets," viz., 1 Cor. xi. 10, which, indeed, may be a case in point.

Whether we can follow Lightfoot in looking upon all these cases as cases of arguments *ex concessis* or not, we can at least understand that his thinking so gave him an explanation of them which enabled him to contend at the same time that the facts involved were not true, and yet that the biblical writers were absolutely infallible or inerrant: they did not put them forward as facts. And on this general principle, he was inclined to deal with all testimonies borrowed by the writers of the Bible from sources of authority among their readers; in such cases they were "copiers, not correctors." Thus:

"Jacob goeth down into Egypt with seventy souls. . . . . The LXX. have added five more . . . . from 1 Chron. vii. 14, 20, &c.: followed by St. Luke, Acts vii. 14." (II. p. 10±.)

Matthew took "the latter end of his genealogy," and Luke "the beginning of his," from "the public registers," "leaving then the civil records to avouch for them if they should be questioned." (IV. 172-73.)

So Matthew took Rahab's marriage to Salmon, "from ancient records." (IV. p. 174, cf. 177.)

There are other instances also in which Lightfoot's explanations

may not seem to us to be satisfactory or indeed suitable. For example, there is a case of quite extreme application of *the principle of accommodation* in his explanation of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. He supposes that Christ framed the parable according to the common Greek opinion as to Elysium and Tartarus; which empties the whole mass of details in the story of its value as a revelation of the future state. And there is a case also in which two inconsistent explanations are offered, the latter of which suggests something very similar to the modern critical *theory of "re-working,"*—though, of course, with a difference. He is discussing Psalm lxxxix., which he considers to be by Ethan, son of Zerah, "penned many years before Moses, in bondage in Egypt;" and he raises the difficulty that David is often mentioned in it, to answer it thus:

"*Answer.* 1. This might be done prophetically; as Samuel is thought to be named by Moses, Psa. xcix. 6: for that Psalm, according to a rule of the Hebrews, is thought to have been made by him. 2. It will be found in Scripture, that when some holy men, endued with the Spirit of God, have left pieces of writings behind them, indited by the Spirit,—others that have lived in after-times, endued with the same gift of prophecy, have taken these ancient pieces in hand, and have flourished upon them, as present, past, and future occasion did require. To this purpose compare Psa. xviii. and 1 Saml. xxii.; Obadiah and Jer. xlix. 14; and 1 Chron. xvi. and Psa. xcvi. and cv.; and 2 Peter ii. and the Epistle of St. Jude, verse 18. So this piece of Ethan, being of incomparable antiquity and singing of the delivery from Egypt,—in after-times, that it might be made fit to be sung in the temple, it is taken in hand by some divine penman, and that groundwork of his is wrought upon, and his song set to a higher key; namely, that whereas he treated only of the bodily deliverance from Egypt, it is wound up so high as to reach the spiritual delivery by Christ; and therefore, David is so often named, from whom he should come." (II. p. 357.)

In these passages we have probably Lightfoot at his worst. Acute, learned, full of expedients, and always reverently bearing in mind, before all things, that the Scriptures are literally the word of God, in which there can be no error; he yet is overtaken by the fault which so often attends the harmonist, and overreaches himself with unnatural subtleties which raise more difficulties than they lay. It would be a blunder to suppose that this type of explanation is characteristic of Lightfoot. Were our purpose to estimate his ability and his resources as a harmonist, there would be quite a different body of examples to be adduced, far more

characteristic of him and far more worthy of his great learning and good judgment. But as our object is to investigate his attitude towards Scripture, we have been forced to adduce rather those instances that have fallen under our eye, in which his dealings with Scripture might be misapprehended by a careless reader as involving the admission of errors in the text of Scripture. It will be only fair, however, that we shall set over against these instances of overstrained subtlety at least one example of his more satisfactory exposition; and we shall choose for this his treatment of that *crux* of interpreters.—Matt. xxvii. 9. He discusses this text twice, and to the same effect in both instances; we quote the substance of both passages:

“And here a quotation of Matthew hath troubled expositors so far that divers have denied the purity of the text . . . whereas these words are not to be found in Jeremiah at all; but in Zechariah they are found. Now Matthew speaks, according to an ordinary manner of speaking, used among the Jews, and by them would, easily and without cavil, be understood, though he cited a text of Zechariah under the name of Jeremiah: for the illustration of which matter we must first produce a record of their own.” He proceeds to quote the well-known passage in *Baba Babra* fol. 14, f. 2, on the order of the books in the Old Testament, in which the “Prophets” stand thus: Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isaiah, the Twelve, and continues: “And thus in their Bibles of old, Jeremiah came next after the Book of Kings, and stood first in the volume of the prophets. So that Matthew’s alleging of a text of Zechariah, under the name of Jeremy, doth but allege a text out of the volume of the prophets, under his name that stood first in that volume: and such a manner of speech is that of Christ (Luke xxiv. 44) . . . in which he follows the general division that we have mentioned—only he calleth the ‘whole third part’ or ‘hagiographa’ by the title of ‘the Psalms,’ because the Book of Psalms stood first of all the books of that part. In that saying, Matthew xvi. 14, . . . there is the same reason why Jeremiah alone is named by name,—viz., because his name stood first in the volume of the prophets: and so came first in their way, when they were speaking of the prophets.” (III., 157.)

“How much this place hath troubled interpreters, let the famous Beza, instead of many others, declare: ‘This knot hath hampered all the most ancient interpreters; in that the testimony here is taken out of Zechariah, and not from Jeremiah; so that it seems plainly to have been ἀμάρτημα μνημονιζόν, “a failing of memory,” as Augustine supposes in his third book, “De consensu evangelistarum,” chapter the seventh; as also Eusebius in the twentieth book Ἀποδείξις ὧς, “of demonstration.” But if any one had rather impute this error to the transcribers, or (as I rather suppose) to the unskilfulness of some person, who put in the name of “Jeremiah,” where the evangelist had writ only, as he often doth in other places, Διὰ τοῦ προφήτου, “by the prophet,”—yet we must confess that this error hath long since crept into the Holy Scriptures, as Jerome expressly affirms,’ &c. \*

“But (with the leave of so great men) I do not only deny that so much as one

letter is spurious, or crept in without the knowledge of the evangelist, but I do confidently assert that Matthew wrote 'Jeremy,' as we read it,—and that it was very readily understood and received by his countrymen. We will transcribe the following monument of antiquity out of the Talmudists, and then let the reader judge" . . . [quoting Bab. *Bava Bathra*, folio 14, 2]. . . . "You have this tradition, quoted by David Kimchi in his preface to Jeremiah. Whence it is very plain that Jeremiah, of old, had the first place among the prophets: and hereby he comes to be mentioned above all the rest, Matt. xvi. 14, because he stood first in the volume of the prophets, therefore he is first named. When, therefore, Matthew produceth a text of Zechariah under the name of Jeremy, he only cites the words of the volume of the prophets under his name, who stood first in the volume of the prophets. Of which sort is that also of our Saviour, in Luke xxiv. 44: 'All things must be fulfilled, which are written of me in the law, and the prophets, and the Psalms.' 'In the Psalms:' that is, in the Book of Hagiographa, in which the Psalms were placed first." (XI. p. 344.)

Surely this is a very admirable specimen of harmonizing. The fact appealed to is an indisputable one;<sup>1</sup> and the usage of quoting a section of the Scriptures by the name of its first book is shown to be a New Testament usage. The only fault to be found with the treatment is that Lightfoot is a little too sure that his explanation is the only possible one. Plausible and satisfactory as it is, we should rather see the whole case put in a properly apologetical form, and their full weight allowed to all the possibilities; somewhat thus: 1, It is not absolutely certain that Matthew wrote "Jeremiah," and not "Zechariah." 2, It is not certain that a passage in Zechariah might not be properly quoted under the title "Jeremiah." 3, It is not certain that a passage in Jeremiah might not have been intended, as well as the passage in Zechariah which supplies some of the words cited. But we are not now discussing the errorlessness of the Scriptures, but Lightfoot's obviously firmly-held belief that they are errorless. And it is clear that he found no error in the citation in Matthew xxvii. 9, which has been in all time, and is now afresh in our day, made to do duty as the plainest of all the errors found in Scripture.

Here we may bring our study of Lightfoot to a close. It is perfectly evident that his fundamental conception of Scripture

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<sup>1</sup> Compare Ryle, *The Canon of the Old Testament*, pages 226 *et seq.*, for the commonness and the antiquity—Ryle thinks the originality—of the order appealed to by Lightfoot.

was that it is the Book of God, the "dictates of the Holy Spirit," of every part and every element of which—its words and its very letters—God is himself the responsible author. It is perfectly evident that he would have considered it blasphemy to say that there is anything in it—in the way of falseness of statement, or error of inadvertence—which would be unworthy of God, its Author, who as Truth itself, lacks neither truthfulness nor knowledge. It is perfectly evident, in a word, that he shared the common doctrine of Scripture of the Reformed dogmaticians of the middle of the seventeenth century. It is perfectly evident also, we may add, that his doctrine of Scripture is generally that of the Westminster Confession; and that he could freely and with a good conscience vote for every clause of that admirable—the most admirable extant—statement of the Reformed doctrine of Holy Scripture. It is a desperate cause indeed, which begins by misinterpreting that statement, and then seeks to bolster this obvious misinterpretation by asserting that men like Lightfoot, and Rutherford, and Lyford, and Capel, and Ball, and Baxter, did not believe in the doctrines of verbal inspiration and the inerrancy of Scripture. If they did not believe in these doctrines, human language is incapable of expressing belief in doctrines. Is it not a pity that men are not content with corrupting our doctrines, but must also corrupt our history?

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

*Princeton.*



### III. THE BOOK OF JONAH.

THE analysis of the contents and scope of the Book of Jonah, which appeared in No. 4, Vol. IV., of the *Union Seminary Magazine*, is novel, while it is certainly ingenious and interesting. The natural effect of so excellent an article is to lead one to an independent study of the book, and as such examination leads the present writer to different conclusions, it is hoped that another analysis may not be unprofitable.

That the Book of Jonah is real history there can be no doubt in the mind of the devout and unprejudiced student. The record in the fourteenth chapter of 2 Kings mentions the identical Jonah, the son of Amittai, who was a prophet of Israel during the reign of Jeroboam II.; and this fact, taken in connection with our Lord's references to the prophecy of Jonah (Matt. xii. 39; xvi. 4; Luke xi. 29), is sufficient to establish not only the reality of the person, but the reliability of the history. But not only does the use which our Lord made of the Book of Jonah establish its truthfulness as narrative, it establishes with equal clearness the fact that behind the narrative lies a hidden and important meaning.

We should not say with the writer of the above mentioned article that it is a "historical parable," but rather that it is *prophetic or typical history*. The two propositions are very different. The author of the analysis in question adduces instances of typical history to prove "that the Book of Jonah may be real history, and none the less an allegory or parable in its ultimate purpose." This shows that he fails to recognize the distinction between type and allegory. The distinction, however, is an important one, so important indeed that Horne in his *Introduction* rejects the view that the prophecy of Jonah is a "parabolic history," as being inconsistent with its character as a "real narrative of a real person." Properly understood there can be no such thing as a historical parable. The parable contains no idea of history, and a history which is typical must contain something more than simply

analogy or resemblance; we must know that the analogy was intended to foreshadow some higher truth, and to establish this we must have evidence from divine authority.

Horne, in a chapter on the interpretation of types, quotes Bishop Marshe's Lectures, in which he says: "If we assert that a person or thing was designed to prefigure another person or thing, where no such prefiguration has been declared by divine authority, we make an assertion of which we neither have nor can have the slightest foundation." In the light of such a canon of interpretation as this, it is easy to see that we have no good ground for concluding that "Jonah represents Israel," or that his mission to Nineveh prefigured the part to be played by the Jewish nation in the history of redemption.

We shall proceed upon solid ground by sticking to Christ's own interpretation. We know that Jonah was a type of Christ because our Lord himself said so, and this excludes the other idea, because he cannot be at the same time a type of Christ and a type of the Jewish nation. While this is not a self-evident proposition, we think its truth will clearly appear in the further study of the book, such a double allusion being inconsistent with its structure and purpose.

Jonah was typical of Christ, not merely in his death and resurrection, but also in his prophetic mission as a teacher sent from God. This is clearly taught in Luke xi. 30, 32. Here, as in every case in which Jesus makes use of the incident, it is a rebuke to an unbelieving, caviling spirit. "For even as Jonah became a sign unto the Ninevites, so shall also the Son of man be to this generation. The men of Nineveh shall stand up in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it; for they repented at the preaching of Jonah, and, behold, a greater than Jonah is here."

The point of the comparison is, that in the one case the messenger is received, and in the other, the greater messenger is rejected, which fact carries with it its own condemnation. If this was the teaching for the Jews of our Lord's day, must it not have been the teaching for the Jews of Jonah's day? In rejecting God's call to repentance through Jonah and his contemporary prophets,

*they had rejected* the identical prophet whom the Ninevites had accepted. If, then, the repentance of Nineveh was a lesson of condemnation to the Jews of our Lord's day, it must have carried the same condemnation to the Jews of Jonah's time. That condemnation consisted in the READY FAITH AND REPENTANCE OF THE HEATHEN AS CONTRASTED WITH THEIR OWN STUBBORNNESS AND HARDNESS OF HEART. The bringing out of this striking contrast would have a double tendency :

1. Towards conviction of sin, by showing to Israel the depth of her guilt as unpalliated by any excuse.

2. An encouragement to repentance by the force of example. The preaching of impending judgment upon Nineveh, together with her repentance and God's reversal of the sentence, presented most forcibly the truth, that while God must punish sin, he has no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, and that he always stands ready to forgive those who turn unto him with a true repentance. Thus the incident combines the thunderings of Sinai with the pleadings of the gospel. This latter lesson is the one which Horne gives as the scope of the book, saying: "The scope of this book is to show, by the very striking example of the Ninevites, the divine forbearance and long-suffering towards sinners, who are spared on their sincere repentance."

This seems too general. It leaves out the idea of any special reference to the Jews, for whom the book was primarily written.

But it is reasonable to expect a special reference to the Jews, and also that the lesson would be one of *condemnation* rather than a gospel message, by reason of the following considerations :

1. Because Jonah was a prophet of Israel, and his prophecy is to be expected to be in *accord with the needs of his people*; but the contemporary history shows that the state of Israel at the time of Jonah's prophecy was one of extreme wickedness. Even the period of prosperity under Jeroboam, which was predicted by Jonah, had failed to have any effect in turning the people back to the true God, and God had thundered out the severest denunciations of them through the prophets Amos and Hosea.

2. A second important consideration, then, is found in the fact that this view of its scope brings the prophecy into line with the

contemporary prophecies of Amos and Hosea. They were all prophets of Israel and had the same problems to deal with, and this makes Jonah's prophecy a *prophecy in act*, exactly parallel to the other two.

Israel was at this time given over to idolatry, and was not to be moved to repentance by threatenings, by punishments, or by merciful kindnesses. Of the thirteen kings that had reigned in Israel since the separation into two kingdoms, there was not one who was a God-fearing and righteous man. Israel's cup of iniquity was nearly full, and she was about to be cast off. After a last tender pleading in the fifth chapter of Amos, doom is pronounced in these words: "Therefore thus saith Jehovah, the God of hosts, the Lord: Wailing shall be in all her broad ways; and they shall say in all the streets, Alas! Alas! . . . Woe unto you that desire the day of the Lord! Wherefore would ye have the day of the Lord? It is darkness and not light." (Amos v. 16.)

Hosea strikingly depicts in symbol the fact that God had rejected Israel. He says to them, "Ye are not my people, and I will not be your God." In symbol they are shown to be what Christ called the Jews of his day, "an evil and adulterous generation." They were incorrigible idolaters, and hence we have again the sentence: "Ephraim is joined to his idols, let him alone." (Hosea iv. 17.) "Woe unto them! for they have wandered from me; destruction unto them! for they have trespassed against me; though I would redeem them, yet they have spoken lies against me." (Chap. vii. 13.)

Thus the light derived from the contemporary history and the contemporary prophets converges to show that the original purpose of the Book of Jonah was to bring out just the teaching which our Lord draws from it for the Jews of his day. It is a lesson of condemnation and of judgment to the Jews, by contrast of the ready faith and repentance of the heathen with their own *rebelliousness and hardness of heart*. This is the historical teaching. It is a lesson to them from the Gentile world. As God had thus shown them his mercy to the *Gentiles*, and his readiness to receive them, while they themselves are made to feel their utter lack of the graces necessary to win his favor, they would read in the event

*their own utter rejection, and supplanting by the Gentiles.* It is not likely that in their minds the application of the lesson would extend beyond their own time, nor is it probable that it was intended to convey anything more to them. But we know that this remarkable history was intended to be *typical*, and so to adumbrate a higher truth. This we learn from Christ's own interpretation, and this reference to Jonah's prophecy is the only satisfactory evidence that we have of its proper typical character. The historical lesson above indicated was prophetic to a certain extent, but could not be said to be typical. There is nothing in the book itself to indicate its typical character, and there is no evidence that Jonah himself understood the typical nature of his prophecy.

In asserting, therefore, its typical character, we again plant ourselves upon the Saviour's teaching.

We have already seen from Luke xi. 30, 32, that Jonah was *in his mission to Nineveh* typical of Christ. From Matthew xii. 40, we learn that Jonah's envelopment in the belly of the fish was typical of Christ's death and resurrection; then the sign of Jonah was not *completely fulfilled* until *after* the death and resurrection. This was the great consummation of his redeeming work, his resurrection being the great sign or attestation of his saving mission to men. Yet his words to the Jews on this occasion, pronouncing a future judgment upon them, clearly implies his knowledge of their continued rejection of him, in spite of the proof contained in his resurrection. But the rejection of Christ by the Jewish nation at this time meant *their* rejection by God, their cutting-off from the church; thus, as the typical teaching of the Book of Jonah, we have the truth which is taught in the Messianic Psalm, cxviii., "The stone which the builders rejected is become the head of the corner." It is a little more fully stated in Psalm xxviii. 16, and explained in 1 Peter ii. 6-8. It is the truth which the Saviour himself taught in the parable of the wicked husbandmen, in which he quotes the passage from the Psalms; and also the truth contained in the Messianic prophecy of Isaiah xlix. 6, "I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth."

Both which truths had a fulfilment when Paul and Barnabas boldly said to the Jews: "It was necessary that the word of God should first be spoken to you; seeing ye thrust it from you, and judge yourselves unworthy of eternal life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles." It typically points to that which Paul, a little later on, speaks of as having actually taken place—the natural branches of the olive tree were broken off that the wild branches might be grafted in; which state of things was to continue "until the fulness of the Gentiles should come in."

The above view of the typical teaching of Jonah is, as far as we know, entirely new; but after having arrived at these conclusions, it was with pleasure that the writer discovered that Barrows, in his *Companion to the Bible*, clearly teaches that Jonah's mission to Nineveh had a typical import. Horne, while rejecting the theory of the parabolic history, does not suggest that the history may be typical. We will state Barrows' view in his own words. After calling attention to the grief of Jonah at God's sparing Nineveh, and trying to account for it, he says: "However this may be, Jonah's mission to the Ninevites foreshadowed God's purpose of mercy towards the heathen world, and that, too, at a very suitable time, when the history of the covenant people, and, through them, of God's visible earthly kingdom, was about passing into lasting connection with that of the great monarchies of the earth." At first blush this view seems very much like that advocated by the writer in the *Union Seminary Magazine*, who "regards the book as designed to teach the true mission and attitude of Israel to the nations of the world," but it is materially different, for Barrows does not make the prophecy designate the Jewish nation as the bearer of the message to the heathen world. The Jews never were a missionary people in any proper sense.

With the light so far obtained from the Scriptures bearing upon Jonah, let us now turn to the book itself, and see how the views advocated comport with a careful analysis of its contents.

The prophecy of Jonah naturally divides itself into two parts. The first part contains Jonah's commission to Nineveh, his attempted flight, in which he is arrested and punished, and his song of salvation at deliverance. In addition to this, and equally prominent in the

narrative, it appears that his attempted flight is providentially converted into a mission to the heathen mariners, who are thereby converted.

Part II. contains Jonah's mission to Nineveh and its result in their speedy conversion. Also Jonah's dissatisfaction and despondency, and God's gentle rebuke of the prophet for this state of mind.

As the history is typical, we shall have to pursue two separate lines of investigation, ascertaining first its proper historical import, and then its typical meaning.

First, let us find out the prominent features of the narrative: The principal part of the first chapter is taken up with the narrative of the storm, which God made instrumental in the *awakening and conversion of the heathen mariners*, and this last we regard as the prominent thought, towards which everything else tends. The story of Jonah's commission and flight is told in three verses, and is only introductory to the narrative of the storm, while even Jonah's fate is told rather incidentally, and occupies not more than half a sentence at the very close. Now, since "the Bible is jealous of its spaces," this narrative of the storm, told with such minuteness of incident, must be the prominent feature of the first chapter. It is told with special reference to the mariners. They are first mentioned and they are last mentioned, and from first to last their safety is the thought which is brought prominently before the mind. Their natural fear is converted into awe by being told that Jonah's presence as a run-away from Jehovah is the cause of the violent storm. The rebuke they administered to him for his disobedience is sufficient to show that they accepted this as the true explanation of the whole matter. They then consult him as to what they should do, and he tells them to cast him into the sea and that it would become calm. Unwilling to sacrifice Jonah, they make a strenuous effort to reach the land. When they saw that their safety could not be secured without it, they followed Jonah's advice, praying earnestly to God not to hold them guilty for what he himself had brought about. "For thou, O Jehovah, hast done as it pleased thee." Immediately upon Jonah's casting into the sea the raging of the sea ceased, as Jonah told them it would, and the record is: "Then the men feared Jehovah exceed-

ingly, and they offered a sacrifice unto Jehovah, and made vows." Surely this is too serious a matter to be accounted for by Barrows' passing comment that "it is not wonderful," but "in harmony with all that we know of ancient habits of thinking and acting." It must mean their acceptance of the true God, or, in other words, *their conversion*.

If this is so, it teaches the ingenuousness of the Gentile mind, and the *readiness of their faith*; and the incident becomes parallel with the conversion of Nineveh itself, teaching the same historical lesson, and at the same time adding to the clearness of the typical teaching, by showing that the book was undoubtedly intended to give a lesson from the Gentile world.

We think that the argument for the conversion of the mariners is strengthened by an inspection of the Hebrew text. The literal rendering of the last sentence is, "the men were afraid with great fear." Gesenius quotes this expression in the tenth verse as an instance in which  $\text{יִרְאָה}$  means ordinary fear, terror; but there is no necessity from the context, even in the tenth verse, for taking it out of its usual acceptance, and in this last verse it is far more natural to take it in its ordinary meaning of reverential fear. While the verb  $\text{יִרְאָה}$  means either fear or reverence, the noun is almost exclusively confined in its meaning to "reverential fear," *awe*. (See Young's Concordance.)  $\text{פַּחַד}$  is the common word for fear in the ordinary sense, and there are several other words so used, so that there is no reason for taking  $\text{יִרְאָה}$  out of its common acceptance; rather it seems to be used here, when it might easily have been left out, for the special purpose of indicating that the verb is here to be understood in its sense of reverential fear. Jonah had used the verb in this sense when he said to the mariners, "I fear the God of heaven." We think we have now sufficiently established the analysis that the principal thought of the first chapter is the awakening and conversion of the heathen mariners. We have followed the Hebrew division, which puts the incident of the fish in the second chapter.

In the second chapter we have Jonah's deliverance and his song of salvation. It is worthy of note, that the song comes before the



actual deliverance. Jonah must have known that his miraculous preservation in the belly of the fish meant his deliverance. It is not necessary to dwell upon the typical significance, as that is explicitly given by the Saviour himself. As Jonah represented Christ in his death and resurrection, we may say that he was saved by *oneness* with Christ in his death and resurrection.

II. The prominent thoughts of the second part are Nineveh's conversion, and the dissatisfaction of Jonah with this outcome of his mission. Jonah's message to Nineveh was a definite proclamation of judgment: "Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown." He had just begun his preaching, when the people of Nineveh "believed God," and manifested every sign of a sincere and deep repentance. The king takes a leading part and proclaims a fast, in which even the beasts were to participate. Here again we have exhibited the *ready faith and repentance of the Gentiles*. "The people of Nineveh believed God," and their repentance was prompt and deep. "And God saw their works that they turned from their evil way." Through this repentance the city is saved. And now come the most difficult questions of the book.

The last chapter contains Jonah's dissatisfaction and God's gentle rebuke of this state of mind. According to the Authorized Version, and also the Revised Version, Jonah was *angry* when he found out the result of his mission. Some interpreters have supposed that this anger was caused by the failure of his prophecy, which made him appear as a false prophet. But this seems a very violent supposition when we take into consideration the circumstances. Such a state of mind is not only unlikely, but inexplicable, when we remember that Jonah had so recently learned the lesson of humility by being so wonderfully delivered from the just punishment of his sins.

To have desired the destruction of this great city on such grounds would have been far more than Jewish prejudice or narrowness, it would have been diabolical wickedness, and must have subjected Jonah to severe punishment; but God does not chastise him, he remonstrates with him with great patience and tenderness. But it is not necessary to hold that Jonah was angry, or that he became petulant and rebellious against God's will when

he found that God's wrath was changed to mercy. The language as it stands in the Hebrew does not compel this supposition, and if this is so we should not adopt a supposition so violent and improbable. The word which is translated "angry" means literally "to burn," and the emotion is not always one of anger, but as Gesenius tells us, is sometimes that of *grief* or sadness. It is so rendered by the Septuagint in several places, and, amongst them, verses 4 and 9 of this chapter. The first verse of the chapter may, therefore, be rendered thus: "But it preyed upon Jonah as a great affliction, and it grieved him." The writer can see no good ground for the translation of the Authorized Version: "But it displeased Jonah exceedingly, and he was very angry," a translation which is allowed to stand in the Revised Version with the simple dropping out of the "very," to which there is no corresponding word in the Hebrew. A baldly literal translation of the first clause would be, "But it fed upon Jonah, a great evil." רָעָה is sometimes used in the sense of "prey upon," "devour" (cf. Psa. xlix. 14, "death shall feed [prey] upon them"; see also Job. xx. 26; Jer. xxii. 22; ii. 16; Isa. vii. 20). This sense of the word, however, is not very frequent, being usually expressed by אָכַל. רָעָה is a milder word, and is just the word for the idea we attach to it in the translation: "It preyed upon Jonah as a great affliction." This rendering, while being a literal translation, harmonizes with "grieve" in the second clause, and presents what we believe to have been Jonah's real state of mind. His emotions were *grief* caused by disappointment, or *despondency* rather than anger.

This is about Fairbairn's idea, who gives also the only satisfactory explanation of the matter that we have seen, which is, that Jonah did not regard Nineveh as the "*ultimate* end of his commission." "If Nineveh [he says] had been the prominent object with him, he would have rejoiced at the result of his mission. But Israel was the prominent aim of Jonah, as a prophet of the elect people. Probably, then, he regarded the destruction of Nineveh as fitted to be an example of God's judgment, at last suspending his long forbearance so as to startle Israel from its desperate degeneracy, . . . in a way that all other means had

failed to do." Jonah, despairing of anything effectually being done for God in Israel, unless there were first given a striking example of severity, thought when he proclaimed the downfall of Nineveh in forty days, that now at last God is about to give such an example; so when this means of awakening Israel was set aside by God's mercy on Nineveh's repentance, he was bitterly disappointed, not from pride or mercilessness, but from hopelessness as to anything being possible for the reformation of Israel, now that his cherished hope is baffled. But God's plan was to teach Israel, by the example of Nineveh, how inexcusable is their own impenitence, and how inevitable their ruin if they persevere." (See Jamieson, Faussett and Brown.)

We may add that evidently Jonah did not hope for any *good* effect upon Israel from the example of Nineveh's repentance, and therefore he must have regarded it as purely a lesson of condemnation to them. This would account for his despondency, which was so severe, that, like Elijah, he seems to have thought his life a failure, and so requested that he might die. God deals with his erring prophet with the same tenderness that he formerly showed towards Elijah. The question which God asks: "Doest thou well to be grieved (or despondent)?" reminds one of "What doest thou here, Elijah?" The one is a gentle reminder that the prophet is not in the *right place*; the other means, "this is not a *right frame of mind*." What this frame of mind was is the question. We believe that it was despondency rather than anger or even vexation. The theory that he was angry seems to be excluded by the fact that he went to the Lord in prayer to tell him about the matter: "And he prayed unto the Lord and said, I pray thee, O Lord, was not this my saying, when I was yet in my country? Therefore I hasted to flee unto Tarshish, for I knew that thou art a gracious God, and full of compassion, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy, and repentest thee of the evil." Is this to be taken as a remonstrance with God for the failure of his prediction? Does the prophet mean to tell God that he has not dealt fairly with him? Is it not rather an effort of the prophet to relieve his burdened heart by telling the Lord the cause of his grief? It is, as it were, an attempted vindication of his *present* and

*former hopelessness*, based upon the slowness of God's judgments. "For I knew that thou art a gracious God, and full of compassion, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy, and repentest thee of the evil." We have here Jonah's own explanation of his former flight, and it is his knowledge of God's long-suffering, which knowledge is confirmed by the present instance. This is not a justification of his former disobedience, but a vindication of his former reasoning. Jonah says then, in effect, that he declined his first commission to "cry against" Nineveh because he regarded it as a useless or hopeless undertaking.

This hopelessness could not have had reference to the heathen entirely, because this must have been dissipated by the conversion of Nineveh; his *present* hopelessness, therefore, or, we may say, his present *dissatisfaction* with results, can only be accounted for on the supposition that his anxiety was to accomplish something for Israel. Like Elijah, his patience with Israel had been exhausted, and he had no hope of anything being done except by judgments.

Perhaps he still entertained a faint glimmer of hope in reference to his plan, since he went out and took his stand to await any results which might occur. Perhaps he did not yet fully understand what God meant by the question, "Is grief well (or right) for thee?" The Lord, therefore, sets about showing him his error clearly, through the incident of the gourd (*ricinus*). The gourd had proved of great value to him by contributing to his comfort, however worthless it may have been in itself, and so when it is taken away he grieves for it. God then asks, "Is it right for you to grieve for the gourd?" Here the translation "angry" can hardly be justified, while, on the other hand, "grieve" brings it into harmony with the statement below, "Thou hast been *grieved* for the *ricinus*." (So Gesenius translates  $\text{דָּוָה}$  in this place.) God draws from the incident an *a fortiori* argument for the *value* of Nineveh. It is not so much that Nineveh is deserving of *pity*; it is looked upon as valuable, and to be "*spared*" on this account. The word  $\text{דָּוָה}$  has this as a second meaning, and we would translate, "should I not spare Nineveh?" The point is, that as Jonah so much desired to spare the *ricinus* on account of a temporary

value, much more should God spare the thousands of the great city Nineveh. This argument seems to be a parallel to the parable of the lost coin, which teaches the value of the soul. After her repentance Nineveh became God's own possession, and was not to be lost.

Thus the book closes because its purpose is accomplished. Jonah's idea that Israel should be reclaimed at the expense of Nineveh's ruin is shown to be *not in accordance with the divine justice*, and naturally Jonah has nothing more to say. The book leaves him in his despondency and Israel in her sin, with impending judgment hanging over her.

This judgment it is the purpose of the book to pronounce and emphasize by THE READINESS OF THE GENTILE WORLD TO ACCEPT THE TRUE GOD.

In its typical teaching we see CHRIST REJECTED BY THE JEWS AND ACCEPTED BY THE GENTILES; and therefore its prophecy is just that which Christ pronounced in connection with the parable of the husbandman: "Therefore I say unto you, the kingdom of God shall be *taken from you and given to a nation* bringing forth the fruits thereof."

This view of the typical teaching is in perfect harmony with the historical teaching as explained above, and, if the latter be accepted, this becomes the most convincing proof of its correctness.

For the fact of the typical nature of Jonah's prophecy we are dependent upon the passages cited above from the Gospels. From these passages we also learned something of the character of this typical teaching, that as regards the Jews it was clearly condemnatory. From this we argued to the historical teaching of Jonah, and found that the view thus indicated harmonizes all the facts of the book, lending a significance to the first chapter which has been overlooked, and explaining the difficult questions of the last chapter as no other theory can do, and making even the abrupt close add forcibly to the general lesson.

Let us now complete the argument by returning to the point from which we started, and supporting our exegesis of the passages in the Gospels. We stated above that "Jonah was typical of Christ, not merely in his death and resurrection but also in his prophetic mission as a teacher sent from God."

This we saw clearly contained in the passage in Luke xi. 29–32, where the preaching, or prophetic, office is the only prominent element of the sign mentioned; the future element, *i. e.*, the resurrection, being only hinted at in the use of the future tense: “For as Jonah became a sign unto the Ninevites so shall also (*ἔσται*) the Son of man be to this generation.”

The passage in Matthew xii. 38–45 also contains both elements of the sign. The allusion to Christ’s *death* and *resurrection* is so direct and plain that it needs no comment. These two facts taken together constituted him the *triumphant Saviour* of the world. His resurrection was the great *sign* or attestation of the truth of his claims and teaching. There could be no endorsement of the man without an endorsement of his teaching; the “sign of Jonah” must, therefore, include the office of prophet as well as that of priest.

Meyer, in his comments on both the above passages, rejects the idea of the prophetic allusion altogether. He distinctly rejects the idea that the “sign of Jonah” has any reference to *preaching*, and claims that in Luke there is no explanation of the sign. He says, “The sign of Jonah is entirely future,” and refers to the futures, *δοθήσεσθαι* and *ἔσται*, in Luke.

Meyer makes an extended argument on this subject in his commentary on Matthew. It is directed against certain critics who denied that the fact of the resurrection was any part of the sign. Let us examine it in so far as it militates against our interpretation of these passages. Meyer contends that in Matthew, chap. xii., verses 40 and 41 are entirely separate in thought. He says: “But if in verse 41 it is only the *preaching* of Jonah that is mentioned, it is worthy of notice that what is said regarding the *sign* is entirely brought to a close in verse 40; whereupon, by way of threatening the hearers and putting them to shame, verse 41 proceeds to state, not what the Ninevites did in consequence of the sign, but what they did in consequence of the *preaching* of Jonah.” “Therefore, (2), it is by no means presupposed in verse 41 that the Ninevites had been made aware of the prophet’s fate.” 3, This event would in such case have no typical significance for the Ninevites. That it was a sign to them “is nowhere said.” The other points are irrelevant to this discussion.

The answer to all this is, that if the connection between the *sign* and the *preaching* of Jonah is not so apparent in Matthew, it is very clear in Luke. If Meyer insists upon the futures, *δοθήσεται* and *ἔσται*, we insist on the imperfect, *ἐγένετο*: "Even as Jonah *became* a sign unto the Ninevites, so shall also the Son of man be to this generation." (Luke xi. 30.)

Now, the simple question is, How did Jonah become a sign to the Ninevites? Was it through his miraculous preservation and deliverance, or was it through his preaching, or both?

Now, if Meyer says there is no evidence that the Ninevites "had been made aware of the prophet's fate," and, therefore, it is not competent for us to say that this was the sign, then, necessarily, the sign must have been *the prophet himself* through his preaching; what, then, becomes of Meyer's argument that the preaching constituted no part of the sign?

Again, if "it is by no means presupposed in verse 41 that the Ninevites had been made aware of the prophet's fate," we may find a high degree of probability that they *did know of it*, in the narrative itself. Did not the mariners know that they had cast him overboard? And would not the news of such a remarkable occurrence as that of the storm, with all its incidents, speedily find its way over the then known world? And when Jonah came to light once more, must he not have appeared as one *that had risen from the dead*? Besides this, is there any reason to suppose that Jonah himself would keep the whole story of his remarkable experience a profound secret? Far more likely is it that Jonah's experience was intended by God to be his preparation for his mission, and his deliverance to be his *attestation to the Ninevites*; in which case he could not refrain from preaching it, in order to give weight to his prophecy of judgment. Is not this supposition the only plausible explanation of Nineveh's immediate repentance?

Jonah then was a sign in his *person*, by reason of his prophetic mission, and this includes both his *deliverance* and his *preaching*.

We were under the impression that we would have to contend single-hand for this exposition, but we find with pleasure that so far we have the support of Godet. His conclusion as to the two

passages in question is, that "the thought in Luke and Matthew is exactly the same," by which he must mean that both elements of the sign are contained in both. He states the matter thus: "It was as one who had miraculously escaped from death that Jonas presented himself before the Ninevites, summoning them to anticipate the danger which threatened them; it is as the risen One that I (by my messengers) shall proclaim salvation to the men of this generation." This statement clearly recognizes the fact that the parallel between Jonah and Christ in these passages is a comparison of their *missions as prophets*, while it seems also to imply that in each case the prophet had his proper *attestation*. The idea of the attestation is the prominent one in Matthew. The resurrection, which was typified by Jonah's deliverance from the belly of the fish after three days, was the great *sign* of attestation to Christ as the Saviour of the world, but whether this passage was intended to imply that Jonah was attested to the Ninevites by his deliverance, it seems impossible to determine with certainty. We believe, however, that Jonah was thus attested, as we argued above from the narrative of Jonah, and if this is true it may well be *understood* in this passage; indeed, it seems necessary to complete the parallel here drawn between Jonah and Christ. The sense of the passage will then be something like this: "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and no sign shall be given to it except the sign already prefigured in Jonah the prophet. For as Jonah was attested by his deliverance, after three days, from the belly of the fish, so shall the Son of man be attested in his rising from the dead, after three days in the tomb. Nevertheless, judgment shall fall upon the men of this generation, the Ninevites being witnesses against you, for they repented at the preaching of Jonah, while you have rejected and will continue to reject the greater than Jonah." Thus the transition from the fortieth to the forty-first verse becomes natural and easy. The connection of thought in the following illustration of the unclean "spirit going out of the man and returning" is equally manifest. A part of the judgment sent upon them in consequence of this rejection of the Saviour would be that they would be given up to a seven-fold



wickedness. This is taught in the last sentence: "*Even so shall it be* also unto this evil generation."

We see from this passage that the sign of Jonah was to be to the Jews a sign of judgment or condemnation. The passage in Luke makes this fact plainer still: "For *even as* Jonah *became* a sign unto the Ninevites, so shall also the Son of man be to this generation." How did Jonah become a sign unto the Ninevites? Of course, through his preaching; but that preaching was a preaching of judgment. He was a sign to them that the divine wrath was about to fall upon them. So Christ was to be to the Jews a sign of judgment. Why? Because of their rejection of him. The passages in reference to the queen of the south and the Ninevites rising up in condemnation, give the explanation of the significance the sign to them, and the *reason*.

We must, therefore, reject the latter part of Godet's statement in reference to Christ's preaching "salvation to the men of this generation," as entirely foreign to both passages. The fact is, that neither Godet nor Meyer discusses the question of the significance of the sign; they confine their attention to the question, "What constitutes the sign?" But the significance of the sign is the all-important point; and we think it is the prominent point in these passages.

We think we have now proved our thesis that the Book of Jonah is both historical and typical, being in both cases a lesson of condemnation to the Jews and a prophecy of salvation to the Gentiles.

LUTHER LINK.

*Monroeville, Ala.*

## IV. THE FUTURE OF ROMAN CATHOLIC PEOPLES.

### A STUDY IN SOCIAL ECONOMY.<sup>1</sup>

IN our day much is said of the decay of the Latin races. It is said that they are declining rapidly, and that the future belongs to the Germanic and Slavonic peoples.

I do not believe that the Latins are condemned to decline because of the blood in their veins. I cannot think that there is any fatal defect in their constitution that necessarily dooms them to decay.

But from history, and especially from contemporaneous events, it does seem that the Roman Catholic peoples advance much more slowly than the nations that have abandoned Romanism, and that, in comparison with these, they are retrograding. This fact is so evident, that the bishops and their principal organ in France, *L'Univers*, made it an occasion for censuring the unfaithful of their church.

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<sup>1</sup>The name of its author, Emilio de Laveleye, Professor of Political Economy in the University at Liege, should secure for this essay a careful reading from all students of political and social economy. One of the ablest scholars of the Southern Presbyterian Church is credited with saying, that he considered M. de Laveleye one of the profoundest thinkers of Europe.

But this discussion of the celebrated Belgian Professor has interest and value not only for the social scientist. When we remember that multitudes of Romanists are annually coming into our country, when we remember that the Church of Rome is making vigorous efforts to gain a firmer footing among us, the question here discussed by Professor de Laveleye becomes one of vital interest to every American citizen. When about one-eighth of our population are Roman Catholics, it should interest every man who loves his country and her institutions to know what is the influence of Rome's system of doctrine and government. This question M. de Laveleye discusses with the skill of a master. Any one who follows him in this argument will recognize in him the philosopher, the historian, and the social economist.

This paper was first published in the *Revue de Belgique*, January, 1875, and in the same year was republished in Paris. It was afterwards translated into Portuguese, and has been widely used in Brazil as a tract, having had several editions. At different times copies of it have been sent to the members of the Brazilian Congress, and it would be well if a copy could be laid on the desk of every Congressman and Senator at Washington.—TRANSLATOR.

The fact is undeniable; but many reasons prevent my attributing it to the influence of race. Unquestionably, the destinies of nations depend in part on their physical constitution. Going back to the beginning, we find only two causes that are sufficient to explain the diverse destinies of the different peoples—race and environment: the constitution of the man on one hand, and on the other the influence of external nature, climate, geographical situation, aspect of nature, products of the soil, and food. But when speaking of peoples that have a blood so mixed as have the nations of Europe, and that really descend from a common stock, it is impossible to refer the social conditions to the influence of race with any degree of scientific certainty.

The English understand better than the French how to enjoy the liberties of popular, representative government. Is this due to the influence of race? I think not. Because, until the sixteenth century, France, Spain, and Italy had institutions very similar to those of the English. The only notable difference was that the English had a centralized system, and, as an organ, a single parliament that was strong enough to resist royal power. The Norman conquest having unified England, it became possible to form a united parliament; and royalty being very powerful, the nobility and the common people united to resist it, while in other countries these two factors were constantly at variance with each other.

The fortunes of France and England became entirely different only at the close of the sixteenth century, when the Puritans conquered the Stuarts, and when Louis XIV., expelling the Protestants from France, destroyed the last remnants of local autonomy, and the only element that could offer serious resistance to despotism.

When we see Latin Protestants surpassing German Roman Catholics; when we can prove that Protestants progress more rapidly and more steadily than their Roman Catholic neighbors in the same country, and in the same group, having the same language and the same origin, it is impossible not to attribute the superiority of the former to the latter to the religion that they profess.

The prejudices of sect and the passions of anti-religion have played too large a part in these discussions. It is time to apply to them the method of observation and the scientific impartiality of the physiologist and the naturalist. From a simple examination of the facts there will come unanswerable conclusions.

It is admitted that the Irish and Scotch are of the same origin. Both have been subject to the English. Until the sixteenth century Ireland was much more highly civilized than Scotland. During the first half of the middle ages fertile Erin was a centre of civilization, while Scotland was a den of barbarians. Since the Scotch embraced the doctrines of the Reformation they have outstripped even the English. The climate and the soil of Scotland would not naturally make it so rich a country as England; but Macaulay proves that since the sixteenth century the Scotch have surpassed the English in every department. Ireland, on the contrary, given over to Romanism, is poor, miserable, agitated by a spirit of rebellion, and seems unable to lift herself up by her own resources.

What a contrast in Ireland herself between Connaught, exclusively Roman Catholic, and Ulster, where Protestantism predominates! Ulster is rich from her industries, while Connaught presents a picture of the last extreme of human misery!

I refrain from making a comparison between the United States and the countries of South America, or between the countries of the North and those of the South of Europe. The differences might be explained by climate or race. But let us look at Switzerland, and compare the condition of the cantons of Neuchâtel, Vaud, and Geneva (especially before the recent immigration of Sabine Romanists), with the condition of Lucerne, Upper Valais, and the Forest Cantons. The former surpass the latter to an extraordinary degree in education, in literature, in art, in industry, in commerce, in wealth, in cleanliness, in all the aspects of civilization. The former are Latin Protestants. The latter are Germans, but under the dominion of Rome. Religion, therefore, and not race, is the cause of this superiority.

Let us now transport ourselves to a canton, Appenzell, inhabited in every part by a Germanic population entirely identical. Be-

tween the inhabitants of Interior Rhodes, who are Romanists, and those of Exterior Rhodes, who are Protestants, there is found exactly the same contrast as between the people of Neufchatel and those of Lucerne or Uri. On the one hand, we find education, activity, industry, relations with the outside world, and consequently, wealth. On the other hand, we find ignorance and poverty.<sup>1</sup>

Wherever, in the same country, the two religions are found side by side the Protestants are more active, industrious, and economical, and consequently have more wealth than the Roman

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<sup>1</sup>Let us hear Mr. Hepworth Dixon, whose opinion is certainly influenced by no prejudice of sect. Read what he says in his recent work on Switzerland. "Compare," says he, "a Protestant canton with one that is Roman Catholic—Appenzell, Exterior Rhodes, for example, with Interior Rhodes, and pronounce your judgment, having full knowledge of the case.

"There is as much difference between these two half-cantons as between the canton of Berne and that of Valais. In the lower part of the country the villages are built of wood, it is true, but everything is neat and attractive. A fountain from which go streams of laughing water, stands in the centre of the village. Near by are the church, the town hall, and the primary school.

"Each house has its garden. Vines cover the walls and nearly every roof. On every side is heard the music of the loom, and the song of the boys on their way to school. The streets are clean, the markets well supplied, and the people one meets are well dressed. In the mountains, on the contrary, poverty and desolation are on every hand. Few villages are seen; the peasants live in cottages scattered here and there. Underneath the houses are pens for the hogs and cattle; above are the sleeping-rooms, just as one sees in Biscay and Navarre. The cottages are solidly built, but no taste is manifested in beautifying these rude dwellings.

"Each pastor lives apart, and only meets with his fellow-citizens at the mass, at the boxing-ring, or at the vulgar tavern. All can read and write, because they are Swiss, and subject to the laws of the cantons; but to them books and journals are comparatively unknown. One finds there a few lives of the saints, some popular newspapers, and a few collections of quack remedies, instead of recent periodicals with their interesting items of news.

"The half-canton that is Protestant, becomes each day richer and more populous, while the half-canton, Roman Catholic, is sunk in poverty and weakness. And this is not to be wondered at, because the first receives all strangers, whatever may be their religion, welcomes with joy every new idea, and adopts immediately all improvements made in the art of spinning, which is the source of their wealth. The second, on the other hand, shuts its doors against all the world, against Protestants of all countries, and against Roman Catholics not born in the canton. The people preserve their old games and their ancient customs; they carry on their rustic labors as in the Middle Ages; they celebrate their feast days and their fights in the boxing-ring; their food is bread made of coarse rye and clabber. In a word, they despise industry, the very thing that enriches their neighbors."

Catholics. "In the United States," says Tocqueville, "the majority of Roman Catholics are poor." In Canada the great enterprises of industry and commerce are in the hands of Protestants.

M. Audiganne, in his interesting studies on *Les Populations Ouvrières de la France*, notes the superiority of the Protestants in the various branches of industry; and his testimony as to the fact is all the more valuable inasmuch as he does not attribute this superiority to Protestantism. "The majority of the employees," says he, "especially those engaged in the manufacture of taffeta, are Roman Catholics, while the capitalists are generally Protestants.

"When a family is divided, one part holding on to Romanism, the faith of their fathers, and the other embracing the new doctrines, enlisting under the standard of Protestantism, there is almost always seen increasing thriftlessness on one side and growing wealth on the other." "In Mazamet, the Elboeuf of Southern France," continues M. Audiganne, "all of the principal business men, with a single exception, are Protestants, while the great majority of the workmen are Romanists. There is less education among the Roman Catholics than among the laborers of the Protestant class."

Before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the Protestants excelled in all branches of industry so that the Romanists could not bear up against the competition. For this reason, at the close of the year 1662, the Protestants were forbidden by many successive edicts to engage in various industries in which they especially excelled. After their expulsion from France, the Protestants carried into England, Prussia, and Holland their spirit of enterprise and economy, thereby enriching the districts in which they settled. Thus to the Latin Protestants the Germans owe in part their progress. The refugees from the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes introduced various industries into England, among others the manufacture of silk; and Scotland was civilized by the disciples of Calvin.

Compare the quotations on the government bonds of Protestant and Roman Catholic countries. The difference is striking. The three *per cent.* English bonds sell at ninety-two and upwards, while the three *per cent.* French bonds fluctuate about sixty.

Throughout Germany to-day the commerce in all products of the brain, such as books, reviews, maps, and newspapers, is almost entirely in the hands of Jews and Protestants.

In the presence of all these concurrent facts, it is impossible to deny that religion, and not race, causes the extraordinary prosperity of certain nations.

The Reformation gave to those countries which embraced its doctrines a power that history is unable to explain. Behold the Netherlands: Two millions of men, on a soil one-half desert sands and one-half marshy wastes, successfully resist Spain, who at that time held Europe in her hands. And when scarcely free from the Castilian yoke, they cover the seas with their merchantmen, march in the vanguard of the intellectual world, and own more ships than all the rest of the continent together. They become the soul of all the great European coalitions; they resist the allied powers of England and France, give to the United States that model of federal union which allows the indefinite expansion of the great republic, and they set the example for those financial combinations that contribute so largely to development and wealth, banks of emission and joint stock companies.

Sweden, with her one million people on a granite earth buried under the snow during six months of the year, under Gustavus Adolphus, with remarkable energy makes war on Austria, and, through her wonderful strategists, Wrangell, Torstenson, and Banneur, saves the Reformation. To-day England is queen of the seas, the first of the nations in industry and commerce, governing in Asia two hundred million people, and girdling the globe with the multitudes that she scatters everywhere. It would be well to see in the interesting book of Sir Charles Dilke, *Greater Britain*, the picture there drawn of Anglo-Saxon power in the world. The United States grow with an amazing rapidity. They number forty-two million inhabitants.<sup>1</sup> At the close of the century they will have a hundred million. Already they are the richest and most powerful people on the globe. Within two centuries America, Australia, and Southern Africa will belong to the Anglo-Saxon heretics, and Asia to the Slavonic schismatics.

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<sup>1</sup> This statement was made almost twenty years ago.—*Translator*.

The peoples subject to Rome seem to be attacked by sterility. They no longer colonize,<sup>1</sup> and have not the least power of expansion. The words employed by M. Thiers to describe his religious capital, Rome, *viduitas et sterilitas*, could also be applied to the Roman Catholic peoples. Their past is brilliant, but their present is dark, and their future threatening.

Where is there a situation sadder than that in Spain? And France after rendering such grand service to the world is truly pitiable. Not because she has been conquered on the battlefield—military reverses can be repaired—but because she seems destined to waver continually between despotism and anarchy.

Even now, at the moment when, to raise herself, she needs the aid and sympathy of all her sons, the extreme parties dispute among themselves for the preëminence, at the risk of again unbinding the furies of civil war. Romanism is the cause of France's misfortunes; by the hurtful policy that we shall analyze further on, it has weakened the country. It was Romanism that, through the Empress Eugenie, a mere tool in the hands of the clerical party, had the expedition to Mexico undertaken for the purpose of arousing the Roman Catholic nations in America; and this same enemy brought on the Prussian war, hoping thus to check the progress of the Protestant countries of Europe.<sup>2</sup>

Italy and Belgium seem to be more fortunate than France and Spain; but is liberty finally established in these two countries? There are many who doubt it. Recently a journalist of Rome

<sup>1</sup> Here is an example taken at random: The Count of Beauvoir arrives at Canton, and sees a small island, Sha-Myen, lying in the middle of the river, belonging to France and England. The traveller is impressed with the contrast presented by the part ceded to England and that belonging to France: "After six years," says he, "there are found a small English settlement, a Protestant church, a cricket-ground, an excellent race-course, large, airy houses, and magnificent *godovas* for the large houses of Chinese tea. A road leads to the British territory from the French. On our territory there are thickets of wild undergrowth, filth, stray dogs, cats, and moles, but not a single house." (*Voyages du Tour du Monde*, Vol. II., page 427.)

<sup>2</sup> The Empress said in July, 1870: "This is my war." It was she, who in the Supreme Council in Saint Cloud, had war declared—a war, the danger of which was clearly foreseen by the Emperor. This from henceforth becomes a fact for history.



published an important work on the situation in Italy under this significant title, *Dark Italy*. "The peoples subject to the Pope are dead or dying," exclaims the author. "*I populi di regione papale o sono già morti o vanno morendi.*"

"If Italy," continues he, "appears to be in a more healthy condition it is because the clergy, who have been waiting for the Pope to recover, formerly from an interference in Austrian affairs, and now from an interference in French affairs, have not yet, as an internal force, attached the liberal institutions of the nation. The clerical party has taken no part in the elections, but this will not always be the case. In Naples, Rome, and Bologna they have already descended into the arena. The church fills the country with societies under the direction of the Jesuits. These societies have taken charge of the rising generation and are educating the youth to hate Italy and her institutions." This estimate of the condition of affairs is correct. Italy is to-day in the situation in which France was after 1789, and in which Belgium was after 1830. The breath of liberty sways the entire nation, including the clergy. Patriotism, the hope of a brilliant future, and the enthusiasm of progress inflame all hearts and cause men to forget their dissensions. But soon will appear again the incompatibility between modern civilization and the ideas of Rome. The clergy, and especially the Jesuits, submissive to the voice of Rome, are already putting their hands to the work of destroying the temple of political liberty which was but recently built upon Italian soil. Exactly this has been going on in Belgium since 1840.

One of the authors of the Constitution of Belgium, and perhaps the most eminent of them, recently said to me, with his soul filled with sadness: "We have believed that to have liberty it was only necessary to proclaim it, separating church and state. I begin to think that we were mistaken. The church supported by the country people wishes to enforce its absolute power. The large cities that have adopted the modern ideas will not be brought into subjection without seeking to defend themselves. We are drifting toward a civil war as in France, we are already in a revolutionary situation. The future, it seems to me, is full of trouble."

The last elections begin to make apparent the danger. The elections for the houses of the national congress have strengthened the clerical party, while in all of the large cities the municipal elections have given the power to the liberals. Thus antagonism between the cities and the country, one of the causes of the French revolution, is showing itself in Belgium. While the government remains in the hands of prudent men, men more disposed to serve their country than to obey the bishops, we need not fear serious disorders. But should the fanatics who openly accept the *Syllabus* as their political platform come into power terrible conflicts would inevitably follow. Recently we narrowly escaped civil war and foreign invasion.

The Roman Catholic countries on both sides of the Atlantic, are given over to internal strifes which consume the nation's energies, or which, to say the least, prevent them from developing so steadily and so rapidly as the Protestant nations.

Two centuries ago the supremacy belonged unquestionably to Roman Catholic countries; the others were nothing more than powers of the second order. To-day, however, placing on one side France, Austria, Spain, Italy, and South America, and on the other Russia, the German Empire, England, and North America, it cannot be denied that the predominance has passed to the heretics and schismatics.

M. Levasseur recently read before the Institute a curious paper in which he shows that France in 1700 held thirty-one *per cent.* or the third part of the combined strength of the five great powers of Europe, while counting six great powers to-day, she possesses but fifteen *per cent.* or the sixth part of their combined strength.<sup>1</sup>

To any person who is willing to look at the facts honestly it is proved beyond question that Protestantism is more favorable than Romanism to the development of national life. It will be well in the next place to discover the causes of this fact. I think it will not be difficult to find them.

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<sup>1</sup> *Compte rendu des séances de l'Institut* by M. de Vergé, November, 1872. The population of France was growing very slowly. In the last five years it diminished 366,000, not including the loss of Alsace and Lorraine.

## II.

It is now admitted in all the world that education is the first condition of progress. The more intelligent the direction, the more productive will be the labor. The application of science in all of its forms to production is what increases the wealth of civilized man. The horrible nakedness of the savage comes from his ignorance. National progress will therefore be in proportion to the scientific discoveries applied to industry.

The education of the masses is also indispensable to the enjoyment of constitutional liberty. When power comes from election it is necessary that the electors have sufficient light to choose their representatives wisely. If they have it not, the country will be poorly governed, it will fall into one error after another, and will march speedily to ruin. In a despotic government education of the people is useful; it is not indispensable. In a great free government, however, or in one that wishes to be such, it is an absolute necessity under pain of decline, either from inaction or disorder. Education of the masses is, therefore, the foundation of the liberty and prosperity of nations. But until to-day the Protestant countries are the only ones that have succeeded in educating the masses. The Roman Catholic nations in vain decree compulsory education, as in Italy, or in vain expend large sums of money to attain the desired end, as in Belgium; they never succeed in educating the masses.

As regards primary education, the Protestant nations are far in advance of the Roman Catholic countries. Only England is not on a level with her sisters, probably because the Anglican church, of all the Protestant churches, approaches more nearly the form of worship of the Church of Rome. All of the Protestant nations march at the front without, or almost without, unlettered citizens, as Saxony, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia, while the Roman Catholic countries remain far in the rear, with at least one-third of the population illiterate, as France and Belgium, or with three-fourths of the inhabitants unlettered, as Spain and Portugal.

Look at Switzerland. What a difference from this point of view between the Protestant and the Roman Catholic cantons! The purely Latin, but Protestant, cantons of Neuchâtel, Vaud,

and Geneva are on a level with the Germanic cantons of Zurich and Berne, and are far above those of Tessin, Valais, and Lucerne.<sup>1</sup> The cause of this contrast is evident, and has often been emphasized. The Protestant religion rests upon a book—the Bible; the Protestant, therefore, should know how to read. For this reason the first and last word of Luther was: “To instruct the children is a duty of the parents and of the rulers. It is a commandment of God.” The Roman Catholic religion, on the contrary, rests upon the sacraments and upon certain forms such as the confession, the mass, the sermon, which do not necessitate reading. To know how to read, therefore, is unnecessary, it is rather a danger, because it necessarily destroys the principle of passive obedience on which the whole Roman Catholic structure is built. Reading is the road that leads to heresy. The natural consequence is, that the Romish priest will be hostile to education, or at least will never make such efforts to render it general as will the Protestant minister. Education being conducive to the enjoyment of political liberty and to the production of wealth, and Protestantism being always favorable to the general diffusion of education we have in this point one manifest cause of the superiority of the Protestant nations.<sup>2</sup>

### III.

All agree that the strength of a nation depends upon its morality. At every turn we hear this maxim which has become almost an axiom of political science: When the morals of a people become corrupt, the nation is lost. Now it is proved that the moral tone among Protestant peoples is higher than among those who profess the religion of Rome. Even the Roman Catholic writers tell us the same thing, and explain it by the fact that Protestants are more faithful in the discharge of their religious duties than the Roman Catholics, an explanation that I believe to be true. Read the literary works of France: attend the different theatres and see the most fashionable plays. Adultery in

<sup>1</sup> For the facts, see my book entitled, *Instruction du Peuple*.

<sup>2</sup> During the war of 1870 it could be proved that the Protestant soldiers had more education than the Roman Catholics. In the ambulances and hospitals when they began to recover from their wounds, the former always asked for books, the latter for decks of cards.

all of its varieties, and in all of its forms is always at the foundation of the plot. The romances and the comedies that have the greatest success should be rigidly forbidden in the circle of a respectable family. In England and Germany it is different. The literary works that are free from the taint of foreign imitation, have a tone and style that could in no way offend the most chaste.

As to the French literature, the evil is of ancient origin. The Provençals having inherited the Gallo-Roman corruption, have sung of loose morals and impure loves, and have made them attractive under the name of gallantry. Gallantry has, in this way, become a prominent feature in all the imaginative writings, and a trait of the national character. The king "vert galant" is the most popular of the French sovereigns. In the countries that accepted the doctrines of the Reformation, the Puritan spirit put a bridle on this looseness of morals, and substituted for it a severity that sometimes has seemed excessive, but that has given to the people an incomparable moral stamina.

In the Roman Catholic countries, those who have wished to combat the omnipotence of the church, have taken their weapons not from the gospel, but from the Renaissance and from Paganism. There are two ways of attacking the Church of Rome: it can be done either by showing that she has forsaken the doctrines of Christ, and by preaching a Christianity more pure and moral than hers, or by attacking her dogmas with irony, and causing the sentiments to revolt against her moral teachings. Luther, Calvin, Knox, and Zwingli adopted the first plan; Rabelais and Voltaire the second. It is clear that the former, supporting their positions with the teachings of the gospel, ought to establish morality, while the latter could establish nothing except its ruin. Thus it has happened that almost all the French authors who have labored to emancipate the spirit of their people have had these defects. Can we unhesitatingly put into the hands, I will not say of a young woman, but of a young man, the complete works of Rabelais, of Voltaire, of Rousseau, of Diderot, of Courier, or of Béranger? The authors who respect morality, and whose works are given to the youth to read, Bossuet, Fénelon, and Racine, are almost always devoted to the church, and their books full of the

doctrines of absolutism. Thus originates the spirit, profoundly Roman Catholic, of almost all those in France who are not revolutionists.

In England and America it is not so. Those who are the most decided partisans of liberty are at the same time men who preach the purest morality; for example, the Puritans and the Quakers. While Bossuet formulated the theory of absolutism, Milton wrote that of the republic, and the Puritans were founding liberty in England and the United States. In one case the writers who are religious and moral, preach servitude, while those who wish liberty, respect neither religion nor morality. In the other case, however, the same men defend at the same time, religion, morality, and liberty.

Let us see the consequences. Compare the private life of the men who took part in the Revolution of 1648 in England, or who founded the Republic in America, with the life of the French republicans. The former are all men of irreprehensible life, of an honor without blot, of a severity of principle almost excessive. The latter, with the exception of a few fanatics, such as Saint-Just and Robespierre, are mostly men of low morals. The most powerful among them, the true representative of the French Revolution, Mirabeau, the great genius, the wonderful orator, seeing himself at court writes obscene books and carries depravity to an extreme. Confront these with the austere Calvinists who have conquered despotism and founded liberty in England and America. What a contrast!

Edgar Quinet, in his admirable book on *The French Revolution*, calls attention to the fact that the men of this epoch, so full of enthusiasm in the beginning, soon grew tired of the effort, and either asked or submitted to the repose of the Empire. The *gneux* of Holland struggled for a much longer time, and passed through and resisted trials much more severe without becoming disheartened. Their cities were stormed and taken, and entire populations massacred. This handful of men struggled against a foe that had at his command the treasuries and the forces of two worlds. They knew neither fatigue nor discouragement, and finally they conquered. They were men of faith!

Pride, self-esteem, and vanity engendered strife among the parties of the French Revolution, and gave rise to a bloody and fratricidal struggle. They beheaded one another instead of uniting to found the republic. In Holland, England, and America, by virtue of a certain spirit of charity, humility and mutual aid, those who had freed their country from tyranny united in consolidating their work. For the founding of a nation the Christianity of Penn and of Washington proves to be a better cement than the philosophy of Vergniaud, Robespierre, and Mirabeau. Without pausing to judge of the two doctrines we may register the results they have accomplished! When the religious sentiment becomes weak, that which prompts men to fulfil their duties, the main-spring of moral life, is self-esteem, vanity, an ardent desire for human approbation. Alfred of Vigny has shown this in eloquent terms in one of the chapters of his book, *Grandeur et Servitude Militaires*. Musset repeated it in these energetic words: "L'orgueil . . . c'est ce qui reste encore d'un peu beau dans la vie."

M. Taine says in his *Notes sur l'Angleterre*: "In France the moral principle is based upon the sentiment of honor; in England, upon the idea of duty. Now the first is arbitrary, its decisions differ according to the persons and circumstances."

In Prévost-Paradol's *France Nouvelle* we have the following passage: "To the eyes of every acute and conscientious observer our country presents the almost unique spectacle of a society in which the desire for approbation has become the principal guarantee of good order, and secures the fulfilment of duties and the making of sacrifices that religion and patriotism have lost their power to inspire. If our laws are generally respected, if the young soldier readily rallies around his flag and remains faithful to it, if the officers respect the public coffers, if, in fine, the Frenchman fulfils his duties to his country and to his fellow-citizens, it is to his love of approbation that we especially owe it. It is not respect for the divine law, now long ago reduced to a problem; nor is it philosophical devotion to an uncertain duty. Much less is it devotion to an abstract being—the state—cast down and discredited by so many revolutions. No, it is only the fear of having to blush before the world for an action that is

judged shameful, that maintains among us a desire sufficiently strong of doing the right." This is a faithful and sad picture that Prévost-Paradol paints, and with a soul filled with sadness he adds: "What has no other support than self-esteem and a desire for approbation must give way as the broken reed of which the Scriptures speak."

Read the proclamations made in France to the people and to the army. When it is wished to arouse them or excite their enthusiasm, appeals are made to love of praise or to self-esteem. Hear Napoleon: "From the height of the pyramids forty centuries are looking down upon you." Again, "Soldiers, entering your homes you will be able to say 'I was at Jena or Austerlitz.'" To sing their own praises, or to have others sing them, is the end and the motive. Nelson at Trafalgar simply said: "England expects every man to do his duty." In the documents that come from the men of the Dutch or the American Revolution, appeals are made to love of country, to duty, and to the divine law. It is clear that these incentives are much more powerful and lasting than those above mentioned. When we come to look at it, to have one's praises sung is indeed an empty honor. If we but have courage to see it, public opinion loses its value as a rule of conduct. The public mind or the public conscience may be perverted, and this desire for approbation and love of human applause may lead us to do what is wrong rather than what is right and honorable.

The French writers have almost all exalted the Renaissance at the expense of the Reformation, pretending that the former was broader in its views than the latter, and that it brought to humanity a liberation much more complete. The facts do not bear them out in this. The countries that embraced the Reformation manifestly take the lead over those that satisfied themselves with the Renaissance. It is because the Reformation had in itself a moral force that was lacking in the Renaissance. And moral force with education is the fountain of the prosperity of nations. The Reformation was a return to the gospel, and the gospel being superior to ancient tradition ought to yield better fruit.



## IV.

The Reformation has proved a blessing to the peoples that accepted its doctrines, because it has enabled them to found free institutions, while Romanism leads either to despotism or anarchy, and oftentimes alternately to the one and the other.

The government natural to Protestant peoples is the representative government. That natural to Roman Catholic peoples seems to be the despotic. While subject to a despotic government, they are in peace, they have the system that is natural to them. When they seek to free themselves, they fall into disorder, and become weak; they are in a state contrary to their nature. This is the position sustained by *L'Univers* and the *Civiltà Cattolica*, organs of the court of Rome, and, sad to say, the facts seem to confirm their view.

It has been often asked, Why the revolutions in the Netherlands, in England, and in America had a happy result, while the French Revolution seems to have miscarried? M. Guizot has published a work for the special purpose of answering this question which really seems to contain the secret of our fortunes.

I do not hesitate to answer that it is because the former were made in Protestant countries, and the latter in a Roman Catholic country. Voltaire himself saw this. He asks himself how it is that the governments of England and France have become as different as those of Morocco and Venice. "Is it not," says he, "because the English, who had long found fault with the court of Rome, have at last thrown off entirely this shameful yoke, while our people, more light-hearted and indifferent, have supported the yoke, pretending to laugh, and dancing in their fetters?" Voltaire found the true reason; but was not he one of the Frenchmen who provoked the laugh, and led the dance?

To-day we can demonstrate even to certainty a truth that only the leading spirits of the eighteenth century began to suspect, namely, that a nation's forms of worship and ecclesiastical constitutions have a tremendous influence in shaping its political constitution and moulding its institutions. This truth, that was then seen only through the mists, now shines in noonday light, and receives fresh confirmation from contemporaneous events. The

influence of religion over man is so great, that he is always inclined to give to the organization of the state forms taken from his religious organization. Wherever the sovereign is considered the representative of Deity, liberty cannot be established, because the authority of him who speaks and acts in the name of God is necessarily absolute. The mandates of heaven are not to be discussed. Simple mortals can do nothing but bow and obey. I know of no exception to this rule. In the ancient empires of Asia and in those of to-day, in the Mohammedan countries as well as in the Roman Catholic nations, wherever the kings reign by divine right the people have been completely enslaved.

The people were free in Athens and in Rome, because those who ruled, elected by their fellow-citizens, did not claim to be representatives of the Deity. The priesthood was not a caste, and exercised but little influence in the government.

Primitive Christianity should have singularly favored the establishment of free and democratic institutions. It is true that on its ascetic side it separated man from his temporal interests, and did not induce him to assert his rights as a citizen. But elevating and purifying his morals, it made him abler to govern himself and live free. In the bosom of the Christian societies of the first centuries, there existed an almost perfect equality, and all authority emanated from the people. Word and opinion were the springs of government. The primitive Christian churches were real democratic republics. For this reason, when the Presbyterians in the XVI. century re-established the ancient organization of the church, they were forced to establish also in the state republican institutions.

The adversaries as well as the apologists of the Church of Rome, confound Romanism and Christianity. Those who attack Christianity attribute to it the principles, the abuses, and the crimes of the Romish Church; and those who defend Romanism point to the merits, the virtues, and the benefits of Christianity. There is error on one side and on the other. Christianity is favorable to civil liberty, while Romanism is its mortal enemy, as its infallible head himself declares. The history of the institutions of this church shows us a constant march towards a centraliza-

tion more and more complete of all the powers. She began with the equalized and representative democracy of the first centuries, and has ended in the XIX. century with the proclamation of papal infallibility, the most absolute despotism that it is possible to imagine. A democratic republic in the beginning, she became an aristocracy when the bishops extended their power without losing their independence of the popes. She was still a constitutional monarchy while the councils exercised the supreme control. Today she realizes the ideal of theocracy and absolutism.

If civil society tends to mould itself after the religious organization, as the facts demonstrate, it ought then to submit itself to a government purely despotic. The Romanists understand it so. Bossuet, in his *Politique tirée de l'Écriture Sainte*, lays down the form of government that is most suitable for a Roman Catholic country: "God has set up kings as his ministers, and through them reigns over the nations." "The royal authority is absolute." "The king should give account to no one of that which he ordains." "It is necessary to render obedience to princes as to justice itself. They are gods, and partake, in a certain sense, of the divine independence." "The subjects have nothing to oppose to the oppressions of princes, except respectful remarks, without insurrection and without murmuring." Thus, logically, the government in a Roman Catholic country must be despotic: first, because the government of the church, which serves as a type, is despotic; and second, because the king receives his power directly from God, or from the Pope, a power that cannot be limited or questioned.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See in what vigorous and pompous language Bossuet defines for us monarchy as it results from Roman Catholic tradition, and as it comes from the Rome of the Cæsars and from the Rome of the Popes.

"It is necessary to render obedience to princes as to justice itself. They are gods, and partake in a certain manner of the divine independence. As in God all perfection is united, so all the power of the individuals is united in the person of the prince. Should God withdraw his hand, the world would fall into chaos, so, should authority cease in the kingdom, all would fall into confusion. Behold the prince in his cabinet; from there go out the orders that cause the magistrates, the machinery of war, the provinces and the armies to move in harmony and accord. He is the image of God who seated on his throne in the highest heavens causes all nature to march in unison. The evil-doer in vain seeks to hide himself; the light of God follows him everywhere. In the same way God enables the prince to

The Reformation, on the contrary, being a return to primitive Christianity, begat on every hand a spirit of liberty and of resistance to absolutism. It tended to revive constitutional and republican institutions. The Protestant recognizes but one authority in religion—the Bible. He does not bow before human authority as does the Romanist; he examines and discusses for himself. The Calvinists and the Presbyterians having reëstablished the republican organization in the church, the Protestant, by a logical consequence, carried into the political society the same principles and the same habits. The accusation which Lamennais makes against the Reformation is perfectly true. Says he: "Power in the religious society had been denied, it was then necessary to deny it in the state, substituting in the one and the other the reason and the will of man for the reason and will of God. Each one from that time, depending on no one but himself, began to enjoy a complete liberty, to be lord of himself, to be his king and his god." Montesquien has also said: "The Roman Catholic religion is best suited to a monarchy, while Protestantism accommodates itself more readily to a republic."

Luther and Calvin did not preach resistance to tyranny; they condemn it rather and commend obedience. They did not admit also the full liberty of conscience. But in spite of them the principle of political and religious freedom and that of the sovereignty of the people naturally came out of the Reformation. It cannot be denied that these have everywhere been its natural fruits. The Protestant writers defend the rights of the people, and where the Protestants triumph they establish free institutions. Their enemies have not been mistaken; they have emphasized—but as an evil—this connection between the Reformation and liberty.

"The reformers," said one who was sent from Venice into

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discover plots the most secret. He has eyes and hands everywhere; the birds of the air recount to him that which is transpiring. He has received of God a certain penetration that makes one think that he can divine. He penetrates into intrigues, his long arms take hold of his enemies in the ends of the earth; they hide themselves in the depths of the abyss, but there is no secure refuge from such a power."

The American republic is the very opposite of this Roman Catholic absolutism. She was the fruit and the image of Calvinistic Presbyterianism.

France in the sixteenth century, "preach that the king has not authority over his subjects." "Thus," continues he, "it leads on to a government such as that of Switzerland, and tends to ruin the monarchical constitution of the kingdom."<sup>1</sup>

"The ministers," says Monteuc, "preached that the kings could have no more power than was pleasing to the people; others preached that the nobility were no more than themselves."<sup>2</sup> This is truly the liberal and democratic breath of Calvinism. Tavannes often speaks of the democratic spirit of the Huguenots. "They are," says he, "republics in the states of the kingdom, having their organization, their people of war, their separate finances, and are wishing to establish a popular and democratic government."

The great jurist, Dumolin, denounced the Protestant pastors to the Parliament saying: "What they want is to reduce France to a popular state and to make of her a republic such as that of Geneva, from which they expelled the count and the bishop. They are laboring likewise to abolish the right of majorat, wishing to make the plebeians equal with the nobility, and the younger as the equals of the older, as if all being children of Adam were equal by divine and natural right." These are undoubtedly the ideas of the French Revolution, and if France had accepted the Reformation of the sixteenth century she would have enjoyed from that time the liberty of self-government, and would have been able to preserve that liberty. In 1622 Gregory XV. wrote to the King of France requesting him to destroy Geneva, the focus of Calvinism and republicanism. In France after the death of Henry IV., the duke of Rohan, a Huguenot, wished to establish a republic, saying that the day of kings was passed.

The Protestant nobility were accused of wishing to divide France into small republican states as in Switzerland, and to the League is attributed the honor of having preserved the unity of

<sup>1</sup> See, for the political ideas of the Reformation, the instructive work of M. Laurent, *La Révolution Française*, Vol. I., Sect. II., § 3.

<sup>2</sup> Blaise de Monteuc, *Collection des Mémoires de Petitot*, first series, Vol. XXII. Page 26.

the French nation. It is true that the Huguenots desired local autonomy, decentralization of power, and a federal system securing the popular and provincial liberties, and this is what France has since sought in vain to accomplish. It was the Roman Catholic passion for unity and uniformity that made the French Revolution abortive, and it is this same passion that has always re-established despotism. "Calvin wished that the minister of the gospel be elected with the consent and approval of the people, the pastors presiding at the election." This is the system that the Calvinists wished to introduce into France. "In the year 1620," says Tavannes (of the Calvinists), "their government was truly popular, the mayors of the cities and the ministers having all authority in their hands, of which they gave no account to their nobility except in appearance: so that, had they succeeded in realizing their plans, the government would have become like that of Switzerland, and the princes and the nobility would have been ruined."

"As soon as the Reformation put the gospel into the hands of the peasantry it demanded the abolition of servitude and the recognition of their ancient rights in the name of Christian liberty." The Reformation caused on every hand energetic demands for the natural rights of men—liberty, toleration, equality of rights, and the sovereignty of the people. These demands are recorded in great numbers in the records of that time, among others, in the celebrated tract of Languet: *Junii Bruti celtæ, vindiciæ contra tyrannos, de principe in populum populique in principum, legitima protestate*, and in the Dialogue, *De l'autorité du prince et de la liberté des peuples*.<sup>1</sup>

These ideas that form the basis of modern liberties have always had eloquent defenders among Protestants. The celebrated preacher Jurien defended them against the attacks of Bossuet, and Locke expounded them in scientific form. It was from Protestantism that Montesquieu, Voltaire, and the political writers of the eighteenth century derived these ideas, and of them the French Revolution was born. But long before this time they

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<sup>1</sup> *Mémoires de l'Etat de France sous Charles IX.*, Vol. III., pp. 57-64. See Laurent, *Revolution Française*, Vol. I., pp. 3, 5.

had been applied with uninterrupted success in Protestant countries, first in Holland, then in England, and especially in America.

The famous edict of the 16th of July, 1581, in which the States General of the Netherlands proclaim their independence of the King of Spain, announces clearly the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. To dethrone a king they must necessarily invoke the following principle: "The subjects were not created by God for the prince, to obey him in all that it might please him to ordain; but rather the prince for the subjects, without whom he could not be prince, that he might govern them according to reason and justice." The edict continues, saying that the people, in order to escape the tyranny of the king, have been obliged to refuse him obedience: "There is no other way than this to preserve and defend their ancient liberty and that of their wives, children, and posterity, for whom, according to natural right, they are bound to expose their lives and their property." The Revolution in England in 1648 was made in the name of these same principles. Milton and the other republicans of that period defended them with wonderful vigor of spirit and character.

The French Revolution did not invent the principles known as "the principles of '89," it only aided in spreading them in Europe. In France, unfortunately, these principles were never respected, not even the most sacred of all, the liberty of conscience.<sup>1</sup> The Puritans and the Quakers had proclaimed them and enjoyed them for two hundred years in America, and it was there and to England that Europe went to find this idea at the close of the eighteenth century.

Already in 1620 the constitution of Virginia had established representative government, trial by jury, and the principle that an impost should be voted by those who have to pay it. From the beginning Massachusetts established compulsory education, and the complete separation of church and state. The different sects lived under the same law, and themselves chose their minis-

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<sup>1</sup> It is worth while to read, in this connection, a very instructive article by Pré-vost-Paradol in the *Revue de Deux Mondes* (1858), in which he shows that neither the law nor the magistrates have admitted liberty of worship in France. It does not exist in this country (Belgium).

ters. Then the representative democracy existed there as complete as it does to-day. Even the judges were annually chosen by the people. We meet, however, with a fact still more important: In 1633 there appeared a man demanding not only toleration, but complete religious equality before the civil law, and on this principle he founded a State. This man was Roger Williams, a name little known on our continent, but one that should be written among those of the benefactors of humanity. He was the first who, in this world drenched with blood for four thousand years because of intolerance, established religious freedom as a political right, even before Descartes had established the principle of free investigation in philosophy. "Persecution in matters of conscience," said he, "is manifestly and lamentably contrary to the teachings of Jesus Christ." "He who guides the ship of state can maintain order on board, and reach the harbor, even if all be not compelled to attend divine worship." "The civil power has no dominion except over the body and property of man; it cannot interfere with what concerns his faith, not even to prevent a church from falling into apostasy and heresy." "To remove the yoke of tyranny from the souls of men is not only to do an act of justice to oppressed peoples, but is to establish public liberty and peace upon interest in, and respect for, the consciences of all."

One should read in the admirable history of Bancroft how Roger Williams founded the city of Providence, and the State of Rhode Island, upon these principles, at that time unknown in Europe, save in the Protestant Netherlands. When a constitution was adopted in Rhode Island in 1644, all the citizens were called to vote on it. The founders called it a democracy, and such it was in the strongest sense of the term; it was exactly what Rousseau understood by a democracy. The people governed themselves directly. All of the citizens, without distinction of creed, were equal before the law, and every law had to be confirmed in the primary assemblies. This was the most radical self-government that human society had known, and it has now lasted more than two centuries without disturbances and without revolutions.

The Quakers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey established sim-



ilar principles as the basis of these States. Power resides in the people. "We put the power in the people," such is the foundation stone of the constitution of New Jersey. Note some of the leading principles: "No man or body of men has power over the conscience. No one at any time, in any way, on any pretext, will be persecuted or injured for his religious belief, whatever it may be. The General Assembly shall be chosen by secret ballot. Every man may vote or be voted for. The voters shall give to their delegates binding instructions. If the delegate shall not comply with his instructions, he may be impeached. Two commissioners, elected by the Assembly, shall exercise the executive power. The judges and the magistrates shall be elected by the people for two years. The judges shall preside over the jury, but the judicial power shall be exercised by the twelve jurymen. No one shall be imprisoned for debt. Orphans shall be educated at the expense of the State. Teaching shall be considered a public service, and shall be paid for from the general treasury."

The principles established in Pennsylvania and Connecticut are more or less the same.

These ideas that man has concerning himself, that he is free, that no service or contribution can be demanded of him without his expressed consent, that the legislative, executive, and judicial, in a word that all powers of government emanate from the body politic, this complex of principles that modern society is seeking to apply, come, undeniably, from Germanic tradition, and, indeed, are met with in the beginning among almost all the races before the development of royal power. But if these principles, crushed out in the Middle Ages by feudalism and at the close of the fifteenth century by centralized and absolute monarchy, have been revived in Switzerland, in England, in Holland and in the United States, it is due to the democratic breath of the Reformation. It is only in Protestant countries that these ideas have lived and secured to the people order and prosperity. If France had not persecuted, beheaded, or banished those of her sons who became Protestants, she would have been able to develop those germs of liberty and self-government which had taken root in the provincial states. This truth was clearly proved in a paper by M. Gustave Garrison

published years ago.<sup>1</sup> Each year investigation and contemporaneous events give us new arguments in support of this view. In the assemblies of Rochelle and Grenoble, in the States-General of Orleans, we find the spirit of liberty and the parliamentary spirit to be as strong as in the British Parliament. Here, too, we have that clear, strong language of Calvin so appropriate for the discussion of the great interests of religion and politics.

“We shall know how to defend against the king our cities that have no king,” said the Huguenots; and without doubt, if they had triumphed, they would have founded a constitutional monarchy, as in England, or a federal republic, as in the Netherlands. If the French nobility had preserved the spirit of independence and legal opposition that it had received from Protestantism it would have imposed limits to the royal power, and France would have escaped the oriental despotism of Louis XIV. and his successors, that has broken the character of the French people.<sup>2</sup> When Francis I. gave the signal for the persecution of the Protestants,<sup>3</sup> and when Henry IV. renounced Protestantism, they betrayed the true interests of France, as did also the nobility. This phrase—“Paris is well worth a mass”—in which the majority of French historians see a proof of practical, common sense, is a revolting cynicism. To sell one’s self, to renounce one’s religious faith for temporal interests, is unquestionably an act that every man should scorn. France is still paying the penalty of this, just as she is still suffering the sad consequences of St. Bartholomew’s Day and of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, those two grand attempts against the liberty of conscience.

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<sup>1</sup> *Revue de Deux Mondes*, 15th of Feb., 1848.

<sup>2</sup> M. Quinet in his book on the Revolution pronounces a severe but just judgment against the French nobility of this epoch: “They had sold their religious faith; how could they, then, found a political faith?”

<sup>3</sup> “Francis I.,” said Napoleon at St. Helena, “was really in a position to adopt Protestantism at its birth, and declare himself its head in Europe. He would have spared France her terrible religious convulsions. Unfortunately Francis understood nothing of all this. He could not excuse himself with his scruples, because he allied himself with the Turks and brought them among us. It was only that he could not see further. The stupidity of the time, feudal intelligence. Francis I., in a word, was nothing more than a hero of the tournament, a gallant of the parlor, a great pygmy.” *Mémoires*, 17th of August, 1816.

What France most needs is men who, without disregarding ancient tradition, would accept at the same time modern ideas. The republicans are generally hostile to every idea of religion, and they, as their predecessors, the revolutionists of the last century, lack a basis or a foundation, upon which to build a solid structure. Those who defend religious ideas wish to revive the old regime, and thus they place obstacles in the way of any reform. France now has opportunity to establish free institutions. But will not the friends of the monarchy rather prepare the way for the return of a Napoleon, throwing the country into anarchy by their blind obstinacy? Under Louis Philippe in 1850, and even to-day, the conservatives ruin their country by their adherence to old methods. At the present moment the republic is the only government possible in France, and the republicans perhaps prevent its taking root because Romanism has created in them a spirit of intolerance<sup>1</sup> and of despotism. France will with difficulty escape another restoration of absolute power, unless she abandons the Roman Catholic traditions. Romanism has poorly prepared the French to live free and to govern themselves with toleration.

Among the Roman Catholic peoples toleration sometimes exists in the laws, but never in the customs. Woe to him, who wishing to enjoy his liberty of conscience resolves to obey the dictates of his own reason. He is hated even by his own parents and friends, and by the indifferent even more than by the faithful. The unbelievers find it more convenient to laugh at the priest, or to attack him, at the same time yielding to him in all important matters of life. Submissive to the yoke of orthodoxy, which they mock at while they endure it, they do not allow others who find it galling

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<sup>1</sup>The intolerance of the French comes from their Romish education. Paris was with the League. In the time of Voltaire the people were still full of their hatred for Protestants and unbelievers. "We are not able," says a sensible French writer, "to bear contradiction in regard to the things we value and esteem. The rashest or most foolish opinion is for us a dogma without which there is no salvation. Each party wishes to be a church, and allows no doubt as to its infallibility. The most liberal seek subterfuges for denying to those who dissent from them the liberty they demand for themselves. Hence the facility with which dictatorships are established, and the same means of compulsion are used by all parties in their alternate victories and defeats."

to throw it off openly and courageously. By intimidation and ridicule uniformity is imposed, and liberty exists only in name.

All of the modern nations are seeking to establish the representative, constitutional regime. But this system, born in England on the soil of the ancient Germanic institutions, and revived and nourished by Protestantism, does not seem able to take root permanently in Roman Catholic countries. And the reason is this: the chief of state, be he king or president, cannot be a true constitutional sovereign. If he be devout and confess to the priest as becomes an obedient penitent, he will be governed by his confessor who in turn obeys the Pope. By means of the confessional, therefore, the Pope becomes the real sovereign, and the Jesuits, who always govern the Pope, become the power behind the throne.

In such a case the prerogatives granted by the constitution to the chief executive, are exercised by a foreign power, and always with detriment to the country. Examples of this abound in history. Too submissive to the demands of their confessors, Louis XIV. revokes the Edict of Nantes, James II. of England, and Charles X. of France, lose their crowns, and Louis XVI. overthrows the monarchy and loses his life.

Ferdinand and Leopold, of Austria, ruined their governments by the most horrible persecutions, and Augustus and Sigismund prepared for the division of Poland by the introduction of the Jesuits and by intolerance. With a sovereign pious and well-confessed, a constitutional regime is a fiction or a burlesque. It subjects the nation to the will of an unknown priest, who is the organ of the pretensions of his church; or it leads to revolution, should the country refuse to submit to this humiliating yoke. It was only by resisting his confessor that the Emperor Francis Joseph, of Austria, could be a true constitutional monarch.

In a Protestant country the constitutional regime develops itself naturally, it is on its native soil; while in a Roman Catholic country, being an heretical importation, it is destroyed by the priesthood unless it will serve to strengthen their dominion. Thus it comes about that constitutional freedom is either perverted by the clergy, or destroyed by the revolutionists.

## V.

Another cause of the inferiority of Romish peoples is, that the religious sentiment is much weaker among the intelligent and dominant classes than it is in Protestant countries. I think there are none who will deny this fact. The Roman Catholic journals declare it to be a fact every day, and demand for religion in Romish countries the same respect that it enjoys in England and America. The enemies of religion revile the Americans and the English for what they call their excessive religiosity, their rigorous observance of the Sabbatic rest, the public prayers and fasts, in a word, for their rigid piety.

Two causes explain why religion has more life and authority among the intelligent classes of Protestants.

In the first place, Romanism, by the number of its dogmas, by its ceremonies, at times childish, by its miracles and its pilgrimages,<sup>1</sup> puts itself out of the atmosphere of modern thought, while Protestantism, by virtue of its simplicity and the flexibility of its forms, readily adapts and commends itself to the spirit of the age. M. Renan has well said: "The formation of new sects, which the Romanists ridicule in the Protestants as a sign of weakness, proves on the contrary, that the religious sentiment still lives among them. Then it is creative. Nothing is more dead than that which never changes and cannot be modified."

The apathy with which two new dogmas have recently been received, which would have given rise formerly to the most violent opposition, or would have caused a schism, is an evidence of the incredibly low ebb of intellectual life in the Church of Rome. Excess of superstition inevitably leads to skepticism. The contemptuous challenge offered by the church to human reason leads men who refuse to abandon the use of their intellect to reject every form of worship. A Frenchman of letters, M. Geruzet, painted this situation with the hand of a master: "The father of

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<sup>1</sup> Agassiz, in his *Voyage au Brésil*, writes in regard to the influence of Romanism in that country: "The priest is the instructor of the people. It should no longer be believed that the soul can be satisfied and edified by grotesque processions, painted saints, lighted candles, and cheap bouquets as its only food. So long as the people do not demand another kind of religious instruction, they will continue to degrade themselves; or at least, they will never rise."

a family who believes in God without believing in St. Hubert is embarrassed on the one hand by his devout daughters, and on the other by his atheistic sons. God save us both from atheism and 'Hubertism.'” Evidently this “Hubertism” has begotten atheism, and the two have brought France to the condition in which we now see her. There is no longer place for a rational religion.

Romanism begets an indifference so complete in matters of faith, that the individual has not really the energy necessary to abandon frankly the church. Even this indifference satisfies Rome, because it prevents the man from rejecting entirely her authority, and thus she ends always by capturing the children of her adversaries.

The second cause that produces skepticism and hatred of priests among Roman Catholic peoples is, that the church shows herself hostile to modern liberty and modern ideas. In this way she compels all who are friendly to political and intellectual freedom to hate and combat her, though often it is done with sorrow and regret. Voltaire's cry of hatred, “*Let us stamp out the infamy,*” becomes logically everywhere the watchword, open or hidden, of liberalism. Liberalism never ceases—can never cease—to attack priestcraft and monasticism, because priests and monks wish to subject society to the Pope and to his delegates, the bishops. We cannot respect that dogma by means of which men seek to destroy our liberty.

We have pointed out the fact and its causes. Let us now look at the consequences.

The first is that it is impossible for those countries to free themselves from the dominion of Rome that rise up against her, simply denying her authority in the name of reason. No nation ever made more violent efforts to accomplish this than France has made. To this end she has employed every means with an incomparable vigor and splendor: the reasonings of philosophy and the jeers of fiction, the satire of comedy and the eloquence of the rostrum, the torch of the incendiary, the spade of the destroyer, and the knife of the guillotine.

Just now in Versailles this “clericalism” has turned over the

teaching to the Jesuits, thus preparing for the return of a royal family completely under the control of the church.

This influence grows rapidly, and, as in Belgium, will one day become irresistible. This comes from the fact that in religion we only kill that for which we give a substitute. If in politics men would bow before the evidence of facts, as in physical science, this truth would be admitted as an axiom by all who were not imbued with prejudice. Free-thinking will not break the dominion of the church; it will rather strengthen it by the terror that it inspires. It cannot satisfy the deep yearnings of the human soul.

The attempt to destroy Romanism without providing a suitable substitute does not, therefore, attain the end desired, but instead gives rise to a spirit of revolution. Let us note that this spirit is common to the Roman Catholic nations everywhere, in America as well as in Europe, while observers wonder at not finding it also in the radical democracies of the United States. The Protestants respect law and authority. The Roman Catholics who are not able to establish free institutions, yet are unwilling to live without them, make despotism necessary, while at the same time they are continually resisting it. Hence arises an ever-active ferment of rebellion.

When the evil reaches the extreme limit the country precipitates itself from anarchy into despotism, and from despotism into anarchy, consuming its strength in the struggle of irreconcilable parties. Such is the picture that Spain and other countries that have come to a like situation offer us. Whence comes the evil?

Here is the cause, as I think. Even an ordinary amount of freedom is not possible without some moral basis. Now the ministers of religion are the only ones who ever speak to the people of duty and morality. If they be not respected and heard by the people, who will be their substitute in this indispensable office? Certainly the free-thinkers cannot do it.

Guizot has admirably said: "Christianity is a great school of respect." If to defend liberty the liberal "Voltaireism" destroys the authority of Romanism, as it necessarily must do, the respect for legitimate authority will also disappear, and will give place to a spirit of opposition, of malediction, of hatred, and of insurrec-

tion. In this way is born the revolutionary temperament of the Roman Catholic peoples.<sup>1</sup> They only live tranquil when completely subject to Rome, as Spain did formerly, and as Tyrol is doing to-day. If they undertake to emancipate themselves they will, with great difficulty, escape anarchy.

## VI.

In what relates to social reforms, with the aid of the clergy all is easy. But without their aid, or against their will, anything is difficult, and sometimes impossible. See, for instance, the case of primary education. If compulsory education be decreed, with the aid and consent of the pastors, as in Protestant countries, the law will be observed. If, on the contrary, the clergy be hostile or indifferent, as in Roman Catholic countries, it will not be respected. Sufficient proof of this we have in the school statistics of Italy. Allow the priest to enter the schools as an authority, as is done in Belgium, and he will prepare for the triumph of absolutism. Expel him, and he will ruin the school by inducing his parishioners to abandon it. And, again, will you give to the teachers of your normal schools a spirit of resistance and hostility to the clergy that they may impart it to the pupils? In this event you will inevitably destroy the religious sentiment and will make an atheistic people. Logic impels you, and free-thinking invites you to this. Are you prepared for it? In Protestant countries, in America and in Holland, you have a public school, not sectarian, but thoroughly leavened with Christian sentiment. In a Roman Catholic country the public school will only be able to live by a violent struggle against the clergy who always seek to destroy it. Your school will, therefore, inevitably be anti-religious.

Christianity offers solutions for the terrible social questions that cause the war between labor and capital, because by the fraternity and abnegation that it preaches it is conducive to the reign of justice. Between employers and employees truly Christian, no difficulty can arise, because equity will reign in all their relations. All too keenly do we feel the awful madness produced by that

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<sup>1</sup> "For us Frenchmen," recently wrote M. Deschaud, in the *National*, "liberty and revolution are synonyms, because authority and oppression have often been so."



weakening of religious sentiment that results from a necessary resistance to the only form of worship that we know. In Protestant countries, on the other hand, the ministers of religion are highly esteemed by all classes of society, and by their intervention the conflicts lose their severity, under the Christian influence of which they are the respected representatives.

In his interesting book on the French Revolution, Quinet demonstrates conclusively that if the prodigious efforts for emancipation produced no satisfactory result, it was because of the religious resistance; and from this concludes that it is not possible radically and thoroughly to reform the civil and political constitution of a country without also reforming the religion of the people. The reason is that civil and political society takes its system from the religious society and organizes itself on the same model.

In Roman Catholic countries it is very difficult to enjoy even an average prosperity because as the church is seeking to establish her dominion in every department, the vitality of the nation must be employed almost exclusively in repelling these pretensions of the clergy. Witness what is actually going on in Belgium. Every effort of the different parties is concentrated on this one question, while other interests, even those of national protection and our independent existence must be subordinated to it.

The celibacy of the clergy, the absolute submission of the whole ecclesiastical hierarchy to a single will, and the multiplication of the monastic orders, constitute a danger to Romish countries of which the Protestant nations know nothing.

I admire a man who renounces the pleasures of family to devote himself to his fellow-men and to the cause of truth. St. Paul is right: he who has a difficult mission to perform should not marry. But when, by requirement, all of the priests are celibates, then arises, aside from the dangers to morality, a great danger to the state. These priests form a caste that have a special interest, different from that of the nation.

The real country of the priest is Rome; he himself declares it. He will, therefore, sacrifice, if it be necessary, his country for the interests of the church, or for the dominion of the Pope, who is the infallible head of his church and the representative of God

on the earth. Papist, first of all, afterwards, if the interests of Romanism allow, Belgian, Frenchman, or German. Such is the Romish point of view, and it cannot be otherwise.

When the Liberal party was in power in Belgium, and Napoleon III., before the Italian war, presented himself as the defender of the church, more than one Flemish priest said: "From the South will come your liberation." To-day the Ultramontane Germans do not hide the fact that, in the interests of the church, they would betray Germany. Did not a Bavarian deputy say in open parliament: "In vain will you raise new regiments; if they be Roman Catholics, they will go over to the enemy?"

The monk, still less than the priest, has a country. The servant of the pope, severed from all local ties, he lives only in the church, which is universal, and has no other object than the extension of her kingdom, which will also be his. How can the state preserve her independence in the presence of the clergy and the monastics? How be free in the presence of those who wish to be lords and who dominate the masses by means of ties the most powerful and sacred? In Protestant countries the pastors are married and have children; they have, therefore, the same interests and the same kind of life as their fellow-citizens. They are divided into a great number of denominations, and do not, therefore, obey any common will. They are not hierarchically subject to a foreign chieftain, who pursues a dream of universal dominion. They are patriotic because their church is a national church. They are independent of the state, as in America, or subject to the state, as in England. They never pretend to be the lords of the state as in France or in Belgium.

The separation of church and state is a measure that men everywhere seek to accomplish. It is possible to accomplish this in Protestant countries, because there the clergy submit. But it is in vain to decree it in Roman Catholic countries. The church, that teaches that the temporal should be subject to the spiritual, as the body is to the soul, will not accept this regime of separation except when she does so to attain her own ends. This separation will be, therefore, either a snare or a burlesque. You cannot in the individual separate the religious man from the citizen, and ordi-

narily the sentiments of the former inspire the actions of the latter.

The ministers of religion exercise over those who consider them interpreters of the divine law an influence much greater than that of the magistrates, representatives of the state, because the priest promises eternal felicity and threatens with the pains of hell that never end, while the officers of the law can only dispose of recompenses and penalties that are earthly and temporal. By means of the confessional the priest makes himself master of the sovereign, of the magistrates and of the electors, and through the electors, of the assemblies. While he has the sacraments in his hands the separation of church and state will be nothing more than an illusion.

To govern together with the clergy is to subject the nation to them. To govern against them is to endanger authority. To govern side by side with them and taking no account of them would be better, but it is what they will not allow.

The Roman Catholic nations of the Continent have taken from England and America principles, which, born of Protestantism, give good results under its influence. But on the Continent we are beginning to see where these principles lead when combatted or utilized by an Ultramontane clergy. They lead to disorder when the masses lose faith, as in Spain and France, and to a reign of the Romish hierarchy when the people hold on to their faith, as in Belgium.

An attentive and disinterested study of contemporaneous facts, therefore, seems to lead us to this sad conclusion: That the Roman Catholic nations will not succeed in preserving the liberties that were born of Protestantism. If they were isolated, submitting themselves to the absolute dominion of the church they might perhaps enjoy a tranquil felicity and a life of sweet mediocrity. But a danger from without seems to threaten them unless they refuse to obey the voice of the hierarchy.

Buckle counts among the virtues of our century that of indifference, which keeps us from religious wars. This advantage, if advantage it be, our age will not always enjoy. Everything seems to be preparing for a great clash, in which religion will be one of

the prime causes. Already in 1870 Romish influence hurled France into war against Germany. If Henry V. or Napoleon IV. ascends the throne, it will be with the aid and support of the clergy, who will arrange everything for a new crusade to free their persecuted brethren beyond the Rhine, on whose aid they will count. The countries in which the clerical party dominates will probably be dragged into a holy war. See the plan advocated in France by *l'Univers* and some other organs of the court of Rome. The restoration of the legitimate sovereigns in the three Latin countries, Spain, Italy and France; Rome restored to the Pope and to the supreme direction of the church; the return to the true principles of government, that is, to those proclaimed by the *Syllabus* and Roman Catholic tradition. Such is the grand plan for whose realization the Romanists labor and hope. Will they succeed in it? Who knows? But if they fail in this supreme assault against Protestantism, what will be the fate of the vanquished? One trembles to think of the woes and miseries prepared for Europe by this dream of universal dominion of the church, this dream that Rome now seeks to realize with more audacity and animosity than ever before.

EMILIO DE LAVELEYE.

*Translated by Samuel R. Gammon.*

## V. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

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### FAIRBAIRN'S PLACE OF CHRIST IN MODERN THEOLOGY.

THE PLACE OF CHRIST IN MODERN THEOLOGY. *By A. M. Fairbairn, M. A., D. D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford; Gifford Lecturer in the University of Aberdeen; Late Morse Lecturer in Union Seminary, New York; and Lyman-Beecher Lecturer in Yale University.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1893.

This volume contains the Morse Lectures in the Union Seminary, New York, together with some matter delivered in the Lyman-Beecher Lectures at Yale, and much additional material never delivered at all. This is not the first appearance as an author of the learned principal of the Congregational College, located at classic Oxford, but this is his first attempt at a systematic treatise upon any of the deeper problems of philosophy or theology. We think this volume will give him an honorable place among the theologians of his school; for this book indicates ample scholarship and dialectic powers of a high order. Principal Fairbairn, more than any other author of recent date deserves the title of the philosopher and theologian of the New Theology. Without further introduction we indicate some of the criticisms to which this volume is liable:

1. The purpose for which this book was written discredits it. The object which the author has in view is to "draw the ground plan of a theology for the present." According to the author all the theologies of the past have been failures, and the new historical and literary criticism has furnished us with fresh data which render a new theology necessary and make a measurably true theology at last possible. This view is revolutionary, breaking with all the past doctrinal achievements of the church, and building upon their ruins a theological structure out of materials entirely new. The Nicene Trinitarianism, the Augustinian Anthropology, the Anselmic and Reformed Soteriology and the splendid works of the Puritan divines of the Second Reformation in Great Britain, can never be outgrown by the church of the future, and true progress consists in joining on to the doctrinal attainments into which God's Spirit has led his church in the past, and from this vantage-ground seeking the solution of the new problems of the present.

2. The author greatly exaggerates the increased knowledge of the historical Christ possessed by the present period. He devotes nearly one-fourth of his volume to "an inquiry as to the causes and the process by which the historical Christ has been recovered." This inquiry is full of interest, and Dr. Fairbairn is at his best in this part of his volume; but it is a gross exaggeration to ascribe to the historical and literary criticism of the Scriptures, as this volume does, both the "discovery" and the "recovery" of the historical Christ. We owe much to the historical spirit which has led to the careful study of the historical setting in which the life of the Christ was lived, but our debt is not so great as this. The his-

torical Christ has always existed for the earnest and patient student of the four Gospels; and one of the proofs of their inspiration is the luminous and distinct picture which, artless as they seem to be, they present of the real, historic Christ as he lived and moved among men. Jesus Christ has always been the best understood character in human history. Every earnest student of the Bible must be thankful for the light which careful analysis of the sources and study of contemporary history has thrown on the biblical history, and as a result the real Christ as he actually lived is more clearly defined to the imagination of the faithful than ever before, and past theology has neglected too much the "Life of the Christ" as one of its elements; but amongst the wonderful discoveries which the nineteenth century has made in the field of the biblical history was not that of the historic Christ.

3 The author builds his system upon too narrow a basis. He proposes to found his theology exclusively upon the consciousness of Jesus Christ. He says: "The most potent influence in the Scriptures for the anti-gnostic fathers, Augustine, and the Reformers was the Pauline. Paul has been in all times what he was in his own—the greatest of all the apostolic forces that work for evolution and change. But the modern return is to Christ, and to him as the person who created alike the evangelists and the apostles, by whom he is described and interpreted. He has become the centre from and through which all are studied, and is not simply looked at through the eyes of Paul or John." (P. 187.) It is true that we must look into the consciousness of Christ through the eyes of the evangelists and the apostles, and that they were inspired to interpret Christ for all subsequent generations, but our author prefers to do his own work of interpretation, and so builds his system, not on Christ as interpreted in the Scriptures as a whole, but on the consciousness of Christ as read by Dr. Fairbairn from his own peculiar view-point. There ought to be no antagonism suggested between Christ and Paul or any inspired writer. A true doctrine of inspiration makes the consciousness of Christ just as responsible for the Epistle to the Romans as for the marvelous sayings of John's Gospel. No theology can claim to be biblical or rational which does not build upon the entire Scriptures. And yet we find that Principal Fairbairn can write the following sentences: "Where Paul is greatest is where he is most directly under the influence or in the hands of Jesus, evolving the content of what he had received concerning him; where he is weakest is where his old scholasticism or his new antagonism dominates alike the form and substance of his thought. So with John: what in him is permanent and persuasive is of Christ, what is local and even trivial is of himself. To exhibit in full the falling off in the apostles cannot be attempted here; enough to say their conception of God is, if not lower, more outward, less intimate, or, as it were, from within; nor does it with all its significance as to the absolute paternity penetrate like a subtle yet genial spirit their whole mind, all their thought and all their being." (P. 293.)

4. The author's philosophy dominates his exegesis and theologizing. There is a biblical psychology and a biblical metaphysics which condition the biblical theology. But our author holds a philosophy which is entirely of the schools of speculative thought, and his theology is forced into the mold of this transcendental German philosophy. For an admirable illustration of philosophy overmastering exegesis and straining it to fore-ordained results, see his account of the temptation

of Christ. (Pp. 349-353.) His doctrine of the incarnation which proves central in the system he projects, is modelled after that doctrine as interpreted in the absolute philosophy of Fichte-Schelling, Hegel modified by Schleiermacher, and with great skill he reads this philosophic doctrine into Gospels and Epistles.

5. The doctrine of development advanced by the author would seem effectually to destroy theology as a valid and stable science. He sketches, on pp. 48-49, Christ's ideal of religion, which he describes as the *organism*; all that has been subsequently added represents the action of environment on organism. Religion as instituted by Christ is very simple, and yet capable of indefinite expansion, and of assuming almost infinitely varied forms under varying environments. The first two hundred pages of the volume contain a learned and suggestive history of the various forms which the simple religion of Christ assumed in the differing environments in which it has been placed. None of these forms represent the absolute truth as to any of the doctrines of the Christian system, and the effort to interpret the consciousness of Christ is to continue in the future with the certainty of partial failure, at least, in every case as in the past. Here, certainly, is development run mad.

We prefer upon this subject the views of that Nestor of American theologians, whose stalwart defence of the truth, and masterly exposition of the Calvinistic system in his *History of Christian Doctrine* and in his *Dogmatic Theology* justly merit the recognition and thanks of the whole church. Says Dr. Shedd (in Introduction to *Dogmatic Theology*, pp. x.-xi.):

"While acknowledging the excellences of the present period in respect to the practical application and spread of religion, he cannot regard it as pre-eminent above all others in scientific theology. It is his conviction that there were some minds in the former ages of Christianity who were called by Providence to do a work that will never be outgrown and left behind by the Christian church; some men who thought more deeply, and came nearer to the centre of truth, upon some subjects, than any modern minds. *Non omnia possumus omnes*. No one age or church is in advance of all other ages or churches in all things. It would be difficult to mention an intellect in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries whose reflection upon the metaphysical being and nature of God has been more profound than that of Anselm, whose thinking upon the Trinity has been more subtle and discriminating than that of Athanasius; whose contemplation of the great mystery of sin has been more comprehensive and searching than that of Augustine; whose apprehension of the doctrine of atonement has been more accurate than that formulated in the creeds of the Reformation. . . . Confinement to modern opinion tends to thinness and weakness."

6. The injustice which the author does to the Calvinistic system and to its representative theologians deserves to be signalized. The statement of the differences between sublapsarianism and supralapsarianism is singularly inadequate and misleading. (Pp. 163-169.) We cannot but admire the temerity of one who can settle the fate of that great system which has commanded the faith of so many of the noblest minds, in the following off-hand way:

"The moment the idea of equity was admitted to a place in the relations of God to man, the old absolute unconditionalism became untenable. If justice reigned, it meant that God must be just to man, even though man was disobedient to God; and there was no justice in condemnation for a sin which came without per-

sonal responsibility, or in a salvation which had no regard to personal will or choice." (P. 171.) The treatment of representative theologians needs comment; both Augustine (p. 115) and Anselm (pp. 118-126) receive scant justice, and the statements should be compared with those of Shedd, or even Hagenbach. It is passing strange that Dr. Fairbairn should make Calvin figure as a bed-fellow with Spinoza. "Calvin was as pure, though not as conscious and consistent a pantheist as Spinoza, and some of the inconsistencies that he spared the later supralapsarians did their best to remove." (P. 164.) Calvin a pantheist, is equal to Dr Briggs placing

Dr. Archibald Alexander in the camp of the Jesuits!

7. The theology reached by the author is substantially the broad theology of Maurice, Stanley, Beecher, Lyman Abbott, and Newman Smyth. (*a*), In bibliography the Scriptures are represented as different in degree, but not in kind, from other writings. Inspiration and revelation are not peculiar to the Old and New Testaments, but are the continuous and usual modes in which God still and ever speaks to men. Holding these views we are not surprised to hear him speak thus of James: "In James we have a complete contrast both to Paul and Hebrews. Its most remarkable feature is not—what so offended Luther—the opposition to Pauline doctrine, but the poverty of its christology, and the paucity of its references to the historical Christ. . . . The position given to him on account of his kinship he neither deserved nor had earned, and it only enabled him to use in government, aims and abilities that hardly qualified him for service. His address in the apostolic council and his behavior to Paul are quite in keeping with his epistle; and we can well understand the feeling of the man who was brave because he understood Christ to the man who was timid because of his failure to understand. Yet even in James there are the germs of a christology." (Pp. 328-329.) (*b*), His theology proper is fashioned not after the Nicene creed, but in the molds of the transcendental philosophy of Hegel. (*c*), Some of the problems of anthropology are answered thus: Sin is permitted because God cannot create a free being who may not possibly sin, and God cannot be fully revealed unless sin becomes an actuality; the sin of Adam becomes the sin of the race, but not in the sense of guilt but of tendency to evil. (*d*), The christology is that of Schleiermacher, and the most able and adroit part of this volume is the ingenuity with which it is read into the Gospels and Epistles. (See pp. 302-371.) (*e*), The soteriology represents the atonement not as a satisfaction to retributive justice, but as a mode in which moral influence is exerted upon the sinner's soul; while the application of redemption is not through the irresistible grace of the Holy Spirit, but that Spirit is immanent in the spirits of all men, and the question of salvation in the last analysis depends upon the sinner's own will. (*f*), The ecclesiology denies that any form of church polity is of divine origin, but all modes of church government are equally legitimate products of development. (*g*), The eschatology asserts with great boldness the "larger hope." "Under a purely legal government the salvation of the criminal is impossible, but under a regal fatherhood the thing impossible is the total abandonment of the sinner." (P. 438.) "So the love of God as eternal and universal will not surrender its object to sin; to it the effort after recovery is necessary. To accept the loss were to cancel the love. He who created, because a Father, must, even in the face of sin, because of his Fatherhood, seek to save the lost." (P. 464.) "To abandon souls he loved, even though they had abandoned him, would be to punish man's faithlessness by ceasing to be faithful to himself."



(P. 465.) "Were he at any point of space or moment of eternity to say, 'Certain sinners must in order to vindicative and exemplary punishment remain sinners forever,' then we would, as it were, concede a recognized place and a function to sin." (P. 467.)

*Southwestern Presbyterian University.*

THORNTON WHALING.

#### BARRY'S LIGHTS OF SCIENCE.

SOME LIGHTS OF SCIENCE ON THE FAITH; being Eight Lectures Preached before the University of Oxford in the Year 1892. *By Alfred Barry, D. D., D. C. L., Canon of Windsor, late Primate of Australia.*

The greater number of readers will be pleased with the genial optimism which pervades this book. Its high literary merits, its habitual reverence for Scripture, its commanding knowledge and ingenious use of moral evidence, seem to make criticism almost an offence.

The author attempts to give subjective validity and objective authority to the proposition that law, as discovered by modern science, is, like the law of the apostle, a *παιδαγωγός* to lead us to Christ. This is certainly important if true. If true, it is hopeful. It is that kind of optimism which falls in well with modern tendencies. But the audience at St. Mary's, Oxford, is not likely to be of one mind on a proposition of possible theological interpretation, and hence the lecturer proceeds to draw a distinction between the optimism of the imagination and the optimism which recognizes difficulties and resolutely seeks to overcome them. This seems worthy of the subject in hand, especially when it is further stated that the pursuit of science is a fact, that it has come to stay, and that it must be somehow tributary to Christianity. Therefore it *is* a tributary. A large philosophy seems to him to include being, and science by the very necessity of thought must be thus inclusive. With such preliminaries our author makes ready for the performance, and he does not propose to mar his work by any incongruous examples which his science may have produced.

From first to last there runs through these lectures the naïve pre-supposition that the faith of religion and the faith of science are reducible to necessary correlates. His method of proof will not satisfy all thoughtful minds.

It assumes that science has an important bearing—laid in the nature of things—upon the *necessity*, the *method*, and the *substance* of faith. On the necessity of faith he endeavors to show that the study of the inorganic world leads to the idea of the unity of being. Next, the study of humanity leads to the concept of personality—the first cause of being. Here he thinks science should be regarded as a school-master to lead us to Christ. "Now it seems to me clear that in all this process, both of discovery and of inference beyond discovery, science ought to be a *παιδαγωγός* to lead up to the realization of a God, a living God, by faith." That is, according to our author, the order of nature is, first, law in the natural world, then God. But this is to reverse the order which authority has established. Lord Herbert of Cherbury, the father of English deism, found, on examining heathen religions, the order to be, (1), God, at least in germ; (2), Worship; (3), The substance of worship, virtue and piety; (4), Repentance for sin; (5), Rewards and punishments in another life. The Stoical classification was *a priori*: God was everywhere. He was the law which he had evolved from himself. Human law comes into existence only as he is recognized.

The hymn of Cleanthes adores Zeus as directing all things in accordance with law. The philosophy of the Stoics began with God. Whatever advances were made in the study of law, in their sense, were made under the regulative conception of God. Herder, in laying the foundations of a comparative science of religion, rejects Hume's notion that religion sprang out of the fears of primitive men. Religion, on the contrary, he asserts, lies at the foundation of, if it does not represent, the first attempts of our species in explaining phenomena.

That the reflective spirit of classic paganism was primarily theistic is borne out by the authorities with such unanimity that it seems unscientific to allege the contrary. Yet our author makes scant reference to the common view. He does, indeed, refer to the Comptist law of the "three states of knowledge," theological, metaphysical, and positive, but contents himself with denying that these states are to be regarded as mutually exclusive.

Theological ideas precede, rather than follow, the discovery of natural law. Upon this point the consensus of opinion is so emphatic that we are surprised at the vague notice of it which follows. The only possible explanation seems to be, that the lecturer regards the evolutionary theory, at this point, as entitled to vindicate itself against all empirical testimony. The history of religions shows that the soul begins, if it does not end, with God. This the doctrine of evolution cannot affirm. It runs athwart its fundamental conception.

We are at pains to cite the above authorities in opposition to the lecturer, because his position here has an important bearing upon the discussion which follows. The balance of authority does not seem to be with our author. Whether, at least, the verdict of Lord Herbert, Herder, the uniform teaching of heathen mythology and ethnology, should be set aside, may appear doubtful.

The second lecture opens with the Scripture, "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." He expects to show that scientific discovery is gradually developing the proof of the unity of the human race. If so, then science is the instrument, unconscious, perhaps, of the final result, of throwing light upon this text. The kind of theology which the lecturer conceives that this text teaches will sufficiently appear in the following extract:

"In the famous words of the text, the whole truth of mediation, as a redemption from evil, is expressed with a graphic and comprehensive brevity. It assumes first that there is a real and effective unity in our nature, in virtue of which all humanity is viewed and treated as a whole; it asserts next an inheritance of sin and death from a primeval origin of evil, as actually affecting all that collective humanity; and lastly, it declares a divine Mediator in Christ, taking away that alienation of our humanity from God which is its spiritual death, and renewing in it the communion with him which is spiritual life."

This seems to agree with the comment of Meyer that the two clauses of the text are identically comprehensive. But no emphasis is apparently placed upon this interpretation by our author. The evident purpose is, to seek scriptural support for the theory of a racial unit which the principle of heredity transmits from the parentage of the past to the parentage of the present.

The "alienation of our humanity from God," by the sin of Adam, is removed by renewing in that humanity "the communion with him." This is accomplished by the mediation of Christ. That his view may appear more clearly he adds:

"That mediation is set forth as doubly a redemption and a re-creation of

humanity, primarily as restoring the higher unity through which it (the humanity) lives and moves and has its being in God." (P. 44.)

The concept, humanity, then, is a substantive reality, which is made the object of Christ's mediation. From this proposition, however, our author seems to recoil when he adds, "We find a speculative difficulty in the doubt whether there is such a thing as real and effective unity in human nature, and whether after all, humanity is anything more than a convenient term for an infinite number of individual beings having certain points of likeness."

We cannot but admire the honesty of the lecturer in making this concession, for if it is valid it wrecks his argument and reduces forty subsequent pages of finished eloquence to the merest verbiage. If universals are realities, if humanity is something more than "a convenient term," then he may claim, under his view, a ground for science in the elucidation of the solidarity of human nature. But in this case he must accept scholastic realism, and thus put himself out of touch and sympathy of modern philosophy. On the other hand, if he decides that human nature is not a lump of being—an existent unity—he gives no conceivable reason why science should illustrate his text, and thus in some dim way act as our school-master to lead us to God. He does neither unreservedly. He cannot be said to run with Anselm, nor follow with Abelard.

What is the *rationale* of our author's position? His theme is briefly the religious influence of science. What is the method of this influence? While its mode is mostly physical it is also anthropological. Thus evolution, while concerned ostensibly with method and order, professing ignorance of the origin of life, makes its presence most effectively felt in the theory of the origin of man. The introduction of germ-life, its growth when environment made it possible, suggests to the lecturer that the study of our "corporate humanity," upon the postulates of evolution, is calculated to assist to higher notions of the reality of that continuous life which is made possible by heredity. This is his view, because he asserts "the reality of this continuous life is unquestionable." But this creates a moral difficulty or rather introduces a problem which he states requires "the reconcilement of our own conscious personality and responsibility with the reign of universal law, and the existence of a corporate humanity." The doctrine, then, of the effective unity of human nature, or a corporate humanity, continuous by heredity, is, according to our author, the teaching of the text. But the text also teaches, he contends, that this continuous core of human nature is restored to "the higher unity" by the mediation of Christ. The doctrine of Christ's mediation, however, is hard to be received on account of the difficulty above mentioned, and the further difficulty of reconciling our responsibility as persons with heredity, conceived of as the continuous life of a human nature which is an effective unity. These difficulties form a barrier to the acceptance of the mediation of Christ. Modern thought vindicates the character of science by removing these obstacles, and so is a school-master to lead us to Christ. This is the outline of the argument. (Pp. 43-86.) From this sketch two points can be fairly made out:

1. That the author is a traducianist, if consistent.

2. That he teaches a form of heredity which necessitates the substantive reality of a universal, *i. e.*, the objective being of a continuous essence, an effective unity of human nature. From the latter position two consequences are recognized and discussed which may be stated briefly as (*a*), The rigid, immanent determinism

of every man to evil. This determinism is confirmed by evolution as a fact. At the same time no evolutionist would affirm that it is either optimistic or pessimistic on any grounds proposed by the author, and (b), the transcendent determinism of every man to grace by virtue of the mediation of Christ, a result which evolutionists regard with stolid indifference. These two forms of determinism are clearly seen by the lecturer to emerge from his argument, but when identified are immediately cancelled by reference to the common consciousness of freedom. Whereupon his argument falls to the ground—his interpretation of the text fails—he is just where he was at the outset.

In regard to the first point, the orthodox and scriptural position is, that of creationism in opposition to traducianism.

In regard to the second point which involves the reality of universals in the sense of mediæval realism, philosophy teaches that general terms have no reality apart from the individuals from which these terms have been generalized. The argument of our author affords a conspicuous instance of the error arising from the hypostasis of an abstract term. We do use the terms, human nature, humanity, the unity of human nature, etc., to express conveniently and comprehensively our estimate of what is characteristic in ourselves or in others regarded as individuals. That which lies back of these mental phenomena we are apt to figure to ourselves as raw material of character. What we really know is self—a person—a unit, constituted through all changes by memory and self-consciousness. We think our author has neglected these elementary truths and thus fallen into an important error. He refers the mediation of Christ to a human nature, a corporate humanity, and exalts the aid of science in explicating this mystery. The mediation of Christ we think had reference rather to persons and not to formal and subjective being, a conclusion which philosophy, if called to sit in judgment upon this text, would not, in this particular, fail to affirm.

Lecture III. is occupied with evolution, natural and supernatural. He reads this much-vaunted hypothesis into the Scripture, (Gal. iv. 4, 5): "When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons." According to our author the fulness of time indicates the period when the human race was prepared to receive the sonship of God. This period marks the beginning of another advance which shall culminate in a higher state of perfection. In regard to this, he inquires, "Have we for this conception as for the doctrine of mediation [Lecture II.] any analogy in the reign of law, as discovered by science, through which the knowledge of that law becomes a school-master to lead us to Christ? The very conception itself obviously suggests to us the consideration under this aspect of that great law of evolution in its largest sense, which seems to be plainly traced in different forms through all the provinces of being."

Like all others who propose to turn evolution to some theological account he proceeds to give his own definition of it. He admits that it properly means that life and consciousness were contained implicitly and potentially in the simpler forms which preceded them. Human genius and moral aspiration were once contained in inorganic matter—were evolved from some ring of cosmic vapor. He wishes it to be understood that this, however, is not his view of the doctrine. He seems to proceed on the assumption that evolution can become theistic by definition. It can be made to teach teleology and even religion by judicious termi-

nology. If this is true, it seems unnecessary further to contend against it. It is wholly immaterial what its authors and teachers meant by the term. Mr. Sully may tell us with Huxley that "the doctrine of evolution is directly antagonistic to that of creation." And we think such men ought to know of what they affirm, but not so reasons our author. He seems to think that evolution may be wedded to Christianity, but it is an evolution which no naturalist can accept. To accomplish this union he proposes materially to change the hypothesis. The first step is to reconstruct the primary meaning and use of the term. (P. 89.) "The law, as properly understood, and as in a great measure established, does not imply what the name evolution by its etymology might seem to suggest and what it was originally intended to suggest, viz. : that all the properties of the higher forms of being were contained implicitly, or potentially, in the simpler forms which preceded them . . . nor does it carry the conviction that the cause, the sole cause of this process, is immanent in the world thus transformed. If it did, it would be, of course, essentially pantheistic, if not materialistic, and, as such, absolutely incompatible with any belief in an original creative mind, at once immanent and transcendent, guiding and determining throughout the process of development." Thus he speaks for evolution : but what does evolution say for itself ?

In the article by James Sully, in the *Britannica*, already quoted, it is said : "It is clear that the doctrine of evolution is directly antagonistic to that of creation." And in the same article, in the part by Huxley, it is stated : "That with which it does collide and with which it is irreconcilable, is the conception of creation, which theological speculators have based on the history narrated in the opening of the Book of Genesis." That the usual view of the world as an act of creation is intended is evident from the context and the further remark that Mr. Spencer, in his reply to Martineau, "considers the ideas of evolution and of a preëxisting mind incapable of being united in thought." Of course our author is not prepared to accept such conclusions nor the dictum of Alfred Russel Wallace that "the idea of special creation or any other exceptional mode of production is absolutely extinct."

The second point of reconstruction which the lecturer proposes refers to the Darwinian view : "The law of evolution is not to be identified, as in common usage it often seems to be identified, with the Darwinian theory." (Page 99.) Of course, if the author can efface the leaders of evolution, and expunge their teachings, he can select such doctrines as he pleases. If these doctrines have no objective reality in the science as understood by naturalists, he can anticipate their discovery, or content himself with the assertion that they appear to be consistent with what we already know. But in such case, as in the present case, there could be no legitimate use of the term evolution. We fear, therefore, that the effort to introduce a new term of communion among would-be evolutionists is doomed to failure. The students of science, as well as those who simply wish to be well-informed, will more likely take their views of evolution from the naturalist than from the theologian. However this may be, we are pleased to see the true theological spirit assert itself when he speaks of matter, life, and man, page 103 : "Whatever speculation, more or less imaginative, may do to bridge over in idea the divisions between them, yet the whole evidence is on all hands allowed to be distinctly against the derivation of organic life from inorganic force, and I cannot

but contend that it is at least equally strong against the derivation of humanity from the merely animal being."

Without quoting further, it is evident that the author's conception of evolution is quite different from that of the naturalist. The naturalist makes haste to complete his theory at the earliest moment, but will not, if honest, withhold from his readers the actual scientific status, but will distinguish between that which is merely speculative and anticipative and that which is known. The theologian, on the other hand, while making equal haste to complete his theory, makes but dim and incoherent reference to the scientific situation. By the scientific part of evolution we understand that which is certainly known, and which has been arranged in an orderly manner. That which is not known, but which is included in the theory as a speculation, is the descent of man from a lower grade of being, the oft-quoted postulate of natural selection, the law of heredity, and the survival of the fittest. It is possible, therefore, to separate the theory of evolution into two parts, the known and the unknown, the scientific and the speculative. This separation can be accomplished properly only by the naturalist. The theologian is apt to cross the dividing lines without regard to their existence. But this distinction is of the utmost importance. The scientific, the known in the organic or inorganic world, can never become the foe of theology. The speculative, the unknown, when assumed to be known, or when treated as sound philosophy, if applied to theology, or if allowed to mingle with it as a reality, is a dangerous experiment. Evolution is more of a philosophy than a science. To apply evolution to Christianity cannot but be attended with wide-spread disaster. Our author treats evolution as a science. It is true it is, in his hands, shorn of its worst features, but he allows it to stand in its terminology. If applied to Christianity, it will operate as a philosophy, while it is regarded as a science. It is this double aspect of evolution which makes it an enemy to be dreaded. It is now an effective agent for evil. What it will become, unless resisted, can be learned from the history of religious errors. Its analogue may perhaps be found in Neo-Platonism as applied to Christianity. It, of course, represents an opposite pole of thought. Its chief tendency was to the supra-rational, the mystical. The tendency of evolution is to naturalism.

Neo-Platonism plagued the church for more than thirty generations. Taken over from heathenism by Justin Martyr and Origen, and further expounded by a long succession of fathers, who resigned themselves to the influence of this philosophy, it so permeated theological thought that asceticism and mysticism came to be regarded as fundamental characteristics of Christian faith and life! Philosophy and theology were made to converge and unite in allegory. Philosophy perished, and religion was enfeebled. Neo-Platonism still underlies Latin Christianity. Nevertheless, we assert that the Christian religion has nothing to fear from philosophy, provided that philosophy is not untrue. Similarly science, considered as an orderly arrangement of facts, can never be antagonistic to the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. That which is to be dreaded is the connection of Scripture with science falsely so-called. It is just at this point our author falls, we think, into serious error. He is endeavoring to point out the method and the natural tendency of science in leading men to Christ. He puts rational astronomy, which is certainly science, on a plane with evolution, which, as such, is certainly not science. Exactly how much of what goes under the name of evolution in science must be determined by naturalists. Not simply as a naturalist, however.

He must be also a mathematician, for the amount of real science contained in any physical science is strictly measured by the amount of mathematics it contains. This has been the position of every mathematician since the time of Kant. But it will be agreed on all hands, that it is vastly more a hypothesis than a science. Science, so far as it brings men into the contemplation of nature, brings them face to face with illustrations of theism. Natural theology, which the lecturer seems to think synonymous with Christianity, is not taught by the knowledge of nature. Science, properly understood and properly applied, justifies and illustrates, but does not teach, the idea of God.

Meanwhile, what has become of the author's text? Rather, it will be inquired what is the causal relation between the lecture and the text? Manifestly the text was added because of evolution. The key is found on the 132nd page:

"Again, the new dispensation of the kingdom, once inaugurated, presents itself in relation to all humanity, as working by a supernatural law of evolution. It begins from the germ of the new life. . . . It gradually extends itself, 'propagated'—to use our significant phrase—from soul to soul, till it shall be co-extensive with humanity itself; it works itself out slowly, as all evolution must work through the appointed ages; and as it works, it brings out that it may dominate, the antagonistic power of evil." Now, so far as we know, no naturalist has schematized this supernatural law of evolution. What are its postulates? There must be something to correspond in the theory of natural evolution to that of spiritual evolution. How are the analogues of natural selection, the mutation of species, the survival of the fittest, and the law of heredity, so well worn in natural evolution, to be discoverable in supernatural evolution? If these postulates had a clear and distinct physical basis, it might be a profitable speculation to inquire as to their metaphysical basis in the supernatural. If these concepts of evolution have only a subjective basis, no basis, in fact, in the natural world, then the attempt to identify them in the spiritual world is nothing less than an attempt to connect Christianity with a philosophy. Evolution is a philosophy, and, as such, it has no other existence. As such, the effort to connect it with the Christian religion, must result in the impairment of the ordinary means of grace. If theologians are to succeed in annexing evolution to religion, the results of this unholy alliance may be read in advance in the history of Neo-Platonism, or in that of Gnosticism.

The fourth and fifth lectures may be passed over without notice, save to remark the recurrence again and again of the realistic notion of a generic humanity; a substantive human nature, which is the object of Christ's passion and intercession. "Thus unity in Christ is ultimately unity through him in God. In the baptism which is its appointed means, each individual nature is baptized into the name, that is, into the nature of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost. So, and so only, is it engrafted into the body of Christ's church." The *it* seems to be what he regards as the racial unit—the universal humanity of which each individual is a mode. The germ idea, so common to evolutionary literature, appears so frequently as the explanation of the unity of man, that we seem to be treated to a scholastic realism of the Platonic type.

The concluding lectures, sixth, seventh, and eighth, enter upon the real work of the projected Bampton lectureship. In many respects these three lectures will be regarded as a timely defence of the faith. They are as radical as we could

possibly expect to find in the home of such men as Professors Driver, Cheyne, and Sandays. These critics are met most courteously with a re-affirmation of the cardinal doctrines of the New Testament. The only points on which the orthodox reader will be likely to demur, are, first, the broad comprehension given to the text of the sixth lecture, "Prove all things." This text teaches, it is said, both the right and duty of criticism and testing of Christianity. Thus: "When the first duty of distinction has been discharged, and the root of the matter made known to us, it has then to go on to the work described in the text—to test or prove it. It must try to discern, first, whether it is a reality—whether what it declares as truth is a real truth, accordant with the great laws of being—whether the power it claims to wield is a real power, able to rule and to exalt humanity." It seems more than questionable to us whether *δοκιμάζειν* in this and other places of the New Testament warrants the idea of criticism at all, certainly not in the form as stated. For the subject-matter of criticism is admitted all along to be either the text of Scripture or the doctrines of Christianity. Consider the task set before us to consider: "Whether it is a reality"! It is true our author limits the investigation to "the great laws of being." But the laws of being have been with us since the days of Aristotle, and yet no philosopher has achieved the problem of knowledge and told us "what is reality."

That we make no mistake in our author's meaning is evident from the succeeding sentence: "Next, it has to see whether under both aspects it is sufficient for the purpose which it professes to serve, and adequate to the claim of a divine origin and spiritual supremacy made for it." (P. 224.) This sounds very much like the claim of some latter-day saints of our own theological seminaries, who have set up subjective validity or the Christian consciousness as the test both of doctrine and Scripture.

The second point referred to is the misleading use of the word science. It is evidently used advisedly, nevertheless we must insist that in nearly every case its use is a perversion of the term. He falls into the naïve assumption that everything put forth by scientific men is therefore science. Thus he assumes implicitly when he does not state explicitly, that there is a science of criticism as applied to Christianity. The question is not raised whether such a science is possible. It is assumed to be, and of right ought to be, in active exercise. But a science which results only in a succession of contradictions is no science. It is not necessary to point out these contradictions as critical results so-called. They are apparent not only as between several writers, contemporaneous and otherwise, but conspicuous in the same writer. It must not be supposed that the lecturer is blind to the mistakes of the critics. He does good work in his criticisms of the critics, but yet blandly inquires: "What, then, is the right critical function of this higher science in relation to Christianity?" Our answer would be, first determine the existence of such a science, and then we can determine its function, in question, without one tremor of hesitation.

Science, as we have already said, is, as to its content, but the orderly arrangement of particular knowledge. As such it is simply an instrument which may be used for or against Christianity. In itself it is neither Christian nor anti-Christian. It is like Christianity itself, according to its use, a savor of life or death. But granting that there is a well-ascertained science of criticism, few orthodox believers will concede the position of the author, that its function is, in advance, to



determine the reality of Scripture, "whether what it declares as truth is real truth." It seems to us that our Saviour has settled that matter beyond recall: "If any man will do my will he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God." That is to say, the reality in question is not to be determined by rational considerations or the intuitions of reason, but by experience.

Without dwelling further upon this point, we cheerfully concede that the lecturer deals some heavy blows upon the extreme critics. This is all the more pleasing and surprising, as, from the wide comprehension given to *δοξολογῆσεν* and *πάντα*, he seemed to have opened the way for the most destructive criticism. He contrives to forget his exegesis, and returns with happy inconsistency to the orthodox view. Thus: "I do not, indeed, mean that for the great mass of men obedience to Saint Paul's exhortation issues, or ought to issue, in abstract scientific criticism. They inherit their Christianity, as they inherit their civilization, from the past; and they have it brought home to them by the teaching authority of the present. For themselves, they have mostly to be content with practical tests. If they find that this Christianity of theirs gives them light on the great questions which every man must ask himself as to his own nature and destiny; if they find that it gives them the capacity of a victorious moral strength and enthusiasm; if they find that it satisfies their spiritual aspirations after the Infinite and Eternal, which is, indeed, the thirst for the living God—they mostly rest on this, and are content to go no further. There is sound reasonableness in this contentment. It shows the strong practical wisdom of the blunt, almost humorous, reply of the blind man at Siloam to the captious questions of the Pharisees: 'Whether he be a sinner or not'—whether he fulfils, or fails to fulfil, your abstract test of a mission from God—'I know not. One thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see.' There may be in many things an 'encircling gloom,' and that gloom peopled with strange, fantastic shapes; but through my Christian faith I find for practical guidance and comfort a 'kindly light';

'And in that Light of life I'll walk  
Till travelling days be done.'

In this pleasing and satisfactory review of the reception and effects of the gospel in the hearts of the "great mass of men," the truth of which is reflected in the experience of every Christian, the author bears witness to the utter fallacy and gratuitous claim of his own argument. The most interesting portion of the sixth lecture relates to the supernatural. "What now," he asks, "is the attitude of scientific criticism to the assertion of the supernatural? I am old enough to have seen it pass through at least three phases." (Page 237.) These three forms of criticism he defines at some length, as, first, the Deistic, in which the debate turned on the sufficiency of testimony, as afforded by revelation, for the establishment of miracles.

The second, the Humian or *a priori* attack upon the credibility of a religion which must be attested by the miraculous intervention of Deity in the uniformity of nature; and third, the existing controversy, in which expert critical testimony is directed against the gospel record. He might also have added to his list the history of the Tübingen school. He would thus comprise within his own experience three signal failures of the destructive criticism. This criticism, in his view, is, nevertheless, scientific. We would suggest that a scientific criticism

which repeatedly fails of its object is either unscientific or gratuitous. And yet he reaches the astonishing conclusion, "that in its critical aspect, science is the school-master to lead us from Christianity to Christ himself." (P. 231.)

The seventh and eighth lectures are professedly based on the text, "Search the Scriptures . . . they testify of me."

There is much to admire in these two lectures, but much also to make the critics smile with derision. Thus: "It is hard to conceive how, even without faith in the divine word of the text, criticism can fail to see that the ancient Scriptures in all their various elements really did testify of a Messiah to come." This is, indeed, the course criticism ought to take, and no doubt it is the author's pious wish, but it is wholly without objective reality in ranks of professional critics. No array of adverse testimony can trouble his optimistic confidence that science is the school-master of the hour. He even quotes, in a foot-note, the view of Kuenen, as given in Muir's summary, that "the traditional conception of the Old Testament prophecy, as a testimony to the Christian Messiah, is repeatedly contradicted by scientific exegesis, and, on the whole, refuted." It would be a dreary task to multiply evidence against our author's position. He constantly misinterprets the purpose of modern criticism. It is no gentle Mary sitting at the feet of Jesus to learn of him. It is rather itself, alone and singular, criticism, the Arrogant.

Still, it must not be understood that he seems to be wholly unmindful of the shadow upon the wall. "It is not to be denied," he adds, "that the actual results to which criticism has been sometimes led are justly looked upon as derogatory to the supreme authority of Holy Scripture." After inflicting this mild censure he returns to the orthodox position as he conceives it: "However the Old Testament has come to be what it is, no man doubts that it is substantially the Scriptures into which he bade us search, to which he referred again and again as an authoritative word of God, and as in all parts testifying of him. So he made it an integral part of our Christianity. So his apostles, taught by him, dwelt upon it with unhesitating reverence, as having inspiration and authority." (P. 277.) How far it falls short of being absolutely the very word of God, and in what sense it is only substantially that word, must be left, it would appear, to the genius of the higher critic. This argument, as a whole, does not seem to fall with much force upon himself, for he concludes that, "However it grew up, the Old Testament is to us what he made it, and in this is the root of the matter."

We now conclude our review of this important work. We say important, because of the dignity and authority of the lectureship which it represents. We do not think it the equal of any of its predecessors. There are various reasons, easily assignable, which make the work of apologetics more difficult as the years go by. Our author was confronted by difficulties of which Butler and Paley knew nothing. Even among innovators his effort will be regarded as a new and striking departure. He is almost wholly without a distinguished example. To attempt to point out a relation between alleged discoveries in heredity and the mediation of Christ; to apply the hypotheses of evolution to the doctrine of the incarnation as the consummation of the natural order of humanity; to illustrate the headship of the Son of man over all being by the problems of social science and the unity of human society, was an undertaking of no ordinary magnitude. Of course, the result is a failure. The proposed analogies do not exist. The proof is simply an illusion. The only danger is, that this will not be the popular verdict. The au-

thor will find a powerful ally in the tendencies of physical science to annex vast tracts of undiscovered territory, in the prevailing mood to espouse the claims of boastful scholarship, and in the movement to break with all tradition, if not with the only standard of life and faith.

No genius, however great, could hope to escape contradiction while trying to bring into harmony so many conflicting interests. Devout orthodoxy, wild speculation, great learning, mingle upon a basis of almost unreflecting optimism. Still the book maintains largely the form of sound words, and in its unhesitating loyalty to Christian faith may administer a lesson, if not a warning, to the class of persons with whom he evidently seeks to fraternize.

W. J. WRIGHT.

*Westminster College, Missouri.*

#### FISHER'S NATURAL THEOLOGY.

MANUAL OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. *By George Park Fisher, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale University.* Pp. 94. Price, 75 cents. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1893.

This little volume was designed by its author to be a companion to his *Manual of Christian Evidences*. It was prepared for those students who have not time for the study of more extended treatises. The reader instantly feels that it is the product of strong and mature scholarship—the work of an author affluent in learning, perspicuous in judgment, forceful in reasoning, felicitous in illustration, and energetic in style.

The following is the table of contents: I. The Nature and Origin of Religion. II. The Cosmological Argument for the Being of God. III. The Argument from Design. IV. The Moral Argument. V. The Intuition of the Infinite and Absolute. VI. Anti-Theistic Theories. VII. The Future Life of the Soul. VIII. Note on the Ontological Argument.

Natural theology is the systematic reduction of those facts of religion which are discoverable by reason independently of the aid of a special supernatural revelation. Such doctrines of religion as are made known by "the light of nature," with the organization and defence of these natural theology has to do. But what is religion, the object-matter of theology? Our author answers, "The beliefs of men respecting a supernatural power, or powers, together with the feelings and practices connected with such beliefs." What is the genesis of religion, or source of these "beliefs"? Dismissing the hypotheses that religion is a cunning contrivance, that it springs from fear, that it is the offspring of dreams, that it was a primitive revelation, Dr. Fisher assumes the true ground, that the aptitudes for religion were created in human nature, and that these aptitudes are elicited by experience, and then perverted or directed to the true and only God. The self-disclosures which God makes in the world, as that world is perceived by consciousness and dwelt upon by the discursive powers of the mind, enlighten, enforce, and direct these spontaneous beliefs of the soul.

Our author does not make his discussion of religion sufficiently full and clear for the class for which he writes. Religion is the sum of those facts which spring from the relation which exists between God and man. Those facts must be made known by revelation—a natural, or supernatural revelation, or both. A false or imperfect reduction of those facts would give a false or defective religion. Those

facts may be viewed either objectively or subjectively in their relation to man. When viewed objectively, religion is a body of beliefs about that supernatural power and man's relations to it; and when viewed subjectively, religion is a life—the experience of man in his relation to God. Objective religion is the subject-matter of theology, and so much of objective religion as is discoverable by reason unaided by the Bible is the subject-matter of natural theology. Natural theology is, therefore, narrower in its scope than the theology of natural religion. We have said this much to support the criticism that Dr. Fisher's treatment of religion is inadequate even for the purpose he had in view. He does not distinguish between religion as a life and religion as a belief.

The arguments for the existence of God are “the recognition of God from different points of view.” The cosmological argument—every effect must have an adequate cause; the world is an effect; therefore the world had an adequate cause—presents God as a self-existent and first cause. The teleological argument—every design must have an adequate designer; the world is a design; therefore the world had an adequate designer—presents God as a being of wisdom, as a first cause with the attribute of intelligence. The moral argument—every moral law must have a moral lawgiver; the conscience is a moral law; therefore the conscience had a moral lawgiver—presents the intelligent first cause as a moral person. The intuitive argument—what all mankind universally and necessarily believe to be true is true; all mankind universally and necessarily believe in the existence of an Infinite Being, absolute and unconditioned; therefore such a Being does exist—presents the intelligent, personal, first cause as the Infinite God. We agree with Dr. Fisher that the argument for the being of God is thus a cumulative one, and irresistible when properly stated.

We must dissent from a point which he makes in the argument from design. “It is plain,” he says, “that, if the Darwinian theory be accepted, it does not avail in the least to exclude the evidences of design.” (P. 38.) To our mind Darwinianism destroys the teleological argument by destroying its major premise, namely, every design must have a personal designer. Dr. Fisher instances the eye and the ear as specimens of design. Darwin explains the becoming of the eye and the ear upon the principle of “the survival of the fittest”—nature by her struggles eventually produced the eye and the ear. Herbert Spencer supplemented Darwin's maxim with the hypothesis of “natural selection,” in which formula he assigns to mindless nature the power of selection, that is, a function of mind. Nature, which is in the hypothesis a mindless thing, yet produces mind-results, that is, designs. Therefore the existence of design does not prove the previous existence of causative mind. Dr. Fisher says that evolution does not destroy the evidences of design. That is true; it does not destroy the evidences of design, but it explains that design does not depend upon an extramundane personal mind in the cause. Evolution, in its extreme form, denies the proposition, every design must have a personal designer. Dr. Fisher correctly holds the teleological postulate to be intuitive.

Our author's treatment of the three great anti-theistic theories—Materialism, Pantheism, Agnosticism—in twelve short pages is too brief to be of any value. The same criticism must be passed upon his chapter on the future life of the soul, containing but five pages. On these topics our author ought to have said more or nothing. He says enough for it to be seen that he entertains sound and strong views on these topics, but he has said just enough for the novice for whom he

writes to know that there are anti-theistic theories, and that there is a doctrine of a future life, held by some and denied by others.

In a final note Dr. Fisher says, concerning the ontological argument for the existence of God, about the validity of which there is a great variety of opinions, "The intuition of the absolute appears to embrace what the Anselmic argument attempts to cast into a syllogistic form." In that judgment we concur.

As an elementary manual in natural theology for busy Sunday-school teachers and Bible-class students, and for young preachers whose education has been limited, we commend this little volume highly. It was written for such a class.

R. A. WEBB.

*Southwestern Presbyterian University, Clarksville, Tenn.*

#### DAVIS'S ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY. *By Noah K. Davis, Ph. D., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia.* *Ecce lo descendit: γυνῶθε σεαυτῶν.* Silver, Burdett & Co. Publishers, New York, Boston, Chicago, 1892.

Dr. Davis has been known as one of the leading thinkers of this country, at least since the publication of his *Theory of Thought*, in 1880. The work, whose title-page is given above, will confirm and increase his reputation as a scholar, teacher, and philosopher. From two years' experience with it in the class-room, the judgment has been formed that it is not only a credit to our Southern and American scholarship, but is also the best text-book on Psychology, for somewhat advanced classes now used in this country. It has been found quite superior to Baldwin, whose German style of thought and expression makes his treatise impracticable for the ordinary college student.

The mechanical execution of the book is satisfactory, as to paper, print and binding. The text, in large, open type, with judicious paragraphing, is all that we can desire; while the foot-notes, in smaller letter, add greatly to the worth of the treatise. The style is clear, though not simple; revealing the author's familiarity with all the technicalities of expression, and with the literature of the classics, ancient and modern. An amusing instance of his fondness for foreign tongues is seen, p. 275, note 2., where we read, "Madame de Sevigné *dit à sa fille malade*: 'J'ai mal à votre poitrine';" the Doctor unconsciously writing French. In the same note he seems unwittingly to rhyme, "In diffusing gladness, we give and gain; in sharing sadness, we lessen pain."

The book opens with a Physiological Introduction, in which the nervous system is described, and the results of the New, or Physiological, Psychology are given and criticised. In Psycho-Physics, the only result is Weber's Law, as finally formulated by Fechner, "The sensation varies as the logarithm of the excitation." In Psychometry, the other department of the New, or Experimental, Psychology, we are taught that the time of the passage of nerve action is 111 feet a second; the time of psychic action in sense-perception, .08 second; and discernment time, from .01 to .03 second. In view of the meagre and uncertain results reached, Dr. Davis asks, "Are [these experimentations] worth their cost?" Hering, Delbœuf and Zeller are skeptical, and even Ladd and Wundt are not satisfied. Let us hope that good may yet come out of it.

Consciousness with Dr. Davis takes the place of Des Cartes thought, as the

one essential fact of mind; and from this he logically infers that the mind is always conscious, and that there are no unconscious states of mind. In this he is more consistent than Hamilton, who affirms that consciousness is necessarily involved in every mental state, and afterwards argues that a large portion of our mental activity is unconscious. If consciousness is the generic mental condition; if, as Hamilton says, to know, or feel, or desire, or purpose, we must be conscious that we know, feel, desire, or will; if, as Davis says, consciousness and mental activity are identical, then there can be no question as to unconscious states, or acts of the mind. Davis, manifestly, considers his position doubtful, sees that the authorities are against him, and takes refuge in reflex action and unconscious cerebration, and obscure consciousness. Obscure consciousness is not consciousness; for a consciousness which is not conscious, is not consciousness. Reflex action and unconscious cerebration are either exclusively physical, in which case we have materialism, the brain thinking and thinking unconsciously; or, they are purely mental, in which case, they would be unconscious mental action; or, they are both, in which case, the mental part would be unconscious mental action.

The most interesting application of this question is to the retentiveness of memory. In memory there are three elements or acts: retaining, recalling, representing. There are three theories of memory: 1. That of repetition, which holds that retention is not an element of memory; that it merely recalls and represents the past. There are few who can persuade themselves that they retain no knowledge of all they have learned; that every act of memory is new, with no connection with the past except that of mere repetition or habit. 2. The theory of physical retention, that the brain receives impressions in the original experience, which it retains, and which cause the recalling. This is materialistic. 3. The theory of mental retention, that the mind holds in possession its treasured experiences, ready to be recalled. This is the common, and probably the correct view. Dr. Davis holds the theory of repetition in a modified form; first, a mental tendency to repetition, as original and ultimate; and, secondly, physical retention and tendency to repetition as supplementary. If the theory of mental retention be true, then there is unconscious mental action.

Dr. Davis believes, with other philosophers, that opposition is essential to consciousness. This is true, in the sense that we cannot know without an object to be known; but, when he and others insist that a non-ego is requisite to consciousness, it is altogether another question. Suppose I were the only being within the limits of my knowledge, would I necessarily be unconscious? Could I not be conscious of myself? Surrounded as we are with other beings, are we never conscious solely of ourselves, our own thoughts? How was it with God, prior to the existence of creation?

For centuries the recognized analysis of the mental powers was a dichotomy—gnostic and orectic, cognitive and appetent, the understanding and the will. Kant rejected this, and taking the feelings out from the will, made a trichotomy—the understanding, feelings and conation. Sir William Hamilton accepted this. Tetens, a German philosopher, improved on Kant by removing the affections and desires from connection with the will and putting them with the feelings, and thus we have the true and generally accepted division—the understanding, the sensibility and the will. Dr. Davis has upset all this and made an absolutely new arrangement: a fundamental dichotomy into I. Consciousness, embracing, as gen-

eric powers, cognition and feeling; and II. Conation, including desire and volition as generic powers.

He, thus, for the first time in the history of thinking, fails to make the cognitive power separate and distinct, and unites it with mere feeling under a common head. He tells us, on p. 79, § 81, that "cognition is a condition of all other mental activities." In this he is in harmony with other psychologists. P. 243, he says, "The primary movement of consciousness lies rather in feeling than in cognition, the shock being the logical antecedent or condition of the intellectual discrimination." Thus he reverses himself. P. 240, at the bottom, "Indeed feeling and cognition in general are equally original and complementary, and can be distinguished only logically." Near the top of the same page: "As experienced they are the combined, simultaneous, or rather the single consciousness of the ego and non-ego in their essential antithesis." In this passage he so far unifies cognition and feeling as to make them constitute a "single consciousness." They are "the obverse and reverse of the same state"; cognition is the objective and feeling the subjective side of the same mental mode. That this blending of cognition and feeling is a radical mistake is shown by the practically unanimous judgment of psychologists to the contrary, by the law of inverse ratio that subsists between them, by the fact that cognition often exists without any attendant feeling, by the fact, admitted by Dr. Davis, that there are not phases of feeling corresponding to all the modes of cognition, and by the fact that cognition and feeling are as unlike as mental powers can be.

We need not be surprised now that Dr. Davis teaches that consciousness of self is not a cognition, but a feeling; for he says, p. 245, "The subject is not cognized, else it would be both subject and object at once, and these being contraries cannot co-exist." But, p. 105, he says, "Self-perception is the immediate cognition of a subjective object," "the consciousness of a subject-object." Here the mind is clearly made both subject and object at once.

Nor need we wonder that Dr. Davis teaches, p. 247, that "belief is the feeling attending all forms of representative knowledge"; that belief is not cognition, but feeling; that is, a belief in miracles, in the theory of Copernicus, in the binomial theorem, in a revenue tariff, in a gold standard, etc., is a feeling and not a conviction of the judgment. Moreover, we are taught that the belief which attends representative, as distinct from the certainty that accompanies immediate, cognition, is never perfect. Thought is a mode of representative or mediate, as opposed to immediate, cognition. Logic and mathematics are sciences of thought; therefore, according to Dr. Davis, the belief which attends logical and mathematical thinking "never becomes strict certainty.

Dr. Davis teaches that cognition is of two radical kinds, immediate and mediate, and that there are three modes of each—of immediate cognition, we have perception, self-perception and pure intuition; and of mediate, there are memory, imagination and thought.

In perception, he is a presentationist so far as the primary and secundo-primary qualities of matter are concerned. He accepts the universal doctrine, that there is no perception of the secondary qualities, that they are mere subjective sensations, the felt effects of unknown causes. He is peculiar in teaching that the secondary qualities, odors, savors, sounds, colors and tangibility, are all but excited states of the brain; that, as the brain is the last in the series of physical instrumen-

talities connecting the mind with matter, it is the direct object of perception. The writer of this notice believes that the mind has a direct knowledge of the secondary, as it has of the other qualities of matter; and that our brain and nerves were given us, not to shut out the world, but as means for perceiving it.

Dr. Davis is a relativist, and not a noumenalist; for he says, p. 55, "Of the substantial mind itself we are utterly unconscious"; and, p. 95, "I do not perceive substance, but a quality of substance."

By self-perception he means the power which Locke calls reflection; Reid, consciousness; and Hamilton, self-consciousness. His term seems the best, and we should have sense-perception and self-perception as the names of the two primary, intuitive, experiential faculties. But Dr. Davis distinguishes between self-perception and self-consciousness; making the former, cognition, and the latter, feeling. He here as elsewhere, shows his tendency to sensationalism.

Pure intuition is his designation of Hamilton's regulative faculty, of Kant's pure reason, of the Scotch common sense, of the Greek *Nous*, or noetic power. He, as all intuitionists do, considers it a power of immediate cognition. This seems questionable. How can a relativist say that we have an immediate cognition of substance? Have we such a knowledge of being, space, time, cause? Are not all of these, as the primary, essential, universal conditions of thought and things—immediate inferences rather than immediate cognitions? As involved in all thought and in all things, do we not necessarily believe in their existence rather than directly know them? Hamilton says: "The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make from the existence of known phenomena." If they are inferences, the power is one of mediate cognition.

Dr. Davis gives five characteristics of these pure intuitions: they are abstract, catholic, self-evident, certain, necessary. Hamilton says that Leibnitz reduced them all to one, necessity. Leibnitz rather meant, that necessity was the element in them which proves that they are not, and cannot be, of empirical origin. The true criteria of these primary conditions of thought and things are two, simplicity and necessity; necessity alone would include *all* the truths of logic and mathematics.

Dr. Davis sets forth that the intuitionism of Leibnitz and Kant holds, that these primary ideas are in their origin innate, and in their nature merely formal, subjective, regulative norms of thought. His own intuitionism teaches that they are adventitious in origin, and are real existences. The truth seems to be, that they are innate, not connate; they have their birth within the mind, by virtue of its own energy, on the occasion of an experience that suggests them. They are not connate, for the mind is not born with ideas, but merely with the power to form them. On the other hand, they are both regulative, as norms of thought, and constitutive, as the prime realities of existence.

Dr. Davis is a dualist and a presentationist, and yet there are expressions, which, taken alone, might indicate a tendency to materialism and to representationism. His terminology is largely that which obtains amongst thinkers that lean towards materialism; he likes such terms as modes, states, forms, shock, sense, feeling; and very sparingly uses act, action, faculty, power, energy. He believes that every mental act has its corresponding movement in the brain. He says, p. 16, "The brain itself is the immediate object in perception." Nevertheless, Dr. Davis is not a materialist, and is so far from it, that he not only refutes it, but



declares that "Locality can no more be attributed to mind than extension; either reduces mind to matter." This is strictly orthodox, but we respectfully ask, Is Dr. Davis's mind nowhere?

He discusses substance, and distinguishes it from qualities, which are multiple, variable, and cognized by perception, while substance is one, identically permanent, and a pure intuition. Are compounds and complexes substances? If so, the Doctor is wrong in asserting that substances are identically permanent; for compounds and complexes are ever changing. If elements alone are substances, then he is wrong in saying that qualities are variable; for the qualities of elements are constant. Elements alone, it seems, should be considered substances.

Having already given Dr. Davis's doctrine of memory, we proceed to imagination. There are two distinct powers of the mind which are confounded in this term. They are sometimes known as the reproductive and the productive imagination. The first is a very simple and merely ancillary power, whose office it is to represent to the mind its mediate objects of cognition. The productive, or, as it is properly called, the creative power, is the highest, noblest of the cognitive faculties; the faculty to which all the others are ancillary, and whose work is likeliest God's. Dr. Davis has only slightly confounded these, and his mistake is due to the name. He means by the imagination the creative faculty, but, misled by the name, he says that it is "representative of an intuition." It is not representative of anything, but is creative of the new; using, of course, materials furnished to it by the other powers, it combines them into factitious forms—useful, beautiful, or sublime. The proper place, therefore, to treat the creative faculty, is at the close of the cognitive powers, and especially after the power of thought or comparison, whose work is directly essential to it.

The last of the powers of cognition treated by Dr. Davis is that of thought, the comparative, relative, discursive, dianoetic faculty. This is the least full and satisfactory of his discussions; doubtless because he has treated the power fully in two other works, neither of which he wishes to duplicate here. It is quite remarkable that he omits all mention of reasoning by name, as a distinct process of thought, and gives a very meagre treatment of judgment.

We pass over feeling, having already noticed his extreme partiality for it, and observe that, by desire, he means the subjective side of conation. There are three kinds of feeling: sensation, correlative to perception; emotion, intellectual and non-rational; and sentiment, intellectual, and rational. There are also three kinds of desire; two craving, appetite, which is physical, and appetence, which is psychical; and one, giving, that is, affection. It is hard to see how a desire can be giving, how an affection can be a desire. Pp. 273, 274: "Love, strictly taken, is an affection, a desire, but is attended by both emotions and sentiments peculiar to it." "The chief instinctive expressions of love are reducible to gentle touch." Bain is quoted as confirming this view when he says: "In considering the genesis of the tender emotion, in any or all of its modes, I am inclined to put great stress upon the sensation of animal contact, or the pleasure of the embrace." If this be true, can God and the angels love? According to the view here given, love seems mixed, for it is connected with the emotions, sentiments, desires craving and physical, and affections.

It is preferable to put the feelings and desires together and treat them under the common head of emotions or sensibilities. There are, first, simple feelings of

mere pleasure and pain. Then there are complex emotions or feelings; of these, the affections are simplest, and are compounded of the simple feelings with the peculiar element known as like or dislike, love or hate. Then the desires, which are composed of the simple feelings, the affections, and the peculiar element of craving which characterizes them. Finally, there are the hopes, which, as the most complex, include all the preceding, and the peculiar element of expectation not found in the others. Dr. Davis omits the hopes.

Volition is the last power treated. Here we note two points: first, Dr. Davis's doctrine of attention. He defines it (p. 79), as "intensity of cognition." P. 85: "It is the special function of the will to fix and hold attention. The will has no other power." The special point to be noticed is his teaching, p. 84: "I find I can attend to only one thing at one time." Yet he tells us, p. 76: "The generic powers of mind [cognition, feeling, desire, and volition] are always simultaneously in exercise." P. 64: "A slight consideration will show that we are usually conscious of many things simultaneously"; and especially, p. 80, "The greater the number of objects to which consciousness is simultaneously extended, the smaller is the intensity with which it is able to consider any one." This last, he says, is a law of attention; if the mind can attend to only one thing at a time, there is no reason for this law.

The main interest in the will is its freedom. Here, as generally, Dr. Davis is vigorous and clear; and, moreover, in his solution, quite original. The argument for necessity he presents syllogistically. Pp. 321, 322: "Every change is caused; a volition is a change; therefore a volition is caused"; but "whatever is caused is necessitated; a volition is caused; a volition is necessitated." He then gives the various answers of the libertarians: 1. I am conscious of liberty; 2. A denial that volition comes under the law of causation—it is an exception; 3. That the law of causality is modified for mind. 4. That spontaneity, not causation, is the law of mind. 5. That man is a free agent, though his will is not free. All of these replies he rejects as unsatisfactory, and then, as a libertarian, gives his own refutation of the iron logic of necessity.

Pp. 332-37, volition has two elements, choice and effort. Of these, effort is a change; is, therefore, caused, and not free. This leaves choice as the only hope for freedom. Choice is dual: first, it is an act, choosing, a mental mode; as such, it is a change, and is, therefore, caused and necessitated. Second, choice is a fact, a thing done, the intention; as such, it is not a change, and, therefore, is not caused, and is free.

According to this reasoning, an act is not a fact; a fact, a thing done by the mind, is not an act; this mental fact is new, and yet is not a change; the mind chooses, but it is not an act; it is a new choice, and yet not a change!

*Washington and Lee University.*

J. A. QUARLES.

#### HALSEY'S HISTORY OF MCCORMICK SEMINARY.

A HISTORY OF THE MCCORMICK THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH. *By LeRoy J. Halsey, D. D., LL. D., Professor Emeritus of Church Government and the Sacraments in the Seminary. Author of "Literary Attractions of the Bible," "Living Christianity," "Scotland's Influence on Civilization," "Beauty of Immanuel," etc.* Pp. 537. Chicago: Published by the Seminary. 1893.

About seventy years ago there was a lad in Rockbridge county, Virginia, of Scotch-Irish descent and Presbyterian training, who, when only fifteen years old, made a grain-cradle for his own use in the harvest field, and swung it over many a broad acre of wheat, keeping his place among the full-grown hands on his father's farm. That boy was destined to release millions of his fellow-men from the severe toil, of which he then had a practical experience, by inventing a machine for cutting grain by horse-power, and to link his name for all time with three great departments of human interest—industry, education and religion—by the liberal and judicious use of the large wealth which came to him through his beneficent invention. In 1831, just seven years after he had made the light cradle for his boyish strength, Cyrus Hall McCormick produced the first successful reaping machine, fashioning with his own hands every part of it, both in wood and iron, in the carpenter and blacksmith shops on his father's farm. It consisted of a vibrating blade to cut, a platform to receive the falling grain, and a reel to bring the standing grain within reach of the blade. The reaper was tested in a field of six acres of oats, near Walnut Grove, the McCormick homestead, midway between Lexington and Staunton, and astonished all who witnessed its work. But none of those then present, not even the young inventor himself, however far-seeing and sanguine, could have foretold all the vast consequences which were to flow from that triumph of his genius. For, not only has it revolutionized the whole method of farming in the areas then cultivated, but it has opened the mighty empire of the Northwest, by making possible its enormous crops of grain, and thus stimulating the construction of thousands of miles of railway, and peopling half a continent with prosperous settlers.

As long ago as 1859 the great lawyer, Reverdy Johnson, said: "The McCormick reaper has already contributed an annual income to the whole country of fifty-five millions of dollars, at least, which must increase through all time." About the same time, William H. Seward said that, "Owing to Mr. McCormick's invention, the line of civilization moves westward thirty miles each year." But even such statements as these, remarkable as they are, do not measure the value of his invention in lessening human toil, increasing the world's wealth, and promoting the advance of material civilization. For they take account only of North America, whereas the reaper has benefited in the same way South America, New Zealand, Australia, Great Britain, France, Russia, and other countries of Europe; and the great establishment at Chicago is still sending its reapers over the world at the rate of one hundred and forty-four thousand a year. The machine was first brought to the attention of the British public at the World's Fair in London, in 1851. At first it was the subject of some ridicule: the *London Times* called it "a cross between an Astley chariot, a wheel-barrow, and a flying machine." But in a few weeks, when, after prolonged tests, the Great Council medal was awarded the inventor, "the Thunderer" changed front completely and admitted that the McCormick reaper was equal in value to the entire cost of the exhibition. In 1867, at the Exposition in Paris, Mr. McCormick was decorated by the emperor with the Cross of the Legion of Honor for his valuable and successful invention. In 1878, when he was called to Paris for the third time to receive the Grand Prize of the Exposition, he was elected a corresponding member of the French Academy of Sciences, "as having done more for the cause of agriculture than any other living man." In the language of the Faculty of Washington and Lee University, "It is

not too much to say that no man in all history has achieved so much for the progress of that branch of industry which is universally recognized as the basis of individual comfort and national prosperity."

We have given with some fulness these facts in regard to Mr. McCormick's influence upon the material interests of mankind for the purpose of emphasizing the statement, paradoxical as it may appear, that his influence upon the higher interests of the race was still greater and more beneficent. The book before us gives some of the most impressive proofs of this fact. He did not think more of machines than of souls. For fifty years he was a consistent, earnest, fruitful member of the Presbyterian Church, and from the earliest days of his prosperity to the end of his honored life, he was the large-hearted and open-handed friend of educational and religious institutions, ever ready to help them with his sympathy, his prayers, his counsel, and his means. In every part of the country, north, south, east, and west, there are churches, academies, colleges, and seminaries which to-day are flourishing and doing a great work for God, because of the timely and generous assistance he gave them in their days of poverty and struggle. He never ceased to love his native State. Two of her venerable and useful institutions, held specially warm places in his heart: Washington and Lee University, in his native county, and Union Theological Seminary, in Prince Edward. It is well known that he gave the former \$20,000, and that in 1866, when the Seminary at Hampden-Sidney seemed doomed because of financial losses by the war, he gave \$30,000 for the endowment of the chair now occupied by the writer of this notice. Had it not been for the liberality of Cyrus H. McCormick and the activity of Benjamin M. Smith in those dark days, our largest Southern Seminary would have had a lame career indeed during the last twenty-five years. Of course his chief work on behalf of Christian education and the spread of the gospel was his endowment of the great institution in Chicago which bears his name, now the leading theological school in America, and of which we have here the history.

But before speaking further of that, we should notice one other wise and far-reaching benefaction of this many-sided philanthropist and enterprising Christian: A religious newspaper called *The Interior*, which had been started in Chicago to represent the Presbyterian Church was twenty years ago about to succumb to financial difficulties, when its friends and owners applied to Mr. McCormick to purchase it. "To promote the cause of union between the Old and New Schools, to aid in harmonizing the Presbyterian Church in the North and South, to advance the interests of the newly-established Theological Seminary in Chicago, and to promote the welfare of the denomination generally in the great Northwest, were among the objects dear to his heart." So in 1872 he bought the paper as requested, placed it on a firm financial basis, secured an editor of rare ability, and thus made it one of the representative religious journals of America, which will no doubt continue to wield a wide and salutary influence for generations to come.

We are not unaware of the fact that the introduction into this article of the foregoing information, drawn mostly from the Memoir of Mr. McCormick, may seem to some to make an unduly long preface to the review of the volume in hand. But we have ventured to introduce it notwithstanding, first, because we trust the facts will have interest and value to many of our younger readers, who perhaps are not as familiar as their elders with the history of this great and good man; and, secondly, because the history of the Seminary could never have been what it is but

for Mr. McCormick's adoption of it, so to speak, in 1859, and his subsequent munificent relations to it. Before he brought it to Chicago the institution had led a very precarious existence, having no solid basis and no assured future. It was he who gave it all three of the elements which Dr. Nathan L. Rice pronounced absolutely essential to a successful theological seminary—a suitable location, a pecuniary basis, and qualified professors who enjoy the confidence of the church; and it was, therefore, he who made possible all its later development, and especially the remarkable growth by which in the last ten years it has outstripped all other American seminaries.

One of the professors first chosen (in 1859) as fulfilling the third condition mentioned by Dr. Rice, and the only living man who has been connected with the institution throughout the thirty-four years of its work in Chicago, the venerable Dr. Halsey, now in his eighty-second year, has undertaken to write the history of that great school of the prophets, whose career extends over the stormiest periods both of our national and ecclesiastical life, and has succeeded in the most admirable manner. "Happy the seminary that has such a historian," not only because he writes with the accuracy, fulness and charm of personal knowledge of the events recorded and men described, but also because he has suffused the whole narrative with the most delightful Christian spirit. In such a work there is indeed danger of a too uniformly eulogistic tone. But we are confident that time will vindicate Dr. Halsey's wisdom in excluding from this history all bitter and offensive reflections, and in softening, as far as he could consistently with truth, the asperities of those unhappy conflicts growing out of political differences. At the same time, it was, of course, necessary that he should give in full the history of Mr. McCormick's noble stand for the dissociation of politics and religion in the management of the Seminary and his great victory in the General Assembly, touching what he called "the agitation in the church of political questions." And all this is here faithfully set down, so that all may see that, as to this issue, he was at one with Dr. Charles Hodge and the Southern Church. No wonder Dr. Gray of the *Interior* should say "he was among the first to seek reunion between the Northern and Southern sections of the church."

Like Princeton, Union in Virginia, and most of our other theological schools, this seminary began as a mere department of a literary institution, Hanover College, Indiana. Like them, too, it soon abandoned this form of organization as utterly unsatisfactory. It is an interesting fact that the two leading seminaries in the Northern Church were founded by Southern men—Princeton by a Virginian, Dr. Archibald Alexander, and McCormick by a North Carolinian, Dr. John Matthews. Dr. Matthews began his work at Hanover in 1830, and there continued it with various assistants for ten years, when it became evident that in order to its proper development, the theological department must be detached from the college and independently organized. It was accordingly removed in 1840 to New Albany, Indiana, where for several years it grew and prospered. But the increasing sharpness of the controversy in regard to slavery, in which some of the professors took a prominent, but disastrous, part, and the establishment and immediate success of the Seminary at Danville, Ky., gave the New Albany school another serious check, and led eventually to its removal to Chicago. The decisive consideration in favor of this re-location, was an offer by Mr. McCormick of one hundred thousand dollars for the endowment of four professorships, on condition

that the seminary should be permanently located at Chicago. The gift was accepted, and the institution was established on what is undoubtedly the best site for a seminary that the continent affords. To this original munificent donation Mr. McCormick added frequently and largely during his lifetime, and since his death the same princely benefactions have been continued by Mrs. McCormick and Mr. C. H. McCormick, Jr., so that now the seminary owns property valued at \$1,300,000, and possesses an equipment for its great work that is well-nigh perfect.

In view of this remarkable and continued liberality, the governing bodies in 1886 changed the name of the institution from "The Theological Seminary of the Northwest," to "The McCormick Theological Seminary."

But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the seminary attained its present position without arduous and protracted struggles, frequent reverses, and sore disappointments, as any reader of this history will see. After the removal from New Albany to Chicago, in acceptance of Mr. McCormick's liberal proposition, some of the synods gave it but a cold support, while others were openly hostile, and "the secular press, both at Chicago and elsewhere, let no opportunity pass to denounce the new seminary as an institution founded in the interest of Southern slavery, and controlled by men who were themselves in sympathy with the doctrines of the pro-slavery party."

Through storm and calm, clouds and sunshine, it has pressed forward on its high mission. Up to the present time it has trained eleven hundred and twenty-three ministers of the everlasting gospel, and is destined to send forth thousands more.

It is evident then, that great as are the results of Mr. McCormick's invention in enabling men to reap the material harvests of the world, still more beneficent and far-reaching are the results of his consecrated wealth in fitting men to reap God's spiritual harvest. The equipment of this great Seminary is obedience, of the most practical and fruitful kind, to the command given by the Saviour when he said: "The harvest truly is plenteous, but the laborers are few; pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he will send forth laborers into his harvest," for it is sending out annually large bands of soul-reapers, and will continue to do so for generations to come.

The book is embellished with thirty-nine illustrations, four being cuts of the Seminary buildings, and the rest being portraits of professors, such as John Matthews, Nathan L. Rice, Francis L. Patton, Thomas H. Skinner, and many others besides the present faculty, and directors, including two of Mr. McCormick. All who knew Judge Samuel M. Moore will be glad to see his noble face here and to read the appreciative sketch of his life and character. To the statements made in regard to the positions of honor to which he was appointed (including the presidency of the Seminary Board), we think it would be well to add that he was one of the commissioners of the Northern Assembly to bear its fraternal greetings to the Southern Assembly at Lexington, Kentucky, in 1883, especially in view of the fact that he, like the founder of the seminary, Dr. Matthews, and its chief benefactor, Mr. McCormick, was a Southern man, and the fact, too, that the relations between the Seminary and the Southern Church have been, and still are, singularly cordial.

In the sketch of Dr. Rice, it is stated, p. 174, that he was pastor of the *Second* Presbyterian Church, of St. Louis, just before going to Chicago, whereas, on p. 153,

it is said that he was pastor at that time of the *First* Presbyterian Church, of St. Louis. By the way, these personal sketches are among the most interesting and valuable features of the volume.

We think every such book as this should have an index, though the want of it in the present instance is less keenly felt because of the detailed fulness of the Table of Contents.

Dr. Halsey has not failed to set forth the influence of the Seminary in stimulating the growth of Presbyterianism in the great metropolis of the Northwest, and especially in its own immediate neighborhood: 'To-day we have seven flourishing Presbyterian churches, with their settled pastors, their working agencies, and their aggregate membership of over fifteen hundred communicants, in a district [of the city] where, in 1863, we had not a single organized congregation.' Still more interesting is the account of the city mission-work by the students, organized six years ago by Dr. Craig for the purpose of carrying the gospel to some of the most ungodly regions of Chicago, and since prosecuted under his skilful and energetic leadership with the most encouraging results.

We must close abruptly, leaving unsaid many things that we desired to present in connection with the general subject of theological education, to the literature of which Dr. Halsey has made such a valuable contribution.

*Hampden-Sidney.*

W. W. MOORE.

ADAMS'S "BORN IN THE WHIRLWIND."

BORN IN THE WHIRLWIND. *By Rev. William Adams, D. D.* Boston, Mass.: Arena Publishing Company, Copley Square. 1893. 12mo. pp. 304.

This is a tale founded professedly on facts, facts, however, not cold and naked, but warmed with the breath of poetic feeling, and painted in the hues of a brilliant imagination. "Truth," says the author in his short preface, "is universally demanded from the pen as well as from the lips of the Christian clergyman; he, of all others, cannot exaggerate with impunity. Conscious of this fact, the author has endeavored so to modulate the tones and utterances of this volume as to keep within the limits of well-verified facts. And yet many of the incidents narrated in the following pages are as strange, startling and unique as anything that has been presented in modern fiction."

The scene, as the author himself tells us, is laid in the eastern section of Georgia, on the banks of the Savannah River. We have seen it intimated, in a notice of the work in one of our religious journals, that there may possibly be an inner meaning which is capable of interpretation in regard to local characters and events which are more real than fictitious. If so, we know nothing which would justify such an hypothesis, as we are completely ignorant of the topography of the section described, and of the personages who may have been identified with it. What few words we may say will have reference only to the merits of the work, and will be prompted by the deep interest which its reading occasioned us. If other readers shall be affected as we have been by its pages, they will lay down the volume only because its reading cannot be accomplished at a single sitting.

The plot is well conceived, and the dramatic art of the narration is sustained from the beginning to the end. There is just enough of exquisite description of scenery, of descant upon the play of human passion, of analysis of the motives

which profoundly operate upon the heart, and of moral and religious reflections, to save the work from being a mere narrative, to impress the lessons derivable from the actions depicted concurrently with the thrilling effect produced by their recital, and to whet the appetite for the succeeding acts of the drama as it moves passionately onward to its consummation.

The traits of the Southern planter, of the typical Southern woman, and the characteristics of their domestic life, are graphically portrayed, and, perhaps, with sufficient fidelity by one who was not "native and to the manner born." Of the accuracy with which the *patois* of the uneducated negro in the part of the country to which the story pertains is given, we are not prepared to judge. The peculiarities of his dialect differ very considerably in the different sections of the country to which he belongs, so much so, that those of one section find it almost impossible to understand those of another. We are inclined to think that a somewhat superficial acquaintance with the negro has led the author to the not uncommon impression, that in his case religion and morality are uniformly divorced from each other. Antecedently to actual observation, we would suppose that the gospel, when truly preached, would produce a better result than this in any race of human beings; nor has our own observation induced the conviction that the supposition is contradicted by the character of the negro race. "Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it." This is true of all men; and that there are some negroes who are genuine Christians, we verily believe, more, probably, than their critics of the superior race are apt to imagine. The author may not differ from us upon this point, and if so, we would have to admit that we have misconstrued his book in relation to this subject.

The portraiture of deep-dyed villainy is such as to fill the reader with horror. No doubt our poor, fallen nature is capable of sinking to fathomless depths of sin and shame, but one is almost tempted to indulge the feeling that the author has dealt with ideal rather than actual instances of the development of hardened iniquity. The plot, however, relieves us in some degree, as it hastens to its issue in the final triumph of virtue, and the ultimate discomfiture of crime.

The author's descriptions of the beauties of nature reveal the hand of a master; the charms of the woods, and the glories of the morning and of the evening are exquisitely painted; and we must not omit to say in conclusion that the religious, the evangelically religious, tone of the work is deserving of the highest praise.

JOHN L. GIRARDEAU.



THE  
PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

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I. THE ATTRACTIONS OF POPERY.

DR. JOHN H. RICE, with the intuition of a great mind, warned Presbyterians against a renewed prevalence of popery in our Protestant land. This was when it was so insignificant among us as to be almost unnoticed. Many were surprised at his prophecy, and not a few mocked; but time has fulfilled it. Our leaders from 1830 to 1860 understood well the causes of this danger. They were diligent to inform and prepare the minds of their people against it. Hence General Assemblies and Synods appointed annual sermons upon popery, and our teachers did their best to arouse the minds of the people. Now, all this has mainly passed away, and we are relaxing our resistance against the dreaded foe just in proportion as he grows more formidable. It has become the fashion to condemn controversy and to affect the widest charity for this and all other foes of Christ and of souls. High Presbyterian authority even is quoted as saying, that henceforth our concern with Romanism should be chiefly irenic! The figures presented by the census of 1890 are construed in opposite ways. This gives the papists more than fourteen millions of adherents in the United States, where ninety years ago there were but a few thousands. Such Protestant journals as think it their interest to play sycophants to public opinion try to persuade us that these figures are very consoling; because, if Rome had kept all the natural increase of her immigrations the numbers would have been larger. But Rome points to them with insolent triumph as prognostics of an assured victory over Protestantism on this continent. Which will prove correct?

Both logic and Holy Writ teach us that "the thing which hath been is the thing which shall be." Like causes must be expected to produce like effects. For Presbyterians of all others to discount the perpetual danger from Romanism is thoroughly thoughtless and rash. We believe that the Christianity left by the apostles to the primitive church was essentially what we now call Presbyterian and Protestant. Prelacy and popery speedily began to work in the bosom of that community and steadily wrought its corruption and almost its total extirpation. Why should not the same cause tend to work the same result again? Are we truer or wiser Presbyterians than those trained by the apostles? Have the enemies of truth become less skilful and dangerous by gaining the experience of centuries? The popish system of ritual and doctrine was a gradual growth, which, modifying true Christianity, first perverted and then extinguished it. Its destructive power has resulted from this: that it has not been the invention of any one cunning and hostile mind, but a gradual growth, modified by hundreds or thousands of its cultivators, who were the most acute, learned, selfish, and anti-christian spirits of their generations, perpetually retouched and adapted to every weakness and every attribute of depraved human nature, until it became the most skilful and pernicious system of error which the world has ever known. As it has adjusted itself to every superstition, every sense of guilt, every foible and craving of the depraved human heart, so it has travestied with consummate skill every active principle of the gospel. It is doubtless the *ne plus ultra* of religious delusion, the final and highest result of perverted human faculty guided by the sagacity of the great enemy.

This system has nearly conquered Christendom once. He who does not see that it is capable of conquering it again is blind to the simplest laws of thought. One may ask, Does it not retain sundry of the cardinal doctrines of the gospel, monotheism, the trinity, the hypostatic union, Christ's sacrifice, the sacraments, the resurrection, the judgment, immortality? Yes; in form it retains them, and this because of its supreme cunning. It retains them while so wresting and enervating as to rob them mainly of

their sanctifying power, because it designs to spread its snares for all sorts of minds of every grade of opinion. The grand architect was too cunning to make it, like his earlier essays, mere atheism, or mere fetishism, or mere polytheism, or mere pagan idolatry; for in these forms the trap only ensnared the coarser and more ignorant natures. He has now perfected it and baited it for all types of humanity, the most refined as well as the most imbruted.

I. Romanism now enjoys in our country certain important advantages, which I may style legitimate, in this sense, that our decadent, half-corrupted Protestantism bestows these advantages upon our enemy, so that Rome, in employing them, only uses what we ourselves give her. In other words, there are plain points upon which Rome claims a favorable comparison as against Protestantism; and her claim is correct, in that the latter is blindly and criminally betraying her own interests and duties.

(1.) A hundred years ago French atheism gave the world the Jacobin theory of political rights. The Bible had been teaching mankind for three thousand years the great doctrine of men's moral equality before the universal Father, the great basis of all free, just, and truly republican forms of civil society. Atheism now travestied this true doctrine by her mortal heresy of the absolute equality of men, asserting that every human being is naturally and inalienably entitled to every right, power, and prerogative in civil society which is allowed to any man or any class. The Bible taught a liberty which consists in each man's unhindered privilege of having and doing just those things, and no others, to which he is rationally and morally entitled. Jacobinism taught the liberty of license—every man's natural right to indulge his own absolute will; and it set up this fiendish caricature as the object of sacred worship for mankind. Now, democratic Protestantism in these United States has become so ignorant, so superficial and wilful, that it confounds the true republicanism with this deadly heresy of Jacobinism. It has ceased to know a difference. Hence, when the atheistic doctrine begins to bear its natural fruits of license, insubordination, communism, and anarchy, this bastard democratic Protestantism does not know

how to rebuke them. It has recognized the parents; how can it consistently condemn the children? Now, then, Rome proposes herself as the stable advocate of obedience, order, and permanent authority throughout the ages. She shows her practical power to govern men, as she says, through their consciences (truth would say, through their superstitions). Do we wonder that good citizens, beginning to stand aghast at these elements of confusion and ruin, the spawn of Jacobinism, which a Jacobinized Protestantism cannot control, should look around for some moral and religious system capable of supporting a firm social order? Need we be surprised that when Rome steps forward, saying, "I have been through the centuries the upholder of order," rational men should be inclined to give her their hand? This high advantage a misguided Protestantism is now giving to its great adversary.

(2.) The Reformation was an assertion of liberty of thought. It asserted for all mankind, and secured for the Protestant nations, each man's right to think and decide for himself upon his religious creed and his duty towards his God, in the fear of God and the truth, *unhindered by human power, political or ecclesiastical*. Here, again, a part of our Protestantism perverted the precious truth until the "manna bred worms, and stank." Rationalistic and skeptical Protestantism now claims, instead of that righteous liberty, license to dogmatize at the bidding of every caprice, every impulse of vanity, every false philosophy, without any responsibility to either truth or moral obligation. The result has been a diversity and confusion of pretended creeds and theologies among nominal Protestants, which perplexes and frightens sincere, but timid, minds. Everything seems to them afloat upon this turbulent sea of licentious debate. They are fatigued and alarmed; they see no end of uncertainties. They look around anxiously for some safe and fixed foundation of credence. Rome comes forward and says to them, You see, then, that this Protestant liberty of thought is fatal license; the Protestant's "rational religion" turns out to be but poisonous *rationalism*, infidelity wearing the mask of faith. Holy Mother Church offers you the foundation of her infallibility, guaranteed by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. She shows you that faith must ground itself in

implicit submission, and not in human inquiry. She pledges herself for the safety of your soul if you simply submit; come, then, "trust and be at rest." Many are the weary souls who accept her invitations; and these not only the weak and cowardly, but sometimes the brilliant and gifted, like a Cardinal Newman. For this result a perverted Protestantism is responsible. If all nominal Protestants were as honest in their exercise of mental liberty as the fear of God and the loyalty to truth should make them; if they were as humble and honest in construing and obeying God's word in his Bible, as papists profess to be in submitting to the authority of the Holy Mother Church, honest inquirers would never be embarrassed, and would never be befooled into supposing that the words of a pope could furnish a more comfortable foundation for faith than the word of God.

(3.) To the shame of our damaged Protestantism, popery remains, in some essential respects, more faithful to God's truth than its rival. For instance, while multitudes of scholars, calling themselves Protestant Christians, are undermining the doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures, Rome holds fast to it in her catechisms and formal declarations. True, she claims inspiration for others than the prophets, evangelists, and apostles, for her popes, namely, and prelates, holding to "the apostolic succession." But if one must err, it is better to err by excess than by defect on a point like this, where negation cuts the blinded soul of man off absolutely from the divine guidance. Thousands of pretended Protestant believers are advancing their destructive criticism to assert that the Pentateuch is a literary fraud. Rome firmly maintains that it is God's own work through Moses. A thousand deceitful arts are plied to degrade the conception of inspiration, as giving only thoughts, and not the words, or as consisting only in an elevation of the consciousness by poetic genius, and such like treacherous views. Rome still teaches the old-fashioned, honest view. What right have such deceitful Protestants to scold Rome for dishonesty of those historical and spiritual impostures upon which she founds the claims of the popes? Truly, they are dirty enough; for the forged decretals, for instance, too much contempt and reprehension cannot be expressed. But they are not a

whit dirtier than the mental dishonesty of the men who, after asserting that they have proved the Pentateuch mostly a literary fraud, done by priestcraft more than a thousand years after its pretended date, still assure us that its value as Scripture and divine rule of faith is not wounded. These recent justifiers of pious fraud cannot convict the older ones. The old imposture, like a rotten roof, has become moss-grown with age, and is picturesque and venerable in many eyes. The new imposture stands ugly and malodorous in its rank freshness.

Again, multitudes of pretended Protestants utterly deny the trinity, the very corner-stone of a theology of redemption. Rome affirms it in all the fulness of the creeds of Nice, Chalcedon, and Athanasius. Myriads of pretended Protestants revere their own ethical philosophy so much more than they do their God that they must needs utterly reject Christ's vicarious satisfaction for the guilt of sin. Rome continues to assert it, in spite of spurious philosophy, although she does add to it superstitious claims of human merit. Myriads of our men have become such "advanced thinkers" that they cannot away with supernatural regeneration. Rome teaches it invariably, even if it is in the form of baptismal regeneration, and still ascribes it to the power of God. Such are a few of the biting contrasts. We cannot wonder that many, even of honest and reverent minds, when they witness this ruthless destruction of the essentials of the gospel, draw two plain inferences. One is, that all such men pretending to be Protestant believers are, in fact, nothing but infidels wearing a mask, probably for the sake of the loaves and fishes as yet connected with the clerical calling; so that it is mere impudence for such men to assume to warn them against popish impostures—rather too near akin to Satan reproving sin. The other is, that the Romanist theologians must have been right in asserting, ever since the days of Luther, that our Protestant way of establishing a divine rule of faith by a rational and explicit credence must turn out nothing but rationalistic infidelity. Souls which value a divine redemption for man shudder as they behold this wild havoc of everything characteristic of a saving gospel; and they naturally exclaim, "There is no security except in going back to that old

foundation, implicit trust in the witness of 'Holy Mother Church' to the Scriptures!" Now, true Protestants know that this conclusion is wretchedly sophistical, but it is dreadfully natural for honest, half-informed men.

(4.) The best argument for any creed is the godly living of its professors. Protestantism used to have a grand and victorious advantage on that point. She is ceasing to wield it. The wealth begotten by her very virtues of industry, thrift, and probity has debauched many of her children. "Jeshurun has waxen fat, and kicked." An unbounded flood of luxury sweeps Protestant families away. A relaxed and deceitful doctrine produces its sure fruits of relaxed and degraded morals. Church discipline is nearly extinct. Meantime spurious revivalism, relying upon all species of vulgar clap-trap and sensational artifice, upon slang rhetoric and the stimulating of mere animal sympathies, instead of the pure word and spirit of God, is hurrying tens of thousands of dead souls into the Protestant churches. These evils have gone so far that a profession of faith in these churches has come to mean nearly as little as a professed conformity to Rome means. No shrewd man regards such a profession as any sufficient guarantee for truth or common honesty in dealing. The lawyers tell us that litigation unmasks about as much intended fraud, purposed extórtion, and loose swearing in these church members as in other people. Worldly conformity is so general that the line between the church and the world has become nearly as indistinct as that between spiritual and profane living in the Romish communion. Meantime, Rome gets up no spurious revivals; she works her system with the steadiness and perseverance which used to characterize pastoral effort and family religion among Presbyterians. It is true that her cultus is intensely ritualistic; but, at least, it does not offend decent people by irreverent slang; her worship is liturgical, but her liturgies, however erroneous in doctrine, are, at least, genteel, and marked by æsthetic dignity. Rome does not venture on sham miracles very much in these United States. It is true she has her spurious relics and other superstitious impostures for impressing the people; but wherein are they less of human artifices and less deceptive than the ma-

chinery of our pretended revivals, with their marchings, hand-shakings, choruses, and ephemeral conversions? Rome's confessional is, indeed, a terrible organ of spiritual tyranny; but still it is a strong organ of church discipline, and it is steadily employed as such in every Romish chapel. The average Protestant church member feels that any assumption of real presbyterial authority over him by his pastor would be an impertinence, which he would resent with scorn. The Romish priest still wields a potent, ghostly authority over his people. One may cry that he wields it by virtue of superstition, by the threat of withholding his absolution or extreme unction. Yet he wields it, and usually for the credit of his church. He teaches his members to practice the forms of their daily devotion with diligence and regularity, holding out a powerful motive in the promise of merit thus wrought out. The Protestant may exclaim, These are but machine prayers, vain repetitions told off by the dozen along with the beads! Very true, the most of it may be very poor stuff; but nothing can be quite so poor and worthless as the living of many Protestant members, who have no family altar and no closet, who say no prayers either in form or in spirit, and who have no conscience of keeping either Sabbaths or saints' days. It is a very bad thing in the Romanist to join the worship of Mary and the saints with that of God; but we surmise that it is a still worse thing to be a practical atheist, and stately to worship nothing, neither saint nor God, as many an enrolled member of a Protestant church now does.

The Romanist's machine prayers and vain repetitions have, at least, this tendency, to sustain in his soul some slight habit of religious reverence, and this is better than mere license of life. While the two communions wear these aspects, we need not wonder that those Americans, at least, whose early prejudices lean towards Rome should honestly regard her as the better mother of piety and morals.

(5.) We Protestants are also giving away to Rome another powerful influence over honest and thoughtful Christian minds. This we do by secularizing our whole state education. The bulk of the Protestants in the United States have betrayed themselves, through their partisan political zeal, to an attitude concerning the



rearing of youth which must ever be preposterous and untenable for sincere Christians. The statesmen and divines of the Reformation, the Luthers, Calvins, Knoxes, Winthrops, and Mathers, were strong advocates of state education; they were such because they were sincere believers in government paternalism; because they believed in the close union of church and state; because their conception of the state was thoroughly theocratic. Had these men been asked, What think you of a theory of education which should train the understanding without instructing the religious conscience; which should teach young immortal spirits anything and everything except God; which should thus secularize education, a function essentially spiritual, and should take this parental task from the fathers and mothers, on whom God imposed it, to confer it on the human and earthly organism, expressly secular and godless? they would have answered with one voice, It is pagan, utterly damnable. But they thought that the state might educate, because the state with them was Christian. Thus state education was firmly grafted into the Puritan colonies. New England, with her usual aggressiveness, has pushed her usage all over the empire. Meantime the Jeffersonian doctrine of the absolute severance and independence of church and state, of the entire secularity of the state, and the absolutely equal rights, before the law, of religious truth and error, of paganism, atheism, and Christianity, has also established itself in all the States; and still the politicians, for electioneering ends, propagate this state education everywhere. By this curious circuit "Christian America" has gotten herself upon this thoroughly pagan ground; forcing the education of responsible, moral, and immortal beings, of which religion must ever be the essence, into the hands of a gigantic human agency, which resolves that it cannot and will not be religious at all. Surely some great religious body will arise in America to lift its Christian protest against this monstrous result! But, lo! the chief, the only organized protest heard in America comes from the Romish Church. It is she who stands forth preëminent, almost single-handed, to assert the sacred rights of Christian parents in the training of the souls they have begotten, of Christ in the nurture of the souls he died to redeem. To-

day it is this Romish Church which stands forth precisely in the position of the Luthers, Calvins, Knoxes, and Mathers as to the main, central point, which is, *that the education of the young should be Christian, and should be committed to Christian hands.* And what are our representative Protestants saying? Instead of admitting this truth of the ages, and confessing the fatal error into which their haste and Jacobinism have betrayed them, they are only shouting that Rome objects to the American state school because Rome hates republicanism, and wishes to overthrow it. The best they can do is to place themselves in this absurd and dishonest position: To boast in one breath of their loyalty to the principles of the Reformers concerning education, and in the next breath to vilify the Roman Church for reasserting the very principles of these same Reformers. What can they expect save a miserable defeat upon this false position, if, indeed, common justice and common sense are to continue traits of the American mind; unless, indeed, America is to make up her mind to be atheistic or pagan instead of Christian? These misguided Protestants may be assured that there are hundreds of thousands of serious, devout parents who will be much more likely to honor Rome as the faithful champion of Christ's rights over their children than to condemn her as the designing enemy of free government. In this unnatural contest Protestantism can only lose, while Rome gains; and she will gain the approval not only of the superstitious, but of the most thoughtful and devout minds.

(6.) It is with this most valuable class of minds that Rome is now gaining another far-reaching advantage. This is by her doctrine concerning marriage and the relations of the sexes. On these points she continues to hold and teach the highest views. It is very true that Rome errs in making marriage a sacrament of the church; but she makes it, as Scripture does, a divinely appointed and religious institution, while Protestant laws and debauched Protestant thought tend all over America to degrade it to a mere civil contract. The Roman doctrine and canon law recognize no divorce except by the pope himself. They teach that marriage is inviolable. The divorce laws in our Protestant states provide so many ways for rending the marriage tie that its

vows have become almost a farce. We are told that many Protestant women in America scornfully refuse to take the vow of obedience to their husbands, appointed by God in his word; and Protestant parsons are so cowardly that they dare not mention it in the marriage ceremony. But Rome still exacts this conjugal obedience of her daughters. Romish pastors also stand almost alone in teaching their people the enormous criminality of those nameless sins against posterity at which fashionable Protestantism connives. Moral and thoughtful men who know history know how fundamental the sanctity of marriage and the family is to society and the church, how surely their corruption must destroy both and barbarize mankind, look on aghast at this spreading taint in American life. Many an educated patriot is beginning to say that Romanism is the only firm and consistent opponent.

Protestants may exclaim that Rome has ever been a corrupting religion; that even the confessional has been made the instrument of profligacy. No doubt these things have often been true; yet another thing is visibly true in these United States: that while degrading views of the marriage relation and of the honor of parentage are eating out the life of so many nominal Protestant families, and bringing them to total extinction, the families of Romanists are better protected from this blight. Their houses are peopled with children, while the homes of rich Protestants are too elegant and luxurious for such nuisances. By the very force of the Malthusian law of population Romanism is growing, while Protestantism stands still.

I have thus described six distinct lines of influence which our unfaithfulness to our principles has betrayed into the hands of the Romanist. They are using them all with constant effect, and we, at least, cannot blame them.

II. I now proceed to explain certain evil principles of human nature which are concurring powerfully in this country to give currency to popery. These may be called its illicit advantages. I mention:

(1.) The constant tendency of American demagogues to pay court to popery and to purchase votes for themselves from it, at the cost of the people's safety, rights and money. Nearly two generations ago (the men of this day seem to have for-

gotten the infamy) William H. Seward, of New York, began this dangerous and dishonest game. He wished to be Governor of New York. He came to an understanding with Archbishop Hughes, then the head of the popish hierarchy in that State, to give him the Irish vote in return for certain sectarian advantages in the disbursement of the state revenues. Neither Rome nor the demagogues have since forgotten their lesson, nor will they ever forget it. It would be as unreasonable to expect it as to expect that hawks will forget the poultry yard. It is the nature of the demagogue to trade off anything for votes; they are the breath in the nostrils of his ambition. The popish hierarchy differs essentially from the ministry of any other religion, in having votes to trade. The traditional claim of Rome is that she has the right to control both spheres, the ecclesiastical and the political, the political for the sake of the ecclesiastical. The votes of her masses are more or less manageable, as the votes of Protestants are not, because Rome's is a system of authority as opposed to free thought. Rome instructs the conscience of every one of her members that it is his religious duty to subordinate all other duties and interests to hers. And this is a spiritual duty enforceable by the most awful spiritual sanctions. How can a thinking man afford to disobey the hierarchy which holds his eternal destiny in its secret fist; so that even if they give him in form the essential sacraments, such as the mass, absolution, and extreme unction, they are able clandestinely to make them worthless to him, by withholding the sacramental intention. Hence it is that the majority of American papists can be voted in "blocks"; and it is virtually the hierarchy which votes them. The goods are ready bound up in parcels for traffic with demagogues. We are well aware that numerous papists will indignantly deny this; declaring that there is a Romanist vote in this country which is just as independent of their priesthood and as free as any other. Of course there is. The hierarchy is a very experienced and dextrous driver. It does not whip in the restive colts, but humors them awhile until she gets them well harnessed and broken. But the team as a whole must yet travel her road, because they have to believe it infallible. We assure these independent Romanist voters that they are not

“good Catholics”; they must unlearn this heresy of independent thought before they are meet for the Romanist paradise. Men of secular ambition have always sought to use the hierarchy to influence others for their political advantage; the example is as old as history. Just as soon as prelacy was developed in the patristic church, Roman emperors began to purchase its influence to sustain their thrones. Throughout the Middle Ages, German kaisers and French, Spanish, and English kings habitually traded with Rome, paying her dignities and endowments for her ghostly support to their ambitions. Even in this century we have seen the two Napoleons playing the same game—purchasing for their imperialism the support of a priesthood in whose religion they did not believe. If any suppose that because America is nominally democratic the same thing will not happen here, they are thoroughly silly. Some Yankee ingenuity will be invoked to modify the forms of the traffic, so as to suit American names; that is all.

Intelligent students of church history know that one main agency for converting primitive Christianity first into prelacy and then into popery was unlimited church endowments. As soon as Constantine established Christianity as the religion of the state, ecclesiastical persons and bodies began to assume the virtual (and before long the formal) rights of corporations. They could receive bequests and gifts of property, and hold them by a tenure as firm as that of the fee-simple. These spiritual corporations were deathless. Thus the property they acquired was all held by the tenure of *mortmain*. When a corporation is thus empowered to absorb continually, and never to disgorge, there is no limit to its possible wealth. The laws of the empire in the Middle Ages imposed no limitations upon bequests; thus, most naturally, monasteries, cathedrals, chapters, and archbishoprics became inordinately rich. At the Reformation they had grasped one-third of the property of Europe. But Scripture saith, “Where the carcass is, thither the eagles are gathered together.” Wealth is power, and ambitious men crave it. Thus this endowed hierarchy came to be filled by the men of the greediest ambition in Europe, instead of by humble, self-denying pastors; and thus it was that

this tremendous money power, arming itself first with a spiritual despotism of the popish theology over consciences, and then allying itself with political power, wielded the whole to enforce the absolute domination of that religion which gave them their wealth. No wonder human liberty, free thought, and the Bible were together trampled out of Europe. When the Reformation came, the men who could think saw that this tenure in *mortmain* had been the fatal thing. Knox, the wisest of them, saw clearly that if a religious reformation was to succeed in Scotland the ecclesiastical corporations must be destroyed. They were destroyed, their whole property alienated to the secular nobles or to the state (the remnant which Knox secured for religious education); and therefore it was that Scotland remained Presbyterian. When our American commonwealths were founded, statesmen and divines understood this great principle of jurisprudence, that no corporate tenure in *mortmain*, either spiritual or secular, is compatible with the liberty of the people and the continuance of constitutional government.

But it would appear that our legislators now know nothing about that great principle, or care nothing about it. Church institutions, Protestant and Romanist, are virtually perpetual corporations. Whatever the pious choose to give them is held in *mortmain*, and they grow continually richer and richer; they do not even pay taxes, and there seems no limit upon their acquisitions. And last comes the Supreme Court of the United States, and under the pretext of construing the law, legislates a new law in the famous Walnut-street Church case, as though they desired to ensure both the corruption of religion and the destruction of free government by a second gigantic incubus of endowed ecclesiasticism. The new law is virtually this: That in case any free citizen deems that the gifts of himself or his ancestors are usurped for some use alien to the designed trust, *it shall be the usurper who shall decide the issue*. This is, of course, essentially popish, yet a great Protestant denomination has been seen hastening to enroll it in its digest of spiritual laws.<sup>1</sup> The working of this tendency of overgrown ecclesiastical wealth will certainly be two-

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<sup>1</sup> See *Dabney's Discussions*, Vol. II., p. 261.

fold: First, to Romanize partially or wholly the Protestant churches thus enriched; and, secondly, to incline, enable, and equip the religion thus Romanized for its alliance with political ambition and for the subjugation of the people and the government. When church bodies began, under Constantine, to acquire endowments, these bodies were Episcopal, at most, or even still Presbyterian. The increase of endowment helped to make them popish. Then popery and feudalism stamped out the Bible and enslaved Europe. If time permitted, I could trace out the lines of causation into perfect clearness. Will men ever learn that like causes must produce like effects?

(2.) The democratic theory of human society may be the most rational and equitable; but human nature is not equitable; it is fallen and perverted. Lust of applause, pride, vainglory, and love of power are as natural to it as hunger to the body. Next to Adam, the most representative man upon earth was Diotrophes, "who loved to have the pre-eminence." Every man is an aristocrat in his heart. Now, prelacy and popery are aristocratic religions. Consequently, as long as human nature is natural, they will present more or less of attraction to human minds. Quite a number of Methodist, Presbyterian, or Independent ministers have gone over to prelacy or popery, and thus become bishops. Was there ever one of them, however conscientious his new faith, and however devout his temper, who did not find some elation and pleasure in his spiritual dignity? Is there a democrat in democratic America who would not be flattered in his heart by being addressed as "my lord"? Distinction and power are gratifying to all men. Prelacy and popery offer this sweet morsel to aspirants by promising to make some of them lords of their brethren. This is enough to entice all of them, as the crown entices all the racers on the race-course. It is true that while many run, one obtaineth the crown; but all may flatter themselves with the hope of winning. Especially does the pretension of sacramental grace offer the most splendid bait to human ambition which can be conceived of on this earth. To be the vicar of the Almighty in dispensing eternal life and heavenly crowns at will is a more magnificent power than the prerogative of any em-

peror on earth. Let a man once be persuaded that he really grasps this power by getting a place in the apostolic succession, and the more sincere he is, the more splendid the prerogative will appear to him; for the more clearly his faith appreciates the thing that he proposes to do in the sacraments, the more illustrious that thing must appear. The greatest boon ever inherited by an emperor was finite. The boon of redemption is infinite; to be able to dispense it at will to one sinner is a much grander thing than to conquer the world and establish a universal secular-empire. The humblest "hedge-priest" would be a far grander man than that emperor if he could really work the miracle and confer the grace of redemption which Rome says he does every time he consecrates a mass. How shall we estimate, then, the greatness of that pope or prelate who can manufacture such miracle workers at will? The greatest being on earth should hardly think himself worthy to loose his sandals from his feet. The Turkish ambassador to Paris was certainly right when, upon accompanying the King of France to high mass in Notre Dame, and seeing the king, courtiers and multitude all prostrate themselves when the priest elevated the Host, he wondered that the king should allow anybody but himself to perform that magnificent function. He is reported to have said: "Sire, if I were king, and believed in your religion, nobody should do that in France except me. It is a vastly greater thing than anything else that you do in your royal functions." As long as man is man, therefore, popery will possess this unhallowed advantage of enticing, and even entrancing, the ambition of the keenest aspirants. The stronger their faith in their doctrine, the more will they sanctify to themselves this dreadful ambition. In this respect, as in so many others, the tendency of the whole current of human nature is to make papists. It is converting grace only which can check that current and turn men sincerely back towards Protestantism. I am well aware that the functions of the Protestant minister may be so wrested as to present an appeal to unhallowed ambition. But popery professes to confer upon her clergy every didactic and presbyterial function which Protestantism has to bestow; while the former offers, in addition, this splendid bait of prelatie power and sacramental miracle-working.



(3.) All the churches which call themselves Protestant, even the strictest, now betray the silent influence of those Romanizing tendencies which have been and are hereafter to be explained. There is an almost universal letting down of the old standard of doctrine and worship. A comparison of prevalent usages of to-day and of seventy years ago in the Methodist, Baptist, Congregational and Presbyterian Churches (except those of the Secession) would startle any thinking mind. Every one of them now admits usages which were then universally rejected by them, such as architectural pomps, pictured windows, floral decorations, instrumental and operatic music. One may say, that these are matters of indifference which cannot be proved anti-scriptural; but every sensible man knows that they proceed from one impulse, the craving for a more spectacular and ritualistic worship. This is precisely the impulse which brought about prelacy and popery in the patristic ages. The strictest Protestant communions are now moving upon the same inclined plane. The descent is gentle, at first, but as it proceeds it grows steeper; and at the bottom is popery. The prelatie churches of America now notoriously occupy the middle and advanced parts of this course. Forty years ago, when things were not near so bad with them as now, the head of the American popish hierarchy pointed an eminent Presbyterian divine to a dainty Puseyite clergyman tripping by, and said, with a sardonic smile: "Doctor, those are the cattle who do our plowing for us gratis. They leave us little to do. My only objection to their work is, that they make their perverts rather too popish to suit my taste as a Romanist." This Right Reverend was, of course, an Irishman. Episcopalians who teach baptismal regeneration, the real presence, the apostolic succession and such like dogmas, must inevitably propel their pupils towards popery. If their favorite doctrines have any foundation in logic or Scripture, that foundation sustains popery as fully as prelacy. When one fixes the premises in the minds of his pupils, he should expect to see them sooner or later proceed to the logical consequence; as all rivers run to the ocean, so the ultimate destiny of all high churchism is Rome. These covert educators for popery are more efficient for evil than the overt ones. I fear those who

are on the road to the Eternal City more than those who have fixed their abode there. This head of my argument is, then, that Romanism is sure to win in America, because most of those who profess to be Protestants are really helping her by preparing her way.

(4.) In sundry respects I perceive a sort of hallucination prevailing in people's minds concerning old historical errors and abuses, which I see to have been the regular results of human nature. Men will not understand history; they flatter themselves that, because the modes of civilization are much changed and advanced, therefore the essential laws of man's nature are going to cease acting; which is just as unreasonable as to expect that sinful human beings must entirely cease to be untruthful, sensual, dishonest, and selfish, because they have gotten to wear fine clothes. Of certain evils and abuses of ancient society men persuade themselves that they are no longer possible among us, because we have become civilized and nominally Christian. One of these evils is idolatry with its two branches, polytheism and image-worship. Oh! they say, mankind has outgrown all that; other evils may invade our Christian civilization, but that is too gross to come back again. They are blind at once to the teachings of historical facts and to common sense. They know that at one time idolatry nearly filled the ancient world. Well, what was the previous religious state of mankind upon which it supervened? Virtually a Christian state, that is to say, a worship of the one true God, under the light of revelation, with our same gospel taught by promises and sacrifices. And it is very stupid to suppose that the social state upon which the early idolatry supervened was savage or barbaric. We rather conclude that the people who built Noah's ark, the tower of Babel, and the pyramid of Cheops, and who enjoyed the light of God's recent revelations to Adam, to Enoch, to Noah, were civilized. Men make a strange confession here: They fancy that idolatry could be prevalent because mankind were not civilized. The historical fact is just the opposite: Mankind became uncivilized because idolatry first prevailed. In truth, the principles tending to idolatry are deeply laid in man's fallen nature. Like a compressed spring, they are ever ready to act

again, and will surely begin to act, whenever the opposing power of vital godliness is withdrawn. First, the sensuous has become too prominent in man; reason, conscience, and faith, too feeble. Every sinful man's experience witnesses this all day long, every day of his life. Why else is it that the objects of sense-perception, which are comparatively trivial, dominate his attention, his sensibilities, and his desires so much more than the objects of faith, which he himself knows to be so much more important? Did not this sensuous tendency seek to invade man's religious ideas and feelings, it would be strange indeed. Hence, man untaught and unchecked by the heavenly light always shows a craving for sensuous objects of worship. He is not likely, in our day, to satisfy this craving by setting up a brazen image of Dagon, the fish-god; or of Zeus, or the Roman Jupiter; or of the Aztecs' Itzlahuhtl. But still he craves a visible, material object of worship. Rome meets him at a comfortable half-way station with her relics, crucifixes, and images of the saints. She adroitly smoothes the downhill road for him by connecting all these with the worship of the true God. Again, man's conscious weakness impels him almost irresistibly in his serious hours to seek some being of supernatural attributes to lean upon. His heart cries out, "Lead me to the Rock that is higher than I." But when pure monotheism proposes to him the supreme, eternal God—infinite not only in his power to help, but in his omniscience, justice, and holiness—the sinful heart recoils. This object is too high, too holy, too dreadful for it. Sinful man craves a God, but, like his first father, shuns the infinite God; hence the powerful tendency to invent intermediate gods, whom he may persuade himself to be sufficiently gracious and powerful to be trusted, and yet not so infinite, immutable, and holy as inevitably to condemn sin. Here is the impulse which prompted all pagan nations to invent polytheism. This they did by filling the space between man and the supreme being with intermediate gods. Such, among the Greeks, were Bacchus, Hercules, Castor and Pollux, Theseus, Æsculapius, etc. It is a great mistake to suppose that thoughtful pagans did not recognize the unity and eternity of a supreme God, "Father of gods and of men." But sometimes they represent him as so exalted and sub-

limited as to be at once above the reach of human prayers and above all concernment in human affairs. Others thought of him as too awful to be directly approached, accessible only through the mediation of his own next progeny, the secondary gods. Here we have precisely the impulse for which Rome provides in her saint-worship. Mary is the highest of the intermediate gods, next to the trinity, the intercessor for Christ's intercession. The apostles and saints are the secondary gods of this Christian pantheon. How strangely has God's predestination led Rome in the development of her history to the unwitting admission of this indictment! Pagan Rome had her marble temple, the gift of Agrippa to the Commonwealth, the Pantheon, or sanctuary of all the gods. This very building stands now, rededicated by the popes as the temple of Christ and all the saints. So fateful has been the force of this analogy between the old polytheism and the new.

The attempt is made, indeed, to hide the likeness by the sophistical distinction between *latria* and *dulia*; but its worthlessness appears from this, that even *dulia* cannot be offered to redeemed creatures without ascribing to them, by an unavoidable implication, the attributes peculiar to God. In one word, fallen men of all ages have betrayed a powerful tendency to image-worship and polytheism. Rome provides for that tendency in a way the most adroit possible, for an age nominally Christian but practically unbelieving. To that tendency the religion of the Bible sternly refuses to concede anything, requiring not its gratification, but its extirpation. This cunning policy of Rome had sweeping success in the early church. The same principle won almost universal success in the ancient world. It will succeed again here. Many will exclaim that this prognostic is wholly erroneous; that the great, bad tendency of our age and country is to agnosticism as against all religions. I am not mistaken. This drift will be as temporary as it is partial. M. Guizot says in his *Meditations*: "One never need go far back in history to find atheism advancing half way to meet superstition." A wiser analyst of human nature says: "Even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate

mind." "Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image-made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." This is the exact pathology of superstition. When the culture of the Augustan age taught the Romans to despise the religious faith of their fathers, there was an interval of agnosticism. But next, the most refined of the agnostics were seen studying the mysteries of Isis and practicing the foulest rites of the paganism of the conquered provinces. Atheism is too freezing a blank for human souls to inhabit permanently. It outrages too many of the heart's affections and of the reason's first principles. A people who have cast away their God, when they discover this, turn to false gods. For all such wandering spirits Rome stands with open doors; there, finally, they will see their most convenient refuge of superstition in a catalogue of Christian saints transformed into a polytheism. Thus the cravings of superstition are satisfied, while the crime is veiled from the conscience by this pretence of scriptural origin.

(5.) I proceed to unfold an attraction of Romanism far more seductive. This is its proposal to satisfy man's guilty heart by a ritual instead of a spiritual salvation. As all know who understand the popish theology, the proposed vehicle of this redemption by forms is the sacraments. Romanists are taught that the New Testament sacraments differ from those of the Old Testament in this: that they not only symbolize and seal, *but effectuate grace ex opere operato* in the souls of the recipients. Rome teaches her children that her sacraments are actual charismatic power of direct supernatural efficiency wrought upon recipients by virtue of a portion of the Holy Spirit's omnipotence conferred upon the priest in ordination from the apostolic succession. The Bible teaches that in the case of all adults a gracious state must pre-exist in order for any beneficial participation in the sacrament, and that the only influence of the sacraments is to cherish and advance that pre-existing spiritual life by their didactic effect, as energized by God's Spirit, through prayer, faith, watchfulness, and obedience, in precisely the same generic mode

in which the Holy Spirit energizes the written and preached word. Hence, if watchfulness, prayer, obedience, and a life of faith are neglected, our sacraments become no sacraments. If thou be a breaker of the law, thy "circumcision is made uncircumcision." But Rome teaches that her sacraments, duly administered by a priest having apostolic succession, *implant spiritual life* in souls hitherto dead in sin, and that they maintain and foster this life by a direct power not dependent on the recipient's diligent exercise of gospel principles. Provided the recipient be not in mortal sin unabsolved, the sacrament does its spiritual work upon the sinful soul, whether it receives it in the exercise of saving grace or not. (See the article, "Prelacy a Blunder," in *Collected Discussions*, Vol. II., p. 218.)

Now let no Protestant mind exclaim: "Surely this is too gross to be popular; surely people will have too much sense to think that they can get to heaven by this species of consecrated jugglery!" History shows that this scheme of redemption is almost universally acceptable and warmly popular with sinful mankind. Apprehend aright the ideas of paganism, ancient and modern: we perceive that this popish conception of sacraments is virtually the same with the pagan's conception of their heathen rites. They claim to be just this species of saving ritual, working their benefit upon souls precisely by this *opus operatum* agency. What a commentary have we here upon this tendency of human nature to a ritual salvation. The evangelists and apostles reintroduced to the world the pure conception of a spiritual salvation wrought by the energy of divine truth, and not of church rites; received by an intelligent faith in the saved man's soul, and not by manual ceremonial; and made effectual by the enlightening operation of the Holy Ghost upon heart and mind in rational accordance with truth, not by a priestly incantation working a physical miracle. The gospels and epistles defined and separated the two conceptions as plainly as words could do it. But no sooner were the apostles gone than the pagan conception of salvation by ritual, instead of by rational faith, began to creep back into the patristic church. In a few hundred years the wrong conception had triumphed completely over the correct one in nearly the whole

of christendom, and thenceforward sacramental grace has reigned supreme over the whole Roman and Greek communions, in spite of modern letters and culture. How startling this commentary upon that tendency of human nature! Surely there are deep-seated principles in man to account for it.

These are not far to seek. First, men are sensuous beings, and hence they naturally crave something concrete, material, and spectacular in their religion. Dominated as they are by a perpetual current of sensations, and having their animality exaggerated by their sinful nature, they are sluggish to think spiritual truths, to look by faith upon invisible objects; they crave to walk by sight rather than by faith. The material things in mammon, the sensual pleasures which they see with their eyes and handle with their fingers, although they perfectly know they perish with the using, obscure their view of all the infinite, eternal realities, notwithstanding their professed belief of them. Need we wonder that with such creatures the visible and manual ritual should prevail over the spiritual didactic? Does one exclaim, "But this is so unreasonable—this notion that a ritual ceremonial can change the state and destiny of a rational and moral spirit!" I reply, "Yes, but not one whit more irrational than the preference which the whole natural world gives to the things which are seen and temporal, as it perfectly knows, over the things which are unseen and eternal; an insanity of which the educated and refined are found just as capable as the ignorant and brutish." But the other principle of human nature is still more keen and pronounced in its preference for a ritual salvation. This is its deep-seated, omnipotent preference for self-will and sin over spiritual holiness of life. The natural man has, indeed, his natural conscience and remorse, his fearful looking for of judgment, his natural fear of misery, which is but modified selfishness. These make everlasting punishment very terrible to his apprehension.

But enmity to God, to his spiritual service, to the supremacy of his holy will, is as native to him as his selfish fear is. Next to perdition, there is no conception in the universe so repulsive to the sinful heart of man as that of genuine repentance and its fruits. The true gospel comes to him and says: Here is, indeed,

a blessed, glorious redemption, as free as air, as secure as the throne of God, but instrumentally it is conditional on the faith of the heart; which faith works by love, purifies the heart, and can only exist as it co-exists with genuine repentance, which repentance turns honestly, unreservedly, here and now, without shuffling or procrastination, from sin unto God, with full purpose of and endeavor after new obedience; which is, in fact, a complete surrender of the sinful will to God's holy will, and a hearty enlistment in an arduous work of watchfulness, self-denial, and self-discipline, for the sake of inward holiness, to be kept up as long as life lasts. Soul, embrace this task, and this splendid salvation shall be yours; and the gracious Saviour, who purchases it for you, shall sustain, comfort, and enable you in this arduous enlistment, so that even in the midst of the warfare you shall find rest, and at the end heaven; but without this faith and this repentance no sacraments or rights will do a particle of good towards your salvation. Now, this carnal soul has no faith; it is utterly mistrustful and skeptical as to the possibility of this peace of the heart in the spiritual warfare, this sustaining power of the invisible hand, of which it has had no experience. This complete subjugation of self-will to God, this life of self-denial and vital godliness, appears to this soul utterly repulsive, yea, terrible. This guilty soul dreads hell; it abhors such a life only less than hell. When told by Protestantism that it must thus "turn or die," this carnal soul finds itself in an abhorrent dilemma; either term of the alternative is abominable to it. But now comes the theory of sacramental grace and says to it with oily tongue: "Oh! Protestantism exaggerates the dilemma! Your case is not near so bad! The sacraments of the church transfer you from the state of condemnation to that of reconciliation by their own direct but mysterious efficiency; they work real grace, though you do not bring to them this deep, thorough-going self-sacrifice and self-consecration. No matter how much you sin, or how often, repeated masses will make expiation for the guilt of all those sins *ex opere operato*. Thus, with her other sacraments of penance and extreme unction, Holy Mother Church will repair all your short-comings and put you back into a salvable state, no matter how sinfully you



live." Need we wonder that this false doctrine is as sweet to that guilty soul as a reprieve to the felon at the foot of the gallows? He can draw his breath again; he can say to himself: "Ah, then the abhorred dilemma does not urge me here and now; I can postpone this hated reformation; I can still tamper with cherished sins without embracing perdition." This is a pleasant doctrine; it suits so perfectly the sinful, selfish soul which does not wish to part with its sins, and also does not wish to lie down in everlasting burnings.

This deep-seated love of sin and self has also another result: The soul is conscious that, if it must do many things which it does not like in order to avoid perdition, it is much pleasanter to do a number of ceremonial things than to do any portion of spiritual heart-work. After I stood my graduate examination in philosophy at the University of Virginia, my professor, the venerable George Tucker, showed me a cheating apparatus which had been prepared by a member of the class. He had unluckily dropped it upon the sidewalk, and it had found its way to the professor's hands. It was a narrow blank-book, made to be hidden in the coat-sleeve. It contained, in exceedingly small penmanship, the whole course, in the form of questions from the professors's recitations with their answers copied from the text-book. It was really a work of much labor. I said, "The strange thing to me is, that this sorry fellow has expended upon this fraud much more hard labor than would have enabled him to prepare himself for passing honestly and honorably." Mr. Tucker replied, "Ah, my dear sir, you forget that a dunce finds it easier to do any amount of mere manual drudgery than the least bit of true thinking." Here we have an exact illustration. It is less irksome to the carnal mind to do twelve dozen pater-nosters by the beads than to do a few moments of real heart-work. Thoughtless people sometimes say that the rule of Romish piety is more exacting than that of the Protestant. This is the explanation, that Rome is more exacting as to form and ritual; Bible religion is more exacting as to spiritual piety and vital godliness. To the carnal mind the latter are almost insufferably irksome and laborious; the form and ritual, easy and tolerable. And when remorse,

fear, and self-righteousness are gratified by the assurance that these observances really promote the soul's salvation, the task is made light. Here Rome will always present an element of popularity as long as mankind are sensuous and carnal.

(6.) To a shallow view, it might appear that the popish doctrine of purgatory should be quite a repulsive element of unpopularity with sinners; that doctrine is, that notwithstanding all the benefit of the church's sacraments and the believer's efforts, no Christian soul goes direct to heaven when the body dies, except those of the martyrs, and a few eminent saints, who are, as it were, miracles of sanctification in this life. All the clergy, and even the popes, must go through purgatory in spite of the apostolic succession and the infallibility. There the remains of carnality in all must be burned away, and the deficiencies of their penitential work in this life made good, by enduring penal fires and torments for a shorter or longer time. Then the Christian souls, finally purged from depravity and the *reatum pœnæ*, enter into their final rest with Christ. But the alms, prayers, and masses of survivors avail much to help these Christian souls in purgatory and shorten their sufferings. It might be supposed that the Protestant doctrine should be much more attractive and popular; viz.: that there is no purgatory or intermediate state for the spirits of dead men, but that the "souls of believers, being at their death made perfect in holiness, do immediately enter into glory." This ought to be the more attractive doctrine, and to Bible believers it is such, but there is a feature about it which makes it intensely unpopular and repellent to carnal men, and gives a powerful advantage with them to the popish scheme. That feature is, the sharpness and strictness of the alternative which the Bible doctrine presses upon sinners: "turn or die."

The Bible offers the most blessed and glorious redemption conceivable by man, gracious and free, and bestowing a consummate blessedness the moment the body dies. But it is on these terms that the gospel must be embraced by a penitent faith, working an honest and thorough revolution in the life. If the sinner refuses this until this life ends, he seals his fate; and that fate is final, unchangeable, and dreadful. Now, it is no consolation to the carnal

heart that the gospel assures him he need not run any risk of that horrible fate; that he has only to turn and live; that very turning is the thing which he abhors, if it is to be done in spirit and in truth. He intensely desires to retain his sin and self-will. He craves earnestly to put off the evil day of this sacrifice without incurring the irreparable penalty. Now, Rome comes to him and tells him that this Protestant doctrine is unnecessarily harsh; that a sinner may continue in the indulgence of his sins until this life ends, and yet not seal himself up thereby to a hopeless hell; that if he is in communion with the Holy Mother Church through her sacraments, he may indulge himself in this darling procrastination without ruining himself forever. Thus the hateful necessity of present repentance is postponed awhile; sweet, precious privilege to the sinner! True, he must expect to pay due penance for that self-indulgence in purgatory, but he need not perish for it. The Mother Church advises him not to make so bad a bargain and pay so dear for his whistle. But she assures him that, if he does, it need not ruin him, for she will pull him through after a little by her merits and sacraments. How consoling this is to the heart at once in love with sin and remorseful for its guilt! The seductiveness of this theory of redemption to the natural heart is proved by this grand fact, that in principle and in its essence this scheme of purgatorial cleansing has had a prominent place in every religion in the world that is of human invention. The Bible, the one divine religion, is peculiar in rejecting the whole concept. Those hoary religions, Brahmanism and Buddhism, give their followers the virtual advantage of this conception in the transmigration of their souls. The guilt of the sinner's human life may be expiated by the sorrows of the soul's existence in a series of animal or reptile bodies, and then through another human existence, the penitent and purified soul may at last reach heaven. Classic paganism promised the same escape for sinners, as all familiar with Virgil know. His hero, Æneas, when visiting the under world, saw many sinners there preparing for their release into the Elysian fields. *Ergo exercentur pœnis, et veterum malorum supplicia expendunt.* Mohammed extends the same hope to all his sinful followers. For those who entirely reject Islam there

is nothing but hell; but for all who profess "There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet," there is a purgatory after death, and its pains are shortened by his intercession. The Roman and Greek Churches flatter the sinful world with the same human invention. So strong is this craving of carnal men to postpone the issue of turning to God or perishing. We now see its effect upon the most cultured minds of this advanced nineteenth century in the New England doctrine of a "second probation." Rome has understood human nature skilfully, and has adapted her bait for it with consummate cunning. Her scheme is much more acute than that of the absolute universalist of the school of Hosea Ballou, for this outrages man's moral intuitions too grossly by rejecting all distinction between guilt and righteousness. This bait for sin-loving men is too bald.

It must be added that the doctrine of a purgatory and of an application of redemption after death is intensely attractive to other principles of the human heart, much more excusable; to some affections, indeed, which are amiable. I allude to the solicitude and the affection of believers for the souls of those whom they loved in this life, "who died and made no sign." The Bible doctrine is, indeed, a solemn, an awful one to Christians bereaved by the impenitent deaths of children and relatives. It is our duty to foresee this solemn result, and to provide against it by doing everything which intercessory prayer, holy example and loving instruction and entreaty can do to prevent such a catastrophe in the case of all those near to our hearts. But human self-indulgence is prone to be slack in employing this safeguard against this sorrow. Let us picture to ourselves such a bereaved Christian, sincere, yet partially self-condemned, and doubtful or fearful or hopeless concerning the thorough conversion of a child who has been cut down by death. Of all the elements of bereavement none is so bitter, so immedicable, as the fear that he whom he loved must suffer the wrath of God forever, and that now he is beyond reach of his prayers and help. To such a one comes the Romish priest with this species of discourse. See now how harsh and cruel is this heretical Protestant dogma! Instead of offering consolation to your Christian sorrow it embitters it as with a drop of

hell fire. But Holy Mother Church is a mild and loving comforter; she assures you that your loved one is not necessarily lost; he may have to endure keen penances in purgatory for a time, but there is a glorious hope to sustain him and you under them. Every minute of pain is bringing the final heaven nearer, and the most blessed part of our teaching is that your love can still follow him and help him and bless, as it was wont to do under those earthly chastisements of his sins. It is your privilege still to pray for him, and your prayers avail to lighten his sufferings and to shorten them. Your love can still find that generous solace which was always so sweet to you amidst your former sorrows for his sins and his earthly sufferings—the solace of helping him and sharing his pains. Your alms also may avail for him; masses can be multiplied by your means, which will make merit to atone for his penitential guilt and hasten his blessed release. Who can doubt that a loving heart will be powerfully seduced by this promise, provided it can persuade itself of its certainty, or even of its probable truth? Here is the stronghold of Romanism on sincere, amiable, and affectionate souls. Of course, the real question is, whether any pastor or priest is authorized by God to hold out these hopes to the bereaved. If they are unwarrantable, then this presentation is an artifice of unspeakable cruelty and profanity. Under the pretence of softening the pain of bereavement to God's children, it is adding to wicked deception the most mischievous influences upon the living by contradicting those solemn incentives to immediate repentance which God has set up in his word, and by tempting deluded souls with a false hope to neglect their real opportunity. If the hope is not grounded in the word of God, then its cruelty is equal to its deceitfulness. But the suffering heart is often weak, and it is easier to yield to the temptation of accepting a deceitful consolation than to brace itself up to the plain but stern duty of ascertaining God's truth.

I have thus set in array the influences which Rome is now wielding throughout our country for the seduction of human souls. Some of these weapons Protestants put into her hands by their own unfaithfulness and folly. God has a right to blame

Rome for using this species of weapon in favor of the wrong cause, but these Protestants have not.

There is another class of weapons which Rome finds in the blindness and sinfulness of human nature. Her guilt may be justly summed up in this statement: That these are precisely the errors and crimes of humanity which the church of Christ should have labored to suppress and extirpate; whereas Rome caters to them and fosters them in order to use them for her aggrandizement. But none the less are these weapons potent. They are exactly adapted to the nature of fallen man. As they always have been successful, they will continue to succeed in this country. Our republican civil constitutions will prove no adequate shield against them. Our rationalistic culture, by weakening the authority of God's word, is only opening the way for their ulterior victory. Our scriptural ecclesiastical order will be no sufficient bulwark. The primitive churches had that bulwark in its strongest Presbyterian form, but popery steadily undermined it. What it did once it can do again. There will be no effectual check upon another spread of this error except the work of the Holy Ghost. True and powerful revivals will save American Protestantism; nothing else will.

R. L. DABNEY.

*Austin, Texas.*

## II. DR. DRIVER ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF ISAIAH XIII. AND XIV.

ON first reading Dr. Driver's argument for the non-Isaianic authorship of these chapters, one is apt to find himself saying, in the words of Agrippa, "Almost thou persuadest me." This is the more likely to be the case if he has read the preceding pages of Dr. Driver's able book; for then he will come to the consideration of the discussion of this particular question, impressed not only with the extent of Dr. Driver's learning and the accuracy of his scholarship, but, what is of much more importance, impressed also with his candor and evident intention to deal reverently with God's word. Further, he can scarcely fail to perceive that there is not a little justice in the views advanced in regard to the relation between a prophecy and its historical genesis, and that these views, judiciously applied, are capable of yielding the happiest results. This favorable impression, moreover, will remain and exert its powerful influence, notwithstanding the fact that the reader may have observed all along that Dr. Driver habitually overlooks or discards considerations which may seem to him to be of prime importance. If, under such circumstances, the "almost" fails to become an "altogether," the fault may lie in the prejudices or the unreasonable fears of the reader, but it is also at least possible that it may lie in some weak link in the argument that has been overlooked by Dr. Driver.

Now, the present writer, after patient and candid study, finds himself unable to accept Dr. Driver's conclusion as to the non-Isaianic authorship of these chapters. He at least persuades himself that his abiding conviction that Isaiah, and not some unknown writer of the time of the exile, is their author, is due not to prejudice. On the contrary, it seems to him that Dr. Driver's own principles and formal admissions demand a conclusion the very opposite of that at which that distinguished scholar has arrived. Let us see

The following extract<sup>1</sup> will put the reader in possession of Dr. Driver's statement of the case :

“The first of these prophecies is one on Babylon (xiii. 2–xiv. 23), which differs from all the other prophecies of Isaiah which have hitherto been reviewed, in the remarkable circumstance that it stands *unrelated to Isaiah's own age*. The Jews are not warned, as Isaiah might warn them (xxxix. 6), against the folly of concluding an alliance with Babylon, or reminded of the disastrous consequences which such an alliance might entail ; nor are they even represented, as in Jeremiah, as threatened with impending exile ; they are represented as *in exile*, and as about to be delivered from it (xiv. 1, 2). It is of the very essence of prophecy to address itself to the needs of the prophet's own age ; it was the prophet's office to preach to his own contemporaries, to announce to them the judgments, or the consolations, which arose out of the circumstances of their own time, to interpret for them their own history. As far as we have hitherto gone, this is what Isaiah has uniformly done. His prophecies have been replete with allusions to contemporary history—to Ephraim, Damascus, and the Assyrians. That history is the foundation upon which his grandest predictions rest. Here, on the other hand, the allusions are not to Assyria, but to *Babylon* ; not the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan, who sought Hezekiah's friendship, which was known to Isaiah (xxxix.), but the Babylon of the exile, which held the Jews in cruel bondage (xiv. 2, 3), and was shortly to be destroyed by the Medes (xiii. 17). To base a promise upon a condition of things *not yet existent*, and without any point of contact or association with those to whom it is addressed, is alien to the genius of prophecy. . . . With the long invective against Babylon contained in these chapters of Jeremiah (*i. e.*, chapters l., li.), the present prophecy is, indeed, in temper and spirit, remarkably akin ; whilst, on the other hand, it exhibits few or none of the accustomed marks of Isaiah's style.”

Again, in another place,<sup>2</sup> he says :

“The first of these prophecies consists of an announcement of the approaching fall of Babylon (xiii. 19), and of the subsequent

<sup>1</sup> *Isaiah : His Life and Times*. By Rev. S. A. Driver, D. D., p. 85 f.   <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126 f.



release of the Jews (xiv. 1, 2) from the land of their exile. The reasons which forbid our attributing it to Isaiah have been stated briefly already (p. 86). The prophet is, in the first instance, *the teacher of his own generation*; hence it is a fundamental principle of prophecy that the historical situation of the prophet should be the basis of his prediction. Isaiah lived during the Assyrian supremacy; and it is the failure of *a particular Assyrian king* to destroy or subjugate Judah which he uniformly foretells. In the present prophecy Babylon is represented as holding the empire of the world (xiii. 19; xiv. 6f.), which it exercises in particular (xiv. 1, 2) *by holding the Jews in exile*; and it is *the city and empire of Babylon* whose overthrow is announced in it. By analogy it will have been written during the period of the Babylonian supremacy; for it is arbitrary to suppose (as has been done) that Babylon may have been mentioned by Isaiah as the 'representative' of Assyria. Not only does Babylon appear here as the sole and supreme seat of the world empire, but Babylon, in Isaiah's day, so far from being the representative of Assyria, was its antagonist, ever struggling to win independence (pp. 45, 55, 96). Moreover, the two empires of Assyria and Babylon are quite distinct in the old Testament; the *rôle* which they play in history is very different; they are never confused, still less 'identified,' by the prophets. The embassy of Merodach-Baladan, the temporary king of Babylon, to Hezekiah, afforded Isaiah a substantial motive for announcing a future exile to Babylon. It could supply no motive for such a promise of subsequent return from exile as these chapters contain. The circumstances of the exile—while the Jews were still in bondage, and the power of Babylon seemed yet unshaken—constitute a suitable and sufficient occasion for the present prophecy, an occasion of exactly the nature which the analogy of prophecy demands. On the other hand, the circumstances of Isaiah's age supply no such occasion. . . . . It only remains to add (for the purpose of obviating misconception) that in assigning the prophecy to a date during the exile, we do not divest it of its *predictive* character; it becomes no *vaticinium ex eventu*. The language of chapter xiii. makes it certain that it was written *prior* to the capture of Babylon by the Medes in 538.

Written some few years before this event, it would be as fully and truly predictive as were Isaiah's prophecies of the failure of Sennacherib (chaps. xxix.—xxxii.), which, indeed, as we have seen, preceded the event by not more than a single year."

This is substantially Dr. Driver's latest word upon this subject. It is unmodified by anything that he has said in his recent work on *Old Testament Literature*. We have quoted thus at length in order that Dr. Driver might have the full benefit of his argument, and we, the full benefit of his admissions.

I. In considering the above extracts, we desire the reader's attention, first of all, to some things which *do not* constitute the grounds upon which Dr. Driver feels constrained to reject the Isaianic authorship of these chapters. Attention to this point is a matter of justice to Dr. Driver. It may also prove to be a matter of importance in justifying the conclusion at which we hope to arrive as against Dr. Driver.

(a.) Let it be carefully noted, then, that Dr. Driver does not deny the Isaianic authorship of the chapters in question, because the recognition of it would carry along with it the *recognition of the supernatural in history and revelation*. If we understand Dr. Driver, he admits not only that God may interpose in human affairs, but he distinctly affirms that God did interpose, and that, too, directly and immediately, in the affairs of Israel. He believes not only in the supernatural in general, but also in the supernatural in the form of miracles. If we do not misconceive him, he has no more difficulty about admitting a miracle in the sphere of mind than one in that of matter. What he insists upon, and this is scarcely a matter for censure, is that before a divine interposition be admitted it should be shown that there is "*dignus vindice nodus*." It is much to be regretted that Dr. Driver, and other of his fellow-workers, should so express themselves as to create the impression upon many minds that they either have already, or else are just about, to surrender their belief in the supernatural. Such, however, is not the case. Dr. Driver believes in the supernatural. He is entitled to credit for this fact as a matter of personal justice, and we are entitled to the benefit of it as a matter of argument. For proven the "*nodus*,"

then, Dr. Driver cannot, upon his own principle, refuse to admit the "*vindex*."

(b.) He does not deny it, because to admit it would be to admit that there is such a thing as predictive prophecy in the strict and proper sense. Dr. Driver himself believes in predictive prophecy, and that, too, in the strict and proper sense, namely, as involving the announcement of an event still future, the occurrence of which could only be foreseen by God, and the announcement of which, upon the part of the prophet, is only to be explained upon the ground that he has learned it by a direct revelation from God. We say that Dr. Driver believes in predictive prophecy *in this sense*. Our warrant for the statement is, that he himself says that he does.

(c.) He does not deny it, because to admit it would be to admit that a prophet might predict a *definite* event belonging to the distant future, that is, lying entirely beyond his own time's horizon—lying beyond it, we mean, in the sense that there was nothing in the political or moral situation, as it presented itself to the natural eye of the prophet or his contemporaries, to suggest, still less to justify, the prediction of the occurrence of the particular event predicted. Dr. Driver himself believes in the prediction of just such events by both Isaiah and Jeremiah. He admits, for instance, the Isaianic authorship of Isaiah xxxix. 5-7; but this passage contains a prediction of the deportation of the Jews to Babylon. Now, this event did not occur for more than one hundred years, and so belonged to the distant future. And let it be noticed further, that there was nothing either in the political or moral situation to suggest, still less to justify, the occurrence of a deportation to *this particular place*, though that was evidently of the very essence of the prediction. Again, Dr. Driver admits that Jeremiah xxv. 11-12, is from the hand of Jeremiah.<sup>1</sup> This contains a prediction of the return from the Babylonish captivity. It was uttered something like seventy years before that event, and so belongs to the distant future. And here again, as in the previous case, there was nothing in the political or moral situation, as it presented itself to the eyes of Jeremiah or his contem-

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<sup>1</sup> *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, page 244.

poraries, to suggest, still less to justify, the expectation of the occurrence of such an event. The language is either a "*vaticinium ex eventu*," or a prediction of a definite event belonging to the distant future, and in the sense above defined, beyond the time's horizon of the prophet who uttered it. Dr. Driver holds it to be the latter.

(*d.*) He does not deny it upon the ground that the prophetic writings "supply no analogy for such a sustained transference to the future as would be implied if these chapters were by Isaiah, or for the detailed and definite description of the circumstances of a distant age." He urges this as an objection against the Isaianic authorship of Isaiah xl.-lxvi., but not against that of these chapters. Doubtless he had a reason for this, and certainly the most obvious reason is that he himself perceived that, if laid, the objection could not be sustained.

(*e.*) He does not deny it because his scholarship has led him to the discovery of any deficiency, defects, or conflicts in the *external* evidence for the genuineness of these chapters. He admits that the external evidence, such as it is, is wholly in favor of the Isaianic authorship of these chapters. He admits that in this respect, at least, they stand upon exactly the same footing as that of the first twelve chapters, the Isaianic authorship of which he himself allows. Hence, his rejection of the genuineness of chapters xiii. and xiv. is confessedly in the face of the external evidence.

These points are negative in form, but, unless we are greatly mistaken, they will be found to be full of positive significance. We bespeak for them the careful consideration of every reader. We have been at the pains to state them—*First*: merely as a matter of justice to Dr. Driver. If any merit attaches to retaining one's belief in the supernatural and in predictive prophecy; if any merit attaches to the bold avowal of such a belief in the face of the oppositions of this naturalistic age, then this distinguished scholar should have the credit for it. Conservative writers who for any reason misconceive or misrepresent his position here only injure their cause and themselves, as well as do a gross injustice to Dr. Driver. It matters not that Dr. Driver is not always self-consistent. Few of us are. It matters not that he holds views and

adopts methods upon other points that are dangerous. Upon the particular point now under consideration he has, in his latest book, put himself upon record in utterances of unmistakable plainness, which commit him to the position we have indicated above. He is unquestionably entitled to the credit of his position, and we to the benefit of it. *Second*: In order to emphasize a point which seems to us of prime importance, and yet one which is only too frequently overlooked, and that, too, by those who can least afford to do so. It is a sad fact, and yet one that cannot be denied, that many eminent Old Testament scholars have lost, or are fast losing, their faith in the supernatural, properly so called, and along with it their faith in the existence of any such thing as predictive prophecy. Many of the younger and less discriminating minds among the so-called progressives and radicals are apt to attribute this loss of faith in the supernatural upon the part of their leaders to the vast oriental learning, the superior methods of historical criticism, together with the greater intellectual acumen, freedom, and boldness of these trusted leaders, and to attribute their own loss of faith in the supernatural to the fact that they are, at least relatively to their youth and opportunities, far in advance of the conservative herd in these same respects. But as regards the leaders, such a case as that of Dr. Driver, even standing by itself, would suggest that there is some mistake somewhere in this conclusion. Few will be disposed to challenge the extent and accuracy of his learning in the Old Testament field, or his intellectual acumen and discipline. He follows, too, the most approved methods of criticism, and yet he retains his faith in the supernatural. As regards the flattering view which these neophytes take of their own attainments, it will be enough, at present, to say that it is more soothing to their vanity than indicative of their self-knowledge or their discrimination. This above all others is a time for every honest-minded, brave-hearted lover of truth among our younger scholars to distrust himself and to search into his motives. When the announcement, "*Le roi est mort!*" has gone forth, it is easy enough to shout, "*Vive le roi!*" This, however, is not the shout of freemen, but of those who exchange one master for another. For ourselves, we see no advan-

tage that the new traditionalism has over the old. The essential characteristics of each are the same. They are indolence, cowardice, and a cringing subservience to authority. Better to follow the counsel of the fearless old apostle, "Prove all things. Hold fast that which is good." But, *third*: we have been at the pains to call attention to these points in order, if possible, to eliminate certain irrelevant issues from this discussion. If we are to judge intelligently of the soundness of Dr. Driver's conclusion, we must be willing to take whatever pains are necessary in order to get clearly before us the ground, the only ground, upon which that conclusion rests, or can rest. Let it be constantly borne in mind, then, that—When Dr. Driver admits that God did from time to time reveal the future to his servants the prophets, he virtually admits that, looking merely at the abstract possibilities of the case, apart from the evidence as it relates to this particular case, God might have put these chapters in the mouth of Isaiah. This is not all. Dr. Driver's admissions here would seem to compel him to go further, and to admit that, proven a need for such a message as the one contained in these chapters, upon the part of the contemporaries of Isaiah, then, in connection with the external evidence, we would have strong, or, rather, unimpeachable, grounds for admitting their Isaianic authorship. At least, that is the way in which he himself seeks to establish the Isaianic authorship of chapters i.—xii. What he denies is not the *possibility*, but the *propriety*, of God's putting such a message as that contained in these chapters in the mouth of Isaiah. This, as we shall see, constitutes the very core of his objection to the view that they proceeded from Isaiah. Some may think that this raises a question of no less difficulty than delicacy. Certainly, in view of the fact that so many of God's ways are absolutely inscrutable to finite minds, it becomes us to be slow and cautious in asserting that the impropriety of such a message as this in the mouth of Isaiah is so great that God could not have put it there. Much in such a case depends upon one's standpoint, and it is not always easy for us to ascertain, or even duly to appreciate, the divine standpoint. True, Dr. Driver might say that the question, after all, is not of any great difficulty or delicacy, but resolves itself

into striking the balance between two probabilities, a task to which even ordinary minds are equal. Is it more probable that the fallible human tradition which assigns these chapters to Isaiah is in error, or that the indications in the body of the prophecy itself, which seem to make it only suitable to a later age, are misleading? It will be observed, however, that, even when the question is stated thus, it resolves itself into one as to the suitability or propriety of such a message as this in the mouth of Isaiah. Let the reader bear this in mind as we proceed.

Let him also bear in mind the fact that Dr. Driver does not allege the length of time which elapsed between the utterance of the prophecy contained in these chapters and its fulfilment as an objection against their Isaianic authorship. If at times Dr. Driver seems a little confused and vacillating in dealing with this point, it need not disturb us. For even if he were disposed to base an objection upon the matter of time, he is, by his own admissions, debarred from doing so. As we have seen, he admits that Jeremiah predicted the return from captivity seventy years before its occurrence. He also admits that Isaiah predicted the exile more than one hundred years before it took place. How, then, could he reasonably maintain that Isaiah could not have predicted the return from exile, when that event lay only seventy years farther in the future. Seventy years—why, what are they among so many? The time factor can only enter into our problem as it bears upon the question of *timeliness*. Let it be remembered, then, that Dr. Driver's objection to the Isaianic authorship of these chapters hinges not upon the question of time, but simply and solely upon that of *timeliness*. He maintains that in the mouth of Isaiah these chapters would have been "born out of due time"; and, so, would have served no useful purpose.

While many would urge the definiteness and detail of description of these chapters as against their Isaianic authorship, let it be remembered that Dr. Driver does not, and, we may add, cannot. True, the objection, if urged, would be utterly destitute of weight. The prophecy does not contain a definite and detailed description of the things predicted. On the contrary, while the picture presented is vivid, the terms employed in painting it are of the most

general kind. Granted that the event of a return from exile had been revealed to Isaiah in its naked simplicity; granted that he had poetic genius at all commensurate with his reputation, and the picture here drawn of the downfall of Babylon might easily have proceeded from him. The reference to the Medes as the instruments in executing the divine vengeance (xii. 17) is the only thing approaching definiteness of detail in either chapter. But, if any one think that it is inappropriate for God to descend to such definiteness of detail in revealing the future, if any regard such definiteness of detail as doing violence to the "analogy of prophecy," we should not forget that there lies ready to our hand that ever-easy to be invoked hypothesis of an interpolation. We confess that we do not admire the haste with which many resort to this suspiciously subservient hypothesis. To us it looks too much like quack criticism. Still, it is the vogue just at present, the panacea of those who have foregone conclusions to establish in the face of stubborn facts. Why then, if need there be, should it not be applied to this single verse rather than to the prophecy as a whole? What surgeon in his senses would think of cutting off a healthy arm in order, forsooth, to get rid of a small wart upon the extremity of the little finger? Whatever may be thought of such a procedure in criticism, in surgery it would be pronounced wanton butchery. But, we say again, that whatever objection others might urge upon this score, Dr. Driver can offer none. For, has he not admitted that a prediction of the distant future may be definite as to the event predicted, definite as to the place where the event is to occur, definite as to the time within which it is to occur? How, then, can he deny that it may also be definite as to the persons through whose instrumentality it is to be effected? No, Dr. Driver's objection might be summed up in two words—*cui bono?* Why should Isaiah reveal to the men of his generation an event that was not to occur until after they and their children and their children's children had all gone to their long home? What profit is there in such prophecies for those to whom they are primarily addressed? The event predicted is too remote, and the persons mentioned by name too utterly unknown even to



awaken the curiosity of Isaiah's contemporaries. The historical situation being what it was in Isaiah's day, Dr. Driver holds that the terms of this prophecy would have been meaningless, and hence necessarily useless, had it been uttered in the ears of Isaiah's contemporaries.

In order that we may have the real issue, the single issue, involved in Dr. Driver's objection clearly before our minds, it will be useful for us to press our analysis one step further. Let it be understood, then, that Dr. Driver's position as to the non-Isaianic authorship of these chapters is not to be referred to *any light* which he, more than another, has upon this special point, such as might be supposed to belong to him in view of his admitted pre-eminence in Semitic studies, and his acquaintance with the results of modern archæological research. It cannot be traced to any new translation of the Hebrew. No more can it be traced to anything new in his statement of the historical environment. We should not, then, permit our judgment to be blinded by the halo which Dr. Driver's eminent ability and learning are apt to throw around any opinion to which he may lend the sanction of his name. It should be understood that we have to do mainly, if not merely, with certain preconceptions of Dr. Driver as to *the propriety, the timeliness, the utility*, of such a prediction as this, if attributed to Isaiah.

The real centre and core of his objection to the Isaianic authorship of these chapters is, that "no intelligible purpose would be subserved by Isaiah's announcing to the generation of Hezekiah an occurrence lying like this in the distant future, and having no bearing upon contemporary interests." It is true that he appeals to the analogy of prophecy, and to the internal evidence which the prophecy is supposed to furnish of its exilic date. It is true, also, that he undertakes to show that the Babylon of these chapters is not the Babylon of Isaiah's day, and further, that Isaiah had no motive for such a prediction as they contain. But all of these points are, after all, merely subordinate and ancillary to the position noted above. They derive their significance from the support which they are supposed to lend and the weight they are supposed to give to that position. We shall, as we proceed, notice

these points, but we wish the reader to understand in advance that, though Dr. Driver spends his main strength upon them, they do not constitute the cutting edge of his contention against the genuineness of the chapters. Dr. Driver, we will not say artfully, but unfortunately, gives such prominence to these subordinate points that the reader is apt to overlook the fact that Dr. Driver's real difficulty lies not in the external evidence, nor in any specific tangible feature of the internal evidence, but rather in this, that it is contrary to his own internal sense of the fitness of things that Isaiah should bother himself or his contemporaries with events that were not to occur until they and their children had been long dead, events, accordingly (let the reader mark the *non-sequitur*), which could have no bearing upon contemporary interest.

II. We proceed next to notice certain propositions which Dr. Driver lays down, and upon which he seems to lay great stress, propositions which, while they are in the main correct in themselves, yet lend no support to his view as to the non-Isaianic authorship of these particular chapters, because of the fact that they are irrelevant, or, at least, are not shown to be relevant, to that issue.

These propositions will be found, we think, to furnish Dr. Driver with the major premise of his argument. If our analysis of his discussion is correct, that premise is: *every genuine prophecy must bear directly upon the interests of the contemporaries of the prophet from whom it purports to come.* We comment upon the propositions about to be given, for two reasons: *First*, because while all of them are true in a general sense, some, if not all, will need more or less modification before they will express the whole or the exact truth. *Second*, because Dr. Driver seems to intimate that they are either denied, ignored, or overlooked by those who accept the Isaianic authorship of these chapters. Such, however, is by no means the case. We impeach the correctness not of his major, but of his minor premise. The latter, as already intimated, is: the prophecy of these chapters has no intelligible relation to or bearing upon the interests of those who were contemporary with Isaiah.

*First*: then, Dr. Driver says<sup>1</sup>: "The prophet is, in the first instance, *the teacher of his own generation.*" Put the emphasis upon the words, "*in the first instance,*" where it clearly belongs by right, and this becomes a simple elementary truth which no one denies. The only conceivable reason for referring to it here is to produce, if possible, the impression that, had Isaiah uttered these words, he would not have been fulfilling his function as a teacher of his own age. This impression, however, would only be correct, provided this prophecy contained no profitable lessons for the people of Isaiah's own time. This is a proposition which Dr. Driver did not seem to think it worth his while to trouble himself with proving. He does not prove it, though he sometimes asserts it, and then again, as here, suggests it. He does not even try to prove it. While, then, we may admit the correctness of the statement, we deny its relevancy, until it has been proved that these chapters in the mouth of Isaiah would have been without instruction for his contemporaries.

*Second*: In the same connection Dr. Driver adds: "Hence it is a fundamental principle of prophecy that the historical situation of the prophet should be the basis of his prediction." Here, again, there can be no exception to what is said, provided only that the emphasis be placed upon the proper word, and that word is clearly "*basis,*" though we submit that "*occasion*" would be preferable, because less ambiguous. All, we suppose, are prepared to admit that the prophet's historical environment must furnish, so to speak, the starting point of all his predictions, otherwise his utterances would have been meaningless riddles to the men of his own day, riddles that would scarcely have awakened sufficient curiosity to have insured their preservation and perpetuation for the benefit of those whom they more particularly concerned. It is one thing to say this, however, and quite a different thing to assert, as Dr. Driver seems, inconsistently, to imply, that prophecy must have its goal as well as its starting point in the prophet's own present. If this were true, where would be the room for, or what the use of predictive prophecy? Predictive prophecy, while it ever takes its rise in the present,

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<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

also ever projects itself, and aims to carry the thoughts of its contemporaries forward with it into the future. It is like a bird of passage, whose tuneful notes first strike the ears and cheer the hearts of those from among whom it takes its flight, but, in so doing, only remind them that the full sweetness of that liquid melody is not for themselves, but for those in other, happier climes, where the swift-winged songster is to find its final home. We are persuaded that the underlying fallacy of Dr. Driver's thinking here and elsewhere is, that it is only the *past* and the *present* which are competent to teach the present. We hope to show that the future, where her voice can be heard, even though it be but indistinctly, is no less potent a teacher of the present than is the past.

*Third:* On page 86 it is said: "It is the very essence of prophecy to address itself to the needs of the prophet's own age." This is true. Hence Dr. Driver should have been at more pains to give us a clear view of his conceptions of the needs of Isaiah's day, as related, or rather as unrelated, to the contents of this prophecy. He has done nothing of the kind, but goes off in a somewhat inconsequent manner to show that Isaiah's other utterances stand related to the needs of his own day, leaving the impression upon the reader's mind that such is not the case with the contents of these chapters. This, however, is manifestly the very point at issue, and ought to have been proved rather than introduced into the reader's mind by implication. It by no means follows, as the day the night, that because the events predicted in these chapters were not to occur for something like two hundred years, therefore the prediction of them could not have been called for that length of time before their occurrence. It must be admitted that Dr. Driver's argument, if it can be called such, limps painfully, if it proceeds, as it seems to proceed, upon the assumption that because the prophecy in these chapters would meet a felt want of those living about the close of the Babylonian exile, therefore it could not have met a felt need of those living one hundred and fifty or more years before that event. If any such impression has found a temporary lodgment in his mind, he has deceived himself.

*Fourth:* Again, in the same connection he adds: "It was the prophet's office to preach to his own contemporaries, to announce to them the judgments or the consolations, which arose out of the circumstances of their time, to interpret for them their own history." Was there, then, no consolation in the prediction of these chapters for those living in the time of Isaiah? It seems to be implied that there was not. Is the implication a fair one, however? It may be, but Dr. Driver has furnished no evidence of the fact. Then, again, it may not be, and in that event Dr. Driver's profound remark is not only irrelevant, but positively misleading. But, again, was it not the prophet's office to interpret for his contemporaries their past and their future, as well as their present history? Dr. Driver, as we have seen, believes in predictive prophecy, but what other office has such prophecy except to interpret for them their future history? And if this be true, how does it happen that Dr. Driver feels himself at liberty to assume that the prediction of deliverance from Babylonian exile would be without interest, significance or profit for the contemporaries of Isaiah? A little proof upon this point would go much further with thinking men than any amount of scholarly assertion or assumption.

*Fifth:* Again, on page 86 it is said: "To base a promise upon a condition of things *not yet existent*, and without any point of contact with the circumstances or situation of those to whom it is addressed, is alien to the genius of prophecy." We would tremble before the presence of "the genius of prophecy" here invoked to bolster up a weak cause, but we cannot repress a smile at the imposition which her learned conjurer has practiced upon himself in her name. Let us ask, is it the non-existence of the condition of things, or is it the lack of contact between it and the prophet's circumstances and situation which presents the difficulty to Dr. Driver's mind in the present case? If the latter, then we must insist that Dr. Driver's mere assertion, while exceedingly weighty, is not of the nature of proof. We venture to think that, Dr. Driver himself being judge, there is a most important point of contact between this prediction of deliverance and the situation in Isaiah's own time. But, if it be the non-existence of the con-

dition which is the bug-bear, then we confess to a feeling of surprise that Dr. Driver should take this position. Let it be remembered that he admits that Jeremiah predicted a return from exile. Was not this conditioned upon the going into exile, and remaining there until there were sentiments of repentance awakened in the hearts of the people? Was it not conditioned, also, upon the rise and victorious career of the Medo-Persian empire? Here, then, is at least one case in which a promise was based upon a condition of things not yet existent, viz., the captivity, and a state of repentance upon the part of the Jews, and the breaking of the power of Babylon by the Medes and Persians. Ezekiel does the same thing, and so do all the prophets, beginning with Samuel and those who follow after. Evidently what Dr. Driver had in mind was something like this: "To base a promise upon a condition of things not yet conceived, contemplated, or announced as going to exist, is alien to the genius of prophecy." But, if he had thought it worth his while to say this, who would have thought it worth while to notice it? Should it be said, however, that the Babylon of this prophecy was not conceived, contemplated, or announced as going to exist, at the time it is alleged to have been promulgated, then we will have somewhat to say in reply later on. We will only add here that we regard Dr. Driver as right in saying that "it is arbitrary to suppose (as has been done) that Babylon may have been mentioned by Isaiah as the representative of Assyria."

III. We come, now, to examine Dr. Driver's proof of his minor premise. That premise, as will be remembered, was: *the prophecy of these chapters has no intelligible relation to, or bearing upon, the interests of those who were contemporary with Isaiah.*

1. The first proposition which Dr. Driver lays down, presumably in support of this position, is that the contents of these chapters are "*unrelated to Isaiah's own age.*" As the italics are Dr. Driver's, we presume that he regards this proposition as one of importance.

(1.) The first comment that we have to offer here is, that Dr. Driver's language lacks clearness. Worse, it is characterized by a vicious ambiguity. It may mean any one of several things. It

may mean, for instance, that our prophecy is unrelated to *the needs* of the men of Isaiah's time. If so, it is merely an emphatic assertion of what ought to be proved. For, if this be his meaning, it is surely lame proof to say that "the Jews are not warned, as Isaiah might warn them (xxxix. 6) against the folly of concluding an alliance with Babylon, or reminded of the disastrous consequences which such an alliance might entail; nor are they even represented, as in Jeremiah, as threatened with impending exile; they are represented as *in exile* and as about to be delivered from it." All this may be true, and still, as we hope to show, the prophecy might have had direct and important bearings upon the personal needs of those who lived in Isaiah's day. We conceive, however, that the more probable meaning of Dr. Driver, when he says that this prophecy stands unrelated to Isaiah's own age, is that it is unrelated to the historical environment of Isaiah and his contemporaries, that it reflects a totally different historical situation, one in which the actual and relative positions of the several actors, as portrayed in our prophecy, differ entirely from those which obtained in the time of Isaiah. We infer that this is his meaning, because in this connection, and apparently as bearing upon this proposition, we are told that "his" (*i. e.*, Isaiah's) "prophecies" (*i. e.*, those found in the first twelve chapters of the book) "are replete with allusions to contemporary history, to Ephraim, Damascus, and the Assyrians; that history is the foundation upon which his grandest predictions rest. Here, on the other hand, all the allusions are not to Assyria, but to *Babylon*, not the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan, who sought Hezekiah's friendship, which was known to Isaiah (xxxix.), but the Babylon of the exile, which held the Jews in cruel bondage (xiv. 2, 3), and was shortly to be destroyed by the Medes (xiii. 17)." Assuming, then, that we have correctly divined Dr. Driver's meaning, our next remark is—

(2.) In the light of his explanation, and more especially of his italics, the objection we are now considering seems singularly, and (we mean no disrespect) even ludicrously, irrelevant. The prophecy, be it remembered, relates, *no matter who wrote it*, to the deliverance of the Jews from their exile in Babylon. And

yet Dr. Driver tells us, not only with gravity, but with emphasis, that in these chapters the Jews "are represented as *in exile*"; and, more astonishing still, that "the allusions are not to Assyria, but to *Babylon*." This may be true, but it can scarcely be considered at all remarkable. The remarkable thing, it strikes us, would have been for Isaiah or any one else to predict a deliverance from exile without representing those whose deliverance was predicted as being in exile, or to predict a deliverance from exile in Babylon without alluding to Babylon. To require such a feat of Isaiah or of any other prophet would be worse than to require bricks to be made without straw. Dr. Driver, it seems to us, might, with a far greater show of reason, have laid the emphasis upon the words "*not the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan*." Had he done so, he would have conveyed some such idea as this: The relative and actual positions of the several parties concerned are so different, as set forth in these chapters, from what they were in the time of Isaiah, that such a picture as is here given would have been meaningless, and so, useless, to his contemporaries. The Babylon of Merodach-Baladan was upon terms of friendship with Judah. The two kingdoms stood upon very much the same footing as respects political importance and available resources. If anything, Judah had the advantage in all these particulars. Not only so, but the actual position of Babylon in the days of Isaiah was that of an Assyrian dependency. It was Assyria, and not Babylon, that filled the political horizon, and absorbed the universal attention of thinking men. Not for one hundred years after the time of Merodach-Baladan did Babylon rise to the position of what we would call a first-class power. During the whole of Isaiah's lifetime it continued to be relatively, if not absolutely, insignificant. But all this is reversed in our prophecy. Here "Babylon is represented as owning the empire of the world (xiii. 19; xiv. 6f.), which it exercises in particular (xiv. 1, 2) by holding the Jews in exile." Now, this is true, and the difficulty which it presents to the Isaianic authorship of chapters xiii. and xiv., if not insurmountable, is, at least, plausible. Assuming, then, that we have at last discovered the real point of Dr. Driver's objection, and reserving for the present some things we will have to



say as to its inherent irrelevancy to the issues before us, our next remark is that—

(3.) For those who, with Dr. Driver, admit the Isaianic authorship of Isaiah xxxix., the objection which we are now considering is robbed even of plausibility. There is a single fact which has evidently escaped the distinguished Oxonian, or he would have seen the futility of raising this objection here after recognizing the genuineness of Isaiah xxxix.

We refer to the fact that the Babylon of Isa. xxxix. 6-9 is not and cannot be the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan, but it is and can be none other than the *Babylon of these chapters in miniature*. It cannot be the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan, because, as we have seen, the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan was friendly to Judah, but the Babylon of Isaiah xxxix. is hostile, and holds the Jews in exile. It cannot be the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan, for that Babylon was upon a footing of equality with Judah, but this equality no longer exists between Judah and the Babylon of Isaiah xxxix. It cannot be the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan, for that Babylon was a dependency of Assyria, but the Babylon of Isaiah xxxix. is no dependency of Assyria, unless, indeed, the maid-servant is there represented as playing the rôle of mistress, and that, too, under the very nose of the mistress herself, and she a jealous one. None of the descendants of Hezekiah were going to be eunuchs in the palace of the king of Babylon as long as Assyria held the reins of a world empire. The rise of the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan to the position of a world empire might have seemed incredible to the men of Isaiah's day, but Jewish eunuchs of royal blood standing in the palaces of the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan's day would have seemed simply ludicrous. The Babylon of Isaiah xxxix. cannot be the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan, because the terms of the prophecy in Isaiah xxxix. indicated clearly enough to Hezekiah that the prophet had his eye upon a Babylon yet to come. We can still almost hear the sigh of relief with which the good Hezekiah said, "There shall be peace and truth in my days." Evidently Dr. Driver has not duly considered the fact that Isaiah, in chapter xxxix., points out Babylon, not only as the place where Judah is to be carried into captivity, *but also as*

*the power* by which she is to be carried captive. Or else he has not duly considered what is involved in such a prediction. The fact is, that while Dr. Driver has made a noble fight for important truths, and upon certain vital points has held manfully to his moorings in the face of a well-nigh overwhelming flood of naturalism in high places—the fact, we say, is that to be perfectly consistent he ought to surrender his belief in the Isaianic authorship of chapter xxxix., or admit the Isaianic authorship of chapters xiii., xiv. His warm friend and admirer, Professor Cheyne, has quite recently twitted him in terms of painful plainness with being timid and vacillating, and, unkindest cut of all, with being out of harmony with the consensus of modern scholarship in reference to his views of predictive prophecy in general, and Isaiah xxxix. in particular.

(4.) But we go further, and are prepared to maintain that, even if the Babylon of chapters xiii., xiv. was not that of Merodach-Baladan, and the Babylon of chapter xxxix. was that of Merodach-Baladan, still Dr. Driver is no farther towards proving the non-Isaianic authorship of the former than he was before. As we have seen, he is unequivocally committed to the position that it is possible for a prophet to predict an event belonging even to the distant future. Where is the relevancy, then, in telling his readers that the Babylon of chapters xiii., xiv. is not the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan? Granted that it is not, granted that it is the Babylon of Nabopolassar, Nebuchadnezzar, and Evil-Merodach, personages of whom neither Isaiah nor any of his contemporaries ever dreamed, still less ever heard, how does this prove that these chapters are not from Isaiah? Clearly it is not because God is incompetent to reveal to his servant the course of events during the times of these kings. Dr. Driver is as far removed from giving credence to such drivel as is any one. But doubtless he would remind us that the possible, in such a case, is not to be taken as the measure of the probable, certainly not of the proper. He would remind us that a prophet is not a fortune-teller, but a teacher sent from God, and that the *raison d'être* for each message must be sought in some lesson it would convey, some need that it would meet, and the only effect of such a prophecy as this from

the lips of Isaiah would have been to produce a vacant stare upon the faces of his countrymen and lead them to ask, What is he talking about? Has the poor fellow lost his wits?

As already pointed out, it is apparently with a view to establishing this last proposition that Dr. Driver informs us that the Babylon of these chapters was not the Babylon of Merodach-Baladan. But the careful reader will have observed that Dr. Driver nowhere takes the pains to prove that, if the Babylon of our prophecy is not that of Merodach-Baladan, then it could meet no want of the contemporaries of Isaiah. He seems to think that this is so clear that it may safely be taken for granted. But is he right? To answer this, permit us to ask another question: What was the *raison d'être* for the prediction of the exile, which, according to Dr. Driver, is made in chapter xxxix.? Was it uttered merely to wring with anguish the hearts of the godless, incorrigible, doomed multitude? Scarcely. Their hearts were not of the kind that could be so easily wrung. They were ever ready to say, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Was it not rather mainly for the benefit of the godly, believing, indestructible, but still imperfect, remnant, that their hearts might be chastened, and so sanctified? Doubtless for their sakes. But if this remnant could be chastened by the prospect of an exile to come upon their posterity after they themselves were dead and in their graves, why might not they be cheered by the prospect that their posterity would be delivered from exile? Had there been a prediction of exile, without one of return from exile, might they not have fallen into blank, irremediable despair? Exile without return would have meant a perpetual casting out from the divine favor and a final dissolution of that covenant with God which was "all their hope and all their desire." If there was to be a remnant, godly and indestructible, then, having uttered his prediction of exile, Isaiah was, as it were, under necessity to predict a return, even though it should involve a reference more or less distinct to a Babylon different from that of Merodach-Baladan, for the vital element, the necessary aliment, of holiness, is hope; deprived of this, it must die. And let it be remembered that, according to Dr. Driver, if Isaiah has not predicted the return

from exile in *these chapters*, he has not predicted it anywhere. In the needs of the godly remnant, then, we find our "*nodus vindice dignus*." Upon his own principles, therefore, what right has Dr. Driver to deny the interposition of the "vindex"? If God may put into the mouth of his prophet a threat based upon "a condition of things not yet existent" (Isaiah xxxix. 6 f.), why should it be thought a thing impossible with God to base a promise upon a condition of things not yet existent? We think that we may fairly claim to have disposed of Dr. Driver's objection, so far as it rests upon this proposition. The further consideration of Dr. Driver's minor premise must be deferred for the present.

W. M. MCPHEETERS.

*Columbia, S. C.*

### III. PRESENTATIONISM vs. REPRESENTATIONISM.

PHILOSOPHIC nihilism either dogmatically denies or skeptically doubts the existence of any substantial reality, whether matter or mind, and admits nothing but impressions and ideas, a panorama of appearances; for which reason it is known also as phenomenalism.

Philosophic monism asserts substantial reality, but denies substantial differentiation; there is substance, but there is but one substance. Monism has three forms: 1. Idealism, which asserts that the one substance is mind, and denies that matter exists, except as a mere illusion of the mind. 2. Materialism, which affirms that the one substance is matter, and that mind is either nerve matter in the brain, or else is a form of physical force, the same as light, heat, or electricity. 3. Absolutism, which holds that the one substance is neither mind nor matter, but God, as pantheism declares; or force, as taught by Herbert Spencer.

Philosophic dualism asserts that there are two substances, mind and matter, each a reality and each essentially different from the other. There are two schools of dualism: 1. Representationism, which avers that matter exists independently of mind, but that mind is unable to cognize matter directly, and does so mediately, by means of a representation. There have been two theories of representationism; the first of which held that the mind, being unable to know immediately its antipodal opposite matter, cognizes it by means of a *tertium quid*, sufficiently material to represent matter and sufficiently spiritual to be known by mind. This is objective or non-egoistical representationism, and is now no longer advocated. The other view maintains that, although the mind is unable to know any material object directly, it can yet form of itself an image of that object, which represents it and which the mind immediately perceives. This is the mental modification theory, and may be called subjective or egoistical representationism. 2. The other school of dualism is presenta-

tionism, which teaches that, although mind and matter are two distinct substances, nevertheless mind has the power of immediately cognizing material objects. There are two divisions of presentationism: Relativism, which affirms that the mind immediately perceives the qualities of matter and necessarily believes in, but does not directly cognize, the substance of which they are the phenomena; and noumenalism, which avers that the mind immediately cognizes both the qualities and the substance of matter.

I apparently see and feel this paper on which I am now writing. The nihilist says there is no mind to see and no paper to be seen; seeing and feeling are, but there is nothing more. The idealist asserts that there is a mind to see and feel, but no paper to be seen or felt, it is an illusion. The materialist affirms that the material eye sees and the material hand feels the material paper; it is the action and reaction of one material agent upon another. The absolutist holds that this is but the play of the one force which makes the universe; that my mind and the paper are but modes of the manifestation of God; and that the seeing and feeling are but feeble pulsations of the one life that throbs throughout immensity. How and what the mind sees and feels is of little interest to these.

#### REPRESENTATIONISM.

It is upon the assumption of dualism that the connection between mind and matter becomes an interesting problem. From the days of Democritus, over four hundred years before Christ, it has been a vexed question, how mind can cognize matter. Two difficulties have been thought to lie in the way: 1. Mind, as immaterial, can have no direct relationship with matter; there seems no common platform on which they can meet. This was met by Democritus by the assumption of an intermediary between the two opposites, the *tertium quid* above referred to. Thus I do not see nor feel the paper, but there is a third something, an efflux from the paper and yet not the paper, sufficiently spiritual to be apprehended by the mind, and yet a true representative of the material paper.

With regard to this theory, it rests upon the assumptions that

contraries cannot come into direct relation; that there is a third something, neither mind nor matter; that this thing, not matter, can yet take the place of matter as the object of cognition; that this thing, not mind, can yet be cognized by the mind, contrary to the first assumption. This *tertium quid* is either mind, and, if so, cannot represent its opposite, matter; or it is matter, and, if so, cannot be cognized by mind, according to the assumption; or it is neither, and, if so, it is a chimera; or it is at once both mind and matter, and, if so, it is contradictory to dualism; or, finally, it is, like man, a union of mind and matter, and, if so, it is itself in need of a medium. This crude hypothesis has been abandoned, and yet it survived to modern times, and was believed by Malebranche, Newton, Clarke, and, possibly, by Locke and Descartes.

How does egoistical representationism meet this difficulty growing out of the radical difference between mind and matter? It agrees with the other school that they cannot come into direct relation; that mind cannot immediately cognize matter. Its theory is, that I do not and cannot see and feel the paper, but my mind forms an image of the paper, or a representation of the paper, and this mental modification is what I see and feel. It is at once manifest that either the mind must of itself, without any influence from the paper, form this mental representation of it; and, if so, what reason have I to believe that there is any paper to be seen or felt? and thus we fall into the arms of monistic idealism; or the mind is influenced by the paper to form this mental representation; and, if so, then matter can affect mind, and the chasm is bridged, contrary to the fundamental postulate of representationism. Or this mental effect, which represents the paper, is not caused by either the mind or the paper; and then we have either an uncaused effect, or else a supernatural miracle.

We see that neither form of representationism can meet their own difficulty of the alleged impossibility of mind directly cognizing its opposite, matter.

2. But they base the necessity of representationism upon the further impossibility of an agent's acting where it is not. It is triumphantly asked, How is it possible for my mind to see the paper, when it is fully a foot away from the sheet? The non-ego-

istical theory seeks to meet this difficulty by the alternative assertion that either the mind goes out to meet the *tertium quid* representation of the paper, or else that the efflux from the paper goes through the senses into the mind. The first of these assertions the presentationist could as well make, and it would serve his theory as well. It is, however, not only a groundless hypothesis, but it is entirely unnecessary. As to the latter assertion, it is, in a sense, true, for the rays of light, not a *tertium quid* efflux, do go from the paper and fall upon the mind's organ of vision.

The egoistical representationist thinks to meet the difficulty by the immediate connection between the mind and the mental representation of the paper; but, as before, this involves him in the dilemma already noticed. If he affirms that the mental representation has no connection with the paper, and is entirely independent of it, then he cannot escape idealism. If, to avoid this, he declares that the paper causes the mind to make the mental representation, then he makes the paper act a foot from where it is.

With regard to this latter spatial difficulty, Sir William Hamilton, a presentationist, meets it by affirming a direct contact between the mind and the paper on the scholastic theory of the ubiquity of the mind in the nervous system. He alleges that my mind is in my eye to see the rays of light that come there from the paper, and that my mind, at the same instant, is at the end of my fingers to feel the smoothness of the paper.

The query arises, What has our accepted dualism to do with the where of mind? Both representationist and presentationist affirm that the mind bears no relation whatever to space. If so, how can there be a difficulty arising out of the mind's situation with reference to the paper? But these same dualists, in one breath, aver that the mind has, and can have, by its very nature, no relation whatever to space; and, in the very next, dispute with each other as to the seat of the mind, whether in the brain, in the pineal gland, in the cerebrum, in the gray or the white matter, or in the entire nervous system. What is the truth? Contrary to the dictum of every idealistic or dualistic philosopher, we venture to say that mind, though the essential opposite of matter, sustains,



and must sustain, a relation to space. This is so true that it is axiomatically true, and the inconsistency above noted grows out of the impossibility of the philosopher ignoring it, whatever be his theory. There are certain absolutely universal categories; they are being, space and time. There is, there can be, nothing outside of these. Being is the absolutely comprehensive category; everything is a being. Space and time are the absolutely universal conditions of being; no being can exist out of space or time. Space conditions matter in two ways: matter is in space, and matter fills space. Space conditions mind in only one way: mind is in space, but does not fill space. Is my mind in heaven? No. In Europe? No. In America? Yes. In this room? Yes. In my body? Yes. Here, looking at and feeling this paper? Yes.

But, apart from this, is it true that an agent cannot act where it is not? If so, can there be any action and reaction? Can any material object be where another material object is? If so, matter does not fill space. Agents always do and must act outside of what they affect. Immediate juxtaposition even is not necessary, else the magnet would not attract, and gravity would not hold the worlds in position. It is, therefore, not a valid objection to presentationism

The first difficulty is as little in the way, because it is a mere assumption. It is not true that contraries cannot come into direct relation. It is a mere *a priori* assertion, without a fact to confirm it. So far from being true, it is contradicted by numberless facts. In chemistry, when do we see the surest, the quickest, the most manifest action and reaction? Can a man pull himself up by his boot-straps? Can he not lift his own weight of something else? Do not contraries suggest each other quite as readily as similars, and more graphically? Do not the mind's thoughts, feelings, volitions, cause the body to move? Is it not an equally palpable fact that I do see and feel the paper? *A priori* assumptions must yield to manifest *a posteriori* facts. We need no theory, no explanation, of this, because it is an ultimate fact. Just as we cannot understand how a mental volition can cause our muscles to contract; as I cannot tell how my mind makes my fingers move

the pen as I write these lines, so I do not know how it is that I see and feel the paper; but the fact in either case is certain.

There is a third objection to presentationism, urged by the nihilist Hume, which would not be noticed here if Dr. Davis, of the University of Virginia, had not given it his approval. We are looking at a balloon, which, as it rises in the air and floats away, becomes smaller and smaller to the vision. Now, says Hume, if it was the balloon we see, it would always be the same to our eye, for it does not change and grow smaller as it recedes; it is an image, a representation of it, therefore, that we see. In a sense, this is true; we do not see the balloon, we see a colored image of it; we may say we see the figure of it. The presentationist avers that we see, not a *tertium quid*, not a mental modification, not a representation of the balloon, but the figure of the balloon itself. If this be so, it is a mere question of optics what changes are produced in the material figure of the balloon as it recedes; and we know the optical law that the figure and distance are in inverse ratio. If, therefore, the image of the balloon did not decrease as it departs, it would rather tend to prove that we do not see directly a figure of it, but a representation in the mind, unaffected by the objective fact.

Before dismissing representationism, we notice that it logically leads to monism and nihilism. As the *tertium quid* form of the theory has been abandoned, we limit ourselves now to the mental modification, or egoistical form of the doctrine. If, as this theory must hold, the mind modifies itself of its own impulses, if my mind, without any perception of the paper, modifies itself to represent the paper, and this is true in all cases of the mind's apparent cognition of matter, then, by the law of parsimony, there is no reason to affirm the existence of an external world, a world outside of the individual mind. On what ground do we believe in a world of matter? Clearly, because matter manifests itself to us in these sensible experiences. As these experiences are said to be purely mental, and not due to matter, we are without evidence of the existence of a material world, and idealism is the result.

We cannot stop, however, at mere idealism. What evidence have we of the existence of other minds than our own? It is

sensible phenomena; we see and hear them through their material bodies; mind has no direct intercourse with mind. But these supposed bodily manifestations are my own mental modifications. Idealism has shown that there is no paper to be seen or felt; I turn and look at my wife and converse with her; but idealism again affirms that her body is an illusion, and her talk equally so. How, then, can I know that she exists? The same reasoning applies to God; how does he manifest himself to us? The proofs of his existence are given to us, directly or indirectly, through these sensible experiences, all of which are nothing but my own mental states. Thus we are reduced to individualism, or egoistic idealism.

Again, I seem to see and feel the paper; this is a mistake, I really see and feel my own mind. There is no external, material substance answering to these phenomena; is there an internal, mental substance? Here are seeing and feeling, but nothing seen or felt; is there anything that sees or feels? If phenomena, apparently material, do not show material substance, how can these same phenomena show mental substance? Thus we reach mere phenomenalism, or phenomenal nihilism.

But, once more, in this experience there is apparently a double set of phenomena—seeing and feeling, on the one hand, and color, shape, hardness, and smoothness, on the other. We have found that the second set, what we ordinarily call the material phenomena, though apparently as real as the other, are, nevertheless, an illusion; why may not the other set be also? Experience is alike the ground of belief in both sets; experience deceives in the one case, so it may in the other. Thus we finally land in universal skepticism, or absolute nihilism.

#### PRESENTATIONISM.

Hamilton properly divides the qualities of matter into three classes: 1. The primary are those which are essential to matter; found, therefore, in all of its varied forms. Of these the most important is extension, in all of its three dimensions, as the length, breadth, and thickness of this paper. 2. The secundo-primary are those qualities of matter which are manifested to us

in the modes and degrees of resistance which it offers to us, as the smoothness and hardness of the paper. These are accidental. 3. The secondary are those which are revealed to us by the ordinary senses of sight, hearing, etc., as the color of the paper. These are also accidental.

Hamilton holds that there are three ways in which we cognize extension—two *a posteriori*, and one *a priori*: 1. When he definitely proposes to himself the task of bridging the chasm between mind and matter, he says that it is done by our consciousness of the affections of our own bodies, as relatively external to each other, and thus revealing to us extension. In the concrete case before us, my little finger touches the paper and my thumb the pen; each of these causes a sensation, and these sensations, not so much as different from each other, but rather as in distinct places, show me that my body is extended. Professor Davis agrees with this, and adds that we become conscious of our own bodies by the muscular sense also. 2. This teaching of Hamilton might imply that we have no immediate perception of the extension of other matter than our own bodies. In another lecture, however, he says, "We may safely establish the conclusion that sight is a sense principally conversant with extension." Dr. Davis assents that we can immediately see surfaces, but denies the immediate vision of solids. 3. Hamilton holds that, as extension is essential to matter, it is involved in the very idea of matter, and thus comes to us *a priori*. It is manifest, however, that this supposes a previous knowledge of matter.

As to the secundo-primary class, presentationists agree that we cognize them immediately in the consciousness of our muscular energy being resisted. I run my finger along the surface of this paper, and there is little or no resistance to the movement, because the paper is smooth. I attempt to push my finger through the paper, and the resistance shows that it is tough. Dr. Davis thinks that the resistance must be to our voluntary movement. This seems doubtful. Suppose we are thrown from a vehicle; the experience of resistance, when we reach the ground, is the same as when we jump of our own accord. Moreover, is actual movement, voluntary or involuntary, necessary to give this expe-

rience? As I sit in my chair, am I not conscious of resistance that prevents movement, as truly as when I sat down I was aware of the resistance that arrested the movement? We are so conditioned that we are always in contact with the material world; sitting, standing, lying, we are sustained by a material  $\pi\omicron\upsilon\ \sigma\tau\tilde{\omega}$ , and thus always in a condition to perceive the secundo-primary qualities.

Presentationists, we may say, agree that we have no real perception of the secondary qualities; that they are the unknown causes of mere sensations; that I know this paper has extension, smoothness, hardness, but I merely believe that it has something which causes in me the sensation of color. I know what extension and smoothness are, for I directly perceive them. I do not know what color is, for I do not perceive it. I believe color exists as the cause of a sensation of which I am conscious; but this effect no more reveals the nature of its cause than matter reveals the nature of a spiritual creator.

Dr. Davis is a presentationist, and, like all others, denies the cognition of the secondary qualities. The peculiarity of his doctrine is, that he holds the immediate object of perception to be the brain; the mind does not see the color of the paper, nor of the rays of light, nor of the image on the retina, but merely notes a modification of the brain, which causes it to have the sensation of color. It is a chain of causes and effects. The paper reflects the rays of light; these fall upon the retina and produce an impression on the optic nerve; this disturbance of the nerve is propagated to the brain, affecting it. This affection of the brain produces sensation in the mind. Now, the special point in his doctrine is, that the mind is totally ignorant of all these links except the last. The mind knows the brain as modified, but not the nerve, nor the retina, nor the rays of light, nor the paper. All between the mind and the paper serves to shut out the paper from the mind; and the brain is a kind of screen between the mind and everything else in the series; that is, God has not given us eyes and nerves and brain to see with, but to keep us from seeing! On the contrary, common sense seems to teach that the mind knows nothing of the brain in the experience of seeing.

We would not know that we had a brain from any experience we have in using it. We doubtless use it in seeing, and it is probably indispensable to our seeing; but it is like a window in a house, which we ordinarily do not observe at all, but which lets in a view of the outside; indeed, the better the glass the less we observe it. The eye, the nerve, and the brain are a set of appliances so adjusted to each other as to constitute an instrument for seeing, like the object-glass, the tube, and the eye-glass of a telescope. The purpose of the telescope is to bring the image of the object to the eye. The eye does not see the eye-glass next to itself, but the image of the object thus transmitted to it. So the eye, nerve, and brain are an instrument for bringing the image of the object to the mind, and the mind does not see the brain, but the image of the paper thus conveyed to it.

If Dr. Davis is right as to the brain being the direct object of the mind's cognition in the experience of the secondary qualities, it is equally the direct object in the observation of the secundo-primary. If I do not see the paper, but my brain, then I do not feel the paper, but feel my brain, when I press upon the paper and it seemingly resists me; for, as in vision, there interpose between my mind and the hardness of the paper the periphery of the nerve, the nerve itself, and the brain. We are thus cut off from all direct knowledge of the outer world, and we have a philosophy worse than representationism, for the modifications of the brain do not represent the qualities of matter.

Hamilton says that Reid, Stewart, and their followers in France hold that "in a sensation of the secondary qualities, as affections in us, we have a perception of them as properties in objects and causes of the affections in us." This seems justified by Reid's statement that in smelling a rose "the object of perception is that quality in the rose which I discern by the sense of smell." Yet Reid, in the very next chapter, says, "The only notion my senses give me is this, that smell in the rose is an unknown quality or modification, which is the cause or occasion of a sensation which I know well." Stewart, moreover, affirms that secondary qualities are "only conceived as the unknown causes of known sensations; and, when first apprehended by the mind, do not imply the exist-

ence of anything locally distinct from the subjects of its own consciousness." We may, therefore, say that presentationists are agreed in denying to the mind an immediate perception of the secondary qualities of matter.

Is this view correct? It would seem madness to question what has the consensus of representationists and presentationists alike. We have, however, seen that all philosophers err in their dogmatic teachings of the relation of mind to space; so they may be mistaken here. The issue is here, presentationism combats representationism as to the mind's cognition of the primary and secundo-primary qualities of matter, but yields as to the perception of the secondary. We contend that it should not yield this last point.

In favor of a complete as opposed to a partial presentationism, it may be urged that the presumption is in its favor. If presentationism is true as to the other two classes of qualities, it is likely to be wholly true; to be true of the secondary also. As representationism has been shown to be entirely untenable, presentationism must take its place.

Again, all men, the scientific and the unlearned alike, naturally accept presentationism as to the secondary as well as to the other qualities of matter. We must reason ourselves out of the belief. We instinctively believe that we see the color of the paper as really as we feel its smoothness. Moreover, the arts and sciences, both useful and fine, presume as confidently upon a knowledge of the secondary as of the other qualities. We deal with them as though they were objective, and as well known as the secundo-primary. The maker of this paper knew as well how to make it white as to make it smooth. I count as confidently on the ink making black lines as I do on the pen not penetrating the paper. We can objectively produce variations of color, sound, flavor, and odor, just as we can shapes, weights, solids, liquids, and gases. A striking proof of the natural belief in the perception of the secondary qualities, on the part even of philosophers, is seen in the fact, that Hamilton and others use sight and color to exemplify their doctrine of immediate perception.

It may be said that, in seeing and hearing, the external object

of cognition is not a quality of the thing said to be seen or heard, but, in the one case, rays of light, and in the other, waves of sound. This is not disputed; we see colors and we hear sounds; and the accepted physics teaches that color is light waves of ether, and sound is waves of air. These light waves and sound waves, however, are produced by the colored and resonant objects, and vary with the character of those objects, and so disclose to us qualities possessed by those objects. The point to be settled is, do we directly perceive objective facts when we see and hear; or, is the experience merely a subjective sensation? That it is objective is confirmed by taste and smell, which are regarded as more subjective than sight and hearing; and yet their objects are qualities of material particles in direct contact with the nerves of taste and smell. As the objection does not apply to the more subjective, still less can it be urged against the more objective. In all these cases the mind is brought face to face with objective facts, and has its knowledge of the material world increased. I know that there is a difference in color between the ordinary surface of this paper and those portions which are stained with ink.

I seem to see the paper and to feel the paper; one of these experiences is said to be real, the other, illusive; the seeing is mere seeming, the feeling is real; the paper appears to be white, I know it is hard. Why this alleged difference? There are sensations in both cases; I use my nerves as instruments in both; the impression of sight is just as distinct, and apparently as real, as the experience of resistance. In seeing, the color comes to my eye; in feeling, my hand goes to the hardness; this is a trivial, a mere mechanical, difference. Why, then, is the one thought to be an illusion, and the other a reality? It is said, Because the hardness of the paper is like the sensation, while the color is not. Is this true? Is the hardness like the sensation? It would be strange if it were, for we would not expect the qualities of matter to be like the experiences of mind. But it is said that the sensation of resistance reveals to us something in the paper that resists, and, as well, the mode and degree of that resistance. It undoubtedly does; and equally the sensation of color reveals to us something in the paper that is colored, and, as well, the mode and



degree of that color. Do I know what hardness is? Only as it produces in me the sensation. In the same way, I know whiteness as the quality in the paper producing in me the sensation.

It is possible that the secondary qualities come also under the category of resistance; that the shades of color are due to the comparative force with which each set of rays strikes the eye. The secundo-primary qualities are mere varieties, in mode and degree, of the powers of resistance in matter; it may be equally true of the secondary.

The alleged crucial proof of the purely subjective nature of the secondary qualities is, that we confessedly have similar sensations that are not caused by real bodies at all. In dreaming, delirium, reverie, or intentional experimentation, these phenomena are produced. In dreaming I may fancy myself writing, just as I am now. This is true; what does it prove? That there is no cause for these extraordinary sensations? This is not alleged. That, as I look upon this paper, the rays from its surface are not the cause of the sensation of whiteness which I experience? This is not alleged. That the extraordinary sensations are merely subjective, without any impression being made on the proper nerves? This is not alleged. Any of these allegations would be fatal to presentationism. These extraordinary phenomena show that other than extra-bodily causes may produce the secondary sensations; and the inference drawn is, that there is, therefore, no perception of the extra-bodily objects when they are produced by extra-bodily causes. The facts are admitted, but the inference is questioned, for a reason that must be satisfactory to every presentationist. The same thing is true of the secundo-primary qualities and their sensations. I dream that I see the paper, when I do not see it; therefore, when I seem to see it now, I am mistaken. But I dream that I feel the paper, when I do not feel its resistance; therefore, when I seem to feel it now, I am mistaken. If it is good logic in the one case, it must be equally good in the other. Dreams, delirium, reverie, and experimentation produce sensations of hardness, smoothness, heaviness, etc. One man dreamed that the devil was sitting on him with the Bunker Hill monument

in his lap. If, therefore, this crucial proof necessitates the denial of the cognition of the secondary qualities in ordinary, normal experiences, it will require us to give up the secundo-primary as well.

This will introduce what seems a fatal and final objection to partial presentationism: It contains the germ of skepticism. Admit the validity of this skepticism, and you puncture the dam which holds back the flood of nihilism. Skepticism is progressive; it begins here with the denial of the cognition of the secondary qualities—pseudo-presentationism. Its next step is the denial of the cognition of any qualities of matter—representationism. Its next step is to deny the existence of matter itself—idealism. Its next step is to deny the existence of mind—phenomenalism. Its final step is to doubt or deny everything; and we have Fichte's "dream of a dream"—nihilism.

*Washington and Lee University.*

J. A. QUARLES.

#### IV. A PUPIL OF JOHN.

CHRISTIANITY is not a theory, but a life. Its ultimate end is, not doctrines, but men. Its claim to be more than human is to be substantiated by the characters it has formed, the lives it has inspired. A godly biography has irresistible apologetic power. The church of the earlier centuries has left us no more precious legacy than the memory of the men it produced. To one of these we invite study—Polycarp, minister of the church in Smyrna.

Polycarp was a pupil of the Apostle John, and for that reason alone “unconsciously tantalizes our reverent curiosity,” as Dr. Coxe puts it. One of Polycarp’s disciples, Irenaeus, says of him: “I could even now point out the place where the blessed Polycarp sat and spoke, and describe his going out and coming in, his manner of life, his personal appearance, the addresses he delivered to the multitude, how he spoke of his intercourse with John and with others who had seen the Lord, and how he recalled their words. And everything which he had heard from them about the Lord, about his miracles and his teachings, Polycarp told us, as one who had received it from those who had seen the Lord with their own eyes.”

In this sketch we do not care to give dates, even if the years of his birth and death could be determined certainly. It is enough to remember that Polycarp sat as a learner at the feet of John, the best loved of Christ’s disciples. This would put his birth somewhere about the middle of the first century. At his martyrdom he declared, “Eighty and six years have I served him.” If, therefore, he was but fourteen years old when he began Christ’s service, this would make his life number an hundred years, and would put his death not far from the middle of the second century.

“Eighty and six years have I served him.” What a record! Nearly three generations of devoted service of Jesus! Men look hesitatingly forward to old age. They think of its “second child-

ishness and mere oblivion, *sans* teeth, *sans* eyes, *sans* taste, *sans* everything," as the master-student of human nature expresses it. They recall Solomon's pathetic picture of old age, which they have seen verified in real life so often, as "the day when the keepers of the house shall tremble, and the strong men shall bow themselves, and the grinders cease because they are few, and those that look out of the windows be darkened, and the doors shall be shut in the streets, when the sound of the grinding is low, and he shall rise up at the voice of the bird, and all the daughters of music shall be brought low; also when they shall be afraid of that which is high, and fears shall be in the way, and the almond tree shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a burden, and desire shall fail." Remembering this, men ask themselves, do they want to grow old? The one consideration which leads to a deliberate choice of old age is the opportunity which it gives of serving Christ longer. The possibility that the more the years the more the service, robs old age of much of its dread. The one thing which most can cheer the old man's heart and illumine the darkening days with an unworldly radiance, "a light that never was on sea nor land," is the ability to look back on an unusually long life of faithful effort. The best preparation for old age is to pack the passing years with good deeds done for Christ; then—

"As the evening twilight fades away,  
The sky is filled with stars, invisible by day."

The birthplace of Polycarp is not known. Indeed, there is no record whatever of his parentage or early life. Smyrna was his home during all the years of which we have any account. Some reference to the city so intimately associated with this early Christian father and martyr may not be uninteresting. Smyrna is situated on the western coast of Asia Minor, at the head of the beautiful bay of Smyrna. It is one of the most ancient of cities, its identity running back to the very dawn of history. It disputes with Scio the honor of being the birthplace of Homer. In the sixth or seventh century B. C. it lost its importance. But Alexander the Great rebuilt it on a grander scale, and to-day it is by far the most important city in Asia Minor. We had the

pleasure, not long ago, of spending three days in this city of Polycarp. After two weeks of coasting along the Asiatic shore, we found ourselves, early one morning, anchored in the beautiful harbor. The crescent-shaped bay was filled with shipping flying the flags of many nations. Before us lay the city, enclosed in an amphitheatre of mountains, fresh and clean in its bath of morning sunlight. Along the substantial stone quay rose a line of buildings, in appearance not unlike those in more western cities. Back of that, on level ground, clustered houses of various shapes, and from among them rose an occasional minaret. Beyond the plain were the hills, on whose side the houses were arranged in tiers, until the slope towards the south culminated in Diermen Tempe, crowned with the ruins of an ancient temple, and that back of the city ended in a noble peak, Mount Pagos, on the summit of which were the massive and picturesque remains of a castle which dates back more than three hundred years before Christ. It was a magnificent view, equalled on the shores of the Mediterranean by the Bay of Naples only. A writer in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* says: "The beauty of the city when seen from the sea . . . is frequently praised by the ancients, and is celebrated on its coins; the same impression still strikes the spectator, and must in ancient times have been much stronger, when magnificent buildings, an imposing acropolis, and the wide circle of massive walls combined with the natural scenery in one splendid picture."

Leaving our steamer, we were carried in lighters to the shore. We cannot speak of what we saw in the city; of its narrow, winding streets, its mixed population, its bazaars; its quaint, but cheap and gaudy, Greek church; its old stone bridge across what purports to be the ancient river Meles, the bridge over which, from time immemorial, the caravans to and from the farther Orient have passed. As we stood on this bridge, sheltered on either side by huge cypress trees, spanning at that season only a dry, rocky bed, and watched a train of camels go by, laden with cotton, and led by a diminutive donkey, it was difficult to realize that in this way the commerce of Smyrna in its palmiest days was handled,—a commerce that gave it rank among the most important cities of the world. Passing by all this, we would describe a morning

climb up the slope of Mount Pagos, back of the town. Our objective point was not the old citadel, hoary with ante-Christian years and venerable with historic and classical associations, but a modest tomb, which lay high up on the mountain-side, the tomb of Polycarp. We came to a small enclosure, the wall, about four feet high, built of rough stones, plastered over and whitewashed. A low wicket gate admitted us. Inside we found a large stone tomb, also whitewashed, and painted green on top. In a little alcove hollowed out in the masonry at the head of the tomb was a small lamp to be kept burning through the night. At the head of the grave stood a large cypress tree, and at the foot another of smaller size. Two Turkish flags were floating over the tomb, while on both cypress trees and on a bush outside the enclosure hung numerous shreds of garments and strands of human hair, votive offerings left there by the superstitious. Here, according to tradition almost undisputed, lie buried the bones of Polycarp—the bones, for the flesh was burned off, and only the bones were left, which, according to the record, were then taken up, “as being more precious than the most exquisite jewels, and more purified than gold, and deposited in a fitting place.” Looking down, we could see at the mountain’s base the ruined stadium in which old Polycarp sealed his love of God with his life-blood, the place of his martyr-coronation.

As we stood thus, looking on the city beneath us, it was difficult to realize that this was the very Smyrna to which the letter in Revelation was sent. As we leaned upon the tomb of Polycarp, we could hardly persuade ourselves that he within was the one addressed as “the angel of the church in Smyrna.” As we read the letter, its words seemed a very prophecy of the martyr-death by which Polycarp was to enter heaven.

About Polycarp’s life in Smyrna we have only meagre knowledge. Three letters, one written by himself to the church in Philippi, one written to him by Ignatius, and one written by the church in Smyrna to give description of his triumphant death, are almost our only sources of information. Early in life he became bishop or pastor, the terms are synonymous, of the church in Smyrna. We are told enough to warrant the conclusion that,

both as a man and a teacher, he was greatly beloved; that the people in eager crowds hung upon his words while he told them what John had told him about Jesus; that so truly did they love him they vied with each other in relieving him of all want in old age. We know also that late in life he went to Rome to adjust some differences concerning the observance of Easter, a mission, however, which resulted in nothing practical.

But there are two events in Polycarp's life which deserve more than hurried mention.

There is still extant a letter which Polycarp wrote to the Philippians, the first-born of European churches. It is a short letter, having only fourteen brief paragraphs. The remarkable feature of this epistle is its resemblance, both in phraseology and spirit, to the writings of John. In the address he is as gentle as John, and writes equally as tenderly of the love of Christ. But when he refers to the abuses which some were introducing, like John he is suddenly transformed into a very Boanerges. This strong likeness to John, which even a cursory reading of the letter reveals, illustrates the teacher's impress upon the character and work of the pupil. John, the teacher, almost lives and speaks and acts in Polycarp, the disciple. Some time ago, speaking with one of the most eminent and successful teachers of Georgia about the magnitude of the teacher's office and its consequent responsibility, we ventured the opinion that the teacher stood second, both in opportunity and responsibility, to the parent and preacher only, if indeed not equal to these. Her reply was that she had never felt, nor been able to persuade herself, that she was accountable to such a degree; that her work was not to mould character, but to develop the intellectual faculties, and, that done, her responsibility was at an end. Her theory is entirely wrong. Whether he will or not, the teacher does determine, in a large measure, the pupil's habits of thought and action. We would emphasize the grandeur of the teacher's opportunity. He reappears in his pupils just as John does in this letter of his disciple Polycarp; he stamps the intellectual and moral impress of himself on those whom he instructs.

Polycarp's treatment of heresy merits consideration. Heresy,

and that of a dangerous sort, had crept into the church, and was doing harm. He was not a heresy-hunter. He had not, like some in these latter days, lost all faith in the honesty of men's doctrinal assertions, and did not go around among the brethren with a microscope, trying to find some heterodoxy in their teachings. Many to-day seem happiest when they have discovered a real or fancied variance between some utterance of a minister and the line of historic interpretation of his church, and to have the greatest satisfaction in proclaiming, "Ah! I have caught him teaching false doctrine!" But when heresy was made known to Polycarp, when it was of sufficient importance to demand notice, observe how he treated the heretics. He avoided meeting them in open discussion whenever possible, not because he was afraid, however, to debate with them, or to denounce them on proper occasion, as, for example, in his severe denunciation of the *Docetæ*: "Whosoever does not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is anti-Christ; and whosoever does not confess the testimony of the cross is of the devil; and whosoever perverts the oracles of the Lord to his own lusts, and says that there is neither a resurrection nor a judgment, he is the first-born of Satan." He seems to have realized that public religious discussions, in which passions are aroused, instead of resulting in good, end rather in the obscuration of truth. A public controversy with the enemies of Christianity, either in the pulpit, on the platform, or through the press, seldom helps the cause of religion. Polycarp, therefore, avoided discussions with false teachers, and thereby deprived them of the opportunity to air their erroneous opinions at his expense, or to use him as a means of advertisement. His was the vastly better plan of meeting every proclamation of hurtful doctrine with the more earnest preaching of the simple truth. After telling his people of their danger from these false teachers, he exhorts them, "Wherefore, forsaking the vanity of many, and their false doctrines, let us return to the word which has been handed down to us from the beginning, 'watching unto prayer,' and persevering in fasting, beseeching in our supplications the all-seeing God 'not to lead us into temptation.'" After all, the best way to meet attacks on the gospel is to preach the gospel.



The ministry is not called upon, except in rare cases, to defend the gospel. It does not need man's defence; itself is its own best defence. The minister is to preach the truth, and to let it cut its own way, as it surely will do. Our pulpits and our religious journals have given a publicity to certain false teachers that they would never have known had we not turned aside from the proclamation of the truth to combat their false notions and to bring themselves to punishment. The modern pulpit is making a serious blunder in trying to defend the Bible, as if afraid that it is about to topple over, and in apologizing for the doctrines of Christianity, as if they needed apology. Christ bids us *preach* the gospel faithfully, fully, fearlessly, and assures us that it shall accomplish his will. With what undisturbed, ringing confidence does the Lord speak through Jeremiah: "I have heard what the prophets said, that prophesy lies in my name, saying, I have dreamed, I have dreamed. How long shall this be in the heart of the prophets that prophesy lies? Yea, they are prophets of the deceit of their own heart. . . . The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully. What is the chaff to the wheat? saith the Lord. Is not my word like as a fire? saith the Lord, and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces? Therefore, behold, I am against the prophets, saith the Lord, that steal my words every one from his neighbor. Behold, I am against the prophets, saith the Lord, that use their tongues, and say, He saith."

This brings us to the account of Polycarp's martyrdom. Though we have few recorded facts concerning his life, this triumphant death, with its retroactive light, explains and makes luminous the whole previous life. A short time after his death the church in Smyrna addressed to the church catholic a letter, in which is given a detailed account of her minister's home-going. Only the main features of the narrative can be mentioned.

During the reign of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the persecution of Christians in Asia Minor had been very severe. In Smyrna not a few had perished. Of these, one, Germanicus, had bravely died for his faith. This only excited the indignation of the mob, and they cried, "Away with the atheists! let Polycarp be

sought out!" Another, Quintus, who had besought others to endure the persecution, himself could not stand the test when the wild beasts were turned loose upon him, but had denied his Lord and had been given freedom. The godless populace, supposing that Polycarp too, the most distinguished of all the followers of Jesus, would turn weak and recant, demanded his blood. When Polycarp first learned that he was sought for, he resolved to remain in the city. But in response to the entreaty of many he sought safety in flight, and went to a country-house not far away. When found there, he fled to another house, to which his pursuers followed. Not finding him, they seized two of his servants, mere youths, one of whom, under torture, revealed his master's hiding-place. His pursuers, with their informant, came at evening to the place where Polycarp was concealed; there they discovered him in an upper room, and he met them with a hearty "The will of the Lord be done." He spoke kindly with them, and they marveled at his age and constancy. He ordered that food be set before them, as much as they cared for, and begged of them an hour for undisturbed prayer. For two full hours he stood and prayed, and his words so touched the hearts of the officers that they began to repent their arrest of so venerable and so good a man. His prayer ended, he was placed upon an ass, and conducted towards the city. On his way he was met by the Irenarch, Herod, and his father, and invited into their chariot. There they tried, but in vain, to persuade him to call Cæsar Lord, and to sacrifice, promising him freedom if he would do so. Vexed by his refusal, they rudely threw him from the chariot, and in the fall the old man broke his leg. But, as if in no pain, he walked on, and, reaching the city, was led into the Stadium. Hollowed out in the slope of the hill, on both sides and at the further end were seats, rising tier above tier, all crowded with an excited populace. In the arena, before them all, stood an old gray-haired man, now bowed under a century of years and cares. They shouted loudly because he had been captured, and, in the confusion, the frightened Christians among the spectators imagined that they heard a voice from heaven, saying, "Be strong, and show thyself a man, O Polycarp!" The proconsul, desiring to shield

him, entreated him to disguise his name, but he shouted out that he was Polycarp. The proconsul begged him to swear by the fortune of Cæsar, and to cry "Away with the atheists!" meaning by that term the followers of Jesus. But the old man, gazing intently on the multitude of heathen around him, and looking up to heaven, waved his hand toward the heathen, not towards the little company of Christians present, and said concerning them, "Away with the atheists!" Then the proconsul urged again, "Swear, and I will set thee at liberty; blaspheme Christ." The multitude kept silence to hear the old man deny his Lord. But instead, he said, "Eighty and six years have I served him, and he never did me an injury; how then can I blaspheme my King and Saviour?" The proconsul again pressed him, and said, "Swear by Cæsar." But he protested, "Hear me with boldness; I am a Christian." He then requested a day to be appointed on which he might explain to the proconsul the doctrines of Christianity. This was refused. The proconsul threatened to throw him to the wild beasts unless he repented. He replied, "Call them then, for we are not accustomed to repent of that which is good in order to adopt that which is evil." The officer threatened to burn him in the fire. The old servant of God said, "Thou threatenest me with fire that burneth for an hour, and after a little is extinguished, but art ignorant of the fire of the coming judgment and the eternal punishment reserved for the ungodly. But why tarriest thou? Bring forth what thou wilt!" The old man's face beamed with peace and joy as the herald proclaimed, "Polycarp has confessed that he is a Christian." The mob lost all self-control, and wildly cried, "This is the teacher of Asia, the father of the Christians, and the overthrower of the gods, he who has been teaching many not to sacrifice or to worship the gods." They begged the officer in charge to let loose a lion on Polycarp. They cried out that he be burnt alive. Instantly the multitud rushed out and quickly returned, bringing wood and other combustibles, and prepared the funeral pile. Polycarp was hurriedly disrobed. They prepared to nail him down, but this he begged them not to do, promising them to remain on the pile without moving. They bound his hands behind him. For a few mo-

ments he stood with eyes uplifted to heaven, and offered a simple prayer. The fire was kindled; but it curled like an arch about the victim, or like a sail swelling in the wind, and the man was unhurt. An executioner was ordered to rush into the fire and pierce the body through with a dagger. From the wound blood flowed, enough to quench the flames immediately around him. The Christians asked for the body; but not until the flames had been kindled again, and the flesh consumed, were the parched bones given to the friends of the dead man. These they buried in the tomb already described.

Polycarp glorified God more in his death than in his life. In marked contrast with this strong soul is the feebleness of much of our modern Christianity. Freedom from persecution has made us effeminate. Much of our so-called religion snaps under any extraordinary strain. And yet our age, no less than that in which martyrs went to the stake, calls for men who are strong enough to resist the shafts of ridicule which the worldly-wise cast at the name of Jesus; men strong enough to remain unmoved in the storms of criticism which have swept down upon the church; men who dare go through the fires of temptation which a hostile world kindles about us. What the church of Christ needs to-day is not *men*, but *man*.

The date which the Smyrna church put to its letter announcing the death of Polycarp is suggestive. It is in these words: "The blessed Polycarp suffered martyrdom on the second day of the month Xanthieus, just begun, on the seventh day before the Kalends of May, on the great Sabbath, at the eighth hour. He was taken by Herod, Philip the Trallian being high priest, Statius Quadratus being proconsul, *but Jesus Christ being King forever, to whom be glory, honor, majesty, and an everlasting throne, from generation to generation. Amen.*" Observe that, after mentioning the names of the civil and ecclesiastical rulers in whose reigns occurred the bitter persecutions which ended in the death of Polycarp, the chronicler is careful to add, "But Jesus Christ being King forever." Back of the blazing, crackling fires of hatred the trembling Christians saw the seat of the Roman Emperor; but above that they beheld, with faith-cleared eyes, the throne of

the universe, and on it the God-man, in whose blood-marked hand was the sceptre of universal dominion. In taking pains to mention this in the very same letter which told of the horrible death of their beloved pastor, they seem to say, "But none of these things move us, for all is under the control of him who is at once the omnipresent, and omniscient, and omnipotent Christ, and the sympathetic Jesus." Here, centuries gone, they took comfort in the truth to which Lowell has given such eloquent expression :

"Careless seems the great avenger; history's pages but record  
 One death-grapple in the darkness 'twixt old systems and the word;  
 Truth forever on the scaffold, wrong forever on the throne;—  
 Yet that scaffold sways the future, and behind the dim unknown  
 Standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above his own."

The church of the present has become panic-stricken. A few summers ago, at the Monteagle assembly, we had occasion, about 8 o'clock one evening, to go from the assembly grounds to the railway station. On our return, walking through a less frequented part of the grounds, we found five little children, mere tots, three girls and two boys, crouching on the ground beneath a large tree. They had wandered off from the cottages after supper, strolling aimlessly, beyond the farthest lamp, and unconsciously had left the path. They had been telling each other, as they walked, stories of ghosts and goblins. Presently they found themselves in the darkness. They grew terrified. The darkness became suddenly peopled to them with all sorts of horrible creatures. Every distant footfall was the treading of some wild beast. Every chirp of the crickets was the cry of some hurtful being. Crouching there and trembling, they were waiting for some one to come and lead them home. Never have we had more enthusiastic greeting than from those little ones to whom we had come to be the deliverer. Just so, God's little children have become terrified. They have learned of wars and rumors of wars. They have been told that the intellectual giants of earth, grim, merciless monsters, have turned their batteries of criticism upon the Scriptures and their central Christ, and have heard them shout, "Now see the citadel of their salvation tumble!" They have been told that the recent discoveries of science are

playing havoc with some long-established doctrines, and have heard the world joyously cry out, "Down the whole creed comes!" They have seen a few weak Christians here and there fall away to the enemy, and have heard the enemy's call, "The whole line wavers!" They have talked of these things to each other until they have magnified the astronomer's telescope, the geologist's hammer, the naturalist's cabinet, and the chemist's retort into great weapons of attack, and there they are, God's little children, crouching in the corner, in the darkness, trembling and pale, imagining that the cause of Christianity is about to go down, and themselves to perish in the ruins. Shame! children of the living, mighty Jehovah! The God of our fathers, the God of history, is still in undisturbed possession of his throne. This is "*Anno Domini*," the year of our Lord, 1894. Whosoever sits upon the thrones of earth, whatsoever battles rage against the church of to-day, "Jesus Christ is King forever, to whom be glory, honor, majesty, and an everlasting throne, from generation to generation. Amen."

WILLIAM BEATTY JENNINGS.

*Macon, Ga.*

## V. ORDINATION TO THE MINISTRY OF CHRIST.

“Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery.”—1 TIM. iv. 14.

WHEN Paul, in his second missionary tour, came to Derbe and Lystra, he found a certain disciple named Timotheus, “the son of a certain woman which was a Jewess, and believed.” Timothy “was well reported of by the brethren that were at Lystra and Iconium. Him would Paul have to go forth with him.” (Acts xvi. 1–3.) The great apostle left Timothy in charge of the church at Ephesus, while he himself went into Macedonia. Not long afterwards Paul wrote the two epistles, in order, to Timothy, who was young and inexperienced, and they have constituted an inspired manual of pastoral theology for the church of all subsequent ages.

The passage above quoted is the fullest and clearest record we have of the ordination of Timothy. It shows as a *fact* that he was ordained, or formally and authoritatively set apart unto the office of the ministry, and *the mode*, “by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery.” Doubtless the writer intended to lay special emphasis on the first and hortatory clause of this text, “*Neglect not the gift*,” and all ministers should constantly remember this exhortation. But the special object I now have in view will require me to occupy the space allotted in considering what succeeds the exhortation. I wish to speak of *ordination to the ministry—its conditions precedent; its divine warrant; its signification; and its mode.*

It is well for our argument to begin with the inquiry, What is “the gift” which is not to be neglected? “There are diversities of gifts” bestowed by God, and mentioned in the Scriptures. These were sometimes extraordinary and miraculous, and, therefore, temporary—*e. g.*, speaking with tongues, casting out devils, and healing diseases, which are ordinarily styled “charisms.” But the Scriptures nowhere furnish evidence that these gifts were bestowed on Timothy; hence they are not included in the “gift”

which Timothy was charged not to neglect. There is no evidence in Scripture that Timothy received even an extraordinary measure or power of the Holy Ghost.

The term "gift" also denotes ordinary and permanent spiritual attainments and blessings by God. And this must be the meaning of the term in the text under consideration, for it is qualified by the succeeding terms of the text, viz., "by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." But these qualifying terms relate to ordinary and permanent means; consequently, we say that "the gift" belonged to the class of ordinary and permanent gifts bestowed by God upon proper ministers. Gifts of this class may and do differ in measure; and no doubt Timothy received and used large measures of them.

"The gift . . . by prophecy" (*δῶτα* with genitive); what is it? Evidently Timothy's intellectual and spiritual knowledge of revealed truth; the gift which came through means of prophecy. For the apostle testifies "that from a child (*βρεφῆος*, a babe, R. V.) thou hast known the holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus." (2 Tim. iii. 15.) And "I call to remembrance the unfeigned faith that is in thee, which dwelt first in thy grandmother Lois, and in thy mother Eunice; and I am persuaded that in thee also. Wherefore I put thee in remembrance, that thou stir up the gift of God, which is in thee by the putting on of my hands." (2 Tim. i. 5, 6.) Knowledge and faith are here clearly embraced in the gift. They obviously represent the graces received from God through the diligent, prolonged and docile study of God's word, and this under the guidance of approved teachers. These testimonials show that Timothy had a profound and extensive culture in the word of God. And this culture he had before the apostle laid hands on him. Putting these passages together we are obliged to say, that the culture preceded the ordination by presbytery, was recognized by the presbytery and by the Apostle Paul, and conditioned Timothy's ordination to the ministry. He was ordained because of his intellectual and spiritual knowledge of the word of God. This was *the condition precedent to his ordination.*



Hence we insist that it is proper to ordain only men who are found by correct tests to possess profound and extensive knowledge of God's word. Their knowledge must be both intellectual and experimental. They must be able to teach the truth both systematically and particularly. They must be able to teach not only special truths, but the just proportions of truth to truth. They must be able to divide to all "their portion in due season." They must be well equipped for spiritual warfare, both defensive and offensive. With the whole heart set on fire by the Spirit and love of God, they must believe the written word, both in the integrity of its system of doctrine, morality and practice, and in each of its more important articulate truths. For "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." (2. Tim. iii. 16, 17.) Men, then, should be well equipped when they enter upon the work of the ministry; nor are they afterwards to forget the loving apostle's charge to Timothy, the ordained minister, "Give attendance to reading, to exhortation, and to doctrine." (1 Tim. iv. 13.)

"The gift . . . with ( $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$  with the genitive) the laying on of the hands," etc. "The laying on of hands" here signifies ordination. "The gift" was received from God by means of the sanctified study of God's prophecy, but that gift was accompanied and signalized by "the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." Timothy's personal qualifications having been recognized by the presbytery, that body set him apart to the office of the ministry by the laying on of hands. There is no room for doubting that Timothy felt God's call to the ministry, or that, in the usual way, he applied to the proper body for authority to preach the gospel. On these two points, it is true, the Scriptures are silent; but their silence furnishes no ground for questioning the ordinary course of procedure. Certain it is "not a novice" was to be ordained; and another law said "lay hands suddenly on no man"; it is not likely, then, Timothy was ordained against his will or without feeling that he was called of God to preach. These truths being taken for granted, and the young man showing all the needed ele-

ments of a godly character and competent attainments, mental and spiritual, he received the laying on of hands as the formal act of induction into the ministry. This action of a duly authorized church court is required by the word of God, in all ordinary conditions, before a man is authorized to perform the functions of the ministry, such as ruling, or preaching the word. The warrant and the propriety of this requirement will appear to most men who are not imbued with a spirit of lawlessness and disorder.

Civil governments require officers to be qualified by oath, bond, or letters of commission. No function of office discharged by an "unqualified" person is ordinarily authoritative and valid. Here we have the general consent of society deliberately stamped upon the necessity for formal qualification for office or introduction into office. It is proper that the transference from private life to public office should be marked by some suitable public action.

There are some bodies of Christians who deny that ordination is required in order to the exercise of the functions of the ministry. The basis of their denial and the guide to their practice are found in such passages as "he that hath a dream, let him tell a dream." (Jer. xxiii. 28.) But the dreams of these dreamers are so numerous and so mystical that we shall not pause to expose the baseless fabric of their vision.

There is, however, an increasing number of persons in well-organized churches, and more worthy of our consideration, who advocate and encourage the habitual and public preaching of the word of God by persons who have not been ordained by any church court. The spirit of "lay evangelism" has of late years invaded some of the most orthodox and orderly churches. It has in not a few instances invaded the Southern Presbyterian Church. Self-constituted "lay evangelists," with measures of an exciting character, not always noisy and boisterous, attract large crowds, and often conduct meetings long protracted; and through their instrumentality many persons become professors of religion, some of whom join regularly-constituted churches. These "lay evangelists" claim to be called of God to "preach" the gospel, and their claim is sometimes fully admitted by Presby-

terians, and even by Presbyterian ministers, who claim that they are loyal to Presbyterian standards.

Now, in reply to these claims and concessions, let us inquire, What is the Presbyterian doctrine of vocation to the ministry? How is a man's call of the Spirit to be tested and proven? The answer is, "Ordinary vocation to office in the church is the calling of God by the Spirit, through the inward testimony of a good conscience, the manifest approbation of God's people, *and the concurring judgment of the lawful court of Christ's house according to his word.*" (Form of Government, Chap. VI., Sect. I., § 1.) "*Wherefore every* candidate for office is to be approved by the court by which he is to be ordained." (Form of Government, as above, Sect. III.)

We are here met by the declaration that these "lay evangelists" do not profess to be, or propose to become, ordained ministers; that "preaching of the word" in public is not a function peculiar to the ordained ministry, but is the right and duty of every Christian who has the gift of utterance; and that ordination would defeat their popularity and success. In reply to all this we submit the following considerations and facts:

If the ordained ministry has fallen under popular odium, it is not the result of ordination which God appointed, and which the New Testament ministry accepted when it did notoriously bring odium and persecution upon them. If odium attaches to ordination, it is one of the divinely-appointed "offences of the cross." And those who are called of God to "preach" are called of God, like Timothy, to bear its odium, and thus prove that they are "worthy of double honor." If this is not correct, then our Form of Government is wrong. Is it not, however, more probable that these "lay evangelists" who, though acquainted with human nature, are not conspicuous for their knowledge of the revealed order of Christ's church, are mistaken as to either their call to the work of the ministry, or its revealed and logical consequences, than that our Form of Government is mistaken as to these matters? If God requires those whom he calls to preach to be ordained, then those who claim the call of God to preach, and yet decline to receive ordination, are certainly contemning an ordinance of

God, and thus they invite discredit upon their claim to a divine call.

If it be true that the ordained ministry has fallen under popular odium, then the spirit of lay evangelism should come to the support of the ministry, and by its earnestness and aggressiveness extricate God's ordained ministry from this odium. But here the question may, with pertinency, be raised, is not this spirit out of sympathy with the Lord's ministry? And is it not often the very means of breeding discontentment in churches with the orderly and scriptural methods of good pastors, and intolerance of his "holding fast the form of sound words"? The natural tendency of the high pressure and novelty of methods used by these "lay evangelists" is to beget a love of excitement, and to teach people that they must have sensational preachers, or none. Moreover, the style of address and the partial character of the discourses of these "evangelists" people teach, demand superficial instruction instead of sound and systematic instruction in the doctrines of God's word. Thus they assist in emasculating Christians as to knowledge, morality, and the faith. The great apostle's lamentation over the Corinthian church, then, becomes pertinent: "And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal, even unto babes in Christ." (1 Cor. iii. 1.)

I affirm that there is no passage or fact revealed in the New Testament that clearly warrants the habitual and public preaching of the gospel to assembled audiences by unordained men. Several different Greek words are translated by the verb to preach (in some of its inflections), or by the noun preacher. These words are used, in round numbers, about one hundred and forty times. I have examined all these passages, and of this number there are only *two*, which, by any possibility, with the most liberal concession, as one may see, can furnish any shadow of pretext in support of such lay preaching as I am combating, and such as is often done in these days by persons designated as "lay evangelists," and who are sometimes encouraged and invited to "preach" by ministers of the Presbyterian Church. The cumulative testimony of all these passages is that public preaching is a function peculiar to the ordained ministry, or that "preaching" is predicated only of

ordained men. The two passages which I have conceded are the following, viz.: Acts xi. 20, 21, and Acts viii. 4.

Acts xi. 20-21: "And some of them were men of Cyprus and Cyrene, which, when they were come to Antioch, spake (*ελαλουν*) unto the Grecians, preaching (*ευαγγελιζομενοι*) the Lord Jesus Christ." Evidently "lay evangelism" can find no safe resting-place in this passage, for no man can prudently affirm or deny, on this statement alone, whether the men who spake to the Grecians, and preached the Lord, were ordained or not; nor can any one more safely affirm that their speaking and preaching was publicly done before an assembly, or privately in the way, or from house to house.

Acts viii. 4: "Therefore they that were scattered abroad went everywhere preaching (*ευαγγελιζομενοι*) the word." This, we admit, is the strongest passage to be found in support of "lay evangelism"; but to a careful mind it is far from being conclusive. We admit that private Christians were scattered abroad, and were preaching the word. But from all the circumstances of the case, we sincerely doubt if their preaching was like that of the modern "lay evangelist," for they were scattered by persecution, which fact would render it in a high degree improbable that they would advertise, and further incite the persecutor's vengeance by holding large public meetings, and publicly preaching the word, for which thing's sake they were already persecuted. It is far more probable that they, with their ardent zeal, testified for Christ in private with many persons; or that they met, like the disciples in Jerusalem, in some "upper room" to pray, to exhort, and to teach, where they might safely work, and yet escape public observation. It must be admitted that this interpretation would signify an exceptional use of the word "preaching," but the exceptional facts stated seem to justify it. And if it be insisted that the "preaching" done by them was of a public and authoritative nature, it would show only that, under exceptional circumstances, such as persecution that scatters, are laymen justified in assuming the functions of public "preaching." We are in the presence of no such circumstances, and consequently not permitted to resort to this extraordinary license. Yet "lay evangel-

ists" are "scattered abroad," and "go everywhere," without persecution, and without the authority of God's word as interpreted in our Presbyterian standards! The fact is, the term "lay evangelist" is a misnomer and is unscriptural, for the only "evangelists" distinctly and clearly mentioned as such in the New Testament were ordained ministers. The term "evangelist" is used only three times in the New Testament: once of Philip, once of Timothy and once to designate officers given by Christ to the church—always, therefore, of ordained men. The term "preaching" in the above text must be used in a generic sense only. Preaching, in the specific sense of public and authoritative proclamation of God's word, is a peculiar function of the office of the ministry.

And now let us see whether ordination is not required for the office-work of the ministry.

Old Testament history shows, not, indeed, by uniform record, but by occasional records and examples, that men were ordinarily set apart by some formal act of their fellows to offices of all dignified grades. Aaron and his sons were formally anointed unto the priesthood. (Exod. xxix. 7; cf. Lev. viii. 1-13; x. 7; Heb. v. 1; viii. 3.) The Levites were set apart to their office by the water of purification. (Num. viii. 1-13.) Saul (1 Samuel x. 1), David (1 Samuel xvi. 13), and Solomon were formally inducted to kingship over united Israel. Jehu was likewise anointed to be king over divided Israel, and Hazael, over Syria (1 Kings xix. 15, 16); Elisha (1 Kings xix. 15, 16) and Jeremiah, to the prophetic office. Thus, *prophets, priests, and kings* were formally set apart.

New Testament history shows a similar custom. Our Lord "ordained (*εποιησεν*) twelve" to the work of apostleship, expressly including preaching (*κηρυσσεν*) among its functions. Afterwards he says, "I . . . ordained (*εθιξα*) you, that you should go," etc. (John xv. 16.) No *mode* is given in this passage, but the Greek words and the objects proposed indicate the probability of some more or less formal action or commission. When Judas had fallen, the apostles proposed that another man should be elected in his place, and "ordained" (*γενεσθαι*) "to be a witness with us of the

resurrection." (Acts i. 22.) When Barnabas and Paul were sent as foreign missionaries, God said, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them. And when they had fasted and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away." (Acts xiii. 3. See also 1 Timothy ii. 7.)

Ruling elders were "ordained in every church" in Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch in Pisidia, "with fasting and prayer." (Acts xiv. 23.)

Deacons were ordained in like manner. (Acts vi. 6.)

Titus was left by Paul in Crete in part to "ordain (*καταστήσει*) elders in every city." (Titus i. 5.)

We shall see that Timothy and Titus must have been ordained.

These records show that in the period and conditions of the planting and establishment of the Christian church, with all its necessities and emergencies, and they were great, persons were introduced into all grades of office by a formal act. Apostles, evangelists, pastors, ruling elders and deacons, *all* who were called to exercise the functions of office, were formally ordained thereunto. Verily, concerning them all may we say as the Spirit said of the priesthood, "No man taketh this honor unto himself, but such as are called of God, as was Aaron." (Heb. v. 4.) And the ordinary evidence of the Spirit's call is to be *judged by a church court* and *attested by the act of ordination*, which is the act of a human tribunal conferring upon the candidate the right and power to discharge the duties of that office in the visible church; and this gift is bestowed in recognition of the previous and richer "gift by prophecy."

What is the proper form of ordination? 1 Tim. iv. 14, teaches that Timothy was ordained by "the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." From other passages relating to the ordination of apostles (Acts xiii. 3), ruling elders (Acts xiv. 23), and deacons (Acts vi. 6), we learn that fasting and prayer are proper accompaniments in the action. The laying on of hands was sometimes the means of communicating something from one person to another—*e. g.*, Acts viii. 17; ix. 17; xix. 6. Sometimes it was a symbolic act, as when the Jewish offerer and the priest laid hands upon the head of the animal-sacrifice; and in ordination it is sym-

bolic. The thing symbolized is, what has already been said, the giving of the right to office and the power for its exercise in the visible church. In token of this gift the members of presbytery say, "We give thee the right hand of fellowship to take part in this ministry with us."

An important question is, By whom shall hands be imposed, or who is to ordain?

In the passage we are considering the answer is plainly given, "*of the presbytery*" (του πρεσβυτεριου). We therefore construe the passage to teach that ordination is properly performed by the laying on of the hands of a *church court composed of a plurality of presbyters*. Prelatists, who advocate ordination by a bishop singly, deny our construction and the warrant for our custom.

In justification of their denial, and of their own custom, they say that "presbytery" here means "the presbyterate," and, therefore, that Timothy was ordained by the apostle Paul singly, representing "the presbyterate." In reply, I would say that there is no warrant to be derived from scriptural usage of this word (το πρεσβυτεριον) for their interpretation. It occurs three times in the New Testament—first, in Luke xxii. 66, where it is well translated, "the elders of the people" (Au. Ver.), or "the assembly of the elders" (Rev. Ver.). Next, in Acts xxii. 5, where both versions agree in rendering "the estate of the elders." The third place is the text, where both versions again agree in translating "presbytery," which means a court composed of a plurality of presbyters. Our translation and interpretation are confirmed by prelatistical commentators and authors of the Church of England, as follows: Scott, *Commentary, in loco*: "By the imposition of the hands of the elders as well as those of the apostle"; Burkitt, "The laying on of the hands of the presbytery"; Alford, "Presbytery" ("the body of the elders who belonged to the congregation in which he was ordained"); Young (*Concordance*), "An assembly of elders." Smith (*Bible Dictionary on Timothy*) does not speak particularly of his ordination, but says that after his conversion "his life and education must have been under the superintendence of the body of elders." Conybeare and Howson, "College of the elders." Hence we are satisfied with our translation, "the presbytery."



Again, prelatists point us to 2 Timothy i. 6: "Wherefore I put thee in remembrance, that thou stir up the gift of God, which is in thee by the putting on of my hands." In the words of a distinguished witness of their own class, Dean Alford, we reply: "There is no real difference between this (*i. e.*, 1 Tim. iv. 14, and 2 Tim. i. 6). There was a special reason then for putting Timothy in mind of the fact that the apostle's *own hands* were laid on him; but that fact does not exclude this of the presbytery, the body of the elders." If, however, the apostle alone laid hands on him that fact would exclude "the presbytery." But it is articulately declared that "the presbytery" laid hands on him. These passages are easily reconciled, if Paul was a member of "the presbytery" and joined in the ordination, which was no doubt the fact and explanation in this matter.

Once more we are told that Paul left Titus in Crete in part to "ordain elders in every city." (Titus i. 5.) The whole verse obviously shows that Paul had begun to organize the churches of that island, and then sent Titus to complete this work. But that Paul sent Titus to proceed in an orderly way admits of no question. "Order is heaven's first law," and in the absence of any direct and conclusive testimony, as to the mode of procedure, we cannot for a moment conceive or allow that an inspired apostle directed Titus to proceed to ordain elders in Crete in any way or on any conditions that would annul the order of ordination in Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, and Greece. We *know* that a plurality of presbyters ordained deacons in Jerusalem (Acts vi. 6); apostles at Antioch in Syria (Acts xiii. 1); elders in Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch in Pisidia (Acts xiv. 21-23); and Timothy (1 Tim. iv. 14). We must, then, interpret the obscure by the plain. In all doubtful cases we must say that the mode and the courts of ordination were the same as in the well-ascertained cases. Hence we say that Titus was ordained just like Timothy; and that, in Crete, he proceeded to ordain elders in coöperation with other presbyters, in the same orderly way in which he and Timothy had been ordained.

And, now, from all that has been said, we conclude, that all persons who are called of God's Spirit to "preach the word" are

required of him to be ordained; that "preaching the word" is a function of the ministry; that the evidence of a call to the ministry and of "the gift by prophecy" is to be certified to the church, not only by the man's professions, but also "with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery"; and that the proper tribunal for ordaining is a court of the Lord's church, composed of a plurality of presbyters. Ordination, then, is a sacred thing to be respected by all lovers of the Lord the head of the church, and they who condemn it condemn God's ordinance. And all who receive it should regard it as a high and honorable privilege; they should "not neglect the gift," but with ever-increasing watchfulness and zeal "stir up the gift" which they have received, unto the glory of the Redeemer.

A. C. HOPKINS.

*Charlestown, W. Va.*

## VI. WHY WE ARE PRESBYTERIANS.

THE Presbyterian Church is the largest body of Protestant Christians in the world. It had, in 1888, 8,894,546 communicants, and a constituency estimated to number 35,578,184. It is the most widely diffused of all Protestant bodies. It is found in every Christian land. It is the historic Protestant church of France, Italy, Bohemia, Switzerland, Scotland, Holland, and South Germany. It has become firmly established in Ireland, Wales, the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, China, Brazil, and South Africa. In the United States the Presbyterian denomination, with its 1,650,000 of communicants, ranks third in numbers, being in this respect exceeded by the Methodist and Baptist Churches only; and it does not lag behind any other in the liberality, intelligence, and Christian devotion of its members, nor in the aggregate power for good that it exerts. From end to end of our land its labors are felt. It stands shoulder to shoulder with all other faithful Christian churches, in opposing sin, in testifying the gospel, and in claiming the land for Christ. It would seem that a people so widely known throughout the whole world, and so prominently engaged in shaping the religious destiny of this country, would not need, at this late day, to have its polity or doctrines explained and defended; and yet it is a fact that many candid and earnest people are to-day inquiring, "Who are these Presbyterians, of whom we hear so much? They seem to be a God-fearing people, and yet they are, in many places, spoken against." The Presbyterian Church has been much spoken against, for it has been the foe of wickedness, ignorance, worldliness, and tyranny! But as its principles come to be known and understood, detraction ceases, and honor is accorded to it for its fidelity to God's truth.

The definitions of Presbyterianism that are in some communities current among the ignorant or the hostile illustrate sadly and amusingly how much people need to be told what it really is. I heard an evangelist in Virginia say that in one neighborhood

he found this definition current, "The people who stood when they prayed, and sot when they sang." In some localities they are regarded as an exclusive and proud people, who believe in college-educated preachers, and cannot get into touch with the masses. In some localities they are regarded as a people that believe a much-denounced and horrible doctrine called "Calvinism," that is not well understood, but that is supposed to run somehow thus: "God has an inflexible decree, and in carrying it out he will save (that is, bring to heaven) a certain part of the human race, called 'the elect,' no matter how sinful they may be; and that the rest of the human race, who are appointed by the same decree to be reprobate, will be lost (that is, sent to hell), no matter how good, or penitent, or prayerful they may be." In some localities Presbyterians are regarded as a sombre, fanatical, morose people, never so happy as when engaged in fastings, long prayers, and long sermons.

These definitions are all of them ludicrous. They show profound ignorance. Presbyterianism, as such, has nothing to do with forms or ceremonies. It has nothing to do with religious opinions and doctrines, except as they result from its loyalty to the Bible. Although Presbyterians are a people who have stood in many lands as a bulwark against superstition, and corruption, and traitorous time-serving, they were determined to this course rather by their intelligent and heroic faith, than by any other matter; and if they have at any time seemed stern in their advocacy of truth and morality against the dissolute, the unprincipled and selfish, we glory in the fact.

There is much need that the public be taught what Presbyterianism is, because the foes of our church are ever busy circulating their caricatures of it, and because the principles embodied in its life are of vast importance.

In brief, I would define Presbyterianism as "ECCLESIASTICAL REPUBLICANISM"; and we believe that this is the form of church life which is taught in the Bible.

*There are three views that have been asserted by Protestants about the right standard by which the form of the church is to be determined.*

*The first* of these is the ERASTIAN idea, namely, that the civil government shall control the church, and shall legislate about its form, and its services, and its ministers, and its pulpit teachings. This idea has been asserted with great earnestness in England. In the days of the Reformation Henry the Eighth made himself the head of the national church, and he required the people to do and think as he, the king, dictated. And he was quite impartial in his burning or butchering those who repudiated his authority, whether they were Papists or Protestants.

*A second* view is that of LATITUDINARIANS. They think that the form of the church is to be decided by the wisdom of Christian people, and by the apparent needs of the times. To this persuasion, no doubt, is due the variety of forms assumed by different Christian denominations. There are different theories of church life, different terms of communion, different methods of church government; for many, regarding these things as matters of expediency, do not go simply to the Bible to determine in regard to them.

The other conception, and the correct one, is, that THE BIBLE IS THE GUIDE OF CHRISTIANS, not only about the gospel doctrine, but about the form of the church. For in it are distinctly taught the facts and principles which determine the form of the visible church.

There are three theories of the church that are professedly based more or less on the Bible. They are Episcopacy, Presbyterianism, and Congregationalism.

*Episcopacy* does not profess to be taught clearly in the Bible. Candid Episcopalians have many of them admitted that the Bible does not teach Episcopacy, but Presbyterianism; and the only plea that these raise in behalf of their system is its antiquity. They call it the "Historic Episcopate." Dean Stanley, of Westminster Abbey, London, himself an eminent scholar of the English church, wrote: "The most learned of the bishops of England (Lightfoot) has proved beyond dispute, in his celebrated essay attached to his edition of St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, that the early constitution of the apostolic churches of the first century was not that of a single bishop, but of a body of pastors,

indifferently styled bishops or presbyters; and that it was not until the very end of the apostolic age that the office which we call Episcopacy gradually and slowly made its way into Asia Minor; that Presbytery was not a later growth out of Episcopacy, but that Episcopacy was a later growth out of Presbytery; that the office which the apostles instituted was a kind of rule, not by bishops, but by presbyters." So much for the admissions of the most eminent scholarship of the Episcopal Church of England to-day.

*Congregationalists* claim to find their authority in the Bible for a government of the congregation by the whole membership. I think they are mistaken; and will indicate indirectly my reasons for this opinion.

*Presbyterians* claim to find the principles of their church government fully and clearly taught in the Bible.

There are three lines of argument that I will follow to show that this claim is correct:

1. The Bible teaches that each church was, by the authority of Christ, guided and governed by a set of representative rulers, called elders, or presbyters.

(1), Notice the following Scriptures: Acts xiv. 23: "When they had ordained them elders in every church, and had prayed with fasting, they commended them to the Lord, on whom they believed." The full equipment and organization of every church was, therefore, secured by ordaining elders in it. In Acts xx. 17: "Sent to Ephesus, and called the elders of the church." These elders were the representatives of the church at Ephesus, and were, as such, called to meet the apostle at Miletus. In Titus i. 5: "I left thee in Crete . . . . to ordain elders in every city." This was the way in which the evangelist would set in order things in Crete, by gathering and organizing into churches, properly officered, the fruits of the labors of the apostle. In Acts xxi. 17, 18: "When we were come to Jerusalem, the brethren received us gladly; and the day following Paul went in with us unto James; and all the elders were present." This was a formal gathering, assembled to meet with the returned missionaries. James, the pastor, was present, and all the elders of the church. In James

v. 14: "Is any sick among you? let him call for the elders of the church." This is not a direction that a sick man should send for a preacher, but for the elders of the church, as guided by a specific promise. These quotations all show that each church was under the rule of several elders, or presbyters.

(2), The elders of the New Testament churches were all of them said to be bishops. Episcopalians now use the word bishop to describe an officer whom they make the ruler over large sections of country, and over the pastors of many churches. There is no such use of the word bishop in the Bible. By its teachings an elder is a bishop, and a bishop is an elder. All Presbyterians receive this as the teachings of the Bible; all Lutherans do; all Methodists do; all Baptists do; all Congregationalists do. And even the Episcopalians at the time of the Reformation admitted this to be the teaching of the Bible, as do their most candid scholars at this day.

But "to the word and to the testimony." Compare Acts xx. 18, with Acts xx. 28. The same men are declared here to be elders and bishops: "Paul sent to Ephesus for the elders of the church." "And he said to them, Take heed to yourselves, and to the church over which the Holy Ghost hath made you bishops." Compare Titus i. 5, with i. 7: "I left thee to ordain elders in every city"; "If any be blameless"; "For a bishop must be blameless." He speaks of the same men first as elders, then as bishops. Compare 1 Timothy iii. 4, with v. 17. The character of a bishop is discussed. He is spoken of as associated with the deacon in administering the affairs of the church, and his function is declared to be "to rule" and "care for the church." And in the fifth chapter, the apostle more fully discusses the duties and obligations of the rulers of the church, and calls them elders. And, to conclude the matter, we find that the Epistle to the Philippians is addressed to the "saints at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons." Evidently, in this case, the word "*bishops*" is used as the equivalent of *elders*. The church appears as officered by its bishops and deacons.

(3), The work of elders in the church is to rule, and they do this jointly. We have seen that when Paul and Silas came as re-

turned missionaries to report to the church at Jerusalem, and to bring alms for the Christians of Judea, all the elders assembled to meet them. We observe the operation of the same principle time after time. The elders of the church at Jerusalem met with the Apostles Peter, James, and Paul, in solemn council, to decide the law about the way of receiving converted Gentiles into the Christian church. And we note that when they thus acted jointly, the position which they occupied was that of *rulers* in the church. This is stated in Hebrews xiii. 7, 17, 24: "Remember them that have the rule over you;" "Obey them that have the rule over you;" "Salute all of them that have the rule over you." First Timothy iii. 1-7: "A bishop must be blameless;" "One that ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection with all gravity; for if a man know not how to rule his own house, how shall he take care of the church of God?" And again, First Timothy v. 17: "Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine." From all of which statements it appears that the elders have jointly the oversight of the church.

Now, if these three positions are plainly scriptural, then the Presbyterian form of church is in accordance with truth; and all other forms of the church are more or less incorrect.

2. The second view of Presbyterianism that we present, as showing that its principles are founded in divine wisdom, is its effect upon human character. This form of church life has tended to produce a distinct type of Christian manhood on earth, and that has been of the noblest and grandest sort. The things for which Presbyterianism has stood throughout the world are these:

THE BIBLE.—And that men might possess it and freely use it, her sons and daughters have poured out their blood like water. In Scotland, Holland, France, Spain, Italy, and other lands, the battle was fought and the victory won.

TRUTH.—They have hated shams, whether from secular or ecclesiastical sources. A bejeweled lord or a gowned ecclesiastic was nothing to them if he represented tyranny or usurpation. They have not known how to keep silent in the presence of lies, or to be bound in ecclesiastical fellowship with those who dis-



owned God's truth. The reason why they have loved the Bible so vehemently is, that they were lovers of truth. If you would know how loyal is Presbyterianism to truth, read the Westminster Confession of Faith, and see how, in the study of the Bible, the Presbyterian Church seeks to comprehend clearly and fully the proportions of truth. No evasions, no compromises there! That book planted its feet upon "Thus saith the Lord," and in his name "soared untrodden heights, and seemed at home where angels bashful looked."

THE FAMILY.—They regarded it as a place of pure affection, and holy responsibility. Their character was formed and destiny shaped. They consecrated it to God. They taught the head of each family to be a priest of God there. The family became the source of well-trained and developed characters. She taught that pious homes are the foundation of the church.

LIBERTY.—And people who loved liberty were the Presbyterians who drove the bloody Duke of Alva and the Spanish Inquisition out of Holland; resisted the 'spiritual tyranny of the Stuart dynasty; dethroned Charles I., and prepared the way for the Commonwealth under Oliver Cromwell. And when the Commonwealth had been brought under the control of the army and Cromwell, and had become a military despotism, so that the nation turned back to the older despotism of the Stuart kings, rather than endure the tyranny of the Commonwealth and the morose fanaticism of the Independents, it was the Presbyterian Prince William of Orange under whose guidance (after the expulsion of King James the Second) was established the foundation of modern English liberty.

ORDER.—As much as they have opposed tyranny, they have also enforced order and law. They were earnest men; they believed in righteousness and executed it.

Such principles tend to produce men of the highest type! Many who are called Presbyterians have never felt their ennobling and transforming power. A besotted or worldly person may be found in this or any other church, insensible and unquickened by its glorious spirit. But well-developed Presbyterians are people of a distinct character. Usually their Christian

sympathies are so broad that they are incapable of sectarianism. Their views of truth are clear and earnest. Their characters are manly and decided. Let me mention several specimens of the product of Presbyterian principles:

There is the grandest character of Europe in the days of the Reformation, *John Calvin*. A man of genius, scholarship, and piety; a man who taught the world more clearly the truth of God than any teacher before him. Called to be pastor at Geneva, he exercised a wise and careful discipline, through the elders, over the church, so that this community, once noted for its dissoluteness, became the model church of the world in purity and piety. He persevered in fidelity, in maintaining the honor of religion, in the face of all opposition, though it at one time cost him banishment from the city. He, by his piety of heart, clearness of mind, and steadfastness of purpose, taught from the Bible and maintained those principles of representative government that have leavened the thought of the world and have secured for many nations religious and civil liberty. Says Bancroft: "He that will not honor the memory, and respect the influence, of Calvin, knows little of the origin of American Independence."

The next character is that of *John Knox*. He was the most famous of the disciples of Calvin. By prayer, and preaching, and brave living, and wise policy, he won Scotland for Christ. He upon whose house was inscribed: "*Lufe God abufe al, and yi nychtbour as yiself!*"—he of whom Morton said, at the grave, "There lies one who never feared the face of man!"

*The Scotch Covenanter* was a heroic though stern expression of the fruit of Presbyterian principles. Of the moral grandeur of that class of earnest, God-fearing men, Charles H. Spurgeon speaks thus: "In my bed-room I have hung the picture of an old covenanter. He sits in a wild glen, with his Bible open before him on a huge stone. He leans on his great broadsword, and his horse stands quietly at his side. Evidently he smelleth the battle afar off, and is preparing for it by drinking in some mighty promise. As you look into the old man's face you can almost hear him say to himself, 'For the crown of Christ and the covenant I would gladly lay down my life this day.' They did lay down

their lives, too, right gloriously! And Scotland owes to her covenanting fathers more than she knows! . . . They were resolved upon this one thing, that Rome should not come back to place and power while they could lift a hand against her. Neither should any power, in throne or parliament, prevent the free exercise of their conscience for Christ's cause and covenant."

The purpose of redemption is spiritual freedom and strength. Its product is men that fear God; men that love truth; men that obey right authority; men that love liberty more than life; men terrible to the corrupt and to tyrants; men tender and loving to the miserable and erring. Is not the supreme thought of redemption embodied in Presbyterian principles?

3. Human history attests the excellence of Presbyterian principles.

(1.) The Reformation was a time of great earnestness in religious matters. By that mighty movement Europe was shaken from centre to circumference. The Spirit of God was breathing upon the nations. The people everywhere began to pray, and to study the Bible, and to contend for its truths. So great was the earnestness and devotion of Christians in those days that apostolic zeal and heroism in missionary work again appeared, and there was shown everywhere love for God's truth, fervor in teaching it, and courage in maintaining it,—courage even unto bonds and death! With such loyalty to God and truth they studied the Bible; and the significant result was that all the Protestants of Europe became Presbyterian in conviction. The Reformed Churches assumed distinctly the Presbyterian order. The Lutheran Churches were all Presbyterian in essential character. Even the Episcopal Church of England was, at that time, ready to admit that Presbyterianism was the teaching of the Bible, and that it assumed the prelatical form at the dictation of the civil power. They who framed the Articles, the Book of Orders, and the Plan of Government of the Church of England candidly admitted that a bishop and an elder are, by the Bible, the same. The original document in which this is asserted was published by Bishop Burnet, of the English Church, in his *History of the Reformation*. He says: "In this writing bishops and priests

(elders) are spoken of as one and the same office." The document appears to embody the resolutions of a Convocation of the Episcopal Church of England of the year 1537 or 1538. It is signed by Thomas Cromwell, the king's vicar-general, as presiding over the Convocation; and by Thomas Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury; by Edward, the Archbishop of York; and by all the other bishops and dignitaries of the Episcopal Church of England. I cannot quote the whole document. Two expressions will suffice: "This authority" (that is, of ordination) "was committed and given by Christ and his apostles unto certain persons only, that is to say, unto priests" (elders) "or bishops." And again: "Yet the truth is, that in the New Testament there is no mention of any degrees or distinctions in orders, but only of deacons or ministers, and of priests or bishops." These quotations fully sustain the statement of Bishop Burnet, that "in this writing bishops and priests are spoken of as one and the same office."

What conclusion can be drawn from this universal verdict of all the Reformers, except that Presbyterianism is scriptural?

(2.) All the other evangelical churches have, in a more or less qualified way, endorsed the principles of Presbyterianism.

The Episcopal Church, by its theory of church government, places all power in the hands of its diocesan bishops; yet the principle of spiritual republicanism has in this country been so asserted and felt that bishops have now little more power than the inferior ministers, whom they call priests. In the deliberative councils the bishops constitute the Upper House, the priests and "laymen" constitute the Lower House. All legislation is enacted by them jointly.

Originally, the theory of the Methodist Church was that all power was in the hands of the bishops, the presiding elders, and the preachers. Now the principle of popular government is asserted, and in the Conferences the churches have secured representation.

The Baptists and Congregationalists were without any rulers. The whole membership of each congregation made and executed the laws for themselves. There was no bond of union among the churches, except that of certain general committees, and of the

Association; and theoretically these had no authority. Yet necessity has caused the Associations to assume a real power over the interests of the church; and in the local congregations it has been found necessary to appoint officers called deacons, who shall be the special guides and leaders of the people in both financial and religious matters.

This process must go on. It results partly from the example and influence of the Presbyterian Church, but more from the study of God's word, and from the guidance of the Holy Ghost to earnest Christians amid the experiences of actual life.

(3.) In every land Presbyterians have asserted the principles of liberty and of representative government; and in our own land, while other Christians, as devoted patriots, labored and suffered also for the establishment of our great and free Republic, the United States of America owes more than men know to the Presbyterians. Says Dr. Kerr: "Nine years after the birth of Martin Luther, North America was discovered, but it was not peopled then. It waited two hundred years for its important settlements. Europe was not ripe, the time was not yet come. A few adventurers explored its shores, bringing home wonderful stories of an almost limitless land; but not until a vast body of liberty-loving Protestants had been trained in Europe did that mighty exodus begin, which has grown to such vast proportions. God sent some of his best people to lay foundations for the future, and to prepare for the millions that were to follow. They were the Huguenots, the Dutch, the Puritan English, the Scotch, and the Scotch-Irish. Was ever a nation founded by such noble people! Educated in human and divine learning, purified in the furnace of affliction, made to love liberty and truth better than life, riches, and home—they were driven away from Europe to occupy North America. They would not have come willingly. Such people love their country, the graves of their ancestors, and would prefer the pursuit of industry and virtue in a quiet life."

By the oppressive measures of Great Britain, by the bloody and cruel deeds of the French government, by the terrible Spanish Inquisition in Holland, thousands were slain, and multitudes driven into exile. A large proportion of the people who came to

America for the first one hundred years were Calvinists in faith, and Presbyterians in their church life.

M. D'Aubigné says: "Calvin was the founder of the greatest of republics" (that is, the United States). "The pilgrims who left their country in the reign of James the First, and landing on the barren soil of New England founded populous and mighty colonies, were his sons—his direct and legitimate sons. And that American nation, which we have seen growing so rapidly, boasts as its father the humble Reformer on the shores of Lake Lemman." Says Bancroft: "A young French refugee" (John Calvin), "skilled in theology and civil law, and the duties of magistrates, and the dialectics of religious controversy, entering the Republic of Geneva, and conforming its ecclesiastical discipline to the principles of religious simplicity, established a party of which Englishmen became members and New England the asylum."

The Presbyterians who came to America to escape persecution were not permitted to exercise their principles here without a struggle. They were called "Dissenters," and were oppressively treated by the civil government, for the Episcopal Church was established by law in the colonies.

When the struggle for liberty began between the colonies and England, the leaders of the Revolution were generally men who had chafed under religious as well as political oppression. They were Congregationalists, Dutch Reformed, Presbyterians, and Baptists.

Bancroft says: "The Presbyterians were the supporters of religious freedom in America. From Witherspoon of New Jersey, Madison of Virginia, imbibed the lesson of perfect freedom in matters of conscience." Says the same writer: "In Virginia the Presbytery of Hanover took the lead for liberty, and demanded the abolition of the Anglican Church, and the civil equality of every denomination." The principle for which the Revolutionary fathers contended—"no taxation without representation"—was Presbyterianism applied to civil life. It demanded that our laws should be made by our own chosen rulers. They saw that if this right were conceded they were free men. If it were denied them they were slaves. This conviction it was

that roused the spirit of resistance from Boston to Savannah. The first Declaration of Independence was made in this country, on May 31, 1775, by the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians of Mecklenburg, North Carolina. More than one year before the Continental Congress uttered the Declaration of Independence these men adopted solemnly the Mecklenburg Declaration. Its key-note was, "We do hereby dissolve the political bands which have connected us with the mother country, and hereby absolve ourselves from all allegiance to the British Crown. We hereby declare ourselves a free and independent people, under the control of no other power than that of our God, and the general government of Congress; to the maintenance of which, we solemnly pledge to each other our mutual coöperation, our lives, our fortunes, and our most sacred honor."

The men who adopted these declarations were the descendants of the covenanters. They were worthy of their noble ancestry. One-third of them were Presbyterian elders, one was a Presbyterian minister, and all of them were connected with the Presbyterian Church.

The example of these liberty-loving Presbyterians of Carolina roused the hesitating people of the colonies to a distinct and fearless avowal of their separation from, and independence of, Great Britain. This occurred the next year, on July 4, 1776.

The Declaration of Independence was based upon the Mecklenburg Declaration; and that was based, as its author avowed, upon the Westminster Confession; and that is based upon the word of God. Behold the glorious links that bind the Declaration of Independence to the granite rock of eternal truth and right! And by Presbyterian hands were those links forged. And to-day the mighty fabric of our republic is based in, and shaped by, the principles of constitutional order and liberty that are the fibre of our scriptural church government. The Congress of the United States, the Legislature of each state, is each constituted upon the principles which are realized in every Presbytery of our church: a body of representative rulers, assembled to legislate, under a constitution, for the people that appointed them to office.

In the large liberty enjoyed by our citizens, and the order that exists everywhere, we find illustrated the wisdom of representative government. What is the source of it? It is based in and conformed to Presbyterian principles.

Men that loved liberty more than life, and that, coöperating with other patriots, broke the yoke of British tyranny from off their necks, "framed their civil government according to the principles for which they had so long contended. They were building for the future, and were divinely guided in laying the foundation of a structure which is still rising before the nations, the inspiration of freedom in other lands, and the admiration of mankind."

Ranke says: "John Calvin was virtually the founder of America." Renan said: "Paul begat Augustin, and Augustin begat Calvin." But who begat Paul? Who was the author of the system of truth, which has been the mainspring of civilization, and the bulwark of human liberty? We answer, It was born in heaven, and its author was God.

"Stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made you free, and be not again entangled in the yoke of bondage"!

*Uniontown, Ala.*

JOHN A. SCOTT.



## VII. NOTES.

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### WOMANISM IN THE SOUTH.

ONE of the distinctive features of the Old South was the position that woman held in the social structure, and the sentiment by which she was surrounded. So chivalric was the deference universally paid her, that the only just criticism upon the way in which she was regarded and treated, is, that she was so cherished and cared for by man, as to become in a large measure too dependent. That is to say, she was not always sufficiently self-reliant when necessitous circumstances demanded that she should be so. And yet the heroism of Southern women during the war, when husbands and sons were at the front, and after the war, when suddenly robbed of servants, was a revelation. It was indeed romantic.

The "womanism" of that day, as represented by the Woman's Rights' advocates in New England, was intensely offensive to the Southern mind, female as well as male. It was foreign and hostile to the genius and spirit of Southern social life. And this forsooth, not because it offered improvement to woman's condition, in the shape of enlarged "rights." For man was giving to woman the ample sway of royal prerogatives, as the undisputed queen of home and social circle. To take a different view of her "rights," was to him, to dethrone her. He saw jeopardy in the movement not merely to himself, but to her, and to himself because to her. On the other hand, the mind and heart of woman were satisfied with her condition. She had no sense of being deprived of liberty, while securely holding the social sceptre in her hand. She had no desire to assume so-called "rights," at the expense of her dignified dower of unfettered privileges and unlimited influence.

But a change has come over the South in this respect, as in many others. The New South retains in large measure the view of woman's position held by the Old South; but the beginnings of "reform" are discernible, and many sober minds are not a little concerned as to the slowly-hastening outcome. Even the conservative Presbyterian Church of the South is not altogether free from the incipient incursions of this

radical movement. The debate in the Assembly at Macon last year revealed the fact, that even a small portion of our ministry is somewhat infected with error on this subject. A few of the younger minds, who have caught the spirit of the times, declared themselves as being in favor of a revolutionary revision of the church's historic interpretation of Scripture, concerning woman's part in the public exercises of worship. So marked and general, indeed, is the beginning of this change in the South, that a female advocate of woman's suffrage finds audience this winter in leading cities, upon a lecture tour, with this for her subject: "The Woman's Movement in the South."

How can this change be accounted for? Perhaps if we are able to discern the causes that are at work, many minds may be warned against a movement so unnatural and unscriptural.

1. Obviously the *changed condition of the South* has a great deal to do with it. Previous to the war, the South was insulated in its life. Its peculiar institutions, and consequent separation, made it distinctive and conservative. Along with the abolition of slavery as the result of the war, came increased facilities of communication between the South and other portions of the United States. There set in, therefore, a slow but sure assimilation of the Southern life to the common life of the whole country. Intermingling through travel, intercommunication through the press, intercourse through commerce, are forces that are certain to unify the life of the country more and more. In this way many valuable features of the stirring civilization of the North have been introduced into the South. From a material point of view, she has been re-invigorated by the new blood that has been infused into her life. On the wave of commercialism, other changes have come, however, and this among others, that here and there a disposition is found to give audience and approval to the woman's movement.

2. The Southern life has come under the influence of the *modern animus towards the Bible*, along with its assimilation to the outside world, and this is the bottom cause for the change under consideration.

The disposition to reject, ignore, or explain away the Scriptures, where they come in conflict with the ideas and demands of the proud nineteenth century civilization, is nowhere more apparent than when the advocates of womanism in church and state attempt to discuss the question from a Bible standpoint. Austin Phelps (a New England man, too) in an essay on "Reform in the Political Status of Women," writes strongly on this point: "A reverent believer in the Scriptures

cannot but detect evidence of this distorted *animus* in the coolness with which the biblical argument in the negative is ignored by the most positive advocates of the reform. For distinction's sake, and in justice to a different class of its advocates, they may be called the 'left wing' of the reform. One is reminded of the fling which used to be thrown at the Bible by the corresponding wing of the old anti-slavery reformers, whose answer to the objection that the Bible tolerated slavery was, 'So much the worse for the Bible, then.'

"If the Scriptures are clear and positive on any subject relating to the organization of society, they are so on this, of the position of woman in the order of nature. St. Paul defines it beyond the reach of cavil. He reasons upon it, not as an Oriental, but as a cosmopolitan. He pronounces judgment upon it, not as a priest, but as a philosopher. He goes back to the beginning of things. He finds his reason for the subordination of woman in the very act of creation. He could not well have put the case in a way more flatly antagonistic to the opposite extreme of our day. What the inspired teacher meant to say on the subject admits of no reasonable doubt. If fire is fire, the apostle's theory of the social economy under which God placed the two sexes at the beginning, and which Christianity leaves as it finds it, makes man the head and the woman something other than the head; man the power of *government* and woman *not* that.

"Yet, notwithstanding the indubitable force of the inspired reasoning, it is scarcely ever heard of among those who chiefly give character to this modern revolution. They often ignore the biblical argument with the flippancy with which one might dismiss the law of the Koran on the subject. Inspiration goes for nothing. St. Paul is no more to the purpose than the author of the Book of Mormon. We are afraid of a reform which starts with such an *animus* towards the word of God. It is not a philosophical treatment of a great authority. It is not a judicial treatment of great precedents. It is not a Christian treatment of a revelation from heaven."

Even with the conservative wing of the movement, where the Bible is not flippantly waved aside, the classical passages of the Scriptures on the subject are tortured most violently, canons of interpretations are flagrantly violated, *ad captandum* appeals to negative and irrelevant portions of the Bible are indulged in, and the current consensus of commentators, fathers, schoolmen, reformers, and moderns, is characterized as traditional and narrow. The writer of this note has read everything he could lay hands on written to support the cause of woman-

ism, and he has never read anything making the attempt to answer, in a scholarly, sober, reverent way, the opposite argument, based upon the Bible. Who has?

The prevailing looseness of the hold of the Bible upon the public mind, in this critical age, is breaking up the conservative simplicity of subjection to the Bible so eminently characteristic of the South in former days; and for this reason the Southern mind is the more susceptible to the arguments of the woman's movement.

Not that there are not those who make some concessions to features of this movement, who are nevertheless truly devout and desirous of being always obedient to God's word, in thought as well as deed. This is cheerfully admitted. At the same time, it must be affirmed that, unconsciously to themselves, such persons are fostering and furthering the beginnings of a movement, which, when traced to its source, reveals a want of subjection to God's word; while an analysis of the prevailing mind of the thinking world towards the Bible makes it evident that one may be so inoculated with the modern rationalizing temper that envelopes us as an atmosphere, as to be susceptible to a mode of treating the Bible which is not at heart *obediently reverent*, and that all *unconsciously*. Growing out of this unscriptural tendency of thought there are certain ideas abroad, that are working forces in shaping our views of social questions, which, while not recognized generally as being unscriptural, are, nevertheless, positively so.

(a), The first of these is an *unbiblical conception of social progress*.

It may be safely stated that the modern view of progress takes its source and shape from the scientific or philosophical doctrine of evolution, rather than from the Bible idea of man and human history. The debate will spring, of course, at this point, whether there is any conflict between the two theories. Some Christian thinkers affirm that there is perfect harmony between them. This question cannot be discussed in the short limits of this note. This much must be asserted and admitted, however, that the purely evolutionary theory of society ignores the moral government of a personal Creator, the moral crisis of a race fall, the supernatural intervention of a redemption, and all the prophecies of the Bible concerning human history and destiny. And this admission springs an infinite chasm between the two theories, viewed in their radical starting points.

The modern idea of progress in society is more intensely advocated by skeptical and atheistic thinkers, than by those that are Christian.

John Stuart Mill by his theories of political economy is still at work in the enthusiasm for humanity that animates the reformers of the social structure. Mr. Mill wrote "The Subjection of Woman," an essay which has done more to further womanism in the thinking world than anything ever written. And yet Mr. Mill was not only unbiblical in his attitude of mind, but anti-biblical. He wrote to Charles Kingsley: "I wish to speak with you on the whole question of woman. In five and twenty years, my ruling idea has been that which my friend Huxley has lately set forth as common to him and Comte; that the reconstruction of society on a scientific basis is not only possible, but the only political object much worth striving for."

It is on the scientific basis, and not on the scriptural basis, that modern progress proceeds. In this sense, the most ardent reformers of society have been and are infidelic, not to say atheistic.

And yet many are caught in the swirl of this movement who are not hostile, but even friendly, to the Bible. They do not see it in its springs, however, and are consequently deceived into sympathy with at least some of its false features. The cry of "Progress!" throws them off their guard, and they fall in with currents that take their rise in false conceptions of progress.

The woman's movement is one of these. It ignores the facts of creation, sin, and redemption, as they bear upon woman's position; whereas these great facts of human history must determine our conception of human progress. And it is expressly upon these facts that the Bible bases its declarations concerning the subordination of woman in the social organization. 1 Tim. ii. 11-14; 1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35; Eph. v. 22-33. If the mind is dominated and determined by the Bible way of viewing human affairs, when womanism demands acceptance on the plea of progress, no favorable impression will be made in its behalf, because it is intelligently perceived that the movement is not in the line of true progress, but is revolutionary and destructive.

(b.) Another force at work in shaping views on social questions is an *unbiblical conception of liberty*. The true definition of liberty is that it is intelligent, willing subjection to the laws of being, individual and social. The Bible idea of liberty, therefore, is voluntary obedience to the God-ordained relationships of life. Therefore, the Bible commands the official subordination of woman in the family, the radical institution of society. Consequently woman is not enslaved by such subordination. She find the largest liberty when she accepts her God-ordained sphere, and seeks to serve God in her appointed limitations.

Now the woman's movement starts out with the false assumption that woman, as she stands in the very organization of society, is in need of emancipation. It proposes to reconstruct society on the "scientific basis," while its view of the scientific basis is determined by reason contrary to revelation. The liberty which it offers is not true liberty, but the lawlessness of a radical individualism. And the Bible says lawlessness is *sin*.

And yet many unthinking persons, too much swayed by the spirit of the times, listen seriously to the pet demand of womanism for the "emancipation of the sex," little realizing that the demand is for a radical revolution of society. "The whole sweep of the relation of the sexes, and all the duties and rights of both" are involved in the movement. "Natural foundations on which organized society has been built from the beginning of time, and without which it is a thing not proved that organized society can exist at all, must be torn up, if this reform is carried consistently to its maturity. Nothing else like it exists in history. No other theory of life has ever cut everything loose from the experience of the race, and put everything at hazard on an unproved and untried hypothesis."

If the biblical conception of liberty sways the mind, is it not sure to resist this unnatural and de-naturalizing movement at every point of its aggressive approach?

(c.) Another force at work in determining thought on social questions is *an unbiblical view of the significance of the present dispensation of human history*.

From the Bible standpoint, that portion of the race that is to survive the crisis of judgment is now in the probation of childhood. It is being trained for the real life of its mature majority. Now everything is provisional and probationary. The whole constitution of society, as well as the experience of its history, has this end in view. With the close of the present stage of existence sex ends. In the resurrection there will be no male and female. In the world to come the human race will be as the angelic race, without sex. But in this present world sex exists, and sex abides, and sex determines the constitution and continuance of society. The family is essential, therefore the subordination of woman is essential, for all time. On the framework of this radical relationship character is wrought out, and the probationary preparation of man, male and female, is completed against the day when the framework will be laid aside forever, and there will be no sex. But to seek redemption from the laws of the rela-

tionship here, is to attempt an ideal, that belongs only to the other side of life. And this effort to inaugurate *now* the final society is the fertile source of all sentimental radicalism, to which most surely the woman's movement belongs. Glorious as will be the ideal society when we shall have been redeemed from everything that belongs to the sexual relationship, to try to introduce that state of things in this present world means disorder, confusion, shame, loss, here and hereafter. The greatest glory of human life now is to fill out God's plan, in loving obedience to all his revealed will concerning it. This is the Bible conception of perfection of society in this present world.

Would that the old Southern view of woman's position might so prevail as to stay the incoming tide of womanism! And this will be the case just in so far as the Bible way of looking at human society is allowed to dominate our thinking in matters of both state and church. But to realize this, the sentimentalism of a godless humanitarianism, with its specious cries of Progress and Liberty, must be understood and resisted.

JULIUS W. WALDEN.

*New Orleans.*

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#### ADDITIONAL FORMS.

LAST May the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (Southern), in session at Macon, Ga., approved and recommended for use in our churches, Forms of Service for Marriages and Funerals. The use of them is, of course, optional. These forms had been prepared by a committee previously appointed by the Assembly, and they were approved and recommended in the same way as might be a set of parliamentary rules, or a hymn-book. The Assembly also approved, and sent down for adoption by the presbyteries, the revision of the "Directory for Worship," which contains forms of covenant for baptism of infants and adults, and for the admission of baptized persons to the communion of the Lord's Supper.

Up to the present, twenty-four presbyteries have voted affirmatively upon the revision, one negatively, and the remainder have postponed action until the spring meetings. The prospect, therefore, of the Revised Directory being adopted is good.

The committee of revision, of which the writer was a member, determined at the outset to be very conservative, and to make as few changes as possible, their main work being to adapt the Directory to the Book of Church Order.

In view of the favorable reception of the additional forms referred

to, it may not be inopportune to say a few words on the general subject of the use and misuse of forms in the worship of God. There is no church without fixed forms for worship, not only a fixed order or directory, but set forms of words. The difference between our Protestant churches is not that some have forms and others have none, but that some have many and others have few. Then, also, there is a difference in the forms themselves. The Presbyterian Churches of English-speaking countries are not called liturgical churches, because they use few forms in the public and direct worship of God in the sanctuary. The benediction is a set form. In the administration of the two sacraments we have forms which are compulsory under the law of the church, and under the command of Christ himself. In the most solemn and delicate function of the minister, the administration of "sealing ordinances," the Head of the church has made obligatory the use of set phrases and sentences. For baptism there is a plain command, and for the Lord's Supper there is what might be called a mandatory example.

Whether the church is to conclude from this that Christ assumed to himself alone the prerogative of fixing a form, or that under his example it may go on and provide more forms, is a question that may be raised.

A middle ground is probably the right one, that Christ alone has the authority to lay down a compulsory form, but that the church may adopt forms which shall be optional.

That this is the belief of the greater part of the church is manifest from the fact that its various branches have from time to time adopted additional forms. The adoption of an optional directory is certainly in the line of this action, for if the church may recommend a certain order, it may also recommend certain forms. This has been done in Presbyterian Churches to a far greater extent than many suppose. The adoption of a set of psalms and hymns, and the recommendation of them for use in the churches, is in the exercise of that liberty to prepare optional forms for worship which the church believes belongs to itself. Forms are forms, whether for use at each service, or given that selections may be made from them for the various services. Hundreds of our congregations have adopted for themselves one of these forms for praise, the doxology beginning "Praise God from whom all blessings flow," and use it every Sabbath. It is as truly liturgical in principle to sing at every service the Long Metre Doxology, as it is to sing the "*Gloria Patri*," or "*Te Deum*." The



difference is in the quality, style, and association of the words used, and not in the principle itself that underlies their use. The "*Gloria*," or "*Te Deum*," would be considered very liturgical, because they are a part of the service of a thoroughly liturgical church, while the doxology is not so regarded, because it has no such associations, though it was written by an Episcopal bishop, and came to us from the Church of England.

A part of the worship of God, in public and private, is the instruction of the young people and adults in the doctrines of the Bible. In what might be called the use of doctrinal or didactic forms for teaching truth, the Presbyterian Church leads the world, as to the extent of its forms and the general use made of them. The Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms are the most elaborate, thorough, logical, and scriptural forms for teaching truth for human edification and divine glory ever devised by man.

The General Assembly was wise in approving and recommending forms for funerals and marriages. The time had come to do it. Legislation is of little value except as an expression or crystallization of the public sentiment which those represented by the legislating body entertain. To have adopted forms for marriages and funerals fifty years ago would have been impossible, or if recommended they would have been used but little. The church was not ready for it. But now this legislation which gives the church optional forms for these two services is accepted by the great majority of our ministers and people. They have decided that funeral sermons or orations are inexpedient, and not to edification on most occasions. Our ministers, in the cities particularly, do not now usually preach sermons at funerals. The distinguished pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, of Richmond, Va., gave public notice to his own church, and also before the Synod of Virginia, in a sermon, that there should be no sermon nor oration at his obsequies. God grant it shall be a long time before that sad event occurs, but when it does, no doubt his wishes will be carried out.

For a long time our ministers have been using funeral services made up of Scripture passages, collated by themselves, or prepared and published by well known divines. The Rev. Archibald Hodge, D. D., recently deceased, prepared one of the most acceptable books of forms for funeral and other services.

At last the church has decided that forms for funerals are desirable and edifying, and that without curtailing the liberty of any man, it is well for the church to have a form of its own, carefully prepared, and

recommended for use by the ministers, containing not only the Scripture passages to be read, but also forms of prayer to be said, or used as models, by him who officiates. There can be little doubt but that this funeral service will come into general use in the course of time.

In the matter of marriages it has become evident long ago that the church needed a service of its own. Ministers were often requested to make their service short on a particular occasion, or to use the Episcopal form. How much better to have our own service, printed and bound up in our hymn-books, for all to use who wish to, and that the contracting parties and others concerned could know beforehand what is expected of them at the solemn scene.

The Revised Directory contains a form of covenant to be used in the baptism of infants, and a statement and form for the public admission of persons to the Lord's Supper. The great propriety of such forms will be manifest on a moment's reflection. Persons who are to answer certain important questions in taking vows upon themselves in one of the supreme moments of their lives, should certainly know beforehand what they will be called upon to assent to. It is but just, and they will feel far more the solemnity of the act if they have already meditated upon the vows they are about to assume. This is true both of the order for making a public profession and also for infant baptism. In the form for making a public profession there is a distinction drawn between those who are joining the church by baptism and the baptized children, members of the church by birthright, who are merely being admitted to the communion on a public profession of their faith. Presbyterians have fallen into a most un-Presbyterian use of words in speaking of our baptized children, a use that tends to do harm to parents and children alike. If they are members of the church by birth and baptism, why should we speak to them of "joining the church" when they come to years of discretion and appear to be born again? If we constantly speak of their "*joining the church,*" they and others will, of course, think they are *not* members, whereas one of the great distinctive and glorious doctrines of our church is that of "infant membership."

The form for public professions in the Revised Directory brings plainly forward the distinction between the baptized and the unbaptized who seek admission to the Lord's Supper. The use of this form, and the one for baptisms, will undoubtedly tend to rectify this serious mistake which we have made.

It is not improbable that we may also have some day a brief scrip-

tural and optional form for the administration of the Lord's Supper. So conservative a man as the distinguished and beloved Prof. T. E. Peck, D. D., of Union Seminary, Va., now translated, in a letter to the writer last winter stated that, in his opinion there was great need of a form for the Communion. If the church comes to feel its need of such a form, it will doubtless be prepared.

The Presbyterian Church has always been extremely conservative in the use of the liturgical element in the direct worship of the sanctuary, and there is little danger of its going very far in that direction. The Scottish church started out in 1561 with Knox's Book of Common Order, which was largely a translation of Calvin's liturgy. But the aggressions of the English, endeavoring to force Episcopacy upon the Scotch, the visible representative of which was the "Book of Common Prayer," caused the people north of the Tweed to give up their own simpler forms, and, turning with disgust from all printed forms, to adopt the Directory of Worship, in the middle of the seventeenth century, prepared by the Westminster Assembly.

The Reformed (Presbyterian) churches of the continent of Europe have always had brief liturgies for public worship as well as for the special purposes provided for by our optional forms, except, that for a long time after the Reformation there was no provision for funeral services.

The liturgies of these churches have grown but little, if any. They are still very brief, consisting, in the order for Sabbath services, of little more than the Ten Commandments, the Apostles' Creed, and the prayers, all of which are optional. In Calvin's old church, in Geneva, to-day, the service is conducted almost identically as when the great reformer filled the pulpit.

The decadence of spiritual power in the continental churches is due not to the small liturgical element in their services, but to other causes one of which, doubtless, has been the paralyzing influence of the union of church and state.

The use of many forms, excluding spontaneity of thought and expression, must produce more or less formalism, if the same words are used every Sabbath, and especially, also, if they are used in addresses to God, either said or sung; but the use of forms of doctrinal statement, and forms of covenant for admission into the church and for baptisms, will produce beneficial results, because they are intended mainly for instruction, and not for direct worship.

Forms of singing God's praise are necessary for reasons too obvious

to mention. We must have hymn-books, liturgies of praise, from which selections shall be made for each service. But forms for prayer to be used every Sabbath are very liable to become the instrument of lip service, and there is little probability of their ever being adopted to any extent by the Presbyterian Church. The only real worship is that which comes from the heart, and the use of the same set of forms at every service, must, in the end, obstruct rather than encourage that outpouring of the soul in penitence, love, and faith, which is most blessed for the worshipper, and most acceptable to God.

ROBERT P. KERR.

*Richmond, Va.*

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### THE BIRMINGHAM CONFERENCE.

THIS conference was held in accordance with the action of the last General Assembly (see Minutes of 1893, page 29), namely: "5. That the Assembly renew the authority given last year to its Executive Committee, or representatives thereof, to confer with the Freedmen's Board, or its representatives, or any committee appointed for the purpose by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, at such a time and place as may be agreed upon by the parties to the conference, upon the following paper:

"Since the two churches are already practically agreed as to the things to be done in the work of evangelizing the negroes, to-wit, the thorough education of a godly ministry, the daily religious training of colored youth in denominational schools, and the constant presentation of the gospel directly to the people by pastors and evangelists, it is proposed: (1), To unite the work of the two churches in behalf of the negroes in an effort to build up an independent negro Presbyterian Church, or, failing to agree upon this, (2), To bring the work of the two churches for this cause into closer sympathy by practical coöperation in every way possible."

There was not much encouragement for the appointment of this committee. An effort was made in 1887 to accomplish the same object, in connection with several others, which proved entirely ineffectual. Committees were appointed by the Northern and Southern General Assemblies to confer on this subject. They met first in New York, in December, and then in Atlanta, in April following. They spent much time in deliberating on this matter, but could not come to any agreement.

These conferences developed a wide divergence of views and aims.

The principal point of difference related to the organization of a separate African Presbyterian Church. The policy of the two churches had already been fixed. The Southern Church, by repeated deliverances, had decided that such a separate organization was best for both blacks and whites. This was no longer an open question with us. Hence, the action of 1893 appointing this committee reiterated our purpose to insist upon such a separate organization. The committee on our part was authorized to agree upon some plan of "closer sympathy and practical coöperation." It was evidently not contemplated by the Assembly that this committee should take any action inconsistent with the settled policy of our church.

It is to be regretted, therefore, that the trend of the proceedings of this conference was in an entirely different direction. It was in the interest, not of coöperation, but of amalgamation. We were not surprised, therefore, to read that the conference closed with a public meeting in favor of the unification of Presbyterianism, which can mean nothing else but simple organic union. Thus it is clear that the instructions of our Assembly were entirely disregarded or resisted, whether intentionally or not we will not undertake to say.

Our first grand objection, therefore, to the conclusions of this conference is, that it fails to make any provision for carrying out the well-known policy and purpose of our church with regard to the organization of a separate colored church. There was, indeed, no mention of this point in these proceedings, so far as we know. That was studiously kept out of sight. It would have been dangerous to introduce it. But it could not be ignored in the carrying out of the plan adopted. Surely our church is not prepared either to abandon or to change its policy. To attempt to do this would produce confusion and discord throughout our bounds. The Northern plan would not suit our people, nor do we believe it would promote the interests of the colored members nor accord with their views truly ascertained. They desire separation, and were the first to apply for the organization of separate presbyteries. They were twitted for being "the white man's church." This charge interfered with their acceptability to their own people. They, indeed, desire the continued help of the white church, but long for independence. We could still give this help and gratify their desire for independence. It is felt also that this arrangement would afford the best method of training them, and aid in their highest development. Hence we steadily pursue the plan that we have adopted.

The action of this conference took, indeed, the form of attempted coöperation, but when we come to study the plan proposed, we are confronted by additional and very serious objections. The first one relates to the controlling power. This, we are asked to lodge in the hands of a *Board*. We need not remind the readers of this Review of the decided opposition of our church to the whole system of ecclesiastical boards as distinguished from committees. Our position upon this subject was reached after protracted discussions. It was argued very fully and with great ability. There were "giants in those days" on both sides of this question. The most illustrious names in our church are identified with this discussion, and it was reasonable to hope that the controversy was at an end, and that we had reached a very firm and clear decision. We do not propose to re-open this controversy. The decision is incorporated in our Book of Church Order. We hope that very few desire to have it reversed, but we are sorry to have to say that this Birmingham committee have proposed to commit the most difficult of all departments of church work to the management of an ecclesiastical board. We cannot think that our Assembly will listen to this for a moment. We are aware that it is thought to apply to only one topic and one form of church work. But it concedes the whole principle, and if carried out, we must have a new Book of Church Order.

But the way in which it proposes to carry it out is still more objectionable; and that is, that the power be lodged in a totally different branch of the church from ours, a really foreign body, and to that foreign body it offers by far the larger share of power and responsibility. The Northern Church is to provide fifteen members of this board, and we are to furnish seven. Thus we are called on to surrender in effect the entire control to the Board of Freedmen. We do not question the ability and integrity of these fifteen members; but we submit, is this arrangement fair and equitable? And is it right thus to abandon the whole work so far as our agency is concerned? Why not say this in plain terms?

We are aware that the Northern Church has the advantage in numbers and wealth. But the questions to be decided reach far beyond the matter of numbers and dollars. It cannot be forgotten that the masses of the people to be legislated for live *amongst us*. It is no presumption in us to say that we know and understand them better than our Northern brethren can; nor are we slow to advance the claim that we are as deeply interested in their spiritual welfare as any other

Christians on the globe. Our relations to them involve many points of difficulty and delicacy; and we believe that our people are capable of dealing with them as well as those who are comparative strangers.

It is very true that we have not shown the zeal and liberality that we ought to have shown towards them; but we trust that there will be a new interest enkindled on this subject, the very outgrowth of this discussion, that will result in a more faithful discharge of this duty.

Surely, when it is proposed to commit this grave responsibility to the hands of strangers, our churches will be aroused to more liberal and vigorous efforts. The proposed plan, if adopted, would weaken, if not destroy, the existing interest.

We cannot evade our responsibility in this matter. However we may try to legislate it out of existence, God will still hold us bound by it.

Another feature of this proposed plan to which we object is, that we are asked to conduct this work outside of our bounds, where influences would naturally prevail against our honest views, and where it would be inconvenient, and perhaps impossible, for even the small number of the members of this board allotted to us to attend.

It would be as reasonable to remove the legislature of Georgia to the city of Philadelphia. It is urged, indeed, that to change the location of this board would endanger the tenure of its property. Surely we have some vested rights ourselves, and we do not propose to sell out to any body of men, no matter how good they may be. This itself proves how impracticable is the whole plan. Taken all together, we regard this scheme as at least dangerous. It would prove an "entangling alliance." We trust our General Assembly will reject it. We sincerely believe, if undertaken, it would be one of perpetual regret. We therefore solemnly warn our people against it.

If, indeed, as has been suggested, it should be the introductory step towards organic union, we do not know of a more speedy way of reaching that end. We cannot for a moment believe that our people are ready for this tremendous result. We are not prepared to surrender the principles on which our separate existence as a church was projected. They are to us as sacred as the graves of our fathers, yea, as sacred as what we regard the true principles of the whole church. We see no reason for giving up our identity. We believe that God has a special work for us to do, and we are not disposed to turn aside from that, and that we can perform it best by our continued separation. In saying this we do not disparage the claims of our Northern

brethren; nor would we fail to record our admiration of their recent testimony in favor of sound doctrine in a time of great peril. We still hail them as allies, but we feel assured that we can best accomplish our part of the work which God has given us to do by continuing our separate existence; and furthermore, we are satisfied that this course would promote harmony and brotherly love in the most effectual manner. Let us work on in our several lines and seek to preserve "the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace."

C. A. STILLMAN.

*Tuscaloosa, Ala.*

### A FIFTY YEARS' PASTORATE.

A NOTABLE sermon on a most notable occasion is the "Semi-Centennial Discourse, delivered in the Presbyterian Church, Natchez, Miss., December 31, 1893, by Rev. Jos. B. Stratton, D. D., pastor," and published by that church. Bound with this sermon is a brief biographical sketch of Dr. Stratton, a sketch of the Natchez church, and a letter from Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D., expressing regret at his inability to be present, and conveying a fraternal greeting. Add to these a picture of the pastor and a picture of the venerable and stately edifice in which he officiates, and we have a pamphlet of more than ordinary interest, worthy of a place in the archives of the church. The occasion of this sermon was the completion by this eminent servant of God of an uninterrupted pastorate of fifty years over the Natchez church, which occasion was duly celebrated by the congregation. We know of no other pastor in the South who has been honored of God with so long and continuous a service in one church as Dr. Stratton. A fifty years' pastorate in this restless day of short and shortening pastorates is phenomenal, and its completion well calls for commemoration. Present on either side in the pulpit when this discourse was delivered, and assisting in the solemn services, were Rev. J. H. Alexander, D. D., who only on the previous Sabbath had retired from a successful pastorate of thirty-eight years in Kosciusko, Miss., and Rev. T. R. Markham, D. D., whose consecrated ministry of thirty-seven years in La Fayette Church, New Orleans, entitles him to the honor accorded him by his brethren of being a leader in our southwestern Zion.<sup>1</sup> Had Rev. John Hunter, D. D., of Jackson, Miss., and

<sup>1</sup> The sad tidings come to us, while this number of the QUARTERLY is going through the press, of the death, on March 12th, 1894, of this eminent servant of God.



Dr. Palmer, whose respective pastorates are each in their thirty-eighth year, not been providentially prevented from being present, Dr. Stratton would have had around him the four of his companions in the Synod whose pastorates most nearly approximate his own in length, and the manifest blessings of God upon whose protracted ministrations in one field have been as conspicuous as in his own case at Natchez.

It may be a relatively short pastorate is better for some ministers and some churches. Leaders in the church, worthy of being heard, have declared that ten years is long enough in one pulpit. Certain it is, that few outrun a generation. Glancing casually over the rolls published with the Minutes of the Assembly for 1864, whose names do we see there that now, after the flight of thirty years, are upholding the banner of Christ in the same church and community as then? Besides the names above cited, we discover those of Burgett, in Mobile; Hoge, in Richmond; Park, in Knoxville; Rumble, in Salisbury; Smith, in Greensboro, and a few others.

But as rare as was the occasion that called forth this commemoration, the sermon itself is equally noteworthy, not only as revealing the quality of the man who delivered it, and so giving us some insight into the conditions on his part which made so long a ministry in one church both possible and useful, but also because of the decided testimony which the author, as one entitled by long experience and wide observation to speak, bears on many of the burning questions before the church to-day. As a voice from the past and yet in the living present, he speaks from high vantage-ground on current tendencies, and tells us, his younger brethren, how most effectually we may handle the word of life in these times of upheaval and resistance to the truth.

The text was, "For I determined not to know anything among you save Jesus Christ and him crucified." (1 Cor. i. 2.) Referring to the expertness with which Paul so frequently focalizes the contents of a great circle of truth in a single centre, the sermon opens by citing this verse as an instance of such. During his eighteen months' mission in Corinth Paul's teachings must have embraced innumerable subjects which could not have been included, categorically or literally, in the term "Jesus Christ and him crucified." What he meant was, that everything in the system of religion which he taught rested upon Christ and his work as its foundation, and led upwards to Christ and his service as its consummation. Every doctrine, precept, duty; every

rite, ordinance, and sacrament, holds its place, and is invested with its function, by this great fact of "Christ and him crucified," as every particle of matter in the material world has its position determined and its movements regulated, by the great law of gravitation. The mighty force which lies in the life and death of Christ was, in one sense, Paul's only theme. Yet, in another sense, that theme included in it a vast amount of underlying and environing knowledge. The speaker then called attention to the manifest departure from the line prescribed by the Apostle for himself in much of the religious teachings of the present day. As evidence of such departure, he cited the desire in certain quarters for the simplifying, weakening, or banishing of creeds and confessions of faith; the inauguration of a distinct school of evangelism which repudiates all systematic theology as at variance with the true knowledge of Christ; and the widespread antipathy in the Christian world to what is called doctrinal preaching. From the press and the pulpit we hear, not infrequently, the startling war-cries, "Back to Christ!" and "Down with dogma!" as though professed expounders of religion had fallen under a Satanic influence like that which entered into Judas, and in their zeal for dogma had sacrificed their fidelity to Christ. By attaching a sinister meaning to this term "dogma," and classing all doctrine with it under this meaning, these "liberalists" have sought to convict teachers of religious doctrine of hiding the pure knowledge of Christ under their own speculations, and of being false to Christ while endeavoring to maintain a theory or to uphold a sect. With these innovators, the speaker said, Paul could never have consorted. His determination to know nothing among the Corinthians save Jesus Christ and him crucified, meant, "I have determined to make known to you *all* in your own character and condition which made it necessary that Jesus Christ should come, and *all* the divine purposes which were concerned in and accomplished by his coming, and *all* the terms upon which the benefits of his coming were to be secured, and *all* the results which were to be effected in the believer's experience and in the history of the world by his coming; and *all* these, in their combination, constitute the body of systematic theology which the church, at least ever since the Reformation, has sought to teach. The Christ of Paul was no vague and misty object like a floating cloud, ever changing its form and tint, but a most fixed and definite orb like the sun, maintaining its outline and immensity of disc, charged with manifold relations, the unfolding of which requires that we pass under review a

vast field of concurrent and affiliated truth, and the exposition of which teems with doctrine. The "liberalist" sees Christ as a surface without bulk. He concedes to Christ but one moral attribute, and that is love. Not, however, that love with body, substance and validity, whose breadth and length and height Paul prays that we may comprehend, and which, he says, passeth knowledge. To preach love alone is not to preach Christ. To do that requires that we preach all the doctrines that centre in Christ, the whole round and range of authenticated knowledge with reference to Christ.

The speaker here deplores that there should be in this age so many signs of a departure from the Apostolic model on the part of the ministry, and of disaffection towards doctrinal preaching on the part of Christian people. In our country and in the Presbyterian Church these faults are prevalent only on a limited scale. In the Southern branch of our church they are practically unknown. In our Southern church at least there is no controversy between Christ and dogma, and the conviction still prevails that it is through evangelical doctrine that men are to be led to Christ. It was needless that the speaker should here remind his hearers of what they well knew, that for fifty years his pastorate had been conducted upon the model of Paul's. He found comfort in the recollection that when he came to them he came with Paul's determination to know nothing among them save Jesus Christ and him crucified, and in the consciousness that he had consistently carried out that determination until that very hour. His conception of the pastoral office was the simple and specific one of *teacher*, not that of a priest, or an exorcist, or a medium and dispenser of supernatural grace. His commission ran: Go ye and *teach* men to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.

After dwelling on the difficulties which invest the preaching of the word, growing out of the variety and magnitude and awfulness of the themes in the word which call for exposition, the speaker adverted to his first sermon in Natchez, delivered while he was but a licentiate, May 27, 1843, which was an index of his determination, at his very introduction to the people, to know nothing among them save Jesus Christ and him crucified, an advertisement that he believed his legitimate vocation was to be a teacher of Scriptural doctrine. That first keynote he made the keynote of all his subsequent teaching. This of course necessitated that he should teach, as connected with and growing out of his central theme, all the practical duties of man, the elements of common Christian morality.

As was proper in such a discourse, the history of the church received notice. Beginning with the visit to Natchez and to the Territory in 1801 of three North Carolina missionaries, the history of the church was traced down to the present date. A building was erected in 1812, an organization was effected in 1817, and in 1828 a new edifice was erected for their sanctuary, which, after having undergone many changes, is the building now occupied by the congregation. Worthy tributes were paid to his predecessors in the pastoral office, of whom there had been but three, also to the elders and deacons with whom he had been associated and who now serve the church. Speaking of accessions to the church, and commenting upon the largest enrolment he had made in any one year as having been the result, to a great degree, of the labors in the congregation of a well-known and beloved evangelist, he used this marked language: "It has to be sadly confessed that the promise of increased vitality and efficiency in our body which had been given us by this increase of our numbers has not been fully realized; and I am only confirmed at the close of my ministry in the conviction with which I began it, that the most assured method of building up a church is to be found in the faithful, continuous, and prayerful application of the doctrine of 'Jesus Christ and him crucified,' through the pulpit, the Sabbath-school and the home." He expresses his preference for "a quiet work of grace, without unusual stimulants."

Most graphic, indeed, is that part of this historic discourse that refers to the vicissitudes which have in the past half-century befallen the speaker's State and city, a series of changes so remarkable as to outdo the surprises of romance. And eloquent is the description which he draws of the close and sympathetic companionship in which as pastor and people they had walked through all these ebbs and flows of historic tide, these radiances and eclipses which have chequered the social sky. And if the church which he served is to live, if as the body of Christ and the depository of the word of the Lord, it must like that word endure forever, it must live, not in memories and traditions of former activities and former blessings, but in its living members. "It must live through a faith in you which discerns through all its outward structure and order the living Christ who is enthroned within. It is not the person of its ministers, however venerated and beloved; it is not the traditions of its sainted forefathers, nor honorary tablets on its walls, nor swelling numbers in the columns of its register, that make a church, but a present active sense of the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ in the hearts of its constituency, and a living practical knowledge of St. Paul's great doctrine of Jesus and him crucified."

Turning his eyes to the future, and contemplating the disclosures that sleep in the womb of the coming half-century, he says: "It is not improbable that a great battle will have to be joined between the confessors of revealed Christianity and the votaries of competing false religions. The strange spectacle has been presented to us during the present year, and in an American city, of what has been called a 'Parliament of the World's Religions.' Whatever good or evil may come out of this extraordinary convention, one thing seems to me clear, and that is, that the crown of our adorable Lord and Redeemer suffered a grievous dishonor when Mohammed, Confucius, Buddha, Brahma, theosophists, agnostics and rationalists were allowed to stand side by side with him as claimants for the suffrages of men. And another thing that seems to me equally clear in this conference was, that these champions of false faiths evinced a boldness in maintaining their systems which shows that they are prepared never without a death-struggle to surrender them." Christ was made to stand as their peer amongst these errorists in Chicago, whereas he is their foeman and their conqueror.

In drawing his discourse to a close, the speaker alluded with emphasis to three things:

First, his personal testimony, after actual experiment of more than a half-century, of the value of the religion which he had tried not only to teach but to live. He had found it true to all its pledges.

Second, the value of self-denial. It does not belong to the world's philosophy, but it does to Christ's, that the sacrifice of self, when endured in obedience or submission to the will of God, is a source of truer enjoyment than any which the indulgence of our natural inclinations or desires can give us. It is the duty of the Christian minister to be, to a large extent, the servant of all men. He ceases to be his own when he becomes the under-shepherd of Christ's flock. But there is abundant compensation, even in this life, for all the hardships of his servitude, for Christ knew the hearts of men better than the teachers of mental science or political economy. He knew that self-improvement for a good object enriches the soul with a satisfaction sweeter and more real than any which the acquisition of the means of merely selfish gratification can give it.

Third, religion can make affliction a benefit; not that affliction has lost its literal quality of painfulness, but through the painfulness of it other sensations have been introduced into the mind, by which what was in itself bitter has been transmuted into sweetness. Looking

back from his mellowed sunset hours over the adversities which have shattered his hopes, and the bereavements which have torn his heart-strings, the aged believer can trace to their influence the quietude and cheerfulness with which his eventide is suffused.

With the declaration that this was a valedictory message he was uttering, and with a grateful recognition of the unvarying kindness which had been lavished upon him through these fifty years by an affectionate people, the speaker invoked upon them the fulness of the blessings of the Crucified, and concluded his address.

We have here sufficiently revealed the secret of Dr. Stratton's long and successful pastorate. Equipped with ample training, grounded in a sound theology, he adopted at the outset of his labors Paul's conception of the ministerial office as his. In singleness of mind, unselfishness of purpose and unwavering fidelity to Christ, Paul was his model. His piety, his modesty, his touching humility, his eminently discreet and practical mind, his sweet and contented spirit, his indomitable habit of hard work, his splendid scholarship, his classic grace and elegance as a writer and speaker, are all conditions contributing to his prolonged usefulness, down to a ripe old age, in a single charge. It is easy to see how the absence of these or his possessing them in an inferior degree, might have rendered his a briefer pastorate.

Yet I am disposed to believe that the cause of short pastorates is more to-day in the churches than in the pastors. Natchez has stood by Dr. Stratton, received his gospel, upheld his hands, discharged her part of the pastoral contract. Had she not, her ungratefulness or irresponsiveness would years ago have driven her beloved shepherd and bishop to some other city. Too often our churches have other cravings than for plain gospel preaching. So many in every congregation chafe at hearing nothing but the monotonous story of the cross. The pulpit must be, for them, sensational rather than instructive. The Bible and our standard devotional works are not read. The world and its themes have possession of their minds. Now it is safe to say that no sensational preacher, who panders to this popular taste instead of striving to elevate and purify it, can hold a long pastorate in any church. Only teaching pastors develop staying qualities. To be such they must be educated men with positive beliefs; must make much of the cross, and sink their own personality in the message they deliver. When I hear of pastors advertising their sermons under flash titles; of song services, floral decorations, choir exhibitions, addresses on current topics, social, literary and political, being made the attraction instead of plain, in-

structive doctrinal preaching from the pulpit, I know that the congregation, taught to relish such substitutes for the gospel, will soon demand another pastor. Resorting to these carnal devices is to sacrifice all intelligent, spiritual interest, which alone can be permanent, to secure a hasty, easy spurt of outward interest that will prove as short-lived as it is shallow. Our churches want to be diverted rather than edified. They degrade the gospel in clamoring that it be popularized. Then the demand is almost universal for the traveling evangelist as the vehicle for securing the Holy Ghost, and the reliance for renewed life is in the galvanism and spasmodic effort of the revival meeting, the thrilling results of which are joyfully heralded to the world through the religious press. The incongruous and unripe elements thus gathered in, often but poorly taught in the doctrines they profess and the duties they espouse, too often demand a constant repetition of the exciting demonstrations under which they were brought in. The cold relapses of such over-stimulated churches tend to drive out the disheartened pastor from his post, to seek elsewhere that responsiveness to his message that he feels he must have or else suffer in his own spiritual life.

In these periods of decline there is often such a falling off in the financial support of the pastor as necessitates his removal. I am inclined to think that in scores of our churches inefficiency in the diaconate is the cause of ministerial changes. The people may not be desirous of a change. They are able and willing to accord a support, but the dilatory and unbusiness-like methods of deacons and collectors allow hopeless arrears to accumulate, till the discouraged pastor, to save his self-respect, is forced to "quit and leave." It is not the call in front of him that leads to the change so much as it is the pressure of neglect and the absence of appreciation pushing from behind. Thus true and godly ministers swap about from church to church of coördinate rank and strength, only to secure that quickening in the activity, attendance and liberality of the congregation that we see frequently following a pastoral change, and lasting, it may be, until the novelty of the new relation is worn away.

On the other hand, pastors must be very discreet men if they would retain the undivided support and affections of a congregation. They must be thoroughly consecrated in their walk, and in the pulpit must know only Jesus Christ and him crucified. If they are not diligent students, they will fall by the way. A few months ago Dr. Stratton, in a letter to me, stated that his Hebrew Bible was an old friend

from which he could not yet afford to part. Cease hard study, and you may look you out another field. Here is where many ministers are at fault, and are responsible, rather than their churches, for the curtailment of their pastorates. They grow weary, and wish to go where they can use their "barrel," where they can dispense stale bread. But no long pastorate can be maintained on a barrel, so another change is made necessary. Is it not true that the multiplication of social diversions, and the great volume of ephemeral literature that is daily dumped into the pastor's study, prevent the perusal and mastery of those older and healthier and more educative works of literature and theology that build up the mind and heart, instead of dissipating all intellectual energy, as the modern twenty-four-paged daily newspaper tends to do? Very many of our ministers now read stories more than they do divinity. Let us learn the conditions of success by observing the character and methods of those who succeed.

W. A. ALEXANDER.

*Southwestern Presbyterian University.*



## VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

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### PALMER'S THEOLOGY OF PRAYER.

THE THEOLOGY OF PRAYER, as viewed in the Religion of Nature and in the System of Grace. By B. M. Palmer, D. D., LL. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, New Orleans, La. Pp. 352. Price, \$2.00. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1894.

As a pulpit orator, Dr. Palmer has been the pride of the Southern Presbyterian Church for near half a century. Since his occupancy, the pulpit of the First Presbyterian Church in New Orleans has been a central throne of eloquence. But in the midst of his consuming duties as preacher and pastor, he has found the time to devote his great talent to authorship. He has issued two volumes of sermons, and several small books of a devotional character. But the book which has most rejoiced the church is the *Life of Dr. Thornwell*—a book in which the consummate rhetorician tells the story of the church's consummate theologian. The treatise which is before us will perhaps outrank in some respects the *Life of Dr. Thornwell*, and establish for itself a permanent and honorable place in our literature, for here his rhetorical and discursive powers unite to expound the theology of prayer. The topic is, in itself, of vast interest, and the manner in which it is handled is as skilful as it is attractive. We shall attempt to make an exhibit of the contents of this volume, and then venture some comments upon it as a whole.

Dr. Palmer, upon the title-page, cleaves his subject into two parts: (1), Prayer in natural religion; and (2), Prayer in the religion of grace. The amplification of the first division extends throughout twelve chapters, and covers one hundred and seventy-nine pages, while the treatment of the second division embraces ten chapters, and one hundred and fifty-seven pages. The last chapter, headed *Conclusion*, is composed of general inferences and reflections.

I. *The Nature of Prayer*.—In its most general conception, prayer is an act of worship—an act which goes the stretch of every faculty, and which is drastic of every power of the soul. But in the last analysis, prayer is “the language of creature dependence upon that God from whom being itself is derived,” and where that dependence has become abnormal in the soul's recognition and exercise of it, prayer is “the language of guilt.” “Here, then, is prayer under three aspects: It is the appeal of creaturely dependence; it is the wail of the sinner's guilt; it is the articulate worship of an intelligent soul. Under the first head God is regarded in his *natural* relation as the creator and preserver of all his creatures. Under the second, he is contemplated in his *gracious* relation as the Redeemer and Saviour of sinners. Under the third, he is adored in his consummate holiness and glory.” (Pp. 13, 14, 347, 348, 15, 19, 20.) From these determinations, four inferences are drawn:

1. Prayer has a place under every form of religion, natural or revealed, on earth or in heaven. (P. 20.)

2. The foregoing description of prayer holds, as in a solution, all the seven parts of prayer—adoration, praise, petition, thanksgiving, confession, supplication, intercession. (P. 24.)

3. There is inlaid in this view of prayer an imperative and universal obligation to perform this duty. Not to pray "is an apostasy from ourselves, not less than from God." (P. 25.)

4. Prayer, from its very nature, can be addressed only to a personal God, standing in immediate relation to the subjects of his government, and to the creatures of his making and preserving. "It is no apostrophe to bald and lawless force, nor to blind and impersonal fate." (P. 25)

Having defined prayer by a method of logical description and illustration, our author proceeds still further to deliver his subject by a process of division and analysis. "The seven-fold division of prayer into adoration, praise, confession, supplication, petition, thanksgiving, and intercession, is yielded by our analysis—just as the light resolves into the colors of the spectrum. Like these colors also, they shade into each other, so as not to be sharply defined." (P. 27.) These are the seven words which compose the vocabulary of prayer. As the language of worship, it breaks into adoration and praise, and as the language of creaturely dependence, it frames itself into confession, supplication, petition, thanksgiving, intercession.

II. *Prayer a Duty.*—This topic logically succeeds the preceding one. The duty is a universal and imperative one. The nature as defined infolds the idea of obligation. But the grounds upon which its binding character rests may be particularized into five distinct, though logically dependent, heads:

1. The duty is created by an explicit and dogmatic command of Jehovah. This command is found in verbal form in the Bible. It is found logically enveloped in the very nature of prayer. (P. 51.)

2. The three aspects of prayer concur in binding it as a duty upon man. He is a creature, a sinner, a worshipper; as a creature he is bound to use the language of dependence, else he employs the language of self-dependence and self-assertion, which would be untrue to the facts of his case; as a sinner, he must employ the language of confession; as a worshipper, he must use the language of adoration. (P. 54.)

3. Every creature has the connatural instincts necessary to its preservation. Man with all his intellectual endowments is no exception to this rule. Prayer is precisely the instinct of his religious nature. It is the creature feeling after help; the sinner feeling after pardon; the worshipper feeling after God. (P. 57.)

4. The faculties and powers of the human soul are not, at the inception of individual life, in developed form, but rather in the form of potentialities and capacities. Dr. Chalmers saw the immortality of the soul as a necessary condition for the fulfilment of the promises and prophecies of infant life. In a similar manner the ends of discipline make prayer a necessary means. The intellect, in quest of truth; the affections, in quest of goodness; the taste, in quest of the beautiful; the will, in quest of power and righteousness, all demand prayer as a means to their respective ends. This argument founds upon the educative in prayer. (P. 61.)

5. Divine and human elements of activity coact in many events in human history. Here enigmas, apparent contradictions, and seeming frictions emerge

to vex, to bewilder, and often to drive to despair. In prayer one learns that the two agencies do intelligently blend with each other, and he is enabled to rest in contentment where he cannot see the mode of harmonies. Peace of mind, in the presence of insoluble problems of providence and grace, binds prayer as a duty upon the very intellect of man. (P. 64.)

III. *Objections to Prayer.*—These follow at the logical heels of duty. They are distributed into five classes; each is stated and then answered.

1. An impeachment of the divine perfections. If God be infinitely wise, good, and powerful, he will devise what is best for his creatures without any suggestions from them. Prayer is a meddlesome impertinence. It implies some degree of distrust in the moral Ruler of the universe. It is a species of ignorant dictation to one who ought to know his own business, and who ought to be willing to do right and be generous without the stimulation of his creatures. To this objection Dr. Palmer makes four replies:

(1.) "The objection does not lie; the divine judgment in the premises being exactly the reverse." The premise of the objection is, God does not wish the creature to pray, but his desire is, that the creature leave him to his own course. The premise of fact is, that God commands the creature to importunately press him in his own behalf. If prayer be an impertinence, it is impertinence divinely commanded. (P. 69.)

(2.) The necessity of prayer has been found imbedded in man's original moral constitution. The Deity is the author of the original constitution. It is absurd to allege that he implanted an impertinent duty in the creature's moral make-up. (P. 72.)

(3.) The objection, carried out, would cancel all religion. The creature need not lean upon God, for God will support him any way; the sinner need not make confession, for God will provide pardon without it, if, in his judgment, pardon ought to be granted; the worshipper need not render his homage and reverence, for such an offering is an impertinent insinuation that God is dependent upon the creature for these delights. (P. 76.)

(4.) The objection misconstrues the office and nature of prayer. It assumes that prayer is a counselling of Jehovah, when it is the language of dependence and an expressed deference to the divine judgment. Every form of human activity would be barred by the argument of the objection. "It is only a minute philosophy, intoxicated with the fumes of its own speculation, and independent of the trammels of logic, that will undertake to wall in the Deity behind his own attributes." (P. 78.)

2. Prayer has no place in a government by law. This is the second objection. In answering the objection, the purpose is not to indicate the true place of prayer in the system of natural law, but to show that there is some place for it; to show the fallacy of the assertion that prayer can have no place in the universe which is governed by law:

(1.) The objection abridges God's liberty when it denies that he can neither control nor suspend any of the laws of nature. In assuming the invariability of law, the objection assumes the supremacy of law above the Creator. The stream thus rises above the source. The assumption is a mere hypothesis. If prayer cannot be answered without an interference with natural law, be it so; God is wise enough and powerful enough to interfere. The objector must deny both the pos-

sibility and probability of miracles. He must deny the possibility of redemption. Such denials show the extremes to which the objector is driven. (P. 82.)

(2.) But the objector modifies his ground. If, he says, the laws of nature are not invariable in essence, they are as a matter of fact. Then it is replied that God, in the original act of planning the universe, may have planned for the answer of every truly conditioned prayer. This is Dr. Chalmers' argument. But it is replied by the objector that the answer is a mere hypothesis. Be it so. It is hypothesis against hypothesis. One is as good as the other. (P. 88.)

(3.) The central answer to the objection is stated by Dr. Palmer in this language: "God provides an answer to prayer through the operation of general laws, in the original arrangements of his providence, prayer being simply the necessary condition." The pivotal words in this reply are, "through the operation of general laws." The gardener brings about the conditions upon which he gets a cabbage from the seed, through the operation of the general laws of nature. It was so planned of God from all eternity. In a similar manner prayer brings into existence certain conditions upon which answers are obtained through the operation of general natural laws. It was so planned by God from all eternity. (P. 90.)

3. The third objection to prayer founds upon the fact that answers to prayers are sometimes withheld—withheld where we would have antecedently expected an answer through the divine interposition. Being disappointed under such circumstances, we must infer that God could not respond because his providence did not cover the case, or that he would not because he is unrighteous in his denials. In either case, prayer is unwarranted and gratuitous.

(1.) "We may err in assuming the request to be intrinsically right, justifying a confident appeal to the divine integrity." (P. 99.)

(2.) "The matter of the prayer may be right, while its spirit may be wrong; and thus lacking the first element of prayer, it is discounted as worthless." (P. 102.)

(3.) "The prayer may have been unexceptionable, both in its substance and in its spirit, whilst the providence of God may have been misconstrued in relation to its answer." (P. 103.)

God has never promised to answer every vagrant wish. To be obtainable, an object must be right in itself; it must be asked for in the proper spirit; it must be in accordance with God's providential plan, making it necessary to condition every prayer with the deferential language, "Thy will be done."

4. Prayer presupposes a state of heart the absence of which renders it an abomination; man does not possess, and cannot originate, the required state of heart; therefore, prayer is to be discouraged, for in discouraging it you are discouraging abominations.

(1.) The appalling principle here affirmed "does not hold in the sphere of our earthly relations, and is unsound in reference to human law." Suppose a debtor acknowledges the claim against him, but pleads an indisposition to pay the debt! (P. 111.)

(2.) The principle affirmed in the objection would "dispense with the obligation to practice any virtue or to attempt any reform." The absence of a proper heart, and even stronger than that, the presence of an improper heart, characterizes every species of moral and spiritual life. If this spiritual *status* exempts from prayer, it exempts from every duty. "The plowing of the wicked is sin." (P. 112.)

(3.) "Our duties to God rest exclusively upon our relations to him, in regard to which the consciousness of responsibility is inextinguishable." (P. 114.) Under this head and at this point Dr. Palmer vigorously defends the justice and goodness of God in constituting the federal relation between Adam and his posterity, out of which relation grew the inability which has been the basis of this fourth objection to prayer.

5. The fifth objection to prayer is founded upon the charge that it leads to fanaticism and mysticism. The objection is superficial, for prayer does not necessarily lead to claims of intimate and private communion with God, which claims react again in vagaries and extravagancies.

(1.) "All true prayer is bounded within the limits of God's sovereign will." (P. 131.)

(2.) "The self-examination required as to the spirit and temper of our prayers forms another protection against fanaticism." (P. 132.)

(3.) "Prayer brings into exercise the full complement of all our faculties, and that, too, in their due and original subordination." (P. 133.)

(4.) "A severe check is imposed upon fanaticism in that we approach God in prayer by an appointed way, and succeed in our petitions solely through the merit of another." (P. 136.)

(5.) "God guards his own supremacy in the answers to prayer, which is an important check to fanaticism." (P. 138.)

IV. *The Place of Prayer in God's Moral Government.*—Having employed the destructive enginery of his argumentation upon the objections to prayer, Dr. Palmer is not content thus to bring in the Scotch verdict, "not proven," but advances the discussion with a view to pointing out precisely and definitely the place of prayer under the administration of God. "The scriptural principle is, not that favors are by our importunity wrung from the reluctance of the Divine Being, but that they antedate the prayer in the determinations of his sovereign and gracious will; and the true spirit of prayer, which he also imparts, is the sign and pledge of the gift to be conveyed. Prayer, then, as already stated, is not the cause which procures through its own efficiency, but merely the antecedent condition upon which a predetermined benefit is suspended. The purpose to give is, on Jehovah's part, sovereign and free; it is the spontaneous movement of his own gracious and loving will. Yet, in the exercise of the same sovereignty and goodness, he inter-poses the prayer of the creature as the channel through which his favor shall descend." (P. 140.) Here in this extract is Dr. Palmer's *theory of prayer*. It is, in relation to the benefits it secures, not a *causa quâ*, but a *causa sine quâ non*.

Foreseeing the objection that Providence seems often to be most generous with those who do not pray at all, Dr. Palmer answers the objection by enumerating four points:

(1.) The question is not what God may do in the exercise of his absolute sovereignty and power, but what is his chosen method of dispensing favors to his children. (P. 148.)

(2.) His benefactions to the wicked may be designed to emphasize the discipline of his children. (P. 148.)

(3.) The prosperous wicked, in their diligent and intelligent coöperation with the will of God in the employment of means and second causes, virtually pray;

though a constructive prayer, and not one in language or spirit, it is, in act, a natural appeal to God, a confession of creaturely dependence. (P. 148.)

(4.) The light of eternity may show that the blessings of the wicked were such only in disguise, while in reality they have turned out to be bitter, the bitterest of all their curses.

But the effects of prayer, besides being thus objective, are also reflexive, developing healthful subjective changes in the soul itself.

(1.) Prayer "deepens the channel of our religious nature." (P. 150.)

(2.) "It imparts truthfulness to character." (P. 153.)

(3.) "It makes direct issue with all sin." (P. 156.)

(4.) "It strengthens the bond of human brotherhood." (P. 161.)

(5.) "It weaves us intelligently into the divine plan." (P. 162.)

(6.) "It lifts Christian experience above fluctuating frames." (P. 164.)

As a good conclusion to the first part of his book, Dr. Palmer devotes a polemical chapter to the Dignity of Prayer; and then opens the second part with an outline delineation of the Covenant of Grace. He is thus brought to the discussion of the place and office of prayer in the scheme of supernatural and redemptive religion. With the doctrine of the Trinity as a principle of division, he distributes his thoughts under three heads: (1), The relation of prayer to the Father; (2), The relation of prayer to the Son; and (3), The relation of prayer to the Spirit. "The natural mode of communication, however, would be to the Father, *through* the Son, and *by* the Spirit; these prepositions simply indicating the coördination of the parties to the covenant, and of their several offices." (P. 200.)

I. *In the method of grace prayer is offered to the Father:*

1. As "the official representative of the Godhead." (P. 202.)

2. As "the seat of sovereignty in providence." (P. 205.)

3. As the enforcer of "the claims of violated law." (P. 206.)

4. As "the author and source of adoption into his family." (P. 208.)

5. As the embodiment of "the obligation of supreme worship." (P. 210.)

6. As "the portion of the soul." (P. 211.)

II. *Prayer in its relation to the Son is a topic of "exceeding breadth."* To bring the discussion of it within bounds, Dr. Palmer rules the subject by the three mediatorial offices of Christ:

1. It is the official distinction of the Son to be the revealer of the Father. From this broad exercise of his prophetic function, the doctrine and duty of prayer receive certain qualifications, as follows:

(1.) "The truth thus revealed furnishes the material of true prayer."

(2.) "Prayer gathers confidence to itself from the entire certainty of the truth addressed to faith."

(3.) In prayer faith accepts the "revelation as delivered in the form of testimony."

(4.) In this divine revelation faith lays hold upon "a constructive pledge of its efficiency in all who truly receive it as the seed of the new birth."

(5.) "Prayer is wonderfully enriched by the new discoveries of truth which this revelation unfolds."

(6.) "Through the truth thus revealed, holy beings hold communion with each other and with God." (Pp. 224-228.)

2. Christ, in the discharge of his mediatorial office, has translated the scheme

of grace into actual fact. The vital connection of prayer with this priestly work of the Redeemer is indicated by our author under the following heads:

(1.) "Through this redemption is restored man's forfeited right of approach to God."

(2.) "The word of the Redeemer furnishes the argument to be used in prayer."

(3.) "In the work of redemption is laid the ground of peace to the sinner's conscience."

(4.) "Upon Christ depends the believer's progress in holiness on earth." (Pp. 244-247.)

3. The mysterious efficacy of prayer lies like a secret in the bosom of the intercession of Christ. The intercession of the Redeemer is the pleading of one who is omniscient, of one who is a party to the covenant of grace, of the same one who offered the atoning sacrifice, of the one who has a covenant right to his reward; and these facts make the pleading irresistibly prevalent. The power of the believer's prayer lies "in the perfect blending of our desires with the petitions issuing from the lips of our Advocate on high." (P. 264.)

4. "Prayer touches the kingly sceptre of our ascended Lord," who is the responsible trustee of all the promises of grace, and who holds the royal right of dispensing the blessings of his kingdom according to the pleasure of his will. (Pp. 282-285.)

III. *Prayer is vitally connected with the Holy Spirit*: (1), As he reveals God in the Scriptures and in illumination; (2), As he is the author of spiritual life; (3), As he is the Advocate at the bar of the conscience; (4), As he is the seal and earnest of all Christian hopes. (Pp. 290-346.)

The foregoing is an outline of the contents of Dr. Palmer's volume. We trust the reader will find it so tempting that he will at once possess himself of a book which covers a subject of such vital importance. But it is incumbent upon a reviewer to offer his own judgments upon the work which engages his pen. We invite attention to the comments which follow:

1. The volume will grade as a model of English prose. Dr. Palmer is an accomplished master of the polished art of rhetoric. He deserves every ounce of his great reputation. In the book before us he has risen to the height of himself. Affluent and expert in the use of figures of speech, fertile and fresh in his diction, he has coined the bullion of his thought into sentences and paragraphs that are marked by clearness, force, and beauty. So wonderfully smooth and graceful is the composition, that the reader has but to start the flow of the language through his mind, when it will continue with such ease and pleasure as to make him feel that the book would be worth its language, even if the language were the merest word-painting. He has employed the laws of definition and division with such logical and mechanical skill as to make it impossible for the reader ever to lose himself, or to become doubtful as to the precise point that is being discussed. Everywhere the scheme of the treatise is apparent; everywhere the discussion is progressive; at every step the contributions to the subject are fresh and real; no section is pressed out of proportion to any other part.

2. If we have been charmed by the rhetoric of the book, we have been more than charmed by its devotional and reverential tone. It palpitates with spirituality. It seems to hold, as in solution, the ripe piety and the rich experience of its

author. The appeals to the Scriptures are made with the confidence of one who has found, by the test of experience, that they are a final and satisfactory authority. The book reads as if its doctrine of prayer is the one which its author has been for fifty or more years verifying on his own knees. It smells of the fires through which he has passed. It has more of the aroma of the closet than scent of the library. As at times the spirit of the volume would exquisitely blend with the spirit of the reader, the tears would involuntarily slip from the eye. We would rather feel the heart of piety than the strong hand of intellect.

3. But Dr. Palmer has put his mind into his book as well as his heart and his speech. Intellectuality and fervency are blended in the choicest forms of English prose. The theology is severely analytical and logical while it is spiritual and rhetorical. It gave us great joy to see the objections to prayer marshalled upon the field by one who was superior to the originators of every one of them, and then by the same hand swept from the field as with consummate ease. It gave us great pleasure to see how the author promptly and effectually installed prayer in the scheme of nature and in the scheme of grace. Standing upon the federal platform of Thornwell and Hodge, Dr. Palmer puts prayer in its logical place in the scheme, and insures the doctrine perpetually in that federal system which can never fail. The discussion is free from crotchets and special pleading. The argument all the way through is forged at the furnace whence the Calvinist has for ages been drawing his doctrines and weapons. The Scriptures are quoted profusely and confidently.

4. The afore-mentioned characteristics lead to the observation that this volume is so prepared that it is at once suitable for the family, the Sabbath-school, the pastor, and the theological class. In our own teaching we shall be compelled to use the book freely. We know of no other that covers the ground. We are sure there could be no better. Dr. Palmer says he wrote it because he did not know of any treatise devoted to his exact subject.

5. We are sorry to complain of the publishers, whose task is always peculiarly difficult. But Dr. Palmer was entitled to better treatment at their hands. Typographical defects may be found on pages 42, 136, 158, 186, 284, 324. The binding is unpardonably poor—our copy is nearly in pieces. The backs are too narrow and too thin.

6 The dedication is exquisite: "To the members of the First Presbyterian Church and Congregation in New Orleans, who have kindly listened to his voice through a period of six and thirty years, and now with watchful tenderness wait on his declining age, this written voice speaks a pastor's gratitude." The Southern Presbyterian Church is grateful to that congregation for the care which it has taken of its distinguished and beloved son, its first Assembly moderator, its wise friend and director during the late war, its brave and mighty defender since the days of blame and defamation, and its great preacher of "the glorious gospel of the blessed God."

R. A. WEBB.

*Southwestern Presbyterian University, Clarksville, Tenn.*



## DABNEY'S DISCUSSIONS.

DISCUSSIONS. *By Robert L. Dabney, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Texas, and for many years Professor of Theology in the Union Theological Seminary in Virginia.* Edited by C. R. Vaughan, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of New Providence, Virginia. Vol. III. Philosophical; 8vo, pp. 611. \$4.00. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1893.

Dr. Dabney has for several decades been well known to the philosophical and theological world. His reputation is far more than national, and hence his works not only deserve, but receive, the most careful study. This being the case, we supposed that another review of his last volume would not be out of place in this periodical. It is a labor of love and a delight to re-read discussions which we had the privilege to hear from his own lips in Union Seminary and also at the University of Texas. Several times in this review we may refer to Professor Wright's able review of this same volume, in a recent number of THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY, but in no spirit of controversy, and with no desire for debate. An old student of Dr. Dabney's, who was under his training for many years, may have apprehended some points in our able divine's philosophy better than one who sees it for the first time in the printed page.

"Positivism in England" is an article in Dr. Dabney's best tone. He gives us a logical history of Comteism. His trenchant pen analyzes the system into its constituent elements and formative principles. Comte unconsciously had a psychology, that of sensualism. Its formative principle is, Nothing is true save *sense* perceptions and consequent reflexive processes. Second cause is the only cause. Search for final cause is absurd. *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu* is held by Comte and his followers; he never once saw the Ithuriel spear that goes to the core of the whole debate, and reveals the truth, *Nisi intellectus ipse!*

Comte's classification of human knowledge shows the vice of his system. It runs: mathematics, physics, astronomy, mechanics, statics, chemistry, organisms, sociology. There is no metaphysics, no theology.

Dr. Dabney unveils positivism, and shows its ghostly form. It is materialistic; it is the science of "material forces and their regular laws." There is no spirit. The supernatural is impossible. Hence, when it comes to criticism, we have the inane theories of Strauss and Renan. It is fatalistic: "phenomena are governed by constant laws from which prayer and adoration can demand nothing." There are only blind physical second causes. Naturalism is another name for the whole. M. Auguste Comte has as English followers Buckle and John Stuart Mill. With great ability Dr. Dabney refutes this philosophy, and exposes its baseless character. The rudimental instincts of conscience, free-agency, and the *a priori* norms of thought, all cut up by the very roots this baleful philosophy. All these the author presses with great vigor and acuteness.

Dr. Dabney manifested his greatness as a polemic in debate with that giant intellect, Dr. A. T. Bledsoe. Intellects of the finest powers were engaged in discussion of the deepest, most difficult problems of human philosophy. It was a spectacle to command one's admiration. Both were trained logicians and profound scholars

The elements of Dr. Dabney's theory of the will are these: The soul is self-

determined; there is no equilibrium of will; *motives*, the subjective, active spontaneity of the appetencies of the soul, are causative of volition; *the inducement*, the external objective in view of which the volition takes place, is merely its *occasion*, not its cause; motives rise according to a permanent subjective law, *the disposition*, which is the ultimate and most original expression of selfhood.

Professor Wright, in his able review of Dr. Dabney's theory of volition, evidently misconceives the fundamental distinction of this theory of volition. He writes: "Dr. Dabney grounds the divine foreknowledge in the certain prevision of a chain of human volitions. The volition, then, must be certain. But this can only result from the efficiency of motive. Motive must then be connected with a certain tendency, and this, in turn, with environment. In other words, the defence in this form is committed to a fruitless regress." The ultimate in this analysis is disposition, and environment does not produce disposition. It is only that in view of which, as a mere occasion, the fundamental law of selfhood expresses itself. Hence there is no regress beyond that regulative law of the human soul, its disposition.

We also beg leave to remark on another criticism. Professor Wright states that in replying to Dr. Bledsoe, "Dr. Dabney answers by defending, not the Calvinist's position, but the doctrine of Placæus. It apparently is a case of *ignoratio elenchi*." 1. To speak of Dr. Dabney's being guilty of *ignoratio elenchi*, without giving specific proof, strikes one as extraordinary. 2. Dr. Dabney here and in other places distinctly denounces and rejects the scheme of Placæus. Especially in his *Theology* does our author state and refute the doctrine of Placæus. This acute heretic laid a snare for his opponents, into which they fell, namely, the distinction between "antecedent and immediate imputation" and "mediate and subsequent imputation"

The chapter on "The Emotions" is one of conspicuous ability. It is a subject strangely overlooked in systems of philosophy, or very poorly treated when taken in hand. Little does Locke, Hamilton, or Porter teach us. Kant is not exhaustive. Brown is illogical in his classification. McCosh is weak. Dr. Dabney presents a classification new and worth its weight in gems.

He says, "Feeling is the temperature of thought," but gives this not as a definition; it is a suggestive analogy merely. He says expressly that no definition is needed, or can be given, except that which every man has in his own consciousness.

The cardinal point in Dr. Dabney's classification is the distinction between the *passive sensibilities* and the *active appetencies*. The sensibilities are affected from without; the appetencies arise from within. *Inducements* can touch sensibility; *motives* arise out of appetency. Here is the safeguard of free-agency.

Feelings, then, go in *pairs*. There is the passive side and the active side. This suggestion threads the labyrinth. If space permitted, we would give the classification in full. All should study it; we sincerely believe that it is the best thought on the subject in the world's philosophy to this date.

Is motive causal of volition? If you mean by motive feeling as a sensibility produced by an objective cause, we answer, No, for then free agency is gone. If you mean by motive the active, subjective appetencies, arising solely from within, we answer, Yes. We have escaped the semi-Pelagian doctrine, and do it by a rational psychology. Edwards did not see this clearly as Dr. Dabney does, and

hence flounders at times. This distinction is the golden key of all the difficulties of the theory of volition.

Dr. Dabney wisely too escapes the theory which makes feeling a primary act by which the self attains to cognition in the process of consciousness. If so, there is no distinction between cognition and feeling, *i. e.*, there is no rudimental distinction. Shall we say cognition is the mere feeling of an idea? If so, we are betrayed into the sensationalism and skepticism of Condillac and Hume.

We would have been glad had Prof. Wright brought out the merits of Dr. Dabney's classification of the feelings; it is the centre of this chapter.

There are three papers on Inductive Demonstration. Dr. Dabney holds that induction is syllogistic. In this he agrees with most of the authorities. Whately, Fleming and Stuart Mill stand with our able author on this point; so do the older authorities, from Aristotle down. Extensive quotations from these writers prove Dr. Dabney's position.

We had never seen, until we took up Dr. Dabney's discussion of this subject, any account of induction which was satisfactory. They all, while maintaining induction to be syllogistic, had this logical vice, it was argument from *some* to *all*. Hence the syllogism was always invalid.

The physical sciences are founded on induction, and if induction is a false syllogism, an argument from *some* to *all*, then the splendid structure of modern science is founded upon sinking sand. How absurd! How humiliating! What a revelation to positivism; its proud boast is vain. All is uncertainty. Logic is false if every ratiocinative process is not virtually syllogistic; science is false, for its so-called truths are mere probabilities. Shall we say that real induction is an inference from some observed cases to all possible cases? It is syllogistic; but where is the universal basis or major premise? It is in the *universal intuition and law of causation*. There you have the major premise. John Stuart Mill holds the same but vitiates it. This is the cardinal and central feature of Dr. Dabney's theory of induction.

Our able author goes through all the "methods," proving the application of his doctrine as he goes. As to the method of agreement: 1. No effect can arise without a cause. 2. But X arose preceded by A + B + C. Therefore A or B or C or some combination of them must be the cause of X. So, too, we prove A + D + E and of A + F + G. Another syllogism: 1. A cause must be present at the rise of the effect. 2. B and C were absent in second and third cases; D and E in the first and third; F and G in second and third, while yet X was always present. Therefore none of these, but only A, was cause of X. Another syllogism: 1. Like causes produce like effects. 2. None but A could be possible cause of all the Xs. Therefore A was only cause of each X. In the same way we proceed in the method of difference, of residues, and of corresponding variations. The thorough understanding and application of Dr. Dabney's theory of induction would sweep away as the mists of the morning much of the unstable science, falsely so-called, which now prevails.

Prof. Wright expresses the opinion that "induction is not syllogism"; we are sorry that he takes a view which to us, at least, seems to bring uncertainty in all science.

"Spurious Religious Excitements" should have followed in order the paper on "The Emotions." Deep in the principles of volition and emotion does Dr.

Dabney lay the ground work of this able discussion. Every pastor should read and carefully master this exposition of the acting of the human heart under spurious excitement. Because of his knowledge of the human soul, Dr Dabney, almost with inspired clearness, points out the evils of false evangelism.

"Monism" is a lecture delivered before the American Association of Christian Philosophy. Sir William Hamilton classifies monists as follows: 1. Those holding absolute identity of subjective and objective. Such were Schelling, Hegel and Cousin. 2. Materialism which assumes object as original and genetic, and evolves the subject. 3. Idealism which assumes the subject as original and genetic, and evolves the object. Prof. Wright states in other terms the same classification, but thinks that Dr. Dabney has not recognized the different phases. We think it clear, however, that Dr. Dabney has divided monism into materialistic, idealistic, and Spinozist. In the introductory paragraphs this is plainly done. Absolute identity of course is pantheistic. Spinoza's theory is also pantheistic. The German idealists are absolute idealists, and hold that the rational ego from whose acts of self-consciousness everything is derived, intellectual and material, subjective and objective, is the "absolute ego." This is an absolute one, and hence is clearly pantheistic. German idealism in all its phases, from Fichte down, including Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, and Hartman, is clearly monistic, and hence, essential pantheistic.

Monism is many in its various shades, and yet monistic in all its forms, and, therefore, all its forms carry monistic vices.

For the beautiful speculations of Lotze we have the highest opinion, and are loathe ever to condemn. Yet there is great uncertainty in his views, now seeming monistic, now near to the assertion of an infinite personal Spirit, from whose will all else springs, and in whom they consist.

But no matter how beautiful and alluring monistic theories, they must be rejected; not as a mental discipline, for they should be studied; but as being the true solution of the central problem of philosophy.

The philosophy of the absolutists is very exalted at times in its tone, and uses many splendid terms. All this we grant. Ueberweg, Fischer, and Pfeifferer do indicate as much. But whenever any philosophy exhibits God as the ground of all existence in such a sense that he has not personal existence independent of, and distinct from, all other existence, it has the vice of pantheism, and will soon develop itself.

Immanence and transcendence must ever stand apart; neither can overshadow the other without baleful results.

We trust that we may yet see another volume from Dr. Dabney's pen, covering the whole of man's ethical and emotional nature. His lectures on these subjects would be invaluable to the students of philosophy. A. R. COCKE.

*Waynesboro, Virginia.*

#### SHEDD'S ORTHODOXY AND HETERODOXY.

ORTHODOXY AND HETERODOXY: A MISCELLANY. *By William G. T. Shedd, D. D.*  
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1893. Pp. 297. Price, \$2.00.

This book is not a connected treatise on the important questions in debate between orthodox and heterodox theologians. It is a collection of articles written, "some for special occasions, and some for religious journals," and now gathered

together in a single volume. The most of them bear, directly or indirectly, upon matters of recent controversy in the fields of science, philosophy, criticism, and theology; but in them all we have the clear thinking, fine writing, and sturdy orthodoxy for which Dr. Shedd is so well known.

The collection is made up of forty-three articles and one sermon, which latter stands at the end of the volume. In the nature of the case it is impossible to make any suitable review of the discussions which the volume contains, for to do so would almost require the writing of another series of brief articles.

The first nine articles deal with various topics bearing on the pulpit and the preacher. Here the articles on *Theological Independence*, on *Courage in the Ministry*, on *Doctrinal Preaching*, and on *Wit and Humor in Preaching*, arrest the reader's attention.

Then follow eight very fine articles on various phases of modern infidelity, especially those arising from anti-Christian science. We mention those on *The Credulity of Infidelity*, on *The Hasty Inferences of Infidelity*, on *The Meanness of Infidelity*, and on *Infidel Physics*, as worthy of special notice.

After these come six or seven articles dealing with radical criticism in a most effective way. Here the articles on *The Two Views of the Old Testament*, on *Conjectural Criticism*, and on *Pseudo-Higher Criticism*, enlisted our special interest.

The remaining articles are of a varied nature, dealing with topics of doctrine, of polity, of social economics, and of politics; but we cannot, in the space at our command, even give the titles of these.

Our readers are familiar with the various writings of Dr. Shedd, and in the volume before us we have his well-known qualities of thought and literary style. We incline to the opinion that any author runs some risk in republishing in book form articles which have already appeared as fugitive writings in various newspapers and magazines. To say that Dr. Shedd has done this in a manner which puts in our hands a book which we can read through with real interest, is perhaps to pay him about as high a compliment as we can. Most of the articles deserve a place in some permanent book form, and Dr. Shedd has done wisely in collecting them together. We hope that he may be spared to give us more such articles.

The great range covered by these articles shows how wide and accurate is the reading of Dr. Shedd. He is a master in the field of doctrinal theology, alike in its dogmatic and historical aspects. From these articles we also find him intelligently informed regarding the wide field of natural science, and quite at home in the burning realm of biblical criticism. Then, too, he is not unfamiliar with the living social and political questions which agitate men's minds at the present day. To our minds this breadth of culture and wide range of knowledge, coupled with a cautious, well-balanced judgment, is one of the most striking features of this volume.

At the close of the collection there is given a sermon, preached on November 27, 1862, a Thanksgiving day, in the Brick church, New York. In this discourse we see clearly what were the author's convictions in reference to the great civil struggle in progress at that time. We have no desire to criticise the general views expressed in this sermon, still we cannot but think that it would have been better not to have included the sermon in this collection of articles. It bears some marks of the high pitch of feeling unavoidably prevalent at that time, it does scant justice to the conscientious convictions of the men who felt compelled to

form what is now popularly known as the Southern Presbyterian Church, and some of the implications of the sermon have not been verified by the facts of history. The remarkable growth and present prosperity of our church during the thirty years of its existence is especially significant in this connection.

But the volume commands our high admiration, and it deserves a place in every minister's library. It is stimulating to the intellect, and it cannot fail to fortify the faith of the reader in regard to the burning questions of religious controversy at the present day.

We may be mistaken, but it strikes us that the general style of the book-making of this volume is not quite up to the usual high standard of its publishers.

Louisville.

FRANCIS R. BEATTIE.

#### RICE'S OUR SIXTY-SIX SACRED BOOKS.

OUR SIXTY-SIX SACRED BOOKS: How they came to us and what they are. A popular hand-book for colleges, Sunday-schools, normal classes, and students, on the origin, authorship, preservation, character and divine authority of the Christian Scriptures. Fourth edition. With analysis and questions. Sixth thousand. By Edwin W. Rice, D. D., author of *People's Commentaries on Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, etc.* Philadelphia: The American Sunday-school Union, 1122 Chestnut street. New York: 8 and 10 Bible House. 1893

To those who value books, as many appear to value newspapers, by their size and their pretension, this slender duodecimo, which has lately been issued by the American Sunday-school Union, will seem of small importance. It will be altogether otherwise in the case of those who do not object to having the edible portion of their artichoke served up to them without the rough integument and indigestible appurtenances.

If anything was needed in the way of presumptive recommendation beyond the imprimatur of the house that has published this in common with so many other works of sound merit, it is furnished by the circumstance of its authorship. Dr. Rice has prepared us, by his previous contributions to Biblical literature and exegesis, to expect at his hands only what meets the requirements of genuine piety, evangelical orthodoxy, advanced scholarship, and special adaptation to the wants of intelligent students who are themselves destitute of the point-of view this writer gives them, and of a kind of knowledge with which he is competent and glad to supply them. The expositions of the Gospels in the *People's Commentaries* have given our worthy author a very desirable, and, we think, a stable reputation. What we have intimated to be true of this *vademecum*, is naturally enough applicable also to the other books which Dr. Rice has brought out under the same or kindred auspices. We think, however, that he has a strong hankering himself after the kernel without the husk; for the *multum* that is consistent with the *parvum*; for the quintessence of a thing as contra-distinguished from its non-essentials. But let us understand one another. The abridged and often jejune syllabus cannot be substituted for the complete lecture, or the compact *résumé* for the adequate discussion. This would be as though one should attempt to get along with rattling skeletons or anatomies clothed only with veined sinews, and to do without flesh and blood and living *men*. Still, even such skeletons

and anatomies as these have their proper uses; and epitomes or digests such as our author's, unlike the ghastly forms behind the glass-doors of the museum, suggest a certain glow of vital animation. Goldsmith, though inexact, and on some subjects he has dared to handle absolutely ignorant, was, as has been previously stated in these columns, among a host of compilers preëminently interesting when he chose to be compendious. A mere synopsis has no attraction of its own, however it may possess a sort of secondary value. Yet there is a way (and, as we saw, Dr. Rice has found it) of breathing the breath of life even into the cold ribs of an epitome or redaction. It is not impossible to put here and there upon the bare bones of an austere analysis something of the tissue as well as of the flesh-tints of vitality, or at any rate of artistic construction. Dr. Schaff (*nomen valde deplendum*) knew this cunning perfectly. Prof. Marcus Dods is likewise privy to it.

Dr. Schaff abounded in picturesque epithets, pregnant descriptions, vivid collateral quotations, and apothegms. The author of the present volume has a different manner. He first states with admirable precision and brevity the main facts and admitted data of all kinds; then, in the same way, the points in controversy; then he succinctly enumerates the arguments of the objector, usually each in a single sentence, follows that with a similar enumeration of the arguments on the other side, and draws his conclusions, which, so far as we have observed, where he is not non-committal, are invariably on the conservative side. The true scientific spirit prevails throughout the volume, due weight is attached to opposing considerations, and the tone of the discussion is unexceptionably cool and judicial. It will be perceived that this is to all intents and purposes an elementary and popular treatise in *Einleitung*, or Introduction; and it is certainly an exploit for the author to have swept in outline and with some small degree of detail, in so narrow a compass, over the entire field covered by Michaelis, Davidson, Bleek, and Weiss. The work, as its title proclaims, is in the form of an inquiry respecting "Our Sixty-six Sacred Books: How They Came to Us, and What They Are." It is the fruit of personal experience, gleaned out of the author's own necessities with a class of advanced students and teachers in a Bible-study circle, and is designed as a hand-book for such classes, or for students generally, whether in colleges, Bible schools, normal institutions, or the like, or in the case of individuals engaged in private self-instruction. The book is provided with an appendix and an index. The appendix takes up fifteen pages, consisting of an analysis and numbered questions. The index is on three pages. There is, for some reason, no table of contents. We are pleased to note that six thousand copies have been issued. We do not hesitate to avow the opinion that this modest *refacimento* would prove useful to theological students, pastors, Bible readers, Sunday-school teachers and superintendents, and to professors and instructors in Biblical literature. The method and order of procedure in this work are nearly identical with those of the great German, English, and Scottish models. He goes from generals to particulars. No formal distinction, however, is made between general and special introduction. The English Bible as a whole, as exhibited in the several translations and revisions beginning with "King James's," is first considered in the first two chapters; then, in successive chapters, the other modern versions of the original Scriptures, other than the English; the ancient versions, and the ancient manuscripts. The sixth chapter tells us about the New Testament as a whole, and how and when it became one book; the seventh deals with the writers.

and composition of the New Testament books, and contains a valuable table of them. The eighth chapter tells us about the Old Testament as a whole, and how and when it became one book. Chapter IX. has to do with the books of the law, their authorship and composition; Chapter X., with the historical books of the Old Testament, and their authorship and composition; Chapter XI., with Hebrew poetry and the poetical books, including observations on the Semitic parallelisms; and Chapter XII., with prophecy and the prophetic books. This comprises all the large print in 133 pages. Then comes a supplement, in the same small, but clear, print as the appendix and the index, on the circulation of the Bible. This constitutes Chapter XIII., and embraces the latest and highly interesting data relative to the work of the various Bible societies, the foreign tongues and dialects, the number of copies issued, and the work of Bible distribution in general. There are foot-notes *passim*, and references to chapter and verse, and to the authorities. There are a few printed fac-similes. One of these, that of Tyn-dale's New Testament, takes the place of a frontispiece.

The account of the old manuscripts is just what it should be as to fulness and accuracy. This will surprise no one, least of all those who know that this and other parts of Dr. Rice's work have been done under the eye of such experts as Prof. Riddle, Prof. Warfield, Dr. Chambers, and others who are mentioned in a preliminary note. What is told us about the English Bible is not new; but there is little in print that is so compact, and the scant space is generously filled with interesting statements.

Let us turn now to the divisions and books of Scripture that have been impugned. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch as a great whole is successfully maintained. Two sentences of quotation will here suffice: "The weight of literary and linguistic facts, in truth, tells strongly for the Mosaic composition and antiquity of the Pentateuch." (Page 98) "The conclusion, then, is that the historic evidence respecting the Mosaic authorship and antiquity of the first five books of the Bible is entirely trustworthy, and modern research and adverse criticism have caused new and yet stronger evidence to be brought to light in support of that view." (Pages 99, 100.) The same hostile critics, he says, who have contended for the post-exilic origin of the Hexateuch "have very sharply, but most unsuccessfully, assailed the Books of Chronicles. (Page 106.) He defends Esther, too, and the Song of Songs. He favors the authorship of Mordecai for Esther, and the date 480 to 470 B. C. Canticles, he seems to hold, may have been, and was the work of Solomon himself, while though he accepts its canonicity, he does not expressly decide upon its authorship. The titles or inscriptions of the Psalms he attributes to an early age, but not to the original penmen. He states what is known, and what conjectured, as to the number of the Davidic Psalms proper. Dr. Rice might have been more explicit on this point, but he evidently stands on conservative ground. The integrity and antiquity of Isaiah are established, and the genuineness of Daniel.

If Dr. Rice does not always state his own opinion in so many words as to the store to be set in a given case on the arguments of friends (as it may be) or of adversaries, he may be relied on never to give positive countenance to error or dangerous speculation; and he somehow manages in every case, so far as we have noticed, to put the safe and sound view in the best light. One of his declarations concerning the date of Isaiah is a little ambiguous. It is where, though cordially espousing the genuineness of the whole book, he *seems* to say that the question re-



specting the time of its composition is one of slight importance. His words are these: "It is, then, not very material to the divine character of this prophecy whether it was spoken seven hundred and fifty, or four hundred and fifty, years before Christ." (Page 126.) He had just laid stress on the proof that the fifty-third chapter was not constructed *post eventum*, but is a prophecy of Christ. He immediately adds that, "whoever the author or authors," the book was divinely and authoritatively inspired. But the book itself *claims* to be by Isaiah, and is cited as Isaiah's by the Master; it must, therefore, have been written in Isaiah's day, or else we should be driven to stigmatize it as fraudulent throughout, or certainly fraudulent in the very part predicting the Redeemer; and yet, as Dr Rice points out in this very volume, the one hundred and twenty quotations (*circa*) from Isaiah in the New Testament are about half of them from these closing chapters, which the skeptical criticism is so fond of ascribing to a later hand, and to the so-called "Great Unknown."

Our excellent guide has something weighty, as well as something recent, to tell us about Job. The name denotes the subject rather than the author of the sublime historic drama, or dramatic history. Moses may have written it, after all, when in Midian, agreeably to the earliest traditions, both Jewish and Christian. Some still continue to attribute the authorship to Job. The notion once advocated by modern scholars, that the book is to be referred to the age of Solomon, has been supplanted by that of the advanced critics, who assign it to the period of the exile. The destructive arguments are drawn from alleged Aramaisms and from allusions to the Mosaic law. These two guns can be easily silenced. Conceding the Aramaisms, these may be accounted for on the view that the book was written south or east of Palestine—say in Arabia or Edom, or in the Euphrates Valley. The language is suitable especially to the eastern region, and has reminded archaeologists of the inscription on the Moabite Stone. (Page 119.) The supposed allusions to the Mosaic law are obscure, and may be no more than coincidences. The recent discovery and demonstration of a wonderfully high state of knowledge and of the arts in Assyria and Egypt before the Mosaic era, has greatly weakened the case of those who advocate the later origin. The exact date of the book is to be determined by that of its still undetermined author.

H. C. ALEXANDER.

#### THE AMERICAN CHURCH HISTORY.

A HISTORY OF THE METHODIST CHURCH, SOUTH; THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH; THE CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH; AND THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, SOUTH, IN THE UNITED STATES. *By Professor Gross Alexander, D. D., James B. Scouller, D. D., Professor R. V. Foster, D. D., and Professor T. C. Johnson, D. D.* 8vo, pp. viii., 487. New York: The Christian Literature Company. 1894.

"The American Church History Series" was begun but a few months ago, with a promise of one volume every three months. The editors and publishers are hastening the work, however, and within less than six months have given us three volumes. That before us is Vol. XI, it being the purpose of those issuing the series to give the several volumes as soon as possible after the preparation of the material, without reference to the order in which they are to stand. The

volumes, including that before us, are for sale at three dollars each, with a rebate of fifty cents a volume to any one subscribing to the full series.

Professor Alexander, of Vanderbilt University, writes the history of the Southern Methodist Church. The causes leading to its separation from the general body, the work of the church and its spirit and principles are admirably set forth. This church has been singularly free from political alliances and entanglements, and has been a bulwark of conservatism in the South. Especially does it emphasize the rights of its individual ministers and members, and resist all undue exercise of authority on the part of its bishops. In respect to the loyalty of its people to its system of church government, and its resistance to the allurements to ambitious men or churches of Congregationalism or Independency, this body of Christians is a model to all. The author is undoubtedly correct in his assertion that "a more homogeneous ecclesiastical community does not exist on the American continent."

Of that remarkable outcome of the divisions of the Psalm-singing Presbyterians, the "United Presbyterian Church," which has not united, by any means, all the branches of that class, Dr. James B. Scouller gives us some account. The intricacies of the history are hard to follow, both as that history is traced in Scotland, and as it developed in America—Reformed, Secession Burgher and Anti-Burgher, Old-Light and New-Light Burgher, Old-Light and New-Light Anti-Burgher, United Secession, Paxton's Party, Original Seceders,—these are some of the numerous names and bodies of which the United Presbyterian Church is the lineal descendant. Through all its divisions, however, the old loyalty to Christ and Presbyterianism, the duty of testimony and freedom of opinion, have appeared; and to-day these Christians are both a wonder and an example to the world.

The Cumberland Presbyterian Church's history is most sympathetically told by Professor R. V. Foster, of Cumberland University. Its origin and name, growth, missions, relation to education, to publication, to the negro, its progress, etc., are well described. Our chief criticism upon the history is that it seems to minimize that which we think the facts of the case prove, namely, that the real *raison d'être* of the separation of those who a little later formed the Cumberland Church was the effort to get rid of the constitutional requirement of an educated ministry, and that the theological defection grew, as it will always grow, out of the multiplication of an unlearned ministry. The lesson to Presbyterians of to-day is one well worth heeding. When the bars are let down so that men may enter the ministry without due qualification, soundness will go out where that kind of ministry comes in.

Naturally, however, our readers' interest will centre in the one hundred and seventy-seven pages of this volume devoted to a history of the Southern Presbyterian Church, and written by Professor T. C. Johnson, D. D., of Union Seminary, Virginia. Our first remark on this part of the volume is, that it somewhat grates upon our feelings to see our own church, next to the largest body of Presbyterians strictly so called, thus thrust off in a corner, the last treated in an eleventh volume, and put in a place subordinate to a body which, like the Cumberland Presbyterians, is not Presbyterian in anything but polity and which is by no means so important a factor in American church history. We have the same objection to Dr. Hays's recently published volume entitled *Presbyterians*.

Dr. Johnson has dealt admirably with the history of our church, its origin, distinctive principles, methods of work, development, testimony, life, growth, and changes. He treats with special fulness and great fidelity the causes for separation from the Northern body, giving all the important parts of the various papers connected with that action, and especially that most magnificent document, the "Address to all the Churches of Jesus Christ throughout the Earth." The Spring resolutions, the protest of Dr. Charles Hodge and others against the political action of the Assembly in 1861, and other papers with which all should be familiar, are given in full. So also is all connected with the history of the Declaration and Testimony Synods in Kentucky and Missouri. The Assembly's position in the methods of conducting its work—the special features of its charter, its early efforts in missions, its relation to every department of Christian activity, are set forth with great fulness. Indeed, so complete is this history, that we believe it should be brought out in a separate edition and used as a text-book in all our theological schools, with a view to the more thorough education of our ministers in the distinctive principles of their church. The relations of our church to other bodies, and "fraternal-relations" schemes and efforts, are described at great length, and the author's own conviction of the impropriety and wrongfulness of any organic union with the Northern Church is plainly shown.

There are some features in the author's work which we could wish were altered. Not to speak of an uncalled-for criticism of what is a misfortune rather than a fault of this QUARTERLY, and that only a temporary one, we question the good taste of the characterization of an institution in which the author is a professor as the most important of the church's institutions; and we hardly think it best, in a history like this, to write in such strong terms and so personal a manner of the traits, either good or bad, as the author may esteem them, of a recent foreign-mission secretary, or of another secretary who has been some years dead; and we think that our brethren who have come to us with a few smaller bodies that have joined our Assembly will relish the suggestion as little as they will admire the rhetoric of the statement that one cause of our church's rapid growth is "the *great esophugeal porrections* of our church in the presence of any ecclesiastical minnows which may be assimilated into good, strict Presbyterians." The beauty of the volume would be greatly enhanced, and its strength not lessened, by a careful revision in many places, and especially by more attention to the rhetoric. Nor do we like such flippant remarks concerning the supreme court of our church as that "it had a bad case of the blind staggers"; that it forsook "the nobler course, under the whips of some goody-goody scolds," etc.

The author's views on independent synodical evangelization will be likely to be challenged. He expresses himself in these words: "An increasing number of the presbyteries and many of the synods have preferred to handle the funds for their evangelists themselves. Hence, while the church has of late been extraordinarily active in evangelization in the home territory, the Assembly's committee has done but little relatively in the work. It should be observed here, however, that the Assembly's plan is the better one. The plan of independent synodical and presbyterial work appeals more to selfish emulation, synodical and presbyterial ambition. It causes expenditures often where there is no sufficient promise, and non-expenditure in fresh fields, full of promise, in our newer and weaker synods. It is independent rather than Presbyterian in tendency, weakening to

the common life of the great body." These are strong words, and we admire both their boldness and their truth!

The great principles of our church, which the author clearly brings out, and shows from her history and life, are, the spirituality of the church; Christ's headship; the *jus divinum* of Presbyterianism; the doctrine of ruling elders' rights and duties; and the doctrine that the church is the agency which Christ ordained for the edification and government of his people, for the propagation of the faith, and the evangelization of the world. Special attention is paid to the constitutional changes which the church has made, and it is clearly shown how the distinctive principles of the church have been wrought out, and expressed in the Book of Church Order.

GEORGE SUMMEY.

#### VAN HORNE'S RELIGION AND REVELATION.

RELIGION AND REVELATION. *By Rev. D. Van Horne, D. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Heidelberg Theological Seminary, at Tiffin, Ohio.* Press Reformed Publishing Company: Dayton, Ohio. 1892. Pp. 192.

The author has published in this little volume the briefs from which he delivered his lectures to his classes. He was induced by his pupils to publish for their benefit, but he also had the larger hope that his book might occupy a worthy place in theological literature.

The field traversed includes such introductory topics as the method of theology; comparative religions; the theistic idea; the relation of theology and religion; revelation; the names of God; the unity of God; the attributes of God; the Trinity; predestination; creation; and providence. He discusses these topics mainly from a historic point of view, seeking to place in juxtaposition the various types of opinion which theological literature has crystallized around them. This is as well done as it can be so briefly done. As a hand-book of general view and opinion upon these various topics, presenting those views in clear outline, with good mechanical devices for exhibiting all the opinions to the eye, we think the author has done his work very successfully.

The author aligns himself carefully by the Heidelberg Catechism and the commentary upon it by Zachary Ursinus. By that standard he is very orthodox. We do not find him at any point engaged in special pleading, nowhere announcing or defending any advanced views, or views of doubtful departure. This is certainly pleasant. More than that, the author deserves to be praised for shutting his ears to all the multitude of voices which to-day encourage theological professors to hold some views which depart, at least to a fractional extent, from the standards which they are pledged to support. Towards the topics handled his attitude is mainly that of an interpreter. He does not always signalize his own views with obtrusive definiteness. As a representative of his church he ought to have made those views stand out with individual prominence. This he does, no doubt, in his class-room with force and zeal.

The results which he reaches from his studies in comparative theology are interesting and gratifying. He concludes: (1), That primitive man was not a savage; (2), That he was a religious and worshipping being; (3), That man's primitive religion was monotheistic; (4), That the Hebrew monotheism was supernaturally revealed; (5), That the ethical superiority of the religion of the Bible proves its

heavenly origin. In these conclusions he rests confidently, and we rejoice at the result of his investigations.

He defines theology as "the science of religion," and then distinguishes between theology and religion in this language: "Theology has to do with the *thought* of God; religion, with his *service*." He quotes Max Müller approvingly: "By religion we should always understand the subject itself; by theology, the study or science of that subject."

He defines inspiration as "a special divine influence upon the minds of the sacred writers, by which their productions, as a whole, constitute an infallible rule of faith and practice." The uncertain clause in this statement is "as a whole." These words were inserted to allow the author to say: "Matter deduced from human reason, or derived from human sources of information, in the Bible, need not be referred to revelation; yet they are inspired." Our idea is that God does not depend, even to this extent, upon the human reason and human sources. What men knew beforehand was told over to them by the Spirit in revelation. Paul says that he "received" the facts of the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ. See 1 Cor. xv. 3-8.

Dr. Van Horne stands upon the sublapsarian order of the decrees: (1), Creation; (2), The fall; (3), Predestination; (4), Redemption; (5), Vocation. Some of his defensive polemics are very fine.

He adopts creationism as opposed to evolutionism.

To fully realize his idea, Dr. Van Horne ought to publish his entire course. It would make a volume of interest and value. His seminary certainly has an able and sound occupant in the all-important chair of systematic theology.

Clarksville, Tenn.

R. A. WEBB.

#### MCLANE'S EVOLUTION IN RELIGION.

EVOLUTION IN RELIGION. *By William W. McLane, Ph. D., D. D.* Congregational Sunday-school and Publishing Society: Boston and Chicago. Cloth. 16mo., pp. 266. Price \$1 00

This volume belongs to that large and popular class in modern literature designed to promote a cordial harmony between revealed religion and the latest developments in physical science. For some time we read these works with no little interest; we began with the feeling that their purpose was premature, and we have continued with the strengthening conviction that in each successive instance the author has failed utterly to establish his fundamental position.

As to the truth of organic evolution, by which we mean the science concerned with the alleged facts deduced from a study of the forms of life, animal and vegetable, their development and growth according to certain laws and under various conditions, we have never felt either called upon or competent to decide; our position has been one of suspense, holding judgment in abeyance, awaiting further light. Our disposition has been to hold a mediate ground between a ready acceptance of such views with a readjustment of apologetic lines, and a hasty rejection of them as altogether infidel and necessarily false. Past history proves that revealed religion can afford to wait before either welcoming alleged scientific advance as an ally or meeting it as an enemy.

While such is our attitude towards organic evolution, we feel no need of sus-

pense with reference to what is called super-organic evolution. Upon the truth of its claims any man familiar with abstract thought, accustomed to processes of reasoning and moderately acquainted with modern discussion, ought to be competent to pass judgment. One may very properly feel a diffidence in questioning the accuracy of a report rendered from long and arduous investigation in the laboratory with the microscope and the scalpel, but when the experimenter leaves the field of personal, faithful observation and enters the domain of logic or philosophy (as distinguished from what is popularly styled science), then, without any impropriety, an intelligent, studious reader may join issue with him; *his facts are one thing, the conclusions he draws from them are a distinctly different thing*; the juror may acknowledge his ignorance of the law, he may even admit the advocate's very superior knowledge of the case on trial as compared with what he has learned from the mere hearing of the testimony, and yet when the evidence has been presented and the attorney has made his argument and defended his theory of the case, the attentive, intelligent juror can say without the slightest undue assumption that he has failed to establish his theory.

So we say of this school of writers that, even granting the truth of organic evolution, the claims of super organic evolution have not been sustained, and more than this, we do not believe they can be.

Evolution is a very broad term, and constant confusion is liable in a free, loose use of it. That there is development in man, mental and spiritual, in society, in religion is unquestionable; the Bible teaches this, history illustrates it, and the pulpit habitually emphasizes it. Now evolution is development, and so one may speak of evolution in these various departments of progress. Moreover, there being one God, supreme over and in all things, the observant student need not be surprised to discover a certain likeness, more or less distinct or remote, between the great laws of development impressed by the one supreme, divine, superintending mind upon all processes of growth. Such analogies abound, they are interesting and instructive; and teachers of all ages, following in the footsteps of the Greatest of all teachers, have not hesitated to use them to enforce and illumine truth.

We repeat, there is development in religion unquestionably, a presumption in its favor in the very nature of religion, revealed as a characteristic in parable, in precept, in prophecy, illustrated in all dispensations of the kingdom, but it is a development by the immanence and eminence of a sovereign, personal, divine Spirit, in union with a living, loving, personal Christ, with an ever constant contact, a perpetual indwelling; involving a discipline and training as real as the training of a child by a parent, and far more analogous to it than to any processes of nature.

One may call this training and development "evolution," and he may ingeniously transfer the titles of the evolution hypothesis—"heredity," "correspondence" "variation," etc.—this is often done, and the masquerade is exceedingly taking with many people, but the process has always seemed to us more ingenious than ingenuous; to trick out a form of faith in such terminology does not make religion scientific, nor can we hope that it will ever make science religious.

Speaking more specifically of the work before us we are glad to say that it is one of the best of its kind. Its author evinces wide and thorough acquaintance with the subject; he is a thoughtful writer, and much that he says is suggestive

and instructive; his style is very compact, and he crowds much in the small compass of the volume. Many of his paragraphs would bear quotation. He is evidently a devout believer in religion, and his book is an earnest, honest, thoughtful attempt to strengthen its position.

To those who wish to see this "New Apologetic" at its best, we commend Dr. McLane's little volume as presenting it very briefly, very clearly, and very plausibly.

SAMUEL M. SMITH.

*Columbia, S. C.*

#### HURST'S HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. *By John Fletcher Hurst, D. D., LL. D.* With Maps. Harper & Brothers: New York. 1893.

There are many compends of church history, but most of them are insufferably dry. A history of the church, within a brief compass, to which non-professional readers may resort for reference, and yet written in an interesting and attractive style, is a great desideratum. This volume is the result of an effort to supply this need. On the whole it is a success. The selection of facts is such as to give the salient points in the history of the church, the arrangement sufficiently methodical, and the style clear and agreeable. While not full enough to supply the wants of students, or to furnish a text-book for theological seminaries, it will be found valuable as a book of reference for the general reader; it will awaken an interest in the subject, and, no doubt, lead many to seek acquaintance with the larger works, such as those of Schaff, Milman, Neander, and others.

The work has its basis, we are told in the preface, in a series of five short histories by the same author, published at different times within the past ten years, on *The Early Church*, *The Mediæval Church*, *The Reformation*, *The Modern Church in Europe*, and *The Church in the United States*. These titles mark the divisions of the present work.

The history of the early church, including the first four or five centuries, is, in many respects, the most interesting and important period of the church's history, not because its usages or doctrinal views furnish a standard by which to try those of the present day, but rather, on the contrary, because in it we are able to discover the germs and early development of many of those departures from the apostolic model, which subsequently grew into enormous errors, and into institutions fatal to the purity and simplicity of the church. It was during this period, too, that the great controversies upon the fundamental doctrines of the faith led to the adoption of those formulas which have defined the faith of God's people for all time.

We are glad to see, as we would have expected, that the author takes the same view of the ecclesiastical organization of the apostolic church which is given by all non-prelatical writers, and which is so decidedly emphasized by the Presbyterians, namely, that the apostolate was necessarily a temporary office, and could have no succession; that the only permanent officers were bishops, or presbyters, and deacons; and that the terms bishop and presbyter, or elder, designated the same officer. It cannot be proven, however, as he assumes, that preaching and the administration of the eucharist belonged to the office of the diaconate. Nor is the single case of "Phebe, our sister, a servant (*diakonos*) of the church at Cen-

cbrea," sufficient to justify the opinion that there was an order of deaconesses in the church of the apostles.

We are pleased with the fairness and general correctness with which the questions at issue in the doctrinal controversies of the early church are defined, as, for instance, the Augustinian and Pelagian doctrines; yet in some instances there is a want of clearness and precision. The author seems to confound the Nestorian and Monophysite doctrines, though they are really the opposites of each other. Nestorius held that there were not only two natures in Christ, but two personalities also. Our author represents him as holding to only one personality, and that the human nature is virtually absorbed by the divine, which is the Eutychian view.

We are glad to see some judicious remarks upon the beneficial results, in the main, of the violent and hair-splitting controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries. After remarking upon the division of all Christendom by a single letter of the Greek alphabet, "half crying Homoiousia, and half responding with equal fervor Homousia," he adds: "The results of the agitations were, on the whole, favorable to Christianity. At the moment, they must have seemed not only fruitless, but of infinite damage. This is always the judgment of the age which produces theological discussions. Controversy seems only evil when in progress. But judged by later generations one sees the good results. The agitations of the apostolic period, and of the four centuries succeeding it, aroused the Christians to a sense of the importance of formulating their doctrines. They were led to meet in great councils, to compare views, and lay down those creeds, one by one, which have served the purpose of doctrinal statement for all later ages. The Council of Nicea, A. D. 325, which determined the divinity of Christ; and that of Chalcedon, A. D. 451, which determined the union of the two natures in him, undisturbed and unmixed, made immortal statements."

The history of the mediæval church our author divides into three periods: 1st, from Charlemagne to Gregory VII.; 2nd, from Gregory VII. to the close of the pontificate of Boniface VIII.; 3rd, from Boniface VIII. to the Protestant Reformation. This includes what are called the Dark Ages and the Age of Revival, periods of great confusion and obscurity, but of inestimable importance, because in them were laid the foundations of modern civilization. The narrative and the statics of the subject are given with condensed brevity, but with clearness and substantial correctness.

About one hundred pages are devoted to the history of the Reformation. The last two divisions of the work, "The Modern Church in Europe," and "The Church in the United States," are among the most interesting and important of the whole. They are necessarily brief, but are instructive, and well arranged for reference. The value of the work is greatly enhanced by a list of authorities prefixed to every chapter, and by several excellent maps.

ROBERT PRICE.

#### BROADUS'S MEMOIR OF BOYCE.

MEMOIR OF JAMES PETTIGRU BOYCE, D. D., LL D., late President of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky. *By John A. Broadus.* New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1893.

We have here the story of a noble life, told in the most charming style. The life of Dr. Boyce covers the period from 1827 to 1888, and Dr. Broadus has



wrought into this biography much relating to the history of his times that will be of permanent value, apart even from the interesting and instructive account of a truly great life. The life-work of Dr. Boyce, however, was the establishment of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary; and his associate and most intimate friend, Dr. John A. Broadus, who has had, perhaps, almost an equal share in founding and shaping the history of this seminary, gives us, in this memoir, chiefly an account of the struggles and heroic sacrifices which were necessary to establish and build up that noble institution. No one can read unmoved the pathetic story of Dr. Boyce's sacrifice of fortune, and of hopes of highest and widest scholarship, in order that he might do the work to which he gave his life. And yet one who knows anything of the great work which the Southern Baptist Seminary is doing cannot fail to be thankful that he found it in his heart to make those sacrifices. The record, as it comes from the hand of Dr. Broadus, must inspire all who have the good fortune to read it. In fact, we place this volume alongside of Dr. Palmer's *Life of Dr. Thornwell*, J. W. Alexander's *Life of Dr. Archibald Alexander*, and A. A. Hodge's *Life of Dr. Charles Hodge*; and if any one thinks this estimate unduly high, let him first read the memoir, and then, we prophesy, his judgment will be ours.

The life of Dr. Boyce, as written by Dr. Broadus, furnishes an admirable introduction to the history and present condition of one of the strongest bodies of Christians in our country, and at the same time a body as remarkable for their conservatism and stalwart orthodoxy as for their evangelical and evangelistic spirit. It is well even for the most orthodox of Presbyterians, on the best of grounds satisfied with his creed and his church, to widen his horizon so as to bring within view other workers for the Lord, from whom he properly differs on some points, and yet for whose work and whose consecrated lives he thanks God.

All who are interested in the subject of theological education will find in this volume much to claim attention and careful thought. While the Baptist doctrine as to educational qualifications for the ministry is different from ours, and while the Southern Baptist Seminary is organized so as to conform to Baptist doctrine and practice, yet the chief excellences in this seminary's plan of instruction might just as easily characterize our Presbyterian institutions. In fact, Drs. Boyce and Broadus's plan of theological instruction is, in substance, that which Dr. Dabney, our most distinguished theological educator, has been advocating for more than a score of years; and it is likely that both alike are modifications of the ideas of Thomas Jefferson as incorporated in the University of Virginia. The Southern Baptist Seminary, the largest, and in some respects the best, theological seminary in America, is a proof of the wisdom with which Dr. Boyce and his associates builded, and is a practical confirmation of the arguments of Dr. Dabney for a similar organization of our Presbyterian theological institutions; indeed, two of them have substantially the same plan—the Southwestern Presbyterian Divinity School and the new Louisville Presbyterian Seminary. We believe that the whole subject of the education of our candidates for the ministry ought to receive careful study and a thorough re-examination at the hands of our Presbyterian ministry. The wisdom of our present methods is in some respects questionable, and many think that there is a growing dissatisfaction with present results. While controversy has been the bane of the Presbyterian Church, yet it ought to be possible to have our present system thoroughly canvassed without engendering the spirit of bitterness

and strife. At any rate, the question seems to be pressing upon us, and much help in its wise consideration may be obtained from this helpful volume.

We notice, by the way, that Dr. Broadus refers to Dr. Robert Price, who was a classmate of Dr. Boyce at Princeton Theological Seminary, as having been long a pastor at Vicksburg, Miss., but omits to mention that he is now the accomplished and able professor of history at the Southwestern University.

We gladly welcome the increasing list of valuable works which Dr. Broadus is adding to the field of authorship. We hope that he may long be spared to gather up for publication the ripe results of his many years of scholarly study. We look, in particular, with longing expectation for a volume from his hands upon the inter-biblical period; and we believe there is no man living who is more competent to give a satisfactory treatment to this period, so important to the understanding of both Testaments and so indispensable to the scholarly interpretation of the New.

THORNTON WHALING.

*Southwestern Presbyterian University.*

## IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

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THE GOSPEL AND MODERN SUBSTITUTES. *By Rev. A. Scott Matheson.* 12mo, pp. 319. \$1.25. Fleming H. Revell Company: Chicago and New York.

This book covers a wide range of topics, and presents some familiar truths in an interesting and popular style. The author has evidently been a careful and earnest student in the field of theology and philosophy, and has much to say that shows clear and exact thought. The most satisfactory portion of his work is that dealing with Christianity and socialism, and the author presents us with some striking and suggestive views. Our ministry would do well to study all those themes which are grouped together under the new department of sociology, and there is much biblical material from which one might construct a Christian sociology. Many hints in this direction may be obtained from Mr. Matheson's book. The least satisfactory chapters are those treating of the relations of science and religion, and between philosophy and theology. And this results from a failure to draw a sharp and deeply scored distinction between science and philosophy. If this distinction be properly made, the so-called conflict between science and religion in a large measure disappears. Mr. Matheson has written a valuable work, which we hope may have a wide circulation.

PEOPLE'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE. Describing places, countries, customs, birds, animals, trees, plants, books, events, and many other things in Holy Scripture. *Edited by Edwin W. Rice, D. D., author of "People's Commentaries" on Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, "Our Sixty-six Sacred Books," etc., etc.* Pp 228. Single copy 25cts., postage 8cts.; by the hundred, \$20. Philadelphia: The American Sunday-school Union. 1893.

Opening this unpretending little volume, we are amazed at its comprehensiveness. It is almost as full as the dictionaries which sell for ten times its price, and we find it not only full, but fresh. It is the result of an effort to give in the cheapest possible form, to place it within reach of everybody, all that is worth knowing by the people at large of the geography, history, biography, customs, antiquities, etc., of the word of God. It is abreast of modern scholarship. It makes full use of the results of recent exploration. It is in every way "up to date," and along orthodox lines. We most heartily commend it to all who do not need, or cannot afford, the more expensive works of its kind.

THEOLOGICAL PROPÆDEUTIC. A General Introduction to the Study of Theology, Exegetical, Historical, Systematic, and Practical, Including Encyclopædia, Methodology, and Bibliography. A Manual for Students. *By Philip Schaff, D. D., LL D., Professor of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1893. \$3.00.

This, the crowning work of its prolific author, brings together most wonderfully the vast stores of knowledge which he possessed. As he tells us himself,

“It is intended to be a guide for theological students in the first year of their course of preparation for the ministry of the gospel. It gives an outline of the various departments of theology, defines their nature and aim, their boundaries and organic connection, their functions and value; it sketches their history, and indicates the best method of prosecuting their study.” Thus it will be seen that it is what is known usually as theological encyclopædia. The latter term the author discards as not being comprehensive enough, as it does not include methodology and bibliography, and is commonly understood in the sense of an alphabetical dictionary of the matter of knowledge. He acknowledges, however, that encyclopædia is the principal, and methodology and bibliography the auxiliary, elements of what he terms “propædeutic.” In so comprehensive a work one could scarcely look for any elaboration of the author’s views upon the well-nigh innumerable themes touched upon in the departments of Religion and Theology, Exegetical Theology, Historical Theology, Systematic Theology, and Practical Theology, with their numerous sub-divisions of Objective and Subjective Religion, Biblical Learning, Philology, Archæology, Criticism, Hermeneutics, Apologetics, Symbolics, etc., etc.; but here and there he shows his bias as a “liberal thinker.” This appears particularly in his dealing with the subjects of Criticism and Inspiration. Notwithstanding defects of this kind, however, it will prove a manual of rare value in the hands of a careful teacher.

HINTS AND HELPS ON THE SUNDAY-SCHOOL LESSONS OF 1894. *By Rev. David James Burrell, D. D., and Rev. Joseph Dunn Burrell.* 12mo, pp. 405. \$1.25. New York: American Tract Society. 1893.

The hearty commendation which we have given of the volumes by the same authors, on the lessons of preceding years, can be renewed for this contribution to the series. We cordially commend the book to students of the International Lessons.

THE SERMON BIBLE. Colossians—James. 8vo, pp. 376. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1893.

This is the eleventh volume of the series. It presents the same features as the others, which we have heretofore fully described, and it carries out as faithfully the plan and design of the work. The body of the volume is made up of short analyses or briefs of discourses on the prominent verses of the Scriptures embraced, with references to the literature of the various texts. An Introduction, naming the leading commentaries on the books, and a goodly number of blank pages for memorandum notes at the end of the volume, will be found most useful and convenient.

CLEWS TO HOLY WRIT; OR, THE CHRONOLOGICAL SCRIPTURE CYCLE. A scheme for studying the whole Bible in its historical order during three years. *By Mary Louisa Georgiana Petrie, B. A.* Sixth thousand. 12mo, pp. xii. 338. \$1.50. New York: American Tract Society. 1893.

This book has grown out of a correspondence school, or “College by Post,” conducted by the author. The school has a staff of about two hundred teachers, and students to the number of three thousand. The school engages in the study

of history, literature and science, but all its members, rightly recognizing the Bible as containing the most important history, the noblest literature, and the highest knowledge, agree to give half an hour daily to the study of the Bible on a regular system. The book before us is an outline of the course pursued. The Bible is divided into sections, under each one of which the author gives chapters containing a general summary, books to be read, periods and dates, geography, heroes, the coming Messiah, as in types and predictions or fulfilment, God's revelation of himself to man, man's relation to God in worship, and a series of thirty two questions. The arrangement is very artificial, and does not work out well in some sections, but still it affords opportunity to give many most valuable suggestions, and stimulates interest and inquiry. The chronology of the Bible and the order of the several books are those that have been long accepted as true, and while there is learning evinced in the preparation of the book, it is not a learning that affects antagonism to the traditional views of the Scriptures. The volume shows painstaking, study and care, and is full of valuable information.

THE COMPANIONS OF ST. PAUL. *By John S. Howson, D. D., Dean of Chester.*  
12mo, pp. 211. \$1.00. New York: American Tract Society. 1893.

The American Tract Society has done wisely to put this admirable work in such form that none need be without it. As itself a "companion" to the author's monumental work, the "*Life and Epistles of St. Paul*," it will fulfil a mission and bear a relation not unlike that of Paul's companions to the great apostle himself. It gathers together all the scattered and incidental allusions to Paul's co-laborers, as found all through the Acts and Epistles, and gives us both the separate work of these New Testament saints and that in which they were coadjutors of the great apostle of the Gentiles. No one could have done this work better than Dean Howson. The subjects of this delightful study are Barnabas, Lydia, Luke, Apollos, Titus, Phoebe, Onesimus, Epaphroditus, Aquila and Priscilla, and Timotheus. Two chapters on Julius and Felix, and Christianity's contact through them with heathenism, are added, and are full of interest and instruction.

FROM OLIVET TO PATMOS. *The first Christian Century in Picture and Story. By Louise Seymour Houghton, author of "Bible in Picture and Story," "Life of Christ in Picture and Story," etc.* Quarto, pp. 264. \$1.50. New York: American Tract Society. 1893.

In beautiful binding, heavy paper, clear print, and profusely illustrated, the book tells the story of the apostles' lives, and of the progress of the gospel up to the close of the biblical history. The troubles of the early church, the planting of the banner of the cross, the missionary efforts and tours of the apostles, the companionships of those early days of toil, the occasion and purpose of the writing of the various epistles, and all else connected with that eventful period, are recounted with faithfulness and intelligence, and in language singularly clear and striking. This clearness, combined with the richness of illustration, adapts this book to the young not less than to the more mature. Some use of the word "Easter" as though it were Scriptural, and other expressions, might well have been omitted.

THE RELIGIOUS FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, Enumerated, Classified, and Described on the Basis of the Government Census of 1890. With an Introduction on the Condition and Character of American Christianity. By H. K. Carroll, LL D. in Charge of the Division of Churches, Eleventh Census. 8vo, pp. lxii., 449. \$2.50. New York: The Christian Literature Company 1893.

This is the first volume of the American Church History Series, designed to be issued, one volume every three months, under the auspices of the American Society of Church History, with the editorial direction of Bishop Potter, Professor Fisher, Bishop Hurst, Dr. Samuel M. Jackson, and others. It is a most appropriate and wisely selected initiatory volume. Both in the matter and the author a better choice could not have been made. The author had an opportunity, as the official head of the division of churches in the last census, such as has never been enjoyed before, to obtain the most complete and reliable statistics of all the churches in this country. The results, as brought together, are full of surprises and food for thought to those who have given little study to religious statistics. The purpose of the book is to describe and classify all denominations, so as to give a clear idea of the character and strength of the religious forces of the United States. An Introduction of more than fifty pages describes the sources of information, the variety in religion, the method of classification, the denominational titles, the causes of division, and other interesting matters connected with our religious bodies. The greater part of the book is made up of the statistics of the various bodies, together with some preliminary matter concerning the distinctive views and history of each. Some curious divisions are brought out by this valuable collection, as, for instance, the "Old Two-seed-in-the-Spirit Baptists," a body numbering nearly five hundred congregations; the "River Brethren," with three branches, and embracing more than one hundred and fifty congregations; four kinds of "Plymouth Brethren"; eight branches of communistic societies, from the "Shakers" to the "Koeshanites"; two branches of "Latter-Day Saints." Altogether, there are one hundred and forty-three separate religious bodies or denominations in the United States, besides one hundred and fifty separate and independent congregations which have no denominational name, creed, or connection. The great work of collating the facts concerning all these could have been accomplished only by governmental authority, and hence the peculiar qualification of Dr. Carroll for this work, so admirably and fully accomplished, and so reliable in its data. In certain instances the compiler's preliminary remarks need revision, as, for instance, his statement that in the Presbyterian Church *deacons* are, with the pastor and elders, members of the session; that elders and deacons are ordained by ministers; and that the Synod is constituted of delegates elected by presbyteries,—a method found only in the Northern Presbyterian Church, and not there until very lately. The account of the origin of our own church is in these words: "In 1858 the Southern churches of the New-School General Assembly separated from the Northern churches because of differences on the slavery question. . . . In 1861 there was a similar division in the Old-School Presbyterian Church, resulting in the organization," etc. It is to be hoped that Dr. Carroll will have some one to instruct him in these matters before another edition of his book appears.

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DOMINANT RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD. *By Rev. Geo. W. Williard, D. D., LL. D., Collegeville, Pa.* 12mo, pp. 308. Reading, Pa.: Daniel Miller. 1893.

The author's object in this unpretentious volume is to present the superiority of Christianity over the other religions which he describes, by showing the great difference there is in the God or gods they worship, their founders, their supernatural character, the forms and spirituality of their worship, their sacred books, their doctrinal beliefs, the measure of truth in each, their adaptability to the wants of man, their effects and influence upon those embracing them, the comfort and hopes they inspire. The introductory chapter, on the Being of God, is followed by a careful discussion of religion in general, in which the author shows it to be a universal and a dominant element in man's nature. He then considers, in their founders, distinguishing features, moral code, etc., the religions of China, as Confucianism and Taoism; of India, as Brahminism and Buddhism; Mohammedanism, Judaism, and Christianity. In a closing chapter, rightly entitled "Review and Contrast," he shows how the marked difference between Christianity and the other religions named is a difference not merely as to degree, but of kind, and especially as to the supernatural character of Christianity, so that no one is justified in the conclusion, now so common, that our faith is but an evolution from cruder forms, or that all religions contain enough of truth to meet the necessities of the human soul. At the same time he recognizes the fact that in the ethnic religions the Christian apologist can find much to show that under the superstitions of heathenism there has ever been a reaching out after something which would provide for the religious yearnings and wants of our nature, and an acknowledgment of its need.

FOREIGN MISSIONS AFTER A CENTURY. *By Rev. James S. Dennis, D. D., of the American Presbyterian Mission, Beirut, Syria.* 8vo, pp. 368. Cloth, \$1.50. Fleming H. Revell Company: New York and Chicago. 1893.

This volume is composed of lectures delivered before the students of the Princeton Theological Seminary in 1893. There are six of these lectures, each one of them presenting a different aspect of the work of missions. The volume is on the whole the most satisfactory presentation of the subject denoted by its title known to the present writer. It admirably answers the purpose of a hand-book for the use of theological students in a class in practical theology. Such a book has long been needed, for no seminary can afford to allow its students to go forth without some adequate instruction in the history and problems of missions, both home and foreign.

Dr. Dennis has been for many years an enthusiastic student of missions, from the point of view of an active missionary worker, and he has gathered into this valuable volume the rich results of these years of experience and study. The thought is clear and strong, the style perspicuous and forcible, the spirit earnest and evangelical, and the book is a valuable contribution to the rapidly growing missionary literature, which is doing so much for this great work. We have not read for some time as graphic and impressive a piece of writing as the opening lecture, entitled "The Present-Day Message of Foreign Missions to the Church," and the remaining lectures, while not so thrilling are well worthy of their place in this excellent and informing volume. We wish all of our ministers and theological students would carefully study Dr. Dennis's book.

THE MEANING AND THE METHOD OF LIFE. A Search for Religion in Biology. *By George M. Gould, A. M., M. D.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1893.

Biology is to lead us to the "Biologos." Matter is eternal and independent. It is that on which life manifests itself, and upon which "Biologos" acts and works, with limitations upon "its" power, but not upon "its" wisdom. This is enough to show our readers the nature of this book of wild ideas, incomprehensible expressions, and irreverent spirit; a book almost as disrespectful to man as it is irreverent to God.

A HISTORY OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES. *By Henry Eyster Jacobs, Norton Professor of Systematic Theology in the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia.* (The American Church History Series, Vol. IV.) \$3.00. New York: Christian Literature Company. 1893.

The American Church History Series promises to be a valuable contribution to the literature of ecclesiastical history. The volume before us is well prepared, and by one admirably fitted by gifts and position for the work to which he has devoted himself. A marked feature of the book is its full bibliography. The history of American Lutheranism could not be properly studied without careful reference to the development of that church in Europe, and hence the author takes us back, with a sufficient degree of fulness, though not exhaustively, to the very beginnings of that church. The lines along which the American history is considered are numerous, as one who knows into how many branches the denomination is divided in this country may expect; but the author shows clearly that these various divisions are largely due, not to vital differences, but to causes connected with language, convenience, etc.; and that they do not seriously affect the matter of unity among the Lutherans. Taking this work along with that noticed next in these pages, one will be possessed of the leading facts connected with this denomination as a whole, and with the history of its various bodies.

THE DISTINCTIVE DOCTRINES AND USAGES OF THE GENERAL BODIES OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES. 12mo, pp. 193. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. 1893.

This little volume contains a brief, but comprehensive, statement of the distinctive doctrines and usages of the general bodies of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in this country. As is well known, there are six branches of this denomination in the United States. The distinctive doctrines of these bodies are scarcely known outside of their constituency; and, unless the followers of the Augsburg Confession are unlike our Westminster people, these distinctive doctrines are not widely known among the masses of their own constituency. This volume will enable all to clearly understand the different positions of these bodies. Able and eminent writers represent their respective organizations. Arranged in the order of the date of organization of each body, we have here much valuable information concerning the Joint Synod of Ohio, by Dr. M. Loy; the General Synod, by Dr. M. Valentine; the German Iowa Synod, by Dr. S. Fritschel; the General Council, by Dr. H. E. Jacobs; the Synodical Conference, by Professor F. Pieper; and the United Synod in the South, by Dr. E. T. Horn.



**SURVIVALS IN CHRISTIANITY: STUDIES IN THE THEOLOGY OF DIVINE IMMANENCE.** Special Lectures Delivered before the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1892. *By Charles James Wood.* New York: Macmillan & Co. 1893.

The gist of this book is, that many of the doctrines which are held by Christian people are importations into the Christian faith from heathen religions and pagan folk-lore, as, for instance, the doctrine of the atonement by a propitiatory sacrifice, etc. These doctrines need to be speedily eliminated, and a new theology, based upon the immanence of God, substituted for them. This is sufficient to show the trend of a volume which is as pernicious in its views as it is indefinite and vague in its expressions of them. A specimen of the stuff given us in the book will be found in the doctrine of the "quickenings of God-consciousness," which the author would substitute for the old-fashioned doctrine which we rightly call regeneration.

**THE STORY OF JOHN G. PATON, TOLD FOR YOUNG FOLKS; OR, Thirty Years Among the South Sea Cannibals.** *By the Rev. James Paton, B. A.* With Forty-five Full-page Illustrations by James Finnemore. 12mo, pp. 397. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1893.

No publication of recent years has attracted more attention than the Autobiography, in two volumes, of John G. Paton, the veteran missionary to the New Hebrides. The book before us is a practical recasting of that Autobiography, with the introduction of a few fresh incidents, to suit a younger class of readers. In addition, use has been made largely of illustration as a still further means of attracting and instructing this class of readers. That the work has been successful is indicated by the fact that the copy before us is one of the fifth thousand already issued. This remarkable success is well deserved. The book should have a place in every Christian home.

**RAMBLES IN HISTORIC LANDS.** Travels in Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France, and England. *By Peter J. Hamilton, A. M., Late Fellow of Princeton College.* Illustrated. 12mo, pp. xvi. 301. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1893.

As a distinguished graduate of one of the best of American colleges, and a holder of its fellowship in Mental Science, the author was peculiarly well fitted to see and appreciate the scenes he describes. He handles all the topics with a sympathetic touch, and leads the reader along unconsciously by the life and vividness of his narrative. The difficult problem of writing something new on lands so well known and tracks so well beaten, he does not attempt; he seeks only to tell "things new and old" in a new manner. Life in a German university is portrayed from his experience, just as it appeared to him fresh from his *Alma Mater* in his own country. Art, history, archæology, nature, civic life, biography, while described from the standpoint of an amateur and of a broad rather than a technical training, are yet set forth in a manner that shows an acute thinker and cultured mind. To one who cannot traverse these historic lands, we know of no book that will be a better substitute for such travel; and to one who contemplates such a trip, we know of no volume which will be more helpful in preparing the

way before entering upon it, or in guiding the footsteps after one has begun one's journey. And withal, the volume is daintily printed and bound, and beautifully illustrated, besides possessing that oft-neglected, but in a work like this almost indispensable, addendum, a full topical index.

THREE VASSAR GIRLS IN THE HOLY LAND. *By Elizabeth W. Champney, author of "A Neglected Corner of Europe," "Three Vassar Girls Abroad," etc.* Illustrated. 4to, pp. 272. \$1.50. Boston: Estes and Lariat. 1892.

An interesting and pleasant book, but scarcely equal, we think, to the author's other "*Three Vassar Girls*" books of travel. The accounts of the lands visited are such as one could well prepare from guide-books, and the thread of story upon which the narrative is strung is neither strong enough nor delicate enough to quicken the reader's interest. The transitions are abrupt, and the coloring unnatural. The whole book seems artificial, and the preparation of it a piece of job work. About one-half the book being devoted to Egypt and Sinai, the title is a misnomer.

*The Preacher's Magazine* for March is the third number of the fourth volume. The leading sermons are entitled, "The Fellowship of His Sufferings," by the Rev. Mark Guy Pearse, and "The Resurrection of Jesus," by the Rev. Joseph Berry. The Rev. F. L. Wiseman writes on "Mission Preaching: Its Matter and Methods," and the Rev. C. O. Eldridge on "Grasping a Thought," being pages for young preachers. Among the other articles we notice, "The Blood of Sprinkling," by the Rev. Thomas Stephens; "The Healthfulness of Religions," by Thain Davidson, D. D.; "How a Commentator was made," being an interview with Dr. J. Agar Beet; and the senior editor, the Rev. Mark Guy Pearse, continues his article on "Moses," writing this month on "The Serpent in the Wilderness." The Homiletical Department is complete, several outlines of Easter sermons being given by distinguished clergymen. Notes on the International Sunday-school Lessons; Outline Addresses on the Golden Texts, and About Books are among various subject headings. The magazine is published monthly at \$1.50 per year, single copy 15cts. Wilbur B. Ketcham, Publisher, 2 Cooper Union, New York.

*The Review of Reviews* for March, 1894, is characterized by the usual fulness and richness of that attractive publication. That part of the successive numbers which most strictly bears out the name and purpose of the periodical is specially interesting. It gathers together the best and most striking portions of the best treatises on current issues, and ably reflects the thought and movement of the world, especially in respect to social, economic, and political matters. The many illustrations with which each number is enriched add greatly to the interest of the various articles.

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I. THE PLACE OF CHRIST IN MODERN THEOLOGY.<sup>1</sup>

THE aim of the large volume (556 pp.), which we shall review in the study of the theme which it presents, is the recovery of the historical Christ. Criticism, it is claimed, "has placed constructive thought in a more advantageous position than it has ever before occupied in the history of the Christian church. It has done this by making our knowledge more historical and real, and so bringing our thought face to face with fact. But, for the Christian theologian, the most significant and assured result of the critical process is, that he can now stand face to face with the historical Christ, and conceive God as he conceived him. What God signified to Jesus Christ he ought to signify to all Christian churches; and here all can find a point from which to study themselves and their systems." (*Preface*, p. 8.) The claim here advanced for criticism is certainly a very large and a very important one. If it is to be conceded, it must be admitted that, hitherto, the Christian theologian has never been brought fully and clearly face to face with the historical Christ. "The most significant and assured result of the critical process is, that he now sees the Christ of history as he has never before seen him, and through Christ, as thus unveiled, can see God as he has never before been in a position to conceive him." It is not claimed that the Christian theologian has not had hitherto a knowledge of the historical Christ. Even the most advanced critic would hardly put forward such a claim. The thing claimed for criticism is, that it effects a change in theology such as Copernicus

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<sup>1</sup> *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology.* By A. M. Fairbairn, M. A., D. D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, etc., etc.

effected in astronomy when for the Ptolemaic geocentric theory he substituted the heliocentric theory of our solar system. The theologian who draws his conceptions of the truth and kingdom of God from his church, with its creeds and traditions, is as much astray in theology as Ptolemy was in astronomy. Abandoning this standpoint, the modern theologian, under the guidance of criticism, takes as "his standpoint, as it were, the consciousness of Jesus Christ, and this consciousness where it is clearest and most defined in the belief as to God's fatherhood and his own sonship."

On page 48 we have our author's statement of the most determinative elements in the contents of this consciousness: "In Christ's ideal of religion, then, the most material or determinative truth is the conception of God. He appears, primarily, not as a God of judgment or justice, but of mercy and grace, the Father of man, who needs not to be appeased, but is gracious, propitious, finds the propitiator, provides the propitiation. His own Son is the one sacrifice, priest, and mediator, appointed of God to achieve the reconciliation of man. Men are God's sons; filial love is their primary duty, fraternal love their common and equal obligation." This is introduced by a more general statement of Christ's consciousness. As we have seen, it embraced two elements. He was conscious of the fact that "God was his Father, and that he was God's Son. What God was to him he desired him to be to all men; what he was to God all men ought to be."

Here we have, in a few sentences, our author's doctrine of God and of man—his theology, his anthropology, and his soteriology. Primarily, God is not a God of judgment or justice, but of mercy and grace, the Father of man, who needs not to be appeased. He is propitious, and does not need to be appeased, and yet we are told that he finds the propitiator, and provides the propitiation—a propitiation which involves the sacrifice of his own Son. This is simply saying and unsaying the same thing in the same sentence. It denies that there is any need, so far as God is concerned, for either a propitiator or a propitiation, and yet affirms that God has provided both, and provided both at enormous cost,

even the life's blood and sore agony of his own immaculate, well-beloved Son. But if such sacrifice were not needed on the part of God, why ordain the propitiator and provide the propitiation? Well, the doctrine is, that the arrangement was designed to achieve the reconciliation of man. Christ's sacrifice was correlative to man, and not to God. This is just the old subjective theory over again. There are really but two radically distinct theories of the atonement possible—the subjective, which teaches that Christ's sufferings were designed to make such a deep impression upon the sinner, in regard to the love of God, that the sinner's enmity would be overcome, and that, moved by the overtures of mercy and grace, he would repent of his sins, and return to the Father against whom he has sinned. The other theory recognizes the existence in God of the attributes of truth and justice, as well as of mercy and grace, and teaches that the claims of these attributes must be met, if men are to obtain the mercy and find the grace they need. According to the former, Christ's sacrifice was correlative to man, and designed to morally impress him; according to the latter, it was correlative to God, and was designed to satisfy the claims of his law and justice. The former is the Socinian theory, the latter is the orthodox view. The governmental theory propounded by Grotius does not in principle differ from the Socinian, as equally with that theory it makes the moral impression of moral agents the great aim of Christ's death, and differs from the orthodox chiefly by substituting the rectoral justice of God for his justice viewed as an essential attribute of his nature.

Equally with both the Socinian and the governmental, or Grotian, theory, our author's view leaves the divine justice, as an essential attribute, out of the account. The aim of the great propitiator, and of him who appointed him, he holds, is not the reconciliation of God to man, but the reconciliation of man to God. He will not admit that Christ's death had reference to the moral law. The law from whose curse he redeemed us "was the law which the Jew loved, and which was thus forever abolished, not the universal law of God. He became a curse for us; certainly, but under the same law, for by it he was hanged upon a tree.

But the law that thus judged him condemned itself; by cursing him it became accursed. His death was not the vindication, but the condemnation, of the law." (Page 481.)

The question here raised is easily settled. The doctrine of our author is condemned by both the Old Testament and the New, and by the entire history of sacrifice, whether sacred or profane. There is no instance of sacrifices having been offered, whether on Jewish or on heathen altars, for the purpose of impressing men subjectively, and thus reconciling them to the objects of their worship. In every instance sacrifices were offered in order to propitiate an offended God, and to shield the offerers from merited wrath. The critic or the theologian who has read the Old Testament without making this discovery must have methods of exegesis unknown to genuine critical science. It would be well if the men who have undertaken the recovery of the historical Christ would address themselves to the recovery of the Mosaic conception of sacrifice—a conception endorsed and reiterated in the New Testament revelation, both by Christ and his apostles. Were they to do this, we should hear no more of their crude, unscriptural speculations regarding the atonement, and its reference, on the one hand, to God and his law, and on the other, to man and his reconciliation. Had our author grasped the Scripture idea of sacrifice, he had never written as he has done regarding the law whose penal claims our Redeemer met and satisfied by bearing its curse. His remarks on this august subject simply prove that he is strangely unacquainted with the primary principles of the economy of redemption as foreshadowed under the Mosaic dispensation and fulfilled by Christ. He has failed to apprehend the relation of the ceremonial law to the moral law. The ceremonial was correlative to the moral, and was designed to indicate the way in which its claims were to be met. Hence, the entire ceremonial system revolved around the ark in which the ten commandments were deposited. It was because of its relation to the moral law that on the great Day of Atonement, when the offerings of incense and of sacrifice for the year were completed, both incense and sacrificial blood were taken within the veil and presented before the ark. The blood of the

atoning victim was sprinkled upon and before the mercy-seat (the lid of the ark), because beneath it were treasured the tables of the testimony. This transaction was designed to show that it was only by the shedding of sacrificial blood that the penal claims of the law were to be met, and the favor of him who dwelt between the cherubim secured. It was the moral law which demanded the sacrifice whose blood was carried within the veil and sprinkled upon and before the mercy-seat seven times. As the Epistle to the Hebrews shows, this solemn transaction had its antitype in Christ's entrance into the holy place, not with the blood of others, but with his own blood, having obtained eternal redemption.

In a word, the ceremonial law, which foreshadowed Christ's atoning work, was, of design, closely co-related to the moral law, in order that the relation of the work which it typified to the moral law might be apprehended as constituting an essential element in that momentous transaction. It is true that he abolished the type, but it is not true that the law whose curse he bore, and by bearing bore away, was the ceremonial law. He abolished the ceremonial by doing what it prefigured, and, by prefiguring, prescribed; but, as has been shown, the thing it prefigured and prescribed was the satisfaction of the penal claims of the moral law. Having satisfied these claims of the moral, he did thereby abolish the ceremonial. The work that it prefigured having been accomplished, it ceased to have any import, and the continuance of it would have been an anomaly in the Christian dispensation. The theory that denies the relation of Christ's death to the moral law, as the satisfaction thereof, must deny that his death was designed to justify God in justifying those who believe on him, and must deny that faith, instead of making the law of none effect, establishes the law. If Christ's work, consisting of his obedience and death, stood unrelated to the moral law, he is not the end of the law for righteousness to the believer, and the doctrine of justification through faith in him must be expunged from our theology. It is to be hoped that these searchers after the historic Christ will stop short before they reach the legitimate goal of the principles propounded in our author's excursus on the atonement.

According to Dr. Fairbairn, the modern theologian, under the guidance of modern criticism, takes as "his standpoint, as it were, the consciousness of Jesus Christ, and this consciousness where it is clearest and most defined in the belief as to God's fatherhood and his own sonship."

Now, there can be no reasonable doubt as to the importance in our theological system of our conception of God, nor can there be any doubt that the only true conception of God is that revealed *in* and *by* Jesus Christ. The leading questions which have agitated the church are resolvable, ultimately, into the question, What is God? Were all the churches of Christendom agreed in regard to the attributes of God, the questions which have vexed and distracted them would very soon be solved and settled. Conceptions of God which leave out of view some of his attributes, and consequently some of his prerogatives, or which merge them, as this book does, in the conception of his fatherhood as the regulative principle of his administration, have no claim to recognition as either theocentric or Christocentric; and the system based upon such conception cannot be regarded as even "a sketch of Christian theology."

Our author would evolve his theology from the consciousness of Christ, and in that consciousness he finds two facts—God's fatherhood and Christ's own sonship. The *personal* consciousness of Christ as to the mutual personal relations between himself and the Father, however, constitutes a small part of the revelation "which God gave unto him," and which he was authorized and commissioned "to show unto his servants." Of those relations he was conscious, and rejoiced in them, and spoke much concerning them, in the days of his flesh, but he did not restrict his matchless discourses to those themes—themes having their root in those relations which subsisted between himself and the Father from all eternity. Our Saviour proceeded from his Father with a definite objective revelation, committed to him, not merely as to its general scope and idea, but as to its form. This is a fact to which the sacred record bears testimony: "The revelation of Jesus Christ which God gave unto him." (Rev. i. 1.) "I spake not from myself; but the Father which sent me, he hath given



me a commandment, what I should say and what I should speak . . . even as the Father hath said unto me, so I speak." (John xii. 49, 50.) Of course, Christ was conscious of his own personal relation to his Father as his Son, but he was conscious also of his relation as the Father's ambassador, and of all which that relation implied. In the above cited passages we are clearly taught that the communications he made in the execution of his prophetic office were not the offspring of his own personal consciousness, but facts and doctrines specified in the objective revelation given him of the Father. In attempting the recovery of the historic Christ, therefore, the problem is not simply the recovery of his sonship and its correlate as presented in the divine fatherhood, but the recovery of the historic embassy of the Son as the administrator of the Father's will. This was manifestly Christ's own view of his commission: "I am come down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me, that of all that which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up at the last day. For this is the will of my Father, that every one that beholdeth the Son, and believeth on him, should have eternal life, and I *should* (margin) raise him up at the last day." (John vi. 38-40, R. V.)

The phrase "consciousness of Christ" is, therefore, altogether inadequate to cover and embrace all that Christ was commissioned to communicate as the Father's ambassador to men. The contents of the divine revelation are not to be measured by, or limited to, the contents of the individual personal consciousness of our Redeemer, but must be regarded as coëxtensive with all that he made known in person and all that he communicated through his servants, the prophets, under the Old Testament, and through apostles and evangelists under the New.

If, however, we are limited to the contents of Christ's personal consciousness, how are we to gain access to them? Our author would rectify the creeds of Christendom and the entire theology of the churches by a recurrence to the consciousness of the historic Christ, of whom he and the higher critics are in search. The problem to the solution of which they have set themselves is twofold: they have to recover the historic Christ, and they have

to unfold the contents of his consciousness. Here is certainly a difficult problem; each element of it would seem to condition the other. "The recovery of the historic Christ" would seem (in our author's view) to be a necessary condition of the discovery of his consciousness, while it is only through the contents of his consciousness that he can be identified. To his consciousness we can have no access, and can know nothing of its contents save as he makes them known. "We cannot," we are told, "conceive and describe the supreme historical person without coming face to face with the profoundest of all the problems in theology; but then we may come to them from an entirely changed point of view, through the person that has to be interpreted rather than through the interpretations of his person." (Pp. 8, 9.) Knowledge of the person, our author holds, must precede the interpretations, and must not be reached through them; but the question arises, How is the knowledge of the person to be obtained? According to our author, this knowledge is furnished in the history of Christianity: "He has left the mark of his hand on every generation of civilized men that has lived since he lived, and it would not be science to find him everywhere, and never to ask what he did," etc., etc. (Pp. 6, 7.)

Now, it is conceded at once that this is a good *apologetic* position, but it is certainly not the scriptural way of obtaining a definite, reliable knowledge of the person of Christ. It is true that Christ has left the mark of his hand on every generation of civilized men that has lived since he lived, and it is also true that the phenomena presented in the history of Christian civilization raise and justify the questions, What was he? and What did he? But is it true that the critical study of the history of Christian civilization "has placed constructive thought in a more advantageous position than it has ever occupied in the history of the Christian church to answer these questions"? This is what is claimed on behalf of the higher criticism, but it is a claim which has yet to be established. The only way in which this claim can be established is by specifying elements in the adorable personality of Christ hitherto undiscovered in the history of the Christian church, and the discovery of which is due to the deeper insight of the

higher criticism. It is very easy to deal in vague generalities, and to talk grandly of what criticism has achieved, but let us come to facts. Let the critics take pen in hand, and enumerate truths respecting the person of Christ unknown to the church until they discovered them. This they cannot do. There is not a single attribute, or prerogative, or function of the great Mediator capable of proof, as an unquestionable possession, to which they can point, and claim that, but for their science, the church had remained in ignorance of it. Without a single exception, all that he possessed, whether in his personal or in his official capacity, was known before the critics or their science had any being. Nor is this all: it can be proved to demonstration that they have marred the visage of the historical Christ, and unsettled the minds of many in regard both to his word and his work. By denying the only genuine doctrine of inspiration, and proclaiming the errancy of the sacred record, they have shaken confidence in the only vehicle through which we can acquire a true knowledge of either Christ or his consciousness; and it is a poor reprisal they give us when they tell us to study the marks which his hand has left upon the generations of men within the sphere of Christian civilization. These marks are numerous, and are significant of the effects of the religion of Christ upon the nations of Christendom, but are they such as to place the Christian theologian in a better position for coming "face to face with the historical Christ"? All that can be fairly claimed for them is, that they may lead men to ask, Who and what was Christ? This twofold inquiry, however, can be answered only by the Scriptures, whose inerrancy these same critics have called in question, and whose errancy they have confidently affirmed as the result of their scientific investigations. As regards Christ's work, as has been already shown, our author himself repudiates its relation to the moral law, thus subverting the teaching of both Testaments and the doctrine of justification by faith in Christ's atoning work.

Now, as the sacred Scriptures are the sole repository of our knowledge of what was contained in the consciousness of Christ, let us turn to this treasury, and ascertain from it, and not from the traces of his hand in the history of Christian civilization, what

he, personally and through his servants, has revealed in regard to its contents.

It is a remarkable and an instructive, as it is a decisive, fact that the system of theology which our author and most of the higher critics reject is the one whose essential elements are to be found in the contents of Christ's consciousness as interpreted by himself. Notwithstanding the high and just tribute he pays to Calvin as a reformer, such is his aversion to Calvinism that he represents its great advocate as a pantheist. "Calvin," he says, "was as pure, though not as conscious and consistent, a pantheist as Spinoza." (P. 164.) He alleges that he had such affinity to pantheism as "to have anticipated Spinoza himself in his notion of God as *causa immanens*." (P. 165.) In proof of this grave charge, he quotes the following from Calvin's *Institutes*, Lib. I., cap. v., sec. 5: "*Futeor quidem pie hoc posse dici, modo pio animo proficiscatur, naturam esse Deum,*" that is, "I confess, indeed, that this can be piously said, provided it proceed from a pious mind, that nature is God." Dr. Fairbairn gives this as a complete sentence, without any hint that it is not complete, or that there is anything in the context which disproves the charge he founds upon it. Well, the following is the language with which Calvin completes this half-sentence: "*Sed quia dura est et impropria locutio quum potius natura sit ordo a Deo prescriptus, in rebus tanti ponderis, et quibus debetur singularis religio, involvere confuse Deum cum inferiore operum suorum cursu noxium est.*" Such is the remainder of the sentence as given by Calvin, and it is separated from the former clause, quoted by our author, simply by a semicolon, whereas he has given no intimation of its existence, and has superseded the semicolon by placing a full stop in its stead! The clause omitted reads, in English, as follows: "but because it is a harsh and an improper way of speaking, since nature is rather the order prescribed by God, it is baneful in matters of such moment, and in which a peculiar reverence is due, to confound God with the inferior course of his own works." Our author has treated Calvin as the higher critics treat the Scriptures. If language have any meaning, we have here, from Calvin himself, an emphatic repudiation of pantheism and of all affinity with Spi-

nozism, which confounds God with nature. Even a *causa immanens* is not pantheism. The doctrine of the divine immanence as taught by Calvin in another passage, cited page 165, is simply what the Scriptures teach, that God is present throughout the whole realm of nature, upholding all things by the word of his power. One might as well charge the Apostle Paul with pantheistic affinity when he says that "In God we live, and move, and have our being."

Having vindicated Calvin against the charge of pantheism or pantheistic sympathies, let us see whether the essential elements of his theological system have any place in the contents of Christ's consciousness as interpreted by himself. In his discourses, as recorded by John, all the fundamental, determining principles of the Calvinistic system find a place:—

1. Instead of a vague, indefinite benevolence, we find the Father revealing his sovereign electing love in the selection of a people from among both Jews and Gentiles whom he commits to Christ, by him to be redeemed.

2. For the ingathering of both, Christ holds himself responsible. The Gentiles he *must* also bring, and there shall be one flock and one Shepherd.

3. In order to their salvation, he lays down his life for the sheep committed to him, and does so by the Father's appointment. This substitutionary laying down of his life is simply the doctrine of the atonement, rejected by our author and most of the higher critics.

4. As the sheep given him of the Father are a definite number, every one of which he knows, his atonement is a definite atonement, which, while sufficient for all, is, in the intention both of his Father and himself, designed for the actual redemption of the sheep, and of them alone.

5. So definite is his knowledge of the sheep that he calls them by name, and leads them forth.

6. This call of his is *effectual*. They *hear his voice, and follow him*, and a stranger will they not follow, for they know not the voice of strangers. This call is so effective that he likens it to the call by which, at the last day, he shall wake the dead.

7. *The perseverance of the saints* is another item in this historic Calvinistic system, and we find it emphasized in these utterances of our Lord. Those whom he has ransomed by his blood he preserves by his power. He *gives* to them *eternal* life, and maintains the life he imparts. No one, whether man or angel, is able to pluck them out of his hand. He is as conscious of the Father's will and coöperation in regard to their preservation as he is of his fatherhood or of his own sonship. The Father who gave them to him is greater than all, and no one is able to pluck them out of his Father's hand. Those given him, redeemed, called, and preserved by himself and his Father, he *will* (wills to) have with himself where he is, that they may behold his glory. John Calvin never sketched a more Calvinistic creed than is presented in these discourses, of which the above is merely a specimen outline.

Our author would rectify the creeds of Christendom by a recurrence to the consciousness of Christ. Of course, Christ's consciousness is locked up in his own bosom until he reveals its contents. We have no direct access to it, and can know nothing of its contents save as he makes them known. Well, the above outline is simply his own interpretation of what is treasured up within his own mysterious consciousness, and if the churches of Christendom are to remodel their theologies in conformity with it, Christendom must become Calvinistic. There is not a determining element, fact, or principle of that old historic theology which is not embraced in Christ's own exposition of his own consciousness as given in these marvelous discourses. Election, definite, substitutionary atonement, effectual calling, the perseverance of the saints and their final glorification, despite the antagonism of the powers of darkness, whether human or angelic, are all there, and there as clearly expressed and as strongly emphasized as in the Epistles of Paul.

It was not by a rigid, logical deduction from the sovereignty of God, as our author alleges, that Calvin was led to propound this doctrinal system. He found every element of it, including the divine sovereignty, in the sacred Scriptures, not simply as *disjecta membra*, but concatenated and linked together by the author of the revelation himself. Let one or two examples suffice:

“For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified. What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us?” (Rom. viii. 29–31.) “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ; according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love; having predestinated us unto the *adoption of children* by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in the beloved.” (Eph. i. 3–6.) Here are the essential elements of Calvinism specifically stated and traced by the Holy Ghost to the divine sovereignty. This is Calvinism, impugn it who list. It has, in days gone by, withstood many an assault from its foes. Rome hates it, and the higher critics hate it, but it lives on despite their puny onsets, and shall live on to fructify and gladden the city of God in the future as it has done in the past.

This book also propounds and advocates the broad church doctrine of the universal fatherhood of God, and the correlative universal sonship of men. “Men are God’s sons; filial love is their primary duty, fraternal love their common and equal obligation.” Christ was conscious of the fact that “God was his Father, and that he was God’s Son. What God was to him, he desired him to be to all men; and what he was to God, all men ought to be.” (Page 48.) It does seem difficult to harmonize these two statements. The one affirms categorically that men *are* God’s sons, whereas the other seems to teach that Christ’s aim was to establish, or reëstablish, the divine fatherhood and the correlative human sonship. It is likely all the author means to express by the latter statement is, that, on the one part, the paternal relation should be manifested, and on the other, that the filial relation should be realized as an actual experience.

Assuming, then, what is expressly taught and advocated in

other parts of the book, that the doctrine held is simply the doctrine commonly held by the broad church school, viz.: that men as men, all men by virtue of their being men, *are* sons of God, and need simply to realize their standing as such, and to act in conformity with it, both in relation to God and man, let us see whether this doctrine has any foothold in the divine word.

Did Christ regard those who refused to receive him as sons of God, despite their refusal? The evangelist settles this point: "As many as received him, to them *gave he power*" (the right) "*to become* the sons of God, *even* to them that *believe* on his name." The doctrine taught here is certainly not the broad church doctrine. Sonship, if we are to credit John's teaching in this passage, is a *gift bestowed*, and not a *status* already possessed by all men, as men. It is a right conferred upon believers, and not a right possessed by them in common with unbelievers. To put this all-important truth beyond all question, it is added that those who were raised to sonship were not sons in virtue of their being men, or in consequence of their natural birth: "Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." (John i. 11-13.) This is evidently the view of Christ, as expressed in his conversation with Nicodemus: "Except a man be born [*generated*] again [born from above], he cannot see the kingdom of God." And he adds that, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit"—coupling the sign with the thing signified, for the instruction of Nicodemus—"he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." (John iii. 3-5.) It is manifest that, according to Christ's view of the matter, the sons whose sonship is of the type described by the men of the broad church school are not within the kingdom of God. They cannot see it, nor can they enter it in virtue of their natural birth. This birth makes them men, but it does not make them sons of God, nor enable them to perceive or to enter his kingdom. In order to their apprehension of the King or of his kingdom, or to their entrance into the latter, they must be *generated again* by the *generating* act of the Holy Ghost. If our view of the sonship of the sons of God is harmonious with Christ's consciousness, we must reject the



doctrine of a universal filial relation sustained by men, as men, and in virtue of their being men.

One of the questions which Christ debated with the Jews was this very question. His adversaries claimed God as their Father. "We be not born of fornication," they said; "we have one Father, even God." Christ repudiated their claim. "If God were your Father," was his reply, "ye would love me." . . . "Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar and the father of it." (John viii. 41-44.) This debate, taken in connection with the interview with Nicodemus, proves that the sonship in question is a spiritual relationship, originating in the action of the Holy Spirit, whereby he imparts spiritual life to a soul dead in trespasses and sins, and under the dominion of the powers of darkness. This latter is the state of all men *by nature*, and the Scripture, instead of representing them, while in this state, as sons of God, affirms that they are "children of wrath." (Eph. ii. 1-3.) So far are men in their natural state from being sons of God, as the Scripture counts sonship, that it is because God is rich in mercy and possessed of great love that they are delivered from their natural relation as children of wrath. (Eph. ii. 4-6.)

This is evidently the doctrine of the Apostle Paul (Rom. viii. 14-17): "For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with (together with) our spirit, that we are the children (*tekna*, begotten ones) of God; and if children (*tekna*, begotten ones), then heirs; heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together."

According to the teaching of this passage, sonship, as the apostle counts sonship, is not the common heritage of men, as men. On the contrary, it is a new relation established by the agency of the Holy Spirit, by whom those who were, prior to his

action, children of bondage and of wrath are begotten, and thus raised to the rank of sons of God and joint heirs with Christ. In the apostle's view, the act of adoption, whereby believers are made sons of God, is a pledge and earnest of their resurrection. What they have already received are but the first-fruits of the Spirit, creating within them longings for the full harvest. They groan within themselves, waiting for the *adoption*, to-wit: the redemption of their body. This is simply saying that it is as sons that the heirs of redemption shall be raised from the dead. Surely if, as the apostle teaches, it is only those who are led by the Spirit of God who are sons of God, it must follow that those who are not so led are not sons of God, whatever else they may be. In his estimate the sonship of God's sons is so exalted a spiritual relationship that the witness of the Spirit is necessary to assure them that they have been raised to such dignity. Yea, so grand and glorious is it that, speaking popularly, he represents the whole creation as waiting (*apokaradoxia*) with earnest or persistent expectation for "the time when they shall be manifested in their true character and glory as the sons of God."

All this is in accordance with the testimony of the beloved disciple (1 John iii. 1, 2): "Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called (*tekna*) the children (the begotten ones) of God"; (and we are *such*) "therefore the world knoweth us not, because it knew him not. Beloved, now are we (*tekna*) the children (the begotten ones) of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is." Those whom John recognizes as sons of God have now a standing, the contemplation of which fills him with rapture, a rapture which he wishes them to partake with himself. Their inheritance is so glorious that its future revelation transcends the apostle's present knowledge. One thing he does know, and to one who had the revelations of Patmos that item of information must have filled him with joy unutterable and full of glory: the many sons are to be like the firstborn, for they shall see him as he is. Will any reverent critic venture to say that the love singled out for admiration by the apostle is simply the general or

universal benevolence of God as the universal Father of the human race? It is manifestly a special love, and its specialty lies in this, that those toward whom it is cherished are regarded and treated as sons, and not as the mere offspring of a general relationship sustained to men, as men.

Writing to the Galatians, the Apostle Paul brings out clearly the same view of the sonship of God's sons as a gift conferred: "When the fulness of the time came, God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, that he might redeem those who were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. So then thou art no longer a slave, but a son; and if a son, then an heir through God." (Chapter iv. 4-7.) These Galatians had experienced a great change. Prior to this they were in bondage, enslaved, under the beggarly elements of the world. By the change they had undergone they were raised to the rank of sonship. For this change they were indebted to *the sovereign grace of God*, who, *when the fulness of the time came*—the exact time ordained by himself—sent forth his Son incarnate to effect, by purchase, their deliverance from the bondage of slaves, and to gift them with the freedom of sons. Having bestowed upon them this gift, he accompanied it with another precious endowment, even the Spirit of his Son sent forth into their hearts, crying, Abba, Father. According to this passage the sons of God have been ransomed by the incarnate Saviour, who came as the Father's gift at the appointed time, and bought them at enormous cost out of the grasp of a broken law, under which they were held as bond-slaves, in order to bestow upon them the freedom of sons. Here again the love, to which the gift of sonship is due, is not the general benevolence of God, acting as a universal Father, but the outcome of his own sovereign good-pleasure and grace. In a word, instead of the sonship of these Galatians being the outcome of their natural relation, it was, as the apostle testifies in the previous chapter, verse 26, a standing acquired by faith: "Ye are all," he tells them, "the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus."

Let one additional example suffice: in the Epistle to the

Hebrews (Chap. xii. 6-8) we find the following testimony on this point: "Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth. If ye endure chastening God dealeth with you as with sons; for what son is he whom the father chasteneth not? But if ye be without chastisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards (*nothoi*, baseborn, spurious), and not sons." According to this epistle, even professing Christians are divided into two classes—the patient, enduring, chastened, and *huioi*, and the unchastened, *nothoi*, or the baseborn and spurious. As Dr. Fairbairn's claimants are not subject to the discipline of the *huioi*, or genuine sons, they must be relegated to the category of the *nothoi*, the baseborn and spurious. The former are the objects of God's fatherly love, and the latter may be partakers of his general providential beneficence; but though they may share largely of his bounty, and flourish as a green bay-tree, they are *nothoi* and nothing more, and have no claim to be regarded as sons. The fact that it is of professing Christians this language is used gives the argument the force of an *a fortiori*.

Now, as these testimonies seem to be conclusive, the question arises, On what basis does our author rest his doctrine of the universal fatherhood of God, and the correlative universal sonship of men, as men? In reading the parts of this book in which the subject is discussed, one is struck with the remarkable absence of proof-texts bearing expressly on the point to be proved. Referring to the preface to the Lord's Prayer, he says: "Nothing so marked Jesus as his feeling of kinship with men, his brotherhood, his love of standing in their midst while they prayed 'Our Father which art in heaven.'" (Page 360.) Here, at least, our author has misread the history of "the historic Christ." Christ was not standing in the midst of *men*, in the author's sense of the term, when he uttered that prayer. He was not standing in their midst, enjoying their society as his brethren, while *they* were addressing God as their father in common with himself. The words "Our Father which art in heaven" are the preface to a prayer which he taught his *disciples* to use, and which they were incompetent to frame. This is one of the most plausible of all the passages which we

find adduced in support of the doctrine of universal fatherhood, and a corresponding universal sonship, and yet the narrative in which it occurs disproves the warrant to make any such use of it. That narrative informs us that at the outset, and in the body of that wonderful Sermon on the Mount, Christ was addressing his disciples. The introductory remarks of the evangelist are decisive on this point. Matthew says: "Seeing the multitudes, he went up into a mountain; and when he was set, his *disciples* came unto him; and he opened his mouth and taught *them*, saying," etc. (Matt. v. 1, 2.) It is obvious from this narrative of the circumstances under which the sermon was delivered that those immediately addressed were Christ's own disciples. Any doubt entertained on this point must be dissipated by the language in which they are addressed. They are called "the salt of the earth," and "the light of the world." They are informed that they shall be persecuted by men for righteousness' sake, and on this ground they are classed with the prophets which went before them. It is of those thus described that he is speaking when he represents God as their father. Will any critic, who has any regard for his character as a critic, venture to say that Christ was speaking of men, as men, when he used such descriptive terms? Are men, as men, persecuted for the name's sake of Christ, or for righteousness' sake? Are men, as men, the successors of the Old Testament prophets, or the salt of the earth, or the light of the world? Surely Dr. Fairbairn does not think so; but, if he does not, he should not have drawn on this discourse for proofs of the universal fatherhood of God, and of the universal sonship of men simply as members of the human race. Is it by such historical research that "the historic Christ" is to be recovered?

But, in addition to his disciples, there was a great multitude who had gone up the mountain to hear him, and we find, in the seventh chapter, that he devotes a portion of his discourse to them. This portion extends from the thirteenth verse to the close, and throughout he never speaks of the Father and his relation to those addressed as he does when addressing his disciples. He speaks of the Father just once, but the phrase employed is "*my* Father." They are addressed as men who have not as yet

entered in at the strait gate; they are warned against false prophets, and are furnished with tests for judging of them; are instructed regarding the conditions on which men are admitted into the kingdom of heaven, and the danger of building their hopes of heaven upon a false foundation. This part of the discourse would, in the main, be out of place if meant for his disciples, but was eminently suited to the outside multitudes who were within the range of his voice.

Our author has failed in this attempt at proof, as fail he must. The Scriptures know nothing of the universal fatherhood and the correlative universal sonship he seeks to establish. The only species of fatherhood and sonship having any being since the fall of Adam is the sonship of those who are in federal and vital union with the second Adam, in whose *economic* sonship they share, and in virtue of which relation they are joint heirs with him to all of which he himself is heir. Whatever species of sonship the first Adam had (and he is called a son of God, Luke iii. 38), he lost it by his breach of the covenant, lost it not only for himself, but also for all his posterity. In Genesis iii. 15, his posterity are divided into two classes, the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent, and the Bible is simply the history of the two seeds. The latter are never classed in Scripture as sons of God. Dr. Fairbairn tries to establish their claim to sonship under what he and his friends of the new theology call the universal fatherhood of God. This claim is directly at variance with the testimony of Scripture. The seed of the serpent cannot be proved to be the seed of the woman, and must be classed as Christ has classified them when debating this very question with his Jewish adversaries. (John viii. 41-44.) The limitation of Christ's relation to one of these classes, the seed of the woman, with which he is identified, and of which he is the head, neutralizes and nullifies our author's argument from the incarnation and the constitution of the Godhead. The relation he established by his incarnation was restricted to his brethren, to whom in all things it behooved him to be made like. It was because they were partakers of flesh and blood that he also himself likewise took part of the same. He did not clothe himself with the seed of the serpent, whom it

was his object to bring to naught, nor had his incarnation any reference to them or to their leader, save that of antagonism and final overthrow. It would be well if these men who are in search of the historic Christ, and who, in their search, have lost sight of the history of his work, would open their Bibles at Genesis iii. 15, and study the history of redemption as unfolded in the history of the two seeds. Were they to do so, they would see that the sonship of the covenant is the same under both Testaments. "The historic Christ" was made of the seed of David according to the flesh; but David was of the seed of Abraham, and they who are Christ's are Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise. As heirship is based upon sonship, Abraham's seed, whether under the Old Testament or the New, are sons of God. The historic Christ, as revealed under the covenant, binds together, in federal bonds indissoluble, the whole family of God as joint heirs with himself of the same glorious inheritance.

Butler, in his *Analogy*, has shown that the Christian religion is analogous to the constitution and course of nature. He was engaged in controversy with the deists of his day, and his position was, that there is no objection urged against Christianity as revealed in Scripture which does not lie with equal force against deism, in whose behalf the light of nature had been invoked. The principle on which the discussion proceeds warrants the inference that the harmony of a professed religion with the constitution and course of nature is one of the tests of its truth and of its claims upon our faith. This much, at least, may be claimed for this test, viz.: that a religion which cannot stand the ordeal of its application forfeits all claim to be regarded as originating with the author of the constitution and course of nature. Tried by this test, the doctrine of the universal fatherhood of God, and the correlative universal sonship of men, as men, must be rejected. The history of the human race, whether sacred or secular, testifies against any such doctrine. In his dealings with mankind God has not treated them all as sons, nor have they cherished towards him the filial regard due him as their Father. As we have already seen, he has not looked with equal eye upon the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent. From the hour of man's

apostasy, these two seeds are classed under diverse, antagonistic categories, and, throughout their histories, are never regarded as sustaining like relations to God, or as embraced in a common sonship. The Son of God did not, as our author's theory requires, become incarnate in the seed of the serpent, thus investing them with a sonship akin to his own; nor has he as the administrator of the covenant of grace treated them as joint heirs with himself of a common inheritance.

This was undoubtedly the principle upon which the administration was conducted under the Old Testament dispensation. Paul recognizes it in his Epistle to the Ephesians. Referring to their former state as Gentiles, he reminds them that they were, at that time, "without Christ," and gives as his reason, that "they were aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world." Were these Gentiles regarded and treated as sons of God, and looked upon with the same fatherly regard as was accorded to the commonwealth of Israel? On the contrary, they were treated as *aliens*, not as sons. The new relation into which they were brought, and the means by which the change was effected, prove the greatness of their estrangement from Israel and Israel's God. They were formerly far off, but now in Christ Jesus they were made nigh by the blood of Christ. They are no longer strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the *household* of God. As God's household is God's family, and his family consists of his sons and daughters (2 Corinthians vi. 16-18), these Ephesians, by being introduced into his household, have *become* his sons and daughters, a relation to which they had hitherto been strangers. The change was a mighty change, for it could be effected only through the blood of Christ. Those who will estimate the change by what it cost to effect it, will be slow to accept the theory of a universal fatherhood and a universal sonship. If these Ephesians, as the theory implies, were *by nature* sons of God, why should the blood of Christ be shed to bring them into that relation? If the theory be true, they had the standing of sons already, and needed no atoning blood to blot out the handwriting that debarred them from the privileges of sonship.



The theory, therefore, will not bear the test presented in the history of the administration of the economy of grace; and, as this book proves, those who hold it are not likely to regard the moral law and its preceptive and penal claims as a barrier to sonship, requiring for its removal the obedience and sacrificial death of the Son of God.

It is true, that all along the track of the divine administration individual subjects of the grace of God were chosen from other than the seed of Shem or of Abraham, and that, when the *fulness of time* came, Israel was cut off, and the Gentiles were grafted in; but this procedure merely demonstrates the doctrine of God's sovereignty, which the advocates of his universal fatherhood cannot accept save as a prerogative subordinate to, and limited by, fatherhood.

Equally subversive of the theory is the testimony of profane history. Our author refers to the evidence regarding Christ's personal rank, furnished by the generations of civilized men since his day. He says that "he has left the mark of his hand on every generation of civilized men that has lived since he lived." (P. 6.) This is a strange abatement of the conclusion warranted, if the theory of the universal fatherhood and universal sonship be true. Why limit the reference to the generations of civilized men, and why limit it to those generations of civilized men which have been born since Christ lived? The premises of a universal fatherhood will not permit such illogical limitation. A universal fatherhood is not to be narrowed down to the fatherhood of civilized men. As Christ has been, under all dispensations, the administrator of the will of his Father, surely his administration must, if his Father sustained a like fatherly relation to all men, have "left the mark of his hand" upon all the generations of the human race, as well before his advent in the flesh as since his incarnation. Fatherhood must assert itself, and a universal fatherhood must assert itself universally. For such universal assertion the agent employed was perfectly competent. Had the Father willed it, there never was a tribe of the human race, civilized or uncivilized, upon which the almighty, omnipresent Son could not have "left the mark of his hand." The limitation of his admin-

istrative action is an index to a corresponding limitation of the Father's will, and such limitation is utterly inconsistent with the theory of his universal fatherhood. It offends one's historical sense to be told that God treated with equal regard the descendants of Seth and the descendants of Cain, or the descendants of Shem and the descendants of Ham or of Japheth.

Equally offensive is it to our intelligence for men to elaborate a theory of God's relations to men, as men, which is in palpable conflict with the present state of the nations and tribes of the human race. We may be sure that there is no relation sustained by God towards the children of men which will not manifest itself in his actual administration. If, then, God sustain towards all men the relation of a father, how comes it to pass that millions of the human family have not felt the touch of Christ's mediatorial hand? Our author is enamored with the contributions of truth furnished by Greece and Rome, but what about the tribes of "darkest Africa"? Has the divine fatherhood manifested itself in the dark history of its benighted, savage sons? A review of the history of God's dealings with our race will not lead any intelligent historian to the conclusion that the fatherhood of God is a universal fatherhood, and that men universally sustain alike the relation of sons. In the presence of that history an intelligent, reverent reviewer will take his stand beside the apostle of the Gentiles, at the close of a like review, and will exclaim, as he does, "O! the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! . . . For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things; to whom be glory forever. Amen." (Romans xi. 33-36.) It is not to the doctrine of a universal fatherhood that our Saviour has recourse for consolation, on a review of the comparative fruitlessness of his ministry in Decapolis. His soul finds refuge, not in the universal fatherhood of God, but in his universal sovereignty as Lord of heaven and earth. His language is, "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my Father:

and no man knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any one know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son [*bouletai*] willeth to reveal him." (Matt. xi. 25-27.) Here we have, on the part of Christ himself, an express recognition of the Father's sovereignty ruling within the sphere of his ministry, and determining its results. Will our author say that those wise and prudent men of the Decapolis, from whom "these things were hid," sustained to God the same relation as those babes to whom these things "were revealed"? Such results can have no place under the universal administration of a universal Father, and can be ascribed to no other prerogative save that of absolute, universal lordship and sovereignty. It is true that our Saviour addresses God under the title of Father, but it is also true that he addresses him as Lord, and ascribes to him dominion over heaven and earth; and it is equally true that it is to the universal lordship, and not to the universal fatherhood, that he traces the limitation of the trophies of his ministry in Galilee. It is impossible to reconcile the doctrine of a universal fatherhood on the part of God, and a correlative universal sonship on the part of men, with the language employed by our Saviour in this passage. The *sovereignty* of the Father as universal Lord, and the *will* of the Son, who came down from heaven, not to do his own will, but the will of him that sent him, forbid the possibility of any such reconciliation. Be it ours to act in the spirit of our Redeemer, and to bow our heads in the presence of the sovereign majesty of God as the authoritative source of the dispensations of the covenant of grace, instead of embarking in philosophical speculations regarding the constitution of the Godhead, which are as unsatisfactory as they are irreverent.

The chief argument advanced by Dr. Fairbairn is of this class. On page 440 we have the following statement of it: "What he is as Godhead he must remain as God; the energies exercised without must express the life within. The inward and the outward face of Deity, if we may so speak, is one face; and he whose inner life is a community of love must be in his outer action creative of conditions corresponding to those within. Hence, he who is by his essence a society will so act as to create an outward so-

ciety which shall reflect his inner relations. The law of the divine working is the divine nature, and as is the nature such must be the work. The internal sonship is normative of the external; and, as fatherhood is essential to the Godhead, it is natural to God; all the qualities it implies within Deity are expressed in his activity within the universe. And, therefore, while Jesus speaks of himself as the Son of God as the Father, he teaches men also so to speak. The relation of the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, is, as it were, the prototype and idea of the many sons who play around the Father's feet. And so we conclude that God cannot be other without than the Godhead is within; the outer action and relations and the inner being and character must be correlative and correspondent."

The reader will observe that in this argument the word *must* occurs five times in regard to the divine action *ad extra*. It is not simply that God must act in harmony with his attributes and prerogatives, but that he must act so as to reveal the inner relations of the Godhead. And, as if the word *must* were not sufficiently expressive of necessity and obligation, it is strengthened by the word *cannot*. God *must*, if he create at all, act as our author prescribes, and *cannot* act otherwise. As within the Godhead fatherhood and sonship exist as essential relations, it is a matter of necessity, a necessity arising out of the very nature of God, that he should create a society of sons of whom his only-begotten Son is the prototype. Now, there is here a palpable *non-sequitur*. There is no warrant whatever for these dogmatic *musts* and this equally dogmatic *cannot*. Nor is there, as has been already shown, any warrant for citing in support of such dogmatism a portion of the Lord's Prayer. There is a higher warrant for holding that God might, in conformity with his attributes and prerogatives, have created man in his own image, after his own likeness, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, with dominion over the creatures as their lord, without giving him the rank of sonship. This view is no mere speculation. It is simply a statement of what the Scriptures tell us that God actually did. The inspired narrative has not a word about sonship, but it says much about lordship. Morally and spiritually man bore the divine image,

and in his relations to the creatures of God he was invested with a dominion which was a reflex of the supreme lordship of his Creator. All this the narrative of man's creation tells us, and it tells us nothing more; and we have no warrant to eke it out by intruding, in the exercise of our speculative faculties, behind the veil, and trying to sound the unfathomable depths of the Godhead, where even the seraphim dare not tread. It is through redemption, and not through creation, that the inner relations of the Godhead are revealed; and the history of redemption gives no intimation of a human sonship based upon Christ's eternal sonship. Both the standing and the grounds of it are economic, of grace, and not of a necessity arising from the constitutional, essential, inner relations of the august, adorable personalities of the Trinity. It is impossible to reconcile Dr. Fairbairn's speculation, bristling all over with the "musts" and "cannots" of an absolute necessity, with the Scripture doctrine of salvation by grace, including sonship through regeneration.

As we have already seen, Dr. Fairbairn does not reject, absolutely, the divine sovereignty; he does, however, what amounts to the same thing: he subordinates the sovereignty to the fatherhood, so that God, in all his inflictions of suffering upon the sons of men, has as his ultimate aim, not the satisfaction of his law and justice, but the recovery and improvement of the subjects of the inflictions. This is the doctrine propounded and argued, pp. 436-444, etc. A few sentences from these pages will satisfy the reader that such is the position assumed: "Sovereignty is a radically different thing when paternal and when legal or imperial; sovereigns, subjects, laws, methods, and ends of government, are all, as regards quality and kind, unlike and dissimilar. Thus, the purely legal or imperial sovereign so reigns as to strengthen and extend his authority, but the father so rules as to educate and benefit his child, as to order and bless his home. The relations of the sovereign are all legal; persons to him are nothing save subjects of rights or duties, objects to be protected or restrained; law and order are all in all; all his ends are political, his methods judicial, his instruments most perfect where least personal; his justice is never absolute, always relative, tempered by the ex-

pediency which can seldom dare to be abstractly just. But the relations of the father are all personal; his ends are to make good persons; his means must be adapted to his ends; and his reign is prosperous only as he constrains towards the affection that compels obedience, or wins from evil by the wisdom of a watchful love.

“And as the sovereigns differ, so do their laws. The legal authority does not chastise, only punishes; all its sanctions are penalties, and they are enforced, not to reform or restore the criminal, but to compel respect and conformity to law. But the paternal authority does not so much punish as chastise; all its sanctions are chastisements, and their ultimate aim is to correct and reform, so expelling the evil as to make room for the good. This distinction is fundamental and determinative. Punishment and chastisement agree, while they differ. They agree in this: both are exercised on offenders by those who have the authority to command, and the right to be obeyed, and the power to execute the judgment which has been passed on disobedience. But they differ here: punishment regards what may be variously described as the maintenance of order, the public good, the majesty of the law, or the claims of justice; but chastisement seeks the good of the offender, certain that, if it secures this, all these other things will surely follow. And this distinction involves another: under a rigorously forensic, or legal and judicial, system, all penalties punish, but do not chastise; they may be vindictive, exhibiting the power or sufficiency of the law against those who break it; or exemplary and deterrent, warning those who would do as the criminal has done, of what will be their certain fate; but under a sovereign paternity, all penalties chastise, and do not simply punish; that is, while doing the same things that legal punishments do, they yet aim at doing something more, so affecting and so placing the offender that he shall cease from his offences, and become dutiful and obedient. Hence emerges a further and final distinction: *a government which is, ‘in the proper forensic sense, legal and judicial,’ is punitive, not remedial; its agencies and aims are retributory and penal, not reformatory and restorative: but a paternal sovereignty is in the true sense remedial in its very*

*penalties; its methods and ends are never merely vindictive or retaliatory, but are always corrective, redemptive. Under a purely legal government, the salvation of the criminal is impossible; but under a regal fatherhood, the thing impossible is the total abandonment of the sinner. If salvation happens under the former, it is by other means than the forensic and the judicial; if loss is irreparable under the latter, the reason is not in the father. And so we may say, in judgment the legal sovereign is just, but the paternal is gracious. The one reigns that he may prevent evil men from injuring the good; but the other reigns that evil may cease by evil men being saved."*

Here, then, is the author's theory as held by himself and the school he represents. The principles laid down in the abstract in the foregoing passage are applied to the divine government in the concrete. There is no need of a detailed examination of this disquisition upon the distinctions between fatherhood and sovereignty, and how the fatherhood affects the exercise of the prerogative of sovereignty. The lines (now marked) in *italics* save us all this trouble, as they present us with the outcome of the discussion in the author's own words. The chief point to be noted is, that "a paternal sovereignty is in the true sense remedial in its very penalties; its methods and ends are never merely vindictive or retaliatory, but are always corrective, redemptive." We have here a singular abuse of language. Paternal sovereignty, we are told, "is remedial in its very penalties; its methods and ends are never merely vindictive or retaliatory, but are always corrective, redemptive." If so, then, why designate the infliction by the term penalty? Chastisement was the only proper term to express the idea that the aim of the infliction was remedial, corrective, redemptive. After distinguishing punishment from chastisement, our author has forgotten the distinction, and has proceeded as if these terms were synonymous. One might as well say that punishment means chastisement, and chastisement, punishment. Suffering inflicted for the correction, or redemption, of the subject of it is simply chastisement, and can never, except by an abuse of language, be designated by the term penalty, or punishment. It is true the adverb *merely* is used to qualify the general state-

ment, but this does not alter the case. The thing claimed is, that under the government of God there is no penalty exclusively penal. In every instance, the great aim of the infliction is remedial, corrective, redemptive!

Here, again, Butler's principle may be applied. How does this theory harmonize with the constitution and course of nature? Does the moral constitution of man assent to it, and, under the magistracy of man, is penalty always inflicted with a view ultimately to the correction and recovery of the criminal? Was it with the design of correcting, improving, redeeming him, that Burke was hanged in Edinburgh for the murder of Daft Jamie? Was it for a like reason that Brady was hanged in Dublin for the Phoenix Park murders? Was the penalty inflicted in these cases not purely and simply retributive and vindicatory? Is there a man on the footstool, whose moral nature has not been debased and perverted, who would not say these murderers were righteously put to death? And surely no man in the possession of his reason would say that the sufferings they endured were remedial, corrective, redemptive. Had the courts which sent these men to the gallows sent them to a reformatory, the consciences of all righteous men would have been roused to indignation, and the decision would have been spurned as a gross perversion of justice and an infamous abuse of the prerogative of mercy. We have a right to give these and like cases as illustrations of the utter absurdity of our author's sentimental, rectoral and judicial ethics, as he has at the outset conducted the discussion in the generic, and assumed throughout that the principles which regulate the infliction of penalties are as applicable to the sphere of the divine administration as they are to the sphere of government as administered by man. The moral sense of civilized humanity will not allow itself to be befogged by a theory which, as soon as it enters the domain of human history, is seen to be at war with the moral judgment of men.

Now, let us see how this theory will bear the test of the facts presented in the history of the divine administration as given in the sacred Scriptures. Was the penalty inflicted upon the giant fellers of the days of Noah by the deluge not merely penal or



vindictory, but also corrective, remedial, redemptive? Was it for the purpose of reforming the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah that God rained upon those cities a deluge of fire and brimstone? Was it for the reformation of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram that the earth opened and swallowed them up? Was the stoning of Achan corrective, remedial, redemptive? Was it for the moral improvement of Amalek that Saul received that dread commission, "Go and smite Amalek"? Was it in order to teach Ananias and Sapphira a lesson in truth and honesty that they were stricken by the hand of death at Peter's word, who simply executed the divine sentence?

But it is obvious if the principle be valid, that it cannot be limited to penal inflictions occurring in time. If "the methods and ends of a paternal sovereignty are never merely vindictive or retaliatory, but are always corrective, redemptive," and if, "under a regal fatherhood, the thing impossible is the total abandonment of the sinner," it must follow that, whether in time or in eternity, the object of the infliction of penal suffering must be remedial, reformatory, redemptive. Whether here or hereafter, as the fatherhood and sonship abide in an indissoluble correlation, the sufferings inflicted by the father upon his child, call them penalties, or chastisements, or what men may please, must have, for their ultimate object, his discipline and reformation. Like the evolutionists, they eke out their theory by drafts upon the *æons* of eternity. The father can *never* abandon his son, but must, in all his dealings with him, treat him as a son, even when he inflicts upon him the dire penalties of the future state; for, as our author holds, "paternal sovereignty is in the true sense remedial in its very penalties," and "under a regal fatherhood the thing impossible is the total abandonment of the sinner."

There are few men so prone to commit theoretical suicide as the higher critics and their theological allies. The divine fatherhood, they tell us, furnishes the key to the divine administration; and yet, side by side with this, they tell us that the divine Father conducts his remedial administration very largely by means of pains and *penalties*; and those of them who, like our author, believe in what is called the "larger hope," contend that this pro-

cess of penal discipline, in the case of those who die impenitent, will be continued hereafter, the Father always *trying* to reclaim his errant children. How an administration conducted on these lines is to be reconciled with the principle of a government under which the ruling, dominant idea is fatherhood, is certainly a grave problem. Would the regnant Father not be acting more in accordance with his relations to his sons were he to reform and redeem them *here* rather than to postpone their reformation till the *future state*? If fatherly love have any other remedial appliances to draw upon, will it have recourse to the anguish inwrought by the worm that dieth not, and the torture of the fire that is not quenched? These are the men who talk so loudly about fatherly benevolence! Surely it were more benevolent to convert men here, through the instrumentality of the divine word and the agency of the Holy Spirit, than to subject them to the torments of Gehenna for, it may be, myriads of ages, amid an environment unirradiated by a single overture of love, save what is revealed through the infliction of unutterable penal anguish. The only answer which the advocates of the "larger hope" can make to this argument is, that there is an obstacle in the will of man which is insuperable even to the omnipotence of God. Professor Bruce, in his *Apologetics*, page 69, *cautiously* puts it thus: "The Christian philosopher does not believe that there is anything in the 'hyle,' in the elements of matter out of which the universe is built, capable of frustrating the divine purpose. But he does recognize in the will of man a possible barrier to the realization of the Creator's beneficent intentions." Our author (pages 467-'68) puts the case in this way: "Compulsory restoration is only another form of annihilation. Freedom is of the essence of man, and he must be freely saved to be saved at all. Were he saved at the expense of his freedom, he would not be so much saved as lost. For the very seat and soul of personality is will; and were the will suspended, especially in the article of its supreme choice, the personality would be destroyed: what resulted would be, not a new man, but another man from him who had been before. And the original man could not be recalled into being; for, were the old will suspended that the man might be saved, restored, the old state would be restored with it."

Whatever else the author has failed to prove he has proved to demonstration that he is neither a philosopher nor an evangelical theologian. He has confounded the faculty of will with the moral state of that faculty, and contends that the moral state of the faculty cannot be changed without suspending its action or annihilating it! This is simply saying that God cannot regenerate the soul without destroying its freedom. Why, the very object of regeneration is the deliverance of the sinner's will from the bondage and slavery of sin. The sinner is a slave of sin until he becomes the subject of this mighty change. As our Saviour informed Nicodemus, he can neither see nor enter the kingdom of God until he is born from above. Here is a divine lesson in the philosophy of salvation, to which Dr. Fairbairn would do well to take heed. According to our Saviour's view of man's spiritual condition by nature, his understanding is so darkened that he cannot apprehend spiritual things, and his will is so enthralled by sin that he cannot lay hold of the things of the Spirit. This is just what Paul tells the Corinthians: "The natural man cannot receive the things of the Spirit of God, because they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." Such is the utter inability of man in regard to divine things that he cannot apprehend the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, until God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in his heart and revealed it. That is, the power put forth in the saving enlightenment of the soul in the knowledge of the divine glory, as unveiled in him who is the brightness of that glory and the express image of the divine nature, is as great as that put forth at first in the creation of light. Surely there can be no intelligent volition in regard to divine things, until the understanding apprehends them. *Ignoti nulla cupido*—there can be no desire for an unknown object. All such passages, and the redemptive facts they make known, are ignored by our author in this theory of the powers and prerogatives of the human will. It will be observed that he does not cite a single passage of Scripture in support of the theory that God cannot renew the will without destroying the freedom of the moral agent. If God can

take away the stony heart out of man's flesh, and give a heart of flesh in its stead; if he can write his laws in the heart and put them in the inward part, surely in doing so he determines the volitions of man's will. Our author's theory is simply a denial of this claim put forth by God in his word. It limits him, in his dealings with moral agents, to mere moral suasion, and reduces him to a state of helpless vassalage to the creatures of his own hand. If our theologies are to be remodeled by a recurrence to the consciousness of "the historic Christ," how is it that instead of citing Christ's testimony in support of his theological reconstructions, our author so often substitutes for such testimony his own speculations in philosophy, speculations which, in this case of the will, involve the denial of the Scripture doctrine of regeneration as taught personally by our Lord himself? The greatest theologian of our day once said: "Let a man tell me what his philosophy is and I shall ask him no questions about his theology." This book, written with marked ability, especially in the construction of terse, antithetical phrases, illustrates the justice of this rule of judgment, not only by the instances it adduces of the way in which philosophy has modified theology in the past, but also by the evidence it gives of the extent to which our author's philosophy has dominated and shaped his own theology. His remarks on Rome and Newman's surrender are excellent; but he has marred and unbalanced his own system by merging the divine attributes and prerogatives in a universal divine fatherhood. He has not held loyally to his own theological ultimate, the consciousness of "the historic Christ," which, as we have seen, would have conducted him to Calvinism, but has, again and again, substituted for it the imaginary findings of his own consciousness. Some of the dangerous consequences of this interchange of standards of judgment have now been pointed out; to state and examine them all would require a volume rivaling in its dimensions the book itself. Oxford, if we are to judge by its philosophical and theological issues, such as "*Lux Mundi*" and the present volume, is not the school in which to study either philosophy or theology.

ROBERT WATTS.

*College Park, Belfast.*

## II. SIDE-LIGHTS ON THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THOUGHTS AND WORDS.

IF it can be made out that there is such a thing in the domain of reality as the exercise of what may be broadly termed intelligence, where consciousness is held in abeyance, then it would appear that no arguments drawn from the actual or supposed invariable *nexus* between thought and language in the case of our conscious mental exercises are germane or relevant to disprove the possibility of thought in the absence of language. For, manifestly, if thought may take place without consciousness, the ascertainment that language is the necessary instrument of a part (even though the greater part) of our thinking leaves the question undetermined whether language is or is not the necessary instrument of *all* our thinking; it would certainly look, though, as if there could be no reasonable demand or promising field for language in the case of operations so entirely occult and withdrawn so completely from the recognition of their own subject. Or we may put it in this way: If it should turn out that consciousness itself can be dispensed with in certain forms of what, for the lack of a better term, we may call our thinking, it would seem to follow *à fortiori* that language can be dispensed with too. Furthermore, this realm of unconscious mental activity may be a wider one than has ordinarily been imagined. Professor Müller,<sup>1</sup> as we said, protests against what he stigmatizes as the philosophy of the nursery and the menagerie. We are inclined to the opinion that he does so with some show of reason, but that he carries his protest too far. Not very much, perhaps, can be learned from the silent and unfathomable experiences of the brute creation, and of infancy; but it may be, and we think it is a fact, that something can be learned from them. In like manner it may be true, after all, that there may be a vast *terra incognita* lying back of

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<sup>1</sup> We are indebted to this gentleman for free access to several of our most important sources of information and authority.

the triangulated regions of consciousness, and that a wholly unsuspected proportion of our mental processes are secretly carried on in that unknown region, as if in some mysterious laboratory.

On the other hand, if the existence of these latent mental exercises—which take place without the coöperation or intervention of consciousness—shall have to be denied, or should be disproved, the physiology of the brain, and the new science based upon it that has succeeded in obtaining a rather precarious foot-hold in Germany and elsewhere under the name of physiological psychology, have a good deal more to say on the question under consideration.<sup>1</sup>

Let us now approach the subject of thought and language from another angle. Everything here depends upon the truth or falsity of what is technically known as the “localization” of nervous and cerebral function. If the theory of local determination and exclusion is ascertained to be the true one, and if the local centres of thought and language are discovered and are found to be normally distinct and separate, though connected, and yet to be capable of disconnection, but also of continued, albeit disjunctive, activity, the conclusion will be favored that in all but exceptional conditions thought and language are closely if not inseparably associated together; but that in abnormal and exceptional situations language and thought may each (or may either one) live on in a state of divorce *à vinculo* from its ancient consort. If, on the contrary, the whole theory of psychological “localization” should have to be abandoned; or if the specific local centres of thought and language should be found to be identical; or if essentially different in cranial situation, yet in an anatomical and physiological sense to be inseparably conjoined; then very obviously, Professor Müller’s contention would be the one supported, viz., that we can only think in words. If *this* be so, we say again (as we said in the former paper), *tant mieux* for that doctrine of inspiration which carries with it the corollary of

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<sup>1</sup> The great work is still that of Wundt. Professor Ladd, of Yale College, has given us the best thing on the subject in English, in his capital book entitled *Physiological Psychology*.

a verbal no less than of an "ideational" infallibility. If the opposite view to that of the renowned Anglo-Teuton is the one we must accept; if, in other words, we are driven to the conclusion that *all* our thought is not dependent upon words, or their equivalents, yet if the study of the brain should point to the certainty or likelihood that language is the *normal* instrument of thought; the probability would surely be a high one, that even when the Divine thoughts now embodied in the sacred Scriptures lay originally and unexpressed, *ad extra*, in the minds of the inspired penmen, they were already clothed in the hallowed vesture of an appropriate and Divinely suggested language. But such an affirmation is not requisite to the establishment of the particular doctrine of inspiration in dispute. For while there is difference of opinion, as we have seen, in reference to the point as to whether we are compelled to *think* in *words* or else give up thinking altogether, there is practically no difference of opinion as to the proposition that we cannot *convey* our thoughts to others except through the instrumentality of some kind of expressive or symbolic language; and, further, that in the case of all oral or graphic statements the truth or falsity of the averments is of such a character that the outward vehicle of the thought, which in such cases is admitted to cohere with it, is affected no less than the inner kernel of the thought itself, and consequently that in such a case it would be obtrusively absurd to brand the word or *sign* as *false*, and yet applaud the idea or *concept* which the word or sign expresses or conveys as *true*.

We now proceed to the examination of these questions. The first thing to do is to investigate the phenomena of "*latency*," as the philosophers have called it; and to do so both in the light of psychology pure and simple, and also in that of physiology and the peculiar psychology that is based upon it. It will, then, behoove us to view the physiology of the brain more comprehensively, and to see what additional light is shed upon our intricate problem by the theory of "*localization*," and a scrutiny of the brain-centres and of their mutual relations in the normal state of health and in abnormal conditions of disease, or of traumatic lesion.

Everybody who has gone to college, and many who have not enjoyed that privilege, remember Sir William Hamilton's two famous lectures, the seventeenth and eighteenth of his course on metaphysics, in which these interrogatories are dealt with: "Are we always consciously active?" and "Is the mind ever unconsciously modified?" This tract of the discussion is by this time beaten ground. It is, nevertheless, a fascinating inquiry that is started under each one of these two heads, and there is much that is still undetermined in relation to the whole matter. With the first of these interrogatories our subject in this essay has only an accidental connection. The second of them has a more intimate bearing on the topic in hand.

Under the first head, that is in considering, in the seventeenth chapter, the question whether we are always consciously active, Sir William concerns himself chiefly with the phenomena of sleep. It is in connection with this that he presents the now well-known statements of M. Jouffroy, the illustrious French writer on psychology and ethics, which are of the greatest interest and value. Jouffroy seems to have demonstrated, and to have been the first to do so, that the mind is in some sense active in sleep; and his contention appears to be indisputable. If it be true, however, that there may be such a thing as a modification of the mind of which we are unconscious, as Sir William maintained, then we do not see that either he or Jouffroy has demonstrated that the mind is always *consciously* active. This, however, is, on the whole, equally, or more than equally, probable. Jouffroy discusses, like the master that he is, the state of distraction (*être distrait*). Here the simple explanation is, that the attention is drawn entirely off from one object, and powerfully concentrated on another, which more strongly attracts it.

But we leave that branch of his discussion which has to do with our waking hours, and confine ourselves to his arguments to show that we are always mentally alert and conscious in our sleep.

He appeals to the fact that the unaccustomed noises of a great city, such as Paris, at first wake a countryman, but that he soon becomes habituated to them. This was, indeed, his own invariable experience in returning from the country to the town. He



also appeals to the still more significant fact that the sound of a light brush on the carpet, if unusual, should wake a man who slept through the noise of great wagons.<sup>1</sup>

The Cartesian system *assumed* that the mind is always conscious. Malebranche takes for granted that we are conscious in our sleep. Locke adopts the negative, and demands proof of the Cartesian thesis. Leibnitz, in his turn, came to the rescue of the Cartesians. This was in the *New Essays on the Human Understanding*, a masterly reëxamination of the whole field covered by Locke's great work. As to the alleged contradiction involved in saying that a being can think and not be conscious of thought, Leibnitz observes that "in this lies the whole knot and difficulty of the matter." But the difficulty, he holds, is not insoluble, and he endeavors to elucidate it. Leibnitz does not, however, precisely say, as against Locke, whether the mind is conscious in sleep, or only unconsciously active. Wolf enounced the same doctrine with that of Leibnitz before the publication of the *Nouveaux Essais* of his redoubtable master. Kant met the issue fairly and squarely, and agrees with Plato and the Cartesians. Kant maintains that, when asleep, we always dream; that to cease to dream would be to cease to live; that those who fancy that they have not dreamed have only forgotten their dream; that one can dream more in a minute than he can accomplish in a lifetime.

John Locke supposes that most men go through a great part of their sleeping hours without dreaming. He adds that every

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<sup>1</sup> We here, once for all, refer our readers to Hamilton's two great chapters, where they will find a rich vein of anecdote, as well as of psychological reasoning. The amusing stories of the postman of Halle, and of Erasmus's learned friend Operinus, the professor and printer of Basle, will be found at the close of chapter xvii., whereas chapter xviii. fairly bristles with interesting narratives, such as the one by Dr. Rush about one of his insane patients; that of Mr. Hurt concerning his own experiences during a fever; the surprising tale of Lord Monboddo respecting the daughter-in-law of the Maréchal de Montmorenci de Laval; and the extraordinary relation of Coleridge touching the dull maid-servant who, during a nervous fever, seemed to priests and monks "to be possessed with a very learned devil." [See *Lectures on Metaphysics*, by Sir William Hamilton, Bart.; edited by the Rev. H. L. Mansel, B. D., Oxford, and John Veitch, M. A., Edinburgh. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, MDCCLXIX.]

And for all that can be said on the other side, we point to Mill's *Examination of Hamilton*, chapter xv. Longmans, Green, Redder & Dyer, 1867.

one knows, or knows of, persons who pass most of their nights without dreaming.<sup>1</sup> He concludes, in his robust, hearty way, speaking of the acknowledged silence here, as regards the fact asserted, of the paramount witness to one's own mental states, consciousness: "This, some may think to be a step beyond the Rosierucians, it being easier to make one's self invisible to others than to make another's thoughts visible to one which are not visible to himself. But it is but defining the soul to be 'a substance that always thinks,' and the business is done."<sup>2</sup>

A considerable space is devoted by Sir William to a study of somnambulism and of ordinary slumber. The somnambulist notoriously has some of his powers exalted. This is true of "the imagination, the sense of propriety," "the faculty of reasoning," and of the bodily powers, which last are under the complete dominance of the will. While in the trance-state, the somnambulist can perform feats, both physical and mental, of which he is wholly incapable when awake. The difference is one of kind as well as of degree. A person without an ear for music has been known to sing with correctness and pleasure. A somnambulist will climb a roof, and move with ease and safety where he could not go, unless with the greatest trepidation and danger, under ordinary conditions. We are ourselves advised of an authentic instance of this very sort. Persons have spent half a lifetime alternating betwixt the two states, and going on indifferently well in both; only one who is a dullard when in the normal state will be "comparatively alert and intelligent" when in the abnormal.

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<sup>1</sup> The great Scottish philosopher, Reid, held that a man might school himself to abstain from dreaming altogether, and that he had himself acquired, and for many years practised, he habit. But we understand him to be speaking of those dreams only that can afterwards be recalled to mind. There is a reference made by one of the authorities to a man who never had dreamed until after his recovery from a brain-fever. The eccentric pianist, Von Bülow (just dead), is declared to have manifested no remarkable talent for music until he had emerged in boyhood from a similar ordeal. Soon after that he came to be looked upon as a youthful prodigy.

<sup>2</sup> This puts us in mind of an exquisite passage in *The Eclipse of Faith*, where Harrington quizzically argues that a certain view, which he opposed, logically involved the conclusion that we must go to some one else to acquaint us with the contents of our own consciousness.

Sir William was the owner of three works written by three several somnambulists when under the stimulus of the trance-condition.<sup>1</sup> Here we have consciousness in an exalted form, yet it is consciousness bi-sected: The somnambulist, while in his abnormal state, has a complete memory of both states, but when in his normal state, is wholly and invariably oblivious of the events of his abnormal. This differentiates this mystic trance from ordinary sleep.

This brings us at once to the question propounded by Sir William Hamilton in his eighteenth chapter, namely, "Is the mind ever unconsciously modified?" and to the parallel physiological inquiry as to what has been somewhat roughly defined as "unconscious cerebration."

At this point it is proper to observe that, since it would appear to have been indubitably established that the mind is active in apparently dreamless sleep, and is, therefore, presumably, *always* so, the unavoidable alternative is presented, that, sleeping or waking, the mind is either in a state of conscious, or else of unconscious, activity. The refutation of Hamilton's seventeenth chapter would, therefore, be *pro tanto* a complete vindication of the ground he occupies in his eighteenth. On the other hand, just as certain of the phenomena explainable on the assumption that we are always conscious, are also explainable on the assumption that the mind may be unconsciously modified, just so certain of the phenomena which are relied on to prove the fact of unconscious mental activity may by possibility only go to prove the fact that the human thinker is, while alive, at all events, when not under the influence of syncope or coma, unceasingly conscious. Once more: on the assumption that Hamilton is, in point of fact, wrong in his contention that we are conscious even in deep slumber, then it follows from what goes before that he is just as certainly right in his contention that our minds may be, and sometimes are, unconsciously modified. But this amazing assertion, as we shall have ample occasion to point out as we advance further, does not by any manner of means depend solely on that circumstance.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I., page 320. Mansel here adverts to the well-known fact that Abercrombie's *Intellectual Philosophy* gives a number of curious examples, apparently unknown to Hamilton.

As an illustration of our meaning, there are incidents which are common to the trance of the somnambulist and the sleep of the ordinary dreamer, which would seem to admit of either explanation. One of these is what is familiarly known as *talking in one's sleep*. Another is the capacity to make fruitful progress in some intellectual work which at the time happened to be engaging one's attention. Of course the jaded body is rested, and what we speak of as the "tired" mind. But this is not judged to be a fully satisfactory account of the matter. Subjects flash before one in the morning in wholly new relations and felicitous adjustments before unperceived, and that would not have been apt to occur to one otherwise—except after severe lucubration. It is often better than long hours of additional toil to have a chance to "sleep on it."<sup>1</sup>

Every extemporaneous speaker knows the advantage of keeping a subject "in soak" in his mind for some time before the moment of delivery. Consciousness in such circumstances seems often to be wholly busy with other matters.<sup>2</sup> Remembering important things, or solving hard problems, or composing poetry

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<sup>1</sup>So thought Leibnitz; and later, Hamilton and Carpenter. With this, too, accorded the opinion and practice of Dr. Archibald Alexander; of his son and biographer, Dr. James Waddel Alexander; of the late Professor William H. McGuffey, LL. D., of the University of Virginia; and of Professor John Randolph Tucker, LL. D., of Lexington, Virginia, and of Washington and Lee University.

<sup>2</sup>Doctor Holmes once inhaled a considerable dose of ether, intending to record the thought which he should find uppermost in his mind on regaining consciousness. "The mighty music of the triumphal march into nothingness" rolled through the corridors of his being. Eternity was unveiled to him. The one great truth underlying all human experience, and that is the key to every earthly and celestial mystery, was revealed to him. As he began to come to himself he recollected his purpose, and staggering to his desk scrawled in wandering characters these momentous words: "A strong smell of turpentine prevails throughout." (*Mechanism*, etc., pp. 54 and 55.)

Sir Humphrey Davy, after inhaling nitrous oxide gas, in the manner of an ancient soothsayer or augur cried out to Dr. Kinglake: "Nothing exists but thoughts. The universe is composed of impressions, ideas, pleasures, and pains." (See *Ibid.*, p. 56.)

The mellow-minded "Autocrat" regards our definite ideas as so many stepping-stones, but says we do not take the step ourselves. The mystery of unconscious mental action, he holds, is exemplified in every act of mental association. (*Ibid.*, p. 59.) There is a Delphi in every human breast. We are *improvisatori*. (P. 60.)

as Coleridge says he composed *Kubla Khan*, or constructing arguments or orations, in one's sleep, are not usually cases in point; for the mental exercises are recollected by the next morning, or the next day. It frequently happens, though, that what seemed to be genius in the dream is recognized as fustian or incoherent nonsense when we wake.

But one sometimes wakes with some such valuable "find" in actual possession, yet without being able to say that the golden discovery took place in a state of consciousness or in one of latency. In such a situation of things, the experience might be cited as possibly *ad rem*.

The question immediately before us is whether the mind ever puts forth energies, and is ever the subject of modifications, of which it is unconscious.<sup>1</sup> This question was mooted in Germany and France long before it was approached in Great Britain. The German philosophers were far ahead of the French in the investigation. The suggestions of Condillac, as well as the previous speculations on the continent, were followed up much later by two French writers who seemed to fancy that they had been the first to stumble upon the doctrine that the mind can be modified and at the same time be unconscious of such modifications. The Germans took this view almost to a man; Condillac tried to explain away the phenomena. Doctor Oliver Wendell Holmes, in that marvellous little volume of his in which philosophy, science, literature, wit, and even theology, are so cleverly combined, and technical terms are so constantly avoided,<sup>2</sup> expresses himself as

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<sup>1</sup> "Do we ever think without knowing that we are thinking? The question may be disguised so as to look a little less paradoxical. Are there any mental processes of which we are unconscious at the time, but which we recognize as having taken place by finding certain results in our minds?" (*Mechanism in Thought and Morals*. An Address with Notes and After-thoughts, by Oliver Wendell Holmes. "Car il ne faut pas se méconnaître, nous sommes automates autant qu' esprit." Pascal: *Pensées*, Chap. XL, § 4. London: Sampson Low, Son, & Marston, Crown Buildings, 188 Fleet Street. 1871.)

\* \* \* "Such a process of reasoning is more or less implicit, and without the direct and full advertence of the mind exercising it." J. A. Newman, *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*. (See *Ibid.*, p, 37.)

<sup>2</sup> Credit, Dr. Holmes urges, should be given to these earlier authorities as well as to Unzer and Prochaska. See *Mechanism*, etc., for Hartley's account of what he calls automatic motions of the secondary kind. [*Mechanism*, etc., p. 40.]

follows: "That there are such unconscious mental actions is laid down in the strongest terms by Leibnitz, whose doctrine reverses the doctrine of Descartes into *sum, ergo cogito*." (P. 37.) He goes on to say that the phraseology of Leibnitz had to be changed to suit the advance of science, but that that great thinker evidently anticipated in its essence the theory of Hartley a half a century later, who himself was hampered by the "vibrations" of Newton, and was in error as to the true interpretation of the cerebral structure. Hartley, in his turn, anticipated in a remarkable manner some of the most startling ideas of modern times. But Leibnitz fifty years before had perceived the analogy betwixt the mysterious process of our thoughts and the series of reflex actions described with fulness and accuracy by Hartley. (Ibid., p. 39.) "Something," Leibnitz maintained, "goes on in the mind which answers to the circulation of the blood and all the internal movements of the viscera." (Ibid., p. 38.)

Unconscious activity is the rule and not the exception, we are told, in the case of those of our actions which have the most important bearing upon life. (Ibid., page 40.) These "unconscious or reflex actions" the Boston professor attributes to a mechanism which, he says, was never more simply expounded than it was by Hartley. Hartley looked upon them as the effects of "vibrations which ascend up the sensory nerves first, and then are detached down the motor nerves, which communicate with these by some common trunk, plexus, or ganglion." (Ibid., p. 41.) The operation is, crudely, like the movement of a rope over a pulley, though it is in some respects like the transmission backwards and forwards of electric currents.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> We shall not repeat here the well-known facts concerning the reflex actions of decapitated frogs, and frogs that have had the hemispheres injured or extirpated; but simply refer our readers to such pages as those of Ranney, Flint, and Martin. Physiologists distinguish between orderly and disorderly reflex movements. In orderly reflex movements of a headless frog, the following parts, according to Professor Newell Martin, of Baltimore, must be intact: "(a), The end organs of sensory nerve-fibres; (b), Afferent fibres from these to the cord; (c), Efferent fibres from the cord to the muscles; (d), The part of the spinal cord between the afferent and efferent fibres; (e), The muscles concerned in the movement."—*The Human Body*. . . . By H. Newell Martin, M. A., M. D., F. R. S., Professor of Biology in the Johns Hopkins University, etc., etc. Sixth edition, revised. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1890. (Pages 576 and 577.)

The doctrine of Leibnitz (and, we may add, of Hamilton and Carpenter) is, "that the brain may sometimes act," "as the heart commonly does, and many internal organs always do," "without our taking cognizance of the fact." (Ibid., page 42.) The idea would seem to be, in the main, a modern one, and its wide diffusion and acceptance to belong to our own era. The root of all the matter in Hamilton, Mill, Holland, Abercrombie, Laycock, Maudsley, Sir John Herschel, Carpenter, Draper, Lecky, Dalton, and the rest (p. 42), may be found in the discussion of that prince of the optimists who discovered the differential calculus.

Here are a few instances of what is meant by the advocates of "unconscious cerebration": We say, "Wait a minute, and it will come to me"; and it does. We go on talking, till all at once the idea comes back to us—delivered like the cash at Wanamaker's—"laid at the door of consciousness like a foundling in a basket." (Ibid., page 43.) How it got there, we cannot say. It could not have come there of itself. The mind must have been groping for it in the dark. (Page 43.) Aged persons, and certain others, cannot reply to a question until the answer has been evolved by some occult process. An old wagoner's daughter, whom with her father Dr. Holmes once met on the highway, said to the interested expert, "Wait a minute or so, and he will tell you"; and so he did, and spoke to the purpose. The doctor compares this delay to what machinists term "lost time," or "*back lash*," in turning a screw that has a worn thread. (Page 44.) A young man who was once a successful pupil of the doctor's "betrayed the same curious idiosyncrasy." (Page 45.)<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Much might be said about the revival of obsolete impressions. De Quincey, Dr. Holmes, and Mr. Moody testify from their own experiences after having been nearly drowned. A man was once rescued out of the Charles River, nearly dead from cramp and suffocation. When he came to, he went to his bookcase, and took a missing bond from between the leaves of a book. As he sank, the act of placing the bond there and of putting the book back in the bookcase had been printed on the retina of his mind's eye. [*Mechanism*, etc., page 93.]

The story of Argus, the dog of Ulysses, in *The Odyssey*, and that of the parrot, told by Campbell, will occur to some of our readers. Laycock tells of some old war-horses that formed in line in a thunder-storm. After the carnage of Vionville, when the evening roll-call was sounded by the first regiments of dragoons of the Guard, "six hundred and two riderless horses answered the summons. Jaded,

Sir Isaac Newton, if we are to accept the averment of Dean Swift, "would revolve" a question "in a circle in his brain, round and round, . . . before he could produce an answer." The numerous cases here come in again, where questions have been answered and problems solved in dreams, and even in what the savant of the breakfast-table styles "unconscious sleep."<sup>1</sup>

Somnambulism and other forms of double consciousness afford an additional magazine of illustrations. A brother of Lord Culpeper, who was, in 1686, arraigned and indicted for shooting one of the guards, was acquitted at the Old Bailey, on the ground that he was a somnambulist, and that the act of killing took place while he was in the trance-state.<sup>2</sup>

"Absent" persons furnish a still more familiar example of unconscious mental action. La Bruyère is said to have thrown a glass of wine into the cavity of the backgammon-board, and then, in his confusion, to have swallowed the dice. Hartley is full of instances of "automatic movements of the secondary kind," as where one knits or plays, and at the same time carries on an easy conversation. A youth and a maiden walk slowly, side by side, in the vernal sunrise, without once considering the "wonderful problem of balanced progression, which they solve anew at every step." (Ibid., page 49.)

On the fifteenth of October, 1843, Sir William Rowan Hamilton, so he writes to a friend, was walking from his observatory to Dublin with Lady Hamilton. On arriving at Brougham Bridge he "felt the galvanic circle of thought close, and the sparks that fell from it were the fundamental relations between i, j, k." This was the completion, or practically such, of one of

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and in many cases maimed, the noble animals still retained their disciplined habits."—*German Post*, quoted by *The Spectator*. [Ibid., page 94.]

Dr. Holmes wrote too early to speak of the distinction which some would now make between what they, somewhat ignorantly, style the "objective" and the "subjective" minds. Many of the alleged facts of the spiritists are thus accounted for. The "subjective" mind acts unconsciously.

<sup>1</sup> Does the charming American "Autocrat" here mean to take sides against the Scotch philosopher in the inquiry whether the mind is or is not always consciously active?

<sup>2</sup> A similar and a memorable case was reported in this country.



the most—probably the very most—novel and amazing discoveries in the higher mathematics, namely, that of quaternions.<sup>1</sup>

On the question as to whether there is, or can be, physiologically, such a thing as “unconscious cerebration,” the valuable opinions still differ. The alleged phenomena are incapable of denial, and are universally admitted. The only debate is as to their proper explanation. One method is that of referring some of them to the category of things forgotten, and accounting for the rest on the principle of “reflex action.”<sup>2</sup> On this view, the phrase “unconscious cerebration” may still be retained for the sake of convenience, but it has become a palpable misnomer.

The celebrated Dr. William Carpenter of England, in his work entitled *Principles of Human Physiology*, and again in his later and more special work on *Mental Physiology*, has pretty nearly exhausted this subject. In the first of these books the philosophic advocate of the theory gives an interesting account of the seemingly miraculous arithmetical powers of Zerah Colburn. He also descants upon Mozart’s unequalled gift of “automatic” musical production, and up on Coleridge’s, of “automatic” yet transcendent monologue.

Sir William Hamilton, the metaphysician, as is so well known, distinguishes three degrees of mental latency. We threw out the hint a while ago that the range of this species of psychological activity might perhaps be ascertained to be a broad one. This is, in fact, undoubtedly the case, as might be shown in a moment. For this statement there is high authority. “In the first place,” says the Scotch professor, “it is to be remembered that the riches, the possessions of our mind, are not to be measured by its

<sup>1</sup> *Nature*, February 7, 1870, page 407; *North British Review*, September, 1866, page 57. (In *Mechanics*, etc., page 50.)

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Holmes is a little ambiguous on this point. He may intend to distinguish between “reflex action” and “unconscious cerebration.” On the other hand, he might be understood to identify them. Professor Hartigan leans towards the “reflex” explanation (ultimately through the coöperation of the *optic thalamus* and the *corpus striatum*), but, if there were only such a word, he would prefer to call it “unconscious ganglionization.” He, however, admits the *possibility* of a true “unconscious cerebration” in certain layers of the cortex, especially if Dr. Baker should prove that only Meynert’s “psychic-cells” are concerned with consciousness.

present momentary activities, but by the amount of its acquired habits. I know a science, or language, not merely while I make a temporary use of it, but inasmuch as I can apply it when and how I will. Thus, the infinitely greater part of our spiritual treasures lies always beyond the sphere of consciousness, hid in the obscure recesses of the mind. This is the first degree of latency. In regard to this there is no difficulty or dispute \* \*."

The second degree of latency, he holds, is that in which the mind contains systems of knowledge or habits of action, which, in its ordinary state, it is wholly unconscious of possessing, but which are revealed to consciousness in certain exceptional conditions of extraordinary exaltation. This phenomenon Sir William justly pronounces one of the most marvellous in the whole compass of philosophy. That in fever, in somnambulism, in madness, and other abnormal states of its activity the mind should give clear evidence of capacities and extensive systems of knowledge with which at other times it had no acquaintance, is something that can be credited only upon irrefragable proof. But that proof is at hand in abundance. The testimony adduced is that of the most intelligent and competent observers and veracious men; and, in most cases, that of reporters wholly independent of one another. The phenomena observed and reported were unambiguous and palpable.

The noted physician, Doctor Rush, of Philadelphia, testifies that a female patient of his who became insane after parturition, in the year 1807, sang hymns and songs of her own composition, and yet had previously given no sign of having a turn for either music or poetry. So soft and agreeable was the tone of the woman's voice that the sympathetic auditor hung upon it with delight. Doctor Rush also mentions two instances of a talent for drawing, that had been evolved in the same way by madness, which had come to his knowledge. Every hospital for such people, the same expert declares, has in it mechanics who have made "elegant and completely rigged ships and curious pieces of machinery," who never displayed the least knack for such things until they went crazy.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Beasley, *On the Mind*, p. 474.

The accumulated data, Sir William maintains (and with reason), evince the general fact that proof of the inactivity of consciousness in a given case is not necessarily proof that the mind may not have been modified—all the same.

He then takes up the third class or degree of "mental modifications." This is the most difficult and abstruse part of the discussion, but it is, in our view, equally convincing as what precedes; and is fully corroborated, alternatively at least, by the phenomena of cerebration as described by the physiologists.

Sir William Hamilton puts the question thus: "Are there, in ordinary, mental modifications, *i e.*, mental activities and passivities, of which we are unconscious, but which manifest their existence by effects of which we are conscious?" In reply to this interrogatory, the great modern interpreter of Aristotle boldly proclaims himself as follows: "\* \* I am not only inclined to the affirmative; nay, I do not hesitate to maintain that what we are conscious of is constructed out of what we are not conscious of; that our whole knowledge, in fact, is made up of the unknown and the incognizable."

We are not sure that we could go the whole way with Sir William, if this affirmation could be fully expanded according to his notions. We are far from being out and out Hamiltonians. We stand nearer to Mill than to Hamilton, as to many points on which Mill takes Hamilton to task; while we differ widely from both on some of the same, and on other points. But we are in cordial agreement with Hamilton<sup>1</sup> in the main in what he urges in these two chapters, as also in his view elsewhere presented, concerning the relation between thoughts and words.

We shall not lay before our readers the articulated proofs of the doctrine as given by Hamilton. It would be demurred that the theory of unconscious mental modification is more than paradoxical; it is contradictory. The objection might be twofold: How can we know something (anything) to exist beyond the boundaries of consciousness—the one condition of all our knowledge; and how can knowledge arise out of ignorance—or one opposite of any kind proceed out of another? The decisive

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<sup>1</sup> In *Hamilton*, Vol. I., p. 341.

answer to the first point of objection is, that there are many things which we do not and cannot know directly, but which manifest their existence to us indirectly through their effects. We have no general consciousness. We are conscious only of particular perceptions, remembrances, etc. But we can have no consciousness of the rise or awakening of the thought or feeling, for its rise or awakening is equally the rise or awakening of consciousness itself.<sup>1</sup>

The answer to the second point of objection is tantamount to the establishment of the thesis supported. The succeeding argumentation is accordingly devoted simply to a conclusive proof of the main position. We can only refer those who are attracted to the topic to Sir William's arguments from the *minimum visibile* and the *minimum audible*, which are as beautifully ingenious as they are practically cogent. When we gaze upon a sylvan landscape no leaf or tree may be separately visible in any distinctness. It is the total impression of which we are conscious. Yet that total impression is incontestably made up of innumerable small impressions of which we are unconscious.

And so it is also with the hearing and with all the other bodily senses. When we listen to the distant roar or murmur of the sea, we are conscious, again, only of the total impression, and this, again, is made up of parts, and these must count as something, or the sum would only amount to zero. "The noise of the sea is the complement of the noise of its several waves: *ποντίων τε κυμάτων, Ἀνήροθμον γέλασμα*;<sup>2</sup> and if the noise of each wave made no impression on our sense, the noise of the sea, as the result of these impressions, could not be realized. But the noise of each several wave, at the distance we suppose, is inaudible; we must, however, admit that they produce a certain modification beyond consciousness on the percipient subject; for this is necessarily involved in the reality of their result."<sup>3</sup> Similar inferences are drawn from the operation of the other senses.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 348, 349.

<sup>2</sup> Æschylus, *Prometheus*, I., 89.

<sup>3</sup> Hamilton, Vol. I., pages 350 and 351.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes inquires: "Is memory, then, a material record?" The brain is, in a manner, "written all over," like the Sinaitic rocks, "with inscriptions left by the long caravans of thought." When we try to listen to the

The lecturer goes on to argue from facts connected with the association of ideas, illustrating his point very neatly from the action of physical forces resulting in certain effects upon ivory balls: when a series of such balls are at rest in a straight row and touching each other, and another ball is made to strike the first one in the row, and in the line of the row, it is only the last one in the row that is propelled.

Something like this, Hamilton holds, appears often to take place in the train of one's thoughts. We are unconscious of the intermediate ideas of the series. He gives this curious example from his own experience, and it might be easily duplicated from the experience of others: One day he happened to think of Ben Lomond, and that thought was immediately succeeded by that of the Prussian system of education. He was at the time unconscious of the links connecting these two ideas. On reflection, he became convinced that they were these: a particular German he had met on the summit of Ben Lomond—Germany—Prussia—Prussian schools. This instance is very instructive.

Sir William controverts at some length the explanation offered by Stewart, which is just Locke's view over again applied to the case in hand; namely, that the intermediate ideas are for an instant really awakened into consciousness, and then immediately forgotten.

Hamilton's most telling argument is derived from "our acquired dexterities and habits." Three views are considered under

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dotard's well-remembered story, we naturally think of the railway train which we daily see moving in the same line, and in both cases we infer that there must be a guiding track. Shakspeare was nearer right than he may have known himself when he used the language: "Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow; *Raze out the written troubles of the brain.*" We carry with us our old scars. The Boston expert illustrates this point from the exploits of microscopic photography. He has a glass slide on which is a photographic picture that may be exactly covered by the head of a pin. This speck of matter may be made to reveal the Declaration and its signers; the arms of the thirteen original States; the Capitol at Washington; portraits of all the presidents from Washington to Polk. Dr. Holmes comically adds that Jackson appears there "with that bristling head of hair in a perpetual state of electrical divergence and centrifugal self-assertion." Now, there must have been an interval when these pictured objects existed potentially and quite invisible in a drop of collodion film no bigger than the smallest grain of sand. [Cf. Haller, quoted by Laycock, in *Mechanism*, etc., page 91.]

this head: The first is that of Reid and Hartley, that the acts are strictly mechanical, or automatic; and that, as there is no active and voluntary intervention of the mind, consciousness has nothing to do with them. The second is that of Stewart, who is held to have invalidated the view of the two preceding philosophers, but not to have successfully sustained his own. Stewart's view "allows to each several motion a separate act of conscious volition." The third view is the one advocated by Sir William himself, who takes a middle ground, and again controverts Stewart's view, and does so with the utmost force and ingenuity.<sup>1</sup>

Hartley takes up the case of a performer on the harpsichord. (What would he have said could he have heard Liszt or Rubinstein play upon the piano!) In course of time, after years of practice, the acts of volition become less and less express, till at last they are evanescent and imperceptible. A great expert, such as the now regretted Von Bülow, has been known to play a sonata of Beethoven, or a crashing rhapsody of Liszt, from memory, and at the same time pursue a wholly different train of thought, or carry on a conversation with a friend. Faced by undeniable facts of this sort in his own day, Hartley concluded that there could be in such cases "no intervention of the idea or state of mind called will." To such phenomena Hartley gave the name of "transitions of voluntary actions into automatic ones."<sup>2</sup> It seems difficult to resist this reasoning, but Sir William rather dubitatively does so.

Stewart adverts to the well-known ease with which an expert accountant, does he mean what we call a "lightning calculator"? can sum up, almost at a glance, a long column of figures, and with unerring certainty;<sup>3</sup> and yet this man cannot, perhaps, recollect any of the figures of which that sum was composed.

Just as Hartley preceded the reigning school of modern physio-

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I., pages 355-360.

<sup>2</sup> Hartley, *Observations on Man*, Prop. xxi. In Hamilton, Vol. I., page 35. Hartley's views are precisely those of contemporary experts. [Cf. Kirke's *Handbook*, Vol. II., page 87.]

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Stewart might have said *three columns* instead of one. We are personally acquainted with an actuary in New York who can do that, unless he has lost the power from disuse.

logists, and an influential school of modern psychologists, in his mode of advocating, as well as (after a few changes in terms) of formulating, the automatic or mechanical theory, so old Leibnitz, if we allow a similar revision of the nomenclature in his case, anticipated all succeeding philosophers in the arguments, as we saw, which they have employed in support of the doctrine of unconscious modification.

The reference just made to Hartley affords a natural introduction to the more purely physiological branch of our investigation. This cannot be dealt with at the heel of this essay *in extenso*, or in any other than what we fear must be regarded as a very perfunctory manner. The first thing in order in any adequate, or approximately adequate, treatment of this broad subject would be a scrutiny of the hypothesis of what has for a good many years been currently spoken of as "unconscious cerebration," for this is substantially the very same question we have just been discussing; only the topic of debate is expressed in terms of physiology instead of terms of psychology, and the scene and subject-matter of the debate itself has been transferred from the twilight recesses of the conscious or unconscious soul to the almost equally mysterious chambers of the brain.

We have already glanced, in passing onwards, at this ancient and hyper-physical *quæstio vexata* as it thus reappears, identical in its essential features, and yet so strangely altered both in shape and vesture. But in order to a competent survey of this and the other physiological aspects of our general inquiry, it would be necessary to take up, first, the vital question concerning the exact relation betwixt the brain and the thinking subject. This would lead up at once to a settlement of the dispute as to cerebral and nervous "localization," and then to a consideration, first, of the brain-centres, regarded as organic parts of an entire system, and afterwards of the specific brain-centres, which are supposed to control respectively the tracts of thought and language, viewed independently and also as mutually interdependent. Both these points of inquiry might well yield a momentary precedence to an examination of the materialistic tendencies of craniology.

This is really the gist of a larger question, relating to the ten-

dencies of medical studies in general, and of physiology taken in its widest scope, but especially that of the brain and nervous system. The larger question we shall not touch, except as its determination is involved in that of the smaller one; and in fact the whole danger, if danger there be, from the pursuit of such studies lies in the temptation to confound the immortal spirit with its physical environment in the great nervous mechanism and economy, ramifying everywhere, but centring mainly in the head and the back-bone. It is painfully true and evident that such studies too often have a deplorable effect upon the minds of thoughtful men, as well as upon the common herd who merely follow their leader, as sheep go over the fence after their bell-wether. It is a still more painfully impressive fact that a good majority of writers and authorities on the functions of the cerebral and ganglionic organs would at first sight appear to give conscious encouragement to the most advanced views of the skeptical materialist. This inference, however, is sometimes an erroneous one, so far as it points to any positive or deliberate leaning in that direction; and is sometimes due to a total want of apprehension of distinctions, fully recognized by the authorities misjudged between things that stand apart from one another as separately and distantly as the heavens and the earth. The actually sinister tendencies of such studies as now too frequently directed have to be admitted.<sup>1</sup> The legitimate tendencies of such studies in them-

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<sup>1</sup>The "Autocrat's" devotion to literature and philosophy, and his sound sense of humor, together with his native vigorous sagacity, have saved him from the favorite sophisms, as well as the fantastic caperings, of most of the materialists. He somewhere says, that while the hieroglyphics scrawled on the brain may be "material," *that* is not "material" which reads and ponders over them. Professor De Motte, of Cincinnati, has developed a grand lecture we once heard into a useful book (unless the book was reduced to the lecture) on "Character-Building"; where he finely points out how the "nerve-tracks," good and bad, are (or may be) formed, changed, obliterated, reconstructed. He dwells much, however, on the persistence of early, protracted, and deep impressions. Doctor Oliver Wendell Holmes, after justly scoring other physiologico-ethical philosophers, goes himself dangerously and erroneously far when he maintains that the moral world "includes nothing but the exercise of choice; all else is machinery." [*Ibid.*, p. 96.] This is pretty much Carpenter and Draper over again. The stanch Puritan goes, too, not only for freedom and responsibility as against fatalism, but for the automatic independence of our volitions as against determinism. [*Ibid.*, pp. 96-100.]



selves, and when under proper supervision and direction, remain an open question so far as their results can be inductively determined. Yet the aspiration and quest after truth in the realm of nature—as of grace—are certainly not unacceptable to him who is the author and infinite exemplification of the truth; and when accompanied by the docile and child-like but profound and discriminating spirit enjoined and recommended in the gospel, are not likely to issue in evil or to fail to be richly rewarded.

What is more: whilst the effect of such studies when of the right sort, and when conducted under the proper restrictions and guidance, has not yet been inductively ascertained on a great scale, it has been determined on a smaller one. Even under the present conditions, and beneath the salutary care of heaven, many who have imbibed the principles of physiology as taught in our day have been securely protected against a deleterious residuum; and the noble science, as we esteem it, that so fundamentally underlies both the theory and practice of the art of healing has been able, in all Christian periods and countries, to point to conspicuous, as well as multifold representatives, who were also adherents and ornaments to our holy religion.<sup>1</sup>

The question of the consonance with Christian theism of the radical view of the brain and nervous centres, that is accepted and propagated by the leading physiologists of our time, is closely bound up with the one just under consideration. That view, it may be said here, universally involves some form of cerebral and sensory “localization,” and associates the operations of the human intelligence and volition, as manifested in this world, inseparably with definite changes in the gray matter of the brain. In its extreme form, indeed, it contends that molecular transpositions tally not only in general, but with precision, with the vicissitudes of thought; and that waste of tissue conforms with the same mathematical exactness to the expenditure of mental, as it does to that of muscular, energy. High authorities agree that the relation between thought and brain tissue has not as yet been so

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<sup>1</sup> We refer here with pleasure to one verifying example furnished by a capital book of J. Milner Fothergill, M. D., Edinburgh, entitled: *The Will Power, Its Range in Action*. Cleveland and Cincinnati: W. W. Garfield. 1889.

accurately fixed as in the other case; but most of them—many of them certainly—appear to think that the removal of this difference is only a question of time.<sup>1</sup>

It will be observed that an acceptance of the doctrine of "localization" need not bind one down to all the particular opinions and whimsies that are often associated with it.

We have used this term hitherto in its most extensive signification, as denoting the hypothetical but accepted view that the function-centres of brain work of every kind can, in most instances, be at least approximately located on an outline map of the cranium as they have been, in fact, objectively located in the human organism. The term, we shall presently see, is used by certain physiologists in a more restricted sense.

For ourselves, we have no dread of the ultimate results of this investigation. No one need be afraid of acknowledging the existence of facts; and surely anything short of the facts need give nobody the slightest alarm. The trouble with the skeptical theorists in the department of cortical and sensory-motor physiology is not with their proved facts, or even, for the most part, with their rashly *asserted* facts, some of which are false, and others of them at present devoid, if not incapable, of proof; but with the wild and often senseless *inferences* they have ventured to draw from them and then boldly to enunciate.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The poet-doctor of the breakfast tea-cups holds that people ought not to be frightened off by the bold language of "certain speculative men of science, from a subject as much belonging to natural history as the study of any other function in connection with its special organ." [*Mechanics, etc.*, p. 5.] Professor Huxley defines our thoughts as "the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." [*On the Physical Basis of Life*. New Haven. 1870.] The reverend Professor Haughton most guardedly conjectures that "our successors may even dare to speculate on the changes that converted a crust of bread, or a bottle of wine, in the brain of Swift, Molière, or Shakespeare, into the conception of the gentle Glumdalglitch, the rascally Sganarelle, or the immortal Falstaff." [*Medicine in Modern Times*. London. 1869. In Holmes, p. 6.] All this should not deter us from studying the thinking organ in connection with thought, just as we study the eye in its relations to sight. [*Ibid.*, p. 6.]

<sup>2</sup>The "materialist" contemplates the brain as wound up by the ordinary cosmic forces, and as giving them (or the effects of their activity) out again as mental products; the "spiritualist" believes in a conscious entity not inter-

The whole thing is as plain as a pike-staff. If the establishment of the point that an inseparable connection, resulting in certain fixed, and, in some cases, commensurable effects, exists in this world between the mind and the brain in the human organism necessarily leads to skeptical materialism, then we all have good reason to go over, bag and baggage, without delay to the materialists. For such a connection *has* been incontestably established, as is notorious to all men. Knock a man "on" the head, as our English friends say, with sufficient force, and you knock him, as both Americans and English say, out of his senses; by which we mean that we knock both sensibility and consciousness out of *him*. Where there is slight or more serious concussion of the brain, as when one falls when walking and strikes one's head very hard on a stone pavement, or as when one is dashed from a runaway horse against the abutments of a railway bridge, or the pediment of an heroic statue, the physician can often tell to a nicety, from the situation and violence of the blow, how long it is likely to be (on the assumption) before loss of consciousness takes place, or how soon (if ever) the man who is already unconscious is likely to "come to his senses."

Place a certain carefully selected person, an undoubted "professional," in a warm and crowded auditorium, in exciting circumstances, and an expert judge in such matters can almost foretell the very moment when she is going to faint or to have hysterics. Slap a quick-tempered and sensitively honorable man in the face, or tweak his nose, and you can predict pretty accurately, if you know the man well enough, the series of mental, no less than physical,

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changeable with motive force, which plays upon this instrument. "But the instrument must be studied by the one as much as by the other; the piano which the master touches must be as thoroughly understood as the musical-box or clock which goes of itself by a spring or weight." [*Mechanism, etc.*, p. 7.] An eminent writer in the *Journal of Psychological Medicine*, for July, 1870, is cited as declaring that the best cerebral physiologists agree that the brain is not governed by the mind, but that the mind is a force developed by the action of the brain. Physiology, however, manifestly leaves us free to reverse this statement in reference to the thinking subject. Besides, there are physiologists (like Professor Hartigan; and Carpenter's leanings appeared to be in the same direction) who make a distinction between "the mind" and the will, or "thought," and the imperishable "soul."

demonstrations that will immediately succeed. Horace knew that the healthy mind is not to be looked for, though it may exceptionally be found, in an unhealthy body, and *we* know that it never coexists with certain grave lesions of the brain. Whatever may be true of the human intelligence in a disembodied state, or in some other sphere, we are all aware that on earth and in the conditions which now obtain, a man who has been long decapitated can neither think nor feel.<sup>1 2</sup>

We have never been able to see why the ascertainment of a *quantitative*, as well as a *qualitative*, correspondence between the molecular changes in the gray matter of the cortex on the one hand, and the expenditure of mental energy on the other, could give

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<sup>1</sup> We put the matter cautiously, so as to be on safe ground. In a delightful address (since printed as an equally charming essay) by the American Goldsmith, Doctor Oliver Wendell Holmes, now probably the most venerable and shining ornament of cis-Atlantic letters, after alluding to the story told of Charlotte Corday, reproduces the ghastly but grotesque one of Sir Everard Digby, that when the executioner held up his heart after execration as that of a traitor, "the severed head exclaimed 'thou liest.'" These tales, he argues, evince the popular conviction that the seat of personality is in the great nervous centre. A dog's severed head, with freshly injected blood, looks as if it "saw you." (*Mechanism in Thought and Morals*. London: Sampson & Co. 1871.)

<sup>2</sup> The Autocrat may be pardoned for asserting, that "the material or physiological coefficient of thought" appears to be "indispensable for its exercise during the only condition of existence" of which we have any solid personal experience. (*Mechanism*, etc., p. 82.) As to the seat of the will he says that it appears to be, by turns, everywhere. It belongs in some sense to the cerebrum. It seems (like the memory) to vary with the organ it directs. As in the case of the general in command, its headquarters are shifted over the field, as circumstances may demand or suggest. "It is the least like an instrument of any of our faculties; the furthest removed from our conceptions of mechanism and matter as we commonly define them." [*Ibid.*, p. 27.] Carpenter, too, retreats before the materialist, to the impregnable citadel of the human *will*. We have to thank the author of a century of *bon-mots*, and of such lines as "The Last Leaf," and "The Chambered Nautilus," for a capital rejoinder to the materialists as to the mind. He urges that "the intellectual product does not belong to the category of force at all," as defined by the men of science. . . . "One cannot lift a weight with a logical demonstration, or make a tea-kettle boil by writing an ode to it." [*Ibid.*, p. 77.] "A given amount of molecular action in two living beings represents a certain equivalent of food in the case of two human beings," but "not an equivalent amount of intellectual product." Bacvius and Maevius were no doubt as good feeders as Virgil or Horace [*Ibid.*, p. 18]; and Nahum Tate probably ate as much as Tennyson. [Pp. 78, 81.]

any real—we mean any legitimate—aid and comfort to the atheistic or agnostic materialist, when he is not admitted to deserve any from the broader facts, some of which have been already mentioned.<sup>1</sup> For surely it is not the *degree* so much as the *fact* and *inseparableness* of the unchallenged connection between the body and the spirit that chiefly, however vainly, threatens the position of the natural realist. Skeletons, manikins, mummies, and ordinary cadavers, are everywhere admitted to be incapable of rational or emotional exercises. There is the whole trouble; and its existence and the problematic mystery that hangs about it, will have to be, and it is, universally conceded. The attempt to magnify it by descending into minute particulars will surely be unsuccessful, and might seem to argue, on the part of the hostile and over-boastful critic and *doctrinaire* who does so, a certain deterioration of the gray matter of one or other (or more) of the layers of the cortex; most probably, some may say, that one con-

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<sup>1</sup> A slight congestion or softening of the brain immediately discloses to us all, says Doctor Holmes, the strict independence of mind on its organ in the only condition of life with which we have any experimental acquaintance. (P. 7.) Such an irresistible demonstration ought really to have been unnecessary. Ordinary good sense should teach us that the microscopic, chemical, experimental study of the organ of thought in lower animals and man, in health and in disease, is just as important as if mind had been ascertained to be simply a function of the brain, just as digestion is a function of the stomach. (See *Ibid.*, p. 8.)

Doctor Holmes asks why there may not be in the human brain a latent property (or capacity) analogous to the one in iron which causes a bar through which the electric current has passed to be magnetized? Force-equivalent is one thing. *Quality* of force product is a thing altogether different. *Ca, ce n'est pas q'un autre chose.* The same movement of the hand (so far as the *amount* of muscular waste is concerned) may grind coffee-berries and play on a hurdy-gurdy. (*Ibid.*, pp. 80, 81. This is less a digest of the author's own words than it is a restatement of his ideas.)

The brain record may perish before the volume on which it was inscribed. He does not quote Johnson's lines:

"In life's last stage what prodigies arise;  
Fears of the brave and follies of the wise!  
From Marlborough's eyes the tears of dotage flow,  
And Swift expires a driveller and a show."

Yet Doctor Holmes denies that "*Hamlet* and *Faust*, . . . the valor of men and the purity of women," can be found "by testing for albumen, or examining fibres in microscopes." [*Ibid.*, p. 9.]

taining Meynert's so-called "psychic-cells." If the grand concession we all make cheerfully to the materialists, that we must be alive and have sound brains in order to think to any purpose, does not involve the surrender of what may be called objective dualism, all that follows is a mere process of differentiation—a practically irrelevant affair of minor details. With "The Duality of the Brain and Thought"<sup>1</sup> placed upon a firm basis, the laws conditioning their mutual existence and coöperation are very obviously of wholly secondary importance. Some of the skeptical experts go so far as to say in effect, as more than one with only verbal variations has positively or more tentatively said in terms, that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile."<sup>2</sup> This to an adept in hyper-physical studies would probably be regarded as mixing things badly, by confounding together two principles which, for aught that any purely physical science (*ex vi termini*) could prove, may be utterly distinct, and which have always been regarded as distinct by the vast body of the sane portion of the human race. But if such statements as the one just now given as a specimen are merely a hopeless jumble in the phraseology, and are simply to be taken in the sense that a portion of the brain is modified in a certain way, and to a certain extent in exact accordance with an analogous and synchronous modification of the mind, whether considered as conscious or unconscious, how could such a fact, even if it were one, be of any benefit to the materialistic skeptic?

Suppose the ladies of New York or London had never gazed upon the chrysanthemum crest of Paderewski, or never known directly of his existence, or that of any other pianist, and he were placed so as to be unseen, yet, if the fact could be certified to them that a different little hammer was lifted at every note, and then came down again on the right metallic string, would there have been any sense in jumping to the conclusion that those little

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<sup>1</sup> The title of a sinewy and unanswerable argument in *Christian Thought*, from the pen of Noah K. Davis, LL. D., Professor of Psychology and Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia.

<sup>2</sup> Vogt, Maudsley, perhaps Haeckel and Büchner, and others of like note, have been credited with what is substantially this assertion.

hammers were living demigods of genius, who made all the music?<sup>1</sup>

Our problem manifestly has to do only with that portion of the human anatomy known as the cerebro-spinal system, except, of course, as that is necessarily affected by its organic connection with the rest of the body. Indeed, our researches, so far as the purposes of this article are concerned, may be practically restricted to the upper portion of that system, and almost exclusively to what is popularly called the brain. The cerebro-spinal system as a whole consists of the spinal cord, the medulla oblongata, and the brain itself, together with the nerves and ganglia appertaining to this, as distinguished from the sympathetic, or organic system,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> When we penned these words, we had never seen those of Dr. Holmes which somewhat resemble them; and we were not thinking of Mr. Mallock's, which we had, nevertheless, perused a number of years ago: "The brain is the organ of consciousness, just as the instrument called an organ is an organ of music; and consciousness itself is as a tune emerging from the organ-pipes." [*Is Life Worth Living?* By William Hurrell Mallock, author of *The New Republic*, etc. . . . New York; G. P. Putnam's Sons, 182 Fifth Avenue. 1879. Page 224.] The writer here finds two pertinent and quite distinct questions, namely: (1), Why do the pipes resound when the air goes through them? (2), What controls the mechanism by which the air is regulated—a musician, or a revolving barrel? He admits that we cannot answer the first, but that this fact has really no bearing at all on the answer we are called upon to give to the second. Here emerges the great dilemma as to the unity or duality of being, and as to the independence or automatism of human life and will. [*Ibid.*, page 224] ". . . It is not denying the existence of a soul to say that it cannot move in matter, any more than it is denying the existence of an organist to say that he cannot play to us without striking the notes [keys?] of his organ. Dr. Tyndall, then, need hardly have used so much emphasis and iteration in affirming that 'every thought and feeling has its definite mechanical correlative'; that it is 'accompanied by a certain breaking up and remarrying of the atoms of the brain.' And he is no more likely to be 'hacked and scourged' for doing so than he would be for affirming that every note we hear in a piece of music has its definite correlative in the mechanism of the organ, and that it is accompanied by the depression and rising again of some particular key. In his views thus far the whole world may agree with him. . . ." [*Ibid.*, page 226.] Professor Clifford's atheistic inference from the absence of a universal brain is obviously based on the fallacy that consciousness is itself a function of the brain. [*Ibid.*, page 210.]

<sup>2</sup> "The sympathetic or organic system, especially connected with the functions relating to nutrition," analogous to what goes on in the vegetable kingdom, and "sometimes called the functions of vegetative life." Though these functions are distinct from those that are peculiar to animals, the centres of this system are

which is so intimately attached and related to it. The brain and the spinal cord are enveloped in three well-known membranes. Of the spinal cord itself, with its white matter and gray matter, its cross actions, its functions as a nerve centre of conduction, transference and reflex action, its bearing upon our voluntary movements, its extensive control of our involuntary activities, we need say nothing more. "The medulla oblongata is a column of gray and white nervous substance, formed by the prolongation upward of the spinal cord, and connecting it with the brain." Like the cord, it, too, possesses functions of conduction, transference, and reflexion, and the addition of what passes under the name of automatism. In the medulla are believed to be situated the special centres of respiration, deglutition, mastication, the secretion of saliva, the inhibitory regulation of heart-action; and the vasomotor operations, including, probably the diabetic tendency, which also centres here; the regulation of the iris and certain other muscles of the eye; hearing, taste, speech, vomiting, and some would say others besides. The brain, or encephalon, is made up chiefly above and in front of the two hemispheres of the cerebrum, and behind and beneath of the cerebellum. There are besides these, and adjacent to the medulla and the cerebellum, the organs spoken of as the pons Varolii, a bridge for nervous impressions; the crura cerebri, which unite the medulla with the cerebrum, and offer another conduit for both sensory and motor impressions; the corpora quadrigemina, now regarded as the principal nerve-centres for the sense of sight;<sup>1 2</sup> the corpora striata,

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anatomically and physiologically connected with the cerebro-spinal nerves. [Flint, p. 506. *A Text-Book of Human Physiology*. By Austin Flint, M. D., LL. D., Professor of Physiology and Physiological Anatomy in the Bellevue Hospital Medical College, New York, etc., etc. [\* \* \*] Fourth edition, entirely rewritten. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1891.]

<sup>1</sup> The thalamus, the outer geniculate bodies, the anterior corpora quadrigemina, the cortex of the occipital lobes, are in some way associated with the perceptions afforded by the retina. [Munk, Weinicke, and others. Ranney, *Lectures on Nervous Diseases*. Philadelphia: 1889. P. 25. Cf. Flint.]

<sup>2</sup> The cortical "nerve-centre" [area?] for *smell* has been said to be situated in the hook of the Hippocampe region and contiguous to the somewhat variable nerve-area for hearing. [See *Handbook of Medical Sciences*. 1888. Article by Dr. Keene.]



apparently the grand motor ganglia, and the optic thalami, apparently the grand sensory ganglia.<sup>1</sup> (K. p. 114.)

We are thus brought to the consideration of the cerebrum, or cerebral hemispheres, which are universally believed to be in some way, and to some extent, mysteriously related to thought, will, and consciousness, and by all competent physiologists to contain the grand physical centre, or centres, of all our intellectual and moral activity. So far as mind can, with any semblance of propriety, be said to be "localized" in matter, it is undoubtedly localized somewhere within the compass of these cerebral lobes and convolutions. (K., p. 120.)

The well-known parts connecting the cerebrum with the other principal divisions of the cerebro-spinal system may be regarded as a continuation of the cerebro-spinal axis, or column. Superimposed on this axis, "as a kind of offset from the main nerve path," is the cerebellum. On the farther continuation of this axis in the direct line is situated the far greater bulk of the cerebrum. The cerebrum, like the other main divisions of the whole system, is constructed of gray matter and of white. The white is simply fibrous, but the gray is both fibrous and vesicular. The lower and greater part of the brain-substance is made up of white matter; but the superior and most important part of it is composed wholly of gray matter. Unlike the gray matter of the spinal cord and the medulla oblongata, the gray matter of the cerebrum, as is also true of that of the cerebellum, is *exterior*, and forms a sort of capsule or covering for the white substance. This outer bark, or rind, of the upper brain is aptly styled the *cortex*. All this gray matter is "variously infolded" into what are called the *cerebral convolutions*. The obvious pur-

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<sup>1</sup>[Kirke, p. 114. Flint, p. 606. P. 608, etc. Kirke puts in a caveat of caution on p. 115.] We refer our readers here to the beautiful colored outline maps in Ranney, *passim*; and in particular to the diagrams of magnified nerve-cells, etc., plain and colored. See *Lectures on Nervous Diseases: From the Standpoint of Cerebral and Spinal Localization. The Later Methods employed in the Diagnosis and Treatment of these Affections.* By Ambrose L. Ranney, A. M., M. D., Professor of the Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System in the New York Post-Graduate Medical School and Hospital; Professor of Mental and Nervous Diseases in the Medical Department of the University of Vermont, etc., etc. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis, Publisher. 1889.

pose of this treatment of the cerebral gray matter was to increase its amount without unduly enlarging the space it occupied. The *weight* of the brain is a considerable factor in human and comparative anatomy. Still more importance is attached by craniologists, who are also psychologists, to the depth and complexity of these peculiar convolutions.

It has become common to speak of the brain, contemplated superficially, as divided into five lobes: the frontal, the parietal, the temporo-sphenoidal, the occipital (behind), and the central—which last is also known as the island of Reil. The anterior, or frontal, lobe is limited in the rear by the great central fissure, known as the fissure of Rolando; and underneath by the fissure of Sylvius. The parietal lobe (lying on the top of the head, and well back of the frontal lobe) is bounded in front by the fissure of Rolando, and below by the fissure of Sylvius. The temporo-sphenoidal lobe is also, but not so far, back of the frontal, and is also back of and *underneath* the fissure of Sylvius. The occipital lobe is, as its name imports, at the base of the brain, and lies behind the external perpendicular or parieto-occipital fissure. The central lobe, or island of Reil, lies deep down beneath the concealing folds of the fissure of Sylvius.

Of the *internal* surface of the cerebrum it is not necessary to speak, with its well-defined fissures and convolutions.

The principal seat of the sense of taste is in the tongue, but the soft palate and its arches, the uvula, the tonsils, and probably the upper part of the pharynx, are also involved. The centre of *smelling* is in those parts of the nasal cavities in which the olfactory nerves are distributed.<sup>1</sup> The nerves of *hearing* have been said to “clasp the roots of the brain” as a vine clasps the bottom of an elm.<sup>2</sup> The centre of *sight*, as we found, is at the base of the brain. The seat of *touch* is everywhere, for touch is only a varied modification of common sensation or sensibility.<sup>3</sup>

In man, the motor region of the cerebral hemispheres comprises, in general terms, the convolutions about the fissure of Rolando, and in or hard by the great, especially the anterior and central, convolutions.<sup>4</sup> The great centre for sensory impressions (the *sen-*

<sup>1</sup> Kirke, II., p. 169. <sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 176. <sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 162. <sup>4</sup> *Mechanism*, etc., p. 23.

*sorium*) is not so clearly defined, but is supposed to lie in the posterior part of the hemispheres.<sup>1</sup>

The cerebral cortex<sup>2</sup> (or a portion of it)<sup>3</sup> is universally regarded as the central field for the manifestation and exercise of consciousness and intellect.<sup>4 5</sup>

Three opposing views have been advanced by physiologists in reference to cerebral localization. The first is the extreme position at one remove, and is maintained and strongly advocated by Ferrier and Munk.<sup>6</sup> These authorities teach that the cortex can be accurately mapped off, in such sense that its limits and functions can be clearly and certainly determined.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Flint, p. 432. Extirpation of the corresponding organ in dogs has been held to have determined this.

<sup>2</sup> In man the general result of injury or disease of the cerebrum is disturbance of the intellectual faculties. One of the earliest and most constant of these phenomena is an impairment of memory. Mental derangement often discloses itself in exaggerated estimates of passing events. Then it goes on till the patient has to be governed like a child or an imbecile. When the cerebral injury is excessive, the senses may be impressible, though intelligence is utterly gone. "The frequency of these results in lesions of the hemispheres, without loss of sensibility or motion, shows the close connection between the mental powers and the nervous action of this portion of the brain. The same connection is seen in congenital idiocy with imperfect development of the brain. In many cases the immediate condition upon which idiocy depends is the small size of the brain as a whole, and particularly that of the cerebral hemispheres. \* \* \* " [Dalton, p. 424.]

<sup>3</sup> Hamilton, p. 424. "The cerebrum is the organ of will in so far at least as each act of the will requires a deliberate, however quick, determination." [Reil, p. 17.]

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Baker, of Washington, D. C., was, at last accounts, disposed to restrict the field of consciousness to Meynert's "pyramidal psychics."

<sup>5</sup> The classic work in Germany on this subject (unless it has been lately superseded) is that of Wundt, which is a treatise of striking ability and knowledge. We have had occasion in these columns to differ with Professor Ladd, of Yale College. It is pleasant to have this chance of saying that we agree with him on the essential parts of the valuable book in which he has not only given to English readers the gist of what was hidden away in Wundt, but struck out independently for himself, and written the only thoroughly competent work on "Physiological Psychology" that we have seen in the vernacular. Strong ground is taken in the final chapter as to the existence of the spiritual principle in man, and the utter distinction between the body and the soul.

<sup>6</sup> Ferrier's brilliant, but rather audacious, treatise is commended to the reader, on *The Functions of the Brain*.

<sup>7</sup> I am indebted for this statement (which is partly, however, in my own words) to the kind and valued instructions of my friend and teacher, J. W. Hartigan,

The extreme position at the other remove is that occupied by the modern school of Goltz. This denies point-blank and *in toto* the former theory. Goltz has, however, only revived the old theory, first promulgated by Flaurens, whose contention was that the brain could only act in its integrity, or as a whole.

Both of these extremes have been widely superseded by the view of those who advocate a middle ground. The theory which is now authoritatively held to be most in accordance with clinical and pathological evidence is that of Exner and Luciani, who in their teaching protest against sharply defined areas, and contend for the overlapping of areas, especially those of the cortex associated with the senses.

The earlier attempts at the localization of the mental faculties were principally those of Spurtzheim and Gall. Just as astrology preceded and was absorbed by astronomy, so phrenology preceded and was absorbed by psychological physiology. So far as the battle of the phrenologists was one for "localization" it was victorious; on the other hand, the detail of their system has been ascertained to be erroneous. Lavater's scheme of *physiognomy*, a very different, though related matter, is not only strangely fascinating, but has in it an element of undoubted truth. The pretension of Spurtzheim that the mental traits can be read from the superficies of the cranium, if true at all is true only to a very limited extent. If the shape of a man's head has anything to do, and often it seems to have, with his intellectual and moral character, this significant conformation appears to be, in great part, symbolical (and providential) rather than to be caused by expansive pressure and development from the interior. The true science of the brain has demonstrated, too, that the phrenologists were all wrong in their precise chart of the faculties and dispositions mapped out on the surface of the encephalon. From the view-point of suggestive *physiognomy*, the "bumps" of comparison and ideality, and even of memory, as well as those of veneration and combativeness, for instance, may, perhaps, be allowed,

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M. D., Professor of Biology in the University of West Virginia, who himself employs the term "localization" to denote the scheme of precise definition advocated by Munk and Ferrier.

in a general way, to stand. They are, however, unrecognized by the scientific analysis of the material organs that are now known to be so mysteriously correlated with the activities of the soul.

Take for example the cerebellum, which has been called "the opprobrium of the physiology of the brain,"<sup>1</sup> and of which much remains to be learned with exactitude. The phrenologists made it the seat of animal passion, whereas it is now believed to have but little to do with brute instinct, but is known to exert a controlling effect, in some way, on the coördination of muscular movements. (Dalton, 1882, page 436.)<sup>2</sup> The seat of consciousness is no longer placed specifically in the forehead, but in the layers of the cerebral cortex; and, as has been lately and strongly urged, in what, considered perpendicularly, is their deep central portion, as distinguished from what is higher or lower.

It used to be believed that the two so-called *hemispheres* of the brain were completely homologous; that the two walnut-shaped kernels were like the twin duplex lamp-burners, or like the twin engines in a great steam-ship. Wigans, in his brilliantly ingenious work on the alleged Duality of the Mind, sought in this way to account for what has been oddly styled "the sentiment of pre-existence," that is, the irresistible impression that one sometimes has that one has been in a certain situation before, when, in fact, this is not, and often could not have been, the case. Even to-day the theory is plausibly upheld in high quarters that, for a majority of the ordinary acts of the mind, only one of the hemispheres of the brain need be called into exercise. It is the hypothesis of some, that for the highest and most comprehensive mental actions both the hemispheres must be exerted.

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Ranney once, in a lecture, spoke of the cerebellum as "the *terra incognita* of the brain." [*Nervous Diseases*, page 39.]

<sup>2</sup> See, on the functions of the cerebellum, Kirke's *Handbook*, p. 118; Dalton (1882), p. 426; and Flint (1889), p. 608. Flint concedes to Gall an apparent connection of some sort between the cerebellum and the generative organs, but denies the presidency of the cerebellar centre over such functions. "The region overlapped by the cerebellum is interspersed with important collections of gray matter, which act as nuclei of origin for important nerve-tracts. . . ." [Ranney, page 53.] The view held by some is, that "the cerebellum is, for certain purposes, subordinate to the cerebrum"; that it is, in effect, "an informing dépôt for coördination, rather than a distinct centre." [Ranney, page 41.]

It was, however, in 1862 that Broca made a discovery that was destined completely to revolutionize the accepted instructions on this subject. It had long been suspected that there was an affection of the brain leading to a disarrangement of the faculty of speech. This disease is known under the name of Aphasia, and is frequently, but not invariably, connected with muscular paralysis. The experience is distinctly one of disassociation: thought remains intact; but the sign, the mode of expressing the thought, is absent and has been forgotten. When a man's vocal organs are paralyzed, he is unable to speak distinctly or to speak at all. There is a form of aphasia known as the *ataxic* variety, in which the organs of speech are thus compromised. But aphasia, pure and simple, is the *amnesic* variety. Here the man can no more speak than in the other case, but the organs of articulation may be uninjured. The lesion is here, as Binet says, more delicate, more complex; it effects the inner sources of language, not its exterior organs. Before we pronounce a word, we must first definitely think of it. This definite thought of the word is just what the bewildered aphasiac gropes for in vain. This, as Dalton points out, is only an exaggeration of the common failing of otherwise healthy persons of halting for the word. (*Dalton*, p. 432.) The studies of thirty years and more had shed little or no light on the *rationale* of this phenomenon. With Broca's investigation all was changed. The particular form of aphasia which he studied specially was the variety resulting in the loss of articulation.

Some of the sufferers were complete mutes; others kept on repeating gibberish; others apply one correct word or phrase to everything. In light cases a large number of words are remembered; but certain parts of speech, particularly the nouns, are gone.

Broca's researches seemed even to himself to be subversive of the principles of physiology. This only led him to continue his fruitful investigations. In March, 1864, the number of his examinations had increased to twenty. The problem as to the local seat of articulate language was solved. It is fixed at the base of the third frontal convolution of the left cerebral hemisphere.

There is there situated a small quantity of gray substance which must be considered as the motive organ of articulate expression. Unless this organ remain unimpaired, the possessor cannot properly express his thoughts.

Facts must prevail over current notions; and it is a fact that in the case of all of Broca's patients, the lesion, or disturbance resulting in aphasia had been one affecting the left side of the brain. Broca's ingenious and reasonable way of accounting for this is the one still adopted. He suggests that our right-handed movements are directed by the left hemisphere in consequence of the well-known decussation, or "crossing," of the motive fibres at the base of the brain.<sup>1</sup> This reasoning involves the corollary that in the case of left-handed persons the disease attacks the right hemisphere, and there are not wanting tangible indications pointing to the same conclusion.

Some time after Broca's discovery it was ascertained that the special disease he studied was only one of several kinds of aphasia. One is that of verbal blindness, where the visual pictures and definite forms of the letters are recognized and differentiated, but the words convey no meaning. The source of this trouble manifestly is not in the eye, but somehow in the action of the perceptive mind. Charcot reports this interesting case. A tradesman one day at a hunting-party lost his consciousness. When he came to the fact was disclosed that he was paralyzed on the right side. He talked jargon, and misplaced words.<sup>2</sup> Gradually

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<sup>1</sup> "The decussation of the pyramids in the medulla oblongata." [Dalton, p. 397.] This decussation does not invariably take place. According to Charcot exceptional cases exist, though their occurrence is extremely infrequent, in which a majority of the fibres of the pyramidal tract in man are direct, and only the minority decussate. Under these conditions, contrary to the rule, paralysis would take place on the same side with the lesion which produced it. Similar variations have been observed in other decussating tracts in the nervous system. See *Leçons sur les Localisations dans les Maladies du Cerveau et de la Moelle épinière*, Deuxième Partie. Paris, 1880, p. 195. [Dalton, p. 398.]

<sup>2</sup> For an admirably clear and sufficient account of aphasia see Dalton, pp. 432, 433. One variety of the disease has been termed *paraphasia*, and is the kind where a wrong word is regularly substituted for the right one. We have it on high authority that "observations on the locality of the centre of language tend to place it more especially in the *convolutions surrounding the lower end of the fissure of Sylvius, and in those of the insula*." [I. e., in the island of Reil.] "Broca re-

he grew better, until after fifteen days he supposed himself to be entirely restored. One day he gave a business order in writing. Under the impression that he had forgotten something, he opened his letter and found out that he could not read a word of any written or printed matter. To overcome this disability he had to begin over again, and learn to read like a little child.

Another form of the malady is word-deafness. In this case it is the verbal-hearing which is destroyed. The victim in this case distinctly hears the sound, but is wholly unable to apprehend the meaning of what is said to him. He is in a situation not unlike that of a man transported to a foreign land, where the people speak an unknown tongue. There is another form of aphasia where the patient suffers from an inability to write, although he can readily understand both what is written or spoken. This is known as *agraphia*.

On the basis of these facts Charcot has constructed a complete psychological theory of language. It is agreed among physiologists that, instead of there being but one brain-centre for memory, there is a plurality of such centres; and that every sensory and motor centre is associated with a memory of its own; and that any one of these may be exclusively impaired. Acting upon this, and developing it in a new way, Charcot has established the fact that every human being who makes use of the conventional language has four distinct kinds of special memory: one for reading, one for understanding words when spoken, one for the utterance of words, and one for writing. The child first brings into play the auditive memory, then the memory of articulation. At

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fers it to the posterior part of the third frontal convolution, while others consider it as belonging to the frontal lobe in general. The evidence for this localization consists in a number of instances in which aphasia has been found in post-mortem examination to be accompanied by lesions of the brain confined to the points indicated" [With or without paralysis.] *A Treatise on Human Physiology*. By John C. Dalton, M. D., Professor of Physiology and Hygiene in the College of Physicians and Surgeons, New York, etc., etc. Seventh Edition. With two hundred and fifty-two illustrations. . . . Philadelphia: Henry C. Lea's Son & Co. 1882. This, we demur, is not an entirely complete statement. For a full, strong exposition of the variety and strength of the evidence for determining the locality of brain-centres and ascertaining the functions of nerves or organs we refer the reader to the text-book by Dr. Ranney.



a later stage he learns to read and write. This explanation sheds light on the four different kinds of aphasia. The loss of the visual memory simply entails the inability to recognize written or printed words. The signs awaken no memory, and consequently present no idea. When any of the other kinds of memory are affected, a similar result is observed. As all persons are not constituted exactly alike, so each one naturally has his own peculiar style of remembering, of thinking, of reasoning, just as he has also of feeling, in the domain of the sentiments and the passions. This psychological individuality has been thought to arise from the preponderance of certain impressions (or sensations) over others. We here repeat the admirable statement of Binet: "A thought always presents itself to the mind accompanied by a sign. This sign is a word which remains in the mind. It varies in its nature with each individual. For one, it is an interior murmur, vague and confused; for another, it is a perfect word, clear and distinct. These two classes of persons *hear* themselves think. There are others who *read* their thoughts, who *see* them, either in the form of mental pictures of objects, or of mental words." Another class cannot think without wanting to articulate. Still another can appeal at will to any one of all four memories. The loss of the memory of *sound* is a graver one than any of the others. This will gradually bring on trouble in speaking, then in reading and in writing, resulting in a species of secondary aphasia, which is comprehensive, but, unlike the primary one, is curable.<sup>1</sup> When one memory is obliterated, the others can be

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Flint has marked within a circle, on an outline map of the encephalon, the figures 9 and 10. "These numbers," he says, "taken together, on the third frontal convolution, mark the centre for the movement of the lips and tongue, as in articulation." This is Broca's convolution, the seat of aphasia. [*Physiology* (1889), p. 615] The place is "at or near the island of Reil." [*Ibid.*, p. 622.] In some few instances, he states, the organ "seems to be in the corresponding part upon the right side. [*Ibid.*, page 622. Cf. Dalton, p. 433, for "exceptional cases," in which aphasia coincides with left hemiplegia.] Hypothetically, both sides may originally have been equally related to language. [*Ibid.*, page 622.] He cites "some cases" of recovery from lesion of the speech-centre in the left hemisphere, and some cases of relapse after fresh lesion. [*Ibid.*, page 622.] Gratiolet (Hardigan and Flint) maintained that the left side probably was the first developed.

trained in a great measure to take its place. It has been an accepted fact for some time, that the nervous centres are composed of two principal elements, cells and fibres. The cerebral changes resulting in aphasia have been found in some cases to affect the cells; in other cases, the adjacent fibres. There may thus be an isolated lesion of the cells, and there may be an isolated lesion of the fibres. Déjerine for several years made a special study of the lesion of the conducting fibres, and cites the case of a man who could read aloud, but who could not understand what he was reading. The man was in full possession of the memory of sight and the memory of hearing, but there was in his case an interruption of the regular connection by the fibres communicating between these two memory-centres and the centre of ideas.

It will be perceived, then, that at the present time at least three forms of aphasia are distinguished: that brought on by some injury to the verbal centres; that brought on by induction, and that brought on by privation of the ordinary means of conductibility.

Binet winds up by saying that in a normal condition of things there is a harmonious coöperation of all the special memories, so that the outcome is "that well-coördinated grouping of sensations of thoughts and facts, which we call language."<sup>1</sup>

If there is anything in the received tenet or doctrine of cerebral localization, it would certainly appear that as the cortex, including Meynert's large pyramidal so-called "psychic-cells," the acknowledged seat of thought, and the whole Broca tract, and its continuations, the acknowledged seat of language, are, or may become, mutually independent; and as disease may result in the impairment of either of these organs without impairment of the other, it would certainly seem to follow that there can be no absolutely essential conjunction of words and of *ideas*. We have seen that philology and psychology point, though somewhat like a wavering vane, to the same conclusion. In this case the necessity of language to the preservation and conveyance of thought remains undisturbed. On the other hand, if the other horn of

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<sup>1</sup> "Aphasia," by Alfred Binet, in the *Revue de Deux Mondes*. [See the April number of *The Chautauquan* for 1892.]

the dilemma should be taken, and it should be insisted, on a final summing up, that, in the light of the most advanced science, thought, unembodied in language, is incapable of existence, as has been pointed out already, so much the better for the old-fashioned and conservative view that still adheres to the formal, as well as the substantial, infallibility of the holy Scriptures.

H. C. ALEXANDER.

*Oakland, Md.*

### III. THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT OF THE PENTATEUCH.

NOT from a pilgrimage to Sinai have we returned with the original autograph of the Pentateuch, but from the laboratory of the new scholasticism do we come, bearing certain alleged evidence concerning the complete original text of the first five books of the Old Testament. First of all, we discover that in this scholastic workshop the book of Joshua has been welded fast to the Pentateuch, and we are called upon to accept the Hexateuch as the earliest unified cycle of biblical writings. We cannot forget that this same school of scientists were once addicted to the habit of raising stout objection to the consideration of the autograph text of any of the books of the Bible. To the law of a Vatican codex! To the testimony of the Septuagint version! This has been the constant appeal of these scholars when reference was made to a Mosaic original. "Let us limit the discussion," they cried, "to the tangible evidence of our later copies, and not reach out after an original manuscript, which is something high in the air, far beyond the reach of even our minute *spectrum* analysis. Such wild searchings have already led many men into a superstitious bibliolatry, an inconsistent worship of the mere leaves and letters of the Bible, worse than the veritable idolatry rendered to the Virgin Mary." We cannot forget that this was once the position of these new discoverers of the date and character of the original sacred document known as the Hexateuch.

It is claimed that the writer whose manual skill gave final form to the Hexateuch has not transmitted his name to us. He is catalogued among those who are termed anonymous. Moreover, his work was altogether a compilation. Not at all can original composition be ascribed to him, but only the arrangement of documents furnished to his hand. During the captivity of Judah in Babylon, or very soon thereafter, lived and wrought this unknown scribe. That is to say, somewhere in the neighborhood of ten centuries after the time of Moses, the Jewish nation

received from the editorial hand of this compiler, in complete written form, their history and their laws now known as the Hexateuch. A term descriptive of this manuscript is furnished along with its date. The "*Parentic framework*"<sup>1</sup> of the customs and laws of the Hebrews is the name applied to the finished literary form of the Hexateuch. We understand this as indicating the purpose of the editor to be only hortatory. He desired to address an exhortation to the people of his day, and to this end he arranged the material of the Hexateuch as it has been handed down to our own time. For the sake of convenience, therefore, and without any intention of disrespect toward the new school, we take the liberty of calling this recently-discovered codex the *Parenticon*.

The editor of the *Parenticon* made use of several documents previously arranged by editors like himself. Each piece of literary composition used by this post-exilic editor was itself a *parenticon*. Therefore, the final volume wrought out by the editor of the Hexateuch (*Parenticon*, written with capital P) was made up of many similar *parentica*. In the main, however, according to the best consensus of opinion among the scholastics, there were four great historical documents, each a *parenticon* in itself, cast together in one linguistic framework as the *Parenticon*. Dr. Driver combines two of these narratives into one, and calls it J E, and otherwise describes the combination as the prophetic narrative. This document deals with the history of the Jewish nation from its earliest beginnings,<sup>2</sup> and was cast into complete form about the middle of the eighth century B. C., or just prior to the time of the prophets Amos and Hosea. The second series of national traditions published to the nation was the document D, or the book of Deuteronomy. Some *memoranda* handed down from Moses himself were incorporated in this manuscript by its editor. The date of this work was about a century later than that of J E (that is, 650 B. C.), for the scholastic theory demands that D must have been written, must have been deposited in the temple at Jerusalem, and there forgotten, in time suf-

<sup>1</sup> Driver's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, pp. 85 and 142.

<sup>2</sup> Driver's *Introduction*, page 110.

ficient to get itself covered with dust, and then to get itself discovered by King Josiah in the year 621 B. C. The priestly narrative, P, dealt with the history of God's revelation of himself to his people. J E and P made up the material of the books of Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers; the first dealing with the story of the race; the second, with the revelations and institutions that lay at the basis of the theocracy.<sup>1</sup> Other *memoranda* of Moses were used by the editor of P, and he cast his material into permanent shape during the time of the captivity in Babylon, say a century later than D, or 550 B. C. Thus it happened that the national legends and customs of the Hebrews were developing into definite, systematic form during the period of almost ten centuries after the exodus; and then arose the editor who selected certain parts of J E, D, and P, and arranged them as the *Pareneticon*.

Now, it may be profitable to follow these scientists along the different paths of investigation, to learn whether they lead us to that alleged point of view whence the new manuscript may be discerned. The first line of search pursued is that of linguistic analysis. The new school has harked back to a well-known canon of literary criticism in vogue in the eighteenth century. This canon affirmed that "every great poem is merely a word-mosaic," and that the business of the literary critic consists chiefly in picking out the fragments and in tracing them back to their original authors. Astruc, in 1753, and Eichhorn, in 1780, ventured to bring the Pentateuch under the ruling of this canon, and the analysis of the sacred narratives began. A fresh energy has filled the modern disciples of this school, and they now confidently claim that they have laid their fingers upon the original fragments of the great mosaic which we have agreed to call the *Pareneticon*. Far be it from our purpose to bandy charges, but in this connection we cannot forbear mentioning a repeated claim set forth by these scientists, that no pre-conceived idea has ever dared to show its head among them. This origin of the analytic method as applied to Scripture would seem to indicate that, after all, the old rejected canon of the last century has found refuge in this new camp, and is now lurking there as a veritable *a priori*

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<sup>1</sup> Driver's *Introduction*, page 110.

theory. Secretly urged onward by this concealed demon, whom they claim to have exorcised, these men assert that from variations in language, style, and narrative, they have traced the joints and seams that unite the different documents of the great mosaic, the *Paraneticon*. Lists of words and phrases are adduced to prove types of literary composition, and these typical documents, J E, D, and P, in minute detail, are pointed out to us as the literary fragments, adjusted and pieced into one great manuscript.

We desire to call attention to a single additional principle touching this method of investigation. Canon Driver is probably the leading spirit in the field of analytic research, and it is Canon Driver who makes an important admission concerning his analysis. He combines into one the two alleged documents J and E; or, to state it more accurately, he declares his inability to assign adequate reasons for their separation by analysis. After careful examination of the alleged variations in language, style and narrative, the Canon admits that the process of analysis is sometimes marked by *uncertainty*, "owing to the criteria being indecisive";<sup>1</sup> then, in a later reference, he admits, further, a cause for this uncertainty, that "the similarity of the two narratives [J and E], such as it is, is sufficiently explained by the fact that their subject-matter is (approximately) the same."<sup>2</sup> Is it not true that Canon Driver here admits the principle that the subject-matter of the narrative affects the criteria of analysis? Where the subject-matter is approximately the same, there is scanty evidence from language and style to show the presence of diverse documents. Conversely, it would seem to follow that difference in the subject-matter accounts for all the variations that are alleged in justification of the analysis. Now, if we apply this principle to the process of separating J E from P, there would seem to be no adequate ground for such analysis. It is alleged that P deals with the creation, the deluge, and the covenants between Jehovah and his people. J E treats of the parents of the race in Paradise, of the story of Cain, the dispersion at Babel, and other events in the growth of the nation of Israel. Here is a wide difference in the general subject-matter of these alleged documents. Does not this

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<sup>1</sup> Driver's *Introduction*, p. 12.    <sup>2</sup> *Idem*, p. 110.

wide divergence in theme give ample foundation for diversity in language and style? The *systematic* recurrence of certain words and phrases, which are spread forth in long catalogues in Canon Driver's work, may be made the basis for an inference exactly the opposite of his own. He arranges these lists like lines of battle facing each other, and then affirms that the differing lines imply different authors. It seems to us that the diversity in the lines is only the natural difference that arises from the varying subjects under discussion, even when those subjects are treated by one and the same individual writer.

In attempting to follow the route marked out by analysis, we have failed to reach a point of view whence we may descry the *Pareneticon*.

The analytic method belonged to the earlier stage of biblical criticism, and might now be regarded as a bit of ancient history, were it not also made the basis of the later stage of investigation. This stage assumes the *literary* analysis as an established fact, and by the *historical* method seeks to find a date for the various documents. The historical stage is illustrated by the announcement of the supplementary and the development theories. The central point in the supplementary theory is De Wette's view, announced in 1805, that the "book of the law" found in the temple in King Josiah's reign was the Book of Deuteronomy; and this discovery is taken as proof that the book itself had been written only a short time before, within the life-time of the same king. The development hypothesis was set forth by Reuss in 1833, and further elaborated by his disciples: by Kuenen in 1861, and by Wellhausen in 1878, and again by Reuss himself in 1881. This theory now holds the field among the new scholastics. It assumes the existence of the alleged Pentateuchal documents; it assumes the supplementary theory that Deuteronomy was written in the time of King Josiah; and then, upon the hypothesis of a natural *development* in the Jewish system of religion, it asserts that the document J E was written *before*, and the document P *after*, the composition of the Book of Deuteronomy. The *Pareneticon* was developed, therefore, in this three-fold order, about the time of the return of the captives from Babylon.



The pivot of the entire theory of development is the old claim of the advocates of the supplementary hypothesis, that the "book of the law of Moses," found in Josiah's reign, was the Book of Deuteronomy. This claim is based upon two propositions:

(1.) "The description of the book shows that in its most conspicuous features it was in close agreement with the contents of Deuteronomy."

(2.) "The historian who has preserved to us the narrative of the finding of 'the book of the law,' himself quotes directly from 'the law' in two passages, and in both instances from Deuteronomic writing."<sup>1</sup>

These assertions are altogether untenable by reason of two facts: Not one "historian," as assumed by Ryle, but two "historians" have given us the narrative of the finding of the law. These are the writer of the Books of Kings and the writer of the Chronicles. Even Dr. Driver himself cannot rise to the height of assuming that the Chronicler is unhistorical, although he does seek to cast the shadow of a doubt upon the integrity of the books.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Briggs declares that he "cannot consent to the denial of the historical sense of the Chronicler for the sake of any theory."<sup>3</sup> The chronicler had the facts of Josiah's reign before him, and his description of the celebration of the passover that followed the finding of the book of the law in the temple renders it clear that this book contained the passover regulations recorded in Exodus and Leviticus.<sup>4</sup> The description of the book in the narrative of the chronicler cannot be limited as a reference to the single Book of Deuteronomy.

Further than this, the author of the Books of Kings, incorrectly assumed to be the sole historian of the period, in his phraseology and line of thought constantly shows a minute knowledge of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, as well as of Deuteronomy. The story of the dedication of the temple by Solomon (1 Kings viii.) reflects a clear acquaintance with nearly the entire Pentateuch. Not by means of the two unsound propositions advanced by Ryle can the existence of the *Paraneticon* be established.

<sup>1</sup> H. E. Ryle, quoted in Briggs's *Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, pp. 16-20.

<sup>2</sup> Driver's *Introduction*, p. 484 *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> *Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, p. 115.      <sup>4</sup> 2 Chron. xxxv.

The next line of argument attempted by the new scholastics is connected with the prophecies of Isaiah and Jeremiah. They aim to show that Deuteronomy is a kind of literary bridge, spanning the period between these two prophets. The method of the argument is to prove that Isaiah knew not the Book of Deuteronomy; that Jeremiah did know this book, and from these alleged facts a leap is made to the conclusion that Deuteronomy sprang into existence between the two. Isaiah's supposed ignorance of Deuteronomy cannot be demonstrated; his real knowledge of the book is the great barrier opposing such demonstration. In the first two chapters of his prophecy, Isaiah's description of Israel as not seeking to understand the law of the Lord, and as adopting heathen customs, and also his warning of judgment to come are evidently based upon Deuteronomy xvii., xviii., xxviii. and xxxii. Another reference to God's law in chapter xxx. 8, indicates Isaiah's knowledge of that portion of the law recorded in Deuteronomy. At the other end of the supposed bridge we find Jeremiah freely referring to Numbers and Leviticus as well as to Deuteronomy. The latter book was not the only ancient sacred record known to him. It is very clear that in the days of Isaiah, as well as in the days of Jeremiah, the Book of Deuteronomy was already ancient history.

The same method is followed in the attempt to fix the order of the other documents in the literary evolution. J E is named as the earliest, because known to Isaiah, Hosea and other prophets preceding Josiah's age. P, the document containing the history of God's revelations to his people, is placed *after* Deuteronomy, in exact reversal of the order that seems most natural, viz., that Deuteronomy is based upon P (Leviticus, etc.) and itself comes after P. These attempts to fix the date and the relative order of the books of the Pentateuch from the internal evidence, illustrate the fact that literary analysis may be carried beyond the bounds of reason. Chiefly, however, in connection with the history of the Hebrew nation, do we find the crowning objection to the development theory. This hypothesis is in conflict with the facts that belong to the tragedy of the ten tribes and the tragedy of Judah.

The tragedy of the ten tribes is a drama that extends over the

period from 975 B. C. to 721 B. C. In the latter year, Sargon of Assyria captured Samaria, the capital city, and carried away these tribes into a captivity from which they never returned. This destruction came upon the nation, says the sacred historian, because the people *rejected* God's "statutes and his covenant . . . and his testimonies."<sup>1</sup> Now, the development theory asserts that no part of the law was extant before (*circa*) 750 B. C., and at that time only the race-annals in J E were written. Here was an entire nation cast into the pit of punishment for disobeying God's law when that law had not yet been set before them in written form! The document J E had been written about a generation before, but that contained not the important legislation of D and P, but only a sketch of the history of the Jewish race! The spirit of God's word gives no support to a theory like this, which denies the long-suffering mercy of Jehovah. No single nation has he ever yet destroyed upon thirty years' notice!

It must be said that Dr. Briggs recognizes this dilemma, and seeks to escape it by asserting that the priestly traditions were in existence all the while, from Moses onward, but that they were not codified until the publication of the documents already named. The *Paraneticon* was a re-codification of prior documents, and these were only codes containing well-known systems of priestly tradition, all issued as exhortations from the priesthood. These traditional systems continued to grow in definiteness until the needs of the nation demanded their publication as formal codes. At the climax of a long course of "theological reflection" these were sent forth, as the expression of the chastened spirit of the priests liberated from Babylon, a complete system of laws and ritual known as the Hexateuch or *Paraneticon*.

But we affirm that this modification of the development view does not save these scholars from the dilemma. For in the kingdom of the ten tribes there was no Levitic priesthood. When Jeroboam set up the rebel government, "he made priests of the lowest of the people, which were not of the sons of Levi."<sup>2</sup> He set up idolatrous altars at Bethel and at Dan, and God sent a messenger from Judah to utter a curse against those altars as an

abomination in his sight.<sup>1</sup> Ahab brought in priests of Baal, but Elijah slew them in the name of the Lord. If the prophets Hosea and Amos, sent to the northern kingdom, carried a message based upon traditions that had developed among the priests of Judah, what authority was stamped upon the message? Even the document J E, upon this theory, was a product of priestly tradition at Jerusalem, and was unknown to the ten tribes. Such modification of the hypothesis does not alter its inevitable conclusion that the northern kingdom received no adequate warning of the dire destruction that came because they had "forgotten the law of God."<sup>2</sup> If that law grew up in large measure after they cut themselves loose from Judah, at what time did they know it? When did they forget it? According to this theory, there were no adequate means whereby the people of the ten tribes might learn God's law. So much of the law as had been developed was the exclusive secret of the priests at Jerusalem! The northern kingdom sank into ruin because these priests failed to reveal their professional system! The only theory sustained by the facts, is the view that God's law had been known to all the people of the twelve tribes of Israel, in written *authoritative* form, since a period long antedating the rebellion of Jeroboam.

The same difficulty confronts the development theory in its attempt to explain the captivity of Judah. The king of Babylon was God's agent in punishing Judah for disobedience of his law and profanation of his temple. It is asserted that the only parts of the legislation of the Pentateuch known to Judah at that time in codified form were the statutes in Deuteronomy. Of course, they had also the history of the race in J E. The substance of the priestly legislation of P was known to them through the priests themselves. But the chronicler asserts, and likewise all the prophets of Judah, that "all *the chief of the priests*, and the people, *transgressed* very much after all the abominations of the heathen, and polluted the house of the Lord."<sup>3</sup> The priests and the people all sinned the same sin against God's law. They were all punished with the same punishment. And yet, Dr. Briggs would have us believe that the people were punished for

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<sup>1</sup> 1 Kings xiii. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Hosea iv. 6.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Chron. xxxvi. 14.

not obeying the traditions that grew up among these same priests!

The real basis of the development theory is, after all, naturalistic. Reuss, Kuenen, and Wellhausen boldly place the ancient Jewish religion on the same plane with Greek mythology, or the worship of the sun in old Egypt. They deny the existence of the supernatural in Judaism, and deny the historical character of the books of the Pentateuch. They look upon these sacred records as only so much folk-lore and legend. Moreover, Wellhausen's view is professedly based upon Vatke's Hegelian theory that there were three great stages in the development of the Old Testament religion. This three-fold period of growth is now accepted by this entire school. Dr. Briggs acknowledges the soundness of their Reussian faith, with the single exception already noted.<sup>1</sup> We have shown how this proposed modification does not alter the leading features of the hypothesis. Almost the entire band of new scholastics stand to-day in Reussian garments, although denying a part of the Reussian logic. They make use of the telescope of Reuss, of his data and his calculations; above all, they look through his eyes, and then affirm that the new luminary sends forth divine rays. Reuss affirms that the beams are altogether of earthly origin, and so far forth is Reuss correct. Never through his naturalistic methods can any divine star be discerned. It seems likely, therefore, that Reuss, the supposed friend and ally of this school, will, after all, become its Nemesis. Since his creed is the foundation of belief in the existence of the *Parenneticon*, it must inevitably follow that the *Parenneticon* itself is of human origin, the offspring of the heated and disordered imaginations of the critics themselves.

A leading figure among the new scholastics is Dr. Cheyne. The self-appointed task to which he has devoted his life is the "hallowing of criticism." The odor of *unsanctity* which clings to the *Parenneticon* by reason of the German contingent in the ranks of the critics, Dr. Cheyne would remove by creating an atmosphere of piety around the new manuscript. Now, we doubt not for a moment the reality and the sincerity of Dr. Cheyne's

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<sup>1</sup> *Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, page 128.

own individual piety and earnest Christian zeal. We call not in question the sincerity of his motives. But we assert that he has attempted the impossible when he sets forth the *Parenticon* as a sure foundation for evangelical piety in the soul. He offers a foundation of sand when he invites his disciples to build their personal faith upon the development theory. At this vital point in its history, the *Parenticon* inevitably dissolves into thin air. Its discoverers have followed methods of research that must make it, if it exists at all, the basis of a natural and not of a divine religion, and yet the earnest piety of some of these men would fain set it to working after the fashion of things supernatural. Dr. Cheyne calls the *Parenticon* the fruit of the ripest priestly reflection and aspiration, and then would fain have it recognized as the best revelation that God could make. He wants to call it naturalistic in its character and origin, but wishes it to bring forth the divine fruit of piety. Here we find the central fallacy of the development theory. Dr. Cheyne recognizes this as the weakest point in his lines, and virtually acknowledges his failure to strengthen it. He makes this acknowledgment in calling for some younger man to take up the question and solve it: "When will some young adherent . . . of evangelical principles, set himself to think out in his own way the relation of biblical criticism to vital Christian truth?"<sup>1</sup> If the young man here invoked shall ever begin the task, he will undoubtedly fail, as Dr. Cheyne has failed, to show any foundation for vital piety in the new criticism, so long, at least, as this criticism retains the form given it by Dr. Cheyne and his associates. When he announces the history of Abraham as a myth, a bit of Hebrew folk-lore; denies to David the authorship of any of the psalms, and makes them only the lyric expression of the aspirations that grew up in the Jewish church; takes away the divine agency in calling the prophets, and virtually makes them shrewd Jewish statesmen and nothing more—when Dr. Cheyne does all this, we are not surprised that consistency should require him to declare his "belief in the permanent religious value of mythic and legendary narratives in the Old Testament." But we do affirm that the attempt, first, to take all the religion out of the Bible by analysis, and

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<sup>1</sup> *The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter*, p. xxvi.

then afterwards to breathe religion again into the Bible by sympathy, is the Titanic task that men cannot accomplish. Yet this is the logical programme of the scholastics, and they claim to have carried it out in the alleged discovery of the *Parenneticon*! The fallacy brought to light in the attempt to make this supposed document the basis of vital religion is surpassed only by the fallacies involved in the methods of investigation already shown. Claiming to lay aside all preconceived ideas, and to rest upon scientifically ascertained facts alone, these scholars have assumed the absolute truth of Hegel's system of philosophy as applied to Jewish history, when the majority of philosophers have not yet accepted Hegel as master; they have assumed a naturalistic growth and development in the Jewish religion, when such growth is contravened by the Bible itself and by the majority of the Christian world; they have used an exploded canon of literary criticism as valid in connection with the sacred Scriptures; they have distorted and denied the plain facts of Jewish history as given in the sacred annals; they have denied the historical credibility of part or of all the historical books of the Old Testament, whenever it seemed necessary to substantiate their theory. Upon all these preconceived and untenable theories does the theory of the *Parenneticon* rest.

We prefer still the theory of an original autograph of the Pentateuch by Moses. This theory does not deny the credibility of Old Testament history; it accepts the story of the Jewish race in the order in which it was recorded by inspired scribes; it calls not for assistance from any philosophical or linguistic hypotheses; it accepts the testimony of the church as strong evidence in support of its claims, though not inspired and conclusive evidence. Moreover, a belief in the Mosaic autograph underlies the piety of many princes in Israel, of the past as well as of the present. Perhaps the old belief in the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch was the foundation of the piety of some of the scholars who swear allegiance to the *Parenneticon*. Yea, verily, when we speak of God-like piety, it must needs be true that the new manuscript can neither give it nor take it away.

HENRY ALEXANDER WHITE.

*Washington and Lee University.*

#### IV. THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CHURCH.

IN a recent number <sup>1</sup> of this Review there is an article from the pen of the Rev. C. R. Vaughan, D. D., on "Representative Government in the Church." Whilst Dr. Vaughan is one of our ablest writers, there are some views advocated in this article that ought not to go unchallenged, lest general silence should be construed into an acquiescence in these as the positions taken by our church.

The paper, previous to its publication, was read before the Synod of Virginia in defence of an action of Lexington Presbytery on an overture. That action was as follows:

"1. Is the authority of the session exclusive of all other authority, in the matter of calling a congregational meeting to consider its temporal affairs? *Answer*: It is.

"2. Has the Board of Deacons a right to call, or to have called, such a meeting, when, in its judgment, it is expedient to consult the body of the people about their temporal affairs? *Answer*: No; the answer to the first question settles this.

"3. Has the session authority to decide where and what, if any, change shall be made in the house of worship, or the method of seating the congregation? *Answer*: The session has the abstract authority; but it would not be expedient to use this power without consulting the congregation, except in extraordinary cases.

"4. *Resolved*, That in returning the answers above given, the Presbytery expresses, as the ground of its decisions, that the session is the only governing body in the church, except in those cases where the constitution expressly authorizes the congregation to exercise that authority."

The first and second answers I accept as in accordance with

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<sup>1</sup> October, 1890. This article was written shortly after the publication of that to which it is a reply.



our constitutional law, with the qualification, that whilst the session alone may call a meeting of the congregation, it must do so when requested by a majority of the church members, in the case here referred to, as well as for the election of officers. The calling of a congregational meeting is not one of the powers given the deacons, and they can act only as members of the church, along with others. And, further, I entirely agree with Dr. Vaughan in repudiating a congregational body, including others than communicants, having control of the temporal affairs of the church, as unknown to our Presbyterian system.

The question at issue is as to *the power of the people in governing the church*: Have they surrendered all governing power to the elders as their representatives, "except in those cases where the constitution expressly authorizes the congregation to exercise that authority"? The Lexington Presbytery and Dr. Vaughan affirm; I deny. Dr. Vaughan's language is very strong: "The government of the church is exclusively in the hands of the ruling elders, chosen by the body of the people to exercise the ordinary functions of government." The power of the people he regards as "expressly limited to two purposes—the election of their representatives, and the dissolution of their relation to one class of these, the pastors of the church." Through inadvertance, I suppose, a third case is omitted—the right of the people to consider the dissolution of their relation to elders and deacons, as well as pastors.—*Book of Church Order*, Paragraphs 113 and 205.

It is admitted in the paper we are considering, that the power of government, under Christ the Head, originally vests in the people; but it is claimed that they have reserved none of this power to themselves, but have, by the constitution they have adopted, turned all over to their representatives, with the exceptions already specified. On the other hand, I maintain that it is in accordance with our views of popular government, and the principles of our church government, that the officers have only the powers specifically given them by constitutional enactment; and that if there be any powers to be exercised in the proper administration of the church not specified in the constitution, they still vest in the body of the church members, not having been

turned over to the officers; that in the particular church, reserved powers, if there be any, belong to the people, and not to the session.

In this category is the power to erect a church building, to remodel it, to sell it, to pull it down, to buy or build another. The constitution nowhere mentions church buildings at all. Although essential to the prosecution of the church's work, they are not within the perview of the form of government. If the head of the church has authorized the people to build churches, they still retain the power, not having given the exercise of it to any body of church officers. If, however, it be claimed that the building of churches is included under the head "temporal affairs," it must be borne in mind that the "management" of these is not committed to the session, but "may be properly committed to the deacons." Of this, more anon.

There are many good reasons why the control of building churches and remodelling them should be retained by the people. If it is proposed to alter the seating arrangements of their building, involving the personal comfort, and not the spiritual interests, of the congregation, the people are better judges of what *they themselves desire* than their representatives can be. If a church building is to be removed, the body of the people can better judge where *they wish* it located than can their officers. If a church building is to be enlarged or a new one erected, the people, rather than the session, can reach a conclusion as to their ability and willingness to incur the expense. It is maintained, however, by the advocates of the session's control, that when the session orders the changing or building of a house of worship, and in the exercise of its admitted power also "orders a collection" to defray the cost, the people may then exercise their rights and thwart the purpose of the session by withholding the money, if they do not approve of the proposal. Dr. Vaughan says:

"When this is done (directing that a chapel be built, and ordering a collection) their full part is done. The part of the people then comes to the front. The law has been set forth, and each one must determine for himself, and under his own responsibility to his own master, how and to what extent he shall obey it."

This seems strange Presbyterian doctrine. Are not the people bound to obey their rulers in the proper exercise of their authority? If the session has the legal authority to order the building of a chapel, or a new church, and is the only body that has any right to order it, as is claimed, then surely the people are bound to obey, and carry out the order. The session is the body of their representatives, and the act if a constitutional one is their own act. They are in duty and in honor bound to execute it. True, they may petition the session to reconsider its action, or they may complain to a higher court; and further, if the session has ordered what they are unable to execute, the action necessarily falls to the ground. Technically the order was legal, but the exercise of power was injudicious and unreasonable. But suppose there be no such difficulty; that the people are fully able to raise the money required to execute the order, and willing to do it if they believed the order judicious. Have they a right to sit in judgment upon the order already given by the session? If so, the people are in this matter the governing body. But if, as our opponents claim, the session only has control in these matters, then the people are bound in good faith to carry out the orders of their representatives; just as faithfully as if they had met in formal assembly and themselves ordered the work.

It should be borne in mind, too, that in some cases, if the session takes control of this part of the temporal affairs of the church, the people would have no redress by withholding their money to nulify the action of the session, and no other veto power. If the session has sole control of the property, it may sell the church the people worship in and buy another. They may have supposed that they were acting wisely, and so far as they knew in accordance with the wishes of the people; but it turns out after the bargain is closed that a large majority of the people disapprove of the change, but the matter is closed and the people have no redress. The authorities of one of our cities, desiring the lot upon which stood a Presbyterian church, proposed to reproduce the building, without cost to the church, on any lot they might select. Did the congregation transcend its constitutional powers when it ordered the removal? Was the session derelict in duty in not

saying to the congregation: "This is our business; we will consider your advice in the matter; but it is ours, not yours, to take action"? If the position of the Lexington Presbytery and of its defender be right then the action of the congregation was unconstitutional, null, and void; the session should have made the contract. And in this case, had the session acted, the people could not have nullified their action by withholding money; for money was not required.

The answer of the Lexington Presbytery to the first question of the overture seems to admit that the congregation has some control over its "temporal affairs," as it claims for the session authority "to call a congregational meeting to consider its temporal affairs." By a "congregational meeting" must be meant an assembly of the church-members, called as is provided for the election of church officers. So called, it may "consider its temporal affairs," yet it may not order anything with regard to them, for the explanatory resolution (No. 4) debars it from all constitutional control over these matters. True the people may *advise* the session, but there, according to this theory, their power ends. If this be so, what matters it whether the deacons, or the session, or members of the church call them together? For, however called, they have no power. And if the session simply wish to know the opinions of the people as one factor in reaching their conclusions, they may assemble the people in any manner they please; the provisions of the constitution for a meeting for a different purpose need not be regarded any further than may be necessary to accomplish their purpose. And, indeed, in some cases they may be able to get the opinions of a majority of the people about the matter in hand without calling them together at all. All this talk about who has authority to call a congregational meeting is idle; for there can be no congregational meeting that has any legal status. If the power of a congregational meeting is limited to the election of officers, and action on the dissolution of their official relations, as is claimed, then the session has no authority to constitute a congregational meeting for any other purpose; and no assembly of the people that they may call is a constitutional assembly. The session (and why not the deacons?)

may call the people informally to get their advice; but the action is extra, constitutional; and the people should be so informed when they come together. The first answer to the overture, to be consistent with the closing resolution, ought to read somewhat after this manner: "There is no constitutional authority for calling a congregational meeting in such a case, since the people have no control over the temporal affairs of the church."

The third answer is peculiar, self-contradictory, virtually an abandoning of the Presbytery's own position, and by implication, an admission of what I claim, the right of the body of the people to control the temporal affairs of the church. It reads: "The session has abstract authority; but it would not be expedient to use this power without consulting the congregation, except in extraordinary cases." That authority must indeed be very abstract that can become concrete only in extraordinary cases. Is our constitution chargeable with the absurdity of taking authority from the people and bestowing it upon the session, when it would ordinarily be inexpedient for the session to use it without conferring with the people? Indeed, in spite of their effort to maintain their theory of the session's power, the framers of this answer had the *feeling* (if I may use the word in this connection), that after all, the people were the proper body to control in the matter of church buildings. And here the Presbytery's able defender fails them; his logic breaks down. Indeed, it would be utterly impossible to frame an argument to bolster up an action which, but for the very great reverence I have for the court from which it proceeds, I would call—so absurd. The writer argues (page 588): "This answer is in accord with the necessary effects of a representative government. Under such an institution the people limit themselves; they refuse to make themselves a coördinate element of current government, except in the two instances expressly reserved. They put all the power of ordinary administration into the hands of their representatives. Those representatives, then, hold the abstract and practical legal power to order all the incidents of legal government. But it does not follow that they are never to consult the views of their constituents. In extraordinary cases they must act often under peril of the public interests, without con-

sulting them. In all ordinary cases which really require it, the very law of their representative character requires them to confer with the people."

Is it a "necessary effect of a representative government" that the rulers should ordinarily consult the people, it being inexpedient to act without their advice? Do our legislators in their ordinary legislation consult the people? True, as the writer says, "it does not follow that they are never to consult the views of their constituents." But the cases calling for consultation should be the extraordinary cases, whilst the answer of the presbytery allows the exercise of the power claimed only in extraordinary cases, and consultation with the people is required in all ordinary cases. In the passage above quoted there is a limitation, not in the presbytery's action, "in all ordinary cases *which really require it.*" Why not say in *all* cases which really require it? This limitation is an entire departure from the position of the presbytery. If the people are ordinarily to be consulted, it is because they, and not the session, have the right to control. But enough of this *ad hominem* argument.

A much stronger reason for holding that the constitution leaves with the people the control of this department of the church's temporal affairs is, that it is sustained by the general, if not the universal, usage of the church. Ordinarily when a church is to be built or remodelled, or removed, or sold, the people in regular assembly act upon the matter. They do not advise the session what to do, but they themselves decide. Previous to the revision of our *Book of Church Order*, during the years it was undergoing revision, and since its adoption, it has been the almost invariable usage for the people, assembled in a constitutional manner, to take in hand, consider, and conclude all important matters pertaining to their church property. Had it been the design of the church to interfere with or change this usage, surely the matter would have been made so explicit in the revised book as to leave no question as to the intent of the law. It is clear that in adopting the revised rules the church meant to leave this congregational control undisturbed.

Again, whilst the powers of the church session are stated fully

and specifically in the law, the power of controlling the temporal affairs of the church is not mentioned. In the revision, too, the statement of the session's powers was made much more explicit on many points than in the old form; not that the powers of the session were greatly enlarged, but duties and powers that might have been doubtful were now clearly and unmistakably set forth. And yet "the management of the temporal affairs of the church" is not found among the powers enumerated. The session has, indeed, the power of revision in one particular in temporal affairs—the power "to examine the records of the proceedings of the deacons." This cannot be stretched to take the control of all temporal matters. They have power "to order collections for pious uses"; but, as giving is one of the ordinances of worship, it will hardly be questioned that this is a spiritual, not a temporal, function. It is, however, maintained that the clause, "to concert the best measures for promoting the spiritual interests of the church and congregation," does embrace the control of the church's temporal affairs. It must be admitted that such temporal affairs as we have been considering, do, more or less, affect the spiritual interests of the church; but so does the exercise of every power given to the people, the deacons, the pastor, and the presbytery. Often the session might exercise some of these powers more discreetly than those who hold them. Is the session, therefore, to take in hand the choice of church officers, because it could make a wiser choice than the people, and thereby "promote the spiritual interests of the church and congregation"? Clearly, the "measures" which the session is authorized "to concert" for the spiritual good of the church must lie within the sphere of their defined powers without intrenching upon the powers of other bodies. The not placing the authority to "manage the temporal affairs of the church" among the powers of the session could not have been through inadvertence. In the old book that general clause is found in connection with the deacon's office, and is so continued in the new. It is a broad and convenient phrase, if not very well defined, and, if it had been put among the specified powers of the session, it would have given it the authority claimed. But it is not there. The church, in revising its law,

took this clause in hand (for a modification of it had been proposed in the first reported revision), and yet put it back just as in the old book, a conditional power of the deacons. It saw proper not to put it among the powers of the session. Indeed, *spiritual* is emphasized in the powers of the session, in manifest contrast with *temporal* in the section pertaining to deacons.

It has already been stated, incidentally, that in the section pertaining to the deacons is this provision: "To the deacons, also, may be properly committed the management of the temporal affairs of the church." This power is not theirs by right, but it may be given them. By whom? Not by the session; for, as we have seen, the session has no power over them. It may be done by the people, the constitutional body that elected them. In practice, by tacit consent, the people allow them the management of various departments of the temporal affairs. They might, constitutionally, commit to them all matters pertaining to church-buildings which have come under our consideration; but this is, perhaps, never done. The people prefer retaining this part of church administration in their own hands, and properly so.

In opposition to the views here set forth as to the right of the people to control such temporal affairs as erecting a house of worship, directly by their own vote, it is maintained in the article we are reviewing, that they have excluded themselves from the exercise of this power by the limitations of that constitution which they have adopted. The following paragraphs are relied on as establishing this limitation:

"The officers of the church, by whom all its powers are administered, are, according to the Scriptures, ministers of the word, ruling elders, and deacons." (Par. 4.)

"The whole polity of the church consists in doctrine, government, and distribution." (Par. 33.)

"The power which Christ has committed to his church vests in the whole body, the rulers and the ruled, constituting it a spiritual commonwealth. This power, as exercised by the people, extends to the choice of those officers whom he has appointed in his church." (Par. 15.)



That we may estimate correctly the degree of limitation which these paragraphs put upon the power of the people in the government of the church, our attention should be directed to a fact in the history of the revision of our *Book of Church Order*. The first revision committee did not, as we might have supposed they would, take up the rules of the old book, make such amendments and additions as were needed, and then arrange and adjust the the whole in a more systematic form. But they laid down a number of general propositions, setting forth, as they supposed, the underlying principles of our system of government. These general statements they attempted to work out by proper divisions and sub-divisions so as to make a complete, philosophical, and systematic elaboration of all the particulars of church government, having an eye to our existing rules, which in the main were to remain unchanged, except in the form of stating them. There are a number of these general propositions in our present book unknown to the old; but not so many as were in the first revision sent up by the compilers to the Assembly. Some were dropped in the revisions which followed, some were modified, others led to the modification of the particular rules under their class, so that they might be made to fit into the general statements, whilst others still await readjustment either of the general or the particular propositions. Our ecclesiastical courts have always been timid about making deliverances *in thesi*, because of the great difficulty of foreseeing all the possible applications of a general proposition. But our revisers were as bold with their *theses* as was Luther when he nailed his ninety-five propositions to the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg. A glance at a few of these will not only help us in the matter in hand, but also aid in the interpretation of some other of our rules of government.

In the first form of the revision (Chap. I., Par. 4), the officers being declared to be of only two kinds, presbyters and deacons, it was said of the first (embracing both teaching and ruling elders), "As ecclesiastical rulers, these presbyters, or elders, are of the same rank, dignity, and authority." This was their abstract theory, but the proposition could not be made to fit the manifest

distinction in the rank of ministers and ruling elders running through the whole system, and it was dropped entirely from this chapter. It was, however, continued in a much modified form in another place (Par. 43): "These ruling elders do not labor in the word and doctrine, but *possess the same authority in the courts of the church* as the ministers of the word." And yet even this lowered form of the claim did not fit the system; and after much contention the specific provisions were modified by the introduction of a rule authorizing an elder-moderator to have the preaching of an opening sermon, or the performance of other ministerial acts, done for him by a minister. There are other rules, as, for instance, those prescribing quorums, that must be altered if the *thesis* stands and the system is made harmonious.

Chapter IV. Sec. 1, Par. 2 reads: "As the whole polity of the church consisteth in doctrine, discipline, and distribution, so the ordinary and perpetual officers of the church are teaching elders, who labor in the word and doctrine; ruling elders, who wait on government; and deacons, whose chief function is the distribution of the oblations of the faithful. He that is called to teach is called also to rule, and he that is called to rule is called also to distribute."

This threefold division of the church's polity may do as a general classification in studying the principles of church government, but it was found that it would not do as a ground for the three divisions of church officers; and therefore "as" and "so" were omitted in the later revisions, thus severing the two propositions. Had they not been thus severed there would have been no place left for the people to take part in the government, not even so much as to elect their officers. The last sentence was entirely omitted, as a generalization incongruous to our system and without a scriptural basis.

Others might be cited; but let us now look at the two general propositions above quoted (Par. 4 and 15), which are said to exclude the people from control of the temporal affairs of the church. The former of them says that all the church's power are administered by the three classes of officers named. This *thesis*, therefore, debars the people from all part in the govern-

ment, even the election of their officers. But the constitution expressly provides for this; therefore this thesis must be rejected till so modified as to suit the system. If not rejected, then the officers and not the people must elect all officers in the church. This is not claimed, and therefore all claim of any limitation of the people's power by it must be abandoned. The framers of this sweeping thesis did not have the people in view; they did not see the application of their own proposition.

In Par. 15 it is asserted that the power of the church vests in the whole body, the rulers and the ruled. This thesis is useless in the system of rules, and, as might be expected, faulty. The children of the church are a part of "the body" of "the ruled," yet they have no part in its government. The next sentence of this paragraph is chiefly relied on to support the position here contested: "This power as exercised by the people extends to the choice of those officers whom he has appointed in his church." It is maintained that this excludes the people from all part in the government except the election of officers. But "extends to" does not mean *is limited to*. The clause gives the people the right of choosing their officers; it does no more. But even this feature of it cannot be pressed; for a presbytery may elect and ordain evangelists without the voice of the people. This thesis has no force in the system. It gives the people a certain power, which is given them more explicitly in the body of the rules; but it does not give them all that the constitution gives, the right to be heard touching the dissolution of the church's relations to pastor, elders, and deacons. It is, therefore, but one of those theses that do not fit into the system, but remain as excrescences upon its body, excrescences that were originally evolved in the effort at philosophical generalization, and some of which were not rubbed off in the numerous revisions. This one, however, is comparatively harmless, as it gives little, and takes away nothing. It in no way affects the people's rights in the remodelling or erection of their church edifices.

Richmond, Va.

W. A. CAMPBELL.

## V. ADDISON ONCE MORE.

THE latter half of that much berated century, the eighteenth, deserves signal honor for the growth of a movement that has been almost overlooked by our historians of literature. In the year 1781, Dr. Johnson published the last volume of his *Lives of the Poets*. This work, whatever be its inaccuracies, marked an important progress in the interest which people were beginning to take in the biographies of men of letters.

In ancient times, biography disdained to concern itself with aught but kings, queens, and warriors,—the great folk of the world; but, as the influence of the church extended, interest began more and more to be felt in religion and crime. Then it was that biography consented to include saints in its favored lists. By and by sinners also came in for their share of attention, provided they were sinners on a large and generous scale, accomplished highwaymen or handsome ruffians, who scorned a sneak-thief as unworthy of the profession. But men of letters had to wait until about the year 1700 before the world at large came to the conclusion that their lives were worth writing.

Few movements, however, have spread with such astonishing rapidity as this movement in favor of men of letters. The reading public of to-day is more interested in the sayings and doings of men of letters than in any other field of biography—cut-throats, however engaging their manners, not excepted.

Though this movement is a hopeful sign, provided it does not degenerate into prying curiosity about personal details which the public has no right to know, it is thus of comparatively recent date, and had made little headway before the appearance of Dr. Johnson's work, mentioned above. Professor Lounsbury<sup>1</sup> is of the opinion that the compass of a few pages would suffice for all that we know of any writer who flourished before the eighteenth century.

But when Dr. Johnson wrote his *Lives of the Poets*, Addison

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<sup>1</sup> *Studies in Chaucer*, Vol. I., page 7.

had been dead sixty-two years; Pope and Swift, only about thirty-five years each. Of Johnson's own life, thanks to the fussiness and devotion of Boswell, we know considerably more than Johnson himself knew; but of these four great representatives of eighteenth-century life and eighteenth-century literature, it is of Joseph Addison that least is known. He died when Johnson was only ten years of age (if the reader can imagine Johnson's having ever been so young), and thus not only failed to come within the circle of the great Doctor's personal acquaintances, but did not live to see the time when a professional man of letters was considered as interesting as a professional criminal.

"I have often reflected," says Steele of Addison, "after a night spent with him, apart from all the world, that I had had the pleasure of conversing with an intimate acquaintance of Terence and Catullus, who had all their wit and nature, heightened with humor more exquisite and delightful than any other man ever possessed." Even the jealous Pope was forced to admit that "his conversation had in it something more charming than I have found in any other man."

These two tributes from such different sources bear witness to the unflinching charm of Addison's urbanity, a quality no less prominent in his writings than in his conversations.

No writer, however, of the eighteenth century had less to try his temper than Addison. He never learned what deep and prolonged suffering meant. If ever a man was born under a lucky star, that man was Joseph Addison. De Quincey remarks on the good fortune that attended Wordsworth, declaring that whenever Wordsworth wanted any office the incumbent was sure to die just at the right time. "Had I held any office or estate," says De Quincey, "that could have been of the remotest advantage to Mr. Wordsworth, with the speed of a man running for his life I would have laid it down at his feet. 'Take it,' I would have said, 'Take it, or in three weeks I shall be a dead man.'" But even Wordsworth cannot bear comparison with Addison, for Wordsworth had to endure for many years what, to a man of conscious genius, is the acutest suffering—lack of sympathy and appreciation; while Addison throughout his whole career could never

complain of neglect, and probably never spent a sleepless night, unless it were after his marriage with Lady Warwick.

But let us look more closely at his early career. When Queen Anne ascended the throne in 1702, Addison was just thirty years of age, having been born in 1672. He was a handsome man, with finely chiselled features and an eye that bespoke the thoughtful rather than the sympathetic spectator of men and things. His father, who died one year after Queen Anne's accession, was a Dean of the Established Church, a scholar and author of considerable note, who had spent many years of practical banishment among the Moors of Northern Africa; and I am inclined to think that Addison's remarkable freedom from bigotry and narrowness of view may have been due in no small degree to the wide experience with men, with religions, and with letters, which his father had gained in his varied career.

Steele tells us that the whole family was remarkable: "Mr. Dean Addison left behind him," says Steele, "four children, each of whom, for excellent talents and singular perfections, was as much above the ordinary world as their brother Joseph was above them."

Among his early schoolmates, young Joseph was noted more for excessive quietness than for brilliancy. The only wicked thing he ever did, so far as I can learn, was to run away from school one day and live in a hollow tree, until the Dean, discovering his retreat, brought him triumphantly back, and probably brought with him some part of the tree for Joseph's private edification when they reached home.

Addison entered Queen's College, Oxford, when Oxford, for once in its career, was of Whig sympathies, and when the church was also opposed to the crown, and fighting for its very existence against the tyranny of James II. Addison very naturally became a Whig, and remained a Whig to the last. But his Whiggism had no touch of the violence and excess that disgrace the political annals of the time. While others were denouncing and betraying one another through the ten years that followed 1688, Addison was quietly conning the Latin poets, or composing Latin verses under the elm trees of the Oxford campus.

Even when England was girding herself for the last great struggle with France, Addison was not even on English soil, but was traversing Europe in the leisurely fashion of the day, stopping when and where he pleased to stop, sauntering now through France, now through Italy, or wandering with a pupil over Switzerland, Germany, or the Netherlands.

The student of Addison's career is apt to grow impatient at so desultory and aimless a mode of living during such critical times. But no better prelude to the work which Addison was destined to do could have been devised. He had already made some literary reputation as a Latin versifier; his long residence at Oxford had stored his mind with classic lore; and these four years of foreign travel gave just that opportunity which he most needed to broaden his mind, and to sharpen his powers of observation, by contact with men and governments, with religions and conditions, other than those to which he had been accustomed.

What the Italian journey was to Chaucer, and later to Goëthe, what the one year of foreign rambling was to Goldsmith, what the four years' residence in India was to Macaulay, such were these four years of foreign travel to Addison. Removed from the heat and dust of party conflict at home, he was unconsciously fitting himself for what I conceive to have been the mission of his life, that of mediation and reconciliation.

Addison's was not a profound nature, but it was admirably poised. He was not capable of the virulent hate so often displayed by Pope and Swift, nor was he capable of the depth of affection shown by Steele, or of the dogged endurance of Johnson. There was no bitterness in him: he hated no man and loved no woman. Though timid and retiring, Addison rarely, if ever, lost his perfect self-possession. Thus his natural temper, his home training, his university life, his good fortune, his aversion to excess of every sort, his extensive travels, all combined to prepare him for the task of mediation and reconciliation between opposing tendencies and conflicting factions.

Though he had refused, after some deliberation, to take holy orders, Addison was yet a preacher all his life. Coleridge once jestingly said to Lamb, "Charles, you never heard me preach."

"My dear boy," stammered Lamb, "I never heard you do anything else." Steele might have said the same of Addison. A somewhat chatty and humorous preacher he was, but a preacher whose influence was always in favor of cheerfulness and moderation, of sweetness and light, and always opposed to every variety of pedantry, bigotry, and excess. "A parson in a tye-wig" is what some one dubbed him.

A lay preacher of Addison's varied attainments and refined tastes was what the age stood sorely in need of. Religion, what there was of it, was mixed with politics, and politics had passed into personalities. Yet there were no vital questions at issue between the Tories and the Whigs. The Revolution of 1688 had forever settled the question of the "divine right." But it is in just such a period as this, says Professor Winchester,<sup>1</sup> that party spirit is most personal and rancorous. "Persons could change sides easily without having to change their principles, but such changes provoked hatred."

Addison, however, did not at once find his proper sphere. Like Sir Walter Scott, he devoted himself first to poetry; and, just as Byron's rising genius turned Scott to prose writing, so, I think, the superior ability of Pope warned Addison that, if he wished to be first, he must abandon poetry, and cultivate some field of literature more suited to his talents.

His experience, however, with poetry is a unique chapter in literary history. On his return from the continent he found the Whig party losing ground. His lucky star seemed to be falling; but, after a short interval of straitened circumstances, not of poverty, a strange and brilliant success was to greet him.

The two great parties had each formed themselves into numerous literary-political clubs. Perhaps the most celebrated of these was the Kit-Kat Club. It consisted of thirty-nine leading Whigs. Though this club was thoroughly aristocratic in its personnel, it happened that Jacob Tonson, a bookseller, was its founder. Addison was a warm friend of Tonson, and thus became a member of the Kit-Kat Club. Lord Halifax, who had obtained for Addi-

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<sup>1</sup> Lecture before the Johns Hopkins University, February 10, 1891, on *Politics, Parties, and Persons*.



son the pension which enabled him to spend four years in travel, was also a member.

Addison little dreamed, as he left his fourth-story apartment night after night to attend the meetings of this club, what it had in store for him. But the little Bavarian village of Blenheim had suddenly loomed into history as the scene of Marlborough's triumph over the united armies of Louis XIV. England was ablaze with bonfires. Marlborough was presented with the famous palace of Blenheim, built at the nation's expense, and containing palace grounds twelve miles in circumference.

But this was not enough. The now triumphant Whigs must have the victory celebrated in an ode. Lord Halifax suggested Addison's name. A messenger was dispatched to Addison's lofty apartment to beg the services of his pen and to promise him a lucrative appointment as a pledge of still greater advancement in the future. It is needless to say that Addison composed the ode, entitling it the *Campaign*.

It is not worth the while to dwell on this production. It was made to order and is not in the proper sense a poem; nor is Addison in the proper sense a poet. Yet it was better than the corresponding ode written on the Tory side, and better than the *Ode to King William* which Addison had written nine years before. In the *Ode to King William*, Addison had declared that the king's deeds were so transcendently great that at least a thousand years must elapse before the advent of a Homer to narrate them in their true glory. This was a favorite method of praise with Addison; but to a king longing for contemporary applause, and lacking the leisure to wait for an unborn Homer, such a method was somewhat disappointing.

The *Campaign*, however, has at least the merit of being a decided improvement on the *Ode to King William*, for the poet now maintains that the highest tribute that can be paid a hero like Marlborough is to recite his actions in their unadorned grandeur. True enough, provided the poet is sufficient master of his craft to keep unadorned grandeur from becoming unadorned flatness. Place the facts in such a setting that they shine of themselves. This was the method employed by Campbell in the *Battle of*

*Hohenlinden*, by Byron in the *Battle of Waterloo*, and by one greater than Campbell or Byron in the *Charge of the Light Brigade*,—one who has but recently passed beyond the stars of God and with a calm courage, paralleled only by that of his own immortal “six-hundred.”

But Addison’s muse had usually but two resources, (1) Exaggeration; (2) Classical allusion. Both are illustrated in the opening lines of the *Campaign*:

“Rivers of blood I see and hills of slain,  
An Iliad rising out of one campaign.”

The celebrated simile, in which Marlborough is likened to an angel—

“So when an angel by divine command,  
With rising tempests shakes a guilty land,”

seemed to the Whigs the choicest thing in all literature. It is amusing to read the contemporary accounts of the *Campaign*: “We may justly affirm,” says the *Journal Littéraire*, “that there is nothing wanting to the perfection of this poem; and that Mr. Addison, thus raised and supported by the nobleness of his subject, is as much superior to himself as he is in all his other pieces to the greatest parts of the other poets of what nation soever. . . . Unless polite literature should absolutely fall into neglect in England, this work of his will prove a more illustrious and lasting monument of the Duke of Marlborough’s glory than Blenheim house, which the Parliament has ordered to be built for him.”

Addison woke to find himself famous, and two years later became Under-Secretary of state. His duties as Under-Secretary were not arduous, and he now began to apply himself to a study of the Italian opera. The fruit of this study was a play called *Rosamond*, closely modeled on the Italian style. Its main motive was to compliment the Marlborough family. It is thus a sort of variation on his former theme in the *Campaign*—a theme which had enrolled Addison among those fortunate ones who, in Thackeray’s words, “got pretty little pickings out of the public purse.” But no “pretty little pickings” came from *Rosamond*, though it was dedicated to the Duchess of Marlborough herself. The opera was played April 2, 1706. It was a failure, and after two or three

representations was withdrawn. It may be said, however, by way of extenuation, that the music was worse than the libretto, and the music was the contribution of Thomas Clayton, whose opera, *Arsinoe*, played the year before, had made a palpable hit, being the first opera ever constructed in England on avowedly Italian principles. Addison himself, says Burney,<sup>1</sup> had practically no qualifications as a judge of music; but the ill-success of *Rosamond* confirmed Addison in his dislike of the Italian opera, a dislike clearly traceable in many pages of the *Spectator*.

Before touching upon Addison's most famous poetical work, I wish to emphasize the fact that in his life fortune constantly furnished him with favorable opportunities for the exercise of his powers. The pension granted him by Halifax enabled him while yet a young man to add to his knowledge of classical literature an intimate acquaintance with the languages and governments of the chief European states. On his return from his travels, when his fortunes were at their lowest ebb, it was almost an accident that a chance acquaintance with a bookseller procured him membership in the Kit-Kat Club. The consequence of this membership was the *Campaign*, which, owing to the state of party feeling at the time, gained for him instantaneous celebrity and advancement. Even the *Spectator*, in which Addison's powers reach their climax, was but a growth out of the *Tatler*, and the *Tatler* was due entirely to the invention of Steele. But the acme of Addison's good fortune was unquestionably the production of *Cato*, a play which, says Mr. Courthope, "could hardly have succeeded on the stage, if it had not been appropriated and made a part of our national life by the violence of party passion."

Almost the whole of *Cato* had been written ten years before it was played. Had it been put upon the stage as soon as written, I hardly think it would have fared any better than *Rosamond*. But in 1713 the rage of the contending parties was at its zenith, and as soon as it was known that Addison had in his possession an unpublished play, great pressure was put upon him to complete it at once for the stage. But Addison hesitated; and no better proof of his fine judgment can be found than this distrust of his

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<sup>1</sup> *History of Music*, Vol. IV., p. 203.

own poetical abilities. His *career* as a poet had been brilliant. He was lauded and lionized by friends and foes. Why did he not devote himself unreservedly to poetry? Surely no poet ever entered the lists with greater prestige than Addison had after his *Ode on the Campaign*. Yet he held his *Cato* back ten years before gaining his own consent to give it to the public, and only the most pressing importunities of his friends could prevail over what I believe was, to the last, Addison's better judgment.

Mrs. Browning says, in a letter to R. H. Horne, that there are some persons "who have education and natural ability enough to be anything in the world except poets, and who choose to be poets in spite of nature and their stars, to say nothing of gods, men, and critical columns." But Addison does not come within the scope of this censure, though gods, men, and critical columns seemed at the time all on his side. Is not George Eliot, however, an example? She cared most of all, and strove most of all, for the name of poet. But who reads her *Spanish Gypsy* to-day? Yet she says, "I have not shrunk from any labor where labor could do anything." Very true, doubtless; but had that labor been bestowed upon fiction, her native realm, the world might have had another *Adam Bede*. Southey is, in my opinion, another example. Professionally he was a poet, but the prose in his *Life of Nelson* smacks more of genius than any poetry that ever came from his pen; and good prose is infinitely harder to write than "correct" poetry. Masters in both realms are rare; such were Coleridge and Matthew Arnold, but the double honor does not belong to George Eliot, or to Southey, or to Addison, though to Addison does belong the honor of recognizing his own limitations when critical journals refused to recognize them.

His own distrust was suggestively displayed by his behavior during the first performance of *Cato*. He and Bishop Berkeley sat with several friends in a side box where they had a private table, and several flasks of good Burgundy, with which we are told "the author thought it necessary to support his drooping spirits." But there was no need of stimulants. Tories vied with Whigs in admiring applause. Pope tells us that "Lord Bolingbroke sent for Booth, who played *Cato*, to come into his box, and

presented him with fifty guineas in acknowledgment (as he expressed it) for defending the cause of liberty so well against a perpetual dictator."

But even in Dr. Johnson's time, *Cato* had come to be regarded as "rather a poem in dialogue than a drama, rather a succession of just sentiments in elegant language than a representation of natural affections, or of any [affections] probable or possible in human life." Its effect was to lend the authority of Addison's name to a formal, lifeless method of writing plays; for that Addison was out of sympathy with the true motives of dramatic composition may be seen at once from the thirty-ninth paper in the *Spectator*. But let it be said to his lasting credit that the play was pure, and for the age this is much, enough, perhaps, to atone for the rigid preservation of the three unities of the classical drama. In Germany, *Cato* formed the model for Gottsched's *Der Sterbende Cato*, written in 1731, while in England the glorious traditions of the Elizabethan drama grew fainter and fainter.

Addison's attitude toward men and things, his love of formal correctness, his whole nature, unfitted him for poetry. Johnson said of him, "He thinks justly, but he thinks faintly." This is eminently true, but worse than this, there is in most of Addison's verse a neat, trim, conventional orthodoxy of sentiment, a punctilious accuracy of phrase, a smack of applied rhetoric, standing at the farthest possible remove from the originality, suggestiveness, and prodigality of thought that characterized the "spacious times of great Elizabeth." De Quincey thinks that Addison disliked Shakespeare because the movement of Shakespeare's lines was too rapid and life-like, while he sympathized with the slow, cathedral chanting of Milton. His languid vitality, it seems to me, not only made his thinking superficial, but produced a quality of mind receptive rather than active. Milton's poetry, moreover, harmonized not only with Addison's classical ideas, but also with that strain of quiet religious contemplation which runs through so much of his writing. The following familiar lines exemplify this trait, and contain as much genuine poetic feeling as anything he ever wrote. The sentiments are not pro-

found, they are, perhaps, common-place, but Addison's heart is speaking:

### AN ODE.

#### I.

“The spacious firmament on high,  
 With all the blue ethereal sky,  
 And spangled Heavens, a shining frame,  
 Their great Original proclaim.  
 The unwearied sun from day to day  
 Does his Creator's power display;  
 And publishes to every land,  
 The work of an almighty hand.

#### II.

“Soon as the evening shades prevail,  
 The moon takes up the wondrous tale;  
 And nightly to the listening earth,  
 Repeats the story of her birth:  
 Whilst all the stars that round her burn,  
 And all the planets in their turn,  
 Confirm the tidings as they roll,  
 And spread the truth from pole to pole.

#### III.

“What though, in solemn silence, all  
 Move round the dark terrestrial ball;  
 What though no real voice nor sound,  
 Amidst their radiant orbs be found:  
 In reason's ear they all rejoice,  
 And utter forth a glorious voice;  
 Forever singing as they shine:  
 ‘The hand that made us is divine.’”

“It seems to me,” says Thackeray, “those verses shine like the stars.”

It is at least somewhat disenchanting to turn from verses like these to those equally famous lines in which Pope has handed down to posterity his opinion of Addison:

“But should there one whose better stars conspire  
 To form a bard, and raise a genius higher,  
 Blest with each talent and each art to please,  
 And born to live, converse, and write with ease;  
 Should such a one, resolved to reign alone,  
 Bear, like the Turk, no brother near the throne,  
 View him with jealous yet with scornful eyes,  
 Hate him for arts that caused himself to rise,

Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer,  
 And without sneering teach the rest to sneer;  
 Alike reserved to blame or to commend,  
 A timorous foe and a suspicious friend.

Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike,  
 Just hint the fault, and hesitate dislike,  
 Who when two wits on rival themes contest,  
 Approves of both, but likes the worst the best.

Who would not laugh if such a man there be?  
 Who would not weep if Atticus were he?"

The merits of the quarrel between these two great representatives of the Queen Anne Age, can, perhaps, never be decided. Addison had established himself at Button's coffee-house, where he was surrounded by "his little senate," consisting chiefly of Budgell, Tickell, Carey, and Philips. Pope had left the society because, as he said, the sittings were carried too far into the night for his health. But I am inclined to think that the author of the *Dunciad* and the author of the *Sir Roger de Coverley* papers are types of two necessarily antagonistic characters—two bodies, as it were, that must in course of time impinge and rebound. The immediate cause, or rather occasion, of the impact, was in this case insignificant. The more important question is not, What was the occasion of the quarrel? but, Is Pope's portrait of Addison a just portrait? To this there is but one answer—No. Can anyone imagine Pope's giving a just portrait of a man who had ever offended him? Did not his known satirical disposition and his unequalled satirical powers make him incapable of portraying with justice the character of a successful rival? As well might you expect to find true portraits of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Scott, in Byron's *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers*, as to find a true portrait of Addison in the unrivaled satire of Pope.

But let us pass into a domain in which Addison had no need to fear a rival "near the throne." If his reputation rested on the *Campaign*, or *Rosamond*, or *Cato*, his name would be but one among the crowd of mediocrities who have won and kept the immortality of oblivion.

The work of Addison consisted in building up public opinion,

in mediating between and harmonizing the conflicting sides in questions of taste, fashion, breeding, and morals. In Queen Anne's time, one might almost say that the unit of society was not the family but the coffee-house; and the first literary organs that made an attempt to give form and consistency to the varied discussions arising out of this social contact were the *Tatler* and the *Spectator*. "It is as a *Tatler* of small talk and a *Spectator* of mankind," says Thackeray, "that we cherish and love him [Addison], and owe as much pleasure to him as to any man that ever wrote."

The *Tatler*, the *Spectator*, and the *Guardian* excluded politics from their columns, their professed purpose being to discuss the fashions and manners of society, the pulpit, the theatre, the opera, and general literature. Thus in his introductory paper to the *Spectator*, Addison says: "I live in the world rather as a spectator of mankind than as one of the species; by which means I have made myself a speculative statesman, soldier, merchant, and artisan, without ever meddling with any practical part in life. I am very well versed in the theory of a husband or a father, and can discern the errors in the economy, business, and diversions of others, better than those who are engaged in them; as standers-by discover blots which are apt to escape those who are in the game. I never espoused any party with violence, and am resolved to observe an exact neutrality between the Whigs and Tories, unless I shall be forced to declare myself by the hostilities of either side. In short, I have acted in all the parts of my life as a looker-on, which is the character I intend to preserve in this paper. . . . In the meantime, when I consider how much I have seen, read, and heard, I begin to blame my own taciturnity; and since I have neither time nor inclination to communicate the fulness of my heart in speech, I am resolved to do it in writing, and to print myself out, if possible, before I die. I have often been told by my friends that it is a pity so many useful discoveries which I have made should be in the possession of a silent man.

"For this reason, therefore, I shall publish a sheet-full of thoughts every morning, for the benefit of my contemporaries; and if I can any way contribute to the diversion or improvement of the country in which I live, I shall leave it, when I am summoned out



of it, with the secret satisfaction of thinking that I have not lived in vain."

Thus Addison's deliberate purpose in the *Spectator* was not the reformation of religion, but the diversion and improvement of society; and this purpose was entered upon not from any rigid sense of duty but from that sense of subtle pleasure which the prose-writer as well as the poet feels when he expresses his thoughts instead of repressing them. Addison felt that he had many things to say, that he could say them better than any other man of his time, that it would be a relief to say them, but that his pen was a more suitable medium than his tongue; for it was only in the limited society of his coterie at Button's coffee-house that his conversational powers unmasked themselves.

I wish here to avow a very decided dissent from the opinion recently put forward by Professor Minto, of Aberdeen, that Addison's humor is malicious. No one appreciates more than I the sterling value of the contributions of this lamented scholar to the criticism of English literature. They are marked by thoroughness, by moderation, and, in one case, at least—his interpretation of Shakespeare's eighty-sixth sonnet—by distinguished originality; but to say that "not a single paper of Addison's can be pointed out that does not contain some stroke of malice"<sup>1</sup> is simply to invert the conception of Addison's character entertained by his contemporaries, and by even his most intimate associates. It is to inject into his harmless pleasantries a venom foreign not only to his character, but equally foreign, equally antagonistic, to the professed purpose and accomplished mission of his life. Nor can I believe that a man of settled malice could have penned the following *Thoughts in Westminster Abbey*:

"When I look upon the tombs of the great, every emotion of envy dies in me; when I read the epitaphs of the beautiful, every inordinate desire goes out; when I meet with the grief of parents upon a tombstone, my heart melts with compassion; when I see the tomb of the parents themselves, I consider the vanity of grieving for those whom we must quickly follow; when I see kings lying by those who deposed them, when I consider rival

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<sup>1</sup> *Manual of English Prose Literature*, page 387.

wits placed side by side, or the holy men that divided the world with their contests and disputes, I reflect with sorrow and astonishment on the little competitions, factions, and debates of mankind. When I read the several dates of the tombs, of some that died yesterday, and some six hundred years ago, I consider that great day when we shall all of us be contemporaries, and make our appearance together." Pope could not have said that, nor could Swift. Both were too much enmeshed in "competitions, factions, and debates" to look calmly down upon them as Addison here does. It is this aloofness of Addison's that constitutes his coign of vantage, and gives at times a somewhat magisterial air to what he says. But he knew well how to blend the winsome with the magisterial. Thus: "As our English women excel those of all nations in beauty, they should endeavor to outshine them in all other accomplishments proper to the sex, and to distinguish themselves as tender mothers and faithful wives, rather than as furious partisans. Female virtues are of a domestic turn. The family is the proper province for private women to shine in."

The attitude, not only of the *Spectator*, but of letters at large in Queen Anne's Age, to women, is interestingly illustrated in a bit of autobiography from the pen of Richardson, the novelist: "As a bashful and not forward boy," says Richardson, "I was an early favorite with all the young women of taste and reading in the neighborhood. Half a dozen of them, when met to work with their needles, used, when they got a book they liked and thought I should, to borrow me to read to them, the mothers sometimes with them, and both mothers and daughters used to be pleased with the observations they put me on making."

This allusion to mothers and daughters, "met to work with their needles," and entertained by the reading of young Richardson, illustrates the class of readers to whom Addison so often appealed in the pages of the *Spectator*. Till now, writers had addressed themselves almost exclusively to men. The novelettes, for example, of Greene and his fellow Elizabethans, bear on the face of them that they were written not for women but for men; and it is now for the first time that we hear of women—not exceptional women, such as Lady Jane Grey or Elizabeth, but ordi-

nary English mothers and English maidens, as furnishing a new world of readers—a world of wives and daughters as well as of husbands and sons, a world neither of the street nor of the study, but of the home. And Addison's style is never so instinct with chivalric grace as in those pages of the *Spectator* where his imagination pictured before him the mothers and daughters of England "met to work with their needles."

It is this style of his, at last, that has preserved the *Spectator* from the fate that so soon overwhelms periodical literature, a style as finished and perspicuous as it is graceful and rhythmical. Johnson's eulogy is well known: "Whoever wishes to attain an English style familiar but not coarse, and elegant but not ostentatious, must give his days and nights to the volumes of Addison." But that Johnson did not follow his own advice is evident from the studied antithesis and balance in which his very eulogy of Addison is conveyed. Antithesis and balance are rarely resorted to by Addison, while they bristle from every page of Johnson. Nor does Addison exhibit that fondness for classical polysyllables which marks the ponderous style of the great Dictator. This peculiarity of Johnson's style allies him with the early part of the seventeenth, rather than with the early part of the eighteenth, century.

But the cumbrous style of the seventeenth century, with its Latin words, its tedious inversions, its needless parentheses, had proved too stilted and immobile for the new French methods of thought that came into vogue after 1660. In this transition from Latin to French influence, the greatest names are those of Cowley, Tillotson, Temple, and Dryden. They were unquestionably Addison's prototypes, but it remained for Addison himself to gather up and consummate what was best in them, and to add such an exquisite grace and comeliness as to make his own style a model throughout the eighteenth century. Though inferior to Cowley in sweetness, to Tillotson in simplicity and purity, to Temple in naïveté and vivacity, to Dryden in vigor and grammatical precision, Addison exhibited the most harmonious combination of their excellencies that English prose had yet seen; and in perfect naturalness, in freedom from forced constructions and forced conceits, he easily surpassed them all.

But a more interesting as well as far more difficult question presents itself, viz., In what respects has Addison influenced the best literary style of to-day? It is impossible within my limits to do more than indicate an answer to this question. Addison's literary criticisms may be dismissed at once. They sought merely to call popular attention to what was correct in form and pure in tone among the master-pieces of our literature. In this they succeeded, but the recent labored attempt on the part of one of our greatest Anglo-Saxon scholars to overrule Matthew Arnold's verdict and to re-instate Addison as a great critic, is futile and untimely.

Prof. Earle, however, in his masterly work on *English Prose*, suggests our proper attitude toward the question of Addison's influence, when he says that English prose style is to-day still modeled upon the eighteenth-century style rather than upon the Elizabethan or the seventeenth-century style. But the eighteenth century furnished two very diverse models of prose style in Addison and Johnson, its two most characteristic prose writers. Washington Irving among Americans seems to me a lineal descendant of Addison, while Macaulay shows a marked affinity to Johnson. But the best literary style of to-day, while owing much of its grace to the influence of Addison and Irving, and much of its intellectual element to the school of Johnson and Macaulay, is by no means a lineal descendant of either.

Style, it must be remembered, is a reflex of the spirit that animates a given age. It is not an addition from without, but a growth from within; and it hardly needs to be said that the spirit of to-day is almost out of hearing distance from the spirit of the eighteenth century. The insistent questions that stir the public mind to-day—the deep spiritual strivings, the mighty scientific problems, the intense desire to know life in all of its phases, the hot pursuit of human character into its shyest recesses, cannot be compressed into the rhythmical cadences of Addison or huddled into the dogmatic periods of Johnson.

Yet there is much of Addison that does and must remain. His light and playful humor, his tenderness, his sympathy, his large and generous humanity, are qualities that break from the fetters

of a conventional age, and appeal to the human heart in all times and amid all environments. While I cannot subscribe to Johnson's unqualified eulogy of Addison's style, yet its free and unaffected movement, its graceful transitions, its delicate harmonies, the pliancy with which it fits and enfolds its subject, may well make us overlook its almost fatal lack of vigor.

Of Addison's closing years we know little, except on rumor. His marriage with Lady Warwick seems to have brought him little comfort, and it is not improbable that domestic unhappiness may have led to overdrinking. For three years he had been alienated from Steele. "Every reader must regret," says Johnson (in the solemn pomp of his well-known style), "that these two illustrious friends, after so many years passed in confidence and endearment, in unity of interest, conformity of opinion, and fellowship of study, should finally part in acrimonious opposition."

Addison died on the 17th of June, 1719. The dissolute Lord Warwick had been hastily summoned, and, bending over the dying man, asked tenderly for his last wishes. "I have sent for you," replied Addison, "that you may see how a Christian can die."

Addison was not one of the world's great men, but he did a great work. Ever since the Civil War England had been divided into violent parties, whose rancorous bickerings seemed to multiply with the passing years. There was hardly such a thing as united public opinion in England until Addison's day. The stage was sunk in corruption. Jeremy Collier's invective had produced a momentary flutter, but Addison's penetrating wit, founded on truth and morality, effected a far greater reform than Collier had effected. Marriage ceased to appear ridiculous in society, and English common sense and English good breeding found a leader around whom to gather, and a banner under which to rally. Yet Addison effected these reforms more by consummate taste and tact, more by moderation and a just estimate of his own limitations, more by mediation and reconciliation, than by the force of indwelling genius.

C. ALPHONSO SMITH.

## VI. NOTES.

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### “IN” *VERSUS* “INTO.”

IN the Revised Directory for Worship, the minister is made to say: “I baptize thee *into* the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”

Before presenting the direct argument in opposition to the use of this form, we would offer a few reflections which may serve as an avenue of approach to the main issue: accordingly—

1. We remark, first, that it is somewhat difficult to attach any very definite meaning to the phrase, “baptize *into* the name of the Father,” etc. What do the words mean? It may be questioned, whether the genius of our language will admit of such a combination of words as “baptized *into* the name.” The phrase may come to have a meaning, but at present it appears to have none that is definite.

2. We remark, second, that the inspiration for the change appears to have been drawn from the Revised Version of the New Testament. And, if so, it would seem to be time enough to adopt a new reading and a radical change in our Directory when the church shall have seen the necessity of adopting that version, to one of whose most radical changes it is now proposed to have the Directory conform. The church does not appear ready to alter the standard; her ministers are to continue the reading of Matt. xxviii. 19, as aforesaid: “Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”

Until the standard of Holy Scripture is changed, especially in matters radical and fundamental, all questions of conformity may with safety be allowed to rest. Matters of inferior consideration, such as typographical errors, and changing “drink ye all of it” into “drink all ye of it,” may be looked after and corrected (if need be)—we had almost said—by the printer. But when, without any change in the standard, it is proposed so to change the reading of the Directory as apparently to designate the subject in baptism as partaker of the divine nature, the matter is more serious.

3. Again, the Revised Version is not consistent with itself in its treat-

ment of the phrase *eis to onoma* when connected with the verb "baptizo"; for then would it translate 1 Cor. x. 2 as follows: "I would not, brethren, have you ignorant, how that our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; and were all baptized *into* Moses." The Revised Version is unwilling to say, though the Greek is identical, that the fathers—the whole two million and a half of them—were "all baptized *into* Moses." On the contrary it reads "were all baptized *unto* Moses in the cloud and in the sea." It would at least be English, were we compelled to say in the baptismal formula, "I baptize thee, consecrate thee, set thee apart unto the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."

4. Again, the Revised Version abounds with the exact words of the old formula, "baptize in the name of," etc. For example, in Acts ii. 38, the Revised Version has, "Repent ye and be baptized every one of you *in the name* of Jesus Christ." Also at Acts x. 48 the new Version reads: "And he commanded them to be baptized *in* the name of Jesus Christ." The familiar words of the ancient formula are still found in the new Bible; why not, also, then in the new Directory?

5. Again, the Revised Version does not feel constrained to translate the *eis to onoma* as meaning "into the name," when the phrase is joined with other verbs than *baptizo*. For instance, at John x. 12, the new Version reads, "to them that believe *in* his name." With *pisteuein* and similar verbs (John iii. 18, Heb. x. 10, 1 John v. 13) the *eis to onoma* is allowed to mean "*on* the name," or even "*toward* the name." Why it cannot be allowed some such meaning with *baptizo* is the question.

There is a vague idea that because *baptism* implies motion, therefore when followed by *eis*, the latter should be translated "into." This cannot be, for in Matt. xviii. 20, we read, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." Here, joined with a verb of motion, *sunegmenoï*, we have *eis to onoma*, and yet the new Version does not say: "Where two or three are gathered together *into* my name." Here note, that, according to the Greek, the sense in which the saints gather together in the name of Jesus is the same as that in which we baptize in the name of Jesus. At all events the Greek is the same, and in either case the verb is a verb of motion.

6. More important still: there is a vague notion that there is something strange or peculiar about the word *baptizo*—the notion of "intus position," for example—which requires that it should be followed by *eis*, which in turn must be translated by *into*. This, also, is an error.

For *baptizo* in the Bible is often joined with the prepositions *epi* and *en*, as in Acts ii. 38, where we have *epi to onomati*, and Acts x. 48, where we have *en to onomati*. This fact ought to cause the word *baptizo* to lose its enchantment for us. Other Greek prepositions besides *eis* have met the word *baptizo*, have stood face to face with it, and yet have survived. Just in the same sense in which the Bible says, "anoint the sick with oil in the name of the Lord," in the very same sense it says, "And he commanded them to be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ." (James v. 14, compared with Acts x. 48, in both which cases we have *en to onomati*.) Not only is it not necessary to translate the *eis* by "into" after *baptizo*, but the word *baptizo* need not be followed by *eis* at all. This appears conclusive.

Direct Argument. I. The text which supplies the phraseology of the baptismal formula is found but once. It occurs at the close of Matthew's Gospel, xxviii., 19, and reads as follows: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Here, the Greek for "in the name of" is *eis to onoma*. This phrase is found in Matthew's Gospel in only four other places. Suppose we allow Matthew to interpret Matthew. Suppose we compare the instances in which he uses this phrase, and so establish the *sense* in which he uses it, losing sight for the nonce of Luke and John and the rest. The above text is found in Matthew, and Matthew's use of the phrase in dispute ought to throw great light upon our path.

Here are the instances: (1), Matthew x. 41: "He that receiveth a prophet *in the name* of a prophet shall receive a prophet's reward"; (2), Matt. x. 41: "He that receiveth a righteous man *in the name* of a righteous man shall receive a righteous man's reward"; (3), Matt. x. 42: "And whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water *in the name* of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward"; (4), Matt. xviii. 20: "Where two or three are gathered together *in my name*, there am I in the midst of them"; (5), Matt. xxviii. 19: "Baptizing them *in the name* of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." The text is Matthew's, and he has put his own sense upon the phrase *eis to onoma*, which neither allows you to say, on the one hand, "He that receiveth a prophet *into* the name of a prophet," nor forbids your saying, on the other hand, "I baptize thee *in* the name of the Father."

II. Again, *eis to onoma*, when used with *baptizo*, means, in New Testament usage, just what *epi to onomati* does when conjoined with



*baptizo*; and, as the latter phrase can by no possibility be translated “into the name,” neither should the former. Acts viii. 16: “They were baptized *in* the name of the Lord Jesus,” or Acts xix. 5: “When they heard this, they were baptized *in* the name of the Lord Jesus.” With these and similar passages compare—from the same writer, and even in the same book—a passage like this (Acts ii. 38): “Repent, and be baptized, every one of you, *in the name* of Jesus Christ.” This last “in the name of Jesus Christ” is not *eis to onoma*, but *epi to onomati*. And yet the sense is identical, for both describe “baptism *in* the name of Jesus.” Meanwhile, the phrase *epi to onomati* will under no circumstances admit of the translation “into the name.”

Further, preaching in his name and baptizing in his name have the same sense. A man does not *preach* in the name of Jesus in one sense and *baptize* in the name of Jesus in another sense. He does both in the same sense. And the two texts, (1), “Repent, and be baptized every one of you *in the name* of Jesus Christ;” (2), “And that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations” have the same Greek *epi to onomati*. You are to baptize in the same sense in which you are to preach *in* the name of Jesus.

Any possible remaining doubt as to this matter at once vanishes when we turn to Acts x. 48—(still, you see, in the same author and even in the same book.) Here at Acts x. 48 we have baptism in the name of Jesus described by *en to onomati*: “And he commanded them to be baptized in the name of the Lord” (*en to onomati*). The meaning of this phrase in this passage is made plain by the following, from the same book: “Silver and gold have I none; but such as I have give I thee. *In the name* of Jesus Christ of Nazareth rise up and walk” (Acts iii. 6). In the same sense that Peter healed the lame man in the name of Jesus, we are to preach and baptize in his name, for both are *en to onomati*. We have the three prepositions, *eis*, *epi*, and *en*, used indifferently to express the common phrase “in the name of Jesus.” Nobody would dare translate the *epi* or the *en* as “into,” and, if in these two of the three parallel forms such translation is inadmissible, it ought to be equally so in the remaining third. *The indiscriminate use of these several prepositions with baptizo by the inspired writers is utterly fatal to the notion that eis has some peculiar or mysterious sense when conjoined with baptizo.* The day of Pentecost was the birthday of the Christian church. Christian baptism or baptism “in the name of Jesus” was administered for the first time on that day. When Peter gave the formula for baptism, “Repent,

and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ" (Acts ii. 38), he used the phrase *epi to &c.*, which *all*, as well Old Version and New Version, agree to translate "in the name of Jesus Christ." If such was the first, so also should be the last, baptism.

III. Passing entirely by the argument that proper baptism is the application of the element to the subject, and not of the subject to the element (an argument we consider good), I desire to submit the following propositions:

1. Baptism in the hands of a Protestant minister is a teaching symbol; it is neither antecedent nor supplementary to the gospel; it is an integral part of it, in its preceptive or declarative form.

2. Scripture nowhere ascribes to baptism a special function in consequence of its symbolical character.

3. If baptism *eis to onoma tou Patros, etc.*, designates the subject as partaker of the divine nature, the Protestant minister cannot formally imitate a function peculiar only to the Holy Spirit.

4. The Protestant minister cannot ascribe to any function of his office a higher validity than to the office itself. Hence—

5. The change of "in the name of" to "*into* the name of" in the formula of baptism would give an unscriptural significance to the function and office of the Protestant minister.

We have discussed the question out of the historical books of the New Testament, and not out of the epistles of the New Testament. Because, (1), The formula of baptism belongs to and is imbedded in the historical books, and (2), The historical meaning, or the meaning attached to the formula in the historical books, establishes and limits the meaning of the formula in all other writings; and (3), The epistles which contain what might be called the philosophical statement of gospel principles in familiar and colloquial language, admit of metaphorical and allegorical phraseology, from which it would be unsafe to make deductions. The popular argument from the rhetorical phrase "buried with Christ by baptism" is an instance of such illogical inference.

With an utter indifference on the part of "baptizo" whether it be joined with *en*, *epi*, or *eis*, it is unreasonable to foist upon one of these prepositions a meaning which must exclude the other two.

And, even if this were not the case, the formula of Peter at Pentecost, when Christian baptism originated, is fatal to the proposed change. The Pentecost preacher used a preposition *epi*, which by no possible torture can be construed to mean "*into*." And we ought

to baptize as Peter did. The last administration of the ordinance should conform to the first recorded instance.

As Presbyterians, we have no ritual to speak of. The formula of baptism is about the sum and substance of our ritual. At least, it is the part of the Directory which comes pre-eminently before the people. And it is this chiefest section that is to be subjected to radical revision and total change. Moreover, the requirement is positive. The Directory does not read, "The minister *may* say" (as in so many other places), but "The minister *shall* say." It is positively required.

*Liberty, Mo.*

WM. FROST BISHOP.

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### ELECTION *VERSUS* EVOLUTION.

THE whole trend of modern thought is in accordance with the development theory. This tendency was begun in the seventeenth century by the philosophers, Laplace and Kant, who ushered in the conception of the stellar universe in its present state of existence as a gradual growth from primal unorganized dust following the laws of centrifugal and centripetal force.. The same tendency has been popularized by modern scientists, who have endeavored to explain the present state of vegetable and animal life on the earth as a gradual evolution from protoplasmic germs following the laws of natural selection and survival of the fittest. Finally, Huxley, Mill, Spencer, and others have applied the development theory to the explanation of mental and spiritual phenomena, affirming that the mind is but an aggregation of highly organized particles of matter, and that the acts of the mind can all be explained by the laws of force and matter. Mr. Beecher, who seems in the latter years of his life to have been carried away from the foundations of the faith by the spirit of the times, declared his belief that the whole of accepted theology would have to be reset in order to accommodate it to this modern mode of thought. In the same strain are the writings of such men as Drummond, who teaches that sin is mere imperfection, the result of imperfect development, and supplants the work of the Holy Spirit by the law of progress.

There are three classes of those who have imbibed to a greater or less degree this mode of thought, the atheistic and theistic evolutionists, and those Christian teachers who are glad to accept the conclusions of evolution in support of their preconceived opinions with reference to the future destiny of mankind. All three agree in the belief that the *world* is improving, and that the progress which the

human race has made is only prophetic of that which it is destined to make. The god of the atheist, that which he thinks is worthy of his thought and his work, is a perfected humanity. While God may not be entirely supplanted in the hearts of those who accept to some extent the teachings of the Bible along with the principles of evolution, still, their hope is excited, and their zeal sustained, by the prospect of a future condition of mankind in this world, such as no eye hath seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.

The scientist, who eliminates God from nature, looks forward to a perfected humanity as the result of an eternal and necessary law of progress. Thus, minute particles of protoplasm, by fortuitous and happy combinations, form higher and higher grades of life, until there comes forth, finally, that complex aggregation of material particles commonly called a frog; these, in turn, following the laws of natural selection and survival of the fittest, after going through numberless intermediate combinations, finally evolve the monkey; the monkey, in turn, under a continued favorable environment, rises to the dignity of man. If, in the past, the crude particles of protoplasm have developed into man, what limit can be set to the progress of man in the unending future? The result will be a perfected humanity, which Comte proposes as the object of our desires, endeavors, and worship.

For example, the men of the future will be more spiritual and less material, and this process may continue until man's body becomes entirely spiritualized, or reduced to a minimum. Again, the sciences of hygiene and medicine will enable men to prolong their lives, so that they will approach, and finally attain, to the everlasting. Again, the discoveries of science will enable men to overcome the resistance of gravity and to explore the regions of which astronomers tell us. Thus, the positive philosopher makes of the human race a rising tower of Babel, by means of which some at least will attain heaven without the help of God.

This plan fails in two particulars: first, in the kind of God it places before us. It is not comforting to believe that our God is a perfected humanity, that will look upon us in somewhat the same light that we look upon the dust from which we have developed, as only fit to make brick and mortar. Again, this plan fails in that it assures none of everlasting life. It is true that the last of the series will live longer, and some *may* live everlastingly; and these, from the positive philosopher's standpoint, might be called the elect. But the only life for which the individual may hope after death is a continued influence

helping to develop the future. The hope of being fossilized and of forming a substratum for higher forms of life is not inspiring.

But aside from these atheistical speculations there is a general expectation among theists and self-complacent Christians of a period of future grandeur for the human race. This expectation is the result in part of accepting the conclusions of the development theory, without denying special Providence as an element in the development; it is fed by the advance of science and the wonderful inventions of the age, which to those who value the material far above the spiritual are taken as evidences of progress all along the line. To this is added the enthusiasm of modern missions, and many a Christian, with whole regions of unexplored depravity in his own heart, thinks that with each stroke of his battle-axe he is laying low a bulwark of evil, or making a crooked path straight. Finally, the dark prophecies of Scripture with reference to a millennium are brought forward, and men conclude that we are upon the very threshold of the time when righteousness shall cover the earth as the waters cover the great deep. There is no doubt but that much of the religious activity of the age is in the spirit of an exaggerated optimism.

It would be worse than useless to deny the achievements of science, to mock the efforts of the missionary, or to neglect the prophecies of Scripture. The student of history cannot doubt that the race is progressing in many ways. Like the incoming tide, there are many ebbs and flows, but there is at the same time a steady advance. But this progress will not carry men to heaven. The human race has not progressed and will never progress to such an extent that men will not have need for the blood of the covenant, and the power of the Holy Spirit in their regeneration and sanctification.

To what extent, then, are we warranted by the word of God to expect human progress and the prevalence of the true religion on the earth?

Not to turn aside to discuss the vexed question of the millennium, it is sufficient to say that the difficulties attending the view that Christ will reign in person over the saints a thousand years before the generations of men shall cease from the earth are so great, and the passages of Scripture against that view are so numerous, that it would seem more in consonance with the teachings of Scripture to believe that Christ's second coming will usher in the general judgment. "There is, however, a truth in millenarianism, namely, that Christianity will yet concentrate, as in a focus, in a flourishing period of the

church, the fulness of divine blessing." Christ said, "And this gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness to all nations." But to whatever extent the nations may receive the gospel, its spread can neither be explained as an evolution of natural law in the spiritual world, nor by survival of the fittest, nor by the unaided efforts of its human advocates. "Not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord of hosts."

After this flourishing period, and before the coming of Christ, a time of great spiritual declension is spoken of. The condition of Jerusalem when it was destroyed by the Roman armies is prophetic of the condition of the world at the final destruction. The same pride, hypocrisy, and strife of sects that was found in one will be found in the other. "When the Son of man cometh shall he find faith upon the earth?" This spiritual darkness may be accompanied by intellectual darkness and degradation. On the other hand, material civilization may continue to advance. The arts and sciences may continue to develop, and men may explore the secrets of nature and utilize its resources to an extent which has not as yet been conceived. If men are fiends, the only result of knowledge and power is to add intensity to their wickedness.

It is not, therefore, unreasonable nor unscriptural for us to look for a remarkable outpouring of God's Spirit, by means of which multitudes from every quarter of the globe shall be brought into the kingdom. But there is nowhere any assurance that the number of the redeemed shall be coextensive with the human family in any generation. After this outpouring of the Spirit, the powers of darkness will again prevail in an unprecedented manner.

The time of the end may be far in the future, or it may be near at hand. It is unknown to all but God. In opposition to some who believe that the end is near at hand, a more general acceptance of Christianity than has as yet prevailed, followed by a general apostasy, would seem to require many years to come. We may rely upon it that the end is still sufficiently distant to render it necessary for us to provide for the ordinary exigencies of life. In fact, it may well be argued that faithfulness in the details of life, and obedience to the dictates of common sense are essential parts of the Saviour's injunction to watch. Not, however, that we are to strive to lay up treasures on earth, or to be over-anxious for the morrow. Whether the end be far or near it is the duty of the individual to watch, and be ready for his Lord's coming.

In contrast to the speculations of the atheist, and the fanatical anticipations of the enthusiast, the doctrine of election, God's eternal truth, guides us safely amid the conflicting breakers of thought and opinion. This great truth prevents us from displacing God with an exalted humanity, it does not lead us to expect the completion of God's purposes toward mankind in this dispensation of grace, nor does it cause us to despair of the sufficiency of God's grace to accomplish his purpose of redemption toward a fallen race.

This doctrine is founded upon the personality and sovereignty of God, and his absolute proprietary rights in and over the works of his hands. It teaches the immortality of every human being. Nor is this immortality merely an unending influence, as the atheist would have us to believe, which, like the wave from the pebble dropped in mid-ocean, breaks upon the distant shore of eternity. It is the continued existence of the personal spirit. These spirits continue to exist, and when the bodies crumble into dust, and when the dispensation of grace shall have ended, the body shall be raised and re-united to the spirit, and all men will appear before God to give an account of the deeds done in the body. This biblical conception of a judgment of a race of immortal spirits is better calculated to impress us with awe than any conception of the destiny of the race in this world can be.

The doctrine of election teaches us that Adam, as the representative of the race, fell, and by that fall brought himself and his whole race under the condemnation of God's justice. The generations of Adam's descendants will continue under the just condemnation of God to the end of the world. Material civilization, the evolution of species, the increase of knowledge, social culture, will never lift fallen man from condemnation into God's favor, for sin is not mere imperfection, but deliberate rebellion of an intelligent creature against its Creator. We are nowhere taught that God hates the frog, or the horse, because they are less perfectly developed than the man. Sin in man is the wilful denial of the authority of his Creator, a desire to thwart God's will, and reduce the King of heaven to the subjection of a frail creature; therefore, God is said to hate it with a perfect hatred.

Out of each generation of the sinful descendants of Adam, God, out of his mere good pleasure, and for the manifestation of his glorious grace, has elected some to everlasting life. In behalf of those upon whom he has thus set the seal of his love, the claims of his justice have been met by the infinite sacrifice and suffering of his Son. The

righteousness which Christ wrought in obeying the law is imputed to his people as a gracious gift. In each successive generation God's Spirit renews and sanctifies those that are bound with Christ in the sure bundle of life. This process will continue until the generations of Adam shall cease. We are led to believe that this succession of generations will be brought to a close suddenly. Christ's prophecy is, that men will be marrying and giving in marriage when the end comes. With this end of the dispensation of grace comes the resurrection and the judgment of all men, and then God will gather his elect into an everlasting kingdom, prepared for them from the foundation of the world.

The Christian may hope for a dispensation of the Spirit among the future generations of men much more extensive than the world has yet experienced. But to look for a millennium as a natural result of the spread of Christianity, in which death shall have been obliterated, and when each successive generation shall be brought as a unit into God's kingdom, suggests more of the hopes and principles of the evolutionist than it does of the work of God's Spirit. To the believer, to whom death is the most certain event of the future, it is much more comforting to look for that kingdom which is after the resurrection and the judgment, in which he himself hopes to share.

Many practical benefits would be gained to the church militant if professing Christians would eradicate from their minds the hopes and principles of evolution which have insinuated themselves into the Christian thought of the world. Evolution would teach us that in this age of the church there are spiritual prodigies, geniuses, the prototypes of a future spiritual species, whom their contemporaries cannot understand, and upon whom they are not competent to sit in judgment. Election teaches that the elders among God's people are competent to discern the mind of the Spirit of God. It places spiritual judgment upon the basis of spiritual experience. It would, therefore, tear away the presumptuous mask of the higher critic, and subject him to the divinely-constituted authorities. Again, evolution would invert God's ordained order, and teach that the child is wiser than the parent. What conclusion is more natural from the premise that humanity is gradually developing materially, intellectually, socially, spiritually. Election would tend to restore the authority of the parent and the subjection of the children "in the Lord." Evolution would have us to believe that the subjection of the woman to the man is a relic of barbarism, of an age when brute force was consid-



ered superior to refinement, sensibility, and purity. Progress will yet establish woman in her rightful place as the equal, if not the superior, of man. Election teaches that the sentence, "he shall rule over thee," was a part of the curse, which will continue in force until the dispensation of grace shall give place to the day of judgment. The family, and not the individual, is the unit in God's dealing with the race. Adam is the head of the race. Christ is the head of the church. The whole race fell in Adam. The whole church is redeemed in Christ. God has dealt with the race not as individuals but as in families; evolution tends to disintegrate the family, election tends to maintain its integrity.

Whatever may be the truth in the sidereal world, or in the vegetable and animal kingdom, the conclusion seems to be irresistible, that evolution in the spiritual world is essentially atheistic, and that election is God's eternal truth.

*Huntsville, Texas.*

N. SMYLLIE.

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#### THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1894.

The Assembly in Macon, in May, 1893, departed from a custom venerable for age in electing a ruling elder instead of an ordained minister of the gospel for its presiding officer. This departure led to another. As the power to preach is not given to the ruling elder, the retiring Moderator called on one who had this power to take his place. This was the Rev. J. M. P. Otts, D. D., of Talladega, Alabama, who, it may be inferred, spoke the sentiments of the principal. His text was taken from Isaiah ii. 3, 4, and from Matthew xxviii. 18-20. The aim of his discourse was to show how the prediction of universal peace on earth by the prophet would be brought about through the agency of the church, under the headship and control of the Lord Jesus. In doing this he foreshadowed the right policy of the church touching organic union with the Northern Church, for which he was criticized by some of those whom he was leading in worship before the Godhead.

The Assembly was welcomed by a large congregation of the good people of Nashville, who, from first to last, evidently knew how

"To press the bashful stranger to his food,  
And learn the luxury of doing good."

It will not be beneath the dignity of a stately QUARTERLY to add that, if a new departure was made at Macon by calling an elder to the Moderator's chair, one not less agreeable or convenient was made at

Nashville by the ladies in dispensing hospitality, when they substituted a daily public lunch for an elaborate dinner. Not only did we thus gain, as the Moderator said in his farewell address, "an hour at least daily for work," but, when the afternoon session began, all came in promptly at once, so that business went on, apparently, without a break. The workers came in to their task well refreshed, but unoppressed. Moreover, it afforded a daily opportunity through two hours for that "flow of soul" after "the feast of reason," which brought the commissioners not only in sight of one another, but into warm, cordial relations, and made an "assembly acquaintance" a something to be carried in pleasing remembrance for many days to come. 'Tis the first time that the writer ever came from an Assembly or Synod feeling that he knew personally many of its members and many of the people whose guest he had been. This departure also gave the housekeepers time to attend the deliberations of their guests, which they did in large number, larger than we ever saw before anywhere, from first to last, and all the day long.

The *personnel* of the Assembly caught the observing eye at a glance. One hundred and sixty-four men, gathered from Maryland to western Texas, stood shoulder to shoulder. Nearly all of them had by years been "lifted to man's estate," and looked like men "on business bent." A few were there whose chins were not yet well used to the razor's edge, and a few whose "students' stoop" gave assurance of having bent before much midnight oil. But the great bulk were men who stood squarely on their feet, ready to take up the load and to bear it bravely, however large it might be. Chancellors of universities were there, and professors from colleges and theological seminaries in unusual numbers. Many visiting brethren also came in, not only from the vicinage of Nashville, but from considerable distances; for example, from Louisville, Selma, Columbia, Clarksville, and elsewhere. The Rev. Mr. Tron, a minister of the Waldensian Church in Italy, was present, and delivered a stirring and eloquent address about his people, their past history and present work. Two of our missionaries, Mr. Grinnan from Japan and Mr. Gammon from Brazil, entertained the Assembly and congregation with addresses at the missionary meeting, and deepened our interest in their work. The Rev. Dr. Alexander McLean, corresponding secretary of the American Bible Society, made an address, showing the successful work of his society in circulating the word of God. Rev. Mr. Saunders also was present to bring the Assembly's Home and School at Fredericksburg, Vir-

ginia, into notice. An evening was given for this purpose, during which addresses were made, showing the importance of this new enterprise as a factor in the work of the church.

The reading of the bills and overtures, together with the reports of the executive and *ad interim* committees, unloaded an enormous amount of work on the floor of the Assembly. The bills and overtures ran up above sixty; last year the full number was twenty-nine. The budget put into the hands of the Standing Committee on Foreign Missions, at the first glance seemed unmanageable. How could all of these great matters be thoroughly investigated and clearly decided on in the few days allowed, and the duties of members on the floor be discharged besides? This was the question that rose in the mind of some of that committee when they took their seats in the committee-room. Happily, it occurred to them that the committee might be sub-divided into five, and the business apportioned severally to them, and that the first ready report in order to the whole committee daily at a specified hour. This was agreed upon, and thus the work was done. The Committee of Bills and Overtures did likewise. So it seems true that there is a way to get out of any place that may be gotten into.

The past year, in spite of universal depression in business, has been one of great prosperity to our church. The Foreign Missionary Committee reports receipts for \$143,774.02, which is \$9,874.25 in excess of those of the year before. The missionary force has grown from 106 to 130. The force of native workers has grown from 87 to 165 in two years. The circulation of *The Missionary* touches 10,000 copies. And 600 heathen converts have been baptized within twelve months into the communion of our church. The contributions to the Home-Missionary work have been \$158,000. The committee aids 73 missionaries. The new plan works well. No debt has been incurred, and there has been advance along the line at many points. Our church has a surplus in both Foreign and Home Missionary Committee treasuries, while the Northern Presbyterian Church is loaded heavily. The Committee of Foreign Missions of the Southern Methodist Church, located at Nashville, are in debt, and wonder why we excel them so far in financiering.

These facts go to show that we have a right to live. We have a place and a work, and the good hand of the Lord our God is with us. Thirty-three years of history lie behind us, during which we have been kept free from entanglements with other churches and their blunders.

It is not offensive arrogance to say that we have realized our mission as a witness-bearer for the non-political character of the kingdom of God. During the sessions just closed, one of the first deliberate acts of the Assembly was to lay on the table a communication from "The National League for the Promotion of Social Purity," because it had a political bearing. Although this paper was afterwards called up by another, offered as a reply to it, yet this other was sent to the Committee on Bills and Overtures, where it was so modified that its adoption confirmed our antecedents and taught another wholesome lesson to those who are ignorant of the dignity of "the supreme judicatory of our church." The vote in favor of this reply, so modified, appeared to be unanimous.

#### ORGANIC UNION.

A special committee, of one from each Synod, was appointed, to which communications were referred on the subject of organic union with the Northern church, from the Presbyteries of North Alabama, Ebenezer and Holston, and one from the Assembly of that church then in session at Saratoga. The report of this committee recommended that we decline to reopen the question by appointing a committee of conference as requested by the Northern Assembly, and gave five reasons for so doing, viz.: The non-political character of the Christian church, on which subject the two churches differ in practice; the opposite policies of the two churches concerning their relations to the negro church in the land, which policies seem to be unchangeably fixed; the essential difference in the views of the two churches of the sphere and work of woman in church matters; the divisive tendency of the agitation of this question; the jeopardy to our property interests by any such union, growing out of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Walnut Street Church case, and other cases of the same kind since.

The committee of thirteen all signed the report with but one dissenting voice. Immediately upon its reading, two substitutes were offered, the latter of which was accepted by the author of the former as a substitute for his own. Thus the issue was joined by the friends of these two papers. The advocates of organic union urged from first to last, as their main reason, the discourtesy in refusing to appoint the committee of conference proposed by the Northern church. The opponents of organic union, while urging many insurmountable obstacles to the union, felt clear of any such allegation because of the following facts: (1.) This proposition was not spontaneous with the Northern Assembly. They say, in their communication, that they

were led to make it by learning that the matter would be before our General Assembly for consideration. This was throwing their influence on one side of a question about which our house was divided. (2.) As it was a matter of business, all that courtesy demanded was a courteous reply to their proposal. (3.) Feeling fully convinced that organic union, "upon the basis of our common standards," was out of all question by reason of insuperable difficulties (and it was just this about which they proposed to confer), it was the honorable, the fitting, and the just thing for us to deal plainly, and not encourage hopes that never could be realized. (4.) As tentative efforts had been made in vain so often—in 1870, 1874, 1876, 1877, 1882, 1883, and 1887, and as it had been formally declared by our Assembly in 1882 that it "is our high and grand duty to preserve our individuality as a church entire and intact, and to encourage no tendencies looking toward blending this body into any other"; and again, so late as 1888, "we continue established in the conviction that the cause of truth and righteousness, as well as the peace and prosperity of our beloved Zion, will be best promoted by remaining as we have been—a distinct member of that one body, the church, of which the Lord Jesus Christ is the supreme and ever-living head"; after all this, to press this matter upon us again is felt to be unkind and discourteous. This point was pressed in the debate. (5.) In 1870 the Northern Assembly proposed to us the appointment of a committee to meet a similar committee to be appointed by them to confer on this subject; *i. e.*, union "in one great organization that shall cover our whole land." We accepted their proposal and appointed the committee, instructing them, however, *viz*: "That the difficulties which lie in the way of cordial correspondence between the two bodies must be distinctly met and removed, which may be comprehensively stated in the following particulars." The difficulties were then plainly stated. When these facts were made known to that Assembly, they refused to appoint the committee to confer with ours already on their way, and all that our committee could do was to say to the next Assembly that they had not been met by any committee from the Northern church, which they did meekly and mildly, as became Christian gentlemen. Could we hazard a repetition of that same discourtesy?

(6.) The way in which this matter was worked up ought not to be overlooked. It did not come, as we like to see such matters come, before the Assembly, as by a power from above. It lacked the authenticating seal of the Holy Spirit. There was too much human

preconcert about it. Men who have been advocating the scheme for years, and who know perfectly well that the Assembly has by formal deliverances deprecated it for peace and righteousness' sake, had too much hand in it. It was not done in a corner. These good men honestly believe that the churches ought to unite. What they did was done in the interest of the kingdom of God, as they thought.

But we object to their way of doing good. The retiring Moderator of the Southern Assembly had been in correspondence with the retiring Moderator of the Northern Assembly on this subject. During the debate in Nashville he produced a letter from the retiring Moderator at Saratoga, speaking for the whole Northern church on the negro question—self-moved to do so. During recess others spoke without concealment of letters received from another ex-Moderator of the Northern Assembly trying to enlist them in the work of reunion. The opening sermon of our Assembly, as we have seen, commended it. That at Saratoga did likewise. A distinguished minister of our church, whose leaning has been known for years, visited the Saratoga Assembly, and, while addressing that body, spoke in a way to help on the work, and wrote a letter to Nashville with the same tendency, which was used in the same way.

Now all this is open and above board. But the writer is one of those who do not like such matters to be handled in this way. A new function will come by usage to the Moderator's office, and the constitution will need to be changed accordingly.

If one presbytery may be thus handled, so may another, and another, until our Assembly becomes a theatre for the operation of a machine whose output will be as inevitable as that of Tammany. How farcical, then, will be the prayers of all the ministers in their congregations, on the Sunday before the Assembly meets, for the Holy Spirit to preside, counsel, and lead to conclusions in accordance with the mind of God!

This is not the first time our Assembly has declined to appoint a committee for this purpose. It did so in 1883, in answer to an overture from a presbytery. And at the same meeting it said, "The question of organic union is not to be entertained as a subject before the church." In 1888, five years later, it said, "We are unable to discover that the obstacles to organic union . . . have, to any considerable extent, been removed." Since that time these obstacles have grown higher. The Northern church this year appropriated \$250,000 to carry out their policy respecting the negro church. In a most laud-

able effort to protect their young ministers against heretical teaching in theological seminaries, they so tightened their grasp on the property rights of these institutions that a majority in the united church would have absolute control of every dollar we have that is so invested. Walking in the light of these facts, reunion with them would be an act of self-effacement. Extinction without the negro, and submergence with, would be our fate. This was so plain to the Assembly that not one member of it said he was in favor of union now; and only four said they were for it conditionally in the future. There is less prospect for it now than ever before. If by machine work we could be compressed into unity, by internal dissensions we would soon fly apart. Peace if possible, self-preservation anyhow.

#### LICENSURE AND ORDINATION.

The prevalence of preaching by unlicensed men, in violation of the law of the church, and yet with the approval of many of the presbyteries, led the last Assembly to appoint a committee to take the matter in hand and report to this Assembly such change in our constitutional requirements as shall correct the irregularity.

The remedy proposed for the evil by the committee is to test all candidates, so soon as they are taken under the care of the presbyteries, as on probation for ordination as their objective all the way through their preparation; and, that their gifts in public speaking may be put on trial as well as their scholarship and good behavior, to license them to preach for a period of three years, under the direction of presbytery. At the expiration of this time the licensure may be renewed for the same term if thought advisable. This licensure is to be granted ordinarily only after the candidate has completed a college course, and has studied theology at least one year under an approved seminary or approved teacher. When licensed, the probationer shall be required to push straight on with his studies for ordination, except for extraordinary reasons. The committee also recommends that the term of preparatory study be changed from three years of eight months' sessions each, to four years of six months' sessions each. The object of this is to give the candidate more drill in active work. The plan lowers the standard for licensure, but keeps it up as at present for ordination.

The majority report recommended the approval of the plan, the sending it down to the presbyteries for adoption, and its publication in the Appendix to the Minutes. A minority report recommended the publication of the plan in the Appendix to the Minutes, and the dis-

charge of the committee, with commendation for their faithful work. The subject was earnestly argued *pro* and *con*. The evil was felt and acknowledged by a large majority, apparently. Our seminary students and self-appointed evangelists are out of order, and consequently doing mischief. The matter, therefore, must not be dismissed. Yet the constitutional changes proposed seem too extensive. It was forcibly argued, moreover, that the licensure of our candidates at so early a stage in their course would probably give rise to two classes of preachers in our church. The churches would insist on retaining a supply who pleased them, though unordained; and the probationer might make light of ordination and consent to be retained.

The Assembly evidently was not satisfied with either the majority or minority report, yet was unwilling to set both aside. The proposition to send the majority report to the presbyteries, and append to the Minutes, was objected to because the Assembly should not send down for adoption a report it did not itself approve. It was proposed to publish both reports in the Appendix to the Minutes, and docket the subject for the next Assembly. Although vigorously seconded by one who is accustomed to keep a docket in the civil courts, this motion was not put to the house because it was a novel mode of doing business in a church court, yet the completion of our action touching the appointment of delegates to the next council of the Presbyterian Alliance was referred to the next Assembly. So the Assembly adopted the majority report without really approving it, and sent it down to the presbyteries. Let the presbyteries bear this in mind when considering it, and not be misled into its hasty adoption. A vigorous protest was entered against this act of the Assembly.

The mind of the body was clearly and strongly opposed to preaching by the unlicensed, as appears from the adoption of a resolution, offered by Mr. Moore, instructing the presbyteries and church sessions not to call on unlicensed men to preach. This, we take it for granted, does not discourage exhortation and Bible-readings, with explanation, by earnest laymen in their own congregations, and with the approval of their own sessions, but irresponsible evangelism.

#### ORDINATION IN HEATHEN LANDS.

Overtures were received from the Presbyteries of Lexington and Roanoke, Virginia, praying that the deliverance of 1893 on this subject be rescinded, because unconstitutional. The action referred to reads thus: "It is lawful for the presbytery from whose bounds such a missionary has gone to the foreign field, after having complied as



nearly as possible with Paragraph 118, Form of Government, through correspondence, to authorize a sufficient number of ordained missionaries (ministers and elders) in the same field to constitute themselves a commission to complete the examination of the candidate and ordain him, if the way be clear. Such ordination should be reported to the home presbytery, and the name of the ordained man entered upon its roll. When this has been done, the commission is dissolved."

The Presbytery of Roanoke, in its overture, declared this action, according to our recollection, "altogether unconstitutional." This language is not extravagant. It is unconstitutional, because it "authorizes a sufficient number of ordained missionaries (ministers and elders) in the same field to constitute themselves a *commission*." A commission from what? These ministers and elders will probably belong to different presbyteries at home.—"A sufficient number of ordained missionaries (ministers and *elders*)." Do we send out elders as missionaries, unless a medical missionary happens to be one? And, if so, whom does he represent? An elder cannot rule except over people who have elected him.—It "authorizes a *sufficient* number of missionaries." What is a sufficient number? A commission must be a quorum of the court sending it.—This commission is to "complete the *examination* of the candidate." But the constitution says, Paragraph 93, "The presbytery itself shall conduct the previous examinations."—"When this has been done, the commission is *dissolved*." What power *ab extra* can dissolve a self-constituted commission?—And last, all this was done by act of Assembly at Macon, without referring the proposed change in the constitution to the presbyteries!

It was well, therefore, for the Nashville Assembly to rescind this action of its predecessor. But was the action substituted for it constitutional? This action reads thus: . . . "The only lawful method of ordination to the ministry is provided in Sections 6, 77, and 93 of the Book of Church Order.

"And in answer to the further request, in the same overture, that the Assembly take steps for amending the Form of Government so as to relieve the difficulties which now beset the ordination of evangelists in the foreign fields, your committee recommends that the Assembly send down to the presbyteries an overture recommending that Section 40 be amended by inserting the following words: 'And to ordain ministers in the foreign fields when ordination in the usual way is impracticable; said newly ordained minister to be reported and enrolled in the presbytery of the ordaining minister.'"

This overture confers the power of ordination in heathen lands upon an evangelist; and the only reason given for this change in our organic law was given orally in debate by the chairman of the Committee on Bills and Overtures, that is, Titus i. 5: "Ordain elders in every city."

The question is, *How* was Titus, an evangelist, to ordain elders? In 1 Timothy iv. 13, Paul reminds this evangelist that he had been ordained by "the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery." What presbytery did it? the local or the provincial, the session or the larger Presbytery? For all of our courts are presbyteries, rising in regular gradation from the session to the General Assembly, each one having plenary power until the larger is formed. "The power of the whole is in every part, and the power of the whole is over the *power* of every part." The power of the Presbyterian Church, South or North, is in the General Assembly, the Synod, the Presbytery, the session. What well-informed Presbyterian will challenge this saying? Again, it is a well-established and distinctive principle of Presbyterianism that the presbytery cannot confer the power *to confer the power* of ordination; it can only confer the power (*εξουσια*) to exercise the power (*δυναμις*) which the Spirit of God has manifestly conferred upon the candidate. It only inducts him to an office.

The apostle himself had plenary power to ordain because he was an apostle; and he did ordain by putting his hands on Timothy; as in 2 Timothy i. 6. Although, in this instance, no doubt he did it as a presbyter, conjointly with the presbyters of the local presbytery. But he had no power to confer apostolic power. This is prelacy. A prelate, deriving his power by succession from the apostles, can make and unmake, frock and unfrock. And this is the radical error of the act we now criticise. The modern notion among Presbyterians in the Southern church, that the evangelist has unlimited power as an extraordinary officer in the church, is a blunder of the first magnitude. It confesses Presbyterianism a failure except when existing as a settled church in a settled country. The radical idea of Presbyterianism conceives of it as a seminal principle, which, if planted in Central Africa, may grow *of itself* into a church as large as this planet of ours. Its expansive power is unlimited. This seminal principle was given by our Lord to his disciples when he said (Matt. xviii. 20), "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them"; (Luke xxiv. 49) "Tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high"; (John xx. 21, 22), "As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you. And when he had said this,

he breathed on them and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost." He is in the "two or three," and empowers them to do all that is necessary to perpetuate the existence of the kingdom of God in the earth. And as organization is necessary to this end, he empowers them to do this—to organize themselves to rule over themselves for God's glory and their own good. This is representative Republicanism as distinguished from Congregationalism on the one hand, which retains the power in the mass, and from prelacy on the other, which gives the power to one man, the prelate. All power of government in Presbyterianism is *joint* power; and no power of government can be conferred except by those over whom it is to be exercised. The essence of Presbyterianism consists not in joint power as opposed to several, but in this, that power (diacritic) can be exercised only over those who give it.

Therefore for this church in America to send an evangelist to China with power to rule over the Chinese is a most violent stretch of authority, one which the Chinese may well rebel against. Autonomy is born in men. When your evangelist, in heathen lands, converts a heathen, the convert has the inherent right to say who shall rule over him. He may choose the Church of Scotland, or England, or Rome, or he may say, I will join myself to "two or three" Chinese and ordain a power to suit myself, according to the word of God. Chinese, who are converted, are not thereby captured like wild horses on the prairie. They are born free-agents, and it is an act of degradation to choke them with a Presbyterian lasso and lead them into our ranks. Consistency, no less than the sacred Scriptures and the natural rights of man, opposes this action of the Nashville Assembly which sets up a second kind of power in our church, one which is contrary to all the governing power in the home church. Presbyterianism can never become prelacy by evolution, or involution, or convolution. To this end he who made it must unmake it and remake it.

That the Apostle Paul does not, in Titus i. 5, settle the manner of ordination, is obvious. On this point there seems to be general agreement. Even Neander says (in his *Church History*, Vol. I., p. 189, as quoted by Hackett on Acts xiv. 23): "When Paul empowers Titus to set presiding officers over the communities who possessed the requisite qualifications, this circumstance decides nothing as to the mode of choice, nor is choice by the community itself *thereby* necessarily excluded." When they have chosen representatives, if no authorized power, apostolic or otherwise, is at hand, they in whom the Holy

Spirit dwells should ordain. In our church, ruling elders are to be ordained by "the laying on of the hands of the session" after prayer by "the minister." This is because ruling elders are next to the people, and derive their power from the people. In 2 Corinthians viii. 19, the fact that a traveling companion for the Apostle Paul had been elected by the people, is cited as a sufficient reason for the confidence of the people in him as a money-carrier to the poor saints. The voice of the people, in whom the Holy Spirit dwells, is entitled to much weight, as he thought. The people being the source of power, the rulers whom they choose and to whom they delegate authority (*exousia*) to rule over them, become their *immediate* representatives; and when these rulers elect commissioners to the General Assembly, these commissioners become their *remote* representatives. Therefore, this Assembly must send down its proposed changes in organic law to the immediate representatives of the people for their sanction before the change can be made. According to the distribution of the power derived from the people by the constitution of our church, the whole power of the church is in the session, as it is in the Presbytery and General Assembly, for the purposes for which that session exists. It is, therefore, entirely competent for the session to ordain elders and ministers where there is no other court to which this power is given by the constitution. This same session might ordain and send out missionaries under like circumstances.

One of the wisest sentences ever framed on this subject was framed by the St. Louis Assembly of 1887, when it adopted the following: "The inherent difficulty in the case lies in the attempt to rule the church across the sea. The solution is found in recognizing the autonomy of the church as a free-Christian commonwealth and investing it with the power of self-government as soon as it is organized." The only amendment we would make to this noble sentence would be to add these words, "as soon as it has organized itself by the selection and appointment of ruling elders."

#### A JUDICIAL CASE.

Miss Sadie Means, a young woman, a member of the Second Presbyterian Church in Columbia, South Carolina, was exhorted by the session of the church to refrain from the habitual violation of the Sabbath-day by working in the central office of the telephone company in that city. She refused to do so. She was asked if she would not rather have a place in a store? This she declined. The pastor stated to the session that she had declined his offer to have her taught stenography

and type-writing at his expense. She was solemnly warned of the danger she was incurring in making her choice. But she still held on her way. For this she was suspended from the communion of the church until she repented. Friends appealed the case to the Presbytery, where the session was sustained. The appeal was taken to the Synod, where the decision of the Presbytery was reversed. Thence it was brought to the General Assembly and tried. The finding of the court as formulated and adopted reads as follows :

“The Assembly finds :

“1. That the record of the cause does not clearly show that the aforesaid Sadie Means came before the session of the Second Presbyterian Church of Columbia, South Carolina, to make known to the court, as provided in Paragraph 234, that she was guilty of violating the Sabbath by working in a telephone office on the Lord’s day, and, therefore, the record lacks the statement which authorizes a judgment without process.

“2. The decision of the session was reached without trial, as provided in Paragraph 174; and these two paragraphs, 234 and 174, limit the session’s power.

“3. The decision was made in undue haste, and at the first and only sitting of the court, so far as the records show.

“4. The sentence of suspension from the communion was of excessive severity.

“It is the judgment of the Assembly that the appeal be not sustained, and that the decision of the Synod of South Carolina be affirmed. In connection with this judgment, the Assembly deems it wise to reëfirm its immutable conviction as to the universal and perpetual obligation to remember the Sabbath-day to keep it holy.”

The finding is in accordance with the law and the testimony, and so far attains the ends of truth and righteousness. But it does not go far enough. A judgment that does not uphold the law breaks it down. This young woman surely did break the fourth commandment. This was a work neither of necessity nor of mercy. Other ways to earn a livelihood were open to her, which she deliberately refused. Now she is reinstated in the church, and permitted to continue violating the law of God with impunity, and that by the court of last appeal in our church! The judgment ought to have gone further, and have upheld the law of God by remanding the case to the session, and ordering a new trial, to be conducted according to the forms provided in our constitution.

The world will surely make capital out of this judgment. So far as our church has influence, it will be felt as favorable to a lax interpretation of the sabbatic law. And this is not the time for toning down the public conscience on this commandment. The saving clause added to the finding will not save. It will be treated as a fillip to the public ear. If Miss Means really felt in her conscience that this was a work of necessity, especially after another had been offered to her, the Assembly should have said: Your conscience is at fault; your moral sense is seared; you ought not to have such a conscience.

The church also will be dissatisfied. God's people had hoped for a deliverance that would brace those who are working hard in support of the law of the Sabbath. The permanent committee of the Assembly on the Sabbath, in their report to this very body at Nashville, had said: "We need not remind you that the eyes of the whole church and country are turned to you. May wisdom be given you to decide aright; and may we be allowed to ask that you embrace the occasion so grandly given, to do something more than merely settle some question of constitutional law, to reassert the high position always held by the Presbyterian Church as taught in the word of God, touching the divine origin and eternal obligation of the fourth commandment."

The church will not soon break the force of this judgment against the decalogue. Of what avail is it to pass deliverances *in thesi*, if when an actual case brings conscience face to face with law, we give judgment that encourages the lawless? Preaching is easier than practicing, even by a General Assembly. The introductory chapter, on Preliminary Principles, to our old "Form of Government," says, "That all synods and councils may err, through the frailty inseparable from humanity." Pity 'tis that this grand chapter was not prefixed to our present book.

#### YOUNG PEOPLES' SOCIETIES.

The report on this subject by the *ad interim* committee was assailed from opposite directions immediately upon its being taken from the docket. The special committee appointed to consider the report and recommend what disposal should be made of it, offered a report criticizing it. The report of the *ad interim* committee was immediately offered as a substitute for that of the special committee. After a discussion of some length, indefinite postponement of the whole matter was proposed. This called many to their feet who insisted that the churches wanted instruction and were looking to this Assembly for it. The

only exhibition of temper made through the eleven days of debates was made at this point, and, for a little while, there was the smell as of sulphur in the air. But the Moderator's gavel and energetic rebuke brought a prompt quietus.

After one or two motions to amend, which were lost, the report of the *ad interim* committee was adopted, without any change, by an overwhelming majority. The report is conservative throughout.

If we mistake not, this Assembly appointed six *ad interim* committees for the ensuing year. No doubt this will make the treasurer draw a long breath. These *ad interims* are very expensive, and the church would do well to find some other way of disposing of unfinished business. The writer modestly suggests that in many cases twelve months' time, or the interval between Assemblies, would bring light enough to the minds of her commissioners. There is danger, we are aware, of a burdensome docket; but carefulness would avert this.

Many other matters were concluded at Nashville on which comment might be made for the benefit of those who were not there, particularly the disposal of our valuable property at Campinas, Brazil, valued at \$100,000; the authority to incorporate the Assembly's Committee on Foreign Missions; and the appointment of a committee to confer with a similar one from the Northern church on Home Missionary work on the border.

This was a notable Assembly, considering the number and importance of the matters handled.

H. M. WHITE.

Winchester, Va.

## VII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

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### JOHNSON'S WHAT IS REALITY?

WHAT IS REALITY? An Inquiry as to the Reasonableness of Natural Religion, and the Naturalness of Revealed Religion. *By Francis Howe Johnson.* Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1891. 8vo, pp. 510.

As the title of this work is not very designative, it may be well to let the author define its purpose. In the Preface he says:

"It is often said, and very generally believed, that science and religion derive their authority from totally distinct sources; that *faith begins where science leaves off*; that science deals with facts that can be proved, while religion is the outcome of conceptions that have no verifiable attachments in reality. It is the object of this book to show that the premises of religion are as real as any part of man's knowledge, and that the methods by which its vital truths are deduced from these premises are no less legitimate than those employed by science."

It is, then, the aim of the author to show that religion is not a collection of suppositions, of hypotheses, of illusions; that it is as real as science; that its facts, truths, and fundamental beliefs are as real as those of science. This must be confessed to be a noble end, worthy of his acute mind. The question is, whether he has made good the promise of his work.

We cannot here follow our author into his elaborate and subtle analysis of philosophical systems. We give him the credit of possessing intellectual powers of a very high order, which he has employed in discussing the profoundest questions of philosophy and science; and, in our judgment, he has exposed the fallacy of idealism as represented by the absolutist thinkers of Germany, and that of the physical and mechanical realism of Herbert Spencer and his school. We must content ourselves with a few observations in regard to the bearing of his work, in its fundamental principle, upon the subject of religion. In forming any proper estimate of the work, it must be ascertained what that fundamental principle is.

1. In pursuing the inquiry, What is Reality? he argues to show that it is not true that *everything is real*. Unless we play upon words, there are some things that are unreal. Nor is it satisfactory to say that *reality is the agreement of our thought with that which is external to our thought*. This does not meet the requirements of the idealist and the physiological psychologist. The definition furnished by the author is: *a thing is real when it is capable of fulfilling the promises it makes to us*. This definition holds good, the author contends, both in regard to the qualities or characteristics of things, and to the realm of real things—the aggregate of realities that we call the actual world. The vital question of our day is, What classes of things or beings, of events or processes, are entitled to have the stamp of reality put upon them? The first specific answer yielded to this "vital question" is, that *our conception of spirit as spirit is the counterpart of a reality, and is not an illusion*. The spirit within us, the human ego, is at least the counterpart



of a reality. What is that of which it is a counterpart? The spirit without us in the actual world of nature. There are elements in that world which no individual human spirit, and no aggregate of human spirits, can originate or control. This is the testimony of experience. We are compelled, then, to believe that, as there is a real spirit within us which has a limited power of origination and control, there must be a spirit in nature without us which possesses an unlimited power to produce these results. Spirit, then—originating, developing, controlling intelligence—is the great, the fundamental, reality.

2. The question of the definition of reality having been considered, the next question that emerges is, What is the *test* of reality? It is that a theory or belief that a thing, or an order of things, is real, must meet all the demands of life. It must be capable of being lived by. If not, it cannot be trusted as affirming reality. The test of reality submitted by the author is, in his own words, as follows: "The necessity of *LIVING* the affirmation of a proposition shows that this proposition expresses a reality." He rejects Herbert Spencer's ultimate criterion, namely, "An abortive attempt to *conceive* the negation of a proposition shows that the cognition expressed is one we are compelled to accept." The American, we must think, has, in this matter, the advantage of the English, philosopher. Now, the belief in spirit, and in spirit as the originating, developing, controlling intelligence in the world, is one which satisfies all the requirements of life; it can be lived by, and, therefore, expresses reality of the very highest character. Hitherto the author's lines of thought run, to a certain extent, parallel with our own, but they now reach a point at which they begin widely to diverge, and keep more and more widely diverging as his speculations advance. We shall point out the reasons of the *toto caelo* difference.

3. We are now prepared to indicate what has already been hinted at—the fundamental principle upon which the work proceeds. It is that of *creative evolution*. It is to the building up, elucidation and enforcement of this principle that the author's elaborate analyses and argumentation are devoted. This is the animus of the book. As far as we can judge, he seeks to establish a theory which will successfully mediate between that of German absolutism on the one hand, and that of Spencerian realism on the other. He rejects alike the idealistic exclusiveness of the former, and the realistic exclusiveness of the latter. He admits the separate reality of the ego and the non-ego so far as related to each other, and he attempts to reduce them to ultimate unity by a method of his own. Conceding the relative duality, and yet seeking a common principle which will bridge the chasm, how does he attain to it? After having labored to secure his great postulate, the reality of spiritual intelligence, he builds upon the analogy of the creative processes of the human spirit, attested by consciousness and proved by experience, the fact of the creative processes of an ultimate, a divine spirit, which sustains to universal nature a relation like that subsisting between the human ego and the narrow realm coming within its scope. The reality of the one fact is equal to that of the other. Further, the same kind of creative energy exists in both cases. As the creative power of the human spirit *absolutely begins* nothing, so is it with that of the divine spirit. Creation out of nothing is not to be admitted. The ultimate spiritual intelligence originates the forms of existing materials; and originating them, it guides and develops all the processes of the universe, mental and material. It is this (thus defined) creative spiritual intelligence which is the principle

of evolution in all things. It originates, enters into, continues always with, and continuously energizes in every part of the universe, inorganic, vegetable, animal, rational, moral and religious. Operating alike in the spiritual and material worlds as their developing principle, it bridges the chasm between them.

Consistently with this theory it is maintained that there always has been, and ever is, an unbroken course of nature. Nothing is supernatural, all is natural. There is no room for special interventions, for miracles (as ordinarily understood), for an objective, external, authoritative revelation. It is not left to us to infer from all this that the author maintains the eternity of the universe and its unity with God; he expressly tells us so :

“Within a limited sphere, we control, alter, reconstruct the elements with which we come into immediate contact. Expanding this thought to the Supreme Being, we think of him, not, indeed, as a *part* of the order of nature, but as the living head and centre of that order. It is a part of him, as our bodies are a part of us. His thought and his initiative are constantly working in and through it. We can no more think of its beginning than we can think of his beginning. He and it are, for us, two aspects of that which eternally *is*.” (P. 286.) “I am a pantheist, without ceasing to be a theist. As a pantheist, I cannot help being keenly alive to the deficiencies of transcendent theism. But as a theist, I am equally clear as to the untruth of abstract pantheism.” (P. 252.)

4. This creative evolution of a supreme intelligence the author asserts to be the great reality, to which, as an ultimate standard, all our beliefs are to be brought, and by which they are to be judged. This is the *Lapis Lydius* by which our theology is to be tested, the straight-edge and plumb-line with which it must be squared. Vain now are all appeals to the authority of tradition, of the church, or even of the Bible itself. Modern culture demands that the appeal be made only to proved reality, as well in matters of religion as in those of science. We are forced to respond to this requirement, or surrender our beliefs. Nothing else will suffice. The attitude of non-resistance to criticism will not answer. We must prove our beliefs by showing their *reality*, a reality equal to that which is claimed for the facts of science, and the inferences necessarily deducible from them. Acquiescing in this necessity, the author offers his great principle as the most real of realities, and affirms that, tested by it, our whole theology must be recast and modified. Upon this whole theory we make a few remarks, of which our limits preclude the expansion :

(1.) We take the bull by the horns, and challenge the proofs of the *reality* of any evolution of species from species. This demand cannot be met by confounding species with variety, or by alleging extraordinary jumps of the evolutionary principle across yawning gaps in the evolutionary process, or by trumpeting, in the face of fact, the universal triumph of the hypothesis of evolution, or by an appeal, in the teeth of the author's dictum, to the authority of splendid scientific names, or by the taunting implication that those who do not adopt this “widest of all generalizations” are as narrow as one who would question the law of gravitation.

(2.) If neither God nor the universe had a beginning, and they are therefore co-eternal, how is God infinite? He is limited by the universe. Does the theory involve the denial of an infinite God? If so, it is as atheistic as German absolutism and English physical realism.

(3.) Who or what is a pantheistic-theist? Is he one who affirms and denies that God is a free, personal, intelligent cause? The pantheist we know, and the

theist we know, but who are you? you, who affirm a necessary-free, impersonal-personal, unintelligent-intelligent being? *Si pictor*, etc.

(4.) It is idle to deny special creations, if the specific differentiations of the creative evolutionist discharge precisely the same office.

(5.) The author points to the egg as an admirable sample of evolution in general. One cannot refrain from inquiring how he came by the information he gives us, that the protoplasmic speck with which the egg development begins, is the contraction of cycles within cycles of a process lying back of it and reaching interminably into the past. Was it by virtue of a prolepsis of our present phenomenal existence that began with our birth, which enabled us to observe and record with scientific accuracy the facts of an eternal history?

(6.) We meet the pantheist by asking how personal, intelligent beings are evolved from an impersonal, unintelligent substance. We meet the creative evolutionist with the question, how impersonal, unintelligent things are evolved from a personal, intelligent being. If they are unlike him, how came they to be evolved from him? If they are like him, how are they impersonal and unintelligent? Perhaps the author will point us in reply to his theory that germ-cells *are* possessed of intelligence. Whether they are personal does not appear.

(7.) We cannot see with what justice the author keenly protests against the affirmation by Christian theologians of the transcendence of the Deity, and their denial of his immanence, in relation to the universe, when only a slight acquaintance with Christian literature would show that both of these positions are maintained, and maintained with, perhaps, equal zeal. What offends him is that the transcendence of God is asserted at all against the doctrine of evolutionists, and that the credit of evolutionists for being the sole discoverers of his immanence in nature would be relinquished, if it were admitted by them that others had always taught it. The Christian theologian, however, does not by the immanence of God in the world teach that he is identified with the world and the world with him; he holds that the death of his saints is precious in his sight, but not that he dies when they die, that he notices the fall of a sparrow, but not because the sparrow is his near relative.

(8.) We cannot concede the correctness of the portraiture which represents us as "those who hold the traditional view." We demur, not because of the sneer it contains that we are behind the times, for we confess that, in some respects, we would rather be behind them than abreast of them, particularly the author's times. But we object, because it is not true that we receive our doctrines as if they were heirlooms handed down for centuries in the Christian family. No, we get them at first hand. We obtain them from the Bible, in the same way that the early Christians acquired them from the same inspired and infallible source. Had they the apostles? So have we. They speak to us in the Scriptures. Had they the apostolic writings? So have we—the very same that they had. Where is the handing down of our doctrine from mouth to mouth, and from hand to hand? As well talk of the traditional light of the sun, because former generations basked in it. Every generation itself basks in it. It will, of course, be objected that it is assumed that the light of the Bible is as evident as that of the sun. Certainly; that is assumed. Not to speak of external evidence, the internal evidence of the divine origin and authority and beneficence of the Bible shines in its pages as

clearly as the light of the sun blazes in the heavens; and it would be as absurd to say that the Bible does not proclaim God *to us*, as to say that *to us* the heavens do not declare his glory and the firmament does not show forth his handiwork. No, we do not derive our knowledge from tradition, we get it from a present Bible. What there is traditional in it is tested by comparison with this great reality—the inspired word of God.

There is one advantage which we possess over the author and those who think with him. They, by denying the possibility of miracles, debar themselves from appealing to them as proofs of the position they maintain. We cite miracles as proofs of ours. Nor are we shut up to past miracles depending upon historical evidence for their support, but confidently assert the miracles involved in the very structure of the Bible, the miracles of prophecy in continuous process of accomplishment from generation to generation, and notably in our own, and the stupendous miracles attested by the consciousness of every regenerated and converted soul. Either the statements of the Bible in regard to miracles are true, or they are not. If true, there is no more clearly ascertained *reality* than the divine origin and authority of the Bible. If not true, the Bible is an out-and-out imposture. We must make our election between these suppositions. Which? is a question of vital importance.

(9.) Let us glance for a moment at some of the modifications of our theology and our religion which this work insists upon as required by that great reality—creative evolution. The moral law must be regarded as affecting only “organic relations.” What is usually known as the Fall must be viewed as having been not a disaster, but a necessary step towards the moral education of the race, its development in a career of righteousness. It would follow that our theological books and catechisms must hereafter treat not of the Fall, but the Rise, of man. The Atonement for sin must be discarded as incapable of adjustment to the scheme of evolutionary progress. Regeneration must be purged of all that is supernatural (as an impossible conception), and contemplated as the product of natural law in its *nisus* to a destined consummation. What else? This is enough to open our eyes to that recast of our old beliefs, which this apostle of creative evolution exhorts us to make in conformity to the standard of indubitable and ultimate reality.

JOHN L. GIRARDEAU.

*Columbia, S. C.*

#### DEWITT'S WHAT IS INSPIRATION?

WHAT IS INSPIRATION? A Fresh Study of the Question, with New and Discriminative Replies. *By John De Witt, D. D. LL. D. Litt. D.* A Member of the American Old Testament Revision Company, and for Many Years Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick, N. J. Author of “The Psalms; A New Translation with Notes,” etc. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Company (Incorporated), 182 Fifth Avenue. 12mo, pp. vi. 187.

This book of Professor John DeWitt comes to us upon high authority, and everywhere betrays the glowing spirit as well as the special knowledge, the general scholarship, the undoubted talents, the sensitively courteous observance of all the proprieties, the fine temper, and the literary workmanship, to be expected

from its source. For Dr. DeWitt personally and as a Christian scholar we entertain sentiments only of respect and admiration. As to the opinions expressed, and the conclusions formulated in this work, readers will differ as respects the tenability of the positions taken up, as well as concerning the wisdom of the enunciation of such views, even on the assumption that the views themselves are simply "not proven," as the Scotch verdicts have it, and consequently are to be regarded in the category of doubt. A man will have to be a convert to the main system that is held in common by Professor Briggs and Professor Smith, in order to swallow comfortably all that is here offered. This book is a plea for the views condemned by the Washington Assembly. As we see it, there is no concealment or disguise of such an intention on the part of the accomplished author.<sup>1</sup> It is to be regarded, however, if we take Dr. DeWitt's true meaning, in the light of a sort of tender homiletic exculpation, rather than in that of a retaliatory polemic, or even of a strictly didactic propaganda. This essay is announced in the preface as a response to an imperative demand. The theological trials in the lower church courts have resulted in opposite decisions, and the action of the higher bodies has not settled men's minds or quieted the feeling of nervous apprehension that has for so long a time prevailed far and wide over the country. The author disclaims the character of a partisan on either side; but comes forward, he tells us, in hopes of allaying this anxiety, and of reassuring the hearts of startled, of puzzled, of perplexed, of bewildered, of timorous, but unlearned, but sincere and resolute believers. "It is not at all strange," he admits, "that many are greatly distressed. They have never before had a doubt that every word of this treasured book is divine and faultless, and honestly think that the foundations of their faith are destroyed. 'What is inspiration' they ask, 'that leaves error behind it?' They demand something positive—some conception of the grace that has given us the Bible, that shall reassure them against this appalling negation." (Pp. iii. and iv.)

This is certainly, one should say, a distinctly serious posture of affairs, and the disposition and endeavor to rectify, or, at least, to relieve it, are eminently laudable. The author had previously stated that whatever should be the issue respecting the individuals impleaded, "it has been claimed, and is not denied, that Christian scholarship in this specialty is nearly unanimous in discrediting the *verbal* inspiration and inerrancy of the Scriptures." He had immediately added, with justice and force, as well as moderation, that it was to be reasonably expected that plain and unlettered but sensible folk would be greatly influenced by the conclusions of the documentary experts in whose ability and attachment to the Bible they had entire confidence. (P. iii.)

Upon this point we have a *caveat* to utter. It is surely a strong statement, that the experts are nearly unanimous in rejecting the doctrine of a *verbal* inspiration. We hesitate to believe this. We grant that there may be a heavy *majority* against it. There may, however, be a nearly unanimous rejection of that doctrine

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<sup>1</sup> Professor DeWitt must be excepted from the class of those who impeach the accuracy of the Saviour. In a foot-note on page 57 one will find this verification of the ground of this disclaimer: "One would suppose that the same principle might apply to the incidental mention by our Saviour, in quoting from the old Testament, of the name of any author with whose writings the passage adduced was connected by Jewish tradition and in common thought. In every such instance his purpose was to identify it to his hearers as of recognized divine authority. The human authorship was secondary and insignificant."

at this moment in Germany and on the Continent of Europe, and that would mean, of course, an almost unanimous rejection of the doctrine elsewhere amongst those who follow the Germans blindly, and content themselves with registering the Germans' latest judgments as their own. But what may be the view taken in Germany on this question a few years hence no intelligence can divine. The bits of glass in a kaleidoscope do not shift more rapidly or more constantly than do the opinions of German scholars on nearly all moot questions. At one time in the realm of philosophy, Germans almost unanimously swore by Kant; then it was in swift succession, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Trendelenburg, Lotze, and back again to Kant. Once the German critics nearly all answered to the call of Semler, Eichhorn, and Paulus; but *anon* they were just as unanimous for Strauss, and afterwards for Baur. Since that day Baur has been displaced by Hilgenfelt, Ritschl, or Keim.<sup>1</sup>

Come now, we seem to hear our plain, but wise and good, people saying, What definition of inspiration are you going to substitute for the one which, you inform us, scholarship and the higher criticism have overthrown? The vague pretension attributed to some of the adepts and their disciples, that the Bible, when released from the shackles that have bound it, and delivered from the misconceptions that have obscured and marred it, will be a grander book than ever before, does not fully satisfy these ingenuous inquirers, who, in the manner of such persons, insist imperiously on being furnished with the proofs.

"An answer to these appeals," returns our author, in a tone of sympathetic fairness which is self-evidently genuine, "must not be refused." For, he goes on to tell us, "the opinion gains ground and strong expression that widespread injury will be consequent upon these trials and resultant discussions, unless clear, definite, and conclusive statement shall very soon bring relief to those they have disturbed." (Page iv.) He quotes from Dr. Lampe, one of the prosecutors in the General Assembly, who exclaimed in indignation: "Is our doctrine to be thrown aside on the demand of a body of critics who have as yet found nothing to put in its place?" He also introduces an extract from an article in *The Interior*, of Chicago, demanding, as the very smallest concession from Professor Smith and his classes, that this is an unsettled question: "The theory is yet in the raw. The doctrine has not been wrought out so that one holding it can identify the alleged human from the admittedly divine in Scripture. . . . Has he not run before his tidings were ready? Has he not broken down before he was ready to rebuild? It is undoubtedly true that the question is one of fact, which lies within the field of scientific research; and, if it be found to be true, the church will be forced to reconstruct her theory of inspiration." (*The Interior*, Dr. DeWitt, p. iv.)

A leading New York journal, on the other hand, hopes for good from the Briggs trial, and from "the campaign of education" that was presently going to revolutionize the Christian world, without depreciating the contents, or impeaching the divine authority, of the Scriptures. But that very journal (presumably in the same article) speaks impressively of "the shock which millions of devout people are receiving, as they find that they have put an estimate upon the Bible that is altogether different from what a knowledge of its character and claims will sus-

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<sup>1</sup> We are well aware that at no period was there an absolute unanimity in favor of any one of these authorities. But there has often been an approximation to it; just as in the philosophic realm, in the case of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Trendelenburg, and Lotze,

tain," as one "greatly to be regretted. The pressure," it avers, "of the heresy trials in the Presbyterian body has hastened the distress of these people, and has done nothing to supply the loss which has been caused by partially destroying their confidence in the Bible." (*What is Inspiration?* page v.)

The highly competent author of this attractive volume springs forward with honest confidence, with manly earnestness, with devout motive, we have no question, and with large equipment and nimble ingenuity, to meet this Herculean action.

The measure of success that has attended this zealous effort on his part will be estimated differently by different readers according to the particular view-point occupied. For ourselves, we regard it as the most pleasing statement we have seen, as well as one of the most effective and persuasive, of that side of the case; and if the respected author of the defence here offered has failed in his attempt, and with a failure as signal as his hopes of succeeding in all likelihood were sanguine, it is in our judgment to be ascribed altogether to the fact that the thesis he has undertaken to support is in itself incapable of satisfactory substantiation. Those who may desire to see the best that can be said for this new departure in American theology will find it suitably compressed within this smallish volume. After a preliminary chapter, Professor DeWitt discusses Verbal or Plenary Inspiration, Inspiration and the Earlier Biblical Study, Two Theologies in Contrast, The Higher Criticism, Destructive and Constructive, Alleged Minor Inaccuracies and Moral Incongruities, Inspiration Defined by Revelation, The Human Coefficient in Revelation, Revelation and Development, The Revelation as Addressed to Men, Hope Long Deferred, The Purpose of the Revelation, The Glory of the Old Testament Revelation, The Prophets, The Christ, The Apostles, The Discriminative Definition in Part, and Completed, and the Final Test.

We shall not take up in detail the so-called minor inaccuracies and moral incongruities of God's word. Few, if any, of them are new, but some of them are set before the ordinary reader in a new light. A great American orientalist has said, in substance, that such opinions as those so agreeably advocated in these pages are for the most part no recent discovery, and that the whole novelty of the thing consists in their being now advocated in what we have been brought up to look upon as the high places of evangelical orthodoxy. We shrewdly apprehend that the sharp, logical mind of the masses will apply to this case the remorseless maxim, *fulsus in uno falsus in omnibus*; the witness discredited in court on the score of his veracity as to one part of his evidence, stands discredited as to the whole of it. If God's word contain errors on any subject whatever, how can it be any more accepted as, in point of fact, God's word? If the Scriptures, so far as their truth is concerned, are not to be taken throughout, and in an unqualified sense, as an emanation from the divine knowledge and veracity, it will, we fancy, be difficult to convince plain but thoughtful men that the sacred writings, or any portion of them, except, perhaps, in a vague and distant sense, can be said to be like the heavens the product of Jehovah. Let it be remembered, just at this point, that infallibility as to the minutiae is now nowhere asserted of any existing text; although it is notorious to those acquainted with the subject that the possible deviations from the true text have already been reduced to an inconsiderable minimum. The primary question is not even as to the text of the autographs, where these were the work of amanuenses; though it would appear to be in the last degree improbable,

and out of course with the known usages of the time, that the inspired writer should willingly permit the first and authoritative transcription of his uttered syllables to go forth over the world without the endorsement of his unerring revision. The primary question has respect to the verity or falsity of the entire revelation in the state in which it originally proceeded from the hands of its supreme author, God. To impeach the accuracy of God's revelation in that view of it, were manifestly to impeach the accuracy of God himself. True, it is conceivable that God might, if he saw proper, breathe messages of divine "inerrancy" through the midst of a huge and motley accumulation of human mistakes, errors, and even lies. In such a case, however, the infallible part only could be correctly attributed to God. This is generally admitted by the opponents, not merely of the inerrancy, but of the truth, of the whole Bible. That book, agreeably to their notion, simply *contains* (in the sense of including), does not *constitute*, God's word. This view certainly does not, to the unassisted eye of an humble believer, seem to aggrandize, or exalt, one's conception of the Holy Scriptures. Nor do we opine that the troubled souls in whose interest this book was written will be satisfied by its honeyed pleadings.

Dr. DeWitt, following in the footsteps of others, makes no difference whatever between verbal and plenary inspiration. As a matter of fact, there are those who accept the one and renounce the other, and *vice versa*. Under the same unpropitious guidance, our author hopelessly confuses together what, though often taken without discrimination, are, when technically analyzed, such distinct things, in a scientific sense, as inspiration and revelation.<sup>1</sup> The learned professor has also repeated the mistake of his continental and Anglo-American teachers when he makes the crucial inquiry to be the one about a *verbal*, an ideal, or conceptual inspiration. As has been elsewhere pointed out and demonstrated in this review, the concession of an inspiration of the words stands or falls with the concession of an inspiration of averments; in other terms, it stands or falls with the concession of an inspiration that could in any sense be justly styled an inspiration of infallibility. No one who admits the statements of Euclid or of Coke-upon-Lyttleton to be accurately *true* would ever dream of taking the ground that the ideas indeed were true, but that the words in which those ideas were embodied were, or might be, inaccurate, or even false. The ultimate question is not any question relating to the verbal form of the announcement, but is the question as to the divine and infallible authority of that announcement *itself*. If God's word contains, and always contained, minor or major inaccuracies, then God's word is, and always was, to that extent not only fallible, but *untrue*. The final problem, thus, is not to find out anything respecting the verbal form of Scripture, but it is to determine whether any part of the Bible is to be received as indubitably and unerringly true on the authority of God; and, if so, whether the whole Bible—every part and parcel of it—is to be so received, or only a certain portion of it; and, if so, *what* portion.

To many, the most unsatisfactory thing about this brilliant discussion will be its sad under-valuation of the permanent authority of the Old Testament, and its downright denial that its authority is the same with that of the New. The authority of the words uttered by Jesus when on earth is here put high above that of all other parts of Holy Writ. Almost on his last page the author of this attractive

<sup>1</sup> See, for instance, *Lee on Inspiration*.



book exclaims: "We repeat, then, with emphasis, our axiom, and without abatement." (Page 185.) "*Whatsoever in the Old Testament revelation, or in any professed revelation from God, is not in accord with the righteousness, or love, or purity, or truth, in the words and the life of Christ, has been annulled and superseded, and is, practically, no revelation for us.*" (Page 185. The italics are the author's own.) This, it will be observed, makes the reader himself of the older Scriptures the final judge as to what portions of the Jewish Bible are to be allowed to possess any authority as a "practical revelation" to *him*.

We here quote, for the benefit of our readers, this author's *naïf* and marvelous declaration as to the extent to which God's word is to be accepted as "infallible." Page 163: "The revelation so produced [that is, by divine inspiration] is permanent and infallible for all matters of faith and practice, EXCEPT so far as any given revelation may be manifestly partial, provisional, and limited in its times and conditions, or may be afterwards modified or superseded by a higher and fuller revelation, adapted to an advanced period in the redemptive process, to which all revelation relates as its final end and glorious consummation."<sup>1</sup> We may remind our readers, just here, that Turretine's distinction still holds good between what was inspired as a *rule* or as doctrine and what was inspired simply as *history*. The three friends of Job were not themselves inspired, and their arguments against that patriarch were discounted by the Almighty out of the whirlwind. Much that is in the Old Testament was only provisional as a *rule*; but that does not touch the question of the accuracy of the records.

We trust that we shall be suspected of no want of deference to the author of this clever volume, if we subjoin that this statement of his theory as to the limitations to be placed even upon an otherwise infallible rule of faith and practice reminds us of something we once met with in *Punch*: A correspondent had contributed a series of letters ostensibly from Africa, entitled, "How I Found Stanley." These letters were full of incredible assertions and amusing extravagances, and were ascertained to have been written on a barge at the foot of the stairs leading down to the Thames. At the close of one of the most startling of these contributions there is a bracketed note signed by the editors, and to this purport: "We have absolute confidence in our correspondent up to a certain point."

On the principle *audi alteram partem*, it is doubtless well that there should exist adequate presentations of both sides of every important controversy. From that point of view Doctor DeWitt may, we presume, be congratulated on a handsome achievement. The book is one that is charmingly easy to read, and that will prove seductively engaging to persons of good taste, and those who love in-trepidity and candor. But we rub our eyes like Rip Van Winkle, and ask ourselves, "Is this *Presbyterianism*?" Our only quarrel with our author's bold contention is, that, in our judgment, it is fundamentally and lamentably erroneous. As a literary and scholastic performance, and as an exhibition of the Pauline grace of charity, this volume is deserving of unstinted praise. The central portions of the discussion (apart from the consideration of their truth or falsity), notably the chapters on the Human Coefficient in Revelation, Revelation Keeping Pace with

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<sup>1</sup> This quotation is part of a lengthy definition of inspiration, which occupies two-thirds of page 163, and is *all* printed in italics.

Development, The Revelation as Addressed to Men, Hope Long Deferred, and The Purpose of the Revelation, are particularly fresh and interesting. The author is here confessedly much indebted to the late Canon Mozley, of Oxford. There is a touching dedication to one who was once a helpmeet on earth but is now a saint in Paradise.

HENRY CARRINGTON ALEXANDER.

Oakland, Maryland.

MATHESON'S DISTINCTIVE MESSAGES OF THE OLD RELIGIONS.

THE DISTINCTIVE MESSAGES OF THE OLD RELIGIONS. *By George Matheson, M. A., D. D., F. R. S. E., Minister of the Parish of St. Bernard's, Edinburgh.* New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1893. One volume, 12mo, pp. 350. Price, \$1.75.

Such acquaintance as we have with books of this class does not commend them greatly to our judgment; there is too much of a disposition to idealize the heathen mythologies, to discover points of resemblance, rather than of difference, in the Christian religion; a disposition apparently so irresistible as to produce an effect well-nigh uniform. Whether the authors intend it or not, whether they are even aware of it or not, the result of such disquisitions is to magnify the excellencies of the mythologies and to minimize the distinctive glories of revealed religion.

We feel inclined to challenge the modern terminology which dignifies these false and often degrading systems with the name of religion, we much prefer the old usage which called them mythologies; to us the very title of such works is a misnomer, there is but *one* religion, and that not something new, to be compared as such with Confucianism, Buddhism, Parsism, *et id omne genus*, as "old religions," but itself at once both the oldest and the only religion, old when as yet these hoary mythologies had never been dreamed of.

We regret to say that a study of the volume now before us has not in any degree lessened our prejudice against such works.

Dr. Matheson divides his discussion into the following chapters: I. Introduction; II. The Common Element in Religions; III. The Message of China; IV. The Message of India; V. The Subject Continued; VI. The Subject Completed; VII. The Message of Persia; VIII. Continuation; IX. The Message of Greece; X. The Message of Rome; XI. The Subject Continued; XII. The Message of the Teuton; XIII. The Message of Egypt; XIV. The Message of Judea; XV. The Subject Continued; XVI. Conclusion: Christianity and the Messages of the Past.

What the author declares as the purpose, and conceives to be the character, of his book we give in his own language:

"I need not say that my design in this little book is not to describe the old religions, but to photograph their spirit. To describe any religion would require a volume twice the size of the present. But a photograph must be instantaneous or abortive. It is a generalized result. It only dates from the time when all the materials have been arranged in order. It does not *involve* work; it presupposes work. When you have completed the perusal of some elaborate encyclopædic article descriptive of a religious faith, the question which rises in the mind is this: Such being the facts, what then? What is its mental contribution to the life of the world? In our days this question has been dwarfed by another—the problem of development. In intellectual circles the whole inquiry has been how any one faith has passed into a different faith. Now I am a firm believer in development, and thoroughly alive to its value. But before a thing can *pass* it must *be*. It must

originally have had a worth for itself alone and not for another. No object, no ideal, could have exercised for centuries a sway over thousands, which had no other cause than the contemplation of that final link by which it was to pass away. To the men of these centuries the power lay in the faith itself—in something which was not only potent but present. This I have called its distinctive message. By the distinctive message of a religion I mean, not an enumeration of its various points, but a selection of the one point in which it differs from all others. My design is therefore more limited than that of some volumes of equal size. I do not seek the permanent elements in religion with the Bishop of Ripon, nor the unconscious Christianity of paganism with F. D. Morris, nor the moral ideal of the nations with Miss Julia Wedgewood. I seek only to emphasize the dividing lines which constitute the boundary between each religion and all beside. In the concluding chapter I have tried to reunite these lines by finding a place for each in some part of the Christian message. I have given a sufficient number of references for a book which is not meant for a contribution to linguistic research, but simply as a mental study. This is not a matter in which the linguist has any advantage over the unprofessional, provided only that the details, so far as they are known, have become common property and are sufficient to warrant a conclusion. It is a doubt on this last point which has induced me to omit from the present generalization the otherwise interesting religions of Assyria and Chaldea."

In this setting forth of principles there is evidently the assumption that every heathen system has its "distinctive message," a "point in which it differs from all others," "dividing lines which constitute the boundary between each religion and all beside."

A study of the volume reveals two additional assumptions, equally evident, though not altogether so obvious or explicit, viz.: that this distinctive message is in each case a true and worthy one, and, secondly, that each finally finds its permanent place in what our author more than once styles "the Christian pantheon."

Starting upon his discussion with such assumptions, the reader will recognize at once the need of great ingenuity in the author; but he will find this need most amply met. Indeed, the ingeniousness of the work is one of its most striking features; it emerges in the very beginning. His first step is to trace the rise of fetichism, the earliest and most degraded form of idolatry; in this most subtle analysis he puts the primitive fetich-worshiper, the very lowest of barbarians, through a course of reasoning that for its consummate ingenuity reflects great credit upon an M. A., D. D., F. R. S. E. We hazard the assertion that, even in this enlightened century, only a small percentage of cultivated scholars would be equal to this process which Dr. Matheson credits to the mind of the very lowest grade of human intelligence.

This ingenuity he again exercises with wonderful success in his quest for an element "common to all religions." That element, he discovers, is "an incarnation, a God manifest in the flesh"; and he finds it in all, even in deism, pantheism, and scientific evolution!

These statements will prepare the reader for the recurrence of such expressions as "contrary to the prevalent impression," indicative of the fact that the author is not less original than ingenious. With such resources, it would be strange indeed if he could not discover some distinctive message in every mythology. We make no attempt to follow him through the process; suffice it to say that he triumphantly brings it forth in each instance. One cannot, however, resist the feeling that the deductions of an author so brilliantly ingenious and so bravely original are untrustworthy; his logic is too much like legerdemain, and the historical

parts of his pictures lack shading. These are defects which greatly invalidate the work as a contribution to the science or philosophy of comparative religion; it gives no just or adequate views of the "religions" it discusses; his representations are all prejudiced by his avowed plan of finding in each system its distinctive message; his whole discussion is controlled by this, and in every instance his treatment of the subject is under the rigorous restraint of this necessity; he *must* seize some one feature, emphasize it, and ignore or subordinate every other. This, perforce, renders his views disproportionate, partial, fragmentary, and consequently of little worth; the reader feels that the discussion is an exceedingly ingenious making out of a theory rather than an adequate setting forth of the contents of the particular system under treatment.

Bad as is such a method, the spirit of the work is no better. We take it for granted that Dr. Matheson is a sincere believer in the divine origin and the supreme glories of revealed religion, but there is scant evidence of such faith in the volume before us, and most certainly a severe restraint has been put upon all expression of the sentiments which are the natural fruit and the usual accompaniment of such faith. True, Christianity is declared superior, but there is slight enthusiasm in its favor; its superiority seems to be rather a matter of degree, and to consist chiefly in the fact that it combines within itself the special excellencies and utters the distinctive messages of all its predecessors, and this rather as an outgrowth and consummation of them by natural progress than as an independent revelation from God. This may be the true "historic spirit," a grand exhibition of judicial impartiality; but for ourselves, we must confess a decided partiality to Christianity over heathenism, and we think that Dr. Matheson's book would have lost nothing in value had it displayed a little more of the same.

In his discussion of "The Message of Judea," we can recall no indication whatever that the Jewish religion had an origin in any way different from that of Buddhism, or sustained any more intimate or direct relations to Christianity. The whole tone of the treatise is remarkable, and many of the statements made in its progress surprising.

We conclude our paper with two extracts from the last chapter:

"These religions are representative of certain ideas which belong to human nature. If a religion appears which professes to be a universal faith, it must show its universality by uniting these ideas. It must be a ladder reaching from earth unto heaven, each of whose ascending steps shall find a place for one of the systems of the past. Instead of being manifested to reveal the falsity of former views, it must, for the first time, vindicate the truth of all—must discover a point in which beliefs hitherto deemed at variance may lie down together in unity, and receive from the heart of man a common justification. Let us see whether the religion of Christ will furnish such a meeting-place for the messages of the nations." (P. 329.)

Having reviewed each in detail, and established its vindication and gathered it with its fellows into the Christian fold as a common meeting-place, a sort of a grand happy family aggregation, he thus sums up his work:

"I have thus endeavored to show that the appearance of Christianity has been accompanied by a resurrection from the dead. It is popularly said to have conquered the faiths of the past. And so it has; but in a very peculiar way. It has conquered as the Roman empire wished to conquer—not by submergence, but by incorporation. It would not be true to say that it has destroyed them; it would be more correct to affirm that it has kept them alive. They had all outgrown

their youth, all survived their time, all failed to bring rest to the soul. The form remained, the sensuous life remained, but the spirit had passed away. If Christianity had not appeared, paradoxical as it may seem, I think these religions would have become supremely uninteresting; Christianity has made them vivid by making them living. In its many-sidedness, it has a side for each of these. It has let in its light upon them; it has given its breath to them; it has found a place for them in its own system. It has given them a logical order which has dispelled the contradictions of the natural order. Indian and Greek, Roman and Teuton, Buddhist and Parsee, Egyptian and Chinaman, can meet here hand in hand; because in the comprehensive temple of Christian truth there is not only a niche which each may fill, but a niche which, at some stage of its development, must be filled by one and all.

"Therefore it is that the religion of Christ ought to have peculiar interest in the faiths of the past. They are not, to her, dead faiths; they are not even modernized. They are preserved inviolable as parts of herself—more inviolable than they would have been if she had never come. Christianity has claimed to be "the manifold wisdom of God." In this ascription she has been candid to the past. She has not denied its wisdom; she has only aspired to unfold it. She has not sought to derogate from the doctrines of antiquity; she has only sought to diminish their antagonisms. China may keep her materialism, and India may retain her mysticism; Rome may grasp her strength, and Greece may nurse her beauty; Persia may tell of the opposition to God's power, and Egypt may sing of his pre-eminence even amid the tombs: but for each and all there is a seat in the Christian pantheon, and a justification in the light of the manifold wisdom of God."

We have already said that Dr. Matheson's interpretation of the heathen mythologies was altogether unsatisfactory because of the prejudice of his plan; in conclusion, we add that his conception of Christianity as a sort of Joseph's coat woven out of these heathen rags, this manifest confusion of "the manifold wisdom of God" with the manifold wisdom of man, which the Apostle Paul calls folly, and by which he says distinctly the world knew not God, is equally unsatisfactory; and, if possible, more unsatisfactory still is his setting forth of the relation between Christianity and heathenism, as an absorption after the manner of Roman conquest; that these poor, pitiable, degraded vanities and lies, over which he has striven to throw a glamour, have been "preserved inviolable" as parts of Christianity, that she has not sought to derogate from their doctrines but has only sought to diminish their antagonisms!

We have a comfortable conviction that everything in this world serves some useful purpose, but what service can be rendered by just such a book as this remains, after a somewhat careful study of it, a question we confess ourselves utterly unable to answer.

*Columbia, S. C.*

SAMUEL M. SMITH.

#### ADENEY'S THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. *By Walter F. Adeney, M. A., Professor of New Testament Introduction, History, and Exegesis, New College, London.* New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1894. Price, 75 cents.

By a severe study of the Bible, without reference to the speculations and deductions of reason, and without reference to ecclesiastical creeds and formularies, biblical theology professes to exhibit the real meaning of the Scriptures. This sounds well. Such investigations seem to be original and fair. But why discard the whole art of clock-making, when, confessedly, the time-piece needs only re-

pairing? It is proper to reëxamine the faith *de novo*, but to do so it is not necessary, it is not wise, to repudiate the results of the past which are embedded in systems of theology, and articulated into confessions of faith. Would it not be more sensible to accept the conclusions of science, and from this vantage-ground to press forward the study of nature? Much of the opposition to dogmas and to dogmatics is sheer foolishness. Let any man who desires to do so test the dogmas in any legitimate manner until he is satisfied; but let him not brand the dogma as false just because it is a dogma, just because the church has set it among its articles of belief. Truth never changes. All truth is old. No truth can be effete. Dogma invites the most learned and the most rigid examination. Systematic theology claims to be biblical, and asks to be judged severely and reverently by that standard.

Professor Adeney announces three marks which differentiate biblical theology from systematic theology, namely, aim, method, and materials. As to aim, biblical theology "does not attempt to state truth absolutely; it seeks to elucidate a certain presentation of truth." As to materials, "these are confined to the pages of the Bible; while systematic theology, even when relying mainly on Scripture, appeals to nature, conscience, reason, etc., for the confirmation of its results, if not for the data of its arguments." As to their respective methods, the Professor of New Testament Introduction says: "The systematic theologian undertakes to balance and harmonize the truths of religion, in order to show their organic relationship in a compact body of divinity; the student of biblical theology, on the other hand, proceeds to trace the development of revelation as this emerges through the successive books of Scripture, and to compare the various forms in which its ideas are conceived by the several teachers there represented. Thus it is less ambitious than systematic theology; but then it admits of being more exact and certain."

According to our professor, it is the aim of systematic theology "to balance and harmonize the truths of religion." This is correct. Believing in the unity of all truth, particularly the unity of biblical truth, the systematic theologian endeavors to fit the individual truths into each other; he lays doctrine by the side of doctrine, and joins interpretation to interpretation, not in an artificial and forced manner, but according to the law of natural affinity. The very principle of scientific classification under which he operates, confirms, or revises, or checks, or refutes, his interpretations. Every stone for Solomon's temple was hewn at the quarry, and marked for its place in the structure. Suppose a particular stone will not fit? Either the workmen at the quarry or the workmen at the temple have blundered. The plan at Jerusalem influenced the directors at the quarry, and the stones sent from the quarry tested the accuracy of the workmen at the city. There was action and reaction. How can Professor Adeney say that it is antecedently probable that the quarriers are right, and the superintendents at Jerusalem incorrect? The exegetical result which will not fit into a sound system of theology is thereby proved to be defective. It must be sent back to the stone-cutters to be changed, or perhaps be discarded altogether.

Again, the history of theology proves that balancing and harmonizing the results of exegesis have been conducive to exactness and certainty. When the Reformation freed the Bible, men at once began to test traditional dogmatics by the word of God. This was right. It led to a reformed theology. But, unfortunately,

a new scholasticism began to replace the old. The theology of Job, of Jeremiah, and even of Elizabeth, was treated with great care. The Neologians pressed for a purely historical and critical treatment of the Bible, without reference to, and even in defiance of, all past ecclesiastical and confessional conclusions, and thus prepared the way for a rationalistic history of religion. Without tracing the story in detail, the Tübingen school was the logical result of the relentless hostility to dogmatics which characterized Germany at that time. It will hardly be denied that most of the vagaries and heresies which are vexing the church to-day are traceable to the same principles and methods which created this rationalistic school of theologians. Professor Adeney says that biblical theology is more "exact and certain" than systematic theology. Will his American readers admit that Ferdinand Christian Baur is more "exact and certain" than Charles Hodge?

Again, many have the idea that the chances of making errors are reduced to a minimum by the method of biblical theology, and that for that reason its conclusions are more "exact and certain." Such is not the case. Many preliminary questions must be determined, and their determination becomes the point of view from which that writer presents his conception of the Scriptures. The following are some of these preliminary questions: "Is Judaism a preparation for, or a mere predecessor of, Christianity? What is the primitive religion? Is the Bible literature, or revelation? What is the connection between the Bible and the aftertime? How much is comprehended in Bible theology? Does it include, for instance, Bible history?" The answers to questions such as these must be determined first, and then subjects, orders, methods, and such matters must be decided. It is thus obvious that the so-called biblical method may easily mislead; and, if the student has started wrong, he is hopelessly wrong, because there is, for him, no system by which to test his conclusions at every stage. The meaning of Scripture, according to this method, is to be determined by lexicons and grammars; and they, in their turn, are under the influence of the general view-point of the writer.

Our author says: "We must not commence with any formulated dogma." We must approach the Scriptures without hypotheses. We must interpret them, "not according to the relations of ideas, but according to the character and work of the several teachers and writers." This is *his* first formulated dogma. "This study should follow a chronological order." This is *his* second dogma. "The essential ideas of the Old Testament are presupposed in the New Testament." This is his third dogma. "New Testament theology may be linked on to Old Testament theology, but it cannot be attributed to the influence of contemporary Jewish thought." This is his fourth dogma. The author of *Ecce Homo* opens his book with the statement: "The Christian church sprang from a movement which was not begun by Christ." If these words, says our author, "refer to the seed or root of Christianity, they go beyond the facts"; but if they "refer to the soil on which the new religion first appeared, they state an evident truth." What, then, was the origin of Christianity? "Christianity first emerged on the crest of the wave of a great revival movement that preceded it, and prepared for it." We are not here denying or affirming any of these dogmatic statements of Professor Adeney. We are quoting them to show how he lays down, in his introduction, the principles by which he proposes to study and investigate the Bible. How, then, can he and his school consistently decry systematic theology?

Having defined the ground upon which he intends to conduct his study of the

New Testament, the author presents, first, The Theology of Jesus, and then The Theology of the Apostles.

In developing the theology of Jesus, he begins with the kingdom of God, understanding that this is the central and regulative idea in the mind of Christ. Kingdom, concretely, signifies "the territory, and people, and general body politic"; and, abstractly, it signifies "kingship, or the rule of a king." In the New Testament it is prevaillingly employed in its concrete sense—"a state in which God rules." This theocracy was "spiritual"; "of gradual growth"; "of world-wide destiny"; "supremely blessed." These were the chief features of the kingdom which Christ came to preach and to set up. From these attributes of the kingdom, our Lord passed to a consideration of the Head of the kingdom, which, by "casual hints and enigmatical phrases," he taught was himself. The title by which he most frequently designated himself was "the Son of man"; but he also taught that he was preëminently "the Son of God"; that "his own person was the source of salvation"; and that he was "preëxistent." The third topic upon which Jesus uttered himself was The Revelation of God. Concerning this revelation Jesus claimed "a unique knowledge of God, which he alone could communicate to the world"; and the overshadowing fact in all his knowledge of God was that of his universal fatherhood. The next topics which follow in their order are: The Gospel; Redemption; The Conditions of Membership in the Kingdom; The New Ethics; The Future. As to the future, our Lord taught "that Jesus Christ will return for judgment and rule," but he "declared his own ignorance of the day and hour of his coming." He taught the fact of resurrection; but "it is not for all men; it is only an inheritance of the redeemed. There is no resurrection for the impenitent wicked. . . . He teaches that they will have conscious existence after death. . . . Future punishment is largely negative. . . . They will have no body, therefore Christ uses the popular language in a metaphorical sense. . . . Our Lord's revelation of the fatherhood of God seems to conflict with the idea of a hopeless future. But all these hints are vague and uncertain." To evade the force of John v. 29, where Christ predicts a "resurrection unto damnation" for those "that have done evil," Professor Adeney pitifully and weakly says: "This solitary expression is directly opposed to the explicit descriptions of the resurrection elsewhere in this Gospel, as well as in the synoptics." John here falsely reported Christ, yet not wickedly. He did not lie, but, in the apologetic words of our professor, "Saint John has here unconsciously assimilated the language of Christ to that of Daniel." If this saves the veracity of Saint John, what becomes of Daniel, who is quoted? Such sophistry to overturn the dogma of the resurrection of the wicked!

Turning from Christ to the apostles, our author tells us that "three main types of apostolic doctrine may be unmistakably distinguished." The first is the *Petrine type*. Its tone is "practical and unspeculative." It did not recognize "the breach between Christianity and Judaism." The second is the *Pauline type*—"mystical," "dialectical," "speculative." The third is the *Johannine type*—"fundamental and spiritual." John is "anxious to save the first principles of the faith from being dissipated in a haze of visionary ideas. His object, therefore, is to define rather than to reason." These are the three types of apostolic theology. Accordingly, the first great advancement made by the apostles upon the doctrines of Christ was "the great expansion and spiritualizing of the whole



conception of Christianity that emerged from the conflict with Judaism." The second great advancement was in the destruction of the ethnic idea of Christianity and the recognition of its catholicity both in power and spirit. The third great improvement was the recognition of the doctrine that "the law is entirely superseded by the gospel." "Christianity now emerges in complete emancipation from Judaism."

We cannot follow our author as he discusses such topics as the Early Preaching, the Epistle of Saint James, the Later Petrine Theology, the Origin and Development of Saint Paul's Theology, his Doctrine of Sin, of Jesus Christ, of Redemption, of Christian Life, etc.

He says that Paul taught "the universal prevalence of sin, and the utter inability of the world to save itself." Of this state of affairs the apostle furnishes two explanations, the one historical and the other psychological: "The universal sin of the race and its death-penalty are traced back to the transgression and doom of the first man." He now tells us that we must pause before we "permit Paul's words to bear the enormous weight of all the Augustinian and Calvinistic theology that has been built upon them." At this point, he, who has approached the Bible professedly without bias, labors to refute the dogma of Calvinism. He betrays himself, for he finds the Calvinistic interpretation the natural one, but will not permit Paul to bear "the enormous weight."

The book chains your attention, while every page provokes you. Things which you feel must be wrong are stated plausibly, and you must tarry to extricate the mind. Intricate questions are started. Peeps into the consciousness and environment of the New Testament authors are given. The book is a volume of hints and intimations. The subject is too large for the pages. The author is scholarly and well-read. The work delights, but does not satisfy. The press-work is beautiful.

R. A. WEBB.

*Southwestern Presbyterian University.*

#### DU BOSE'S PREACHING IN SINIM.

PREACHING IN SINIM; or, The Gospel to the Gentiles: With Hints and Helps for Addressing a Heathen Audience. *By Hampden C. Du Bose, D. D., Twenty-one Years a Missionary at Soochow.* Richmond, Virginia: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1894. Pp. 241. Cloth, \$1.00; paper, 60 cents.

In dedicating this volume to the pastors of the Southern Presbyterian Church the author modestly styles it a "little treatise on Homiletics in China." The idea of writing such a treatise was conceived while preparing his volume of Street-Chapel Sermons, which was published in Chinese. Its purpose is to aid the newly-arrived missionary in beginning his work; also to furnish suggestions to workers here in the home field. It aims to inform the friends of missions in the home lands how those whom they send forth tell to the untutored pagan the story of God's love; and the earnest wish of the author is that it may be instrumental in leading young men in our colleges, whose attention is now turned to eastern lands, to consecrate themselves to the work of preaching in China.

The style of this volume is pleasant. It is easy and delightful reading. Its meaning is always clear. Throughout it breathes the spirit of earnest piety, and reveals a soul on fire with zeal for Christ and for missions. It grows more inter-

esting the further you read. It will prove a valuable addition to our devotional literature, and should be included in their selections by our schools and congregations when they procure missionary libraries.

It is not a volume simply for outgoing missionaries, or for missionary pastors. It is not a technical treatise on Homiletics. It is rather a plain, earnest, glowing statement of the social surroundings and prejudices that are encountered by the heralds of the cross in the Land of Sinim, with an indication of how their proclamation of the gospel must, as to its delivery, be modified to suit these peculiar conditions. Some of its seventeen chapters read like newspaper articles; others seem like sermons or popular lectures to Christian audiences. It is interspersed with incidents, and embellished with happy cullings of sacred poesy. The author illustrates his meaning by giving examples of the way in which particular doctrines may be pressed upon the attention of the heathen, and how objections to other doctrines, as they occur to pagan minds, may best be met.

The sixth chapter seems to be somewhat polemical in its aim. Its subject is "The Spiritual Kingdom," which term the author uses, not in juxtaposition to "political kingdom," but as the opposite of an "educational kingdom." He compares the press, the hospital and the school, as modes of evangelizing, with preaching, and with warmth emphasizes the superior value of the latter. He depreciates the school as a factor in mission work, and calls attention to the danger that the church will turn aside from her main calling. This, he declares, is already the case in Japan, "where only one-third of the ministerial force is engaged in preaching. They have listened to the siren voice of the native press calling them from the pulpit to the professional chair. In India we learn that some whole missions give all their energy to reaching the brain instead of the heart. There are breakers ahead!" On page 78 he says: "Geography, arithmetic, astronomy, history, chemistry, are not spiritual weapons, and, though they are good in their proper sphere, they are not mighty to demolish Satan's kingdom. Our direct work is, not to reform the Chinese system of education, for in it there is much that is excellent, but to overthrow their religious systems, which are abominations." Page 79: "Is it right for the church to attempt the double herculean task of christianizing and educating? . . . The heralds upon the walls of Zion must not mistake *material progress* for the coming of the kingdom of righteousness." Page 81: "We are ordered to 'teach all nations,' but Christ limited the text-books to sixty-six. . . . We are not to accept Beecher's definition of preaching 'Christ and him crucified' as including geography, history, science, or whatever would elevate and benefit mankind." Page 81: "If one in ten of the whole force is engaged in teaching, it is sufficient to conserve the interests of Zion and to promote those of science." Page 85: "When men like the late Norman McLeod, returning from a tour of missionary inspection in India, advocate the educational policy; or like the sainted Alexander Duff, who said, 'Let me reach the brain,' we take issue, and cry, Time to teach, when Christ says preach! . . . We are to beware of taking the broad view of missionary work, for it is like walking in the broad road; the narrow way of Christ's command is the safest." The author realizes that in our home boards and committees there has been discussion as to the extent of the church's warrant to do educational work in her evangelistic efforts on foreign soil, and how far the work of secular education can be made to subserve the main end of disseminating gospel light. His views, at least so far as China is concerned, are very positive.

Chapter ten discusses the way in which natural theology and Christian evidences may best be presented to the Chinese mind. In China the preacher has special need to handle such themes. It is a gigantic task so to answer the question, What is God? that a heathen may understand. The author quotes with approbation the criticism of the devoted William Burns on the preaching of some missionaries, that it was *too evangelical*, that is, they did not dwell sufficiently at first upon the evidences of Christianity.

It is an advantage, says Dr. DuBose, to the missionary in Sinim, in publishing the mediatorial work of Christ, that the people are familiar with the idea of a mediator. The whole structure of the Chinese social and political economy is based upon the use of the middleman. As for the federal headship, the civic code of the Middle Kingdom abundantly illustrates the principle of representation. There is a legal unity between the governor and the governed. The mandarin is held responsible for all that occurs within his territory. The case is cited of a soldier who had offended. As punishment, he was beaten, his captain was cashiered, the colonel was removed, and the general was censured. Why? The theft committed by the soldier was clear proof of a lack of discipline in the army. A father who has failed in training his son is held responsible for his son's misdemeanors. It is not difficult to make the Chinese grasp the conception of Jesus as the representative of his people, standing for them in the covenant of grace, with the whole responsibility of their salvation centred in his person, since they recognize the scheme as having its foundation in law and its superstructure in equity.

Other interesting features might be noted. Throughout, the treatment of the themes is popular rather than technical.

W. A. ALEXANDER.

*Southwestern Presbyterian University.*

## VIII. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

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THE EPISTLES OF ST. PETER. *By J. Rawson Lumby, D. D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.* Crown 8vo, pp. xxiv., 374. Price, \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Co. 1893.

THE PSALMS. *By Alexander Maclaren, D. D.* Vol. II. Psalms xxxix.-lxxxix. Crown 8vo, pp. viii., 503. Price, \$1.50. *The same Publishers.*

These additions to the "Expositor's Bible," under the editorship of W. Robertson Nicoll, M. A., LL. D., and published, six volumes per annum, by the Armstrongs of New York, are, like those already noticed, beautifully printed and attractively bound, and are offered on extremely favorable terms to subscribers to a year's set or to the entire series.

Dr. Maclaren, on THE PSALMS, completes the work so admirably begun in his first volume, continuing it along the same lines, and following the method and principles which were noticed in our review of that volume. His discussions are largely textual. No great attention is paid to the questions of authorship and date, but sufficient to show his preference for the orthodox and conservative views. His justification of the imprecatory Psalms is adequate and just, and will commend itself to right-thinking men.

ON THE EPISTLES OF PETER, Dr. Lumby devotes his preface to a vindication of the Petrine authorship of the First Epistle against the attacks of modern criticism, and especially those based upon the unlikelihood of Peter's addressing Christians in those lands where Paul had wrought, and upon the harmony of its language with the accepted writings of Paul. The more difficult questions connected with Second Peter are also briefly and strongly handled, and the author's conviction is most clear, and well sustained, as to the genuineness of this Epistle and its early acceptance by the church. The difficulties arising from Eusebius's testimony, the seeming ignorance or want of acknowledgment in the earliest centuries of such an Epistle, etc., are faithfully considered, and the conclusion reached that we are not justified in rejecting the judgment of the Council of Laodiceæ even though time may have swept away the evidence by which that Council was led to assign this Epistle a place in the sacred canon. No court of law would permit a decision so authenticated and of such standing to be disturbed or overruled. After these preliminary discussions, our author proceeds, according to the general plan of this series, to consider the contents of the Epistles by topics, as The Work of the Trinity in Man's Election and Salvation, The Heavenly Inheritance, The Christian's Ideal, The Priesthood of Believers, Christian Service, The Saving Knowledge of God, Judgment to Come, etc.

**THE PENTATEUCH.** *By Rev. A. J. Rowland, D. D., Pastor Franklin Square Baptist Church, Baltimore, Md.* 12mo, pp. 96. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1893.

This little volume is the first of a series of "Bible Handbooks for Young People" to be issued by the publishers. As its brevity indicates, it is suggestive rather than exhaustive. The General Introduction is devoted mainly to a brief discussion of the "Development Theory," and presents the leading arguments for and against this theory, together with something of the bibliography of the subject. The author's conclusion is that the Pentateuch is essentially Mosaic in authorship, though he seems to be willing to admit almost too freely, with others, that it does not greatly matter if other hands than Moses' had much to do with drawing up the narrative. The several books of the Pentateuch are then considered, and, without a break or explanation, and in violation of the very title of the treatise, the Book of Joshua is considered in the same manner, as to authorship and date, chronology, design and scope, analysis and summary.

**THE WORLD'S PARLIAMENT OF RELIGIONS.** An Illustrated and Popular Story of the World's First Parliament of Religions, Held in Chicago in Connection with the Columbian Exposition of 1893. *Edited by the Rev. John Henry Barrows, D. D., Chairman of the General Committee on Religious Congresses of the World's Congress Auxiliary.* Two Volumes. Royal octavo, pp. xxiv., 800, and 800. Chicago: The Parliament Publishing Company. 1893.

These two splendid volumes embody all the proceedings of the so-called Parliament of Religions of last year, together with the preliminary steps and organization which brought about that singular aggregation of men and women of all faiths. It is not for us here to discuss the many questions which arose upon the suggestion of such a Parliament, or to give the reasons for the strong dissent which found utterance in many quarters. These were appropriately considered before the gathering took place, and in connection with the overtures to the various religious bodies and many individuals to take part in its organization or proceedings. Suffice it to say that the proceedings themselves, as given in the daily press and as now permanently recorded in these volumes, justify, we think, all the earnest opposition with which the churches of Christ and many of their leading members met the proposed scheme.

The two great volumes before us give first a full account of the origin of the plan for the Parliament of Religions, and of the response to the suggestion, not omitting to note the fact that there was dissent, though seeking at the same time to minimize the reasons for this dissent. It seems singular to see the editor's grouping of the more formal opposition: The American Presbyterian General Assembly, the Sultan of Turkey, the Archbishop of Canterbury! A full account is given of the assembling of the Parliament, with its *personnel*, and the addresses of welcome, response, etc., followed by a chronicle of the meeting from its beginning to the close. These topics form the First Part of the work before us. The Second Part is an Introduction to the Parliament Papers, and embraces seventeen short chapters on such general subjects as: The Study of the World's Religions, What the Various Faiths had to say concerning God, the Nature of Man, the Importance of Religion, etc., Religion and Morals, Religion and Modern Social

Problems, Hopes for the Religious Union of the Whole Human Family, the Elements of a Perfect Religion. These topics are not discussed at length. The editor merely gives the leading references to them as found in various speeches delivered before the assemblage. The Third Part is made up of the papers themselves, delivered from day to day, while in the Fourth and Fifth Parts, the Denominational Congresses and a Review and Summary are briefly presented. In estimating the results of the Parliament, the editor of these volumes names chiefly the widening of the bounds of human fraternity, the impetus given to the study of comparative religion, the fortifying of timid souls in regard to the right and wisdom of liberty in thought and expression, the reunion of Christendom, etc., and he glorifies himself and his co-laborers rather overmuch when he writes: "Without reserve it may be said that the Parliament of Religions was as much an achievement of faith as anything recorded in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews!"

THE SERMON BIBLE. First Peter—Revelation. 8vo, pp. 391. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1894.

With this, the twelfth volume, the series is finished. Each volume is complete in itself, and may be bought separately. Special inducements, however, in a great reduction of price, are offered to those who purchase four, or eight, or the entire twelve, volumes at one time. The "Sermon Bible" is a compilation of the best thoughts of the best men, not only as found in book form, but also as derived from manuscript reports and fugitive periodical sources. In addition, there are many references to sermons, periodicals, books, etc., which contain homiletic matter bearing upon the texts considered. Each volume also contains many blank pages for notes. Used judiciously, this series will be of great value to the preacher; used as a crutch to lean upon, the danger is that, like other works of its class, it will injure him. The conscientious, faithful preacher will be helped and stimulated by it; the lazy, unfaithful one will soon need more than it gives.

A HISTORY OF THE PREPARATION OF THE WORLD FOR CHRIST. *By Rev. David B. Breed, D. D.* Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. 8vo, pp. 483. \$2.00. Chicago and New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1894.

This edition of Dr. Breed's admirable work, which has been before the public for three years, differs from the first chiefly in the incorporation of two entire new chapters, one on The Disciplining of Israel, and the other on The Consolation of Israel, and in the use made by the author, and indicated in the footnotes, of recent valuable works bearing upon his theme. The first new chapter deals with the effects upon Israel of the wilderness life; of the giving of the book of the covenant and the moral law; and of the death of Moses. In the second added chapter, the period immediately following the return from Babylon, and those events occurring more immediately within the limits of the Land of Promise, are considered, the five chapters preceding it being devoted to the more general study of the so-called inter-biblical period.

"THE MORNING COMETH." Talks for the Times. *By Rev. David James Burrell, D. D.* 12mo, pp. 320. \$1.25. New York: American Tract Society. 1893.

A volume of short, practical, evangelical sermons and talks, thirty-five in number, by the eloquent pastor of the "Marble Church" in New York, and char-

acterized by all his usual fervency of spirit and directness of application. The title is derived from the first, which is on the text, "Watchman, what of the night?" It is an admirable volume for use by ruling elders and others in conducting service in the pastor's absence, and we cordially recommend it for this purpose.

PREACHING CHRIST. Sermons. *By the Rev. Llewelyn Ioan Evans, D. D., LL. D., Twenty-nine years Professor in Lane Seminary. With a Sketch of his Life, by Henry Preserved Smith, D. D.* 8vo, pp. 388. New York: The Christian Literature Company. 1893.

The larger part of this unusually well printed volume is composed of seventeen sermons by Dr. Evans, and one address delivered at the opening of the session of Lane Seminary in 1886. This address was on "Preaching Christ," and from its caption, as well as its fitness to express the author's idea of preaching, the title of the book is taken. The compiler regards the sermons as examples of how "to preach Christ." The sermons are in the main practical, some of the subjects being: Strength, Completeness, Cheerfulness in Giving, The Christian's Debt, The Tests of Christianity, Prayer, etc. They are full of the richest doctrine, however, and evince a most philosophical study of the problems of life and application to them of the great principles of religion. The special views of the author which caused his last days to be shadowed, in the opinion of the great majority of his church, do not appear. Dr. Smith's biography of Dr. Evans is finely written. Naturally, it may be called a sympathetic treatment of his life and work. A full account is given of his relation to the revision movement, and of that now widely-known joint publication of the biographer and Dr. Evans, entitled: "Inspiration and Inerrancy," of which the portion entitled "Biblical Scholarship and Inspiration" was by Dr. Evans. That this paper is warmly defended goes without saying. Dr. Smith, after setting forth Dr. Evans's views, closes his remarks with these words: "It will seem incredible to a future generation that a man holding such a doctrine of inspiration should be regarded with suspicion, and denounced as a rationalist, because he refused to affirm the extra-confessional doctrine of inerrancy. But such was the case. The spirit of heresy-hunting was let loose, and no piety, scholarship, or services were enough to protect from its attacks."

TIMELY TOPICS.—Political, Biblical, Ethical, Practical. Discussed by College Presidents, Professors, and Eminent Writers of our Times. 12mo, pp. 361. \$1.00. New York: E. B. Treat. 1892.

This is a series of thirty-six specially contributed and copyrighted papers which have appeared in recent issues of *The Treasury Magazine*. They are discussions by men of eminence and ability of themes which are among the burning questions of the day. Opposite views are represented by able advocates. A few specimens will indicate the nature of the collection, and show its value. Dr. John Hall, of New York, discusses The Papacy in Politics, and The Protestant Church and the Apocrypha; Dr. W. R. Gordon, the Character and Aim of the Society of Jesus; Sir William Dawson, the Opponents of Christianity; Dr. Killen, the Rise of Prelacy and its Gradual Development; Bishop Perry and Dr. Harper (Presbyterian), the Historic Episcopate; Prof. Hunt, Liberty of Thought and Its Limitations; Prof. Sayce, Biblical Archæology and the Higher Criticism; Dr. William Henry Green, the Unity of Genesis I. and II., etc.

EVERY-DAY RELIGION; or, The Common-Sense Teaching of the Bible. *By Hannah Whitall Smith, Author of "The Christian's Secret of a Happy Life."* 12mo, pp. viii., 242. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1894.

A series of nineteen Bible Readings, the passages cited and the practical remarks growing out of them, or based upon them, being interspersed. The author disclaims any attempt at doctrinal exposition or statement, or explanation of religious mysteries. Her object is "to get at the every-day, practical, common-sense principles" of our religion, as "how to live a Christ-like life in the midst of an un-Christ-like world; how to have inward peace in the midst of outward turmoil; how to see the hand of God in every-day matters; and how to accept the homely details of his will," etc.

FOREIGN MISSIONS AFTER A CENTURY. *By Rev. James S. Dennis, D. D., of the American Presbyterian Mission, Beirut, Syria.* Second Edition. 12mo, pp. 368. New York, Chicago, and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1894.

The first edition of this admirable treatise was fully noticed in the April QUARTERLY. It is a pleasure to us to know, by private letter from the author, that the demand for the publication has been so great that even this second edition is now nearly exhausted, and that the publishers may issue a cheap paper edition after a while. The demand for such literature is a most hopeful sign, and we rejoice with Dr. Dennis in the stimulus which his work has thus given to the great cause to which he has devoted his life.

TEN YEARS' DIGGING IN EGYPT, 1881—1891. *By W. M. Flinders Petrie, author of "Pyramids of Gizeh," "Hawara," "Medum," etc.* With a Map, and One Hundred and Sixteen Illustrations. 12mo, pp. 201. \$1.50. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1893.

This attractive little book is a popular presentation of the author's work, and, incidentally, of the modern art of excavation. The work of the archæologist is usually so technical, and the bearing of its results so unfamiliar, that we welcome this happy treatise from the pen of one of the most diligent and successful of explorers. The chapters on Fresh Light on the Past, and the Art of Excavating, are peculiarly interesting, as showing the methods and the great value of the work in which men like the author are engaged.

MYTHS OF GREECE AND ROME. Narrated with Special Reference to Literature and Art. *By H. A. Guerber, Lecturer on Mythology.* 12mo, pp. 428. \$1.50. New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago: American Book Company. 1893.

The author's aim, to present a complete and entertaining account of Grecian and Roman mythology, with special relation to its influence upon literature and art, is successfully met in these wondrously attractive pages. The language is singularly chaste and beautiful, and especially so in dealing with those myths where delicacy of treatment is so difficult. This feature of the work more than any other, though its excellencies are numerous and great, specially commends it. The myths are told graphically and accurately. The more repulsive features are avoided. Both Latin and Greek names are given. Where there are different



versions of the same myth, preference is given to that which has had largest effect upon literature or art. A chapter giving an analysis of myths by the light of philology and comparative mythology is of special value. A map, genealogical table, index to poetical quotations, and a very full glossary and index, make the book complete and practically useful. The numerous illustrations, and especially the reproductions of celebrated works of art, enhance the value and beauty of the volume.

PRINCETON SKETCHES. *The Story of Nassau Hall. By George R. Wallace, Class of '91. With an Introduction by Andrew F. West, Ph. D., Giger Professor of Latin in the College of New Jersey. Illustrated. 8vo, pp. 200. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1893.*

In its beautiful grey cover, thick enameled paper, numerous illustrations, and general beauty of typography, this volume will be an ornament to any table. To the Princeton graduate, it comes with special interest. It is from the pen of a loyal alumnus, who writes the outlines of Princeton's history with a sympathetic hand. The several chapters indicate in their titles the author's treatment—In Good Old Colony Days, The Revolution, The Halls, Ante Bellum, Administration of James McCosh, Princeton University, Under the Princeton Elms, The Princeton Idea.

REALITY VERSUS ROMANCE IN SOUTHERN CENTRAL AFRICA. Being an account of a Journey Across the Continent from Benguela on the West through Bihe, Ganguella, Barotze, the Kalihari Desert, Mashonaland, Manica, Gorongoza, Nyasa, the Shire Highlands, to the Mouth of the Zambesi on the East Coast. *By James Johnston, M. D. With fifty-one full-page Photogravure Illustrations from Photographs by the Author, and Map indicating Route Traversed. Pp. 353. \$5.00. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1893.*

The secondary title of this work is so full that little need be said concerning its general contents. As to the author's purpose, however, it is to be carefully noted that he had a distinct aim before him. It was his purpose to obtain absolutely correct information concerning that part of the Dark Continent which he traversed, free from all bias or prejudice or the glamour thrown about African travel. He made his journey and prosecuted his inquiries from a purely independent standpoint. He traveled under the auspices of no government or commercial company or society. His views are, therefore, uninfluenced by any motive outside the desire to present the actual facts observed. The most remarkable facts are, that he traveled entirely across the Continent without firing a shot in anger or in self-defence against an enemy; that he did not lose a native carrier by death; that he seemed to leave a trail behind him of peace and good-will rather than of blood and hate. A special point of investigation was the present practicability and success of missions. His account of such work as he witnessed it is not encouraging, and he seems inclined to believe that many of the reports are too highly colored, and that the plain facts should be given to stir the church at home, rather than such glowing accounts as may produce a wrong impression. The author may just here, perhaps, be subject to criticism. Roseate views may

not be best, but long, weary years of apparent fruitlessness do not mean that God's work is not going on. The piers upon which the splendid bridge eventually rests are laid first far below the surface, and for a long period of toil may not appear to the eye.

The book is beautifully printed and profusely illustrated, and compares well with other and more ambitious accounts of African travel, while its unaffected simplicity, independency, and admirable spiritual tone do much more to enlist the reader's interest and store his mind with unvarnished facts than any similar work we have read.

THE STARRY SKIES; or First Lessons on the Sun, Moon, and Stars. *By Agnes Giberne, author of "Among the Stars," "Sun, Moon, and Stars," etc.* 12mo, pp. 234. \$1.00. New York: American Tract Society. 1894.

This is the gifted author's latest contribution to the series of scientific books for the very young. From practical use of them in the home, we know their value and attractiveness. They prepare the child for the profounder studies of later years, and, withal, inspire reverence for the Creator of the world. The title indicates the nature of this book. The style is most simple and direct, but not puerile. To each chapter is appended a series of suggestive questions, with answers bearing upon the subject considered. We cordially commend the work.

BEAUTIFUL JOE; An Autobiography. *By Marshall Saunders, author of "My Spanish Sailor."* With an Introduction by Hezekiah Butterworth, editor of *Youth's Companion*. 12mo, pp. 304. Cloth, 60 cents. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1894.

The beneficent work in which *Our Dumb Animals*, and the well-known book, "*Black Beauty*" are engaged, is well carried on in the book before us. It purports to be an autobiography of a dog. The story took one of the prizes recently offered by the American Humane Society for the best treatment of the wrongs of animals,—Mr. Hezekiah Butterworth, Rev. Philip S. Moxom, D. D., and Dr. Edward Everett Hale being the committee of examiners. The prize itself was declined by the author, and the American Baptist Publication Society secured the work for publication. It is written in the most delightful style, showing on every page the intensest sympathy and love for the animal kingdom. Many incidents are introduced that will make it of absorbing interest to the boys. The publishers have given the book an attractive dress, and have put it at a low price. It ought to find a place in every home; it will delight as well as instruct, and its influence will be most salutary in securing more thoughtful and humane treatment for the creatures that are the companions of man, and upon which his happiness so largely depends.

The *Review of Reviews* for June shows the usual flexibility of that keenly-edited periodical in adapting itself to the topics of the month. In its department of Leading Articles it groups together a very remarkable series of digests of important recent essays on various topics pertaining to the political and social status of woman. Moreover, its always varied and curious collection of caricatures, illustrating the history of the month, is enlivened by a number of cartoons from New

Zealand and Australia, some intended to eulogize and others to satirize the enfranchisement of women in the New Zealand colony and the unsuccessful woman suffrage campaign in New South Wales. The department of "New Books" is especially strong, containing a London letter full of interesting chat about the literature of the month, together with a review of the work soon to be published by Professor Richard T. Ely, the well-known professor of economics in the University of Wisconsin, on "Socialism and Social Reform." The reviewer commends the book for its sane and well-thought-out conclusions, as well as for the genuinely American spirit of the author. The completion of this work by Dr. Ely will doubtless be news to many of our readers. The University of Wisconsin is to be congratulated on the substantial contributions of its faculty to the best literature of the day in various departments.



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I. DR. DRIVER ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF ISAIAH  
XIII. AND XIV.

As shown in the first part of this paper,<sup>1</sup> the validity of Dr. Driver's conclusion as to the non-Isaianic authorship of these chapters hinges upon the validity of the minor premise of his argument. That premise is embodied in the proposition, *the prophecy of these chapters has no intelligible relation to, or bearing upon, the interests of the contemporaries of Isaiah*. We have already noticed one of the propositions laid down by Dr. Driver, presumably in support of this position. We will now ask attention to some others which are laid down, presumably for the same purpose.

I. The first of these is expressed thus: "The circumstances of the exile—while the Jews were still in bondage, and the power of Babylon seemed yet unshaken—constitute a suitable and sufficient occasion for the present prophecy, an occasion of exactly the nature which the analogy of prophecy demands; on the other hand, the circumstances of Isaiah's age furnish no such occasion." Now, in reference to this proposition, there are several points that can scarcely fail to arrest the notice of the thoughtful reader: (1), The first is this: The sting of the proposition, if it has one, is in its tail. In other words, we may admit that the circumstances of the Jews, while still in bondage, constitute a suitable and sufficient occasion for the present prophecy, and the admission will be without prejudice to the position of those who maintain the Isaianic authorship of this passage, and without profit to those

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<sup>1</sup> *Presbyterian Quarterly*, April, 1894.

who deny it. It would be lame logic, indeed, to affirm that, because the circumstances of the exile would have furnished a suitable and sufficient occasion for such a prophecy as we have here, *therefore*, the circumstances of Isaiah's age could have furnished no such occasion. It would be discourteous to impute such logic as this to a writer of Dr. Driver's eminent ability. If, however, the fact that the exile might have furnished a suitable and sufficient occasion for such a prophecy as the present does not prove that there might not have been a suitable and sufficient occasion for it in the days of Isaiah himself, it is hard to see what it can avail Dr. Driver to establish this part of his proposition. Evidently the whole weight of his argument against the Isaianic authorship of these chapters, so far as it is derived from this proposition, rests upon Dr. Driver's ability to show that "the circumstances of Isaiah's age" supply no suitable and sufficient occasion for them. We would not unnaturally expect him to give us the benefit of the considerations which have forced his own mind to this conclusion.

But the next thing that can scarcely fail to arrest the surprised attention of the thoughtful reader is, that, (2), Dr. Driver seems to expect his readers, one and all, to accept this vitally important part of his proposition upon his (*i. e.*, Dr. Driver's) mere assertion, and without one particle of proof. Indeed, it seems to be somewhat of an idiosyncrasy of our distinguished author, and other fellow-critics, to mistake their *conclusions*, especially when roundly and emphatically stated, for *arguments*. Unfortunately, however, there is a class of minds with whom the effect of such a method of argumentation is rather to produce amusement than to beget conviction. For instance, our own distinguished Dr. Briggs came perilously near making himself conspicuously ridiculous, when, after rehearsing an argument from the pen of Dr. A. A. Hodge, he proceeds to annihilate it by asking the momentous and decisive question, "But what does Biblical criticism say?" and then quoting as the utterances of this awful divinity some of his own ill-considered and unfounded assertions. If it should be said that it is hardly fair to require Dr. Driver, especially in such a case as this, to prove a negative, several things would have to be taken into consideration. In the first place, it may be admitted

at once that, if it is difficult under any circumstances to prove a negative, it will be doubly so in the present instance. Granted that God might put such a message as this in the mouth of Isaiah, and how easy it will be to conceive that the prophet either found or made an occasion for delivering it. The real question is, Had Isaiah a motive for such a message? Granted that he had, and it will be difficult indeed to persuade the average man of common sense that the circumstances of his age would furnish him no suitable or sufficient occasion for the utterance of it. It matters not that we may be unable to place our finger upon the veritable occasion itself, or even upon any probable occasion. Our ignorance is not to be made the measure of Isaiah's knowledge. He was probably more familiar with the circumstances of his own day than we are. But, again, if it is so difficult to prove a negative, would it not have been as well for Dr. Driver to have refrained from such a sweeping assertion? Having made it, however, there would seem to be nothing for him to do except to prove it, or recede from it. For hard as it may be on him to require him to prove what from the nature of the case he cannot prove, it would be harder still upon his readers to require them to accept as true a statement of fact for which confessedly there is and can be no evidence. But yet another thing will occur to the thoughtful reader: It is that, (3), Dr. Driver has himself pointed out at least the possible occasion of the utterance of this oracle. We do not say a suitable and sufficient occasion. For felicitous as is this phrase in its sound, we have misgivings as to whether Dr. Driver himself could define very accurately just what, even in his own estimation, would have constituted such an occasion. And we are more doubtful still as to whether he and Isaiah would have been of one mind upon this all-important point. If, however, the visit of the ambassadors of Merodach-Baladan furnished a suitable and sufficient occasion for the prediction of an exile to Babylon, then it will be hard indeed for most minds to see why that event, or some question called forth by Isaiah's prediction of exile, may not have furnished an occasion that would at least have warranted Isaiah in rounding off his message by predicting a return from exile. The wonder would have been had he failed to do so.

For nothing is more characteristic of the prophets in general, and of Isaiah in particular, than, after having announced a message of judgment, to follow it up with a word of hope. But, and this brings up for consideration another of the propositions by which Dr. Driver seeks to support his minor premise, we are told that while—

II. "The embassy of Merodach-Baladan, the temporary 'king' of Babylon, to Hezekiah afforded Isaiah a substantial motive for announcing (xxxix. 6) a *future* exile to Babylon, it could supply no motive for such a promise of *return* from exile as these chapters contain."

There are some things in this statement that we must pass by with a merely casual comment. That it is somewhat oracular in tone, after what we have already seen, need no longer surprise or disturb us. It is to be regretted, however, that along with the air of assumed authority it should partake of the not injudicious, though sometimes annoying and always suspicious, reserve and obscurity which so generally characterized the ancient oracle. One thing, and only one thing is clear, and that is clear, not because of Dr. Driver's authoritative assertion, but from the very nature of the case. We refer to the assertion that the embassy of Merodach-Baladan could afford "no motive for such a promise of *return* from exile as these chapters contain," nor, for that matter, for a promise of return in any conceivable form. It is not clear, however, what exactly is Dr. Driver's conception of a *motive*, and especially of a substantial motive. It is not clear either how the embassy of Merodach-Baladan could have furnished a *motive* for a prediction of exile. In fact, the reader is almost forced to the conclusion that, by a singular confusion of thought, the word *motive* has been used where *occasion* was intended. It will not be necessary to stop to prove that these things are in reality as wide apart as the poles. Often as they are confounded by superficial thinkers, such a crudity was not to have been expected in the present case. But, if occasion was what was meant, then while it is clear that the embassy of the king of Babylon would have furnished an occasion, or, if you please, a substantial occasion, whatever that may mean, "for



announcing a *future* exile," it is not clear why that event would not also have furnished an occasion "for such a promise of *return* from exile as these chapters contain." There seem to be but two possible grounds for such a position. One would be that the embassy from the king of Babylon led Hezekiah into a sin, which sin would furnish a most suitable occasion for an announcement of judgment, but a very unsuitable one for a promise of special divine interposition. This view, it must be confessed, is specious, but how narrow! Habit, if nothing else, would have prevented the prophet from stopping with the announcement of judgment. But more on this point later. It is enough to say in reply to such a view that it overlooks the obvious fact that the connection between an occasional cause and the effects which follow from it is, from the very nature of the case, loose, and, if the solecism may be pardoned, inconsequential. A careless hand turns a lever and lets on the water which sets in motion a dynamo, which in turn generates a current of electricity. Now, the effects of this current may be manifold, and divergent. All of them, moreover, will be determined by the will of another than him who started the current upon its course. Thus the unbelief of Ahaz became the occasion of the announcement of the birth of Immanuel. Dr. Driver seems to imply, however, that there are special features about this promise of return which preclude the idea that the embassy referred to could have afforded a suitable occasion for *it*. His language is: "It (*i. e.*, the embassy) could supply no motive for *such a promise* of return as these chapters contain." (We have taken the liberty of changing the position of the italics.)

Now this seems to admit that Isaiah might have given a promise of return *in some form*, only not in the form found in our prophecy. But, as a matter of fact, unless Isaiah predicts a return here and in chapters xl-lxvi, then he predicted an exile without giving any intimation of a return. The question will arise: Is this natural? Is it probable? We remark further, that if it is the promise of return found in these chapters which constitutes Dr. Driver's difficulty, we have at hand two simple, yet sovereign and approved, remedies, either of which would meet the case. The

promise it will be observed is contained, wholly contained, in verses 1, 2 of chapter xiv. Now, we might maintain, and that with the best of critical authority for the intrinsic propriety of the procedure, that these verses show traces of the hand of a redactor, who, by a few simple alterations just here, sought to recast an ancient and genuine prophecy of Isaiah so as to make it more entirely and impressively suited to the exigencies of those living in Babylon about the close of the exile; or, with equal propriety and support from critical authorities, we might pronounce these verses an interpolation. Why give the falsehood to the opening words of chapter xiii. for the sake of these two verses? Cut them out bodily and what is left will form an intelligible and symmetrical whole. It will be what xiii. 1, declares it to be, namely: "The burden of Babylon which Isaiah, the son of Amos, saw." Why let go a stable tradition running back at least to the time when the Book of Isaiah received its present form, and launch ourselves upon the shifting currents of critical conjecture because of these two verses? If there is anything peculiar or suspicious about them, why not amend them? Why not cut them out, and let them go? We say, again, that, if we were determined to maintain the traditional view as to the authorship of these chapters, Dr. Driver's difficulty about the peculiarity of the promise found here need present no obstacle. And were we to resort to the hypothesis of a redactor, or an interpolation, there would be a poetic propriety in the defence. Tempting as is such an answer, however, we must refrain from having recourse to it, not merely because to employ it might have the appearance of poaching upon ground already preëmpted and posted by a certain school of critics, but principally because we feel an invincible mistrust of the reliability of an hypothesis which scatters its favors around with more compliance than the veriest prostitute. Heroic measures are for desperate cases. Let this hypothesis, albeit it would serve us as readily and as efficiently as it does them, remain in the service of those who have foregone conclusions to establish at all hazards. For ourselves, we prefer to bring our conceptions of what prophecy is into conformity with the record, rather than cut and carve the record until it squares with our preconceptions of

what prophecy ought to be. Reserving our right, then, to the benefits of this hypothesis, such as they may be, we decline to avail ourselves of them. We are prepared to admit that xiv. 1, 2 is an integral and an essential part of the prophecy. We are prepared to face the objections which Dr. Driver bases upon these verses, and abide the result. Let our first inquiry, then, be as to the peculiarity which marks out the promise of return here given as unsuited to the lips and time of Isaiah. It may simplify matters for us to place the very words of the promise before the eyes of the reader. This will enable him to judge for himself as to how peculiar it is. The promise, then, runs thus: "For the LORD will have mercy on Jacob, and will again choose Israel, and set them in their own land: and the stranger shall be joined with them, and they shall cleave to the house of Jacob. And the people shall take them and bring them to their place: and the house of Israel shall possess them in the land of the LORD for servants and for handmaids: and they shall take them captive whose captives they were; and they shall rule over their oppressors."

Now, can the reader believe it, this is all, absolutely all that there is in reference to the return of the Jews to their own land in the whole of these two chapters. What precedes is a vivid picture of the overthrow of Babylon. What follows is equally as vivid a picture of the contempt to which Babylon will be subjected when overthrown. We respectfully submit that the only peculiar thing that will appear upon reflection is, that Dr. Driver should have found any peculiarity about this promise. The peculiarity can hardly be in the thing promised, which is a return from exile in Babylon. Grant that Isaiah might predict an exile, and it seems arbitrary to say that he could not have predicted a return. As a matter of fact Dr. Driver says no such thing. But granted that Isaiah predicted an exile to Babylon, then, if he predicted a return at all, he must have predicted a return from an exile in Babylon. Just as little can the peculiarity be in the form of the promise. The terms employed are perfectly general. There is a marked absence of specific details. If Isaiah might have predicted a return, it is hard to see why he may not have employed some such language as this. It is hard to see how he could have

failed to use some such language. The peculiarity can scarcely be in the substance of the promise, so far as it relates to the circumstances attending the return. The substance of the promise from this point of view is thus admirably stated by Dr. Driver: "They will return to Palestine under such changed conditions that foreigners will now claim eagerly the privilege of incorporation in their community, and the nations will press forward to offer them an honorable escort upon their journey." What is there here, however, more than constitutes the very staple of prophecy as it bears upon the future of the people of God? The same words would answer for a statement of the substance in Isaiah x. 5; xii. 6; or Jer. l., li. 58. It matters not that Dr. Driver has come to regard the latter passage as dating from the exile. He does not assign it to that period simply because it breathes a confident assurance that Israel will yet hold the religious, or, if any one so chooses, the political, supremacy of the world. This belief was not born during the exile. It is not the setting of the promise which constitutes the objectionable peculiarity. If Isaiah might predict a return, it is at least conceivable that he might preface his prediction of this event with an announcement of the overthrow of Babylon. Why not? The return could hardly be expected so long as Babylon retained her supremacy.

Is it the tone of evident joy with which the announcement of the destruction of Babylon and the restoration of Israel is made that is the peculiarity of which we are in search? If so, then admit the existence of even a modicum of either patriotism or piety in the bosom of the prophet, and all difficulty at once vanishes. We have touched upon these points, not because they seem to us to have any real merit in them, but simply because Dr. Driver seems disposed in an indirect and vague sort of way to make something out of them.

What, then, is the peculiarity which forbids our regarding this prediction as from Isaiah? Certain it is that it is not to be found in the promise of return, as such. As little is it to be found in the general features of the setting in which the promise of return is imbedded. Evidently, if it exists at all, it must be sought elsewhere.

Before pursuing our quest further, however, it will not be amiss to dwell briefly upon a somewhat different point which Dr. Driver's statement thrusts upon our attention. Intentionally, or unintentionally, he has raised this question: Had Isaiah a substantial motive for uttering such a prediction as that of these chapters? Now, this strikes us a most pertinent and important inquiry; and we can but regret that Dr. Driver has given it so little of his attention. It is much more important and tangible than the question of occasion. For granted that Isaiah had a substantial motive for this prediction, and he would have been a pitiful fellow indeed if he failed to find a suitable occasion for making it. We press the question then: Had Isaiah a sufficient motive for the prediction under consideration? Were we seeking the occasion of the prophecy we would have to scan all the historical circumstances which might have given rise to it, which might, so to speak, have furnished a point of contact between the prophet's present and the future which he is to disclose. Not so, however, when we inquire for the motive impelling him. Here we must endeavor to put our finger upon that, whatever it may have been, which influenced him to embrace the opportunity furnished by what we call the occasion. Now, since every prophecy may and must be regarded as a means to some end, whatever leads the prophet to desire and seek that end will constitute a motive for uttering the prophecy.

What was there, then, to influence Isaiah to utter such a prediction as that before us? If it is from Isaiah, what end did he hope to accomplish by it? Now, we submit that the answer to such questions as these is not reasonably to be sought in the political occurrences of Isaiah's time. It is not to be restricted to effects to be produced upon his own contemporaries. Why might not the prophet have desired to do somewhat for those who were to come after him? It is fairly to be sought in the purposes of that God whose servant the prophet was. Those purposes reached far beyond the prophet's own time. Such, indeed, is the relation of the present to the future, that God always deals with the present, with his eye upon the future. If, then, we would know the motive of the prophet in any given case, we must in-

quire how that case stands related to the purpose of God. The purpose of God here we know, because he had announced it. It was, amid all the vicissitudes, and notwithstanding all the defections of his chosen people, to preserve and perpetuate a remnant that would serve as a holy seed for the church of the future. Now, let it be borne in mind that not only was the exile a means to that end, but so also was the *threat* of the exile; not only was the restoration a means to this end, but so also was the *promise* of a restoration. If asked, then, for the dominant motive, the divine motive for chapters xiii., xiv., we answer that it is the same as that which prompted to the utterance of chapter xxxix. The embassy of Merodach-Baladan may have furnished an occasion for the latter, but we must look deeper, and in a wholly different quarter for the motive. If any one asks for the relations between these particular utterances and the end specified, we answer that God rules men, and accomplishes his purposes through rational motives. These for present purposes may be reduced to two, viz.: fear and hope. The leaven of apostasy was actually at work in Isaiah's day. Had no check been put upon it, universal defection would have been the certain result. But, if the question be pressed, why this particular threat of a deportation to Babylon? we answer that the same God who gave the prophecy was shaping the history. To ask why he so shaped the history would be but a fruitless impertinence. The only question with which we have any concern is, Why, having determined upon this special discipline, did he announce it so long beforehand? Dr. Driver has not troubled himself apparently to find an answer to that question. Our answer, if permitted to suggest one, would be, the time for the judgment not having arrived, but the need of its influence being already imperative, he announced it thus long beforehand because he foresaw that the threat of judgment would, in its measure, exert the same powerful and salutary influence in restraining and correcting the tendency to apostasy that would be exerted by the judgment itself when it actually fell. So much for the threat of Isaiah xxxix. 6, which is admitted to be from the prophet himself, and not from another. But what of the motive for chapters xiii., xiv.? We answer that man cannot

live the life of God by threats alone. We are saved not only in hope, but by hope. The restoration was as essential a part of God's plan as was the exile, and the promise as essential to the preservation and perpetuation of the remnant as was the threat. In order that there might be a remnant, those who were to compose the remnant must from the time of Isaiah on, and all the more as things went from bad to worse, have some reasonable assurance that God would not cast off forever. For Isaiah to have created in the hearts of his contemporaries the feeling that they were rejected of God, would have been fatal to the very end he must have had in view when he uttered the threat of chapter xxxix. 6. The godless are sure to become ungodly. Such being the relation which existed between the matter of these chapters and the purpose of God, we venture to find in the piety and patriotism of the prophet the substantial motive that influenced Isaiah to utter them. Or, to state the case somewhat differently, the mere announcement of a captivity to Babylon (xxxix. 6) would have created needs in the hearts of the people, the desire to meet which would have constituted a substantial motive for the utterance of the prediction of chapters xiii., xiv.

But further, before dismissing this point it may be worth our while to look at it from another and lower standpoint. Given the prediction of chapter xxxix. 6 from the lips of Isaiah, and his mere pride of consistency would have been a motive for the utterance of that of chapters xiii., xiv. Let us look at the situation: The prophet is standing near the close of his career, relatively near, at least. He had, at the beginning of his course, struck two notes loud and clear. One of them was a note of warning and judgment. It was not vague and general. In at least one particular it was sharply, painfully definite. The judgment was to be progressive, and was not to cease until it culminated in the devastation of the land and the *deportation of the people*. By whom the judgment would be effected, where the people would go into exile, he does not then declare. But he staked his reputation as a prophet upon the certainty of an exile when he named his son Shear-jashub. Isaiah's doctrine of a "remnant" is universally recognized, but its true significance

seems to have been much overlooked. It is said that he teaches that though "divine justice requires that its unworthy members should be swept away," still "the chosen nation is imperishable"; and again, that "the approach of trouble or danger throws him back upon the thought of the permanence of the nation." Now, we submit that this is not only inadequate, but a wholly misleading account of Isaiah's doctrine of the "remnant." It is worse than the play of Hamlet with the part of the noble Dane omitted. Isaiah's doctrine is not that a "remnant" shall remain after the overflowing scourge has swept by, but that a "remnant *shall return.*" And "Shear-jashub" meant nothing unless it meant that the nation should go into captivity. To this position the prophet committed himself in what may be called his inaugural (vi.), whether it was uttered before chapters i.-v. or not. It was subsequently reaffirmed with all solemnity (vii. 3). In the closing year of Jotham the judgment strokes began to fall. In the reign of Ahaz the culmination seems to be imminent. Ephraim and Syria combine to afflict Judah. The prophet, however, from the mouth of God, declares that the fears which have seized upon king and people alike are ungrounded. In effect, he affirms that the end is not yet. Later the Assyrian comes down upon Judah "like a wolf on the fold." Again the prophet, from the mouth of God, assures Hezekiah that the end is not yet. Time passes on. The prosperity of Judah revives, and it begins to look as if the "consummation, and that determined," which the prophet declared he had heard from the Lord, were not going to take place at all. But again the prophet, with sublime confidence in the God of revelation, stands forward and declares, in the face of present prosperity, that the consummation determined will yet be accomplished. By revelation from God, he describes in a province at that time a dependency of Assyria the power by which, and in the capital of that province the place in which, the long-deferred judgment is to be executed. With sublime consistency he stands forward before king and court, and projecting his vision upon the near future, *if it can be proved*, or upon "the shifting future," if there is comfort for any in that way of viewing it, or speaking as one not knowing whether the event about to be predicted be-



longed to the nearer or to the relatively remote future, holding himself, in a word, "*independent of time*," and concerned only to impress those who heard him with the dread certainty of the event itself, he declares: "Behold the days come, that all that is in thine house . . . shall be carried to Babylon: nothing shall be left, saith the LORD of hosts. And of thy sons shall they take away; and they shall be eunuchs in the palace of the kings of Babylon." One thing, then, is certain, and that is, that Isaiah, to the very end of his career, adhered consistently to the note of judgment, sounded at its beginning. But when this note was first struck it was accompanied by another, a note of hope; and during his subsequent ministry, as often as the former note was sounded it was invariably followed by the latter. This is a recognized characteristic of his style. He makes no threat but he relieves its gloom by some word of promise. By the time of Hezekiah this habit of his must have become, as it were, a second nature. Why, then, should it be thought a thing incredible that Isaiah should predict a return from exile? Consistency demanded that he should do this very thing. Had he failed to do so, how could he ever have had the courage to look again into the face of his own son, "Shear-jashub"? Alas for the prophet, if, in his old age, he should have been compelled to disown his son, or else ask for an act of the Sanhedrin changing his name to "Lo-shear-jashub." When Isaiah uttered the prediction of chapter xxxix. 4-7, he committed himself to some such prediction as that found in chapters xiii., xiv. If the former was spoken "out of his own heart," there is no assignable reason why he should have hesitated to venture upon the latter. If the former was spoken by revelation from God, it is hard to see why the same may not be true of the latter. Certainly there was no lack of motive for some such prediction. Having uttered chapter xxxix. 4-7, he had gone too far not to feel that he would have to go further. Had he not done so, every scoffer in Jerusalem would have plucked him by the skirt of his garment and said: "Accept our sympathy. We have long been expecting the demise of poor Shear-jashub, and now it seems that he is dead."

III. It will be proper in the next place to notice the only posi-

tive evidence of the non-Isaianic authorship of these chapters which Dr. Driver, with all his learning and ingenuity, has been able to produce. It consists in certain indications of time, supposed to be furnished in the very body of the prophecy itself. What these are, and what their supposed significance, he himself shall be permitted to state. We are told, for one thing, that "they (*i. e.*, the Jews) are represented as *in exile*, and as about to be delivered from it" (xiv. 1, 2). Let the reader note the assertion here made. It is that those addressed were actually in exile. Let him also notice the proof adduced. It is found in the words, "For the LORD will have compassion on Jacob and will yet choose Israel, and set them in their own land: and the stranger shall join himself with them, and they shall cleave to the house of Jacob. And the peoples shall take them and bring them to their place: and the house of Israel shall possess them in the land of the LORD for servants and for handmaids: and they shall take them captive, whose captives they were: and they shall rule over their oppressors." Again, in substantially the same vein, we are told: "Undoubtedly Babylon came within Isaiah's 'historical horizon'; but in order to vindicate Isaiah's authorship it must be shown that it came within it in a manner suited to form the occasion for *this particular prophecy*, viz., as the power which held the Jews in the thralldom of exile, and was destined ere long to be destroyed." And so, commenting upon chapter xiii. 17, Dr. Driver says: "Lit., Behold, *I am stirring up*, of the imminent future as chapter xvii. 1, &c." And once more we are told: ". . . The busy populous city shall never be inhabited, neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to generation: its castles and palaces of luxury will become the resort of wolves and jackals. And why all this? The prophet supplies the answer (xiv. 1, 2), *Because the time has come for Israel to be released from exile.*" Now, from these statements it is clear that Dr. Driver maintains that the fair implication, indeed the only fair implication, of the language used by the prophet is, that at the time it was uttered Babylon was in actual possession of the empire of the world, that the Jews were actual exiles in Babylon, that the time of their deliverance was actually drawing rapidly near, and that the fall of Babylon was an event

actually imminent. If this be true, then of course Isaianic authorship is out of the question. But it must be observed,

(1), It is one thing to show that the prophet *represents* the Jews as in exile, and the fall of Babylon as imminent, and quite a different thing to show that when the prophet uttered these words those addressed were actually in exile, and the fall of Babylon an event actually imminent. This is evident. For clearly there is such a thing as a prophet uttering his prediction not from his own actual historical present, but from an assumed present. He may, in a word, transfer himself, for the nonce, into the future, and then speak from it as though it were his own actual present, as though he and his contemporaries were themselves actors in the scenes which he depicts. Nor is there anything surprising about such a procedure. Every poet feels at liberty to do the same. The end aimed at is so obvious that everyone sees it at once, and so proper that no one questions it. In no other way can the prophet secure such effective vividness and dramatic force. Dr. Driver himself admits the validity of this procedure, and recognizes the fact that it was employed by the prophets. Thus he tells that throughout a considerable portion of the prophecy contained in chapters xxiv.—xxvii., the prophet speaks “not from his own standpoint, but from that of the redeemed nation in the future, expressing in its name the feelings of gratitude and devotion which he imagines that it will naturally entertain, and confessing the disappointment which the failure of its own exertions had brought upon it.” But, if in that prophecy the prophet assumed his standpoint in the future, why may not the author of these chapters, whoever he was, have done the same? If it be admitted, however, that the prophet is here speaking not from his own actual historical present, but from an assumed present, then several things are at once clear: It is clear, for instance, that he might have assumed his present in the distant, rather than in the near future. It is clear that what was really imminent from his assumed present might have been far distant from his own actual present. It is clear that Isaiah might have been the author of these chapters, even though he did for good reason choose to represent the exile as in progress and the fall of Babylon as an event near at hand. Hence

the question emerges, Does the prophet, whoever he may be, who gave us this prophecy, speak from his own absolute present, or does he speak from an assumed present, which is, in reality, future? The answer to this question must determine the validity or invalidity of Dr. Driver's position. But here it must be observed that,

(2), Dr. Driver has furnished no evidence whatever that the prophet is speaking from his own, rather than from an assumed, present. Let us see. One of the two passages which he cites is chapter xiii. 17. Now let the reader compare with this passage Genesis vi. 17. He will find that the construction is identically the same in each case, viz., the particle הַנִּהְיֶה with the participle. And yet according to interpreters generally, the flood was one hundred and twenty years in the future when God spoke to Noah. Further, a reference to Harper's *Elements of Hebrew Syntax* will assure the reader that Dr. Driver is an interpreter out of his own heart when he says of chapter xiii. 17: "Lit., Behold, *I am stirring up*, of the imminent future." The doctrine laid down by Harper and confirmed by Gesenius, yes, and by Dr. Driver also, is, that "the participle is used in the description of a state or action belonging to the sphere of the *future*, thus represented as beginning, and hence *certain*; only the context determining whether there is reference to a near or to a remote future" (the italics after the word *certain* are ours). But, if this doctrine be true, what warrant does this passage furnish for raising a question as to the Isaianic authorship of these chapters? Dr. Driver is not more fortunate in the only other passage he cites in proof of his position. He gives an admirable summary of the prophet's description of the desolation which is to overtake Babylon. This he concludes with the rhetorical question, "And why is all this?" He proceeds to say, "The prophet supplies the answer (xiv. 1, 2), Because the time *has come* for Israel to be released from exile: 'for Jehovah will have compassion upon Jacob, *and will yet choose Israel*, and will settle them in their own land.'" We submit, however, that inspection will show that it is Dr. Driver, and not the prophet, who supplies this much desiderated answer. The idea of *time*, even of *relative time*, to say nothing of *absolute and actual time*, seems to be wholly absent from chapter xiv. 1, 2. The language evi-

dently refers not to the *imminence* of Israel's deliverance from exile, but to the *certainty* of her restoration to the divine favor. Let the reader examine in the light of its context, Zech. ii. 12, "And Jehovah shall inherit Judah in the holy land, and shall again choose Jerusalem," and say whether the prophet there refers to an event belonging to the impending future. But if not in Zechariah, then why here? The language is almost identically the same. We are justified, therefore, in saying that Dr. Driver has failed to produce any evidence from the body of the prophecy that the prophet was speaking from the standpoint of his own actual present. But we may go further, and say that,

(3), The body of the prophecy furnishes evidence that the prophet is not speaking from his own actual present, but from an assumed present. Such is manifestly the case in the taunt-ode which he puts in the mouth of redeemed Israel (xiv. 4ff). The same is true of the opening words of the prophecy (xiii. 2-6), where the prophet, speaking of what is certainly future, nevertheless describes it as though it were occurring under his very eye. But stronger and seemingly decisive evidence of the fact that the prophet is speaking from an assumed present is that furnished by a single clause in chapter xiv. 3. The entire verse reads, "And it shall come to pass in the day that the LORD shall give thee rest from thy sorrow, and from thy trouble, and from the hard service wherein *thou wast made to serve.*" It seems practically incredible that the prophet, if he were addressing those who even while he spoke were experiencing the gall and bitterness of oppression, should have said, "wherein *thou wast made to serve,*" thus referring to evils that they were groaning under at that very moment as a thing of the past. Certainly we would have expected him to say, "wherein thou art being made to serve." The Hebrew, however, will not bear this rendering. The verb (עָבַר) is a perfect, and is here correctly rendered as a past. Had the prophet been referring to experiences of contemporaries he would almost certainly, if not necessarily, have employed either an imperfect or a participle. The time indications in the body of the prophecy, then, so far as they are positive, and not wholly neutral, point to the conclusion that the prophet is speaking not from his own his-

torical present, but from an assumed present. This being the case, we again raise the question, and leave it with the reader, Why may not these chapters have proceeded from Isaiah?

IV. We come next to notice a concession made not only by Dr. Driver, but by all critics, even the most radical. It is, at least so it strikes the present writer, a concession of the utmost importance, and yet, strange to say, its importance is universally overlooked. If any are surprised when we state it, we can only say that we trust that they will be even more surprised before we dismiss it, surprised not that we should emphasize, but that Dr. Driver and his confreres should have overlooked, its significance. It is admitted, then, that we have some prophecies which are the genuine productions of Isaiah, the son of Amoz, a veritable historical personage, who exercised his prophetic functions during the reigns of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah. Now we make bold to affirm that, admitting even this much, the critics must go further and admit the genuineness of the chapters under consideration; and that, venturing to deny the Isaianic authorship of these chapters, they render it impossible to adduce even probable evidence of the existence to-day of a single genuine Isaianic prophecy. Let us see. Does Dr. Driver, then, accept chapters i.-xii. as genuine upon the evidence furnished by the inscription (i. 1)? If so, the inscription of chapters xiii., xiv. (see xiii. 1) vouches with equal force for their genuineness. Does he accept chapters i.-xii. upon the authority of a continuous tradition ascribing them to Isaiah, the son of Amoz? There is the same evidence for the genuineness of chapters xiii., xiv. Is his conviction determined by the style of chapters i.-xii? Then the question arises, How are we to judge as to Isaiah's style until we have some writings which we are sure came from Isaiah's hand? Authorship must be established before there can be any argument from style. There is danger that critics may reason in a circle just here. Is it upon internal evidence that Dr. Driver assigns chapters i.-xii. to Isaiah, and for lack of it that he declines to admit the Isaianic authorship of chapters xiii., xiv? If so, several questions emerge: *First*, What is the nature of this internal evidence? It seems to be the agreement or supposed agreement existing between the matter of

chapters i.—xii. and the course of events in the days of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah as learned from the Scriptures and confirmed by the testimony of the monuments. In a word, it resolves itself into the suitability of the matter of these chapters to the times of these kings. But can we prove that Isaiah wrote these prophecies merely by proving that the matter of them would have been suitable to the times in which he lived? Suitableness may determine the time at which a given writing was produced, but can it determine the person by whom it was produced? Further, who shall determine what constitutes suitability in such a case as this? The compiler must have regarded chapters xiii., xiv. as suitable to the times of Isaiah, or certainly he would not have put them in the mouth of Isaiah. Dr. Driver regards Isaiah xxxix. as suitable to the times of Isaiah, and so assigns it to that prophet. Dr. Cheyne declares it unsuited to the mouth of Isaiah, and laments the timidity of his learned and greatly admired friend of Oxford in yielding so much to conservative prejudice. Verily it looks as if the maxim, "*de gustibus,*" etc., held in the case of the critics as well as of others. But, again, will mere suitability establish even the time when, let alone the person by whom, a writing was produced? Was there ever a skilful forger who did not look well to this point? Verisimilitude along such broad lines as those laid down by Dr. Driver, and he cannot lay down any except the broadest, our present information does not warrant it,—verisimilitude along these lines would be within the ability of a bungler. Suitableness to the times environment of the prophet! Do we not hasten on in critical matters to a time similar to that spoken of in Judges, a time when every man will *think* that that is right in his own eyes? And are there not some so foolish as to regard such a time as one of ideal intellectual freedom? They readily enough perceive that when every man does that that is right in his own eyes liberty has passed into license, and anarchy stands at the door, or rather has already entered, and is preparing the way as fast as she can for despotism. It does not seem to occur to them, however, that lawless thinking is just as hateful, and not less injurious, than lawless acting. Freedom of thought is a blessed boon for which our fathers did

wisely to die. God forbid that we should exchange it for intellectual anarchy. But to return, does Dr. Driver base his acceptance of the Isaianic authorship of chapters i.-xii., and his rejection of such authorship for chapters xiii., xiv., upon the ground that in the case of the former the external evidence is confirmed and corroborated by the internal, while this is not true of the latter? This looks plausible, at least upon the surface. We should not forget, however, that, while a house may have, and may need, both a foundation and buttresses, it must have a foundation. Further, when certain material has been appropriated for the foundation, it cannot at the very next turn be used for buttresses. Dr. Driver will have to decide whether he is going to use the external or the internal evidence as the foundation of his faith in the Isaianic authorship of chapters i.-xii.

He cannot use the internal evidence for this purpose. This, as we have already seen, will not even furnish a stable foundation for the belief that these chapters were originally promulgated in the days of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah, still less can it furnish us even plausible grounds for crediting them to the person known as Isaiah, the son of Amoz. But how about the external evidence? Let it be remembered that in the last analysis this resolves itself into nothing more or less than the testimony of the person, or persons, whoever these may be, who compiled or edited the book which bears the name of Isaiah, and gave it its present form and contents. Now it will at least be admitted that if the testimony of this witness, or of these witnesses, is to furnish a solid foundation for a rational belief in the Isaianic authorship of chapters i.-xii., it can only be because the character and competency of the witness affords a solid foundation for confidence in his testimony. What, then, about the character and competency of these long-forgotten, but now famous, redactors? Suppose that upon the best of evidence they are proven to be not only incompetent, but swift witnesses, will their testimony avail as a foundation for a rational belief in the Isaianic authorship of chapters i.-xii.? Now, fortunately, we are in a position to speak with entire confidence upon this point. The critics who, so to speak, created these redactors, or who, at any rate, redeemed



them from the well-nigh hopeless oblivion to which their modesty and the ingratitude of an uncritical past had consigned them, the critics, we say, have made a special study of their motives and methods, and have followed their all but invisible footsteps through many an intricate maze. Hence the critics, if anyone, are prepared to give what might be called expert testimony upon this most important point. The critics, then, shall speak. Take for instance R, R<sub>1</sub>, R<sub>2</sub>, and the rest of the goodly company of redactors who have been given such a conspicuous place in the Pentateuchal controversy. The critics have put them through all their paces, and some very interesting ones they have, and what is the result? Simply this: While the public is greatly divided as to whether they were the shrewdest literateurs and most arrant liars that the world has ever seen, or merely arrant fools with the best of intentions and unprecedented luck, while the public, we say, are still divided upon this perplexing question, there is not a shadow of a doubt in anybody's mind, and least of all in the minds of their friends, the critics, upon the one point vital to our present contest. That single point upon which there is universal agreement is, that the statement of a redactor in reference to a matter of fact is at least as likely to be wrong as it is to be right. The correctness of this proposition is well-nigh fundamental to the very existence of the most approved schools and methods of modern criticism. What evidence have we, then, that the redactor of Isaiah is more reliable, or, if you please, more fortunate, than any one of the many Rs of the Pentateuch? But, again, Canon Cheyne has recently proved, at least to his own satisfaction, that the editor, or editors, of the Book of Psalms were either themselves deceived, or else attempted to practice a deception upon others, almost every time they touched a Psalm. But what evidence have we that the editor of the book bearing the name of Isaiah was either better informed or more fortunate than they? None whatever. On the contrary, we have unimpeachable evidence to justify the assertion that, whatever may have been his intentions, he is utterly untrustworthy. Canon Driver tells us that in assigning the material making up this book to Isaiah the editor was guided not by information but by conjecture. He also tells

us that in thirty-five out of sixty-six conjectures he blundered most egregiously, assigning to the times of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz and Hezekiah, and to the mouth of Isaiah, productions which belong to the time of the exile, and proceeded from some Great Unknown, or several such. Canon Cheyne makes the case even worse for this unhappy editor of our unfortunate prophet.

Now all this would be bad enough, even if this poor editor had expressed himself with some caution and reserve, and had stated somewhere in the book that he was merely giving us his best judgment in the premises. But he does not. On the contrary, it is evident that he is quite as confident that he is right in one conjecture as in another, quite as confident that he is right throughout, as Canons Driver and Cheyne are that he has missed it in a majority of instances. But this very confidence which he has in himself is ruinous to him in proportion as we have confidence in the critical conclusions of Canons Driver and Cheyne. And now we ask again, will Dr. Driver make the testimony of such a witness as this, a witness whom he has himself impeached and shown to be utterly untrustworthy, the basis for a rational belief in the Isaianic authorship of chapters i-xii.? Is it said that the very supposition with which we started has been forgotten? That that supposition was that it was neither the internal evidence by itself, nor the external evidence by itself, but the two together as mutually corroborating and confirming one the other, that lays a foundation for a rational belief in Isaiah's authorship of chapters i-xii.? We reply, no, this has not been forgotten. But we have yet to learn that nil added to naught, or multiplied by naught, or combined with naught in any conceivable way, will produce anything but naught. We have shown that the internal evidence in the present case, if it bears upon anything, bears solely upon the question of time, and not at all upon that of authorship. We have shown that the external evidence establishes neither time nor authorship. When neither give authorship it is hard to see how they can mutually confirm and corroborate one the other so as to assure us that Isaiah, the son of Amoz, was the person who produced chapters i.-xii. of the collection of prophecies at present ascribed to him. Dr. Driver must, therefore, either admit that

chapters xiii., xiv. are from Isaiah, the son of Amoz, or else admit that we have no sufficient warrant for ascribing chapters i.-xii. to him.

In concluding this somewhat prolonged discussion of a small and relatively unimportant part of the prophecy of Isaiah, the writer feels that he owes it to himself to say, that he has aimed at something more, and more important, than the vindication of the Isaianic authorship of these chapters. He has aimed to show that, notwithstanding his great learning, Dr. Driver evinces not only a lack of clearness in his statements, but a lack of clearness in his mental processes. This vice, we need scarcely say, is not likely to be found confined to this one alone of all his discussions. Again, he has aimed to show that Dr. Driver has what might almost be called a habit of floating a proposition which, taken by itself, few would admit, by linking it on to another which, taken by itself, few would deny. Further, we have aimed to show that Dr. Driver's conclusions in too many instances rest for their validity not upon evidence or weight of argument, but simply and solely upon the authority of his own *ipse dixit*. Not only so, but we have tried to show that Dr. Driver himself has been led to these conclusions not by the principles which he lays down, nor by the phenomena presented in the prophecy, but mainly under the influence, doubtless not suspected by himself, of his prepossessions. Finally, we have endeavored to make it patent to all that Dr. Driver cannot successfully impugn the genuineness of any portion of this grand book without cutting from under himself and others all ground for rational confidence in the *Isaianic* authorship of the rest of it. The reader must be left to judge how far we have succeeded. But clearly, if we have succeeded, we have attained much more important results than vindicating to Isaiah the authorship of chapters xiii., xiv.

W. M. McPHEETERS.

*Columbia, S. C.*

## II. THE THEOLOGY OF HOSEA AND AMOS, AS A WITNESS TO THE AGE OF THE PENTATEUCH.

IN very recent years the attempt has been made to reach the solution of the Pentateuchal problem through the testimony of the Psalms. Thus the published lectures of Cheyne on the Psalter were saluted by a famous critic of America with these words: "It has long been evident that the Psalter was the key of the Old Testament. Biblical criticism will never attain its end with regard to Pentateuch or prophets until the Psalter has given its witness." But those who claim even a passing acquaintance with Old Testament criticism justly question the force of this remark. The two distinct methods of criticism, the linguistic and the historical or comparative, are most conclusive when used suppletively. But when applied alone the former is the less trustworthy, and, indeed, has proved self-destructive.

When the Higher Criticism proceeds to revise the traditional acceptation of the age and occasion of the Psalms, it is forced by the rarity of historical allusions to use the literary analysis as the almost absolute criterion. In this lies the weakness of any critical theory of the Pentateuch, based upon the Psalter. Poetry of right is accorded license in language. Psalms express religious feelings that may be the same in differing ages and circumstances. Therefore many differences must be found in the chronological systems of the Psalter; and he who trusts to these for the settlement of the issues of the Higher Criticism may expect to be led far astray. To the spiritual believer the Psalms are a mighty volume of praise, ascending to heaven from Israel's long and eventful history; to the rationalistic Higher Critic, seeking signs, this book is a trackless wilderness.

Without doubt, the historical method is the safer, and is as useful to the conservative student as to any other. This paper is designed to direct attention to the evidence in the Pentateuchal question furnished by a special part of Old Testament history, the writings of Hosea and Amos, the prophets of Israel. The

classification of these prophecies as historical is justified by the following considerations: Many historical data and allusions are found in them; they cast bright sidelights on current Hebrew life; appeal must be made to them for the religious, social, and political condition of the Israelites in that age.

Several attendant circumstances make them the most important witnesses in the case before us: First, the nature of the prophet's office prepared him to be an impartial and trustworthy witness. He was not the official custodian of the written law, for this duty had been assigned to the priests, who should preserve, interpret, and promulgate it. The prophetic office was quite different; he was a man of a crisis; his was a special work; he received his message often direct from God, and had license to rebuke priest and doctor of the law, as well as common people. Frequently he was raised up to denounce undue reliance on ritualism, or too rigid regard for the letter of the law; and it is wrong to expect their discourses to be mere commentaries on the ceremonial and civil laws. If, however, from their impartial and apparently hostile point of view, they do quote and approve the law, it is the more striking corroboration.

Again, these are among the few books of the Old Testament universally accepted as authentic, therefore their importance in matters of dispute cannot be overestimated. The rationalist and the supernaturalist can come to no agreement about the age and authority of the other early books of the Old Testament, and with differing premises they reach differing conclusions. But in these prophets we find common ground, a battle-field where terms are equal, a witness admitted by all, an arbitrator whose decision each is pledged to honor. Finally, their testimony is invaluable, because it is given where we least expect it. They prophesied in the kingdom of Israel, and two hundred years before, under Jeroboam, the Ten Tribes had separated themselves from the Levites, who kept the law, and from Jerusalem, where only it could be fully observed. After this schism and apostasy they could not have been specially interested in the observance of the Mosaic law; and if we should find no appeal in these prophets to the law, we could not therefore deny its existence; but if it still appears well

known and supreme after these two hundred years of lapse and opposition, no further evidence of its existence and authority is needed.

As witnesses, they are well chosen, for they speak from very different points of view, and more diverse characters could scarcely be found. They began their work about the same time, but Amos continued about two years, while Hosea labored probably more than sixty. Hosea, a native of the northern kingdom, seems to have been of noble birth, gentle in character, a patriotic Israelite, and prepared for the prophetic office. He may have come into his ministry under the influence of the preaching of Elijah and Elisha, still powerful, though they had long since passed away. Because of his patriotic devotion to, and intimate acquaintance with, the people, we look to him more for references to the inner life of Israel and for statements concerning morals and worship. Amos, a citizen of Judah, and a rough herdsman of Tekoa, was stern, moved more by the will of God than by love for the sinners, and called without elaborate preparation for his mission. He was the John the Baptist of that age, not so much concerned with the history and welfare of Israel, as a messenger of judgment to come. But while they set out on their mission with different antecedents and motives, they bear the same witness.

It is taken for granted that the reader is familiar with the rise of the Higher Criticism, and has a general knowledge of the position of the school now prevalent, including the stages through which the development of the laws is supposed to have passed, and the periods to which the various documents are assigned. We are told by this school that Hosea and Amos lived and taught before the rise of the Mosaic ritual, and show a spirit not only free from but hostile to it. Let us judge this theory by what the prophets have to say. It must be borne in mind that the northern kingdom was now steeped in vice and idolatry; it was no longer a question of observing the Mosaic law, but of reviving and preserving the principles of Jehovah's worship. We need not look for ritualism; the true test is the existence or absence of those fundamental principles for which Israel, Moses and the law were raised up by God. In short, what are the controlling ideas of the theology of these prophets?

I. Hosea and Amos recognize two depositories of revealed truth. God is a Great Author, and has written two books: the Universe and the Book of the Law. They answer to each other, and both are used to press upon man obedience to the divine will. In their preaching these prophets drew largely from nature, as great preachers have generally done. They sent sinful Israel to God's creatures and works to learn his greatness and goodness, and their miserable apostasy. In this they were forerunners of Christ, who understood so well the human heart, and used so effectively lessons from the physical world; and we may well believe that, as a man, he studied diligently these prophets. Can we not trace in his teachings his intimate acquaintance with them? Every sermon or prophecy delivered by them is full of illustrations from nature. We might say of them that they sought to clarify and beautify historic faith by nature's countless analogies. They and Christ realized the importance of her testimony to truth, and it is a luckless day when, through indifference, or by meek surrender to the materialist, the church loses the support of this great field of revelation. Paul goes so far as to state that, by the manifestations of nature alone, man can come to an adoring knowledge of God. Botany traces his power in leaf and flower, Geology declares that he laid the foundations of the earth, and Astronomy, leaping from star to star, ascends to his "holy hill on high."

Let us cite some examples of their remarkable use of analogy: All kinds of things, grand and lowly, beautiful and commonplace, are taken with good effect, just as Christ made us see the truth through mountain and mustard seed, king and sparrow, talent and farthing. Every sphere of life is invaded for mediums to convey truth; even the barnyard and kitchen are drawn upon. Israel's wickedness is represented by a cake not turned, and his folly as the confusion of a silly dove; his weakness through wantonness is like the grey hairs of age; as a luxuriant, unpruned vine cannot bear good fruit, neither does he, because of rank temporal growth; his goodness vanishes as the morning cloud and early dew; his obstinacy is like that of the stubborn heifer or untamed wild ass; and his wicked king shall be cut off as foam on

the water. Confusing wilderness, arid desert, hunger, thirst, nakedness, rottenness, moth-eating, laceration by thorns, eagles' tearing, lions' devouring, the wind's fury and torrent's devastation set forth the tribulations of those who forget God. The righteous are beautiful as the lily and established like the strong, deep-rooted cedar of Lebanon; his God is refreshing shade, reviving dew and rain, and life-giving food to him. Jehovah's calling his people to follow him is like the mighty, yet tender, roaring of the lion for her young. Marriage, the closest and most affectionate relation of life, suggests the blessedness and nearness of God's relation to his people. Agriculture gives the plowing of the plowman, and the harvest of grain and fruit for illustrations; and the nine chapters of Amos are filled with pictures from his own shepherd life. These are some of the hundreds of instances in which Hosea and Amos appeal to nature as a witness for God.

But nature, though important, is not all. They have a surer guide, a stronger witness: this is that historic revelation which they call the Law of God. Their mission begins with this law, and all their warnings and entreaties are enforced by appeal to it. As theologian and preacher of this day must turn to the Bible for authority, so these prophets appealed to a well-known law. It was a revelation, despised by Israel, a standard of life, from which they had departed. What was that law? This question brings us face to face with the theological issue of our day: The age and authority of the books of the Bible.

This law, to which Hosea and Amos held Israel accountable, was written: "I have written to him the great things of my law, but they were counted as a strange thing." (Hos. viii. 12.) Some in recent years have boldly asserted that no trace of a full ritual, moral and civil law, such as the Mosaic Law, can be found in the time when these men lived. They tell us that the first centuries of Israel's life in Canaan were half-barbaric, and that the first signs of emerging from this state are found in these early prophets, and that by them and their successors the people were finally led up to the high religious life found in the Pentateuch, and they expect us to believe this in the face of archæological discoveries, which have proved that the use of letters antedates



Moses by centuries; that in and before his day legislation, historiography, and theology flourished, and that all the early life of Israel was in closest association with the nations especially proficient in these things. Is it even supposable that under such circumstances we should find them a nation without a written history, without a written law, without a carefully-appointed religion?

This written law was committed to a certain class for preservation and instruction, namely, the priests. The fourth chapter of Hosea is a rebuke of the sins of the priests, and two of the charges brought against them are, that there is no knowledge of God in the land, and that they have forgotten the law of their God.

In the same chapter of Hosea in which this law is said to be written we find the statement that it is also of ancient origin, for the prophet associates it with the covenant which God entered into with the Israelites at the beginning of their national independence: "They have transgressed my covenant and trespassed against my law" (Hosea viii. 1); and following this are four specifications of their trespass against the law: the schism under Jeroboam, which cut them off from the central and legal sanctuary at Jerusalem (verse 4); idolatry, in the same verse; too intimate association with the Gentiles (verses 8 and 9), and lastly, profane and unprecribed worship (verses 11 and 13).

We must not forget that Amos also knew of this law, and has made a very suggestive reference to it. In declaring the wrath of God against seven prominent nations he has only one charge to bring against Judah, while a long catalogue of Israel's sins is given. All of Judah's sinfulness can be reduced to one great crime: he has despised the "Law of the Lord." (Amos ii. 4.) In connection with this statement we must remember that the authorized sanctuary, the regular line of priests, the faithful Levites, and the ark of the covenant were with Judah. Now, these statements that Hosea and Amos make about this law: that it was written, was in the keeping of the priests, was of ancient origin, and was specially authoritative in the kingdom of Judah, create in our minds the suspicion, at least, that it was very much like that law, which, according to Deuteronomy, thirty-first chapter, Moses

wrote and delivered to the Levites for preservation in the side of the ark, and for teaching and judging the people.

Now let us examine some of the ideas and doctrines of these prophets, that we may come to a knowledge of the contents of that law to which they refer their authority:

II. First, their idea of God. The modern school of criticism asserts that it was materialistic and narrow. Jehovah was the God of Israel in the same sense that Moab had Chemosh and Phœnicia had Baal. And the low and cruel traits which other nations ascribed to their national deities, the Israelites of early times entertained of their God. It is not merely asserted that this was the belief of *some* of the people, but that it was originally the approved faith of the nation, and that evidence of this is found in Hosea and Amos. If this were true, how far they were from the Almighty God of the Book of Genesis! But whatever erroneous and low ideas the apostate people might have held, the prophets had an exalted and spiritual conception of the Divine Being. His power was as boundless as space: "He that formeth the mountains, and createth the wind, and declareth unto man what is his thought, that maketh the morning darkness, and treadeth upon the high places of the earth, the Lord, the God of hosts, is his name." (Am. iv. 13.) And again: "It is he that buildeth his stories in the heaven, and hath founded his troop in the earth; he that calleth for the waters of the sea, and poureth them out upon the face of the earth: the Lord is his name." (Am. ix. 6.)

His omnipresence was stated by them in almost the identical thought of that beautiful and spiritual Psalm, the cxxxix. Amos says there is no place in the universe whither the wicked can flee and be beyond the reach of God: "Though they dig into hell, though they climb up to heaven, though they hide themselves in the top of Carmel, though they be hid from my sight in the bottom of the sea, though they go into captivity before their enemies," they cannot evade his hand. (Amos ix. 2-4.) His intelligent justice is taught by Amos in the parable of the plumb-line, and its universality by the arraignment of all nations before his tribunal. It may be said that a more beautiful description of God's providence is found in no other part of Scripture, except in

the words of Christ. In the second chapter of Hosea he is represented as bringing back the sinful people to his service and blessing by want and sorrow. His constant care in the wilderness is often mentioned: "By a prophet the Lord brought Israel out of Egypt, and by a prophet was he preserved." (Hos. xii. 13.) Captivity can come only when God raises up a nation. (Amos vi. 14.) Not only was the belief in separate national deities foreign to these prophets, but they also rise above the narrow race religion that has characterized the Jews, and declare God's fatherly care for all nations. Notice the beautiful words of Amos: "Are ye not as children of the Ethiopians unto me, O children of Israel? saith the Lord. Have not I brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt? and the Philistines from Caphtor, and the Syrians from Kir?" (Amos ix. 7.)

III. Another point to be noticed is their high and spiritual conception of Jehovah's relation to his own people. Continually they call the attention of the people to the unfailing and adorable mercy of God. "Come," says Hosea, "and let us return unto the Lord: for he hath torn and he will heal us; he hath smitten and he will bind us up." "O Israel, return unto the Lord thy God; for thou hast fallen by thine iniquity. Take with you words, and turn to the Lord: say unto him: take away all iniquity and receive us graciously." And to the penitent sinner thus returning, God's answer of mercy is: "I will heal their backsliding, I will love them freely." Their teaching about God's love for his people calls to mind the pure and holy doctrines of the New Testament. Hosea plainly declares God's fatherhood: "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt. I taught Ephraim also to go, taking them by their arms." As the Apostle Paul represented Christ's relation to his church by the marriage bond, so Hosea begins his book with an allegory in three chapters, grounding God's affection for, and forbearance with, his people on his marriage to them by the covenant. The keynote of Hosea's prophecies is the tender, forgiving, yearning love of God. Can this be the product of semi-barbarism and the accompaniment of sensual and idolatrous worship?

IV. Another part of the prophets' theology to be considered is

their idea of the relation of the people to God, the duties which God requires of them. We may express these briefly by the term worship; for it covers the praise of heart and tongue, the offering of the hand, and faith, love and obedience.

The rationalistic school holds that the early religion of Israel was polytheistic and materialistic, and that even in the days of these prophets the calf-worship was the authorized form, and that the prophets knew and winked at this. It is the idea of Kuenen that human sacrifices were offered, although this was without the prophetic approval. History does state that the worship of the people had become corrupt, but the prophets, far from countenancing, vehemently condemn these corruptions. Their writings show that they received and taught the same pure and spiritual worship which God has ordered in every part of the Scriptures, and to which the holy men of old, moved by the Spirit, have gladly subscribed.

That cardinal institution for the preservation of Jehovah's worship, the single sanctuary, stated most clearly in Deuteronomy, is maintained by Hosea and Amos. There were, in fact, many places of national worship in both kingdoms, and the existence of these is supposed by some to be an evidence that there was no law to the contrary. They had come down as holy places from antiquity, because of association with the patriarchs, and no organized effort was made to suppress them until Hosea and Amos were resting in their graves. Such is the so-called scientific theory of this generation. But these prophets thought and spoke differently. Hosea, though a citizen of the northern kingdom, and showing his love for his country throughout his book of prophecy, traces all the corruptions in religion to the schism from the kingdom under the son of David, and to him it appears that the restoration of religion shall come along with the reunion under the rule of the house of David. He states, very particularly, that the fault to be found with the schism is, the origin through it of unauthorized sanctuaries and worship: "They have set up kings, but not by me; they have made princes, and I knew it not; of their silver and their gold have they made them idols, that they may be cut off. Thy calf, O Samaria, hath cast thee off." (Hos.

viii. 4, 5.) The inference is clear, that if separation from Judah has been the natural cause of forbidden and sinful institutions, then the sanctuary and the worship of Jerusalem must be of divine authority. It is worthy of special mention, that the statements of Hosea concerning the schism are in complete harmony with the history of that event contained in the First Book of Kings. We are told by this same prophet in plain words, that instead of these sanctuaries having come down with authority from former ages, the opposite is the case, and they are a recent and sinful growth. Israel fell into the same folly that has ruined so many nations. Worldly prosperity and military triumph had resulted in the corruption of all spheres of life. Religious life had been overloaded with multiplications of illegal sanctuaries and appointments: "According to the multitude of his fruit he (Ephraim) hath increased his altars; according to the goodness of his land they have made goodly images." (Hos. x. 1.) Can we ask for language that is clearer than this? The reign of Jeroboam II. had been a time of remarkable political and financial prosperity. But the people had not been brought back in humble gratitude to God; they were encouraged to multiply their sins, and to leave further behind them that pure and divinely-given system, which is always so uncomfortable for the voluptuous and wicked.

While the northern kingdom is uniformly condemned, both prophets speak with favor of the southern kingdom: Hos. i. 7, 11; iii. 5; and Amos ix. 11. But we know that there was the same proneness to sin in Judah as in Ephraim, and in the fifth chapter of Hosea they are classed as equal sinners; hence this approval cannot be on the ground of better conduct, but simply because Judah had been true to David, possessed the true sanctuary, and was in nearer accord with the covenant than Ephraim.

Many passages can be found in which the false sanctuaries are denounced in unequivocal terms. They are called places of sin, and also sin in themselves. Hosea makes a very significant play on the name of the principal idolatrous sanctuary, calling it *Bethaven*, house of iniquity, instead of Bethel. Indeed, all the sanctuaries of Israel are condemned in the same language: "the

high places also of Aven, the sin of Israel." (Hos. x. 8.) Amos, viii. 14, calls the worship at Bethel the "sin of Samaria," and in bitter irony the people are derided for resorting to such places of worship: "Come to Bethel, and transgress; at Gilgal multiply transgression!" If any one should raise the objection, as some have done, that this language is directed, not against these places as sanctuaries, but against the evil practices so common there, other passages rule out the objection by showing that the places in themselves are the objects of attack. In one passage the seeking of the Lord is put in opposition to resorting to these places: "Seek not Bethel, nor enter into Gilgal, and pass not to Beersheba: *seek the Lord.*" Their speedy destruction is promised, together with the certain punishment of their devotees: "The calf of Samaria shall be broken in pieces." (Hos. viii. 6.) "The high places of Aven, the sin of Israel, shall be destroyed." (Hos. x. 8.) After setting forth the bitter humiliation and the severe punishment in store for Israel, Hosea attributes all to these false sanctuaries: "So shall Bethel do unto you." (Hos. x. 15.) Many similar passages might be cited on this point, but one other, that is conclusive, will suffice. Amos describes the punishment of those who frequent these places thus: "They that swear by the sin of Samaria, and say, Thy God, O Dan, liveth; and, The manner of Beersheba liveth; even they shall fall, and never rise up again." (Amos viii. 14.)

This is their witness against the unauthorized sanctuaries; they also express their approval of the divinely-appointed place of worship. It is at least remarkable, that, in condemning the sins of Bethel, Dan and others, Jerusalem is never spoken against. Nor can the importance of this silence be diminished by the plea that these prophets were laboring in the northern kingdom, and, therefore, were not concerned with Judah; for the Beersheba against which Amos more than once utters judgment, is, in all probability, the city of that name in the southern part of Judah, and well known to the prophet, as it was not far from Tekoa, his own home. In positive language, also, Jerusalem is declared to be the legal sanctuary, and no such favor is ever shown by them to any other locality. Amos begins his prophecy with these signifi-

cant words: "The Lord will roar from Zion, and utter his voice from Jerusalem." In order to realize the force of this introduction we must bear in mind that the prophet is on a mission to the Ten Tribes. He does not seek to court favor, after the manner of a wily politician, by praising Bethel and its costly and beautiful structures, but declares even to those who have thrown off Jerusalem's authority that for them Jerusalem is the place of the Lord's manifested presence, and seat of his earthly dominion.

It is evident that the prophets admitted a divine law which regulated the worship of God. We have given their direct references to it. Let us now examine some of its features as they appear incidentally in their writings:

Certain religious offices are mentioned and described. The priests are keepers of the law and instructors of the people; they dwell in particular priestly cities, and a part of their living at least is derived from the sin-offerings of the people. These facts are gathered from the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters of Hosea. The separation of the Nazarites by vow is said to be of God, and those who cause them to break the vow by drinking wine are upbraided. (Amos ii. 11, 12.)

The feasts and other religious days are mentioned frequently, and most significant is the fact that in two instances at least the statements made concerning sacred occasions correspond with laws which the rationalistic critics assert came into existence at a much later time. Hosea associates the Feast of Tabernacles with the sojourn in the wilderness, although it has been asserted that the historical significance belongs to the latest stage of development: "I that am the Lord thy God, from the land of Egypt, will yet make you to dwell in tabernacles, as in the days of the solemn feast." In the days of Amos the Sabbath was not the great and festive holiday that some would make it now, and that some assert it was before the so-called rise of ritualism after the exile. It is true that many in that time were eager to profane it, but they were held back by some power or law. Amos states this, and leaves us as the only inference from his words that the Sabbath was to be kept holy in his time when he speaks against those who say,

“When will the new moon be gone, that we may sell corn? and the Sabbath, that we may set forth wheat?”

We can also trace here the features of a ritual for sacrifice, familiar to prophets and people. Burnt-offering, meat-offering, sin-offering, free-will-offering, and thank-offering—that is to say, nearly all of the offerings prescribed in the Mosaic Law—are mentioned incidentally in the course of their writings. And certain peculiar rites are connected with certain of these offerings. For instance, the burnt-offering is daily, and there is a tithe to be offered every third year. (Amos iv. 4.) It has been mentioned already that Hosea knew of the support which the priests received through the sin-offering. Amos iv. 5 makes a peculiar statement. Leaven was regarded as a symbol of corruption, and therefore prohibited as an offering. But he speaks of an offering being made with leaven, and this offering appears to be the only one permitted to be brought with leaven in the Levitical law, as stated in the seventh chapter of Leviticus. With this thank-offering both unleavened cakes and leavened bread should be brought. The former were burned; the latter was eaten by priest and offerer. Amos in his irony represents the zealous but deluded offerer as burning both unleavened and leavened in vain.

The patient reader, who has followed the enumeration of these facts, will at once recognize them as laws he has already found in the Pentateuch. And now, in addition to mentioning the laws of sacrifice, the prophets give them their approval. The Lord is represented by Hosea, viii. 13, as speaking of “*mine offerings*,” an indication that sacrifices, if offered in the proper manner and spirit, would be accepted. The burden of the entire fifth chapter of Amos is, that the sin and corruptness of the people have made their offerings unacceptable to God; not but that sacrifices from clean hands and pure hearts would be acceptable. Hosea prophesies the cessation of the feasts, and of religious rites generally, as the direst calamity. The principal passage for this prophecy is in the ninth chapter of Hosea. In captivity they shall be cut off from all religious privileges, and even their daily food will be polluted, because it has not been sanctified by the offering of the first-fruits to God. Here is both statement and approval of sacrificial order.



But in pursuing the evidences of a divinely-prescribed place and manner of worship we must not overlook the teachings of the prophets concerning the spirituality of worship. They uphold the spiritual nature of Jehovah's worship in two ways: First, They denounce the existing idolatry in most emphatic terms. Many of the passages cited to show their disapproval of the various sanctuaries carry with them also condemnation of the idolatrous practices so common at these places. Whenever Baal-worship is condemned, idolatry in general is condemned; for this was not the worship of the Phœnician god, which prevailed in the days of Ahab, since Jehu had eradicated this. The name was now applied to idolatry in general, especially to the worship of the golden calves. This worship, and also that of all images, is spoken against in direct terms: "Of their silver and their gold have they made them images, that they may be cut off." (Hosea viii. 4.) Of the calf in Bethel, Hosea speaks in language almost similar to Isaiah's famous and beautiful description of the worthlessness of man-made gods: "The workman made it; therefore it is not God" (Hosea viii. 6); and: "They sin more and more, and have made them molten images of their silver, and idols according to their own understanding, all of it the work of the craftsmen." (Hosea xiii. 2.) One of the first resolutions of penitent and pardoned Israel, in the restoration-prophecy of Hosea, is the surrender of idolatry: "Neither will we say any more to the work of our hands, Ye are our gods." (Hosea xiv. 3.)

There is a verse in Hosea about which much discussion has centered, and which many have interpreted as an approval of a certain form of idolatry: "The children of Israel shall abide many days without a king, and without a prince, and without a sacrifice, and without an image, and without an ephod, and without teraphim." (Hos. iii. 4.) It appears that memorial pillars were set up in places of special importance in the patriarchal history, and these became the objects and the centers of idolatrous worship. The Book of Deuteronomy prohibits the using of them in worship. The "image" mentioned in the verse just quoted is one of these pillars, and the rationalistic interpreters have supposed that Hosea regards the loss of it as a great misfortune, and, therefore,

virtually sanctions them. Those who maintain the non-existence of the Pentateuch in the time of these prophets make much of this interpretation of the verse. But it is an impossible view according to the facts. In another place, chapter x. 1, these pillars are condemned as idolatrous abuses, which have increased with prosperity. The interpretation carries too much with it, for it would make the prophet sanction teraphim, common household gods, and this is contrary to his repeated utterances against image-worship. The proper interpretation brings Hosea out in strong disapproval of the entire mixed and idolatrous system. He does not regard captivity as a time of calamity, because the people shall be deprived of civil and religious ordinances, but as a time of correction, in which they shall be purified from illegal institutions; for after their return, they shall not desire the restoration of these things, but, in striking contrast to the past, they shall then "seek the Lord their God" (Hosea iii. 5).

The second way in which these prophets emphasize spirituality of worship is by attacking gross formalism. The true people of God in all ages have contended that the state of the heart is more important than the outward forms; that the latter are useless unless they are the expression of the former. And such is the teaching of Hosea and Amos. Let us take a well-known passage from each: Hosea says; "I desired mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings." After setting forth the enormity of Israel's sins, Amos uses this strong language concerning their formal worship: "I hate, I despise your feast days, and I will not smell in your solemn assemblies. Though ye offer me burnt-offerings and your meat-offerings, I will not accept them; neither will I regard the peace-offerings of your fat beasts." In all succeeding ages the church has appealed to these beautiful passages as proof-texts for heart-religion.

But at this point an objector comes upon the scene to tell us that these verses prove conclusively the ignorance of the Levitical law on the part of the prophets, since they express a spirit antagonistic to the cold legalism of this law. The religion sanctioned by the prophets before the Exile is spontaneous and spiritual, while that embodied in the Priest-code is cold and rigid formal-

ism. It is sufficient to reply in passing that this assertion is based upon one of the most outrageous assumptions ever made by bold mortal. It is true that bigoted men have reduced the Levitical law to legalism, but it is far from the truth to say that it takes an attitude of bare formalism. On every page there is the stamp of spirituality. The minute sacrificial directions were not merely for the sake of ritualism, but apart from their evident typical bearing, their great lesson is the holiness of God and the holiness required in his worship. The laws concerning uncleanness were not intended for meaningless restrictions, but to teach the necessity of separation from sin and sinners. The moral and civil laws of the Pentateuch express that brotherly interest which has always characterized the relation of the Hebrews to each other. And even circumcision, the initial rite of the Hebrew church, is declared in the Pentateuch to have its spiritual significance. (Deut. x. 16.) Such was also the doctrine of Hosea and Amos, and such the doctrine of Christ, who came not to destroy, but to fulfil and interpret the law.

So striking is the correspondence of these prophets to the Priest-code, and so many allusions do they make to it, that a large branch of modern critics, ably represented by Professor Dillman, refuse to admit the conclusion of Wellhausen and his followers, that this legislation is exilic or post-exilic, but stoutly maintain that it originated in or before the time of Hosea and Amos.

V. Another duty which God requires of his people is prominently presented in these writings: It is a service which God has co-ordinated with the worship of himself, namely, the righteous and hearty discharge of man's duties to man. This might be classed under worship, for God made man in his own image, and he that honors the creature honors also the creator. The practical fulfilment of the two great commandments may be summed up largely under the second, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "For if a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" Great prominence is given to moral and civil ordinances in the Pentateuch, and the prophets press them on the people as necessary in true religion. Justice, uprightness, and charity must be followed by

those who will worship God acceptably. The use of false weights and measures is denounced; the landmarks between adjoining estates must not be changed, nor must bribery be practised; creditors must respect the rights of their debtors; considerate charity and the absence of oppression must be the spirit that a worshipper of God manifests to all in trouble, such as the unfortunate, the poor, the widow, and the orphan. The associations of men must be pure, and violation of this requirement is a profanation of the Lord's holy name. So the prophets conceive of man's duty to man in thought and language similar to that great law of the Hebrews which has made their life honored in persecution and adversity. Such have been the sentiments of the wisest Christian law-makers, who have transferred the outlines of the Pentateuchal moral laws into the codes of their own nations.

High conceptions of the nature of God, of his relation to man, of man's duty to him in worship, and of man's duty to man are the characteristic features of the teachings of Hosea and Amos. But the rationalists, who are seeking to revise the Old Testament history, claim, finally, that these lofty ideas appear for the first time here; that there has been progress in civilization and spiritual development until a great revolution is at hand, of which the prophets are precursors. What now do they teach on this point? Do they profess to be the heralds of new things?

It is evident, throughout, that they lay no claim to originality for their ideas. They speak of things well known to all the people, and the doctrines they present are familiar standards, from which Israel has departed, and by which he is now to be judged. The law, which has been ignored, counted a strange thing and despised, is of ancient origin, being connected with the covenant. We can conceive of no more striking figure than that which Hosea uses to express the apostasy of the nation from an old faith: their idolatrous worship and sinful life are represented by adultery; and this unfaithfulness occurred not once, but repeatedly. This implies a contract by which, and a time when, all these violated laws are binding. There are three passages which deserve special mention, as showing the antiquity of the commands which the prophets seek to enforce. Hosea compares the princes of

Judah, who have done evil and caused others to sin, to those who remove their neighbors' bounds. So they have removed the bounds between right and wrong, between the worship of God and that of Baal, bounds well known and fixed. The other two passages refer the beginning of Israel's apostasy and wickedness to the forty years in the wilderness: "I saw your fathers as the first ripe in the fig-tree at her first time: but they went to Baal-peor, and separated themselves unto that shame." (Hos. ix. 10.) "Did ye offer unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel? But ye bore the tabernacle of your Moloch and Chiun your images, the star of your god, which ye made to yourselves." (Amos v. 25, 26.) The latter passage has been made to bear many interpretations. The key to its interpretation is the time referred to in the second verse: "But ye bore," etc. The natural and common-sense view is that the time must be the same as in the preceding verse, the years in the wilderness; and according to this, Amos declares that the idolatrous worship, which he denounces, began even in the wilderness, and the laws against it existed and were violated then, as in his own day.<sup>1</sup>

This rationalistic theory takes away the text of the prophets' sermons, makes their threatened judgments without cause, and reduces the expressions of their righteous wrath against the national sins to unjust tirades. Worst of all, it takes away their claim to historical accuracy, a claim that none have a right to deny them. Uniformly they represent the idolatry and corruptness of the nation as departure from the "Law of the Lord," for which punishment by overthrow and exile shall come. But if there was no law, the nation's direful end was either a great misfortune or a great injustice. Let us be satisfied with their records, unrevised by modern science, and give to these holy men of old the credence they deserve, when they tell us that Israel sinned in departing from God's law, and received just retribution for continued apostasy, in continuous exile.

The Higher Criticism has accomplished much good. Not least

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<sup>1</sup> We are encouraged to hold this interpretation by the fact that Stephen in his famous speech adopted it. (Acts vii. 41-43.)

of its good deeds has been the turning of the eyes of the church to this portion of the Scriptures, so often and so unjustly ignored. And we have found in the prophets "a treasure hid in a field." Besides trusting them in the defence of our faith, we receive from their writings sermons of wonderful power, ideas and illustrations of surpassing beauty, and the most helpful exposition of Old Testament religion given before the coming of the Greatest of prophets.

EDWARD MACK.

*St. Louis.*

### III. THE NEW TESTAMENT LAW FOR THE CHURCH'S EFFORT AT PROPAGANDISM.

*“But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you: and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth.”* (Acts i. 8.)

These words are sometimes spoken of as being one form of the apostolic commission. They do contain, by implication, a warrant granting certain powers and privileges to, and imposing certain duties upon, the apostles. But they do not constitute formally such a warrant. They are sometimes spoken of as setting forth the apostolic mission. They do set forth that mission—the work to which the apostles were to devote their energies and their lives; but they do so *incidentally* and not of primary intention; *virtually* and not formally. The tenses used in the text are futures, not imperatives; and not futures for imperatives. They are not mandatory, but declarative. There is a mandate in the words, indeed, but it is there by implication alone.

The words are sometimes spoken of as a promise. They undoubtedly carry a promise—two glorious promises with them: the promise of a divine power, and the promise of a future victorious witness-bearing. But they do not constitute in form a promise. In form and in design they are a prophecy. They foretell what shall be.

Being a revelation of God's will in regard to the apostolic church and its work, the words show the apostles and the church the plan with which they should fall in—show them that they have a commission, a warrant, to go about doing the things which the prophecy declares shall be done; show them that their mission is, and is only, the accomplishment of what has thus been prophesied. Furthermore, as the prophecy is of good things, of things which the apostles, and all like-minded with them, desired to see fulfilled,

the words stand to them in lieu of a promise. But in intention and effect they are, first of all, simply and solely a prophecy.

This the Greek tenses of the text and the context show. We shall not enter upon the scholastic discussion of the tenses. What has been said will not, we think, be doubted by any one who knows anything of Greek syntax. But the plain reader may see that the context favors the view which we have taken: The apostles had raised a question about a matter which they had hoped would occur in the future. They had asked the Lord whether he would at that time again restore the kingdom to Israel. They were forecasting. They desired from him a prophecy. Christ told them that they might not know the times and the seasons "which the Father hath put in his own power." He denied their wish, so far as the particular inquiry was concerned, but he gave no rebuke to the *spirit* of forecast. He left their minds for one moment careering in the measureless realms of the future, and then brought forth from the womb of the future something of which it could not be said, "It is not for you to know." He propounded the words of our passage; he foretold the law which was to regulate the spreading of his truth and the establishment of his kingdom to the end of time.

These words, every one sees at a glance, were spoken of the church of the apostolic age—of the church in which the apostles themselves were to be the chief witnesses. But he is a very superficial reader who does not see, as clearly, that they contain the law for the church's propagandism to the end of time. They have a twofold content. They set forth the principle or law of the church's propagandism, and foretell the first great instance of its outworking in the actual life of the Christian church. In other words, instead of announcing the abstract principle which is to condition the spreading of the church, they predict a concrete embodiment of that principle. In regarding the instance we must not overlook the more important thing, the principle, which will be worked out over and over again. We must remember the canon for the interpretation of prophecy, announced by Bacon: "Prophecy hath springing and germinant accomplishment." In proportion as the rapidity and soundness of the church's growth



increase, in that proportion it will be discovered has the law which governed the spread of the church in the apostolic age been made the law again of the growing church.

We have, then, in Acts i. 8, God's preannounced plan of the church's effort at propagandism throughout the apostolic age and to the end of time. And it is fair to conclude, *a priori*, that a proper study of this plan would yield many valuable indications as to *how* and *where* the church of God of to-day should bear its witness; and as to *when* it shall bear it somewhere else.

We propose, accordingly, to briefly consider these words for the light which they throw on *the* problem before the church of God of every age, the *evangelization of the world*. We shall first study the fulfilment of the prophecy as wrought out in apostolic history, study the plan as therein illustrated, and then draw lessons bearing on the problem before the church of to-day. In the study of the outworking of the law, of the church's effort at propagandism, in apostolic history, we shall ask "Why?" at every step. Why wait at Jerusalem? Why bear witness first in Jerusalem and in all Judea? Why bear witness, second, in Samaria? Why bear witness, last, to the Gentiles? What is the core and heart of this prophecy for us? What is the principle which the church should apply over and over? How will God secure the accomplishment of his plan? If our inquiry is answered by only a very moderate amount of light, it will be something to have set our minds going on the subject.

There are four periods in the life of the apostolic church—all marked in the Acts, and all, likewise, distinguished in the text: 1, the period during which the disciples waited, according to Christ's bidding, in Jerusalem; 2, the period of witness-bearing among the Jews; 3, the period among the Samaritan people; and, 4, the period amongst the Gentile nations.

To take up these periods in their order:

1st. *Why the period of waiting?* To the apostles themselves the command to wait in Jerusalem until they should receive the promise might well have seemed contrary to human wisdom. The disciples were few in numbers. They were obscure, despised and timid. They made next to no impression on the world. It was

a time of weakness. It might easily have seemed that there was danger of their being crushed utterly in case of their not allowing themselves to be parted from Jerusalem, in case of their waiting there for the promise of their departed Lord. Or, escaping annihilation, it must have seemed that there was great danger of the utter disheartening of the disciples by holding them in Jerusalem, waiting. It must have seemed that if they were to do anything for Christ, it behooved them to proceed to work at once; for as the days passed would not all the devils of doubt tear at them?

But Christ had said, "Don't be parted from Jerusalem. Wait here for the promise: 'Ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you.'" Though we may not fathom all his reasons, we are pretty safe in naming the following:

*First*, He proposed to *develop the quality of courageous faithfulness* in the apostles, and to *prepare them for the reception of a larger amount of truth*. He would enlarge their fidelity to himself. He had a most self-abnegating life in view for them. He desired in them men who would do anything which his cause required, men who would ride through any moral Balaklava for him; and so he put them through this spell of waiting. He knew that it makes a man, as well as takes a man, to stand still on a sinking Victoria merely because the order to "stand still" has been given. He knew that, in consequence of the great strain thus to be brought to bear on these men, they would come through with iron in their courage for him; and that by thus sticking to himself through those days, like brave soldiers of a forlorn hope, they would get far along towards being invincibles at the end of the test. Moreover, he had, at the end of the days of waiting, much truth to open to them.

Mr. Frederick W. Robertson calls obedience "*the organ of spiritual knowledge*"; and our Lord, himself, teaches that "if any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." Obedience to God's known will fits for a larger apprehension of that will. A great growth was designed to go on in the disciples while they were waiting; and did go on. The event which separates this period from the next, viz.: the out-

pouring of the Holy Ghost, was so great, did so much to bring about the change in the attitude of the disciples toward the world, that we are in danger of forgetting the preparation for the change which had previously been going on in the hearts of the disciples. We do well, however, to inquire whether, without the preparation, those vessels would have been able to receive the gifts in such measure as was poured out into them. A hogshead of water cannot be put together in a gallon bucket. Nor can there be poured all at once the greatest wealth of spiritual gifts into a shrunken soul. There was a movement from both ends of the line about the time of the Pentecost: God poured out, from above, the heavenly gifts of the Spirit; but they fell upon men, who, by their hard obedience to himself, had been lifted up and made able to receive his gifts. Now, this uplift in power to follow Christ fully, and this enlargement of capacity for the reception of heavenly gifts, were most important reasons for Christ's bidding the disciples to *wait* till the Pentecost.

*Second*, The disciples were bidden to wait because Christ saw that *the effect of the outpouring would be greater at Pentecost than at an earlier time*. There are nicks of time that are all-important. There were to be present at that feast representatives from almost every civilized nation under the sun. News of the great event was to be carried widely over the world, and make in many directions for the spread of Christ's kingdom.

*Third*, They were to wait because, again, they could not work with effect until God had sent down upon them the Holy Spirit; until God had made them forever certain that he was with them, and had made clear forever to their minds the true nature of Christ's work. The outpouring of the Holy Ghost at Pentecost was a blessed rain that washed out the atmosphere. It was the glorious sunlight chasing away the darkness and enabling the church to *see the truth and that it had the truth*. It was somewhat more, but chiefly this—a filling with the truth.

The first period was, therefore, a period of great importance: The disciples were not only enabled to begin their witnessing under external conditions the most favorable, but they were lifted in character, were filled with a certainty as to what the truth is, and filled with the truth.

The outpouring of the Holy Ghost at Pentecost made the first epoch. The equipment of the apostolic church for witnessing was thereby so far completed, that the church was to proceed to the work of testifying at once. "And ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem and all Judea."

2nd. *Why was the witnessing to be first of all in Jerusalem and in all Judea? Why first of all to the Jews?* Among the reasons which can be seen we note:

*First, That men might have assured evidence of the resurrection of Christ.* The disciples of Christ began their testimony to his resurrection from the dead, not in remote Galilee, but in the town in which he had suffered, and in the hearing of those who had nailed him to the cross. The mediæval miracles were generally first affirmed in places and in times remote from those in which they were said to have occurred. The same is true of the "miracles of Mohammed." But the greatest miracle of Christ, his own resurrection from the dead, his disciples witness to in the weeks succeeding its occurrence and under the eyes of his murderers. This fact adds to the comfortable certainty of the Christian world till to-day.

*Second, God would magnify his mercies to the children of Jacob.* Therefore, the witnessing was to be first to the Jews. The children of Jacob had strong race prejudices, and if they were to be converted the change would be attended by less friction before their Gentile brothers should be led into the Christian fold. The previous acceptance of Christianity by the Gentiles would have made it vastly more unacceptable to the Jewish race. A Jew's embracing Christianity under such conditions had involved his taking openly into fellowship the uncircumcised and swine-eating Gentile. It is plain that the witnesses of Jesus were in the best condition for testifying effectively to the Jews concerning Jesus before they had, according to Jewish thought, contaminated themselves by preaching among the Gentiles. Not to have worked among the Jews first would have been to have treated them with less kindness than the Gentiles.

But God would fulfil his promise of a Saviour to Israel, which of old he had called out of Ur of the Chaldees, which he had

brought up out of Egypt with a high hand and an outstretched arm, which he had brought back from Babylon, which he had ever kept in the hollow of his hand. He would multiply his mercies upon Israel. He had already sent the Saviour even to death. But the people had not generally recognized him up to the time of his crucifixion. The crowning proof of the Messiahship was Christ's resurrection from the dead; and that Israel might have unimpeachable evidence that the Saviour had been sent, it was fitting that they should have the fact of the resurrection substantiated beyond a doubt. God proved to them, therefore, under circumstances which permitted the freest examination of the evidence, that Christ had risen from the dead. He made the disciples witness to the resurrection first to the Jews.

*Third*, Jesus bade his disciples bear witness first of all in Jerusalem and in all Judea, *that he might secure a missionary host with which to speedily take the rest of the world.* Of all the peoples in the world at that time, the Jewish people were, perhaps, the best fitted to make Christians of a high order of usefulness in the further spread of the truth. They were eminent for civic and moral virtues. They had higher notions of the inviolability of truth, duty, and of God. They were capable of nobler enthusiasm and stronger devotion. Such qualities in the first converts were matters of no inconsiderable importance, if the gospel was to become widespread. God does not, as a rule, make Christians of the same power out of natural men of unequal power. The engines are of different sizes. God may fill each *full* of the fire and water of life; but the engines are not thereby brought to the same power. The witnessing was first to the children of Abraham, that that superior race once Christianized might become the source of mighty instruments for the further spread of the truth.

*Fourth*, Jesus bade the witnessing first among the Jews, *that economy of force might be used in the preaching of the disciples.* The witnesses were all in Judea. The simple principle of the economy of force and time dictated that the land in which the witnesses were, all other things being equal, should be the first arena of witnessing. Every unnecessary change of place involves a loss of precious time.

*Fifth*, *the disciples themselves had need of being baptized into*

*universal Christianity before they could witness to others than Jews.* The question which the apostles had asked Christ, about the establishment of his kingdom, shows somewhat of their circumscribed views. Their after history makes it plain that they were sadly warped by the narrowest prejudices. Before God could use them in their whole personalities in the spread of his truth among the Gentiles, he had to lift them to a plane clear above the childish and confined one on which they stood on the day of ascension. They had to take in the truth which months before Christ had announced to the woman of Samaria, when he said, "Woman, believe me, the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father. . . . But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshiper shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth." The early church had to be weaned from the juvenile pap of Judaism before it could witness abroad.

The foregoing are at least some of the reasons which made Judea and Jerusalem the most proper field of labor for the apostolic band and church during the second period of apostolic history.

Acting, so far, on Christ's plan, the disciples, by the Spirit's aid, won for Christ a great body of followers among God's chosen people. Chapters ii. to vi., inclusive, of Acts, show that the progress of the Christian movement in Judea during this period became like that of a swelling river. At length the time came when the levees which confined this beneficent stream to Judea should have been cut by the disciples, that vivifying channels might have been carried into the arid wastes of the non-Jewish world. The work in Judea had reached the stage at which the witnesses of Jesus should have begun to go into the regions beyond. The truth of the resurrection had been amply confirmed. God had sufficiently magnified his mercy to the seed of Jacob. A host to work as missionaries had been secured. The economy of force now demanded the removal of a portion of the laborers to another part of the vineyard. The liberalizing of the Jewish converts had been going on, as the speech of Stephen shows. Everything pointed to the fact that the time had come for the church

to widen its mission, the time to take into the scope of its endeavor some more of the whole world which Jesus had commissioned it to disciple. But God's kindlier pointings of providence, as well as his repeated commands, were not respected. The Almighty has often had to touch his people to remind them that he has spoken. He had to quicken the apostolic church at this point. Up to this time God had been holding in check the enemies of the church and mightily confirming the disciples' testimony by granting signs and wonders to be done, leading Joseph like a flock. Now he unleashes the hounds of persecution.

The stoning of Stephen and the persecution that followed, recorded in the seventh and eighth chapters of Acts, make another epoch. The witnessing well done among the Jews, while not discontinued there, is to be done now in Samaria; and God sent the disciples there, though it took a persecution in Judea to do it.

3rd. *Why was the witnessing next in Samaria?* As we have seen, during the previous period of witness-bearing the minds of the disciples had been in a constant state of preparation for wider work. The spiritual nature of Christ's kingdom had taken a fuller hold on them. They had come to regard heaven as the throne of God, the earth as his footstool, and no house or place as large enough to contain him. Their absolute confidence in the support and guidance of the ascended Christ had been made firmer. Their likeness to him in his universal love for man had become more thorough-going. They were more able to feel his love for all men, Jews and Gentiles as well. Their personal devotion to Christ had been deepened. But though freed, in a degree, of prejudice, the minds of the disciples were still biased. They were still Jews, with much of the Jews' sense of superiority to other peoples, and most of the Jews' horror at the life of the uncircumcised. And it was manifest that if a people existed outside the pale of Jewry with whom an affiliation was more easily possible than with any other, it was the Samaritans. This was, perhaps, the chief reason why the gospel was to be carried next to the Samaritans. *The Jewish Christians could mingle with the Samaritans with comparative ease.* The Samaritans were circum-

cised, and would submit to any Jewish rite which the older church in Jerusalem might impose.

A *second* reason why the gospel was to be carried next into Samaria after its carrying into Judea, was the consideration that *the Samaritans had some truth, and were thus prepared to receive more*. They had the books of Moses, and from them an approximately correct notion of God. They had shared in the belief in a coming Messiah. There were probably many earnest and devout spirits among them. They had received and profited by some wayside teaching of our Lord while engaged in his earthly ministry. Their receiving the first witnessing outside of Judea was but an example of the general principle, "To him that hath shall be given."

Reasons analogous to some of those which dictated the evangelization of Judea first, might be added as among those that determined the evangelization of Samaria second. But the suggestion is enough for the reader. Thus the cords of Zion were lengthened and her stakes strengthened without exciting grave Jewish prejudices. She was enlarged where the work would be easiest, among a people to whom God had been pleased to show particular mercies in the past.

In following God's plan as to the work in Samaria, the disciples had taken a long stride towards universal Christianity. They had opened their doors to a multitude which no man could number, which was certainly not found in Samaria. They had taken down the great wall of partition that cut off the blessed light from the non-Jewish world. The Jewish Christian church had split its shell and prepared for a higher stage of life. In taking in the Samaritans the *whole Jewish church in Christ* had made ready for the final step into universal Christianity.

Meanwhile God had prepared two men, under whose leadership Jewish Christianity was to make the final step of transition into this universal Christianity. God had said: "Ye shall be witnesses unto me, both in Jerusalem and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth." The church may lag, but God works! He had prepared Paul and Peter. "The blood of martyrs is the seed of the church." The fruit of the mar-



tyrdom of Stephen was, in part, the Apostle Paul. Saul was allowed to continue for a time his persecutions, but at length, under God's further providences toward, and miraculous grace upon, him, he took up the work which had cost Stephen his life.

Peter had heard the great commission from the lips of his Lord, *to preach the gospel to all the world*, and the solemn words of the text, and much more to the same purport. But men are slow to learn, even inspired men and apostles, and God was under the necessity of teaching Peter again by providence and miracle. Accordingly, by the vision of the unclean which had been cleansed, by the commission to go to the house of Cornelius, and by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the household of that devout centurion, God had taught Peter to receive the Gentiles into his church.

Thus had God prepared men to lead his church into broader views of Christianity. Meanwhile, certain obscure Christians had begun to work in the regions beyond Judea and Samaria. Thank God for the good that obscure Christians have done and can do.

Some obscure Christians, who had been driven away from Jerusalem and had gone as far as Antioch, had preached there to the Gentiles. The church of Jerusalem had sent Barnabas to take care of the converts and help on the work. Barnabas soon called in Saul of Tarsus to help him.

The fourth period of apostolic history was now begun. Christianity had doffed its Jewish dress. Under the moving of the Holy Spirit the church sends picked men, among them Barnabas and Saul, to the Gentiles beyond.

The mighty missionary conquests of the apostolic age were pushed with Napoleonic vigor and seraphic devotion by Paul and his helpers. Asia Minor, Macedonia, Greece, Italy, and Spain, perhaps, were overrun by this band of the army of Christ. Acts, chapters xvi.-xxviii., gives us only a part of the course of Paul. The most reliable traditions indicate that what Paul was doing in one direction the other apostles were doing in other directions. Now and again the church had to pause to fortify herself in positions already taken. Such a pause was the council of Jerusalem, to stop the putting Christianity back into its Jewish dress, which

it had continued to wear as long as the converts were all Jews. But the pauses were brief. The world was *hers*; and Christianity, the world religion, went forth to conquer the world to its uttermost part.

The law of missionary endeavor in this period among the Gentiles continued to be: To bear witness as filled with the Holy Spirit, first, to Jews, and then to Samaritans, and then to Gentiles. The witnesses went first to Jews, and then to the proselytes, and then to the Gentiles: "Ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you; and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth." The latter half of these words has more than a geographical significance. Their order is significant. The gospel was to be preached, first, in one place, then in the other, and then in the other. The words contain, in part, the plan of God for the church's testifying, the divine law of its propagandism. It may be difficult to state the law well. Possibly the following statement brings out a large part of its content: *The church, filled with the Holy Spirit, shall in its efforts at propagandism seek to witness where its witnessing will result in the most efficient additional army of witness-bearers.* Perhaps we would do best to leave the law as set forth in its living concrete form as in the words of Holy Writ.

Having seen how our prophecy was wrought out in the apostolic age, it now remains to draw some lessons bearing on the great problem before the church of to-day: How to take the world for Christ:

*First,* The church should know the truth and be faithful to it. Why were the disciples bidden to wait in Jerusalem until they should receive the outpouring of the Holy Ghost? In part, that their fidelity might be tried and strengthened. The church would be better off with fewer men and more Christian manhood. In part, that the Holy Ghost might work in them a power of knowing the truth and living it. The Holy Ghost made to them unmistakably plain that the *truth was theirs*; that they bore the torch of truth, the instrument of regeneration, sanctification, and redemption. He made more clear to them the truth they already

had. He communicated other truth to them. And one of the things which the church of this age needs, is to get hold, by consecrated effort and the Spirit's help, of the truth, that truth which the Holy Spirit gave the apostles, is to *know the truth we seem to preach, know it and live it faithfully*. It is the *sine qua non* to genuine growth in every worthy congregational and denominational enterprise. O Lord, give thy church the power of *conscious truth* in apostolic measure! If the church could preach the truth with apostolic certainty, and live the truth with apostolic fidelity, it would soon do its part in winning the whole world for Christ.

Hence, *second*, the church should preach Christianity as a religion accredited by genuine miracles. Why did the apostles linger at Jerusalem to witness first there? In part, to make the stronger testimony for the resurrection of Christ; to make themselves the better able to preach a religion vindicated as divine in its origin by miracles. It is fashionable to-day in certain quarters of our country to instruct young missionaries to make nothing of the miraculous side of Christianity. They are instructed to call attention rather to its superior moral code, "as the world does not receive the miraculous readily." Now, we are to be discreet in presenting religion, of course. But Christianity unevangelized has to do with miracles, and can be ultimately proven to the spiritually unenlightened only by miracle. Jesus of Nazareth bound up his system with the claim of miraculous powers and miraculous acts in such a way that, on the one hand, miracles are a part of his teaching, and, on the other, his system cannot be proven true if his miracles are denied or disused. The church should faithfully preach the gospel, not *a la Russel*,<sup>1</sup> not bereft of the miraculous element, though it may be foolishness to the Japanese and a stumbling-block to the Chinaman.

*Third*. The church should learn adequately the religious condition of the world, so as to know where it can most effectively push its witnessing for Christ, and should push it there.

If we have been even approximately right in giving the reasons why the witness was to be first in Jerusalem and in all Judea, then in Samaria, then in the Gentile world, *then this duty of the*

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<sup>1</sup> Recently Professor of Biblical Theology in Yale Divinity School.

*church of to-day must seem very plain.* The church cannot otherwise follow the plan of God. It cannot distinguish the Jew, the Samaritan, and the Gentile. It cannot witness to the best effect, cannot witness so as to make to-morrow's host of witnesses most effective.

Are our people, our elders, our ministers, earnest enough in acquainting themselves with the relative opportunities in the different parts of the *home fields*—the relative opportunity in the Black Belt in Virginia, say, and in Arkansas—and the relative needs in the great regions beyond? Do they ask, as they should, where they can work the work that will count most for Christ? Or, are there in missions case after case of zeal without knowledge—of blind hitting out, if, perchance, something may be done? Are there other cases where selfish considerations are all-determining, *e. g.*, the desire to work up a little corner in one's own Presbytery because it is one's own? Is not *blind* Sampson a good image of the church of to-day as it works? Thank God, the church is doing great things! But is blind Samson better than Samson with his eyes, and looking equally to God, would have been? How much we lose by reason of want of circumspection! Who now does not believe that the ninth decade was the decade in which the Christian church should have taken the Japanese for Christ? The hour passed and Japan was not taken.

To some the demand that the church should get a good outlook on the condition of the world so as to judge intelligently as to where to strike for Christ may seem very large; but is not God wont to make big demands of us? And does he not demand the use of every power? And has he ever granted to the man of business the right to wrap himself in secular affairs so as not to be able to study to see where *he* can do most to forward the kingdom of God? Has he given a right to any preacher to preach on, where he happens to be born, without asking where he can serve God best?

The passage before us teaches that there should be the wisest circumspection—the fields of effort chosen with the greatest care, and chosen with the simple view of forwarding the kingdom of God. It makes a demand for no inconsiderable knowledge on the

part of the people in general. It makes a demand for a commanding knowledge on the part of the ministers and leaders of the church. No system of theological education can be complete which does not give the student at least some hold on the religious condition of the world; which does not set before him with some precision the great problem in the solution of which he is to pour out his life; which does not begin to answer for him the question as to where there is the greatest need of workers in order to the proper forwarding of the work. To hold any other position is to avow one's self a trifle. Especially should our secretaries of the work at home and abroad know the field and where the harvest is ripe. They, of all men, should never forget that the missionary is to search not for captives, but for recruits in the army of witness-bearers in which they are captains; that the church is hunting for the most effective additions to God's servants. Nor should *they* forget that they are to consult the economy of force and time, whether that economy demands concentrating of force on a given field, or scattering the force; and that they are to consult the currents of race prejudice and a host of such like things.

*Fourth.* The church should select its instruments for the several parts of its witness-bearing according to their several kinds and degrees of fitness. This is implied in the foregoing points, but deserves specific statement. It was illustrated in apostolic history.

Under the guidance of the church courts and the Holy Ghost, Paul was sent to the Gentiles. Why? Because by the breadth of his intellect and heart he was the fittest Christian of the day for the work. Previously, the Holy Ghost had sent Peter to receive, by baptism, the first uncircumcised converts into the Christian church. Why? Peter was the man for such a bold innovation on seeing that it was right.

The Holy Ghost reveals not his guidance in such miraculous wise in the present. But he speaks through the church when he willeth. The church courts may act under his guidance. And the church through her courts should choose all her special agents carefully. *The voluntary element has had too large a place in missions at home and abroad, as it has had in determining who*

*shall be ministers.* It has too large a place now. The courts should *pick* the men for all the places, especially for the hard places. The Lord prefers to win his great victories by the three hundred chosen according to his own test, rather than by ten thousand simple volunteers, though they be men of courage. To illustrate, if our courts had picked with sufficient care, our home missionaries, that work would be better supported; if they had picked with sufficient care our foreign missionaries, there had been fewer returned missionaries, and with larger results, perhaps.

*Fifth.* Inclusively, the church should study day by day to secure the most efficient additional army of witness-bearers. It should study to know God's plan, and should fall in with it. God says to the Christians of this age: "Ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost has come upon you; and ye shall be witnesses unto me in Jerusalem and in all Judea, in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth." Ye shall witness in that order which shall result in the most effective increase to the army of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Lord give his church the grace to do this great thing which he has commanded!

In conclusion, the church should consider whether God may not make it suffer if it lags in the outworking of his plan. If his plan is such as has been represented in the preceding pages, the church, working according to any other, must have a relatively feeble growth. No plan can be so good for God's church as his own. The adoption of any other plan is, that far, apostasy moreover, and the apostate always suffers. Out of fear of the sons of Anak the Israelites would not enter Canaan according to God's plan. Their bones strewed the desert. They tired of God's rule over them in the time of Samuel; they got an earthly king, but he became possessed of an evil spirit. The history of the people of God is a proof, the most convincing, that they should follow his plan, even if it does seem difficult.

THOS. C. JOHNSON.

*Hampden-Sidney, Va.*

#### IV. THE LAMBETH ULTIMATUM.

THE "dissenting" religious press in the United States is much exercised over "the historic episcopate," as one of four essentials to organic union. I am so ardent an advocate of that dogma that the agitation of these good brethren impresses me as groundless. The Book of Acts is, beyond question, history, and confessedly inspired. The epistles of St. Paul, also, contain much historical matter. In these venerable documents we find the primitive Christian churches provided with rulers called *episcopoi*, or *elders*, and hundreds of these *bishops*, which is the English for *episcopoi*, were ordained by the apostles and their assistants. I am, therefore, as sure that the primitive church was *episcopal*, as that the Bible was from God.

The "historic episcopate" is impregnable, and the wonder is that so many have the hardihood to call it in question. But a still greater wonder is, that a corrupt church, in alliance with the Roman empire, succeeded so well in abolishing this apostolic institution, and substituting a hierarchy of prelates in its place. The episcopate of uninspired history, or tradition, is a priestly aristocracy, as unlike the elders of Paul's churches as an elephant is unlike a mouse. The episcopate of *inspired* history was a body of select men in a congregation of believers. See Paul's epistles to Timothy and Titus, and his address to the elders of the church of Ephesus as "bishops." (Acts xx., Revised Version.) The episcopate of uninspired history, on the contrary, is everywhere the investiture of an *individual* with authority over many parishes and many local ministers. Under the former system each congregation or city was provided with a number of primitive bishops. Under the latter, a whole state or province is subjected to a diocesan, who itinerates from parish to parish to supervise his subordinates.

As a consequence of so great a change after the apostolic system was introduced, the relative number of so-called bishops be-

came smaller and smaller, and the church was subjected to an episcopate held by clerical princes appointed over large populations.

The apostolic church was thus, beyond dispute, *more episcopal* than its successors. We are confronted in our day with a strange scene. The corrupt majority in nominal Christendom insists that a system of church government shall be accepted as historic and fundamental which *excludes* episcopacy from the parish or congregation, and converts it into a rare and exclusive office of superintendency over large areas. The Protestant bodies which adhere more strictly to the scriptural models are denounced as schismatic, because they cleave to the original, historical episcopate founded by the apostles, and object to a bishopric which is interdicted to the local parishes of the church. Thus the non-episcopal denominations are manifestly more zealous for the historic episcopate of the Bible than those bodies which boast most loudly of their devotion to the system. I maintain that the most consistent Episcopalians in the world are the Presbyterians, who have about one bishop for every hundred or two communicants, whilst the prelatical systems provide less than one per cent. as many. I do not pretend to exactness, but the reader knows that a Presbyterian church has several bishops, and the prelatie bishop has many churches.

There is no reason whatever for rejecting the "historic episcopate" if *sacred* history is allowed its due weight in the scales. The observant inquirer will be astonished to find that prelacy is, in the light of the New Testament, nothing less than an abandonment of the parochial episcopacy so carefully instituted by Paul.

It is hard to deal gravely with some of these priestly pretensions, however sincerely entertained. Millions of Chinese burn bogus paper money, in the belief that somehow their dead may use the smoke as currency. Millions of papists, and some Anglicans, who are educated and rational, accept the dogma of transubstantiation, being ready to swear that our Lord, when he instituted the supper, held between his fingers his own entire person, one Christ being held in the hands of another, which was yet the same. And now we find a large body of pious and learned pre-



lates proclaiming their belief that "historic episcopacy" is an essential feature of Christianity, whilst the Baptist denomination, with equal fervor, and equal reason, plead for "historic immersion." It is difficult for Bible Christians, who believe that "the kingdom of God cometh not with observation," but is mainly "within" us, to contend with these frantic parties who are so earnestly vociferating, "Lo, here! and lo, there!" If we understand the prelatist, he wishes to convey, by the terms he employs, the notion that his episcopate is "historic," in the sense of original and permanent. But, with the exception of the word itself, the whole institution is the fruit of a development. *Stat nominis umbra*. "Bishop" means different things in different times and localities, and "historic" belongs to events, rather than institutions. The episcopate of these gentlemen is no more historic than the pyramids. It is a fine specimen of *lucus a non lucendo*. It was one thing under St. Paul, another under Constantine, another under Hildebrand, another under Cranmer, and still another under Laud. It is of one type in Abyssinia, of another type in Russia, of another at Rome, of another in South America, and of still another in the United States.

The advocates of the institution propound it as a part of an ultimatum for organic union with other Protestant sects, and seem to assume that it is perfectly definite and intelligible. But, on inspection, it is found to be a vanishing quantity, presenting occasion for unlimited difference of opinion. And yet its advocates treat it as a fundamental article of religious belief, no more to be surrendered than the sacraments!

With due respect, we must say that this exaltation of a *form* to the dignity of a fundamental dogma of the religion of Christ, appears to us as irrational as paper money for the dead, or the material presence of our Lord in the eucharist. We are not rationalists, and admit the truth of many religious propositions, however mysterious, when proved from Scripture. But this proposal is, that all Christians shall accept in faith the inexplicable mystery of a spiritual pedigree descending to us through eighteen centuries of ecclesiastical evolution, as validly in Abyssinia, Russia, Italy, and Spain, as anywhere else, but totally wanting among

those Christians who respect the Bible most, and are doing most for the kingdom of Christ.

The fruits of the Spirit are confessedly associated with Christian institutions, but here is one special gift that flows in a different channel, from hand to head, of corrupt and debased hierarchies, with all the greater assurance of purity in the transmission, according to the *impurity* of its channels. Copts, Jacobites, Armenians, Nestorians, Greek Catholics, Roman and Spanish Catholics, are all, according to the assumption of these high church Anglicans, in full possession of the so-called historic episcopate, which guarantees the continuous enjoyment of the Spirit of God flowing steadily through the hands of their bishops. The fruits of the Spirit enumerated by St. Paul, in Galatians v. 22, should especially abound in populations so highly privileged, and be conspicuously wanting under an unauthorized ministry, such as is generally found in Britain, Germany, Scandinavia, and the United States. Current history, however, testifies that the territories that bask in the full blaze of the "historic episcopate" cannot compare in Christian morals with those chiefly served by a schismatic ministry. Travellers are unanimous in declaring that the Turk is an honorable, dignified gentleman, compared with the Catholic sects that habitually quarrel and fight, under his supervision, in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, and over the Saviour's manger at Bethlehem.

The reader can now comprehend our meaning when we say that this theory of the historic episcopate is as hard to believe as transubstantiation, or the ashes of a paper currency devoted to the dead. If reason is to decide upon its claims, as the mode of argument generally pursued in its behalf would indicate, common sense must dispose of it at once as an absurdity of the lowest grade.

But one of the strangest phenomena is the unwillingness of Christian men, who thus appeal to history, to give its due weight to the only history that is infallible. The meagreness and obscurity of the early fathers, on whom they rely, are proverbial. So far as they contradict the New Testament, they are an impertinence. When they confirm its testimony, they are little needed.

The inspired pages are incomparably more explicit and satisfactory. But their testimony is habitually slighted, in comparison with the vague and dubious testimony of tradition, by nearly all the champions of the historic episcopate.

If one of their own prelates should ordain elders as bishops in every parish in his diocese, the act would be denounced as an outrage by the whole hierarchy; and yet it would be in close conformity to apostolical example, since Paul instructed both Timothy and Titus to do so. The elders of Ephesus were *bishops* (see Acts xx. 28, Revised New Testament), but this fact is *too* historical for the hierarchy. They refuse to recognize an episcopacy fifty or a hundred years older than their own, not only as improperly ordained, but as not historical! They positively forbid the Christian congregations under their care to be organized after the model of Paul's churches, and require them to be governed by an episcopate of later date and far more extensive jurisdiction.

This episcopate, of inferior antiquity and exalted pretensions, now proposes union with other Protestant denominations on condition that the latter shall practically accept the more modern and more princely type of episcopacy derived from tradition, and renounce the more historical and scriptural system so clearly revealed in the word of God. And the absurdity of the demand does not consist altogether in dictation by a small minority of Protestants, of insular origin, to the great majority of their brethren, equally acquainted with the Scriptures, and comprehending many nationalities; nor in the superstition that exalts the outward form of ordination to an importance far superior to that of an actual fellowship of faith by the Spirit. Its chief feature lies in the amazing notion that an episcopate whose institution or germination occurred sometime during that night of horrors that followed the destruction of Jerusalem, and covered up as with a pall the infant church of Christ, rendering all satisfactory history almost impossible; that such an episcopate, conjectural, traditional, mutable, indefinable, should be called *historical* in a præeminent sense, and urged as a *necessary substitute* for another episcopate of higher antiquity, revealed in the inspired oracles of Paul and Luke, and put upon record for the benefit of all future ages!

All this seems to us palpably inconsistent with the letter of the Bible and with plain common sense. We bring no railing accusation. Great respect is due to the English and American hierarchy. But many great and good men adhere to transubstantiation, and many learned and devout ecclesiastics believe in the Holy Coat of Treves and the carpal bones of St. Anne. The most puerile conceits are sometimes entertained by the most august personages.

We have sufficiently exposed the antagonism of this high church fetich with the explicit, undeniable letter of the New Testament. Its significance is tremendous. The courtesies of society render us blind to the immense gulf it creates between the hierarchy and other Protestants. They appear very gracious towards ministers of other sects, and doubtless often breathe a fraternal spirit; but when it is proposed that they shall *officially* give some sign of recognition, a polite rejection never fails to come. It is always maintained that ordinances administered by Lutheran, Presbyterian, Congregational, Methodist, Baptist, and other evangelical ministers are not altogether valid. A small minority of those who profess a supreme regard for the Bible accuse an overwhelming majority of their brethren of *schism*, on the ground that this majority cannot exactly concur with the insular minority in substituting a traditional episcopate for the more historical episcopate of the other Reformed churches.

I propose now to exhibit the contrariety of this theory to the *spirit* of the gospel. It offends us very grossly by its sharp contrast with the primitive type of Christianity. But that is nothing, when compared with its presumptuous antagonism to the fraternal spirit enjoined upon us by our Lord. We are astonished whenever we receive a summons to *union* from parties who have done more to promote division than all their opponents. Parochial episcopacy was undeniably instituted by the Apostle Paul. From the time of the English Reformation, a governmental party in that country, always associated with the court and the aristocracy, has maintained a desperate controversy against this form of episcopate, seeking, by every device of priestly ingenuity, to substitute for it the opposite hierarchical system. So

far as Protestants are concerned, it is a purely English idea, as little countenanced by continental churches as any other insular peculiarity. But it has been fighting ever since, not only against the *letter* of inspired history, but against the sacred fellowship of the gospel.

The prayer of our Lord for his people, that they might be one, is constantly brandished as a sword in the hands of this Anglican party, to compel Christians of other principles and nationalities to abandon their convictions and become prelatists after the Anglican order. Religious indifference, and wealth, and social prestige, are always operating in furtherance of their purpose; but conscience, intelligence, and the spirit of liberty, continue to array an immense majority of Protestants in opposition to the scheme. This majority appeals not only to the inspired testimony of the New Testament, but to its spiritual principles. Peter, in his First Epistle, chapter v., exhorts his fellow-elders to exercise their episcopate (see Greek) over their respective charges (see Revised Version) in a meek and humble spirit, as examples rather than lords. If he and Paul teach the same order, they both refer to the "parochial episcopacy" of the elders, like those of Ephesus and Philippi. The injunction plainly condemns all individual and arbitrary exercise of the functions of an elder over a local congregation. This precisely accords with the Saviour's own precept, that office in his church was to be a *service*, and not a distinction of rank: See Matt. xx. 26: "Not so shall it be among you: but whosoever would become great among you shall be your minister; and whosoever would be first among you shall be your servant." I use the Revised Version, but in the original the language is still stronger. Servant and slave are the words employed. Nothing could be more explicit and forcible than this prohibition by our Lord of any imitation in his church of secular rank and temporal autocracy.

All intelligent people must know that prelatical episcopacy in the oriental, Catholic, and Anglican systems violates this divine precept by a shameful imitation of the usages of the Gentiles. It can hardly be necessary to refer to the spiritual peerages in Russia, Italy, Spain, and England, or to the pomp and state of

these hierarchies in all the older countries of the world; whilst they affect or cultivate another demeanor in democratic America.

The spirit of prelacy, when unrestrained, is in glaring contrast with the spirit of the gospel. It destroys the parochial episcopate of the Scriptures, and introduces into the church that very domination, of one over many, which Christ and his apostles so earnestly prohibited. The extent to which the authority of representative bodies has been substituted in the United States for the autocracy of Protestant prelates is strong confirmation of this criticism. The prelatic theory is given up, in proportion to the influence allowed to lay representation. But this dogma is characterized, wherever it predominates, by the rule of one appointee over many subjects, and is in permanent conflict with the impression created by the injunctions of Scripture. Spiritual eminence is inseparably associated with profound humility, and true episcopacy is the function of lowly shepherds in the midst of a dependent flock, carefully feeding the sheep, and lovingly leading them in the way of life.

The spirit of prelacy, unchecked by controlling deliberative bodies, is autocratic, pompous, and adverse to the humble services of the Master. There are many noble exceptions, but the tendency is easily seen in England, and in most Catholic countries, where the bishops usually take rank with the secular aristocracy. This tendency is the natural growth of a system founded upon the false assumption that the Christian ministry is a *priesthood* like the atoning priesthood of our Lord. The Holy Spirit, under whose inspiration the New Testament was written, so carefully guided the several authors that not one of them ever applied the title of "priest" to the preachers of the gospel, as they would naturally have done had the notion been true. A more significant omission cannot be conceived. But this idea is so essential to the dogma that no concession of it has been allowed in the interest of peace after centuries of controversy. The hierarchy would rather hold on to *disunion* for centuries more, than abandon the title of "priest," however unscriptural.

This arbitrary error is far more than a mere verbal distinction. All perverts from other Protestant bodies to the prelatical ranks

accept a dogma which the New Testament most solemnly repudiates. The priesthood of the Redeemer was the fulfilment of the whole priesthood of the Jews. So we are forced to understand the Epistle to the Hebrews. In the temple service assistant priests were needed by reason of infirmity; but our Lord needed no assistants or successors. The chief function of the apostles was that of witnesses, and the ministers of the new dispensation are heralds of salvation. The atoning work was finished on the cross. The atoning priest ascended to heaven. The office was wholly absorbed in his one person, and other priests of like functions form no part of the provision made for the church. The very word was expressly abandoned. Ephes. iv. 10-12: "He that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, that he might fill all things. And he gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ." The priesthood was evidently *not* given, which would not have been omitted if Paul had been a prelatist of the present type.

If, then, there was no such office provided for in the Christian church, there was no use for the title. We are far from higgling about mere words; but when a denomination of Christians adopts a *word* as the vehicle of an enormous error, it is the duty of Protestants to protest. Especially are we compelled to remonstrate when this error is laid down as one of four indispensable conditions of a union which is claimed to be imperative upon those addressed. This is the very reason why the Anglican clergy insist upon the word *priest* in their immutable system. It is totally unwarranted by the New Testament, as all candid readers know, but is considered necessary for the purpose of preserving a certain doctrine in the church to which most Protestants object.

These champions of a pernicious phraseology seem willing to sacrifice, for centuries more, the unity of the church for the sake of wearing the badges of the corrupt papacy. Other denominations have been remonstrating for generations against their unnecessary imitations of Rome, but they plainly declare that they love such words as *altars*, and *priests*, and *temples*, foreign as

they are to the idiom of the primitive Christians, more than they love unity and peace.

We protest against such a sacramental use of unauthorized terms, solely on account of the error they convey. The earnestness of their advocates betrays a significance of a portentous character. Why *insist* upon a temple, an altar, and a priesthood, if the work of *atonement* was finished on the cross? We are expressly told (Heb. viii. 4) that if Christ had remained on earth *he* should not have been a priest. And, again (ix. 25), that he is not to be offered up often. Beyond question, therefore, the eucharist is not in any sense a repetition of the first offering of Christ. But the tenacity of Anglicans for this priestly phraseology, against all the appeals of their brethren, proves the charge that, as a church, they are not prepared to renounce all faith in the popish sacrifice of the mass. They prefer to retain a language that at least does not deny that Christ is repeatedly offered up on an altar, by a priest, in a consecrated temple.

The divisive character of this persistency in phrase is very obvious. It builds a Chinese wall to encircle a new celestial empire. The Redeemer himself drew a line of distinct separation around his church. It was not his will to include his enemies or shut out his friends. The so-called historic episcopate, which creates and sustains the so-called Christian priesthood, extends its fraternal embrace around millions of nominal Christians, inferior in morals to many followers of Mahomet and Confucius, whilst it refuses recognition to millions of evangelical Protestants at least as good Christians as its own members. No extravagance is intended. As individuals, they exhibit a kindly spirit towards Lutherans, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, and other orthodox Protestants. But as ecclesiastics, they declare, on paper, and keep it recorded, that Abyssinians, Copts, and Syrians are their Episcopal brethren, whilst the other Protestants are schismatics.

The Chinese wall thus drawn is an extraordinary structure. It encloses multitudes of the worst specimens of humanity, the vile scum of degraded nationalities of the Orient. It shuts out multitudes of the true people of Christ, who bear the cross after him



as ardently as any of his ancient martyrs. Their ministers are generally excluded from their pulpits, always from their altars, and they are politely informed, that when they want true orders they will please strip off the false orders they have hitherto worn.

The question arises whether these church lines correspond with the boundaries of the Redeemer's kingdom. It is perhaps impossible to exclude all false professors, which, however, should be the aim of all honest administration. On the other hand, it seems very wrong to rule out any of the Lord's true disciples. A few may exclude themselves by unreasonable excuses, but, with rare exceptions, all persons who give evidence of Christian piety seek admission to Christian fellowship. We therefore challenge the right of any organization claiming to be catholic to prescribe any other than the original Christ-given terms of communion. These were simply "believe and be baptized," the latter being the confession of the former in a significant rite.

Now, the Lambeth Conference, representing the Anglican Church, summons all other Protestant Christians to a comprehensive union for the whole world, on a basis of four articles, one of which is this same "historic episcopate," that so directly contradicts the Scriptures, to be adopted in the first article. In other words, a catholic basis of union is proposed, in which all members shall concur in the maintenance of two dogmas which are irreconcilable; and, what is far worse, the member is to consent to a principle in church government as of fundamental obligation which conflicts with his honest conception of the contents of the inspired Scriptures just accepted. It is true that modifications of the last stipulation are provided for; but no intelligent reader will suppose that the characteristics of the high-church theory are to be abandoned. There is no suggestion of any such concession. The demand is clearly that all the constituents of this united church shall hereafter agree in submitting to a government, in parishes by a priesthood, and in dioceses by "historic bishops"; whereas the very Scriptures, which they have just received as the word of God, declare in so many words that the original primitive churches were governed, under the apostles, by a body of *elders-bishops* in each congregation.

We would like to know how this proposition can be harmonized with the terms of communion laid down for his church by Jesus Christ our Lord. The verbal contradiction is obvious. The jailer at Philippi was not required to assent to any "historic episcopate." He was admitted to an apostolic church on profession of his faith in Jesus Christ, and that church contained no prelates, but simply a corps of elders, called "bishops," and a body of servants, called "deacons." (See Philippians i. 1.) But the spiritual contradiction is still more repulsive. These bishops at Philippi were the appointed shepherds of one little flock, such as Paul taught to rule chiefly by example, and positively forbade to act as lords over their fellow-Christians; and all of us know how solemnly our Saviour insisted that the oversight of his church should be a lowly service, and not a rank or dominion.

The Lambeth proclamation is ostensibly and honestly a proposal of union from a minority of Protestants to the vast majority, on condition of rejecting the parochial episcopate of the Bible, and practically accepting the "historic episcopate" of the more corrupt bodies of Christians. But this condition was never even hinted at by Christ or his apostles. "Historic episcopacy" had no existence when Christianity began. No claim of catholicity can be entered in behalf of a system that in one breath accepts the Bible, and then rejects its explicit testimony. Faith in Jesus Christ says nothing about the government of the church. It necessarily implies the truth of the Scriptures and reverence for their contents. But it is obvious that the converted jailer was not required to commit himself to a doctrine of polity based upon centuries of history yet to come.

The Lambeth scheme, no matter what its spirit, is directly contrary to the catholic basis of union. That basis is found in the terms prescribed to the primitive converts under the preaching of the apostles. That which the multitudes converted at Pentecost believed, was not an "historic episcopate," but a divine, atoning Saviour. The faith which saves the soul is the apostolic basis of catholic Christianity. All other terms are sectarian. The common creed which lies at the foundation of all Christian character is the line that distinguishes true disciples from the world. It

should, in design, embrace every child of grace in all sects and nations. No right is given by the gospel to any organization to say to the individual believer, It is nobler to be a churchman than to be a Christian. True Christianity, as Jesus taught it, recognizes and welcomes all who love him, whatever sectarian name they may bear, and its spirit offers fellowship freely to all who manifest the spiritual image of the common Lord.

The "historic episcopate," as a necessary condition of fellowship on a par with the inspired Scriptures and the doctrine of salvation, violates the fraternity for which it professes to plead. Beyond all question, that "love of the brethren" which St. John lays down as a test of Christian piety is independent of denominational lines. But this unscriptural, artificial, arrogant dogma fosters a spirit of alienation between its advocates and other bodies of believers. Embarrassment attends all the spiritual intercourse of churchmen, as they call themselves, with Christians of lower pretensions, and generally the Lord's table is so served by the former as to represent the isolation of a sect instead of exhibiting the communion of saints.

Of Protestant denominations, the Lutheran is the largest in nominal adherents, the Presbyterians next, and the Anglicans next. But outside of England, and especially in the United States, this body sinks down into comparative insignificance. There are at least forty millions of decided Protestants among us. The adherents of Anglicanism can hardly exceed five per cent. of them. The posture of this minority in relation to the rest would be extremely ludicrous, were it not so sincere, so solemn, so pathetic. It regards itself as in possession of a secret of vast importance to the Christian public, and longs to impart the blessing to all others. This refers to a mysterious connection between their hierarchy and the Lord, by means of which the prelatial bishops are alone authorized to confirm and ordain. Without intending it, they hold a theory of "historical" succession from his hands analogous to the electric apparatus now becoming so familiar. The storage is in the hierarchy. The power is transmitted in consecration by imposition of hands. The benefit is exclusively enjoyed by their own highly-favored communion. The

dissenting majority, voluntarily out of connection, are in darkness, and sadly in need of the holy current that imparts validity to all Christian ordinances.

The desire of this little body to distribute this wonderful agency, which is nothing less than the Holy Ghost flowing in unbroken current through the sacred fingers of the prelacy, is of course creditable to its benevolent sentiments. The majority are supposed to be in a deplorable condition, cut off from the source where the gift is generated by their blind unbelief. The Anglican society is *ex hypothesi* on the mount of privilege, but its elation is happily sobered and softened by compassion for those who are not partakers of the benefit. This yearning towards unfortunate dissent has at length led them to an offer involving great self-denial. They are willing to give up almost everything else for the sake of sharing their mysterious blessing with their less favored brethren outside!

The obtuseness of the parties so feelingly approached must appear phenomenal. The immense host remains unmoved, and seems to say that, in their view, the source of grace is within reach, without any necessity for invisible lines of connection. They think, moreover, that in experience they get along quite as well without priestly manipulation as they could with it. Observation appears to convince them that the blessing of Christ is not distributed more abundantly to the subjects of hierarchies than to others, and if any advantage is seen, it belongs to those who do not depend upon prelatical assistance, but enjoy a more direct access to God, by means of the Bible and personal communion. They contend that the alleged monopoly of valid ordinances, claimed by the prelatists, ought to bear fruit in those lands where it is most fully enjoyed. They decline to boast, but are willing that even the world shall judge whether Christian piety and activity are less conspicuous among Methodists than among Anglicans, or whether the Copts and Syrians, the Russians and Spaniards, are more heartily engaged in efforts to convert mankind than Baptists or Presbyterians. It is still true, as the Lord declared, that in religion the character of sects or parties is known "by their fruits."

In any American community it is easy to determine by observation in which sect the fruits of the Spirit are most manifest. These are stated by the inspired Paul to be those graces which mark all true disciples in greater or less degree. If any particular congregation enjoys valid ordinances derived in unbroken succession from Christ, who ordained the apostles, and other congregations around it are destitute of this advantage, the former ought to be known to the public by a marked superiority of the graces of the Spirit in its members. The first of these, named in Galatians v. 22, is *love*. If any one of these local bodies of Christian worshippers is eminent for its spirit of love towards the brethren of various names in that community, we have the word of God that it is in closest connection with heaven. We must be pardoned for maintaining that the absence of such evidence renders null and void every pretension to spiritual preëminence. Our prelatical brethren are not aware of the necessary impression of their assumptions. The outside world is absolutely indifferent to displays of church arrogance, whether Romish or English, and the secular press smiles with pretended respect and secret scorn upon high and low alike. But the intelligent Protestant public in the United States can never be reconciled to such claims of superiority, without Bible warrant, and unsustained by a corresponding sanctity of Christian character.

The Lambeth ultimatum is an expression of earnest desire for union. As far as this desire is sincere, it betrays a remarkable incapacity in great and good men to comprehend what the union prayed for by our Lord signifies. Even if their scheme were realized literally, it is obvious that the union secured would be nominal only, leaving the doors wide open for lasting dissension among Protestants, with no pope to act as umpire. The next logical step would be a reconciliation with Rome. If prelacy is accepted by all, a supreme bishop, to conclude controversy and pacify a distracted church, will become an absolute necessity. But in our judgment the ultimatum does not contemplate *union* at all. It proposes assimilation, and nothing more. The Swiss Confederation resembles the American; but there is no union between them. The American Episcopal Church is something like

the Anglican, but they are otherwise distinct. No organic union is suggested in the proposition issued by the bishops of the two bodies, and yet they contend that they are the leading champions of union. It is a strange allusion affecting all parties. Organic union of the whole of Christendom is an impossibility without a supreme, visible, infallible authority presiding over it. United prelacy is popery. But the Lambeth Conference means nothing of the kind. It proposes nothing but a change of dress, one uniform, pronounced to be historical and apostolical, being offered by them, its sole Protestant depositaries, in the place of the prevailing diversity. A number of great denominations is to continue in existence, all having the "historic episcopate," but all as distinct as the English episcopacy is distinct from the American. We contend that this is not union, but mere assimilation in one point. But the prayer of our Lord for the *oneness* of his disciples was *not* that they should be alike in church polity. He meant oneness of spirit, as he and his Father are one. He meant for them to be so absorbed in one faith and purpose as to dwell joyfully together in the bond of peace. But putting on a uniform never yet formed an army. The absurdity of the ultimatum is conspicuous. It is like a proposition from Germany to France to secure future union by adopting one uniform for both armies, and continuing those armies on a war footing! Christian unity is surely something entirely different. It contemplates a state of harmony in respect to ideas and feelings.

All know that the time has passed for compulsory uniformity. All do not seem to know that the time of *shams* has also expired. Unity of spirit is the need of Christendom, and it will never be realized until men agree upon some standard for the settlement of religious differences. Nominally, Protestants appeal to the Bible, but on the subject of church government too many are unwilling to abide by it. The Lambeth bishops appear to give more heed to the traditions of popery than to the positive testimony of Holy Writ. Nine Protestants out of ten, who consult the Scriptures, have an irresistible conviction that prelacy was not the polity indicated in the New Testament. Some of these hold that the parochial episcopate should be closely imitated. Others regard

the system of government as a matter left to discretion. But the Anglican party, in its zeal for *union*, convincing themselves that the episcopacy of the New Testament was *not* parochial, but prelatial and obligatory, propose to the vast majority of the Protestant public to unite upon four essential propositions, of which prelaty is one. In other words, the one-tenth aforesaid invites the nine-tenths to an *imaginary* union on a basis of three terms already for centuries allowed, and one term long controverted. It would savor of disrespect to intimate that any concession of principle is intended. No concession of any important matter is embraced in the offer. They will allow non-liturgical worship to proceed at the will of the worshippers. But this is a mere recognition of the rights of the people already enjoyed. The stipulation proves that *union* is not expected. The sacrifice is altogether on the side of the nine-tenths, who must all submit to be governed by priestly rectors and diocesan bishops succeeding the apostles. It is assumed that no principle is in the way, but only an unfounded whim or prejudice. But here is the astounding feature of this unparalleled movement: The one-tenth regards its own darling fiction as a divine *principle* never to be questioned, whilst the convictions deeply graven in the minds of the nine-tenths by centuries of controversy and investigation are treated as *trifles* that ought to be easily given up for the sake of a visionary union. Now, if the people may decide between one form of worship and another, why may not so large a majority of the whole decide between prelaty and liberty?

The objections of a vast majority of Bible Christians to this system, are strangely misunderstood, because they are not held as vital articles of faith. They are far more worthy of the name of principles than the unwarranted notions of a small minority. The Anglican brotherhood is deeply affected by its isolation, and labors hard to obtain relief. But a grave mistake is made when a minority among equals regards its own views as unchangeable principles, and the honest convictions of all the other evangelical bodies as mere prejudices. Such one-sidedness closely resembles fanaticism. The isolation so much lamented is their own handiwork. A small faction of insular Protestants, with Bibles in their

hands, but in close sympathy with arbitrary sovereigns and a fawning aristocracy, entrenched themselves, three hundred years ago, within a gulf of sectarian peculiarities, by which they have been kept ever since, in bitter antagonism towards a large majority of brethren equally devoted to the truth. They are now weary of the conflict, and desire to escape from their chosen isolation. But such a device as they propose was never known in human affairs. They warmly invite their outside friends to cross over the enclosing gulf, and enjoy their minor peculiarities within the pale unmolested. A single ship in conflict with a fleet becomes tired of battle, and, under a flag of truce, offers to contend no longer, if the opposing vessels will surrender and place *her* flag at their mastheads.

Now this is a war of opinions among Bible-reading Christians. It ought to stop. Three hundred years of unbecoming strife are surely enough. All parties long for peace. Sects should be as reasonable as nations or armies. What shall be done? Plainly and unquestionably they should cease firing and consent to negotiate on terms acceptable to the common sovereign. Jesus Christ is Lord, "yesterday, to-day and forever." His will is not conveyed from the Vatican, but from his written word. It is not found in the so-called "Fathers," but in the canonical Scriptures. The Anglican brethren would be wise to approach the majority at least as *equals*, and consent to refer the matter in controversy to the inspired oracles, which were completed before the history of the Fathers began.

This course would not only be prudent, but eminently pious and Christian. The Lord's prayer for *unity* in his church is worthy of all acceptance on such an occasion. It unquestionably relates to unity of spirit. The parties must confer as brethren in Christ if peace is to follow. Every attitude of superiority ought to be abandoned. Everything unfraternal should be given up. Those who meet in conference might well *pray* together and *commune* together as loving brethren, as the very first step to be taken. The ecclesiastics could imitate the Lord on the night when he was betrayed, and humbly serve one another with girded loins, "in lowliness of mind, each esteeming others better than himself."



We can conceive of no objection to such a beginning, except from Satan and his dupes. The lip of prelatical pride might curl in scorn, but the angels would clap their wings for joy, and the King of kings would smile approval, according to his word. The question, "Who is my brother?" is as plainly taught us as, "Who is my neighbor?" He is every child of God. "*As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name.*" (John i. 12.)

J. A. WADDELL.

Roxbury, Va.

## V. CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS IN THE GOSPEL MINISTRY.<sup>1</sup>

PREACHING, which is the prime function of the ministry, has been aptly and tersely defined as "Truth through Personality."

The other departments of instruction in this institution have to do mainly with the truth—a fixed and unvarying element. This department, however, more especially in one of its branches, has to do with the ever-varying element of *personality*—the medium through which the truth is conveyed.

The burning question here is not, "What is truth?" but rather, "How can the truth be brought into saving contact with a perishing world?"

Whilst there are many and divergent views as to what constitutes that truth which is committed to the ministry, there are no less divergent views as to the nature and functions of the ministry; views, perhaps not so obtrusively heterodox, but none the less pernicious in their influence.

In view of the practical importance of the subject, and without apology for introducing to your attention so trite a theme, let us consider briefly and simply some, at least, of the conditions of success in the gospel ministry.

Where shall we find our model minister? the ideal pastor? What constitutes the highest excellence in this calling? One instinctively points to the great "Shepherd of the sheep," as being the archetypal "teacher" sent from God, the very incarnation of every conceivable qualification for this office. Another points to the great apostle to the Gentiles as a more approachable model, being himself a sinner saved by grace. Another turns to the apostle of love, the warm and gentle-hearted John; or to the practical, matter-of-fact James; or to the eloquent Apollos, mighty in the Scriptures; or to the beloved Timothy,

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<sup>1</sup> Inaugural Address in Union Theological Seminary, Va., May, 1894.

with his godly ancestry, his early piety, and his apostolic training. All of these are indeed grand models, worthy of imitation, and yet one sees at a glance that there are marked differences. We must separate the essential from the incidental. We must seek for those fundamental qualities which hold good for all time and for all individuals. We must translate the traits of the first century into those of the nineteenth, and recast Eastern customs into those of the West.

What are some, at least, of the principal qualities and characteristics which mark the true "man of God," the absence of which detract more or less from his efficiency, or even stamp him as an intruder?

We mention some of these characteristics, not in the order of their importance precisely, but for convenience rather, under these heads:

1. *Physical.* The body is an integral part of man as truly as is the soul. Both shared alike in the fall and in the redemption. Christ died for our bodies not a whit less than for our souls, and ministered to the wants of one as assiduously as to the other. Undertaking the work of our redemption, he took to himself "a true body" as well as "a reasonable soul," and so became "bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh."

The body thus assumed played a most important part in the scheme of redemption; for without it there could have been no sacrifice for sin on Calvary, nor any ministry of love. He needed a body; yea, a sound and vigorous one; and we have reason to believe that our Lord was a man of great bodily vigor, and not, as is often represented, an effeminate, ethereal being, ill-fitted for the conflicts of life.

How arduous were his labors, as for three years he bore the heat and burden of the day! How tremendous the weight of responsibility resting upon him; how incessant the toil! Yet, while his disciples sought their much-needed repose in sleep, he spent the night in prayer. Once, and only once, do we find mention made of his being weary, and even then he was about his Father's business as he rested on Jacob's well. Had he entered upon his life-work a pale-faced youth, emerging from his cloister;

a poor dyspeptic, with nerves already shattered, his work would have been a miserable failure.

His immediate disciples, too, were brawny sons of toil; hale, hearty, inured to all manner of hardships. They, at least, were not laid aside by clergyman's sore throat, or nervous prostration; and doubtless, in choosing them, our Lord had respect to their sound and vigorous bodies, their capacity for work, and their ability to endure hardships.

Paul, indeed, may be regarded as an exception to this rule, but without sufficient reason. True, he was insignificant in appearance, and afflicted, as many suppose, with ophthalmia, but a man who could, through a long series of years, perform such herculean labors, and endure such hardships—a man “in labors more abundant; in stripes above measure; in prisons more frequent; in deaths oft; five times receiving forty stripes save one; thrice beaten with rods; once stoned; thrice shipwrecked; a night and a day in the deep; in journeyings often; in perils of waters, of robbers by his own countrymen, by the heathen, in the city, in the wilderness, in the sea, among false brethren, in weariness and painfulness; in watchings often; in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness; and besides these things the care of all the churches” (2 Cor. xi. 23–28)—and then die in a good old age, and only by the executioner's sword, was surely no weakling.

True, we read of the “oft infirmities” of Timothy, yet we also find that he was solemnly urged to apply a remedy therefor, and that injunction has been preserved in the inspired record for our warning and admonition.

It is freely conceded that prodigies have been performed both in church and state by men of frail bodies; but the proposition still holds good that a sound and vigorous body plays a most important part in the work of the ministry; and while some may succeed without it, multitudes will fail for lack of it.

The arduous labors which confront the minister, the ever-increasing burdens he is called to bear, imperatively demand the very highest type of bodily vigor. A minister with a long catalogue of diseases, a pale face, an ethereal look, and sepulchral

tones, may strike the fancy of the sentimental dreamer, but if the work of the Lord is to be done efficiently we must be living and not dying men, except in a figurative sense.

So intimate is the connection between our physical and spiritual natures, that the very gospel we preach receives its complexion from the condition of the body, and a dyspeptic gospel is often offered to those who are looking for the bread of life.

II. *Intellectual.* (1), A sound mind. The gospel is addressed primarily to the intellect, and through the intellect to the moral nature. It demands the exercise of the reason and judgment, and hence it cannot be apprehended by the idiot, nor be laid hold of by the mentally incompetent; much less can a disordered mind be the means of communicating it to others.

As a liquid takes the shape of the containing vessel, so the gospel inevitably bears the impress of the medium through which it is transmitted. It is therefore a matter of prime importance that the herald of the gospel should have the ability to apprehend it in all its fulness, and to proclaim it in all its integrity.

There is no room in this noble calling for cranks, nor for the riders of hobbies, nor for the weak minded; and he who is unfit for a responsible position in other callings is still more unfit for the responsible work of the ministry. This is no dumping-ground for poor unfortunates, and a call to the ministry is not usually made known by a failure in other departments of labor.

“We have this treasure in earthen vessels,” indeed, but they are not cracked vessels, nor rejected ones. It is enough that they are *earthen*. God has, indeed, chosen to save the world by “the foolishness of preaching,” but not by foolish preaching, nor yet the preaching of foolish men. If there is a calling in which common sense is a requisite; it is this, and the lack of it can be offset only by the most incontestible evidence. Here is a work affording ample scope for all our God-given powers of mind, as well as of body, and none need fear that it will in anywise dwarf the most acute intellect. To this great work the church should consecrate its best talent, and far distant be the day when the gospel of the grace of God shall be entrusted to mediocres and weaklings!

(2), Thorough cultivation. An educated ministry has ever been the watchword of the Presbyterian Church, but with many it has degenerated into a mere "shibboleth," and the substance is sacrificed to the shadow. Hands are often raised in holy horror at the idea of licensing a man to preach, who, while lacking a classical education, has had his wits sharpened by a manful share in the battle of life, while the college and seminary graduate, who has so effectually idled away his opportunities that he is unable to tell how many tenses there are in Hebrew, or is in doubt as to whether Abraham lived before or after the flood, receives the imprimatur of the church without the slightest hesitation. May the time soon come when our beloved church will sharply distinguish between an education and a prolonged and expensive attendance upon some institution of learning! But while the church demands, theoretically, at least, an educated ministry, many utterly fail to appreciate its importance. Profoundly impressed with the transcendent importance of spiritual qualifications, the intellectual are lost sight of and are depreciated, forgetful of the fact that the one is but the complement of the other. Others, again, are misled by the phenomenal success of some extraordinary cases of this kind, forgetful of the multitudes who ignominiously fail; nor is allowance made for the fact that there is an education which does not come through the use of books, though the process be a slow and painful one.

But there is another ground of objection far more serious: it is that scholarship is inimical to piety, and, to a certain extent, unfits one for the humbler duties of the ministry, and especially for work among the ignorant and lowly. It is held that an uneducated man can more readily adapt himself to this class, and can do far more efficient work than one more scholarly; that Latin, Greek, philosophy, etc., are, so far from being a help, rather a hindrance in this work. If this be true, it is a matter of great moment, for the gospel must be preached to the poor; and for the church to be out of touch with this feature of the work is to be out of touch with her Lord, and failure is both inevitable and deserved.

It is undeniable that with many piety apparently wanes with

the increase of learning, and that while there are many and glorious exceptions, yet educated men do shrink from contact with the ignorant and degraded, and seek for more congenial fields of labor.

It is a well-known fact that heathen converts who are educated in Christian lands and then go back to labor among their benighted countrymen are, as a rule, failures, and either lapse into heathenism, or, overcome with disgust, do not lay hold with heartiness upon their perishing fellows.

How can one who has soared be content again to grovel? How can he who has had converse with angels now talk with men? How can he who has communed with sages—

“The great of old,  
The dead, but sceptred sovran who still rule  
Our spirits from their urns”—

now talk of gardens, and chickens, and remedies for the croup?

Beyond all question, education does materially widen the gap between the man of God and the lowly to whom he ministers; but the remedy is not less education, but more grace to bridge the chasm.

When one is upon the same social and intellectual level with his people, it requires but little effort and but little grace to enter into all their feelings, hopes, and aspirations; but as he rises above them, it requires more effort, more grace, more self-denial, more crucifixion of the flesh. The increased efficiency arising from his education must be paid for by a corresponding sacrifice. As we crowd on more sail, there must be an increase of ballast in the hold, or shipwreck is inevitable. With each upward step there must be an increase of grace. The spiritual development must keep pace with the intellectual, otherwise education becomes a curse.

How wide the gap between our Lord and those to whom he ministered in the days of his flesh! Think of his views of truth, his sentiments, his tastes, as compared with those of the groveling, sordid, and sensuous throng with which he mingled! Think you that his efficiency as a teacher and herald of the gospel would have been greater had he known less, and had his tastes and sen-

timents been more in accord with theirs? Nay, verily, for thereby was he prepared for this very work, and by grace "condescending to men of low estate," "the common people heard him gladly," "wondering at the gracious words that fell from his lips."

Was it a disadvantage to the great apostle to the Gentiles that he had been brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, and that he was master of the learning of his day? Would he have been more successful as he talked with the humble women by the river-side at Philippi, or preached Jesus to the half-civilized heathen of Lycaonia? Was he fitted only for preaching upon the Areopagus, or in the halls of the Cæsars? Let us read his own answer in those memorable words to his Corinthian converts: "For ye see your calling, brethren, . . . how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called; but God hath chosen the foolish things of the world, . . . and the weak things, . . . and base things, . . . and things which are despised, . . . yea, and things which are not."

We need an educated ministry, not only for literary centres, but for the slums and backwoods as well. Alas, that so many look upon a collegiate or seminary course as an initiatory rite merely, and not an actual or important preparation! Alas, that so many in the ministry virtually give up all study, because, forsooth, their lot has been cast among a plain and uneducated people!

(3), Acquaintance with the Scriptures. But while secular learning is not to be despised, a knowledge of the sacred oracles is still more indispensable. There is an intellectual acquaintance with the word of God which forms the ground-work and substratum of all spiritual knowledge. Let it never be forgotten that the heart can be reached only through the head; and the facts recorded in Scripture, its warnings and promises, its doctrines and precepts, must be in the head before the spiritual truths they convey can reach the soul.

This book is no charm, communicating its efficacy in some mysterious way, but must reach the soul by the open door of the understanding. It is a written communication, and must be construed in accordance with universal and well-recognized laws of language. The Holy Spirit is indeed the interpreter of the



word, but he does not teach the facts of Scripture, nor the laws of grammar, nor yet the principles of interpretation; and he who neglects these thereby debars his gracious influences.

One of the most hopeful signs of the times is the revival of Bible study, and may the time soon come when the sacred word will be as familiar to the humblest as their Scriptures were to the Jews of old, and when it will be a disgrace for one to be a teacher of the word without an intellectual mastery of that which he teaches!

(4), Loyalty to the truth. There are many who receive without question the traditions of the elders, and who deprecate investigation as a heinous offence, allegiance being given to systems and received doctrines rather than to the truth itself. Above all things, the messenger of the "King of Truth" is bound to "prove all things," and then "hold fast that which is good."

A fear of investigation; a fear lest some cherished tenet be found untenable, only shows the absence of loyalty to the truth. Should we not unfeignedly rejoice when some fancied truth has been unmasked, for then has truth triumphed! If Calvinism be not true, then down with it! If plenary inspiration is a delusion, then away with it! If this Bible be not the word of God, then ruthlessly hurl it from its lofty pedestal! Yea, if Jesus be not the Christ, the Son of God, then proclaim it before high heaven!

Our Lord explicitly challenges investigation of himself and his claims. So far from demanding faith without evidence, he declares it to be our duty to reject him if he does not justify his claims, saying: "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not," and again: "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin."

Unfeigned loyalty to the truth is an indispensable requisite in everyone enlisted under the banner of the "King of Truth," and every herald of the cross should be able to say with another:

"Before thy mystic altar, Heavenly Truth,  
I kneel in manhood, as I knelt in youth;  
There let me kneel till this dull form decay,  
And life's last shade is brightened by thy ray!"

III. *Spiritual.* (1), We place in the very forefront of spiritual qualifications a sound and saving conversion, the fruit of a divine quickening. Many, like Judas Iscariot, have been made instrumental in the salvation of others while they themselves were still strangers to God and heirs of perdition, yet for all this the proposition still holds good, that a saving knowledge of Jesus Christ is a prime requisite in his ambassadors. Without this one may indeed proclaim the truth, but he cannot be a representative of Christ nor a witness for him. He cannot be a leader of the flock, not being in the way of life himself, nor can there be a genuine, Christ-like sympathy; and at best he is but a finger-board which shows the way but does not walk in it.

Let it not be supposed that this qualification is mentioned merely as a matter of form, for though standing in the foremost rank it is often lacking, perhaps as often as any other. Speaking of religious teachers, our Lord says: "Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name, and in thy name have cast out devils, and in thy name done many wonderful works? and then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me ye that work iniquity." In other words, many accredited ministers of the gospel, after an apparently successful ministry, will be shut out of the kingdom for a lack which no one ever suspected.

The dangers which beset the ministry in this particular are not seen in their true light. Many decide this most momentous question of a call to the ministry while yet novices in the Christian life, and before their own conversion has been tested by time; and in many cases a decision has been reached and publicly announced long before manhood. When once committed to such a course, how hard to retrace one's footsteps and confess that a mistake has been made; and doubtless some are carried into the ministry by the *vis inertiae* of an early choice. When once inducted into the sacred office, invested, in the eyes of the multitude, with an official sanctity, and looked up to as a spiritual guide, how easy then to take the popular verdict as a true one! How hard to open so painful a question and to deliver an unbiased judgment! How easy to mistake an intellectual knowledge of the

truth for a saving acquaintance with it; and to mistake a zeal in matters pertaining to religion for religion itself. May it not be that the unsuspected secret of some, yea, of many, failures is *the lack of vital godliness*? How lame and impotent and perfunctory such a ministry! The blind leading the blind, and both falling into the ditch! How dreadful to preach a glorious salvation to others and then miss it ourselves! Well may we say with Paul: "But I keep under my body and bring it into subjection; lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway."

(2), Fervent Piety. One may be a true child of God, and yet only a babe in Christ, a poor, dwarfed weakling all his life. It is not enough that one is born of God, he must have attained to manly strength if he would discharge efficiently the duties of the ministry, for its burdens can be borne only by the sturdiest shoulders. "Fight ye not with small or great, save only with the king of Israel," was the command of the king of Syria to his captains; and it is the leaders of the Lord's host to-day who must bear the brunt of the battle, and woe to him who is not "strong in the grace that is in Christ Jesus"! "Not a novice," says Paul, "lest being lifted up with pride he fall into the condemnation of the devil."

The minister determines, to a large extent, the type of piety among those to whom he ministers. As a leader he sets the pace for those that follow, and his spiritual offspring will inevitably bear the impress of his own character; and hence the urgent need of a high type of piety.

This, then, is one of the great needs of the ministry: more spiritual life; more saltiness in the salt; more conformity to Christ. While we exert ourselves most strenuously to cultivate our intellectual natures, with tenfold more earnestness should we seek to cultivate our spiritual natures, for neither will grow without careful cultivation.

The secret of a successful ministry is pointed out in those words of our Lord, addressed more immediately to his disciples: "Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide

in me. . . . He that abideth in me and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing." All the efficacy of the gospel is of God; and the closer the relation between the messenger and him who sends, the more efficacious the message.

What a thing of power the gospel is when proclaimed by those who have seen God face to face, when they come forth from the closet with face still aglow with the divine radiance, and bring a message directly from the King of kings! Oh, for a ministry that finds a throne of grace its tower of strength! an earnest ministry like that of Jesus or Paul, like that of a Payson or a McCheyne!

There is nothing so attractive to men as the utterance of the deep convictions of the soul; and the man who "believes, and therefore speaks," never lacks for hearers. "Never man spake like this man," said the officers sent to take Jesus; and one respect in which he differed from others was, that he declared, not the traditions of the elders, nor other vain speculations, but that which he knew as the very truth. He spoke with the authority born of deep conviction and assured knowledge, and not as the scribes.

When the man of God has "tasted the powers of the world to come"; when God, and heaven, and hell, and life and death are realities, and not vain abstractions; when they are as substantial entities as the things we come in daily contact with, and no longer idle dreams, then his message will both compel attention and produce conviction. The believing man is always an earnest man, and a man of blood-earnestness is always a man of power. When the word of God in his heart becomes as a "burning fire shut up in his bones," and he becomes "weary with forbearing," or when he "can but speak the things he has seen and heard," then even a Herod will hear him gladly, and do many things while he fears him, and a Felix will tremble as he reasons of "righteousness, temperance, and a judgment to come."

(3), Ability to Sympathize. Closeness of contact with God is most needful, but closeness of contact with man is equally essential. He who would lift his fallen brother must be able to grap-

ple him as with hooks of steel. The bond of union must be one which no power in earth or hell can break, since the grappling power measures the saving power. It was no work of supererogation when our Lord took upon him the nature of those he would save. He so linked himself with our fallen race that not even death itself could dissolve the bond, and even to-day a man sits at the right hand of the Father, a pledge of the eternal redemption of his people, for he says, "Because I live ye shall live also." In like manner it behooves the man of God to be in all respects one of the people, and the more completely he becomes identified with those about him the more able is he to bless and to save. Let it be the aim and ambition of the minister to bind himself with indissoluble bonds to those about him, avoiding most scrupulously anything that would tend to isolate him from them, and then, through the mighty power that comes from his contact with the throne above, let him lift them up. Especially let him learn to love, for there is no bond like unto this. Christ first loved us and then gave himself for us, and only as we love men can we bless them. Paul, catching his Master's spirit, declares his willingness to be accursed from Christ if thereby he could save his brethren. Let the minister first lay hold on God, or rather be laid hold of him, and then let him lay hold with a deathless grasp upon those about him, and success is assured.

It is said that in the House of Lords any exhibition of enthusiasm is considered a sign of weakness, but the minister who is not an enthusiast, whose soul is not stirred to its profoundest depths, who is not in the best sense of the term a fanatic, is unworthy of the name. He who has no passion for souls, and who never, like his Master, wept over the perishing, and has never had bestowed upon him the "donum lachrymum," may well doubt the reality of his call to the ministry of the gospel of the Son of God.

(4), A divine call. That a certified call from God is a distinct source of strength does not admit of question. With all his deep piety and ardent patriotism, how could Moses have ventured upon that mission of deliverance had it not been for that peremptory "Go!" of Jehovah? How could he have led Israel through the

wilderness, but for that soul-inspiring, "Certainly I will be with thee"? How could Joshua have assumed the responsibility of invading Canaan, but for that most potent warrant: "Have not I commanded thee?" How quickly would Jeremiah have given up his hopeless ministry, but for that word of the Lord which was like "a fire in his bones"! It was an element of strength even in our Lord's ministry, for again and again did he remind his hearers that he had not come of himself, but had been "sent." Had it not been for this same profound conviction on the part of the apostles, they would have been as chaff before the wind, but with the Risen One at their backs all the powers of earth and hell could not turn them aside.

There are, perhaps, times in the life of every minister when nothing short of the consciousness of a divine call can enable him to buffet successfully the waves of opposition and trial; and woe to him who in this dire extremity is lacking this sheet anchor! It causes the weakest to set his face like a flint, and taking his stand where duty calls, to say with Luther: "Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise: God help me!"

We hear much of the decline of the pulpit and its loss of power, and, beyond question, much of that which is called preaching is utterly futile, but whenever and wherever a God-sent messenger delivers a God-given message there is power—a power that can waken the dead, and shake Satan's kingdom to its very centre.

(5), Thorough Consecration. Jonah was indeed divinely commissioned, but his was an unwilling answer to the call of God, a reluctant service, the offspring of fear rather than of loyalty and love. There must be a hearty and whole-souled response to the divine call; a joyful surrender of all our powers to the Master's service.

Like Isaiah, we must cry: "Here am I; send me." Like the Chief Shepherd himself, our watchword must be: "Lo, I come . . . to do thy will, O my God!" or like Paul, we must say: "For to me to live is Christ."

The crying need of the church is not more men, but *better* men—more consecrated men. Gideon's band of three hundred is

preferable to an army of thirty-two thousand half-hearted and untrained men. Jonathan and his armor-bearer put to flight the Philistines, while Saul and his army were trembling in their tents. What cannot even one man do if so be that the Lord is with him! The Israelites said to David: "Thou art worth ten thousand of us"; and one man like Paul, with his natural powers developed, and indued with power from on high, is worth more than a whole host of inefficient men.

Brethren of the ministry, and those who are looking forward to it, let us seek to get a true conception of this glorious ministry. Let us ever set before us a high ideal of it, a scriptural ideal, and let us make it our daily effort to seek its realization in ourselves and others, that "when the Chief Shepherd shall appear we may receive a crown of glory that fadeth not away."

THOMAS R. ENGLISH.

*Union Theological Seminary, Va.*

## VI. THE DETERMINANT OF VALUE IN MORALS.

ALL theories of morals resolve themselves into two, the intuitional or formal, and the utilitarian or hedonistic. The object of this paper is to point out some of the difficulties of the latter theory and to propose a possible basis of harmony, a *modus vivendi*, for the intuitionist and the utilitarian. The inveterate and hardened opposition of these theories might suggest that the human mind is hopelessly divided against itself. The only other view is that there is a higher unity or a middle ground in which differences may be made to disappear. Possibly it may be said that utilitarianism has so far won the field that any provision for the opposition is gratuitous. Should this be the case, if active opposition were to cease altogether the utilitarian could never be at peace with himself, for, as such, he can never complete his theory, while the intuitionist would calmly await the return of the pendulum or seek to hasten its return by such mediating influences as need not impair his original position.

What is the position of the intuitionist? Briefly, that the place of value in morals is to be found in the motive, in the rational, autonomous self. The intuitive perception of law furnishes the ground of obligation. To will the right for the sake of the right is thus the ultimate end of morals. In willing the right for its own sake the moral law is understood to be identified in consciousness, and this defines the motive. The speculative ethics of Cudworth, Clarke, Price, and Kant seek to disentangle the *a priori* element in moral consciousness—to show what is revealed in knowledge independent of experience, although never given except in experience.

The utilitarian takes offence at this view of a moral standard. It is regarded as unphilosophical or as unworthy the scientific spirit. An action performed for the sake of duty or because it is right is thought to be obscure, unintelligible, if not meaningless. The place of value must be determined by our knowledge of pleasure and pain. Utility is the foundation of morals, or the



greatest happiness to the greatest number. It follows that moral action is to be measured by its effects. Morality is independent of motive, except as the motive may increase one's happiness. An action is good if it increases the happiness of mankind; bad if it lessens this happiness. The first principles of morals are to be learned from induction, and not from intuition. Morality belongs wholly to experience, and cannot be determined from the ideals of reason. All our moral life is conditioned by the amount of pleasure which results from our actions, and must be subordinated to it. The principles of intuition and utility, therefore, as regulative of moral distinctions, would seem to present a complete disjunction. The intuitionist sees reflected in his consciousness the moral imperative which compels his action. The utilitarian, on the contrary, calmly eliminates the notion of obligation, and substitutes the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the sole principle of morality.

Without dwelling upon the points of opposition in these rival theories, the purpose is to direct attention to the incompleteness of the one which makes happiness the regulative principle in morals and thus to emphasize the importance of a new position. Our course of thought will be first critical and then constructive. In this we are not concerned with evolutionary ethics except so far as its expounders assume the truth of the hedonistic principle. In the extensions of biology, sociology, as also ethics, Spencer seeks to lay down a system of rules rather than to justify principles. In the *Data of Ethics* it has been well said, "Spencer's old dogs wear new doublets." The old principles are applied to a great number of new details and illustrations. In his *Justice* and ethics of *Individual* and *Social Life* he assumes as true the ethical principle of Locke and Bentham. In accord with the latter he insists that the moral consciousness does not contemplate obligation as externally imposed, but is "chiefly occupied with recognition of and regard for those conditions by fulfilment of which happiness is achieved or misery avoided." Mr. Spencer does not deny the presence in consciousness of a sense of obligation in the lower forms of human life, the savage and religious devotee and that it still persists in ever weakening forms in nor-

mally cultured life, but contends that this feeling must ultimately fall away and "pro-ethical" ideas give place to those which are strictly ethical. By the "pro-ethical" he distinguishes those ideas which have a popular following in the ethics of the day; those strictly ethical are those which follow legitimately upon the establishment of the pure hedonistic condition. The reading proves to be dreary enough, but serves to show that the contrast of utilitarian and evolutionary ethics is due, chiefly, to the standard of expression. All along the effort is made to confirm the evidence of Locke and Bentham against the *a priori* view of the origin of moral ideas. In his almost exclusively objective treatment of ethics, Mr. Spencer finds no place for some of the deepest facts of our moral consciousness. Utility or "internal sustentation" is not the only or fundamental factor in civilization. The dead fly in the whole of the Spencerian philosophy is an unduly magnified environment. External circumstances are treated as causes for all the perturbations of society. Undoubtedly war, robbery, and in a contrary sense industry and the awards of justice, react upon society, but human nature lies deeper than all social phenomena. The heart is the unresting, disturbing force. Busy with altruism, Mr. Spencer forgets the individual. The issues of life do not proceed from phenomena.

"There needs but a continuance of absolute peace externally and a rigorous insistence on non-aggression internally to ensure the moulding of men into a form naturally characterized by all the virtues."—*Principles of Ethics*, p. 471.

It is remarkable that Mr. Spencer remits to an ideal stage the final test of his philosophy. He is wonderfully gifted with prophecy. He foretells with absolute precision what the coming man is to be, provided his present surroundings fall away. If Mr. Spencer could play both sides of the chess-board in the game of life, no doubt we should have a fair showing of the real merit of his carefully drawn precepts. He has made large contributions to sociology and biology, but his contributions to ethics, in so far as they affect its deeper problems, are opposed to all experience. That the "discipline of peaceful coöperation" can bring humanity into the ideal state of happiness has no value in scientific in-

quiry. It may possess some value as an illustration of the imaginative spirit, it may be Platonic, but it is not science.

Professor Paulsen in his *System der Ethik* attempts to mediate between intuitionism and hedonistic utility. He develops moral laws from the historical conditions of life. Obligation is consistent only when found in conformity with social conditions. Moral law, as such, is not immanent in man's constitution, but is developable from his surroundings. Consequently there is no fixed standard of moral action. The test of moral worth is the pleasure attendant upon the objective realization of the act. Nevertheless the pleasure-sensation is not to be regarded as the formal cause of the act. This system is another illustration of the objective treatment in ethics. It offers nothing new in principle. Indeed, nothing is to be found in evolutionary ethics which throws any new light upon principles. Its whole effort is exhausted in methods to exploit utility in terms of evolution.

The same remark may be made in reference to Darwinism so far as it has attempted to deal with the problems of punishment. While it is true that Darwinism is transforming moral principles, it is not true that it is transforming utilitarianism, which finds its moral end in the welfare of the community. This view of the ultimate ethical end did not originate with Darwin, nor has it been modified by his followers; but in the means to this end Darwinism is an undoubted factor. To this end also it is said Christian ethics supplies no rational basis. Darwinism comes to the rescue of the community in the form of "ethical surgery." Punishment is justified only on the ground of the happiness of society. The retributive idea disappears, or is subordinated to the idea of the general welfare. In the name of society, its evil members must be eliminated. Bad specimens are to be neither educated nor confined at the public cost, but driven off. Weak and worthless children are to be disposed of by heroic measures and in ways which the theorists of this school have not exactly formulated.

These illustrations of evolutionary ethics will suffice to show that no new principle has been introduced into utilitarianism.

We may now fall back upon the authorities to whom the present form of the theory under notice is mainly due. It is not de-

nied that some of the fathers of utilitarianism have been misrepresented. This has been done in the interest of those who desired to unify the theory or to give currency to some of its grotesque forms. Thus Hutcheson, while a professed hedonist, resolving all virtue into the primary necessity of seeking the happiness of others, was one of the foremost of the sentimental school which explained conscience by the postulate of an original, implanted, moral sense. In like manner Hume, while essentially a utilitarian, maintained one of the distinctive doctrines of intuition. His language is emphatic: "As virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account without fee or reward, it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches, internal taste or feeling, whatever you choose to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil." And yet both these writers have been described as advocates of the experiential theory of morals, or, in other words, that all our ideas of morality have been derived from experience, and that any suspicion of obligation, apart from the desire of pleasure and aversion from pain, is simply an illusion. The student of the history of morals cannot fail to notice the evidence afforded by these illustrations that the disjunctive classification so common with later writers is by no means a necessity. It means that ideas founded on intuitive morals do co-exist, presumably logically, with similar ideas derived from utility. Both Hume, who insisted that all virtue must stand the test of utility, and Hutcheson, who defined virtue in terms of happiness, founded their opinions upon the *a priori* structure of human nature. Generally speaking, however, utilitarian writers have divorced themselves wholly from intuitive moralists. They teach openly that there is no interest for us apart from our own interest. There is no voluntary restraint upon our actions which cannot be accounted for on our desire for pleasure. Hobbes, in his *Leviathan*, puts it sweetly thus: "Good and evil are names which signify our appetites and aversions." Goodness, as seen in God or men, is no more than goodness to us. "The goodness we apprehend in God is his goodness to us." (Hobbes's *Human Nature*.) To speak of the love of the good for its own sake is to speak untruly. "*Il lui est aussi impossible d'aimer le bien pour le bien, que d'aimer*

*le mal pour le mal.*" (*Helvétius.*) Philosophers of this school proceed with great deliberation and seriousness to derive the dearest sentiments of the human heart from pleasure as the ethical principle. Pity is aroused in us by a realistic suggestion of our own sorrow had the calamity which has visited our neighbor fallen upon us. Charity consists in the conception of ourselves as benefitted by the return of our gifts either in kind or in the increased ability to accomplish our own desires. Reverence is no more than our view of the power of another over us to do us good. Even piety itself is degraded to the conception of one's self as favored in the councils of heaven: "The pleasures of piety are the pleasures that accompany the belief of a man's being in the acquisition or in possession of the good-will or favor of the Supreme Being." (*Bentham.*)

It follows that morality is no part of an uncultured or uncivilized life. Apart from the education which persuades men into the self-appropriation of their own interests as seen by themselves, or in the collective experiences of the race, there is no morality. It is not easy to conceive of that state of society whose animating principle is wholly selfish, and which is described by *Hobbes*, *Helvétius*, and *Bentham* as actuated by no motive but self-advantage. "Dream not that men will move their little finger to serve you, unless their advantage in so doing be obvious to them. Men never did so, and never will while human nature is made of its present material."—*Bentham's Deontology.*

It is a doctrine as old as *Plato* that vice is another name for ignorance. The utilitarian, who reduces all value to happiness, reaches the above conclusion by the precept that all virtue consists in knowing how to pursue successfully one's own pleasure with a due regard for the happiness of others. Every one is supposed to know what pleasure is, but not every man knows how to attain it. This knowledge enables its possessor to be virtuous, and his grade of virtue must, therefore, be measured by this knowledge. Each man necessarily pursues his own happiness, and as all pleasure is self-regarding, hedonistic utilitarianism in its last analysis appears to be but the apotheosis of self. "All pleasure is self-regarding, for it is impossible to have any feelings

out of our own mind. . . . Such terms as unselfishness, disinterestedness, self-devotion, are applied to the vicarious position wherein we seek our own satisfaction in that of others."—Professor Bain's *Emotions and Will*, page 113.

Locke, whose ethical principle was happiness, and Paley, who is classed among the utilitarians, seem to have embraced the prudential scheme: "We are obliged to nothing but we ourselves are to gain or lose something by; for nothing else can be violent motive to us. The Christian religion hath not ascertained the precise quantity of virtue necessary to salvation."—Paley's *Moral Philosophy*, Book II., ch. ii., and Book I., ch. vii. Still further, in discussing the difference between an act of prudence and an act of duty, he says: "The difference, and the only difference, is this: that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come." Locke, in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, argues that, in view of the threatened punishments of the future world, ordinary prudence would require men to regulate their conduct so as to avoid them. (Book II., chapter xxi.)

On the question of the nature of the Christian's love, the Church of England generally took sides against the selfish view of Hobbes, while in the Romish Church Bossuet took the selfish side, and was opposed by Fenelon and Molinos. The opinion of Bossuet was judicially sustained by the church, and the opinions of his opponents were condemned.

The most subtle form of hedonism known to utilitarian moralists is that derived from the association of ideas. First traceable in Aristotle, applied by the Epicureans to friendship, rediscovered in modern times by Locke, it was developed by Hutcheson, Hartley, and the elder Mill. It is the most plausible, if not the most logical, form of utilitarianism. As employed by the Epicureans, this principle was illustrated by the love for a friend, which, beginning in the pleasure derived from the acquaintance, was in time transferred to the personal object. Wealth and power are first loved as means of pleasure, but afterward as objects in themselves. Money, although not in the least lovely in itself, is asso-

ciated with our happiness, and thus becomes an object of affection. Thus the passion of the miser is accounted for. He loves the money, not for its use, but for itself. Virtue is associated in our minds with the pleasure with which we acknowledge the esteem and honorable mention of men. Our deepest pleasures are associated with acts of benevolence, justice, and truth. Contrariwise, a life of vice is associated with pain and terms of obloquy. Hence virtue, in time, becomes lovely in our eyes; we practice it with pleasure, we violate it with pain. Hence, also, virtue, while not originally and naturally a part of the universal human end, may become so. The means, ultimately, becomes the happiness desired. Thus conscience is accounted for. It is a product, not an original cause. The moralists of the associationalist school, it will be observed, in place of identifying conscience as an abiding element of consciousness, are entitled to claim as a discovery only an important instrument for its training. Conscience is, *a priori*, moral insight. The inductive moralist fails to see that the explanation of virtuous conduct is one thing, and its identification quite another. Without dwelling upon this point, it seems evident that all forms of utilitarianism, however refined, reduce our ideals of praiseworthy conduct to selfish elements. All the vast and complicated schemes of modern ethics, when subjected to analysis, seem adjustable under the four laws of Epicurus: Pleasure without pain is to be sought; pain without pleasure is to be avoided; shun the lesser pleasure, which hinders the greater pleasure, or results in the greater pain; endure the pain which prevents a greater pain, or leads to a greater pleasure. (Cicero, *De Finibus*, i. 2.) Judged by the common sentiments and actions of men, the morality of the utilitarian must be condemned. The noblest deeds, the greatest self-sacrifices, must fall under the sharpest criticism, if not condemnation, if subjected to the authority of its canons. This is admirably brought out by Palacio Valdes in a speech of one of his characters: "I maintain that what my son-in-law did this morning is an immoral act. And why an immoral act? Because it attacks the very foundations of morality. And what are the positive foundations of morality? Until recently, it was believed that this was something extraneous to the forces

which are at work inside our physical nature. A profound error! One of the many dreams which have disturbed the infantile mind of our ancestors! Morality is the result of one of the many combinations in which the organic development of the human animal rests from its labors. Morality is nothing more than the social instinct taking deeper root with every succeeding generation. But this purely animal instinct, which man honorably shares with all other living beings, and in particular with the seals and the male bison, whose moral sentiment is admirable, has no other reason for its existence than the general welfare. Morality is founded, accordingly, on the general welfare. What did the general welfare demand when that old man flung himself into the water? Did it demand that my son-in-law should risk his life to save him? No, certainly not, for the life of that unhappy man, without any salient quality, was useless to humanity, while that of my son-in-law, young, active, and intelligent, is important. Consequently Mario, by risking his life for another which has no value, has attacked the general welfare; consequently he has committed an immoral act."

Without considering the question how far hedonistic morals have affected society, or what would be its probable effect if virtue were generally regarded as no more than transformed selfishness, we now turn our attention to a form of mediation between the two theories—a place of value in morals repugnant in philosophy neither to the intuitionists nor to the utilitarians. And here let it be said, that while the latter have generally reduced utility to terms of pleasure, so that the theory has usually been described under some form of hedonism, this view is by no means necessary. The emphasis of value has not always fallen upon pleasure. Dr. Samuel Clarke, one of the most pronounced of intuitionists, admitted into his doctrine a utilitarian element by making the welfare of all men a fit and universal end, good and useful in itself, and determined the ground of this fitness as logical. To find similarly a determinant of value which is neither primarily to be sought as hedonic nor because it emerges in consciousness as the moral law, is, as already stated, the object of our investigation. The reasons for this attempt have been sufficiently given.



The probability of a successful issue is quite another thing. No mediation is possible except as posited upon some firm basis. This may be metaphysical, scientific, or both. If we find a middle ground it must be an end which has the element of utility, and at the same time must be such as to contain implicitly, at least, the *a priori* elements common to universal consciousness. To collect these elements, and to connect them with the proposed end, it is necessary to bring together and compare the two poles of ethical thought. Let us select for this purpose Mill the younger, the utilitarian, and Kant, the intuitional moralist. These writers are polar opposites in theory. Mill declares that the foundation of morals is in the principle of greatest happiness, which means that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, and wrong if they tend to produce pain.

With each the first question is, whence is the ideal? Mill does not profess to show that the moral end, which he claims is scientific and universal, is intuitively known, but claims that our ideal is induced by our accumulating experiences of pleasure and pain. From Mill we learn that the morality of conduct can be learned only from the effects which attend or follow the action. Mill teaches that "the motive, when it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality." He contends for a progressive morality, thus: "The contest between the morality which appeals to an external standard and that which grounds itself on internal conviction, is the contest of progressive morality against stationary, of reason and argument against the deification of mere opinion and habit." Also, he teaches that actions done without regard to the greatest happiness, as, for instance, an action simply inspired by a feeling of duty, have no value except to indicate a disposition which is calculated to result in happiness. He offers no solution of the great problem of the utilitarian: How is it that happiness is most likely to come when unsought? That is, how shall this anomaly be treated?—a principle having been scientifically attained, it is best realized when neglected!

The doctrine of Kant avoids this paradox by placing all value in the moral ideal of the self. This is just the contradictory of Mill, who places all moral value in the object. The latter finds

the necessary law of morals in the effects of actions. The former finds the same law in the law-originating subject. According to Kant, the only way to a law of moral judgment is by first excluding all contingent matter. According to Mill, this law is possible only by excluding all *a priori* elements. Experience alone furnishes the true ground of moral law. Mediation between these opposites seems impossible, except by considering Kant's course of thought. He is carrying over into his ethics the same analytical process which distinguishes his first *critique*. It is to separate matter from form in judgment. Law is simply the *form* of our experience, or rather the form of the self in obtaining knowledge. As natural law is the form of our perceptions in nature, so moral law is the form of our perceptions in morals. Thus the law obtains its universal element—it is derived from the subject. Mill holds that the law of morals must, on the contrary, be derived from the object—the consolidated experiences of mankind. Here also must be considered Kant's notion of freedom. His transcendental exposition of the ego brings out the well-known dual representation of self as noumenal and phenomenal, or as causal experiential. Beneath the veil of the phenomenal self is the thing-in-itself—the postulate of cause as necessary in mind as the postulate of the conservation of energy in the physical universe, which it contradicts. In this contrast between phenomena and thing-in-itself, autonomy is made possible, and this autonomy is the basis and sole condition of freedom. Now, moral action is nothing more than the visibility of will—the reflection of the innate self or character woven in the intellect in space, time and causality. What the will is, in itself, appears as thing, *dingheit*, in time as life, in causality as those actions out of which external life is constituted. As the will, so are the actions. Will is, then, the necessary determinant of actions. Setting aside the mere forms of our intellect and directing our gaze upon the thing-in-itself, which is the will within us, the consciousness of freedom overtakes us, which no logic can cancel. There is, then, according to Kant, nothing good in all the world but a good will. Manifestly, if experience were to determine the will there could be no freedom, since our experience, being constituted by natural law,

would bring self, and therefore freedom, under the dominion of external causality. Consequently autonomy, freedom and morality are mutually dependent.

All that belongs to the phenomenal world lies under the constraint of space, time and causality; but will, as thing-in-itself, is free from the mental forms by which, in our intellectual perception, the world is constructed. If I look at my actions I see them necessitated, since my motives, with a given environment, could not be otherwise than they are. On the contrary, if I look within, and behind the phenomenal, I see myself as free, able to will to do or not to do; and thus, with the consciousness of freedom, I have the consciousness of responsibility. From this exposition of the will, a good will must be the first thing to be desired, and thus we reach the first canon of Kant. The second canon lies implicitly in the first. Let your act be such that you can will it to become universal. The first effect of the autonomous self is spontaneous respect for its own legislation. It wills for law, and by law, as given by itself. It wills the right for its own sake. The law is the expression of the good will. The good will is the ideal. From this point all morality must be viewed. We cannot will falsehood and theft to be universal, because such an act of will would involve a contradiction. You cannot will that all men should steal, for in that case there would be nothing to steal. The second canon is thus vindicated at its weakest point. The logical result of willing in opposition to self is absurdity. But what is gained by the determination of this principle? What practical good in a will which is concerned alone with itself? We have reached the form of the law, how shall we reach its concrete expression? We have here to remember the peculiarity of the Kantian exposition. It is to detach form from matter. Our knowledge is a union of these elements—separable in analysis but not in experience. They have no reality considered as existing apart and alone. Nevertheless they exist in synthesis—the *a priori* part running through every concrete reality. What is true of knowledge in general must be true of morals in particular. Every moral judgment must re-combine the moral elements which have been separated and identified in our analysis. Here

the object was to identify and describe the universal element in moral judgment. It is moral law, necessary and regnant for its own sake. Having described this element, it is next necessary to define the object of the will in every act of willing. This introduces the third canon, which means, in its simplest form, Let your act be such as to treat each person of all humanity not as a means, but wholly as an end. This law is really implicate in the second, since if a man is to will nothing but himself—the will willing itself—the principle, as universal, must include all men. The principle of self-legislation makes self, as rational, the end. But this personal end is the universal end. What is thus individual becomes also common to all humanity. The good will becomes self-realizing in the end of humanity. The end which all have in view is also the end of each particular self. The categorical imperative directed to the self as object, defines the true nature of the autonomous self as subject. The end of humanity is simply another name for the end of the rational self. Moral judgment is thus determined by an external end, but this end is at the same time the exact equivalent of the legislating self. The form of law, in this view, receives its content. The abstract which at first was the basis of thought becomes concrete. The form and the matter of morality, which were separated for the purpose of study, are now recombined in experience. The next question would be, What is that end of humanity which gives content to the form of universal law? The answer distinguishes the Kantian ethics from that of Mill's.

We have already stated the position of the latter in common with other utilitarians. The only universal ethical principle is happiness. In the Kantian view this principle is perfection, that is, personal perfection, and then, secondarily, the happiness of others. The first duty, which is our own perfection, easily follows from the nature of the first canon. The good-will is first posited as the highest concept of any and all good. To perfect this will must ever be the aim of the rational self. This, then, becomes the first duty which, in part, defines the nature of the end of humanity. But how shall the second duty, the happiness of others, be explicated? The Kantian doctrine seems, after all,

to be about to degenerate into the happiness theory. Having saved the intuitionist, he is now intent on saving the Epicurean! If the happiness principle will not hold in reference to myself, how can it hold in reference to my neighbor? If it is not lawful to seek my own happiness, how can it be my duty to seek the happiness of humanity, or the duty of humanity to seek it for me? But Kant is not unaware of this difficulty, as it would appear from his conception of the ideally perfect will. When the commands issuing from self are loyally accepted and obeyed, the constraint of obligation falls away. The relation of self to law is radically changed. The feeling of duty is transformed into the feeling of pleasure. It was duty to obey the law; it is now pleasure. Kant saw perfectly that it is impossible to exclude wholly the element of happiness from the ethical theory. Perfection itself would not compensate for the loss of happiness, even if the idea of pain could be eliminated. What place, then, does pleasure hold in the conditions of human life? It is manifest that what may be my pleasure in one condition may be my duty in another. Experience may verify my intuitive perceptions, but it cannot act independently of them, and, as an able arbiter, determine moral values. No experience can assure me that my neighbor ought to be happy. His one supreme condition of happiness is obedience to moral law. To promote this obedience is to promote his happiness. No other means to this happiness are possible. Logically, then, the duty of the individual to seek the happiness of all men is deduced. On the other hand, the duty of all men to seek their own happiness, while affirmable, is never felt as obligation. A law of nature, in sensible experience, inclines all men to seek their own pleasure. The use of the term "duty," then, in this relation is unmeaning; but the question remains, What is there in intuitive morals to compel men to seek the happiness of others? It is the unresting moral imperative of the rational self seeking to realize itself in experience. It is that element of consciousness, often the weakest element in our constitution, which makes itself known as supreme and authoritative. This is the hidden spring of morality, the categorical imperative of Kant. That Kant has rightly designated this power is abundantly sup-

ported by the moral literature of every age. Carlyle has well represented this feeling in *Hero Worship*: "It is calumny to say that men are roused to heroic actions by ease, hope of pleasure, recompense—sugar-plums of any kind in this world or the next. In the meanest mortal there lies something nobler. The poor, swearing soldier, hired to be shot, has his honor of a soldier, different from drill regulations and the shilling a day. It is not to taste sweet things, but to do noble and true things, and to vindicate himself, under God's heavens, as a God-made man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs. Show him the way of doing that, and the dullest day-drudge kindles into a hero. Difficulty, abnegation, martyrdom, death, are the allurements that act on the heart of man." No intuitionist opposes the general theory of utility as an end indicated by law, but as a motive. The true motive is the self-impelling desire to objectify the ideal of moral law in personal experience and in the experience of all men. The above question, then, presents no difficulty to the intuitionist. It is quite different from the view-point of the utilitarian. The word "duty," or the feeling of obligation, is spoken of in an equivocal sense or openly rejected. His philosophy provides no tenable answer to the question why he should seek the happiness of all men. He may prefer his own to another's happiness. If he cannot be certain that he is entitled to an equal share in the common happiness, and no more, there is a strong suspicion that he will be tempted, if occasion offer, to appropriate unduly and to the full extent of his desires. There is only one recourse for the utilitarian. He must show that the happiness principle is given in immediate perception. This he cannot do except by concession to the intuitionist. To save himself he must sacrifice a portion of his theory. He must show some deeper impulse than the love of happiness before he can proclaim to the world a universal, moral law. It is for this reason that we desire to mediate between the two theories, not because the efforts of Janet, Jouffroy, and a crowd of more recent writers have not been good, but because they have proved ineffectual.

We have seen that, in the rival theories under notice, the motive is the moral determinant in the one, and the effects of action, or

happiness, is the test of morality in the other. We now propose *character and happiness* as the *summum bonum*, the mediate ground for both theories. We are led to this by considering the term *perfection*, which Kant postulated as the necessary end of the practical reason. The reasons for this preference are various: The term *character* is easily resolvable into terms of the cardinal or representative virtues, while the word *perfection* is not. Character presents to our minds a synthesis of those attractive qualities which are associated in our minds with happiness. In terms of evolution, perfection may mean that completeness of organism which maintains the actions of greatest pleasurable consciousness. It is not intuitively known that happiness is the necessary complement of perfection, but surely we have an immediate perception of those elements which combine in that unity which we call character, and which we pronounce deserving of happiness. The term character also has an advantage in concreteness. And finally, it is a return to the Aristotelean conception of the moral end. It is admitted that the intuitionist has nothing to gain by this substitution. It is a concession which rather mars the inner harmony of the Kantian metaphysics, but is not destructive of its cogency, considered with reference to Kant's ethics. Indeed, it is a direct corollary of his third canon. The highest empirical end which we can offer humanity is character. The supreme worthiness of character cannot be dissociated from the moral element. Granting, then, that character cannot be conceived apart from morality, we have to see how the utilitarian, by a necessary implication of his own principle, connects his theory with it. As a hedonist, his own experience and the accumulated experiences of society soon assure him that character is the necessary antecedent of happiness. He can feel no obligation to be happy apart from this character. He may, therefore, dismiss the thought of obligation, since by his theory he recognizes no worthiness to be happy disconnected from the causes of happiness. But utility demands that he shall recognize the empirical causes of happiness. He must, therefore, place value on character, not for its own sake, nor for any feeling of obligation, but for its utility in producing happiness. The hedonistic principle is thus vindicated as respects

himself, but how is he to proceed from the individual to the many? How is he to identify the interest of one with the interest of all? It is true that the utilitarian has made it clear to himself that his own interest in the general allotment of happiness is to count no more than that of his neighbor. How is he to maintain this impartial view, and how is he to give concrete expression to what Mill calls the Golden Rule of utility? Surely, in no other way than this, by making the place of happiness logical. Happiness has no reality apart from the objects which produce it. It is in itself an abstraction, and must be sought in the concrete. Moreover, objects must take rank in importance with reference to this quality. The object must be conditioned by the greater happiness, and the greatest object is that which produces the greatest happiness to the greatest number. Utility is required to select this object. Furthermore, it is required to select this object, not as an end, but as means. If he were to choose in reference to end, without objective reference, he would change his conception of morality. With this in view, he is logically led to choose character as the greatest instrument of the greatest happiness to the greatest number. If he were to identify character, in itself considered, as the sole end of action, he would cease to be utilitarian. He, as utilitarian, is interested in the external result, not in the supreme worthiness, of character. This result, if regarded as pleasure, is, considered abstractly and in this sense, an end. But in experience the concrete subject must go along with the abstract notion. From this point of view the intuitionist and the utilitarian may be conceived as having the same determinant of value. The one would view character as the end in itself, with the necessary consequent, happiness. The other would view pleasure as the abstract end, with character as the concrete instrument. All pleasure-producing objects would then be subsumed under character. Each object would, as now, be acknowledged in its relation to pleasure, but would take rank in importance and influence according to its relation to character. The life of the utilitarian would probably show as little obliquity from the common moral ideal as the life of the intuitionist. The philosopher no more lives his moral philosophy than the plain man lives his own moral ideal.



The only object of mediation, as proposed in these pages, is to seek from the intuitionist a closer determination of value in morals, and from the utilitarian a much-needed aid in exploring the nature and extent of our moral consciousness. The phenomena of experience are, of course, the same for both theories. Inductive morality must content itself with what is, and is, so far forth, scientific. The metaphysic of morality must transcend that which is merely external to the subject, and must exhibit the rational grounds of moral judgment. The determinant of value is, as we have endeavored to show, common to both, while the basis and method of exposition will be ever necessarily different. The transition from every form of exposition to Christian ethics should be easy, and in accord with the dictum of revealed morality.

W. J. WRIGHT.

*Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri.*

## VII. NOTES.

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### PROF. JOHNSON'S HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN PRESBY- TERIAN CHURCH.

THIS history was prepared for the "American Church History Series," under the general editorship of the late Prof. Schaff, Bishop Potter, Prof. Fisher, *et. al.*, and it first made its appearance in February last in that series, bound with the history of the Southern Methodists, the United Presbyterians, and the Cumberland Presbyterians. But in such a form it was not adapted to rapid circulation among Southern Presbyterians, many of whom, naturally enough, objected to buying three other histories in order to possess a copy of their own church's history. In order to obviate this difficulty, the author has arranged with the publishers to bring out a separate edition of his history bound alone, though the text remains the same, even the paging being unchanged. In this form, the book *is* adapted to rapid circulation, and we hope that it will find its way, not only into the library of every Southern Presbyterian minister, but into that of every Southern Presbyterian family in the land.

This history was reviewed in these pages by Dr. Summey on its first appearance, but as he dealt with the four histories bound in one volume, his review was necessarily brief. It is our purpose to call especial attention to the book in its new form, and hence we deal with it alone.

Our church was born in 1861, and yet a history of it which only dealt with the years since that time would be manifestly imperfect. To judge aright of the child, we must know something of its pre-natal life. When Dr. Holmes was asked: "When should the education of a child begin?" He answered: "Madam, a hundred years before the child is born." Professor Johnson has recognized the principle involved in that answer, and so in Chapter I. has sketched briefly the origin of Presbyterianism in the South, tracing it to its sources in Europe. He shows how Presbyterianism came to our Southland with the English Presbyterians, the Dutch, the Germans, the Swiss, the Huguenots, the Scotch, and the Scotch-Irish before our nation was born, and how, through these peoples, it assisted at

that birth—nay, would it not be better to say caused that birth? Surely the Presbyterians had much to do with giving political liberty to the nation, and furnished her the model for her representative form of government; and surely Presbyterians were in the lead in giving religious liberty to the nation. Thomas Jefferson left this inscription for his tomb: "Here lies buried Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of American Independence, of the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and Father of the University of Virginia." From Virginia, religious liberty spread to the other States, to the national constitution—it is now universal in our land, and we sometimes think we have always possessed it, but says Dr. Johnson: "The petition from the Presbytery of Hanover, dated November 11, 1774, 'To the Honorable Speaker and the Gentlemen of the House of Burgesses' of Virginia [this petition was first published by the Hon. Wm. Wirt Henry, LL. D., in the *Central Presbyterian*, May 16, 1888], and the memorials from the same presbytery, in 1776 and 1777, to the same legislative body, at once leave no doubt as to where Mr. Jefferson got his views of religious liberty, and evince the fact of the zeal of the Presbyterian people of Virginia for religious liberty." (P. 320.)

Dr. Johnson shows that not only were the forefathers of Presbyterianism in the South liberty-loving in the State and liberty-loving in the church, but that they were truth-loving, and that schools sprung up wherever Presbyterians went, and that these schools, often at first taught by Presbyterian ministers, grew into academies, colleges, universities, from which many of the great and good men of our country have come forth to bless the nation, and by their life-work glorify God. Those forefather-Presbyterians were pioneers in education, and nearly every college, founded prior to fifty years ago, when traced back to its roots, will be found to have had its beginning in a Calvinist preacher as teacher, and the young of Calvinistic peoples as pupils. Presbyterianism always educates, elevates and refines any community to which it comes. Ignorance and Presbyterianism are as incompatible as darkness and sunlight.

Thus of the ninety-six thousand five hundred and fifty communicants of the Old School Presbyterian Church south of Mason and Dixon's line in 1861, we find that they were, in pedigree, of good reformation blood, English, Dutch, Swiss, Huguenot, Scotch, and Scotch-Irish; in character, they were worthy of their ancestors, loyal, devoted to duty, to the missionary cause, liberty-loving in state and

church, truth-loving, with well-manned colleges and seminaries; and in her ministry, not a whit behind in cultivation and power any part of the church—"Thornwell in meridian splendor at Columbia, Dabney and Peck, slower in reaching maturity as well as younger in years, were teaching with marked ability at Union . . . Palmer and Hoge and others were edifying as well as delighting large and cultivated audiences day after day. A ministry, generally highly cultured and especially trained, was serving with acceptance the people of God. No considerable part of the church elsewhere surpassed the South in all that goes to make up intelligent and honest Presbyterianism. It had been a happy, a blessed portion of the church of God." (P. 323.)

Chapter II. brings us to the troublous times of 1861, and in it the author traces the origin of the Southern Presbyterian Church as a separate organization. The events of this period needed a firm, faithful, truthful handling. If ever the spirit of John Knox's determination not to mince matters, but "to call a spade a spade," is in order, it is when dealing with the events of 1861-1865, whether in church or state. No Southern Presbyterian can afford to be ignorant of the glorious position his church took then for the Headship of Jesus Christ—for Christ and his crown. He who will look at the FACTS and "call a spade a spade," will see that God brought our beloved Southern church into existence to conserve the truth, to bear witness to the fact that Christ Jesus is alone the Head of his church and that she is not to be prostituted to Cæsar.

In this chapter the author's admirable method is shown to greatest advantage. He states his method in the preface to be as follows: "We have wished to be convincing. We have, therefore, resorted to laborious compiling, *made the unimpeachable records of the churches talk wherever possible.*" Ah; that *is* the way to be convincing, and we feel like congratulating Prof. Johnson on his success. When the records talk, unless you are gangrened with prejudice, you must see the facts, and you must be convinced.

Our author states the occasion of the origin of the Southern church, thus: "The occasion of the Presbyterian Church in the United States coming into existence was the successful effort on the part of the majority of the Old School Assembly in 1861 to usurp the crown rights of the Redeemer in making new terms of church membership; and in the same act to prostitute the church to the state, so far as to hold the Southern Presbyterians to the support of the Federal Government as over against the governments of their several Southern States on

pain of ejection from the church in case of failure to comply with the terms of church membership thus made." (P. 324.) He then begins by the "unimpeachable records" to show that this is true. It was only a month after the fall of Fort Sumter when the Assembly of 1861 met in Philadelphia. The "atmosphere was surcharged with the war spirit." Many hoped that the church would not meddle with state affairs; thus only, could the church remain a unit. The first attempt to make a political deliverance failed, but later on the Spring Resolutions were passed, but only after quite a struggle, led by Dr. Charles Hodge, to prevent the church from thus departing from the truth. Dr. Johnson enables you to see the burning spirit of that Assembly in the "unimpeachable records" he quotes. The Spring Resolutions are given, Dr. Hodge's masterly protest, signed by fifty-seven others, is also given; and that shows how godly Northern men (for only sixteen Southern commissioners were present to sign it), when not blinded by politics and passion, looked upon such action by a church court. Nothing stronger ever came from Southern pens than that protest by the ablest theologian the North has produced. Every young Southerner should commit it to memory, that he may know who, in 1861, broke the constitution of our church, and who kept it. Dr. J. H. Vandyke, speaking of the Assembly's action, states that perhaps tar and feathers, and brickbats and lamp-posts, had something to do with the Assembly's change of feeling. Hear his conclusion: "Whether from these causes or not, it is well known that the Assembly underwent a speedy and marvellous change in its spirit and in its purpose, until in an evil hour, 'her rash hand reaching forth,' she passed the famous, or rather *infamous*, Spring Resolutions." (Concise Record of Assembly, 1866.)

Well, the Spring Resolutions were passed, were protested against by the ablest men of the Northern Church, the protest was feebly answered, the Assembly adjourned, and now Southern Presbyterians *must either avow certain political opinions*, or they were no longer members of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. Jesus Christ only required a credible profession of faith in him as the Saviour to admit one to his church, but the Presbyterian Church, North, by the passage of the Spring Resolutions, improved on that, and required also a profession of faith in a certain kind of political government ere you could be a member of that church. Who gave her a right to *make* terms of church membership? It was her business alone to declare the terms that Christ had made. In changing his terms she

had usurped the place of the king. Should the Southern Church obey God or man? It was not long in deciding. On June 13, 1861, the Presbytery of Memphis led in renouncing the authority of the Assembly for its unchristian and revolutionary action; the other presbyteries followed in quick succession. "This separation," says Palmer, "was based in every case upon the unconstitutionality of the Assembly's action." Forty-seven presbyteries sent commissioners to the Assembly called to convene at Augusta, Ga., December 4, 1861. Dr. Palmer preached in his matchless way on the "Headship of Christ," the opening sermon. Near the close of it he said: "Do we understand, fathers and brethren, the mission of the church given us here to execute? It is to lift throughout the world our testimony for this headship of Christ. The convocation of this Assembly, is in part, this testimony. But a little while since it was attempted in the most august court of our church to place the crown of our Lord upon the head of Cæsar, to bind that body which is Christ's fulness to the chariot in which Cæsar rides . . . . Once more, in this distant age, and in these ends of the earth, the church must declare for the supremacy of her Head and fling out the consecrated ensign with the old inscription: 'For Christ and his crown.'"

Dr. Palmer was elected Moderator, and Dr. Thornwell introduced resolutions giving a name to the body and the old historic doctrine and government of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith. The Southern Church was now a separate organization. "The Address to the Churches Throughout the Earth," prepared by a committee of which Dr. Thornwell was chairman, gives the reason for its existence. Dr. Johnson says of it: "It is a paper of which any church might be proud . . . . in that single paper is enough to justify the separate existence of the Southern Presbyterian Church." (P. 347.) Our author gives up nearly seven pages of his history to the reprinting of this Address, and he was wise in thus again letting "the unimpeachable records talk." This paper was solemnly signed by all the members of the Assembly. As one reads, the impression is forced on one that the men who formed our first Assembly were standing for principle. It was not a mere temporary war necessity. That was only the occasion. The church was brought into existence to conserve the truth.

Chapter III. deals with the marvellous growth and development of the church since 1861. Here Dr. Johnson furnishes much needed information for the whole church. He boldly claims that the organiza-

tion of the Southern Church is the best and most presbyterian of any even of her sister bodies. He expounds the difference between Boards and her Committees, and shows how by the latter she controls, through her courts, all of her agencies, thus giving perfect unity, and yet individual freedom throughout all her borders. Pastors often find dense ignorance among their people as to the method pursued by our Assembly in doing her work, say of Foreign Missions, of Education, etc. This Chapter III. of Dr. Johnson's book will make that plain now to the humblest. It makes one proud of the Southern Church when we see how well organized she is after the Master's plan; and if the sessions would only follow closely that plan, would any church anywhere be so well fitted to do the Master's work in all lands and among all people as she? One becomes a High Church Presbyterian as he "walks about Zion and tells the towers thereof" in company with Professor Johnson.

It encourages us to read: "In thirty-two years the devastation and desolation of war and reconstruction to the contrary nevertheless, the Southern Presbyterian Church has much more than doubled itself. . . There are two and a half times as many members as in 1861; and more, its contributions to foreign missions and to home missions are at least four times as large." (Pp. 357, 358.) It is well here to call attention to the fact, which our author makes plain, that, along with the headship of Christ, another inscription has been upon the flag of the Southern Church from the beginning, and that is, "The world for Christ." Her interest in foreign missions grows apace. In this chapter, also, is a brief review of the schools, colleges, and seminaries of our church, and a mere mention of the church's periodicals. To one who would understand the peculiar organization of the Southern Church this Chapter III. is the most important of the book. It tells what the Southern Church is, and how she works. The author still follows that method of his, the "unimpeachable records talking."

Chapter IV. is brief, and deals with the changes in the organic law, and with the moral life of the church. The author here shows that the Christian life of Southern Presbyterians compares favorably with that of any body of Christians on the globe. He has put on record also the position of our church in regard to lynchings and other lawless acts. He shows how the Southern Presbyterian Church stands opposed to all forms of godlessness, and how, as in New Orleans, Dr. Palmer's vigorous attacks greatly aided in driving the lottery from the United States.

The last chapter of the book deals with the "relation of the church to other bodies." Here our author makes plain the fact that in recognizing as Christians those who love the Lord Jesus, Presbyterians have ever been in the front ranks; and our Southern Church makes no exclusive claim to be the only church. We are glad that the Professor has brought out this truth, because errorists who wield the pen, from blank atheists to ill-instructed Christians and shallow progress-howlers, take a special delight in foisting up that old lie about the narrowness, the exclusiveness, and bigotry of the Presbyterian Church, when the fact is, that in large-hearted liberality and toleration she has always been in the lead; this, too, without any lowering of her own standard, because her people have an intelligent faith, and are able to discriminate between essentials and non-essentials.

Next our author addresses himself to the task of showing how the church has kept her tenet of the spirituality of the church. He frankly acknowledges that during the troublous times she faltered and turned aside to express sympathy, when she ought to have kept silent. The records talk again, and there we learn the exact phrasing our Assembly used, and have, furthermore, her frank avowal that they were out of place. After gathering together all expressions in her past deliverances, the Assembly of 1876 says: "If these expressions are taken in their literal sense, it should be candidly admitted that they are entirely out of place in a court of the Lord Jesus Christ, and are, therefore, to be regretted and disapproved." Even upon the worst meaning being extracted from those expressions, notice how frankly the church retracts them. The fact is, however, that it is only by pressing a special meaning upon the words (which was never intended), they can be made to conflict with her expressed doctrine of the spirituality of the church. Dr. Johnson also lets the "records talk" on the deliverances concerning slavery, and verily they talk better than even the best informed men of the present day on that dead issue. Our author grants that the church has at times, for a season, faltered in her testimony to the truth that church and state are to be kept separate, but says: "Her witness for this truth has been one of her peculiar glories. The Assembly has humbly explained and acknowledged such mistakes as she has made." He sums up this part of the history in the words of Dr. S. S. Laws: "That it faltered at all amidst the pressure and confusion of the times is not the surprise, but rather that it did not fall away from the truth like others. . . . The surprise is that it has had the grace to acknowledge before the world



its inconsistency in any transient departure. Awakening from a terrible dream, and finding that a false and treacherous principle had, in an interval of paroxysm, stealthily insinuated itself, it hurled it with indignation from its embrace and placed its heel upon it as a deadly viper." (P. 435.)

Professor Johnson next brings before us the unions which have taken place between our church and other bodies. In 1863, the Independent Presbyterian Church was received into the Southern Presbyterian Church upon the basis of the hearty adoption of our Confession of Faith.

In 1864, after careful conference, on the basis of the standards only the United Synod of the South, bringing 121 ministers, 199 churches and 11,581 communicants, was received into union with the Southern Church. The Alabama Presbytery of the Associate Reformed Church came in about the same time.

Then, in 1869, the Synod of Kentucky. The history of this synod and the actions of the Northern Assembly, which led to its withdrawal from that body and uniting with the Southern Church, is again told in "the unimpeachable records of the churches," and a gloomy tale it is. We never knew before that a church court of the Lord Jesus could deliberately take such positions and hurl such epithets at brethren, and that, too, after the war was over. How does this sound? The Board of Domestic Missions was ordered to appoint "none but those that give satisfactory evidence of their loyalty to the national government, and that are in cordial sympathy with the General Assembly in its testimony on doctrine, loyalty and freedom." (P. 442.) Again: "The order to all the lower courts, requiring the examination of all the ministers and church members coming from any of the Southern States, and making it a condition precedent to admission to the church courts and churches that they confess as sinful certain opinions before held touching 'State rights,' rebellion, slavery, not in harmony with previous political utterances of the Assembly." Phe-e-w! Again: "And therefore declaring the Assembly's purpose to ignore the existence of any Presbyterian Church in the Southern States except such churches and presbyteries as are loyal to the government of the United States and to the Northern Presbyterian Church, and whose views are in harmony with its views on subjects of domestic slavery." (P. 443.) And yet some of the Southern brethren tell us that this is digging in a graveyard, and that all of this is long since dead. *When* did it die? Has it ever been retracted? Where, when? As well talk

of the Declaration of Independence being dead, or of the unrepealed laws on the statute books of our states. Such things don't die except by *repentance, confession and retraction*. "The union of the Kentucky Synod and the Southern Presbyterian Church 'was a marriage between two who saw alike substantially.' The Synod of Kentucky had been an Old School body. It had been a witness for the supremacy of 'Christ's crown and covenant.'"

In 1870, the Associate Reformed Presbytery of Kentucky was received into organic union with the Southern Church.

In 1874, union was effected with the Synod of Missouri, which, much in a similar manner to that of Kentucky, was compelled to withdraw from the Old School Assembly. It was the Gurley *ipso facto* order that caused it to leave the Northern Church in 1866 and 1867.

The last ten pages of Dr. Johnson's book are exceedingly timely. They contain the *facts* about our relations with the Northern church up to 1893—facts that sadly need to be known in the Southern church just now. Dr. Johnson believes that the Master's prayer for unity will never be realized till the visible church is organically one, but he believes organic union folly, "unless it is *intelligently effected*. *We believe that the church should know its own past and its present, what it has stood for, and what it should now stand for, before it can, in a way to please God, propose organic union. In the same way it should know its neighbor with whom it thinks of uniting.*" (P. 316.) We have taken the liberty of putting this passage in italics, for it seems to us to contain pure gold. I would commend it as a motto to every man in our church who in the next few years proposes to open his mouth on the subject of organic union. *Union must be intelligently effected.* You must know the past and the present of the Southern Church, and you must know the past and the present of the Northern Church, ere you lift up your voice to speak on the subject. To all who would fit themselves to consider the subject of organic union intelligently, I commend this history of Dr. Johnson with "*its unimpeachable records of the churches talking.*" We are glad to know that it is to be adopted as a text-book in Union Seminary and Southwestern Presbyterian University. We trust soon that Louisville Seminary, and Columbia, and Austin will do likewise.

The ministry of the church cannot aid their work better, and create a Southern Presbyterian *esprit de corps* in an easier way, than by aiding in the circulation of this brief but comprehensive history of our

church by that solid rising young scholar of Union Seminary, Dr. T. C. Johnson.

We close this review with the closing paragraph of Prof. Johnson's history, which has the ring of God's truth in it: "It has been shown that there was good reason for her coming into being as a separate church, for her continuing to exist as a separate church to-day. God has put high honors on her in the past, making her witness for the non-secular character of the church, and for a Bible Calvinism, and for a Bible that makes God teach and endorse good ethics, for the government of the church according to her divine constitution, for the highest form of church organization in the Presbyterian body, perhaps. She may never merge her witness for these truths by an adulterous connection with any church that will not and cannot bear a true witness for them, but to her eternal shame. May the God who raised up a Thornwell to lead this church in her infant days, and a McPheeters to suffer for two of her synods and for Christians everywhere, who has given a Dabney and a Peck, an H. M. Smith, and a B. M. Palmer to minister to her people hitherto, raise up spiritual sons worthy of such fathers to lead the church until another body who has the same witness to make, or can teach us a truer one, shall admit us to union with them."

"No church has a right to an independent existence which has not a truth or group of truths to witness for, which other churches in the country do not witness for. The church that has such a witness to make should maintain a separate existence. We believe in union, but in union with those who hold God's essential truths fully as we see them." (Pp. 478-'9.)

This book is a success. It will give the people a correct view of what the Southern Church has been, is, and should be. We advise all Southern Presbyterians to purchase it at once and master its contents. It is preëminent for the unique method of "suppressing the author's personal equation and making the unimpeachable records of the churches talk."

W. McF. ALEXANDER.

*Memphis, Tenn., July 12, 1894.*

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#### INTO *VERSUS* IN.

THE question of a Revised Directory is evidently settled for our generation. An overwhelming majority of the presbyteries voted to accept it, and the Assembly at Nashville set the seal of its approval

upon it. There has been manifest, however, some opposition to the change in the baptismal formula from "I baptize thee in the name" to "I baptize thee into the name." There was an overture to the Assembly from the Presbytery of East Hanover, requesting a change to the old reading, and, though this proposition was almost unanimously defeated, there has been some agitation of the subject in the papers, and the last QUARTERLY contains an able defence of the old view. It is the purpose of this article to show that the Revised Directory has taken scriptural ground on this question, and that there was high authority for the change.

1. One or two inadvertencies of the article referred to may be corrected first. The text of Westcott and Hort has *en* instead of *epi* in Acts ii. 38, so that there is no instance of a conjunction of *epi* with *baptizo* in the New Testament. This simplifies the question and takes the force out of several statements with regard to the indiscriminate use of *epi* and *eis*.

2. "The Revised Version abounds with the exact words of the old formula, 'baptize in the name of.'" Not *abounds*. There are only two instances in the New Testament, though these two (Acts ii. 38, and x. 48) are referred to eleven times in Dr. Bishop's article in the QUARTERLY. Here the Greek preposition is *en*; in all similar instances, *eis*. The Revised Version translates without interpreting, and in this matter, when due regard is given to the necessities of the English idiom, it is exactly as consistent as is the original text.

Let it be noted that the English phrase "in the name of" is itself ambiguous. It generally means by the authority of, in behalf of, for the sake of. In this sense it is used some fifty times in the New Testament, where the Greek has *epi* or *en* with the dative. Nor is there a denial that baptism is "in the name of Christ" in this sense—that the ordinance is administered by his authority. The apostles are fond of quoting that authority, and it is at least natural to suppose that Peter, in giving the command, "Be baptized," would say, "in the name of the Lord Jesus," as in the two passages already referred to.

But, because of the use of *name*, so common in Scripture, "in the name" has an altogether different sense. The name represents the character; it unfolds the nature; it is often put for the person himself. Take the text quoted by our author, John iii. 18: "He that believeth *in him* is not condemned. He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed *in the name* of the only begotten Son of God." To believe in the name of the Son is to believe in

him. The preposition is *eis*, but the English idiom requires us to say "in the name."

1. We come, then, to the heart of the matter. Those who contend for the phrase "in the name" in the baptismal formula must mean that Christ commanded his disciples to baptize *by the authority* of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Passing by for a moment its use with *baptizo*, the phrase *eis to onoma* is not used in that sense in the New Testament. John uses it three times in his Gospel and three times in his First Epistle, after verbs of believing, as in the reference above. The phrase does not occur, except with baptize, in the other books of the New Testament, with the exception of two passages in Matthew and one in Hebrews. Let us examine them.

Matthew x. 41, 42: "He that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet shall receive a prophet's reward," etc. Notice that it is not "in the name of Christ," but "in the name of a prophet," "a righteous man," "a disciple"; evidently meaning that the one received is received in his character as a prophet, "because he is a prophet." (Broadus.) In the parallel passage in Mark ix. 41, we have both ideas presented: "Whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, *because ye belong to Christ*," where the last clause is synonymous with "in the name of a disciple."

Matthew xviii. 20: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name." Of course the phrase here used could be used in either of the two senses already mentioned. According to Winer (*Grammar of the New Testament Diction*, pages 432, 433, 436), there is no such thing as an indiscriminate use of the prepositions *eis* and *en*. Evidently there was a conception in the mind of the writer that compelled the use of *eis*. We would certainly strip this passage of its glorious promise if we render it "by my authority." So argues Olshausen: "The *eis* here is not to be confounded with *en*. In the formula *eis onoma* the name is, as it were, the point of union; . . . it denotes the person, the being itself. The assembling in the name of Jesus presupposes the life of the Spirit of Jesus as already existing in those so meeting together." So we all feel. Only his followers can meet in his name.

Hebrews vi. 10 speaks of work and love showed *unto his name*, that is, unto him. In none of these passages can we translate "by the authority of."

2. Take another point of view, the use of *baptizo* with the preposition *eis*, without reference to the phrase *eis to onoma*. In ideal rela-

tions it is always *baptize into* or *unto*. There are eight references of this kind: Acts xix. 3; Acts ii. 38; Romans vi. 3; First Corinthians, x. 2; First Corinthians xii. 13; Galatians iii. 27. According to these passages, the disciples of John were baptized "unto the baptism of John," and the Israelites "unto Moses"; but we, who are in Christ, were baptized "into Christ," "into his death," "into one body."

3. Now, remembering the use of *eis* with *onoma* and with *baptizo*, we must consistently translate *baptizo eis to onoma* "baptize into the name." There are five places in which the phrase occurs. In Acts xix. 3, and following, those who had been baptized *unto* John's baptism were baptized *into* the name of Christ. The connection is obvious.

See Paul's argument in the first chapter of First Corinthians. "Paul, called to be an apostle of Jesus Christ by the will of God," certainly had authority to baptize. Yet, if we translate, in verse 13, 'by the authority of Paul,' we make him argue against that authority when he asks, "Were ye baptized in the name of Paul?" The argument goes far deeper. Paul intimates that a baptism *into* his name would imply that he had been crucified himself; and he thanks God that so few had been baptized by him, lest they should say that they had been baptized into the name of Paul. Paul had authority to baptize, but only as Peter had—"into the name of the Lord Jesus." (Acts viii. 16.)

4. Such, we are persuaded, is the correct translation of Matthew xxviii. 19. I have never seen a recognized commentator who took a different view. Nor has "the inspiration for the change been drawn from the Revised Version of the New Testament," although the revisers of 1881 were a magnificent body of scholars, the weight of whose opinion can hardly be overestimated. Let us examine other authority.

"Into the name," says Dr. Dabney, in his *Theology*. "The rite dedicates us unto the Trinity, bringing us into a covenant relation to him."

"Into is the most obvious and commonest translation of the Greek phrase."—*Broadus*.

"The sublime object to which baptism tends consists of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost."—*Olshausen*.

"Into the name, that is, into union with him and subjection to him as their Sovereign and Saviour."—*Alexander* on Acts viii. 16.

Dr. Dale, whose opinion on the whole subject of baptism in all ages

of the world is entitled to profound respect, makes the translation here defended the crowning point of his argument for the essential meaning of *baptizo*. He says (and he differs widely from the opinion of the article in the last QUARTERLY): "In the phrase *baptizo eis* there is an essential power of the verb which fixes definitely the meaning of the preposition." "The phrase 'baptize into the name' expresses the ideal element into which the baptized object passes."

Dr. Dale quotes, as favoring this translation, Schaff, Barclay, Fairbairn, Beecher, Calvin, Bengel, Stier, Halley, Lange, and Pusey, the last giving a quotation from Cyprian, who "connected the indwelling of God with our baptism into his name." We feel sure that Cyprian did not draw his inspiration from the Revised Version.

Scott felicitously connects "baptism into the name" with Numbers vi. 24-27, where it is said with reference to the threefold benediction: "They shall put my name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them."

Although our author complains of the difficulty of attaching any very definite meaning to the phrase "baptize into the name," it is a difficulty which he has solved. He speaks of it as "designating the subject in baptism as partaking of the divine nature." Exactly. In the case of the children of believing parents, a prophecy; in the case of adult believers, so far as man can judge, the declaration of an accomplished fact. In such a declaration no Protestant minister gives an unscriptural significance to the functions of his office.

And when once God's people grasp, as many of them already feel, the full significance of the formula, we are persuaded that "baptism into the name" will be as good English as it is sound scriptural truth.

*Fayetteville, North Carolina.*

A. J. McKELWAY.

## VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS

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### SABATIER'S ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI.

LIFE OF ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI. *By Paul Sabatier.* Translated by Louise Seymour Houghton. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1894. Pp. xxxv., 448.

The Dark Ages, so-called, were not all equally dark, nor were they at any time totally dark. The beautiful metaphor by which Macaulay describes the state of Italy during that period is, in part at least, applicable to the whole of southern Europe: "The night which descended upon her was the night of an Arctic summer. The dawn began to reappear before the last reflection of the preceding sunset had faded from the horizon." The lowest point of moral and intellectual depression was reached during the ninth and tenth centuries. In the eleventh century signs of the reawakening of the human mind from its long and profound slumber began to appear. The dawning light waxed brighter during the next two centuries, and a great stir set in amongst the peoples of Europe which has never ceased, and which is now spreading itself over the habitable globe.

These three centuries are sometimes designated by historians as the Period of Origins, or the Creative Period, because then originated movements and institutions and principles which have given impulse and tone to modern Christian civilization. It was the period of the Crusades, the rise of Gothic architecture, the founding of universities, the schoolmen, the rise of anti-sacerdotal sects, of the Mendicant Orders, of free cities, and of the spirit of nationality.

Of the products of that wonderful age, not the least remarkable, nor the least influential, were the Mendicant Orders, the Dominican and Franciscan Friars.

The first of these was founded by Dominic, a Spaniard, under the title of "The Preaching Friars," about the beginning of the thirteenth century. It partook largely of the severity which belonged to the national and personal character of its founder. The refutation of heresy and the forcible suppression of heretics became one of its chief functions. When the Inquisition was established in its definite form by Gregory IX., in 1232 A. D., it was placed in the hands of the Dominican order. The fame of this order is thenceforth inseparably connected with the history of that inhuman institution.

The origin of the Franciscan order was nearly cotemporaneous with that of the Dominicans. Its founder was Francis of Assisi, so called from an Italian city, the place of his birth. The two orders, at first in perfect harmony, became violent competitors for influence and popular favor. They differed also in their spirit and their relations to the papacy. The Franciscans were largely free from the relentless severity which we have already said was characteristic of the Do-



minican order. Their origin was due, on the part of St. Francis, not so much to his zeal for orthodox truth and the authority of the church, as to his pity and love for the poor people suffering in that wretched age from all the miseries of poverty, disease, oppression, and moral and spiritual degradation. The Franciscans identified themselves, therefore, with this class of society. They voluntarily became poorer than the poorest; they went about doing good; they preached on the streets and in the slums; they nursed the sick, even the lepers, and kissed their sores. There was a pathetic but cheerful and uplifting tone in the gospel which they proclaimed, which said to the wretched and down-trodden, "Lift up your heads, for the day of your redemption draweth nigh." This is said of the order, of course, when it was in its primitive and best estate, when the spirit of its saintly founder was still alive. And no doubt it could be said truly of the party called *Spiritual* Franciscans, even amidst their prophetic vagaries and fanaticism, after the order, as a whole, had degenerated from its primitive purity. Moreover, as it was not doctrinal orthodoxy and abstract truth for which they were zealous, their preaching partook of a practical and hortatory rather than a didactic character; and, as the scholastic learning of the age was exclusively occupied with theological and metaphysical subtleties, which rather disqualified than prepared the preacher to instruct and move the people, St. Francis repudiated human learning himself, and forbade his disciples to cultivate it.

Another effect of the spirit breathed into the order by St. Francis was a degree of independence towards the papacy which was not characteristic of the Dominicans or of the older orders. There came a time, indeed, when a large section of the Franciscans were in open revolt against the Pope, and were the object of bitter persecution. With this was connected also the mystical and prophetic views of the Spirituels, or Zealots. Offended by the opposition of the Pope to what they regarded as the more spiritual and stricter interpretation of the rule of their founder, disgusted with the worldliness and immoralities of the clergy of all ranks, from the Pope down, and despairing of the reformation of the church by the ordinary methods in use, they took refuge in wild apocalyptic fancies. The millennium was at hand, the dispensation of the Holy Ghost, in which the church was to be revolutionized, the papacy reformed or destroyed, and the monks, especially the Franciscans, were to be the chosen instruments in the salvation of the world. The most famous of the works embodying these views was the *Introduction to the Everlasting Gospel*, ascribed to the celebrated Joachim, of Fiore, who died before the Franciscan order was established, but in reality it was the work of a Franciscan Friar, and was published about 1254. It had a vast circulation, and was condemned and burned by command of the Pope, but not until it had done much towards weakening the power of the papacy and preparing the way for the great Reformation in the sixteenth century.

The fundamental principle in the rule of St. Francis was poverty. The vow of poverty had been common to all the monastic orders, but it meant more in his order than in the others. In them it was a prohibition of property to the individual members. In that of St. Francis it applied to the order itself. There was to be no property even in common, no churches, no lands, no buildings, no funds. The brethren were to lodge where they could, and to obtain by their own labor, and by begging from door to door, whatever was necessary for the supply

of their immediate wants and for the charities which they dispensed to the sick and poor.

The ideal which St. Francis set before his mind was impossible of attainment. Even before his death the vow of poverty was so far modified, though not with his consent, as to permit the order to own some poor huts, which afterwards grew into magnificent cathedrals and monasteries. With growing wealth, as he anticipated, came in corruptions of various kinds, until the order became utterly degenerate, a source of corruption and a means of oppression to society and the church. As Milman says of the four mendicant orders, including the Franciscans, "They were a vast standing army, far more vast than any maintained by any kingdom in Christendom, at once levying subsidies to an enormous amount, and living at free quarters throughout the land. How onerous, how odious, they had become in England, may be seen in the prose of Wycliffe, and in the poetry of Piers Ploughman."

St. Francis' prohibition of human learning to his disciples proved to be equally unavailing. It was not long before all the great schoolmen were Franciscans or Dominicans, and all the professorships in all the universities were filled by them. So completely had they gained control of the University of Paris, that an effort was made by the secular clergy and the civil authorities to expel them, but without success. Bonaventura was a Franciscan, and Thomas Aquinas a Dominican. William of Ockham, the great literary antagonist of the papacy in its contests with Philip the Fair of France and Louis IV. of Germany, was a Franciscan; and, perhaps greater than all the rest, Roger Bacon, the philosopher, scientist, and theologian of the thirteenth century, was a Franciscan.

The interesting work to which this article is devoted is a history of St. Francis of Assisi, and not of the order which he founded. The brief sketch which we have given above is not intended as an exposition of the contents of the work, but as a means of awakening interest in the subject of which it treats, for, remarkable as his character is viewed from a psychological or religious standpoint, his importance in history is derived solely from the great institution of which he was the founder, and which, though not preserving his spirit, was undoubtedly one of the most potential factors in the history of the Middle Ages. The work undertakes to give not only the leading events of his life, which are not many, but especially a faithful portraiture of his character. This, as far as we are capable of judging, is successfully accomplished. It is founded, evidently, upon a careful study of the original writings of St. Francis, upon biographies of him written not long after his death, and upon other authentic documents.

The author himself might seem to be a French Catholic, loyal to the church, and yet holding more liberal views of the right of private judgment than would be approved at Rome. In reality, however, he is a Protestant of the most radical views. He is in thorough sympathy with his subject, has an unbounded admiration for his hero, and seems to have faith even in the miracles which are claimed for him. The style is clear, glowing, picturesque, rising sometimes to poetic beauty. There is a fitness in this. St. Francis was a native-born poet, personifying the great objects of nature, not in artificial rhetorical figures, but in the warm, spontaneous utterances of the heart, and welcoming with fraternal salutations the little birds that loved to hover around his hermitage. "I see," he said,

joyfully, to his companions, "that it is pleasing to our Lord Jesus that we live in this solitary mount, since our brothers and sisters, the birds, have shown such great delight at our coming."

St. Francis was born about the year 1182. His father was a wealthy cloth-merchant of the little Italian city of Assisi. The boy was encouraged by his father to associate with the profligate young nobles of the city, and he became addicted to vicious indulgences. His mother, however, mourned over his excesses, and longed and prayed for his conversion. There was, even then, in him a delicacy of feeling, an innate nobility, which redeemed his character from utter baseness. Especially was there a sympathy with the suffering, which sometimes led him to acts of unusual generosity. Captivity in war, and sickness, led him to reflection, and he became disgusted with his frivolous and unworthy life. His convictions became deep and distressing. How far the elements of an evangelical repentance entered into his religious experience it is impossible for us to know. As was natural in that age, it took the form of ascetic exercises and works of practical benevolence.

The state of the church at that time, the beginning of the thirteenth century, no doubt suggested to Francis the formation of a society for the promotion of true religion as he understood it. According to our author, a loyal Catholic, "The first glance at the secular clergy brings into startling prominence the ravages of simony" and other evils, which Innocent III. admitted could be corrected by fire and sword alone. The bishops were violent, quarrelsome, contentious, and were held up to ridicule in popular ballads from one end of Europe to the other.

"The monastic orders were hardly more reputable." The immoralities of the monks are certified to us not merely by the writings of professed satirists and by the rhetorical exaggerations of popular preachers, but by papal bulls, on almost every page of which appear appeals to the court of Rome against assassinations, violations, incests, and adulteries. "Among the populace there was superstition unimaginable," and but little instruction given from the pulpit.

In consequence of these evils a large number of so-called heretical sects sprang up, such as the Albigenses, the Catharists, and the Waldenses. Our author while charging the first two with Manicheanism speaks kindly of the Waldenses, though he regrets their rise. "Many vile stories," he says, "have been told of the Waldenses; calumny is far too facile a weapon not to tempt an adversary at bay. Thus they have been charged with the same indecent promiscuities of which the early Christians were accused. In reality their true strength was in their virtues, which strongly contrasted with the vices of the clergy." It is quite remarkable that, while during the pontificate of Innocent III. the papacy reached its culmination, it was then that there was the greatest spread of anti-papal sects. Italy, itself, was in danger of being overrun by them. At Viterbo in 1205 the Paterini had the majority and elected the Consul, and were put down only with fire and sword. "But stifled at one point the revolt burst out at a hundred others, at this moment it was triumphant on all sides: at Ferrara, Verona, Rimini, Florence, Prato, Faenza, Treviso, Piacenza. The clergy were expelled from this last town, which remained more than three years without a priest." Such was the state of the church in Italy when St. Francis established his order of Preaching Friars, and secured for them the reluctant sanction of Innocent III. According to the admir-

ing biographer, "Italy may well be grateful to St. Francis; it was as much infected with Catharism as Languedoc, and it was he who wrought its purification. . . . The only weapon which he would use against the wicked was the holiness of a life so full of love as to enlighten and revive those about him, and compel them to love. The disappearance of Catharism in Italy, without an upheaval, and above all without the inquisition, is thus an indirect result of the Franciscan movement, and not the least important among them. At the voice of the Umbrian reformer Italy roused herself, recovered her good sense and fine temper; she cast out those doctrines of pessimism and death, as a robust organism casts out morbid substances."

While admitting the cause, we may be permitted to doubt the wholesomeness of the result. That the Catharists were Manichean heretics, and licentious livers, rests on the testimony of their adversaries, the Catholics, alone. We cannot be sure that their testimony is true. From the nature of the case it could not be impartial. It would have been sufficient in that day to condemn any class as heretical that they revolted against the tyranny and wickedness of the papacy and the clergy. We must be permitted to doubt, however lovely may have been the character of St. Francis, and however noble, self-denying, and useful may have been the labors of his early followers among the suffering poor, whether the religious system which he helped to perpetuate in Italy was better than might have been expected from the triumph of the so-called heretics.

As to the character of St. Francis himself, it is well-nigh impossible for us in this age and country to understand and appreciate it. In the view of the sturdy, practical, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon intellect, he was a mystic, a fanatic, almost a lunatic. Perhaps the most that we can say in estimation of a character so phenomenal is, that it was the product of the Italian temperament, chivalric enthusiasm, mediæval ignorance and superstition, mingled with intense love for God and Christ, and for whatever God had made and Christ redeemed.

Our author furnishes us with no clue to the theological system of St. Francis, if, indeed, a mind so fantastic could have had any such system. Of his faith in Christ as an atoning Saviour, and of his ardent love, however strangely manifested, there can be no doubt. For this reason we would not deny to him in common with all other believers the title of saint. In his preaching and labors among the poor he was actuated, apparently, by pure, unmixed Christian benevolence. It was the same spirit as that which animated the Wesleys and Whitefield, and his Preaching Friars were the Salvation Army of the thirteenth century.

Not even in the briefest account of the life of St. Francis would it be allowable to pass over without notice the alleged miracle of the *sacra stigmata* in his person. Accordingly, considerable space is devoted by the biographer to the examination of the evidences of its truth. In the outset he denies the reality of any miracle, if by that "we understand either the suspension or subversion of the laws of nature, or the intervention of the first cause in certain particular cases." But if by a miracle we mean "all that goes beyond ordinary experience" and is inexplicable by any of the known laws of nature, in this sense he believes in the reality of the *stigmata*. "There are," he thinks, "in the human creature almost indefinite powers, marvellous energies; in the great majority of men these lie in torpid slumber, but awakening to life in a few, they make of them prophets, men of

genius, and saints, who show humanity its true nature." Examining the *stigmata* from the point of view of history, he concludes that while there is no lack of difficulties, great and small, the testimony appears to be too abundant and too precise not to demand conviction. His account of the matter is this : St. Francis in the solitudes of Mt. Verna had been for days and nights fasting and praying in a state of ecstatic communion with Christ, quite transformed into Jesus by love and compassion. He passed the night before the festival of the "Elevation of the Cross" alone in prayer. In the morning he had a vision. A seraph with outspread wings flew towards him from the edge of the horizon and bathed his soul in raptures unutterable. In the centre of the vision appeared a cross, and the seraph was nailed upon it. When the vision disappeared, he felt sharp sufferings mingling with the ecstasy of the first moments. Stirred to the very depths of his being, he was anxiously seeking the meaning of it all, when he perceived upon his body the *stigmata* of the crucified, that is, the print of the nails in his hands and his feet and of the spear in his side. These marks continued to be visible as long as St. Francis lived, and were seen upon his body when he died.

There are several explanations of the alleged incident given by different writers: First, some affirm at once that the whole story is fabulous, invented by the Franciscans to glorify their founder, and to complete that likeness to Christ which he realized to such a remarkable degree in his life and character. The author of this book dismisses this theory at once, and some judicious Protestant writers agree with him that the evidences of the truth of the story are too strong to be set aside. Others, especially devout and credulous Catholics, hold it to be a genuine miracle. This, however, is incredible, for reasons which we do not have time to present. Others, still, hold that the wounds were inflicted by St. Francis himself for the deliberate purpose of deception. It is replied to this that it is utterly inconsistent with the man's character. He might have been a fanatic; he could not have been an impostor. Archbishop Trench, "assuming their existence as sufficiently proved by contemporary evidence," rejects their miraculous character, and at the same time "dismisses with scorn the suggestion that they were marks artificially and fraudfully brought about by the saint himself, for his own greater glorification, with or without the assistance or connivance of others." Another explanation is given by a celebrated Dominican writer, and accepted by Archbishop Trench, "who reverently accepts the fact of the *stigmata*, but explains their appearance on the body of St. Francis as the physical effect of exalted imagination, combined with vehement love, admiration, meditation, and compassion." It is claimed that many cases are on record of the effect of the imagination and the passions on the body leaving permanent impressions and changes. Which of these explanations is correct is not, perhaps, a matter of importance to us; but that the occasion for them should have arisen is certainly remarkable.

On the whole, it must be felt that the history of St. Francis, the founder of the Franciscan order, is a matter of great interest and importance to the student of church history. We know of no work in the English language which will give more valuable assistance in the investigation of the subject than that to which we have called attention in this article. It is but just to the translator, also, to say that we are greatly indebted to her for a clear and beautiful rendering of the original.

ROBERT PRICE.

*Southwestern Presbyterian University, Clarksville, Tenn.*

## HERVEY'S AUTHENTICITY OF LUKE.

THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE GOSPEL OF ST. LUKE : Its Bearing Upon the Evidences of the Truth of Christianity. Five Lectures. *By Lord A. C. Hervey, D. D., Bishop of Bath and Wells.* Delivered at Bath in the autumn of 1890. Second edition. Published under the direction of the Tract Society. Pp. 156. London—New York : E. & J. B. Young & Co. 1894.

This course of lectures was delivered before the Bath and Wells Diocesan Society for the Promotion of Higher Religious Education, and is published with the view of bringing within reach of those who have not easy access to many books both the results of learned research into the history of the Gospels and also some of the evidences of the truth of Christianity. It aims to lay before the reader those facts and reasonings which lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the gospel record is true, and that we may, without misgiving, rest the whole weight of our hopes for eternity upon that record. The persistent attacks which have been made during the last hundred years upon the authenticity of the Gospels render it important that every Christian should be acquainted with the main arguments by which the authenticity of the Gospels may be established. The motive for these attacks has been hostility to the supernatural, with which the Gospels abound. After the utter failure of the old attempts to explain miracles away by imputing credulity or imposture to the apostles, the effort of unbelief has been to prove that the gospels were not written or compiled by the persons whose names they bear, by men who were eye-witnesses or contemporaries, but are the productions of unknown writers in the second century. In support of this theory an enormous mass of learning and ingenuity has been expended, mainly by German scholars. Once establish the fact that the gospels were not written till some time in the second century, and you might accept them as legends, and not history. Such was the object of the once influential Tübingen School of critics, the anonymous author of *Supernatural Religion*, and the authoress of *Robert Elsmere*. But the theory of Baur and the Tübingen critics with regard to the late date of the gospels is now generally considered to have collapsed. It lies among the slain. Confronted by the array of facts and arguments brought by scholars of equal learning, its boast, that "the late date of the gospels is one of the received results of modern criticism," can no longer be made.

Bishop Hervey, in these lectures, singles out St. Luke for examination. If the Gospel of Luke, which Renan declared to be the most beautiful book in the world, can be shown to be authentic, it carries with it the whole gospel story—the birth, life, miracles, teaching, death and resurrection of our Lord, and there can be no valid objection to the authenticity of the other Gospels. It happens that there are peculiar means of proving the authenticity of Luke which do not exist in the case of the other Gospels; for it is the one Gospel whose existence and authorship are distinctly spoken of in another book of the New Testament itself. The author of Luke is the author of the Acts of the Apostles, and the Gospel was written first of the two, being spoken of in the other as "The former treatise." To establish the authenticity and authorship of the Acts, therefore, is to do the same thing for the Gospel. Dr. Hervey, therefore, devotes nearly one-half of the volume to the presentation of the proofs of the early origin and genuineness of the Acts. He presents,

first, in a compact and admirable manner, an epitome of the external evidences from the early fathers, showing by actual quotation from their writings that the Acts was widely known and in general use but little more than a score of years after it was written, and how futile is the attempt of the Tübingen critics to account for these quotations from Acts, found in Clement, Polycarp, and others of the latter part of the first and early part of the second century, by attributing their resemblances to a common use of "oral tradition," and how inadequate is the time allowed by the late date which these critics contend for, 120 A. D., for this work to gain that general circulation and recognition as canonical which it had acquired even before the middle of the second century.

In his array of the internal evidence that the Acts was written by Luke, and at the time to which it is unanimously ascribed by the church of the first few centuries, our author is peculiarly happy. He dwells upon the remarkable accuracy with which the author alludes to historical persons and circumstances, an accuracy attested by contemporaneous records, and which no one writing three or four score years after the events related could possibly have emulated, but easy enough if the author is actually living amidst the things he is describing and which he knows by his own senses of seeing and hearing; for example, the accuracy with which the titles of the various officials in various cities is given, differing so widely as they did. Then follows a compact presentation of that line of proof of authenticity that has been so admirably handled by Dr. Paley in his *Horæ Paulinæ* and which has never been refuted, to-wit, from the undesigned coincidences in facts, chronology and localities, in casual phrases and allusions and statements, between the Acts and the Epistles. The author does not fail to present, or to appreciate at its proper value, the argument, from the faultless precision of the narrative of Paul's journey from Cæsarea to Rome and his shipwreck, subjecting them to the test of nautical science, of scientific investigation, of meteorology, of topology and of recent experience in the Mediterranean seas, that the writer must of necessity have been a sharer in the same voyage. The presentation of this argument in detail, by Mr. Smith of Jordan Hill, has been declared by Bishop Whewell to be the finest piece of demonstrative writing that has appeared since the time of Paley. We commend most heartily those parts of these lectures which unmistakably identify Luke as the author of the Acts, and then show the author of the Acts to be also author of the Gospel. The arguments are not new, but they are freshly and compactly stated, and in a manner that chains and fascinates the attention.

On page 89 the lecturer ventures, with much hesitation, as conjectural and possibly unsound, an argument for this identity of authorship, from the prominence given to Peter in the early part of the Acts, which we wish he had omitted, because his evidence is already conclusive, and there is not enough truth in the suggestion to add anything to his proof. Instead of resting in the explanation that Peter was but filling that place and measure of prominence assigned him by our Lord's appointment, the author thinks that this marked prominence over the rest of the twelve may have been, at least in some measure, due also to a secondary reason: to-wit, that Luke designedly so selected his matter as to magnify the name and labors of Peter in view of his former discreditable denial of his Lord, but for which sin he had become penitent and been forgiven. Peter was still living when Luke wrote, and he had recorded in his Gospel the story of his weakness and fall.

Pained at the necessity of having to record such a blot on a life afterward so honored and saintly, he gladly seeks opportunity of recording such facts as might be to his honor and evince his forgiveness and restored standing. We do not think that the author of Acts has accorded to Peter, in his sketches of the early church, any prominence beyond that which he enjoyed under the express appointment and permission of our Lord. Nor has he told us of Peter's leading part for any other motive than that it represented the facts as they existed, as much as he may, in his delicacy, have deplored Peter's former fall and disgrace. We are not playing into the hands of Rome when we recognize a certain leadership in Peter, a prominence neither accidental nor to be attributed to intentional selection and grouping of matter by the author. The whole after-history of the church was not shaped and determined by an endeavor to evince the hearty recognition of a restored penitent by our Lord and his brethren. This would give too much prominence to Peter's denial of our Lord, which, however disgraceful in itself and exceptional in its details, is yet not generically different from what we may observe in the common frailty of believers every day. There was no need, in Peter's case, that, seven or eight years after, he should be accorded a prominence in the apostolic labor simply to emphasize a restoration and forgiveness that had been amply attested by our Lord by the shores of Lake Genesaret.

The last two lectures are devoted to the proofs of the authenticity of the third Gospel, irrespective of Acts. The author goes farther than is necessary in conceding the use of previous documents by our Gospel writers in compiling and preparing their works. For example, on a slight hint from a few unusual words in the chapters bearing on the Baptist, he concedes as altogether possible, and not unlikely, that Luke may have had some Aramean records of the life of John.

As a part of the external evidences of authenticity, of which our author gives us an admirable summary, as in the case of Acts, he cites even the testimony of Paul himself, holding that in 1 Tim. v. 18 the words, "The laborer is worthy of his hire," and referred there to Scripture, are found spoken by our Lord in Luke x. 7, and the reference to Christ's confession before Pilate (1 Tim. vi. 13), coming so soon after the preceding, may, with great probability, be referred to Luke xxiii. 3.

Turning now to the internal evidence for the authenticity of our Gospel, our author groups his matter under three heads: its historical accuracy, its agreement with the other Gospels, and the fitness of its contents to be accepted as a true account of the life and teachings of our Lord, each of which, so far as his space would allow, is treated in an eminently satisfactory manner.

But no part of this little work is more delightful than the last chapter, in which he discusses the personal character of Luke, as it serves to influence our estimate of his testimony. His true and lovely spirit, as attested by Paul after ten years of most intimate and devoted association in circumstances specially trying; his talents and superior culture; his exceptional opportunities of acquiring accurate knowledge of all points on which he writes, through personal converse with apostles and eye-witnesses, and personal visits to the localities described, and through access to public and other written records; all this is most graphically set forth in language as simple as it is striking. Add to all this, as a guarantee of



accuracy, that Luke published in the lifetime of those who were conversant with the persons and events which form the subject of his narrative, and, had he tripped in his statements, the means were at hand to correct his mistakes. Dr. Hervey thinks it likely that Luke wrote his Gospel A. D. 59 or 60, when Paul was a prisoner in Caesarea, a supposition that has nothing against it and much in its favor.

Throughout the whole of these lectures the author discusses Luke, his sources of information and the special opportunities enjoyed by him, as he would speak of any secular author, and without any reference to the inspiration of the writer. He is considering Luke merely as an historian, and asking what right he had, merely as such, to our confidence. The question of credibility is prior to that of inspiration; yet he is careful to attribute that wonderful accuracy which marks his writings to inspiration of the Holy Spirit, not as superseding, but as strengthening and enlarging, his natural powers. The Gospel of Luke is not only the words of an honest and capable man, but of a man specially selected and qualified by the Spirit to be a teacher of the church throughout the ages.

This little volume, so replete with scholarship, is addressed to common people, not to scholars. The author has so grouped his matter, and clothed it in language perspicuous and elegant, that for the purposes for which it is designed it could scarcely be improved.

Clarksville, Tenn.

W. A. ALEXANDER.

#### HERRON'S CHRISTIAN SOCIETY.

THE CHRISTIAN SOCIETY. *By George D. Herron, D. D., E. D. Rand Professor of Applied Christianity in Iowa College.* Fleming H. Revell Co., Chicago, New York, Toronto. 1894. \$1.00.

*The Christian Society* is a significant book from a man who already has a wide and influential circle of admirers, and who is destined, if his life be spared, to attain a still larger and more commanding influence. Professor Herron attracted attention some years since by an address entitled "The Message of Jesus to Men of Wealth," and his reputation has been increased by the publication of a number of small, yet thoughtful, volumes: *The Larger Christ*, *The Call of the Cross*, *The New Redemption*. The present volume is the most mature and systematic production which the author has as yet offered the public. We cannot resist the conviction that Professor Herron has been somewhat premature in the utterance of his thought upon some of the most difficult and vexed problems of human thought. He would have gained a power and permanent influence if he had waited until profounder reflection and wider study had given a more systematic form and maturer flavor to the literary fruit which he seems to have plucked in eager haste. It is a great mistake for an author to venture too early or too often into the field of authorship. We do not believe that Professor Herron has yet thoroughly digested his views or mastered his own powers, and while we have read his works with much interest, and, we hope, profit, we regret their premature publication.

There can be no doubt of the author's consuming earnestness or large ability, and *The Christian Society* gives evidence of admirable literary gifts, which, in some degree, compensate for the crudeness of the thought. Professor Herron is

skilled in the art of putting things, and some of his sentences bring suggestions of the rhythm and music of Emerson.

Our author seems to think it necessary, in the brief compass of his small volume, to cover the whole field of theology and ethics, and the chief criticism we would make upon his attractive and readable book is, that he fails to discriminate the exact boundaries of the particular department he is cultivating, with an exact and accurate statement of the principles which will make society Christian. In philosophy he seems to be a disciple of Hegel, in theology, of Ritschl, while in political philosophy we can detect traces of Maurice and Mulford. The materials thus accumulated from various sources have not been thoroughly welded together in the crucible of his own mind, and we cannot think he has contributed anything new or illuminating to the science of Christian sociology.

*The Christian Society* is divided into five chapters, entitled—I. The Scientific Ground of Christian Sociology; II. The Christian Constitution of Society; III. The Gospel of Jesus to the Poor; IV. The Message of Jesus to men of Wealth; V. The Political Economy of the Lord's Prayer.

The opening chapter is devoted to an exposition of the thesis contained in the following statement, and which, in fact, contains the fundamental doctrine of his book:

“Jesus Christ offers sociology the only scientific ground of discovering all the facts and forces of life. That ground is his revelation of universal unity. However unique we regard the person of Jesus, however difficult we regard the interpretation of his teachings, however imperfect their literary transmission to us, it is clear that the vision which so flooded the soul of this teacher, which makes his person the light of the world, was the oneness in substance and elements and forces of the universe.”

But we cannot attempt to give an analysis of the various chapters which make up this interesting volume. We recommend those who desire to become acquainted with a school of thought destined to exercise considerable influence upon our American Christianity and life, to procure this readable and informing book.

THORNTON WHALING.

#### ELLIS'S FRUIT OF THE VINE.

THE FRUIT OF THE VINE; Unfermented or Fermented; Which? *By John Ellis, M. D.* Pp. 128. New York: National Temperance Society and Publication House, 58 Reade street. 1894.

Dr. Ellis is well known through the wide, gratuitous circulation which his numerous controversial pamphlets have received. For many years a professor in medical colleges in Cleveland and New York, and lecturer on temperance, he seems to be devoting his old age to the settlement of the wine question. This work treats of the wine, alcoholic and temperance question in all its various aspects. He argues from the Bible, history and science to show that there are two kinds of wine. His objective point is to banish fermented wine from the Lord's table. He is a warm if not a furious debater, and represents those who dissent from his views as holding positions and supporting them by arguments that they never dreamed of.

Laying down the proposition that communion wine is typical of regeneration, and that to properly symbolize this it must contain no impurities, he assumes that his opponents concede this view, and that they object to unfermented wine on the ground that the juice as pressed from the grape is impure and for that reason altogether unfit for communion purposes, and requires to be purified by fermentation. Having constructed thus their argument for them, he proceeds to an elaborate refutation of it by insisting that fermentation is not such a purifying process, but one of destruction and contamination. He has an idea that all advocates of unfermented wine in the Lord's Supper justify its use also as a beverage ; that in the ultimate analysis it is their love of red liquor that controls their views and prevents their giving in to the weighty arguments which he and those astride the same hobby with him hurl against their heretical position ; that if they were not blinded by a sensual appetite they would see as he sees.

Gesenius, in his Lexicon, declares that *tirosh*, the Hebrew word rendered *oinos* in the Septuagint and the New Testament, means fermented wine, and appeals to Hosea iv. 11 to show that it had the property of inebriating. But our author demolishes Gesenius at one blow, by saying that he was but "a recent writer, who wrote when intoxicating wines were generally regarded among Western Christian nations, where they were loved and used, as the only wines." As to Gesenius's derivation of *tirosh* from the verb *yarash*, he says : "Had it come originally from some English or American scholar instead of our 'learned German,' it would have been *hooted* as utterly unworthy of notice." We prefer on this point following such authorities as Dr. Robinson and Dr. William Smith, and would rather believe it always means fermented wine than that it invariably refers to the unfermented juice.

That on which advocates for the use of unfermented wine in the Lord's Supper really and primarily ground their conviction is, not the exegetical or historical demonstration that the unfermented article was used by our Lord and appointed by him for our use, but their fear, in their prohibitory zeal, that the taste of fermented wine in the communion may develop a fondness for it in the young and arouse the slumbering appetite in those once enslaved to drink, and so lead to the habit of intoxication. We do not share these fears, nor are we able, as these are, to say, dogmatically and *a priori*, that our Lord would not have used an element that, hypothetically at least, is liable to such abuse.

Our author affirms that the use of an intoxicating element in the Holy Supper is largely responsible for the widespread use of intoxicants as a beverage, and constitutes to-day the greatest obstacle temperance reform has to encounter. He further says that our church periodicals, which should enlighten their readers on this point, are controlled by church organizations which will not allow the use of such wine in the sacrament to be freely discussed in their pages ; that our theological seminaries too often encourage and uphold the use of intoxicants. Rather than attend such institutions, he adjudges it better for the ministerial student to look humbly to the Lord and search the Scriptures diligently and draw his own conclusions.

Throughout this desultory discussion the author does not hesitate to impugn the intelligence or the integrity of those holding the counter position. Truth and virtue are alike on his side. The bigot is always unfair and makes a weapon

of abuse. This author does not spare his opponents. But neither his arguments nor his belligerency carry conviction. He is rambling and repetitious. His reasoning is weak and trivial, his manner often undignified and scattering. The one gratifying feature of the book is the high ground it takes on personal temperance.

I am disposed to regard the notion of two wines, one fermented and the other unfermented, as a "pure invention, unsupported by any facts and unsanctioned by any scholarship." That the leavening of bread was known in Old Testament times, as now, to be similar, if not chemically identical, with the fermentation of liquors, is in the highest degree improbable. The requirement to remove leaven from their houses during the Passover would never have been understood by the ancient Jews to include the expulsion of fermented wine from their homes and from the Paschal feast. When Jesus said, "This is my cup," he did not mean, as our author would have us believe, that the resemblance between wine and his blood, on which the symbolism is based, is one revealed by chemical analysis. So that our author's argument that blood and the unfermented juice of the grape are very similar in their constituent elements, while blood and fermented wine are quite diverse, is altogether trivial and nothing to the point.

Clarksville, Tenn.

W. A. ALEXANDER.

#### DR. STRONG'S CONCORDANCE.

THE EXHAUSTIVE CONCORDANCE OF THE BIBLE : Showing Every Word of the Common English Version of the Canonical Books, and Every Occurrence of Each Word in Regular Order; together with a Comparative Concordance of the Authorized and Revised Versions, including the American Variations; also, Brief Dictionaries of the Hebrew and Greek Words of the Original, with References to the English Words. *By James Strong, S. T. D., LL. D.* Large Quarto. Pp. 1809. Fine cloth, \$6.00; Half American Russia, cloth sides, \$8.00; Half Turkey Morocco, \$10.00. New York: Hunt & Eaton. 1894.

The first inquiry that suggests itself as one hears of this volume is, Why add another to a department already so fully occupied? Has not the great object of any concordance, viz., the securing of a verbal index to the Scriptures, already been fully accomplished? A careful examination of this work will show that it fills a place of its own, and combines with the verbal index certain other features that have never before been brought into use except in separate volumes, and which will make it, when once known and used, absolutely indispensable to the student of God's word.

First of all, this Concordance is independent of all others. Unlike Cruden, who evidently based his Concordance upon those which had preceded his, from John Marbecke's, prior to the Authorized Version, to Clement Cotton's and Samuel Newton's, and unlike Young, who followed the English and Hebrew Index and English and Greek Index which accompanied Wigram's well-known *Englishman's Hebrew Concordance* and *Englishman's Greek Concordance*, Dr. Strong began at the fountain head, and with his English and Hebrew and Greek Bibles, of approved editions, before him, compiled a work which is original and independent. Another feature of the Concordance is its simplicity. The order is strictly alphabeti

cal, as spelled in the Authorized Version; distinctions of parts of speech, common and proper nouns, singular and plural, primary and inflectional forms, etc., are not allowed to interrupt the series. Thus the volume is characterized also by great completeness. Every word, without exception, is given. The particles, even, are dignified with a place, though only the places in the Scriptures where each may be found, and not the collection of words, are given in the case of these particles.

The leading characteristic, however, of this monumental work is the manner in which it makes practicable a thorough word-study of the Bible, and that in the original languages. Opposite each verse quoted is a number. This number refers to that word in the Hebrew or Greek lexicon appended to the volume, which is rendered by the English word under which the passage is given. Referring to the appropriate number in the lexicon, even the ordinary English scholar can find the original word, in the original tongue, and transliterated and pronounced, with its specific meaning. The results of the best scholarship are thus digested for the uneducated, and an ordinary reader or student of the word may, by a simple reference, obtain the fruit of years of study. The great value of this feature of the work will be seen when one remembers that oftentimes the same English word is used to translate different Hebrew or Greek words, between which there is a marked difference of signification. For instance, no one who looks under the head "Everlasting" in this volume need be ignorant of the fact that there are five words in the Hebrew and two in the Greek which have this common translation; or under the head "Damnation," that there are three distinct words so rendered, and yet each having its own meaning. Many of the so-called "Bible Readings" of the day would be vastly improved by a careful use of this work, and the mere nominal coincidences of the Bible would cease to be made the basis of erratic teachings and vagaries, which are made so plausible to the popular mind by the mere fact that they are declared to be "in the Bible." For purely verbal interpretation, this volume is invaluable.

Another most valuable feature of the work is its "Comparative Concordance." Here the student will find, by a simple reference, all the changes that have been made in the rendition of a word from the Authorized to the Revised Version. An asterisk in the Main Concordance calls attention to the fact that the revisers made some change. Referring to the word in the Comparative Concordance, one will find the changes all fully expressed. In this part of the work the suggestions of the American revisers are embraced, as well as the changes made by both the American and English companies.

Take it all in all, this is the greatest work of its kind that has ever been published. Everybody can use it. It places the ripest and richest fruit of scholarship at the disposal of the simplest English reader. It saves the scholar most valuable time and pains in research. It makes practically available the results of the Revision, of which, indeed, we may add that it is the first concordance. Above all, it carries the student to the very sources, and shows him, in the very words of God, what he is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of him. The indebtedness of the Christian world to the compiler, who just lived to see the work completed and ready to go forth upon its mission of helpfulness and truth, is immeasurable, and can never be paid.

Necessarily, the volume is a large one. It numbers more than eighteen hun-

dred pages, and is nearly of the size of a Worcester's or Webster's "Unabridged." It must be remembered, however, that it is many volumes in one. It is clearly printed, handsomely bound, and, for such a volume, the price is very low. We most cordially recommend it, and urge all Bible students to make it their first purchase.

GEORGE SUMMEY.

Clarksville, Tenn.

#### THE EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE.

THE SECOND BOOK OF KINGS. *By F. W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Archdeacon of Westminster.* Crown 8vo, pp. xvi., 496. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1894.

THE BOOKS OF CHRONICLES. *By W. H. Bennett, M. A., Professor of Old Testament Languages and Literature, Hackney and New Colleges; Sometime Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.* Crown 8vo, pp. xii., 464. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1894.

THE SECOND EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS. *By James Denny, B. D.* Crown 8vo, pp. viii., 387. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1894.

THE EPISTLE OF ST. PAUL TO THE ROMANS. *By Handley C. G. Moule, M. A., Principal of Ridley Hall, Cambridge.* Crown 8vo, pp. xvi., 437. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1894.

Referring to what we have said in many issues past of the QUARTERLY, concerning the general features of this series of "The Expositor's Bible," its exceeding great value, and the favorable terms upon which it can be purchased as a whole, or in the annual series of six volumes, we notice with pleasure these last four additions.

In thirty-nine chapters, an epilogue, and four appendices, Canon Farrar traces the general features of Jewish history as embodied in the SECOND BOOK OF KINGS. This he does with his usual brilliancy of style and beauty of diction, making the story most fascinating in all its parts. For the general principles underlying his treatment of this book, and in fact all the books of the Bible, and of his relation to critical questions, we refer the reader to the PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY for October, 1893, where these points are fully set forth. The "Epilogue" at the close of this volume is added, in part, as a defence of his favorable attitude towards the Higher Criticism adopted in the work, and is chiefly remarkable for the emphatic, even denunciatory, manner in which he repudiates the doctrine of Verbal Inspiration, characterizing it as a dangerous and absolute falsity, and the attempt to enforce it as leading to the utter shipwreck of all sincere and reasonable religion. The Appendices are most valuable for the lists and descriptions they give of the ancient monuments bearing upon the history, and of the chronology of Assyria and of the kings of Israel and Judah.

Professor Bennett begins his work on *The Books of Chronicles* by stating that Chronicles is a curious literary *torso*; that when Ezra and Nehemiah, with which it is closely related, are removed, the *torso* that remains is of very mixed character, partly borrowed from the older historical books, partly taken down from late tradition, and partly constructed according to the current philosophy of history. He further states that "the times were uncritical," and so the author of Chroni-

cles, some unknown writer between B. C. 300 and B. C. 250, was occasionally "somewhat easy of belief as to the enormous magnitude of ancient Hebrew armies and the splendor and wealth of ancient Hebrew kings; the narrow range of his interests and experience gave him an appetite for innocent gossip, professional or otherwise." If such be the character of his work, what must be expected of the character of the author of Chronicles, and with what confidence can we follow the spiritual guidance of such a man in that exposition of it which enriches the subsequent pages of Professor Bennett's book? Throughout, Professor Bennett follows the critical views held by Professor Adeney in the latter's work on Ezra and Nehemiah, fully noticed in a recent number of the *QUARTERLY*.

Mr. Denney, in his work on *SECOND CORINTHIANS*, first sets forth the close relation between the introduction to this Epistle and its proper interpretation, and then devotes considerable space to a careful tracing of the vital connection of this Epistle with the First Epistle, a study of the visits of Paul to Corinth, and the occasion of the writing of this epistle. Then in twenty-six chapters he presents the salient features of the book, under such titles as Suffering and Consolation; Faith Born of Despair; The Church's One Foundation; Christian Mysteries; A Pastor's Heart; Church Discipline; Living Epistles; The Victory of Faith, etc. He shows a thorough and sympathetic insight into the purpose and spirit of the great apostle, and gives us one of the best of this series of expositions.

No book in the New Testament is better adapted to show a commentator's position as to the great doctrines of grace than the *EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS*. The questions of authorship and date, and of the integrity of the book, are so thoroughly settled that a writer needs to dwell upon them only sufficiently to illumine the exposition of the text. Dr. Moule touches upon none of these questions, except, and that briefly, that of the list of names in chapter xvi. He announces that he is personally convinced that the pages we know as the Epistle to the Romans are not only all genuine, but all intimately coherent. The author gives us more textual interpretation in this work than is found in most of the series to which it belongs, and he adds a running, free translation, for which he gives an explanation and semi-apology in the introduction. The expositions are sound, evangelical, fervid, and full of spirituality. A few specimens which we add below show his spirit and purpose, and manifest principles which will account for the reverence and yet power with which he deals with the superb product of Paul's inspired pen. Principal Moule describes in his first three chapters the time, place, occasion, writer, and readers of the Epistle, the report of the Roman church, and Paul's declaration that he was not ashamed of the gospel of Christ. In the next five chapters he sets forth Paul's account of the need for the gospel, God's anger and man's sin, man's being given up to his own way, the universality of human guilt, the special responsibility and guilt of the Jews, and the futility of their claims. Passing over his admirable discussion of the next chapters, we find our author, under the title of "Christ and Adam" (Romans v. 12-21), strongly setting forth the federal theology and original sin in such words as these: "We shall find the apostle teaching, or rather stating, for he writes as to those who know, that mankind inherits from primal man, tried and fallen, not only taint, but guilt—not only moral hurt, but legal fault. 'The many' are the whole company which in each case stand related to the respective Representative." "Nor again are we to think that because 'the condemnation' was 'to all men'

in the sense of their being not only condemnable, but actually condemned, therefore 'the justification of life' was 'to all men' in the sense that all mankind are actually justified. Here, again, the whole Epistle, and the whole message of St. Paul about our acceptance, are on the other side. The provision is for the *genus*, for man; but the possession is for men—who believe." In a foot-note at this point he commends Calvin's view of the universality of the offer of redemption. In the chapters on Romans viii. and ix. there occur glowing words like these: "With a foreknowledge which, in this argument, can mean nothing short of foredecision—no mere foreknowledge of what they would do, but rather of what he would do for them." "Let us banish from the idea of 'predestination' all thought of a mechanical pagan *destiny*, and use it of the sure purpose of the living and loving God." In treating of the famous tenth verse of Romans ix., he says: "The reason of the choice lay in the depths of God. . . . All is well there. . . . So we are led up to the shut door of the sanctuary of God's choice. . . . The whole matter, in its practical aspect, has a voice articulate enough for the soul which sees Christ and believes on him. . . . See in thy choice of him, his mercy on thee. And now fall at his feet, to bless him, to serve him, and to trust him." And further on, "HE may be not only submitted to, but trusted, in that unknowable sovereignty of his will."

*Clarksville, Tenn.*

GEORGE SUMMEY.



## IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

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PLAIN INTRODUCTIONS TO THE BOOKS OF THE BIBLE. *Edited by Charles John Ellicott, D. D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol.* Vol. I. Old Testament Introductions. 12mo, pp. viii., 358; Vol. II. New Testament, pp. 342. London, Paris, and Melbourne: Cassell & Company, Limited. 1893.

Dr. Ellicott's part in this work was simply to gather, and correct a few trivial errors, in the several introductions which form parts of the large commentary of which he was editor. The introductions are from many pens, as those of Plumptre, Rawlinson, Barry, Salmon, Spence, Plummer, and others. The general introduction by Canon Plumptre, sets forth the dynamic theory of inspiration, and anticipates the position that the author of the chapter on the Pentateuch, R. Payne Smith, D. D., maintains as to the Mosaic authorship of the first five books of the Bible. The chapter on Job, by Professor Leathes, proves the integrity of that book, claims for its age approximately that period in which the Hebrew patriarchs lived, and ascribes its authorship to Moses. It goes without saying that Dr. Plumptre regards Isaiah as the product of one and the same author throughout. The author of the chapter on Ecclesiastes inclines to the anti-Solomonic theory of its authorship, but seems unwilling to assign it a later date. Rev. Henry Deane, in treating of Daniel, holds to the unity of its authorship, and argues strongly for the traditional view of its authorship in the Babylonian period rather than later. On Second Peter, Dr. Alfred Plummer discusses at great length the authenticity of the Epistle, and concludes that while "the objections to the Epistle are such that, had the duty of fixing the canon of the New Testament fallen on us, we should scarcely have ventured, on the existing evidence, to include the Epistle, they are not such as to warrant us in reversing the decision of the fourth century, which had evidence that we have not. If modern criticism be the court of appeal to which the judgment of the fourth century is referred, as it has not sufficient reasons for reversing that judgment, it can only confirm it." From these glimpses it can be seen that these two handy volumes are sound and conservative and can be safely put into the hands of students of the word.

THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA AND METHODOLOGY. *By George R. Crooks, D. D., and John F. Hurst, D. D.* New Edition, Revised. Large 8vo, pp. 627. \$3.50. New York: Hunt & Eaton. 1894.

In this work, another of the "Biblical and Theological Library" of the publishers, the authors, making the volume of Dr. Karl Hegenbach, of Basel, the basis of their work, give an outline of the importance, nature, and history of the great divisions of theological study, together with a bibliography of the English and American literature. The new edition just issued includes an enlargement of the bibliography, and adds, in an appendix, a selection of the English and

American literature on the relations of religion and science, and a list of histories of Christian churches in the United States. The whole volume makes a most useful and comprehensive handbook, showing the outlines of theological science. The work is neither so extensive, nor yet so much characterized by a new terminology, as Dr. Schaff's recent work on the subject, and it seems to us to be better adapted to general use.

CHRISTIAN ARCHÆOLOGY. *By Charles W. Bennett, D. D., Professor of Historical Theology in Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Illinois.* With an Introductory Notice by Dr. Ferdinand Piper, Professor of Church History and Christian Archæology in the University of Berlin. Large 8vo, pp. xvi., 558. New York: Hunt & Eaton.

This volume is one of the series now issuing from the Methodist Publishing House, under the title of the "Biblical and Theological Library." The several volumes will, of course, in theology, be found to conform to the doctrinal standards of the Methodist Church, but at the same time all of them will be of great value and usefulness to all evangelical Christians.

Dr. Bennett's *Christian Archæology* has been before the public three or four years, but has only just now come into our hands. It is a handsome octavo volume, clearly and handsomely printed, and profusely illustrated. It is the first work upon the subject which has appeared in America. The author is an eminent and accomplished professor in the Garrett Biblical Institute, and was a student of Dr. Piper, of Berlin, who has prepared a short Introductory Note to the volume, on the scope and value of the subject and its study. The author defines Christian archæology as that department of archæology, or the science of antiquity, which deals with, and makes a systematic study of, the art, constitution, government, discipline, worship, rites, and life of the early Christian church. In this work he confines his study to that period which ended with the second Trullan Council at Constantinople, A. D. 692. His first two chapters are devoted to the setting forth of the general principles of Christian archæology, and of the utility of the study. The subject is then considered under four heads or books: (1), The Archæology of Christian Art; (2), The Archæology of the Constitution and Government of the Early Christian Church; (3), The Archæology of Christian Worship and Rites; and (4), The Archæology of Christian Life. In the first book, Christian thought, life, doctrines, and institutions are examined in the light of monumental evidence, as distinguished from documentary evidence. In the second book, an examination is made into the fundamental idea of the Christian church and its organization as revealed in the New Testament Scriptures. In the third book, the author deals with the matter of public worship, the sacraments, sacred times and seasons, etc. In the fourth book, examination is made of the questions of the family, the marriage relation, household religion, slavery, trades, business, charities, etc.

In a brief notice like this, one can thus give but a bare outline of a most valuable work. In the chapters on the composition and officers of the apostolic church, the author maintains the identity of bishops and elders, the power of the council, the republican type of church government. He gives fully the various theories as to the episcopacy as now held, and by the order in which he considers them he seems to prefer that which holds that the episcopate as a distinct office

was of post-apostolic origin, and that it was a prudential measure rather than a divine institution. He shows that the deacons did not at first have authority or rights in the administration of ordinances, and traces the development of their functions. In the discussion of the subjects and mode of baptism, the author, while maintaining correct principles as to the significancy of the rite, and the arguments connected therewith, rather yields the historical argument, and makes but little of the great generic principle of infant church membership and its influence upon the earliest Christians. He deals with remarkable fairness with the question of slavery, in the chapter devoted to that subject, showing that Christianity recognized the institution, and made no attempt for its immediate abolition; that "a slave can be the truest freeman through the liberty wherewith Christ shall make him free," but that emancipation was recognized and encouraged as a work of Christian love.

The whole work is one of great value, and evinces both scholarship and research.

A HISTORY OF THE DISCIPLES OF CHRIST, THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS, THE UNITED BRETHREN IN CHRIST, AND THE EVANGELICAL ASSOCIATION. *By B. B. Tyler, D. D. ; Professor A. C. Thomas, M. A. ; R. H. Thomas, M. D. ; D. Berger, D. D., and Rev. S. P. Spreng ; and BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN CHURCH HISTORY, By Samuel Macaulay Jackson, D D., LL. D.* (The American Church History Series, Vol. XII.) Pp. 518. \$3.00. New York : The Christian Literature Co. 1894.

This volume is another contribution to the American Church History Series, begun under the general editorship of the late Dr. Schaff and others, several volumes of which we have already noticed. Dr. Tyler, in the one hundred and sixty pages assigned him, considers the preliminary conditions, moral and spiritual, which gave rise to his church, as revivals, contentions, divisions, etc., the life of the Campbells in America, connection with the Baptists, the problem of Christian union, the creed question, the literature and education and missions of the Disciples. Professor Thomas and Dr. Thomas introduce their account of the Society of Friends with a complete bibliography of that body. They claim that the sketch which they write is based upon an independent examination of original records, documents, contemporary histories, journals, and other materials. They give an impartial account of the various divisions which have occurred in the Society. Dr. Berger writes the history of The United Brethren in Christ. The bibliography is quite limited. The body took its rise in the great revival movement at the beginning of this century, and its early adherents came largely from the ranks of the Mennonites. It is an organization largely modelled upon that of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Its Confession of Faith was revised in 1889. It is too brief to set forth clearly the denomination's position as to controverted points of theology, though the type is Arminian. The church membership is a little above two hundred thousand. The Evangelical Association, whose history Rev. Samuel P. Spreng writes, was founded by Jacob Albright, a Methodist among the Pennsylvania Germans. Albright was a Methodist preacher, but he was not satisfied with the conditions of work among his countrymen. The Evangelical Association grew out of his work, and its first council was held in 1803. The ordina-

tion of Albright has been much questioned, and our author defends it. The body is strictly Arminian in its theology. It holds a doctrine of "Christian Perfection," as set forth in its Articles of Faith. Its government is episcopal. Its adherents are two-thirds German-speaking Americans. They number about one hundred and fifty thousand. A secession of perhaps twenty-five thousand members has recently taken place. Of all these facts, the history before us gives a carefully prepared, clear account.

ANNOTATIONS UPON POPULAR HYMNS. *By Charles Seymour Robinson, D. D., Editor and Compiler of "Songs of the Church," 1862; "Songs for the Sanctuary," 1865; "Psalms and Hymns," 1875; "Spiritual Songs," 1878, etc. 8vo, pp. 581. \$2.50. New York: Hunt & Eaton. 1894.*

This latest contribution to hymnological study comes from the pen of one of the most successful of all the compilers of sacred poesy and music, and is worthy of its author. The origin, authorship, and history of more than twelve hundred hymns are succinctly but clearly given, together with something of the life or career of the authors, accompanied in many cases by well-executed pictures of the authors. The volume has been prepared with a special view to its use in praise-meetings, or services of song. It fully meets this end, and many a pastor will find its contributions to the effectiveness of such a service abundant and invaluable. We commend the book most heartily.

FAITH-HEALING, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE, AND KINDRED PHENOMENA. *By J. M. Buckley, LL. D. Small 8vo, pp. 308. New York: The Century Co. 1892.*

This book is made up of a series of papers, very familiar to the public, which appeared in *The Century*, during three or four years prior to their appearance in this form. They are clear-cut, interesting, sensible papers, and deserve to be carefully read. They show plainly that in all the apparent phenomena cited by the believers in the vagaries considered there is nothing that scientific laws cannot explain, and that it is a superstition to assume the operation of supernatural causes when there is a rational explanation of the phenomena.

THE PRINCE OF INDIA; or Why Constantinople Fell. *By Lew. Wallace, author of "Ben-Hur," "The Boyhood of Christ," "The Fair God," etc., etc. Two Volumes. 12mo. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1893.*

On our first reading of these volumes, the inquiry constantly presented itself: What shall we denominate the work? Is it fiction, history, archæology, legend, historical theology, or what? Rising from a careful re-reading of it, we conclude that it is a marvellous combination of them all. So as to its style, what should we pronounce it? Brilliant to an almost remarkable degree in some respects, it is dull or full of affectation in others; rapid in movement and thought in some portions, and thrilling, it is dreadfully prolix in others. But the more we read it, the more it grows upon us. It is a work in which the author has gathered a vast store of facts and remains of an age with which the average reader is unfamiliar, and while they have been hung upon a thread of romance, or built upon that venerable legend of the Wandering Jew, they are yet remarkable declarations of facts and doctrines of the age in which the scene is laid, and especially of the various

factions of the Greek church, the division of which doubtless contributed to the downfall of Constantinople and the establishment of the Turks in Europe. Some critics have thought that the author might have compassed his purpose in one-third less space. We would not now cut out a page. The first feeling has passed away. We do not now feel the laboriousness of the author's work, nor are we lost in contemplation of the artist instead of the art. The apparent painstaking character of the work, the research and study it indicates, only assure the reader that he may safely follow the author. In only one respect would we criticise him. Here, as in other works, and notably as in the case of his wife in that masterpiece of hers, the *Repose in Egypt*, the author throws a glamour about Mohammedanism and its votaries which obscures their abominations. There is very little in Islam and its adherents to commend them. The portraiture of Mohammed the Great, by Dr. Ludlow, in *The Captain of the Janizaries* is, we believe, truer to the facts.

THE SIBERIAN EXILE. Translated from the German of Gustav Nieritz. *By Mary E. Ireland.* 12mo, pp. 122. \$1.00. Richmond, Va. : Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1894.

THE SHEPHERD'S FAMILY. Translated from the German of Gustav Nieritz. *By Mary E. Ireland.* 12mo, pp. 111. \$1.00. *The same publishers.*

These two volumes are not only pure, but attractive. The stories are quite interesting, the first particularly so, and will be worthy additions to any Sabbath-school library or home. They may be safely entrusted to our young people.

Among the important topics editorially treated in "The Progress of the World" department of the *Review of Reviews* for August are the recent railroad strike and its results; the tariff dead-lock in Congress; the assassination of President Carnot; the new President of France; the doings of the German Emperor; the veto of the British Peers; the British budget and the elections, and the personalities of the late Lord Chief-Justice Coleridge and his successor, Sir Charles Russell. The full-page portraits of these last will especially interest American lawyers.