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THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

NO. 19.—JANUARY, 1892.

I. THE CHRISTO-CENTRIC PRINCIPLE OF THEOLOGY.¹

THE work to which special reference is here made is the product of an able and distinguished scholar, who is a theological professor in the Reformed (German) Church. He is the author of an article in the *Schaff-Herzog Encyclopædia* which clearly foreshadowed the distinctive principle of the work before us, and the moulding influence of that principle, as a constructive one, upon the whole system of theology. This assists us, in view of the fact that only the first volume of the "Institutes" has as yet been issued, in estimating the comprehensive sweep and the modifying effect of Dr. Gerhart's fundamental assumption, in relation to his theology as a whole.

It is not intended in these remarks to attempt an articulate examination of the doctrines maintained in the author's theological system, but to devote particular attention to its constructive principle. The whole system is based upon what is denominated the

¹INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. *By Emanuel V. Gerhart, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Systematic and Practical Theology in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, Lancaster, Pa.* With an Introduction by Philip Schaff, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Church History in Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 51 East Tenth street, near Broadway. 1891. 8vo., pp. 754.

“Christo-centric principle.” Proceeding upon the supposition—and it is acknowledged to be valid—that the human mind is impelled as by the force of an irresistible instinct to seek for unity in every department of knowledge, whether scientific, philosophical or theological, Dr. Gerhart professes to find the unifying principle of theology in what he terms the “Christ-idea.” If we understand him, it is the doctrine concerning Christ, the “Christological” doctrine, which is fundamental to theology, and imparts to all its truths their bond of unity. This is the “central” theological principle. It pervades, shapes, controls the whole theological system. “Governed by this fundamental truth,” the author says, “a system may begin by presenting the import of this truth, and setting forth its regulative force for the construction of all Christian doctrines; then pass on to treat the manifold parts of the Christian religion in its light and under its guidance.” This is the method which he avowedly pursues.

He claims for it novelty so far as this country is concerned. Upon this point he makes the following remarks, which savor of a condemnatory criticism of all previous and existing systems of theology :

“Thus far no system of theology, developed from the Christ-idea as its standpoint, of American or English authorship, has greeted the church. Works of this class have been fashioned after the Augustinian or Arminian type. As a consequence there is in many circles a sense of the lack of harmony, perhaps it may be said a sense of dissonance, not only between a large proportion of influential pulpits, but also between much of the soundest Christian thought of our times and regnant theological systems. And from many directions has come the expression of a desire for a construction of all Christian doctrines proceeding from what is now generally felt and acknowledged to be the central truth of Christianity.

“The scientific labors of all Christian thinkers from Clement and Origen onward through the middle ages. I appreciate and honor, especially the great ideas of Augustine, which, as reproduced and matured by John Calvin, mark a mighty epoch of progress in evangelical theology and practical religion. But the Reformation did not propose to break the bondage of Romanism in order to replace it by a Calvinistic yoke.” [!]

Upon these utterances, in which a charge in general is made against previous systems of theology, and in particular against the Calvinistic, of inadequacy and of inconsistency with the soundest Christian thought of our times, we cannot forbear pausing to

make a few comments. While we steadfastly maintain that there is no legitimate development of the contents of the Scriptures by substantive addition, subtraction or substitution, inasmuch as they are a fixed and unchanging quantity, and that they can only be developed by logical inference which explicitly evolves what they implicitly contain; we do not deny that there may be a legitimate development of the church's knowledge of the doctrines of Scripture. This development may be conceived to be actualized in one or other of three ways: either by a more thorough-going and enlightened exploration of some doctrinal field, or by a fuller expansion of the logical contents of some doctrine or doctrines, or by a correction of some doctrinal statement which has been discovered to be wrong, and the substitution of a more scriptural one in its place. The results, if any, thus attained may in a proper way, a way provided for in the constitutions of ecclesiastical bodies be, with due deliberation and caution and with much prayer for the guidance of the Holy Spirit, formally incorporated into the doctrinal symbols of the church.

It is obvious that any theologian who undertakes to formulate such results, and to advocate their adoption, assumes a most responsible office. The presumption is against him, and it is incumbent on him to rebut it by reasons of the most convincing character. In the case before us the changes proposed are radical, because corrective and substitutionary. We advert to one or two eminent examples. By the acceptance of a central and ruling principle it is claimed that theologies hitherto constructed after the Augustinian or Arminian type may be brought into harmony with each other, if not reduced to unity. Of course, this could only be effected by the elimination of the distinctive features of Augustinianism and Arminianism, and the substitution of others in their place. And we here only suggest that a central principle which will be potent enough to achieve this office will succeed in bringing fire and water into harmony and reducing contradictions to identity. It is as hopeless as it is too late to expect, by the adoption of any generic principle, to accomplish such a result.

A special instance of such a change which the author signalizes is in connection with the Calvinistic theology, which, he remarks,

reproduces and matures the Augustinian. To any one who has studied the Calvinistic system it is evident that it rests upon two main pillars: Unconditional Election and Federal Representation. Take away either, you mutilate it; take away both, you destroy it. Rejecting the regulative—we say not central and unifying—force of these two great principles of Calvinism, Dr. Gerhart would enthrone in their place a principle, in accordance with which God's love subjugates to itself every other attribute of his character, stamps its controlling influence upon his moral government and absolutely dominates theology. The supremacy of this principle, it is contended, renders it impossible that God should be sovereign to the exclusion of man's sovereignty, or that man should be sovereign to the exclusion of God's sovereignty. It reduces the two sovereignties to unity. This is an extraordinary feat of logical unification. What can the unit be? We confess that it passes our ability to imagine it, unless it be a verbal creation styled "divine-human" sovereignty. And what meaning could be extracted from those terms we cannot possibly conceive. To our humble minds it seems clear that either God is sovereign or man. To affirm the latter is to be untrue alike to Scripture and to fact. It remains that God alone is sovereign. Now, this is one of the main contentions of the Calvinistic theology, and to deny its tenableness is not to modify that system, not to improve upon it and better it; it is to break down one of its principal supports. A similar course of remark would hold in regard to the federal and representative principle—the complement of unconditional election on the one hand, and of particular atonement on the other. Deny both these principles, absolutely sovereign election and federal representation, and you wipe out Calvinism as a distinctive system. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of Arminianism. Take away its two leading principles, first, conditional election involving the sovereignty of the human will in the matter of appropriating salvation, and, secondly, universal atonement, and the system is not modified; it is, as distinctive, blotted out.

To bring, therefore, these two contradictory systems, hoary with age and scarred by blows mutually inflicted in a conflict of

centuries' duration, into unity under the moulding influences of a unifying principle is simply impossible. The attempt would suppose the destruction of both. Nothing could be effected but the substitution in their room of a system radically new and radically different. This is the end to which Professor Gerhart seems to be directing his splendid powers, and nothing is risked in predicting failure as the result.

It may be observed, further, that it is difficult to see how the author's positions hang together. On the one hand, he magnifies the Augustinian and Calvinistic systems as epoch-making, and as producing signal benefits in the past. On the other, he rejects both, so far as they are distinctive, and impeaches them as productive of dissonance in Christian communities, and as conflicting with the Christian thought of our times. Was what is now false in theology once true in theology? Is the "*Homo Mensura* theory" tenable in asserting that there is no invariable standard of truth, that truth is as it appears to each man to be? Is theological truth determined by circumstances and environment? Augustine was once right, Calvin was once right, but now they are both wrong! One is reminded of Mr. Herbert Spencer's position that every past religion as a necessary product of evolution was absolutely right, but as compared with the last and climactic result of the same wondrous law, relatively wrong. Fetichism is right for the Tasmanian, but wrong for the Englishman. Christianity is to be commended for the ignorant fanatic, but to be despised by the enlightened agnostic. If he repudiate these analogies and would be consistent, Dr. Gerhart must hold that what is now wrong in Augustinianism and Calvinism was wrong when Augustine and Calvin wrote; and then he would prove himself the greatest theological reformer that the Reformed Church ever saw.

As it is to be presumed that the pious author would not decline to wear the yoke of Scripture, his splenetic fling at "a Calvinistic yoke" must be construed as indicating his contempt for the Calvinistic theology; and it is only adverted to now, as a remark emanating somewhat strangely and significantly from a learned professor in a church of which Ursinus and Olevianus were illustrious ornaments.

It will be perceived that the author's Christo-centric principle is not treated by him as a mere principle of classification, upon which to collect the various truths of theology into logical unity; it is a genetic principle which exerts a moulding and determinative influence upon theological doctrine. It is a positive force dynamically operating in the recast of the theological system. Were it used as simply a basis of classification, the question concerning its validity would certainly be possessed of no little logical interest. But it rises into something more than logical value when it is regarded as a constructive, an "architectonic" principle, creating the type of doctrine and stamping the genius of theology. It is especially as considered from this point of view, and as wielded by the learned author, that the Christo-centric principle of theology justifies and invites examination.

Let us, at the outset, settle the question, What are the requirements which a central principle of theology must meet? It must be: (1.) A principle of Unity. It must discharge the office of collecting together all the diversified elements of theology, and logically reducing them to unity upon itself. There must be no exceptions. (2.) A Generic and All-comprehending principle. As generic its essence must pass into all the specific doctrines of theology, and constitute their common because essential attribute. As all-comprehending it must include every single element of theology under its scope. Were there one excluded from its sweep the integrity of the professed central principle would be invalidated. (3.) A Universally Regulative principle. It is not sufficient that it be regulative of a certain section or department of theological truth. It would be easy to show that there are several such regulative principles. This one ruling principle must regulate subordinate regulative principles themselves. It must dominate the whole of theology in all its parts. We understand Dr. Gerhart to claim for the Christo-centric principle that it meets all these demands. The question is, Can this claim be verified?

1. Let us inquire into the scope of the alleged Christo-centric principle. Is it claimed for it that it is the central principle of *all* theology? A few citations will settle this question in the affirmative:

“Thus far no system of theology developed from the Christ-idea as its standpoint, of American or English authorship, has greeted the church.”¹ “This work is in sympathy with the Christological trend of the Christian sentiment and scholarship of our age. It is an earnest effort to make answer to the call for a doctrinal system in which Jesus Christ stands as the central truth; not only as the instrument of redemption and salvation, but also as the beginning and end of revelation.”² “Governed by this fundamental truth, a system may begin by presenting the import of this truth, and setting forth its regulative influence for the construction of all Christian doctrines.”³ “It may be safely said that there is not a sentiment or thought expressed by any writer [inspired] on any one of the innumerable questions concerning things in heaven and things on earth, concerning the past or the future, that does not derive its import from the person of the God-man. Events, doctrines and duties are distinctive because his personality, his history and his kingdom are unique . . . The Messianic principle underlies and permeates the entire history of pre-Christian revelation.”⁴ “I shall, therefore, limit the discussion of the Christ-idea, taken as the fundamental law of theological science, to three general subjects: God, the Cosmos, and Jesus Christ.”⁵

Quotations to the same effect might be multiplied, but these are sufficient to indicate that the author intends his central principle to embrace all theology, in all its possible extension. He does not limit it to the scheme of redemption. He often, it is true, speaks of Christian theology and Christian doctrines, but he obviously means, not the theology of redemption as ordinarily understood, but the whole science of theology as contemplated by a Christian man. In fact, he makes redemption the primordial element of all theology.

The central principle is narrower than the scope assigned to it.

(1.) It cannot bring into unity the theology of natural religion and the theology of redemption. By natural religion we mean the religion of man in innocence; by redemption, or redemptive religion, we mean what everybody except the advocates of the Christo-centric principle and a few Arminians mean—the religion which proposes to save man from sin. Adam, in innocence, knew nothing of an incarnate Redeemer. He needed no incarnate Redeemer, and as God does nothing superfluously, he did not reveal an incarnate Redeemer to Adam unfallen. He offered to justify Adam upon a totally different principle from that of redemption, upon the principle of conscious legal obedience. We speak not

¹ Pref., p. viii.

² *Ibid.*, p. ix.

³ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

⁴ P. 129.

⁵ P. 188.

now of Adam's descendants. Adam himself might have won justification by the works of the law, a principle exactly opposite to that by which a sinner may be justified. To say that the Christo-centric principle permeated and controlled Adam's religion is to say that Christ, the incarnate Son of God, made justification possible to him; which would be absurd.

Adam's theology was not a redemptive theology before the Fall. It was, it is true, a federal theology, but it was essentially legal. Had he stood he would not have been justified *by* Christ; he would have been justified *without* Christ. The principle of justification was common between his theology and that of the sinner, but not the Christian principle of justification. In this regard justification would seem to discharge the office of a central, a regulative, principle more perfectly than the Christo-centric principle. Further, had Adam maintained his integrity, the whole race would have been justified in him, that is, would have been confirmed in holiness and happiness forever; and then there would have been no necessity for the Son of God to become incarnate, for redemption would not have been needed. If it be said that this reasoning is based on the untenable supposition of a federal relation between God, on the one hand, and on the other Adam and his posterity, we reply, that one who does not recognize that relation has no true theology, and the question of a central principle would lose all significance. And, moreover, if the Christo-centric principle rules out a federal theology, it would be on that account convicted of being unscriptural.

Dr. Gerhart occupies the position of the Supralapsarian, redemption being substituted for predestination in the order of the divine decrees. Redemption having been the primordial conception, the creation and the fall of man had to take place, in order to its actual realization. The start was given to a "process of becoming" in accordance with the law of evolution, which was destined to reach its climax of development in the actual redemption of sinners. Indeed, we understand him to enunciate this view. But if this be so, Dr. Gerhart must, in logical consistency, be a Universal Restorationist; otherwise his fundamental germ of redemption would expand partly into the actual redemption

and partly into the actual destruction of human beings. The evolution would concurrently conduct to heaven and to hell.

It may be replied, that, even supposing that all which has been said were true, the Christo-centric principle would not be invalidated. For, it was the Son of God who created the world and placed Adam upon it; it was the Son of God who instituted Adam's religion, who dispensed its measures, who administered its sanctions. Christ must still be regarded as having been the fundamental principle. We rejoin: in the first place, Christ and the Son of God are not altogether convertible terms, notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Gerhart so conceives and uses them. The Son of God, the Second Person of the Godhead, although eternal was not eternally incarnate. There are some things in Scripture which are referred to the eternal Son of God which are not referred to him as incarnate. He was not eternally anointed, nor was it eternally said to his parents, "Call his name Jesus." Although, therefore, we admit that the Son of God was the creator of the world and of Adam, we do not admit that he was creator as Christ Jesus the Redeemer. In the second place, we are not prepared to concede what the author's view demands—that the Son of God was Creator to the exclusion of the Father and the Holy Ghost, or that in the discharge of the creative office he was even superior to the other Persons of the Godhead. Certainly, the Father as Creator was not subordinate to the Son as Creator. To this consideration it may be added that the general doctrine of the church has been that, in some ineffable sense, the Father is the representative of the supreme authority of the Godhead, and to substitute the Son for him in that august relation is to break with the *consensus* of Christendom. In the third place, there is nothing in the Scriptures to necessitate *our* believing that Adam recognized or sustained a peculiar and emphatic relation to the Second Person of the Godhead. There is some ground in the record in Genesis for the belief that he knew his relation to the Triune God as his God. Most certainly he did not know Christ Jesus in his capacity of Redeemer as his God. It behooves Dr. Gerhart to change the name of his central principle from *Christo-centric*. We see already that he meets insuperable diffi-

culty in pushing that principle beyond the limits of redemption.

(2.) This naturally leads to the observation, that the Christo-centric principle is not broad enough to cover the doctrine of the Trinity, a doctrine not only of redemptive, but also of natural, religion. For it is not supposable that angels do not know God as Triune, or that Adam was destitute of that knowledge. If God makes himself known to his creatures, he must reveal himself in his true nature. He could not have communicated to our first parents a Mohammedan and Unitarian conception of himself. Now, ever since the settlement of the Arian controversy the church has constantly maintained the consubstantiality of the Persons of the Godhead. But admitting that they are identical as to essence, what room is there for a Christo-centric principle which, if conceded, must make the Son fundamental in the essential relation of the Trinity? Nor is it less difficult to see how that principle could be asserted with reference to the personal relations of the Godhead. The church has always held—Dr. Gerhart himself holds—the “priority” of the Father, so far as those relations are concerned. How, then, can the Son, not to say Christ, be considered the primordial principle in those relations? Even so far as the economy of redemption is concerned, it is universally held that the scheme of salvation sprang from the bosom of the Father, that it had its origin in his infinite wisdom and mercy, that he called the Son to its discharge and sent him on his redeeming mission to earth. Might it not, therefore, with some color of plausibility be urged that the Father is the primordial principle of redemption?

If it be said that for the *knowledge* of the Father we are indebted to the Son, since Jesus himself declares: “Neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him;” and that here the Christo-centric principle holds good; we might ask in return, How is the Son himself revealed? The answer must be, By the Holy Spirit through the Word. And it might, in the last analysis, be exceedingly difficult to say whether we know more of God, of the Trinity, of the Father, by the revelation of the Son, or by the communion of the

Holy Ghost. When it comes to a comparison, in this matter, between the Persons of the Godhead, and the exaltation of the office of one above that of another, we confess that we shrink back from instituting the dread equation.

(3.) The decrees of God would also seem to lie beyond the scope of the Christo-centric principle. They transcend its regulative influence. Unless the maintainers of this principle are prepared to revolutionize the common doctrine of the whole nominal church, they must admit that it is peculiarly the office of God the Father to decree. He decreed creation, he decreed redemption. The office of decreeing is not peculiarly attributed to the Son. If there be, in this matter, any will which is a fundamental, primordial, regulative principle, it is not especially the will of the Son, but that of the Father. We cannot, therefore, regard the divine decrees as embraced within the sweep of the Christo-centric principle.

(4.) It is hard to perceive how the attributes of God are reducible under the regulative potency of this principle. The pure extravagance is maintained by our author that "the essence of God is love." It is true that the Scriptures declare that "God is love." They also declare that "God is light." If the declaration that he is love justifies the assertion that his essence is love, the declaration that he is light would warrant the affirmation that his essence is light. We would, then, have two divine essences, and the *intrinsic* unity of God would be sacrificed. But let it be admitted that, in some eminent and ineffable sense, love characterizes the divine nature, and the question arises, How can the love of the Son be regarded as fundamental and primordial in the internal relations of the Godhead? Did his love to the Father antecede, in the order of thought, the love of the Father to the Son? Would that consist with the Christian doctrine of the personal relations of the Trinity? Further, the love of God for that infinite righteousness which is the perfect and eternal norm of rectitude in his nature, an infinite love which may be fitly characterized as his holiness, and which, in the event of a conflict with his love for the happiness of the creature, must infinitely take precedence of it—a view which to our mind is the fundamental and unan-

swerable argument for the necessity of the atonement—this love, it must be supposed, is equally shared by all the Persons of the Godhead. But if so, one fails to comprehend how the love of the Son for the infinite righteousness of the divine nature can be regarded as primordial, and as regulative of the same infinite love as belonging to the other divine Persons. How can the love of the Son be a principle which reduces to unity upon itself the love of the Father and that of the Holy Spirit?

Turning now from the love of God, contemplated as intrinsic to the Godhead, and looking at that love which was extrinsically exercised towards mankind, we must reach a similar result. It was the love of the Father for guilty, ruined sinners of the human race which *initiated* redemption. It was the love of the Father which induced the call of the Son to undertake the work of redemption: "And no man taketh this honor unto himself, but he that is called of God, as was Aaron. So also Christ glorified not himself to be made an high priest; but he that said unto him, Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten thee." The love of the Son for sinners, therefore, free and infinite as it was, cannot be considered as the primordial principle of redemption. But even if, as to their nature, the love of the Father and the love of the Son for sinners be contemplated as equal, that very equality would preclude the supposition that the love of the Son was regulative of the Father's love. Unutterable, infinite, everlastingly adorable as was the love of the Son for perishing sinners, it is not competent to any theologian to say that it *originated* redemption, or that it surpassed that love of the Father which led him to send his only-begotten and well-beloved Son to humiliation, shame and death in order to its achievement.

A like course of argument might be pursued in relation to other divine attributes, especially that of justice, but we have no room for its presentation. Enough has been said to show that the divine attributes cannot be marshalled within the scope of the Christo-centric principle.

(5.) The providential government of God, viewed as to its whole duration, cannot be adjusted to the claims of this principle. We cheerfully confess, we strenuously contend, that, until the

redemption of the church is completed, the administration of the providential government of God, in all its extent, is committed to the hands of Christ as Mediatorial Sovereign. It is a glorious truth, and cannot be too frequently or too earnestly enforced. But when the end shall come, when the Son shall have subdued all opposition to himself and his church and finished the redemption of his people, he shall deliver up his extra-ecclesiastical kingdom to the Father from whom he received it. "Then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that *God may be all in all.*" The peculiar relation of the Son to a delegated and temporary dominion over the universe outside of his church will cease, and God the Father, as representative of the Trinity, will resume the reins of universal empire. Here, again, we discover a theological truth which refuses to be reduced under the Christo-centric principle. If there be a central principle indicated in this relation, it would seem to be the authority of the Triune God.

(6.) This principle is too narrow, in that, logically developed, it necessitates the exclusion of the validity of any knowledge of God which is not concerned about him as manifested in Christ, of every element of theology which is not Christological. This is logically required, because, as we have seen, this Christo-centric principle is the fundamental, primordial, pervading, regulative and unifying principle of all theological truth, and consequently of that great section of theological truth which specially treats of the knowledge of God. Of course, we admit that there can be no adequate knowledge, especially no saving knowledge, of God except as he is manifested in Christ. But the fallacy growing out of the enforcement of the Christo-centric principle consists in a failure to attach sufficient consequence to the distinction between a partial and inadequate knowledge on the one hand, and a full and adequate knowledge on the other. Because some men have no knowledge of God in Christ, it hardly follows that they have no knowledge of God whatsoever.

The Mohammedan maintains the intrinsic or essential unity of God. He is grievously wrong in not also holding to a Trinity of Persons in the Godhead; but so far as he goes he is right. The

Deist acknowledges the existence of God. He is in deplorable error in rejecting Christianity; but as far as *he* goes he is right. Even to the heathen, who know nothing of the gospel, and, therefore, nothing of Christ, the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth his handiwork, the irrepressible voice of conscience testifies of the moral government of God by which they will be judged, and the fundamental laws of belief, the native instincts of the soul, when elicited into expression by experience, conduct to the affirmation of an infinite Being. It is these testimonies of nature, internal and external, which, according to the declaration of an inspired apostle, render them utterly nexcusable. They reject a knowledge of God which they might attain. And were they to hearken to these natural instructions and confess the existence and government of God, they would possess a knowledge which, although lamentably incomplete, would be, as far as it would go, a true and valid knowledge. The principle under consideration, if pressed to its logical extreme, would rule out, as gratuitous and useless, all the arguments of philosophy and theology for the existence of God, which are not immediately derived from the Christian Scriptures. Our author himself expresses his appreciation of the value of the great, basal pre-suppositions of nature. He concedes that "the God-idea of natural intuition includes truths of fundamental and unchangeable worth."¹ It would appear to be obvious that the fundamental convictions of mankind, although not regulated by the genetic force of the Christo-centric principle, are preparatives for the clearer and fuller revelation of the Scriptures, and the supreme manifestation of God in the person and work of the Lord Jesus Christ.

The examination of the author's central principle of theology, from the point of view of its scope, has occupied so much of the space allotted to us, that only one or two other considerations can be submitted, and that but very briefly, while others still will have to be entirely omitted. The arguments already presented constitute a *direct* impeachment of the validity of the author's Christo-centric principle. What remains to be said will furnish

¹ P. 180.

an *indirect* argument against that principle derived from some of the consequences to which the author's own mind has been led as the result of its adoption.

2. Obedience to his central principle constrains the author to take what we cannot but regard as the extravagant position that the Son of God, as Redeemer, is "the Archetype, the Organ and the End" of the whole created system. This makes him, as has already been intimated, a Supralapsarian, with redemption substituted for predestination, and with justice left out. This follows from the position that the Son as Redeemer is the archetype and the end of the created universe; redemption was the ruling idea of creation. No doubt the Son of God is the Creator of the universe, and it was designed to subserve his glory. But that is, we conceive, a different thing from affirming that as Redeemer he was Creator, and that the universe was created in order to celebrate his redemptive glory. When Paul encountered teachers who disparaged the Lord Jesus Christ, and prated of angelic hierarchies and governments as objects of worship, he guarded the church against this frenzy by exalting Christ as the eternal Son of God who made the worlds, and upholds them by the word of his power; as in all things having the pre-eminence and as being entitled to universal adoration. But we are slow to believe that Paul meant to say that the Son of God was Creator as Redeemer. True, he created the universe; so did the Father, and so did the Holy Ghost. In the act of creation, did the Son create as Redeemer, and the Father and the Spirit not? No doubt, the universe is, as a fact, a magnificent theatre for unfolding the glories of redemption. But was the universe created *in order to be* a scaffolding for redemption? Was Adam created in order to sin that he might be redeemed? Is this true of the human race? Are lost human beings magnifying the glories of redemption? Were the fallen angels created in order to be redeemed? If redemption was the end of creation, what of damnation?

When the author affirms that the Son was the "Organ" of creation, if he mean by the organ, the immediate executor of creation, he seems to forget that by the Scriptures that office is expressly assigned to the Holy Spirit. The Son of God has glory

enough—is it not infinite?—without detracting from the glory of the other persons in the ever-blessed Trinity. Nor does it magnify his own glory to say that he created the world to be redeemed, and suffered a part of it to be damned. The author rejects Sublapsarian Calvinism, but its difficulties are nothing compared with those of this Redemptive Supralapsarianism.

This criticism is relieved of the charge of captiousness, and is positively confirmed by the author's views in regard to evolution. He expresses his inability to endorse evolutionism in some of its aspects. We suppose that he meant his rejection of it, so far as it is atheistic or tends to atheism. But he does signify his approval of the law of evolution. He says :

“If Jesus, who is no less truly corporeal than psychic, be the perfection of mankind, then this unique Man is, in either case, the microcosm, the end and crown of all inorganic and organic forces of the lower kingdoms of nature. He reveals the final cause which from chaos onward has been active in producing and shaping the innumerable formation of the universe. The Christ-idea accordingly becomes the law for Christian thought concerning the cosmos. Christ is the *end* no less than the beginning. The end or final cause of the universe is the controlling motive, which works in all its kingdoms, in all its *genera* and species, shaping their development from within toward consummation. Darwin's theory concerning the evolution of man from the lower kingdoms, is, if theistically interpreted, scriptural and Christological.”¹

The author elsewhere says:

“As of the natural creation so of the spiritual creation of the Son is the Principle,”² “He at the same time, in contradistinction from the Father, is the principle of the universe, being immediately connected with finite things.”³

“As of the natural creation so of the spiritual creation the Son is the Principle.”² “He at the same time, in contradistinction from the Father, is the principle of the universe, being immediately connected with finite things.”³

We are not sure enough of the author's meaning in affirming that the Son of God is the principle of the universe, to speak dogmatically. If he mean merely that he is the final cause of the universe in the sense that he is the end contemplated in the whole “process of becoming,” by which the universe is evolved to its consummation, he inconsistently confounds final cause with

¹ P. 193.

² P. 303.

³ P. 304.

efficient cause in saying that the former "has been active in producing and shaping the innumerable formations of the universe." If he mean what this language implies, namely, that Christ is the working principle immanent in the evolutionary process, he out-Schleiermachers Schleiermacher. If we do not misunderstand that powerful but erratic speculator, he held that into the world, as created, there was infused a divine, a theistic, principle by which its organic development was effected; but that in consequence of the incarnation of the Son of God there was infused into the world, as redeemed, a Christic principle of organic development. Our author appears to go beyond this, in holding that the Christic principle of development characterized the old creation as well as the new, the pre-incarnation as well as the post-incarnation world.

But passing from this construction of his meaning, which we admit to be too doubtful to allow of its being pressed, we are perfectly sure of his doctrine, first, that the incarnate Son of God, as "corporeal and psychic," was the product of Darwinian Evolution theistically and Christologically interpreted (!); and, secondly, that Christ was the end, the designed "crown and climax" of the evolution of the universe. And it is clear that this justifies our assignment to him of the position that creation was in order to redemption, and our insistence upon the insuperable difficulties which oppose that view.

3. Another doctrine which plays a conspicuous part in this work, and which appears to be regulated by the Cristo-centric principle, is that God is absolute love. A single citation must suffice:

"Love is his essence or being. His sovereign will, his wisdom and power, His holiness and righteousness are qualities of love."

Without stopping to note the fact that this extraordinary doctrine violates the analogy of our own constitution, for if anything be clear it is that the justice which demands the execution of the criminal is, to him, not the manifestation of love, we ask, What is the connection between the view that the essence of God is love and the author's central principle of theology? Is it that he starts with the assumption that God's essence is love, and infers

that Christ, as love, is the only revelation of that fact? That can hardly be, for upon that supposition what the author, with a touch of German irreverence, calls the God-idea would be determinative of the Christ-idea, and his central principle would be abandoned. Is it that because Christ is love, and as such is the manifestation of God, it is inferred that the divine essence is love? That would make the doctrine as to the manifestation of God's essence superior to and regulative of the doctrine as to his essence itself. So far as we have observed, Dr. Gerhart does not indicate the *nexus* between his Christo-centric principle and his equally unphilosophical and untheological position that the essence of God is love, qualified by the attributes of intelligence, justice and will. He was bound to show the connection, or consent to the sacrifice of the logical coherence of his system.

But if there be a connection which our limited faculties fail to recognize, then his Christo-centric principle is responsible for some very serious results. It would necessitate, first, the denial of the sovereign, unconditional election of sinners to salvation, and of the vicarious atonement of Christ as the substitute of his people; and, secondly, the affirmation of the indiscriminate love of God for all individuals of mankind, the universality of the atonement, and the ability of the sinner, without enabling and constraining grace, to accept the provisions of redemption. In brief, the fundamental principles of Calvinism are denied, and those of Arminianism affirmed. True, all these results are not in this volume explicitly avowed, and we have no right to predict whether they will be in the next volume. But the author has admitted into the present volume an Introduction by Dr. Philip Schaff, in which they are boldly and distinctly enounced, and it is fair to conclude that he approves them. Let us look squarely in the face the end proposed to be accomplished by this central principle, which will make "the theology of the future" "a theology of love,"—"a theology," it is contended, which "will give new life to the church, and prepare the way for the reunion of Christendom." It is that whatsoever is peculiar to and characteristic of Calvinism shall be destroyed, and whatsoever of it is left shall be swallowed up in the omnivorous maw of Arminianism. This Dr. Schaff will not

achieve within the Presbyterian Church. Whether Dr. Gerhart will have better success in the Reformed (German) Church, we have no means of determining. One would, however, suppose that the Heidelberg Catechism, to which he declares his adhesion, would be difficult of digestion by an Arminian stomach, even though sweetened with the sugar of universal atonement.

If, as Dr. Gerhart holds, love is the divine motive which controls and overshadows every other; if "humanity," redeemed in Christ, is made in him "personally one" with God, and Christ assumed not impersonal, but personal, human nature, and thus identified it with divine personality; if redemption was the end aimed at in the creation of the universe; if there be a Christic principle inserted into the world-process of becoming, and Christ, as Incarnate Redeemer, is the final product, the crown and climax of a universal evolution,—then we can conceive no logical escape from Universal Restorationism as the ultimate conclusion. The system, by an inexorable logic, conducts to the final elimination of the very principle of sin from the universe, and the restoration of all rebellious creatures to the favor and to the service of God. Sin and hell will ultimately become merely matters of history. The Devil himself will at last prostrate himself in repentance at Jesus' feet, and confess himself his saved and willing subject. No doctrine as to the "autonomy" of the creature can avert this logical conclusion. For God, and God alone, must be sovereign. The Lord God omnipotent must reign.

As it has been our purpose to confine these remarks to the Christo-centric principle, considered in itself and the consequences attributed to it, we will not discuss the author's subordination of the Scriptures, as an objective standard, to the revelation of God concretely made in the person of Christ; nor his too sharply-drawn distinction between Biblical and Dogmatic theology; nor his denial that the Trinity was revealed in the Old Testament; nor his affirmation that man's love to God conditions God's love to man; nor his approval of some of the results of the Higher Criticism; nor his Dornerian hypothesis of the divine-human *personality* of Christ.

Viewing the work as a whole, we cannot but regard it as one

of dangerous tendency, the more dangerous because of the scholarly elegance with which it is written. It professes to honor the Son of man, but betrays him with a kiss. It is one of the causes which will coöperate in bringing on a defection of the Church from the truth for which martyrs have died—a defection, the dark prospect of which is only relieved by the conviction that the closing days of this painful period are near at hand, and the glorious Star of the millennial morning is not far from its rise.

JOHN L. GIRARDEAU.

II. DR. BRIGGS' BIBLICAL THEOLOGY TRACED TO ITS ORGANIFIC PRINCIPLE.

THE appointment of a professor in a theological institution is a transaction the importance of which it would be difficult to over-estimate. As it is in such institutions that those who are to unfold to men the unsearchable riches of Christ are usually trained, it is manifest that all such appointments must affect for good or evil the vital interests of the kingdom of God. It is this conviction which has stirred to her profoundest depths the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, on the appointment of Dr. Charles Augustus Briggs to the newly erected Chair of Biblical Theology in Union Theological Seminary, New York. Impressed with a sense of the importance of the branch of theological study with which the occupant of the chair has to deal, and cognizant of the views of the person selected by the Board of Directors to fill it, the church has taken the alarm, and in her late Assembly has declined, by an overwhelming majority, to approve of the appointment. As the directors, after taking legal advice, have resolved to adhere to their action in filling the chair, it is likely the case will be transferred to the civil courts.

The wide-spread interest taken in the case on both sides of the Atlantic, the character of the principles avowed by the newly-appointed professor in his Inaugural, and the re-publication of the Inaugural, together with defences of its teaching by two professors of the Lane Theological Seminary, Cincinnati, with a commendatory introduction by Professor Bruce, of the Free Church College, Glasgow, may serve as a sufficient apology for an examination of the doctrines thus openly proclaimed.

As my chief subject is the Inaugural I shall not enter at large upon a criticism of the papers furnished by the Lane professors, whom Dr. Bruce pronounces as men of light and learning. The

theory of inspiration they advocate is not new, nor is there anything novel in their advocacy of it. Their avowed object is to prove the errancy of Scripture. The theory is simply this, that the men who wrote the Scriptures were gifted with an indefinable species of inspiration, somewhat akin to that possessed by Shakespeare, Milton, or Tennyson, as theologians, but not as historians, scientists, geographers, astronomers, etc. These apologists not only look unmoved upon the attempts of the enemies of the Bible to make good their charges of errancy against it within these departments, but take sides with them and exercise their gifts and draw upon the resources of their scholarship, to discover, and array before the general public, what they regard as evidence of scientific and historical mistakes and of sanctioned immoralities, or, as Dr. Bruce has expressed it, of "crude morality."

It is not difficult to see the drift and tendency of this theory and its concessions. All that the adversary of the Bible has to do is to deal with it as Dr. Duff and others have done with the sacred books of the Hindus. He has simply to establish against it the existence of errors within the spheres in question. Having done this, his work is done. He can say to these apologists, as Duff said to the Hindus, "If your sacred writers have made mistakes within the sphere of the Natural, and in regard to things subject to human observation, what right have you to claim acceptance for their teaching within the sphere of the Supernatural? If they have proved themselves unworthy of trust in the former, who will credit their testimony in the latter?" Passing then, at once, from further notice of these Lane essays, let us examine the Inaugural which gave occasion to their production, and which has led Dr. Bruce to introduce both it and them to the churches of these lands.

Revealed Theology may be divided into Exegetical Theology, Biblical Theology, and Systematic Theology. Exegetical Theology is so designated because it treats of the exegesis or interpretation of the Sacred Text. Biblical Theology has for its object the tracing of the genesis and development of the religion of the Bible, in a purely historical manner, as it presents itself in both Testaments. Systematic Theology aims at the scientific exhibi-

tion of the knowledge of God and the things of God, pointing out the mutual harmonious relations subsisting among the truths it embraces and their harmony with the revelation made through the light of nature, so far as it treats of the same subjects.

It is with the second of these subjects that the Chair in question has to deal, and Dr. Briggs very properly takes it as the theme of his Inaugural. It is not unnatural that he should have formed a very high estimate of his subject, or that he should enter upon the discussion of it with enthusiasm. He might, however, have done both without speaking in terms of disparagement of creeds and dogmatic systems. In his letter of thanks to the Board of Directors (pp. 6-7), we have the following comparison instituted between Biblical theology and ecclesiasticism and dogmatism—"Biblical scholars have been long held in bondage to ecclesiasticism and dogmatism. But modern Biblical criticism has won the battle of freedom. The accumulations of long periods of traditional speculation and dogmatism have been in a large measure removed, and the Bible itself stands before the men of our time in a commanding position, such as it has never enjoyed before. On all sides it is asked, not what do the creeds teach, what do the theologians say, what is the authority of the church, but what does the Bible itself teach us? It is the office of Biblical theology to answer this question. It is the culmination of the work of exegesis. It rises on a complete induction of all the departments of Biblical study to a comprehensive grasp of the Bible as a whole, in the unity and variety of the sum of its teaching. It draws the line with the teaching of the Bible. It fences off from the Scriptures all the speculations, all the dogmatical elaborations, all the doctrinal adaptations that have been made in the history of doctrine in the church. It does not deny their propriety and importance, but it insists upon the three-fold distinction as necessary to truth and theological honesty, that the theology of the Bible is one thing, the only infallible authority, the theology of the creeds is another thing, having simply ecclesiastical authority, and the theology of the theologians or dogmatic theology is a third thing, which has no more authority than any other system of human construction. Now, Biblical theology aims to

limit itself strictly to the theology of the Bible itself. Biblical theologians are fallible men, and doubtless it is true that they err in their interpretation of the Scriptures, as have others, but it is the aim of the discipline to give the theology of the Bible pure and simple, and the inductive and historical methods that determine the working of the department are certainly favorable to an objective presentation of the subject, and are unfavorable to the intrusion of subjective fancies and circumstantial considerations."

The prominent points of the claim here set up on behalf of Biblical theology as distinguished from the teaching of creeds and dogmatic theology raise very naturally the question, "Is Biblical theology itself exempt from the objections here preferred against all dogmatism, and, if so, how has this exemption been secured?" The writer admits that Biblical theologians are fallible men, and that it is doubtless true they err in their interpretation of the Scriptures, as have others. How does it come to pass, then, that their interpretations of the Scriptures are a safer guide to the study of the Bible than the formulated teaching of ecclesiastical creeds and the systems of dogmatic theologians? It is no answer to this question to say, as we are told, that "it is the aim of the discipline to give the theology of the Bible pure and simple," and that "the inductive and historical methods that determine the working of the department are certainly favorable to an objective presentation of the subject, and are unfavorable to the intrusion of subjective fancies and circumstantial considerations." This is no answer to the questions regarding the fact and the mode of the exemption of Biblical theology from the errors charged against the creeds and systems of dogmatic theology. The creeds and dogmatic systems aim to give the theology of the Bible pure and simple, and they follow the inductive methods as well as the system advocated by Biblical theologians. Nor are they forgetful of the historical order observed in the revelation of the economy of redemption, under diverse and successive dispensations. There is no claim that can be advanced, on the grounds here specified, that can be regarded as the exclusive property of Biblical theology. To warrant the claim to preëminence it must be shown that the Biblical theologian is

a better logician, and, therefore, less liable to make mistakes in his deductions than the authors of the creeds and the theological dogmatic systems. It is admitted that both exercise the logical faculty, and deduce from the sacred text doctrines which they do not find made ready to their hand. Wherein, then, lie the safeguards which distinguish the theological inductions of the Biblical theologian in point of purity, or any other Scriptural quality, from the inductions of the men who, in the exercise of this same inductive faculty, have framed the creeds, or the dogmatic systems which have appeared in the history of the church? Manifestly the safeguard is not to be sought in greater purity of aim, and it certainly cannot be claimed that the schools represented by Dr. Briggs have proved themselves possessed of logical powers transcending those manifested by the master minds who have given to the church her creeds and her carefully-balanced systems of theology.

It had been wiser for the interests of the higher criticism if Dr. Briggs had not instituted comparisons upon these points. He speaks of the Biblical theology as one unfavorable to the intrusion of subjective fancies, while the higher criticism which has furnished him with a Bible which he acknowledges is so different from the Bible of his earlier years as to be to him a new book, is built upon the subjective fancies of the higher critics, no two of them agreeing in their subjective imaginings. The Bible these men have given the author of the Inaugural is a Bible transfigured from year to year as new critical conjurers have arisen to bewitch their votaries by their enchantments. The Biblical theology based on this ever-changing Bible should be careful about instituting invidious comparisons. Its historical method is subversive of all theology, whether Biblical, symbolical, or dogmatical. One who has taken the trouble of reckoning the number of theories invented by these higher critics in regard to the origin of the books of the Bible puts them down at 747—603 of the Old Testament and 144 of the New—and affirms that they are, with few exceptions, either dead or moribund. Is it from a Bible manipulated by such theorists that our Biblical theologians are to deduce, and present to the Church of God, “the theology of the Bible pure and simple”?

Those who identify themselves with the critical system so fertile of ever-dissolving theories, might be a little more modest in criticising the symbolism or the dogmatism of the churches, and less forward in claiming for themselves the championship and guardianship of the sacred oracles and the key to unlock their mysteries. One would think that an indispensable preliminary to all such criticisms and claims would be a convention of these higher critics to settle the fundamental vital question, the question of questions, Which of all the new Bibles which the higher criticism has produced is to be the Bible of the future, from which the Biblical theologian is to deduce his Biblical theology? Until this is done his work cannot begin; and Dr. Briggs was rather premature in undertaking, even at the call of the venerable Directors of the Union Theological Seminary, the task of erecting the temple of Biblical theology in that institution until the higher critics shall have agreed about the foundation on which he is to build.

But let us test the claim put forth for Biblical theology by our newly inaugurated Biblical theologian by a specimen of his own workmanship. On page 50 of the Inaugural, speaking of man's original state, he charges Jew and Christian alike with exaggerating man's original innocence and depreciating his ultimate perfection. "Protestant theologians," he says, "have exaggerated the original righteousness in order to magnify the guilt of our first parents. They thus come in conflict with ethical and religious philosophy. The Bible is not responsible for these exaggerations. The original man was innocent and sinless, but not possessed of that righteousness and moral excellence that comes only by discipline and heavenly training." Confounding a test of federal fidelity with a means of grace, he adds, "The temptation was a necessary means of grace. Man did not make his progress in the straight lines of faith and obedience, but in the curved line of sin and redemption."

One of the greatest theologians of our age has remarked, "Let a man tell me what his philosophy is, and I shall ask him no questions about his theology." Dr. Briggs has told us in these few sentences what his ethical and religious philosophy is, and has, at the same time, told us how it has affected his views on one of the

cardinal points of Protestant theology, viz., the question of man's original state. He rejects the Protestant doctrine on this question because it comes in conflict with his ethical and religious philosophy. His reason for rejecting the Protestant doctrine is that it teaches that the original man was created in knowledge, righteousness and holiness, while his ethical and religious philosophy teaches that such an estate comes only through discipline and heavenly training. Such is the confession made by our new Biblical theologian, who tells us that "the aim of his discipline is to give the theology of the Bible pure and simple, and to fence off from the Scriptures all the speculations, all the dogmatic elaborations, all the doctrinal adaptations that have been made in the history of doctrine in the church." Is it not singular that, after starting with such purity of aim, and after "fencing off from the Scriptures the speculations and dogmatic elaborations, and all the doctrinal adaptations that have been made in the history of doctrine in the church," he should have left a gap in his fence for the admission of a species of ethical and religious philosophy which from the day of Pelagius, its author, has done more to mar the peace of the church and corrupt her theology than any other principle that could be named? The ethical and religious philosophy which he has admitted through this gap is neither more nor less than the fundamental principle of the Pelagian heresy, which has, in one shape or other, veiled or unmasked, inspired and armed for the conflict all the opponents of the Augustinian and Calvinistic theology from the days of Pelagius till the present. How is it that in fencing off all traditional dogmatism he has reserved an opening for this traditional Pelagian "ethical and religious philosophy?" It is manifest that by the admission of it he has gainsaid all that he has professed about the high "aim of his discipline to give the theology of the Bible pure and simple." He will admit no theological dogma, nor will he accept of any doctrine deduced from the Bible by man which comes in conflict with this "ethical and religious philosophy." In a word, he has abandoned the position that the Bible alone is to have voice in determining his doctrinal deductions from its contents. The Lydian stone by which all its teachings are to be tried, and in conformity

with which they are to be formulated, is the principle that "righteousness comes only by discipline and heavenly training." This is the generative principle of his theological system, and we must conclude that it will govern him in all his utterances as professor of Biblical theology.

But leaving him to reconcile the claim advanced to absolute Biblical purity of aim and method, with the admission of this Pelagian factor, let us consider its bearing upon the leading facts and doctrines of the Sacred Record. How must it affect (1) the Scripture account of the creation of the first Adam; (2) the account given of the creation of the second Adam; (3) the account given of the estate in which men are born into this world; (4) the bearing of this principle upon the Scripture doctrine of the new birth; and (5) its bearing upon the doctrine of sanctification? Having examined the theological consequences of this principle, it will be in place to consider its claims to take rank as a principle or law of "ethical and religious philosophy."

1. Let us see how this principle must affect one's views regarding man's original state. The Scriptures teach that "God created man, male and female, in his own image, after his own likeness." Dr. Briggs objects to the Protestant interpretation of this account of the creation of man, which infers from it, that man was created in the possession of righteousness and moral excellence. This, he alleges, comes only by discipline and heavenly training. There can be no doubt about the antagonism between the principle in question and the Protestant doctrine of the estate in which our first parents were created. That doctrine is briefly stated in the Shorter Catechism of the Westminster divines in answer to the question, "How did God create man?" The answer given is, "God created man, male and female, after his own image, in knowledge, righteousness and holiness, with dominion over the creatures." Such is the Protestant doctrine of the moral state of man in virtue of the creative act, and it is manifest that no one holding the principle that such moral qualities "come only by discipline and heavenly training," could, conscientiously, accept the Protestant doctrine on this point. How Dr. Briggs managed to hold the one and subscribe

the other is a problem. According to the Inaugural, man's original estate, so far as "righteousness and moral excellence" are concerned, was one of mere negation. He did not possess such righteousness or moral excellence, and was innocent before God without it. According to the Standards, subscribed only a few minutes previously, our first parents were created in God's own image and likeness in possession of knowledge, righteousness and holiness. Dr. Briggs alleges that this is a Protestant exaggeration of man's original estate, and rejects it because it is (as it unquestionably is) in conflict with his ethical and religious philosophy. It would be interesting to know by what species of ethical and religious philosophy he justified himself in subscribing that which he must have looked upon, at the time he subscribed it, as in conflict with ethical and religious philosophy. He must have had some way of reconciling his previous profession and his subsequent utterance, but it must be a way unknown to ordinary "ethical and religious philosophy."

But let us see whether the Protestant doctrine on this subject is in conflict with genuine Biblical theology. If, as that doctrine teaches and the Bible expressly affirms, man was created in God's own image and likeness, what reason is there for alleging that this image and likeness did not embrace "righteousness and moral excellence?" Is it possible to conceive of a moral agent possessing such an image and yet being destitute of these qualities and existing in a merely negative state of so-called innocency without bias of inherent principle toward good or evil? In so far as such a one lacks these qualities, in so far does he lack conformity to the Divine image. If we are to take the testimony of the Bible "pure and simple" as our authority on this vital point, it is in these qualities that the Divine image preëminently consists, for when through the provisions of the economy of grace, the lost image is restored, the subject of the restoration is "renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him" (Col. iii. 10), and "after God is created in righteousness and true holiness" (Eph. iv. 24). Manifestly these passages teach that the image of God embraces the very qualities which Dr. Briggs' "ethical and religious philosophy" excludes as unattainable save through discipline and heavenly training."

2. This "ethical and religious philosophy" is clearly at war with the doctrine of the incarnation. The expression, image of God, is employed in Scripture to indicate the transcendent moral beauty and perfection of the Son of God. He is "the image of the invisible God" (Col. i. 15). He is "the brightness of his glory and the express image of his essence." (Heb. i. 8.) Are we then to eliminate from this image of God, as exhibited in the Incarnate Son, whom to see was to see the Father, the qualities of "righteousness and moral excellence," because the possession of such qualities prior to his moral activities would be out of keeping with Dr. Briggs' "ethical and religious philosophy?" It is true the Scriptures speak of him as increasing in wisdom and stature and in favor with God and man (Luke ii. 52), but they never speak of him as increasing in holiness, or growing in moral purity. The Pelagian canon excludes all such subjective states as impossible in a moral agent, until he exercises his moral faculties, and Dr. Briggs is not at liberty to limit its operation to any particular class of moral qualities. If, therefore, moral excellence includes moral purity, this "ethical and religious philosophy" must eliminate moral purity from the estate of the Man Christ Jesus as generated by the immediate agency of the Holy Ghost, under the overshadowing power of the Highest! Prior to the exercise of his mental and moral faculties as a man, however, even from his inception in the womb of the Virgin, the Scriptures teach that he was holy, a moral quality which according to Dr. Briggs, comes only by discipline and heavenly training. This was evidently the doctrine propounded by the Angel Gabriel at the Annunciation. "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee, therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." (Luke i. 35.) The ethical and religious philosophy which negatives the Protestant doctrine of the creation of man must also set aside the Scriptural doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God. And this is Biblical theology, forsooth! If Adam could not have been created in a state of positive holiness, and could not have possessed these qualities which enter into the conception of moral excellence, for the reason assigned, viz.—that such qualities

"come only by discipline and heavenly training," it must follow (for the Pelagian canon will allow of no exception) that prior to the exercise of his moral faculties under "discipline and heavenly training," the Man Christ Jesus was not possessed of righteousness or moral excellence.

Here, then, are two of the plainest doctrines of the Bible which cannot abide the test of this Pelagian philosophy, and which must be excluded from the future system of Biblical theology that is to be elaborated by Professor Briggs and inculcated upon such of the future ministry of the Presbyterian Church as may be committed to his care. If these youths are to accept his teaching and recognize the ethical and religious philosophy from which it flows, they must go forth as heralds of this novel Biblical theology and inform the people that neither the first Adam nor the second Adam was created "in knowledge, righteousness or holiness," and that these moral qualities in both cases were the outcome of the exercise of their moral faculties under discipline and heavenly training.

3. Equally manifest must be the bearing of this same "ethical and religious philosophy" upon the doctrine of original sin, viewed simply as a subjective state. The estate into which the Fall brought mankind is an estate of sin and misery, and the sinfulness of this estate consists in "the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of our whole nature, commonly called original sin, together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it." The doctrine propounded here is, that men enter this world in a morally corrupt state, and that this estate is not the product, but the cause, of all actual transgressions. Now the question here is, can this doctrine abide the application of the Pelagian test? If the moral qualities of righteousness and moral excellence cannot be concrete, and must be the result of a prior exercise of the moral faculties, will it not necessarily follow that the evil qualities embraced under the conception of moral corruption, must be the offspring of the unlawful and vicious exercise of these same powers of the soul? If good moral qualities cannot come into being save through the exercise of the moral powers, on no principle of ethical or religious phi-

losophy can it be shown that bad moral qualities can originate in the soul of a moral agent until that agent shall have performed immoral acts. If, as the Pelagian maxim teaches, moral character be a thing of acquisition, the product of moral action, no child born into the world can at its birth, and prior to the exercise of its moral powers, be regarded as existing, as our Standards teach it does, in a state of moral corruption. Pelagius and Celestius taught, that "*omne bonum et malum quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis—et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur.*" That is, all good or evil, on account of which we are worthy of praise or blame, does not come into being with us, but is the result of our own action . . . and as we are procreated without virtue so are we also without vice. Such is Dr. Briggs' "ethical and religious philosophy" as expounded by its authors, and there is no need of argument, to satisfy any person of ordinary intelligence, that it sets aside the Scripture doctrine of original sin as set forth in the Standards of the Westminster divines. Dr. Briggs by his act of subscription proposed to hold the latter, and in his Inaugural avowed the former, as the organic principle of his Biblical theology, and we must leave him to solve the "ethical and religious" problem created by his action on the very solemn occasion of his inauguration. Perhaps he may have satisfied himself, as Mr. George Ward, Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, one of the principal leaders in the Oxford movement, did, by signing the Standards in a "non-natural sense" which were all one with signing them in a sense not natural.

4. But the difficulties multiply and are intensified, once we enter the sphere of the application of redemption, and consider the bearing of this "ethical and religious philosophy" upon the doctrine of regeneration. As stated in the Shorter Catechism, the Spirit not only convinces us of sin and misery, but also enlightens our minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renews our wills, and both persuades and enables us to embrace Jesus Christ as he is offered to us in the gospel. There could be no more truly Biblical summary of the points embraced in the doctrine of regeneration than is given in the above account of effectual calling. By

the direct agency of the Holy Spirit, acting correlatively to the divine objective revelation, the mind of the sinner has such a view of his sin and moral wretchedness, and such a view of Christ as he is offered in the gospel, as he could never acquire through any process of discipline or heavenly training. Nor is this all. Not only is his mind enlightened, but his will is renewed, and he is persuaded and enabled to embrace the Saviour thus revealed by the supernatural agency of the Holy Ghost. This representation is in full accord with our Saviour's own account of this fundamental change, in his conversation with Nicodemus—John iii. 3-5. In the third verse he informs Nicodemus of the necessity of this radical change in order to *see* the kingdom of God, and in the fifth verse he informs him of the necessity of it in order to *enter* the kingdom. In a word, both the *intellect* and the *will* must undergo this change. He conditions the spiritual action of both the cognitive and conative powers of the soul upon the previous action of the Holy Spirit, which he likens to a new genesis of the man.

Our Saviour was evidently not of Dr. Briggs' opinion, that moral character cannot originate in a moral agent prior to his own moral activities, or that "righteousness and moral excellence come only by discipline and heavenly training." His verdict on this point is that prior to a change, which the Spirit of God alone can effect, a change which is equivalent to a re-creation of the soul in all its powers, the sinner can have no right apprehension of divine things, and can have no saving knowledge of them, or desire to possess them.

This doctrine prevades both Testaments. Thus—Jeremiah, xxxi. 33; Heb. viii. 10—God promises to make a new covenant with his people, putting his law in their inward parts and writing it in their hearts. Here we have the same principle, antecedent divine action, reaching to the roots of man's spiritual nature, and producing knowledge of God and observance of his covenant, prior to the "discipline and heavenly training," through which alone, if we are to credit this new Biblical theology, such a moral subjective state could be produced. Such is Christ's estimate of this change and of the necessity of it, prior to all spiritual action on the part of the soul, that he compares it to the change that shall

take place at the resurrection of the dead. "The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live. . . . Marvel not at this, for the hour is coming when all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth, those who have done good unto the resurrection of life, and those who have done evil unto the resurrection of condemnation." John v. 25-29. In Ephesians i. and ii., the apostle employs this same figure of the resurrection, to illustrate the mighty revolution that takes place in all the elements of man's moral nature, when he is quickened from his natural estate of spiritual death, into one of spiritual life. He compares the change to the change which took place when God raised Christ from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality and power and might and dominion and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. The apostle seems to labor for language to convey to the Ephesians some conception of the greatness of the power by which a sinner dead in trespasses and sins is made alive and united with Christ in all the stages of his elevation, from the tomb of Joseph to the throne of God, in the heavenly places. It is evident that the apostle did not write this account of this spiritual change under the inspiration of the "ethical and religious philosophy" which teaches that the moral excellence which such a change implies comes only by discipline and heavenly training. Dr. Briggs enumerates several barriers which have been erected by ecclesiastics and dogmaticians, between the people and "the theology of the Bible pure and simple;" but this barrier of his own Pelagian "ethical and religious philosophy" stands erect and frowning between himself and the vital doctrine of the new birth, as propounded by Christ himself and his apostles. Here again he is in a strait between the two. He must abandon his organic theological principle, or abandon the Scripture doctrine of regeneration—a doctrine so clearly expounded in the Standards to which he had set his hand and seal on the day of his inauguration.

5. Few of the singular propositions of this singular Inaugural have drawn forth so much criticism as its avowal of the doctrine of "progressive sanctification after death." "There is," we are told,

“no authority in the Scriptures, or in the creeds of Christendom, for the doctrine of immediate sanctification at death. . . . Progressive sanctification after death is the doctrine of the Bible and the church.” Before giving expression to this doctrine Dr. Briggs had subscribed the doctrine of the Westminster Standards on this subject, which is briefly thus given in the Shorter Catechism: “The souls of believers are at their death made perfect in holiness, and do immediately pass into glory; and their bodies being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the resurrection.” Dr. Briggs tells us that “there is no authority in the creeds of Christendom for the doctrine of immediate sanctification at death.” Well, here is one of the chief creeds of Christendom, and one, too, which he had subscribed a few minutes before he made this statement, which affirms what he denies on this very point. It says that “the souls of believers are at their death made perfect in holiness, and do immediately pass into glory;” while he, after affirming in the most solemn manner that this was a part of his faith, immediately tells his auditors that such doctrine is contained in no creed of Christendom! He even in a foot-note refers, in proof of this statement, to the Confession of Faith, Chap. XIII., a chapter which treats of sanctification in this life, while he gives no hint of the fact that Chap. XXXII. expressly affirms what he denies, viz., that the souls of the righteous are at death made perfect in holiness. Such treatment of these immortal Standards can only serve to shake confidence in the cause it is designed to serve. Dr. Briggs’ “ethical and religious philosophy” demands a progressive sanctification, as sanctification, according to its teaching, comes only through discipline and heavenly training, either here or hereafter. Hence our Standards must give way to his Pelagian “ethical and religious philosophy,” and as the believer is imperfect in this life, he must be subjected to ethical and religious discipline in the future state. Here is the key to his *post-mortem* sanctification. His theory is not determined by “the theology of the Bible pure and simple,” but by the fundamental canon of the Pelagian heresy.

Having seen the bearing of Dr. Briggs’ “ethical and religious philosophy” upon the chief facts and features of the economy of

redemption, let us examine the principle underlying it, as expounded by himself. This principle, he informs us, is that "righteousness and moral excellence come only by discipline and heavenly training." In other words, moral qualities come into being only through the moral activities of moral agents, and can have no existence prior to such exercise of the moral faculties. Against such Pelagian dogmatism it is here claimed that it is one of the commonplaces of ethical and religious philosophy—that all moral and religious action, in order to be recognized as such, must proceed from moral and religious principles. Such is the verdict of sound moral science and sound religious philosophy. They both reiterate the verdict of Scripture, that the tree is known by its fruit, and that an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit, nor a good tree evil fruit. The order ordained by God is, first make the tree good, and then its fruit will be good. A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth good things, and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth evil things, for it is out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.

This is Scripture, it is Biblical theology, and it is "ethical and religious philosophy" as well. It would be recognized as the truth on the subject the wide world over. In the judgment of the race, actions flow from principles, and moral actions from moral principles. So obvious is this relation of principle to action, that all men recognize it in their judgment of the actions of their fellow-men. An action is never adjudged bad or good apart from the principle by which the agent has been actuated. The agent himself is judged of as morally good or morally bad according to the principle revealed in his actions. The moral quality revealed in the action is ever regarded as having its habitat in the moral agent, and as constituting part and parcel of his moral character. On this assumption are based all forecasts of the actions of individuals. We venture to predict the character of the actions of particular individuals, and write out, on their behalf, certificates, because of our faith in the principles by which their actions, as far as known to us, have been governed.

Besides, the principle involved in this discussion is recognized in all righteous jurisprudence. No jury will convict an accused

party on the ground of an overt act pure and simple. Take, for example, the case of one accused of murder. The prosecution must not only prove that A has killed B, but must prove that A was moved thereto by malice aforethought, and that the deed of blood was the outcome of such cherished malice. If the defence can prove that A acted unthinkingly, or that he acted in defence of his own life or of the lives of others, no righteous jury will find a verdict of guilty against the accused. Indeed, it was on this principle that the cities of refuge were instituted in Israel. They were appointed for the protection of the man who might have slain his neighbor unwittingly, and who had not hated him in time past. When a case of this kind occurred, and the slayer succeeded in reaching one of these cities before he was overtaken by the avenger of blood, he was safe until the congregation decided concerning his guilt or innocence. The point to be decided by those who investigated the case was the one in question here. Was the act the result of premeditated malice, or was it done unwittingly and without cherished hatred? It is manifest that this entire institution was based upon the principle that overt acts have, in themselves, no moral character, as good or evil, but take their character, not only from their matter, but also from the character of the motives and springs of action which give them birth.

This principle is so plain in itself and is so intimately interwoven with the institutions of the Bible and of civilized nations, that one feels like apologizing for occupying time in stating and defending it. The only excuse for doing so is, that our new professor of Biblical theology has failed to discover it in the Bible, and has accepted in its stead its ethical and religious antagonist. But if the principle now established be valid, what becomes of Dr. Briggs' theology, which is built upon the principle that "righteousness and moral excellence come only by discipline and heavenly training?" The higher criticism is ever boasting of its science and philosophy, but its claims to scientific or philosophical rank, if we are to judge of them by this specimen, are certainly not well founded. The principle avowed is in direct conflict with one of the most clearly established principles of "ethical and religious philosophy," and as we have seen, if recognized within the sphere

of the remedial economy of grace, would supersede the necessity of the office of the Holy Ghost in applying the redemption purchased by Christ. As Dr. Briggs in his remarkable book entitled "Whither," concedes a high place, even the *locus primarius*, in the future federation or future union of the churches of Christendom, to the Latin or Roman Church, he was, perhaps, indicating the concessions he is ready to make to that church on the question of the original state of man. That church holds that original righteousness was an admirable gift bestowed upon man subsequent to his creation. He was man, possessing all the essential attributes of man, prior to the bestowal of this admirable gift; and, notwithstanding the absence of this gift, and despite the tendency of the lower powers of his constitution to rise in rebellion against the higher, he was innocent and sinless. There is not time to point out Rome's reason for thus representing man's original state as purely negative, further than to say that the position is essential to her doctrine of works of supererogation; for if the subjective estate of concupiscence which underlies and mars all man's moral activities is to be taken into account in judging of his moral achievements, there is not much hope of his attaining a position of moral excellence which transcends the requirements of the moral law and leaves a surplus to be funded for the benefit of others, as the church, as the administratrix of the grace of God, may in her wisdom decide. There is, however, this difference in favor of the Romish view as compared with the doctrine of the Inaugural. Rome teaches that righteousness was bestowed upon the first man as an admirable gift, while Dr. Briggs denies the possibility of righteousness coming in any way save through means of discipline and heavenly training. His concession to Rome, therefore, is a vain concession. She will not accept even of the position of preëminence he is willing to concede to her, on the condition that she shall tolerate, in the symbol of the future federal organization, a principle which involves the denial of her prerogative to infuse, through the medium of the sacrament of baptism, a grace which constitutes the subject of it righteous before God. This leads to an examination of what the Inaugural propounds on the subject of the authority of the church.

“There are,” we are told, “historically three great fountains of Divine authority—the Bible, the Church, and Reason.” Having specified these as the three great historic fountains of Divine authority, Dr. Briggs singles out the church from its secondary place in the enumeration and sets it in the forefront as follows:

“1. *The Authority of the Church.*—The majority of Christians from the Apostolic age have found God through the church. Martyrs and saints, fathers and schoolmen, the profoundest intellects, the saintliest lives, have had this experience. Institutional Christianity has been to them the presence chamber of God. They have therein and thereby entered into communion with all saints. It is difficult for many Protestants to regard this experience as any other than pious illusion and delusion. But what shall we say of a modern like Newman, who could not reach certainty, striving never so hard, through the Bible or the reason, but who did find Divine authority in the institutions of the church? Shall we deny it because it may be beyond our experience? If we have not seen God in institutional Christianity it is because the church and its institutions have so enveloped themselves to us with human conceits. Divine authority has been so encased in the authority of popes and councils, prelates and priests, ecclesiastics and theologians, that multitudes have been unable to discern it, and these mediators of redemption have so obtruded themselves in the way of devout seekers after God that they could not find God.” (Pp. 24–25).

According to Dr. Briggs, the church is one of the “three great fountains of Divine authority.” The proof he gives of this claim is, that “the majority of Christians from the Apostolic age have found God through the church.” It is difficult to see the connection between the proof and the claim. Does it follow from the fact that men “have found God through the church” that the church is one of the “three great fountains of Divine authority?” It is one thing to find God through the instrumentality of the church, and another, and a very different thing, to accept him on the authority of the church. To accept God upon the authority of the church is not to exercise true faith. To do so were simply to repose one’s faith upon the church herself. This would

not be true faith. Genuine faith rests upon higher ground. It believes God. "Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness." "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life." "Ye believe in God, believe also in *Me*." From Genesis to Revelation there is no instance of a command or a counsel to believe in the church, or to believe anything on the mere authority of the church. Neither prophet nor apostle ever pointed to himself as the object of faith or as speaking in his own name. The call the church has been commissioned to give precludes the possibility of her accepting any such objective position. The call she is to give is a call to "repentance towards God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ," and the faith and obedience of him who accepts that call terminates, not on the church, but upon God as he is revealed in Christ.

The case of Newman cited in confirmation of this claim to divine authority on behalf of the church, while it puts his meaning beyond doubt, is very far from establishing his position. The passage he quotes from Newman's *Apologia* points to a very different conclusion. Newman says, in this very passage: "I was not conscious to myself on my conversion of any difference of thought or of temper from what I had before. I was not conscious of firmer faith in the fundamental truths of Revelation or of more self-command; I had not more fervor; but it was like coming into port after a rough sea; and my happiness on that score remains to this day without interruption." The object of Dr. Briggs is to magnify the authority of the church, and to help him in this glorification of her authority he cites the case of Newman, who, he says, "Could not reach certainty, striving never so hard, through the Bible and the reason, but who did find divine authority in the institutions of the church." His witness, however, is no sooner in the witness-box than he testifies that he had found salvation ere ever he had entered into the portals of the Church of Rome. Whatever else he found within her pale he did not, if we are to accept his own testimony, find a firmer faith in the fundamental truths of Christianity. He had as firm a faith in

these truths before he abandoned Protestantism for Roman Catholicism as he had afterwards. How does this testimony prove that Newman found in the church what he failed to find through the Bible or the reason? Surely a man who has a firm faith in the fundamental truths of Revelation has found God, and as Newman possessed such faith, as he tells us he did, prior to his conversion to Rome, wherever else he found that faith, it was not through the instrumentality of her institutions or her authority.

It is not the object of this criticism to ignore or set aside the testimony of the church. The object is to clear this subject of the province of the church in the economy of grace from the confusion in which it has been involved in this singular Inaugural. Even were it true that the church is one of the three great fountains of divine authority, the question must of necessity arise, what is meant by the church? According to the Inaugural, the idea of the church is merged in the general vague conception of what the author calls "institutional Christianity." To martyrs and saints, fathers and schoolmen, the profoundest intellects and the saintliest lives, "institutional Christianity has been the presence chamber of God." There is certainly need of discrimination here, which is not to be found in this Inaugural. On the contrary, its author employs the term in a sense well fitted to perplex and confound his hearers. He makes it embrace the Church of Rome, and as we have just seen, informs us that Newman found in her institutions that certainty and divine authority which he could not find through the Bible or reason, though Newman himself tells us in the very passage relied on that he had found a firm faith in the fundamental truths of Revelation before his conversion to the Romish Church. Scott's *Force of Truth* and Scott's *Commentary* were instrumental in imparting to him a faith in the fundamental truths of revelation which was not made firmer by the ministrations of Rome.

Newman's case, therefore, cannot be cited to prove the doctrine of the Inaugural, that the church is one of "the three great fountains of divine authority." It was not on the authority of the Church of Rome that Newman accepted the fundamental truths of revelation. There were more reasons for saying that New-

man's faith rested on the authority of Thomas Scott, whose forcible presentation of truth and expositions of the Bible convinced his intellect and won the confidence of his heart. It is time that these eulogies of Rome through compliments to Newman were brought to an end, and that Protestants ceased to use his hymn, "Lead, kindly light," which is simply the record of his progress Romeward. The part taken by Rome in the salvation of Newman cannot, for a moment, be put in comparison with the service rendered him by Scott. Scott's administration was primary and antecedent, Rome's secondary and *ex post facto*. If there is to be any claim to divine authority advanced for either, the priority certainly belongs to Scott and not to Rome. But neither Scott nor Rome can be recognized as a fountain of divine authority. Whatever of truth he learned from Scott was invested with an authority which was not imparted to it by Scott. The fundamental truths of revelation have their origin in no finite fountain, whether individual or corporate. Their sole fountain is the infinite mind of the infinite Jehovah; and from that fountain no one save the Spirit of God can bring them forth. This the Spirit has done, and by his inspiring agency has placed them on record. The relation of the church to this record is not that of a fountain to the streams that issue from it, but that of a herald whose business is to cry "Ho! every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no money, come ye, buy and eat, yea come, buy wine and milk, without money and without price." To speak of the church as the fountain of authority is to confound the herald with the waters to which she is commissioned to invite the thirsty. Rome, and her imitators in *Lux Mundi*, may claim for the church the prerogative of placing the stamp of authority upon the Word of God, and may thus claim to be, as the author of the Inaugural describes her, a fountain of divine authority; this is to reverse the relation which obtains between the church and the word. The word itself is the sole fountain of divine authority, and the church possesses no authority which she has not received from the one divine fountain of the divine word. Her function is ministerial and not magisterial. She can, on her own authority, enact no law to bind the conscience; she can make overture of

no promise to the acceptance of faith, for which she cannot adduce the testimony of the written word. Her functions are executive and not legislative, and the organization that forgets this distinction, and arrogates to itself legislative prerogatives, is usurping, as Rome has done, the royal prerogatives of the sole King and Head of the church.

But what our author concedes to Rome with one hand, he takes away with the other. In the very same paragraph in which he represents her as imparting to Newman that certainty and assurance of Divine authority which he could not reach through the Bible or reason, he immediately prefers against her the following charge: "Divine authority has been so encased in the authority of popes and councils, prelates and priests, ecclesiastics and theologians, that multitudes have been unable to discern it; and these mediators of redemption have so obtruded themselves in the way of devout seekers after God that they could not find him." How are the two ends of this paragraph to be reconciled? In the same breath we are told that Newman found certainty and Divine authority in the Church of Rome, and then we are told that this Divine authority was so encased in the authority of popes and councils, prelates and priests, ecclesiastics and theologians, that multitudes have been unable to discern it; and that these mediators of redemption have so obtruded themselves in the way of devout seekers after God that they could not find him. If, then, Newman found Divine authority in Rome, he must have found it by turning a deaf ear to popes and councils, prelates and priests, ecclesiastics and theologians, and by ignoring those mediators of redemption which she obtrudes in the way of devout seekers after God. That is, he found in Rome that which he could not find within the pale of Protestantism, by clearing out of his pathway popes and councils, prelates and priests, ecclesiastics and theologians, and the whole array of her mediators of redemption! How much of Rome was left to instruct him after such clearance it would be difficult to determine. Stripped of those accessories, Rome is not Rome. Without her popes and councils, and prelates and priests, and ecclesiastics and theologians, and mediators of redemption, she is no longer distinguishable from that Protestantism

within whose pale, under the teaching of Thomas Scott, he found that firm "faith in the fundamental truths of revelation" which, notwithstanding all the higher prerogatives claimed for her by the author of this Inaugural, Newman himself confesses he was unable to increase.

One of the sources of obscurity and confusion exhibited in this Inaugural is the lack of clear definition of terms. This is very manifest in the author's vague use of the term church. If the church be, as he affirms, a great fountain of Divine authority, it is certainly a matter of vital importance for those who are in search of Divine authority, that they should be very definitely informed regarding what is meant by the church. It is true Dr. Briggs quotes on this point the Confession of Faith, which gives one of the best definitions of the church that has ever been framed by uninspired men; but singularly enough, he omits the first clause of the passage specified, that clause on which the whole ecclesiology of the Westminster divines is built; that clause in which they define the invisible church as consisting of "the whole number of the elect which have been, are, or shall be gathered in one, under Christ the Head thereof." This is a grave omission, for this is the Scriptural ideal of the church, and all external organizations are recognized as part and parcel of the true church only upon the assumption that their members are members of this invisible mystical body of Christ. It is to this body that all the promises are made, and to it alone belong all the prerogatives and attributes which the Scriptures ascribe to the church. Even granting then that the church is a "great fountain of Divine authority" it does not follow that this is true of the several external organizations bearing the name of church. Dr. Briggs has omitted to tell his audience what the Westminster divines affirm about all such organizations erring. They teach that they may err, and have erred, and it is needless to say, that both under the Old Testament and the New, the outward visible organization has erred from the truth, even in relation to questions affecting the foundation of the economy of Redemption. Was the Jewish external organization a "great fountain of Divine authority" when through its Sanhedrin it condemned our Lord to death for claiming to be the

Son of the Living God? Was the Church of Rome "a great fountain of Divine authority" when through its head, Pope Liberius, it placed the stamp of its authority upon the Arian heresy, or when, in later times, it condemned to the stake the servants of God because they contended earnestly for the faith delivered once for all to the saints, or refused to recognize the blasphemous claims advanced in behalf of the Roman See? Or, to come to our own day, was Rome a "great fountain of Divine authority" when, through the Vatican Council, it passed the dogma of the infallibility of the pope? Or, to come still closer to the practical working of the theory propounded in this Inaugural regarding church authority, how is it to be reconciled with the action of the directors of Union Theological Seminary, who have resisted the decision of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, and have resolved to adhere to their action in transferring Dr. Briggs to the newly-instituted Chair of Biblical Theology in that seminary? Certainly neither the directors nor Dr. Briggs can regard that Assembly as a great fountain of Divine authority. From the action of the directors in taking legal counsel we are warranted in the inference that they, at least, whatever the author of the Inaugural may think, regard the courts of civil law as a higher fountain of authority than the courts of the church.

The theory, therefore, won't work, and the reason it won't work is that it is unscriptural, and is in conflict with the convictions of all intelligent Christians. No intelligent Christian accepts the decision of any ecclesiastical assembly simply on the ground of its authority. Its decisions must be established by appeal to the Word of God, and it is only when thus fortified that any intelligent Christian bows to it as authoritative. In other words, the ultimate authority in the church is Christ, her King and Head, and his word alone has any authority in her councils or decisions. To submit to the decisions or commands of any church, whether Papal or Protestant, simply on the ground of her own authority is, as our standards teach, to betray true liberty of conscience.

The primary mistake in the construction of this Inaugural is to be found in its divisions. Its author tells us that "there are historically three great fountains of Divine authority—the Bible, the

church, and the reason." These are, according to Dr. Briggs, "the sources of Divine authority." It would have prevented much confusion of thought, as well as much erroneous dogmatism, had he taken as his subject "the sources of theology" and given as his divisions the Bible, external nature, and the moral constitution of man. As his subject was theology, such should have been his all dominant theme throughout, and these subdivisions of its sources would have enabled him to keep his theme ever present throughout the entire discussion. Instead of this natural common-sense method of dealing with the subject proper to his chair, he throws theology aside, and substitutes for it the "sources of Divine authority," and gives, as one of his subdivisions, "the church," which turns out to be an equivocal term, as in defining it he omits that clause of the Confession of Faith which is the key to all genuine Protestant ecclesiology, and apart from which, and the limitations it implies, any visible organization which may choose to arrogate to itself ecclesiastical prerogatives, may call itself a church, and claim to be a fountain of Divine authority. Had he adopted the course suggested, his theme, from beginning to end, would have been the knowledge of God and Divine things, as revealed in the Bible, in external nature, and in the moral constitution of man. Following this method he would have had a fine opportunity to magnify Biblical theology to his heart's content, pointing out the fact, that there is nothing of God or of Divine things revealed in external nature or in the moral constitution of man that is not given, again and again, in the Bible, and stamped with the seal of Divine authority. To come down from this high platform to talk of the church, as undefined, as a source of Divine authority, exalting it above the Bible itself, was to belittle the whole subject, and to clothe with confusion the entire discussion. There is nothing proper to the chair or to the occasion which would not have come under one or the other of the above divisions. The only disadvantage incident to such a method of treatment would have been that under it Dr. Briggs could not have availed himself of the occasion to impeach before the general public all traditionalism, all ecclesiasticism, and all dogmatism, and all dogmaticians. This disadvantage, however,

would have been more than counter-balanced by this method, as it would have kept him from perpetrating the palpable contradiction of condemning ecclesiasticism, traditionalism, and dogmatism, and then turning round and pronouncing a panegyric upon the Church of Rome, whose bad preëminence in all these departments has justified her enrolment as the mystery of iniquity.

There is an all-pervading characteristic of this Inaugural which impresses one unfavorably, namely, its spirit of self-confident boasting and avowed contempt of the theological labors of almost all theologians save those who have had the honor of taking part in his own theological education. On page 41 we have the following account of the critical exploits of the "Higher Criticism:" "We have undermined the breastworks of traditionalism; let us blow them to atoms. We have forced our way through the obstructions; let us remove them from the face of the earth, that no man hereafter may be kept from the Bible, but that all may freely enter in, search it through, and find God enthroned in its very centre." The "we" here means the critics, but the Inaugural does not tell us what wing or arm of the critical array has had the honor of these marvellous critical achievements. Of course this "we" must be regarded as embracing Dr. Briggs himself, and if we are to accept his own estimate of his critical prowess, he must have taken a foremost place in these mining operations, and he is sure to be heard of, if not seen, after the critical dynamite has exploded.

These critics are in their operations somewhat like the men of dynamite in the army of the Irish Nationalists, who thought that by exploding a few of their cartridges in the Tower of London and other public places they could cause the British Empire to totter to its overthrow. The advocates of this species of warfare, however, have found to their cost that the "resources of civilization are not yet exhausted." And so may these boasting critics, even with Dr. Briggs bearing in their rere the critical explosive in the one hand, and his Pelagian *fusee* in the other, find when the noise of the explosion has subsided and the smoke has cleared away, that the old historic fortress is still there, and that they themselves, after imperilling their critical lives and limbs, have

been shut up in some critical keep under the custody of some competent critical warder. Walls that have withstood 747 such mining operations as Dr. Briggs boasts and threatens are very likely to withstand the 748th explosion, however large the critical cartridge, and however critically it may be laid. Such is the Biblical theology which Prof. Bruce, of the Free-Church College, Glasgow, commends to the churches of these lands! It is unbiblical, unscientific, uncritical, unethical, and untheological, and rests upon a Pelagian fundamental as its ultimate organic principle.

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III. SCRIPTURAL LIMITS OF DENOMINATIONALISM.

THE chaotic condition of Protestant Christianity is generally recognized and deplored. The sentiment of loyalty to Christ, as our common Saviour and King, is painfully crossed whenever we survey his realm and consider its disordered state. Wherever we turn our eyes we find the church militant lying like scattered encampments of Arabian tribes, not only independent, but animated by a discordant and often hostile spirit. It is the Lord's will that his people shall be one, in some important sense, and whatever may be our view of the unity he contemplated there can be no escape from the conclusion that it is not realized adequately in the church as observed by the world. On the contrary, the world cannot but discover many signs of unseemly rivalry and unbrotherly antagonisms between different sects and parties.

These facts, thus soberly stated, are too notorious to be denied. The spirit of loyalty manifestly calls for more cordial relations among Christian brethren. We cannot conceive of a pious heart indifferent to such an object. We assume that, wherever the love of the one Redeemer prevails, the desire must exist for a fraternal understanding among all his disciples. In various degrees this is felt and expressed by all parties. But it is counteracted in many ways, and thwarted by a thousand unfavorable influences in almost every part of the kingdom. That such influences are, to a great extent, unscriptural, unhallowed, and pernicious, is a truth so obvious that it needs no proof. The chief trouble lies in the disposition of obstructive parties in the church to lay the responsibility upon others. We find in fact that, in some cases the strongest appeals for unity proceed from denominations that claim an exclusive title to the divine sanction. It appears that such sects regard their own position as a powerful plea in behalf of organic union. It seems to furnish an unanswerable argument to less exclusive Christians, on the ground that the principles of the one party are more sacred and inflexible than those of the others.

The mountain is too great and immovable to yield. Therefore Mahomet must go to the mountain!

The fallacy of this plea will be exposed before we close. In the meanwhile let us examine the aspects of the church generally in the actual attitude of particular bodies, whether nominally liberal or exclusive. There are hundreds of such divisions in every free country; and in others, where despotism prevails, there are diverse opinions and interests in constant revolt against uniformity. Centrifugal forces operate in every sphere, physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual, and will probably never cease in our terrestrial experience. But the variations extend from the most beautiful diversity to the most reprehensible alienations. The unfraternal spirit may be seen under the most brotherly forms, and, for the most part, different organizations are formed to relieve antagonisms that disturb the peace.

Again, some sects are based upon differences of interpretation given to the Scriptures, upon post-canonical traditions, and still others upon expediency, as impressed upon them by their zealous founders. Some lay especial emphasis upon doctrine, some upon orders, and others upon ritual. All are animated, more or less, by earnest zeal for their distinctive opinions, and seek the growth of the kingdom according to their peculiar systems. There are some ecclesiastical leaders who contend for the success of their own denominations as the ultimate form of triumphant Christianity; whilst others support a sect as having a *special* mission for the benefit of a class or a temporal condition of society. The forms are many, but the motives for their propagation are far more numerous. They defy classification.

Out of all this confusion stand forth a few plain truths which cannot be questioned. They are like head-lands that guide the mariner through the intricacies of navigation. We wish to develop them so clearly as to reach definite conclusions.

1. Uniformity of thought and observance cannot be expected in a church destined to embrace all races and classes. Christianity appeals to the understandings and affections of men. It does not require us to shut our eyes and receive its truth blindfold. But free inquiry on the part of imperfect individuals ever leads to di-

versity of opinion and taste. All nations and all religions furnish examples of this tendency. But the church is a free commonwealth, and, more than any religious institution of a different origin, approaches us through the medium of instruction and persuasion. From the very beginning, there have been schools and parties in its bosom, and however lamentable these divisions have been, history demonstrates that violent repression intensifies without eradicating the evil. It was no purpose of the divine Lord to *force* men to believe his doctrines, or follow a ritual against their convictions and their wills; and he did not commission his church to employ temporal pains and penalties. Not only the Scriptures, but the experience and common sense of men, plainly teach us that coercion will not, and cannot, effect uniformity and organic union in the Christian church. Whatever may be the expectations of the Church of Rome, or the Greek Church, no Protestant sect in our day bases any calculation of its success upon the use of compulsion.

2 The only hope now entertained of an obliteration of sectarian lines points to harmony of views expected to result from a pertinacious series of argumentative and persuasive efforts. Actual unity, in the letter as well as the spirit, is fondly anticipated by many in some happy age when all Christian bodies shall become one through mutual concession or *absorption*. The latter process is the favorite conception of the exclusive sects. The Baptist brethren are confident that the whole Christian world will at last adopt their views, because they believe those views are now rejected through ignorance, prejudice or obstinacy. The Episcopal Church is equally assured that the veil will finally fall from the eyes of dissenters, and they will all be gathered into its fold through the influence of increasing light. As we remarked above, these bodies of Christians appear to think, not only that their logic is without a flaw, but that their lofty claims are the wisest policy. They flatter themselves that their zeal for unity will prove an effectual argument in behalf of their own systems when addressed to parties less tenacious of their views. The calculation is that the members of other Christian bodies may be aroused to enthusiasm for the union of the Lord's people, and

in this frame may be disposed to concede contested ground in order to accomplish that end. Without doubt the policy is shrewd and efficient. Observation convinces us that many dissentients are won by this process, as the extravagant prices placed by the oriental merchant upon his goods promote their sale.

But on the other hand, absorption is by no means an assured success. It has been tried for hundreds of years, and has promoted the growth of these denominations here and there, but at the same time confirmed the opposition of other bodies likewise increasing with marvelous rapidity. Protestantism on the continent of Europe has never countenanced High Church or exclusive views. They have been chiefly held by English-speaking populations. But the relative numbers have not changed in their favor. The Methodists have kept pace with the Baptists, and Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Reformed and American Lutherans are not behind the Anglican body. But even this church is not unanimous, and we can confidently affirm that *nine-tenths* of the Protestant world to-day repudiate the exclusive opinions entertained by those denominations first referred to.

3. The method of *compromise* is far more plausible, and has many advocates in all parts of the church. It is earnestly proposed to reduce the several creeds to such a minimum that they may be combined into one upon which all may stand. Two great difficulties have for ages stared the advocates of such a means of union in the face. One is found in the dissensions of Christians concerning the fundamentals of *salvation*. The other relates to the fundamentals of *organization*. Few Protestants can be discovered who identify these questions. All admit the salvability of sincere believers in Christ, but many distinguish between *covenanted* and *uncovenanted* subjects of the divine mercy. Extremists are not wanting who profess to hold that the spiritual condition of the latter class, numbering by our estimate nine-tenths of the whole, is far less hopeful than that of the former. But these fanatics are happily few. Most Anglicans, however high, and nearly all Immersionists, however inconsistent, refuse to shut the doors of heaven against brethren out of their communion. The trouble is that they refuse to extend official recognition to a large

majority of the saints of God, whose sincere piety they cannot question, but upon whom they nevertheless fix the charge of *insubordination* to the authority with which Christ has invested his church. The one-tenth continues, from generation to generation, to require the nine-tenths to surrender their convictions and conform to prescribed conditions, on pain of a forfeiture of the promises. What ground can remain for their charitable admission that such Christians may yet enjoy the divine favor in heaven, we find it hard to imagine. Our own faith holds that none but covenanted disciples will ever be admitted to Paradise, and that, even there, the highest seats are not reserved for an upper class, who in this world refused to recognize many in whose foreheads the name of Christ was written.

Overlooking these inconsistencies, and giving the exclusive brethren credit for hearts more accordant with the spirit of the gospel than their logical systems, we find them still maintaining that others reject some of the fundamental principles of church *organization*. The immersionist holds that there is no valid organism composed of unimmersed members; and the Anglican holds that diocesan authority is essential to a valid administration of ordinances. Supposing these views to be entertained in the spirit of Christian fraternity, they involve a proposition almost too absurd to be written in words. They are equivalent to saying that the vast majority of Christ's true people are *outside* of his visible kingdom. To any sound mind, the probability of such a state of things must appear almost infinitesimal.

This posture of two leading evangelical denominations presents an obstacle to visible union of immense magnitude. These brethren profess to contend for great principles, but fail to consider the weight of *principle* involved in the opposition of their fellow Christians. One of the former bodies may be ever so conscientious in teaching that βαπτισμός in the New Testament always signifies submersion. But it is equally a conscientious tenet of all the other great Protestant bodies that this Greek word does not admit of translation into any one modern term. This solemn conclusion is permanently registered in both the old and the revised English versions. The same testimony is borne by the ver-

sions in other modern languages, and thus we have *principle against principle*, and one is as honestly held as the other. The Anglican Church is also firmly tenacious of its position that the "Historic Episcopate" is divinely instituted; but they should not forget that a presbyterial episcopate is held by others with a distinctness and honesty no less conspicuous than theirs, and with this immense advantage, that all modern accepted versions of the New Testament translate the Greek *επισκοπος* by words acknowledged by themselves to be equivalent to presbyter or elder. If the scriptural bishop was superior in order to the scriptural presbyter, these versions fail to show it.

These two exclusive denominations do not sufficiently appreciate the *principle* that denies their claims. They know that the other evangelical bodies do not unchurch them, and erroneously infer that they are *less conscientious* than themselves. But a Christian may reject a dogma as unscriptural, and yet recognize as a brother him who maintains it. A negative opinion may be as devoutly and persistently urged as a positive one. The only difference between the two opposite principles in religion which may be so classified, is that the frequent statement of the negative is apt to appear the more *aggressive*, because it more obviously refers to the other party. Protestantism is in terms almost necessarily an assault on popery. Hence in quiet times the affirmation of the immersion theory, or of the High Church dogma, proceeds without interruption, in acts, if not in words; but the opinions of those who reject them are not often expressed, because their very utterance appears to lack courtesy. At the same time, the spirit of the dissenting parties may be more in harmony with Christian brotherhood.

The actual union of Protestant denominations is, therefore, more seriously obstructed by those sects which especially urge its necessity than by others. The black flag makes peace impossible until extermination is complete. But, on the other hand, the less exclusive churches also recoil from such a consummation for reasons of their own. Union is difficult on their part on account of their creeds, orders and usages. The American House of Bishops, and the Lambeth Convocation, of recent date, have in-

deed signified a readiness to concede a relaxation of articles, and some freedom of ritual. But this is in view of a general submission to the "Historic Episcopate," which we may confidently expect to employ a tremendous pressure in favor of uniformity. In the matter of dogma, little urgency would be anticipated.

But independently of Anglican policy, Presbyterians, Lutherans, Methodists and Congregationalists, do not regard organic unity as of more importance than their own distinctive doctrines and principles. All of them exist separately for the purpose of expressing and illustrating views of Christian truth which they cordially believe and think worthy of careful preservation. Their differences are not vital to salvation, or even to valid organization, but too sacred nevertheless to be unnecessarily relinquished. If one visible head were clearly required in the Scriptures for all Christians in the world, they would feel compelled to abandon their Protestantism and return to the Church of Rome, which at the Reformation alone represented that principle. But the movement began with a recognition of the truth that spiritual doctrine is more important in the kingdom of Christ than union with a visible head; and so long as they are not papists, they must continue to protest against the hollow unity of Rome.

4. This leads to the last inquiry, whether a consolidation of all Christians into one visible body under one authority, is indeed contemplated by the Lord in the scheme of his kingdom; and if so, is its neglect by Protestants a fundamental error? In answer to these questions, we are forced to consider what is involved in the affirmative propositions to which they relate. If the independence of the Protestant sects is a fundamental error, the conclusion is very obvious that separation from the Church of Rome was, and continues to be, a sinful apostasy of the first magnitude. Protestants are thus in an awful *dilemma*, being driven by conscience to reject the fatal doctrines and corrupt institutions of Rome, and, at the same time, to submit to her authority as divine and final. The robust faith of our fathers did not fail to perceive that fundamental truths cannot conflict with one another, and the followers of Luther and Calvin chose the Scriptures and separation, rather than popery and continued union. The Gordian knot was boldly

cut with the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God. It was plain to the eye of faith that union with the corrupt church in which they were reared, could not be a paramount obligation, if it forced their consciences into compliance with impious ceremonies. The example and precept of our Lord, in his vindication of himself and his disciples from the charge of Sabbath desecration, furnished abundant proof that some duties are greater than others, and loyalty to him is more binding than loyalty to the church. This doctrine is almost universal among enlightened Protestants, and those who question it will, like John Henry Newman, find their more congenial home in the Church of Rome.

But still there are in the Protestant ranks very many who insist that valid authority for the continuance of Christ's ordinances in a state of separation from Rome, must necessarily be derived through special forms of transmission from the Roman hierarchy. They claim that this valid connection is through certain historical names, and no others, and that, although salvation is possible otherwise, it is given by *promise* only to those who enjoy this advantage. There can be, it is urged, no authorized church without this connection, which is possessed exclusively by the Anglican communion, and the few remaining old Catholics and Jansenists of Europe. Some perhaps would include the non-papal oriental churches, but only such as would condone errors quite as grave as those of Rome.

It is impossible for us to discuss the question here, whether any authoritative connection is essential. We confine ourselves to the simple inquiry whether a more valid succession of commissions is enjoyed by the Anglican Church than by the Lutheran, or Presbyterian bodies. This question of validity, on the part of one portion of the Protestant world towards others, would never have been raised except in the interest of Episcopacy in the diocesan sense. Many of the Continental Reformers were ordained by the authority of Rome as completely as those of England, as we well know of Luther and Zwingle. The dogma that all valid orders proceed from the hands of a diocesan bishop did not affect the presbyters anywhere. It referred only to a supposed superior order, and to ordination *by* presbyters rather than *of* presbyters.

The Continental Reformers rejected the Romish dogma of ordination which the English at length adopted. We emphasize the fact that it is not a Protestant, but a papal doctrine, and one repudiated by the great mass of those who bear the Protestant name.

But yet further, we contend that the stigma of *invalidity* stamped upon the bulk of the Protestant churches was not originally so designed. The laws requiring diocesan or prelatical ordination were at first *national* in their scope. The first English Reformers did not ascribe invalidity to Lutheran ordinations in Germany, or to Reformed ordination in the Netherlands. They were reckoned fully valid where they were legal, and frequently treated so in England, where they were held to be illegal. We believe it can be shown that these early Protestants of England, when abroad, generally recognized the orders and ordinances of Continental churches to an extent which they now everywhere refuse.

This whole position of the Anglican bodies, as now held, is a gratuitous assumption directly in the teeth of the Scriptures. How Christians who repudiate other and more plausible errors of the Church of Rome can adopt such a dogma, discrediting nearly the whole of Protestant Christianity outside of their own communion, is an inquiry that baffles our intelligence. Eminent men are its advocates who would shine in a more favorable sphere, but on this subject are as irrational as abject papists.

The proposition is that there is no valid organic Christianity except in churches under *bishops* who are superior to presbyters. It is not formally claimed that they were *apostles*, although such is the usual argument. It is a "Historic Episcopate" that is offered as a fundamental article of union; and we give them credit for including canonical as well as patristical history under those terms. Now, unbiased reason would say that the New Testament is entitled among Christians to paramount respect on any subject. But our Anglican brethren refuse to see what all other Protestants see as plainly as the letters in which the words are written, that the bishops of the New Testament were the presbyters themselves. In the old and the revised versions the fact is patent, and both were the work of Anglican scholars chiefly. As we hold of immersion, that, if it is the only true version of βαπτισμος, it should

so stand in an English translation of the Bible, we repeat, in reference to *επισκοπος*, that if it signifies *apostle*, it ought to be so rendered. But this is not the demand of our brethren. They did not even suggest it. They do not in their formularies affirm such a doctrine. Bishop is their favorite word, and, undeniably, "bishop" is used in their own versions of the New Testament interchangeably with "presbyter," and not interchangeably with "apostle."

Without another word, it follows that organic Christianity does not depend upon the superiority of bishops to presbyters, according to *scriptural* history. The "Historic Episcopate" is patristic and Romish, and cannot survive one hour's examination in the light of history divinely inspired.

This investigation must reduce the different bodies of evangelical Protestants to an equality that removes the chief barriers out of the way of union, so far as union is possible. Inconsiderable minorities, which pertinaciously unchurch vast majorities in the kingdom of Christ, virtually commit themselves for all the future to an isolation which renders union a hopeless dream. But we are now to inquire whether the different sects, when approaching one another on equal terms, may not possibly effect a union of some kind, for which the church should pray. That some sort of unification not now realized was contemplated by the Lord, is too obvious to need argument. All parties agree in this, whether exclusive or inexclusive. But how far an approach to visible unity is practicable and desirable, is an open question for Protestants, as it is a sealed one to Romanists. In our humble judgment, it is desirable and practicable in equal degree, but there are limitations beyond which it cannot go. The unity for which the Redeemer prayed was one that should embrace all his people in all nations. In the present dispensation, there are obvious physical barriers in the way of one organization covering the globe. A representative council reflecting the mind of all Christians could not be assembled. One authority controlling the whole, especially if a majority of mankind were included, would necessarily be despotic and consolidated like the papacy. In fact, this impious usurpation by a local clique owes its birth to the error of an early age

concerning this very question of a visible union throughout the world.

The demand for such an organization, if consistently urged, would force an ignominious return of certain sects back to Rome. But we thankfully observe that this consistency does not prevail, since some of them maintain a local independence. The Episcopal Church in the United States is not *visibly* one with the English Establishment. Resemblance and correspondence are the only external ties by which they are united. It is fair, therefore, to assume that organic union is not an unchangeable article with that church, however much we might so infer from its theory of apostolic succession.

We cannot waste time on the claims of Romanism for universal dominion. If a man's conscience is a trust from God to him individually, he cannot surrender it to any pretended authority in the hands of others. The responsibility lies upon himself personally. This is an intuition, which is violated by those who ascribe infallibility to a priesthood, and allow other mortals, upon a false plea, to control their thoughts and actions. All true Protestants should hold back from such an abject submission. And all such repudiate the thought of a visible Protestant union embracing all nations, because it involves the errors against which their protest is recorded.

Not only is an organic unity of free Christians impossible for the world, but it is likewise impracticable within any national area. The difficulty is not altogether physical, but to some extent moral. We may even suppose all physical barriers removed, and yet be confronted with the same question. Leaving the future to determine the ultimate state of the church, we must still inquire concerning the facts and obligations pertaining to the present. Is it then practicable and desirable for all true Christians in a given state to be in one organization and government?

In order to meet this question, we must first ascertain what visible organic union is. It seems to us to imply not only agreement concerning matters of faith essential to salvation, but concerning principles and institutions that tend to preserve them. One might easily justify union with Rome on the basis of *some* of her articles.

But it is notorious that these are interwoven in her cunningly devised system with horrible heresies and abominable idolatries. A symbol consisting solely of truths whereby we must be saved, never has sufficed, and never can suffice, for the preservation of the integrity and purity of the church. There must be a creed embracing saving faith and many other points inseparable from it in a consistent system. The distinction recognized by the Presbyterian Church between truth necessary to salvation, and truth which must be taught, commends itself to every considerate mind. However brief and simple may be the expression of the former, the latter must obviously be explicit and definite. But we incline to the opinion that our system is defective in not providing for the progressive instruction of all its members, or requiring their final acceptance of its doctrines.

There are in the Church of Rome, and other old organizations in the East, a multitude of errors full of peril to the souls of their adherents, and too grossly incompatible with a pure scriptural worship to be tolerated in the name of Christ. Evangelical Protestants must exclude all such errors from their faith and practice. But this implies other statements than those required for salvation. The worship of images, saints and relics, prayers for the dead, authoritative absolution, and many other superstitious observances, require to be repudiated by those who profess to believe in Christ. But if this must be our attitude towards apostate communions, it must also mark our dissent from one another. A common creed for all evangelical Protestants must force us to express a culpable indifference towards the errors we object to in our fellow Protestants. The Arminian cannot conscientiously consent to the preaching of "the decrees of God," neither can the Calvinist cordially allow "the self-determination of the unrenewed will" to be credited with the sinner's conversion. It is the same in the matter of church government. The Episcopalian cannot, without a radical change of views, admit the parity of the ministry, whilst non-conformists revolt as much as ever at hierarchical pretensions. In the matters of worship and administration, the Baptist and the Anglican bodies are, on principle, wedded to certain *forms* which the other denominations cannot conscientiously accept as they are urged.

Proposals of organic union thus imply a surrender of principle on all sides, which may not involve anything absolutely fundamental, and yet may be so related to these prime articles that it cannot command the cordial acquiescence of honest minds. All parties judge from experience that the combination of discordant elements in one organization free from outside pressure, must intensify antagonisms and increase strife. It is true that a more exalted spirituality in the church would counteract this tendency; but this seems to suggest that the experiment cannot be safely made until that condition is realized.

All the facts conspire to force a conclusion that orthodox Protestantism cannot be brought under one visible authority. But with equal power they urge upon the separate bodies a unity of spirit and concord of purpose of which we yet have no experience. It remains as true as ever that the will of Christ requires relations among his people far more cordial than the prevailing sectarian spirit allows. The very thought of *absorption*, so fancifully entertained in some quarters, implies fraternal recognition and confidence towards other sects. Why should one denomination propose to embrace the members of another, on formal conditions, if confidence in their Christian character were not deeply felt? We may be sure that the exclusive bodies would promptly receive the others if they would yield to their special requirements by external conformity. However vain their expectations of future compliance, this attitude goes far to prepare all parties for a degree of fellowship more accordant with the gospel than that which is at present enjoyed.

The special obstacles presented by certain sects to fraternal and equal consultation, having been abandoned, the Protestant churches should then prayerfully and loyally confer together with reference to harmony and coöperation. The history of Foreign Missions, as it is now passing before us, illustrates the spiritual unity of which we speak. The increase and approximation of mission stations in different parts of the world, suggest more and more forcibly every day the necessity of some friendly arrangement to avoid interference and friction. Two obvious evils result from the occupation of common ground by rival sects. One is of an economical

nature that chiefly affects the Christian world. The other is spiritual, and exerts an unfavorable influence upon the unevangelized masses.

Christian bodies which, at home, are held apart by considerations which the outside world cannot understand, soon discover in a strange land that the cost of missions is vastly increased by separate enterprises. In Japan and Brazil, the several classes of Presbyterians there engaged in the same work, have cordially united for the purpose of consolidating their efforts and increasing their relative efficiency. The economical reasons for a similar union will soon be seen elsewhere. It is probable that in the near future the same bodies will be fused in China and India. But a similar regard for business principles, as well as higher motives, has prompted most of the Protestant missionaries in Mexico to enter into a convention, or *modus vivendi*, by which they propose to assign cities and towns of a certain population or under to particular denominations, that churches, schools, and other mission agencies, may be maintained at a minimum of expense.

On this aspect of the question we need not dwell. Far more important and inviting is the other consideration. Christianity suffers immensely by division in the eyes of the followers of other religions. Its pure and holy doctrines and precepts appear to be contradicted by teachers who profess to serve one master and yet refuse fellowship to one another. The law of love, urged upon the rest of mankind, seems to be wanting in themselves. The heathen cannot understand the minute explanations offered, and these dissensions among brethren prove stumbling-blocks to millions who are compelled to witness them. Missionaries realize the fact in almost every field. Spiritual motives, far more than the suggestions of economy, induced almost all Protestant laborers in Mexico to establish an understanding among themselves, and occupy different localities. The same spirit will be required wherever the faith is extended.

We use Foreign Missions simply for purposes of illustration. The evils resulting from opposition of interest between sects are apparent wherever arbitrary power does not render division impossible. In free and civilized nations religion everywhere

multiplies its forms. But Christianity maintains itself by a constant conflict with sin and unbelief. Sectarian rivalries and antagonisms furnish its enemies with arguments, and foster the spirit of resistance among the masses of the people. Organic union is impossible, but some symbol of unity of spirit, some formal expression of fellowship, is both possible and necessary, in order to remove scandal and expedite the conquest of the world.

Fearful responsibility rests upon all sects in proportion to their bigotry and spontaneous isolation. The conscience of the church is asleep on the subject, because the evil is not obvious in large cities which are the centres of influence. Crowded church buildings may be found side by side, whose worshippers, differing widely in their principles and institutions, are unconscious of the rivalry they represent. They avoid a sense of antagonism, as they escape collision on the street. But the systems are in conflict nevertheless in hundreds of villages, and rural communities, and, in our own country, on thousands of miles of frontier. In the cities the agreement to differ is an established usage of society, fostered by secular interests, and church leaders in such localities become blindly indifferent to the results in the respective fields of Domestic and Foreign Missions. Whilst we write, the well-bred representatives of several rival denominations are doubtless exchanging courtesies in many casual meetings, whilst others of the same opinions are elsewhere experiencing the bitter results of strife and mutual interference.

The diplomacy of the world achieves a thousand successes which war could never secure. All history proves that treaties and conventions express the anxiety of nations to preserve the peace. Civilized governments recognize one another as legitimate members of a brotherhood with common interests under different forms. Protestant Christianity, whilst preaching peace on earth and good will to men, knows nothing similar to international law, and refuses to establish any rule of comity and mutual intercourse. Too many of its flags are so contrived that ordinary salutation is impossible. One church refuses to recognize another by any official act, and the reproach of *illegitimacy* directed against kindred organizations is emblazoned in a heraldry of unconquerable pride.

Not only is there a want of written law regulating the intercourse of sects, but there is no established usage, such as society everywhere observes in temporal affairs. Signals at sea, and oral rules on land, constrain the conduct of men to observances that are absolutely necessary for peace and comfort. But the general understanding that prevents ships and wheels from colliding in the harbor and the city, and teaches even the pedestrian to *keep to the right*, is unknown to the churches. In thousands of localities they contend with eager competition for paramount influence, and divide small communities into little sections that prove vexatious to one another and burthensome to the church at large. One village or rural neighborhood is compelled to support several organizations with their ministers, where one church and one pastor would suffice.

We are confident that the insufficient supply of ministers, so generally lamented in almost all denominations, is largely due to this local subdivision of the people of God. There are, perhaps, preachers enough to supply all the evangelical bodies with pastors, if they were wisely distributed. And the support of pastors by their flocks would be so general as to render Domestic Missions a policy for the frontiers alone. These great facts are undeniable, and yet few ecclesiastics seem willing to consider them. Inferior questions absorb our attention, and a crying evil unknown to primitive Christianity, and oppressing with its dead weight the church of God, is not allowed a moment's regard.

Jealous rivals among armed nations do not hesitate to treat with one another in order to secure a basis of amicable intercourse. But here are communities of Christians, all the subjects of our divine King, that refuse to one another all overtures looking to an understanding. They are willing to absorb a rival sect, but strangely resolved not to negotiate with it for fraternal relations. Religious principle is the plea for an arrogant attitude, such as belligerent nations dare not maintain. Such a principle is indeed sacred, if not confounded with pride of opinion or traditional prejudice. But this is the error against which all Christians should protest. There is *no principle* adverse to brotherly comity among the sincere disciples of Christ. It is a spirit alto-

gether inconsistent with his cross, that holds a brother by the throat and refuses to be reconciled unless he surrenders his free opinion on a matter not vital to salvation. The prayer of the Redeemer that his people may be one, referred, in the light of common sense and charity, to a spiritual rather than a formal relation, and is obstructed far more by sectarian exclusiveness than by denominational independence.

In view of the facts reviewed, we cordially endorse the suggestion made by some of the leaders of Christian thought, of a federative alliance, or formal treaty, with a few stipulations binding the parties to a decent and respectful understanding with one another. No common government or tribunal should be contemplated. But a code of rules regulating correspondence and intercourse would serve to harmonize the operations of the various bodies, and restrain them from unfraternal conduct.

That the will of Christ, expressed in his prayer, demands a unity not now realized, is plain enough. But if this will is frustrated, there is enormous guilt at the doors of reluctant denominations. To assume an isolated position, and urge all others to find unity in the bosom of *our* favorite system, is an easy way to deceive ourselves, but is practically schismatic and obstructive to the very cause which it proposes to promote. When that cause triumphs, it will certainly not be accomplished as narrow sectarians imagine. The unity of the Spirit will precede the union of denominations, and the attraction must be mutual. The day will come when "Ephraim shall not envy Judah, and Judah shall not vex Ephraim." There will first be peace, then brotherly consultation and agreement.

That some sort of unification among Protestants is an obligation and necessity in the presence of the enemy is a proposition so familiar as to have little effect. All admit it, and all sit still in despair. We point to a solution which requires no sacrifice but that of pride. When will the church learn to distinguish between unchangeable truth and fanatical obstinacy? When will she cease to confound her own prepossessions with the revealed will of God? Let her prayer be more earnest in all her assemblies for deliverance "from all false doctrine, heresy, and schism." And let her

learn with all humility that error may lurk under the form of an ideal perfection. Above all, we would say, let the Presbyterian Church realize her advantage as the leader of such a movement, by reason of her catholicity. Any sincere Christian is now welcome to her communion; any Christian minister may enter her service on terms not arbitrary, but scriptural. We honestly believe that this establishment of concord by negotiation among orthodox Protestants is as plainly required by the gospel as the commands of the Decalogue, and that it devolves upon the Presbyterian Church to take a leading part in securing it. It is *not* her duty to abandon her principles. It *is* her duty to extend them as a basis of fraternal Christianity throughout the world.

J. A. WADDELL.

IV. THE BEARING OF SOCIALISM ON MORALITY AND RELIGION.

To those who "by Christ believe in God" (1 Peter i. 21) the atheism of the socialistic movement is the foremost matter in the moral criticism of the system (in 1 Cor. ii. 15, the Gr. for "judge" is, *criticise*). We will begin with a previous question (article *Socialism*, Encycl. Brit., new Ed.), whether socialism ought not to be saved from utter rejection on account of its atheism by regard to the circumstance, that it has an "ethic" which to some extent is coincident with the Christian ethic ?

A pirate ship has a discipline that is much the same as that of the royal navy. "Ethic" in this connection has to mean *order* of action, as distinguished from the spirit of its life. And in this respect there must be some coincidence with Christian ethic on the part of every conceivable system for the government of a community that is not to be a rope of sand. A Satan's kingdom (Matt. xii. 25) that is at all to stand, must have in it something of that order which reigns in the kingdom of God. The difference morally between the two dominions of darkness and light is, not in respect of mere ethical precepts, dictating particular courses of action, but in respect of first or impulsive principle, prescribing the last or chief end, and moving the affections toward that end, in and through all particular courses and actions. According to a difference of ends in the heart's wish and endeavor, the same course of action may be either good and godly, or "earthly, sensual, devilish." Two vessels on the same tack are *making*, the one for Good Hope, and the other for Cape Wrath. This *de finibus*—of the end as criterion of morality—is commonplace of rational ethical speculation, heathen as well as Christian.

The body of precepts is in itself a dead thing, like man when only made "of the dust of the earth." And the impulsive or first principle, which is breathed into that body as a breath of life, mak-

ing ethic into morality, pure or impure, is what gives moral character, whether good or evil, to the whole of that life which it inspires. Now in Christianity the first principle of all moral action for man is—witness the last word of Christ to Satan (Matt. iv. 10)—*serve God*. In socialism, on the contrary, the impulsive principle is, *worship mammon*: since it holds, with the first word of Satan to Christ (Matt. iv. 3) that the one true end of life is, enjoyment of commodities. That is the lowest conceivable form of worldliness, appealing only to the “lust of the flesh” (1 John ii. 16 and Gen. iii. 6, with the two temptations, in Eden and in the wilderness.) And to plead, that the ethic of a system of godless Epicurism is in some measure coincident with the Christian ethic, is only to say in Greek what means in English, that the lowest kind of worldliness, when on its good behavior, is not simply anarchical, or utterly disorderly: which may be so far satisfactory to the policeman who has his eye upon it, but is not reassuring to a statesman, and is quite out of court in moral criticism.

The old heathen Epicurism had, like Mahomedanism, something that might redeem it from utter perfection of sordidness. There were enchantments of a superstition that haunted the forsaken place of faith; or, in a Lucretian poetry an atheistic theosophy might find something like theology for wings of lofty song. But even then, the worldliness was too vile for even the worldly world itself. That world’s own “prophets” (Tit. i. 12) of the worldlier sort—such as Horace and our “Peter Pinder”—indignant at the outrage on mere manhood through the vileness, would break out into fierce Archiloelian invective on “*the herd of Epicurus*,” or, “*Epicureans, alias swine*.” “*Bellygod!*” has in our new time been the expression of a manly nation for utmost measure of contemptuous loathing of a creature in the human form. And that is the one thing, the very thought of which overcame for once the manhood of the great apostle who was the manliest of mankind. In a Roman prison, waiting (Phil. ii. 17) for a martyr’s death, Paul unbosoms himself to his noble Philippian (iii. 18, 19), about that thing, as a thing the existence of which among Christians it grieves his very heart to think of. And now, when he goes on to write of it, the paper is blotted with his tears:—“whose god

is their belly, whose glory is their shame, who mind earthly things."

That thing, which makes apostles weep, is the "perfect man" of socialism. The shamefulness of its earthliness is not fully seen unless we take into view the peculiar character of the selfishness of the system. Antigonus, after the death of Demosthenes, a great man, was perhaps too hard on the Greek orators in saying, that they were like what remains of an animal that has been offered in sacrifice—nothing but the tongue and the digestive organs. For, in addition to mere greed for commodities, there might be in them something of a vain ambition to shine—"the lust of the eyes;" and something of "the pride of life," such that the Pharisee, in contemplation of his own goodness, will forget his covetousness to give tithes—sacrificing commodity to conceit. But the "perfect man" (Eph. iv. 13) of socialism, forgetting God and country and home and freedom, has an eye and a heart for commodity alone. So that what we see in him is not a man at all; but a scarecrow semblance of manhood, with hunger in place of a soul. And we further see what may suggest the thought, that the dehumanized being is under domination of a fiend—that lowest form of perfect selfishness which visibly lorded in the swine-owners of Gadara.

That, which is the consummation of socialist perfection, is the very thing which Paul sets forth (Rom. i. 30), as the consummation of enormous wickedness, sent upon men (verses 18-28) by the judgment of God, in a judicial abandonment of them, on account of the crime of atheism. Paul maintains, that the atheism cannot but be a wilful blindness, (verse 28). And three times he says (verses 24, 26, 28—the Greek word is the same in all the three places), that on account of the crime of it, there was that *judicial abandonment* on the part of God, "giving" them "up" or "over" to the enormous wickedness in three forms of "uncleanness" in the heart, "vileness" of the affections, and a "reprobacy" as to the mind for the perpetration of unseemliness or indecency.

It is thus that he introduces his awful catalogue of the crimes of heathenism (Rom. i. 18-32). And at the head of the black

list (verse 31), last, as if the worst of all, he places men's being "without natural affection." He adds a qualifying epithet ("implacable" is wanting in the best manuscripts), "unmerciful"—the Greek word for which is literally rendered, *pitiless*. Here, then, we are reminded of "pitiless" in that "pitiless ferocity," which history has represented to us as being the leading outstanding feature of the moral character of socialism.

But Paul's description of the *pitiless* character, "without natural affection," has in it a specific appropriateness in application to socialism that is wanting in Mr. Olhier's vaguer "ferocity." The "perfect man" of socialism has no *personal* affection toward *individuals*; not even so much of discriminative attachment as (Isa. i. 3) the dumb creatures may come to have in them toward their "own" respective pastors and masters. His affection, a sort of godless Mahomedan fanaticism, is only toward a system; toward the programme of action, regarded as machinery for securing the commodities; and toward the community, regarded as an organization for working the machine. So Hugh Miller (*Essays, Literary and Scientific*—"Eugene Sue,") says that socialism, like Jesuitism, is pitiless naturally, because the individual is lost in the society, and (such) a society has no feelings.

The apostle's word (Rom. i. 31) for natural affection—*στοργή*—does not mean only, in a general sense, any affection that belongs to the nature of man. What it means is that specific natural affection, of discriminating tenderness, which a rightly constituted individual has for "his own, and especially those of his own house." Hence the name of the "stork," because that bird is proverbial for parental affection, as witness the story of what happened in a town of Holland: When the town in which the storks had their nests went on fire, and the young birds could not fly away, the parents remained to perish with them in the flames. Such affection is so strictly natural to man, that Christianity declares that he who has it not is worse than an infidel. (1 Tim. v. 8). Accordingly, in Homer we find that among old heathen Greeks the man who did not belong to a people and family of "his own" was reckoned infamous. That infamous condition—of "heart," "affections," "mind"—where it appeared in heathenism, was by Paul

regarded as monstrous depravity, enormity of wickedness, the evidencing fruit of a judgment plague of God, like the leprosy upon Gehazi and his race. And *that peculiar infamy is by socialism brought on its manhood deliberately and upon system.*

The two great, "natural affections" distinctively toward one's own—domestic affection and love of country—it systematically endeavors to stamp out and destroy. *That intentional obliteration of humanity is a specialty of socialism.* We have seen its working in relation to patriotism. Let us consider

ITS BEARING UPON THE FAMILY.

The socialist reasoning is as follows:—

"If family be allowed to exist, then there will be formation of private capital, through parental affection hoarding for inheritance. But all capital ought to belong to the whole community. Therefore family shall not be allowed to exist."—Q. E. D.

The policy based on this reasoning has, for the purpose of it, to be "thorough"—like that policy of the tyrant Strafford which, turning godly Englishmen into Ironsides, cost him and his master their heads. Nothing will secure the purpose short of the thoroughness of Rousseau and his paramour, in casting their newborn offspring out on the chances of a foundling. There must not be allowed to be any possibility of there occurring in the future that "recognition," which was the humanly interesting climax of pathos in the fateful classic drama of man's life. For if only a parent once *guess*, that this or that one of the herd of young "humans" is perhaps his or her "own" child, then who knows whether there may not be relentions into parental affection, with consequent lapsing into a provision for the person's "own," that might so far imperil the collective stock of commodities for the community?

It is true that this Rousseauism is a wholesale moral infanticide that is more cruel than Herod's liberal infanticide at Bethlehem; more cruel than death, since it dooms the hapless innocent to live, while casting it out of nature's own provision for such tender guardianship and training of the young life as may make life worth having and living. "Can a mother forsake her sucking child?" "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him."

The *στοργή* of parental feeling is the tenderest guardianship in the world. A doting mother, tenderly numbering the hairs on her infant's little head, is, by him who is in the bosom of the Father, and hath declared him, made a picture of the infinite guardian tenderness of God, and her comforting offices toward a child in its grievings are made to represent the divine redeeming love of the Spirit. It is of these things, *their* especial inestimable inheritance of nature, that all infants are to be bereft. They are to be cast out upon a stone mother, the community, and reared indiscriminately as a herd of "humans," since young ones are needed for the purpose of keeping up the breed.

Here we feel as if that socialist reasoning were an incredible thing. It seems impossible to believe that it is serious; that rather is it not a "ferocious" jocularly, without the noble rage of Swift, in his reasonings on the economy of living on the flesh of Irish infants, and suggestions as to various modes of proceeding in that cannibalism. For, not to speak of the mother, does not nature say, "like as a father *pitieth* his children"? But Paul says, "without natural affection, *pitiless*." History through her expert witness has said, "*pitiless* ferocity." And what else can be the meaning of the socialist reasoning here, about "family" as "obstacle," thus of the same nature as patriotism and religion?

The other weaker party seems completely overlooked in the reasoning. The "perfect man" in Eph. iv. 13 is (*ἀνήρ*), the male human being, manhood in complete formation. We are studying the "perfect man" of socialism, not in the "ferocious" out-breaking of a passionately selfish animalism, but in his calmness of contemplation, legislating for the future. He is (ideally) in full and sole command of the situation. What does *he* provide? (1 Tim. v. 8), and *for whom*? Simply for himself, the morsel of meat (Heb. xii. 16), the mess of pottage, safely guarded in the flesh-pots.

For that, alone, the two *weak* ones are pitilessly sacrificed. We have seen him perpetrate the wholesale moral infanticide of casting all children out of nature's provision for them. And now we perceive that he is not even conscious of perpetrating a far more infamous crime. What, under the rule he is arranging for

is to be the lot of *woman*?—of woman in girlhood, and then onward, to and through old age?—and above all in *that* relation in which the honor, the happiness, the quintessential womanhood of woman, will depend upon the character of the rule he is planning?

Woman is to be a desecrated thing, the centre of desecration, and the fountain of profanation, staining even that helpless one, her “own,” who is the innocent victim of the “uncleanness.” She is to be drawn or dragged into complicity in the moral infanticide of her offspring. And what is her life to be—the childless mother of motherless children, with wild longings and remorse, impelling her to the desperate self-abandonment (Eph. iv. 19) of those who (Rom. i. 24, 26, 28—the word in Ephesians is the same as in Romans) are judicially abandoned of God!

What are we to think of the socialist *man*, who is the prime author of that tragedy, and who deliberately plans it in the calm of his study, simply in order that *he* may be sure of his morsel of meat? That Esau, the “profane person,” claims our study. For *he* is the only thing in socialism. The woman and the child are ignored, or worse, as mere “things which are not.”

But when we look beyond the pale of Bible religion, we see that in heathenism the monstrosity of his Rousseauism is not so incredible as the sentimental philosopher was even in “infidel France”—a land of some remaining Christian light. *Liberal infanticide* is spoken of by Mr. Lecky, (*History of European Morals*, vol. ii., the part on “woman”), a most highly competent authority, as “*the crime of heathenism.*” That is to say, notoriously, in heathen communities, modern as well as ancient, this “crime” was, and is, not abhorred and punished as infamous and monstrous, but permitted and recognized, as one of the measures of domestic economy which might be taken by a prudent house-holder!

Paul, before saying “without natural affection” (Rom. i. 31), has (verse 30) specified in his catalogue of crimes of atheism, “disobedience to parents.” “Children of disobedience” is (Eph. ii. 1-3) one of his descriptions of the general condition of death in sin; and correspondingly, “children of obedience” is (1 Peter i. 14) the *literal* rendering of Peter’s description of (verse 23) those who are born of God. But older than that which is thus brought

into notice, there was moral death in respect of *parental* affection. Hence *the foremost* thing in the mission of the Baptist, preparing the way of the Lord, was (Luke i. 17), not, "turning the disobedient to the wisdom of the just," but, before that, "turning the hearts of the fathers to the children;"—a charge resuming the last words (Mal. iv. 6) of the last prophet of the old dispensation, which (Matt. xi. 13) "prophesied until John." The very foundation work of clearing the way for "the kingdom of God and his righteousness," thus was setting right the *parental* affection.

In heathenism, even in the Roman family, the best in the old heathen world, the children really counted for nothing. They were only *things*, for the state or for the family; so that the murdering of a selection of them was no enormity. The idea of a *sacredness in this human life*, in the infant as in the adult, a thing of infinite preciousness, the image of God, had no place in the darkened human heart. The great place which children have in our life, the interest which "grown people" take in *Helen's Babies* and *Alice in Wonderland*, would be quite inconceivable in the dark lands. Hence Plato, "the divine," in calmly planning for his ideal Republic, a condition in which all children shall be an indiscriminate herd of "humans," does not show any peculiar degree of inhumanity. It is inhuman; but heathenism here was inhuman. Plato only showed in his own person the general fact, that, relatively to one of the natural affections—the domestic—the heart of heathenism had come to be a stone.

So as regards the spousal relation, as has appeared in the case of Plato's master, Socrates, "beyond comparison the prince of philosophers," the best and wisest man we know about of those who have been formed in heathenism. It was a saying among heathen Greeks, that only a family man can be supremely qualified for the highest offices of the state. But even in his case we can see what *sort* of family man a heathen Greek might be, who otherwise was an admirable citizen, nobly gracious in consideration even for the weaknesses and humors of his pupils and friends. In the tender solemnity of his near approaching martyrdom for truth, his bearing toward his "own" wife, in her ungovernable distraction of grief on his account, is simply incomprehensible except

in the light of the fact, that the natural affection of "husbands love your wives" had gone out of the heart of heathen Greece. Mere zenanaism was the best condition of woman elsewhere in heathendom.

Peter (1 Pet. iii. 5-7), looking for a model matron, who to his Christian women may be a mirror for their spiritual adornment, can see none in the heathen world. The women of the New Testament—Gospels, Acts, Epistles—are quite a different kind of human being from the heathen woman as she then was. She was not "honored" (verse 7). When the wife was not a mere domestic drudge, she was only petted and fondled, like a favorite intelligent animal, perhaps dressed out as an animated doll. Cornelius Nepos (*Preface*) makes a boast of the fact—as exhibiting one point of superiority to the Greeks—that a Roman is not ashamed to allow the women of his household to appear at a festive entertainment to his friends.

It had not been so from the beginning; nor is it so in all places at any time. Domestic affection did not perish when man fell. In Homer's heroic age, the manliest of the heroes was a model of domestic affection; one of the ladies is most noble in matronhood; and another is most beautiful in maidenhood. Many generations after, Homer's Roman imitator gives to his chief hero, as his characteristic excellence, a "piety" which in his case is another name for filial affection. And Virgil himself may in his youth [have seen true family affection among the rustics of those Mantuan plains, where departing "Justice" left her latest footprints on the earth. Even in the Imperial City, head-centre of the world's worldliness, there were survivals of the old Roman "virtue" of home:—*e. g.* in Germanicus and his wife, whose stately purity is so affecting in its nobleness appearing amid that nest of poisoners.

What is it that had gone so far toward completely destroying a natural affection that had survived the catastrophe of Eden? *Atheism*. It may be inferred from Paul's teaching in connection with the social life of heathenism. Socrates was, of those ancient heathens who in a sense are known to us, almost the last of the real believers in a personal deity supreme. The "philosophers"

who "encountered" Paul at Athens were completely atheistic in their belief; which means that God had long died out of the reflecting mind, the real mind of heathendom. And a noteworthy fact is, that *the decline of domestic affection in the hearts of men went on simultaneously with the decadence of religion in the soul.* In the present inquiry we need not raise the question, whether along with practical atheism there may not have been other operative influences, which might serve to account for the tragedy of moral death in respect of domestic affection. At present we turn to the fact, that in any case this the atheism, is a cause which in its operation will work that moral death.

In Eph. iv. 18-19 (as in Rom. i. 18-32) depravity is the *consequence* of atheism. But here the consequence is not judicial, but natural; as when a man contracts foul deadly disease through practice of vice. The moral death (in Eph. iv. 18, 19) results from ignorance, as physical death would to our natural world be a result of extinction of the sun. And (1), The *immediate* effect of the death is, *insensibility*. The "past feeling" here is—word and thing—distinct from the stoical "apathy;" which is an artificial condition, brought on by discipline, and maintained by habit which may be a continuous action of the will. The apathy is not incapacity of feeling but superiority to it—whence the stupid inhuman boast of stoicism about "pain" being "no evil" to the philosopher, (*he* did not weep over Jerusalem; it was the *man* that wept in Brutus over Lycian Xanthus). The "past feeling" (in Eph. iv. 19) is real insensibility, as in a stone heart, or as on the part of dry bones in a valley of death. It now is a "second nature," in men who are "twice dead," "having their conscience seared as with a hot iron." But it is not simply the sinfulness into which the fall brought mankind (Rom. v. 12); as (Eph. ii. 3) when all men are said to be "by *nature* the children of wrath"—the *state* of nature as was inherited (Ps. li. 5), as distinguished from (Eccl. vii. 29) the *constitution* of the nature as originally created. It is a "secondary formation" of depravity, which thus (Rom. i. 26) is enormous or monstrous, as revolting to a natural good feeling that is found even among unregenerate mankind.

But that first stage, of moral insensibility, leads on to (2), *the*

outbreaking of depravity, which Paul here sees, on the part of the atheists, as a desperate *self*-abandonment; who, being past feeling, *gave themselves* over. This, history shows us through her expert witness, is actual human experience of socialism. And Hugh Miller (*Essays Literary and Scientific*—"Eugene Sue") theorised on the matter to the following effect (the words are ours):

(1), In the conflict with Jesuitism, it is not enough for socialism simply to drive away the superstition and villainy of false religion. That only creates a "vacuum" in the heart and life, as in the case of a displacement made in the sea by thrusting a bucket into its water. When the bucket is withdrawn, the water rushes back to fill the void thus left. (2), Christianity [cf. Luke. xi. 22] fills the void, with innocent fulness of a happy life in peace with God and love to man. (3), Socialism, to begin with, *leaves* the void; and the human passions, impure because not under law to higher affections, will rush in as a sea of death. (Here Miller has the observation that a society has no feeling, "pitiless:" meaning, that in this respect socialism is a godless Jesuitism.) Here he states as a fact, relatively to what the peoples (and Paul) mean by "uncleanness," that the socialist French views regarding marriage are embraced by some, not socialist, who are restrained from practicing them by "the usages of society."

Plato saw the human passions as wild horses, kept in restraint only by a child holding the reins. Why did he think them wild? He, like Kant—the true modern Plato—saw in man's *condition*, or state of nature as it now is, a "radical evil" (Kant's expression), which, in their judgment, is not accounted for by philosophy, in her view of the constitution of men's nature. So sees the *Confession of Faith*, when (with Augustine) it says of our first parents, "they being *the root* of mankind, men are fallen sinners by nature (cf. Gal. ii. 15). And so saw the Great Frederick, when he said to an enthusiast who thought that education would do the work (1 Pet. i. 20–25) of regeneration, "Ah! dear Sulzer, you know not what a reprobate (*wie verdamnte*), accursed breed this (mankind) is."

To Paul's view, the reins are now flung wildly away. The consequent rush is, not simply of Hugh Miller's wild sea waves into the "vacuum," but of the atheists "into lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness" (Eph. iv. 19); that is, "the herd" of Gadara, running violently down a steep place into the sea. (Matt. viii. 32.) And, since (their) rational free agency enters into the abandonment (we perceive that), the rush of unclean animalism is at the impulsion of unclean spirit; so that this

again is the "perfect man" of socialism, namely, the scare-crow fiend, with hunger in place of a soul.

It may be made a question whether Paul in (Rom. i. 18-32 and Eph. iv. 18, 19) his two famous descriptions of "the moral condition of heathenism" (title of Tholuck's little work—Engl. Transl.; Clark, Edin.), means, that the heathens *generally* were in that condition; or, whether he may not mean only, These things *are* in the heathen world, to such an extent as to show that mankind have utmost need of the Gospel (Rom. i. 14-16; Eph. ii. 12), as being dead in sin. We have information as to facts which may help to answering that question:

1. In the heathen's persecutions after Paul's time, the primitive apologists and martyrs are found repelling "calumnies" of heathenism, imputations, abominable crimes to the Christians; and their customary answer is, "No, we do no such things; but *you* do them—that is what has made you think of imputing them to us." (See in Athenagoras: *The Embassy*—addressed to Marcus Aurelius. This was the point of—cf. 1 Peter iii. 16—"I am a Christian—we do no evil," the only thing moaned out by slave-girl Blandina, dying under protracted, frightful tortures under authority of that idolized imperial stoic "philosopher.") 2. In our time intelligent heathens make out of these Pauline descriptions a proof that the Bible is a modern forgery; for, they reason, no man who did not live in our time could have had this acquaintance with *us*. And missionaries, who can see behind the screen of heathenish decorums, assure us that the Pauline descriptions are only "an over true tale" of what is now going on in heathen communities. Besides, 3, Have we not seen the *infanticides*, and the moral death relatively to "honoring" women? Do we not know that the *temples* have been, and are, head-centres of "the pollutions" (2 Peter ii. 20) in particular, of uncleanness?—surely the altar inscription *ought* to be confessed atheism. (Acts xvii. 23.)

But that question does not vitally affect us at present. If once we know that a man is dead (Eph. ii. 1-3), we may not need to inquire further to what extent loathsome evidences of corruption have broken out all over the body (Isa. i. 5, 6). The body may

be a mummy (1 Cor. xiii. 1-3), who in this case is perhaps a leading member of the church (Matt. xxiii. 27); for the Pharisees were covetous, that is, atheistic—"ye cannot serve God and mammon." Though there should be the moral death in reality, there may, as regards manifestations of it, be restraining influences—Plato's "child"—that prevent unbridled breaking-out. In Paul's day (2 Thess. ii. 7-9) there was in the world as a whole a "let" or hindrance that held back the manifestation of the Man of Sin. And in the sinful man (Isa. i. 15) there may be degrees of manifestation of wickedness, from the first inception of lust to the final consummation of death (cf. Rev. xxi. 8, 27); as in the man of God there is the gradation from the blade, through the green ear, to the ripe corn in the ear.

An ordinary "human," coming into the kingdom of the bramble (Judg. ix. 14, 15), would take some time to grow up into the full state of the "perfect man" of socialism. Hugh Miller says that one mode of "uncleanness" is restrained from manifestation (the *heart* is unclean in the cases he speaks of) by the "usages of society"—a Christian sense of decency being in the air, and in some command of the region. And in this or that case that particular enormity may have no natural possibility, or it may be checked by another mode of worldliness—like Diogenes "trampling on Plato's pride"—as when a miser starves himself to death in the insanity of "greediness" for commodities.

What we see in Eph. iv. 18, 19, is the ordinary normal progression where the restraining influence is withdrawn. The moral deadness is a ghost, ready to break into a beast; as even the artificial ghostliness of "apathy" in Marcus Aurelius, "the philosopher," gives place to the savagery of Marcus Aurelius, the emperor, most ruthless of heathen persecutors, murdering his innocent subjects, because (*Letter of the Christians of Lyons and Vienna*) their superiority to death made a fool of his "philosophy" (1 Cor. i. 20).

What Paul says of the matter—the teaching of Christianity, regarding it by a throned witness of God in Christ—may be set forth in fine as follows:—The true life from the fountain (Jer. ii. 13) is a rivulet of domestic affection, a great river thoroughfare

of patriotism, and a world-embracing ocean of philanthropy. How noble this would be in London, Edinburgh and Glasgow, New York and San Francisco, and far Antipodean Melbourne and Sydney beneath the Southern Cross! These are the capitals of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. All round the world, they are the shining centres of the most recent civilization, as represented by the foremost and most gifted of its pioneers. Commercial centres in business relation to the whole world, they are like stars, which are seen as guiding lights by all mankind. Not only so: they are effectively in daily contact with all peoples. Their daily life is everywhere an operative influence, even where its traces are not seen, as an atmosphere of the whole world. Surely, then, that race is a tree whose leaves are for the healing of the nations: which is the noble way of being Israelite indeed (Gen. xii. 3). *But what if that atmosphere of their influence be poisoned?*

In every one of these cities we have named, there may be found a "back slums" (see it in Vanderkiste, *The Dens of London*; Rev. D. McColl, *Our Work in the Wynds*; and *Old Edinburgh*—understood to be by Miss Bird—in the series of "Odds and Ends"). There, men and women are living in a desperate self-abandonment (Eph. iv. 19) of godlessness. Material and moral ill-conditions are working moral and spiritual ruination, *making* miserably broken men and women for this life, and lost souls for that which is to come. Through the body there is enslavement of the soul, as fatally effective as demoniacal possession; so that now there is campaigning (Eph. vi. 12) of God's kingdom against a spiritual tyranny that has a *stronghold in natural evil*, as truly as there was in Egypt when Moses worked his miracles there, or in Palestine when the Son of Man "went about doing good, and healing those who were oppressed of the devil" (Acts x. 38 cf. Luke viii. 35 and xiii.) *That* plague-spot is at the heart of those most favored places of this most gifted race.

The spreading of evil, we know to have a most fatal facility in man's condition. The plague that steals into a city through the vicious weakness of one wasted criminal, creeps out from his cell, and glides among the population as a pestilence that walketh in darkness, until it appear as a destruction that wasteth at noon-day

—a pale death visibly striking alike at regal palaces and hovels of the poor (Hor.). But, to Isaiah's vision (Isa. i. 5, 6) of insight which is foresight, the wofulness of material evil is only a symbol of the true inward ruin of manhood, which (verse 3) is wrought by the practical atheism of apostasy, from God. Now that is the abiding real condition of all mammon-worshippers, so rife in this epoch of "material progress." Then, though the wordliness at the shining centres do not shew the shame of its nakedness, but disguise itself as Christian, perhaps it is not the less effectual on that account (2 Cor. xi. 14), as a "spirit of the age" (Eph. ii. 2), the *unperceived* propagandism of infidelity and atheism; as when the life of a rich and beautiful land is blighted by an iceberg that is stranded on the shore.

But now as to the effect of this atheism itself, relatively to the true life which we looked at. The effect is two-fold—*deprivation* and *depravation*. 1. *Deprivation*: where God is withdrawn from the mind (Eph. iv. 18), religion from the heart, there that life is abandoned by the sunshine and the vital air which "fillet all in all," and by the refreshing visitations of "the gracious rain" from the unseen "river of God" in the sky. The abandonment is to "uncleanness," "vileness," "reprobate mind." (Rom. i. 24, 26, 28; cf. 18.)

Also and especially, 2. There is *depravation*. In the life there now is wanting that which is the sovereignly moral element even in common social life. The second "great commandment" (moral principle as distinguished from ethical precepts—sun as compared with planets) is "like unto" the first (Matt. xxii. 39), so that he who does not love God cannot truly love his neighbor, as prescribed by moral law. For morality (Edwards) is of the affections. And in the social affections the distinctively moral element is what is represented by the Bible word "honor" (1 Peter ii. 17), which means, a tender reverence, *e. g.*, for manhood as such; that is, for the distinctively human nature which is alike in all human beings—free rational spirit, the image of God. And that thing in man is not regarded with a tender reverence in the heart that does not love and honor God. For that thing, which is the thing to be honored in manhood, has place as object of revering love in God supremely.

The child's obedience is wanting in that moral element—the tender reverence of “honor thy father and thy mother”—where the obedience is not “in the Lord.” (Eph. vi. 12.) Subjection to magistracy is only a calculating compliance, or an idolizing of self in one's own people, if the subjection be not in the spirit of reverently regarding the powers that be as “ordained of God.” (Rom. xiii. 1–5.) And philanthropy, where it is not bloodless cold as in “the loves of the triangles,” is mere fondness for “two-legged featherless animals,” if the divine image be not regarded (Gen. ix. 6; James iii. 6), though it should be miserably effaced as a prodigal son.

In socialism, what is there of this moral quality? If there be nothing of it, there is moral death. Where death is, there is corruption, though not always appearing, nor, when it appears, always taking the name or shape of “legion” entering into swine. In connection with family, we are struck with the vast calamity of even *deprivation* that has befallen the “belly-god,” who is able to contemplate as desirable, or at least as endurable, for the sake of a better mess of “pottage,” a social condition in which family is not. To ordinary human beings, the man thus “past feeling,” “without natural affection,” is an object of profound compassion, compassion far more profound than that with which we look on the born blind, who never can even imagine what the blessed sunlight is, and shows. For to their feeling a social condition without family would be a world without sunshine.

Family is not only for the individual who happens to be in a family of his own. The society is made up of families. The system of things is domestic. Domesticity is the genius of the region. It is in a family atmosphere that every one lives and moves. Every individual is a *family-bred* man; all are family-bred, with a community of feeling as alumni of the universal *alma mater*. So that among them a formed socialist—if there were such a being—might come to be human, as a scholarly taste is formed by association with university-bred men.

Every one has a family of “his own” at least in memory. The loneliest mourner on the street can say, “better to have loved and lost, than never to have loved at all;” feeling it were better to ef-

face his memory and life itself than to "pluck from memory the rooted sorrow," which is a shadowy continuance with us of the being of the loved and lost. Family claims (2 Sam. xii. 23) the "they are not lost but gone before," which goes into the death-song of "O death! where is thy sting?" Heaven itself is more heavenly because homely (Isa. xiv. 1-3), "the Father's house," into which the first-born will gather all the brotherhood; (Heb. xii. 18-26) so that Augustine the solitary, perhaps hoping to find Monica, sings of "Jerusalem, my happy home." And the very names of earth become thus heavenly; "*father-land*," "*mother-country*," cardiphonia of the peoples, in recognition of a tender sacredness of appropriation that (Ps. cii. 14) reaches even to the soil which mingles with the dust of stainless kindred. The emigrant, sighing "Home" in his distant land, claims an indefeasible title in domestic affection to the old land he has left; while from a distant past the haunting memories come to guard for him the long-forsaken spot, where "the home of my forefathers stood," though now

All ruined and wild is the roofless abode,
And lonely the dark raven's sheltering tree.

It is not, however, a mere sentiment that moved Christianity to the restoration of the ruined constitution. Nor is it only, as in the case of the political constitution, a regard (Rom. xiii. 4, 5) to the general beneficence of this ordinance of God. To the maintenance and defence of family, Christianity is laid under two-fold obligation of a special trust.—1, The true *law* of family, centering in the fontal precept of social duty (5th commandment), is part of that Moral Law, which is trusted to God; Israel as his "testimony" to mankind. And 2, The family institution is by divine authority so inwrought into the working constitution of the church that she cannot carry on her business without requiring of those under her authority conformity to what she regards as being God's own constitution of the household.

The institution at the same time is a stream that nourishes the roots of the tree that shades it. The Christian family is itself effectively a root, or living foundation, of Christendom in the community. And also it is a leavening propagandism of Christianity.

It is a question of ecclesiasticism, which is "the integer" of Christianity as a distinct institute—the congregation? the presbytery? or the prelatie bishop? There can be no question of the fact, that of Christianity as a leavening influence in general society, a true integer is "the church in the house" (Philemon 2). The religion thus has good cause for its, "Woodman, spare that tree."

A peculiarity of the constitution, binding the religion to peculiar vigilance and faithfulness in maintenance and defence of it, is that *it can be destroyed*. The twin Edenic institution of the Sabbath is saved by the lordship of the Son of man (Mark ii. 27, 28). He vindicates it by his resurrection, guarantees it by his manifested sovereignty, keeps it (Eph. iv. 10) by his glorious exaltation, as the sun keeps our world's life when he is high in the firmament ruling the day. The lowest slave in heathendom, toiling under the lash of a Legree, could be 'in the Spirit on the Lord's day.' Christ has shown (Matt. xii. 5) that the ordinance may be, while "profaned" in form, yet hallowed in the spirit. And not all the legionary forces of the empire, no creature-power in the universe, could prevent the weakest and the most despised of the "things which are not" from practicing a "holy resting all that day." It is otherwise with the family. Man can destroy it, not only separating husbands and wives, parents and children, but creating and perpetuating a social condition in which the spousal relation does not exist, and a child cannot know either father or mother, sister or brother; while the whole society is corrupted and made vile by defilement at the desecrated fountains of its life. All which adds to the stringency of the obligation laid on the religion to keep the constitution "pure and entire," guarding it in God's name for the sake of man.

As to the true nature of the domestic constitution, the Bible history of it has problems for the constitutional student—problems arising specially from the circumstance (Matt. xix. 5) that, on account of the moral condition of man, the restoration of the fallen constitution had to be accomplished gradually, as the dawning comes in slowly in accommodation to the eyes. And in the literature of the apostolic and immediately following ages there is—*pace* the Vicar of Wakefield—hardly any information regarding

the detailed nature of the process through which a constitution so important, the heart of the social life of mankind, came to be solidly established among the various peoples. ("No axe was heard, no ponderous hammers rung.") But the substantive result, which is what now concerns us, is clear, so that he may run who reads,—namely, that

Wherever this religion has attained to commanding force in a community for one generation, there a Scriptural domestic constitution—always the same in substance everywhere—has for the generations following taken an abiding place in the people's life, its received custom and public law; so that thenceforward any endeavor to tamper with the received constitution of the family shall be regarded as an assault on the authority of Bible religion. The constitution is beyond question pure and wholesome in its nature. And the fact, that so great a power as Christianity is thus engaged, definitively and irreversibly, in the maintenance and defence of it, is auspicious for the welfare of mankind.

The restoration is especially directed to righting the two *weaker* parties of the triad. And in the New Testament the greatest place is given to the restoration of *woman*, fallen into heathenish degradation. It is to be noted that what Peter says to husbands is not, "love your wives," but, "honor" them (1 Pet. iii. 7, cf. ii. 17). In assigning the woman's *weakness* as a reason for giving to her that honor, the Galilean fisherman exhibits a "chivalry," which, often fantastic in its forms, is—*e. g.*, as appearing in the greatest Republic that the world has ever seen—the soul of the nobility of our new civilization. But the ground of the "honor" is that relationship to God in respect of which the husband and wife are alike; so that under him they are joint sovereigns of the household, and they have a common need of a clear way as suppliants to his throne. Looking at the matter thus, Peter finds the model for women under the Old Testament (vs. 5, 6), in the person of devout women of its ancient time. In outward condition, so far as was compatible with innocence, they were as other women of their own standing among the peoples. But, as being personally and individually of the faithful, they were honored by the people of God, and "honorable" (Psa. xlv. 3) as his daughters. The

fontal precept of all his "testimony," in the innermost shrine of the revelation of his holy mind and heart, placed woman on the same level with man as an object of "honor," most nearly resembling the homage that is due to God: "Honor" thy *mother* as well as thy father.

Paul's wonderful analogy (Eph. v. 22-33) lays the emphasis expressly on "*love*" your wives; on which account it was the less necessary for Peter to emphasize it, if, as is thought likely, he had read *Ephesians* (2 Pet. iii. 15, 16) before writing his first Epistle). But the "honor" was folded, very remarkably, in that Old Testament representation of religion to which Paul refers in what he says of "a great mystery;" representation of the individual soul's relation to God as a *spousal* relation (Jer. ii. 2)—"thy Maker is thine husband" (cf. The Song of Songs). This representation, which under the Old Testament was variously made prominent in the whole system of religious thought, must have powerfully tended to maintain to men's feeling the sanctity of marriage, and the honor of woman in all the relations branching out of that.

So in Paul's teaching, when she is redeemed from heathenism by the Son of Man (cf. 1 Tim. ii. 15), we find (1 Cor. vi. 15-20) her person guarded as a sacred thing, a very temple of the Holy Ghost. And (1 Cor. vii. 14) her presence is a sanctifying influence, so that the children are "holy." The family is Christian even if her husband be a heathen. We can see from the history that, in the exciting new conditions of womanhood's emancipation, there had to be resolute firmness of apostolic discipline, upon the solid ground that woman, if she is to be either honored or honorable, must always be womanly. But the essential thing is, that as in Israel under the Old Testament, so more fully here in the new Israel of God, womanhood is now redeemed; so that the heart of social manhood has received healing, and its life is made pure at the fountain in the natural sanctuary of home.

We here will not speak, and we hardly dare to think, of *the desecrated thing* which socialism would put into the place of that Eve of the Paradise regained.

The great place of children in Christendom is not only because

of the interest in them that was shown by Jesus the Son of man, but also and especially, by reason of the place that is due to them in the kingdom of God. The great place which children have in the New Testament, as compared with their nothingness in heathenism, is a bequest from the Old Testament; not only (Mal. iv. 6) with its latest breath, but in its earliest institutions, at the foundation and in the heart of the greatest of them.

In Abraham's day children were sealed by circumcision of infants (Rom. iv. 11), as being on a level with the great Patriarch, the father of all believers, in respect of that highest thing attainable by creatures (Rev. vii. 13-15), "the righteousness of the faith which Abraham had." When Israel came to be a nation, children had the foremost place in the great national feast of the Passover. Not only they partook of the feast; they were made, as it were, the guests of the festival. By appointment of God (Ex. xii. 26, 27), at the original institution of it in Egypt, through all generations until the coming of Christ, every year, on that great occasion, the children alone were addressed. The words of the address to them, by the fathers of their flesh, were from the mouth of God. They were the words, as far as we know, of the only sacramental address that God (the Father) has ever spoken. Need we wonder if, under the new dispensation, in the apostolic directories, though Paul (Eph. vi. 1, 2) have a word for children, the Apostle of the circumcision (1 Pet. ii. 12—iii. 9) does not find it necessary to address any separate admonition *to them* (cf. 2 Pet. i. 19-21 and 2 Tim. i. 5; iii. 15).

In the homely *Book of Proverbs* we see the Hebrew family, and say, "happy is the people that is in such a case." That family is very like the family honored in his heart by the author of *The Cottar's Saturday Night*. It made Canaan and Scotland to be the two lands of song that was from the peoples' heart. For it was to the people a happy land of home. A great feature in it is (see Prov. xxxi) the tender faithful *honored* queen of the household. And her sons and daughters, who honor her, are, in the noble habit of reverence, laying the foundations of a character that will afterwards go far, and always be to them a basis of honorable manhood or womanhood. The young people who in this book are

(Eph. vi. 1, 2) made so much of, so kindly advised and reasoned with, while warned, as if by the Apostle Peter in his mellow old age, are not young slaves. But on this one point, of reverence where it is due, the law of Moses has a terrific severity (Exod. xxi. 15), which is resumed in the old Scottish law prescribing that one who strikes a parent shall be put to death "*without mercy.*"

The merciless severity, guarding so sternly the essential moral element of "honoring" in the system of the social affections, was greatest kindness to the young. Without that element, the outlook for young lives, and for the community the young are coming to form, is dark. But supposing that in socialism the children should somehow find out their parents; *could* they honor them?—*them!*—the desecrated thing, and the scare-crow fiend with hunger in place of a soul, whose moral relation to their children is conspiracy in moral infanticide? It is not difficult for children to honor a parent like William Burns.

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V. THE FOUR GOSPELS: THEIR DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.

The four Gospels of Jesus Christ are in many respects like him whose life they record, and whose nature, character and mission they set forth. They are of divine origin and nature, inspired and infallible, "full of grace and truth." They also bear all the marks of human origin, and are full of diverse human nature. Christ came as the Saviour of all men, "a light to lighten the Gentiles and the glory of his people Israel," and he reaches out in helpful sympathy to all peoples of every age. So these Gospels are universal in their adaptations. But he was also a Jew, "sent unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel," the "Son of David, the Son of Abraham." So each Gospel was primarily written for a certain class of people, appealed particularly to certain human wants and needs, and was even specially adapted to certain national characteristics. Again, as Jesus consistently unites the most diverse and complex elements in the unity of his being, so these Gospels, while altogether giving one consistent narrative of his life, and a consistent representation of his nature, character and mission, yet tell the story in a variety of ways, emphasize different elements of their subject's nature, and present very different views of his character and mission. When we consider by whom each of these Gospels was written, for whom, with what purpose, and under what circumstances and influences, we see that they must, naturally and necessarily, exhibit marked distinctive characteristics. It is our present purpose to show the diverse aspects in which they present Christ and Christian truth, and their differences in spirit and style. Let us therefore compare and contrast them.

I. AUTHORS, AND PEOPLE FOR WHOM PRIMARILY INTENDED.

Matthew was a converted Jewish tax-gatherer. He probably wrote at Jerusalem, where the Apostle James was the presiding

genius of the church. His Gospel is written in the very spirit, if not under the direct influence of James, the great representative of the Hebrew element in the Apostolic Church. Mark, according to most authentic tradition, was the intimate associate of Peter, and compiled his Gospel from the historical discourses of the apostle. He seems to have caught the hopeful, ardent spirit of his master. Luke was a cultured Gentile (probably Greek) physician, and the companion of Paul, "the Apostle to the Gentiles." John was "the disciple whom Jesus loved," who was admitted to the closest communion with the divine Teacher, and was lifted to the highest plane of spiritual thought and feeling.

The primary mission of Matthew's Gospel, like that of its subject, was "unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel." It is "the book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham." It was written for the Jew in love with the history and traditions of his nation, and "waiting for the consolation of Israel." It comes to God's covenant people, Abraham's seed according to the flesh, and David's kingdom. It presents Jesus as the Anointed Saviour, the Messiah, David's Heir and Abraham's Seed, King of Israel and Promised One.

Mark wrote for the Romans, a people practical and energetic, living in and for the present, uninfluenced by tradition or sentiment or philosophy. His Gospel appeals to these principles of Roman character: respect for *facts*, respect for *practical deeds*, and respect for *proress*.

Luke wrote for the Gentile "seeking the Lord, if haply he might feel after him, and find him." His gospel appeals to the man who has tried heathen philosophy and morality, and found them wanting. It is, like its subject, "a light to lighten the Gentiles." It also appeals to the tender, sympathetic, and compassionate elements of our nature.

John wrote for the man marked by no national trait, but belonging to that class in all countries and times represented by the Alexandrian philosophers, "fervent in spirit and mighty in the Scriptures," and "searching the deep things of God," profoundly contemplative and spiritual.

Matthew appeals to the man of tradition; Mark, to the man

of action; Luke to the man of sentiment; John, to the man of philosophy.

This catholicity, realized thus by all the Gospels together, is also displayed in the style and language of each. Every one of them has a Greek body, a Hebrew soul, and a Christian spirit. "The most beautiful language of heathendom and the venerable language of the Hebrews are here combined, and baptized with the spirit of Christianity." They all together constitute the Universal Book.

II. THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS OF CHRIST.

Matthew is "the book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the Son of David, the Son of Abraham." It links the New Testament with the Old, and connects Jesus with God's covenant people. It gives the birth and life and death, the character and mission of Jesus as the fulfilment of type and prophecy embodied in Jewish history and law and worship. "Now, all this was done, that it might be fulfilled," etc. (See chapters i.—iii. *passim*.)

Mark is "the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God;" connects Jesus with the Infinite One from whom he derived his divine energy and power.

Luke traces his genealogy as "the Son of Adam," thus connecting him with our whole race; presents him in his broad human relationships, as the relative and Saviour of humanity.

John, like Matthew and Mark, strikes the keynote of his Gospel in his first words: "In the beginning was the Word—and the Word was God—and the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." He passes beyond all human relationships, and connects Jesus immediately with the eternal Father. This Gospel is the revelation of the mystery of incarnate Deity.

Matthew's is the Gospel of the MESSIAH. The Jews long for their Anointed One. He is come, says Matthew. They sigh for the kingdom of heaven. It is here among you, he tells them. But they had grossly false conceptions of both Messiah and kingdom; these must be corrected. They look for a prince; Matthew points them to a pauper. They are waiting to hail a conqueror;

he shows them a crucified felon. They anticipated a glorious earthly reign; he presents Jesus "despised and rejected of men." Instead of organizing an army and setting up a throne, Jesus "began to shew how that he must suffer, and be killed." Hence this book also reveals the intense disappointment of the Jewish hierarchy and nation, their bitter spite against this unpretentious pretended Messiah, and their savage revenge. It also emphasizes the near approach of Israel's doom, in the parable of the wicked husbandmen and in the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem.

The Messiah of Matthew is: 1. *Lawgiver*. Jesus delivering the Sermon on the Mount corresponds to Moses delivering the law on Sinai. Moses, however, spoke as a mouthpiece; Jesus, "as one having authority." Moses gave "the law of commandments contained in ordinances;" Jesus expounds their spiritual meaning, realized in true holiness of heart and life. "The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." 2. *Prophet*, that prophet raised up of the Lord like unto Moses. (Dent. xviii. 15.) This is the Gospel of discourses and parables. Here too we learn how Jesus, in the very spirit of the prophets of old, denounced the sins of the Jews; their pharisaical hypocrisy, sanctimoniousness, formalism and hierarchical assumption and pride. Here he sets forth purity of heart and blamelessness of life, rather than perfunctory observance of ordinances, as that righteousness which they sought after. 3. *King*. "Son of David," the kingly title of Messiah, is frequently recorded by Matthew as having been applied to Jesus. This is preëminently the Gospel of "the kingdom of heaven." In one chapter alone (13th) is set forth its foundation by God and growth in spite of every obstacle, its corruption by the devil and final purification, its outward progress and inner development, its preciousness, and its comprehensiveness.

Mark sets forth Jesus as the MIGHTY CONQUEROR and WONDER WORKER; the conqueror of natural forces, of diseases, and of devils; the man of good and great deeds. Peter, under whose influence the Gospel was written, struck its keynote in these words: "God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power, who went about doing good, and healing all that were op-

pressed of the devil; for God was with him." So also Jesus in these words quoted by Mark alone: "The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." The nature and effect of his ministry are described in the words of the multitude recorded by Mark: "They were beyond measure astonished, saying, he hath done all things well: he maketh both the deaf to hear, and the dumb to speak." Mark's miracles are works, powers, wonders and signs. He loves to record the effects on the popular mind of the Master's words and deeds; to depict their astonishment, wonder, awe, fear, reverence and adoration; and to tell how he attracted multitudes: "So many came and went, he could not even eat." It was just the kind of life of Christ to attract and impress the practical, un-sentimental, unphilosophical, deed-loving and prowess-admiring Roman.

Luke presents Jesus in the aspects of PRIEST and SAVIOUR. He heralds no royal infant born to a glorious inheritance, "Son of David, Son of Abraham," but an humble ministering Saviour, bearing human sin and suffering, "the Son of Adam." No one asks, "Where is he that is born King of the Jews?" but an angel announces, "Behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people. For unto you is born this day a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord." No Magi offer tribute and adoration to the royal seed; but lowly shepherds worship their infant Redeemer. Simeon welcomes him as the "salvation prepared before the face of all people; a light to lighten the Gentiles, and the glory of thy people Israel." Luke alone records that beautiful sermon in which Jesus defined his ministry of love and mercy: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; he hath sent me to heal the broken hearted; to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind; to set at liberty them that are bruised; to preach the acceptable year of the Lord." Everything in this Gospel centres about the atonement. In the transfiguration scene, Matthew speaks only of Jesus' radiant countenance and shining garments, and the glory that surrounded him; but Luke mentions also that strange conversation about "the decease which he should

accomplish at Jerusalem." Luke presents the resurrection not so much in its triumphant aspects (like Matthew), but rather as supplementary to the passion, unfolding the spiritual necessity by which suffering and victory were united. (xxiv. 7, 26, 44, 46, 47.) It is the Gospel of the genuine and full humanity of Jesus. Matthew relates such incidents of the nativity as connect Christ with prophecy; Luke such as exhibit his pure humanity. Here we have the fullest account of his birth and childhood; the humble life at Nazareth, in subjection to his human parents, his "increasing in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man." It is Luke who tells us of the bloody sweat, of the "man of sorrows," and of Pilate's thrice repeated, "I find no fault in this man." It is the Gospel of Jesus' universal sympathy—for the afflicted, the despised, the outcast, the depraved, and the guilty. (Chapter iv. 18-22.) He is introduced to us as "the friend of publicans and sinners;" as "the Son of man who came to seek and to save that which was lost;" as preaching his gospel to the poor and oppressed, to Samaritans, publicans, prodigals, thieves, and harlots. It is Luke who records that prayer of Jesus on the cross for his own murderers: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."

John portrays Jesus as INCARNATE GOD. "The Word was God. . . . And the Word became flesh." The other evangelists tell us how Jesus was born and lived and died, and what he did and said; John, in the doctrine of the incarnation, gives us the unifying principle of the life of Christ, on the basis of which we can logically and consistently and intelligibly reconstruct that life so full of paradoxes. The others give all the material circumstances of the life; John enables us to combine and construct them into one organic whole. He lifts the veil that hides the mystery of Christ's being; he furnishes the clue which alone can guide us through all that labyrinth of apparent contradictions and absurdities. As some one remarks, what Jesus *did* and *said* can be understood only by knowing what he *was*.

While the other writers begin with the idea of Christ's humanity, and through the influence of his wonderful life gradually lift us to the conception of his divinity, John descends from the con-

ception of his eternal sonship to those of his incarnation and crucifixion. Their miracles are "signs" to prove Christ's divinity; his are the natural "works" of divine power and energy. "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." They give the history of the divine man; he gives the history of the human God.

To sum up, then: Matthew is the Gospel of the MESSIAH, Lawgiver, Prophet, and King; Mark is the Gospel of the MIGHTY WORKER and CONQUEROR condescending to minister to human needs; Luke is the Gospel of the atoning HIGH PRIEST and sympathetic SAVIOUR; John is the Gospel of INCARNATE DEITY, "the Word made flesh."

Matthew emphasizes Christ's AUTHORITY; presents him as King and Lawgiver to be *obeyed*. Mark emphasizes his ACTIVE MINISTRY; presents him as our Example in good and great deeds to be *imitated*. Luke emphasizes his SACRIFICE; presents him as our Saviour to be *believed in*. John emphasizes his INCARNATION; presents him as Eternal Spirit, Source of Life and Light, to be *worshipped*.

In Matthew, Christ is exalted, after his resurrection, as Mediatorial King: "All power is given unto me in heaven and earth." In Mark, the Conqueror is exalted to the throne of power and glory. "He was received up into heaven, and sat on the right hand of God. And they went forth, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following." In Luke, the High Priest is exalted to dispense forgiveness: "Thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead, that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations." In John, Jesus represents himself as going to be by the right hand of God exalted, in order that he might receive of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, and send that Comforter who should initiate the disciples into the still deeper mysteries of divine wisdom.

Ecclesiastical symbolism has always represented the Christ of Matthew's Gospel as a Man, in token of the overlordship therein ascribed to him. The Christ of Mark is a Lion, "the lion of the tribe of Judah," "Lord of all power and might." The Christ of Luke is an Ox, the patient, laborious, burden-bearing animal of sacrifice. The Christ of John is an Eagle, soaring away with un-

wearied wing in the rare atmosphere of heavenly thoughts, and gazing with undazzled eye upon the sun of the divine countenance.

III. THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS OF CHRISTIANITY.

These four Gospels present not only Christ but Christianity in various aspects; they embody the different elements of theology coëxisting in apostolic teaching. Matthew, writing as the exponent of the Hebrew element in the Christian church, presents Christianity in its objective aspects; gives us the *law*, elevated and spiritualized. It is the Gospel of evangelical works; is designed to bring forth "fruits of righteousness." Mark, disciple of Peter, the ardent and buoyant, represents Christianity as a vitalizing, organizing, fructifying force. (See 1 Peter i. 3, 23.) Luke, disciple of "the apostle to the Gentiles," is the antithesis of Matthew; he makes Christianity to consist in faith in a crucified and glorified Saviour, rather than in obedience to a divine Lawgiver and King. John presents Christianity in its mystical elements; it is the Gospel of metaphysical theology. Here we find the hard doctrines of the Bible; hard to apprehend and hard to believe: the Trinity, the eternal sonship, and veritable divinity of Christ united to a true and genuine humanity, human depravity and moral inability, the election of grace and effectual calling of the Spirit, union with Christ, and the final preservation of the believer. All these doctrines come from Jesus dogmatically and authoritatively.

Matthew represents Christianity as the fulfilment of Old Testament type and prophecy and law; as the promise to Abraham fulfilled, as the realization of the hope of the faithful and the consolation of Israel. Mark represents it as a new regenerating force introduced into a spiritually dead world. Luke presents it in its adaptability to the needs and wants of sinful and suffering humanity. John, as the unfailing source of spiritual life and light.

Luke gives us the truest and most comprehensive view of Christianity. It is the Gospel of the free forgiveness of sins, the Gospel of Zacchæus, and the publican, and the prodigal, and the sinful woman and the dying thief. It is the Gospel of salvation for all men:

the Gospel of "the son of Adam." In Matthew Christ's mission is "unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel;" in Luke it is to the whole brotherhood of man. In Matthew he sends forth the twelve, saying, "go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not;" Luke mentions no such restriction in the sending of the twelve, and also records the sending out of the seventy on their larger mission (Matt. x. 5, 6, Luke ix. 1-6; x. 1-3). Matthew "preaches peace to them that are nigh;" Luke, "to them that are afar off," aliens, strangers, godless, and hopeless. Luke alone records Simeon's song (ii. 30-32), and Jesus' gracious allusion to the widow of Sarepta and Naaman the Syrian (iv. 24-28). He mentions the fact of the superscription on the cross being in Hebrew and Greek and Latin, for the whole world to read. It is the Gospel of the brotherhood of mankind. It teaches Christ's compassion and love for the sick and afflicted, the lowly and despised, the publican and Samaritan, the prodigal and the harlot. Here we naturally look for the parable of the good Samaritan, that sweet rebuke to bigotry and caste pride, and commendation of helpful compassion toward the stranger. "As Paul led the people of the Lord out of the bondage of the law into the enjoyment of gospel liberty, so has Luke raised sacred history from the standpoint of Israelitish nationality to the higher and holier ground of universal humanity."

IV. COMPARISON AS TO SPIRIT AND STYLE.

Each Gospel draws its inspiration, on the human side, from the character of the writer, or of him under whose influence it was written. James was the Apostle of Duty; Peter the Apostle of Hope; Paul the Apostle of Faith; and John the Apostle of Love. And so we find Matthew pervaded by the spirit of Obedience; Mark by the spirit of Hopeful Activity; Luke by the spirit of Penitent Faith; and John by the spirit of Love.

Matthew exemplifies the power of teaching; Mark, the power of working; Luke, the power of suffering; John, the power of loving.

Matthew's Gospel is didactic, and abounds in long discourses. His style is fresh, vivacious, ingenuous, and graphic. He has a

simple, happy, almost child-like admiration of what he tells. He abounds in exclamations: "Lo!" "Behold!" As in the transfiguration scene: "Behold, there appeared unto them Moses and Elias. And behold, a bright cloud overshadowed them; and behold, a voice out of the cloud."

Mark's Gospel is the record of a busy campaign, with little time for comment. See how appropriate are the matter and abrupt manner of his introduction and conclusion, and how many wonderful events he crowds into his first chapter. Note his frequent use of *εὐθὺς* (i. 10, 12, 18, 20, 21, 28, 29, 31, 42, 43). He has no long discourses, but gives minute details of incidents, and vivid descriptive touches. His Gospel abounds in miracles, but is almost destitute of parables. "He leaves it to faith to translate the passing deed into the abiding lesson." His style is compact, energetic and lively. His narrative, broken, abrupt, graphic, may be compared to a series of stereoscopic views. He gives little touches, interjects remarks and descriptive expressions, that enliven the picture and bring out the prominent features. His style is not only stereoscopic, but phonographic. Note the "εα" of the unclean spirit (i. 24), not, "Let us alone," but "Ah," expressive of dismayed surprise, or "alas!" a sigh of anguish. Listen to that derisive exclamation of the rabble about the cross; "ουα!" Note how Jesus in the weakness and semi-delirium of his mortal agony cries out in the Aramaic speech of his childhood; "Eloi, Eloi, lama sabbachthani!" Mark's Gospel is the shortest and freshest, but the least elegant and literary. On the other hand, the narrative of the cultured Greek physician, companion to the scholarly Paul, is longest and possesses most literary merit. It is accurate, complete and orderly (i. 1-4). Luke abounds in artistic and poetic elements. Here the painter finds his favorite sacred subjects, the Virgin and child, the aged Simeon, the scene in the temple with the doctors, the ascension, with Christ's uplifted hands shedding blessing on the gazing disciples. Luke abounds in graphic touches. See the whole narrative of the youth of Jesus, the home at Bethany, Jesus sobbing aloud (*κλαιων*) over Jerusalem, the big drops of bloody sweat in Gethsemane, the weeping women on the way to Calvary. How pictorial are his parables; the lost sheep,

the prodigal son, the rich fool, Dives and Lazarus, the Pharisee and the Publican, the good Samaritan.

Luke evidently possessed also an exuberant poetic nature. Read his description of the nativity and childhood of Jesus: "all that idyllic serenity, that softness as of a spring morning, contrasting so touchingly with the tears and blood and darkness of the close." His story of the penitent sinful woman bathing the Saviour's feet with her tears, and wiping them with her hair is almost a poem (vii. 44-47). See also his accounts of the resurrection, the walk to Emmaus, and of the ascension. This Gospel is the Pierian spring of Christian hymnology. It is Luke who gave us the Salute, the Magnificat, the Benedictus, the Gloria in Excelsis, the Nunc Dimittis. These hymns are the garments of Christian praise steeped in Hebrew dyes; "echoes of the harp of David."

John has a Greek vocabulary and grammar, but, more than any of the others, a Hebrew spirit and style. His Gospel can be almost literally translated into Hebrew without losing its beauty and force. He has the Hebrew simplicity and imaginativeness. His style is also marked by the rythmical parallelism so characteristic of the Hebrew writers. This parallelism of John is no tedious repetition, but a symmetrical and continuous progression; like the motion of the moon as it revolves in its own orbit, and at the same time moves along the line of the orbit of the earth; or like the gyrations of an eagle in his flight, whirling and whirling, yet ever advancing. "The eagle of God seems to wheel round and round his favorite thoughts." (i. 1-14; vi. 53-58; xiv. 27; xvii. 21-26; 1 John ii. 9-11.)

This Gospel in its simplicity and depth is like the sea on a calm fair day, with its blue surface and the transparency of its sunlit superficial depths, but below, invisible and unfathomable depths of life and treasure and beauty. The heavens have their worlds of beauty which they reveal to the naked eye, and others again which can only be seen through the telescope; they are at once the admiration of the infant, and the unfailing source of interest to the astronomer. So John is the delight of the Sunday-school pupil, and the thesaurus of the metaphysical theologian. It is like everything in nature; each simple beauty, like the embroidered veil before the Holy of Holies, conceals some wondrous

mystery. This Gospel is the natural revelation of infinite Deity ; if it is incomprehensible at times, that is through no fault of language or style, but because of the infiniteness of the subject matter. It may be said to many a perplexed reader of this book: "Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well is deep."

There is a striking contrast in style between the discourses of Jesus as recorded by John and as recorded by the synoptists. There are several reasons for this: First, the subject matter of John's discourses differs widely from that of the others. In the latter, Jesus deals mostly with the objective truths of Christianity; in the former with subjective experiences, and with the divine philosophy of external facts. Second, the auditors of Jesus in the two cases are generally different; the discourses of the synoptists were addressed chiefly to Galilean fishermen and peasants; those of John to Judean theologians, and to his own inner circle of disciples. The former therefore are popular, concise, parabolic, and proverbial; the latter, being concerned with the profoundest mysteries, are metaphysical, lengthy, and sometimes mystical and obscure. Compare the difference between the discourses of Socrates addressed to Xenophon and those addressed to Plato, as recorded by the two auditors. Third, There was evidently an attraction of the style of John to that of Jesus. The disciple had absorbed and assimilated the Master's matter and spirit and manner, a common effect of the influence of sympathy and congeniality and association. Fourth, John had for about fifty years revolved in his mind and repeated these discourses, till they had become cast into the mould of his own thought and expression.

The difference in the subject matter of the discourses of John and those of the Synoptists, is one which runs also through their narrative portions, and affects the style of the latter also. The Synoptists deal principally with facts, deeds, and sayings; John with the divine philosophy underlying them, their spiritual ideas and principles. John's may be called the Gospel of idealism and symbolism. He relates and describes everything so as to bring out its spiritual and supernatural lessons. His very characters are, as some one has called them, "idealized pictures;" and his miracles are parables: "the miracles of the Synoptists teach as well as prove; those of John prove as well as teach."

E. C. MURRAY.

VI. ROBERT BROWNING: THE MAN.¹

The aureole encircling the poet's brow is often so dazzling that it blinds the eye to the dimensions and character of the brow encircled. It is true that the author's subjective personality must always appear in his work, especially in a poem where the whole finer intellectual and emotional nature of the poet is discharged into the reservoir of his verse. But we must recollect that great poems are the product only of the *finer* emotions and intellectual faculties, when "through the harmonious fusion of mind irradiated by the electric dry light of reason and of soul aglow with the white heat of emotional fervor, the poet's eye catches glimpses of a seraphic vision,"

"The light that never was on sea or land,
The consecration and the poet's dream."

Even with "the glorious dreamer of Highgate," *A Sunrise in the Valley of Chamouni*, was the exception; those dull, Lethed days "kerchief'd in cloud" and "usher'd with a shower still," when senses and intellect are stupefied with opium, were alas! the rule. It is in the common every-day life, then, with its daily routine of petty cares, perplexities and emotions, that we must expect to find the real character revealed. "Character," says a contemporary dramatic critic with fine sagacity, "is the sandy footprint of the commonplace hardened into the stone of habit."

If all this is true, how absurd is the biographer's or the reader's etherealization of authors! Being men of like passions with ourselves, we can well imagine them saying to the idealizing general public in the agonized accents of Shylock: "If you prick us, do we not bleed? if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us, do we not die?" Shelley is not always piercing the topmost ether of thought in *The Cloud* or *The Skylark*; at times he is

¹ *Life and Letters of Robert Browning*. By Mrs. Sutherland Orr. Two volumes. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, Mass., 1891.

coldly neglectful of, or deliberately cruel to, the woman whom he had married in a moment of romantic frenzy. Byron sometimes, "with the thunder talks as friend to friend," but oftener to Lady Byron, as foe to foe.

If, then, in lyric and epic poetry—where we naturally expect a thorough transfusion of the poet's nature—the author cannot always be read into his work, nor his work into him; in dramatic poetry, where self-effacement is the fundamental law, we ought not to expect to see the author any more than his intellectual and emotional personality renders inevitable.

Now Browning, though to some extent both a lyric and an epic poet, is more decidedly a dramatic poet, and being dramatic, he throws upon his stage of action a great variety of characters, few of whom reflect himself any more than Iago reflects Shakspeare. This point needs to be insisted upon, for it is through forgetfulness of its importance that the first impression produced by Mrs. Orr's book upon the reader unacquainted with Browning's life is one of distinct disappointment. To his surprise he finds that the author of the inscrutable *Sordello*, the enigmatically beautiful *Child Roland to the Dark Tower Came*, and the delirious *Red Cotton Night-Cap Country*, is as easily understood as any other Englishman, and has a hearty laugh, a cordial manner, a fine digestion, a robust manhood, and no eccentricities, religious, social, or political, no daring infidelity like Voltaire's, no such immorality as Byron's, no self-enforced social isolation like Thoreau's, no insane Pantisocratic scheme like that of Coleridge and Southey.

In view of the fact, too, that Browning himself "deprecated the constant habit of reading him into his work," it may not be amiss to consider the man divorced from his work. Singularly fortunate was he in his parentage, his education, and his home environment. One recalls the happy youth and early manhood of Milton, those days of cloudless serenity and of poetic incubation at Horton when the brooding Muse was waiting, with what Balzac calls "*la patience angélique du génie* :—

"Till old Experience do attain
To something like prophetic strain,"—

before she plumed her wings for flight to the crystal battlements of heaven itself. As a part of this experience comes the *Wanderjahr* of 1638 to the continent, where he communed with such choice spirits as Grotius and Manso, sojourned amidst "the Alpine mountains cold" and viewed the moon through Galileo's "optic glass."

"At evening from the top of Fesolé
Or in Valerno to desery new lands,
Rivers, or mountains on her spotty globe."

Nearly two hundred years after this noteworthy journey (1833), a virile young Englishman, musical like Milton, highly educated in art and letters, after having given earnest, in *Pauline*, of the great poet that was to be, started out upon his *Wanderjahr*, caught from Russia a passing inspiration in Ivàn Ivànoritch, and laid at Asolà, "that white little hill-town of the Veneto," the foundation for that deep-seated, abiding, and fervent love, which led him to exclaim :

"Open my heart and you will see
Graved inside of it—Italy !"

Like Milton, Browning earned but little money until he was in the thirties. Like the "God-gifted organ-voice of England," therefore, he was not forced to "spur a jaded fancy for gold," but "could stay the very riping of the time" during the mellowing years of his genius. The Brownings, though not rich, were in sufficiently comfortable circumstances to enable the father of the poet to collect a library of some six thousand volumes and gratify to a considerable extent his artistic and bibliophilic tastes. The poet, too, had a small independent income.

His lineage is interesting. The paternal grandmother was a West Indian Creole, and his mother, a Wiedemann, may have been, as Mrs. Orr suggests, one of the collateral branches of the Wiedemann-Rezzonico family long naturalized in Venice. According to the ordinary principles of heredity, these facts help us to understand the poet's warm imagination, fondness for high coloring, ardent love for music, and impulsive earnestness.

The Creole grandmother has led Mr. Furnivall to believe that Browning's ancestress had negro blood in her veins, and that the poet was, therefore, a mulatto ! As this assertion comes from the

President of the Browning Society, it may be well to lay the whole matter at rest by an abstract of Mrs. Orr's dignified refutation, under which, we cannot help thinking, there lurks a great deal of latent scorn. She begins by saying: "Such an occurrence was, on the face of it, not impossible, and would be absolutely unimportant to my mind, and, I think I may add, to that of Mr. Browning's sister and son. The poet and his father were what we know them, and if negro blood had any part in their composition, it was no worse for them, and so much the better for the negro." She then proceeds to brush aside the trivial proofs (?) of African descent. It has been asserted that the poet was so dark that a nephew, in Paris, in 1837, mistook him for an Italian. Now, as the poet had no married sister or brother, he could have no nephew; furthermore, he was not out of England in 1837. It is also said that Mr. Browning senior, while on his mother's plantation at St. Kitt's, was made to sit with the negroes in chapel. This, Mrs. Orr assures us, on the evidence of a gentleman "whose authority in all matters concerning the Browning family Dr. Furnivall has otherwise accepted as conclusive," is absolutely without foundation. Besides, he had light-blue eyes and a clear, ruddy complexion, while the poet had large blue-gray eyes, and, in childhood, golden hair. At the age of twenty-four an admirer says of the latter:

"Thy brow is calm, Young Poet—pale and clear
As a moonlighted statue."

The other assertion that he was of Jewish descent is also disproved. We mention these facts only because of the fictitious value attached to them.

What is much more important to us is the knowledge that through the poet's veins coursed the warm blood of the Creole, possibly of the Italian, and that he inherited a robust manhood from a long line of sturdy English middle stock ancestry. Voltaire's remark that the English are like their own beer—foam at the top, dregs at the bottom, and good in the middle—is certainly true in the case of the Brownings.

Browning's father was a man of fine intellectual tastes, well versed in Italian, French and Spanish, and passionately fond of

curious imprints of rare old books full of that out-of-the-way knowledge for which the poet himself seems to have had an instinctive craving. It could only have been a strong inherited prepossession for the odd that induced him to write a "mono-dramatic epic" of twelve books upon an obscure Roman murder trial, or a lengthy drama upon the enigmatic Paracelsus.

Of the poet's mother, Mr. Kenyon—the friend who introduced Browning to his future wife, Miss Barrett,—declared that "such as she had no need to go to heaven, because they made it wherever they were." From her, Scotch-German in descent, Mrs. Orr thinks that Browning inherited "the metaphysical quality so early apparent in the poet's mind." From her, too, came, doubtless, his love for music and for poetry of the Romantic School, and, most noteworthy inheritance of all, a nervo-bilious temperament, mercurial and tremulously emotional. To his mother he was passionately attached, and "even late in life, and long after her death, he rarely spoke of her without tears coming into his eyes." From both parents he inherited deep religious instincts, to which, greatly to the amazement of his rationalistic friends, he always clung tenaciously.

The early home life was a very happy one. The usual signs of poetic precocity appear, and as usual the merit of the poemules was doubtless exaggerated by admiring friends and relatives. We are told that at the tender age of twelve the "Byronic influence was predominant" and that the outcome of this passion was a volume of poems entitled *Incondita*. But the poetic epoch of his life was yet to come.

"Passing a book-stall one day, he saw, in a box of second-hand volumes, a little book advertised as 'Mr. Shelley's Atheistical Poem: very scarce.'" This was in 1826, the poet's fourteenth year. Shelley had been dead four years, yet so little impression had this epoch-making poet left upon the minds of the London public that it was with great difficulty that his poems could be secured by Mrs. Browning for the enthusiastic fledgling-poet, attracted by the above advertisement. The fond mother bought Keats' poems too, because she was assured that "one who liked Shelley's works would like these also."

These books would have been a useless and an injudicious gift to most boys, but the Brownings had their son educated almost exclusively at home, and appear to have studied his predilections and to have left him large liberty of choice in his reading. As he read from the precious volumes on the eventful May night they were presented to him, they seemed to him, as he said, like the voices of the two nightingales singing just outside his window, in a laburnum tree then "heavy with its weight of gold." Though Browning bears no great affinity to either of these two poets, they inspired him to attempt something in a nobler strain than the Byronic *Incondita*, and it is said that from this time his poetic growth was rapid and steady.

It was seven years, however, before he ventured into print—years of seed-time and sowing.

"In the morn and liquid dew of youth,
Contagious blastments are most imminent,"

and Browning does not seem to have escaped entirely "the canker that galls the infants of the Spring;" but habits of conscientious industry and strong love for his mother and his home were powerful antidotes to vice in the period of "rebellion and unrest" between *Incondita* and *Pauline* (1833).

When the time came for the choice of a profession, Browning chose literature, and his father seems to have acquiesced without a murmur in this decision. With characteristic energy, he "studied and digested" Johnson's dictionary at the very outset of his career, thus laying the foundation for his future extraordinary command of language. The first poems and dramas, *Pauline* (1833), *Paracelsus*, *Strafford*, and *Sordello*, received but little general recognition. A few choice spirits saw unmistakable evidences of genius, both present and potential; but most readers, we imagine, agreed with M. Odysse Barot, who says: "God gave man two faculties, and I wish, while he was about it, God had supplied another, namely, the power of understanding Mr. Browning." [Quoted from Sharp's Life, page 110.]

What concerns us just here is not the nature of these poems, but the splendid, unflinching courage with which the author, regardless of popular neglect, worked upon the lines marked out by

his own intense individuality. Fortunately for English poetry, he was as independent of purses as he was of praise.

But with the beginning of the *Bells and Pomegranates* series in 1841, the circle of the poet's admirers widens perceptibly. Indeed, no reader of the first of these, that delicious dramatic idyl, *Pippa Passes*, could fail to see that a star of unique brilliance had appeared above the poetic horizon. It may be said that from this time the poet's fame kept steadily increasing, especially in America, where both Browning and Carlyle received their first hearty recognition. Lowell spoke warmly of *Bells and Pomegranates*, and Emerson of *Sartor Resartus*.

In *Bells and Pomegranates*, which continued until 1846, appeared most of Browning's dramas. Some of these were acted with great applause, but, largely through mismanagement, they were not retained long on the boards. This was notably the case with *The Blot on the Scutcheon*. Macready, at whose instigation *Strafford* had been written, was to take the leading part but became recalcitrant at the last moment, and one of the other important actors accepted a more lucrative offer after the play had been acted only a few nights. But however plausibly Mr. Gosse, Mrs. Orr and Mr. Sharp may excuse the failure of Browning's dramas, the fact remains undeniable that they have never been popular with stage managers.

It is not our purpose in this paper to notice any further, except in an incidental way, Browning's other works, nor to trace at every turn the course of his comparatively uneventful life, whose epochs are marked chiefly by the publication of his books, by outings abroad, and by those public honors that fall naturally in the way of every man of conspicuous eminence.

One epoch, however, is a most noteworthy and romantic exception. While *Bells and Pomegranates* were appearing, the author of *Lady Geraldine's Courtship* wrote in that poem with rare felicity of insight these lines:

"There, obedient to her praying, did I read aloud the poems.

* * * * *

Read the pastoral parts of Spenser, or the subtle interflowings
Found in Petrarch's Sonnets.

Or at times a modern volume, Wordsworth's solemn-thoughted idyl,
 Howitt's ballad verse, or Tennyson's enchanted reverie,—
 Or from Browning some 'Pomegranate' which, if cut deep down the middle,
 Shows a heart within blood-tinctured of a veined humanity."

The last two lines are Browning in a nutshell, and the young poet could not have failed to be gratified at this hearty appreciative recognition of his salient characteristic. "One thing and another," says Mr. Sharp, "drew them nearer and nearer. Now it was a poem, now a novel expression, now a rare sympathy." Correspondence begins, in 1846 an introduction is sought, visits become more and more frequent and soon the invalid poetess whose darkened chamber had been illumined with the light of love can say with all the gracious *abandon* and glowing fervor of the newly betrothed:

" Say thou dost love me, love me, love me—toll
 The silver iterance!—only minding, Dear,
 To love me also in silence with thy soul. "

The father's consent not being asked, for his obduracy is only too well-known, the marriage takes place secretly September 12, 1846, and the married pair go a week afterwards to Paris and thence to Italy.

Much poetic prose of the most effusive kind has been written on this singularly happy union, and the world owes to it the finest collection of sequacious sonnets in English. (Many detached ones are, of course, finer.) We need hardly say that we refer to the Portuguese Sonnets, in which, under the transparent disguise of a supposititious Portuguese original, the author pours forth a golden flood of lyric love for him beneath whose looks she sits

. "As children do
 In the noon sun, with souls that tremble through
 Their happy eyelids from an unaverred
 Yet prodigal joy."

The portmanteau of every newly wedded pair should contain, along with Spenser's *Epithalium* and Howell's *Wedding Journey*, this exquisite collection written by Miss Barrett before her marriage and not shown to the poet until after that happy event. Her appreciation for his *Moon of Poets* is shown in "My Star," *Prospect*, *One Word More*, *A Wall*, and in that beautiful threnody be-

ginning "O lyric Love, half angel and half bird!" In all of these poems, does "the thought of one beloved wind like a golden thread through the woof of his multi-colored imagination." Mrs. Orr happily suggests that Mrs. Browning's "spiritual presence entered largely into the conception of Pompilia, and, so far as this depended on it, the character of the whole work." (*The Ring and Book*.)

There was a prose side, too, to this poetic union. Mrs. Browning was so fragile that she seems to have been kept alive more by fire from within than by fuel from without. With a devotion as unselfish as it was beautiful, her strong, active, and naturally sociable husband gave up social life and devoted himself exclusively to her. It would be unjust to both to suppose that the married life was all roseate and that a noble self-sacrifice, which brings its own reward, was not practised by both husband and wife. In Mrs. Orr's luminous common-sense view of this union, largely a new view, bearing truth stamped upon its face, Browning's unselfish devotion is brought out far better than in the choice rhetoric of Mr. Stedman or the glowing periods of Mr. Sharp.

It is not too much to say that this marriage made Mrs. Browning a great poet, for to it we owe directly *Portuguese Sonnets* and indirectly *Aurora Leigh*. The cloistered idealist never escapes entirely from her atmosphere of unreality, but in *Aurora Leigh* she grapples nobly with problems whose correct solution is impossible to a literary recluse with a strong emotional nature cabi'nd, cribb'd, confined in the pent up Utica of single life.

How far the marriage affected the husband's literary life will appear, we hope, in our examination of his poetry. Just here it is enough to say that during the fifteen years (1846-61) of his married life, he wrote comparatively little. In 1863 his literary life begins anew with that splendid outburst of genius, *The Ring and the Book*. From this time on until his death in 1889, his works follow one another rapidly, and, with rare exceptions, are more and more difficult to the general reader.

The interest in his life now becomes almost exclusively a literary interest, although his social area widens and his fame increases steadily, not only on account of the growing appreciation for his work, but from the mere fact that he appeared more frequently in public.

The Browning Society, founded in 1881 by Mr. Furnivall and Miss Hickey, also contributed much towards the extension of the poet's fame and influence. His attitude towards this society was characteristic. We quote from a letter written at the time of the society's foundation, and taken from Sharp's life, p. 189.

"I had no more to do with the founding it than the babe unborn, and as Wilkes was no Wilkesite, I am quite other than a Browningite. But I cannot wish harm to a society of, with a few exceptions, names unknown to me, who are busied about my books so disinterestedly. The exaggerations come of the fifty years'-long charge of unintelligibility against my books; such reactions are possible, though I never looked for the beginning of one so soon. . . . Anyhow, as I never felt inconvenienced by hard words, you will not expect me to wax bumptious because of undue compliment. So enough of 'Browning'—except that he is yours very truly, 'while this machine is to him.'" But it cannot be denied, as Browning says, that "there is a grotesque side to the thing," and that the Browning Society, in its zeal for the apotheosis of a living author, made him ridiculous in the eyes of the wits and witlings of the daily press.

This society naturally whetted the curiosity of the public in regard to Browning's character and home life. In the account of the poet's private life the reader must not expect in Mrs. Orr's book the shocking minutiae of Froude's Carlyle. Enough is told, however, to reveal his most prominent traits, views, and habits of work, and in chapter xx., Vol. II., especially, there is a candid, full account of these. It may not be uninteresting to cull from this chapter a few of its most important features. In politics Browning was a Liberal Unionist. In religion, "he rejected or questioned the dogmatic teachings of Christianity. The Evangelical Christian and the subjective idealist philosopher were curiously blended in his composition," and like Tennyson, though even more firmly than the Poet Laureate, he believed

* * "That somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill."

His attitude towards his contemporaries was in striking contrast with Macaulay's serene indifference or Carlyle's splenetic

acidity. "I do not suppose," says Mrs. Orr, "his more eminent contemporaries ever quite knew how generous his enthusiasm for them had been, how free from any undercurrent of envy, or impulse to avoidable criticism." Towards adverse criticism he was usually indifferent, though he "deprecatd the constant habit of reading him into his work" and "the form of literalism, which showed itself in seeking historical authority for every character or incident which he employed by way of illustration, was especially irritating to him."

As a writer, strange as this may seem to the superficially captious reader, he was painstaking in the extreme, though he often wrote with surprising rapidity, *Childe Roland* and many shorter poems being composed in a day, and *A Blot on the Scutcheon* in five days.

As a philosopher, his sympathies were all with individuals, rather than with masses. The great movements, therefore, for the amelioration of mankind touched his imagination but little. Herein, according to his admirers, consists his great strength, for his appeals are made directly and personally to the human soul with all its passions, hopes, fears and conflicts.

Other important characteristics of Browning have been indicated, we trust, in our sketch of his life. The wide-spread misconception of this great poet is our apology for trespassing thus far upon the valuable space of the QUARTERLY.

We have shown throughout our appreciation of Mrs. Orr's volumes by the liberal use we have made of them. Though they give us far less of the man than recent biographies have taught us to expect, this, it is fair to say, is not due to Mrs. Orr, but to the wholesale destruction by Browning of the letters to his family. Many of those that remain are withheld from publication, so that the biographer is forced to piece out the later life by the letters of Mrs. Browning, and by her own intimate knowledge of the poet.

Though, therefore, we have much of deepest interest *about* Browning, we have little of note *from* him. Most of the letters in these volumes are conventional and colorless. A few like the one to Miss Haworth just after Mrs. Browning's death, reveal to us the

writer's genuine self, and tantalize us with a sense of loss. But we suspect this loss is exaggerated, for Browning was very reserved in private life, and it is doubtful if the unpublished letters would tell us much more of him than we already know.

At any rate, until Mr. Robert Barrett Browning, the poet's only son, sees fit to publish the letters that have been withheld, we must accept Mrs. Orr's two volumes as authoritative. It is not too much to say that they contain the best and fullest presentation of the poet's life and character. Of her literary judgments we shall have more to say in a future paper. It is hardly fair to expect as yet definitive literary judgments upon the work of the most striking poet of the century. We are too near to him for our perspective to be accurate.

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VII. NOTES.

THE REVISED DIRECTORY FOR WORSHIP.

In the year 1729, the old Synod of New York and Philadelphia, which antedated the establishment of the first General Assembly in the United States, and from which that General Assembly came in 1789, adopted the old Directory for Worship, and recommended it for use by the churches. It was originally drawn up by the Westminster Assembly of Divines; the same which framed the Catechisms and Confessions of Faith.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States (afterwards "in the United States," now called, popularly, the Southern Assembly), adopted the old Directory, along with the other standards of the old church, at its organization in 1861. In 1864, the question of revising the Directory was taken up, and the committee on revising the Form of Government and Book of Discipline were directed to bring in a report as to what changes, if any, were needed. No report ever came from the committee on the subject, but in 1879, on motion of the Committee on the Book of Church Order, the Assembly appointed a committee to revise the Directory. It was the Committee on the Book of Order reorganized, and consisted of the Rev. Drs. J. B. Adger, B. M. Palmer, G. D. Armstrong, Stuart Robinson, T. E. Peck, James Woodrow, J. A. Lefevre, R. K. Smoot, and Messrs. Thomas Thomson, and W. W. Henry.

In 1880, the first draft of the revision was presented, accepted by the Assembly, and copies ordered to be sent to each pastor and session, and to the Presbyteries for their criticisms, which criticisms were to be forwarded direct to the chairman of the committee. This was done, and a new draft, made in the light of these criticisms, was reported in 1881. The Assembly again ordered the work sent down for criticism, when it came up in 1882.

In 1885 the completed work was received by the Assembly, and sent down to the Presbyteries for their further examination and criticism. The majority of the Presbyteries having approved of the work, but

recommended further revision, their answers were referred, by the Assembly of 1886, to a new committee, consisting of the Rev. Drs. M. D. Hoge, T. D. Witherspoon, J. H. Smith, G. D. Armstrong, and Ruling Elder Hon. W. W. Henry.

This committee presented their report in 1889, and the General Assembly adopted it, chapter by chapter, and sent it down to the Presbyteries, which were "directed to take action on the same, voting to *adopt* or *reject* it, and to report their action to the next General Assembly." Order was also taken continuing the Committee of Revision, and directing them to prepare and report to the next Assembly an appendix, "containing a funeral service and also a marriage service."

At the Assembly of 1890, it appeared that twenty-three Presbyteries had adopted, and forty-one rejected the Revised Directory, but a large number requested a continuance of the revision. So the committee was ordered to go on with their work, availing themselves of the suggestions of the Presbyteries; and there were added to the committee the Rev. Drs. D. O. Davies, W. S. Lacy, and Robert P. Kerr.

The committee, thus enlarged, performed the task assigned them, and presented their report at Birmingham, at the last General Assembly, 1891. The Revised Directory was then adopted, and ordered, in the words of the Assembly of 1889, to be sent down to the Presbyteries "for their adoption or rejection," they being directed "to vote *aye* or *no*" upon it. Copies were also ordered to be sent to every minister and church session.

The action of the Assembly was deliberately taken, after nearly a whole day spent in considering the Directory, sentence by sentence, every word of it being read carefully aloud by the secretary of the committee, except the long passages (nearly whole chapters) from the Scriptures in the funeral service. These passages were from Psalm xxxix., and Psalm xc., and 1 Cor. xv. The secretary began reading these, but was in each case stopped by the Assembly, because they were such familiar passages it was not considered necessary. The whole Revision, handsomely and accurately printed, had been put into the hands of every member of the Assembly the day before, and so the matter was really before the body nearly two days, including the evening and night, during which no doubt it was read by all, and carefully studied. After it had been considered and adopted, paragraph by paragraph, the Revision was adopted as a whole, with but one slight modification in the marriage service. The vote was unanimous and cordial, and was followed by a resolution of thanks to the

committee, and a special prayer of gratitude to God for the happy result attained. The secretary of the committee begged the Assembly when he presented the report, to take full time to consider it, and to feel free to make as many changes as it wished.

The resolution sending the Revised Directory down to the Presbyteries for their vote, *aye* or *no*, was in the same terms as those used by the Assembly of 1889. There is no discourtesy to the Presbyteries in this. The Assembly merely deeming the time had come for a vote, put the matter to the house of the whole church, precisely as is always done in every deliberative body, whenever a matter is acted upon. This does not, of course, cut off criticism and suggestion; for it is the same action as was taken by the Assembly of 1889, which was followed by a rejection of the Directory, with criticisms, and requests that the work of revision go on. This is how it comes to be before the church now; and in this way, if the Presbyteries will it so, it may be kept before the church for many years more.

It is, however, we beg leave to suggest, not necessary to continue the work of revision further. The writer of this article may be allowed to say that, in his judgment, the matter is by this time the expression of the mind of the church, perhaps as nearly as it can well be secured. The Revised Directory is not the work of one man, nor of a set of men, but, through the agency of the various committees that have labored on it, incorporating not only their own ideas, but the suggestions of the Presbyteries for so long a time, it is now largely the work of the whole church. It has been more of a growth than a creation.

Of course, if the Directory be adopted in its present form, it is not an absolute finality, but it will doubtless be amended, and improved as time goes on, just as the Book of Order has been since it became a part of the constitution of the church. If we waited until no one found any fault we should never adopt anything new.

The old Directory, like the Form of Government, needed revision, because the church had advanced in some things beyond the methods of the ancient times. The truth is, the old Directory had almost become obsolete, and was very little used. We would not say it was behind the present usages of the church merely because some of its expressions now seem a little grotesque. We could allow some expressions, because of their noble origin, while we would not now write such a paragraph as that at the top of page 424: "In time of public worship, etc., . . . abstaining from all whisperings, from salutations

of persons present, or coming in; and from *gazing about, sleeping, smiling,* and all other indecent behavior."

But we do deem the old Directory seriously defective in several particulars. There is no provision whatever for holding Sunday-schools for children and adults, to study the Scriptures and the Standards of the church. This was no fault of the Directory when it was made, for Sunday-schools are a modern institution. But Sunday-schools are now established in the heart of the whole church of God, and are one of the greatest arms of the church for accomplishing the object of her existence. It is right that the Sunday-school should be recognized in our Directory, and rules laid down for its proper conduct.

No prayer-meetings are mentioned in the old Directory, and for the same reason that the Sunday-school was omitted. Prayer-meetings, as they are now universally observed, were unknown in the church of the seventeenth century. There is no question as to the immense value of these two instrumentalities for the development and expression of spiritual life; nor can there be any doubt as to the propriety of their being recognized in the rules for the worship of God.

No provision is made in the old Book for a public profession of faith on the part of persons who are being admitted to full membership, except in case of those who have not been baptized in infancy. In recent times it has become the rule, with few exceptions, for all persons who are making their profession of faith with a view to being admitted to the communion, to do it in the presence of the congregation on Sabbath morning, and it is a most useful act, because of its influence upon the persons themselves as well as upon the people, Christians, and non-professors who witness it. The new book provides for this, and furnishes a suitable form of questions to be used in this solemn proceeding.

In the old Directory the matter of inflicting church censures is included. This properly belongs to the Book of Discipline, where our church has placed it, in the volume entitled "The Book of Church Order." Surely it need not be retained in both the Book of Discipline and the Directory of Worship. We now have it in both. It is left out of the Revised Directory, and there is every reason for its omission.

We will say, further, that the general arrangement of the subjects in the new book and the style are greatly in advance of the old. One of the greatest advantages of the new Directory over the old is in the fact that it contains in its appendix a set of beautiful forms for funerals

and marriages. They are optional of course, and are never to be made obligatory. They will be very useful for ministers, and would, in cases where no minister is present and a funeral must be held, be of the utmost benefit to a layman who might be called to officiate.

In this case, as in others, the church has grown up to a new institution. In an old Directory of one of the Reformed (Presbyterian) Churches of the continent of Europe, every kind of religious service at funerals was forbidden, "in order to avoid all superstitious observances."

Funeral sermons have about had their day, and now the majority of Presbyterian pastors have some form of funeral service. Many excellent ones have been prepared and are in use. The funeral service, composed of Scripture reading, prayer, and praise, has come to stay, and is fast becoming established in the mind of the church. There is no good reason why the church should not prepare and recommend to its ministers a funeral service suitable and proper for use in their churches. The same remark applies with equal force in the case of marriage. None of these services are compulsory, but are for guides, or to be used with or without modification, as the taste of the minister may dictate. The Dutch and all other Reformed Churches have such forms, and have had from ancient times, and there is no tendency discernible among them towards formalism and ritualism. Presbyterian doctrine does not lead to ritualism. John Knox presented a translation of Calvin's forms at the first General Assembly in Edinburgh, and they were adopted and were used, for nearly a hundred years, under the name of "The Book of Common Order." The Church of England tried to force Episcopal church government upon the Scotch, and the visible representative thereof was the English Prayer Book, and so it was natural that the Scotch should come to detest every kind of form for worship. After they had been hammered over their heads for one hundred years with a Prayer Book, they gave up even optional forms and adopted the Directory of Worship. But those times are now far away, and the drift in Scotland is back towards the use of a few optional forms, such as are now provided in our new Directory. There is no danger to us in this matter of running into ritualism, because all the Reformed churches throughout the world, except those distinctively termed Presbyterian, have the same optional, simple forms, with very slight changes, which they have had hundreds of years, and there is not a trace of ritualism among them. It is Arminian, or semi-Arminian doctrine that expresses itself in ritualism,

but not Calvinism. Pure Pelagianism is all form, all ritual; and teaches that salvation depends upon the form. Calvinism teaches that form is useful, must be simple, scriptural, and optional, but we are obliged to have some forms. We already have a number—the benediction, the doxology, the baptismal formula, etc., and almost every minister has his own form of service for marriages and funerals. It is only proposed to provide good ones for funerals and marriages, that all pastors may have at hand, that the services on these occasions may be conducted with solemn dignity and propriety, to the good of souls, and to the glory of God. There is a form for marriage in the old Directory, but it is not distinctly given nor fully elaborated. There is no direction given for any funeral service except that “the minister *if present*, may exhort them to consider the frailty of life and the importance of being prepared for death and eternity.”

If the Revised Directory be adopted by the Presbyteries it will be an immense gain for our church. A distinguished minister of the Northern Church said last summer to the writer, that the Book of Church Order and the Revised Directory, both of which he had read, put our church far ahead, in its administration of government and worship, of its sister north of the Potomac, and we believe he was right.

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THE GENERAL PRESBYTERIAN COUNCIL.

The Fifth Council of the Alliance of the Reformed Churches holding the Presbyterian system will be held at Toronto, Canada, in September next. The supreme courts of the various churches which constitute the Alliance have either already appointed their allotted number of delegates or will make these appointments at their approaching meetings. The Western Section of the Executive Commission, of which the Rev. Talbot W. Chambers, D. D.,* is chairman, has recently been in session at Toronto, to arrange for the Council, and it is given out that present indications point to a large and representative attendance, to a cordial reception on the part of the Toronto Presbyterians, and to substantial benefits to follow greatly in advance of those hitherto realized.

In view of this, it has been thought not out of place that some ac-

*It was erroneously stated at the last Assembly that Dr. Philip Schaff held this position.

count of the present status of the Alliance and of the specific results which have come out of its previous meetings should be given in these pages. This is the more timely because it is no secret that at our last Assembly it was proposed that our Church withdraw from the Alliance. The proposition was received with surprise and the reasons assigned showed so slight an acquaintance with the history of the Alliance that the Assembly with fuller information before it voted them insufficient, and expressed its joy that so much had been done by the Alliance, appointing at the same time a committee to report to the next Assembly the names of our quota of delegates to the Toronto Council.

The present writer was able to sympathize with the hesitation of the minority, as to continuing our relations with the Alliance, for he has at times entertained grave doubts on the subject; and in connection with the Rev. Dr. R. McIlwaine, the Rev. Dr. P. H. Hoge, the Rev. S. H. Chester, he was privileged to lay before the Assembly the information which had removed his doubts. The views herein presented therefore are based not on any uncompromising advocacy of the Alliance, but upon a more or less careful examination of the "Proceedings" of the four Councils—Edinburgh, 1877; Philadelphia, 1880; Belfast, 1884; London, 1888—with the purpose of weighing accurately the criticisms so frequently made upon the actions, and also the inaction, of the Alliance, and of discovering what advantages, if any, have accrued from these sixteen years of effort. To the readers of the *QUARTERLY* outside of our own Church, it is needful to say that these views are not in any sense official, but that if the writer may judge from assurances given him, both in public and in private, on previous occasions, an appreciable number of his brethren will be found to approve them.

The first impression one receives from these "Proceedings," whatever his ultimate conclusion may be, is a sense of the great achievement it is to have held together under one constitution and with a certain measure, even a growing measure, of coöperation, sixty-six distinct churches, some large and some small, some rich and some poor, separated from one another by thousands of miles over land and sea, by hopeless differences of language, by wide varieties of ancestry, by diversities of historical traditions and by ignorance of the conditions and opportunities, each of the other. The consensus that can overcome such a dissensus must be very real and potential, even though it be undefined, and it must be conceded to be an effective bond of unity, whether for good or for ill.

I.

The criticisms made upon the Alliance proceed, for the most part, from a failure to recognize, or, if recognized, to approve of the peculiar basis on which it stands. It is an assembly, not of individuals, but of churches, through representatives elected by their supreme courts. This carried out logically would invest it with the authority of the courts composing it, but the logical sequence is overruled by practical considerations, and, instead of supreme authority, the Council has no authority, either of legislation or coercion. Its influence is moral and advisory only, even while its membership is official. Hence it is neither an Ecumenical Council, in the strict ecclesiastical sense, nor an Evangelical Alliance, for its lack of authority separates it from the former, and its official basis of membership from the latter. It is, therefore, obviously open to criticism from two opposite directions: it comes short of what an Ecumenical Council should be, and it exceeds, in a large measure, what an Evangelical Alliance should be, and those who would make it either of these are alike disappointed. To one who declines to see that between these two there is ample room for such an organization, the Alliance is and must continue to be an ecclesiastical non-descript.

This unique basis must be distinctly recognized to estimate aright the various particular criticisms passed upon the Alliance. These are by no means shallow, on any other basis they would be fatal; but on this they lose much, if not all, the force they would otherwise have.

1. The latitude of utterance on the floor of the Council has excited apprehension. Expression has from time to time been given there to opinions which seem hardly consistent with a clear and thoroughgoing devotion to the body of truth held in common by Presbyterians throughout the world. At each meeting some such instance has occurred, the most notable being of course the paper of Dr. Marcus Dods, on "How far is the Church responsible for present skepticism?" which drew forth the protest of many members of Council, and, afterwards, in connection with a certain sermon of his, led to the movement to vacate his chair in the Free Church College, Glasgow, which movement, however, failed. Such utterances are felt to convey a wrong impression as to the state of opinion in the churches represented in the Alliance, and to impair very largely the value of the meetings of the Council.

Yet, on the basis of the Alliance, utterances like these cannot be excluded, for the reason that the Council has no choice as to its members, and so only very slight control of their utterances. They sit

the official representatives of the churches that appoint them, and with these churches, rather than with the Alliance, lies the responsibility of what they say. The Council cannot exercise judicial functions. It is composed of those delegates which the various churches choose, and if the churches are satisfied the Council must in the nature of the case be satisfied also. However individual utterances may be deprecated, the Council cannot refuse recognition to the accredited representative of any church holding membership in the Alliance. Dr. Caven expressed the true view when, speaking on this subject, he said at London:—

“I have no charge of unsoundness against any man of this Alliance, or against any brother sitting here. The Council would entirely go beyond its province if it assumed to sit in judgment in that way upon any one taking part in its proceedings. At the same time, it becomes our duty to speak out distinctly our sentiments in regard to the great topics before us.”

Whatever danger may attend this latitude of expression is, to a great extent, overcome by the readiness of the great body of delegates to “speak out distinctly.” The paper of Dr. Dods drew forth the emphatic dissent of members from Ireland, Scotland, China, and America, and the Rev. John McEwan, of Edinburgh, representing the Free Church, said,

“He would like the Council distinctly to understand that the paper to which they had listened, so far as his knowledge went—and it was a pretty extensive knowledge of the Free Church—did not touch any sympathetic chord in any large number of the people of that church in Scotland.”

Dr. Bannerman, of Perth, frankly admitted that his friend, Dr. Dods, had spoken unguardedly, and had laid himself open to misconstruction, claiming that he had spoken only from the standpoint of practical apologetics. Such vigorous disavowals and such careful apologies go very far to break the force of utterances that are out of harmony with the general belief of Presbyterian churches.

At the same time, it ought to be very frankly stated that the committee charged with the selection of speakers can, to a great extent, relieve this difficulty by confining appointments to those men who most adequately represent the views prevailing in their respective churches. The area of selection is large; the number to be selected is comparatively small, and it is quite unnecessary to single out men whose claim to distinction is that they are not in sympathy with the views prevailing in their churches. This would be no infringement of personal rights, would save apologies, explanations and repudia-

tions, and would give to the formal papers a comparatively representative character.

2. The degrees of doctrinal development represented in the Council are various. The constitution declares that any church organized on Presbyterian principles, which holds the supreme authority of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments in matters of faith and morals, and whose creed is in harmony with the consensus of the Reformed Confessions, shall be eligible for admission into the Alliance. These Reformed Confessions are: the Gallican, 1559; the Belgic, 1561; the Heidelberg, 1563; the second Helvetic, 1566; the Canons of Dort, 1619; the Westminster, 1647; the Waldensian, 1655; the Welsh Calvinistic Methodist, 1823; the Free Evangelical Church of the Canton de Vaud, 1847; the Union of the Evangelical Churches of France, 1849; the Free Christian Church in Italy, 1870; the Spanish Christian Church, 1872; the Free Church of Neuchâtel, 1874; the National Church of the Canton de Vaud, 1874; the Cumberland Presbyterian, 1883; the Evangelical Syrian, 1862. The Westminster Standards are represented in thirty-six of the sixty-six churches of the Alliance, and these constitute its real strength, yet no one symbol is definitively adopted. The consensus of them all is the basis of the Alliance, and even this is modified by the differences existing in the mode of subscription; some churches, like the Evangelical Reformed of Paris, requiring applicants for membership to declare, in the presence of two members of presbytery and one member of the church, their adherence to the Confession, and others requiring this only of ministers and office-bearers.

The doctrinal basis of the Alliance, therefore, is not that symmetrical system with which we are familiar; if it had been, nearly one-half of the churches would have been excluded. It is perhaps an open question whether a Westminster-Belgic-Helvetic-Dort basis would not yield in some particulars more satisfactory results, but it is quite certain that such a basis would have made other desirable results unattainable; and, choosing the latter rather than the former, the fact is that the Alliance is not constituted on this ample basis. We must therefore not expect to find even general concurrence in the conclusion to which our system, so thoroughly wrought out, has led us, and we must be careful to distinguish between the corollaries which to us are clearly demonstrated and the first principles in which alone we may look for unanimity. On the other hand, as the differences among these Confessions are differences only of the degree in which the one system is developed, we may reasonably expect that views which cannot be reconciled with

the system shall be excluded altogether, or else tolerated as the crudities of one who in spite of them is making progress towards the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God. On a consensus less than this, we could not properly exclude Methodists, or Episcopalians, or Lutherans, and would cover the ground so well occupied by the Evangelical Alliance; on a consensus larger than this we could not include some of the churches which feel most keenly the need of the Alliance. We sacrifice nothing of our precious heritage in indicating the extent in which others share it, while they gain much by fraternal contact with the larger and fuller faith we hold.

This is very aptly expressed by Dr. Mathews in a recent address before the Irish General Assembly, in which he said:

“He did not know how many colors or shades of color artists had discovered in the natural world, but he knew that in the Presbyterian world, while blue was the one distinctive color, there were some eighty different shades. Of course some of these shades were deep as the blue of that banner which had waved at Drumclog, while others there might look as if, though guaranteed to be fast color, they had been in the wash-tub, and were considerably the worse for the wetting. Still they were all blue—all Presbyterian—all recognized as brethren in the faith. Now, of course, it might be that some of those deeper shades could stand a little toning down, and some of the paler ones would be the better for a toning up, but the Alliance did not hold itself charged with effecting any such mixing. That was left to each church to do for itself.”

It is on this basis that various continental churches are eligible to membership in the Council. Although several of them are descended historically from churches prominent in the Reformation era, their present symbols lack the fulness which we might expect them to show, and hardly go beyond the merely evangelical basis. Thus the Independent Evangelical Church of Neuchâtel utters its Confession of Faith in the following words:

“Faithful to the holy truth which the apostles preached and the reformers have restored to light, the Evangelical Church of Neuchâtel acknowledges as the only source and rule of its faith the sacred writings of the Old and New Testament, and proclaims with all Christian churches, the great truths of salvation contained in the creed called the Apostles’ Creed: ‘We believe in God the Father, who has saved us by the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, his only begotten Son, our only Lord, and who regenerates us by the Holy Spirit; and we confess this faith by the use of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord’s supper, in obedience to the commandments of the Lord.’”

Compared with the Westminster Confession this is a very meagre outline, yet it is enough to bring it within the consensus of the Reformed confessions and with its Presbyterian system to secure it a place in the

Alliance. It is sufficient to form a common standing-ground, while the eagerness with which some of these continental churches embrace the opportunity to enter the Alliance shows that they instinctively recognize their affinity with us, and that they are in an open frame of mind to receive whatever of development, of sympathy and of practical assistance we can give them. What that is will appear hereafter in considering the positive results of the Alliance.

Further, it is on this basis that churches which either have revised or are in process of revising their symbols continue within the Alliance. If their revision does not impair their harmony with the consensus of the Reformed confessions, the Alliance as such is not thereby disturbed. Indeed the right of any church to revise its standards is implied in the Reformed conception of creeds and confessions. These are held to be the human expressions of the truth of Scripture, and like all things human, to be liable to error and open to improvement. The charge of symbolatry is never brought against the Reformed Churches as such by any open-minded and well-informed opponent, however vigorously he may dissent from the system of doctrine; and in any process of revision the question is conceded by all competent disputants to be not whether a revision is theoretically possible, but whether it is practically desirable. The proposition to revise standards, however venerable, cannot of itself be construed as involving defection from the truth, for on that principle the Church would never have proceeded beyond the Apostles' Creed; and conversely a refusal to revise cannot be held to indicate indifference to modern thought or insensibility to the demands of the historic creeds upon modern consciences, but rather a genuine satisfaction with these as expressions of our conception of divine truth, however mysterious that truth may be. Upon this mutual understanding churches may retain or revise their standards without altering their relations to one another in the Alliance, provided always that the limits of the consensus are observed.

Once more, it is on this basis that, after nine years of waiting, the Cumberland Presbyterian Church was at last admitted to the Alliance at Belfast in 1884. Its form of government is Presbyterian, but its creed is a revision of the Westminster standards, of which during the debate at Belfast, Dr. Charteris, of Edinburgh, said:

“The presentation of the doctrine of God's government in the Cumberland document seems to me to be a failure in definition. The intention to avoid fatalism is obvious, and excellent; but it is impossible that any logical mind can be satisfied with the attempted compromise between the doctrines of divine sovereignty and

human responsibility. It is not Arminianism, but neither is it Calvinism, and yet it involves all the difficulties of both."

The Cumberland Church was admitted, because it adopted the constitution of the Alliance and made formal application for admission. It was held that as the Alliance had no judicial functions, the responsibility of deciding whether the Cumberland Confession was in harmony with the Reformed consensus must rest with the applicant. This was admirably stated by Dr. John S. Moore, of Texas:

"The responsibility is upon them, as in the case of an individual applying for admission to the Church. That is the only ground upon which I support them. And now, let me indicate the reason why I can vote upon this ground. This Council, instead of using its moral influence, its mighty intellectual and spiritual power, for depressing doctrine, becomes a mighty intellectual and moral power for elevating the standard of doctrine and bringing these Cumberland Presbyterians into harmony with the consensus of the Reformed Churches."

And as if to make the ground of admission the more distinct, the report of the committee, which qualified the recommendation with the words "without pronouncing any judgment on the church's revision of the Westminster Confession and of the Shorter Catechism," was, on motion of Dr. Chambers, of the Reformed Church, amended by substituting for these words the very emphatic phrase "without approving of the church's revision of the Westminster Confession," etc.

It is, therefore, to be regretted that at the last meeting of the Cumberland General Assembly, in answer to a proposition of the General Assembly of the North to formulate a consensus creed, the following resolution was adopted:

"1. That, while the Cumberland Presbyterian Church holds the 'Presbyterian system,' it does not accept the 'Westminster Confession' as its creed."

This is followed by other resolutions, appointing a committee to enter into correspondence with a view to the consideration and preparation of a short creed, to be used as the common creed of the Reformed Churches throughout the world, etc., . . . provided that nothing in the creed to be thus prepared shall conflict with the Confession of Faith of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church.

It is to be hoped that this disavowal of the Westminster Confession indicates no lessening sympathy with the consensus of the Reformed Churches. Of that consensus the Westminster Standards are a thorough and a necessary development, and it will be a difficult task to maintain with sincerity the one while with equal sincerity disavow-

ing the other. It is to be hoped that our Cumberland brethren have not mistaken the necessary implications of the consensus.

The recognition by the Alliance of the various degrees of development in the Reformed theology represented by the different creeds will doubtless prove a great blessing, unless, with a desire to please certain churches, the doctrines likely to call forth their dissent are excluded from discussion. If papers like Dr. Stuart Robinson's, at Edinburgh, on "The Churchliness of Calvinism," or like that of Dr. Cairns and Dr. Hodge at Philadelphia, on "The Vicarious Sacrifice of Christ," are hereafter barred, the result of extending the privileges of the Alliance will be disastrous, and it will soon become theologically colorless, for its vitality lies in its strong and emphatic presentation of the distinctive Reformed theology.

3. The question of a consensus creed very naturally took first place in the programmes of the Councils until the very definite conclusion reached at Belfast made further consideration needless.

At Edinburgh Dr. Schaff read a paper on the general subject, in which he said:

"The desirability of a common doctrinal bond of union among the Reformed Churches is likewise apparent. But the expediency of such a work at the present time is, to say the least, doubtful."

Dr. W. Krafft, of Bonn, submitted an outline in thirty-one articles, supporting each article by references to one or more of the Reformed Confessions, and after discussion, Mr. Taylor Innes offered a resolution, which was adopted, raising a committee to report to the next Council "what are the existing creeds and confessions represented in the Alliance; what are the existing formulas of subscription; how far individual adherence to these has been required from ministers, office-bearers and private members; and the Council enjoined the committee in submitting their report not to accompany it either with any comparative estimate of these creeds and regulations, or with any critical remarks upon their respective value, expediency or efficiency." This report, extending over one hundred and fifty pages, was laid before the Philadelphia Council, and a new committee was appointed, with Dr. Cairns as chairman, to consider the desirableness of defining the consensus of the Reformed confessions. At Belfast this committee reported:

"I. It is not indispensable to the Alliance, as an organization, that the consensus should, at present, be further defined.

II. The committee fully grants that there are advantages which the defining of

the consensus would secure, as working out the ends for which the organization exists.

III. The advantages which might arise from a satisfactory definition of the consensus seem to the committee, for the present, outweighed by its risks and difficulties."

And the motion of Principal Caven was adopted, viz:

"That without committing itself to all the reasonings by which the report reaches its conclusions, the Council adopt as its finding the conclusion to which it comes, viz.: That it is inexpedient at present to attempt a definition of the consensus of the Reformed Churches."

This conclusion was so generally approved that an explanatory motion, offered by Dr. Calderwood, that the Council should declare its conviction that a formal statement of the consensus of the Reformed creeds would render a great service to the cause of Christian truth, was voted down, the Council declining to commit itself even to this position. At London the subject was not opened at all, and among the various types of opinion in the Alliance to-day, there is substantial agreement that the consensus must, for the present, be left undefined.

This is the more particularly adverted to because at our last Assembly it was asserted that the Alliance had undertaken to formulate the consensus, and that our Church would ere long find herself confronted with a double creed. The assertion was so unexpected that it was not possible to produce at once the documentary evidence to show its groundlessness: the foregoing is perhaps sufficient for the purpose.

The only excuse for an assertion so wide of the truth lay in the invitation of the General Assembly of the Northern Church to the Reformed Churches holding the Presbyterian system, to prepare a short creed containing the essential articles of the Westminster Confession, to be used as the common creed of these churches, not as a substitute for the creed of any particular denomination.¹ The Alliance, however, is not to be held chargeable with the actions of any one or more of the

¹The letter addressed to our Assembly and the supreme courts of other Reformed Churches, contained the following explicit paragraph:

"Into the question of the advisability of a consensus creed, the Committee of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, do not feel called upon to enter, but prefer to leave its consideration to the several churches interested, or to the representative committee which they may respectively appoint. It is understood, however, that the creed which may be formulated by the labors of the joint consensus committee will have no binding force in any of the Presbyterian or Reformed Churches, except as first submitted to and approved by the judicatory or judicatories in whom such power of approval is vested by the laws of these churches respectively."

churches which compose it, and for our Church the matter ended when our Assembly announced that we are not prepared to unite in forming a consensus creed.

These instances are sufficient to illustrate the statement made in the outset, that it is no inconsiderable achievement to have held together the various churches represented in the Alliance for as many as sixteen years. Delicate relations like these are easily disarranged. It would not require a Boanerges to wreck the usefulness of the Alliance; and with the most generous forbearance in non-essentials, and the most judicious solution of the various difficulties as they arise the Alliance must for some time yet continue to lead a precarious existence.

II.

The results of these sixteen years of united effort, are, if estimated aright, enough in themselves to lead the churches to whatever of care and sacrifice are necessary to promote the future efficiency of the Alliance. Passing by the general and, if one may so say, the sentimental considerations, the following definite and substantial results are traceable to the Alliance:

1 An estimate approximately correct of the strength and prevalence of Presbyterianism. Our churches, though one in faith and order, have lived hitherto in provincial ignorance of each other and of the power and influence that was latent within them. The writer readily recalls the eagerness with which in his early ministry he sought in vain for some information concerning ecumenic Presbyterianism. That search need no longer be in vain. The matter of statistics engaged the attention of each Council, until at London Dr. Mathews presented a report, covering two hundred and fifty pages, and dealing with the statistics of churches, of contributions, of creeds, of collegiate institutions, of theological faculties, of mission fields and agencies, of philanthropic effort and of literary publications. It is doubtful if ever a document of greater value was laid before any Council. Its figures and lists and columns are eloquent, and the results it summarizes are massive. It shows that of presbyteries there are in the United Kingdom, 284; in Europe, 383; in America, 653; of pastoral charges in the United Kingdom, 5,181; in Europe, 4,844; in America, 14,839; of separate congregations in the United Kingdom, 5,768; in Europe, 4,284; in America, 13,379; of ministers in the United Kingdom, 4,783; in Europe, 5,527; in America, 11,906; of licentiates and students in the United Kingdom, 1,548; in Europe, 574; in America, 3,040; of

communicants in the United Kingdom, 1,394,476; in Europe, 533,934; in America, 1,561,640; of Sabbath-school attendance in the United Kingdom, 951,774; in Europe, 375,482; in America, 1,413,890. Adding to these the figures for Asia, Africa, Australia, New Zealand and the western islands, the totals are: Churches, 81; presbyteries, 1,406; pastoral charges, 25,787; separate congregations, 25,601; ministers, 23,077; licentiates and students, 5,426; communicants, 3,886,680; Sabbath-school attendance, 2,846,517. A supplementary estimate by Rev. W. H. Roberts, D. D., places the total of Presbyterian adherents at 20,198,500.

The contributions, though the returns are more incomplete, show for congregational expenses, including ministers' salaries, \$20,455,800; for (what we would call) the Invalid Fund, \$531,245; for Home Missions, \$949,210; for Church and Manse Erection, \$1,111,755; for Publication and Education, \$880,810; for Foreign Missions, \$2,160,950—a total of \$29,550,980.

This report is published in separate form, and is well worth careful study. It is an effective reply to the charge that Presbyterianism is insular or provincial, and a healthy rebuke to that spirit which sees within its own ecclesiastical boundaries the one and only Presbyterian Church. Dr. Mathews has laid all the churches under very deep obligations for his unremitting labors in this direction.

2. New life and hope to the churches on the European continent. Those were pathetic words spoken at London by Dr. Tollin, of the French Reformed Church at Magdeburg:

“We are dying out, though, because we have no accessions. The French are becoming German; the Reformed, Lutheran. We felt it an earnest need of our hearts to shake hands with the twenty millions of Reformed, and to cry to you, *Morituri te salutamus*. In death we are still one with you; one living, loving, believing, hoping, triumphing church of the Saviour who died for us and rose again. Amen.”

This is an extreme case, but it emphasizes the difficulties under which our brethren in Europe are struggling. From nearly every one come words of discouragement. The lands which tourists visit in curiosity and for information present, in spiritual things, a dark picture. The ever-present influence of Romanism, the chill of Rationalism, the want of a well-kept Sabbath, the interference of the various governments, the backwardness of the people in Christian effort, the want of a Christian literature, all conspire to make the work of the Reformed Churches a task which we can hardly appreciate. To the help

of these churches—weak in numbers, weak in resources and often weak in faith—we who are strong are called. It is sustentation work on an ecumenical scale. It is especially a providential opening for those who cannot endorse Foreign Missions, for these are not heathen to be converted, but brethren of like precious faith, to be upheld as they struggle against tremendous odds for Christ and for his church.

The Alliance has responded to this call. It has admitted on an equal footing with churches numbering hundreds of thousands of members, continental churches, such as the Free Evangelical of Geneva, with 478 members; the Free Evangelical of Germany, with 440; the Greek Evangelical, with 40 members; it has recognized *bounds* in Germany where it could not recognize synods and presbyteries; it has admitted from East Friesland the “coetus” of Emden, founded by Lasco in 1544; it has raised \$67,000 to supplement the meagre salaries of the Waldensian pastors, and \$25,000 for the Home Mission, Church Erection and Publication work of the churches in Bohemia and Moravia; and it has appointed a committee in two sections to take in charge this work on the European Continent and devise measures for its extension.

3. The new policy of coöperation in Foreign Missions. The statistics show that our churches have in the foreign field 512 foreign and 346 native ministers, with 280 licentiates, 572 other foreign and 3,669 native agents; 283,054 baptized persons and adherents, 55,610 communicants; 1042 churches and congregations; 1728 schools with 54,000 pupils; 84 high schools, colleges and seminaries with 6,603 students.

But under independent action the work is often duplicated and the effort is wasted. India is an illustration of this, for thirteen or fourteen different Presbyterian agencies are at work there, making of course as many different native Hindu churches, while these united would form a church with 229 congregations, 11,503 native communicants and 53 native pastors.

It is not surprising therefore that the first Council at once took up the question of coöperation on the foreign field. The steps by which it was reached during successive meetings cannot be recited here, further than to note that the plan outlined by our honored secretaries, Drs. J. Leighton Wilson and M. H. Houston, was ultimately adopted. At London the following was unanimously adopted:

“WHEREAS, previous meetings of this Council have approved of the general principle of the organic union and independence of the church in the mission-

field; and whereas four propositions embodying this general principle have been submitted to the supreme courts of the allied churches,¹ and have been approved of by them; resolved, that this Council rejoices that this great principle may be considered as unanimously accepted, and that it only remains for the allied churches to carry out the principle in the management of their various missions."

What relief this will afford to discord, to rivalry and to the waste of men, money and labor; what harmony of plans in the selection of locations, in the appointment of men, in the use of the press, will ensue; what recognition it will give to the inalienable rights of native churches and to their national characteristics, we at home may perhaps but dimly appreciate, but to the missionaries in the foreign field the Alliance will have proven its right to a place in history if it accomplishes nothing more. This policy—coöperation, confederation, incorporation—has already been more or less successfully adopted in work in Brazil, Japan, South Africa, China, Trinidad and the New Hebrides.

4. The realization of the scriptural unity of the church. This can only be briefly adverted to, for its proper treatment is a separate undertaking. The Master prayed that his own might all be one, and yet there is no word of his more sadly perverted, none made to sanction more ruthless sacrifices of principle and of priceless history, none used to justify more heartless combinations of men in various external unions, each of which aspires to be known as *the church*.

Union is not unity. Scriptural unity is not found in a human organization which for the sake of numbers tolerates within its fold all varieties of belief, of misbelief, and of unbelief, and which seeks to

¹ The American form of these notable propositions is as follows:

"1. It is in the highest degree desirable that mission churches should be encouraged to become independent of the home churches; *i. e.*, self-supporting and self-governing.

"2. It is desirable that churches organized under Presbyterian order, and holding the Reformed faith, should be placed under a Presbytery within territorial boundaries, suitable for effective government, and that such Presbytery, wherever constituted, should, as far as practicable, include all the Presbyterian churches within the bounds, by whatever branches of the European or American churches originated.

"3. In the infancy of the native church, it is most desirable that the foreign missionaries should be associated with the Presbytery, either as advisers only, or in some closer relation.

"4. It is undesirable that the Presbyteries of native churches should be represented in supreme courts at home, the development and full organization of independent churches being what is to be arrived at, whether these are founded by a single foreign church or by two or more such churches."

compensate for this hollowness by dignifying with apostolic functions its ministry and imposing a rigidly uniform worship on its adherents. Scriptural unity is the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, and is therefore a doctrinal unity, based on what men believe in common concerning Jesus and his salvation. It is attained as men leave behind the first principles of the doctrine of Christ and go on to perfection, and as they realize one body, one Spirit, one hope of their calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in all. It is never fully realized amid the infirmities of this present world, but it can be approximately realized; and as the Reformed symbols mark perhaps the highest reach of man in his progress towards the faith and the knowledge of the Son of God, they offer the scriptural basis on which that unity may be begun—but begun only, for only in the unseen and eternal beyond will the church of God attain to this its true unity.

W. S. PLUMER BRYAN.

Asheville, N. C.

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

DABNEY'S DISCUSSIONS.

DISCUSSIONS. *By Robert L. Dabney, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Texas, and for many years Professor of Theology in Union Theological Seminary in Virginia.* Edited by C. R. Vaughan, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of New Providence, Va. Vol. II., Evangelical. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1891.

This second volume of Dr. Dabney's Discussions appeared in October last. It somewhat smaller than the first volume, but presents the same general appearance. There is an unfortunate clerical error in the name of the volume for which, it is to be supposed, Dr. Dabney is not responsible. It is called "Evangelical." I am very far from asserting that anything which Dr. Dabney would publish could be anything else than evangelical. But in the sense intended this word as the title of this volume is a misnomer. These Discussions are mainly, though not exclusively, ecclesiastical, and this is the designation of the volume that was promised by the editor in the preface to the whole series.

The proof-reading is not absolutely perfect,—what book ever is? In the spelling of one or two Hebrew words the printers have evidently failed to understand the editor's corrections. An editorial defect of the first volume has been corrected to a great extent in this. With a few exceptions each discussion is accompanied by a note indicating when and where it first appeared. On the other hand, the want of arrangement or classification of the Discussions appears in this volume, as in the first, though not quite so glaringly. It is true that some of the Discussions defy classification; but there seems to be no reason why the speech on "Fusion with the United Synod" should not be grouped with other Discussions on "Fraternal Relations," and the like; or why, of two articles on Theological Education, one should be placed near the beginning and the other at the close of the collection.

The volume opens with a noble discussion of the "Proper Uses and Results of a Study of Church History." It is the discourse delivered by the author when he was inducted into the chair of Ecclesiastical History and Polity in Union Seminary in 1854. Few of our ministers, I suspect, have seen the discourse, and many of them, it is to be feared, are unmindful of the importance of the Study of Church History. One of them recently confessed that he had never been able to appreciate the value of this study. To all such this Discussion is most heartily commended.

A few of the Discussions in this volume have lost somewhat of the interest they once had, because they treat of questions that are settled. Of these there are two on the Revised Book of Discipline, and several on our relations to other ecclesiastical bodies. These have still a historical value; and, like all Dr. Dabney's well-considered work, are worthy of attention, because they are pregnant with

thought expressed logically, clearly and forcefully; but it is not to be expected that a speech on the Union of the Old School Assembly, South, with the United Synod, or on Fraternal Correspondence with the Northern Assembly, will command the same attention now as when these questions were "burning."

Those who did not hear it will be glad of a chance to read Dr. Dabney's celebrated speech on the "Ecclesiastical Equality of Negroes," delivered on the floor of the Synod of Virginia in 1867. Many will differ *toto celo* from the conclusion reached, and may not altogether approve the spirit of the author, but they will see in this speech Dr. Dabney when he was thoroughly aroused, when he let himself out, when his heart and head and tongue were all aflame, when his words burned. This was indeed a sight to see, when the orator as well as the discourse was present. The discourse itself, deprived of this living element, is well worth looking at. It affords, if nothing more, a field for a somewhat exhaustive study of caustic adjectives.

But this second volume, like the first, contains a large quantity of matter which is of present and perennial interest and value. There is, for example, the discussion of the question: "What is a Call to the Ministry?" Our pastors will find this very useful in their work. So as to the discussion of "Lay Preaching," of "The Public Preaching of Women," of "A Thoroughly Educated Ministry," and "Theories of the Eldership." These are still "burning questions," and conservatives in every church may find here facts, arguments and rhetoric, with which to contend with their adversaries.

The discussion of "Theories of the Eldership" is a very able defence of the position on this subject held and taught by Drs. Miller and Thornwell, and which is now supposed to be generally accepted in our church. It is conclusive as against the theory maintained by Dr. Charles Hodge and others. Dr. Dabney shows that if ruling elders are not presbyter-bishops they have no place in the church. Candor compels the expression of a doubt as to the author's success in his attempt to establish his own view as to two classes of presbyters, and especially as to his success in meeting the conclusion that all presbyters are, or ought to be, preachers or teaching-elders, drawn from the fact that the New Testament requires them all to be "apt to teach," and to be "able by sound doctrine both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers." To this conclusion, thus drawn, viz., that all presbyters are, or ought to be, officially teachers and preachers, Dr. Dabney demurs as follows:

"The ruling elder needs it [aptness to teach] just as truly as the preacher does, although not in the same plase, even if he is never to preach in public. It has been well remarked in support of this assertion, that the ruling elder should preach the gospel from house to house, that he should be the private instructor of all inquirers, that he should be a catechist and Bible-class teacher. This is all true, but it comes very far short of the true strength of the case. Limit the ruling elder's task as strictly as possible to the business of ruling, and still his function is just as truly and as purely a *teaching function* as that of the preacher. He rules only by teaching, that is, his whole authority is exercised through an inculcative process. The only power exercised in church government is spiritual power; this regards each man as a free agent, possessed of the right of private judgment, and hence has its only support in that of didactic evidence. The church has legitimate power over the conscience only as she presents to that conscience, in the exercise of its own private judgment, what ought to be adequate evidence that her command is scriptural. The sceptre of Christ's kingdom is his word; *to wield this is to teach.*

And we distinctly declare, that our tendency to consider that teaching must mean preaching alone arises only from our overweening and unscriptural fondness for public preaching over the quiet, efficacious inculcation of the spiritual inspector. Had we used Christ's plan more efficiently we should not have contracted this perverted notion. Were ruling elders what they ought to be we should perhaps find that, so far from regarding preaching as nearly all of religious teaching, it is less than half. But we repeat, to rule is to teach; and therefore the ruling elder should be 'apt to teach,' though he never mount the pulpit." Pp. 145, 146.

If Dr. Dabney's premises in this passage are true, they sustain the conclusion he seeks to overthrow. If the ruling elder as such is to be a catechist and a Bible-class teacher, if he has, *ex officio*, a teaching function as truly and as purely as that of the preacher, then the distinction made by Dr. Dabney and those who agree with him between the ruling elder and the teaching elder is absurd. More than this: If the ruling elder is to preach the gospel from house to house; if he is an ambassador of Christ, a *κηρύξ* to the individual and the family, then, with the single exception of that self-possession which enables men successfully to "mount the pulpit" and effectively to speak to large audiences, he needs all those gifts, qualifications, attainments and graces, which should characterize the preacher; and having these, the distinction between him and the preacher disappears.

The distinctions made in this connection by Dr. Dabney and others between teaching and preaching, between discharging these functions in public and in private, are altogether misleading. There is a very important distinction between teaching, properly so-called, and preaching. There is a distinction, but altogether unimportant, between the discharge of these functions in public and in private. But neither of these distinctions has any special bearing on this controversy. The real distinction is between official or authorized teaching and preaching on the one hand, and unofficial or unauthorized teaching and preaching on the other hand; or, if it be preferred so to designate the two circumstances in which the functions are discharged, the distinction is between *private* teaching and preaching, that which a man does as a private person on his own motion and authority, and *public* teaching and preaching, that which is done officially on the motion and authority of some public body. Dr. Dabney is a recognized teacher and preacher of the Presbyterian Church both in public and in private. He is duly authorized by a public body to discharge both functions under both sets of circumstances. He is an official of the Presbyterian Church. Mr. Moody, so far as is known to me, has no such authorization. Whether he teach or preach in public or in private, he does so as a private individual; he goes forth on his own personal authority. He is not an official in any church.

Now, then, the question is: Does the New Testament teach that the presbyter-bishops required to be ordained in every church were divided into two classes, one of which consisted of *official* teachers and preachers, who were also rulers officially, and the other class of men who, though authorized to rule officially, had no *official* or church authority to teach and to preach?

It is not proposed in this connection to discuss this question. It is too important and far-reaching to be decided off-hand, or in a remark or two made in a book-review. It is enough to say that Dr. Dabney's argument to sustain the affirmative of this question is very unsatisfying, and his account of the functions of the presbyter, regarded as a ruler, goes very far towards establishing the negative.

Along another line there are several valuable discussions. The one on "Dan-

gerous Reading," another, much more elaborate, on "The Sabbath and the State, are worthy of careful attention. The "Dancing Question" is fully discussed, and in doing so the author presents a *thesaurus* of facts, arguments and authorities, ancient and modern. It is commended to all who have to contend with this subject.

Besides those already referred to, there are two classes of discussions which call for a brief notice. One of these consists of several papers on "Ministerial Support." These are as timely now as when they were first published. All our elders and deacons should read them. The other class consists of articles and letters published just before the war between the States. They very fairly and forcefully represent the religious attitude of Christians in Virginia and the South generally at that time. They should be read by the men of the generation which has succeeded Dr. Dabney's. Many of them will be surprised to learn how earnestly and zealously their fathers and elder brethren, even those who are now supposed to have been extreme men in those trying times, deprecated the condition into which the state and the church were plunged, and how earnestly they prayed and labored to avert the war.

There remain to be noticed several valuable discussions which cannot be classified, and we must be content with a bare mention of their scope. Perhaps the most important of these is entitled, "Prelacy a Blunder." In this discussion Dr. Dabney assumes that the corner-stone of the foundation upon which the prelate theory rests is, "that Episcopal ordination *confers* the spiritual gifts, or *χρησιματια* of spiritual powers, instead of merely *recognizing* ministerial qualifications and conferring official title. And this assumption, in its turn, rests upon the false claim that the acts of the apostles laying on hands to confer the Holy Ghost, as in Acts viii. 17; 2 Tim. i. 6, are the prelatists' precedents and warrants for it." To attack and overthrow these assumptions is the special object of the discussion. The true doctrine of the *χρησιματια* conferred by the apostles is held to be this: that they were supernatural in character, and the power to bestow them was granted to the apostles and others for a special and temporary purpose, viz., to be signs to unbelievers, attesting the credibility of the apostles and early disciples witnessing to the resurrection of Christ. This view is maintained by Dr. Dabney with great ability, and the whole discussion deserves the careful attention of all our churchmen who have to confront the arrogant pretensions of the "Papists and their Apists."

Dr. Dabney's review of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Walnut Street Church case appears in this volume. Many of our officials have read it. Those who have not should do so. It is able and learned. I have read several reviews of this discussion, but have not been able to see that the opinions and arguments presented in it have been successfully met. The question discussed is of great importance, inasmuch as it involves the rights of the beneficiaries and their successors to that vast wealth which the piety of the age is bestowing on the church, and which is so likely to fill prelates and church courts with the lust of power.

"Broad Churchism" and "What is Christian Union?" are both able and timely. As will be inferred at once from the general position of the author, in the former of these, which was originally delivered as a sermon constituting the General Assembly at Huntsville, Ala., in 1871, he enforces upon church teachers and rulers the sacred obligation of strict orthodoxy, and in the latter, which origi-

nally appeared as two articles in the *Central Presbyterian*, he maintains the thesis, that a general organic union of Protestant Churches would not promote true Christian union.

All that in general was said of the discussions presented in the first volume of this series is true, with the exceptions and limitations indicated above, of those now under review. There is in all a wealth of thought and a clear and cogent method of presenting it which will serve to make this volume a valuable addition to any library.

E. C. GORDON.

“MACREALSHAM’S” ROMANS DISSECTED.

ROMANS DISSECTED: A New Critical Analysis of the Epistle to the Romans. *By E. D. MacRealsham* New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., 38 West Twenty-third street. 84 pp. Cr. 8vo. 1891.

Seldom of late have we enjoyed such a literary treat as this well-printed, thick-papered, and wide-margined brochure has afforded us. It is exactly in the line of Archbishop Whately’s *Historic Doubts Respecting the Existence of Napoleon Bonaparte*, but immeasurably more elaborate and erudite. It more nearly resembles the exquisite ironical contention of the late Henry Rogers in *The Eclipse of Faith* and kindred writings in the same general manner, against the class of freethinkers headed and represented by Mr. Francis William Newman, and especially that delicious piece of humor in which that superb apologist resolves the whole chronicle of the Tractarian Movement at Oxford into a manifest allegory—as plainly indicated by the very names of the characters in the fictitious drama, Newman, Wise-man, etc. The cue was given to all these writers by the *Leo Provincencour*, of Blaise Pascal, of which, in many ways unapproachable work the keen, and racy, and mirth-provoking dialogue (with its unanswerable and overwhelming erotetic dialectic) of *The Eclipse of Faith*, is, in certain respects, an acknowledged imitation. But the method of the Socratic conversation is not pursued in Rogers’s laughable exposure of the Oxford myth, and certainly not in *Historic Doubts* or in *Romans Dissected*.

But this remarkable *tour de force* of the so-styled Mr. [Professor?] MacRealsham stands alone, so far as we are informed, in the whole circuit of this species of literature as regards the scale of its pretensions, both in the way of acquaintance with past and contemporary investigations in Germany, and of unflinching perseverance in detailed and comprehensive argument. Precisely the same method as that of our facetious but redoubtable champion has been applied by more than one critic (notably by Dr. McCosh) to the problem of interpreting one of the Orphic effusions of one Dr. Charles Briggs—whose name is beginning to acquire a measure of notoriety in church circles. This unbound volume is on a much grander scale. The feat performed is very much as if some leonine foreigner were to succeed in casting ridicule upon Liszt or Rubinstein by a masterly reproduction, and at the same time burlesque, of his mode of playing on the piano. The irony of the treatise is more occult, if not more delicate, than that either of Rogers or of Whately, and in that particular reminds us of the irony of Swift in portions of *Gulliver*, and that of Irving in the long cosmological introduction to *Knickerbocker’s History of New York*. Indeed, the joke is so profound and veiled that the clever author would be sure to be taken by many sober-sided readers in dead earnest but for his

own serious protest against any such construction of his language. At this point our rarely-endowed wit and scholar and disputant is not unlike Mr. Maskelyne, the London wizard, who would be apt to be revered by the spiritualists, whose cabinets and dark seances and mirrored ghosts he repeats in the presence of his audience, as one of the most powerful of mediums but for his emphatic and nightly annunciation that he does it all by trickery.

In brief this is, as the admiring and confessedly competent American editor, Dr. T. W. Chambers, says it is, at once an amusing *jeu d'esprit*, and an apparently triumphant argument.

It is well known that Baur left the four great Pauline epistles of the main doctrinal group (First and Second Corinthians, Galatians, Romans), unscathed by the destructive critical process which he applied so ruthlessly to the other letters attributed to the Cilician apostle, as well as to a considerable proportion of what remained of the New Testament after the remorseless labors of Semler, Eichhorn, and Strauss. It is also conceded that if we except one or two hair-brained vagaries, no fairly respectable efforts up to very late dates had been made to disturb this favorable estimate. Now our author, smiling as he does behind his mask, gravely proceeds to point out that no book, however well established as to its authenticity or genuineness would be proof against the methods and processes of the "Higher Criticism" when pushed to the extreme of extravagance actually attained in the criticism of the books of Moses; and that the Epistle to the Romans, itself, if subjected to the same rigid and unfriendly analysis as that which has been brought to bear upon the Pentateuch would leave that great masterpiece of the Pauline logic and hortation in as bad a plight as the dismembered body of Osiris.

The methods pursued in this ingenious work, then, is that of a critical analysis which results in showing that that book of all others in the whole Bible (with scarcely the exception of the Epistle to the Hebrews), of which the integrity is most evidently unimpeachable, being, or having been regarded as being, from the beginning to the end one flowing concatenation of characteristic Pauline arguments as closely linked together as the mediæval coat of mail,*—is after all a composite production of at least four different authors, three, at least, if not all of whom put forward the pretension to be Paul, the Apostle to the Gentiles. Now, manifestly, if this can be proved by the "Higher Criticism," anything, and of course too much, can be proved by the Higher Criticism.

But our author contends, with the utmost apparent reason, that his peculiar analysis and dissection of the book of Romans is carefully copied from the analysis and dissection of the Pentateuch on the part of the most "advanced" exponents of the neological Higher Criticism of Holland and Germany.

The four unknown authors of the Epistle are conveniently designated as G.¹, G.², J. C., and C. J. The argument of this novel, but seemingly consistent, critic is like that of the Pentateuchal analysis, three-fold, viz: Doctrinal, Linguistic, and Historical. The signs G.¹ and G.² are used because in the sections sacred to the first two composers, Jesus Christ is hardly ever mentioned; only God. These two initial writers differ however mutually and decidedly in their theological drift. The terms J. C. and C. J. are employed to denote the remaining two composers, because in the sections attributed to the one the Redeemer is called Jesus Christ, but

*See Shedd, Introduction to Commentary on the Romans.

in the sections attributed to the other he is spoken of as Christ Jesus. All four are held to be Christians, but G¹. portrays Christianity as an ethical institute, a spiritualized Judaism. The *law* is here exalted at the expense of *faith*. In G²., on the contrary *faith in God*, not in Jesus, is everything; in J. C. *faith in Christ*; in C. J. the necessity of spiritual union *between the Christian and Christ* issuing in the replacement of the life of the flesh by that of the Spirit.

The same general conclusion as to the four specific fabricators of the book, in the supposed pious interest of the church, is then reached by the linguistic, and lastly by the historical argument.

Our author, who is all the time grimly laughing in his sleeve, admits that it is not romantic to have to give up the names of Moses, David, John, or Paul, and say J., E., P., J. E., G., J. C., etc., but urges that it is a good thing to be able in this way to so large an extent to eliminate the personal equation; as the highest plane of exact science is that of the algebraic notation. "Accordingly," he goes on to argue in the very same manner of *The Eclipse of Faith*, "it would really be well if all writings were anonymous or pseudonymous, if all orators could speak unseen, or rather, since even the audible voice often exercises a biasing effect, if there were no orators at all, and everything thought and expressed could be found only in the unimpassioned form of anonymous writings." (P. 83.)

One of his chapters (the first) has a cadence strangely resembling the familiar tone of that great scholar and audacious genius Heinrich Ewald; whose name, however, is not mentioned. "It is with no small degree of confidence that the following analysis of the Epistle to the Romans is presented to the world as one which will at once commend itself to all candid minds as unmistakably correct. Even though future critics should need to modify our results in some unessential particulars, the analysis in its main features must be regarded as final. . . ." (P. 8.)

H. C. ALEXANDER.

SANDAY'S ORACLES OF GOD.

THE ORACLES OF GOD: Nine Lectures on the Nature and Extent of Biblical Inspiration and of the Old Testament Scriptures at the Present Time, with Two Appendices. By W. Sanday, M. A., D. D., LL. D., Dean Ireland's Professor of Exegesis; Fellow of Exeter College; Oxford Preacher at Whitehall. Second Edition Revised. London: Longmans, Green & Co.; New York: 15 East 16th street. 1891. [All rights reserved]. (xiv, 156 pp. 12mo.)

This is another book of marked ability, scholarship, special knowledge, and intellectual and literary charm. Luther is credited with the observation that the devil ought not to have all the good music. In the same way we have often thought that the devil ought not to have all the good rhetoric and eloquence, all the good poetry and good prose style, and he certainly has not, as witness, not to cite the inspired examples, such names as those of Chrysostom, Augustine, Erasmus, Calvin, Bengel, Milton, Jeremy Taylor, Bossuet, Fénelon, Pascal, Vinet, Monod, Godet, Krummacher, and Liddon. Yet the adversary in the great apologetic debate that is now going on has, on the whole, we fear, the advantage of us on the points just adverted to, who conceive ourselves to be the irrefutable champions of Christ's cause in "an evil and adulterous generation." We may carry the heaviest guns, but they have the most shapely bows and the most taking flags and pennons. The

logic and the truth, we do not question, are on our side; but the refinement, the taste, the culture, the special equipment, it is to be apprehended, are oftener on the other. A plain and awkward Methodist once had an oral controversy at Winchester, Kentucky, with a smooth, specious, humorous, impervious "Reformer," on the mode of baptism. The arguments of the Methodist were cogent, unanswerable. The reasoning of the "Reformer" was as flimsy as it sometimes appeared disingenuous; but he always "came up smiling" and carried everything before him with the floating majority. One of the auctioneers at a church bazaar in Queenstown, Ireland, said jocosely to another, "you may say what you please, but *I have the crowd.*"

We do not apply this opprobriously, or at all, to so sincere and devout a man as Dr. Sanday. There is, nevertheless, as Dr. Boyd has so clearly pointed out in *The Recreations of a Country Parson*, a supreme art of "putting things." Pope had this in perfection; so had Horace before him, and Tacitus, and Juvenal. Full half the power of Mr. Huxley lies just here; and also that of his antagonist, Mr. Frederic Harrison.

But is the author of this richly-stored volume an enemy or a friend? Undoubtedly he *means* amity. The *hands*, too, are certainly those of Jacob. This is the most striking attempt that has met our eye to state and recommend the theory of *Biblical Inspiration* that is held in common by Dr. Eduard Richm, at one time professor at Halle; Schlattmann, now deceased, but another Halle professor; Professors Driver and Cheyne, of Oxford; Dr. Bruce, of Scotlaed; Dr. G. P. Fisher of Yale; Principal Robertson, of Durham; Dr. Briggs, and we presume, in its main outlines, the theory held by a considerable majority of the best known Biblical experts of our day. That theory is that the Bible does not *contain* the infallible word of God in the sense that a full measure contains its own total "content," but merely in the sense that it *includes it*, as the banker's safe may be said to contain his money and securities. Agreeably to this view, which we are sorry to say seems to have been for some time getting to be the popular and accepted one in what are generally considered to be the most authoritative quarters, God has been pleased to make his divine and infallible revelation to be the spiritual kernel that is wrapt up somehow in a secular and altogether fallible husk or shell.

Of course this is better than the more radical theory which undertakes to get rid of *all* divine, or certainly of all divinely infallible, revelation; either by denying it outright as Theodore Parker did, or by defining it clean away as Schleiermacher and Morell did. According to this more recent, but by no means wholly novel, presentation, the divine (because spiritual) truth in the Bible bears much the same relation to the body of the Scriptures that the honey Sampson found bore to the carcase of the lion, and Sampson's celebrated riddle thus meets with a new and curious solution: "Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness."

Many, however, will continue to exclaim of this theory, "It has taken away my Lord." The whole Bible is then no longer from the beginning to the end in strictness of speech God's word, but only *part* of it is.

We are pleased to learn that Professor Sanday would be "loth to believe that our Lord *accommodated* his language to current notions, knowing them to be false." (P. 111.)

The author of this brilliant duodecimo thus sums up briefly what seem to him

to be the results of his investigation. "What is the relation of the natural to the supernatural, of the human to the divine in the Bible? They shade off into each other by almost insensible degrees; but at the two ends of the scale they are wide enough apart to stand out quite clearly. In all that relates to the revelation of God and of his will, the writers assert for themselves a definite inspiration; they claim to speak with an authority higher than their own. But in regard to the narrative of events, and to processes of literary composition, there is nothing so exceptional as to exempt them from the conditions to which other works would be exposed at the same place and time." (P. 75.)

The narrative of events, then, is not to be regarded as inspired with an authority higher than the writers' own! Does this refer to *all* or only to *some* events, and if so, to what events? Is the narrative of the creation, is that of the fall, is that of the incarnation, the crucifixion, the resurrection of our Lord, in any sense or degree "inspired" from above?

Waiving this point, this theory viewed broadly is hardly distinguishable in its essentials from that of Dr. Briggs and his trans-Atlantic guides and sponsors—for Dr. Briggs did not, as many appear to suppose, *invent* this by no means perfectly recent view of Scripture, or in any manner improve it.

Over against this theory in all its forms we modestly venture to place what we consider to be, after making due allowances, the main consensus of orthodox Christendom in all ages.

We confess to some surprise that such a master of English as Dr. Sanday should make use of the word "solemnize" that he does at the bottom of page 112.

H. C. ALEXANDER.

DALE'S CHRIST AND THE GOSPELS.

THE LIVING CHRIST AND THE FOUR GOSPELS. *By R. W. Dale, LL. D.* New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1890. Pp. ix., 299. Price \$1.50.

This volume consists of fourteen lectures to the Carrs Lane congregation, by Dr. Dale, of Birmingham, England. The title is an apt one, and fairly descriptive of the contents of the book. In these lectures, admirably adapted to earnest hearers of ordinary intelligence, Dr. Dale aims to shew that in the four Gospels we have a thoroughly trustworthy account of the Christ who lived and walked among men—the Living Christ—according to the conception formed of him in the minds of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.

In the first four lectures he discusses the argument based upon the believer's experience of the Living Christ; and upon this he rightly lays the greatest stress, regarding it as fundamental, and affording a solid basis for our faith, even though all other arguments should fail.

In the opening lecture he calls attention to the remarkable indifference with which the majority of Christians regard the fierce assaults of modern critics upon the Word of God; and he gives it as his opinion that these persistent and seemingly successful attacks "have not in any large number of cases destroyed faith, *where faith already existed*, but where faith does not exist, they appear to very many persons to create an insuperable obstacle to faith." (P. 9.) We think that he might have made the statement even stronger, and affirmed that faith has not been destroyed in *any* case where it already existed; since it is clear, from the whole trend

of his argument, that it is "saving faith" of which he is here speaking. He proceeds to say, that to those who feel constrained to reject the Scripture narratives as untrustworthy, "there is something perplexing in the persistency of the faith of the great majority of Christian believers;" and this perplexity is greatly enhanced by the consideration, that "among those who remain Christian, there are men whose intellectual vigor, patience, and keenness are equal to their own; men who are their equals in general intellectual culture, and who know as much as they know about the currents of modern thought; candid men; men who are incorruptible in their loyalty to truth; men who have a due sense of the immense importance, in relation to the higher life of the human race, of the questions at issue." (P. 9.)

In answer to the question thus raised: "*How is it that the faith in Christ of such men is unshaken?*" he says, in the recapitulation of his argument:

"My first answer to the question was this: That whatever may have been the original grounds of their faith, their faith has been verified in their own personal experience. They trusted in Christ for the remission of sins, and they have been liberated from the sense of guilt; for deliverance from sin and the chains of evil habits have been broken or loosened, and the fires of evil passion have been quenched or subdued. They trusted in Christ for a firmer strength to resist temptation and to live righteously, and the strength has come. They have received from him—they are sure of it—a new life, a life akin to the life of God. . . . Whatever uncertainties there may be about the historical worth of the four narratives which profess to tell the story of Christ's earthly ministry, their faith in him is firm, because they know by their own experience that the Living Christ is the Lord and Saviour of men.

"My second answer to the question was this: That there are Christian men who would say that the representation of the Lord Jesus Christ in the four Gospels appeals, and appeals immediately, to all those elements and powers of life that give answer to the manifestations of the presence of God. They believe in Christ because they see God in him. They do not ask for proofs that he wrought miracles: He himself is the great Miracle. . . . For these two reasons, critical and historical controversies do not destroy faith."

The remaining lectures discuss in detail the historical evidence for the Gospels. Beginning with Eusebius in the fourth century, and working back, the lecturer adduces in order the testimony of Clement, Tertullian, Irenæus, Tatian, Justin Martyr, Marcion, Papias, and Polycarp. By cumulative evidence he shows that the Gospels known and received by the church in the days of Eusebius were the very same which were known by the fathers of the second century, some of whom, like Polycarp, were the disciples and associates of the apostles and others who had known the Lord, and who, consequently, could scarcely be deceived as to the trustworthiness of these narratives.

While intended for a popular audience, these lectures evince no little thought and research, and are most admirably adapted to the wants of thinking men who lack both time and opportunity to make original investigation.

Yorkville, S. C.

T. R. ENGLISH.

GLADDEN'S WHO WROTE THE BIBLE.

WHO WROTE THE BIBLE? A Book for the People. *By Washington Gladden.* Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1891. Pp. 381. Price \$1.25.

It is always a pleasure to bestow merited praise. Whatever, then, may be thought of the author of this little book, the publishers of it are worthy of all

commendation. There may be a difference of opinion as to the meritoriousness of the aim of the book, but there can hardly be two opinions as to the merit of its mechanical execution. The paper is good, the letter-press clear, the binding neat, and sufficiently strong. Again, whatever may be thought of the spirit of the book, its style is admirable. There may be two opinions as to the weight of the argument, but none can charge the style with being heavy. The English is pure and simple. The sentences are terse and lucid. If we cannot always agree with Mr. Gladden, we can, at least, always understand him, and that in itself is no small comfort.

What we have further to say can best be summarized under the following heads:

1. The title of the book is, in part at least, misleading. Instead of "Who wrote the Bible?" it might more appropriately have been, "Who did not write the Bible." For it is really an effort to prove that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, nor Isaiah the book that bears his name, and so on. Or, "Who did not write the Bible?" For, what with original sources, redactors and re-redactors there may be, according to Mr. Gladden, a well-nigh innumerable company who had a hand in the writing of the Bible. Or, with still greater propriety, it might have been entitled, "A spirited and spiteful attack upon the doctrines of verbal and plenary inspiration." The doctrine of inspiration in either of these forms seems to fire the soul of Mr. Gladden with intense indignation.

2. The second part of the title of the book, *A Book for the People*, unlike the first, is entirely appropriate. Not only so, it is full of significance. Fifty years ago, the doings of the so-called "Higher Critics" had attracted but little attention even among the scholars of this country and England. Ten years ago, the discussion of these questions was confined entirely to scholars. The appearance of this book is, as it were, a notice served upon the church that from this time forward, until a settlement of some sort is arrived at, they will be discussed in every Young Men's Christian Association Bible-class, in every Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor, in every College coterie, at every hearth-stone. If there is peril in these views, then we should wake up to a thorough appreciation of the fact that the peril is even now upon us. Ignorance, indifference, or carnal security in reference to these matters will henceforth be without excuse. The views of the "Higher Critics" are being rapidly popularized, and propagated among all the more intelligent people of our churches. This, it may be, is more true of the churches of the North than of those in our own immediate bounds, but we will make a sad, possibly a fatal, mistake, if we flatter ourselves that we will not have to face these issues.

3. We note, with a certain sense of relief, that the "*odium theologicum*," and the spirit of dogmatism is not confined to us poor orthodox "Advanced thinkers" and "Liberals" sometimes take us sharply to task because we fail to maintain an imperturbable calmness and courtesy when contending *pro aris et focis*. Mr. Gladden has not always profited by these teachings of those with whom he aspires in this book to be ranked; for we find him indulging in such language as the following; "This is a fair sample of the *lazy traditionalism* which Christian opinion has been constrained to follow"; and again, "For the errors are here; they speak for themselves; nothing but a *mole-eyed dogmatism* can evade them;" once more, "Are not they *idolaters* who make it treason to disbelieve a single word of the Bible," &c. (italics all ours). Now we are not of the number who seem to fancy

that there can be war without wounds, nor do we think that the times are just yet ripe for the settlement of all differences in the intellectual and moral spheres, any more than in the political by referring them to a "Board of Arbitration." On the contrary, we believe that "there is a time to kill," and privately cherish a belief not only in the manliness, but also in the common sense of the maxim attributed to Luther. "When you are an anvil bear, but when you are a hammer strike." We have referred to these outbursts of spleen upon the part of Mr. Gladden merely to show that, if there be any odium attaching to the *odium theologicum*, it should not be wholly confined to the orthodox.

4. We would not for a moment question the breadth of Mr. Gladden's reading, or the accuracy of his scholarship. It is evident, however, that he has a faulty memory. He says, for instance, "The books of Samuel are generally ascribed to Samuel as their author." We would respectfully ask since when? Thomas Scott, whose commentary Mr. Gladden has doubtless read, sought something like a century ago to disabuse the popular mind of this mistake. If any respectable writer ever asserted it, we would be glad to be informed of his name.

5. Mr. Gladden's book is interesting as an illustration of the nature and power of what may very properly be called the Mew Traditionalism. Whereas the old traditionalism appealed to the fathers, or the *consensus ecclesie*, embodied in some creed or creeds, the latter appeals to "modern scholarship." They are both alike in all essential particulars. They alike demand unquestioning submission to naked authority. And alike they threaten the stubborn recusant with pains and penalties, the former threatening to brand him a "heretic," the latter to brand him a "fool." Truly, it is a sad choice. We confess to a hearty and wholesome dread of deserving either epithet. But neither can be deserved so long as loyal allegiance is yielded to the facts of Scripture. And as we are persuaded that there are many who do not allow the dread of having the former epithet applied to them to deter them from looking into and passing upon the "Traditions of the Elders" for themselves, so we are persuaded that they will not permit the dread of having the latter epithet rashly hurled at them, prevent them from challenging and examining for themselves the claims of "modern scholarship." For if "synods and councils may err, and have erred," so may "modern scholarship," despite its more than ecclesiastical arrogance. We weary of the constant harping upon "the assured results of modern criticism." It is a species of bullying for which our only feeling is one of contempt. Truly, the modern critic, whatever may be true of his results, himself is not lacking in assurance. We would have much more confidence in the trustworthiness of these results, if those who seek to thrust them upon us would themselves show enough confidence in them simply to state them, and the evidence upon which they are supposed to rest, and then leave them to commend themselves to honest and intelligent minds by their own intrinsic force. The lad who drew a picture and then wrote under it in large capitals "THIS IS A COW" may thereby have expressed his own assurance of the triumphant success of his efforts as an artist, but he certainly did not adopt a course calculated to beget a like confidence in others.

5. We would advise our ministerial readers to get this little book, and read it for themselves. If these views are to be disseminated among our people, then the sooner we post ourselves in regard to them the better.

W. M. MCPHEETERS.

PRICE'S SYLLABUS OF OLD TESTAMENT HISTORY.

A SYLLABUS OF OLD TESTAMENT HISTORY: Outlines and Literature, with an Introductory Treatment of Biblical Geography. By Ira M. Price, Ph. D., (Leipsic), Professor of Hebrew and the Cognate Languages in the Theological Seminary, Morgan Park, Chicago. Pp. viii., 198. Chicago and New York: Fleming H. Revell. 1890. Price \$1.

Every teacher knows the value of the syllabus. For advanced students it is a far more stimulating and fruitful method than the use of a text-book. As the true teacher is the man who can throw his subject out of connection with books and make it live before his students independently of this or that authority, so one of the surest marks of the true teacher is his use of the syllabus or some equivalent thereof, as distinguished from slavish adherence to the *ipse dixit* of a single writer. There are undoubtedly some excellent text-books of Biblical History, *e. g.*, Smith's and Blaikie's. Of the merits of the former especially we have the highest opinion. But even that needs to be supplemented by the use of a syllabus. Not only does it promote more thorough and independent study, but it affords the opportunity for a more comprehensive treatment. The field of Old Testament History has widened vastly in our day, and the material to be handled has been greatly increased by disinterred contributions, before unknown, from the history of peoples contemporary with the ancient Israelites. The book before us aims to furnish a conspectus and plan of work for this broad and thorough study of Old Testament History. It is easy to see at a glance that the author is a practiced teacher. There is a wide difference between books that are made to order and books that have grown up out of a live teacher's recognition of the actual needs of the classroom. This work belongs to the latter category, and shows its origin on every page. It is not a book to read but to study, and is designed for use in Seminaries, Colleges, and Training Classes. And if such works were more generally studied and such methods more rigorously pursued in such institutions, Presbyteries would not have such frequent occasion to stand aghast at the scandalous ignorance evinced by the answers of some of their candidates for licensure in regard to the cardinal facts of the Biblical History, and intelligent occupants of the pews in our churches would be less frequently shocked by seeing the minister in his sermons make of the Bible a nose of wax. Professor Price says in his Preface:

"These outlines are not expository in the ordinary sense of that term. They are intended to lead the student along the line of the facts. He familiarizes himself with the Old Testament narrative, and with all the new light shed on its pages by contemporaneous history and modern research. This is just the point at which most Bible students are deficient. Moralize and allegorize they can, easily. But to give and explain the Bible facts accurately, and in order, is a rare ability. Some of the prevalent erroneous and disastrous allegorizing methods of our day will meet their doom when their advocates and employers become grounded in a knowledge of the historical setting of the Old Testament. As soon as the careful and devoted student has mastered the events and the facts, the impulses and the motives, the moral at the bottom of these facts readily appear, the lessons and teachings, thus concretely expressed, present themselves with a vividness and force never before conceived."

The Introduction takes up three topics. The first is Biblical Geography, to which the author gives considerable space. This is wise.

"Bible history has been too long suspended in mid-air. Much of the ignorance

of its facts has been due to a neglect of the study of the geography of Palestine and adjacent lands. In other words, the background of the picture was lacking; there was no local coloring. Readers and students rambled through a mass of chaotic facts, and brought out with them only a very general impression of all that they had seen. By a systematic and orderly study of the background, at the start, we shall be prepared to locate our events as they occur, and pin them to their proper places."

The second topic in the Introduction is Literature, under which he gives, among other things, a "Moderate General Outfit for the Study of Old Testament History," consisting of fourteen works, seven of which he says should be in the hands of every student, viz: *The Revised English Version*, *Hurlbut's Manual of Biblical Geography*, *Geikie's Hours With the Bible*, *Blaikie's Manual of Biblical History*, *Josephus's Antiquities of the Jews*, *Stanley's History of the Jewish Church*, and *Thompson's The Land and The Book*. Many would hesitate about putting Stanley into "the hands of every student," and it is not long since we heard even Geikie accused of "rationalizing." But if we should leave that out, what could we put in its place? We are glad to see Professor Price give the place of honor to the Revised Version. For the purposes of the working student it is immeasurably superior to the Unrevised Version. At the end of the book the author gives a list of all the works referred to in the Syllabus, and also a supplemental list of the more elaborate and scholarly works of value for more extensive and detailed study.

The third and last topic of the Introduction is Chronology. Here the history is distributed into twelve periods, and for the designation of these the chronology of Archbishop Ussher is adopted, "*but for the sake of convenience only.*" For a long time no scholar has believed in the earlier Chronology of Ussher, and Dr. Green of Princeton is now engaged in the work of pulverizing it in popular journals, for the benefit of general Bible readers. When he has finished his destructive criticism we trust that Ussher's pre-Mosaic chronology will no more be cited, even for convenience. In an appendix Professor Price gives the new dates for the history of the Dual Kingdom, along with the old, but without attempting to harmonize the two.

The body of the book consists of a careful analysis of the Old Testament history, references being given at the end of each section to the best literature on the subject in hand. The volume is well printed for the most part, but it is unfortunate that there should be a misprint on the title page. It is interleaved, as every such book should be. In conclusion, we venture to call Professor Price's attention to the fact that Jethro was *not* the father-in-law of Moses

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HAWEIS' THE BROAD CHURCH.

THE BROAD CHURCH, OR WHAT IS COMING. *By the Rev. H. R. Haweis, M. A.* New York: U. S. Book Co., Successors to John W. Lovell Company, 142 to 150 Worth street. Cloth. 12mo, pp. viii., 276. \$1.25. 1891.

The term Broad Church represents a school of thought rather than a system of theology, a tendency rather than a distinctly defined party; owing to this it is at once both exceedingly vague and exceedingly comprehensive, and more than this it is also exceedingly influential. It is one of the characteristic movements of our age

and appears to be spreading in every direction; there are few ecclesiastical organizations that have not felt its force. The two great bodies upon which, for reasons which need not be mentioned here, it has thus far left, perhaps, its most marked impress, are the Episcopal and Congregational, though there are not wanting recent evidences of decided character indicating that portions of the Presbyterian Church are responding to its influence. The Southern Presbyterian Church has so far been mercifully spared the disintegrating effects of its inroads, but we cannot hope long to enjoy this blessed immunity; in all human probability within a decade we shall inevitably be contending with it. Practically it took its rise, in its present modern form, from the influence of a brilliant coterie of which Frederick W. Robertson, who died 15th August, 1853, at the age of thirty-seven, was *facile princeps*. At that time its acknowledged exponents could be numbered upon the fingers of one hand, and the movement was neither strong nor popular. Though regarded with a suspicion and disfavor which greatly embittered the noble soul and darkened the last sad, suffering years of Robertson, there seemed nevertheless something of peculiar fascination in these views, particularly for minds that were thoughtful and active but immature, which had the force and individuality to appreciate the difficulties brought under review, but lacked that maturity of thought and breadth of study which would have surely shown how pitifully far short such brilliant speculations and plausible theories fall of meeting the objections they signalize. And we feel constrained to say just here, that exactly this very type of mind and thought seems to be represented in the leaders themselves, as well nigh a constant characteristic of their writings. These writings are thoughtful and acute, bright and original; we find them readable generally, sometimes suggestive and helpful, but they invariably contain marks of partial and fragmentary thinking; they generate never the confidence growing out of a manifest mastery of a subject; their views of truth lack perspective, they exaggerate in some directions, in others they refuse to look; their pages bristle with invisible interrogation points; they start innumerable objections which they have either refused to see or have declined to consider; their readjustments suggest difficulties greater than those they are designed to relieve, so that on the whole such works are as tantalizing as they are attractive, as disappointing as they are fascinating.

Despite these alleged defects—a cynic might possibly say by virtue of them—the movement has grown steadily. Its wide-spread prevalence may be due partly to a combination of favoring circumstances, among which could be mentioned the modern revival of Biblical criticism, the somewhat phenomenal popularity of naturalism in apologetics and the prevalent disposition towards creed-revision; any one of these would alone suffice to invite the expression of latent, perhaps otherwise unconscious broad-churchism, while the concurrence forms occasion infallibly sure not to encourage it only, but really and rapidly to develop it. The church, we fear, is beginning to reap some of the natural results of certain alliances to which she gave a swift welcome.

The present volume is a fair and favorable specimen of the generic class; we have read it with sustained interest, we commend it to those who desire to read an entertaining presentation of the claims, character, purpose and methods of this school of thought; it may be well worth while for such to listen to this latest voice crying in the wilderness of an obsolete theology. Readers scarcely need be reminded that the author's view point is the Church of England. His introductory

pages are intended to emphasize the call for the coming kingdom of broad-churchism, and the state of things he depicts is certainly such as to indicate desperate need of something; if his diagnosis be just, the disease demands heroic treatment, but his remedy will not be adjudged wanting in this element at least. We give no specific criticism of the volume because it is essentially the same with many which have preceded it, perhaps only a little more definite and pronounced. As we have passed over this ground exhaustively in two previous articles, one devoted to Frederick W. Robertson, and the other to the Andover Renaissance, the former appearing in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* for January, 1882, the latter in the initial number of this QUARTERLY, we feel that we may with good grace spare our readers the patience and ourselves the labor of a repetition.

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STERRETT'S REASON AND AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

REASON AND AUTHORITY IN RELIGION. *By J. Macbride Sterrett, D. D., Professor of Ethics and Apologetics in Seabury Divinity School.* Cloth, 12mo., pp. 184. \$1. New York: Thomas Whittaker, 2 and 3 Bible House. 1891.

This is a brief, but somewhat ambitious contribution to broad-church literature. As a representative specimen of its purposes and style we quote the following:

"A criticism which is merely negative is both irrational and unhuman. The function of criticism is to be the dynamic forcing on from one static phase of belief and institution to another, to destroy only by conserving in higher fulfilled form. Its aim can only be to restore as reason what it first seeks to destroy as the unreason of mere might; to restore as essential realized freedom what it momentarily rejects as external necessity. Such work involves a thorough reformation of the whole edifice of dogma and institution, a thorough reappreciation of the genuine worth of these works of the human spirit under divine guidance.

"Such a task implies an ideal of knowledge vastly different from that of ordinary rationalism. That holds an abstract conception of truth, imagined under the form of mathematical equality or identity. It has no place for development or organic process, and none for comprehension of concrete experience which it vainly tries to force into its mechanical forms. This method, on the contrary, simply undertakes to understand *what is*, or concrete experience, under the conception of organic development in historic process. It can attempt no demonstration of the organic process of religion by anything external to it. It seeks only to give an intelligent description of the process. The process itself gives the conception of its rationality."

We feel a shrinking timidity in criticizing such writing as that; perhaps we may venture to say that for those who like that sort of thing it will prove exactly the sort of thing they like.

SAMUEL M. SMITH.

THOMPSON'S DIVINE ORDER OF HUMAN SOCIETY.

THE DIVINE ORDER OF HUMAN SOCIETY: Being the L. P. Stone Lectures for 1891, delivered in Princeton Theological Seminary. *By Prof. Robert Ellis Thompson, S. T. D., University of Pennsylvania.* Philadelphia: John D. Wattles, Publisher. 1891. Pp. 274.

This book is made up of eight lectures, delivered in Princeton in February and March of last year. It is a timely and able production. We are living in a

time of an unsettling of opinions and beliefs; not only in the domain of theology, but also in the political and social relations. The foundation principles underlying the structures of state, family and church are being insidiously attacked. To quote the author of these lectures, "Social agitations have arisen which seem to go down to the roots of things." One of the burning questions of the day is the nature and extent of authority, and consequently of obligation. And to the task of relaying, or rather of restating, some of these "fundamentals" does Professor Thompson set himself.

Under four general heads is the subject matter of these lectures grouped: the family, which is termed the "institute of the affections"; the nation, "the institute of rights"; the school, and the church. The title contains the dominant idea of the work: that God by creation and providence is the author of society and its institutions, the family, the state, and the church. Professor Thompson's position is that of the "higher sociology," which "denies that progress and civilization are the outcome of unvarying natural law." The "higher sociology differs from the lower in its view of the forces which actually explain the world's movement. It does not seek the primal forces in the environment of man, but in the divine will moving in a holy order upon the face of society, and bringing forth unity, order, and human well-being. Much of what the materialistic sociologist puts forward as the causes of institutions, or of great social transformations, it regards as their occasions only, and it looks beyond these historic circumstances to the first causes of things." (Pp. 17 and 18.)

Following out his idea in the lectures on the family he says (p. 24.), "the family is not created by the voluntary act of those who live in this relationship. We are born into it by no choice or volition of our own. It was given us, not made by us. And even those who found a new family are rightly said to enter into the marriage relation, not to constitute it between themselves. It is something which exists for them," "instituted for them, not only or mainly, by the positive law of the land, or the canons of the church, but by the creative will of God, and thus established in the very nature of things." He makes the eminently true statement (on p. 58), that "the freedom of choice in this matter which happily exists in western society, does not carry with it the freedom of unchoosing." He strikes at the heart of the growing evil of divorce when he says (on p. 59), that "our lax divorce laws are unchristian and unphilosophical;" for "they ignore the true nature of affection as founded on the will. True God-like love is that which gives, hoping for nothing again." To sever the ties of a holy relation on "the plea of incompatibility of temper, or the like, would be to barter the likeness of God for the social comforts of earthly life."

In Lecture IV., p. 87, Professor Thompson defines the state as a divine institution, and repudiates the commonly received opinion that it is a social contract. "The state, the body politic, has its roots in our human nature. It is thus mediately the creation of God, who has made our human nature what it is. It is by our nature, not by any deliberate choice, or act of volition, that the state exists. We did not make it; we were born into it." On p. 88. "The state is founded in human nature. It is the institute of rights, and rights are implicit in our human nature." The state is not a human invention, but God's ordinance. We "honor the king" because we first adore God, whose servant the king is. We look above the throne to behold the power by whose will the throne exists. These are far

reaching truths, for as our author, on p. 128, observes: "Those who see no God behind the state are driven by a kind of spiritual necessity to exalt the state into a god, and to assert that in every case the will of the community has the right to override that of the single person." Thus "through the spread of Agnosticism and Atheism, the liberty of the individual citizen is again brought into peril. The lower sociology tells us that conscience is the outcome of non-moral forces, chiefly of the pressure of society for the suppression of ideas and practices hostile to its existence, or its peace. Right, in the last analysis, is what society judges to be expedient; wrong is what it deems inexpedient. Society being thus the creator of the conscience, its creature has no right of appeal against the decisions of its creator. And being confessedly an imperfect creator, itself advancing toward something better by slow and painful steps, the conscience is thus subjected to the absolute sovereignty of a blundering and often a blind power. There is thus no absolute right, no standard of eternal justice to which an appeal may be taken, no higher law than the statute which expresses the average judgment of the community. And it rests entirely with the community, therefore, to say what ideas and opinions it will tolerate in its members, and what it judges necessary to its own welfare to suppress."

Says the author with fine sarcasm, "We have been misreading history for these thousand years and more. We have felt our hearts throb and our eyes grow moist as we have seen old men and maidens, gently nurtured women and their children, cast to the lions of the Roman amphitheatre for their confession of the name of Christ. We should have looked up to the Diocletians, and the Licinius with admiration blended with pity for the hard necessity of seeming cruelty which their social position had thrust upon them. We have sympathized with Vanini, Galileo, Bruno, and the other 'martyrs of science,' who endured bonds and death in assertion of the truth their discoveries laid bare to them. Let us now belaud the inquisitors who stood for the only right Agnostic science recognizes, the right of society to suppress convictions it judges dangerous to the public welfare. Not the Covenanters on the hillside, flying from the brutal and bloody minions of a Stuart king, but Graham of Claverhouse, Grierson of Lag, and 'bloodie Mackenzie,' are to claim our admiration."

On p. 130, Professor Thompson says: "Assume that the state is an original, uncreated entity, that it owes nothing to the will of a divine intelligence at the heart of things, that its authority is original and not delegated by God, and you have laid the foundation of political despotism and of religious intolerance."

In his lectures on "The Church," Professor Thompson says, p. 195, "The lower sociology can get no farther than the nation," while "Christian sociology recognizes the existence of an institute of humanity, which however far short of its ideal, aims at nothing less than the unification of all mankind in a society which shall transcend all limitations of race and nationality. This is the church." On p. 15, in his opening lecture, the author says, speaking of the science of sociology, it "concerns itself with the three normal forms of society, the family, the church and the state. It recognizes the development of the nation out of the family, and the church out of the nation." The dream of the statesman, philanthropist and poet, is the rise of a "brotherhood transcending national boundaries," of a "Parliament of man and federation of the world"; and the inspired singer speaks of a time when "he shall have dominion also from sea to sea." But is this the church?

Is it not rather a state of social regeneration brought about by the agency of the church? And this glowing anticipation is to be realized only when Zion shall have truly become the perfection of beauty, and when through her God shall shine as never before. We object to the statement that the church is the outcome of the state; that the civil is antecedent to the ecclesiastical economy, even from a sociological point of view. Both logically and chronologically the family precedes the state, but the church is not the evolution from the state, as the state is from the family. The church existed coëvally with the family. There was a church in the times of Adam and Abraham, in principle if not in form; and in Israel the ecclesiastical is easily distinguishable from the civil. As bearing upon the sociological question the most important Scripture is contained in Paul's address to the assembled Athenians: Acts xvii. 26 and 27. Speaking of God he says: "And hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, . . . That they should seek the Lord, &c." God made men, ordaining that they should dwell together, and that they should seek him. Being of one blood, of like nature, men are social; being made in the image of God they seek God, they are religious. This is the creative origin of state and church. God created both by creating man as he is. Had not man been created with social capacities and tendencies society would never have embraced more than the family. There could have been *aggregations* comprehending many families, but no *association*, no true society. Nor could such an institution as the nation be a possibility, which is, according to Professor Thompson, "a people with the will to be one."

The germs of both state and church exist in the family. The roots of both to-day are there. The father performs, and always will, the functions of both presbyter and magistrate. The state still accords to him the divine prerogative of corporeal discipline and coercion. And the church not only recognizes, but emphasizes the presbyterial authority of the parent. The candidate for the episcopal office must first prove his aptness to rule in the family church, before he can be promoted to exercise that gift in the great congregation. Indeed this is the idea of Professor Thompson himself, as expressed on pages 82 and 83, "The family is the unit out of which the church is built up." "Each Christian congregation is a spiritual organization, made up of lesser congregations gathered from Christian homes." "The family is the oldest of worshipping societies, and the priesthood of the father is the oldest of priesthoods." And on page 104 he recognizes the "two spheres," the civil and religious in the Hebrew commonwealth.

It is hardly fair to criticize a book for what it does not contain, or an author for what he does not say; but on the question of the fundamental relation between church and state he has comparatively little to say. From the reading of the foregoing chapters we had expected him to be "luminous" here, and to have elaborated the correlation and differentiation of the two. Perhaps his sociological system is at fault,—that of evolving the church from the state. On pages 250 and 251 he says: "The relation of the church to the nation presents many nice problems which are not solved by assuming that the two forms of society constitute entirely separate spheres of life and activity." And although he has many good things to say about this question (especially on page 253), it really amounts to advice to the church to do whatever she has to do in an "ecclesiastical way." He leaves us somewhat in the dark by not defining the term ecclesiastical as used in this connection. To say that church and state are "two forms of society" is

hardly the way in which to state the truth. We should look upon society as a unit, as a body, and upon state, church, and other coöperative and philanthropic orders as organs or limbs of that body. The state, *i. e.*, the governmental machinery, is the organ by which society protects itself; the church, *i. e.*, the ecclesiastical machinery, is the organ through which society exerts in a concertive way its religious activities. In the body social there is implanted a life which manifests a variety of tendencies. As in the physical world so is it in the social, that "life is manifested in certain special acts called *functions*, performed by certain special parts called *organs*." The state is the organ for the performance of the civil functions of society; for preserving the rights of men; and it is aptly termed by Prof. Thompson the "institute of rights." The church is the organ by which are performed the religious functions of society; through it is manifested the religious life of society.

In the family no such distinction of parts is necessary; the conditions being simple none are required. But when we move onwards the conditions become complex, and so the necessity for the specialization of parts. The "diversities of gifts," both civil and religious, lead inevitably to an extension of organization, and a differentiation of duties.

Reasoning along these lines, we see that state and church are not institutions arbitrarily and artificially fastened upon society. They are not two rival institutions endeavoring to occupy the same territory, requiring nice diplomacy and tact on the part of each to maintain amicable relations. They are not, as some seem to suppose, hostile to each other, the one peculiarly worldly, and the other peculiarly sacred; the one peculiarly a human institution, and the other divine. In the ideal condition of society, where every man is a church member as well as citizen, state and church are not two, but one and the same body of men, working in different capacities along different yet converging lines. The relation of church to state, and of state to church, is made known by determining the relation of each to the common body social, through the medium of the functions performed by each. Thus the relation will not be found to be of an artificial or diplomatic nature, but natural and fundamental.

Many other points in these able and interesting lectures might be noticed, but want of space forbids.

W. G. F. WALLACE.

DEEMS' GOSPEL OF SPIRITUAL INSIGHT.

THE GOSPEL OF SPIRITUAL INSIGHT. Being Studies in the Gospel of John. *By Charles F. Deems, D. D., LL. D., Pastor of the Church of the Strangers, President of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, etc., etc.* Pp. 365. Price, \$1.50. New York: Wilbur B. Ketcham. 1891.

As Dr. Deems may properly be regarded as a credible and competent witness upon some points connected with his book, upon those we will ask him to speak for himself. He says: "It is not spiritually healthful to keep one's mind perpetually exercised in one field of thought. In the preparation of the *Gospel of Common Sense* my mind had been employed on the practical ethics of Christianity. I felt that it would be good for myself, as well as for my readers to vary the study. Spiritual insight is helped by practical morality, and practical morality is aided by the cultivation of spiritual insight. So, upon laying down the Epistle of James, I took up the Gospel of St. John."

Again, he says: "It is assumed that those who read this book believe in the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospel of John, and have never been troubled by the agitation of that question, or, having examined it, have seen how utterly futile the attacks of all hostile criticism have been." Hence he does not enter upon these questions himself, except to a very limited extent. What he does have to say upon them, however, is well and effectively said.

Again, he says: "As the writer of this volume approached the study of each topic, not in a critical spirit, not in a controversial spirit, but tenderly and devoutly, that he might see as far as possible into the heart of God by seeing into the heart of Jesus, he ventures to express the hope that his readers will peruse these pages in the same spirit."

The tone of the book is fervently evangelical. Its exposition eminently practical. Its style is "racy and most readable." The binding, paper, etc., while not noticeably good, are fair. In conclusion, we must add that there are passages here and there in the book against which we would utter a *caveat* if time and space permitted.

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TAYLOR'S ORIGIN OF THE ARYANS.

THE ORIGIN OF THE ARYANS: An Account of the Prehistoric Ethnology and Civilization of Europe. *By Isaac Taylor, M. A., Litt. D., Hon. LL. D.* Scribner & Welford, 743-745 Broadway, New York. 1890. Pp, 332. Price \$1.25.

This handy and readable volume forms one of an interesting series of scientific manuals published by Scribner & Welford, and edited by Havelock Ellis. The title of this series is *The Contemporary Science Series*, and in this number of it Dr. Taylor has given us a scholarly and well-written book. We were, of course, prepared to find it just such a book, for the author had already ably discussed kindred themes in his *Words and Places*, *Greeks and Goths*, *The Alphabet*, and *Leaves from an Egyptian Note Book*. In all of these works there are evidences of high scholarship, great research, and scientific method. All of these qualities are prominent in the *Origin of the Aryans*, and the work deserves high praise even where there cannot be agreement with the opinions expressed or conclusions reached.

This book might be properly described as a broadside fired during the progress of a great controversy. This controversy arises from the antagonism of rival theories to account for the origin of the so-called Aryan races, and to describe the lines of their dispersion. Two main parties in this great controversy which is still going on advocate very different views as to the genesis of the Aryan races, languages and civilization generally. One party in a general way, though with differences in details, maintains their Asiatic origin, and the other, in general, but with no complete agreement, discovers the beginnings of the Aryans somewhere in Europe. The former of these theories held sway from about 1820 till less than a score of years ago, and it has many advocates still. According to this theory the cradle of the Aryan races is to be found somewhere in the high table-land of central Asia, east of the Caspian Sea, and north of Persia. From this central source great streams of migration moved east and west, filling up Europe and the northern part of Asia. These great streams in due time resulted in forming the Indo-European races. Thus the Greeks and the Hindoos, the Latins and the Iranians, the Teutons and the Tartars, the Celts and the Chinese, are all originally from a common

stock. Race resemblances and language affinities are supposed to support this theory, which is usually termed the Asiatic theory as to the origin of the Aryans.

This side of the controversy has been taken more or less definitely by Rhode, Pott, Lassen, Grimm, Pictet, Max Müller, Schleicher, Link, Justi, Misteli, Kiepert, Sayce, Muir, Morris, Papillon, Hale, Hommel, Delitzsch, Kremer, and many others.

The other theory denies that any such migration as is supposed by the Asiatic theory ever took place, or is required by the facts of the case, and it asserts that somewhere in the central or eastern part of Europe is the original home of the Aryans to be discovered. According to this view, which is known as the European theory, the Aryans have always been in Europe, and all their migrations and modifications have taken place in that region. Not only can all the facts be explained in accordance with this view, but the facts go to confirm the European hypothesis. This theory is quite new, and has not yet been submitted fully to the tests of time and criticism. Still, it is now adopted, or regarded with favor, by a great many anthropologists, and it seems to be winning its way. It is scarcely more than a dozen years since it was first definitely propounded by Benfey and Geiger, although nearly thirty years before Latham had expressed serious doubts as to the validity of the Asiatic hypothesis. More recently this theory has received the support of Whitney, Cuno, Schmidt, Leskien, Spiegel, Pösche, Lindenschmit, Penka, Schrader, and others. Our author takes this side of the controversy, and agrees substantially with the views of Schrader, although he draws a good deal from Schmidt, Pösche and Penka. He does not profess to set forth any new views, but only to systematize the results gained by others. At the same time it is clear that his attitude towards the Asiatic theory is polemic, and towards the European, apologetic.

In six solid chapters he argues for this general position in regard to the origin of the Aryans. The first gives a general sketch of the Aryan controversy; the second a good description of the pre-historic races of Europe; the third a careful account of neolithic culture in Europe; the fourth defines the supposed Aryan races; the fifth discusses the growth of the Aryan languages; and the sixth deals in an interesting way with the Aryan mythology.

In supporting the European theory our author relies chiefly on the facts of archæology, craniology and philology, and these facts are used with a good deal of skill against the Asiatic theory and in favor of his own. At times one feels that conclusions are drawn from an imperfect induction of the facts, and that scant justice is done to the opinions of men holding the opposite theory.

In this connection it is proper to say that he assumes that man has a far greater antiquity on the earth than six or seven thousand years. Indeed, he seems willing to grant a very high antiquity for man, for he does not seem to make any objection to the views of Croll and Geikie, who, relying chiefly on astronomical data, conclude that the last glacial epoch in Europe ended about 80,000 years ago, and that palæolithic man inhabited that continent soon after that time. It is to be noted, however, that Dr. Taylor does not think it necessary to go back so far in discussing his theme, nor does he seem at all anxious to connect these palæolithic men with the Aryans whose origin he is seeking after. Still he holds in general man's high antiquity.

In the facts of archæology he thinks that he finds good reason for believing that the Aryan races are indigenous to Europe, and that there is really no great

Aryan race with eastern and western migrations, in the broad sense advocated by the Asiatic theory. He here discusses in a very thorough way the old remains found in pile dwellings, caves, kitchen-heaps, barrows, dolmens, and other places, and makes inferences from these in support of his views. He seems also to accept the theory of the several archæological ages, and has a great deal to say about the stone, bronze and iron ages. He here follows Lubbock in his expositions, and seems to overlook the fact that there are many defects in this theory. Still he makes all the use he can of conclusions here in support of his general thesis.

The facts of craniology are also wrought out with very great care, and he maintains that various measurements of skulls of fossil and modern men, in the regions under consideration, confirm the European theory in regard to the origin and growth of the Aryan races. On this topic he writes very learnedly and technically. He speaks of dolicho-cephalic, brachy-cephalic, and meso-cephalic skulls, with such freedom and familiarity that only a specialist in the department of craniology is really able to appreciate the merits of the discussion or to see the force of the reasoning in support of his own views.

Then, too, the facts of philology are treated in an interesting and effective way. He points out with a great deal of propriety that race and language are not always identical, and that to argue race origin from linguistic affinities is, at best, a very uncertain procedure. He hence concludes that there may be an Aryan language but there is no Aryan race strictly speaking. Language being mutable may be imposed on alien races by natural or forcible means. He here points out many undoubted facts to make good the position that race origin and language origin do not always go together. This consideration is used with considerable effect against the Asiatic theory. In this connection it need only be added that Aryan mythology, particularly the names of deity, is also expounded in favor of the European origin of the Aryan races.

Of the four leading Aryan races in Europe in the neolithic period—the Iberians, the Ligurians, the Celto-Slavs and the Scandinavians—he thinks that the Celto-Slavs are likely the original stock of the Aryans, and hence that central Europe is the ancient home of the Aryans. From that point they spread over Europe, and one branch went over into Asia and became the Iranians. If the question be raised whether there has been migration from Asia to Europe, or from Europe to Asia, Dr. Taylor would take the latter alternative, though it is not likely that he would regard this as strictly speaking a part of the European hypothesis.

But we cannot follow our author further in his discussion of a most interesting subject upon which almost every year is shedding new light, and upon which the last word has not yet been spoken. A few brief reflections are added in conclusion.

1. It must be admitted that our author has made an able presentation of the European theory. Still it may be doubted whether he has succeeded in making out a case against the leading advocates of the Asiatic hypothesis.

2. The assumption of very high antiquity for the human race is scarcely justified by the facts that are as yet well established. It is exceedingly doubtful if we have any well authenticated human remains of any kind requiring a vast length of time for man's residence on the earth. So many supposed very ancient facts have, on further examination, been greatly reduced in age, that great caution in this matter should be exercised by any one who has a desire to preserve his reputation for calm and sober sense.

3. Our author puts too much reliance upon the theory of the three great ages of pre-historic men—the stone, bronze and iron ages. The stone age, after the manner of Lubbock, is again divided into palæolithic and neolithic periods, and so the theory is built up in a very mechanical way. That such implements were used by pre-historic men may be freely admitted, but that each lasted for any well defined period by itself, or that we can build up any sort of chronology from these implements, may be very seriously doubted. To see, as we sometimes do, stone (chipped and polished), bronze and iron implements ranged nicely in order in a museum, may entirely mislead us in regard to the age and significance of these implements no matter how pretty they look in the cases.

4. The chapter on mythology seems to us the least satisfactory part of the treatise, and hence the reasoning therein does not strike the reader as having much force or cogency about it.

The book on the whole deserves careful study; for any one who masters its contents will have a pretty clear grasp of the main outlines of a controversy which may not be concluded for many years to come.

Columbia, S. C.

FRANCIS R. BEATTIE.

WADDEL'S MEMORIALS.

MEMORIALS OF ACADEMIC LIFE: Being an Historical Sketch of the Waddel Family, Identified through Three Generations with the History of the Higher Education in the South and Southwest. *By John N. Waddel, D. D., LL. D., Ex-chancellor of the University of Mississippi, and of the Southwestern Presbyterian University.* Pp. 583, 8vo. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication, 1891.

This is a volume of annals, modestly and reverently written. It is the story of a Scotch-Irish family which, for a century, has had its hand upon the religion and education of the South. Its influence has extended through all grades, from grammar school to university. Its American career began in Rowan county, N. C., in 1776, when William Waddel emigrated from the North of Ireland.

The first one hundred and twenty-seven pages of the volume are devoted to Dr. Moses Waddel, a son of William Waddel and the father of our author. He founded the celebrated Willington Academy in Abbeville county, S. C., where he gave a preparatory education to such men as Rev. R. B. Cater, D. D., Rev. Jno. H. Gray, D. D., Rev. J. C. Patterson, D. D., Rev. T. D. Baird, D. D., Jno. C. Calhoun, William H. Crawford, George McDuffie, Hugh S. Legaré, James L. Pettigru, and Pickens Butler. He subsequently left Willington to accept the Presidency of the University of Georgia, where he labored with great success for ten years. In this part of the volume we have sketches of the professorial colleagues of Dr. Moses Waddel.

The next eight pages are devoted to Prof. William Henry Waddel, a son of Prof. James P. Waddell, and grandson of Dr. Moses Waddel. He was a professor in the University of Georgia, and died in 1878.

The remainder of the book is an autobiographical sketch of Rev. John Newton Waddel, D. D., LL. D. Like his father, his career began as a teacher in Willington Academy. Before the war he was Professor of Ancient Languages in the University of Mississippi, located at Oxford; at the breaking out of the war he was

President of a flourishing Synodical college, which had been founded at La Grange, Tenn., by the Synod of Memphis. This building was pulled down by the Federal troops to build chimneys to their tents. After the war he was made Chancellor of the University of Mississippi. He resigned this office to accept the position of Secretary of Education in the Southern Presbyterian Church. From that office he was called to the Chancellorship of the Southwestern Presbyterian University, Clarksville, Tenn. This position he resigned in 1888 on account of ill health. This venerable servant of God and man now awaits the time of his departure at Avondale, Ala.

The book is full of information about men and educational institutions and measures. It is stored with advice for the young. Every reader will be pleasantly impressed with the author's pious acknowledgment of a special providence running throughout his life.

R. A. WEBB.

Charleston, S. C.

IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE GENERAL EPISTLES OF ST. JAMES AND ST. JUDE. *By the Rev. Alfred Plummer, M. A., D. D., Master of University College, Durham; formerly Fellow and Senior Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford.* Crown 8vo.; pp. x., 476. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1891.

THE BOOK OF LEVITICUS. *By the Rev. S. H. Kellogg, D. D., Author of "The Jews; or, Prediction and Fulfilment," etc.* Crown 8vo.; pp. 566. \$1.50. The same publishers.

THE BOOK OF PROVERBS. *By R. F. Norton, M. A., Hampstead; Late Fellow of New College, Oxford.* Crown 8vo.; pp. 418. \$1.50. The same publishers.

These three volumes belong to the series of *The Expositor's Bible*, which the publishers have been issuing with great regularity during the past four years. Each volume is complete in itself and may be bought separately, but subscribers to the entire series, or to a year's issues, are given specially favorable rates.

The volume on *James* and *Jude* is one of the best that has been issued. The author, who is gifted with a singularly clear and felicitous style and a gift for happy application, treats first of the Catholic Epistles, and then discusses the authenticity and the authorship of the Epistle of James, and the persons to whom it is addressed. He decides in favor of the theory that the author was James, the real brother of the Lord, and believes the *διασποδρα* to have been those christianized Jews who were away from their home in Palestine. The relation of the Epistle to Paul's and Peter's writings and to the Apocryphal books, is fully discussed. The author traces certain coincidences between this Epistle and the Book of Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon. In this connection, we think he places almost too high an estimate upon the value of the Apocrypha. The subject of the Apocrypha also naturally attracts the author's attention in the exposition of Jude's Epistle, and he gives us a short discussion of its bearings upon questions of interpretation. The discussion of the authenticity and authorship of the latter epistle is full and satisfactory.

Dr. Kellogg's *Leviticus* is divided into three parts, I., The Tabernacle Worship; II., The Law of the Daily Life; and, III., Conclusion and Appendix. In Part I. special attention is paid, in an extended introduction, to the questions of the origin and authority of *Leviticus*, its occasion and order, its purpose, and its present day use. He reviews the theories which have sought to displace this book and discredit its divine origin and authority, and shows them to be unfounded, incidentally touching here upon the whole Pentateuchal question, and rightly making Christ the arbiter of this matter. The purpose of the book he declares to be the directing of Israel how they might live as a holy nation in fellowship with God. Its key-note is "Holiness to the Lord." This purpose, however, embraced the preparation for Israel's world-mission, the establishment of the theocracy and all

that pertained to it being but a means to an end, namely, to make Israel a blessing to all nations, in mediating to the Gentiles the redemption of God. The present purpose of the book is to hold before us the fundamentals of true religion; to show us that while the priesthood and sacrifice are no more, the spiritual truth they represented abides and must abide forever, namely, that there is for man no citizenship in the kingdom of God apart from a High Priest and Mediator with a propitiatory sacrifice for sin. These principles underlie the author's expositions throughout and indicate the sound and practical lines upon which his interpretations run.

Horton's *Proverbs* falls far below the mark of the above-mentioned volumes. In its expositions, which are as a rule well put and effective, he follows the general order of the author or compiler of the book, chapter by chapter, bringing the scattered sentences together under subjects which are suggested by certain striking points. He spoils it all, however, by stating that this method has the grave defect of completely obliterating the marks of the origin and compilation of the several parts of the book. To remedy this in a measure, he furnishes a brief introduction, in which he repudiates the traditional view of the origin of the book, pronounces much of its teaching crude and imperfect, declares that the reader will be glad to remind himself of the somewhat "loose relation" in which certain parts stand to the main body of the work, and states that nowhere is it more necessary to distinguish between the inspired speech, which comes to the mind of the prophet as a direct oracle of God, and the speech which is the product of human wisdom, human observation, and human commonsense, and is only in that sense inspired. With such views of inspiration, and left to judge for himself, according to his own predilections or shortcomings concerning what is and what is not the wisdom of God, the ordinary reader would find but little of divine authority in the teachings of Proverbs, and its utterances would have but little weight to his soul.

THE BIBLICAL ILLUSTRATOR; or, Anecdotes, Similes, Emblems, Illustrations, Expository, Scientific, Geographical, Historical, and Homiletic, gathered from a wide range of Home and Foreign Literature, on the verses of the Bible. *By Rev. Joseph S. Exell, M. A.* GENESIS, Vol. 1, pp. xciv. 664, Vol. 2. pp. 605. Each volume, cloth, net \$2.00. New York; Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1891.

The scope of this work has already been described. It will embrace all the books of the Bible. Two or three volumes will be issued each year. The volumes are in no way connected, so that separate ones may be purchased. The price of the book is so low for one of its great size and immense amount of material that it is not difficult for a preacher with very moderate income to become possessor of the entire work. When he has it, it will be to him a library in itself. The volumes on Genesis contain a full introduction to the Holy Bible, in the form of short treatises from numerous pens on its history and structure, perspective, diversity, unity, human yet divine features, use, inspiration, literary attractions, etc. After this follows an introduction to the Pentateuch, in which is given a full argument, from the pen of Dr. A. Moody Stuart, for the Mosaic authorship, a history of the Pentateuchal composition controversy, by Prof. Edouard König, and a sound discussion of the authenticity and the truth of the history of the Pentateuch and kindred subjects. These features alone make the volumes more than worth their price.

THE PULPIT COMMENTARY. *Edited by the Rev. Canon H. D. Spence, M. A., and by the Rev. Joseph S. Ewell.* REVELATION; PROVERBS; JUDGES AND RUTH; PETER, JOHN, AND JUDE; ROMANS. About 460 pp. each. 8vo. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1891.

We have lately received these additional volumes of this American re-publication of the well-known English commentary. The PULPIT COMMENTARY is as a whole undoubtedly the best of its kind now published. Its unparalleled wealth of homiletic matter is the great feature. It has ransacked every department of learning and illustration to set forth in the strongest manner the text with which it deals. The American publishers deserve praise for the success with which they are bringing out the work. It is furnished to subscribers on most favorable terms.

BIBLICAL COMMENTARY ON THE PROPHECIES OF ISAIAH. *By Franz Delitzsch, D. D., Professor of Theology, in the University of Leipzig.* Authorized Translation from the Third Edition. By the Rev. James Denny, B. D. In Two Volumes. Vol. I. 8vo., pp. 520, \$2.50. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1891.

This translation exhibits the author's exegetical methods and results perhaps as well as the later or fourth edition published just before his death, but does not represent Delitzsch's critical views so well. It was the author's claim, however, that in the Book of Isaiah the influence of criticism upon the exegesis is nothing, and it has been a matter of complaint on the part of some of the more advanced schools that even in the last, the fourth edition, the learned author did not qualify his former interpretations by his changed critical views. Except for the wavering condition of his mind, therefore, and the sense of uncertainty it sometimes imparts, this edition of the author's work is of much value to the student of Isaiah. The American publishers have brought it out in good style, with large clear print, and neatly bound.

PEOPLE'S COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO JOHN: Containing the Common Version, 1611, and the Revised Version, 1881, (American Readings and Renderings), with Critical, Exegetical and Applicative Notes, and Illustrations drawn from Life and Thought in the East. *By Edwin W. Rice, D. D., Author of "People's Commentary on Matthew," etc.* 12mo. pp. viii., 335. \$1.25. Philadelphia: The American Sunday School Union. 1891.

A sound, evangelical, scholarly treatise, and one which will be permanently useful. The introduction presents in most compact form, but clearly, the various theories concerning the Gospel, and there as well as in the succeeding pages the author shows his familiarity with the discussion and the soundness of his own views.

BIBLE STUDIES FROM THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS: Covering the International Sunday School Lessons for 1892. *By George F. Pentecost, D. D., Author of "In the Volume of the Book," etc.* 12mo. pp. 416. Cloth, \$1.00. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1891.

This is the fifth consecutive volume from Dr. Pentecost's pen on the International Lessons. It is the equal of those which have preceded it and which we have cordially commended after careful examination and use. The author's ability,

practical and spiritual insight, soundness in the faith, evangelical fervor, freedom from denominational bias and critical vagaries well qualify him to prepare a series of expositions at once faithful, helpful, and reliable.

HINTS AND HELPS ON THE SUNDAY SCHOOL LESSONS FOR 1892. *By Rev. David James Burrell, D. D., and Rev. Joseph Dunn Burrell.* 12mo. pp. 463. Cloth, \$1.25. New York: American Tract Society. 1891.

Another work on the Lessons for the new year that we can recommend. The discussion is more textual than Dr. Pentecost's, but the authors gather up the results in the several salient points of each passage studied and present the lesson in its unity. Coming from pastors' hands, and those pastors eminent for their wisdom and faithfulness, this series of studies will be found well adapted to the use of ministers as well as Sabbath-school teachers. The style is clear and direct, and the suggestions spiritual and practical.

THE WRITERS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT: Their Style and Characteristics. *By the late Rev. William Henry Simcox, A. M., Rector of Harlaxton.* F'cap. 8vo, pp. viii., 190. Net, 75c. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1891.

A volume in the "Theological Educator" series, and forming the second part of Simcox's *Language of the New Testament*, reviewed in the *QUARTERLY* a year ago. The author has here given a description in outline of the style and language of each of the writers of the New Testament, with a tracing also of the affinities of vocabulary between different groups of writers. It is to be regretted that the gifted and accomplished author passed away before the publication of this work. In his death New Testament scholarship has suffered an almost irreparable loss.

DANGERS OF THE APOSTOLIC AGE. *By the Right Rev. James Moorhouse, D. D., Bishop of Manchester.* 12mo. pp. xvi. 225. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1891.

This book consists of three parts, in which the author discusses the Galatian Lapse, the Colossian Heresy, and the Hebrew Apostasy. As will be seen from these titles the dangers of the Apostolic age of which the author treats were (1), That the church might be narrowed, in its doctrine and practice, by the determination of the Judaizing part within it to insist that all should enter it by the way of circumcision and observance of the whole Law of Moses; (2), That the true doctrine of God's universal sovereignty and of the solution of the problem of evil might be impaired by the growth of Gnosticism, as a means of accounting, by the interposition of a series of secondary beings, for the origin of evil; and (3), That the Jewish element in the Christian church, disappointed in their still lingering expectation of the early visible return of Christ in power and great glory, and led by their attachment to the traditions of their own race, might renounce their faith and become apostates. The several chapters are a faithful picture of the struggles that grew out of these dangers.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFANT SALVATION. *By Benjamin B. Warfield, D. D., Professor in Princeton Seminary.* 12mo, pp. 65. New York: The Christian Literature Co. 1891.

A monograph which we heartily commend to our readers as one of the most timely and judicious that we have seen. Its special value, in addition to its pur-

pose as set forth in the title, lies in the fact that it shows conclusively that those alone who hold to the Calvinistic faith in its integrity are logically justified in the belief that all who die in infancy are saved.

RECOGNITION AFTER DEATH. *By the Rev. J. Aspinwall Hodge, D. D.* 12mo, pp. 184. 75 cts. New York: American Tract Society. 1891.

This book was first brought out by the Carters, from whose estate the plates were recently bought by the American Tract Society. It is worthy of the many editions through which it is destined to pass. Its subject is one of the most precious and its doctrine, if true, one of the most comforting. The author has clearly set forth all that is revealed on the subject, as to the teaching of the Scriptures, the meaning of terms, the methods of recognition, and in general the resurrection and the resurrection body. It is a book brim full of comfort and hope.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT: 12mo. pp. 319. New York: American Tract Society. 1891.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT: 12mo. pp. 323. *The Same Publishers.*

These companion volumes, each complete in itself, embody a number of thoroughly sound essays, on vital topics connected with the Scriptures as a whole. They will greatly help those who are troubled by the attacks upon the Bible and will furnish good material with which to meet prevalent objections. The two volumes contain twelve treatises, the subjects being, The Witness of Ancient Monuments to the Old Testament Scriptures, by Prof. Sayce; The Vitality of the Bible, by Prof. Blaikie; Present State of the Christian Argument from Prophecy, by Principal Cairns; The Origin of the Hebrew Religion, by Dr. Conder; The Bible Tested, or Is It the Book for To-day and for the World, by Dr. Jacob Chamberlain; The Old Testament Vindicated, by Dr. T. W. Chambers; The Historical Evidences of the New Testament Scriptures, by Dr. Maclear; The Christ of the Gospels, by Dr. Meyer; Ferdinand Christian Baur and his Theory of the Origin of Christianity and of the New Testament Writings, by Prof. Bruce; The Religious Value of the Doctrines of Christianity, by Prof. Des Isles; Unity of Faith, a Proof of the Divine Origin and Preservation of Christianity, by Dr. Stoughton; the Evidential Value of the Observance of the Lord's Day, by Dr. Maclear. A number of these papers have long been familiar to most of our readers. Their publication in its present shape will add to their already deservedly appreciated worth.

THE RIGHT ROAD: A Hand-Book for Parents and Teachers. *By John W. Kramer.* 12mo. pp. 282. \$1.25. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1891.

Really a "Primer of Ethics," presenting a wholesome statement of the fundamental principles of morality, and especially basing them upon the Word of God as the expression of his will. Being intended for teachers' and parents' use with very young children, each subject is illustrated with pertinent anecdotes and Scripture quotations. Indeed, if only the incidents related fix themselves in the child's mind, great good will have been accomplished. They usually not only explain but enforce the teaching. The author deserves praise for the happy manner in which he has presented the greatest of abstract principles in such light that the youngest child can understand and appreciate them.

DUTY: A Book for Schools. *By Julius H. Seelye, D. D., LL. D., Late President of Amherst College.* 16mo, pp. 71. Boston: Ginn & Company. 1891.

In statement perspicuous, simple and striking, easily within the reach of the youngest mind, President Seelye has in this little book gone over the whole domain of duty,—duty to God, duty to mankind, duty to one's self, duty to others, and the culture of the moral life. The thoroughness of the author's treatment of these matters in such short compass will be a surprise and delight to the reader of the little book.

WHAT ROME TEACHES. *By M. F. Cusack.* 12mo, pp. 280. Cloth, \$1.25. New York: The Baker Taylor Co. 1891.

The quondam "Nun of Kenmare" gives us here an intelligent statement of the doctrines of the Church of Rome, and shows their bearing upon practical matters in political, social, and domestic life. All the facts and doctrines she brings out are cited from accredited documents of the Roman hierarchy. With keen insight into the true nature of Rome's faith, with long experimental acquaintance with the practices of the church, and with a love for souls and a philanthropy which won for her a world-wide reputation as the "Nun of Kenmare" while she was yet a Romanist, Miss Cusack is rarely gifted for the work set before her here, and her book indicates a faithful use of these facilities.

CHAPTERS FROM THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF SPAIN CONNECTED WITH THE INQUISITION. *By Henry Charles Lea, LL. D.* 12mo, pp. 522. Philadelphia: Lea Brothers & Co. 1890.

The author's great work, *The History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, which we deemed justly entitled to unqualified praise, is to be followed by a special work on the Spanish Inquisition. To the latter the book now before us may be regarded as preparatory and introductory. It is a consideration of certain subjects which the author in his researches has come to regard as worthy of more elaborate treatment than can be accorded them in a general narrative. These subjects are: The Censorship of the Press, Mystics and Illuminati, Endimonianas, El Santo Niño de la Guardia, and Brianda de Bardaxí. The first subject receives the fullest treatment. The author is unquestionably the ablest American scholar in the history of the Middle Ages, and the present work is equal to his best. His research and acumen appear upon every page, and his analysis of the decadence of Spanish literature shows him to be a philosopher as well as a student. The work will be a standard.

CONCISE DICTIONARY OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AND GAZETTEER. *Edited by Rev. Samuel Macauley Jackson, M. A. Associate Editors: Rev. Talbot Wilson Chambers, D. D., LL. D., and Rev. Frank Hugh Foster, Ph. D.* Second and Revised Edition. Pp. 1050. Cloth, \$3.50. Library Leather, \$5.00. New York. The Christian Literature Company. 1891.

The new features in this edition of a most valuable reference book are (1), A series of large and handsome maps, specially prepared for this work and showing not only the lands of the Holy Scriptures, but also the countries around the Mediterranean Sea during the Crusades, the Church Provinces of Middle Europe just before the Reformation, and Protestants and Roman Catholics in Europe just af-

ter the Reformation; (2), A concise gazetteer, with such references to the maps as will make the ascertaining of localities simple and ready; (3), A patent marginal reference index. The entire work is now one of the most complete that we know. The articles are condensed and comprehensive. Biblical, archæological, ecclesiastical, biographical, historical, geographical and topographical matter of every kind is presented, and the best points of modern research as well as of early studies and literature packed into these rich pages. The contributors are men recognized for their familiarity with the topics assigned them; as Selah Merrill, on Palestine, Jerusalem, the Jews; T. E. Clark, on Young People's Societies; William Elliot Griffis, on Japan; Ballington Booth, on the Salvation Army, etc. The article on the Presbyterian Churches, prepared by Dr. William Henry Roberts, gives the best concise account of the Southern Church we have ever seen, especially setting forth the grounds of its organization and continued separation from the Northern Church and emphasizing its testimony to the doctrine of the spirituality of the church. The short articles on Calvinism and predestination, by Dr. Chambers, are gems. Few living theologians are written of. Drs. Hoge and Palmer are the only names of men in the Southern Church that we find. We heartily commend the book to all who cannot afford to buy the many volumes which one would need to possess in order to have the same amount of information.

THE CYCLOPEDIA OF TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION: A Reference Book of Facts, Statistics and General Information on all Phases of the Drink Question, the Temperance Movement and the Prohibition Agitation. 8vo, pp. 671. \$3.50. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1891.

A vast store-house of facts for the information and help of workers in the temperance cause. For an encyclopædia the volume is perhaps too pronounced on one side, but it is the right side; and for an encyclopædia it "preaches" as well as gives information; but its hortation is all on the side of truth and righteousness. At the same time, however, it states fully and strongly the positions which the general spirit of the book antagonizes, and seeks to make its persuasion the persuasion of truth. While of great value in many other respects, we regard this work of special value as a digest of the legislation on the subject of temperance. It presents the temperance question in every aspect, moral, economic, social, religious and political. It traces its history in all lands, as well in the lives of great leaders in its various movements as in its more general features. As a reference book on the subject it will be found indispensable.

FIFTEEN HUNDRED FACTS AND SIMILES FOR SERMONS AND ADDRESSES. *By J. F. B. Tinsling, B. A., author of "Hidden Lessons from the Repetitions and Variations of the New Testament," etc.* 12mo., pp. 471. \$2. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1890.

A well-arranged, well-indexed compilation from all manner of sources, ancient history, modern newspapers, philosophy, science and general literature. Illustrations that "illustrate" are of too great value to be dispensed with. This collection will be found most suggestive.

THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS. Published monthly at \$2.50 per annum. Illustrated. Pp. 150. New York: The Review of Reviews, Astor Place.

We take pleasure in commending this magazine to those of our readers who desire to keep abreast of current thought and current events. To the busy man who has but little time to read, or to the man of modest income, who cannot afford to take more than one or two periodicals, it furnishes a remarkably well-digested summary of all the important events of the world, of the noteworthy articles in the leading magazines, religious as well as secular, and of current life and literature in general. Its Index of the articles of the leading magazines is invaluable to the student. Its illustrations aid in fixing in the mind notable persons and events. Its original articles are carefully prepared by the most skilled writers on both sides of the Atlantic. Its book department is full and complete. *The Review of Reviews* has had a phenomenal success and bids fair, as it deserves, to continue its successful career. Patrons and contributors of the QUARTERLY will find the latter's articles regularly indexed and summarized.

THE LITERARY DIGEST : A Weekly Compendium of the Contemporaneous Thought of the World. \$3.00 per Annum. New York : Funk & Wagnalls.

We desire to notice this valuable periodical not merely because of the prominence it gives to the articles of the QUARTERLY, but because of its intrinsic merit. Its weekly appearance is a delight. One possessing it need not be at a loss to know what is the spirit of the press. Its contents are excerpts from the leading reviews, books, and papers of the week, and well wrought reviews of the best literature. The several departments in which are grouped the expressions of current thought are politics, sociology, education, literature, art, science and philosophy, religion, and miscellany. Its index to periodical literature is also well prepared and of great usefulness to special students. With this periodical in hand, one has a survey of the whole field of thought and opinion.

THE CAPTAIN OF THE JANIZARIES : A Story of the Times of Scanderbeg, and the Fall of Constantinople. By James M. Ludlow, D. D., Litt., D. 12mo. pp. 404. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1891.

A historical romance, in which is interwoven the career of Scanderbeg who for so many years successfully opposed the Ottoman power. The story is one of thrilling interest, and reviews a chapter of history which deserves to be made more familiar, especially at this day when the peoples living immediately west of the Turk's dominions and yet under his Suzerainty are destined, probably, to play so large a part in the early future of Europe. Dr. Ludlow displays thorough and painstaking research into history, and great familiarity with the customs of the East. We congratulate him upon the demand for his wholesome book which the new edition indicates.

THE INTERPRETER WITH HIS BIBLE. By A. E. Waffle, A. M., author of "The Lord's Day" (Prize Essay), etc. 16mo., pp. 106. 60 cts. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1891.

This little treatise on the proper method and spirit in studying the Bible is intended to meet the wants of persons who are anxious to study the Bible for themselves, but who have not had the advantages of a classical education. To meet

current doubts it first presents an admirable argument for the most orthodox view of inspiration. Then follow chapters on The Interpreter Himself, discussing the moral, spiritual and intellectual attitude of the interpreter; The General Principles of Interpretation, as Interpreting Scripture by Scripture, etc.; and on the Interpretation of Figurative Language. While brief, the discussion is in fine spirit, and indicates profound reverence for the truth on the part of the author.

ALDEN'S MANIFOLD CYCLOPEDIA OF KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE. With Illustrations. *Perseverance—Pluperfect*. About 400 pp. New York: John B. Alden. 1891.

The twenty-ninth volume of a work which we have frequently described, and of a character similar to the volumes which have preceded it.

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I. THE QUESTION OF INSPIRATION IN ITS BEARING ON THE DOCTRINES OF GRACE.

HOWEVER Christian men may differ respecting the nature and extent of inspiration, they are all agreed in regard to its importance. In the estimate of all it is looked upon as presenting the gravest question the church has ever encountered. Nor is this estimate of its importance to be wondered at when we consider the relation which this question sustains to all the doctrines of revelation. There is no question respecting the being and attributes of God, the mode of the divine subsistence in three persons, the origin and original state of man, the fall and the state into which it brought mankind, the covenant of works and the covenant of grace, the atonement and intercession of Christ, the office of the Holy Spirit, the nature and prerogatives of the church and her unity as the one body of Christ, the doom and destiny of the finally impenitent—there is not one of these questions whose solution does not depend absolutely upon the testimony of the Bible. Within the sacred volume, and there alone, have we any reliable information on any of these subjects.

It must, therefore, be manifest that all questions in regard to the trustworthiness of the sacred record are questions in regard to the very foundation of Christianity. When a passage from this record is adduced in support of a particular view on any of these subjects, the question arises, of necessity, on what ground is it brought into court, and why should it have any weight in determining the issue? As the ultimate authority on

all such questions is God himself, the claim of the passage to take part in the decision must depend upon the fact that it gives utterance to the voice of God. Of course this claim raises the question of the relation of the words of the passage to God, and carries us at once into the very heart of the question of inspiration.

In entering upon the discussion of this question it is necessary to clear the subject of some misconceptions which have proved a source of much confusion of thought, and have led to much doubtful disputation. One or other of these misconceptions is revealed by almost every opponent of the doctrine of the plenary, verbal inspiration of holy writ. Writers of this class assume that such inspiration implies the doctrine of verbal dictation. That is, that the Holy Spirit dictated to the sacred writers the words they were to employ in committing to writing, or in giving oral utterance to, the facts or doctrines they were commissioned to communicate to men. This misconception has ruled Prebendary Row in discussing this subject and has determined him in rejecting, as untenable, the doctrine of an inspiration which extends to the words of Scripture. Perhaps the most striking instance of this particular misconception is presented in the impassioned denunciation of the verbal theory by Coleridge in his *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*. The following are the terms of this now celebrated denunciation: "All the miracles which the legends of monk or rabbi contain can scarcely be put in competition, on the score of complication, inexplicableness, the absence of all intelligible use or purpose, and of circuitous self-frustration, with those that must be assumed by the maintainers of this doctrine, in order to give effect to the series of miracles by which all the nominal composers of the Hebrew nation before the time of Ezra, of whom there are any remains, were successively transformed into *automaton* compositors." It would be difficult to find a better sample of the *ignoratio elenchi* than that furnished in the foregoing sentence. Its author assumes, that according to the verbal theory the sacred writers were transformed into automaton compositors, while the theory proceeds upon no such assumption. All that the theory assumes is, that the Holy Spirit, who breathed into man's nostrils

the breath of life and constituted him a living soul, has access to the souls of men, and can determine their thoughts and volitions. No intelligent advocate of the doctrine of verbal inspiration professes to know how the Spirit of God does this, as it may be assumed that Coleridge himself would not have claimed to know how the Spirit imparted intellectual and moral life to the lifeless form of the first man. In fact, no one knows how God does anything but our ignorance of the $\tau\delta\ \pi\omega\tilde{\omega}\varsigma$ does not justify the conclusion that we are ignorant of the $\tau\delta\ \tilde{\upsilon}\tau\epsilon$. It is pleasing to cherish the persuasion that good men who are in the habit of quoting the above sentence of Coleridge, and endorsing it as conclusive against the verbal theory of inspiration, would shrink from applying the principle which underlies it to the doctrines of grace. Strip the Coleridgean criticism of the assumption, that the Holy Spirit cannot work in the soul's of men to will and to do of his own good pleasure, and it is bereft of all point or power. On this assumption it manifestly proceeds. It assumes that even the author of man's*faculties, including his will, cannot determine what his volitions shall be except by an interference with the action of that faculty, which would be destructive of his freedom as a moral agent. If this be a valid principle, what becomes of the Scripture doctrine of regeneration, repentance, and sanctification? Can a man whose heart is at enmity against God turn from sin which he loves, to God whom he hates, before he is born from above? If the principle be valid, how is it that the divine action in the enlightenment of those whose minds are blinded by the god of this world, is likened to the act of God in the original creation of light? If the principle be valid, how can the power by which those dead in trespasses and sins are quickened into spiritual life find its analogue in the mighty power put forth in the resurrection and enthronement of Christ, and the subjugation of all things to his sway? Did this mighty power transform the subjects of it into unconscious *automata*?

The question at issue here marks one of the turning points in theology. One school of theologians hold, that when God created free moral agents he thereby limited himself, in his government of them, to the operation of motives. Any influence which re-

wards or punishments can exert is allowable, but any direct determining action on the part, even of God himself, is out of place in the sphere of free moral agency. (See Birks on the *Difficulties of Belief*.) This view of moral agency when analyzed and carried out to its legitimate consequences, must resolve itself into blank Pelagianism, resting, as it does, upon the assumption that ability is the condition and measure of responsibility—an assumption ethically unchallengeable in speaking of unfallen moral agents, but utterly erroneous and deceptive in treating of such agents as fallen. The only point of difference between Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism is, that the former holds that man possesses the requisite ability in virtue of his constitution as a free responsible agent, while the latter holds that the requisite ability is the result of a grace common to all men. Both hold that, apart from ability to obey the divine mandates, there can be no righteous claim for obedience, and, consequently, no moral obligation. As semi-Pelagianism conditions moral obligation upon the impartation of grace, it of course follows, that if God would exact obedience he must impart the needed grace. It is manifest that the grace communicated, under such conditions, is no longer grace, else obligation is no longer obligation. What God is under obligation to do cannot be represented as an act of grace.

The principle of Coleridge's objection to the doctrine of verbal inspiration, therefore, involves grave theological consequences. It is manifestly subversive of the Scripture doctrine of the work of the Holy Spirit in the application of redemption. It is impossible to hold it and, at the same time, to hold intelligently what the Scriptures teach respecting man's natural state as the subject of spiritual death, and the agency of the Spirit in renewing the human will. All objections against the doctrine of verbal inspiration, based upon the prerogatives of man's will, viewed as an isolated, self-determining power, must lie with equal force against the doctrine that faith and repentance are the gifts of God, and are wrought in the soul by the omnipotent, life-giving agency of the Holy Ghost, who works both to will and to do of his own good pleasure, making the subjects of his working willing in the day of his power. Coleridge is at home when on board the mystic

ship of the *Ancient Mariner*, but he is manifestly out of place when he assumes command of the bark of critical theological speculation. The doom of the ill-fated craft which dissolved beneath the "ancient mariner," leaving not a rack behind, lingers on the track of the critical bark under such unscientific guidance; but the deplorable evil is that, in the meantime, the story of its mystic motion, "without or wave or wind," under the weird spell of its captain's enchantment, may detain many a wedding-guest on his way to the spiritual marriage feast.

Another very common misconception confounds inspiration with revelation, the material of the record with the recording of it. The opponents of verbal inspiration ask its advocates, "Do you mean to tell us, that a record embracing the words of wicked men and demons, a record detailing such wayward experiences as Solomon has recounted in the book of Ecclesiastes, has been given, in its totality, by divine inspiration?" Such questions are urged with a confidence which shows that those who urge them regard them as unanswerable, and absolutely conclusive against the verbal theory. One thing such questions do certainly show—they show that the questioners do not understand the question they have undertaken to discuss. No one who understands the real point at issue would ever think of putting any such questions. It does not follow, because the language of wicked men, or of demons, or the history of Solomon's sinful courses, are not matters of revelation, stamped with divine approval, that, therefore, the recording of such language and such experiences, was not entered upon and executed by divine authority. Or, to give this objection its widest scope and comprehension, it does not follow, because the incidents of human history upon the theatre of time and under the eye of the historian, are not matters of supernatural revelation, that, therefore, the Scripture record of which they form so large a part is not a record divinely inspired. The ultimate question here is, were these historical incidents placed on record by divine authority, or were the sacred writers left to choose what species, and what amount, of material, should constitute the main body of a book which was to give the history of the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent, and serve the Church of God as the rule

of faith and practice to the end of time? This is the only admissible question in this controversy, and it admits of but one answer. The sacred writers were infallibly guided in the selection of all such materials, and were preserved from placing anything on record which was not intended by God to constitute a part of the sacred volume. The agency of the Spirit in the instruction of the writers, in regard to the material of the communication they were commissioned to make, comes under the head of *revelation*, while his agency in determining the form of the record, and the words in which the communication has been expressed, comes under the head of *inspiration*. When the sacred writer placed on record the words of satan in the temptation of Eve, he had the authority of the Holy Spirit for doing so; and it was by the same authority that the language of satan in the temptation of our Lord was embodied in the history of his earthly life. The Spirit has not set his seal to the character of the language employed by the tempter, but he has set his seal to the trustworthiness of the record of it as made under his own authority by the inspired penman. The result is that the entire record, irrespective of the character of the ideas, or facts recorded, is the word of God.

Closely connected with these misconceptions is the objection founded on the diversity of style among the sacred writers. It is alleged that if the Holy Spirit actually exercised an influence which determined the words of the utterance, or the record of the subjects of his inspiration, he, and not they, was the real author of the utterance, or the record, and the style would be uniform from Genesis to Revelation, from Moses to John. As the sacred volume exhibits no such uniformity, it is argued that the Spirit could not have sustained such relation to the agents he employed. In treating of the charge made by Coleridge against verbal inspiration, the fundamental principle of this objection has been dealt with. It assumes, as his denunciation does, that the Holy Spirit cannot determine the volitions of a free moral agent without destroying his freedom and converting him into an *automaton*. The bearing of this principle upon the doctrines of grace, it is hoped, has been made sufficiently clear already, but it may not be

out of place to examine this same principle in its relation to this specific objection.

At the outset, let it be observed, that the objection assumes that the Holy Spirit has but one style of operation and must always keep by that style, no matter what his subject may be. It may well be asked, on what authority is this assumption based? Does it meet with any countenance from his style of working in the domain of earth's fauna or flora, or in the resplendent glories of the sidereal array? The earth with its teeming diversities of forms, and the heavens which his omnipotent power has garnished with splendors sufficient to entrance and fill with rapture the loftiest intellects, unite in proclaiming the unity of the worker and the diversity of his operations. Indeed, it cannot be claimed that even a human author is limited to one unvarying style. Limited as the human faculties are, the history of human authorship proves that the same writer can vary his style according to the variety of the themes of which he treats, now lingering in the humble vale of unpretentious prose, and anon, inspired by some grand conception, scaling the loftiest heights of impassioned poetic utterance. Are we to recognize such variant powers as attributes of human authorship, and, in the same breath, assert that the author of all the powers possessed by man is destitute of any such versatility in giving utterance to the deep things of God? It is but charitable to assume that those who would so limit the Holy One of Israel have really not taken into account the theological consequences of such limitation. Only grant that the Holy Spirit is the same in substance and equal in power and glory with the Father and the Son, and all such objections are seen at once to be as irrelevant as they are irreverent.

Those who advance this objection overlook the agency of the Spirit in fashioning and training for their specific work the agents whom it was his purpose to employ in the production of the sacred record. His selection of the agents was not an *ex post facto* determination. He did not wait till one chanced to appear suiting his purpose and fitted for the execution of it by a constitution and culture produced independent of his agency. Having, in infinite wisdom, determined to furnish his church with

a revelation invested with all the attraction wherewith diversity of style could clothe it, he, at the same time, determined to create, and cultivate by his grace and providence, the men by whose agency this gracious purpose was to be carried into execution. Just as he raised up an Aholiab, a Bezaleel, and a Hiram, to execute the heaven-revealed plan of the furniture and adornments of the tabernacle, or the temple, so also did he raise up men to lay the foundations and raise upon them the superstructure of the temple of truth. In view of these unquestionable facts it may well be asked, What do men mean by raising such objections as are based upon diversity of style found among the sacred writers? Is it reasonable to suppose, that, the Spirit of God having determined on the production of a record characterized by such diversity, and having created and cultured agents for the prosecution of the work, he would overbear them in the execution of it so that the result would exhibit no trace of the exercise of the very attributes with which, of set purpose, he had endowed them? Such *self-frustrating* procedure (to borrow a term from Coleridge's charge of *self-frustration*) is the logical outcome of the theory of the anti-verbalists, and cannot be laid to the charge of the theory of verbal inspiration.

This is the only view of the Spirit's action in the selection and equipment of the agents of revelation that can be reconciled with his wisdom and sovereignty, and the bearing of it upon the question of his agency in relation to the free-agency of the subjects of an absolutely plenary, verbal inspiration, must be patent to all who will duly weigh the facts of the case. The qualities, whether natural or supernatural, bestowed upon these agents, become part and parcel of their personal constitution, and when moved by the Spirit to speak or record the matter intended for the present or future instruction of the church, they acted freely, bringing into action endowments which were given by the Spirit to be employed in his service, and under his guidance. In using these qualities according to their specific nature, and to their fullest extent, he was not interfering with the freedom of the inspired organs of his will. On the contrary, the more thoroughly he took possession of the men, working out his purpose *ab intra*, through the

mediation of the qualities which he himself had bestowed, the more truly personal, on the part of the inspired agent, would be the resultant utterance, or the resultant record. The variety of style in each case becomes a designed variety, and is the necessary outcome of qualities imparted in the creation, and subsequent culture of the agent, under the presidency of the Holy Ghost. Moral agents moved *ab intra* are moved freely, whether the author of the impulse be the Spirit of God, or the god of this world. Our Lord acted as a free-agent when he was led of the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil, and Judas acted freely when satan entered into him and, by internal impulse, moved him to betray his Master. It is only *ab extra* coercion that transforms men into Coleridge's *automata*. So long as the overt act is originated from within, and is in harmony with the character of the actor, so long must the agent be regarded as possessing all the freedom possible to any order of free moral agents within the empire of moral agency, whether on earth or in heaven. All the objections, thus far examined, proceed upon a false theory of the freedom of the will, and are as clearly at war with the principles of sound philosophy as they are with the plainest utterances of Scripture in regard to the doctrines of sin and grace.

Other opponents of the doctrine of verbal inspiration base an argument on the phenomena presented in the present state of the sacred text. A recent writer thus puts it: "But the theory of verbal inspiration is of course quite as untenable, even if applied to the Scriptures in their original tongues. The occurrence of one single various reading, the presence of one single direction to the *K'ri*, or reader to correct the *K'thibh*, or written text, is fatal to such a theory. And as every student of the Scriptures in the original knows, such phenomena are to be found by thousands in the Greek and Hebrew text. Thus we are driven to the conclusion that the theory is absolutely baseless, unless we insist on another theory equally absurd, that the Holy Spirit, who dictated every word of Holy Scripture as an infallible revelation to mankind, has not provided means for the preservation of the words he had dictated, but has allowed the church to lose a vast number of them altogether."

It is difficult to see the force of the reasoning exhibited in this quotation. One is at a loss to know how "the occurrence of one single various reading," or of thousands of various readings, in the present Hebrew or Greek texts, warrants the conclusion that the original autographs, as they came from the hands of the original writers, were not verbally inspired. There is no logical connection between the premises and the conclusion. Various readings are the outcome of a comparison of different manuscripts, and the design of critics is to ascertain, as nearly as the available sources of information will enable them, what the reading of the original autographs really was. When out of several readings one is selected, as entitled, in the judgment of the critics, to take its place in preference to the others, all that the decision warrants is, that in their estimate this was the original reading as it appeared in the inspired autograph. For aught implied in such critical decision, the autograph may have been verbally inspired, or it may have been a piece of mere human composition. In view of this matter-of-fact critical procedure, out of which various readings spring, one may be excused if he apply to the argument of the aforesaid writer the language he has used in speaking of the verbal theory, and pronounce it "absolutely baseless."

The reader will observe in the passage quoted an instance of the confusion of thought, and misconception of the doctrine the writer is opposing. He confounds verbal *inspiration* with verbal *dictation*. As we have already stated, no intelligent advocate of the verbal theory holds or teaches any such doctrine, and the cause of truth is not advanced by charging men with holding doctrines which they repudiate. He also assumes that it were absurd to hold, "that the Holy Spirit, who dictated every word of Holy Scripture as an infallible revelation to mankind, has not provided means for the preservation of the words he had dictated, but has allowed the church to lose a vast number of them altogether." On what authority is this theory of the Spirit's action pronounced absurd? Suppose it were true that a vast number of the words of inspiration have been lost—a statement which cannot be proved, as all the original words, intended for transmission, may exist in

the aggregate of manuscripts—does it follow that it is absurd to hold that the Spirit has permitted such loss to occur, and taken no measures to prevent it? Is there anything in the analogy of God's dealings with mankind to justify this assertion? Has God done nothing of this kind in the history of our race? Having created man upright, wearing the divine image, did he "provide means for the preservation" of him in that estate? We know that he did not; and if he did not interpose in this case, what reason is there for holding that he would interpose in order to preserve, in its original textual integrity, the revelation of his will? If, consistently with his character, he could permit man to mar the divine image in which he was created, might he not, with equal consistency, permit man to mar his workmanship in the divine record after it came from the hands of the sacred writers?

As to the extent of this marring in the case of the record, it is not unreasonable to ask, on what authority it is alleged that "*a vast number*" of the original, Spirit-inspired words, has been lost. The allegation implies a range of knowledge which no critic possesses. No one can make such an assertion except he has discovered the original autographs and compared them, word for word, with all existing manuscripts. In no other way could a critic find out what words of the autographs have been omitted in the apographs, or in the vast array of copies now extant, which have been made through the intervening centuries. As no man is in a position to institute such a comparison, it is manifest that no one is warranted in alleging that the church has lost "*a vast number*" of the words of inspiration.

It is unnecessary to revert to the author's argument from the *K'ri* and *K'thibh*. The *K'ri* is simply a notification to the reader of what he, in the opinion of the notifiers, is to substitute, in reading, in place of what is written in the body of the text. All instances of this class are simply instances of suggested various readings and are merely conjectures as to what was the reading in the original text. On the other hand, the occurrence of such marginal notifications carry with them a word of admonition for the anti-verbalists. They prove, to all men, how reverently the

men who have had custody of the sacred text have looked upon its words. Instead of venturing to change the *K'ihibh*, and actually substitute for it the *K'ri*, they have simply placed a note in the margin, which indicates what they thought the original writing was.

There is one feature of the method adopted by anti-verbalists in dealing with the doctrine of verbal inspiration, which is not fitted to commend it to those whose object is to ascertain the real state of the question, and the *data* for settling it. They are, commonly, in the habit of minimizing the scriptural *data* on which the verbal theory is based, and reducing to a minimum the testimony of even the small array of texts on which, they inform their readers, the theory is built.

The writer, in his book on *The Rule of Faith and the Doctrine of Inspiration*, has dealt with some remarkable examples of this method of controversy presented in the writings of Prebendary Row, and he is surprised to find an additional instance of this method in the *Theological Monthly*, for May, 1891. (Pp. 343, 344.) The following is the account given of the sum total of the scriptural data on which, it is assumed, the verbal theory rests:

“Our first task will naturally be to inquire what the Scripture itself says: and, as has already been remarked, it says very little. It declares that the Spirit of Christ ‘was in the prophets.’ It declares that God ‘spake by the mouth of his holy prophets.’ It tells us that ‘holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.’ Jesus Christ himself, though he speaks with respect of the ancient Scriptures, though he quotes them as having authority, has told us little more about them than that they ‘testify of him.’ He does not hesitate to amplify or modify their teaching, and sometimes even to abrogate it. And it is to be remembered, that when the Scriptures are referred to in the New Testament, the Old Testament is meant, save in one passage only—2 Pet. iii. 16. The New Testament nowhere asserts its own inspiration. The doctrine that it is divinely inspired rests solely on the fact that the apostles of Christ were filled with the Holy Ghost in order to carry out the work they were commissioned to

do, namely, to proclaim the doctrine Christ had taught them to all the world. Whether this gift endowed them with immunity from error, and, if so, how far the immunity went, we are nowhere told. The passage most usually cited to establish such immunity (2 Tim. iii. 15, 16) is not decisive. For (1), it is doubtful whether it does more than say that all the inspired books are, in consequence of that inspiration, profitable for instruction and reproof; and (2), it does not define in what inspiration consists, nor what consequences it involves. That the prophets when they predicted future events, were the channels whereby the Holy Spirit communicated infallible truth to the world, is a proposition few would dispute. But it is nowhere asserted in Scripture that all portions of it were equally written under such influence. That the guidance of the Holy Ghost was expressly promised to the disciples on various occasions is certainly stated, and there can be no doubt that such guidance was infallible. But that they were at all times under that special and infallible guidance, either in their lives, in their oral communications, or in their writings, is nowhere affirmed. And if we have reason to believe that they were liable to error in the two first, it is open to doubt, as far as Scripture is concerned, whether infallibility can be ascribed to the last. Thus the language of Scripture itself is not distinct on the nature and limits of inspiration. If theories are to be formed on the point, they must be built on inference, not on any direct assertion of Christ, or of the first preachers of the gospel." (Pp. 343-44.)

On page 389 the following sentences occur: "We might, no doubt, claim to be infallibly certain of the truth of the words of the Eternal Son of God. But as they have been handed down to us by human means, we cannot be infallibly certain that we have an infallible record of them. And so, moreover, though we have the best possible grounds for believing that the Bible is the word of God, we might hesitate to say that we were infallibly certain that this was the case."

It is hardly necessary to remark that the above quotations justify the charge of minimizing already preferred against the anti-verbalists. Christ's own personal testimony is reduced almost

to the one sentence, that the Scriptures testify of him! Nor can we be infallibly certain, it is alleged, what were his words in any testimony he bore on the subject, as these words have been handed down to us by "human means." If so, it may well be asked, what warrant have we for believing that he bore even this minimum of testimony? If the introduction of "human means," is the introduction of an element of uncertainty, it must follow, as the whole Bible has been given through the use of "human means," that this faith-subverting element of uncertainty pervades the entire record, to neutralize the force of its threatenings, and to shake confidence in its promises. Our author seems to make an exception in favor of the prophets when they predicted future events, and he also concedes "that the guidance of the Holy Ghost was expressly promised to the disciples on various occasions," and holds that "there can be no doubt that such guidance was infallible." But it is difficult to see why "there can be no doubt" if, as our author teaches, there can be no certainty about the language through which alone we are informed of these prophetic utterances, and of these promises of infallible guidance. If the use of human agency in the transmission of the revelation warrants the inference, that "we cannot be infallibly certain that we have an infallible record of the truth [even] of the words of the Eternal Son of God," surely it must follow, that we cannot be infallibly certain that we have an infallible record of anything that prophet, apostle, or evangelist ever uttered or penned. The author himself has drawn the only legitimate conclusion from the operation of this disturbing human element in the communication of the divine will. His conclusion is, "though we have the best possible grounds for believing that the Bible is the word of God, we might nevertheless reasonably hesitate to say that we were infallibly certain that this was the case. All practical questions," he adds, "in truth, rest on the basis of probability rather than of certainty. On points such as the existence of God, we may claim to have found an amount of probability which practically amounts to certainty. At least there is an approach to certainty on which no reasonable man would scruple to act. But the certainty which rests on logical demonstration we do not claim to possess." (Pp. 389-'90.)

Our author's best possible grounds of faith in the Bible as the word of God, according to his own account of it, is simply a probability, and of like character is his ground of belief in the existence of God himself! Is this the sole basis of the faith of God's elect? God forbid! "Let God be true and every man a liar." What a transformation such a theory of a basal probability would work if applied to the sacred text. Take, as examples of its operation, such texts as the following: "We know (with some degree of certainty) that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have (probably) a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." "He that cometh to God must believe that he (probably) is, and that he is (probably) a rewarder of them that seek him." "I know (with some degree of certainty) whom I have believed, and am (in some measure) persuaded that he is (probably) able to keep that which I have committed to him against that day." Whatever function the doctrine of probability may have had a century ago, in controversy with atheists or deists, there is no room for it in the economy of grace, whose provisions are so complete that they "make known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places the manifold wisdom of God." The method of salvation is such as to exclude probability as the basis of faith. That by which those who received Christ differed from those who received him not, lay not in this, that the former regarded it as probable that he was the promised Messiah, while the latter deemed his claims to rest upon an improbability. The ground and origin of the faith of those who received him was, that they "were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." To a like cause the Scripture ascribes the faith of those who behold "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." The omnipotent energy of the operating cause, in their case, is likened to the omnific mandate uttered in the original creation of light. The doctrine of the divine word assumes, and affirms, the utter inability of man to apprehend, or receive, the things of the Spirit of God, and denies the possibility of his receiving, or knowing, either the kingdom of God, or its King, prior to regeneration. Christian faith, therefore, is not the result of a

process in which the probable is weighed against the improbable, issuing in the preponderance of the former over the latter. The promises of which it takes hold are not yea yea, and nay nay, but in Christ are all yea and amen. In a word, if the Scripture account of man's natural state, and of the power put forth in his recovery, be true, the doctrine of probability as the basis of saving faith must be rejected as irreconcilable with the first principles of the doctrines of grace. God has not left "the heirs of the promise" to draw conclusions from a balance of probabilities, but, "willing to show more abundantly the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it with an oath, in order that by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might have strong consolation who have fled for refuge to lay hold on the hope set before us." Such is the basis of the believer's faith and hope. The divine promise confirmed by the oath of God, and the immutability of the divine counsel, place the ground of his confidence outside the category of the merely probable.

Our author would exclude dogma from having any part in settling the question of inspiration. His reason for such exclusion *probably* is, that dogma excludes probability. What is dogma (from *doxéō*, to think) but the formulated result of thought? The claim to acceptance of any dogma, whether within the domain of science, philosophy, or theology, depends upon the character of the *data* on which it is founded, and the logical consistency and accuracy of the process of thinking through which it has been reached. The above dogma, and its correlative dogmas previously established, can bear, without peril, the application of this, or any other righteous test. They are neither more nor less than the formulated teaching of the word of God regarding the way of life and the guarantees of the safety of those who walk in it. Such is the idea of dogma, and such is the character of genuine scriptural dogma; and judged by such dogmatic test, the doctrine of probability, as the basis of the Christian faith, must be excluded as antagonistic to the determinate, and determining, principles of the economy of grace, and as having an unsettling tendency which must be most inimical to that strong consolation which it is the privilege of the heirs of the promise to enjoy.

As the foregoing quotation shows, our author finds an argument against verbal inspiration on the fact, that while Christ speaks with respect of the ancient Scriptures, and quotes them as having authority, he does not hesitate to amplify, or modify their teaching, and sometimes even to abrogate it. It is difficult to see the force of this argument. It is a recognized prerogative of the enacting, legislative, authority, to do all that is here mentioned. The authority enacting the law can amplify, or modify it, and even abrogate it, if a change of circumstances render such action necessary. No one questions the right of human legislators to attemper their laws and adjust them, as the progress of events may demand. Are we to deny to Christ, who was the legislator under the Old Testament, this same legislative prerogative? The laws of that dispensation which he has amplified, or modified, or abrogated, were necessary for the time then present, but were unsuitable in their original form to the new dispensation, or, as in the case of some of them, were incapable of adjustment to its milder, freer, constitution. As he is the author of both dispensations, he certainly had the right to exercise his prerogative, as the legislator in both, and to make such changes as, in his infinite wisdom, he deemed necessary to the progressive development of the kingdom of his grace. Such action, on his part, cannot, with any show of justice, be interpreted as implying any lack of approval of those laws, as if they were destitute of divine authority in the times for which they were enacted, and it is only on such assumption that our author's argument can have any force.

But it will be observed that the argument in question confounds *the matter of the sacred record* with *the inspiration of the writers*. So far as the point at issue is concerned, the character of the laws referred to is not to be taken into account. The sole question is, Were the sacred writers moved by the Holy Ghost to place them on record, and was the agency of the Spirit who moved them to write, such as to render them infallible in the execution of their task? The character of the laws has nothing whatever to do with the subject under discussion. It is time that writers on this subject would learn to distinguish between the character of the matter of the sacred Scriptures, and the inspiration of the agents

employed to place it on record. Let it be remembered that men have been inspired to make record of the acts and utterances of satan, of demons, and of wicked men. If writers on inspiration would remember this fact, and recognize, as the *status questionis* demands, the above distinction, they would be less likely to formulate arguments against the plenary, verbal inspiration of the organs of the Holy Ghost, from the character of the communications they were commissioned to convey. The infallible inerrancy of the inspired writer in the execution of his task and the character of the matter of his composition, are altogether distinct questions, and should never be confounded. The matter may embrace blasphemous utterances, or the history of a deed of villainy, and, nevertheless, the agent who placed both on record may have done so by divine authority, and under the inspiration of the Spirit of God.

In view of the length to which this article has already extended, it would be unreasonable even to indicate the dimensions of the Scripture testimony on which verbalists base their theory of inspiration. The writer, therefore, must content himself with the request, that his readers will refer to previous articles of his in which the chief features and facts of this testimony are set forth. These articles prepared, at the editor's request, appeared in the *Theological Monthly*, for April and October, 1889.

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II. THE UNCONSCIOUS CALVINISM OF WESLEYAN THEOLOGY.

IN a former paper¹ the writer ventured the assertion that "genuine faith will not fail to bring sincere, though it may be unconscious, tribute to the comforting royal truth so firmly enthroned in our Calvinistic system." That statement it is now proposed to verify conclusively, by presenting some illustrations of the unconscious Calvinism of Wesleyan theology.

Arminian writers, with one accord, abandon the fundamental principles of their theology whenever they enlarge upon the hopes that are most precious to our fallen race. That we do not live in a world of chance; that the divine will is everywhere and always being surely accomplished; that all things are moving on in a divinely ordained harmony toward their appointed consummations; that the final outcome of the gospel scheme is a glorious certainty, of which all the providential and spiritual agencies now at work are the predestined means; and, especially, that God in the exercise of his sovereign prerogative, and in fulfilment of his own eternal purpose, is daily saving by efficacious grace certain elect souls out of the guilty and condemned mass of humanity: these general principles are all of them indirectly, and some of them explicitly, affirmed by every Arminian writer. But every one of them is Calvinistic, and out of harmony with the scheme of human contingency which is the differentiating property of Arminianism.

Brought face to face with the mysterious and unwelcome doctrine of divine sovereignty, Arminian writers have vainly sought to explain it away, floundering impotently amid their own damaging admissions in favor of Calvinism; or anon, borne along by the impulse of genuine Christian faith, they have forgotten for a time the shibboleths of their creed, and voiced their hopes in lan-

¹ PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY, April, 1891, p. 238.

guage that betrayed their substantial agreement with the leaders of our Calvinistic host.

Our space will permit us to give only a few citations from the abundant store of evidence at hand. To the passages now quoted from the Wesleys, from Richard Watson, from Dr. Albert Taylor Bledsoe, and from the Methodist Hymnals, the reader may add many more of similar import, if he will search the pages of these and other Arminian authorities.

I. *As to the certain salvation of all infants who die in infancy.* On this point the two great schools of theology are at one, for the reason that a Calvinistic doctrine has been incorporated into the Arminian system. It is a doctrine which can only be predicated on Calvinistic grounds. All who die in infancy are, if saved at all, unconditionally chosen of God to be heirs of salvation.

No Arminian can consistently hold the doctrine of conditional election, unless he postulates a *post-mortem* probation, and a special *limbus infantium* for all who do not stand a probationary test in this world. Holding to this theory, which would confessedly be unsupported by any Scripture, he must also concede the possibility that some of the infants whose characters are to develop in this middle region between Paradise and perdition, may be lost through unbelief and sin, as is the case with others who grow up in this world. But modern Arminianism refuses thus to gain consistency. The burial service used by the greatest of the Arminian churches contains the words of Job: "The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away: blessed be the name of the Lord." Mourning parents of to-day, in all evangelical bodies, are assured by their pastors that the precious babes who are fallen asleep are at rest in the Lord; that their death was divinely appointed, and the immediate occasion of their entrance into glory.

Now it must be borne in mind, that the chief objection urged by Arminians against the doctrine of unconditional election is, that it represents God as an arbitrary and partial sovereign. "Scripture affirms," they say, "that God is no respecter of persons; but this dogma represents him as choosing arbitrarily and distinguishing unjustly between creatures of equal ill-desert." But the objection, if just at this point, holds equally against the doctrine

that all who die in infancy are saved. How stands the case with these little ones? Granted, that so far as actual sin is concerned, they have done nothing to merit damnation. This fact alone does not entitle them to redemption. It is true of all who have not yet attained to the age of accountability. If, then, any of them are saved, they must needs be saved by grace. The Almighty does not act under compulsion in saving any soul. Were it possible for every dying little one to be enlightened and made capable of appeal to the Ruler of the Universe, not one could justly demand that *itself* should *die in infancy and be saved*. But for all that it dies, and, dying, is saved by sovereign grace. Why then, it might be asked, is this child saved, while another, born of the same parents, is suffered to grow old in sin and at last to meet the doom of the reprobate? Why is the one taken and the other left? The only possible answer is, that God always acts as sovereign, and has mercy on whom he will have mercy. No injustice is done to the child that lives when the dead child is made an heir of glory. None are damned, save for their own wilful unbelief and sin; and then they are simply permitted to "eat of the fruit of their own way." The salvation of any infant is an instance of unconditional election. God's reason for his own sovereign act, though it must be wise and good, is known only to himself. Here, as often besides, the devout soul can only echo the words of the Son of Man: "Even so, Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight." So answers the Calvinist; and so, likewise, as we shall presently see, does the Arminian.

Christian theology does not view the infant as does poor human sentimentality, pronouncing it altogether innocent and spotless. It is, before it ever becomes capable of moral action, the heir of a fallen race; and, because of its federal relation to the first Adam, is under the divine law regarded not only as depraved but as itself under condemnation. To be saved it must be cured of its sinfulness, and absolved from its original guilt. Orthodox Arminianism has but echoed the testimony of our Calvinistic theology in declaring, as it has done from the beginning, that every soul, infant or adult, needs to be justified, as well as regenerated and sanctified, in order to be fitted for heaven. How this change in

man's legal status and moral nature can be effected under any but a scheme of unconditional election has been a difficult problem, upon which Arminian learning and logic have been expended from the days of Arminius until now, without reaching the solution so greatly desired. The Arminian must in no wise admit the doctrine that saving grace is irresistible; and yet he would fain comfort bereaved parents with the assurance that their departed little ones are all saved. He would not leave the least doubt enshrouding the question as to their eternal blessedness. But under any scheme there is a mystery involved in the salvation of an unconscious infant; and the mystery swells beyond all bounds when an effort is made to separate it from the general mystery of regeneration. Hence the Arminian, more than any other man, is sorely perplexed at this point. "The difficulty in the case," says Richard Watson, "arises from this, that in adults we see the gift connected with its end, actual justification, by acts of their own, repentance and faith; but as to infants we are not informed by what process justification with its attendant blessings is actually bestowed."¹ He goes on to say that "a divine and an effectual influence may be exerted on them, which, meeting with no voluntary resistance, shall cure the spiritual death and corrupt tendency of their nature." It may be noted that our author implies that an *effectual* influence of grace would not be effectual, if it met with any "voluntary resistance." But this does not alter the fact that he has in terms admitted the sovereign election of these infants.

But how can this doctrine be harmonized with that of the conditional election of adults? This question Watson attempts to answer, and, like Milton's devils when they essayed to discuss hard doctrines, finds himself "perplexed, in wandering mazes lost." We need not, he contends, suppose "any great difference in the principle of the administration of grace" in the case of infants "and that of adults." Because if we do there would be a great gap in the Arminian argument! Even in the latter case, "the very power and *inclination* to seek justification of life, is thus prevenient and in the highest sense free." Again, "*independent of their own acts, the*

¹ *Watson's Institutes*, Part II., Chapter XVIII.

meritorious cause [of their salvation] is not inert, but fruitful in vital influence and gracious dealing." Which proves "that the benefits of the death of Christ are not in every degree, and consequently on the same principle not in every case, conferred under the restraints of conditions. So *certainly* is infant salvation attested by the Scriptures." And so possibly, that of some adults. Here it is evident that Watson had in mind the apostle's question, "Who maketh thee to differ? And what hast thou that thou didst not receive?" He makes two statements. One is tantamount to an avowal of faith in the doctrine of effectual calling. It would be hard to distinguish between the "renewal" of the sinner's will, in a work which results in his being "persuaded and enabled" to accept Christ, and the bestowment upon him by "preventive grace" of the "power and inclination" to seek God's favor. The other is equally Calvinistic, being an explicit acknowledgment that we may not impeach the justice of God in electing to save some men unconditionally. If, argues our author, the benefits of the atonement are not in every *degree* conferred "under the restraints of conditions," it is on the same principle that they are not in every *case* so conferred. Anyway, *grace is sovereign*; and if the Spirit discriminates between adults, giving them "various degrees" of religious feeling, he may, on the same principle, discriminate between the infant and the adult by saving the former unconditionally. This argument, if valid, proves too much, and upsets the objection which elsewhere the same author urges against unconditional election: viz., that it would be unjust for God to make such a discrimination between creatures equally guilty. Adult election only involves a further exercise of the same discrimination manifested in the election of infants. Indeed, our author's argument may be put even more strongly without doing violence to his own words. Adults, notwithstanding their depravity, guilt and stubbornness, are blessed by preventive grace—which is grace "in the highest sense free"—with the "power and inclination" to seek divine mercy: is it any wonder that passive infants are saved by the same free grace? In other words, if some adults are, by sovereign grace *effectually called*, God may with equal propriety *regenerate* some infants.

But Watson, as might be expected under the circumstances, is not satisfied with his own demonstration. He next turns about to hunt for what he has just declared unnecessary: namely, a condition upon which the infant's salvation may be viewed as suspended. He would fain mention some "instrumental cause" of the infant's rescue from sin and its consequences. First he names "the intercession of Christ himself, which can never be fruitless." This is another lapse into Calvinism, since that intercession is in itself an exercise of sovereign grace, and secures the salvation of all whom our Lord is pleased "in his wise providence to remove from the world" in infancy. If the intercession of Christ may secure the salvation of *infants who die*, it may on the same principle secure the regeneration in infancy of *some who are to live*. Hence our author, finding himself no farther away from the doctrine of unconditional election than before, proceeds to tell us in the next paragraph that God makes baptism "a means of grace" and a "channel of saving influence" especially "to those whom he intends to call to himself." That is, God, in pursuance of his intention to save them, is pleased to move their parents to invite the "saving influence" of the Spirit by bringing them to the font!

The natural affinity between the Arminian doctrine of conditional election and the Romish doctrine of baptismal regeneration is obvious. In the passage just quoted, Watson has merely yielded to the inherent necessities of the general system which he maintains. Arminianism, as we have already intimated, cannot admit consistently that any soul can be elected to salvation prior to its own choice. Hence it is that Watson, having unfolded clearly the true Scriptural doctrine as to the salvation of infants, grows dimly conscious of his own inconsistency, and fumbles about for some other argument which will harmonize better with his view as to the salvation of adults. The infant cannot personally fulfil any condition; his salvation being nevertheless conditional, a condition must be shown, and somebody must be found able to perform it in his behalf. Baptismal regeneration, conditioning the child's salvation upon the acts and faith of parents and god-fathers, answers the purpose of Arminian theology by removing the case from the

jurisdiction of a sovereign Spirit, and permitting the election to be made by human beings. This, notwithstanding we are assured that God can in any wise save the child unconditionally without doing any violence to the principles of eternal justice.

Watson, however, has but followed in the wake of John Wesley. That illustrious author, in his *Treatise on Baptism*,¹ teaches that the first benefit of baptism is "the washing away of original sin by the application of the merits of Christ's death," and endorses the declaration of the Church of England, that "children who are baptized, dying before they commit actual sin," are saved.

At this point another fact worthy of notice is brought to light. Arminians are fond of quoting the language of the Westminster Confession concerning "elect infants, dying in infancy," as setting forth by necessary implication the horrible doctrine of infant damnation. Were it granted that the Westminster divines meant to teach the possible damnation of some infants, it is clear that the followers of Wesley and Watson ought to be last among those who urge the accusation. For "elect" in the passage just quoted from the Westminster Confession, substitute *baptized*, and it is discovered that the Methodist fathers quite as much as any other Calvinistic divines, were troubled by the thought that some infants might be lost. If the emphatic and universal teaching of the Presbyterian Church of to-day, touching the certain salvation of all infants who die in infancy, may be justly considered a token of the decline of Calvinism, the same doctrine taught from Methodist pulpits and emphasized in recent years by a revision of the Methodist ritual, may with equal propriety be adduced to show the decline of Arminianism. The truth is, however, that the Arminian doctrine in the premises has been essentially modified; while the fundamental principles of the Calvinistic theology are urged now with as great vigor as ever.

II. In discussing the subject of *special providence*, Arminian writers with one accord unconsciously broach the doctrine of unconditional election.

It is indeed remarkable that Richard Watson, in his *Institutes*, has given no complete dissertation on special providence. This

¹ *Wesley's Works*, Vol. VI., pp. 14 and 15.

subject, so manifestly important by reason of its close relations to the doctrines of grace, he considers only as it concerns believers, and dismisses with a single short paragraph. Nor does he expatiate largely on general providence. We are led to surmise that possibly his reason for treating these two great topics in such brief and gingerly fashion, was the extraordinary mystery which surrounds them both as viewed from the Arminian stand-point. It is impossible to square the teachings of Scripture, as they refer to life and death and the myriad earthly interests of men, with the doctrine of conditional election. Watson, however, in the brief discussion which he gives of the general subject of providence, is clear and Calvinistic. He tells us¹ that "the plan and purpose of bringing back a revolted world to obedience and felicity" is "steadily kept in view in the Scripture history of the acts of God in former ages;" and is "still the end toward which all his dispensations tend, however wide and mysterious their sweep, *and which they will finally accomplish*, as we learn from the prophetic history of the future, contained in the Old and New Testaments." Again, God "is present everywhere, to sustain and govern all things;" and "his wisdom is infinite, his counsel settled, and his power irresistible." Inasmuch as Watson was not inclined to Universalism, it is plain that the "world" to which he refers as being destined to be "brought back to obedience and felicity," is the world of the elect. He declares his belief in the certain accomplishment of the divine purposes concerning the salvation of sinners. And this is Calvinism.

Elsewhere he says that the "mixed and chequered external circumstances of men in this present life" are designed to awaken them "to a due sense of their endangered and fallen condition, and to prompt and influence them, sometimes with mighty efficacy, to seek" God's "favor and grace." These dispensations of Providence "are not only instruments of prevention, but *designed means of salvation*, preparatory to and coöperative with those agencies by which that result can only be directly produced."²

Such, in brief, is Watson's doctrine of providence, as related to redemption.

¹ *Institutes*, Part II., Chapter I. ² *Ibid.*, Part II., Chapter XXIII.

Let us now examine its full import. The "prophetic history of the future" tells us of the final salvation of "a great multitude, which no man can number," but whose names are all even now "written in the Lamb's Book of Life." These constitute that "world" which God purposes to "bring back to obedience and felicity." In every age these elect souls are being induced by divinely ordained means "to seek the favor and grace of God." Though this multitude includes millions yet unborn, they are all now, even according to Watson, personally known to God, and to save them these dispensations of providence, often so "wide and mysterious" in their sweep, are designed by One whose "counsels are settled" and "whose power is irresistible." No Calvinist could express himself more strongly than Watson has done.

But the agreement of Watson with our Calvinistic theology will appear, if possible, more plainly, when we consider the general principle which he has above enunciated, as it appears through the medium of concrete illustrations. "The greater includes the less," and any attempt to show how the doctrine of Watson is illustrated in the experience of individuals, will only serve to bring out an instance of personal, unconditional election. Suppose, for example, the death of a child is used by the Spirit in connection with the Word, to melt the heart of an impenitent father: is not that affliction, being the specially "designed means" of his salvation, a token of the divine electing love? Does it not show that the father and the child were both in fact chosen together? Again: A man is born in a Christian community, the child of Christian parents. He is subjected to revival influences from his youth. He is environed by a merciful providence, abounding in dispensations "corrective or encouraging." All these manifold means are used by the Spirit "with mighty efficacy" to bring about his conversion. Can we make anything of all this but an election by sovereign grace? Antedating not only the sinner's repentance, but even his conscious being, such an election must needs have been one of God's eternal purposes. Manifestly, in either case, the withholding of the providential means and the influence of the Spirit by a sovereign God, would have led to a different result.

We turn now to Wesley's *Sermons*, in which we will find, along with much refractory ore, a rich vein of unconscious Calvinism. In his thirty-seventh sermon, as elsewhere, John Wesley quotes approvingly the maxim of Augustine, "*Praesidet universis tanquam singulis, et singulis, tanquam universis*"—a maxim which admirably expresses our Calvinistic faith, both as to providence and grace,—and then asks: "What is it (except our own sins) which we are not to ascribe to the providence of God?" "I know not," he answers, "what things they are which are not owing to the providence of God; in *ordering*, or at least in governing of which, this is not either directly or remotely concerned. I except nothing but sin." A significant exception: Arminianism being, in its last analysis, nothing more nor less than the doctrine that sin is an evil which God can neither prevent nor control without abolishing free-agency. But Wesley is too wise, too humble and too grateful not to see the truth; and accordingly he retracts the assertion he has just made by adding, "and even in the sins of others, I can see the providence of God to me." We may not consider that God's providence is concerned with our own sins, but only with the sins of others as they affect us! Which means, not that Wesley is involved in hopeless absurdity and self-contradiction, but only that in blundering fashion he has sought to introduce the familiar Calvinistic proviso that God is not the author of sin. He means, doubtless, that "the almighty power, unsearchable wisdom and infinite goodness of God, so far manifest themselves in his providence, that it extendeth itself to the first fall and to all other sins of angels and men; and that not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding and otherwise *ordering and governing* of them, in a manifold dispensation to his own holy ends; yet so as the sinfulness thereof proceedeth from the creature and not from God."¹

Wesley could subscribe the doctrine of the Shorter Catechism that "God governs all his creatures and all their actions." In his sermon on "The Education of Children," he advises parents to teach their little ones "from the first dawn of reason" that God "*orders all things*," and that "nothing comes by chance." This

¹ *Westminster Confession of Faith*, Chapter V., Section 4.

is good advice, just at this time, for all Presbyterian parents who would bring up their children in the true faith. "As God made the world," he continues, "so he governs the world and everything that is in it." Here sin is not excepted. "As he governs all things, so he governs all men, good and bad, little and great. And he overrules all. He gives us all the goodness we have; every good thought and word and work are from him. Without him we can neither think anything right nor do anything right." Thus, denying that God is the author of sin, he affirms that God is the author of all good—which is Calvinism.

In his sermon on Divine Providence he asserts that "to God all things are possible; he doeth whatever pleaseth him in heaven and earth and in all deep places, and we cannot doubt of his exerting all his power as in sustaining so in governing all that he has made."

The ore in our mine grows richer as we sink our shaft. We strike a new lode in Wesley's sermon on "The Imperfections of Human Knowledge." In this he talks about the mysteries of providence with genuine Augustinian humility. Among these mysteries he mentions the fact that Christianity is not spread as far as sin. "The poison is diffused over the whole globe; the antidote is not known in a sixth part of it." Besides, the antidote itself is in many instances grievously adulterated, "and instead of curing adds tenfold malignity to the disease." Why so many are thus left to perish in their sins is to him "a wonder of wonders." He finds also a mystery quite as great in the dealings of God with particular families and individuals. He cannot understand why one is born of rich and another of poor parents; why so many are exposed to want and pain "and a thousand temptations" from which there is apparently no way of escape; why multitudes are from infancy so hedged in by evil influences that they seem to "have no chance (as some speak), no possibility of being useful to themselves or others." He had almost said they had no possibility of salvation; but this would have been teaching the Calvinistic doctrine of reprobation, and that in severest form: so he resorts to paraphrase as if it were to conceal his meaning. And yet why it is that circumstances so vitally affecting their

temporal and eternal destiny are thus ordered "antecedently to their own choice"—this, too, be it remembered, in a world governed according to Arminian principles!—is to John Wesley a "mystery too deep to be fathomed by our reason." He did not believe that a heathen was incapable of moral action, and therefore irresponsible. Nevertheless, in the condition of the Hottentot or New Zealander without gospel privileges, there was somewhat exceedingly painful and perplexing. From the time he "comes into the world, until he goes out of it again, he seems to be under a dire necessity of living in all ungodliness and unrighteousness." In view of this awful fact,—apparently some terrible decree of reprobation operating right before our eyes,—Wesley cries out in humility and astonishment, "Art thou not the God of all the ends of the earth, and of them that remain in the broad sea?"

Growing still humbler, and hence of necessity more Calvinistic in spirit, he is next moved to wonder why God "suffered us so long to go on in our own ways before we were convinced of sin; or why he made use of this or the other instrument and in this or the other manner. . . . A thousand circumstances attended the process of our conviction which we do not comprehend." Still, again, "why he suffered us to stay so long [under conviction] before he revealed his Son in our hearts," is another mystery equally beyond explanation. There is no marvel in any of these facts, beyond the mystery of human stubbornness, if we assume with Bledsoe that God is doing his best at all times to restrain sin and promote righteousness; but if we agree with Wesley as he agrees with Calvin, in ascribing these things to the good pleasure of a sovereign God, then indeed may we say, "His ways are past finding out." None of this divine procedure, he assures us by way of parenthesis, can possibly be due to an "absolute decree;" and yet God *suffers* individuals and nations thus to continue in sin. "It is simply a mystery: we do not know what is the reason for it; it is enough that God knoweth."

Not once, from first to last, in this remarkable discourse, does Wesley lose sight of the fact that God could, *if he chose*, do more toward saving the world than he is doing. Taken altogether, and

in spite of its obtrusive Arminianism, which is palpably professional, this sermon is beyond all doubt worthy to be counted a specimen of allotropic Calvinism. Maintaining throughout that the spread of the gospel and the conversion of souls are absolutely dependent upon providential circumstances and the dispensations of sovereign grace, Wesley inculcates faith in the divine wisdom and goodness, and submission to the divine will, at the very points where a Paul, an Augustine and a Calvin are agreed that we can only wonder and adore. Then, after having denied the doctrine of the decrees in ambiguous prose, he affirms it in vigorous verse of unmistakable intent. The hymn composed by the preacher, and given at the end of the sermon, embalms an unquestionably Calvinistic faith in the following lines :

“ High is thy power above all height;
Whate'er thy will decrees is done ;
 Thy wisdom, equal to thy might,
 Only to thee, O God, is known.”

III. Arminian writers unwittingly subscribe the Calvinistic doctrine of divine sovereignty *whenever they expatiate on the efficacy of prayer*. When our Methodist brethren sing

“ Prayer is appointed to convey
 The blessings God designs to give,”

the change of tense which their doctors have made in these lines with a view to extracting all Calvinism from the hymn, does not in any wise answer their purpose. An unchangeable God has no new designs, and prayer is no new appointment. The poet expresses his faith that a believer's prayer is an appointed means, connected with an appointed end. Even as emended, this grand old Calvinistic hymn remains unchanged in a single sentiment from its opening declaration as to the appointment of prayer, to its final note of encouragement to the believer in Jesus.

It is in prayer that Christian faith rises to the full height of all its power and grandeur. Spurning all restraints imposed by imperfect creed-formulas, and pleading nothing less than the almighty power and gracious promises of a sovereign God, faith,—as Charles Wesley sings, voicing the joyful experience of all Christians,—

“ Faith, mighty faith, the promise sees,
 And looks to that alone;
 Laughs at impossibilities,
 And cries, It shall be done.”

Much as any other man does the devout Arminian believe, as we have already seen in the case of John Wesley's faith, that “with God all things are possible.” Whenever he kneels to pray in a revival meeting, he pleads for “convicting and converting power,” for “almighty grace” to be sent down from heaven; and as he thinks of the sad state of the impenitent, exposed to eternal death, yet callous of heart and obstinate of will, the fervor of his holy desire grows more and more till, with an exultant faith that will take no denial, he reaches the climax of his intercession oftentimes in repeating the poetic prayer of Charles Wesley:

“ Come, O thou all-victorious Lord,
 Thy power to us make known; -
 Strike with the hammer of thy word,
 And break these hearts of stone.

* * *

“ Convince us first of unbelief,
 And freely then release;
 Fill every soul with sacred grief,
 And then with sacred peace.”

Prayers like this are held orthodox by all Arminians; but they cannot be answered unless the doctrine of effectual calling be true. Indeed, it would be hard to find, outside of the Shorter Catechism or the Westminster Confession, a more thoroughly Calvinistic expression of faith in the sovereignty of the Spirit in regeneration than is embalmed in these lines of the Methodist Asaph.

Again, the Arminian may not believe in the “final perseverance of the saints,” but with Charles Wesley he thinks that such a consummation is nevertheless somehow in accord with the gospel scheme, and “most devoutly to be wished for;” and therefore he sings:

“ All my hopes on thee depend,
Love me, save me to the end;
 Give me the *continuing grace;*
 Take the everlasting praise.”

However much the Arminian may be prompted to rely on his

own faith and perseverance, when he begins to theorize concerning the mystery of free-will, he finds a better ground of hope when he thinks of the mystery of grace.

Thus it is seen that Arminian orthodoxy regards the bitter drugs of Calvinism as very proper remedies for spiritual disease, provided only they are capsuled in poetic verbiage. It would be easy to show that the "five points," albeit every one of them pronounced poisonous when presented in the concise and logical terms of the Westminster Assembly, are by our Methodist brethren deemed "wholesome and full of comfort," when they are enveloped in the flowing numbers, and dressed in the majestic scriptural imagery of Cowper, Doddridge, Newton, Montgomery and Watts.

That God can, in accomplishing his own eternal purposes, convert a soul and then bestow on that soul "continuing grace," is scouted, now as a blasphemous falsehood, and anon as a sheer impossibility, by Wesleyan writers; yet nevertheless they urge us alike in prose and verse to pray for the present and final salvation of our friends. "We reduce prayer to a real absurdity unless we allow that its very ground and reason is special interposition."¹ We pray, then, that by special interposition "almighty grace" may so use the "hammer of the word" as with "love's resistless stroke" to break even "hearts of stone;" and that, having converted them, God may bestow upon them "continuing grace," and so "love and save them to the end." If such prayers can be answered at all, it is only because it is possible for God to save, in answer to prayer, any soul, however sinful and stubborn, whom he chooses so to save. This is our Calvinistic faith; and when Arminians bow at a throne of grace, or sing those words of saints which in truth and power are nearest akin to the words of divine inspiration, they believe as we do. Alike in fervent prayer and in holy song, they abjure all the doubts that are naturally suggested by Arminian teaching, and trusting the saving strength of Omnipotence, they plead the infallible promises of a covenant "ordered in all things and sure."

¹Richard Watson: *Life of Wesley*, p. 127.

IV. When Wesleyan writers discuss the *work of the Holy Spirit*, their Calvinistic testimony is often clear and explicit.

The doctrine of total depravity is as fully taught by the Wesleyan school of theology as by any other. They view the natural man as

“vile, conceived in sin,
And born unholy and unclean;”

utterly “dead in trespasses and sins,” and incapable of raising himself to a new life. This being so, the Holy Spirit must needs, as Charles Wesley sings,

“Speak with the voice that wakes the dead,
And bid the sleeper rise.”

John Wesley in many of his sermons has expressed a view of the unregenerate man that would satisfy any Calvinist. Thus, in his sermon on the “Spirit of Bondage and Adoption,” speaking of the sinner’s agony under conviction, he pictures the struggle as follows:

“He resolves against sin, and yet sins on. He sees the snare, and abhors and runs into it. So much does his boasted reason avail,—only to enhance his guilt and increase his misery. Such is the freedom of his will,—*free only to evil*,—free to ‘drink in iniquity like water,’ to wander farther and farther away from the living God and do more ‘despite unto the Spirit of grace.’”

Again, in defining the new birth, he says it is the “change wrought in the whole soul by the Almighty Spirit of God, when it is ‘created anew in Christ Jesus,’ . . . whereby the ‘earthly, sensual, devilish’ mind is turned into ‘the mind which is in Christ Jesus.’” Why does he use the term “Almighty Spirit” in this connection? The answer may possibly be found in his sermon on “The Deceitfulness of Man’s Heart,” in which he says “there is in the heart of every child of man an inexhaustible fund of unrighteousness that nothing less than almighty grace can cure.” Scouting utterly the Pelagianism which is now openly tolerated in many Methodist pulpits, he will not give any sinner reason to think he can turn to God without being first moved by the Holy Spirit. Much as he acknowledged the essential grandeur of human nature, he considered it after all but a splendid ruin, unspeakably

defiled. "Without the light which is given us by the oracles of God," he asks, "how could we reconcile [man's] greatness with his meanness?"

In the next sermon he is equally explicit. "Man is sunk," he declares, "even below the beasts that perish. Human nature is not only sensual, but devilish. There is in every man born into the world (what is not in any part of the brute creation—no brute is fallen so low—) a carnal mind which is enmity, direct enmity against God."

This sinful attitude and habit of will is one phase of the soul's enmity against God, and the renewal of the will is of the essence of conversion. Let us again turn to Wesley for an account of the manner in which the purposes of a sinful heart are changed by grace. In his sermon on Phil. ii. 13, he displays the zeal of an Augustine. He is determined to give God all the glory of his work. "His motive to work lay wholly in himself, in his own mere grace, in his own unmerited mercy," he says. Then, proceeding with his exposition of the text, he interprets τὸ ὀβλεῖν as implying "every good desire, whether relating to our tempers, words or actions, to inward or outward holiness," and τὸ ἐνεργεῖν as meaning "all that power from on high, all that energy which works in us *every right disposition*, and then furnishes us for every good word and work." "All this," he adds, "is well adapted to hide pride from man." Yea, verily; and so is the entire Calvinistic system, of which this doctrine is a part! Again, "If we know and feel that the very first motion of good is from above, as well as the power which conducts it to the end; if it is God that not only infuses every good desire, but that accompanies and follows it, else it vanishes away; then it follows that he that glorieth must 'glory in the Lord.'" These statements are certainly unequivocal; but John Wesley can put his Calvinism in still more positive form. Seeking still further to impress upon the sinner his natural inability and entire dependence on God, he says that, even as the dead Lazarus was motionless, incapable of coming forth before the Lord had given him life, so "it is equally impossible for us to rise out of our sins, yea, or to make the least motion toward it, till he who hath all power in heaven and earth calls our dead

souls into life." No genuine disciple of Arminius ever yet, with his wits about him, taught that regeneration must precede even the "least motion" toward the abandonment of sin. But if John Wesley does not teach as much, what does he teach?

However, notwithstanding his views as to the spiritual impotence of unrenewed souls, John Wesley would have us consider him an Arminian. For this reason, doubtless, he quotes, towards the end of this sermon, a maxim from a venerable father of the church, to show that grace does not destroy free-agency. That father is—St. Augustine!—an authority to whom, on general grounds, all Calvinistic theologians are ready to defer, touching the doctrines of grace. Neither can any Calvinist find fault with the maxim quoted: *Qui fecit nos sine nobis, non salvabit nos sine nobis*. God created us out of nothing; but regeneration is a change wrought in the souls of intelligent creatures; and Calvinism does not teach that in any part or process of this mysterious work of the Spirit, is the sinner's reason or moral agency for one instant destroyed or held in abeyance. Nay, the human reason, enlightened by the Sun of Righteousness, but answers back to the Infinite Reason as star-light to sun-light; and from the first rational thought of sin, of righteousness and of judgment, until the redeemed soul is brought home to heaven, free grace leads free will in the accomplishment of God's saving purpose.

Believing as much as he did in free moral agency, Wesley was none the less a firm believer in the power of the Spirit. In his sermon on Patience, alluding to conversion, he says, "Earthly desires, the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eye, and the pride of life are in that instant changed by the almighty power of God into heavenly desires. The whirlwind of our will is stopped in mid-career, and sinks down into the will of God."

This last quotation might be adduced to show that Wesley believed in irresistible grace. But we have testimony even more explicit. The following is from his little tract on *Divine Sovereignty*: "It may be allowed that God acts as sovereign in convincing some souls of sin, arresting them in mid-career by his resistless power. It seems also that in the moment of conversion he acts irresistibly. There may likewise be many irresistible

touches during the course of our Christian warfare." So much according to Calvin—if, indeed, Calvin himself would not regard this statement too strong—and then, as usual, our author lapses into Arminianism. "But still," he adds, "as St. Paul might have been disobedient to the heavenly vision, so every individual may, after all that God has done for him, either improve his grace, or make it of none effect."¹ By which reservation all that Wesley can mean is, that not even by an irresistible work of grace, is any man's accountability destroyed. He would insist that whatever may be the efficacy of grace, "no violence is offered to the will of the creature." Paul was free to choose; and the fact that his only hope of salvation lay in his obedience to the divine will, was impressed upon him by the Spirit, and so became the motive by which, as a rational creature, he was induced to choose aright.

Indeed, no Calvinist has borne more emphatic testimony in favor of the absolute, infallible efficiency of saving grace, than was borne by John Wesley. In his sermon on the General Spread of the Gospel, he admits that "there are exempt cases, wherein the overwhelming power of divine grace does for a time work as irresistibly as lightning falling from heaven." He caricatured the teaching of Toplady in the famous statement: "The elect shall be saved do what they will, the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can." And yet the following is not from Augustus Toplady, but from that arch-enemy of Calvinism, John Wesley: "I do not deny, that in some souls the grace of God is so far irresistible, that they cannot but believe and be finally saved."²

We may now bring forward another witness. The life-long effort of Dr. Bledsoe was to construct a complete Arminian theodicy. He wanted to set forth a scheme of Christian doctrine, in which there would be no room for necessity. He hated cordially the notion which Wesley cherished, that the power of the Divine Spirit could "stop the whirl-wind" of the human will "in mid-career." He declared that conversion was not in the power of God. With him the doctrine of necessity was fatalism; and Calvinism was both. And yet,—amazing inconsistency!—this prince among Arminian leaders, most extreme of all in his view

¹ *Wesley's Works*, Vol. VI., p. 136.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. III., p. 289.

of human freedom, and most strenuous of all in his opposition to any theory which claimed that human volition could be efficiently controlled by the Holy Spirit, was *himself a necessitarian*. His doctrine of moral freedom was in fact a doctrine of chance—of absolute contingency, so far as all human actions and all human destinies were concerned; and yet at the same time he was as much a fatalist as Zeno. Here is no mild Edwardian doctrine of “philosophical necessity,” but a scheme of absolute necessity, in comparison with which all the alleged awful features of Calvinism seem turned to smiling grace and unspeakable comfort. Having demonstrated to his own satisfaction that the sinner’s free-will may infallibly defeat all the efforts of the Almighty Spirit in seeking to save him, he falls back for comfort upon this wonderful view of the divine grace:

“We may rest satisfied that every soul which may be induced to work out its own salvation is found among the elect and his name written in the book of life. . . . According to this view of the divine goodness, it shines forth without limit and without partiality; it embraces all who may be saved, and does all possible things for their salvation. ‘God’s power,’ says Cudworth, ‘displayed in the world, is nothing but his goodness, strongly reaching all things from height to depth, from the highest heaven to the lowest hell, and irresistibly imparting itself to everything, in the several degrees in which it is capable of it.’”¹

Here is goodness shining forth indeed without partiality and without limit; but its effects are limited by a fact more terrible to contemplate even than the “*decretum horribile*” of Calvin. Grace is efficacious only so far as men are capable of being affected by it. The divine illumination, falling equally in heaven and in hell, in the palace and in the pig-sty, can elicit responsive light from some diamond spirits, some elect souls; but others are but cobble-stones, and *cannot* shine. Here is, indeed, an awful state of things. God is doing all he can; but there is in many souls an *inherent incapability* of salvation, and *all these incapables will necessarily be damned*. Subjects of God’s moral government, they are nevertheless unable to acquire to a Christian character, for the same reason precisely that pigs cannot be converted; being incapable of any proper religious experience. This thought would paralyze all hope, but for the assurance that to all who are not

¹ *Southern Review*, July, 1878, p. 21.

thus incapable of salvation, the divine goodness imparts itself *irresistibly*.

Thus we see that Bledsoe, who taught that all grace is resistible, and that human will is omnipotent in countervailing the influences of the Spirit, taught at the same time, and in the same treatise, the contrary proposition that all grace is irresistible, and that all human beings are necessarily and inevitably regenerated who are susceptible of such a change. This patent inconsistency is an unconscious tribute to Calvinism. A genuine Christian believer must believe that the gracious purposes of God touching the salvation of men will be certainly and infallibly accomplished; and Bledsoe's doctrine of necessity was an imperfect glimpse of truth by one who saw "men as trees walking." It is an effort to retain in his system the comfortable Calvinistic doctrine of effectual calling; but as he will not acknowledge the sovereignty of grace, he goes to the extreme of necessitarianism.

Richard Watson, in seeking to bring into view the nexus between the moral agency of the natural man and that of the regenerate man, has given another token of his unconscious Calvinism. The natural man, though a free and accountable creature, is for all that filled with enmity toward God, and until cured of that enmity, "is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." The spiritual man, in whose heart the love of God has been shed abroad by the Holy Ghost, freely chooses the way of obedience. How comes it that free will is thus led from a depraved habit to an upright mode of action? Here is the same man—the same will: how shall we account for the manifestation of new power and changed appetencies? In discussing the subject of regeneration, Watson seeks to throw some light upon these difficult questions. He brings forward a theory of *universal regeneration*. "The Spirit," he tells us,¹ "removes so much of their spiritual death as to excite in them various degrees of religious feeling, . . . enabling them to seek the face of God, to turn at his rebuke, and, by improving that grace, to repent and believe the gospel."

How men can turn at God's rebuke without repenting, or seek his face without believing the gospel, we may not pause to in-

¹ *Institutes*, Part II. Chapter 18.

quire. But the question must suggest itself to any thoughtful mind, why does Watson contend for this partial regeneration in order to account for the sinner's ability to repent and believe? Evidently, because he regarded faith and repentance as *fruits* of regeneration. His argument is nothing but this: all men are capable of repentance and faith, because all have been regenerated! Again, notwithstanding his effort to bring forth a scheme of doctrine that would not be obnoxious to the charge of representing God as partial, we see here that Watson could not be blind to the sovereign discrimination of grace. Even this regenerating power does not excite in all men the same degree of religious feeling; but "various degrees" in different individuals. Besides, as we have already seen, he contends that the "power and inclination" to believe and repent are "prevenient" and so "in the highest sense free." Yea, verily, this Calvinistic doctrine of free grace is doctrine of freest grace indeed—of grace unsought and undeserved, yet coming upon the stubborn sinner, melting his hard heart, subduing his pride and obstinacy, and saving him to all eternity. Nor can it be denied that all who have both the "power and inclination" to repent, *do* certainly repent: otherwise we would have the sinner inclined to do a thing, and yet not inclined to do it.

We have thus far adduced evidence to show that the Wesleyan fathers taught the sovereignty of the Spirit in regeneration. We now proceed to show how they taught that the work of grace was predestinated in a past eternity.

Watson says,¹ "The decrees of God . . . can only scripturally signify the determinations of his will in the government of the world he has made. These determinations are plainly, in Scripture, referred to two classes, what he has himself determined to do, and what he has determined to permit to be done by free and accountable agents. He determined, for instance, to create man, and he determined to permit his fall. He determined also the only method of dispensing pardon to the guilty, but he determined to permit men to reject it, and fall into the punishment of their offences."

¹ *Theological Institutes*, Part II., Chapter XXVIII.

Dr. Adam Clarke says, "All power must originally emanate from God, hence, sin and Satan can neither exist nor act, but as he wills or permits."¹

In these passages we have the Calvinistic doctrine of the decrees presented, and the distinction drawn between the positive and permissive decrees.

John Wesley is on record as having emphatically declared his agreement with the doctrinal symbols of the Church of England.² The seventeenth article of that church, touching "The Godly Consideration of Predestination and of Our Election in Christ," is not only full of "sweet, pleasant and unspeakable comfort to godly persons," but is unquestionably Calvinistic. It stands to-day substantially as it was after the revision of the English Prayer Book by JOHN KNOX and his brother chaplains by authority of Edward VI. But John Wesley, as we have already proven, could not only profess Calvinistic doctrine, but show his sincerity by sound Calvinistic exposition. To the instances already given, we may add one or two. In his sermon on "The Wisdom of the Divine Counsels," he discourses in quite orthodox fashion on the decrees. "The wisdom of God refers to his appointing the ends of all things, and his knowledge to the means which he has prepared and made conducive to those ends;" so that "the wisdom of God [*i. e.*, the decree] includes the means as well as the ends." Having laid this Calvinistic foundation, he makes one of his customary flings at Calvinism, but, nevertheless, builds as he has begun. Proceeding to tell by what means God is pleased to carry on his work, "in counteracting all the wickedness and folly of men and all the subtlety of Satan," and in planting, preserving and increasing his church, he enlarges on the work of the Spirit. "In the room of those who have fallen from their steadfastness he is continually raising up out of the stones other children unto Abraham. *This he does, at one or another place, pouring out his quickening Spirit on this or another people, just as it pleaseth him.*" This good work of "raising up men of every age and degree, young men and maidens, old men and children, to be 'a chosen generation, a royal priesthood,'" . . . shall continue "till

¹ Clarke's *Theology*, p. 78.

² Watson's *Life of Wesley*, pp. 76, 77.

all Israel is saved, and the fulness of the Gentiles is come in.'” Paul’s language fits the doctrine well.

Again, in one of his discourses on the Sermon on the Mount, expounding the words “Thy kingdom come,” he refers to the prophecy, “Thou wilt give him the heathen for his inheritance and the uttermost parts of the earth for a possession”—and quotes approvingly these words of the English burial service: “Beseeching thee of thy gracious goodness *shortly to accomplish the number of thine elect,*” etc. “Awful words,” he adds, “and yet abundantly justified by the holy oracles.” So all true Calvinists are agreed; and for this and all other displays of his sovereign grace, we would unite with Wesley in ascribing to God, as he does in concluding this sermon, “the praise due from his creatures for all his wonderful works, for his power and the mightiness of his kingdom, and for all his wondrous works, which he worketh *from everlasting,* and will do, world without end.”

V. Last, but not least, *Arminians, in seeking to maintain the doctrine of God’s infinite foreknowledge, are compelled to admit the doctrine of predestination.*

“The almighty, all-wise God sees and knows from everlasting to everlasting all that is, that was, and that is to come.” So says John Wesley, and with him all theologians at this point are agreed. But this statement being true, it follows that the number of God’s elect is already in the divine mind a certainty, fixed and definite. Further, the conversion of each person in that number, together with the time, the means, and the instrumentalities that are to be used,—these and all other facts and circumstances in the lives of all of them, are facts already settled, since God already knows that they will take place. Nothing is or can be contingent with the Almighty. Whatever may be said about human possibilities, these certainties of the future, so far as the world in its duration is concerned, are limited: every one of them is already contemplated as a certainty by the All-knowing Mind, and the divine prescience cannot and will not be found in error. Hence again it follows that for one not yet a believer a home in heaven is being prepared; for another who is now to all appearances an exemplary member of the church, hell is moved beneath to meet him at his coming.

How came these certainties of the future so to be? They are

no more certain now than they were a thousand years past. As events their occurrence must depend upon the operation of certain powers. They will not prove to be the products of chance. The forces that are to produce them—whether classed as second causes or what not—are now operating, and if operating now, we must trace them in their operation back through by-gone ages to the Fountain of Being, the Origin of all power, the “Great First Cause, least understood.” This is our Calvinistic reasoning. God foreknows, *because* he predestinates. Every event is primarily contingent, as Watson admits, either upon the purpose or permission of Jehovah. “We concede to him who originated the whole of this wondrous process, that his eye reaches from the beginning to the end of it; that from the lofty and uncreated summit of his own omniscience he can descry all the successions of the universe that himself hath made; that in the single fiat of his power by which the mechanism of his creation was called forth, and all its laws ordained, there were comprehended all the events that took place in the history of nature or of providence; and that neither their variety can bewilder, nor their minuteness elude, the one glance by which he is able to embrace all worlds, and look forward through an infinity of ages. And he doth thus foreknow, because he doth predestinate; because in the very constitution of his work there are the principles and the powers by which its every evolution is determined.”¹

Now, the great labor of Arminianism has been to disprove the doctrine of predestination. In order to do this, Arminians have sought to effect a divorce between God’s foreknowledge and his purposes. They have maintained that events eternally foreknown as certainties, might have been otherwise, being in their nature contingent. Paul, divinely chosen to bear the gospel to the Gentile world, might have nullified his own election and so disappointed the heart of the Infinite! Stones called to be children of Abraham, might after all become obstreperous and despise their birth-right! So argues Wesley; and Watson laboring to prove that divine decrees are sometimes revoked, cites the case of Eli!

With such a scheme of contingency in view, it is no wonder that the tendency of Arminianism has been, as illustrated in

¹Chalmers, *Lectures on Romans, in loc.*

Adam Clarke's vagary, to deny in some way the divine foreknowledge of future contingent events. Wesley himself, orthodox as we have seen him to be on this very point, and a predestinarian as well in his orthodoxy, is forced to shift his ground when he essays to play the role of Arminian apologete on the subject of predestination. Contradicting his own statements both in prose and verse, touching the decrees, he now boldly denies that God has any *plans*, and virtually declares that he simply *does things* without asking himself why! Considering, in his sermon on Predestination, the question why God speaks of himself as foreknowing and predestinating, his answer is in substance, Because men are such fools! "When he speaks to us, knowing the scantiness of our understanding, he lets himself down to the level of our capacity, and . . . in condescension to our weakness, he speaks of his own purpose, counsel, plan, foreknowledge. *Not that God has any need of purpose or of planning beforehand.* Far be it from us to impute these to the Most High; to measure him by ourselves. It is merely in compassion to us that he speaks thus of himself as foreknowing the things of heaven and earth, and as predestinating or foreordaining them. But can we possibly imagine that these expressions are to be taken literally?" Not possibly by any means; alas! for Arminian theology if we do! Wesley's method of cutting the Gordian knot is child-like in its simplicity; and in the same spirit he concludes his sermon by advising everybody to content themselves with "this plain account" of predestination, and not "endeavor to wade into those mysteries which are too deep for angels to fathom."

This is good advice for all who would put asunder what God hath joined together in the everlasting wedlock of truth to truth. Arminians cannot admit that God actually foreknows all things, or that the schemes of providence and redemption are divine plans, without abandoning their objections to Calvinism. No rational man's thought can forever move in circles; it must sometimes go in a straight line from point to point. Richard Watson, prejudiced as he was against Calvinism, was a man of acute and discriminating mind. We have already seen what large tribute he bore to the truth of our Calvinistic system, when speaking of infant salvation, of depravity, and of the work of the Spirit. We

give one other instance of his unconscious Calvinism, and our argument is complete. Watson had the hardihood to "wade into" the mystery of the divine foreknowledge, and the result was the most remarkable somersault in all the history of theology. It is remarkable not only for its quickness, and unconscious ease, but also for the fact that it was a leap out of deep water upon that *terra firma*, to which we may give the name of Calvinism, or, if the reader pleases, of Absolute Reason, as applied to the gospel in connection with the divine attributes. Writing on the subject of the divine omniscience, and possibly with a view to refuting John Wesley's denial that God had any ideas of time or succession, Watson expresses himself on this wise:

"If there be what the Scriptures call *purposes* with God—if this expression is not to be classed with those figures of speech which represent divine power by a hand or an arm—then there is foreknowledge, properly so-called, with God. The knowledge of anything actually existing is collateral with its existence; but as the intention to produce anything, or to suffer it to be produced, must be before the actual existence of the thing, because that is finite and caused, so that very *intention* is proof of the *precognition* of that which is to be produced, immediately by the act of God, or mediately by his permission."¹

Untangling this last sentence, we find it contains a logical chimaera, and these are its links:

1. All events are "finite and caused."
2. The ultimate cause of all finite things is the will of the Infinite.
3. All things are embraced in the divine decrees, since all must occur, either "immediately by the act of God," or else "mediately through his permission."
4. Because, then, God has purposed or predestinated all things, this fact proves that he *foreknows* all things.

In this single sentence, therefore, Watson has deserted the lists of Arminianism, and has avowed himself a Calvinist. He has set forth a general principle from which every distinctive Calvinistic doctrine can be deduced by necessary logical sequence.

¹ *Watson's Institutes*, Part II., Chapter V.

III. METHODS OF THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION.

RECENT discussions on the floor of synods, and through the columns of the religious press, have tended to give additional prominence to a question that has long engaged the attention of leaders and thinkers in our church, the question whether there is not needed some radical change in our method of training candidates for the gospel ministry. As far back as 1869 we find Dr. Dabney, in a memorial addressed to the General Assembly's Standing Committee on Theological Seminaries (*Discussions*, Vol. II., pp. 46 ff.), calling attention to what, from his long experience as an instructor, he regarded as serious defects in our present system of theological education, and pointing out various modifications which he thought could be made with advantage. In addition to this and a number of similar voices coming from those who look at the question from the point of view of experienced educators, there have been multitudes of voices, coming up from the rank and file of the church, making themselves heard through overtures from church courts, recommendations of committees, and communications in newspapers and reviews. With the latter class of writers the moving cause seems to have been a sense of the inadequacy of the present and prospective supply of ministers in view of our great and growing destitutions, and a desire to find some method of facilitating the introduction of candidates into the ministry, and the supply of our vacant churches.

Very numerous and very varied have been the expedients suggested to meet this laudable end. We have had, for instance, suggestions as radical as that of dispensing with the qualifications for licensure and ordination prescribed in our Book of Church Order, and putting men into the ministry who have had no thorough training in the classics and in philosophy. Another, and less radical recommendation has been to shorten the term of theological study, making it a two years' course instead of three, so as to gain one year in active work. Still another has been to con-

tinue the three years' course, but to make the annual sessions only six months long, allowing the alternate six months to be spent in the field, in the performance of such practical work of an evangelistic character, and in the supply of vacant churches, under the oversight of pastors, church sessions and evangelists, as Presbytery may in each specific case deem advisable.

The latest of these propositions looking to economy of time in the introduction of men into the ministry, one whose claims are being most strenuously urged by its advocates, contemplates the substitution of theological departments in literary institutions for separate and independent theological seminaries, and the combining of academic and theological courses of study so that they may be carried on simultaneously by the student. It is claimed for the method of education by theological departments, not only that it saves time in the work of preparation for the ministry, but that by bringing the theological professor into closer connection with instructors in the literary and scientific departments of the institution, it guards against the danger of these theologians becoming locked up in their own specialties, and thus, isolated in thought, drifting into heresies, or into mischievous speculations which have tendency to positive error. Indeed, the charge has been boldly made upon the floor of more than one of our synods, that our theological seminaries are fast becoming a serious menace to the peace and welfare of the church; that nearly every heresy has its origin in these schools, both in this country and in Europe; that they are in danger of becoming in this respect the scourge and terror of the church, and that our only safety lies in the breaking up of our body of theological students into small detachments, to be, by means of theological departments, educated at many and widely distant centres, where the dangers incident to theological life in our regular seminaries may be avoided.

Inasmuch, then, as the subject is thus prominently before the public mind, it seems a fitting occasion to make a calm and thoughtful review of our methods of theological education, especially in the light which the history of the past throws upon them.

The first thought which will suggest itself to one who makes

such an impartial review of the history of theological education for the last century, will, we doubt not, be that the experience of the past is not of such a character as to make us very hopeful in reference to the method of education in theological departments of institutions of academic and professional learning. This is the method of theological training that has been pursued constantly in Germany, and the theological departments of the German Universities have been for a century hot-beds of transcendental and rationalistic speculation. One has but to read Dr. Dabney's masterly article in *The Southern Presbyterian Review* of April 1881 (*Discussions*, Vol. I., pp. 440 ff.), on The Influence of the German University System on Theological Literature, to see the causes of that rationalism which has made the atmosphere of these theological departments so baleful. This is the method of theological education also in the Established Church or Kirk of Scotland, each of its great universities having a theological department, whilst the Free Church, and the United Presbyterian Church, educate their candidates in schools of theology, theological halls, which are separate and independent institutions. The comparative freedom from heterodoxy of the ministry of the Free Church and United Presbyterian Church will be admitted by all.

Coming now to our own country, the history of theological education is equally instructive. The earliest of all our institutions of learning was Harvard College, founded in 1636, only sixteen years after the landing at Plymouth Rock. It began its course distinctly as a seminary for the training of young men for the ministry, with combined academical and theological courses of instruction. It began under the most orthodox and conservative influences. Its first professorship was that of divinity, and was endowed by an orthodox layman of the Baptist Church in England. The first professorship endowed by a native New Englander was that of Hebrew and other Oriental languages, endowed by an orthodox Congregationalist. And yet, for nearly a century, all the chairs in this divinity school have been filled by Unitarians, and when Prof. C. H. Toy, carried away by German rationalistic criticism, was forced to give up his position in the Southern Bap-

tist Theological Seminary, an institution organized on the plan that is represented to be so dangerous, it was within the walls of Harvard, with its theological department, that he found congenial companionship and remunerative employment.

Following the current of history of theological education under the auspices of the Congregational Church, we find that Bangor Seminary, in Maine, began with combined academic and theological courses, but in 1827, finding that the arrangement was not satisfactory, the academic department was given up, and the institution became a regular theological seminary, and has been, we believe, comparatively free from heresy. Yale, which has a theological school as one of its university departments, has certainly nothing to boast of in the way of freedom from heresies and mischievous speculations. Andover was organized as a department or branch of Phillips Academy, and has always continued in that relation, being governed by the board of Trustees of the Academy, though having a special board of Visitors to whom questions of orthodoxy, etc., are referred. It is only necessary to refer to the term, "Andover Theology," and to the recent troubles which the American Board of Commissioners Foreign Missions have had with the institution to see to what extent the combining of theological and academic training under the same corporate management and control, has been a safeguard against the dangers incident to separate and isolated theological schools. Hartford Theological Seminary was founded in 1834, was originally organized as a separate institution, and has so continued, being one of the soundest of all the New England theological schools. Oberlin Theological Seminary, Ohio, was originally organized and still continues a department of Oberlin College. The name of Charles G. Finney, so prominently associated with it, and also the term "Oberlin Theology," show how little its freedom from the isolation of a regular theological seminary has kept it from the taint of heresy.

In the Protestant Episcopal Church, the only attempt of which we have information to make trial of the system of education in theological departments, was in the case of the Berkeley Divinity School of Connecticut, which was virtually a department of Trinity College Hartford until 1854, when it became a separate and inde-

pendent school. Concerning the arrangement in the University of the South at Sewanee, Tenn., we are not able to speak, but if the method of training in a theological department is being tried in that institution, it is too early as yet to forecast the result of the experiment.

In the Lutheran Church a single experiment in this direction, and the only one of which we have information, was made in 1839, when the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis was founded. This school of theology originally included an academic department, or gymnasium; but in 1861 the two were separated, the gymnasium being removed to Fort Wayne, Indiana, and the theological school being placed upon the same independent basis with the other seminaries of the church.

In the Baptist Church the leading schools of theology have been and are upon the plan of separate theological seminaries, including Hamilton and Rochester Seminaries, New York; Newton, Mass.; Southern Baptist, Louisville; Morgan Park, Chicago; and Crozier, Pa. Theological departments have been tried in various institutions, and, as at Georgetown College and other places, abandoned for regular theological seminaries. The same is true to a considerable extent in the Methodist Church, although at Vanderbilt University there is now, as we understand, a very flourishing theological department.

Coming to the Presbyterian Church, in which, of course, we are most interested, it is a well-known fact that in our earlier history, and up to the year 1748, we had no theological schools of any kind. Young men preparing for the ministry studied under some approved divine, and upon his recommendation, after full examination in open Presbytery, were licensed and ordained. At Princeton in 1748 the first theological school was opened. It was in the form of a theological department of the College of New Jersey, under an action of the Synod, in which the board of trustees of the college are required to provide, either in the person of the president of the college, or of one of its professors, a professor of theology. It is highly probable that in this case at first, as Dr. Howe, in his semi-centennial sketch of the history of Columbia Seminary, has shown in reference to other institutions, this

professor of theology sustained to the body of students little more than the relation of chaplain, and to the theological students that of the approved divine under whom they might carry on their theological studies simultaneously with their academic; but it involved the principle now so strenuously recommended, of combined academic and theological education. Whatever the merits or defects of the method, it was, after long and thorough trial, abandoned; for we find that in 1812 a regular seminary, with a separate board of trustees and a distinct organic life, was substituted.

The second in age of our Presbyterian seminaries is Union, in Virginia. It began its existence in 1812 as a department of Hampden-Sidney College, Dr. Rice, the president of the college, being *ex officio* professor of theology. This relation continued until 1824, when the friends of theological education were so much impressed with the importance of having a separate and independent school of theology, that the relation between the college and the theological department was dissolved, and Union Seminary projected, though it had to begin its separate organic life without either buildings or endowments.

The next three seminaries organized under the patronage and control of the Presbyterian Church seem to have been Auburn, in New York, which was founded in 1819; Western, at Allegheny, Pennsylvania, in 1827; and Columbia, South Carolina, in 1828. These were all organized as independent schools, and have so continued through their history. Of one or more of them we shall have occasion to speak later. Lane Seminary comes next, having been organized in 1829. It began its course, says Dr. E. D. Morris, one of its professors, "as an academic and collegiate as well as theological institution"; but he adds that, "after an experiment of five years, the academic and collegiate departments were finally closed."

McCormick Seminary, Chicago, comes next in order. It also began its career as a theological department, having been organized in 1830, as a department of Hanover College, Ind. It remained in this relation ten years, but in 1840, the relation was dissolved, the theological school removed to New Albany, Ind., and reorganized upon the Seminary basis. Here it remained

until removed to Chicago, where first as the Northwestern, and since as the McCormick Seminary, it has been doing its splendid work.

Union Seminary in New York was organized in 1835, as an independent school of theology, and has so continued. It will be referred to more in detail a little further on.

Danville Seminary in Kentucky was founded in 1853, being the outgrowth of a "Theological Fund of the Synod of Kentucky," an endowment originally intended to maintain a "Kentucky Professorship" in the Theological Seminary at New Albany, Ind.

As to the more recently established schools of theology, that of the Northern Church at San Francisco, and that of the Southern Church at Austin, Texas, as also the theological departments of the Southwestern Presbyterian University at Clarksville, Tenn., and of Arkansas College at Batesville, Ark., it is not necessary to speak, as owing to their recent origin, the facts in their history are familiar to the readers of the *QUARTERLY*. It may be proper in this connection, however, to say that the same conviction in Kentucky and the adjoining states, of the need of a well endowed and equipped theological seminary for the Southwest, which led to the founding of Danville Seminary in 1853, has been pressing upon the minds and hearts of Kentucky Presbyterians ever since Danville Seminary was lost to the Southern Presbyterian Church. So soon as it was found that neither any property rights in Danville Seminary, nor any interest in its endowments could be secured by our branch of the church, the minds of our leaders in Kentucky were turned to the necessity of laying new foundations and creating new endowments for that work of theological education for the Southwest, which the founders of Danville Seminary had designed it to do. This movement first assumed the form of the establishment of a university on a broad and liberal basis, with a fully endowed and well equipped theological school as a department of it. Long before the convention was called, which led to the formation of the Southwestern Presbyterian University, this movement in Kentucky had taken definite shape, and when that convention met, Dr. Breck, who had been made chancellor of the projected university, had already secured munificent endowments.

The location of the institution had been fixed, grounds purchased, and every necessary step taken for carrying out the plans in detail and without delay. Although, as has been already said, the original plan contemplated a theological department, and although the facilities are easily in reach of the Board of Curators for opening a theological department, with suitable buildings and grounds, and large endowments, so that it should at once be thoroughly furnished for its work, yet the conviction has been so steadily and strongly growing in the minds of those most interested in the scheme, that no mere theological departments of literary institutions can meet the wants of the Southwest, that the friends of Central University have been willing to forego, for the present at least, any advantage which a theological department with its additional students and endowments might give. They are willing to wait at least until it shall be determined if the way is not open for uniting the Synods of the Southwest in the founding and maintenance of a great seminary of the first class, at some suitable point, a seminary not organically connected with any literary institution, but sustaining the same relations to all the universities and colleges under the patronage of our church. It is believed that such an institution, located as every theological seminary should be, in some large city, with a broad and liberal course of study, and a corps of professors in whose orthodoxy and piety the church has confidence, would do for Presbyterianism in the Southwest a work similar to that which is being done for the Baptist denomination by the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary at Louisville.

Returning from this, however, which is of the nature of a digression, let us resume the consideration of methods of theological education in the light of the history of the past. The hasty review we have made of theological education, for the main facts of which we are indebted to articles in the Schaff-Herzog *Encyclopædia* will, we think, fully warrant the following conclusions.

First, The plan of "combining academic and theological education," which is proposed as an expedient for meeting, and to some extent at least relieving the present exigencies of the church, is not by any means a new one. It is not, in so far as we can see,

in any of its essential features, as has been claimed, a "new departure." There may have been important modifications and changes. Some of these may be great improvements, but the methods in their essential features have been in operation, both in this country and in Europe, through the whole history of seminary training.

Second, The method of educating in theological departments, under the forms in which it has heretofore been tried, does not seem to have been successful. In most instances in which this method has been introduced and faithfully tried, it has at last been abandoned, and the method of education in separate theological schools adopted in its stead. So far, therefore, as the testimony of experience goes, it seems to favor the method which it is now proposed to abandon, rather than that which it is proposed to substitute for it. Nor does it seem difficult to recognize the advantages of the method of training by instruction in separate and independent theological seminaries. In the first place, in the selection of members of the official boards which are to govern these institutions, the distinctly theological schools have this great advantage, that men may be selected simply with a view to their acquaintance with theological subjects and with the best modes of teaching them; whilst in the government of a great university, you must choose as curators or directors men who have large acquaintance with literature and science, and the best methods of teaching them, even though they may not be well versed in theology, or properly alive to the demands of the day in theological training. It also stands to reason that men whose sole duty as curators is to have the oversight of a theological school and its interests, can devote to it more time, thought and prayer, than those who are charged also with the management of schools of law, medicine, engineering, etc. The school in which men are being trained for the ministry, with the spiritual atmosphere that should gather about it, is very different from the school of medicine or of law. Schools of mere professional learning may very properly be grouped in universities. Schools of theology should have their own corporate life, their own distinct regimen, and whilst it will be of advantage to them to have the proximity of a

university, to the libraries, museums, etc., of which the theological students may, under proper restrictions, have access, the history both of German and of British universities exhibits but too plainly the tendency of university life to secularize theological study, to make it purely professional, to lead men to study Isaiah and Paul precisely in the same spirit in which they would study Homer and Plato, and to look upon the ministry as they do upon any other learned profession.

Third, As far as our investigation has proceeded, the burden of proof goes to show that, so far from the regular theological seminaries being hot-beds of heresy, they have been throughout their whole history, and almost without exception, strongholds of orthodoxy and conservatism, whilst the theological departments of literary institutions have been the fountains from which in most cases the mischievous speculations have come that have troubled the church. Let any man take our two oldest seminaries, Princeton, New Jersey, and Union, Virginia, which through all their career have never had a taint of heresy, and let him compare their influence and their work with Harvard, or Yale, or Andover, or any of those institutions that have maintained theological departments. Or let him go back over the whole list of institutions, putting on one side those which are departments, and on the other those which are separate schools, and then let him judge for himself.

To the rule which favors separate seminaries there are, however, two apparent exceptions. There are two of the institutions of the Presbyterian Church that are, and always have been, regular seminaries, that have recently given the church much trouble. The first of these is Union Seminary, New York, whose action in the election and inauguration of Professor Briggs has occasioned such great disturbance in the Northern Church. Union Seminary has never, we believe, had organic connection with any literary institution, but rests upon its own distinct and separate foundation. Its course, however, cannot be considered as typical, on account of the peculiar circumstances under which, and the distinctive principles upon which, it was projected by its founders. It had its origin in connection with the New School controversy, and in a reactionary movement against the orthodoxy and conservatism

of Princeton. The distinct principle, therefore, upon which the institution was founded was that of a large and liberal construction of the Westminster Standards. Thus, Dr. Hatfield, one of the professors of the seminary, in his article upon its history, in the Schaff-Herzog *Encyclopædia*, gives as its *raison d' être* that the "other schools of sacred learning" were to some extent committed to partisan views of existing conflicts," and that a seminary was to be "established on an independent basis, not subject to the control of accidental majorities in the General Assembly, committed to no theological school in the church, and to no ecclesiastical party." To one familiar with the controversies of the hour it is easy to read between the lines in Dr. Hatfield's article, and to see that the real purpose in the founding of the seminary was to educate young men under the auspices of that principle of lax construction of the standards of the church, which in the New School movement was far more ominous of evil than any positively erroneous form of doctrine which the advocates of the movement at that time held. Nothing is more natural than that, having given up the safeguard of a strict construction of our doctrinal standards, the institution should drift away from its conservative moorings, and become the congenial dwelling-place of one who is adrift upon the open sea of theological speculation, like Professor Briggs.

The other apparent exception is that presented by our own Seminary at Columbia, S. C., in the recent troubles in connection with the Chair of Natural Science in its relations to Revelation. It would be altogether alien to the purpose of this article, as it would lie entirely beyond its proper scope, to enter in any way into the details of this unhappy controversy or to pronounce any opinion upon its merits. It is sufficient to say that whatever may have been the nature or the extent of the speculations arising in the conduct of this chair, they cannot be laid to the charge of the regular seminary system with its isolation of the theological professor, for in this, the only instance in which any charge of dangerous speculation was ever laid at the door of a professor in that seminary, the much-dreaded walls of isolation had been broken down. A special arrangement had been made by which the professor in the Seminary was also

professor in the University, and the students of the Seminary in regular attendance upon the lectures of the University, and so academic and theological education were being combined. Dismissing these two cases as only apparent and not real exceptions, we renew the statement that the verdict of history is in favor of separate and independent schools of theology with all their dreaded isolation of the theological professor, rather than the one now proposed of theological departments in institutions of literary and professional learning.

Turning for a moment from considerations growing out of the experience of the past, and looking at the matter in the light simply of economic and prudential principles of education we can see no real advantage to be gained and much to be lost by the proposed change. As to economy of time, we are unable to see how, where a certain course of academic study is to be gone over, and also a certain course of theological study, the combining of the two courses, so as to carry them on simultaneously, can enable the student to master them in less time than he could if he carried them on successively. We say to *master* these courses, for it must be considered that such a conspectus of church history, for instance, as could be consistently combined in the class-room with the ordinary course of secular history for university students, falls immeasurably short of that thorough mastery of church history in its underlying principles and in its outworking details which is indispensable to the student of theology. If his classes in the study of secular history are carried as thoroughly through its principles and details as they should be, he will find every moment of his time occupied with history in its secular relations. He will have no time to master the principles and developments of church history as he goes along. Or if the professor seeks to indoctrinate them thoroughly in these principles in the class-room, that portion of the class which is not engaged in distinctly theological study must be carried far more into the details of church history than is consistent with the limited time to be given to the study of history in the institution. When we find, for instance, that in our academic institutions every moment of the four years course is crowded with work, none of which can without disadvantage be omitted,

and when we find in our theological seminaries that the students are kept on a strain through the whole three years' course, and have difficulty even with their utmost exertions to master a course, no part of which, in the present stage of theological research and inquiry, can without serious loss be omitted, to speak of accomplishing the same work in one year less of time by combining the two courses is to speak of that which seems in the very nature of the case impossible. The ground may be gone over, but it must be, in some of its parts at least, cursorily gone over, for there is only so much that flesh and blood can accomplish.

There are, in the minds of many, serious objections to the system of combining academic and theological education. It is an admirable system for men advanced in life when they receive a call to the ministry, and for others who for good and sufficient reasons are to enter the ministry under the rule for "extraordinary cases," but for one entering upon his academic course at the usual immature age, it projects him into actual professional study for the ministry before he has reached that maturity of judgment in which he is prepared to give a deliberate and final settlement of the question as to the reality of his call of God to the work. It also brings him forward prominently before the minds of his fellow students as a theological student, at a time when it would be best, both for him and for them, in most cases, that he should occupy the more modest position in their eyes simply of an earnest, consecrated Christian youth, seeking his own intellectual and religious education, and seeking to be helpful in promoting the welfare of others around him.

In the judgment of the writer of this article that which is needed as a reform in our methods of theological education is a thorough recasting of our system of instruction within the institution itself. According to the method that has been handed down from the days of Dr. Archibald Alexander, we have in each of our seminaries a fixed curriculum of study, to which every student is expected to conform, no matter what may have been his previous studies, or what may be the bent of his mind, or what the kind of labor to which he proposes to devote himself in the ministry of the Word. Now instead of this fixed curriculum of study, let the

course be upon what is usually called the university plan of distinct and independent schools, of Theology, Church History, Hebrew, etc. Let each professor be selected as a specialist in his own particular department, and let every student pursue his studies in such of these schools, and so many of them, as in the judgment of the faculty and with the advice of Presbytery, through its Committee of Education, may in each specific case be thought best. Where the candidate is advanced in years when he enters upon his studies, and is without previous academic training, let the Presbytery, with a view to his admission to the ministry, at the proper time as an extraordinary case, prescribe such limited course of study as may meet the exigencies of his case, and particularly let there be in every seminary a chair of the English Bible in which candidates of this character may have as thorough training in Bible study as can be given without a knowledge of the original tongues of Scripture. Where the candidate is to be licensed and ordained as usual, let him be required to take a full course in all the schools, or so many of them as shall be necessary to meet the requirements of our Form of Government. Let the schools be so arranged that more or less time may be devoted to each one, as the special gifts and bent of mind of the student may indicate. Let there be special courses of study for men who feel that they have a special call to evangelistic work in foreign lands, or in the waste places at home. Let special courses be arranged for such ruling elders and educated laymen of the church as may have gifts qualifying them to teach, and yet may not feel called to the ministry of the Word. Let them have such thorough training in Bible study and in practical methods of church work as shall fit the laymen to be in the highest sense lay helpers, and the ruling elders to be in the truest sense pastors of the flock. Let scholarships be provided, by means of which young men of superior talents and fondness for linguistic studies may be supported whilst they make thorough study of Oriental languages and literature, archæology, philology, and all that will enable them to throw additional light upon the Word of God and defend it from the assaults of rationalistic criticism.

The general plan of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

at Louisville, Ky., with such modifications as would adapt it to the conditions and usages of our own church, would give us such an institution as we need.

With such a seminary, eligibly located in one of our large commercial centres, where the students have advantages that cannot be obtained except in a large city, with an endowment sufficient to support a full corps of professors, with a fund from which to aid indigent young men seeking the ministry, and with a liberal use, on the part of the Presbyteries, of the rule for extraordinary cases, a new impetus would be given to theological education in the Southwest, and a great step taken towards the supply of the ministry in the waste places about us, and towards the evangelization of the heathen world.

Such an institution is contemplated in the memorial to the Synods of the Southwest, recently adopted by the Synod of Kentucky. The need of such an institution is imperative, as attested by the number of young men of our church now going beyond our bounds to secure advantages which it would happily supply. The wealth with which to endow such an institution is in the hands of our people. The time is opportune. It will be a profound pity if interests that are purely local shall prevent the realization of so important a scheme. Presbyterians of Kentucky are so interested in it that they are willing to forego all merely local interests and to join heart and hand with the other Synods of the Southwest in building up an institution of the kind in any one of a number of great commercial centres that have been named in connection with it. May the day soon come when we shall see its massive foundations laid and its stately superstructure rise!

T. D. WITHERSPOON.

IV. A SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRAYER.

I. *Prayer instinctive.*

“There was a mighty tempest in the sea, so that the ship was like to be broken. Then the mariners were afraid, and cried every man unto his god, and cast forth the wares that were in the ship into the sea, to lighten it of them. But Jonah was gone down into the sides of the ship; and he lay, and was fast asleep. So the ship master came to him, and said unto him, What meanest thou, O sleeper! Arise call upon thy God, if so be that God will think upon us, that we perish not.”—Jonah i. 4–6. The scene, depicted so graphically in the words quoted above, is one which has been repeated many a time, on every sea, and in every age of the world.

“Wherever there is religion, true or false,” writes Dr. Dabney, “there is prayer. Even the speculative atheist, when pressed by danger, has been known to belie his pretended creed by calling in anguish upon the God he denied. This natural instinct of prayer reposes for its ground on God’s perfections and man’s dependence and wants. As long as these two facts remain what they are, man must be a praying creature. . . . To tell him who believes in God not to pray is to command him to cease to be a man.”—*Theology*, p. 715.

“Among all the moral instincts of man,” writes M. Guizot, “there is no one more natural, more universal, more unconquerable than prayer. To prayer the child applies himself with eager teachableness. On prayer the aged man falls back as on a refuge against decay and solitariness. With joy or with fear, openly or in the secret of his heart, it is to prayer that man betakes himself in the last resort, to fill up the void of his soul, or to bear the burdens of his destiny. It is in prayer that he seeks, when all is failing him, support for his weakness, comfort in his affliction, encouragement for his virtue.”—*Boyle Lecture for 1873*, pp. 66, 67.

If the statements quoted above are true,—and I think no observant, thoughtful man will call their truth in question,—then, (1), The legitimate effect of prayer is not exhausted in producing a certain subjective condition in the praying soul, as some would have us believe, but in the words of Dr. Chalmers:

“Prayer, and the answer to prayer, are the preferring of a request upon the

one side, and compliance with that request upon the other. Man applies, God complies. Man asks a favor, God bestows it. These are conceived to be the two terms of a real interchange that takes place between the parties,—the two terms of a sequence, in fact, whereof the antecedent is prayer lifted up from earth, and the consequent is the fulfilment of that prayer in virtue of a mandate from heaven.”—Chalmers' *Works*, Vol. II. p. 321.

And (2), Prayer, on the part of man is instinctive—instinctive in the strict, scientific sense of that term.

What is the meaning of the word instinct as it is used by scientific writers? Paley defines it, “A propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction.” Whateley defines it, “A blind tendency to some mode of action, independent of any consideration on the part of the agent of the end to which the action leads.” Sir William Hamilton says: “An instinct is an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge.” A more elaborate definition than any of these, though in substance the same, is given in the *Imperial Dictionary*, in the words: “Instinct is a certain power by which, independently of all instruction or experience, and without deliberation, animals are directed to do spontaneously whatever is necessary for the preservation of the individual, or the continuation of the kind. Such, in the human species, is the instinct of sucking exerted immediately after birth, and that of insects depositing their eggs in circumstances most favorable for hatching. Instinct makes animals provide for themselves and young, and utter the voices, betake themselves to the course of life, and use the means of self-defence, which are most suitable to their circumstances and nature. The nest of the bird, the honey-comb of the bee, the web of the spider, the thread of the silk-worm, the holes or houses of the beaver, are all executed by instinct, and are not more perfect now, than they were long ages ago. In the beginning of life we do much by instinct, and little by understanding; and even when arrived at maturity, there are innumerable occasions on which, because reason cannot guide us, we must be guided by instinct. The complex machinery of nerves and muscles necessary to swallowing our food, walking, etc., is set agoing by instinct. The motion of our eyelids, and the sudden motions we make to avoid sudden danger, are also instinctive.”

In further exposition of the nature of instincts, I remark,

1. Instincts vary only slightly, if at all, from generation to generation. Instinctive methods are incapable of improvement, and experience teaches that they are not liable to deterioration. The honey-bee builds its cell to-day in the same fashion its progenitor did 6000 years ago in the garden of Eden; and the first-born child of the human race drew its nourishment from its mother's breast just as the child of to-day does. The slight apparent variations in instinct, manifested by certain animals under cultivation, in the hunting-dog, for example, seem to be owing to variations in the organs made use of—the organs of smell, or hearing, or locomotion—rather than to any change in the instinct itself. Because the instincts of animals are thus invariable, scientists have always regarded them as among the best guides in classification, and the most trustworthy characteristics in defining natural species.

2. Whilst instincts are thus invariable from generation to generation, in the individual, they are capable of atrophy from disuse. The instinct which guides the new-born infant in securing nourishment from its mother's breast, is sometimes entirely wanting in mature years; to the half-grown child, sucking is a "lost art." This is true not of instincts alone, but of other powers or faculties of the soul, *e. g.*, the conscience or moral sense. It would seem to be a general law, that proper exercise is necessary to the healthy condition of body and spirit alike.

3. Instincts in animals are congenital, although in some instances, they may not be called into active exercise until long after birth, *e. g.*, the nest-building instinct of the bird. The child draws its nourishment from its mother's breast as perfectly immediately after birth as it does at any subsequent period of its life. The first cell that a honey-bee builds, is as perfect in form and structure as any it builds afterwards. The young duck, when first it plunges into the water, swims as deftly as the parent duck. Hence, as the Duke of Argyll has well said—

"To account for instinct by experience, as Darwin has done, is nothing but an Irish bull. It denies the existence of things which are nevertheless assumed in the very terms of the denial; it elevates into a cause that which must, in its very nature, be a consequence, and a consequence too of the very cause which it denies. Con-

genital instincts, and hereditary powers, and pre-established harmonies, are the origin of all experience, and without them, no one step in experience could ever be gained."—*Unity of Nature*, p. 94.

4. Sir. Wm. Hamilton's definition of instinct is: "An agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge." In its nature and operation it is like a conclusion reached by a process of sound reasoning, and laid up in the memory for subsequent use. Sixty years ago, in my study of geometry, I had demonstrated to my entire satisfaction the truth that the three angles of a rectilinear triangle are equal to two right angles, and this conclusion was then laid up in my memory. Often since, I have made use of it, without a doubt as to its truth, though the demonstration which once satisfied me has been entirely forgotten. The simplest conception of an instinct, which experience enables me to form, is that which makes it of like nature with one of these conclusions. And, as instincts are congenital, if results of reasoning, it must be reasoning on the part of God the Creator, and not of the creature whose instincts they are.

5. Instinct, in its proper sphere, is the most perfect guide of conduct with which we are acquainted. The civil engineer, if he attempts an investigation of the matter on mechanical principles, will find himself shut up to the conclusion that the best possible method of drawing a liquid from a reservoir like the human breast is to give to the sucking mouth the exact conformation, and to the tongue the exact motion, which the infant, by instinct, gives its mouth and tongue when drawing its nourishment from its mother's breast. The cell of the honey-bee has long been the admiration of the mathematician, because of the economy of space and material it exhibits. If we conceive of instincts as results of the reasoning of God, the Creator, implanted in the mind of the creature at birth, all this is satisfactorily accounted for, and we can understand how it comes to be true that instinct, within its proper sphere, is a safer, more trustworthy guide than reason. Following our instincts, we are following the guidance of God; following human reason, we are following the guidance of man.

Such being the nature of instincts, if God has implanted in my soul the instinct of prayer, and I know through consciousness that such is the fact, then has he laid upon me an imperative obliga-

tion to pray, and to believe in the efficacy of prayer. It may be that difficulties are suggested and cavils uttered—difficulties which I cannot wholly remove, and cavils I cannot satisfactorily answer. What then? Shall I cease to pray, and give up my faith in the efficacy of prayer? By no means. There is no belief which man holds concerning which difficulties have not been suggested. There is no truth which has not been made the subject of cavil. Pyrrho doubted the reality of the external world. There are Sadducees in our day as well as eighteen hundred years ago, who “say there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit.” Should some scientific engineer approach a mother with an infant at her breast, and suggest a doubt as to whether the method the infant was practicing in securing its nourishment was the best possible in the case, and give it as his opinion that, if the child would make more use of pressure and less of suction, there would be a greater economy of its strength; would not the mother, if a sensible woman, reply, “The child is following the instruction of a better engineer than you. If your conclusions differ from his, there must be some fault in your reasoning, though I may not be able to point it out. I am sure that God is wiser than man; and as the child is following God’s instructions, I will let him suck in the future as in the past.”

II. *Prayer ordinarily answered through the operation of second causes.*

In answering prayer, as in all other works of his providence, God ordinarily secures results through the agency of second causes. This the men sailing with Jonah believed, as is evident from the fact that at the same time “they cried unto their gods,” they “cast forth the wares that were in the ship to lighten it of them.” So is it with the thoughtful Christian man in our day, who, as taught of our Lord, prays, “Give me this day my daily bread,” and then, if a farmer, carefully cultivates his fields, expecting the answer to his prayer to come through the agency of a cultivated soil, and shower and sunshine multiplying his seed sown.

Our world is a law-governed world—not law-governed in the sense in which the materialist understands that expression; a sense in which the laws of nature are so many mechanical forces,

and the world itself an automatic machine driven by those forces; but law-governed in the sense implied in God's immanence in nature; and the laws of nature—in the words of Sir Isaac Newton—are but “the established modes of the Divine working.”

“If means were not necessary to the attainment of ends; if God did not carefully confine his powers to the line of established laws; if we lived in a world in which miracle, instead of being the infinite exception, was the rule, and God was constantly breaking forth with the exercise of supernatural power in unexpected places, and like the wild lightning eluding the most rapid thought as it dashes zig-zag across the sky,—we should find all thought and intelligent action impossible. We could not understand God, because we could not trace the relation of means to ends in his action. If we could not understand him, we could not appreciate his wisdom, his righteousness, or his benevolence. We could not work with him, for we could not depend upon the operation of any means; we could not hope to effect any result. The universe would be a chaos, and the community of men a bedlam.”—Dr. A. A. Hodge's *Lectures*, p. 96.

The true doctrine on this point is well taught in the old Greek fable of “The Wagoner,” who, when his loaded wagon stuck fast in the mud, and he, falling upon his knees, called upon Jupiter for help, received for answer—“put your shoulder to the wheel, and then call upon the gods.”

It is a fatal objection to the doctrine of the advocates of “the faith-cure,” as it is called, that they utterly ignore the truth, taught in Scripture and confirmed by experience, that, in all ordinary circumstances, God answers prayer through the intervention of second causes; that his answers come to man as his blessing upon the use of appropriate means. Intelligent Christians they claim to be, but the heathen sailors who were Jonah's companions in tribulation exhibited a better understanding of the Christian doctrine of prayer—and Æsop was a better expounder of Scripture—than they.

III. *The nature of true prayer.*

Prayer is, in the language of the Shorter Catechism, “an offering up of our desires unto God.” (Ans. 98.) Though words are the ordinary, they are not the only means by which man may make known his desires unto God. Actions have as articulate a voice for the ear of God as words have. When the sailors, of whom Jonah tells us, cast forth their wares from the laboring ship to lighten her of her burden, they made known to God their desire

for rescue from impending danger as distinctly as when in words they called upon him to save them. When the woman that "was a sinner" came behind our Lord as he reclined at table in the Pharisee's house, and weeping, "washed his feet with her tears and wiped them with the hairs of her head," she gave a more eloquent expression to her desire for the pardon of sin than she could possibly have done in the use of words; and her prayer was heard and answered; for there came immediately from the lips of him, who as God, had power on earth to forgive sin, the assurance—"Thy sins be forgiven thee, go in peace." Luke vii. 47-50. In the words of Montgomery—

"Prayer is the soul's sincere desire,
Unuttered or expressed;
The motion of a hidden fire
That trembles in the breast.
Prayer is the burden of a sigh,
The falling of a tear;
The upward glancing of an eye
When none but God is near."

This truth will enable us to understand the language of Paul, "Pray without ceasing" (1 Thess. v. 17); "praying always, with all prayer and supplication in the spirit, and watching thereunto with all perseverance" (Eph. vi. 18). Paul's exhortation to Christians is not, as his words are sometimes interpreted, to always maintain a spirit of prayer, so that if occasion offers, they may be ready to pray, but to "pray always," to "pray without ceasing." This the industrious farmer does, in so far as his daily bread is concerned, not only when in the morning, on bended knee, he utters the words, "give me this day my daily bread," but just as distinctly, and to God's ear just as intelligibly, by the turning of every furrow with which his fallow-ground is broken up, by every stroke of the hoe with which his crop is cultivated, by every thrust of the sickle with which the ripened grain is gathered at the harvest season; and we may go a step further, and say, the necessary nightly rest by which his body is refreshed, and fitted for labor in the field, has, for God, a voice repeating the same petition, and thus his whole life becomes a prayer; he "prays without ceasing." On a certain occasion, after preaching this doctrine on the Sabbath,

on Monday morning I had occasion to pass a field in which a farmer, who had been one of my hearers the day before, was engaged in cultivating his crop, when he said to me, pleasantly, "You see, Doctor, I am busy praying for my daily bread." "Yes," was my reply, "and you expect an answer to your prayer, do you not?" "Certainly," said he. "Now, my friend," said I, "if you will pray for the salvation of your soul in the same earnest, honest way, I doubt not you will secure an answer to that prayer also."

The repetition of a mere form of words, where the words are not the expression of a desire of the heart, though the form be one which God himself has taught man, is not a prayer. At best, it is but an incantation, the utterance of a charm. The ten thousand pater-nosters, counted off upon the beads of many a devotee, are but "vain repetitions," such as the heathen use. There is not a breath of prayer in them from beginning to end; and it is only in the maudlin theology of "Babylon, drunk with the blood of God's saints," that they are accounted prayers in this, our day of advanced civilization. And yet these "vain repetitions" are often counted as prayers by superficial thinkers, and as, of course, they secure no answer from God, they are counted as unanswered prayers, and brought forward as proof of the inefficacy of prayer. This, on the one hand;—on the other, the honest, intelligent labor of the diligent man, giving utterance to prayer which God hears and answers, is not thought of as prayer at all. In the sweat of the brow of the honest laborer there is a language which God understands as truly as in the tears of the penitent. And so it comes to pass that a man's life is full of prayer and the answer to prayer of which we take no account.

IV. *The range of effective prayer.*

"The natural instinct of prayer reposes for its ground on God's perfections and man's dependence and wants," and hence, it would seem fairly to be inferred, that the range of effective prayer, as testified to by instinct, is coëxtensive with man's necessities; that it is not confined, as some would have us believe, to securing relief for man's spiritual wants alone, but covers man's physical necessities as well. Certainly, the sailors who were Jonah's companions so believed, when they "cried every man unto his god"

for deliverance from the storm which threatened them with shipwreck. So the Scriptures plainly teach in the story of Hezekiah, king of Judah, who, when sick, "turned his face to the wall, and prayed unto the LORD" for bodily healing, and received an answer to his prayer; a prayer as instinctive as that of the sailors just referred to, as proved by the fact that it is a prayer which has been repeated in every land, and every age.

"Prayer and the answer to prayer, are the two terms of a sequence, whereof the antecedent is prayer lifted up from earth, and the consequent is the fulfilment of that prayer in virtue of a mandate from heaven." Prayer is an efficient power in the material universe, not directly, as light, heat, and gravity are; but indirectly, by calling into active exercise the will-power of God. The efficient putting forth of the will-power of God in the affairs of our world constitutes his providential government of the world, and this extends to "all his creatures and all their actions." In the words of Dr. C. Hodge—

"The theory of the universe which underlies the Bible, which is everywhere assumed and asserted in the sacred volume, which accords with our moral and religious nature, and which, therefore, is the foundation of all natural as well as revealed religion, is that God created all things by the word of his power; that he endowed his creatures with their properties and forces; that he is everywhere present in his universe, co-operating with and controlling the operation of second causes, on a scale commensurate with his omnipresence and omnipotence, as we, in our measure, co-operate with and control them within the narrower range of our efficiency."—*Theology*, Vol. III., p. 698.

No good reason can be given why the range of effective prayer should not be as wide as the range of God's providence; and the teachings of Scripture on the subject seem to imply that such is the fact.

As already remarked, our world is a law-governed world, and there is a necessity that it should be such if it is to furnish a suitable habitation for man. But this fact is in no way inconsistent with the efficient putting forth of the free will-power of man in such a way as to control and direct the operation of law-governed mechanical forces so as to bring about results such as man desires. The ocean steamer carries her freight from one seaport to another, whithersoever her commander may determine, not only without deranging the operation of natural laws, but in perfect harmony

with those laws. If the will-power of man can operate in this way, why may not the will-power of God also? And it is on this will-power of God that prayer lays hold. That "unwavering trust in the constancy of nature which the Creator has implanted in man," which has been urged as an objection to the efficacy of prayer for certain blessings, *e. g.*, for rain, is not a trust in a constancy in any way inconsistent with the free operation of the will-power of either God or man. The sight of the ocean steamer moving whithersoever the will of her commander may determine does not disturb my "confidence in the constancy of nature." On the contrary, understanding as I do how this effect has been brought about, it confirms my confidence in that constancy.

Study the prayer our Lord taught his disciples to offer—"Give us this day our daily bread." (Matt. vi. 11.) How do thoughtful, Christian men expect this prayer to be answered? Not by miracle—God's raining down bread from heaven, as he did upon the Israelites in the wilderness—but by God and man coöperating, and by will-power controlling the operation of second causes fitted to secure that result. Man breaks up his fallow-ground, casts in his seed, and cultivates the growing crop. God sends from heaven his showers and sunshine, and so makes for man a fruitful season. In this law-governed world of ours the one agency is as indispensable, and in its proper sphere as efficient, as the other. If the man who prays to God for his daily bread does not believe that prayer is an efficient agency in securing the needed alternation of shower and sunshine, through the putting forth of the will-power of God, his prayer is a hypocrisy; if it be not effective, the teaching of instinct and Scripture alike is a delusion. The "constancy of nature," when rightly understood, furnishes no reason why the range of effective prayer should be less extensive than the range of God's providence.

In his lecture on Divine Providence, Dr. A. A. Hodge tells us—

"The great Dr. Witherspoon lived at a country seat called Tusculum, on Rocky Hill, two miles north of Princeton. One day a man rushed into his presence, crying: 'Dr. Witherspoon, help me to thank God for his wonderful providence. My horse ran away, my buggy was dashed to pieces on the rocks, and behold, I am unharmed.' The good Doctor laughed benevolently at the inconsistent, half-way character of the man's religion. 'Why,' he answered, 'I know a providence a thou-

sand times better than yours. I have driven down that rocky road to Princeton hundreds of times, and my horse never ran away, and my buggy was never dashed to pieces.' Undoubtedly the deliverance was providential, but just as much so also were the uneventful rides of the College President. God is in the atom just as really and effectually as in the planet. He is in the unobserved sighing of the wind in the wilderness as in the earthquake which overthrows a city, full of living men, and his infinite wisdom and power are as much concerned in the one event as the other."—*Lectures on Theological Themes*, p. 39.

As men, when thinking on the subject of God's providence, often err in recognizing that providence in events out of the ordinary course of things only; so, when thinking of the efficacy of prayer, do they err in recognizing as answers to prayer, remarkable occurrences alone. The quiet bestowment of daily bread as God's blessing upon the labors of the devout Christian is as truly an answer to prayer as deliverance from shipwreck, or recovery from sickness. For this reason, as well as for reasons already given, we often fail to see how full of prayer and prayer-answers the life of the Christian man on earth is.

V. *Natural and Christian prayer.*

By natural prayer, I mean such prayer as instinct alone would lead a man to offer, prayer which is simply the cry of a needy, dependent creature to a being, in whom he believes, superior to himself and therefore able to help him. By Christian prayer, I mean such prayer as instinct supplemented by revelation leads the Christian man to offer, prayer which is the cry a needy dependent sinner addresses to his reconciled Father in Heaven, in the name of Christ Jesus, through whom this reconciliation has been effected. Had man never sinned, made as he was "in the image of God," he had been a perfect law unto himself, and his natural instinct would have proved an unerring and sufficient guide in prayer, as his reason and conscience would have been in the duties of life. But man has sinned, and as a consequence thereof, his whole nature has become fatally marred, and all his relations to God fatally deranged. Looking at the matter in the light of history we learn, among other things, that man is subject to degradation under the operation of sin indulged in from generation to generation, and this to such an extent that his intellect, and conscience, and even his moral instincts almost disappear, and he himself becomes little

better than a brute, as illustrated in the case of the savage Patagonians described by Charles Darwin in his "Voyage of the Beagle." Yet as history testifies, in the case of these very Patagonians, man may be recovered from this degradation by Christianity, and reason and conscience, and the moral instincts resume their proper sway again.

One of the first effects of the degrading influence of sin—though by no means the only one—is to obscure, if not obliterate the idea of the fatherhood of God, and all filial feeling on the part of man. God becomes a stern tyrant and man a crouching slave. Christianity, which is a revelation from God, aims to restore the original relationship between God and man, in fact, and to the apprehension of man. It discloses to reason and conscience a way in which God "can be just and justify the sinner;" a way in which man may resume his original filial relationship to his Father in heaven, and so free scope be given to the operation of his instinct of prayer. Hence it comes to be true, that while all prayer is instinctive, man needs to be taught to pray a Christian prayer; there is need that revelation should supplement the work of instinct here.

When his disciples said to our Lord, "Lord, teach us to pray, as John also taught his disciples," he said, "When ye pray, say, Our Father which art in Heaven" (Luke xi. 1, 2); and, in his sermon on the mount, when giving the assurance of the efficacy of prayer so precious to the Christian heart, "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you," he followed it up with the words, "What man is there of you, whom if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone? Or, if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent? If ye, then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father in heaven give good things to them that ask him?" (Matt. vii. 7-12.) Thus does our Lord teach us that the doctrine of the fatherhood of God is fundamental in the true conception of Christian prayer. The correlative doctrine of the Christian's sonship the Scriptures teach in such words as these: "For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear, but ye have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry

Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God." (Romans viii. 15, 16.) "And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father." (Galatians iv. 6.) Adoption among men is often a mere form; adoption into the family of God is always a blessed reality. In his regeneration the child of God always "receives the spirit of adoption;" and in his thoughts and feelings becomes indeed a child; and to him God is his father, not by creation alone, but his reconciled father, through redemption, and as such he approaches him in prayer. Hence it comes, that Christian prayer is as truly instinctive to the Christian man as what I have called natural prayer is to the man who is not a Christian; and revelation simply supplements without interfering with the operation of instinct.

The Christian conscious of his own ignorance and liability to err in judgment, and having thorough confidence in the unerring wisdom and perfect love of his Father in heaven, will naturally always pray with entire submission to the divine will. If he have a reverent, loving child's spirit, his most earnest prayers will always be followed, expressly or by implication, with a request that God would, after all, choose for him. An example of this feeling expressed we have in our Lord's prayer, when "being in an agony, he prayed more earnestly, and his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground": "Father, if thou be willing [if it be possible, Matt.] remove this cup from me; nevertheless, not my will, but thine be done." (Luke xxii. 42-44.) An instance of this feeling implied we have in Paul's prayer, thrice repeated, for deliverance from what he terms "a thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan buffeting him," as is evident from his declaration when an answer is given, not in the removal of the thorn, but in the assurance, "My grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in weakness." "Most gladly, therefore, will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me." (2 Cor. xii. 7-9.)

"There is nothing more contemptible than the presumptuous claim that God has subjected the universe to our dictation. Every really holy soul must prefer a million of times that God should reign absolutely, and do with him and his as seems good in his sight. What child of an earthly father can judge in any case what,

upon the whole and in the long run is best for itself? How much more should we insist upon leaving every decision at the disposal of our Heavenly Father."—A. A. Hodge's *Lectures on Theological Themes*, pp. 102, 103.

To the doctrine of the advocates of the "faith-cure," as it is called, I have already called the reader's attention to one fatal objection, viz., that in the rejection of appropriate means, it ignores the truth that—except in the case of miracles—God answers prayer through the agency of second causes. A second equally fatal objection to that doctrine is that it calls for faith without submission, a thing impossible in the case of a reverent, loving child of God. If in any particular case prayer is offered for the healing of disease, and the healing does not follow, the advocates of the "faith-cure" ascribe the failure to the lack of faith, and so of proper prayer, on the part of the petitioner. All such doctrine as this is based upon an entire misapprehension of the true nature of the faith characteristic of effectual prayer. Such faith is either the sincere belief of some definite, specific promise, or it is that faith described in the words, "He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him." (Heb. xi. 6.) And such faith is perfectly consistent with entire submission to God's will, even in the case of things most earnestly desired and importunately prayed for; as is well illustrated in our Lord's prayer in Gethsemane. True faith in all things submits to God's will, and delights to do so. Christian prayer is the making known of a child's desires to his Father in heaven. "Confidence without submission," as Dr. A. A. Hodge has well said, "is the most offensive form of unbelief which disgraces man or offends God"; it is unbelief which strikes at, not the word, but the very nature of God.

VI. *Tyndall's prayer-test.*

A few years ago a proposition was made—originating with Sir Henry Thompson, but brought to public attention by Professor Tyndall, and so, generally spoken of as Tyndall's prayer-test—to determine the efficacy of prayer for the sick experimentally, in a way which, it was claimed, ought to be satisfactory alike to all. The proposition, as stated by its author, was—

"For the purpose of our inquiry I do not propose to ask that one single child of man should be deprived of his participation in all that belongs to him of this

vast influence;" *i. e.*, the influence of the general prayers for the sick offered in Christian churches on every Sabbath day; "but, I ask that one single ward or hospital, under the care of first-rate physicians and surgeons, containing a certain number of patients, afflicted with those diseases which have been best studied, and of which the mortality rates are best known, whether the diseases are those which are treated by medical or surgical remedies, should be, during a period of not less, say, than three or five years, made the object of special prayer by the whole body of the faithful, and that, at the end of that time, the mortality rates should be compared with the past rates, and also with that of other leading hospitals, similarly well managed, during the same period. Granting that time is given, and numbers are sufficiently large, so as to secure a minimum of error from accidental disturbing causes, the experiment will be exhaustive and complete. I might have proposed to treat two sides of the same hospital, managed by the same men; one side to be the object of special prayer, the other to be exempt from all prayer. It would have been the most rigidly logical and philosophical method. But I shrink from depriving any of—I had almost said—his natural inheritance in the prayers of Christendom. Practically, too, it would have been impossible; the unprayed-for ward would have attracted the prayers of believers as surely as the lofty tower attracts the electric fluid. The experiment would be frustrated. But the opposite character of my proposal will commend it to those who are naturally most interested in its success; those, namely, who conscientiously and devoutly believe in the efficiency against death and disease of special prayer. I open a field for the exercise of their devotion. I offer an occasion of demonstrating to the faithless an imperishable record of the real power of prayer."—Tyndall's *Advancement of Science*, pp. 97, 98.

1. I cannot believe that Prof. Tyndall, when he proposed thus to test the efficacy of prayer in healing diseases, used the word prayer in its low, heathen sense, of the mere repetition of a form of words—an incantation—a charm. No Christian believes in the efficacy of incantations. No teacher has ever denounced the worthlessness of the mere repetition of a form of words more emphatically than our Lord. (See Matt. vi. 5-8.) As Prof. Tyndall, in conducting such an experiment as this, would insist that the medicines should be pure, the genuine articles, he surely will not question the Christian's right to demand that the prayer used should be genuine also. Christian prayer is the only kind of prayer in question; for while it is true that God, in the exercise of his sovereignty, may, and sometimes does answer such prayer as that of Jonah's heathen ship-mates, it is Christian prayer alone which God has bound himself by promise always to hear and answer. In the words of scripture it is "the effectual, fervent prayer of the righteous man"—righteous in the gospel sense of that word—"which availeth much." (James v. 16.)

a. According to the teaching of Scripture, Christian prayer is the prayer of a reverent, trusting, loving child addressed to his Father in heaven. In this particular the teaching of science, as Prof. Tyndall himself admits, is in perfect accord with that of Scripture.

"The theory that the system of nature is under the control of a Being who changes phenomena in compliance with the prayers of men, is, in my opinion, a perfectly legitimate one. It may, of course, be rendered futile by being associated with conceptions which contradict it, but such conceptions form no necessary part of the theory. It is a matter of experience that an earthly father, who is at the same time both wise and tender, listens to the requests of his children, and if they do not ask amiss, takes pleasure in granting their requests. We know also that this compliance extends to the alteration, within certain limits, of the current of events on earth. With this suggestion offered by our experience, it is no departure from scientific methods to place behind natural phenomena a universal Father, who, in answer to the prayers of his children, alters the current of these phenomena. Thus far theology and science go hand in hand."—*Advance of Science*, p. 102.

b. Christian prayer is "an offering up of our *desires* unto God." Words must be the expression of a real desire on the part of the petitioner, or they are not prayer. "God is a spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth." (John iv. 24.) The most terrible denunciations our Lord ever uttered against any sin were against the sin of hypocrisy, stage-acting in matters of religion. (See Matt. xxiii.) It is to the heart of the worshipper God's eye is directed, and it is that which he sees there, and that only, which constitutes prayer. A man may impose upon his fellow-man, he may even impose upon himself as to the true nature of his desires; he cannot impose upon God. The Christian can pray honestly for the recovery of a sick friend, with an earnestness correspondent to his love for that friend. He can pray for the recovery of the sick in general, with a real, though feeble desire, through sympathy with all sufferers, and as the outcome of his love for his brethren according to the flesh. But the prayer Prof. Tyndall's experiment calls for, is altogether different from such prayers as these. The prime object of that prayer is, not the relief of a suffering friend, or fellow-creature, but the shutting of the mouths of certain cavilling philosophers, who, rejecting God's plan of settling a question, would fain excuse that rejection by proposing an entirely different plan. Certain I am, that this is

the form the prayer would have to assume, if I attempted to offer it.

c. It is a well-known, wise and just principle governing God's administration of his kingdom of grace, that he will give such proof of the truth of the Christian religion as a whole, and of its several doctrines in particular, as shall thoroughly satisfy the ingenuous inquirer, but not "signs from heaven" to shut the mouths of cavillers. Our Lord says, "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God." (Jno. vii. 17.) That is, if any man will set about making all right between God and himself, and do this with the Scriptures in his hands, and making those Scriptures his guide, he shall know that Christianity—and, as a part of that Christianity, the most important, practical doctrine of the efficacy of prayer—is from God. Thousands in every age of the world, and in every country where Christianity has been preached, have put this matter to the test, and invariably with the result of coming to believe in Christianity with a faith which death itself could not disturb. This is God's plan for securing a certain result; and, in so far as I can see, it is the only plan which will preserve for man his free-agency in matters which concern his salvation and the life to come.

Now, what does Professor Tyndall propose that the Christian shall do? That he should come to God with the prayer that he would set aside his plan, pursued for long ages, and with abundant success, and give "a sign from heaven" instead;—that he should do the very thing he refused to do when proposed by the cavilling Pharisees and Sadducees eighteen hundred years ago (see Matt. xvi. 1-4), and had the refusal recorded in Scripture for the instruction of his people in after times. That a reverent, trustful, loving child of God should honestly put up such a prayer as this is impossible.

2. Professor Tyndall, as already quoted, writes:

"It is no departure from scientific method to place behind natural phenomena a universal Father, who, in answer to the prayers of his children, alters the current of phenomena. Thus far theology and science go hand in hand."

In these words he distinctly recognizes a peculiarity in the sequence of prayer and the answer to prayer which places it in an

entirely different category from that to which physical causation belongs. The free will-power of our Father in heaven is interposed between prayer and its answer. Prayer acts directly upon our Father in heaven, disposing him to attend to our wants in the exercise of his infinite wisdom and love. For this reason, prayer is often spoken of as a moral, not a physical, cause, although the answer to prayer may be in the form of a strictly physical effect. The experimental test proposed by Professor Tyndall, as has been well said:

“Is applicable only to natural order, and authorizes conclusions only in cases of strictly physical causation. That he should propose to apply it under distinctly foreign conditions, to a case involving free-will, to the moral order, was, if not mere frivolous mockery, a gross logical blunder. In the natural order, in a case of physical causation, the method named would furnish a crucial test; but, in the case proposed, it was crucial only in that it was devised to crucify the Lord afresh, and put him to an open shame.”—Professor N. K. Davis, in *Christian Thought*, Vol. III., page 17.

3. In establishing the truths of science, careful observation is as often resorted to as experiment, and its results are as thoroughly accepted. In the case of moral causation, this method is fully open to us, and, when properly pursued, is as thoroughly scientific as the other. In the most certain of all the natural sciences, astronomy, we are compelled to depend upon observation, and not experiment, for our knowledge of truth. Tested by observation, the efficacy of prayer has been satisfactorily established by the experience of Christians in every age. In the words of Dr. A. A. Hodge:

“Millions of spiritual children of God have been ceaselessly trusting him, praying to him, and proving him, from Adam to Moses, from Moses to Christ, from Christ to the present day. Our Father knows our hearts; we know and he knows the real meaning of our prayers. We know our Father’s heart. We know that when we were ‘in distress, we called upon him, and he answered us, and set us in a large place.’ The Christian is satisfied with what he knows as to the confidential relations between his prayer-hearing Father and himself. He can well afford to smile with pity when the stranger to the household criticizes his Father’s faithfulness, and tries to convince the child, against the witness of his own consciousness, that his father does not hear and answer his prayers.”—*Lectures on Theological Themes*, page 107.

That the doctrine of the efficacy of Christian prayer, a doctrine profoundly practical in the Christian life, should have been cavil

led at, and assailed from many different quarters, should cause us no surprise. In this particular, its fate has been but that of Christian truth in general. To all these cavils and objections, in so far as they claim to be scientific, the sufficient scientific answer is: Prayer is instinctive—natural and Christian prayer alike. Your cavils and objections are, at best, but results of human reasoning. Now, if there is anything certain in science, it is that, within its own proper province, Instinct is a safer, more trustworthy guide than Reason.

GEO. D. ARMSTRONG.

V. JOHN WYCLIF.

“The Holy Scripture is the faultless, most true, most perfect, and most holy law of God, which it is the duty of all men to learn, to know, to defend and to observe.”—*John Wyclif.*

THERE are a few men whose lives are an epitome of their age. Not those who merely reflect the thought or action of their times, such as a Medici, a Sydney, a Voltaire, an Addison, a Wellington or a Jefferson. For they won the applause of men because they did best what many were doing well. They sum up, indeed, the conscious life of the era, while they leave out of sight the deep silent influences, often at deadly odds with the cherished ideals of the day, which work beneath the surface of society. Consequently they exercised a far greater influence on their own generation than on posterity, so that we are sometimes at a loss to explain their influence over their contemporaries. Nor yet do I mean those strange, striking characters who have again and again burst upon the world, men of titanic mould, who have sought to shape the world by mere strength of arm; men of prophetic gaze, who have seen the splendor of a far future day and tried to hurry forward a laggard world to realize its glories. Men who have accomplished little; who have broken and been broken; marvellous in gifts, out of temper with their times, magnificent anachronisms. Among such men were Savonarola, and Frederick II. of Germany, whom all men called *Stupor mundi*, but none ever dreamed of calling great. It is a far higher type than either of these to which I refer, one which by unerring instinct grasps not merely the conditions of the time, but its tendencies and its needs; which lives the life of the day, but boldly leads the way to the new life of the future. History is forever playing the same dramas—now tragedy, now comedy, now a mock-heroic melodrama, now a broad farce,—with only changes in the stage setting and the actors. These great characters she is forever casting in new rôles, so that they appear to be, not the peculiar property of their times, but the common possession of the ages. They are

naturalized citizens in every land. Were we to meet them on our streets to-day we should recognize in each one of them the highest traits of the man, the truest instincts of the gentleman. We should find nothing uncouth about them, nothing antiquated, but feeling the spell which ever emanates from the truly great, we should obey their behests as those of natural right leaders of men.

A catalogue of such men might be difficult to make. Yet many of them are sufficiently conspicuous, and, happily for the world, no great cause has ever wanted, not merely some great mind of this type, but many, constantly appearing and approaching the work from one or another position; reasserting old truths, restating old propositions, re-proving old problems. They stand at this and that turning point in history testifying to the universality and the perpetuity of truth, and revealing over and over again its simplicity and sufficiency. In times of storm and stress we sometimes fear that the truth of God shall want some one sufficiently versed in human wisdom to bring home the wisdom of God to those who either want a shepherd, or whose shepherds have neglected the care of their flocks. It is profitable now and again to remind ourselves how many and how noble are the men who from time to time have proved that the wisdom of God is the highest wisdom of man; aye, more, is so much higher than the mere wisdom of man as to supply, not only sufficient wisdom for man's daily need, but also to awaken a deep yearning in the heart never to be satisfied in this world. A yearning of this sort, however incompatible with the self-satisfaction of human self-love and conceit, is wholly compatible with that thirst for knowledge which is content to be progressive rather than final. In this day, when the truth of God as revealed in his blessed Word is being assailed on so many sides, it is of interest to turn back the pages of history and contemplate the quiet grandeur of one and another of those who have been the proponents and the defenders of his Word. Scarcely any one of these is more worthy of our attention than John Wyclif.

By profession a secular priest, Wyclif became step by step the most learned of English schoolmen; a bold and unfaltering patriot,

the most fearless of reformers, the most aggressive of protestants, the founder of English prose literature, but something far more and far better than these, by God's grace the first to translate the Holy Scriptures as a whole into a modern tongue, the protomartyr of the cause of a free and infallible Bible for Englishmen. When he was born we do not know, nor certainly the place. It was probably the little north-country town of Wyecliff. The year of his birth may with some certainty be put in the third decade of the fourteenth century. About the age of fifteen, poor, of obscure parentage, without power or influence, he entered the University of Oxford as a candidate for clerical orders. For many years he lived unnoted and unknown except within the precincts of the university; so much so that we cannot with any certainty mark the steps of his career until he became master of Balliol College, in the year 1351. While his name appears not infrequently in the records of the university prior to this time, it is impossible to disentangle the careers of the, certainly, two, perhaps three or even more, persons of the same name then in residence. Yet he must have been a by no means undistinguished person at the time of his election to the mastership of this great college. And from that time forth he was one of the most conspicuous figures in the little world of the university.

He came upon the scene at a time of change. England was undergoing a transition from feudality to nationality; from local exclusiveness to commercial expansion; from absolutism to comparative liberty. It is the first stage of these changes and characterized rather by the decay of the older ideas and institutions than by the appearance of the new. Wyclif was one of the few actors upon the scene whose life belonged rather to the new era that was dawning, than to the old era that was dying in brilliant colors against the evening sky.

In one sense the most conspicuous transition of all was less in the external world than in the domain of thought, less in the facts of life than in the point of view from which they were regarded. The first centuries of the Middle Ages were dominated by splendid dreams. The greatest of these were the ideals of a world empire and a world church, which took form in the Holy Roman Em-

pire and the Roman Catholic Church. The former being temporal had not substance enough to endure from age to age, though Charlmagne, Otto the Great, Frederick Barbarossa, and many other powerful rulers, built their lives into its tenuous fabric. The church, as its empire was over the mind rather than over the body, was more real, more successful in its efforts and more permanent in its results. But the church of Gregory VII. and of Innocent III. fell short of the ideal church almost as far as did the empire of Otto III., *Mirabilis Mundi*—as a wondering world hailed him—of that golden dream which deluded his brilliant mind and lured him to his end. Out of these dreams sprang others only less strange and unreal than themselves, as the dream of the permanent recovery of Jerusalem, and all the strange phantasmagoria which that dream brought upon the world stage, of which the most marvellous is the spectacle of ten thousand little children, helpless and unprotected, setting out to achieve the conquest which the armies of Europe had failed to accomplish. Not even the pathway of these little ones, stained with the blood of their innocent feet, marked through all its miles and miles with here and there a little heap of bleached bones, served to awaken the world to a sense of reality. But the crusades wore out the world, and the reaction from them did more for Christendom than they. Exhausted by vain and misdirected efforts, princes and people alike sank into a lethargy from which the entreaties of popes, who still sought to awaken religious enthusiasm, failed to rouse them to crusading fervor. And as they fought for life in wasted lands and ruined homes, they found a spirit of change abroad and began to see things in their true light. The great empire of the world now appears as but a figment of men's brains. The emperor was seen to be in himself the feeblest ruler in Europe, and kings but shadowy overlords to powerful feudatories, while the people were ground under the hard hand of the rude and reckless baronage; but, worst of all, the great world church, the glory of the world, was seen in all its nakedness, fallen from its high estate, the instrument of the pride, the lust of power, the love of luxury and the greed of gain, of a corrupt prelaey. Italy had long recognized this. The outside world was now slowly

awakening to a realization of the scandal to Christendom. That cold, cruel, unscrupulous prince whom history knows as Philip "The Handsome," of France, was destined in the opening years of the fourteenth century to dispel many a shade of the lingering night, and first of all he directed himself to this papal pretence.

By craft and cunning, by pitting the legalism of the civilians against the casuistry of the canonists, by using French gold more freely where Italian gold was freely used, finally by opposing to the perfidious prelates of Italy the unscrupulous bishops of France, he broke his way into the close circle of Italian clerical politics, secured the election of a French ecclesiastic to the papacy, hailed his minion to Lyons for consecration, and then held him a prisoner in France. It was an evil omen. A bishop of Rome consecrated in Gaulish Lyons! And the omen was surely fulfilled. From that day forth Clement and his successors in the papacy went not forth from France for seventy long years. Seventy long years, the splendid church, which at the close of the thirteenth century proudly claimed to dictate to the world not only in things spiritual, but in things temporal, bowed the neck beneath the foot of princes of an effete race, who sat upon a tottering throne. Boniface VIII. had blinded men's eyes by the pomp with which he paraded the streets of the Eternal City, preceded by the drawn swords, symbols of the temporal and spiritual powers which the pope affected to wield as the vicar of God on earth. Now amid the extravagance and debauchery of his court at Avignon, Clement V. sat, a spectacle which smote all Christendom with sorrow and shame. But though the vileness of the papal court was stripped naked before every eye, the pope relaxed no whit of his pretensions, no jot of his claims. His throng of impure simoniacal followers held the richest of preferments in every land. In England, French Cardinals held the most desirable livings; the English priests held what they could get. Among others the deaneries of York, Salisbury and Lincoln, the diaconates of Canterbury, Durham and Suffolk, the prebendaryships of Thane, Massingdon and York, were in such hands. Indeed, the revenue which the papal court drew annually out of England was no less than five

times that which passed into the royal exchequer. And yet the local clergy, especially the mendicant orders, had become so corrupt, that despite this terrible display they did not revolt. The exhibition of the rottenness of the church gave Philip an opportunity to destroy the Knights Templar, one of the blackest deeds upon the pages of history.

What Philip did to the Templars every prince in Europe was constantly doing to the Jews, and no man spoke a word of protest. But this was different. The order blazed up in one last burst of heroic constancy. Broken upon the wheel, torn upon the rack, lacerated by all the devices of inquisitorial ingenuity, surrounded by the blazing fagots of the stake, they with one accord declared the purity of their order and the innocence of their lives. The whole world wept for them. The vicious captive pope could neither be coaxed, cajoled, bribed or forced into complicity in their destruction. Stripped of their wealth, shorn of their glory, the world which had envied their state and feared their power, in the day of their adversity honored their fortitude and bewailed their suffering. But it was in vain. The day of public opinion had not dawned. What the king commanded and his greater vassals sanctioned no man might gainsay.

There is a power which not even feudal nobles could long sin against without reaping their reward. And men said that God visited the sin upon Philip and his house. Certain it is, that he died shortly afterwards from the effects of a trivial accident aggravated by anxiety of mind. He was still young, his handsome face had lost none of its elegance of line, none of its freshness of color; his heart had not softened one whit from its stony hardness. He left three tall sons to inherit his wealth and power, and dreamed that the ancient line of Hugh Capet should continue long in France. One by one they died, leaving no heirs; in fourteen years there was not one of his house left to sit upon his throne. The sins of the father were visited upon the sons.

What little of glory the age was to know was to be derived from England. The two Edwards, the king and the Black Prince, laid France at the feet of the English throne without substantially advancing the cause for which they fought. For though they won

battles, though they beat and baffled the French at every turn, they lacked the generalship to reap the fruits of victory. The result of it all was that France became almost a desolation, even in times of truce the prey of roving bands of ruthless soldiery. And England, flooded with ill-gotten wealth, was plunged into a gay and reckless luxury such as the Island realm had never known before. Out of the midst of the court circle rings for us the song of gay "Dan" Chaucer the precursor of modern English poetry. What a picture he paints of the wild debauchery and hollow skepticism of the court, while with acute insight and pitiless irony he penetrates the glittering bubble and shows how empty it was! Underneath all this there was suffering scarcely less than that of France, and it is pictured for us with painful plainness in another poem of the time, the strange old-fashioned poem of the "Vision of Piers Plowman," by William Longland. Longland was a London cleric, silent, moody, pinched with poverty, embittered by a sense of the wrongs of the laboring classes, and generally regarded as a madman. The picture which he paints stands out in strange contrast with the bright canvasses of Chaucer; it is a picture infinitely sad. But he has found the key-note of the future. The burden of Chaucer is "eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow ye die." The burden of Longland is, "work, work for self, work for the world." The inexpressible sadness of his song lies upon the heart. Its solemn warnings thrill and move the soul, but it seems as if there was, there could be, no hope, as if the work it inculcated was to be but a distraction from the pain of thought.

As if the hand of man were not heavy enough upon the world, the hand of God suddenly fell upon the devoted lands. Unheralded, coming whence no man knows to this day, going whither no one will ever know, the most fearful pestilence broke out and spread with terrible rapidity over all Europe. Beginning at Constantinople, it swept Cyprus, Sicily, Italy, brooding with especial malignity over the fair city of Florence, and marking for one of its victims that lovely Laura of whom Petrarch sang; sweeping on it nearly depopulated the cities of Provence, leaving in the city of Avignon, where Pope Clement VI. held the most extravagant and dissolute court in Europe, scarcely a fourth of its gay and godless

citizens. In France, its victims were more than half of the people. In England, London was reduced to a feeble five and thirty thousand. Yarmouth, from ten thousand sank to three. Norwich, the first city in the north, out of perhaps 100,000 inhabitants lost "57,374 persons, besides religious and beggars." In Bristol, the first city in the west, "the living were scarce able to bury the dead and the grass grew several inches high in the Broad street and High street." In the abbey of Croxton, in Lincolnshire, all the inmates died except the abbot and the prior. Of the fifteen hundred parish clergy in the diocese of Norwich, a thousand died.

Upon such a world rose the star of John Wyclif, the one benignant influence of the age.

Wyclif had been deeply touched by the sufferings of the people at the time of the first ravages of the Black Death, and took up his pen. But his time had not come. He sank back into his place in the University, pushed on with his scholastic studies, now and again in that sphere coming in conflict with the pope and papal methods, but in this he only walked in the way of his predecessors. Says John Richard Green :

"Of all the scholastic doctors those of England had been throughout the keenest and most daring in philosophic speculation; a reckless audacity and love of novelty were the common note of Bacon, Duns Scotus and Ockham, as against the sober and more disciplined learning of the Parisian schoolmen, Albert and Aquinas. But the decay of the University of Paris during the English wars had transferred the intellectual supremacy to Oxford, and in Oxford Wyclif stood without a rival. To his predecessor Bradwardine he owed . . . the tendency to a predestinarian Augustinianism which formed the groundwork of his later theological revolt. His debt to Ockham revealed itself in his earliest efforts at church reform. Undismayed by the thunder and excommunications of the church, Ockham had not shrunk . . . from attacking the foundations of papal supremacy or from asserting the rights of the civil power. The spare, emaciated form of Wyclif, weakened by study and by asceticism, hardly promised a reformer who would carry on the stormy work of Ockham: but within this frail form lay a temper quick and restless, an immense energy, an immovable conviction, an unconquerable pride. The personal charm which ever accompanies real greatness had only deepened the influence he derived from the spotless purity of his life. As yet indeed even Wyclif himself can hardly have suspected the immense range of his intellectual power. It was only the struggle that lay before him which revealed in the dry and subtle schoolman the founder of our later English prose, a master of popular invective, of irony, of persuasion, a dexterous politician, an audacious partisan, the organizer of a religious order, the unsparring assailant of abuses, the boldest and most indefatigable of controversialists, the first reformer who dared when deserted and alone to

question and deny the creed of the Christendom around him, to break through the traditions of the past, and with his last breath to assert the freedom of religious thought against the dogmas of the papacy."

Following this strong national tendency, and drawing his arguments both from them and from such continental schoolmen as Marsiglio of Padua, Wyclif early showed himself on the side of the freedom of England from papal pretensions. He declared that the English people needed no grant to their king from the pope, saying: "All we need for a true dominion over the realm is to keep ourselves from mortal sin, and give our wealth rightly to the poor, and so hold our kingdom, as hitherto, immediately from Christ." Time-servers in the University marked his tone, and whispered it about that his heart was set upon a bishopric. So lightly do evil natures impute base motives to others whose lofty natures are above their comprehensions. It was not long before the pope made a direct demand of tribute money as a feudal acknowledgment. At once Wyclif stepped to the front in the role of the patriot priest. It was a point which Edward III. never dreamed of yielding, and which the parliament treated with scorn, but there was urgent need of a champion, learned in the doctrine of the schoolmen, and the casuistry of the canonists to justify before the world and the people of the realm the position which king and parliament so boldly assumed. By the breadth of his learning and vigor of his dialectic, Wyclif utterly refuted and forever set at rest the papal pretensions, and not content with the temporary discussion of the matter, he summed up the theory of government which he had so vigorously expounded in the treatise, "On the Divine Dominion." It may be said that there was nothing new in the treatise, that the truths were as old as the gospel, as plain as the most patent principles and precepts of daily life. In just these particulars lay its power. Happy had it been for more than one of the great emperors, if in their struggle with the papacy, there had been some one to thus clearly formulate the doctrine of individual responsibility of rulers and of the coördinate, rather than the dependent, relation of the temporal power to the spiritual; never was it so powerfully enforced, since it had been preached to Rome by the swords of Charlemagne and Otto.

The court recognized the value of their champion, and for a time the quiet priest basked in the sunshine of courtly favor. It was a brief period, short and sweet as a golden day in mid October. So long as the struggle was between England and a French pope his services were in active demand. In 1372, he withstood to his face a papal nuncio, showing his personal perfidy and falseness to solemn oaths, and at last in a sudden burst of righteous indignation declared the pope was not infallible, but an erring sinner. Two years latter, he was sent in almost princely state to Bruges in Flanders, as second in a solemn embassy of which the bishop of Bangor was the leader, to meet the legates of Gregory XI., and to seek for some adjustment of differences between pope and king. The embassy accomplished nothing, but the experiences of the mission deepened the conviction in Wyclif's heart of the need of resistance to popish abuses. He set out as one likely to develop in the line of the great national prelates, such as Stygand and Grossetete had been before him, such as Woolsey and Cranmer were to be after him. He returned with the seal of the reformer set upon his heart. The needs of the nation, while never forgotten, were henceforth to be subordinate to his zeal for the necessities of the world. A few years before, he was willing to admit that the pope was the vicar of God on earth; now he brands him with superb courage as "Antichrist."

The attitude which Wyclif occupied with respect to the court might have blinded the eyes of a less sturdy man to the evils of the day by the opportunities of preferment held out to him, or distracted a less far-seeing man from the real cause of the reckless life which the court fostered and encouraged. But while Wyclif gave the heartiest coöperation to all the national measures of the court, he scrupulously guarded himself against any compromising relations with it. He stoutly condemned its excesses, but seeing with unfailling clearness of vision, that the corruption of church and clergy was the centre of evil, he reserved his strength for constant and telling assaults upon them. There was no use of lopping off here a branch and there a branch; the axe must be laid to the root of the tree. He valued and made the best possible use of the support he received from the court, especially from John of

Gaunt, but it had little effect upon his conduct. With fearless eloquence charge after charge, supported by incontrovertible evidence, flowed from his pen. He boldly proclaimed them from the pulpits of Oxford and London, and his disciples spread them throughout England. The archbishop of Canterbury cited him to appear before the bishop of London, on the 13th of February, 1377. On the appointed day Wyclif appeared, accompanied by the Duke of Lancaster, Lord Harry Percy, the Earl Marshall, and their retainers. The bishop became enraged, hot words followed with Percy and the Duke of Lancaster, and the trial broke up in a riot. The only result of a definite character was that Wyclif was left free and allowed to go his way.

But it was only because a surer blow was being prepared. Fifty grounds of heresy were extracted from his writings and sent to Avignon to form the basis of a charge of false doctrine. Of these, nineteen were chosen as grounds for trial, and five bulls were issued by the pope, addressed to the king, the prince, the bishop of London and the universities, directing them to summon him to answer the charges. The king died before the bulls reached England, the University of Oxford "treated it with contempt"; the Synod of London was broken into by the citizens of London, who were Wyclif's ardent supporters; then the queen regent (for the old king being now dead, the young son of the Black Prince sat upon the throne as Richard II.) forbade further proceedings. In a short time the pope died, and hostilities were suspended.

The death of Gregory XI. precipitated the Great Schism. The Babylonian captivity had been scandal enough; now the world beheld for forty years the spectacle of two popes, one in Rome, the other in Avignon, each claiming to be the infallible representative of the Prince of Peace, levelling anathemas at each other and hailing each other as Antichrist. Every faithful heart in Christendom was oppressed with shame. What wonder that the heart of Wyclif burned within him, and that with tongue and pen he poured forth a ceaseless impeachment against "these wolves in sheep's clothing who were rending the flock of Christ."

Wyclif, the representative national churchman, won the king

and court; Wyclif, the reformer, won parliament and the people; Wyclif, the tender-hearted preacher, the friend of the suffering, the poor and the oppressed, had taken firm hold on the humble classes; they alone were to be unfalteringly his friends in his next great step. He had gone too far to stop. By one bold stroke he now cut himself adrift from pope and prince, and by one sweeping declaration placed himself alone and unsupported upon the broad platform of the truth, and by that act became the first protestant.

The mediæval church had built up its supremacy upon the foundation of the doctrine of transubstantiation. That doctrine affirmed that the act of consecration of the elements used in the celebration of the Lord's Supper transformed the bread and wine into the actual body and blood of the Lord. The church claimed that the truth of this doctrine had been proved by countless miracles; that the bread had shed blood before the eyes of the doubting; had even assumed the form of the Christ-child. The act of consecration thus came to be counted in itself a miracle; "it was by his exclusive right to the performance of the miracle which was wrought in the mass, that the lowliest priest was raised high above princes." In 1381 Wyclif formally denied this doctrine and defied the prelates to refute his position. For the first time he stood utterly alone. The university, hitherto his faithful supporter, at once condemned him. John of Gaunt bade him be silent. Calmly in the midst of the general uproar he replied: "I believe that in the end the truth will conquer."

But how should men judge of the truth who knew it not? We know not when Wyclif first entertained the idea of translating the Bible into English, but certain it is, as soon as the denial of the doctrine of transubstantiation was promulgated the work was pushed eagerly forward. Hitherto only the Psalms had been translated into English. Now Wyclif was determined to give the Word of God to Englishmen in their own tongue. He retired to his little parish church of Lutterworth, and, aided by a little band of faithful men, the good work went grandly on.

Never till now were his full powers revealed. "A flood of denunciation" was poured forth upon him in the form of countless

pamphlets, which he answered with amazing rapidity and splendid ability. Not a moment did he falter. Inspired by his courage, his friends rallied to his support. In the years of his preparation he had formed an order of preachers known as "Poor Priests," who were trained in the truth of the gospel, a love of the suffering poor, and a bitter hostility to the corruptions of church and clergy. They now went forth, and "tower and town and hamlet" heard the Wyclifite doctrines. The seculars in the university rallied to his aid, turned out the regulars, and the university once more gave him its support.

An attempt was made to throw the blame of the peasants' revolt under Wat Tyler, which occurred in the autumn of 1381, upon Wyclif, but in vain. It was plain that his teachings drifted that way, for that revolt was, in its inception, a revolt of the unjustly oppressed against a cruel condition of life. The Wyclifite doctrine, like all true protestantism, spoke plainly of liberty, preaching liberty to the captive, and the breaking of chains to them that are bound. It was one with the spirit which animated the French on the plains of Ivry, the Germans on the field of Lützen, the English on Marston Moor, and our ancestors at Bunker's Hill. It had nothing in common with the wild excesses of the Jacquerie, or the fury of that "rabble, devil-born," which one hundred years ago besmirched the fair name of liberty in France.

Like fire amid a field of stubble the new doctrines spread. They could have had no better introduction to the people than the hostility of the church and court. In vain the name of "Lollards," or "idle babblers," was given to the Wyclifite preachers. The people gladly welcomed them and the truth they preached. In a few years their enemies declared that every second man one met was a Lollard. The regular clergy prepared once more to stamp out this heresy. Courtenay, now primate, summoned a council at Blackfriars. An earthquake shook the building as they were about to begin their sittings. The prelates were terrified, and would fain have left Wyclif alone. But the resolute archbishop declared that "the expulsion of ill humors from the earth was of good omen for the expulsion of ill humors from the church," and pressed on the condemnation of Wyclif. Then Courtenay

turned upon Oxford. At first the university was defiant, and St. Frideswide's church—now the cathedral—heard the truth of the teachings of Wyclif iterated and reiterated. After a fierce struggle, the church succeeded, with the aid of the crown, in suppressing the Lollards in the university; "but," says Green, "with the death of religious freedom all trace of intellectual life suddenly disappears. The century which follows the triumphs of Courtenay is the most barren in its annals, nor was the sleep of the university broken till the advent of the new learning restored to it some of the life and liberty which the primate had so roughly trodden out."

But the grand old man still lived on. From his retirement came pamphlet after pamphlet with ceaseless rapidity, and at length a bold petition to king and parliament asking leave to publicly defend his teaching. Summoned to convocation at Oxford, he perplexed and confused his opponents with his subtle scholastic logic, and totally baffled their efforts to gain from him any statement which they might make a subject of condemnation. It is a singular spectacle. To-day he pleads in plain, simple, rough-hewn English with the people; to-morrow he puzzles, with the subtlety of his scholasticism, the most learned doctors. To-day he fearlessly faces the combined camps of prince, pope and prelate; to-morrow he proclaims the gospel of the Prince of Peace to the unlearned in his little parish church. To-day he fulminates terrible accusations against the powerful; to-morrow dwells with simple eloquence upon the needs of the people, who were indeed sheep without a shepherd. And all the while with steady persistence the great work of translating the Scriptures went on. The moral effect upon his contemporaries must have been tremendous. Even the bold Courtenay halted and hesitated. At last it was determined that Wyclif should be summoned to Rome. The English prelates were doubtless glad enough to put the problem in other hands. When the summons reached him, he answered with calm irony: "I am always glad to explain my faith to any one; above all, to the bishop of Rome." But age and the strain of unremitting labor were telling on him. The splendid vigor of the noontide of his life was now softened into a mellow golden light in the sunset of his days. All the gentleness and tenderness

of his disposition appear. He sends forth a little volume intended to "teach simple men and women the way to heaven." But most of all, he gives himself to his translation of the Bible, and at length sees it completed—the capstone of the noble structure it had been his life-work to rear.

Merely from a literary point of view it was a great work. Upon it our modern English prose was built. "Were the great reformer to be restored to life to-day," says an authority upon our language, "he would probably be able to read our common Bible from beginning to end without having to ask the explanation of a single passage." Indeed, not merely the language, but the diction and the phrasing of our ordinary version of the Scriptures is the fruit of the labor of Wyclif. From such a point of view he stands side by side with his contemporary, Geoffrey Chaucer.

But it was not from the literary standpoint that Wyclif viewed this work. He declared that: "Christian men should stand to the death for the maintenance of Christ's gospel, and the true understanding thereof, obtained by holy life and great study, and not set their faith nor trust in sinful prelates and their clerks." And again that: "The Holy Scripture is the faultless, most true, most perfect, and most holy law of God, which it is the duty of all men to learn, to know, to defend, and to observe." It was to him the bread of heaven, which, when denied to men, caused them to die for soul hunger, tenfold more bitter and more deadly than bodily hunger. How well he succeeded let an enemy testify: "This Master John Wyclif hath translated the Bible out of Latin into English, and thus laid it more open to the laity and to women that can read, than it had formerly been to the most learned of the clergy; and in this way the gospel pearl is cast abroad and trodden under foot of swine."

Learned as he was, Wyclif had no doubt that God, who had spoken through Galilean fishermen, could be understood by simple-minded Englishmen. He, too, was more eager to discover what the gospels contained and to lay them open in their perfection to men's minds, than curious to inquire in what way the truth of God could be made of none effect. Even to this day those scoffed at "women that can read" discern more than some of the "most learned of the clergy."

It was the impulse which did not die away, but lay in the hearts of the people, ready to be awakened and show itself, when, more than a hundred years later, the reformation came with overwhelming power.

Meantime Lollardy was to continue more or less active in England. Erasmus long years after complained that it was to be hoped that Lollardy, or the persecution of it, would cease before winter, as the frequent burning of these simple preachers raised the price of fire-wood. It was to spread to Europe and to make converts of Huss and of Jerome of Prague, and bring them to be burned at the stake by the edict of the Council of Constance; to go on, indeed, filling the whole world of Christendom. Luther, to his own surprise, woke up one day to the consciousness that he was a Hussite and a Wyclifite. Calvin and Knox were distinctly so.

Indeed Wyclif, following St. Paul and St. Augustine, anticipated all the advances of sixteenth-century reform. Not less eager in the cause of the highest learning than Erasmus, he mingled the sweetness of character of More with the fervor of Latimer and the invective of Knox; assailing the abuses of the papacy before Savonarola, the scandal of indulgences before Luther, the doctrine of transubstantiation before Zwingli; he anticipated Tyn-dal's zeal for an open Bible, and Calvin's predestinarianism; while, like all the great reformers, he based the hope of salvation on faith alone. He even anticipated the eighteenth-century work of the Wesleys, and sent forth scores of "simple preachers," who spoke the truth of God with simplicity and power.

In the last days of 1384 he was stricken with paralysis and died peacefully in the rectory of Lutterworth, on the 31st day of December. Many had prophesied that he should die a violent death, but he died peacefully, in the midst of friends, with the serene consciousness that his earthly work was done and that it had been done nobly and well. His body was laid to rest in the little churchyard.

If you should go to the pleasant little town of Lutterworth to-day you would find the old church of St. Mary's, an interesting specimen of the Gothic architecture of the thirteenth century, standing

much as it stood in Wyclif's time upon the banks of the little river Swift. There are still to be seen the little pulpit of carved oak from which he preached, the massive oaken table on which he wrote, the great arm-chair in which he died, and upon the vestry wall hangs his portrait. It is easy among these relics of the man to conjure up some idea of how he seemed when he walked upon the earth. If you turn thence to the churchyard you will seek long enough before you find the grave in which he was laid peacefully to rest. Forty long years his body rested there, then that church which battled with him in vain in life ordered in the Council of Constance that his poor mortal remains should be torn from their grave, burned to ashes, and the ashes thrown into the river. The act was duly performed and as quaint old Fuller remarks: "Thus this brook hath conveyed his ashes into Avon, Avon into Severn, Severn into the narrow seas, they into the main ocean. And thus the ashes of Wyclif are the emblems of his doctrine, which now is dispersed all the world over."

Whether we judge men by their personal strength and manliness, or by the results of their lives, Wyclif is unquestionably the greatest man of his time. There is but one other who can for a moment be compared with him, Edward the Black Prince, one of England's national heroes. The Black Prince deserves the place he holds in the affections of the people. He was a brave man, an able statesman and a true patriot. But if the picture of the gallant lad of sixteen years making a stand for St. George and Merry England on the field of Cressy, with but a handful of English yeomen, is a sight to send English blood pulsing through the veins, how sombre is its companion piece. If men of English blood may look with pride on the field where, in the golden twilight of that autumnal day, the flower of French chivalry went down before the cloth-yard shafts sped by English yew, how shall they regard the blazing homes of Limoges, where not a living soul, man, woman, or prattling child, but shared a common death in the indiscriminate massacre of that unhappy day. There are other pages, if not so dark yet dark enough, to warn us that the lights and shadows of this life are evenly balanced.

And if we turn from the question of personal character to results, the life of the prince, like that of his royal father, is singu-

larly barren. Ere he died, France had regained nearly all the territory which she had lost, and much which England had held for more than two hundred years. And in England their joint legacy to posterity was an hundred years of anarchy.

On the other hand, we have seen how calm was the courage of Wyclif; how great was his quiet strength; how noble his strenuous life. It has been well said of him by a German historian that "he held the mind and spirit of his countrymen in his hand, and seemed to be the hero in whom the nation had become incarnate." And Dean Hook says: "John Wyclif may be justly accounted one of the greatest men that our country has produced. He is one of the very few who have left the impress of their minds not only on their age, but on all time."

It would be well if more in this generation bore the impress of that serene and reverent mind. It would be well if the following utterances of his were stamped upon all current thought. They are a few of the well cut gems, which are skilfully set in the rich gold of his works.

"We believe the authors of the Old Testament to have spoken out of an inner inspiration, coming from God's mouth. Not simply out of an inspiration of faith or the sanctity of their life, nor as authorized by the church."

"No Christian man is to admit that Holy Scripture be in any way false, nor is he who understands Holy Scripture wrongly or badly to allow that it is false. For its falsity does not lie in the Holy Scripture, but in him who falsely interprets it."

"Then they say that no man can know what is the gospel but by the approving and confirming of the church; but true men say that to their understanding this is full of falsehood. For Christian men have certainty of belief by the gracious gift of Jesus Christ, that the truth taught by Christ and his apostles is the gospel, though all the clerks of Antichrist require men to believe the contrary."

"God's law is the foundation for every catholic opinion, the example and mirror for to examine, and to extinguish every error or heretical pravity. Therefore, even a slight error in this matter might bring about the death of the church."

VI. WHEN DID THE VISIBLE CHURCH OF GOD ORIGINATE?

By "the visible church" is meant that society which God by covenant separated to himself out of the world, to be his recognized and peculiar people; and which he has invested with certain offices and prerogatives, of which these are the chief: 1. It is the kingdom of God, in which he is the alone sovereign, and his law the paramount rule. 2. It is the custodian of his word and ordinances. 3. It is his witness, ordained to publish his word, maintain his testimonies, and proclaim his salvation. 4. It is the communion of God, endowed with a recognized and covenant right of intimate access to him in the ordinances. 5. It is the bride, the Lamb's wife, the fruitful mother and nurse of God's children. Certainly no such society existed before the call of Abraham. But was it not erected by the covenant with him?

1. The Abrahamic covenant organized no new society. Its promises were reserved for a son as yet unborn; and although its seal was set in the flesh of all the patriarch's other sons, it was thus sealed, not to them, but to him. They were neither parties nor heirs, and were therefore sent away from his house, because "In Isaac shall thy seed be called." So, Esau, although circumcised, was excluded, "that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand." (Rom. ix. 11.) Any objection to this view, based upon supposed differences of moral character in the parties, as a ground of exclusion, is obviated by the case of the sons of Jacob, who notwithstanding their crimes were retained in the line of promise. As to the seal of that covenant, on the one hand, it was withheld from Melchisedec, the elder Abimelech, and other cotemporary believers. On the other, it was set on all of Abraham's house, the most of whom had no more title in the promises than the rest of the world. In fact, that was strictly a personal covenant. Abraham was the sole party of the second part, and the sole condition was his faith. So Isaac and Jacob were by dis-

tinct successive acts made parties severally, on the same condition, (Gen. xxvi. 3-5; xxxv. 10, 12; Heb. xi. 8-20); and the manner in which this covenant is named from these three patriarchs (Ex. vi. 5, 8; Gen. xxviii. 13; xxxv. 12;) and the personal relation to them in which it always appears, forbid the idea that it was designed immediately to erect or embrace a community. It organized no *assembly* (*ecclesia*). It established no *society* in covenant with God.

2. Nor did it create office, nor appoint distinctive ordinances of testimony. Sacrifice had been observed from the beginning, and was not the peculiar privilege of any class or society of people. The Abrahamic covenant made no change as to this ordinance. If circumcision was a rite of testimony, no more than sacrifice was it reserved to the heirs of the promises; but, as before indicated, was given to many who had no special part in them. That covenant, moreover, gave the house of Abraham no peculiar property in the rites of worship, nor special privilege of access to God in them. Nor did it recognize that family, nor any part of it, as the spouse of Christ. It may be accounted the betrothal. But the marriage covenant was not yet.

The Sinai covenant stands in eminent contrast with all this. Its terms were in these words: "*If ye will obey my voice, indeed, and keep my covenant, then shall ye be a peculiar treasure to me, above all people; for all the earth is mine; and ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and a holy nation.*" (Ex. xix. 5, 6.)

1. To this covenant the deliberate consent of every soul of all Israel, now increased to a nation, was thrice demanded and thrice given at Sinai; and they all, individually and collectively, were comprehended and sealed as parties to it. (Ex. xix. 8; xxiv. 3, 7, 8; Deut. xxix. 2-11; Josh. viii. 35; Heb. ix. 19.) They were thus erected into a covenant society, the kingdom of God, on terms of which the fundamental condition was, "If ye will obey my voice."

Such was the momentous character of this covenant that by divine command it was afterward twice again propounded to Israel, and accepted by them, before possession was finally given of the promised land—once in the plains of Moab, on the eve of crossing

the Jordan, and again at Mount Ebal, after the first victories of the conquest had been achieved. Moreover, the violation by Israel of the terms of this Sinai covenant, thus thrice ratified by them, is expressly specified by Jehovah as the ground of all the judgments afterward visited upon them. Says God, by Jeremiah (xi. 1-11): "Cursed is the man that obeyeth not the words of this covenant which I commanded your fathers in the day that I brought them forth out of the land of Egypt, from the iron furnace, saying, Obey my voice. . . . So shall ye be my people, and I will be your God. . . . I earnestly protested unto your fathers, in the day that I brought them up out of the land of Egypt, even unto this day, rising early and protesting, saying, Obey my voice. Yet they obeyed not, nor inclined their ear, but walked every one in the imagination of their evil heart. Therefore I will bring upon them all the words of this covenant;" that is, the penalties thereto annexed. (See Deut. xxvii., xxviii. Compare Jer. vii. 22-26, and xxxi. 32; and Lev. xxvi. 44, 45.)

2. To the society organized under this covenant were given abundant ordinances of testimony: (1), The holy law which was expressly designated "the testimony"; (2), The system of witnessing rites which ultimately found their seat in Zion, and thence diffused the light of salvation through the world; (3), The written oracles of God; and (4), The illustrious orders of priests and levites set apart to the sole duty of maintaining those ordinances and testimonies, and preserving and transmitting those oracles. Israel was thus set apart and ordained God's official witness in the world. To her, thus consecrated, was given the eminent and exclusive privilege of free access to his presence, and communion in the ordinances thus given.

3. The society thus created was the spouse of the Son of God. This is the favorite and very beautiful and instructive figure for the church in the Scriptures. It is applied to the church of the Old Testament and the New, the church visible and invisible, until in the end "the bride, the Lamb's wife," inherits the New Jerusalem. That Israel was the spouse, and that the union was formed at Sinai, is the explicit testimony of the Scriptures. Says the Lord by Jeremiah: "I remember thee, the kindness of thy

youth, *the love of thine espousals, when thou wentest after me in the wilderness*, in a land that was not sown. Israel was holiness to the Lord, and the first fruits of his increase." (Jer. ii. 2-3.) In Ezekiel (xvi. 3-14) the Lord describes Israel as an infant abandoned at its birth, and cast out to perish in its blood, but rescued, nourished to maturity, and espoused by him. "When I passed by thee, and saw thee polluted in thine own blood, I said unto thee in thy blood, Live! yea, I said unto thee in thy blood, Live! I caused thee to multiply as the bud of the field, and thou didst increase and wax great, and thou attainedst to excellent ornaments. Thy breasts were fashioned, and thy hair was grown; yet wast thou naked and bare. Now, when I passed by thee, and looked upon thee, behold, thy time was the time of love; and I spread my skirt over thee, and covered thy nakedness. Yea, I swore unto thee, and entered into covenant with thee, and thou becamest mine." Here the voice of mercy, crying, "Live!" can refer to nothing prior to the call and covenant with Abraham. There was no multiplying until the Egyptian sojourn, and the marriage covenant can be no other than that of Sinai. Elsewhere in the same prophecy it is expressly stated that Israel was yet in her virginity when in Egypt she was defiled with strange gods. Afterward, the Lord says, "she became mine, and bare sons and daughters." (Ezek. xxiii. 3, 4. See also Hosea ii. 14-16, with which compare Ezek. xx. 35-37.) The same conception runs through the prophets.

It thus appears that not till the assembly at Sinai did the visible church exist, and that it was then erected in Israel, with attendant circumstances august as became the nature of the transaction. If the church is the covenant kingdom of God; if it is the custodian of his oracles and his ordinances, and his commissioned witness before the world; if by covenant it enjoys peculiar favor, access and fellowship with him in those ordinances; if it is the beloved bride of the Son of God, the fruitful and nurturing mother of God's children, Israel was all this, set apart and consecrated thereto by the whole grand transaction at Sinai, culminating in the covenant and its baptismal seal.

4. Of Israel, the parties to this covenant were "all the people,"

including not the adults only, but the children and the little ones. At Sinai, the language of the narrative is thus all-comprehensive, without any enumeration of particulars. But when it was renewed in the plains of Moab, with the survivors of the forty years' wandering, the details are specific. "Ye stand this day all of you before the Lord your God; your captains of your tribes, your elders, and your officers, with all the men of Israel, *your little ones*, your wives, and thy stranger that is in thy camp, from the hewer of thy wood unto the drawer of thy water: that thou shouldest enter into covenant with the Lord thy God, and into his oath, which the Lord thy God maketh with thee this day." (Deut. xxix. 10-12.) So, again, at Mount Ebal, where in accordance with the command of Moses, the covenant was again rehearsed and confirmed, with its blessings and its curses, "there was not a word of all that Moses commanded, which Joshua read not, before all the congregation of Israel, with the women and *the little ones*, and the strangers that were conversant among them." (Joshua viii. 35.) Compare the place with the twenty-seventh chapter of Deuteronomy.

5. This covenant was sealed with its own distinctive baptismal seal. In the Abrahamic covenant,—the betrothal of the church,—the promises were, that he should have an innumerable seed, the heirs with him of the promises; that God would be their God; that Canaan should be their possession, and that in his seed all the families of the earth should be blessed. The appropriate seal of this covenant was circumcision set on all the males, adults and infants, a seal which set forth salvation through the blood of the promised Seed. The patriarchs "all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off." (Heb. xi. 13.) But now, the set time was come, the time for the fulfilment of the covenant in the espousal of Israel. God sent Moses to say to them, "I remember my covenant. . . I will take you to me for a people, and I will be to you a God." (Ex. vi. 1-8.) And when that purpose was fulfilled at Sinai, when Jehovah took to himself his betrothed, his chosen bride, it was fitting that the covenant should be signalized with a new and distinctive seal. Moses "took the blood of calves and of goats, with water, and scarlet

wool and hyssop, and sprinkled both the book and all the people, saying, This is the blood of the covenant which God hath enjoined unto you." (Heb. ix. 19, 20.) The seal of the Abrahamic covenant signified the shedding of the blood of the promised Seed. That of the Sinai covenant certified and set forth the application of that blood and the imparting of the Spirit, whereby are wrought pardon, cleansing and sanctifying to the people of God.

Provision was made in the law given at Sinai for perpetuating that seal in the water of separation (Num. xix.), which was thenceforth constantly used as the token and seal of admission to the pale of the covenant, was continued in use till the time of the New Testament, was known to the Jews by the name of baptism, and, eliminated of the sacrificial elements, was administered by John, and Christ's disciples in coincidence with John (John iii. 26; iv. 1, 2,), and is perpetuated to us in Christian baptism.

The society organized at Sinai was identical with the church of the apostles. It was so in lineal continuity of organization. It is certified to be the same by the prophecies, which make the church of Israel heir to the fulness of the Gentiles in the gospel day; and by Paul's parable of the wild branches grafted into the good olive tree. It is attested by its name, *Ecclesia*, which, in our English version of the Old Testament, is sometimes rendered "the assembly," and generally "the congregation," and in the New Testament, "the church." Originating in the assembly at Sinai in the command of God to Moses (*Ecclesiastan pros me*), "*Assemble to me the people*" (thus given in the Septuagint Greek, Deut. iv. 10), that day was thenceforth known as "the day of the assembly;" that is, of the meeting with God. (Deut. ix. 10; x. 4; xviii. 16.) Hence the word is used throughout the Old Testament to designate the worshipping assemblies of Israel, the greater and the less, and, in the New, is applied by Jesus to those of the Jews in his day (Matt. xviii. 17), by the martyr Stephen to Israel in the wilderness (Acts vii. 38), and by Christ (Matt. xvi. 12), and the writers of the New Testament to the Christian church and its local assemblies. It is evidenced to be the same by the characteristics, officers and functions, which are common to both. In fact, so absolute and unquestionable is this identity that the Apostle

Peter appropriates the very terms and language of the Sinai covenant as immediately belonging to and descriptive of the Christian church: "Ye are *a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a peculiar people*; that ye should shew forth the praises of him who hath called you out of darkness into his marvelous light; which in time past were not a people, but *are now the people of God.*" (1 Peter ii. 9, 10.)

SAMUEL J. BAIRD.

VII. NOTES.

“SOULS” VERSUS “HANDS.”

IN re-reading Trench *On the Study of Words*, the other day, I came across this paragraph:

“There are words which reveal a wrong or insufficient estimate that men take of their duties, or that, at all events, others have taken before them; for it is possible that the mischief may have been done long ago, and those who now use the words may only have inherited it from others, not helped to bring it about themselves. An employer of labor advertises that he wants so many ‘hands;’ but this language could never have become current, a man could never have thus shrunk into a ‘hand’ in the eyes of his fellow-man, unless this latter had in good part forgotten that, annexed to those hands which he would purchase to toil for him, were also heads and hearts; a fact, by the way, of which, if he persists in forgetting it, he may be reminded in very unwelcome ways at the last. In Scripture there is another not unfrequent putting of a part for the whole, as when it is said, ‘The same day there were added unto them about three thousand *souls*.’ ‘Hands’ here, ‘souls’ there—the contrast may suggest some profitable reflections.”

There is food for thought here, and already we are witnessing the fulfilment of Trench’s prophecy.

There is a marked contrast in God’s and the world’s way of counting men, which reveals a corresponding difference in their estimate of man’s worth. Whenever in the Scriptures synecdoche is used in reference to men, the soul, not the hands nor the head, is the part chosen to represent the whole: “all the *souls* that came with Jacob into Egypt;” “the same day there were added unto them about three thousand *souls*.” The world, on the contrary, counts men by heads or hands. When the government lays a tax upon her citizens, that tax is known as a “poll-tax,” a head-tax, and suggests the numbering of cattle as so many head. Employers say that they have so many “hands” in their shops or on their farms. This common mode of designation means nothing if it does not indicate that the world forms

her estimate of a man's worth, not on the ground of what he is, nor of what he may become, but only of what she can get out of him. Men are so many "hands," because they can do so much manual work, and can bring such profits to their employers. But by the very enumeration of men as "souls" it is proven that God looks upon them, not as mere earth-born creatures, but as divine, the soul being that part of man's dual nature which was breathed into his finished earthly body, that part which is God-like. On the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, where the "great spirit" of Michael Angelo "appears in its noblest dignity and highest purity," one scene represents the creation of man, a scene "which displays a wonderful depth of thought in the composition, and the utmost elevation and majesty in the general treatment and execution." The Creator has just touched the lifeless body with the tip of his finger, and Adam is in the act of rising from the ground, where he had been lying. In that touch of the Almighty life came into the material body, from Jehovah flashed the soul into the body of clay. It is this soul, thus divine in its origin and nature, which gives man his worth, and which makes Christ declare that he who gains the whole world and loses his own soul has made a bad bargain. In virtue of this superior worth of the soul, when God refers to men otherwise than as "men," it is as "souls." Is it not time for Christians to protest against this degradation of men, even in theory, to the level of "hands," mere human machines, whose worth is to be estimated by the amount of labor they can perform? And is it not time to impress the thought that God's appreciation of the worth of a man, as opposed to the world's non-appreciation, is a strong plea for man's appreciation of God?

Yet we ought not to be greatly surprised at the world's estimate of men as so many "hands," rather than "souls." It is the natural result of the thought of the age. This is essentially a materialistic age; the great trend of thought is towards the denial of all but matter. The world to-day assures us that there is no such thing as mind, or soul; that what we have been accustomed to call such are only forms under which matter acts, just as heat is a mode of the sun's action. The following excellent summary of modern thought is by an American clergyman: "Of the soul as a purely spiritual essence we know nothing. Mind indeed, we know, but not the mind of which the psychologist fondly dreams. The only mind known to us is a more subtle form of nerve matter residing in the brain. Thought is only a molecular function of this nerve matter. Emotion is only a delicate pulsa-

tion that thrills like an electric current along the tissues of this nerve system. That which distinguishes man from the brute is not that he possesses a spiritual nature, but that he has a higher molecular development, and therefore a more delicate sensibility to nerve impressions. But as all this intricate and complicated molecular action is purely physical, and subject like all other physical action to the great law of cause and effect, it follows that all idea of spontaneity in the will must be abandoned. All volitions fall under the reign of a physical necessity which is universal and inexorable. With freedom of volition, moral responsibility and obligation also disappear. All primary faiths and intuitive convictions being purely subjective must be rejected. Consciousness, it is true, bears her clear and unmistakable testimony to the reality of that inner world of thought, volition, obligation; but consciousness is scouted from the stand as a discredited witness, because her testimony cannot be substantiated by the exact methods of physical science. All metaphysics is pronounced unphilosophical—"a land of vain shadows and airy phantoms,—a visionary cloudland that may delight the imagination of the mystic, but which vanishes into nothing when touched by the wand of exact experimental science." If this be the thought of the day, and none can deny it, banishing mind, emotion, and even consciousness to the realm of the unreal, and making man wholly and only a material being, a bundle of bones, muscles, nerves and nerve impressions, then it is not at all remarkable that men are reduced to the level of animated machines, and are reckoned as so many "hands" who can do so much work and bring so much profit to those who "operate" them. The materialistic thought of our age does not dignify man, it degrades him; and yet man prefers it to the elevating word of God, and, bowing down before it, adores it as *Philosophy!* It is the most arrogant *philosophism!*

In this estimate of men as "hands," the already apparent results verify the prophecy.

The lock-outs which occur so frequently, and which entail such suffering on those who are locked out, are one result. The gigantic corporations, which form a distinctive feature of our modern civilization, employ large number of men, "hands," as they call them. They are skilled laborers, faithful in doing their work, and by their labor the corporation prospers and its members grow wealthy. But there comes a lull in the business of the corporation. Yet, though so well able to bear the strain for a time themselves, realizing that it will be only temporary, they resolve to cut down expenses by suspending the men

in their employ. If a machine does not pay stop running it. Here are so many men, or rather "hands," human machines; it does not pay to operate them, so they are shut out. It does not matter that they are specialists, men who are able to make only one part of the manufactured product, who will find it difficult to get work during the time of their suspension; it does not matter that they have families who are dependent upon their wages for the very necessities of life. Let them be without work, let them and their families suffer, rather than force the corporation to expend a little money, or be content with a smaller rate of profit, for the short time that it does not pay to work them. They are only so many "hands," according to the corporation's valuation. One of our great railway systems has hundreds of men in her employ in one Southern city. Not long ago, in the dead of winter, when home expenses were heaviest, in the midst of the season when men who were without work found it difficult to get situations, at the time when Christmas joy should have filled hearts and homes, several hundreds of these "hands" were suspended from the shops. The suffering was intense. The railroad declared that it did not pay to keep them, but pretended to comfort them by saying that the suspension was temporary only, for three months probably. The millionaires who compose this corporation ought to have been willing to put up with smaller profits, for they could have done it and still not have suffered, either in their own persons or homes, rather than make these hundreds of men and their families suffer for food and fuel. They ought to have kept them, even though there was a short lull in the business, knowing that they had helped to make the business, that they would soon be needed again, and that meanwhile they would be in sore need if shut out. If these huge corporations recognized in their employees not "hands," but men, "souls," they would not deal with them so heartlessly. As a consequent of such treatment, these "hands" combine and become strong to wreck the corporation's property.

In this same valuation of men as "hands" we have a partial explanation of another of the great labor troubles of the day, our workingmen's strikes. Strikes are generally to be condemned, but in many cases much can be said in favor of the strikers. A strike is not always a movement for higher wages alone. A mere money motive is not at the bottom of all these disturbances. No, deep down in their hearts, these men, conscious of their own dignity, rebel against being considered and treated as mere "hands." They know that they are "souls," with soul needs and soul longings. They yearn for some time

to spend in the education of their intellects, in the social enjoyments of home, in the praise of God. Now they are worked twelve, thirteen, fifteen hours in the day. There is no time left for the society of wife and children, no time for reading and personal culture, no time for worship; it is toil, toil, toil, that is wearisome to the body, that contracts and belittles the mind, that destroys the nobler aspirations of the soul. The men realize this. Hence they cry, “Do not work us so many hours in the day, work us for a reasonable time, that we will gladly give, but, for humanity’s sake and for God’s sake, leave us opportunity for some culture and enjoyment, and religious privilege.” This is partly their plea, and so far as this impels their strike the strikers merit profound respect and sympathy. This being denied them, they quit their work, and trouble follows. The world of capital to-day needs to remember that laborers are “souls,” not mere “hands,” and, while held to earnest and faithful labor, they ought to be sufficiently paid, and ought to be given some time for mental and spiritual improvement.

It is only when the spirit of the gospel of Christ, which values men as “souls,” not “hands,” prevails, when employers and employees esteem each other as brothers, that the perilous conflicts between labor and capital will be adjusted. When men are rightly valued the social sores will be healed.

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THE REVISED DIRECTORY FOR WORSHIP.

THIS book, now before the church to be rejected or adopted without criticism at the approaching meetings of the Presbyteries, is liable to objections of a very grave kind – objections which, taken either singly or together, render its adoption very undesirable. If they touched only the small points on the surface, they might be overlooked for the present as blemishes to be erased after the book has been adopted. And yet it is very questionable whether the church should enact as organic law an instrument on which even a slight blemish is perceptible, because no change in such law can be made without exceeding difficulty. Certainly a Directory, prescribing the manner of worshipping God in public throughout the church in the whole world, should not be adopted as a whole and finally until the Presbyteries at previous meetings have shown a virtual unanimity on the question.

To say that, because the last Assembly sent it down by a unanimous

vote, therefore the mind of the church is practically one, is surely a mistake. It is well known that the Assembly, in order to save time, dispensed with the formality of taking the vote on the paragraphs *seriatim*, and substituted for it a rap from the moderator's gavel; and it has been in print by the religious press for five months uncontroverted, that some of the members of the Assembly testified to the bewildering haste with which the book was disposed of.

But further and conclusively. It is far from true that the mind of the church is practically one in favor of the book; for when it was before the Presbyteries two years ago, forty-one out of sixty-four Presbyteries voted to reject it. This is about a majority of two-thirds. Since then no change of importance has been made in it, except the addition of a marriage and burial service, on which no Presbytery has had an opportunity to express its judgment. Public opinion on the adoption of constitutions must be allowed to ripen slowly.

Many objections to the book have been brought in the religious press. It has been urged that the book contains no new principles; that every principle in it is in the book we now have, and consequently, nothing of *permanent* value will be gained by its adoption; that the Sunday-night worship in church has been disparaged, and thus the tendency of our time to convert the Lord's day into a holiday will be encouraged; that the social prayer-meetings in the congregations will be discouraged by emphasizing the power of the session to control such meetings; that a number of important omissions is noticeable; that the virus of sacramentarianism, retained from popery in the present book, is retained in the new.

These objections are valid, and load the book heavily. But there are others, on which stress must be laid, which seem fatal to the work.

It contains the germs of an elaborate liturgy that must in time supplant that simplicity which is our glory. Ages gone by the Presbyterian Church refused the liturgy, because it cramps the freedom of the mind in worship, and runs the thoughts and feelings into grooves along which the worshipper slips without consciousness of what he is doing. Her face has been steadfastly set against it. Efforts have been made in the General Assembly of our Southern Church at different times—certainly twice in the last thirty years—to introduce it, but without encouragement. Now it is woven into this book at many points.

Those who urge the adoption of the Directory disclaim any intention to ritualize our worship. The forms are optional, they say. Then

why incorporate them in such a book as the Constitution, which is presumably a scheme of the permanent and fundamental features of the church? Why not print a book of optional forms, to be kept on sale by our Committee of Publication, as our Hymn Books are? (These forms, including those in the body of the book, take up about twenty-four out of forty-nine pages, or about one-half of the book.) Then those who want such forms may buy this, or that of Dr. A. A. Hodge, now used by some; or some one of the many such compilations that are kept in stock by the large booksellers. And when one set of forms wears smooth and becomes unedifying to themselves and hearers, they may buy another.

Two years ago, while walking about in Old St. Giles' church in Edinburgh, with Dr. W. G. Blaikie, whose fame as author, scholar, and preacher, is known throughout the Presbyterian Church, he said, "this is the first time I have been here in seventeen years." And yet this is the church in which Knox preached and Jennie Geddes worshipped. Here she threw the famous stool at the head of the Dean who was reading the liturgy, under orders from King Charles. The outburst of popular indignation, occasioned by this act, was the beginning of the great struggle for religious liberty in Scotland. When asked, with much surprise, (for the Doctor teaches his classes almost in a stone's throw of St. Giles'), the reason for this fact, he answered, because it is no longer Presbyterian in worship, it has been renovated into the likeness of a cathedral, and a minister of the Established Church, with ritualistic tendencies, put in charge, and the flavor of formalism has become so strong as to render me uncomfortable here. This is, as nearly as I can recollect, his very language.

If now this camel's nose has turned out the Old Scotch Covenanters from old St. Giles', how long will it take to turn us out of our Southern Presbyterian Church, or split the tent in twain?

This Directory contains a doctrine contradictory to the express teaching of both the Confession of Faith and Larger Catechism. In the Confession of Faith, chapter twenty-eight, article first, on baptism, it is written: "Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament, ordained by Jesus Christ, not only for the solemn admission of the party baptized into the visible church, but also to be unto him a sign and seal of the covenant of grace." Thus two valuable benefits are secured by it—(1), a solemn admission into the visible church; and (2), the outward evidence as well as inward confirmation of the grace which is conveyed to the subject in the covenant. Baptism is the visible entrance to the visible

church where all the gracious benefits of redemption are realized, and where the subject grows up (under proper training) in all things into him who is the head.

The Larger Catechism teaches the same doctrine in questions 165 and 166. Thus: "Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament . . . whereby the parties baptized are solemnly admitted into the visible church"; and "Infants descending from parents, either both or but one of them, professing faith in Christ, and obedience to him, are, in that respect, within the covenant, and are to be baptized."

Regarded in this light, baptism, either of the adult or infant, is seen to be a solemn duty and a precious privilege. It justifies the importance assigned it in the words of our Lord Jesus and in the Acts of the Apostles. It does not teach the Romish or high prelatical doctrine of baptismal regeneration, *ex opere operato*, through "the corporate influence of the church"; but it teaches the value of the covenant relationship with God and with his church into which children are brought by the sanctifying influence of the former. For this reason the faithful in all ages have set great store by it and observed it with deep and solemn reverence. And the history of those families that have held this view and conformed to it in their practice, justifies the claim made for its efficacy in the Scriptures. It would be an interesting and edifying work for some antiquarian in church lore to collate facts from any old Presbyterian settlement illustrating the efficacy of baptism in sealing the blessings of grace from generation to generation.

What, on the other hand, is the doctrine of the Revised Directory? In chapter third, paragraph second, it is written, "The Scriptures teach that the children of a professed believer are born members of the visible church. Their baptism is now, as their circumcision was under the Old Testament, a public acknowledgment, made by both the Lord and his church, of their interest in the covenant."

This contradicts the foregoing. The one teaches that the infants of believers are within the covenant and therefore entitled to membership in the church. The other teaches that such infants are members of the church from their birth. Both cannot be right. This says it is a sign and seal of the covenant of grace; that says it is a public acknowledgment of their interest in the covenant. According to the one it is a means to an end. According to the other it is an end in itself. The one declares it to be a seal of an invisible covenant. The other declares it to be a mere badge of a visible relationship to a visible church.

The inconsistency is unavoidable unless it can be shown that there is a *radical* difference in the signification of adult and infant baptism, a difference of which there is no hint in either book. Unless we are ready to stand before the Christian world with a constitution violently inconsistent with itself, a revision of both our Confession of Faith and Larger Catechism also will be obligatory as soon as we adopt this new Directory.

That the doctrine of this new book is held by some ministers in our church we do not deny. It seems to have been introduced by Dr. John M. Mason's book on "The Church of God." This book he wrote when a minister in the Associate Reformed Church, combating High Church Episcopacy. And while it has been of great service to our church, yet any careful reader will see that, on this particular phase of his subject, his own mind was not clear. In one place (p. 103), he speaks of the excision of infant members from the New Testament Church, or, if you prefer it, their *non-admission to her privileges*. Again (on p. 108), he says: "the infants of believing parents are . . . fully entitled to its *initiating ordinance*." Thus he puts our doctrine in the clearest light, but elsewhere countenances the other view.

Our present Directory, in its statement of the purport of infant baptism, sets the matter in a deeply solemn light, and renders it very dear to the believing parent. No such one can consent to leave his child out of the church, and thereby deprive it of the blessings of grace stored up in the church. But if we set aside this doctrine, there will be no difficulty in understanding why infant baptism will become quickly obsolete. Probably a failure to comprehend this view explains why it has already lost its hold on many in the church. For why should a parent present his child for baptism, if it already belongs to the church and shares its benefits with its parents? Intelligent parents, free from superstition, not led by others, but thinking for themselves, want a good and sufficient reason for their faith and practice. Unless a very plain, unquestionable order is found in the sacred Scriptures, an inference will not compel obedience, against their natural sense of propriety.

And here the proposed Directory is again at fault. In undertaking to say what infant baptism is, it imports a novelty into our Presbyterian nomenclature. It says, "Baptism is a public *acknowledgment*, made by both the Lord and his church, of their interest in the covenant." This word "acknowledgment" seems to be used here in its legal sense, as the "avowal of one's signature, or of the validity of a docu-

ment to which one's name is signed." (*Worcester*.) But baptism is the seal itself—the setting one's name to the document, which makes it valid. The "acknowledgment" of this signature is a different act. In law, the acknowledgment attests the seal.

The definition says, it is "a public acknowledgment, made by both the Lord and his church, of their interest in the covenant." Whose interest? That of "the Lord and his church." Then the child has no interest in it, and is left out, or the definition is imperfect.

Suppose we take the word in its other senses, that is, either as an "admission of the truth of a fact," or "gratitude for favor received" (*Worcester*): what then would baptism become but simply an act of worship without any sealing value—as a prayer or a song? No, not this either; for this admission is "made by both the Lord and his church," and God does not worship himself. What does it mean? We cannot tell.

The book says: "The Scriptures teach it." Where? With the help of both Cruden's and Young's Concordances we cannot find it.

Unfortunate as it would be to bind up in the same lids, though in two different portions of the book, two statements of doctrine that do not hold together, it would yet be more unfortunate to adopt a Directory of Worship that is inconsistent *with itself*.

In the third chapter and fifth paragraph of this Directory it is written, "baptism is a sacrament whereby those baptized are solemnly admitted into the visible church," and, as we have seen, in the preceding paragraph, it is written, "that the children of a professed believer are born members of the visible church." We read these two inconsistent statements almost in the same breath; the one lands us immediately upon the other. If the two statements were separated from each other in different parts of the same book, this inconsistency might be unobserved; but when brought immediately together, the mind of the thoughtful reader halts at once and asks how is this? What explanation can be given? The only possible explanation is that the book, the same chapter, is treating of two things radically different, that the baptism of an adult has a meaning and efficacy altogether different from that of an infant. Can this be shown from the Scriptures; or is there any hint of it in our Standards, as we have already asked?

There is no such discord in the Directory we now have. The logic of the Westminster Assembly is unassailable. Moderator Twisse and James Gillespie, and their colleagues cannot be drawn with this hook.

For these and other reasons, as we must choose between the old and the new Directories, let us take the old.

H. M. WHITE.

PEACE CONFERENCE.

LAST December a Conference in the interest of international arbitration was held in the Bible House, New York city, composed of delegates from several of the leading denominations of this country. The meeting was in response to a call for such a conference, issued by the General Assembly of the Southern Presbyterian Church in 1890. To that Assembly the paper which originated this movement was offered, and after consideration by the Committee on Bills and Overtures, it was adopted as offered. The object of this action of the Assembly, and of what has since been done to carry out the purpose of that action, is to bring to bear, by means of petitions, the combined influence of the churches of Christendom upon the governments of Christian countries, in favor of substituting for war some peaceful means of settling international disputes.

The preamble of the paper refers to the right of "petition in cases extraordinary" recognized in the Confession of Faith. The leading resolution adopts, "An Overture to the highest ecclesiastical authorities of the churches of Christendom," and a petition to governments, which the churches addressed are asked also to adopt. After reference to the fact that war and bloodshed are "the means to which Christian nations look to right their wrongs," the overture proceeds:

"We believe that among the Christian people of our own and other lands there is a strong sentiment in opposition to this deplorable evil, and in favor of referring all matters of international claims to some suitable tribunal for peaceful solution. And further, we entertain the hope that if the influence of this sentiment were properly brought to bear upon the governments of these Christian nations it would greatly further this desirable end.

"We therefore ask you to join us in petitioning all the governments of Christian countries to take measures to banish warfare as the means of settling the strifes that arise between nations, and to substitute a more rational and Christian tribunal."

The following is the Petition, the general form of which the ecclesiastical bodies addressed are requested to adopt:

A PETITION

To be addressed to the Several Governments of the Christian Nations of the World.

The Presbyterian Church of the United States, through its General Assembly, wishes you grace, mercy and peace.

We, in coöperation with other Christian bodies, humbly memorialize you, as the guardians of your people, in behalf of peaceful arbitration as a means of settling questions that arise between nations. The spectacle that is presented of Christian

nations facing each other with heavy armaments, ready upon provocation to go to war and settle their differences by bloodshed or conquest, is, to say the least, a blot upon the fair name of Christian. We cannot contemplate without the deepest sorrow the horrors of war, involving the reckless sacrifice of human life, that should be held sacred, bitter distress in many households, the destruction of valuable property, the hindering of education and religion, and the general demoralizing of the people.

Moreover, the maintaining of a heavy war force, though war be averted, withdraws multitudes from their homes and the useful pursuits of peace, and imposes a heavy tax upon the people for its support. And further, let it be borne in mind, that wars do not settle causes of dispute between nations on principles of right and justice, but upon the barbaric principle of the triumph of the strongest.

We are encouraged to urge this cause upon your consideration by the fact that much has already been accomplished; as, for example, by the arbitration of Geneva in the Alabama case, and by the deliberations of the American Conference at Washington, not to mention other important cases. It will be a happy day for the world when all international disputes find peaceful solutions; and this we earnestly seek.

As to the method of accomplishing this end, we make no suggestions, but leave that to your superior intelligence and wisdom in matters of state policy.

We invoke upon rulers and people the richest blessings of the Prince of Peace.

Done in the General Assembly at Asheville, North Carolina, U. S. A., on the twenty-third day of May, A. D. 1890.

JAMES PARK, *Moderator.*

JOSEPH R. WILSON, *Stated Clerk.*

The resolutions provided for a committee of correspondence with other churches, and for a conference in 1891.

The following report of the Committee on Bills and Overtures on this paper was adopted:

“Recognizing the right of petition to civil governments in regard to momentous matters, and the obligation of the church through its highest judicatories, to place itself on the side of truth and righteousness, your committee recommend the adoption of Dr. W. A. Campbell’s paper, and the filling of the blanks in the Committee of Correspondence with other Christian Churches with the names of Rev. Wm. A. Campbell, D. D., Rev. Moses D. Hoge, D. D., Mr. Marshall M. Gilliam, and Rev. R. P. Kerr, D. D.

“They further recommend, that Rev. W. A. Campbell, D. D., and Rev. Moses D. Hoge, D. D., be appointed our delegates to the conference in the interests of peace, contemplated in 1891; but that this Assembly does not by this appointment of delegates, commit itself in advance to any measures that this Peace Conference may adopt.

H. G. HILL, *Chairman.*”

The committee thus appointed communicated the overture to many ecclesiastical bodies both in this country and in Europe. The petition was adopted and delegates appointed to the conference by a number of Annual Conferences of the Methodist Church (the meeting of the

General Conference being passed), by the Southern Baptist Convention, the General Council of the Reformed Episcopal Church, the General Synod of the Reformed Church in America, the Associate Reformed Synod of the South, the General Assemblies of the "Northern" and of the United Presbyterian Church, and the Lutheran Synod of South Carolina. The General Council of the Lutheran Church adopted the petition, but through inadvertence, as the clerk writes, failed to appoint a delegate. A number of the bishops of the Episcopal Church expressed their cordial approval of the movement, and promised to lay the petition before their respective Diocesan Conventions. One of these bodies approved it; no others reported. The National Council of the Congregational Church, which meets only once in seven years, could not be reached; but Rev. Josiah Strong, D. D., of that church, and secretary of the Evangelical Alliance, was present in the Conference, and gave most efficient aid in our preliminary arrangements. The larger number of the delegates who were appointed, and who had signified their purpose to attend, did not appear.

On motion of Dr. John Hall, who represented the Northern Presbyterian Church, Dr. M. D. Hoge was appointed Chairman, and the writer, Secretary of the Conference. Our objection to having both the officers from the same church was overruled, on the ground that we had had the matter in hand, and therefore still could best give direction to the movement.

A summary of the information received and reported to the Conference showed that whilst the proposal to bring to bear through this petition the combined influence of Christian churches upon governments in behalf of settling their differences by arbitration, met with cordial approval wherever it had received consideration; yet much more remained to be done to secure full coöperation of the churches, and to this end the Conference directed its attention. Its action was embodied in the following resolutions:

1. *Resolved.* That, in order to secure the concurrence of other religious bodies in the petition to governments, adopted by those bodies represented in this Conference, final action on it in forwarding it to the governments addressed be deferred to another Conference, to be held in the city of Chicago during the Columbian Exposition, in 1893; that the representatives of the churches of Christendom be requested to adopt this, or a like petition, and send up to the proposed Conference the several copies thereof, properly addressed to the several governments and officially signed; that they be requested each to send one or more delegates to the said Conference; that the main design of that Conference shall be to take steps to bring the petitions before each government through such influential persons as will secure for them favorable consideration.

2. *Resolved*, That a committee of correspondence be appointed for each of the leading denominations, namely: Baptists, Congregationalists, Disciples, Episcopalians, Friends, German Evangelical, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, and one for all other denominations not herein named; that each committee be charged with the duty of presenting the matter of the first resolution to the proper ecclesiastical bodies or authorities in its respective denomination, and of securing, as far as possible, favorable action thereon, and of seeing that the petitions when adopted be duly forwarded.

3. *Resolved*, That a committee be appointed to prepare in proper form, and in as many languages as may be expedient, a sufficient number of copies of the petition, which has already been adopted by the bodies represented in this Conference; that copies be duly addressed to the respective governments of Christian nations, and arranged in sets embracing one to each governmental authority addressed; and that as many of these be furnished each committee of correspondence as it may need to lay one set before each ecclesiastical body with which it communicates.

4. *Resolved*, That a committee be appointed to make arrangements for the proposed Conference in Chicago; to fix the time for the same, and to give due notice thereof to all delegates through the committees of correspondence, or otherwise; and that this committee be authorized to receive all the petitions or other communications that may be forwarded to the Conference, previous to the time of its assembling.

5. *Resolved*, That the chairman and secretary of this meeting, and such other persons as they shall associate with themselves, shall be an executive committee authorized to appoint the committees provided for in the previous resolutions, and to do whatever may be deemed necessary to further the purposes of this Conference.

Rev. Drs. M. D. Hoge and C. H. Robinson were requested to bring this subject before the General Presbyterian Council at Toronto, and Dr. Josiah Strong to bring it before the Evangelical Alliance for the United States.

A public meeting was held in the Cooper Institute hall, after the adjournment of the Conference, presided over by General Stewart L. Woodford, of Brooklyn, at which able addresses on international arbitration were made by Rev. Drs. Moses D. Hoge, Josiah Strong, and John Hall, and the presiding officer. The Hon. W. C. P. Breckinridge, member of Congress from Kentucky, had agreed to make an address on the occasion, but was unavoidably absent.

Letters of regret that they could not be present at this public meeting, with expressions of hearty approval of the movement, were received from a number of men prominent in the church or the state, among them Hon. Wm. E. Dodge, who showed his earnest support by contributing the larger part of the expense of the meeting, as well as in other ways, Hon. Abram S. Hewitt, Hon. David Dudley Field, Hon. Chauncey M. Depew, Bishop Potter of New York, and Bishop Phillips Brooks of Massachusetts.

W. A. CAMPBELL.

Richmond, Va.

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

GIRARDEAU'S "THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS."

THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS. *By the Rev. Professor John L. Girardeau, D. D., LL. D.* Columbia, S. C. : W. J. Duffie; New York: The Baker & Taylor Co. 1891.

This volume is a republication of certain articles in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* of more than a decade of years ago, with other additional papers that have been ripening in Dr. Girardeau's desk. A pathetic interest attaches to the views of this book in the connection of their origin with the lamented Dr. Thornwell. As far back as 1849, when the author was only a "licensed probationer" for the gospel ministry, he fell upon a sermon of Dr. Thornwell wherein was advocated the doctrine of moral necessity in acts of choice—or, rather, Dr. Thornwell's conception of that doctrine as presented by President Jonathan Edwards. In private conversation with Dr. Thornwell, that divine admitted to Dr. Girardeau that the scheme of moral necessity, in his opinion, does not avoid the difficulty of making God the author of sin. Thus was Dr. Girardeau started on a long intellectual pilgrimage in search of a theory concerning man's free-agency that acquits God of responsibility for sin. Unfortunately, throughout that journey he has carried the burden of an error—an error which came to him from Dr. Thornwell's own misconception of Edwards' doctrine—viz., that the theory for which he longs must have no kinship with the teaching of Edwards. After years of searching into the secrets of the mind, with the work of President Edwards constantly under his pillow, Dr. Girardeau has called forth from the vasty deep the long-sought theory. He has had wonderful success in evolving an hypothesis in exact accordance with his wishes at the outset—for the doctrine of this book has naught of resemblance to the creed of Edwards.

In entering the lists against the views of Dr. Girardeau, we wish to say in the outset that we come not as a knight bearing the *name* Necessity. That part of Edwards' armor inscribed with the *title* of his theory we discard. It may be well to pause and state the reason why.

As an eighteenth-century champion of Calvinism, Edwards had to deal with such Arminian writers as Dr. Samuel Clarke and Dr. Whitby, and with such Calvinistic concessionists as Watts and Doddridge. These theologians held up the human will as an instrument self-determined in all its operations. Autocratic sits the will in the seat of intellectual power, yet isolated from intellectual influence; and then, snap-like or automaton-like, determines within itself when to act. Edwards assailed this view as "self-contradictory and absurd." Most successfully did he uplift the insulted human mind, and place it back in the seat of honor as a co-worker in the plans of God's providence, and, at the same time, a responsible, voluntary agent. Unfortunately, however, President Edwards made use of

the term "moral necessity" to indicate the spontaneous working of man's nature in connection either with good or with evil. Writers of the school of Collins and Lord Kaimes at once assumed that Edwards held their view of philosophical necessity—an assumption which Edwards, in a private letter, strongly denied. Nevertheless, while Edwards did vindicate the true kingship of the human soul against all assaults of her enemies, his use of the word "necessity" led him into some statements that seem inconsistent with his general theory. His system, as a whole, has been accepted by subsequent leaders of Calvinistic thought. Even Dr. Thornwell's charges against Edwards do not change the fact that in all essentials he finally accepted the views of Princeton's President. Not so with Dr. Girardeau. The armor that he has donned is most pleasing in his sight because it presents a complete contrast to that of President Edwards. The latter, however, in its fundamentals, and with "Moral Certainty" substituted for "Moral Necessity" as the title thereof—this is the armor we shall assume in the contest.

"In all acts of man, the agent in each act is the will. This agent is not influenced to action by motives external to itself, but is self-determined within itself." Thus shouts the herald at Dr. Girardeau's end of the lists.

"In every act, the agent is the soul of the man himself. This agent, the man's soul, is influenced to action by motives presented by the operations of the mind."—So announces the herald at our station.

The contest is between the theory of Self-Determination of the will and Self-Determination of the soul. The appeal for judgment must be made to the facts of the human mind. In the presence of that tribunal, we invoke a sacred regard for the inviolability of English speech. Let not a double nor a forced meaning be thrust upon any term in its storehouse.

I. *The faculty of will, as defined by Dr. Girardeau, cannot be found in the human mind.*

Let us see what Dr. Girardeau means by the "will." Like a surgeon, he walks into the midst of the "mental powers," and carves us four divisions (page 39): (1.) Intellect; (2.) Feeling; (3.) Will; (4.) Conscience. We take this to mean that the will is a special faculty of the mind, not cognate with the intellect or mind itself, but only a cousin-german thereof. Without stopping to look at the other parts of the analysis, let us examine more closely the natural history of this creature called will. Does the mind own or control this faculty? Not so. The will sustains to the other mental powers the relation of "elective obedience" (p. 39). And yet this creature finds a dwelling-place in the territory of the mind itself. By the right of squatter sovereignty, forsooth, it sulks in its own corner, and runs errands for the mind only when it chooses!

Let us look in upon the workings of this psychological Czar. It is "the leading office of the will to appropriate by its choice, and yield obedience to, the laws furnished by the other faculties: the law of truth, by the understanding; the law of taste (?), by the feelings; the law of duty, by the conscience" (page 41). This provincial sovereign, the will, seems here to be assuming the robes of office that belong to the mind itself; for we are told that the will "*appropriates* by its choice" whatever treasures the other faculties possess—it *discriminates*, and *decides* which of these to put on the market. Now, from time immemorial, each of these functions, *choice*, *discrimination*, *decision*, belongs of divine right to the entire human soul. These functions are the *Magna Charta* that define the prerogatives of the man as

compared with the brute. In spite of its isolation, this special faculty, will, cannot act within its own territory without stealing the powers of the mind.

Can this strange being be bodied forth before the eye? Yes, in some such doubtful shape as Hamlet's cloud; for after Dr Girardeau has summoned the curiosity from its hiding-place, he comes to the conclusion that it is "very like a sponge." Hear him describe it: "If we could suppose a living, self-acting sponge, with a power of assimilating elements from other objects, according to a principle of elective affinity inherent in itself, we should have a faint analogue of the will in its initial process of consent and appropriation" (pp. 41, 42).

But let us hurry on to get a glimpse of the will full-fledged. On pages 43-44 he accords it these elements:

- (1.) The *power* to choose, lying at the root of the faculty.
- (2.) Choice, *appropriating* the offspring of the other faculties as its own.
- (3.) Conation, an habitual *inclination* and appetency *to action*.
- (4.) The determinate choice of action—the *act of willing*—the exercise, in any form, of the energy residing in the will.

Tracing its genealogy further, Dr. Girardeau calls the will "the elective faculty." In this will is there "a fundamental law—that of causal efficiency by virtue of which it chooses." "The faculties may then be distributed as: The intellectual, which is cognitive; the emotional, which is æsthetic; the voluntary, which is elective; and the moral, which is judicial" (p. 44).

To the will as thus defined, Dr. Girardeau ascribes a self-determining power. This he further explains as "power to originate its determinations" (p. 46). The will "appropriates" the cognitions and judgments of the mind, but these do not have the effect of motives, to *move* the will to action. It moves itself. It appropriates the mind's treasures of knowledge and of thought, but the action of the will is not at all connected with these. The "law of causality" is the spring of its movements.

Now very clearly this creature, the will, has gotten itself into a serious dilemma as regards its own nature. Since an impersonal "law" is the basis of its actions, the will has neither personality nor individuality. Since it is unaffected in its movements by rational and moral dispositions of the mind, the will is neither a rational nor a moral agent. Otherwise, it must be an impostor, stalking in the garb of the mind itself. An irrational monster or an impostor must the will needs be. The second horn of this dilemma seems to be accepted by Dr. Girardeau as he carefully arrays the will in its four elements. But these four elements are the recognized property of the *entire soul* considered as facing a crisis that calls for action. Let us recall these elements and restore them to their proper owner, the whole mind of man.

(1.) The *power* to choose belongs to the mind, to the entire soul, and not to a special faculty.

(2.) Choice, appropriating the offspring of the other faculties; this is an erroneous way of stating the function of the soul in unifying its various operations into one controlling disposition of character. This controlling disposition is the mind's motive to action.

(3.) Conation, or habitual inclination to action, belongs to the soul of man as the first article in its constitution. To lodge this characteristic in a special faculty would dismember the rational nature.

(4), The act of willing belongs to the mind itself. The mind thinks its own thoughts, feels its own emotions and wills its own actions.

It seems very clear that the capital error in Dr. Girardeau's whole theory has its source just here in his *definition* of the will. The soul of man is a unit in all its operations. When an act is performed, that act springs from the entire mind. This unity does Dr. Girardeau destroy when he ascribes all action to a special faculty, isolated from the mind itself by a self-determining power.

We leave it to the judgment of the reader if Dr. Girardeau's own contradictory statements have not shown the impossibility of the self-determination of the will, and that he has failed to show the existence of any such faculty in the human mind.

Now let some well-known witnesses speak on the matter here at issue:

Sir William Hamilton says, "As to mental powers you are not to suppose entities really distinguishable from the thinking principle or really different from each other. Mental powers are not like bodily organs. *It is the same simple substance which exerts every energy of every faculty, however various.*"—*Bowen's Hamilton*, p. 264.

Hear Dugald Stewart: "Although we divide the soul into several powers and faculties, there is no such division in the soul itself, *since it is the whole soul that remembers, understands, wills or imagines.*" (Quoted from Addison as the best expression of his own opinion, and sanctioned by Hamilton.)—*Hamilton*, p. 264.

Dr. Charles Hodge: "When we say that the will is self-determined, we separate it from the other constituents of the man, as an independent power. . . . In this case the volition ceases to be a decision of the agent."—*Theology*, Vol. II., p. 295.

Dr. Dabney: [According to the self-determining theory of the will] "man might be neither a reasonable nor a moral being. Not reasonable because his acts might be wholly uncontrolled at last by his whole understanding; not moral, because the merit of an act depends on its motive, and his acts would be motiveless." *Theology*, p. 122.

II. *Dr. Girardeau's definitions are self-contradictory.*

At times in the writing of the genealogy of the will, Dr. Girardeau seems to have glimpses of the truth, and consequently, his statements are not always consistent with his general theory. On one page we find him asserting that the will is a special faculty, the seat of efficient causality in the human soul (pp. 43, 115, &c.), on another page that the will is not a faculty, and that the soul itself is the seat of causality "in willing" (p. 29). On one page we find the will figuring as mind-director, controlling the man according to its own designs (p. 41)—keeping him away from happiness by not choosing the dictates of his soul—on another the will plays the part of the mind's servant, the organ through which the soul expresses its own activity (p. 27). How do these statements, further, accord with the repeated assertion that activity is not possessed by the soul, but by the will?

The core of Dr. Girardeau's theory is that the will determines itself to action without the influence of motives (p. 116 *ad lib.*) but on page 114 occurs a remarkable admission: "Motives are the final, the will is the efficient cause of voluntary acts. . . . On the principle that most effects are produced by a concurrence of causes, we admit that final causes concur with the efficient cause in the production of voluntary acts. Without the final, the efficient would not produce." Between

these two contrary positions, we see Dr. Girardeau's whole theory fall to the ground. By his own admissions he has surrendered his case.

It were hardly necessary to follow Dr. Girardeau in his progress through other definitions up to this climax of claims for a mere abstraction, for his faculty of will is a mere abstraction which he attempts to clothe in the garments of a real entity by the process of definition. His argumentative progress is marked by a slaughter of long-recognized terms and distinctions. He obliterates old landmarks left by Calvinistic writers on this theme, and yet claims our Calvinistic good-fellowship.

Dr. Girardeau's theory of the will prevents his seeing any distinction between *ability* and *liberty*. Ability has reference to character; it "is the power to change our character by a volition."—*Hodge*. Liberty also is used with reference to character; it expresses the prerogative of the soul to determine itself, to decide according to its disposition. We possess no *ability* to make our natures different by merely willing it, but we possess liberty to decide in accordance with our own character. Since Dr. Girardeau's theory separates the soul and the will in the operation of their special functions, he makes ability and liberty mean the same thing, the power to choose. As applied to an irrational automaton, they do, perhaps, express the same idea. But the soul is not such. In one breath, Dr. Girardeau denies any distinction between the man and the will, and in the next he runs his knife through the unity of man's soul, and makes that very distinction. "What is the will but a power of the man?" (p. 28.) What is ability but a power of the will? (p. 24.) In this multiplication of prerogatives, the agent, man himself, is left out of view.

It remains in this connection to show how Dr. Girardeau's *definition* of will has placed him in exact contradiction to Calvin and the Reformed Confessions. He clings to this as his chief glory that his feet have been placing themselves in the very foot-steps of the Reformers. Let us see.

In his Institutes, Book I. Ch. XX. § 7, Calvin makes a two-fold division of the mental faculties, intellect and will. "The intellect is, as it were, the guide and governor of the soul; . . . the will always respects its authority and waits for its judgment in its desires." The will is not in this section, nor anywhere by Calvin made a faculty separate from the soul itself. Will includes the desires with all the active energies of the soul. It is the soul in a certain phase of its character. Calvin means by will, nothing more than a peculiar disposition of mind. This definition is as wide as the poles apart from that of Dr. Girardeau. Hence, in discussing the question at issue, Calvin and Dr. Girardeau do not at all mean the same thing when they speak of the will.

In its deliverances concerning free-agency the Westminster Confession (Chapter IV.) declares man to be the doer of his own acts and responsible for them because they spring out of his own character. Will is used to define the volition of the soul. There is naught here to substantiate Dr. Girardeau's definition of the will, but altogether the contrary. From the second Helvetic Confession, quoted by Dr. Girardeau on pp. 167-168, we draw the closing instance to show the contradictions made in the statement of his theory. The passage is brought forward, as are all those just instanced, with dozens beside, to prove Dr. Girardeau's complete harmony therewith: "The intellect, indeed, is obscured, but the will (*voluntas*), from having been free, is made the servant of sin. For it serves sin not unwillingly, but willingly; for indeed it is said to be will (*voluntas*, willingness) not unwillingness

(*non voluntas*, not not-will)." Here Dr. Girardeau commits himself to the translation, *willingness*, as the proper rendering of *voluntas*. *Willingness* is a disposition of mind, and so stated here. Contradictions do indeed meet and kiss each other if this view of the function of the mind in willing be the same with Dr. Girardeau's self-determination of the will.

III. *Dr. Girardeau's theory of a self-determined will is not even a working hypothesis—for he fails to explain it.*

"No elective act of the will ever takes place without some motive to its occurrence" (p. 105). Let us hold fast to this admission that there must needs be a motive to move the machine. But whence that motive? "In the power of the will we have [a cause of which volitions are legitimate effects]" (p. 93). As each act of the will comes out of the depths of the will's power, it must be pushed forth by another act of will. For the will determines its own acts; it must do this by a determining act; this act is also an act of will and must be due to a prior determining act, and so on without end. Here have we the impossible case of an infinite series of acts, so strongly urged as an objection by Edwards.

Dr. Girardeau's only attempt to meet the force of this objection is to urge the same objection against Edwards' theory in regard to an act of the understanding (pp. 98-118). But of this:

(a.) The cases are not at all parallel. The understanding, in Edwards' theory, is the whole mind in the attitude of judging—and the mind has an active spontaneity which lies at the beginning of the processes of reason. The will has no such rational spontaneity. The mind expresses the life that is within. There is no life within the will needing expression.

(b.) "Thou art in a leaky boat my friend, thou art sinking."

"Mine is as good a boat to sink in as yours." This answer of Dr. Girardeau is no proof against the fact that there is a fatal rent in the bottom of his boat.

(c.) On page 118, Dr. Girardeau admits that in this respect his theory belongs to the tribe of "insoluble difficulties," of "great absurdities." That he places moral certainty in the same category does not break the force of his admission. Along with this negative concession, let us couple the more positive one already quoted from page 114, that "the *final* causes" of voluntary acts are the motives furnished by the mind. Here he surrenders even his objection to Edwards' theory. He finds a beginning for the series of acts of the will in the operations of the mind, and in so doing he surrenders his guns.

We beg the special attention of the reader to the state of the case at this point of the discussion. Dr. Girardeau admits, *in terminis*, that he has found his Waterloo—and this admission of defeat may be stated in three particulars:

(1.) He acknowledges his failure to meet the argument of an infinite series of acts in the operations of a self-determined will—nay, he admits that acts must find their primary springs of life in the mind and not in the will.

(2.) He acknowledges the claims of the theory of moral certainty to explain the acts of the human soul as a power which spontaneously expresses itself in accordance with its own nature. Let us feast our eyes on the words: "That the spontaneity belongs to the man himself, and in acting in accordance with it, he is only expressing himself," that may be true, but that accounts only for self-expression, "not for self-determination" (p. 50). "Man acts with spontaneous freedom whenever he sins" (p. 56). Dr. Girardeau has here spiked his own guns.

(3.) After destroying his own position, Dr. Girardeau runs away from the field which he himself had chosen. In continuing the quotation just given from page 50, we find this: (Moral certainty accounts only for self-expression, not for self-determination, but) "How came the man to be conditioned thus and so? Did he have any voluntary agency in inducing that moral type of being which now characterizes him beyond his power to change it?" Again, on page 56, he asserts that in Adam's case "is the real place at which the discussion of the self-determining power of the will must be had. It is idle to transfer the question to the will in its present sinful condition." It is useless to give further quotations, for Dr. Girardeau has left the theory of moral certainty on the field of man's present sinful condition, and lo! he is marching off to another quarter, to the entirely different question of the *genesis* of the soul itself, to the origin of sin.

"What determined the moral spontaneity? What is its origin? What is the *genesis* of the contents of the soul's subjectivity?" When we heard such questions as these from the learned Doctor, we felt sure that he was off in search of an evolution theory, but he quieted us with the avowed purpose of investigating the first entrance of sin into the soul of Adam.

Now we hope Dr. Girardeau will pardon us for reminding him that he himself joined the issue as to man's freedom in his present state:

(a.) "The question before us is not in regard to the possession of faculties, but of the power to act" (p. 25).

(b.) The unregenerate mind has been analyzed to show the will as a special faculty.

(c.) The unregenerate mind has been used in denying the distinction between liberty and ability (pp. 23-25).

(d.) Illustrations have been drawn from the exertions of a pedestrian, terrified boy and practiced musician, to show relation of will to present activity (pp. 37-38).

(e.) All of Dr. Girardeau's *principles*, and all of the discussions up to this point have been *psychological*, and now he wants to say that the question is one of man's spiritual state.

Be it so. We are willing to go back to Adam's case, and join issue with Dr. Girardeau in the garden of Eden. But we insist on noting these points: First, that our author himself says that Adam's case is exceptional, and not logically a type to measure the present question of moral freedom. But, secondly, we notice as the discussion proceeds that Dr. Girardeau has gone off the first ground of battle, carrying his guns with him. Strange to say, the principles he used here he means to use in that case so different! Yea, we shall soon see him bringing forth his same theory of a self-determined will, with an additional attachment called the power of contrary choice. What that means we shall see.

Since, therefore, he means to use the same *psychological* principles in discussing Adam's case as he has used in regard to fallen man, we take this opportunity to state more fully what is the creed of moral certainty.

The theory of moral certainty in regard to human acts is based upon the unity of the human soul. By its very constitution that soul is endowed with the power of determining or deciding what shall be its acts. The soul thinks its own thoughts, feels its own emotions, and *wills* its own volitions. The *entire* soul is present in any one of its acts, present as the cause and agent of that act. A veritable fountain of spontaneous action is man's soul. Therefore are his acts the expression of

his own nature. The soul is said to be *free* because it can and does express and record its own character in its acts. It gives expression to no other dispositions, sentiments or opinions than those which belong to itself. The act of stealing brands the agent as a thief. He has simply used his liberty to express his character by an outward act.

Hence, the cause of any act is the state of character immediately preceding the act. This it is which puts the soul in motion and hence is this frame of mind called the *motive* causing the act. That *motive* is the result of the soul's previous operations as a thinking and feeling unit. For example, the judgment of that man's soul has affirmed the gold-purse before him to be valuable. The desire of his soul has admitted its desirability. The result of these mental operations is that state of mind called cupidity. From his mind has come forth no moral judgment, or a very faint moral judgment, concerning his right to possess the purse. His prevailing state of character may be described by the term *thief*. He puts forth his hand and he is a thief in fact. The relation of the man's character to his action is expressed by the title, moral certainty. An act of exactly the same *color* with the soul itself, is *morally certain* to follow the movement of that soul.

Now we are willing to apply this moral metre to *any* case, psychological or spiritual, or even to the case of Adam, which Dr. Girardeau claims is peculiar.

"A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." "I say unto you that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." In this field of spiritual teaching, our Lord

- (1.) Acquits himself of responsibility for man's sin.
- (2.) Makes man responsible for his own sin.
- (3.) Affirms the *certain* connection of moral results with moral character.

Judas Iscariot "was a *thief*"; from the position of apostleship he "by *transgression* fell, that he might go to his *own place*." Yea, the deed of treachery was morally *certain* before its commission. The words italicized above show the elements of that certainty in Judas' career. Likewise did Jesus say concerning him, "I know whom I chose." He foreknew the act in knowing the character of Judas.

The theory is the only creed that dignifies the human soul by making its acts a part of itself—the only creed that tears aside the veil from human life and leaves it not an enigma, but a great net-work of sequences that have a sure basis in moral character; it is the creed that can allow God foreknowledge of the action of his creatures, and hence the only creed that exalts God into absolute sovereignty and demands from man absolute responsibility.

IV. *Dr. Girardeau's theory, applied to the fall of Adam, fails to quadrate with the facts in the case.*

The first sin of Adam is the test-case, unto which Dr. Girardeau appeals. In order to plant the two cornerstones of Calvinism, viz.: Adam's *responsibility* for his sin, and God's complete *acquittal* of blame as to the origin of that sin, he affirms that his moral calculus must be applied to the problem.

Let us pause here to express gratefulness for one thing. In opening the discussion, Dr. Girardeau glances backward into the period before time began and before the world was. Into past chaos does he look to consider the opinion that in an ante-mundane and timeless state of existence, every individual member of the human race was infected with the germ of sin. But the chimeras of Schelling and

Schleiermacher and Müller are too fantastical for Dr. Girardeau, and so he accepts the scriptural ground, that in Adam all men have met spiritual death. We are very grateful that the discussion has been narrowed down to a single issue.

(a.) *The charge against moral certainty not sustained.*

The indictment is this, that "moral certainty in relation to Adam's fall, accounts neither for self-expression nor self-determination" (p. 121). Let us bring the charge before the tribunal of the actual facts.

Adam's character was "very good" as God looked upon it at the close of the sixth day's work. There he stood lord of all other creatures, formed "in the image of God"—"after his likeness." Knowledge, righteousness, and holiness were the marks of his nature. Adam was possessed of a *rational* nature as the solid basis of these special marks of character, for God entered into a mutual contract with him. Moreover his nature was *moral*, for God indicated a right and a wrong course of action with penalty and reward, in the terms of the contract, and Adam understood. Now, therefore, Adam was possessed of *knowledge*, of *data* concerning his relationships, for God revealed this in making the contract; he had *righteousness*, that is, conformity to God's standard, for was he not just new from the moulding power of God's "image"?—he had *holiness*, for God pointed to the future as the time of *deterioration in character* through failure to obey: "In the day that thou eatest . . . thou shalt surely die."

Unto Adam in this state external inducements were offered. They were offered to his *mind*, to his *soul*. Now did a *new* knowledge and a *new* desire follow. A disposition of soul, a state of character was the result of this spontaneous working of the mind, and this *new* disposition became a controlling *motive* to action. That *motive* was unbelief—the resulting action was disobedience—the just penalty was the taint of sin in all of Adam's seed. The act was the expression of Adam's own self-hood. It was the *certain* moral result of Adam's disposition of unbelief—and the responsibility for the act was all his own. Adam's sin was, as it were, the child that sprang from his own nature. He must needs acknowledge it, for it was stamped with the image of his character and the penalty consisted in the sealing of its death-face upon Adam and all his line.

Dr. Girardeau interposes here, that God made man's *nature*, and that moral certainty cannot acquit him of blame in thus laying the train for the sinful act. The Doctor is again getting away from the point at issue. We are discussing the origin of Adam's sinful *act*, not of Adam's *nature*. As a different question, we reserve that for the close of the debate. We leave it to the reader to decide whether our theory is amenable to the charges made against it by Dr. Girardeau.

(b.) *Adam did not possess a self-determining will.*

This follows as a necessary result of the position already substantiated, that Adam *did* possess a self-determining soul. But we wish to put Dr. Girardeau on the witness-stand: "He [Adam] *saw clearly* the issues involved, and *deliberately resolved* to break with his God, and ruin his race. But we cannot avoid the conclusion that, as his moral dispositions and tendencies were all in the direction of holiness, the intrinsically blind impulses of his constitution started the train of inducements, inflamed the desire which enticed the will in the direction of sin. Here were motives brought to bear upon the will; but it is obvious that in their first presentation they were in the control of the will" (page 88). Here in the closing sentence we see the old chimera of an impossible faculty coming to the surface only

to be pushed under by the previous admissions. The *clear view* of the mind in an act of knowledge, the deliberate *resolution* of the mind in an act of judgment, and the impulses of the constitution springing up in the flame of *desire*—there was a distinct state of character that determined the soul to take its awful plunge into sin. There was the *evil tree* which *could not* bring forth good fruit. According to Dr. Girardeau's own application of his theory, the self-determined will is superfluous.

(c.) *Adam did not possess the power of contrary choice.*

Dr. Girardeau affirms that Adam, in his first estate, possessed the power of contrary choice; that he lost this power by the fall. He defines the said power as that of "otherwise determining." Adam, at the very moment of sinning, had a power lodged in his will not to do the sin. Even in that moment, his will might have done the opposite. But as soon as Adam committed the act, this power was gone. Henceforth his will and that of all his sons, except in regard to things natural and civil, must be under the bondage of sin. "Since the Scriptures teach that there was a free will, which was lost by the fall, . . . therefore," says Dr. Girardeau, "it was the freedom of contrary choice" (page 135).

But Dr. Girardeau's contradictions administer a fatal blow to this special power of a special faculty. Let us listen as he strikes his special power dead. In three strokes the work is done.

(1.) The chief premise in his chain of reasoning is false.

Here is the logical machine which the Doctor forges to found his theory:

A. "The Scriptures teach that there was a *free will* which was lost by the fall."

B. "There is only one other kind [kind of liberty not taken account of by the moral-certainty theory], the liberty of deliberate election between opposite alternatives."

C. "That, *therefore*, was the liberty which was lost; and consequently it was originally possessed" (page 135).

In regard to "A," we deny that the Scriptures teach the loss of "a free will" in the sense that Dr. Girardeau attaches to the term. "*Death* passed upon all men" by reason of Adam's sin; "by the offence of one, *judgment* came upon all men to condemnation." Through Adam's disobedience it hath followed that "There is none *righteous* . . . there is none that *understandeth*, there is none that seeketh after God." That which Adam did lose was his *character*, and so do Scripture and the church teach. The inspired word nowhere says that Adam lost a *special psychological* faculty. In so many words does Dr. Girardeau admit this: "There was a certain free will which Adam lost *when he lost himself*" (p. 134). Two distinct meanings are drawn out of this term, "a free will": In "A" it designates an independent faculty of the mind; in the sentence just quoted it means a condition or state of moral character. The first premise "A" has vanished.

(2.) In his second premise he "begs the question."

Now examine "B." "There is . . . the liberty of deliberate election between opposite alternatives." Here is what Dr. Girardeau has promised to prove. This is a bald "begging of the question." The conclusion "C" has been brought in to do service as "B" until he can form the insubstantial creed.

(3.) The conclusion "C," even if true, destroys the theory of Dr. Girardeau.

That which was possessed and then lost by Adam was a mutable will—capable of doing its work independent of Adam's character. But Adam did lose character. Dr. Girardeau says so: "When the unregenerate sinner commits sin, he acts

spontaneously" (p. 133). "The liberty of spontaneity remains—the sinner pleases to sin." From holiness down to *unholiness* of nature is the step which measures Adam's loss and our loss in him. Dr. Girardeau means this by the above statements, or he means nothing at all. A complete change in character has caused the death of this special power of the will—although, the will had no organic connection with the character. Strange contagion of death between creatures completely *isolated* from each other. The will, as defined, a faculty beyond the control of the man's nature, is yet shorn of half its prerogatives by a change in that nature.

(d.) *Calvin does not agree with Dr. Girardeau in any one of his claims.*

(1.) Nearly six pages of Calvin in minute type are quoted to show that the Genevan Reformer distinguishes between "the necessity of sinning in our unregenerate condition, and the free and unecessitated sin of Adam" (pp. 138-143). The simple meaning of this is that Adam's "first sin did not originate from his natural make and constitution," that the psychological machinery of Adam's soul was not the same *before* and *after* his sin. To explain farther, Dr. Girardeau's point seems to be this, that Adam had two natures—the first one of these was created by God, and was possessed of a will that had power of contrary choice—the second of Adam's natures was made by this autocratic will, and this second nature of Adam committed the sin. Not the God-created nature, but the will-created nature did the sin. Thus would Dr. Girardeau acquit God of the blame of Adam's sin, by making Adam's soul at the moment of sinning a creation of a mere power of his mind. All this does he claim to find in Calvin. But there is nothing of the kind in the great Reformer. In the pages here quoted, he speaks of the "voluntary fall of the first man," and affirms that our ruin is attributable to our own depravity" (p. 140). Calvin holds in these very pages, that *psychological* freedom belonged to Adam before the fall, and still belongs to his seed, but that spiritual inability binds the sinner. Dr. Girardeau has already denied any difference between the *liberty* of expressing one's nature, and the *ability* to change the nature. Hence, when Calvin makes that very distinction here, Dr. Girardeau fails to apprehend the whole tenor of his reasoning. Calvin, *in terminis*, vindicates the certainty of character in giving color to moral activity, whether in Adam fallen or in Adam unfallen.

(2.) When Calvin speaks of Adam's will as "pliable in either direction," he is clearly stating the openness of Adam's soul to conviction—his capacity of receiving knowledge on both sides of a question, for in the same section (*Inst.* Book I, Ch. xv., § 8) Calvin adds, that Adam "possessed reason, understanding, prudence and judgment, not only for the government of his life on earth, but to enable him to ascend even to God and eternal felicity. To these was added choice to direct the appetites and regulate all the organic motions, so that the will should be entirely conformed to the government of reason."

In these declarations there is no intimation that the will has power of contrary choice.

(3.) Triumphantly does Dr. Girardeau draw an arrow from Edwards' quiver, and one from Calvin's, to show that the points are set in opposition to each other (pp. 163, 164.) That between these writers there is "a radical difference touching the very nature of the inquiry as to the freedom of the will."

We turn to those writers and quote (what Dr. Girardeau does *not* quote) sentences in exactly the same connection:

"The will itself is not an agent that has a will; the power of choosing itself

has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition, or choice, is the man or the soul, and not the power of volition itself."—Edwards' *Inquiry*, Part I., § 5.

Now from *Inst.* Book II., Ch. IV., § 8, let Calvin speak: "In the dispute concerning free will the question is not, whether a man, notwithstanding external impediments, can perform and execute whatever he may have *resolved in his mind*, but whether in every case his *judgment exerts freedom of choice* and his *will freedom of inclinations*." Where is the "radical difference" between these men?

(e.) *Calvin does not agree with Dr. Girardeau concerning the relation of God's decree to Adam's fall.*

Dr. Girardeau has reached the core of the question, he affirms, in the relation of God's decree to Adam's sin. In presence of this problem he causes to march by in solemn review the whole tribe of theodicy writers from Dr. Twisse of Westminster Assembly fame to Dr. Bledsoe. They all pass by as vanquished theorists. Last in the procession, like a Roman conqueror, comes Dr. Girardeau himself, sitting, as he claims, in Calvin's chariot. The peculiar faculty of will which he has forged out for Adam's use has solved the question. Here is his creed: "Adam fell by the permissive will and ordination of God," but "the case, as a whole, could not pass out of the controlling hand of the Supreme Ruler." The middle term, of course, that bridges the gap between God's ordination and the act of Adam is the power of contrary choice in a self-determined will. God "permitted" this will to be an autocrat just long enough to have the disobedience consummated and then he took away "contrary choice" from the minor lord. Let us see whether Calvin holds this view.

Concerning the fall Calvin says, "He [Adam] not only was ensnared by the allurements of Satan but *despised the truth* and turned aside to falsehood."—*Inst.* Book II., Ch. I. § 4. Of the effect of the sin: "Wherefore I have asserted that sin has possessed *all the powers of the soul* since Adam departed from the fountain of righteousness."—*Idem.* . . . § 9. With Adam as a being controlled by his own character, ruled by rational motives, did God deal in this matter. Concerning such a nature, Calvin says that "God permitted Satan to tempt man." But the permission thus granted to a rational soul differs widely from permission given to an irrational, irresponsible machine, such as our author's theory makes the will. It is one thing for a king to grant authority to a trusted minister whose actions are already foreknown from his very character, but it is quite a different thing to bestow the prerogative of important decisions upon an independent princeling who is beyond the reach of the king's reasonable influence.

On the same plane of agreement with Calvin, and of absolute variance from Dr. Girardeau's view, stand all the Reformed Confessions. It were needless to quote extensively. Brief reference to Westminster may here suffice. This creed declares that our first parents were "left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject to change." This liberty of will that was liable to change was that spiritual liberty that belonged to spiritual character. How was the liberty changed? By the change of man's character—that foundation underlying and controlling all acts of will. Now, we affirm that this position is entirely foreign to that of Dr. Girardeau. So likewise is the teaching of all the Reformed creeds.

Assuredly, Dr. Girardeau's theodicy fails to solve the problem. The creed of moral certainty holds the field. In conclusion, we wish to state the claims of this

theory concerning the question of the Origin of Sin. The theory makes no claims of a clear solution beyond the facts revealed in God's word:

"Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man. But every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then, when *lust* hath conceived, it *bringeth forth sin*; and sin, when it is finished, *bringeth death*." Out of the moral character of man hath sin its origin, and man is responsible.

But if God's creature sins out of the very constitution of his being, is not God primarily responsible for the sin? "Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he still find fault? For who withstandeth his will? Nay; but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why didst thou make me thus?"

These assertions of Scripture rear up two great bulwarks—the absolute sovereignty of God, and the responsible choice of man. As regards man himself, the controlling force of character is clearly and fully revealed. The reason for God's choice that sin should enter man's nature—that reason hath not yet appeared. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be" hereafter, and in like manner hath it not yet been told how we came to be what now we are. Nor does it limit the truth of our theory that this is so. No theory concerning man's freedom of action is able to find out facts which God has not chosen to reveal. But the creed of moral certainty is the only one that can build up a symmetrical structure from the facts already spoken through inspired tongues and by the voice of God himself.

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DRIVER'S INTRODUCTION TO THE LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. *By S. R. Driver, D. D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; formerly Fellow of New College, Oxford.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1891. Pp. xxvii. 522. \$2.50.

"Of making many books there is no end." So said the Preacher twenty-eight centuries ago. Had he lived now, he might have added—Of projecting libraries there is no end. The book before us is the first volume of a library which proposes to compass the field of Theology, and to bring the discussion up to date all along the line.

This new library is to have a fine name, quite in keeping with this age of International Conventions and World Fairs. So it is to be called the *International Theological Library*, and its projectors propose to make it international and inter-confessional. Already twelve treatises are arranged for at the hands of eminent scholars of the Presbyterian, Anglican, and Congregational communions in Britain and America. This new library is to be under the joint editorship of Professor C. A. Briggs, of New York, and Professor S. D. F. Salmond, of Aberdeen. Thus across the sea scholars clasp hands in international amity, and over denominational barriers scholarly hands are reached to build up this *new Theological Library*. How far the cause of truth will be served thereby remains to be seen.

As already stated, Dr. Driver's treatise on the literature of the Old Testament, is the first of the series which is to make up this library. In a well written preface the author is at pains to tell us what his subject of discussion really is. He says

that it is not an introduction to the *theology*, or to the *history*, or even to the *study* of the Old Testament. It is rather an introduction to its *literature*, and on the whole, he confines himself quite closely to his theme.

In his preface our author further states that the methods and results of his study do not affect the *fact* of revelation, but only its *form*. And he adds that his conclusions do not touch either the authority or the inspiration of the Old Testament Scriptures. He therefore assumes the *fact* of revelation, and the *reality* of inspiration, and he argues that he has ample scope for his critical procedure without impairing in the least degree the authority of the Old Testament Scriptures. He does not tell us precisely what doctrine of inspiration he assumes, and many will seriously doubt whether his critical results can be harmonized with the true scriptural doctrine of inspiration. And, further, it is a question admitting of serious debate whether the *fact* and *form* of revelation can be so widely separated as our author in his preface argues they may be. It may be reasonably maintained that the *fact* takes its complexion from the *form* in which it is communicated.

Taking next a general survey of the treatise itself, we find that after a brief introduction the literature of the Old Testament is discussed in twelve chapters. I., The Hexateuch; II., Judges, Samuel and Kings; III., Isaiah; IV., Jeremiah; V., Ezekiel; VI., The Minor Prophets; VII., The Psalms; VIII., The Proverbs; IX., Job; X., The Megilloth; XI., Daniel; XII., Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah; These chapters are of unequal length. Chapter I., on the Hexateuch, takes 150 pp.; chapter VI., on the Minor Prophets, has 53 pp.; and chapter II., on Judges, Samuel and Kings, has only 24 pp.

The task undertaken throughout is to discover, as far as possible by every available means, *how* and *when* the literature of the Old Testament assumed its final form, and to trace the various elements which enter into that literature to their sources. To this end the resources of historical, linguistic and literary criticism are employed, and the instinctive insight—we shall not say fancy—of the author plays no unimportant part in the procedure.

The methods employed by our author are those of advanced reconstructive criticism, which argues in various ways in favor of the composite structure of the Old Testament. It might be too much to say that Dr. Driver's methods are entirely those of the negative or destructive critics, and yet there is much in the book before us which might be made to justify this characterization. Again and again his conclusions agree with those of Wellhausen and Kuenen. And he accepts fully what he terms "the assured results of modern criticism" which are so largely negative. Perhaps he owes more to Dillmann than any other continental writer, and his sympathies are all with writers like Cheyne, G. A. Smith, Sanday and Briggs. Then in the bibliography and notes with which each chapter is enriched the vast majority of authorities cited belong to the advanced school of critics. Only here and there is even a conservative continental critic quoted, and seldom is an English speaking conservative mentioned at all. But perhaps this is done of necessity and not of choice, on the ground that the advanced critics have appropriated all the scholarship which gives an opinion any authority in this field.

In working out his method our author takes up each book in order and goes through it with marvellous and microscopic care. Every verse, every clause, word by word, is sifted and weighed, and its place in the literary organism decided upon. With almost superhuman insight the parts of the literature thus sifted and

separated are assigned to their respective, but generally nameless, authors. The symbols used by advanced critics are employed by our author constantly. Hence on almost every page the symbols J. E., J E., D., H., P., appear, indicating the various authors of different parts of the literature.

The composite authorship runs all through the Old Testament, but it is seen specially in the Hexateuch. Probably a table taken from our author (p. 67) may illustrate his method better than any description. The table selected for this purpose is that given for Deuteronomy, the structure of which our author tells us is "relatively simple."

P.				
(J. E.	Ch. 27, 5-7 ^a .			
(D.	Ch. 1-26. 27, 1-4.	7 ^b -8, 9-10, 11-13 (14-26),	Ch. 28.	Ch. 29-30.
P.				
(J. E.	31, 14-22.	32, 1-43.	44.	32, 48-52.
(D.	31, 1-13.	23-30.	45-47.	Ch. 33.
P.				
(J. E.	34, 1 ^a .	8-9.	10.	
(D.	34, 1 ^b -7.	11-12.		

The three main divisions in this table denote the three leading sections of Deuteronomy. Those chapters and verses which follow P., J E. and D. indicate those parts of the book which belong, in our author's opinion, to the several writers denoted by these symbols.

To indicate further our author's style of criticism, two quotations may be given. The first is from the Book of Exodus (p. 29), which is a fair sample of the majesterial tone of our author apparent on so many pages.

"The structure of J E.'s narrative of the transactions at Sinai . . . is complicated, and there are parts in which the analysis (so far as concerns J. and E.), must be regarded as provisional only. Nevertheless, the composite character of the narrative seems unmistakable. Thus, in ch. 19, the natural sequel of vs. 3, *went up*, would be, not vs. 7 *came*, but vs. 14, *went down*; vs 9^b is superfluous after vs. 8^b (if, indeed, it be more than an accidental repetition of it); vs. 13^b is isolated, and not explained by anything that follows (for the "trumpet" of vv. 16-19 is not the "ram's horn" of this verse). In the latter part of the chapter, vv. 20-25 interrupt the connection; vs. 20 is a repetition of vs. 18^a ("descended"), and vs. 21 of vs. 12; the priests and the ark are introduced without preparation; vs. 25 "and *said unto them*" (not "and *told them*") should be followed by a statement of the words reported, and is quite disconnected with 20, 1; on the other hand, 20, 1 is the natural continuation of 19, 19. It is evident that *two* parallel narratives of the theophany on Sinai have been combined together, though it is no longer possible to determine the precise limits of each."

A second quotation is from page 115, where the prophetic narrative of the Hexateuch is under discussion. In speaking of the Song of Moses (Exod. xv.), of the Song of the Well (Numb. xxi.), and of the Song of Triumph over Sisera, we have a passage which finely illustrates the purely hypothetical procedure of our author. He says (*italics mine*):

"There is no express statement that these were taken by him from one of the same sources; but in the light of his actual quotations, this *is not improbable* at least for the first two. The Song of Deborah (Jud. 5) *may also have had a place* in one of these collections. Further, the command to write 'in a book' the threat to extirpate Amalek (Exod. 17) *makes it probable* that some written statement existed of the combat of Israel with Amalek, and of the oath sworn then by Jehovah to exterminate his people's foe. The poetical phrases that occur in the context *may suggest* that this too was in the form of a poem, reminiscences of which were interwoven by E in his narrative. And the ten commandments, which E incorporates, of course existed already in a written form. The blessing of Jacob (Gen. 49) *may have been derived* by J from a source such as the book of Jashar. The song of Moses in Deut. 32 (which is very different in style) *was taken, probably, from an independent source.* The ordinances which form the basis of the 'Book of the Covenant' *must also have existed* in a written shape before they were incorporated in the narrative of J, as well as the 'Words of the Covenant,' *which, probably in an enlarged form, are preserved in Exod. 34.*"

We have space only to state some of the main results which our author reaches as the outcome of his criticism of the Old Testament literature. The literature, as we now possess it, was a gradual compilation, and the result of many hands—authors, compilers, revisors and redactors—till it was completed. This is particularly the case with the Hexateuch, but in a measure with most of the prophets and the poetical books. The Pentateuch is not from the hand of Moses, but from various other hands, extending down to the period of the Exile. He admits that Moses "was the ultimate founder of the national and religious life of Israel," and that "he provided his people with the nucleus of a system of civil ordinances," with "some ceremonial ordinances," and with "some form of priesthood." But fully developed Mosaism did not appear till after the days of Josiah and Ezekiel. The Deutero-Isaiah is supposed to have written chapters xl.-lxvi. of the prophecy near the close of the Exile in the days of Cyrus. In like manner, Zechariah must have two authors; and the book of Job, we are told, "can scarcely be earlier than the days of Jeremiah, and belongs, most probably, to the period of the Babylonian Captivity." Many of the Psalms are of quite late date, and the book of Daniel may belong to the post-exilic era. But time fails us to follow out the results further. These are sufficient to indicate how radical they are at every turn.

We conclude with a few brief remarks in regard to this book and its general significance:

1. On every page there are evidences of great learning in certain lines, and of immense patience. Still we are not willing to allow our author and his fellow-critics a monopoly of learning, when compared with the conservative critics.

2. We are constrained to utter a note of warning against excessive specialism, even in biblical study. The effect of this is to fix attention too much on certain things to the exclusion of others equally important. Our author has used the critical microscope too much, and consequently incurs the danger of growing nearsighted. An occasional use of the telescope would be helpful in his case.

3. Then, after all, there is very little that is new in the book before us. We do not profess to be very deeply versed in Wellhausen, Kuenen and Dillmann, but from what little we do know of their writings we are willing to venture the assertion that nine out of ten of the opinions, conclusions and alleged facts are borrowed from some of these sources.

4. In reading this treatise one is amazed at the number of bold, unsupported statements, on the one hand, and at the vague hypotheses, on the other. Possi-

bilities are not proofs, and statements are not arguments, not even in advanced criticism.

5. Equally striking is the large scope allowed for the *subjectivity* of the author. The opinion of the critic is, again and again, in matters of style, of religious ideas and other things, taken to be conclusive. But fancy is not fact, and the mere opinion of a critic, no matter how learned, is not history. This is one of the most dangerous features of the critical school to which our author belongs.

6. It is by no means a very edifying spectacle to see an English-speaking author turning out to the inauguration of a *new* theological library in the cast-off study gown of the German professor. The gown clearly does not fit well, and, moreover, it is a little threadbare. Our author, too, seems to overlook the fact that more conservative views are coming to the front, and displacing the school to which he belongs, even in Germany.

7. We are inclined to advise all the critics of the advanced school to beware lest the old buried monuments with their inscriptions do not soon completely demolish their theories. Assyriology and Egyptology have already spoiled some fine theories, and the mine is perhaps half prepared to blow some other theories—perhaps our author's view as to the Book of Daniel—into piecemeal.

8. It is worth while pointing out that those continental critics whose step our author follows are on professedly naturalistic ground. This is true of Kuenen and Wellhausen, and, to a large extent, of Dillmann also. This being the case, it must be a difficult task—perhaps an impossible one—for English critics to adopt their methods, and accept their main literary conclusions, and at the same time retain a sound doctrine of inspiration.

9. It is evident also that a re-arrangement of the literature implies a reconstruction of the ritual and legislation of Moses. This raises the wider question of the mode of the development of the religion of Israel. Our author, as the result of his critical views, must logically take sides in the controversy raised by this question; and if he is consistent here he will find himself among those who hold naturalistic views.

10. Good will no doubt come from all this radical criticism. Just as the replies made to the theories of Baur and Strauss a generation ago established the historicity of the New Testament, so we believe the replies that will soon be more fully made to the critical theories of the Old Testament will in like manner confirm its real historical character throughout. But scholarship is needed, and here is a weighty reason why ministers should study the Old Testament in the original tongue.

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BROWN'S "APOCALYPSE."

THE APOCALYPSE. Its Structure and Primary Predictions. *By David Brown, D.D., Principal of the Free Church College, Aberdeen.* Tall 12mo., pp. xi-224. New York: The Christian Literature Company. 1891.

The return of the venerable and reverend Principal Brown, not only to the fields of authorship, but after the lapse of a half century to the interpretation of the Apocalypse, affects one somewhat as the re-appearance of Nestor would have affected the younger generations of Greeks, if he had come back to the Troad to fight over his old battles again after fifty years' absence from the scenes of his

early conflicts. In the interim Doctor Brown has been active at his post, in General Assemblies, in Pan-Presbyterian Councils, in the pulpits of Scotland, in every good word and work, even to some extent through the press, and in the line of exegesis—as witness the admirably short, select, sagacious, sound, and serviceable commentary familiarly spoken of as “Jamieson, Faussett, and Brown,” and it is probably not carrying conjecture too far if we opine, that the judicious treatment of the Revelation in that work, was due in a measure to the influential, possibly the controlling voice of the third named in that trio of British scholars and divines. Yet those of us who have not as yet been convinced of the truth of the pre-millennial theory, and who can remember when the echoes of the noise made by “Brown on the Second Advent,” were still lingering on the hollow ceiling of the old Presbyterian rotunda of our fathers, have yearned to see and hear once more in the thick of the fray a stroke or two of that resounding battle-axe that did such execution before the alert champions of the present day were born. We might fitly liken him to another, and fondly exclaim:

“One blast upon that magic horn,
Were worth a thousand men.”

The fullest and strongest word that has yet been uttered in English against the Pre-Adventist theory, as advocated in the first half of the present century, and by many in the later periods, along the lines pursued in the controversy, that was then as now burning and blazing on both sides of the Atlantic, was that of “Brown of Aberdeen,” and was expressed and perpetuated in his massive treatise on that subject. Some would prefer the breadth, originality, and profundity of Fairbairn in his “Prophecy,” but Fairbairn was not so intelligible or popular, and not at once so compact, so systematic, or so complete.

This charming little critique on the last book of the sacred canon, is an exploit in literature as well as in scholarship and exegesis—putting one in mind of recent achievements of Mr. Gladstone. There is a half-unconscious pathos in what Dr. Brown has to say about himself in the preface: “. . . Oversights may probably be found here and there; but when one is nearly *eighty-eight* years of age, while his feeble eye-sight can receive no aid from artificial light, such things will be pardoned. In fact, should none appear, it is due to the intelligent pains taken upon the proofs in the printing-office, which I must here gratefully acknowledge.”

We have not detected any blemish of the kind. But if in a physical sense the distinguished author's eye has grown dim and his natural force is abated, such is not the case as respects his intellectual and spiritual powers, which are still bright and energetic as in the days of his prime, and like autumnal fruit, “frosty, but kindly,” have acquired the mellow flavor due to long keeping, but are still firm at the core and retain their fine lusty bloom. Many who have looked into that benignant and expressive face will unite in the prayer that “the good gray head,” so gifted with true discernment, and the warm, tender, honest heart, so full of the faith and loving kindness of the gospel, may be spared to the church for still further earthly service in the cause of the Redeemer.

This work is not a commentary. Dr. Brown's studies had lain in a wider territory; but the multiplied editions of his *magnum opus*, and the solicitations of personal friends and eager students of prophecy in both hemispheres, who were earnestly desirous to find out all that is to be known as to the *time* when the second coming is to be expected, were brought to bear, but vainly, in hopes of inducing

the revered teacher at Aberdeen to enter upon that arduous task. He at length promised the editor of the *Expositor* that he might try "an A B C of the Apocalypse," and the present volume is the result. Two years after that promise he contributed a tentative article on the *date*, and afterwards another on the *design* of the Apocalypse. He was now thoroughly interested, and went on and made the book with which he says to reluctant ears that he means to close his literary work.

The Introduction is of the greatest value, and has relation to the authenticity, the date, and the design of the Revelation of John the Divine, together with an addendum in the shape of an able and conclusive rejoinder to Sir William Hamilton's far-famed attack on the genuineness and authenticity of the Apocalypse.

Dr. Brown's argument as to the date of the book leads him to the conclusion that the completed idea involved in the progressive disclosures of the sacred Scriptures "proclaims its place in the order of time to be in this book, as the fitting close of all revealed truth." In this view he is powerfully supported by antiquity, and on all grounds by Hengstenberg, but is opposed by Weiss and the prevailing chorus of contemporary voices. The internal evidence has always seemed to us to favor the older view, and nothing that we have met with that has been brought forward from external or other sources has, to our notion, shaken the solid foundations of the theory which has so long referred the Apocalypse to the age of Domitian, and the closing years of the century. It is, therefore, a ticklish question.

Principal Brown regards the future date of the millenium as utterly uncertain. After dealing ably with the structure of the Apocalypse, the venerable author takes up in a general and most interesting way the vision of the seven seals and the principle of their interpretation. He then discusses in a more or less particular manner the first, fifth, and sixth seals, the woman and the dragon, the war in Heaven, the preparations for the seventh seal, the seventh seal itself, and the seven trumpets. After this he brings under consideration, the dragon's new policy, the characteristics of the bestial power, the measuring of the temple, the altar and the worshippers, the two witnesses, their martyrdom, resurrection and ascension, the seven vials, with the choral hymns, and the key to the mystery. Then follows a summary; which is succeeded by an exposition of confirmatory predictions (2 Thess. ii. 1-12; 1 Tim. iv. 1-5). The remainder of the work is occupied with what is said of the fall of Babylon, the hallelujahs over its fall, the last war and end of Christ's public enemies, the thousand years, the thousand year's reign with Christ, the rest of the dead, satan's last effort and final defeat, one general judgment, concluding remarks and some valuable addenda.

The main scheme of this treatise may be said to stand or fall with the consecutive or historical view of the structure and contents of the Apocalypse. There are three widely divergent views on this subject. The first is what Auberlen has styled the church-historical view. The second is the allegorical or contemporaneous view. The third has been variously called the prophetic-symbolical, the pneumatic, the organic, etc. According to the first view, the book is strictly (to borrow Francis Bacon's phrase), "history written beforehand," and is to be interpreted like those chapters in Daniel which portray in advance the fortunes of the successive world-kingdoms. This has been the popular, and until the middle of the present century, the almost universal view of the church from a very early period. Among its innumerable modern representatives we may name Bengel and Elliott. Calvin never pretended to understand the Book of Revelation and refused to comment on it.

The second, or allegorical view, denies the fact and possibility of a supernatural prediction, and sees in the Apocalypse a figurative mirror of contemporaneous events. This has assumed two forms, the Jewish and the Christian, both of which are untenable and heterodox.

The third, or pneumatic, or organic, view denies that we have in the Apocalypse an uninterrupted consecution of events, and insists that we have there not one series chronologically succeeding upon another, but a system of mutually related but parallel series of events. This which has probably come to be the reigning scientific view in Germany and elsewhere at the present day, also maintains that even within the limits of one of these series the events recorded are epochal and symbolical rather than purely or prosaically historic.

The second view has from the nature of the case never found a lodgment amongst the upholders of evangelical truth. The choice has always lain betwixt the first and third. Principal Brown gave in his adhesion half a century ago to the first view, and still retains it. Dr. Brown's special presentation of this view is as might have been supposed an exceedingly sensible and conservative one. He is radically inimical to the empiricism, charlatanism and fanaticism sometimes connected with this subject. He also strongly opposes Professor Milligan's presentation of the third or organic view. Weiss, in his disquisition on the Apocalypse in his *New Testament Introduction*, is somewhat eclectic. If the third view is nevertheless, as we had been previously led to conclude, the only tenable one, it must be conceded to be the exegetical achievement of modern times and of the nineteenth century. It was also one of the many brilliant exploits of Germany. This view has assumed several forms. It appears to have been excogitated by Hoffman, who, however, Auberlen contends, laid too much stress on the future. It was developed by Hengstenberg, who, however, laid too much stress on the past. In its balanced and symmetrical shape it was advanced by Ebrard, and improved by Auberlen and Fairbairn. (The greatest of rather recent, if not all, works on the Apocalypse is part of the monumental commentary on the New Testament, by Meyer.) The third, *i. e.*, the pneumatic view, has been reduced to a practical form by our own Ramsey, in that noble volume, so redolent of hallowed wisdom and capacity, and spiritual piety, and earnestness, *The Spiritual Kingdom*.

Dr. Brown's convictions of fifty years ago, as to the alleged promise of a premillennial advent,¹ have been strengthened by time, observation, and study. He would seem to take the numeral and the noun literally. It appears to us that the number one-thousand is more likely to be indefinite or symbolical. The "Little Season" and the final conflict with Gog and Magog are treated here as well as they easily could be. The evil element amongst the nations is not destroyed, but only conquered and suppressed during the millennial period, and afterwards fanned by satan into a flame, and then a devouring conflagration. We should have liked the author to state explicitly whether he believed that conflict to be physical or spiritual, or both. Dr. Brown opposes the textual system of Westcott and Hort. This book sheds much light on individual texts.

H. C. ALEXANDER.

¹ *Christ's Second Coming: Will it be Pre-millennial?* T. & T. Clark: Edinburgh. Seventh Edition.

STEVENS'S "GALATIANS."

A SHORT EXPOSITION OF THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS. Designed as a Text-book for Class-room use and for Private Study. By George B. Stevens, Ph. D., D. D., Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in Yale University. Tall 12mo., pp. vii., 240. The Student Publishing Company, Hartford, Conn. 1891.

To any one who loves the Bible and knows what the just interpretation of the Epistle to the Galatians really involves and what *crucis criticorum* it has laid before the expositor, especially to one who has himself attempted to expound that grand polemic for the benefit of others, the very title of this new commentary is likely to be an "appetizer." The high source from which it emanates has a tendency to redouble this feeling of curious interest. A perusal of the unadorned but handy and well-printed volume, of which we have copied the inscription made on the title-page, will on the whole not disappoint but amply fulfil the reasonable expectations thus awakened. The accomplishment, it appears to us, in this instance approaches singularly near to the complete realization of the idea the author set before him as his aim. Was that aim the best one?

Several important things are to be considered just here. One is the correctness or incorrectness of the author's exegesis. Another is the felicity or infelicity of his method in presenting it. Still another is the propriety or impropriety of the author's own theological point-of-view; in other words, the tenability or untenability of his personal attitude towards the body of coherent doctrine which makes up the system of what was regarded by our fathers, and is doubtless also regarded by ourselves, as evangelical orthodoxy.

As to the first of these points, little is left to be desired. The exegesis (which, speaking broadly, is at once critical or linguistic, and logical, and at the same time doctrinal), is straightforward, honest, competent both as to learning and perspicacity, up to date, and sound in its results. That is to say, it is sound in the sense of extricating and stating for the benefit of the reader the genuine Pauline meaning. The discovery of that meaning is, of course, the final demand that could be made upon the exegete *pur et simple* in this case. Whether the private system espoused by the exegete himself is absolutely consistent with that of the inspired penman is another question, and one which might or might not be answered in the affirmative, according to circumstances.

The method our author has adopted of letting us know just what are his conclusions as to the apostle's intentions and positions in the book—indeed, so far as that was possible in comparatively brief compass, the exact sense of all its more important and many of its less important statements—strikes us most favorably. Some of his readers did not need the abounding evidence afforded by this small, but masterly work, of Professor Stevens's detailed and comprehensive acquaintance with all the special knowledge required of the New Testament scholar, or pertaining to the particular subject-matter. Now, there were various ways of demonstrating and utilizing these qualifications. Doctor Stevens might have given us, had he so chosen, an elaborate critical commentary after the pattern of those of Meyer or Bishop Ellicott. Or he might have given us an elaborate logical and theological commentary merely, or for the most part, like those of Calvin or Haldane. Or he might have endeavored to combine the two plans, somewhat after the fashion of

those of the late Doctor John Eadie. Or he might have given us a practical commentary in the general manner of Matthew Henry. He has wisely done none of these things. Meyer, Calvin, Eadie, and Henry have well-nigh exhausted the possibilities in the directions they have respectively pursued. More recent works of the practical class are plenty as blackberries. Besides, that sort of thing was not what was especially and imperiously wanted.

There are also obvious drawbacks to the acknowledged and indispensable value of such comparatively voluminous works. In marked avoidance of these, such writers as Jamieson, Faussett, and Brown, and notably (but on a wholly different scheme), Dr. Butler, have given us the interpretation of the whole Bible *in miniature*. All these preceding methods and constructions have their place, and their distinctive uses. What was still a great desideratum must of course be something wholly different. A single Gospel or Epistle can be handled more exhaustively *in petto* than the entire Scriptures. Something like what Dr. Stevens has now achieved for the book of Galatians had been done in a degree for this or other books, both of the Old and New Testaments—hardly (unequaled as that work is in certain high respects, and resembling this one indeed in its union of comprehensiveness and brevity) by Dr. Shedd for the book of Romans, perhaps more nearly but in a still more succinct and far more fragmentary way in his regular and direct comments on the text by the late illustrious Bishop of Durham. The method of Dr. Stevens is to take up and handle adequately above all others the greater and more salient points, and as many more as he can, both critically and doctrinally, with the minimum, but also the exactness of the modern linguistic nicety, together with a proportionate development of the logical and theological content of the Epistle; so as to put everything in a very limited compass, and to state it with a precision, a conciseness, and a force and lucidity, that rival the same traits as exhibited by the great masters, who are at the same time the great *teachers* of the physical sciences. The style reminds one agreeably of the didactic parts of Tyn-dal and Huxley.

The artistic effect is somewhat analogous to that of the incomparable outline sketches in sepia, with their deep or more delicate dashes or touches, in the way of shading, which are attributed to the leaders of the graphic art at the close of the middle ages—specimens of which are still to be met with in odd corners of old cabinets on the European continent.

The Greek and Hebrew text is introduced sparingly. The Hebrew type is heavy and plain. The ordinary English type is about the size employed in many double-leaded editorials. The words of the authorized version are printed much larger and very black. The author's governing motive was to introduce the student of the Bible to the religious and theological teaching of the Apostle Paul. He says, "The method of biblical study, comparatively new among us, which investigates each book of the Bible, or group of books which belong together by reason of common authorship or similarity of character as a whole, and explains all its parts in the light of their historic occasion, purpose and peculiarities, is one of so great value and importance, that it is certain to be more and more widely employed, and to be adapted in all practicable ways, to the popular study of the Bible. A wholly new light is shed upon the meaning of the biblical books when the historic situation in which they arose is understood and their occasion and immediate use made clear." The manual is dedicated to "that large and increasing company

of Bible students who are eager to gain a clearer understanding and a more intelligent appreciation of the sacred Scriptures."

The analysis of the Epistle results in the usual three-fold division into the apologetic, dogmatic, and "hortatory and practical" sections, each one of which embraces two chapters. These, our readers will perceive, might be reduced to a two-fold division, consisting of the apologetico-dogmatic, and the practical and hortatory sections. Professor Stevens, like his predecessors, omits to mention that the practical part of Paul's epistles in general, and memorably of this one, contains more or less intricate reasoning as well as mere hortation. The Yale teacher sees more clearly than most of the commentators on this book that the apologetic part relates just as much to his gospel as to his commission, if not more so. Both were in the fullest sense divine, and neither in any sense human. The grand point in the two first chapters is Paul's *independence* of man, both as to his own doctrine and his own office, and his consequent parity with Peter and the rest of the original twelve. The second section, it should be observed, under the three-fold division, is not simply *didactic*; it is in the first instance *polemic*. So that we may say that the first section is personal and apologetic; the second polemic and doctrinal; the third, practical and hortatory. The introduction (in the technical sense of that term), is brief but judicious. We naturally turn to the places that have originated the vexed questions, in order to put our author to the test as an exegete. When thus approached, and tapped upon, and sounded, the substance of this product rings like good bell-metal.

The analysis and exposition of the second chapter are undeniably those of a master in Israel. Bishop Lightfoot's mode of paraphrasing succinctly the entire scope is closely followed, and improved upon, in this volume, particularly in the preliminary analyses of chapters. We give an example. Referring to the circumcision of the Greek Titus, which had been advocated before the council, but was not exacted, he goes on to say: "There were, indeed, those who urged it, but I refused to allow it because of the presence of pharisaic extremists who, by insisting upon the necessity of circumcision in order to the attainment of salvation, sought to restrict our freedom as Christians from the law, and to put us again under its burdens; to have yielded would in this case have compromised the essential principles of the gospel (3-5)." The word "those" is here admirably chosen—as if for the purpose of excluding or evading Bishop Lightfoot's eccentric view that these were *apostles*, who afterwards gave in, and whose credit Paul here endeavors to save by hopelessly involved *anacolutha*, thus "making shipwreck of the grammar!" There is very little that is thus exegetically hazardous in this little book from Yale. The fifth and sixth verses are looked upon by Professor Stevens as a digression respecting the attitude of the extreme Jewish party, as contrasted with that of the apostles; verse six picking up again the thread which was dropped for the moment at verse three.

The contention now seems to be virtually abandoned that the Pauline visit to Jerusalem, mentioned in Gal. ii., is identical with that referred to in Acts xi. 30 and xii. 25. Meyer, indeed, goes so far as to pronounce the visit in Acts xi. and xii. as only "semi-historical," and to hold with others that Paul actually turned back before reaching Jerusalem. This view our author seems to approve, though the process of condensation has made him appear to be a little "non-committal." This view is needlessly derogatory to the inspired historian, and is unnecessary to

sustain the alleged and now almost demonstrable coincidence of the visit of Gal. ii. with that of Acts xv. If Paul did not actually get off the vessel at Jerusalem (which is enormously improbable) Luke's veracity would not inevitably be impeached in consequence. But, as our author himself unwittingly concedes to us, there is little occasion to resort to a contradiction or forced interpretation of the third evangelist. The second visit (Acts xi. 27-30), as Dr. Stevens expressly reminds us, was for a special purpose and Paul has no occasion to mention that visit here. He might have taken the position more explicitly that Paul's argument only called for the mention of *such* visits as lent any plausibility to the charge (or insinuation) that he had derived his commission from the Jerusalem College.

This has seemed to us a sufficient answer to the otherwise strong arguments of Calvin *in loco*, and of Brown in his *Ordo Secularum*, on the other side. Brown's chronology here (and the same is true of his chronology bearing upon the difficult question as to the length of the interval between Abraham and Moses, apparently adverted to in Gal. iii. 17), though beautifully argued out, would appear to be decisively set aside by the prevailing judgment of contemporary experts. The difference of view as to the duration of the Egyptian sojourn is certainly as old as the first century. Both the views find support in Josephus; and our author avers that "opinion is" still "divided as to which is the more correct." This question about the "four hundred and thirty years after" is intelligently, but very succinctly, handled by the Yale scholar. We add a few statements of our own. A faint suspicion in the minds of some continues to attach to the Hebrew text in Exodus as we now have it, which is opposed by the oldest text of the LXX. *there*, but followed in the Greek of Acts vii. 6, and seemingly corroborated by the weight of modern authority. If we conform the Hebrew text to that of the LXX. in Exodus, we appear to set the Bible at variance with itself, as well as to oppose what is pronounced by Meyer and others the authoritative, expert *dictum*. If we assume the Massoretic and scientific chronology to be the true one, the seeming conflict with Genesis and Galatians is hardly insuperable. There is an undoubted vagueness as to the *terminus a quo*; and why may not the surmise of Bengel be true, after all, that the apostle's count begins, not from Abraham, but from the last reiteration of the promise, namely, to Jacob? If this hypothesis be abandoned, the adversary would find it hard to pin Paul down to a decision in favor of the popular chronology, which, perhaps, he merely cites as the one accepted by his readers. Paul's argument called for a *notoriously long period*. The precise length of that period had nothing to do with the point or validity of his reasoning.

To revert to the second chapter, the last part of it is the most difficult passage of equal compass in the epistles, and is disposed of by the Yale professor in the most satisfactory manner. The initial paraphrase of this section is also and unequivocally excellent. The exposition here, and throughout the third chapter, in fact everywhere, is sober and conservative, and in most instances by no means novel. The selection, and the restatement and cogent defence of these positions, are, however, worthy of well-nigh unstinted praise. Galatians ii. 19 is more luminously discussed here than we have seen it done anywhere else, and the same is true of much of the context. His view of Galatians iii. 20, is cognate and in part identical with those of Winer and Scott, in part like that of Ellicott or Bishop Lightfoot. He makes the apostle argue from the relative and conditional nature of the Mosaic transaction to the conclusion that it "might be terminated

whenever the relations of the parties might require it." The promise, on the other hand, "was an act of God alone, and was absolute and unconditional."

Galatians iv. is admirably expounded. The question about "the time appointed by the Father" is dealt with sensibly. In the phrase "rudiments of the world," he follows Bishop Lightfoot in seeing a reference to what is "outward and visible, the symbols and pictures of spiritual realities," and in making the expression comprehend the ritualistic systems of the pagans as well as that of the Jews. He evidently regards Paul's allegory of Hagar and Sinai as an augmentative illustration. It must certainly be this, unless with Calvin we take the Old Testament narrative as being originally typical. He reminds us of Luther's keen saying that "Paul's allegorical arguments were *the painting of the house after it was built.*"

The third thing of importance which we said at the beginning called for consideration was the question as to the author's own theological standpoint. *Exegetically*, as we have seen, Professor Stevens is almost beyond criticism, better in his bright terse way than almost anybody else. He is sound and strong, loves the "Anglo-Saxon" idiom, and is usually clear as a bell.

When the late Dr. Nehemiah Adams of Boston, author of *A Southside View of Slavery*, asked Theodore Parker if Paul was a Calvinist, the honest free-thinker replied, there can be no doubt of that; the only debatable question is, was Paul right? Somewhat so (but only as to the Jewish "mould" of the thought), our author holds that Paul may embody the essential thought of the Spirit in his own inherited and fallible "thought-forms." The strict juridical view is contended for as *Paul's* view of justification!

H. C. ALEXANDER.

CONE'S GOSPEL CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL CHRISTIANITY.

GOSPEL CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL CHRISTIANITY: A Study of the Gospels and of the History of the Gospel Canon during the Second Century, with a Consideration of the Results of Modern Criticism. *By Orello Cone, D. D.* Pp. xii., 365. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1891.

"To the believers who fear criticism, and to the unbelievers who appeal to it," so runs the brief dedication of this book. Dr. Cone is evidently a man of an amiable turn of mind and means to be serious. His object in writing this book was unquestionably benevolent, and only benevolent. These facts, however, serve but to enhance the utter *ludicrousness* of the contrast between the hopes awakened by his dedication and the results produced by his performance. How he could ever seriously have hoped to calm the fears of believers, or correct the skepticism of unbelievers by writing such a book as he has written, utterly passes our poor comprehension. Few unbelievers would demand a more complete dismantling of the fortress of the Christian faith than is effected under his hand, and few believers would trouble themselves as to its fortunes thus dismantled.

The following quotation from Martineau, which appears upon one of the fly-leaves, will put the reader in possession of Dr. Cone's view-point better than anything that we can say: "No divine revelation can be delivered into human keeping without being shorn of its first lustre by the clouded region through which it has to pass. . . Yet there are discernible a few ineffaceable lineaments which could belong only to a figure unique in grace and majesty." The lineaments left after

the criticism favored by Dr. Cone has done its work are few indeed, and well deserve to be considered *ineffaceable*. If any remain it is simply because Dr. Cone has failed to be consistent in applying his own principles. Take a single specimen: "That theophanies and angelophanies do not belong to the sphere of history is a proposition which does not require demonstration to one who has the elements of the historical sense." Let this single principle be honestly and remorselessly applied, and it will not be difficult to forecast the result, so far as the gospel narratives, and the rest of the Scriptures, likewise, are concerned. It is, absolutely futile to say with Dr. Cone that "the angelophanies in the account of the resurrection do not convert that event into a myth, any more than the story of the resurrection of the saints in the first gospel renders the crucifixion unhistorical." If the story of the crucifixion were not otherwise corroborated, then, according to the principle enunciated above, it would have to be relegated to the sphere of myths along with the story of the resurrection of the saints, given in the same breath. The old maxim, *falsus in uno falsus in omnibus*, still commends itself to common sense as sound in spite of all the efforts that are being made to show that it does not apply to the writers of Scripture, or, at any rate, that it does not apply in its full force to them. Doubtless the discovery that a witness has inadvertently fallen into an erroneous statement will not seriously impair the value of the rest of his testimony. But, if he be detected in a single wilful falsehood, the whole of his evidence will be rendered suspicious, and, if not otherwise confirmed, practically worthless.

Dr. Cone first brands as legendary Matthew's account of "the birth and infancy of Jesus; the details of the temptation in the desert; the episode of Peter's walking on the water; the story of a piece of money to be found in the mouth of a fish; the rending of the veil of the temple; the resurrection of the saints at the time of the crucifixion; and the corruption of the guard placed at the tomb." He then attempts apparently to set down the introduction of such legendary matter to "naïveté" on the part of the writer of our Matthew. Now this "naïveté" is certainly a very pretty word with quite a pleasing foreign accent about it, and it may be all very well for Dr. Cone and those who think with him to use it to explain the introduction of legendary matter into—a "*gospel*"! Whether such an explanation is an exhibition of this charming "naïveté" on the part of Dr. Cone himself, or simply so much nonsense we shall not now pause to inquire. One thing is certain, however, and that is, that to the homely horse-sense of the average Anglo-Saxon there will seem to be as close a resemblance between this sort of "naïveté" and *lying* as there is between "two peas in a pod"

We mean no injustice to Dr. Cone, therefore let us hasten to add again that he is evidently a man of an amiable disposition, and writes with the sincere intention of helping somebody in some way. We may cherish the hope that his effort will not be altogether without success, even though it be in a very roundabout and indirect way, and one not anticipated or designed by the author. For his book is certainly useful as showing the logical outcome of certain critical principles, so-called, which are just now very much in vogue. The book, moreover, shows wide reading, and contains not a little useful information.

After what has been hinted a more detailed criticism here is unnecessary,
Columbia, S. C.

W. M. McPHEETERS.

BROWN'S HEBREW LEXICON.

A HEBREW AND ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. With an Appendix containing the Biblical Aramaic. Based on the Lexicon of William Gesenius as translated by Edward Robinson, late Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Edited with constant reference to the Thesaurus of Gesenius as completed by E. Rödiger, and with authorized use of the latest German editions of Gesenius' *Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament*. By FRANCIS BROWN, D. D., Davenport Professor of Hebrew and the Cognate Languages in the Union Theological Seminary, with the coöperation of S. R. Driver, D. D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, and Chas. A. Briggs, D. D., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology in the Union Theological Seminary (New York). Pp. xii., 80. אֵשֶׁר - אֵ. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1891.

Eight years ago it was announced in the *Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia* that Prof. Francis Brown was engaged in the preparation of a new Hebrew lexicon, based on Gesenius. As the publication of this work will doubtless mark an epoch in the history of Old-Testament philology and exegesis, the appearance of its first part is an event which calls for somewhat special notice. William Gesenius, "the father of modern Hebrew lexicography," was born in 1785, and died in 1842. He gave an almost unprecedented impulse to the cultivation of the Hebrew language and literature. These studies had sunk to a very low ebb at the time when he began his career. One of his most distinguished pupils, Dr. Edward Robinson, tells us that in 1829 he heard Gesenius himself say that when he began his labors at Halle twenty years before he had but fourteen hearers. This statement was made to a class of more than five hundred students. While he lived he was *facile princeps* among lecturers on Old-Testament topics; and even to this day, after the lapse of half a century, his grammar and lexicon hold the foremost place among learned helps in these studies, though, of course, both have been subjected to frequent revision. That there was, nevertheless, need for the new and radical revision undertaken by Prof. Brown and his collaborators is the first point made by the editors in their business-like prefatory note. Gesenius' *Lexicon Manuale Hebraicum et Chaldaicum in V. T. Libros* appeared in 1833, and was translated into English by Dr. Robinson in 1836. "This broad-minded, sound, and faithful scholar added to the successive editions of the book in its English form the newest materials and conclusions in the field of Hebrew word-study, receiving large and valuable contributions in manuscript from Gesenius himself, and, after the latter's death, carefully incorporating into his translation the substance of the Thesaurus, as its fasciculi appeared"—that is, the *Thesaurus Philologicus Criticus Linguae Hebraeae et Chaldaeae Veteris Testamenti*, begun by Gesenius some years earlier, left unfinished at his death, and substantially completed by Rödiger in 1853.

"But the last revision of Robinson's Gesenius was made in 1854, and Robinson died in 1863. The last English edition of Gesenius, prepared by Tregelles, and likewise including additions from the Thesaurus, dates as far back as 1859. In the meantime Shemitic studies have been pursued on all hands with energy and success. The language and text of the Old Testament have been subjected to a minute and searching inquiry before unknown. The languages cognate with Hebrew have claimed the attention of specialists in nearly all civilized countries. Wide fields of

research have been opened, the very existence of which was a surprise, and have invited explorers. Arabic, ancient and modern, Ethiopic, with its allied dialects, Aramaic, in its various literatures and localities, have all yielded new treasures; while the discovery and decipherment of inscriptions from Babylonia and Assyria, Phenicia, Northern Africa, Southern Arabia, and other old abodes of Shemitic peoples, have contributed to a far more comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the Hebrew vocabulary in its sources and its usage than was possible thirty or forty years ago. In Germany an attempt has been made to keep pace with advancing knowledge by frequent editions of the *Handwörterbuch*, although progress has been so great as to demand a more radical revision than any yet issued, but in England and America there has not been even so much as a serious attempt.


"The present editors consider themselves fortunate in thus having the opportunity afforded by an evident demand. Arrangements have been made whereby the rights connected with 'Robinson's Gesenius' are carried over to the present work, and exclusive authority to use the most recent German editions has been secured. They have felt, however, that the task which they had undertaken could not be rightly discharged by merely adding new knowledge to the old, or by substituting more recent opinions for others grown obsolete, or by any other form of superficial revision. At an early stage of the work they reached the conviction that their first and perhaps chief duty was to make a fresh and, as far as possible, exhaustive study of the Old Testament materials, determine the actual uses of words by detailed examination of every passage, comparing, at the same time, their employment in the related languages, and thus fix their proper meanings in Hebrew.

"In the matter of etymologies they have endeavored to carry out the method of sound philology, making it their aim to exclude arbitrary and fanciful conjectures, and in cases of uncertainty to afford the student the means of judging of the materials on which a decision depends.

"As to the arrangement of the work, they have considered it to be the only proper course to follow the Thesaurus in classifying the words according to their stems, and not to adopt a purely alphabetical order. The necessity of seeming to decide some questions of etymology which in their own minds are still open, is inseparable from such a course; they have submitted to this necessity in the desire to give students of Hebrew, from the outset some familiarity with the structure and formative laws of the Hebrew vocabulary. By frequently setting words that might offer especial difficulty—particularly those formed by prefixes or affixes—a second time in their alphabetic place, with cross-references, they have hoped to make the book available for all who learn to read the language of the Old Testament.

"That they have separated the Aramaic of the Bible from the Hebrew, and placed it by itself at the end of the book, is a change which they hope will commend itself on grounds of evident propriety.

"The work of preparing the lexicon has been divided as follows: Professor Driver is responsible for the pronouns, the prepositions, and the other particles, and for words etymologically related to these; Professor Briggs for terms important to Old Testament religion, theology, and psychology, and for their related words; Professor Brown for the other parts of the work, as well as for the plan and the general editorial management."

In this distribution Professor Driver has doubtless been assigned the work for which he is best fitted. He is most widely known as the author of what Dr. William Henry Green has justly called an "admirable treatise" on "The Use of the Tenses in Hebrew." And such an article as the one here given on , for instance, shows that he is no less thorough and felicitous in handling the particles than he was in that celebrated monograph on the verb. The gravest misgivings concerning the new lexicon will be felt in regard to the part assigned to Professor Briggs. For, although he has written a book on these subjects which even Mr. Gladstone pronounces "a valuable authority," and which, in spite of the faults that we have

elsewhere endeavored to point out, is very helpful to critical students; still, as he has latterly shown no very special genius for clear and scriptural definitions, to put it mildly, we are sure that many will have a sense of sharp incongruity in the assignment to Dr. Briggs of the "terms important to Old Testament religion, theology, and psychology," and will wonder whether the toning down practiced by Robinson and Tregelles upon the radical tendencies of Gesenius will be equally observable in this new edition. As to Professor Brown, if he has a superior in Semitic philology among American scholars, we do not know who it is. There can be no question then of the competency of the editors in point of learning and ability. And, while they all belong to what we in America regard as an advanced school of criticism, this fact will not materially detract from the value of the work for conservative students, so far as we are able to judge from the contents of this first part. There is, however, a cool assumption throughout of the truth of the extreme analysis of the Pentateuch; we are sometimes told how often a given word is used by E., J., P., and D. respectively, and the "earlier Isaiah" is distinguished from the later. Now, inasmuch as E, J, P, and D never had any existence save in the imaginations of the critics, and inasmuch as the "earlier Isaiah" was the only Isaiah, these distinctions seem to us to occupy valuable space to no purpose. But, just as former editions of Gesenius have been accorded the foremost place among Hebrew lexicons by radicals and conservatives alike, in spite of the author's erraticalness, so we have little doubt the work before us will supersede all others, notwithstanding the critical theories of the editors. But of this we can speak with more certainty after other parts have appeared.

By the way, it is an interesting inquiry why the conservative scholarship of our time is so unproductive, not only in the departments of textual, exegetical, and historical criticism, but also in the department of sacred philology. It is useless to deny the fact, and equally vain to plead that there is no necessity for new work in these departments. For even if that were granted in regard to those subjects concerning which our theological prepossessions have most weight, the question still remains, why is it that the best works on Hebrew grammar and lexicography also are written by men who belong to the "progressive" school? Are we reminded of Dr. Green's Grammar? The answer is, *exceptio probat regulam*.

The new lexicon represents prodigious industry as well as vast and varied learning. It will be much larger than the old Gesenius, although very few passages of Scripture are given in full, as they were in that. But "in nearly all words every passage is referred to; so that the dictionary will be a concordance as well." It is a marvel of condensation in references. Over five hundred abbreviations are employed. It is not so easy to find what you want as in the old edition. Henry Ward Beecher said that if he should attempt to look out his text in the Old Testament in the original, it would take him most of the week to ascertain what it was. Those who sympathize with him on this point, and we are sorry to say their name is legion, will not be specially encouraged to make such investigations by the arrangement of the material in the work before us. But of course increasing familiarity with the new distribution on the page will diminish this difficulty to some extent. And, as we said before, we believe the lexicon is destined to come into general use.

One notable difference between this and former editions of Gesenius is the exclusion of much of the grammatical glossing with which the learned German was accus-

tomed to cumber the pages of his dictionary. The letter **𐤀**, to which Robinson's Gesenius devotes a whole page is dismissed by Professor Brown in three lines. Thus: "**𐤀**, *Aleph*. first letter; in post B. Heb. = numeral I (and so in marg. of printed M T); **𐤀** = 1000; no evidence of this usage in OT times." We beg leave to differ. We believe there *is* evidence of this usage in Old Testament times. As to derivations, we find many cherished etymologies disproved and rejected. But every student of the old Gesenius will sympathize with us in our gratification at the prospect of finding a greatly reduced number of roots meaning to *shine*. In giving the corresponding words in cognate languages the Arabic, Syriac, Ethiopic and Greek characters have been used, but in the case of the Assyrian a transliteration is given instead of the cuneiform characters. This is well. The printing is wonderfully accurate, but in a number of cases there is not a good impression of the vowel points. Further strictures, such for instance as we may have to make upon the treatment of particular words, we must reserve for another occasion.

Hampden-Sidney.

W. W. MOORE.

MATHESON'S SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT OF ST. PAUL.

SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT OF ST. PAUL. *By the Rev. George Matheson, M. A., D. D., F. R. S. E., Minister of the Parish of St. Bernards, Edinburgh.* A. D. F. Randolph & Co., New York; William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1891. Pp. 324; Crown, 8vo.

The learned author of "*Can the Old Faith Live with the New?*" in presenting this later contribution, fairly states the subject matter of his book in its title. It is not a biography; not an attempt to set forth in proper connection the external facts and influences of an individual life. It is the more difficult attempt to so *interpret* these external facts and forces as to reveal the nature and extent of those subjective changes which mark the less obtrusive progress of the inner life. In this study Dr. Matheson does not propose to sketch anew a life so well delineated by Benson and Lardner, by Conybeare and Howson, and others. He does not begin in Celicia and close in Rome a narrative replete with thrilling incident. We find here no account of the missionary journeys, the travels, voyages, sermons, persecutions, escapes, shipwrecks and miracles of the world's greatest preacher.

Our author sets for himself the far more difficult task of tracing the inner spiritual history of Paul, from the moment of conversion till he was "ready to be offered."

The problem for which solution is sought in these fresh and stimulating pages is this:

"Assuming that the thirteen epistles of St. Paul are genuine, and waiving for the present all questions of Biblical criticism, is it possible to regard them as marking the stages of a progressive development? Is it possible, out of these alone, and without the aid of any foreign materials, to construct a fairly correct picture of the successive phases of Paul's Christian experience? The design of the book is, therefore, a limited one: It is strictly confined within these thirteen epistles. Even within these boundaries, its title involves an additional limit. On the one hand, it is a development of St. Paul, not of Saul of Tarsus; on the other hand, it is his *spiritual* development, as distinguished alike from the course of his outer life and the growth of his intellectual system."

In the effort to solve his abstruse problem the author has rigidly ignored all authority except that of the apostle's own epistles. With the exception of some

facts gleaned from *The Acts*, he uses no other material. There occurs in the book, we believe, no citation from any uninspired work.

The dominant idea of the discussion seems to be this: The thoughtful letters of a sober mind delivering itself on any given subject, at intervals covering a long succession of years, must, when carefully scrutinized in their consecutive order, surely indicate the modifications of that mind, the trend of its development, during that period. Applying this idea in the study of Paul's inner life, we find ourselves in possession of thirteen letters professedly written by his hand, extending in chronological order from 1st Thessalonians to 2nd Timothy, and covering a period of from 16 to 20 years. As these letters all deal with moral and religious truth alone, they may be expected, if scrutinized in order, to indicate the progress of not merely intellectual, but *spiritual* development, which transformed the narrow Pharisee into the great-souled propagandist of Christianity, whose faith and zeal craved the salvation of a world; whose warm sympathies and untiring efforts recognized no limits more narrow than the fallen race. Our author seeks to trace in these epistles the foot-prints of this spiritual progress from Jerusalem to Rome. And he rightly holds that such development, such broadening and maturing of the spiritual nature of the apostle, is entirely consistent with the plenary inspiration of his earlier as well as his later epistles.

It must be confessed that some of Dr. Matheson's positions seem fanciful. Yet, as a whole, the book is healthful, and helpful to the Bible student. Its tone is evangelical, its design original, its execution scholarly.

Maryesville, S. C.

W. J. McKAY.

IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. *By Tobias Mullen, Bishop of Eric.* 8vo., pp. 664. New York: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1892.

A thorough study from the Romanist standpoint of the Old Testament Canon. Many valuable arguments and suggestions are given, and the author is evidently most familiar with the bibliography of the subject as well as the condition, history and value of ancient manuscripts. His chief reliance for the establishment of the Canon, however, is placed upon the *dicta* of the church, through council and pope, both of whom he of course believes to be infallible in its determination. The Canon for which he argues is that set forth by the Council of Trent, viz. : the same Old Testament books which Protestants accept, with the addition of seven of the apocryphal books. The author distinguishes between these books, however, and practically admits the uncertainty of the latter seven, by classifying them as protocanonical and deutero-canonical. The author, in treating his main topic, takes occasion to discuss coördinate subjects, and hotly contends for the Douay Version and denounces King James' and the Revised Versions. It is an interesting book to those who wish to see the Romanists' view of the subject.

THE SERVANT OF THE LORD IN ISAIAH XL-LXVI. Reclaimed to Isaiah as the Author, from Argument, Structure and Date. *By John Forbes D. D., LL. D., Emeritus Professor of Oriental Languages, Aberdeen.* 8vo. pp. xiii., 252. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1890.

Though at the advanced age of eighty-seven years, and naturally living in memory in a period largely anterior to that in which we have had so large a development of critical studies and theories, the author shows great familiarity with the more recent movements, and deals ably with all the elements which have lately been so prominent in the study of Isaiah. His present work is an able, scholarly, critical study of the authorship of the latter part of Isaiah's prophecy. It consists of two parts, the first containing analyses and translations of the last twenty-seven chapters and arguments for the traditional view of their authorship. The arguments are derived from external testimony, from the improbabilities attending the critical view, as that the writer of these chapters should have remained unknown, should have had such a pure diction, etc., from the unity of the writer's plan, which forbids the composite idea, and which can be accounted for much more readily by the acceptance of the older view, from the relation of this part of Isaiah to the rest of the book, from the use of proper names which belonged to the period of the true Isaiah, and the suggestions or implications of the fact that the temple and Jerusalem were yet existing, etc. The second part of the book is of less value, though useful as a study in connection with the first part. It is a discussion of Isaiah vii.-xii.

THE PROGRESS OF DOCTRINE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. Considered in Eight Lectures Delivered before the University of Oxford on the Bampton Foundation. *By Thomas Dehany Bernard, M. A., of Exeter College, and Rector of Walcot.* 12mo. pp. 258. \$1.00. New York: American Tract Society. 1891.

A work that will never grow old. This book deserves the demand which calls for renewed editions of it. It is already too well established in the hearts and minds of our readers to need more than that attention be called to it.

MESSIANIC PROPHECIES IN HISTORICAL SUCCESSION. *By Franz Delitzsch.* Translated by Samuel Ives Curtiss, Professor in Chicago Theological Seminary. 12mo. pp. xii, 232. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1891.

In this work, completed but a little while before his death, and containing the substance of lectures delivered to his classes, and the publication of which grew out of the author's interest in the Jewish race, Professor Delitzsch considers the Messianic prophecies in their historical order. He does not confine himself simply to the prophecies in the narrower sense, but includes under the same idea promises and hopes relating to the future salvation. In his development of his theme, the author's devotion to Israel and desire for their salvation, his fervor and consecration, are no less manifest than the accuracy of his scholarship, the broadness of his learning. In dealing with some of the Messianic prophecies, his studies and expositions are based upon the results of the modern criticism, and that of the most advanced type. Indeed, he asserts that "the course of development of christological expectations cannot be determined without the concurrence of literary and historical criticism."

THE TEMPLE OPENED: A Guide to the Book. *By Rev. W. H. Gill, A. M., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of the Evangel, Philadelphia, and author of "Credimus."* Cr. 8vo. pp. 563. \$2.00. Philadelphia: Published by the author. 1891.

A unique and most valuable book. All that one must usually seek in ponderous volumes on Biblical Introduction is found here in compact form. By question and answer it brings out all the problems and facts of biblical study. It gives a comprehensive view of the word from without and from within. In the first part, the author deals with man and religion, reason and revelation, inspiration, the canon, the apocrypha, criticism, chronology, geography, etc.; and in the second part with the books of the Bible, their origin, date, authorship, authenticity, harmony, etc. He views all these subjects from the conservative and orthodox standpoint. He shows great familiarity with the modern discussions and theories. It is a book for Sabbath-school teachers everywhere, and may be used with advantage by the maturer classes and in institutions of learning as a text-book.

STUDIES IN THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES. *By Alexander Mair, D. D., Morning-side, Edinburgh.* 12mo., pp. xvi., 396. \$2.00. New York: American Tract Society. 1892.

This is a second and revised edition. A new chapter is added, and a most valuable one, on "Some Recent Reverses of Negative Criticism." This chapter traces the recession of critical thought from the advanced position of Baur and gives

some of the causes for the more conservative views which critics of the New Testament have been forced to take, especially in reference to the date of the Gospels. The studies are separate and each is complete in itself. They are on Christianity and Physical Science, Intellectual Difficulties in Religion, Revelation and Inspiration, Early Historical Testimony to the Authenticity of the New Testament, The Testimony of the Unquestioned Epistles of Paul, Some Recent Reverses of Negative Criticism, Miracles, The Resurrection of Christ and What it Implies, The Unique Personality of Christ, Some Important Converging Lines, and Christianity Proving Itself by the Principle of the "Survival of the Fittest." They are all scholarly, but cast in a popular mould and are well worthy the handsome form in which they have been republished.

THE IMPREGNABLE ROCK OF HOLY SCRIPTURE. *By William Ewart Gladstone.*
Pp. 174. Cloth. 35 cts. New York: John B. Alden. 1891.

A cheap edition of the recent valuable work, the chapters of which first appeared in the *Sunday School Times*, and noticed at length in a recent number of this QUARTERLY.

THE SERMON BIBLE. St. Luke i. to St. John iii. 12mo. pp. 414. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1891.

This is the seventh volume in a series which we have already described. Like the others, it contains outlines of sermons on the Scriptures embraced, by eminent preachers, obtained from sources otherwise inaccessible, as well as from homiletical literature, and very complete references to theological treatises, commentaries, etc. These references are of special value in acquainting the student readily with the sources of the best modern thought on a given text.

GREAT THOUGHTS OF THE BIBLE. *By the Rev. John Reid, Author of "Voices of the Soul Answered in God," etc.* 12mo.: pp. xiii., 318. Cloth; \$1.50. New York: Wilbur B. Ketcham. 1891.

The author groups some of the great thoughts of the Bible in three parts: those which pertain to certain characteristics of the Saviour, those which refer to the salvation he effects, and those which pertain to the relations and condition of the saved. He presents many thoughts which are not new altogether, but certainly placed in new and striking relations. Occasionally the headings or first lines lead one to suspect the author's soundness or to be startled, as for instance, in the chapter on "The Saved are blessed with Sinless Character," but as we read on, we find that he is referring entirely to the saved in their heavenly home, and not on earth. Another instance of the same kind is found in the discussion of "The Fatherhood of God," where, however, he is careful to warn the reader against a mistaken application of the doctrine. The book is full of power and beauty, and is well worth reading.

ISAAC AND JACOB; THEIR LIVES AND TIMES. *By George Rawlinson, M. A., F. R. G. S., Rector of All Hallows, Canon of Canterbury, etc.* 12mo.; pp. viii., 186. \$1.00. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1891.

Canon Rawlinson had not here the same fine opportunity to display that special learning which has so splendidly fitted him for his work, as in previous publications.

He has, nevertheless, made large use of the progress of geographical and archæological research in his study of the lives of these patriarchs, and has given us a book of rare interest and instructiveness. This compact little volume belongs to the series of "Men of the Bible," which we have before had occasion to heartily commend.

THE INTERWOVEN GOSPELS AND GOSPEL HARMONY. The four histories of Jesus Christ blended into a complete and continuous narrative in the words of the Gospels, with a complete interleaved Harmony. *Compiled by Rev. William Pittenger, Author of "Oratory, Sacred and Secular," etc.* 12mo. pp. 245, Cloth, 50 cts. New York: John B. Alden. 1891.

A third and enlarged edition of a work already well-known. The addition consists mainly in the introduction of a Harmony, accomplished by giving, in small type, on pages interleaved opposite the main account, (which follows the leading record, from whatever Gospel it be,) the other accounts and underlining the words that are peculiar to each. This method enables the student to see at a glance not only what each evangelist records, but what he records that others do not.

STUDIES IN JOHN'S GOSPEL. The Gospel of Christ's Deity. *By David Gregg, D.D.* 12mo. pp. 348. Cloth, \$1.25. New York: American Tract Society. 1891.

A series of twenty-four discourses on the salient feature of John's Gospel, so presenting them as to show their convergence upon the one great theme of the book, the Lord's divinity. The work is sound, able and suggestive. Its special value will be found in the happy manner in which it unifies the thought of this Gospel and makes the study of it more philosophic and practical.

THE EPIC OF SAUL *By William Cleaver Wilkinson.* 8vo., pp. 386. Cloth \$2.50. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1891.

A poem, in blank verse, of eight thousand lines, divided into fourteen books, and embodying the facts in Paul's life given in Scripture, with such additions from imagination to that narrative as to complete an account of his career up to the time of his conversion. Parts of the work have appeared from time to time in various journals and have been well received. A visit to Palestine during the time of the preparation of the volume aided the author in his effort to furnish a correct geographical and topographical setting to the poem.

THE LAND OF HOLY LIGHT: A Book of Travel Through Bible Countries. *By Robert Pollok Kerr, D. D., author of "Presbyterianism for the People," "The People's History of Presbyterianism," "The Voice of God in History," and "Hymns of the Ages."* 12mo., pp. 346. \$1.50, post-paid. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1891.

We are not disposed to join in the screed against travellers' writing their experiences and observations in the Holy Land. True, a four weeks' tour does not give one much opportunity for exploration, and there is danger of hasty generalizations; but it must be remembered that the period is not so much one of study as of the gathering up of the result of years of thought and of the bringing together of many previously unconnected materials. Besides, these books being usually limited in their circulation to the circle of acquaintance or influence in which the traveller

moves, the more of them the better, if we desire to see general information concerning the present condition of the Holy Land and the lessons to be derived from its history and scenes. These reasons apply with special force in the case of Dr. Kerr. His well-known powers of observation, long years of careful study, especially in the line of history, and ability in graphic description fit him well for foreign travel and narration; and his versatility and attractiveness as a writer and large circle of admiring acquaintance and influence will cause the record of his journeyings to be more generally read than usual with this class of books.

The title and sub-title do not altogether agree, but one will see the appropriateness of the latter on opening the book and finding in it chapters on the ocean voyage, Constantinople, Bekaa and Baalbec, Cairo, Alexandria, Athens, Rome, Naples, etc., in addition to those on Palestine proper. It is a book of personal reminiscences, pleasantly told, vivid descriptions of the peoples, and cities, villages and countries visited, and a happy application of many precious Bible truths which a view of the Land of Holy Light suggested.

A DEFENCE OF JUDAISM VERSUS PROSELYTING CHRISTIANITY. *By Isaac M. Wise.*
8vo. pp. 129. Cincinnati and Chicago: The American Israelite. 1889.

Rabbi Wise announces that this book was written and published as a response to that "missionary chieftain . . . who took a vulgar renegade from Judaism by his hand, and appointed him a missionary to the Jews," an act which he denounces as an insult to Judaism to be most bitterly resented. From this as well as the title the reader may judge of the character of the book. The expectation excited by this, however, is in some respects happily unfulfilled. After the first chapter, the author leaves off vituperation and undertakes the discussion of the main question, why the Israelite cannot embrace Christianity. He writes from the standpoint of universal brotherhood, universal salvation and the supremacy of reason. He avows the highest respect for Judaism, Christianity, Islamism and every other religion "in harmony with the postulate of reason and the standard of conscience." He denies the doctrine of sin, and finds sinners only in "those exceptional persons who are possessed of the demon of folly," regarding sin in the same light as a defection of the mind. He agrees with Canon Taylor in the denunciation of general or special missionary work "among the so-called unconverted," as a work which has no other result in his judgment than the increase of hypocrisy and the annual waste of millions of dollars. Coming directly to the point at issue, he discusses the following subjects: Rejecting the Evangelical Story from Historical Motives; The Testimony of Miracles is Inadmissible; The Doctrine of Divine Immortality; Universal Salvation without the Messiah; Mundane Happiness depends on Morality, not on Christology, on Intelligence, not on Christ; No Christology in Moses, in Isaiah, in Jeremiah, in the Psalms, in Zechariah. As a "Reformed Israelite" he argues for what he calls "denationalized Judaism," a principle already partly realized in Christianity, the Islam, the philosophemes of most prominent philosophers, the government of free nations, the reign of freedom, etc., as the only religion that will secure man's present and eternal happiness. This, he argues, was what the prophets preached and predicted. The book is valuable as being a bold, defiant, outspoken attack from an able enemy upon the outposts of Christianity, and it will be well for all to read it who would intelligently understand and appreciate the work of missions to the Jews and its special difficulties.

THE PREACHER AND HIS MODELS. The Yale Lectures on Preaching, 1891. By Rev. James Stalker, D. D., Author of "*Imago Christi*," "*The Life of Jesus Christ*," etc. 12mo; pp. xii., 284. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1891.

The careful study of this book, after much familiarity with its predecessors in the Yale Lectures, inclines us to put it at the very front of that admirable series. It is most attractive in its clear-cut style, incisiveness and simplicity. One is never at a loss to understand the author's meaning. In this respect it is a model. The author, though comparatively a young man, writes like a veteran. His own rich experience shows throughout. This it does, not obtrusively, but in the happy application of his thoughts; or, rather, in the consciousness which the reader has that the lecturer has found in his own life the actualization of the principles set forth in the models whom he describes. After an introduction in which he gracefully tells of the request made by the Yale authorities that he consider the subject of preaching from a new point of view, and in which he gives us a most engaging analysis of the critical disposition of students, and practical, common-sense comments upon that subject, he presents his theme, the prophets and apostles, represented in Isaiah and Paul, the preacher's models. He shows that this theme does not lead one away from present-day needs, nor cause one to miss the opportunity of dealing with practical work. In the first four chapters the author discusses the preacher as a Man of God, as a Patriot, as a Man of the Word, as a False Prophet. In the remaining chapters, he treats of the preacher as a Man, as a Christian, as an Apostle, as a Thinker. The prophet and the apostle are presented from these standpoints, and the fundamental principles of preaching and of the preacher's life, authority and duty found in them. From this brief statement it will be seen that the treatment is eminently scriptural and philosophical, and at the same time practical. The author goes to the foundation of things, and has nothing to do with preaching as an art, except so far as it is a holy art, justified in the life and work of prophet and apostle. We heartily recommend the book as one remarkably fresh, stimulating and suggestive.

SONS OF GOD. By Rev. S. D. McConnell, D. D., Rector of St. Stephen's Church, Philadelphia. Author of "*History of the American Episcopal Church*," etc. 12mo. pp. 259, \$1.50. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1891.

Eighteen sermons on practical themes, as The Family Record, Jesus' Working Theory of Life, Personal Religion, The Law of Progress in Religion, etc. Of their soundness our readers may judge from such statements as these: "Humanity is divine. Which is but another way of saying that 'we are God's off-spring.' This fundamental assumption that men literally share in the nature of God, as a child shares in the nature of its father, I believe to be the starting point of all religion, and the rescuing this truth from oblivion to be the distinctive work of Jesus Christ." By the "Sons of God" he means all men. One may expect what will follow from this "starting point" of the preacher's doctrine. The "fall," he regards as an ascent. Speaking of our first parents eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, he says, that "they attained the point where they could comprehend moral distinctions, they passed beyond the brute, and took their places as sovereign citizens in the republic of spirits." These specimens may be taken as a type of the book.

STUDIES OF CHARACTER FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT. *By Thomas Guthrie, D. D.* 12mo., pp. 436. \$1.00. New York: E. B. Treat. 1891.

Another of the Robert Carter and Brothers books, wisely republished by the purchaser of its plates. The Old Testament characters portrayed are Abraham, Eliezer, Joseph, Moses, Joshua, Caleb, Boaz, Ruth, Gideon, Hannah, Samuel, Jonathan, David, Solomon, Rehoboam, and Jehu. Many books of a similar kind and dealing with the same subjects have been published of late, but none that surpass this standard volume in richness of thought, figure, analysis, and application.

THE CHRISTIAN APOSTOLATE. Its Principles, Methods and Promise in Evangelism, Missions, and in Social Progress. *By W. W. Everts, D. D., Author of "Pastors' Hand-Book," "Life and Thoughts of Foster," etc.* 12mo., pp. 533. \$1.50. New York: Fleming H. Revell. 1891.

We confess to a little uncertainty as to the meaning of the term Christian Apostolate, as used by the author. At times he seems to use it in the sense of the body of truth, the faith delivered to the saints, then again as meaning the church in her organized form, and sometimes as expressing the ministry and Christian work. A clearer definition would be helpful. So also throughout the work there is lacking that clearness of style which is needful to give readableness to a book. The treatise is in three parts. Part I. sets forth the cardinal principles of Christianity as spiritual forces, and as illustrated and enforced by the Testimony of Miracles, Prophecy, Atonement, the Holy Spirit, Probationary Promise, and Consecrated Individualism. By probationary promise the author means the opportunity given to nations, families and individuals by the advent and proclamation of Christ, an opportunity or advantage which carries with itself a corresponding promise and peril. In consecrated "individualism," he refers to the relation of the individual as the unit of social forces, not to that doctrine of individualism as a determining factor in doctrine, which has lately sought to force itself upon Christian thought. A different name would have been better, under the circumstances. Part II. deals with the Christian Apostolate as organized in the church, the factors of church power, evangelism in home and foreign missions, etc. Here the author makes a plea for unity, and regards the divisions of the church and of missions as a wasting of the resources available for Christianizing the world, and as a means of accounting in part for the delay of the fulfilment of Christ's great commission. In a chapter on "The World's Outlook," he presents an admirable summary of the work of missions at the present day. Part III. traces the relation of the church or Christian Apostolate to the problem of social progress, civil liberty, education, philanthropy, public charities, anti-slavery, and temperance movements, moral, prison, and labor reform. The entire work is characterized by great earnestness and consecration, and is a strong appeal for greater aggressiveness in evangelizing the world.

MENS CHRISTI, and Other Problems in Theology and Christian Ethics. *By John Steinfort Kedney, D. D., Professor of Divinity in Seabury Divinity School, author of "Hegel's Æsthetics," etc.* 12mo., pp. 201. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1891.

Six lectures on the question of Christ's knowledge and of inspiration as affected by the doctrine of the Kenosis; on the doctrine of atonement; on the possibilities of

the future, as determining the mode of human moral activity; on the functions of the Christian ministry; on the doctrine of "A Nature in God"; on the impotence and the right use of imagination in dealing with Christian doctrine. They are sometimes rich in thought and suggestive, though marred by obscurity of style and technicalities which will place them beyond the understanding of the average reader. They are all constructed upon the theologico-scientific order, and an attempt to develop new methods of theological statement. His view of inspiration may be judged from the statement, on page 27, "All Christians are inspired, and upon this must be built whatever further inspiration is possible. That the distinction [between all Christians' inspiration and that of the New Testament writers] is one of degree and not of kind is shown by the fact that the results of such inspiration, as discovered in the utterances of Jesus and of the New Testament writers, can be reasonably, and by degrees entirely, followed, apprehended, thought and made practical by the Christian mind."

LIFE IN CHRIST AND FOR CHRIST. *By the Rev. Handley C. J. Moule, M. A., Principal of Ridley Hall, and formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.* 24mo. pp. 132. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1890.

A dainty little volume, beautifully printed and bound, containing six discourses on the relations between Christ and his believing people. It breathes a deeply devotional spirit, and sets forth the union of the believer with Christ as a doctrine and fact that should be as practical as it is assuring.

OUR FATHER'S KINGDOM. *By Julius H. Seelye.* 16mo; pp. 36. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1890.

A baccalaureate address, based upon the second and third petitions of the Lord's Prayer. It contrasts the kingdoms of trade and philosophy with the kingdom of grace among men, and points out, in most admirable rhetoric and the choicest thought, the permanence of the principles of the kingdom of God, and their supreme value as a rule of life.

FELLOWSHIP WITH CHRIST, and Other Discourses Delivered on Special Occasions. *By R. W. Dale, LL. D., Birmingham.* 12mo; pp. 368. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1891.

Fourteen sermons by the well-known Birmingham pastor, and all of them worthy of the permanent form thus given them. They are full of unction, sound, evangelical, and appear in that delightful rhetoric characteristic of all Dr. Dale's writings and utterances. Some of the topics discoursed upon are—Fellowship with Christ; The Risen Christ; The Christian Gospel and the Spirit of God; God's Greatness and Condescension; Social Science and the Christian Faith; Faith and Physical Science; The Ministry Required by the Age; The Unity of the Church; and Propitiation.

MEMORIES OF GENNESARET. *By John R. McDuff, author of "Morning and Night Watches," etc.* 12mo. pp. viii., 388. \$1.00. New York: E. B. Treat. 1891.

These beautiful chapters on the scene of Christ's work, his home, his companions, and the miracles wrought by him upon or near the Sea of Galilee, or Lake

Gennesaret, are of perennial value. More modern treatises or expositions cannot displace them nor detract from their interest and delightfulness. The new owners of the plates have done well to issue this edition of so well known and so useful a book.

MORNING BY MORNING ; or Daily Readings for the Family and the Closet. *By C. H. Spurgeon.* 12mo. pp. viii., 408. Cloth, \$1.00. New York: American Tract Society. 1891.

EVENING BY EVENING ; or Readings at Eventide for the Family and the Closet. *By C. H. Spurgeon.* 12mo. pp. viii., 400. Cloth, \$1.00. *The Same Publishers.*

These books are not new but they are as fresh and helpful as on the day they were first published. They are composed of comments and spiritual suggestions drawn from short passages of Scripture, one for each day, and a page devoted to each day of the year, with a suitable selection of hymns for week days and Sabbaths. They will be found particularly useful to those who from timidity or consciousness of ill-qualification hesitate to set up the family altar, or who, having set it up, allow the service about it to become cold and perfunctory.

THE ENGLISH REFORMATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, with Chapters on Monastic England and the Wycliffite Reformation. Illustrated by maps and portraits. *By W. H. Beckett.* Cr. 8vo. pp. 312. \$1.40. London: The Religious Tract Society. New York: Fleming H. Revell. 1890.

The seventh of the "Church History Series." The author has traversed the ground thoroughly, and shows unusual acquaintance with both the history and literature of the subject. He has packed a vast amount of information into this small volume. It is written in popular style and can be enjoyed by young people as well as students. An appendix and ample foot-notes contain the more critical part of the study. The maps and illustrations are good, and a copious index makes the work useful for ready reference. We heartily commend it.

HYMNS OF THE AGES, for Public and Social Worship. *Selected and arranged by Robert P. Kerr, D. D.* 8vo. pp 306. \$1.00. For Introduction, 75 cts. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1891.

Dr. Kerr has added this to the many books that have come from his pen. It is a collection of hymns and tunes, suitably arranged and clearly printed, from the widest range and selected for their real worth or because of their long-tested popularity. As each critic of such a collection is apt to be influenced by his own associations or taste in passing judgment in detail upon its contents, an analysis of the hymns and tunes and criticisms upon their setting would be worthless. We are therefore content to mention the special features by which this book is distinguished from others. And first of all, it is prepared by one who both knows the needs of average congregations and is qualified to provide for them. He is a man of exquisite taste and has the capacity for educating others to the same standard. Next, the book is in attractive form, compact, clearly and neatly printed, except here and there little typographical errors, which the next edition will correct, light in weight and attractive to the eye. It comprises 682 hymns and doxologies, which all intelligent

pastors know is a sufficiently large number for all practical purposes. The tunes are chosen from a wide range, and embrace melodies which have been popular in the Scotch and English churches as well as those more familiar in America. It contains a goodly number of both hymns and tunes composed by Dr. Kerr himself and breathing his spirit and mind. A special feature of it is its low price. It was made to be used, and to be used in congregations that have not been able to afford the voluminous collections hitherto offered to the public. It is the compiler's contribution to the great cause of congregational singing. We cordially recommend it for the examination of sessions and church committees.

THE CRUISE OF THE MYSTERY IN McALL MISSION WORK. *By Louise Seymour Houghton, Author of "Fifine," etc.* 12mo., pp. 410. \$1.25. New York: American Tract Society. 1891.

A very pleasant story, weaving together many facts and incidents connected with the boat or river work of the McAll Mission in France. It is written and published with a view to aiding in the purchase and maintenance of a properly constructed house-boat. It is handsomely printed and illustrated.

PERSIA: EASTERN MISSION. A Narrative of the Founding and Fortunes of the Eastern Persia Mission. With a Sketch of the Versions of the Bible and Christian Literature in the Persian and Persian-Turkish Languages. *By the Rev. James Bassett, Author of "Persia: Land of the Imams."* pp. 353. Price, \$1.25. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath school Work. 1890.

Attention has recently been drawn afresh to Persia by the Shah's visit to Europe. This prepares us to read with interest anything that throws light upon that country. Mr. Bassett is well qualified to write on the subject, having been a missionary in Persia for many years. The specific object of this volume is to give the principal facts in the founding and fortunes of the Presbyterian Mission in Eastern Persia. The book is full of information concerning the work of this mission as well as regarding the religious condition of the people. It contains twenty-five illustrations specially prepared from photographs which will aid the reader greatly in forming true conceptions.

A GOOD START. A Book for Young Men. *By J. Thain Davidson, D. D., Author of "Talks with Young Men," etc.* 12mo; pp. viii., 283. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1890.

We have before had occasion to speak of the success of Dr. Davidson in dealing with young men, and of the strong bond of sympathy which exists between him and them. This book will add to his good name in this respect. It is a series of practical discourses on such subjects as "Something better than riches;" "Is the Young Man safe?" "The city's wilderness;" "Men of pluck;" "The scapegrace;" "Betting and gambling;" "The true test of religion;" "Strong in the Grace of Christ;" "A perfect Man." The discourses all abound in clear, direct statements and arguments, warm and manly appeals, sound wisdom and practical sense. It is a good book to place in the hands of young men.

MYSELF. The Great Teachers of Mankind on the Nature of Mind and the Laws of Life. *By Lafayette Charles Loomis.* 12mo; pp. 95. New York: John B. Alden. 1890.

A curious title for a collection of short sentences gathered from the writings of all ages, from the early Hebrew Scriptures, Zoroaster, Confucius, Pythagoras, down to Huxley, setting forth their views of how we shall direct our life so that we may gain the most and the best of the inestimable, the mysterious gift of conscious being. We regard the collection as one of little worth.

A KING OF TYRE: A Tale of the Times of Ezra and Nehemiah. *By James M. Ludlow, D. D., author of "The Captain of the Janizaries," etc.* 16mo., pp. 301. \$1.00. New York: Harper & Bros. 1891.

A historical romance in which are wrought vivid pictures of oriental life, and attracting attention to a time with which not many are familiar. As a study of the historical period it covers it is of much value, showing learning and research on the author's part. As a romance it is of thrilling interest. It should be in all well-appointed Sunday-school libraries.

LIFE AND LETTERS OF GENERAL THOMAS J. JACKSON (Stonewall Jackson). *By his wife, Mary Anna Jackson.* With an Introduction, by Henry M. Field, D. D. Illustrated. 12mo., pp. 479. \$2.00. New York: Harper & Bros. 1892.

Apart from all the interest and sympathy which we feel in Jackson and his wonderful career, we must judge this account of his life to be one of the happiest contributions ever made to biographical literature. It is characterized by the utmost simplicity and beauty. The style and diction are charming. The book deals with the inner life rather than with the public career of its subject, and is a portrayal of that which no one besides his faithful wife could so well appreciate and recount. His religious experiences and principles, and the manifestation of them in all departments of his life, are the leading topics of the book. To carry out the purpose of the biography, the wife of Jackson had necessarily to lift the veil from many affecting home scenes and incidents and to expose to the eye letters which one can rarely exhibit freely. From this she shrank; but urged by wise friends, especially by Dr. Field, whose introduction is one of the most beautiful pieces of writing we have read in a long time, she became convinced that these letters, even with their endearments, more than anything else exhibited the true character of the man, his devotion, his tenderness, his faith, his humility. These traits made him the man he was and underlay that outward life which made him the hero of the War between the States, and an object of admiration, not only to his friends, but, now that the time has come when a calm judgment can be placed upon his life, to his enemies as well. This account of his life may be placed in the hands of all our youth, and will inspire them to noble acts and thoughts and great purposes in life. The book is beautifully printed and illustrated, and daintily covered in cloth that is almost a "Confederate grey."

ROBERT CARTER. *His Life and Work.* 12mo., wide margin, gilt top, pp. 250. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1891.

It were better for the world if more such biographies as this were written. It is an account, given with rare simplicity and sweetness, of the life of a man who wrought no startling deeds, who held no prominent positions, but who lived as all men can live, by God's grace, an upright, even life, obediently following conscience in personal, domestic, social and business life, faithfully endeavoring to carry religious principles into all his dealings with his fellow men, and thus winning for himself friends and admirers in every rank and calling.

CHARLES GRANDISON FINNEY. *By G. Frederick Wright, D. D., LL. D., Professor in Oberlin Theological Seminary, Ohio.* 16mo. pp. 329. Gilt top, \$1.25. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1891.

This biography is one of the publishers' "American Religious Leaders" series. It is a faithful portraiture of a man whose great abilities as a preacher and in the development of the institution at Oberlin justly entitled him to a prominent place. The biographer's statements of Finney's philosophical and theological views is very full and fair. He is not blind to the errors or tendencies of these views, and does not attempt to blind his readers to them. It is an admirably written book and will be read with interest even by those who have no sympathy with the positions of the subject of the biography.

THE BUSY PASTOR'S WORK REGISTER. *Arranged by Rev. W. C. Campbell, D. D., Roanoke, Va.* Second Edition. Pp. 198. Roanoke, Va.: The Bell Printing and Manufacturing Company. 1891. Price, postpaid, 63 cents.

A very compact book, with neat leatherette cover, indexed and paged in such a manner as to make it easy for the pastor to keep an accurate account or record of his work. It is suited to the use of pastors of any denomination. It registers the visits paid, members of the church, new members received, new persons met, baptisms, marriages, funerals, and sermons, and has blank pages for memoranda. It can be carried in the pocket. It has been prepared by a practical pastor, one who knows what other pastors need and who is willing to share with them the fruits of his experience.

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I. THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF WRITTEN REVELATION.

WE use the term Revelation, in its wider signification, as the name of the Sacred Scriptures, and as implying divine authority for the whole, just as we call the whole the Word of God. Both of these names imply the orthodox view of inspiration. We shall assume that the book is as distinctly divine as if it all were actually revealed, while it is as distinctly human as if it all were of human origin. It is the analogue of the Incarnate Word, in whom perfect divinity and inerrant humanity meet in one person—the God-man. While it is not the purpose at this time to discuss this view, it will, no doubt, appear incidentally that no other working hypothesis is so satisfactory as this, no matter what inductions we seek to make from the Scriptures.

Writing looks to permanent preservation in unvarying form, and carries authority when duly authenticated. The “Ten Words” were written on tables of stone by the finger of God, and kept in the ark of the testimony under the most awful sanctions. Moses wrote his law in a book, and put it either in or beside the ark for a witness. Samuel wrote the “manner of the kingdom” in a book. Christ said to Satan, “It is written.”

There is no difference of opinion here. Nor is it important to settle whether there were previous writings from which much of the earlier books of revelation was taken, nor how far such writings may have been inspired.

It is now popular to say that the Scriptures are a growth, a de-

velopment from a few germinal truths into a complete system of doctrine and morals, keeping pace with the exigencies of the race in passing from infancy, so called, to full maturity. This view finds the whole Scriptures congruous and coherent, like a growing plant adding shoot to shoot and leaf to leaf, and flowers and fruit at the appointed season. It finds the whole Gospel logically and coherently contained in the Protevangelion, just as the plant is contained in the seed, but not discoverable except as unfolded in successive stages of growth from century to century.

There is another theory closely akin to this, which finds blemishes and incongruities, and misapprehensions of truth, and barbaric and semi-barbaric codes, the crude products of a still crude humanity, to be superseded, as the race advances and light increases, by sounder doctrines and purer morals, down to the close of the canon. Some who hold this theory find a continuation of this evolutionary process in the "Christian consciousness" until it yields a fruitage not found in the Scriptures at all, and even impossible there, because of the still narrow and contracted view of the sacred writers themselves; or in other words, the spiritual insight of the nineteenth century "would have been an anachronism" in the first.

These two theories are one, in that they both assume a "continuity of doctrinal development." But the former is far more coherent with our notions of the Divine Teacher and Revealer; while the latter, if true, might be cited to prove the same stages in the development of divinity as are argued for humanity.

It is worth our while to consider whether there be any such doctrinal development in the Scriptures as would justify either theory. Looking backwards into the Scriptures from our standpoint, it is evident that some things seem much clearer and are far more emphasized in the later books. Good and substantial reasons may be found for this, other than the hypothesis of development; and it may be that the facts are utterly inconsistent with this hypothesis.

We are often cautioned not to read into the Scriptures our own preconceptions, and especially not to read into the earlier books views of truth gotten from the clearer teachings of the later.

Without disparaging this caveat, it might be well to emphasize a counter caution, not to read out of the earlier Scriptures many things which are necessary to their having any signification at all, to the utter emasculation and invalidation of the later also.

No one will deny the historic development of the race into families, peoples, and nations, for the Scriptures exhibit this fully. Nor will any one dispute the growth of the volume of the Scriptures from century to century. It remains, however, to discover the law of that growth by a careful reference to the facts they furnish, before we can set up the "historic continuity of doctrinal development" as the law of that growth. There are certainly many facts found in them which not only set aside much of the argument for this hypothesis, but do suggest another hypothesis wholly incompatible with it, which may be stated in the following propositions:

1. The whole body of truth was known to the ancients as a concrete unity, prior to our present written revelation.

2. Apparent modifications and additions are but the practical adaptation and application of old truth to new and varying conditions.

3. In the earlier Scriptures those things were written and emphasized which were most readily corrupted or most easily forgotten

4. The volume of inspiration grew to keep pace with the obscurations which sin and Satan sought to put on the old truth. As new perversions and heresies arose, new prophets, divinely accredited, set up the old truth in refutation. In the completed canon we have the record of the conflict—truth triumphant, Satan discomfited.

An exhaustive presentation and discussion of the facts that bear upon this question would require a volume. It may be profitable here, however, to cite the surface facts and indicate their significance in such form as to "blaze the way" for a more exhaustive induction.

- I. The human race had no such infancy as is assumed, for which a small modicum of truth would have been sufficient. Primitive man was in all respects a wonder in creation, a wonder until now; in body, perhaps a giant, certainly of iron constitution, ten-times

as long-lived as now, even after the curse and blight of sin and the death-sentence had passed upon him; in spirit, "made after the image of God in knowledge, righteousness and true holiness, with dominion over the creatures." Such was man—marvel of marvels! Who will deny that his necessities and exigencies were as extensive as his faculties, and as varied as his millennial experience? or that his God-given knowledge was equal to them all?

II. There was ample provision, both before and after the fall, for his thorough indoctrination, and for preserving and conserving the same, in the probable absence of written doctrine. There was face to face converse with the Lord Jehovah, the mediator of all the covenants, and the theophanic revealer of the ages, all for purposes of instruction. The family was made the locus of a "holy seed," and the Sabbath the special time for teaching "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness," just as now. The head of every house was a priest, and had the oracle by virtue of his office, a fact often overlooked. There were also inspired visions given for instruction and easily distinguished from ordinary dreams, whether understood or not, and also inspired expositions of the same. To all this was added tradition, made valuable by the long lives of the patriarchs, and by the oft-repeated testimony of actual experiences and realizations of truth, and guarded by the inspiration of priest and prophet. And ages later, when the family priest was superseded by a priestly caste, the prophetic order was greatly expanded so as to guard against the possible evils of a hereditary priesthood on the one hand, and to supplement a partial canon on the other.

III. The actual knowledge of the first generation was far more than a mere germ. When we consider the brevity of the early history, the wonder is that we find so much expressed or implied. The record in Genesis was written for the Jewish people, and is to be understood as they understood it. For example: When they read that Cain and Abel made their offerings, there was no need to mention the distinction between the sin-offering and the meat-offering, and all the details thereof; the mere mention of the offerings was ample exposition; and when Eve said, "I have gotten a man from the Lord," there was no need to define the

doctrine of providence; it is simply assumed as fundamental in her creed. Indeed it is noteworthy that statements of doctrine in the earlier Scriptures are commonly made in concrete form by assumption and by implication, rather than by categorical statement. The same is true of the later Scriptures also, except when, in refutation of some heresy, it becomes necessary to set up the old truth in positive categories.

IV. The fulness and completeness of truth from the beginning may be amply illustrated :

(*a.*) The constitution of the family is so definitely given that neither Moses, nor Malachi, nor Christ add anything to it, but rather quote the same in refutation of the heresies of their day.

(*b.*) The Sabbath must have had its full significance from the beginning, because subsequent references to it in the law are a reminder of older obligations rather than new legislation; and Christ's careful expositions are but a re-definition of its original limitations, made necessary by perversions of the true nature of Sabbath observance.

(*c.*) The knowledge of God was as complete and accurate in the early ages as since. An Eternal First Cause is assumed as the creator of all things. He is man's friend and counsellor, lawgiver and judge. He vindicates truth, and determines heresy as final arbiter. He passes sentence on the sinner, and executes the same, or protects the criminal for a purpose. He declares his mercy in the very face of forfeited favor, and stays the death penalty. His blessing on all the works of his hand and the interlacing curses vindicated his attributes of justice, goodness, power, and knowledge in those early days as clearly as now. He was recognized as the God of creation, of providence and of grace.

And if it be true that the name Jehovah—Jahveh—translated LORD in so many versions, as well as in the New Testament, was the specific name of the second person of the Godhead, as can easily be shown, then the doctrine of the Trinity was the very surface doctrine of the earliest records, and the supposed necessity for the distinction of "Elohistic and Jehovistic" absolutely fails the critics.

(*d.*) And what of their moral code? No man can read the

first eight chapters of Genesis and fail to see that the moral law was as inexorable as at Sinai, and was enforced by stupendous sanctions, as the waters of the flood do testify.

(e.) But perhaps the Protevangelion was a mere germinal foreshadowing of a plan of salvation to be unfolded and understood after the lapse of four thousand years. If we study it in the light of its origin and setting—the covenant of works, the tempter, the curse, the promise, the Cain and Abel feud, the accepted bloody sacrifice, the rejection of the mere thank-offering, and the divine rebuke of Cain—we can but recognize the plan of salvation in its concrete entirety from which Cain and Socinus have taken nothing away, and to which Paul and Calvin have added nothing new. That plan of salvation revealed at Eden and transmitted in type and prophecy is, like its author, “the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.”

V. For all practical purposes, however, our proper starting point is Noah, and the quantum of truth which he possessed was the heritage of the race when entering on its new career. When we remember that he was a “righteous man,” “perfect in his generation,” and a “preacher of righteousness,” enjoying the divine counsel both before and after the flood, it is safe to assume that all former truth was his, embracing, at least, what we have already sketched. All the facts of his life go to confirm this view, as witness his Sabbath, his sacrifice, his covenant, and his curse. We start here with no mere germ of truth, and with no imbecile infancy of the race, needing but a small modicum of knowledge. Whatever may have been the apostasies before the flood under the leadership of Cain and his sons, the race made a second start under conditions most favorable for preserving the knowledge of the true God and the way of life, and the old patriarch was their teacher for three hundred years. The families descended from him, and growing into nations, were of one faith and worship, just as they were of one tongue.

VI. In the course of time heresies were invented, and apostasies followed, and men started on the same career of evil as before the flood, except as retarded by the confusion of tongues and other causes. It became necessary in the economy of grace to

adopt a new expedient, or a new line of policy (I speak reverently), in order to save the truth against the time of general apostasy. Tradition had once failed with all its associated advantages, such was the perversity of sin and the cunning of Satan. While the danger was still remote, Abram was chosen, and made a party to a special covenant; a chosen people grew out of his loins, unique in their training and exceptional in their relations to God. They were to receive the "oracles of God" in written, permanent form for a testimony against encroaching apostasies, and so to bless all nations, and prepare the world for the coming of the true seed, the promised Christ.

VII. There is no evidence that apostasy was general in the time of the patriarchs, but rather the reverse. Abram found the "fear of the Lord" on the thrones of Egypt and of Gerar, and two hundred years later Joseph held no exceptional creed in Egypt. Melchizedek, king of Salem, was a high priest, and Abraham was only a temporary member of his constituency of family priests. There is no mystery about this man, if we recognize him as a high priest in a catholic hierarchy, to which, no doubt, belonged Potipherah, priest of On, Jethro, priest of Midian, of later date, and later still, Balaam, who was evidently high priest of his people, and of wide reputation, a priest of the Lord, officially as true as steel, but personally as corrupt as sin, himself marking a stage in a growing apostasy. The indications are clear enough that the Canaanite nations were not yet apostates in the days of the patriarchs. Two centuries, however, wrought great changes in Canaan and in Egypt, while sixty-six were growing into two millions; and they emerged at Mount Sinai to receive the written oracles none too soon to save the waning truth from her enemies. All the subsequent history shows that the nations were not ignorant of the claims of the Lord Jehovah, though they so largely rejected his authority. In David's day, Hiram, king of Tyre, was as orthodox in his expressions as David himself, so far as the history goes; and when Tyre and Israel had fallen into a common apostasy, the prophet Isaiah denounces against them both a captivity of seventy years, and apparently for the same reason. We need not cite similar knowledge of the truth at Nin-

evah and Babylon at a later day, for other forces were at work besides natural succession. It is, however, pertinent to notice that the earliest idolatry of which we have any record was a ritualistic idolatry in worship of the true God. And the more we study the usages and traditions of pagan peoples, the more evident it is that they are all but secondary crystallizations from a common faith, and the detritus from a common original formation, the origin and details of which are in the Scriptures.

VIII. The books of Moses put into permanent form all those things which were most liable to perversion, and which were in most need of emphasis amid changing conditions, whether they were ceremonial, civil, or social customs, or matters of moral obligation. They were not new, but were put in permanent and authoritative form against the corrupting tendencies of the age; *e. g.*, the elaborate provisions of Leviticus do but record the more briefly stated practices of the earlier patriarchs, with conceded new adaptations to new conditions; the Sabbath, the altar, the bloody sacrifice, the priest, the clean victim were of early origin, while the special provision for the continual burnt-offering was probably or at least possibly new; or in social law, the levirate marriage was as distinctly lawful in Judah's family as in the happier nuptials of Boaz and Ruth; or in civil matters, the principle of government by elders was as distinctly marked when Moses covenanted with the elders of his people in Egypt, as when at Mount Sinai, by divine command, he called out the same seventy elders and put honor and responsibility upon them; or in the moral code, the harlotry of Tamar was adjudged worthy of death centuries before the seventh commandment was promulgated from Sinai's top.

Were it not for the obvious fact that Mosaic codes and customs were not new in their general trend and underlying principles, and often in actual detail, hostile criticism could never have given them plausible origins elsewhere. On our theory, the hypothesis of earlier documents and earlier codes would tend to strengthen their authoritative codification at Mount Sinai, rather than to disintegrate and weaken. Indeed the vocation of the destructive critic would utterly fail him on our theory, for if the codification

and recension be only the making permanent the doctrines of the ages, what matters it whether such codification took place earlier or later? His criticism is largely in the interest of the evolution of doctrine, morals, government, and civilization, if not of humanity itself.

IX. There can be no question of the completeness of civil, social, and moral law as presented in Mosaic legislation, while the ceremonial seems to occupy too much space and attention. There is a reason for this, however. The ceremonial system is an elaborate book of prophecy expressed in object lessons instead of written language, eminently adapted to exposition by parent, priest, and prophet. It was necessary to fix the minutest details against corruption or loss. There is a minimum of verbal prophecy in the earlier books of Scripture because not then necessary; but in the later history, when the ceremonial was waning and "waxing old" and of increasingly difficult access on account of the dispersion, and was even suspended for a season, the volume of written verbal prophecy was rapidly expanded, and was promulgated through the synagogue, so as to set forth for all, both Jews and proselytes, that which had been so well expressed in type before. It was only a change of method and means to meet new conditions.

It may also be noted here that the prophets were much engaged in correcting abuses, restoring the law, and setting up sound principles against encroaching heresies in doctrine and practice. Here also the volume of inspiration grew to keep pace with the obscurations and perversions of faith and practice. Such truths as had not been attacked were little emphasized at an earlier day, or rather in the earlier Scriptures. The period of decline in the kingdoms of Judah and Israel was preëminently a time of apostasy. It is not surprising therefore that there was large work for the prophetic order and that their numbers reached five hundred at one time in the days of Ahab and Jezebel. The major and the minor prophets belong all to the period of decline and restoration. What wonder then that the truth seems to shine out with new light in their writings! They were the restorers of the old paths rather than teachers of new doctrines.

For example: When Isaiah arraigned formalism, and vindicated

the substance as against the mere form, was he promulgating a new doctrine, or was he not rather refuting a rampant heresy which substituted the form for the substance? a heresy scotched for a time, but not yet dead.

When Malachi said, "Will a man rob God?" was he teaching God's ownership of the tithe as a new doctrine? He was only unmasking that rank heresy by which they not only withheld the tithe but justified themselves in it—a heresy unknown to Abraham, Jacob, and Moses, who evidently believed that the tithe was the Lord's.

Or take the Sermon on the Mount, when centuries later still, he that gave the law on Mount Sinai, expounded the same on the Mount in Galilee, brushing away Pharisaic glosses and interpretations and traditions by which they "made the law of none effect," and restored the law to its original and true significance. Phariseeism with its negative pole Sadduceeism, was the last great heresy of the ages. Christ and the apostles vindicated the old truth against all comers. They based their claims and their teaching on the known, accepted, obvious, and common sense interpretation of the older Scriptures. "Search the Scriptures," said Christ. "To the law and to the testimony," cried Paul. Their teachings and writings bristle with polemics. Even the gentle John cries, "Believe not every Spirit," "No lie is of the truth." There was no more powerful expositor of heresy and expounder of truth than he, and in his epistles we find the only complete, exhaustive, and final refutation of that most pestilent heresy, antinomianism.

For four thousand years the Father of Lies exhausted all his ingenuity and malice to destroy the bulwarks of eternal truth. He succeeded only too well in deceiving our race and destroying the hopes of man. The Prince of Peace, the Revealer, stood by his people and fought the battle with falsehood and sin. The enemy, when beaten on one field, planned his cunning assaults on another, till the whole ground was fought over. Every refuge of lies was overthrown, every hiding place was exposed, every possible heresy was sifted, and every truth vindicated.

The victory was won; the record of the conflict was written; the canon was closed. Prophet and oracle ceased because no

longer needed. The Book contains the universal and final appeal. We approach it with every hard question with the same confidence with which Joshua and Eleazar stood before the Shekinah. Satan can only go over the old battle field, and repeat himself and his tactics in order to deceive the unwary and the ignorant. His new pretences are all old; his new heresies are all obsolete; his new disguises are but the tattered remnants of the sheep's clothing so often torn from him by the great shepherd of Israel. The wolf can only prowl on the old battle fields, and the most timid believer may put him to hasty flight with a single weapon from this armory.

The recasting of old falsehoods in new philosophic forms of statement, and in new metaphysical nomenclature, is all that he now can do, and nothing pleases him better than when the defenders of truth handle the same weapons instead of that "sharp two-edged sword," which is the word of God.

Human experience had already been exhaustive in Solomon's day, and he put much of it in permanent form for the guidance of those to come after. The same things in essence had been re-enacted in divers forms by agencies divine, human, and satanic, but the historic argument, the logic of events was not yet complete. How much more may we now say with him, "The thing that hath been is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun. Is there anything of which it may be said, see, this is new? It hath been already of old time which was before us."

What then is the law of the growth of the sacred oracles—the object and scope of written revelation? We answer in one triple proposition: To preserve and vindicate the old truth against all comers; to record the history of the conflict and its issues; and to expound and illustrate the way of life from Eden to the resurrection.

Objections to this theory arise from two sources: the mistaking of new historic facts and their obvious lessons for new revelations of truth; and a total misapprehension of the relations of the prophets to the Mosaic economy, and even of Christ himself to the same, and through it, to the older covenants. Suffice it to say

that the prophet was commissioned to enforce and not to modify; and Christ was so "made under the law" to obey and to suffer, that it was not competent for him to add aught to, or take aught from that which he had before set up with paramount authority. He came "not to destroy but to fulfill."

Several valuable corollaries flow from this theory if it be accepted in its entirety.

1. The fixity of truth from the beginning, like the fixity of species, while it presents great variety in its applications and concrete manifestations.

2. The absolute sufficiency and completeness of truth, written and unwritten, at the successive stages of the mediatorial economy.

3. The lawfulness of constructing a whole body of divinity on a few recorded truths, just as comparative anatomy reconstructs the ancient saurian on a single discovered bone.

4. The superior value of the historic method, the logic of events, over the purely exegetical in the defence of truth. The methods of Augustine, Calvin, and Hodge seem to be a partial reversal of the methods of Christ and Paul, and just so far weaker and less satisfactory.

5. It supersedes the plausibilities of the humanitarian, the rationalist, the liberalist, and the destructive.

6. Christian apologetics rises to the higher ground of Christian polemics, putting the beast, the false prophet, and that old serpent to shameful rout with the word of God which is the "Sword of the Spirit."

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II. THE ANTI-BIBLICAL HIGHER CRITICISM.¹

No graver crisis has ever confronted the evangelical churches of Christendom, than that which they are called to face at present; none which affects matters so fundamental, or the issues of which are so serious and so far-reaching. Heretofore, the contests within the church have concerned questions of doctrine or of policy, more or less momentous; but all parties recognized one supreme authority. The Word of God was the admitted standard by which all controversies were to be ultimately decided. But now the Word of God is itself brought into question, and the issue which is forced upon us is, Is the Bible what the church has always believed it to be, and what we have always been taught to regard it? Or must the old view of the Bible be given up, and a new view be substituted for it, by which its authority and trustworthiness will be seriously impaired?

Attacks upon the genuineness and the truth of the books of the Bible, made by the enemies of the Bible, are no new thing. Nor is there anything novel in such attacks made in the name of Biblical Criticism by scholars, who have no faith in the supernatural. They cannot consistently do otherwise than discredit the books of Moses with the marvellous miracles which they record, and the accurately fulfilled prophecies which they contain. The only thing that is novel in the present situation is the acceptance of these critical conclusions by Christian scholars, who claim to be evangelical in their creed, and to be reverent students of the word of God. They admit the allegation that it has been demonstrated that several of the books of the Bible were not written by the persons to whom they have heretofore been attributed. But this, they affirm, need occasion no concern. It is really no damage to the Christian faith. Human authorship matters little in the books of Scripture. The only thing of consequence is divine authorship. Let the critics establish what they may, the heart of the matter is

¹ An address delivered in New York, in the "Marble Church," and revised and enlarged for THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

beyond their reach. The divine origin and authority of Scripture are not dependent upon their human authors, but upon God, whose word it is.

It should be said here that we have no disposition to depreciate Biblical Criticism, when reverently and fairly conducted, nor to underestimate its value as a branch of theological science. We wish it distinctly understood at the outset that we do not object to the application of the most searching tests to the books of Scripture, and the most thorough scrutiny as to their real origin. Turn on the light from every possible quarter and ascertain the exact truth. If all antiquity has been in error and the Jewish people and the Christian church through all the ages have been in error in believing that the Pentateuch was the production of Moses, let the truth be told though the heavens fall.

We think it capable of demonstration that Moses did write the Pentateuch, and that the objections by which the attempt has been made to set aside the faith of all past ages and to contravene the explicit testimony of our Lord in this matter can be shown to be invalid. This, however, is not the point to which we ask attention at this time. Our object at present is to set forth the gravity of the question at issue. It is not so indifferent a matter as it has been represented to be, whether or no Moses wrote the Pentateuch. It is said that the contents of the first five books of the Bible remain the same, whoever wrote them and whenever they were written. It may still be the Word of God and equally command our faith, whether it was all written in the Mosaic age and by Moses himself, or was written by other inspired men in later ages.

But this reasoning leaves out of view the intimate connection between the genuineness of a production and its truth and authority. It is not accounted a matter of indifference in the affairs of ordinary life, whether a legal instrument, claiming to be authoritative, or commercial paper, purporting to represent a given value, has proceeded from the proper authority, and whether the signature that it bears is genuine. If it is not from the source that it claims to be, and the signature attached to it is false, it is not worth the paper that it is written on.

Moses was a commissioned messenger of the Most High. His inspiration is attested by indubitable proofs. Our Lord and the inspired writers of the New Testament abundantly confirm the claim of the Pentateuch to be regarded as the Word of God, but in so doing, they uniformly attach to it the name of Moses; Moses says, Moses wrote, Moses taught, the law of Moses, etc., etc. It is as God's word through Moses, that they commend it to our faith. If these books be detached from Moses as their author, they are thereby detached likewise from the indorsement of our Lord and his apostles. They bid us accept what Moses taught and what Moses commanded. If these are not the teachings of Moses, and these commands are not his, their sanction is withdrawn.

Much has been said of late about the absolute inerrancy of the original autographs of Scripture, as though the question at issue at present was one of minute accuracy in trivial and unessential matters, and this related only to hypothetical originals no longer in existence, and was a mere inference from a particular theory of the mode of inspiration. This is an utter misunderstanding of the real gravity of the case. The actual issue which is now before the evangelical churches of Christendom is far more serious and far-reaching than this. It is vital and fundamental. It is a question of the historical truth and the divine authority of the Old Testament from beginning to end. Are its statements trustworthy? Can they be depended upon, not in minor and unessential matters, but in the great body of its contents? and has it any just claim to be regarded as really the Word of God? Its historical truth and its divine authority are closely linked, and must stand or fall together, not only because that which is untrue is thereby evidenced not to be from God, but because the Old Testament is professedly a record of God's revelation to his chosen people through a long series of ages. If the facts as therein set forth are true and real, it is beyond question an immediate divine revelation. If the alleged facts are fictitious the revelation itself is unreal.

The particular point to which we wish to direct attention is the bearing of the critical hypotheses respecting the Pentateuch upon its historical truth, and consequently upon its divine origin and authority.

If, according to the common and well-attested belief upon this subject, Moses is the author of these books which bear his name, their historic truth is placed beyond controversy. If Moses is the author of the narrative of those fearful plagues which broke the obstinacy of Pharaoh, and of the miraculous passage of the Red Sea, and of the majestic scenes attending the delivery of the Law at Sinai, and of the journeyings of Israel through the wilderness attended by so many manifestations of divine grace and power; and if he placed on record the legislation attributed to him and which he is said to have received directly from God himself, then we have in this fact the highest possible voucher of the truth and certainty of the whole. It is the testimony of an eye-witness and a principal actor in the scenes recorded, of unimpeachable veracity; his record was made at a time when the events were fresh in the minds of the whole people; and his word is moreover confirmed by the mighty signs and wonders wrought by him, which are God's own attestation to its truth.

But we are told that we lose nothing by accepting the critical hypothesis, which denies the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and affirms it to be of composite origin; that this hypothesis is not discredited because unbelieving critics, such as Kuenen and Wellhausen, have used it to destroy the authority of the Pentateuch. In the hands of evangelical critics it is harmless. What evil can result from admitting that the Pentateuch is a compilation from four different inspired documents? Then instead of only one witness we have four separate witnesses to the history of the Mosaic period. These have been compared to the four Gospels, which supplement and corroborate each other and give a more complete and better attested life of Christ than could have been afforded by one alone. And it has even been alleged that we have in the Pentateuch a singular advantage beyond that which we possess in the Gospels. Uninspired men have undertaken to harmonize the Gospels, and to combine them into one continuous narrative. But there is much in even the best of these efforts which is open to question. Of different possible arrangements of the materials we cannot be certain in every case that the right one has been reached; whereas the Pentateuchal history is already

compacted for us into one continuous narrative by one inspired redactor.

Such is the representation that has been made. Now let us look at the actual operation of this critical hypothesis, and that not in the hands of Kuenen and Wellhausen, but of those who call themselves evangelical critics. We shall leave out of view the more destructive speculations and inferences of the former, and confine ourselves to those consequences which are inseparable from the hypothesis, however inclined its advocates may be to present it in the most favorable aspect possible.

The authors of the four Pentateuchal documents, which the critics profess to have discovered, are altogether unknown. The age in which they lived is uncertain and can only be approximately ascertained. For convenience in referring to them they are commonly designated by the letters of the alphabet, J, E, D, and P. J, the Jehovist, speaks of God uniformly as Jehovah, E prefers instead to call him Elohim, the Hebrew for God. D is the writer of Deuteronomy. P is the priestly writer to whom we owe the great body of the ceremonial law, as well as certain portions of the Pentateuchal history which are supposed to be linked with it. J and E are conceived to have been the oldest of these documents. The Rev. Dr. Driver, of Oxford, England, whose *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament* has recently been published under the editorial supervision of Dr. Briggs, of New York City, and Dr. Salmond of Aberdeen, Scotland, tells us that J and E were not later than 750 B. C., and they may belong to the early centuries of the Monarchy. If we understand him to mean by this vague expression the earliest date to which it can possibly apply, they may perhaps be coëval with the age of David and Solomon. At the very least, therefore, they are at a remove of 400 years from the Exodus, a distance of time equal to that which separates us from the discovery of this continent by Columbus, or from the birth of Martin Luther. Or if the larger limit be allowed, they may be more than 300 years later still. Dr. Driver assigns D to the reign of the ungodly king Manasseh, eight centuries after the Exodus, and P after the Babylonish Exile, nearly or quite ten centuries from the Exodus. For our knowledge, conse-

quently, of the whole Mosaic period we are dependent upon records which are from four hundred to one thousand years subsequent to the events which they relate, and which are based upon the popular traditions of the time when they were prepared. And let it be remembered that the age of Moses was the foundation period of the Old Testament religion when its institutions were ordained by God himself amid signal attestations of the divinity of their origin; a period, therefore, respecting which it is of the utmost consequence that we should possess positive certainty of the truth and reality of the events recorded.

What credit would be attached to the Gospels if, instead of being written by contemporaries and eye-witnesses, or based upon the testimony of those who were, they were composed four centuries, eight centuries and ten centuries after the time of Christ, and reported simply the stories that were circulating respecting him at these several dates? And, further, if instead of being written by well-known apostles and evangelists, their authors were entirely unknown and their origin purely conjectural? What foundation would we have for our belief in anything that is related of Jesus Christ or in the truth and reality of his miracles and his death for our redemption, if all rested upon such a basis as this?

But it is said that other histories of the Old Testament are compilations and are anonymous, and were written long after the events which they record. Thus the Books of Kings contain the history of four hundred and fifty years from Solomon to the Exile, and could not, of course, have been written until after the latest event which they record. But it is to be observed that the contents of these books are throughout drawn from public and contemporary records, to which appeal is made at the close of every reign; and thus an adequate guarantee is given of the accuracy of the history. It is also the case that Moses records the lives of the patriarchs, though he was born five hundred and sixty years after the call of Abraham. But here again it is to be observed that the inspiration of Moses, of which we have the most abundant proofs in the notable miracles wrought through his instrumentality, is God's own attestation of the truth of all that he has delivered to

us in the Book of Genesis, not only respecting Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, but of the earliest ages extending back to the creation of the world.

Here, however, we are met by the question, If the inspiration of Moses accredits the narratives of Genesis respecting events long prior to his time and even the primeval ages, why may not the inspiration of J, E, D and P, in like manner, accredit the contents of the Pentateuch?

The reason is obvious: In the first place, we have abundant and decisive evidence of the inspiration of Moses; of J, E, D and P we know nothing whatever, and of their inspiration we have no proof. In the second place, the hypothesis of the critics in relation to these assumed documents is absolutely inconsistent with the idea of their inspiration in any such sense as affords any guarantee whatever of their historical truth.

That this is so will appear from a statement of the grounds upon which the critics base their hypothesis for the partition of the Pentateuch. There are two principal criteria by which they undertake to distinguish the several documents, and which they regard as affording the clearest evidence of their existence. We must devote a few moments to the examination of these criteria, and shall then indicate the bearing which they have upon the historical truth of these documents and upon their inspiration in any proper sense of that term.

The first of these criteria is an alleged diversity of style and diction. Certain words and forms of speech are, it is said, peculiar to P in distinction from J and E, and wherever these characteristic expressions occur, this is an indication that the paragraph, sentence or clause, in which they are found, has been extracted from the document P. It is apparent how easy it is to make a division on this basis which is altogether factitious. The critic assumes that certain words and phrases are characteristic of one document, and certain other words and phrases are characteristic of another document. He accordingly goes through the Pentateuch with this criterion in view. Every paragraph, sentence and clause, in which any of the one class of expressions chance to be found, is regularly assigned to the one document; and with

like regularity every paragraph, sentence and clause, in which any of the other class of expressions appear, is assigned to the other document. And when the partition is completed it is found that all of the one set of expressions is in one document and all of the other set in the other document. But the reason of this is, because the critic has put them there. The partition corresponds with the hypothesis, for the simple reason that it was made by the hypothesis.

There is another significant fact connected with this matter. The critics tell us that while P is readily distinguishable in style and diction from J and E, it is not possible to establish any clear distinction of this sort between J and E themselves. And the reason of this is obvious to one who examines the subject with any care. To P are assigned the ceremonial law, genealogies, statistics and such grand, world-wide events as the creation and the main portion of the flood, but almost nothing that pertains to the ordinary current of events and the experience of individual lives. What can properly be called the narrative portion of the Pentateuch is almost entirely divided between J and E. The natural and necessary consequence of this partition is that each document has those words and phrases which are appropriate to the subject matter assigned to it. P has not the words of ordinary narrative for the simple reason that such narrative is regularly given not to P, but to J and E. And for the same reason P has not the style which belongs to narrative. It is said that there is a marked difference between these documents in point of style; that the style of P is rigid, formal, stereotyped and repetitious, and that of J and E is easy, flowing and picturesque. The difference is just that between genealogies, statistics and ritual legislation on the one hand, and historical narrative on the other. The differences of style are obvious enough; but they indicate not a diversity of writers, but diversity of theme. And unless it be maintained that one and the same writer must always limit himself to the same class of subjects, with what propriety can it be insisted upon that he must invariably adhere to one uniform style? Why may not a historian, while he deals principally in narrative, insert likewise genealogies and ritual laws in their proper place? And if the

genealogy has not the easy, flowing style of the narrative, is that any proof that it is from a different hand?

The impossibility acknowledged by the critics themselves of discriminating between the diction and style of J and E arises from the fact that the narrative parts of the Pentateuch are partitioned between them. Where there is diversity of matter, there is diversity of style. Where the matter is of the same description so is the style. There is nothing surely in all this to indicate that the Pentateuch is a composite production, made up by the blending of different documents. And thus we dispose of the first criterion proposed by the critics, on the basis of which they undertake to parcel the Pentateuch among the documents which they imagine that they have discovered. We are obliged, of course, to deal with this matter here only in the most general fashion. It is impossible now to go into details.

The second criterion upon which the critics base their partition of the Pentateuch is the one with which we are most particularly concerned at present, since it rests upon the assumption of the untrustworthiness of these alleged documents, and is fundamentally inconsistent with their inspiration, provided the term "inspiration" be used in its proper and universally accepted sense, as such a divine control over the writers of Scripture as secured their infallibility and guarded them from error. Here is where the allegation has its root, that Biblical Criticism requires a modification of the common doctrine of inspiration, as this is claimed by the sacred penmen, and has been the uniform belief of the Christian church. This doctrine is opposed to one of the primary assumptions of that school of criticism which rends the Pentateuch into tatters. We say "assumptions" advisedly. It is not a conclusion established by this divisive criticism, but is assumed as the basis on which the divisive criticism is itself built. We refer to their assumption of the existence of duplicate and discrepant statements as a pervading feature of the Pentateuch narratives. This is, in fact, the main reliance of the critics. They affect to find duplicate and discrepant statements everywhere, and they point to them as clearly evidencing duplicate authorship.

The way in which these are made out, is simple enough. Two

distinct events have certain features in common. These are compared, and are held to prove that these events are not two but in reality are one and the same, and this in defiance of the explicit statements of the record. The critic unhesitatingly sets the direct and unequivocal testimony of the sacred historian aside, and assumes on the ground of a superficial resemblance in a few particulars, that what is represented to be two separate occurrences is in fact but a single transaction. This assertion is made by the critic from no independent testimony tending to identify the two events or to show that the historian was in error. It is his own arbitrary judgment that the historian is not to be credited. Having thus converted the two events into one on the ground of a certain measure of correspondence, as the history never repeated itself the critic next displays their points of difference, not to show what they really do evidence, that the events are in fact distinct as they appear on the face of the record. but that these are two variant accounts of the same thing. And as the same writer could not have given such diverse representations of the matter, it is argued that they must be attributed to distinct writers.

Thus for example Abraham, on two separate occasions, through fear for his own safety, prevaricated respecting Sarah, saying that she is not his wife but his sister. She is brought into peril in consequence, but is providentially released. The critics tell us that these must be regarded as variant accounts of the same transaction, which according to J occurred in Egypt at the court of Pharaoh, but according to E took place in Gerar at the palace of Abimelech.

Again Abraham made a covenant with Abimelech in relation to wells of water, which were an occasion of strife between their respective servants, and he called the name of the well where their bargain was made Beersheba, the well of the oath. At a later time Isaac was in the same region and had a like difficulty about wells. The name of the Philistine king was again Abimelech, which was the permanent appellation of the monarch, like Pharaoh in Egypt, or Cæsar at Rome. Isaac had to dig over again the wells of his father which the Philistines had meanwhile stopped. So it came to pass that he too made a covenant with

Abimelech respecting wells at Beersheba, thus furnishing a fresh reason for the name which it bore ever afterward. Here again the critics can see nothing but variant accounts of the same transaction, which one document connected with Abraham and another with Isaac.

The critics still further multiply what they consider variant traditions of the same occurrence by setting one part of a transaction over against the other part of it, as though they were conflicting statements. Thus two reasons are given in the sacred record why Jacob left his father's house to go to Padan-Aram. One was to escape the fury of Esau, whom he had overreached by fraudulently obtaining his father's blessing; the other that his father charged him to go and obtain a wife from among his kindred. The two are entirely consistent; but the critics create a discrepancy by saying that J and E give a reason of which P knows nothing but assigns as the reason something altogether different.

Again, they tell us that J and E have quite different versions of what happened to Jacob at Bethel. According to E, he had a dream, in which he saw a ladder reaching from earth to heaven, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon it, but heard no voice and received no verbal promise. J, on the other hand, knows nothing of any dream or ladder or angels, but says that Jehovah there appeared to Jacob while he slept and made certain promises to him.

Thus by identifying distinct transactions or distinct parts of the same transaction, they find material for what they consider separate documents, each of which tells a story diverse from the others and at variance with them. The necessary effect of such treatment is, of course, to produce the appearance of discrepancies and divergencies everywhere. And the entire history from first to last is converted from a consistent, continuous and reliable record into a medley of contradictory and jarring stories, such as were floating about at the time when these several documents were written. It is obvious what becomes of the historical character of a record so dealt with. And need it create surprise that critics who have formed this conception of the Pentateuch clamor for a modification of the common doctrine of inspiration?

And it is not merely the patriarchal history, which is thus resolved into a mass of discordant materials. The Mosaic period fares in the same way. The same methods are applied to it and with a like result; and this not in its subordinate details but in matters of the greatest consequence. God reveals himself to Moses in Exodus, chapter iii., and again in chapter vi. Both times he announces his purpose to deliver Israel from the bondage of Egypt, and bring them to Canaan by the instrumentality of Moses. Stress is laid upon his name Jehovah as pledging this result, and upon Moses shrinking from the task, his brother Aaron is associated with him as a spokesman, and the miraculous sign is given of the rod changed into a serpent.

Here, again, the critics tell us, these are but different narratives of the same thing, and there are numerous contradictions between them. The locality is different and the whole situation is different. E locates it in the wilderness of Horeb, while Moses was keeping the flocks of his father-in-law in Midian: the Lord there appeared to him in the flame of fire in the bush. P knows nothing of Moses ever having been in Midian, or having seen the marvellous spectacle of a bush burning with fire yet unconsumed; he reports the revelation as having occurred in Egypt. According to E, the people believed Moses, when he brought them this message; but, according to P, they refused to hearken to him. In E, Aaron was to speak for Moses to the people; in P, he was appointed to speak for him to the king. In E, the signs were done before the people; in P, they were done before the king. In E, a rod possessing miraculous virtue was given to Moses as the instrument by which his wonders were to be wrought, in J, the rod was not the effective agent but the material of the miracle; it was itself converted into a serpent. Thus the different documents vary materially in their representation of the affair. And it is inferred that they must have followed diverse traditions of it. What the exact truth in the matter was, and how much of what is recorded really took place, and how much is to be placed to the account of legendary accretions, which had gathered in the lapse of from four to ten centuries intervening before the record was made, is left to be inferred.

In like manner, there are discrepancies between the different documents as to the plagues sent upon Egypt to compel Pharaoh to let Israel go. These concern the number of the plagues, what the plagues were, the design with which they were sent, and the manner in which they were wrought. According to P, the plagues were simply exhibitions of power, with which the magicians of Egypt vie with partial success at first, but are finally discomfited. J and E make no mention of any magicians. In P, Aaron with his rod works the miracles; in E, it is Moses with his rod; in J, no rod was used at all. There is only one plague that the three narrators, P, J, and E, have in common. From all this it has been inferred that the several traditions represented by these documents agreed that certain extraordinary events preceded and facilitated the Exodus, but there was no agreement as to what these events were.

The same sort of discrepancy is alleged of the passage of the Red Sea, the transactions at Sinai, and the wanderings in the wilderness.

According to the critical hypothesis, even in the most moderate hands, the situation, then, is this: The Pentateuch, instead of being one continuous and self-consistent history from the pen of Moses, is made up of four distinct documents which have been woven together, but which the critics claim that they are able to separate and restore, as far as the surviving remnants of each permit, to their original condition. These severally represent the traditions of the Mosaic age as they existed four, eight, and ten centuries after the Exodus. When these are compared, they are found to be in perpetual conflict. Events wear an entirely different complexion in one from that which they have in another; the characters of those who appear in them, the motives by which they are actuated, and the whole impression of the period in which they live is entirely different.

It is very evident from all this why the critics tell us that the doctrine of inspiration must be modified. If these Pentateuchal documents, as they describe them, were inspired, it must have been in a very peculiar sense. It is not a question of inerrancy, but of wholesale mutual contradiction which quite destroys their

credit as truthful histories. And these contradictions, be it observed, are not in the Pentateuch itself, but result from the mangling and the mal-interpretations to which it has been subjected by the critics.

On the critical hypothesis, the real facts of the history are not what they seem to be to the ordinary reader. They can only be elicited by an elaborate critical process. The several documents must first be disentangled and carefully compared; the points in which they agree and those in which they differ must be noted. And from this conflicting mass of testimony the critic must ascertain as best he may how much can be relied upon as true, how much has a certain measure of probability, and how much must be rejected altogether.

Another element of precariousness enters into the critical attempts to distinguish what is reliable from what is not in the Pentateuchal narratives. By the confession of the critics themselves, and by the necessity of their hypothesis, the documents which they fancy that they have discovered are by no means complete. By singling out the paragraphs and clauses which are regarded as belonging to each of the documents severally, and putting them together, they undertake the reconstruction of the original documents, which are supposed in the first instance to have circulated separately as distinct and independent publications, but to have been subsequently fused together into the Pentateuch as we now possess it, by a series of compilers, or, as they are technically called, redactors. First, the two oldest documents, J and E, were combined, and the combination was effected, it is supposed, by the following method: Sections or paragraphs, longer or shorter, were taken alternately from J and from E, and pieced together so as to form one continuous narrative. It was the purpose of the redactor to make the best use that he possibly could of these two sources at his command, in preparing a history of the period of which they treat. In some cases he made full extracts from both his sources of all that they contained, and preserved the language of each unaltered, making no additions or modifications of his own. Frequently, however, it was necessary to adjust what was thus taken from different works, in order to make it

read smoothly, or to render it harmonious. Hence, upon occasion he introduced explanatory remarks, or made such changes as seemed to be required in what he borrowed from J or from E. Sometimes his sources were so nearly parallel that it would lead to needless repetition to use them both. In such cases, accordingly, he confined himself to the account given in one of the documents, either omitting the corresponding statements of the other altogether, or weaving in a clause or a sentence here and there when it seemed to him distinctive and important. Again, cases occur in which the narratives of J and E were in real or apparent conflict. Here he does the best that he can. He either undertakes to harmonize their accounts, where this is possible, by inserting some statement which seems to reconcile them, by so changing the order of the narrative as to relieve the difficulty, or by converting inconsistent accounts of the same event into two different transactions. Where none of these methods is practicable, and reconciliation is out of the question, the redactor adheres to one of his sources, and disregards the other.

D, which was composed some centuries after this union of J E, existed for some time as an independent work, and was then combined with J E by a new redactor, who, besides attaching D to this previously existing work, retouched J E in several places, and introduced a number of passages from his own point of view, which was different from that of the older historians.

Finally the document P was prepared, at first as a separate publication, but at length it was interwoven by a third redactor with the preëxisting triplicate treatise D J E, the process being substantially the same as has already been described in the case of J E.

This is in general the method by which the critics suppose that the Pentateuch was gradually brought to its present form. It will be seen at a glance how the complexity of the critical problem is increased by the successive editorial labors which are supposed to have been brought into requisition in the course of the construction of the Pentateuch. The several documents must not only be distinguished from each other, but also from the various redactional additions and insertions which have at any time been made.

Let us assume that this delicate and difficult analysis has been effected with unfailing accuracy notwithstanding the liabilities to error vitiating the result, which increase at every step. But waiving this, what is the situation when the analysis has been accomplished? and what is its bearing upon the historical character of the Pentateuch?

The critics have undertaken to reproduce for us the documents J, E, D, and P, which are our primary sources for both the Mosaic and the patriarchal history, and which date respectively four, eight and ten centuries after the Exodus. These documents are not only at variance with each other in their statements respecting numerous particulars, thus invalidating each other's testimony and showing that the traditions which they have severally followed are mutually inconsistent; but they are besides very incomplete. Numerous gaps and omissions occur in each. Matter which they once contained, as is evident from allusions still found in them, is now missing; how much it is impossible to tell.

But what is more serious, the parts that yet remain have been manipulated by the various redactors. The order of events has been disturbed; events really distinct have been confused and mistaken for one and the same; and narratives of the same event have been mistaken for events altogether distinct; statements which are misleading have been inserted with the view of harmonizing what cannot in fact be reconciled; when traditions vary, instead of being recorded in their integrity to afford some opportunity of ascertaining the truth by comparison, they have either been mingled together; thus disturbing both, or one only has been preserved, thus leaving no check upon its inaccuracies. All this and more, the critics tell us, the several redactors have done with their materials. No charge is made of dishonest intentions. But surely it is most unfortunate for the historical value of their work. There is no way of ascertaining how far these materials have been warped from their proper original intent by the well-meant but mistaken efforts of the redactors to correct or to harmonize them. That their meaning has been seriously altered in repeated instances, which are pointed out by the critics, creates a very natural

presumption that like changes have been freely made elsewhere which can now no longer be detected.

It is difficult to understand in what sense the redactors, whose work has been described, can be said to have been inspired. They certainly had no inspiration which preserved them from error, or even from making the gravest historical mistakes. They had no such inspiration as gives any divine attestation to their work. The Pentateuchal history gathers no confirmation from having passed through their hands.

Upon the theory of the most conservative of the divisive critics, for it is this with which we have been dealing, what dependence can be placed upon the historical statements of the Pentateuch? These are, as they allege, inaccurate and inconsistent with themselves not in the patriarchal period merely, but throughout the lifetime of Moses, when the foundation was laid of the Old Testament religion and those signal miracles were wrought which gave it undeniable divine sanction. The real facts are not those which appear upon the surface. They can only be elicited by an elaborate critical process which shall detect and remove the mistaken additions and attempted emendations of each of the redactors, and shall then restore the four documents to their pristine condition, so far as what remains of each will allow. This will put the critic in possession of a mutilated record of four variant traditions of the Mosaic age, as these existed four, eight and ten centuries after that date. And now it is by the help of such materials in the way of comparison, correction and elimination that he must sift out and ascertain the real facts. Must we not say that the history of the Mosaic age, if this be the only way of arriving at it, rests upon a quicksand? and that nothing of any consequence can be certainly known regarding it?

We have been able in this discussion to look in a hurried way at but one feature of the disintegrating work which is done in the name of Biblical Criticism. We do not speak of the destructive inferences drawn by critics who are avowedly antagonistic to supernatural religion. We have confined ourselves to the conclusions accepted by that class of critics who claim to be evangelical, and who occupy positions of honor and influence in evangelical

churches, such as the British scholars and divines, Drs. Driver and Cheyne, and the American scholars who affiliate with them. We have looked at but one phase of their work, even as respects the Pentateuch. Had we been able to consider their treatment of the Mosaic laws, our conclusion would have been yet more abundantly confirmed. Here is no question merely of the strict inerrancy of Scripture, of absolute accuracy in unimportant minutæ, of precision in matters of science. This is not the issue raised by the theorizing of that class of biblical critics with which we contend. And it is no mere question of the mode of inspiration. But it is the question whether any dependence can be placed upon the historical truth of the Bible; whether our confidence in the facts recorded in the Pentateuch rests upon any really trustworthy basis; facts, be it observed, not of mere scientific or antiquarian interest, but which mark the course of God's revelations to the patriarchs and to Moses. It is the certainty of facts which are vital to the religion of the Old Testament, and the denial of whose truth weakens the foundations on which the New Testament itself is built. The critical theory which we have been examining, is destructive of all rational certainty of the reality of these truths; and thus tends to overturn the historical basis of the religion of the Bible. Our holy religion is a historical religion, based on a series of redemptive facts, in which God revealed himself to men and unfolded his will and gracious purposes. And to weaken the evidence of those facts, to cast doubt upon the reality of their historical occurrence, is to cast doubt upon the reality of that revelation which they embodied.

Those who hold these critical views which we have been considering may tell us that they believe in the truth of the Pentateuch, that they believe it to be inspired of God, that they believe it to be infallible in all matters of faith and duty. Of course, we do not question these declarations of their personal faith. But this does not make their critical theories harmless. It is well that men are sometimes inconsistent; that they who have adopted wrong principles or dangerous theories, do not always follow them to their legitimate conclusions. What we are concerned to know is not the personal faith of those who still cling to the creed in

which they have been brought up in spite of their acceptance of a critical hypothesis which is antagonistic to it. What we are concerned to know is the legitimate tendency of the critical hypothesis itself. However some of its adherents may retain their faith in the historical truth of the Pentateuch and its divine inspiration and authority, this hypothesis, as has been shown, undermines them all. Its acceptance by those not already well grounded in these doctrines must tend to unsettle their faith. Its general acceptance must lead ultimately to the denial of the inspiration of the Pentateuch even in that qualified sense in which these critics profess to accept it now, as well as to the denial of its historical truth, as surely as the tree will bear fruit after its own kind.

Now are we not right in saying that it is not Biblical Criticism in any proper sense which thus antagonizes the truth of the history recorded in the Bible and the inspiration of its books, but that it ought rather to be denominated, Anti-biblical Criticism, since even in the hands of those who wish to be regarded as evangelical, it unsettles the verity of the sacred oracles, and annuls their claim to be the very Word of God?

But a single word more. What must be the state of mind engendered toward the Scriptures by these critical speculations? Everything is unsettled. Doubt and uncertainty pervade the whole, unless we are content to take the *ipse dixit* of some particular critic. Where all rests upon uncertain conjecture, who can forbid fresh conjectures and additional speculations? In regard to every passage in the Pentateuch, the question must be raised, Is this by J or E or D or P, or is it an insertion by one or other of the redactors, or is it from some other source different from any of these? To which of the centuries from four to ten after Moses does it belong? Is its statement to be credited as a fact or to be set aside as a misconception? Will this encourage faith in Scripture and a reverent submission to its authority on the part of those who are taught to deal with it in this manner? Every one can answer this question for himself.

WILLIAM HENRY GREENE.

Princeton.

III. THE STUDY OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE IS DEMANDED BY THE NEEDS OF OUR DAY.¹

The Stuart Robinson professorship has been established with a twofold purpose.

The need of a seminary discipline in the English Bible had long been felt. We cannot go all the way back to the time when the need, having become conscious, first began to express itself in words; but in 1881 the Presbytery of Bethel overtured the General Assembly to "recommend and urge upon the attention of the Boards of Directors of our theological seminaries the pressing demand for a more copious, thorough, and direct study of the book they are to preach, on the part of our theological students, not merely in private, but under the direction and lead of the professor." (*Assembly's Minutes*, 1881, page 370.) This Bethel Presbytery, on the same occasion, urgently prayed the Assembly "to lend its sanction and approval to the plan of substituting" in Columbia Seminary, which was then about to be reorganized, "for the exegetical study of the Scriptures in the original Hebrew and Greek that of the English Bible, old and new versions." In this last request the presbytery had overestimated the powers of the General Assembly, since the overture involved a change in the constitution of our church. But in response to the *first*, the Assembly formally called the attention of the directors of our theological seminaries to the overture, and expressed its hearty approval of any practicable measure which should secure a more careful study of the English Bible by our seminary students as a part of their theological training. (*Assembly's Minutes*, 1881, pp. 370, 371.) In 1882, also, there was presented from the Presbytery of Fayetteville an overture "relative to the establishment in our seminaries of a course of exegetical study of the Scriptures in the English language." In reply to this overture, the General Assembly of

¹ Inaugural Address delivered in Union Seminary, May 3rd, 1892.

1882 referred the Presbytery of Fayetteville to the action of the General Assembly of 1881 as meeting the case presented; but it took occasion again to earnestly and respectfully call the attention of the directors of theological seminaries to the matter, and to request them to report to the next General Assembly any results which they might reach.¹ The Synod of Virginia, too, in October, 1882, respectfully suggested "to the trustees of the seminary"—our seminary—"the propriety of taking incipient measures to increase the provision for instruction." It, of course, goes without saying, that in addition to the united voices of Assemblies and Synods, private individuals had been busy in the endeavor to excite a pervading sentiment in favor of the speedy institution of such a discipline. To mention a single instance, the distinguished president of Davidson College—then professor of Biblical Instruction in Clarksville—traveled to this place, in June, 1882, of set purpose to forward the movement for increased study of the English Bible. Difficult, therefore, as it proved to be to raise the endowment fund, mighty struggle as it was, it is not surprising that in 1883 our Board of Directors determined to provide for instruction in the English Bible by the establishment of a new chair. Accordingly, these gentlemen invited the attention of the General Assembly of 1883 to the following resolution which they had adopted in their corporate capacity May 2, 1883:

Resolved, That the trustees of Union Theological Seminary in Virginia, fully concurring with the General Assembly as to the importance of such study of the Bible as suggested by that body, yet, in view of the onerous duties now resting on the professors of the seminary, and the insufficiency of our existing income for the support of a separate chair, do not see the way open at the present time for the introduction of any measures for the end proposed, beyond the considerable instruction in the English Bible which is already distinctively imparted in this institution. At the present meeting of the corporation, however, plans have been inaugurated for an increase of income from further endowment, which, if successful, may accomplish the wishes indicated by the Assembly, and in which the trustees sympathize." (*Assembly's*

¹ See *Assembly's Minutes*, 1882, pages 564, 565.

Minutes, 1883, p. 34.) And in their annual reports to the General Assembly and to the Synods of Virginia and North Carolina, the trustees of the seminary state: "In response to a resolution of the Synod of Virginia (*Minutes* of 1882, p. 168), and impressed with the importance of initiating, at the present meeting of trustees, measures for the endowment of a fifth professorship in this seminary, to be known as the chair of *English Biblical Study and Pastoral Theology*, a committee (Rev. Drs. C. White, Rumples, Richardson, Dabney, and Peck) will address the Christian public, asking contributions to endow this chair." The trustees thus took worthy recognition of the need to which General Assembly, Synod, and private individuals had respectfully called their attention.

The friends of Union Seminary had also long felt another want, namely, that of a course in pastoral theology wider and more developed than was possible while that department was a mere appendage to the chair of systematic theology. In this feeling, the whole Synod of Virginia seems to have shared. And thus, we take it, is explained the non-specific, purely general way in which the Synod of 1882 called the attention of the Board of Trustees to the duty of "improving the provision for instruction in this institution." You will remember that the General Assembly had called attention to the need of greater facilities for the study of the English Bible; but the Synod called attention to the need of further "provision for instruction." It, though not formally saying so, wished work done in pastoral theology. The feeling was general then, perhaps, as it is now, that the *data* for the practical science of pastoral theology had never been sufficiently considered and systematized; that positive advance over anything already taught on this subject was quite possible; that for the suitable professor of pastoral theology there awaited a work akin in character to the *creative*. Nor was the impression less general that such a course would be followed by consequences of the highest practical value—the enablement of the student to turn his knowledge into wisdom, to use the treasures of his theological, Biblical, psychological researches with effect in dealing with men as pastor and teacher.

In this move to increase provision for instruction in practical

theology, the church fell in with one of the best things in the spirit of this age. Our age would turn all its knowledge to practical ends. It does not wish to know about things for the sake of knowing. It wishes to know about things for the sake of further achievement; *e. g.*, it does not wish to know simply of the great power of electricity, or the laws of its generation and dissipation, but to know it in such a way as to be able to make electricity man's servant—make it carry his messages to the ends of the earth, roll his cars, light his streets and home, cure his body of its ills. It may be that the age is wrong in considering, too generally, as practical ends only those which have to do with material advancement. Nevertheless, the practical turn of the age is one of its good characteristics. And if its outlook is too contracted—if its vision is too often like that of the garbage birds, on the earth, if it falls short of the needs of the soul, if it fails to look on the invisible as steadily as it should, it is yet true that Christian men should learn from this generation of the world that truth, grand as it is, precious as it is, is not after all the ultimate end, and that whatsoever philosophers have regarded it so were and are wrong; and they should come to see that truth itself, or our apprehension of truth, is in order to *character as God's servants and sons*; that the object of truth-getting is truth-using; that truth never attains its true value for us until we have got the power of its practical application to good ends. If any considerable help then, toward the use of one's knowledge, toward the application of that knowledge unto the practical end of building up God's kingdom, can be given by such a course of instruction, there should be such a discipline as Pastoral Theology.

Our wise Board of Trustees of 1883 attempted, consequently, in the founding of the so-called Fifth Professorship to make at least a partial provision for these two wants—instruction in the English Bible and in Pastoral Theology.

Perhaps such a composite chair cannot in the very nature of things, fully supply in either direction what has been desired. Certain it is, that *some* in our churches believe that the English Bible should receive the larger share of the chair's attention; while *not a few*, on the other hand, would make the Pastoral

Theology of the first importance, so much so as to let it absorb almost the entire energies of the chair. These latter insist that the English Bible, so far as studied should be a mere text-book of Pastoral Theology; that only those parts which are rich in matter bearing on homiletics or on pastoral conduct should be studied by this chair, and these only so far as they give help of a specific and practical sort to the student viewed as a prospective pastor and preacher.

Now, the importance of a chair of practical theology can hardly be overestimated. The subject is, indeed, worthy of the whole time of any man, no matter how mighty soever he be. It is true, also, that there is room for a large use of the English Bible in such a course. The general impression to which we have adverted, that much and rich Scripture teaching on the subject has not yet been put in proper shape, is probably correct. Nevertheless, the importance of the study of the English Bible is also hard to overestimate. The Assemblies of 1881 and 1882 were calling the attention of the Board to a real need, quite as real as that for a wider course in pastoral theology. And that call was for an increased acquaintance with the English Bible, for an exegetical study of that Bible. And the Board in its response to the Assemblies and Synod recognized the *at least tantamount* importance of the Biblical work of the chair, by naming it *not* the chair of "Pastoral Theology and English Biblical Study," *but, of* "English Biblical Study and Pastoral Theology," by their speaking in the report to the General Assembly and the two controlling Synods in 1885, of the chair of "*Biblical Theology with the English Bible as the text-book,*" and by their general expressions touching the chair thenceforward. In the minutes of the meeting of the Board of 1888, it is indeed recorded that the Board instructs its financial agent to tell the people the purpose of the chair, viz.: "That it is intended to be the chair of English Biblical Study and Pastoral Theology, that the principal text-book is to be the English Bible, and the principal subject to be taught is the art of preaching and the best methods of conducting the public worship of God" (pp. 178-179 *Records of Trustees*). And *these* words, if we knew nothing of the previous history of

the chair, and nothing of its future history, yet at the time of their record might be considered, I think, as decisive in favor of the view that the chair is one simply of Pastoral Theology. The Board may, however, have an exegete competent to their interpretation in consistency with its past touching the chair, as with what was then to be its future in the same relation. About that future, at any rate, as about its past, there can be no doubt. In 1889 (*Extracts*, p. 104), the following resolution was recommended and adopted: "That the Board more clearly define the scope of the Fifth Professorship as embracing the study of the English Scriptures and Pastoral Theology. In the study of the English Scriptures we would include the authorship, period, and contents of each book; the central thought of each book, and its relation to the other books in the development of doctrine—in other words Biblical Theology. Under Pastoral Theology full instruction should be given in all matters of practical church work, such as Sunday-schools, church finance, protracted services and the evangelistic work." In these words the two branches of the chair's work are sharply discriminated and defined. The chair is to do a work in pastoral theology. It is also to do a work in biblical theology, which is a more precise determination of the kind of exegetical work which it is to do. The Board at the same meeting appears to have changed the name of the chair to that of "Biblical and Pastoral Theology." This action on the part of the Board was highly gratifying to the Synod of Virginia. For in its minutes of 1889 we find this resolution recommended and adopted: "That the Synod approves the action of the Board of Directors of Union Theological Seminary in giving to the new professorship the name of 'the chair of Biblical and Pastoral Theology,' and further that the Stated Clerk be directed through the religious press to call special attention to the name given to the new chair, and publish the resolution of the Board of Directors."

Those who would make pastoral theology absorb the whole energy of the chair would violate the constitution of the chair, as determined in the manner we have seen—determined by church courts, by the planning of the directors, and the purpose of the people in their contributions.

Now, far be it from us to make little of the value of pastoral theology, or even to seem to do it. Nothing could be further from our intention. We have already expressed our sense of its great importance; and we assert further that it is the most delightful half of our work. But its importance is universally recognized; and there is not, we think, as *unanimous* a verdict in favor of the English Bible—probably because it is a newer branch of seminary discipline, and consequently not so well understood. There is not that universal *feeling of the need* of the English course. Yet, honored fathers of the Board, you and your predecessors have made no mistake in putting the work of the English Bible tantamount in the constitution of this chair. A study of the English Bible is demanded by the needs of our age. Will you hold in mind this proposition: THE STUDY OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE IS DEMANDED BY THE NEEDS OF THIS AGE? For to certain 'proofs of this assertion I would invite your attention for a few minutes.

1st. Every preacher should have at his command *the contents of the Bible*. He should know its histories—the stories of creation and the fall; of the growing wickedness of man, and of the flood; of renewed haughty rebellion, and the dispersion; of the choice of a people, their development in Egypt, and their mighty deliverance; of the descent of Jehovah at Sinai to make known his law; of Israel's apostasy, and the consequent wanderings in the desert; of their ultimate entrance into Canaan, their mighty conquests, their ever-recurring apostasies again, and those gracious divine deliverances; of their development into a nation, happy, great, and strong, under kings royal indeed; of sins of people and ruler, and of division and internecine war following thereon; of grand prophetic teaching; of noble opportunities anew presented for retrieving their stand; of obliteration—first, of the northern division, and then the southern; of Judah's reestablishment; of its eternal cure of the love of foreign idolatry; of the nation's running to Phariseeism and Sadduceeism, to ritualism and skepticism; of its furnishing a few humble followers of our Lord, but of its rejection and crucifixion of him, the Lord of glory; and of the muttering thunders of the coming storm of God's wrath which are already reverberating in the New Testament.

He should be acquainted with those matchless biographical sketches in which the Scriptures abound—the stories of Enoch and Noah; of Abraham the friend of God, and Isaac, and Jacob, the prince with God; of the wild Esau, as of the worldling Lot; of Joseph, in his sparkling, but haughty, boyhood, in his oppressed and slavish youth, in his incorruptness, distinguished and in great power, in his beautiful forgiveness toward his brethren, in his humble recognition of the hand of God; of Moses, in the rushes, as the petted son by adoption of a queen, in his rash murder of the Egyptian, in Sinai's desert feeding sheep, at the burning bush, as empty of self, therefore capable of being filled with power from on high, before Pharaoh, clad in a majesty that more than matched the king's, in his calmness at the Red Sea, in his superb, heroic readiness to sacrifice himself for his people after the sin of the golden calf, and in his weakness at the waters of Meribah, where he sinned with his lips—the strongest, grandest, humblest man in all Old Testament history; of the general Joshua, and the chieftain Caleb; of Othniel and Achsah, Deborah and Barak, Gideon and Jephthah, Samson, and Samuel, the seer, the judge, the John the Baptist of the coming kingdom; of Saul's noble youth, but decadent manhood; of Jonathan, the lovely and the chivalric; of David, from the sheep-fold to the throne, as a shepherd, a warrior, courtier, outlaw-chief, tribal king, and king of Israel—from that sink of moral iniquity wherein he committed the double sin against his brave Hittite warrior Uriah, and screened uncleanness by murder, to that height of spiritual life wherein he composed the fifty-first Psalm; of Solomon's bright morning, but darkening day. But time would fail us to mention the names of Old Testament worthies—mighty prophets, faithful priests, heroic kings—whose lives the preacher should know as well as he knows his own life—all the light places and all the dark places in those lives. Nor should he know less, but rather the more, of New Testament characters. He should be acquainted with the shaggy prophet of the wilderness in all his power to despise shams, and in the height of his sublime courage for truth, and in his *soaring* humility. He should know Peter in the blaze of his fervor of love, which moves him, as occasion requires, to

put forth "ecstatic ascriptions of adoration and praise, or follow Christ to prison and to death." He should know John in all his power to love and all his power to hate, and in his deep pondering. He should know the many-sided, the versatile Paul—know the history of the man—his weaknesses and meannesses, his strength and grandeur of character, his insufficiency and sufficiency. And unless he does know these things, he can never appreciate the spiritual aspirations, the burning love for Christ, he can never apprehend the spiritual conceptions of Paul, or John, or Peter. He cannot half preach their truths. He should certainly, also, know the biography of Christ—Christ from his marvellous annunciation and miraculous birth, through his sweet boyhood, of which we have at least a glimpse, and his faithful years of service for his folks at home; through his baptism for righteousness' sake, and his mysterious and terrible temptations; through his ministry, in obscurity, in the full blaze of notoriety, and in the full flush of opposition made to him; in the last week of his life, with all his teachings and doings therein, and on the last day and at the last minute; through his resurrection and ascension.

He should follow one and all these characters through their valleys of Baca and Achor and across the slopes of their Delectable Mountains; should become acquainted with every downward step of their misery for, and in, sin, to the very clay of the miry pit, and with every upward step to the height of glory where these servants of God have stood with their feet upon a rock. He should remark and treasure up their deepest experiences that he may know in some degree what he ought to look for in his own and others' hearts and lives.

Above all, he should treasure up the great facts which God has revealed concerning his own character, and the incidents wherein these facts have been revealed; God's power and wisdom and goodness as seen in creation, in every miracle of which we have record, and in that great, complex, but absolutely orderly movement which we call sacred history; God's stern, inflexible justice and loving mercy together brought out on occasion, of the fall in Eden, of the flood, of the dispersion, of the exodus, and of the

conquest of Palestine and throughout Israel's history; God's sleepless loving providence, of universal reach, but manifested specially toward God's people—toward Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and their children whom he led as a flock; God's holiness, his entire apartness from sin, his intolerance of sin, brought out by the most magnificent ceremonialism, as by a thousand instances of miraculously expressed hate of sin; God's truth so determining that it was impossible for the Strength of Israel to lie—all these attributes, all these manifestations of God the preacher should be master of.

Further, he should know the essential contents of the Law and the Gospel, and of the individual books of each. Only when he has looked at God, Christ, the sinner, hell, salvation, heaven through the eyes of Moses and David, and of John and Paul, does he see these great and many-sided subjects in their true perspective. And we can never approximate looking through John's eyes until we know the essential contents of John's writings.

And these are but illustrations of the biblical facts which the preacher of our day, who does not know them, needs to know. This need is not, it is true, peculiar to our age. It is a need of every age. There never was a time since the revelation of these facts, nor will there ever be a time, when the preacher can do the work—the present constitution of nature lasting—which God has given him to do, as he should do it, while ignorant of these facts. *Only* in the great facts which reveal God's character and will concerning man do we find the preacher's message as God's herald to man. Only by the study of inspired biographies of men who were sinners, become saints—regenerate, but imperfectly sanctified—rose, struggled, fell, and yet rose again to greater heights, will the preacher learn how to deal with souls in like process of life. For the only absolutely trustworthy experiences,—psychological experiences, spiritual experiences, carnal experiences, of sinner and saint,—are found in inspired facts. Only, also, from the divine philosophy of history embedded in the Bible can he learn to construct a philosophy of the history of his own age. To unlock the mystery of the present and learn how to behave in his own age, the preacher must to the Bible history with the Bible

philosophy thereof. Thus to get his message and learn how to apply it to men the preacher should at least have the great classes of facts of which we have spoken.

That preacher, therefore, in any age, who fails to master the contents of the Bible, in so far as he is not prevented by physical inability, is responsible for a one-sided, dwarfed development—for unused powers, for a pound laid up in a napkin. The preacher is under a moral obligation to master these contents.

Now the contents of this larger sort can be mastered by a study of the English versions. Says Dr. Thomas Chalmers in his lecture, "Advice to Students on the Conduct and Prosecution of their Studies," in which he recommends, as the first study in the order of *importance*, the study of the Scriptures in the vernacular, "Is there such a difference . . . between the common translation and Campbell's *Translation of the Four Gospels*, that, after studying to the uttermost, and drawing the full sense out of first the one and then the other, the variation in the result will be of any more than a small fractional importance to the whole mass of that doctrine and information which can be obtained from either of them? And might not the very same thing be said of the difference between just our common translation and the one which is perhaps awaiting us, after that by the labors of criticism, the *beau-ideal* of a perfect or of a best possible translation has at length been realized?" (*Works*, Vol. IX., p. 24.) Not only can these contents be mastered in the English versions, they can be mastered more perfectly and rapidly there than in the original text. To hold that the work can be done with equal speed from the original texts, is as if one should hold that dogmatic theology could be acquired with the same rapidity from a Latin text as from an English, by one well acquainted with English, but only imperfectly acquainted with the Latin. "There is much," again says Dr. Chalmers to his students, "very much, of biblical learning that I want you to get in English, just as much in fact, as is practicable in English, for the plain reason that it can be got faster that way, and therefore to get it in Greek or Hebrew is to bring upon a number of most useful acquisitions the burden of a most unnecessary servitude. It is a wasteful expenditure of

strength." It is quite as easy to show that such work can by nine-tenths of our students be done with more perfectness from the English Version than from the original texts.

The average college boy remembers comparatively little of the Livy he read in the Latin on yesterday, or of the Horace, or the *De Amicitia*. His attention has been so much occupied with linguistic problems that the facts, the very cream of Horace, or of Livy, or of Cicero have passed away unheeded. The similar thing is true to a greater or less extent of the divinity student, in his use of the original texts. His attention is withdrawn from the matter, the substance, the spirit, and fixed on the mere form. Besides his progress from page to page is so slow that he hardly ever sees a whole story in its completeness, much less a whole book. He fails of that large comprehensive vision which is essential to mastery.

But beyond this, as a rule the mastery of the contents of the Bible, or even their approximate mastery, can *only* be made by the help of the vernacular. Ours is an unusually well-equipped institution for the exegetical study of the Scriptures in the original tongues. Yet in this seminary *much* less than half the chapters of the whole Scriptures can be covered in the Greek and Hebrew. And if the great *terre incognitæ* of Scripture are explored at all, it must be by an English Bible course, or if any considerable portion of them be mastered it must be by such a course. The time of the students as well as that of the professors would allow nothing else.

If there were no other reason then, than to afford an opportunity for and to accomplish a wider acquaintance of this general sort with the Bible, you would have acted *wisely* in the establishment of this chair, since it is to give at least a partial attention to the mastery of the contents of the Bible. But there are other reasons of quite equal moment.

2nd. OUR SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH MUST STUDY BIBLICAL THEOLOGY,—*must study Biblical Theology in the technical sense* of the phrase; and our most valuable text-book for this study is the English Bible.

By biblical theology is meant the historical exhibition of the

religion contained in the canonical books of the Bible, according to its progressive development and the variety of the forms in which it appears.¹

We have asserted that this science *must* be studied. It matters not that the investigation may result in little that is new, and that we may return from the toil of the investigation with the conviction that, after all, our FATHERS have seen the essential facts and drawn the doctrines thence and stated them in systematic form. It matters not that our dogmatic theology is founded on, moulded by, and filled with a correct biblical theology. Though all this is granted, yet the circumstances of the age make it incumbent on us to study biblical theology.

For this discipline—a good one in itself, the highest form of exegetical work—the one that shows us revelation as a living, moving, growing thing—is receiving almost universal attention. And it is and must ever remain a precondition to an assured personal certainty that one's dogmatic theology is correct.

Let me, in passing, guard against being understood to have a light estimate of the importance of dogmatic theology. Dogmatic theology is the very queen of the sciences. It has ever held the predominant place in theological discipline and will continue to do so in the future. No truth is seen until it is seen in relation to at least the whole body of kindred truths. No truth is known until it is known in system. Dogmatic theology has received, is receiving, and will continue to receive much detraction at the hands of enemies of the truth and *foolish friends* of the truth. Every bulwark against error will receive endless defamation at the hands of errorists, and dogmatic theology in proportion to her importance. But while holding her in this high esteem, we reassert that we cannot have an immediate certainty that our dogma is correct unless we study biblical theology. The reasons, if not already evident, will appear incidentally as we proceed.

Furthermore, it is plain, even to the eyes of him who *willeth not to see*, that *our* dogma is *impugned*—generally *impugned*. The

¹Cf. Weidner, *Biblical Theology of the Old Testament*.

spirit of this age impugns it. We have pointed out a good quality of this spirit of our age in its practicality, even though that practicalness be of too low a type.

Another good quality of the age is its disposition to inquire into everything—to accept nothing without sufficient reason. But our age, too often, exhibits another quality as unqualifiedly bad as these are good, namely, the disposition to reject the past, as being the past, without examination.

It is an age of grand, of glorious advancement in certain departments of knowledge. Increment after increment of light has been added in rapid succession. Truths whose very existence were unsuspected have been discovered, and have brought with them other worlds of truth. Old theories, old doctrines, honored through a hoary past, have been exploded. New theories, which, if not true, yet approximate more nearly the truth, have been established for the time. Much of this new truth is of very great value. Much of the old theories displaced is now seen to have been of positively hurtful tendency. To illustrate this movement by an instance from the department of medicine: About a score of years ago, Sir James Simpson, the discoverer of chloroform, was the greatest light in the faculty of Edinburgh. He was succeeded by his nephew. A few years later, the latter gentleman was asked by the librarian of the university to go to the library and pick out the books on his subject that were no longer needed. "And," says Professor Drummond, "his reply to the librarian was this: 'Take every book that is more than ten years old, and put it down into the cellar.'"¹ And so in the realm of history, our age has substituted the ingenious guesses of our fathers by facts. It has resurrected the ages long gone by, and made them tell truly the tale of their daily lives, their hopes, despairs, fears, and joys. And the lines along which this increased light has been thrown are not a few. The successes of the age in getting rid of cobwebs and reading "God's thoughts after him," have, by God's good help, been *vast*. But the age's successes have made it mad. It has become proud of its works, and contemptuous of the past. It not only claims the right to examine the past, which is well and

¹*The Supreme Gift*, page 44.

good, but it claims the right to reject the past as being the past, and then to examine or not as it chooses. Like Nebuchadnezzar, it looks on the great Babylon which *it* has builded. And, like Nebuchadnezzar, it loses reason. It makes the induction, like a village matron, from a case or two of error in the tenets of the past, that the past is all worthless. If it give an examination to the past at all, that examination is an act of free grace to the past; it is not in any sense its due before rejection. And this Spirit of the Age deals with the Christian religion and with the forms of its doctrinal statements as it deals with other subjects.

We *hear its voice* in our own communion, from persons of some degree of culture, from men and women who read the works of Stanley and Drummond *et id omne genus*. From these persons the voice passes to the great unreading crowds. And from these crowds it comes every now and then—nay, often—to the preacher in distinct articulation: “I have a difficulty. Don’t tell me what the church says, what the standards say; tell me what the Scriptures say. And before you do that, tell me what the Scriptures *are*.” These people are virtually rejecting our standards and our Bible without examination. Pastors tell us that their people are putting such questions.

We hear the voice of the Spirit of the Age, again, in the changing teachings of the churches. We may, indeed, credit these churches with a love for the past—in some cases, with an unworthy, dishonest fight for the past. The time ghost may have a rich gift for some churches of to-day. We pass this. We reassert that his voice is heard in the *changing teachings* of the churches of to-day. The great Cumberland Presbyterian Church has drifted far out toward Socinianism; denied to God the attribute of justice, on the ground that he is possessed of the attribute of mercy; denied the atoning efficacy of Christ’s death. The Northern Methodist Church is driving on in the same direction. The Northern Presbyterian Church has, to say the least, a large minority of Arminians; it has, too, a powerful though small minority of rationalists. That church wishes a new creed. In this they are at one with the Presbyterian churches of England and Scotland. As for the German theologians: through them

the voice of the age speaks most loudly. In a sense this voice may be said to be *theirs* peculiarly. A summary of its teachings through them may engage you for a moment with profit. It is as follows:

1st. "The modern world-philosophy which denies miracle and prophecy and recognizes only a purely historical development of things is assuredly right. In order to win the cultured classes, therefore, Christian dogmas must be modified and concessions must be made.

2nd. "Our view of inspiration must be modified and toned down in view of critical objections. And we must declare that the *Bible is no longer the only source of Christian truth*, that on the contrary, its system of truth is to be based on the Christian consciousness and the Christian certainty of salvation, that, in short, the experience of the believer is to be put in place of the Scriptures.

3rd. "The doctrine of the subjection and bondage of the human will is to be given up. The will is relatively independent and coöperative in conversion which is confused with regeneration.

4th. "Synergism and Pelagianism in some form or other is true.

5th. "Predestination or God's free and gracious choice of sinners unto salvation, is to be given up as a doctrine.

6th. "There is little or no difference between justification and sanctification. Sanctification is a process of unaided human development.

7th. "Salvation, as a whole, is in the main a process of human development."

This summary has been taken with immaterial changes from the article of Dr. A. Zahn in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* of July, 1891, not because it contained anything new, but because it is a statement that must carry credibility with it. Dogmatic theology of to-day thus impugns the dogmatic theology of Calvin which we substantially hold. Shall we not be ready to answer, every man giving a reason of the hope that is in us?

It is still more to the purpose to observe that biblical theology which is widely cultivated, as we have seen, in many quarters, is lifting high its voice in fierce denunciation of our dogmas. Ritschl, the head of the most influential school of biblical theology in

Germany, until his death in 1888, found hardly a grain of truth in our dogma. Take the point of Christology. Ritschl taught that, "inasmuch as Christ's disposition of mind is the same as God's, Christ receives the predicate of deity, by which, however, there is no thought of any constitution of nature, the Scriptures admittedly teaching the contrary" [Z]. Both he and his most celebrated and talented follower, A. Harnack, of Berlin, teach that much of our dogma is nothing in the world but Greek ideas—purely heathen in its origin. There are, thank God, much more worthy presentations of biblical theology. But many even of the more conservative biblical theologians assert that the apparent biblical support for many of our doctrines is only obtained by severing the proof-text from its context and its historical setting, that dogmatic theologians see proofs for their positions in such texts, because they go to the Bible to find such proofs. And with all this clamor around us, with these voices sounding high against us, we should know how to meet worthily these aspersions on our standards.

We cannot, be assured, meet them worthily by holding by prescription the faith of our fathers—by clinging to it as a Mussulman clings to his inherited Mohamedanism, as the heathen Chinese of to-day in the Province of Hunan cleave to their faith out of regard to the past. No, sirs; we can only meet these detractions worthily by planting ourselves on the immovable rock of truth. We must study the biblical theology ourselves. We must raise the questions. Did our fathers really derive their theology from the Bible? Did they get the whole truth and nothing but the truth? What are the Biblical facts and doctrines out of which to construct a theology?

And in this study of biblical theology we must go to the Bible. We are not to go to the works of biblical theology. We are not to go to the works of Ritschl, or Bender, or Kafton, or Häving. We are not to go to the works even of Oehler, or Weiss, or to the compends of Weidner. If we do we will look at facts through their eyes. We will fail to see for ourselves. We will get no more of the needed discipline than by reading the biblical sections in the dogmatics of Hodge, or Dabney, or Shedd. In this age and about these eternally vital matters we want the intuitive certainty that

comes only of a direct, immediate, personal handling of the word itself. We must go to the Bible, and to the English Bible, for reasons evident. The great facts which we wish specially to find are the common, outstanding facts, the facts which no proximately correct version could hide—facts, therefore, which we can get without fail from our versions—facts which the cottage patriarchs of our church have gathered so well from their version as to make of seminary-bred preachers their humble disciples. The mighty work, the limited time, the adequacy of the English Version, all say for the English Version: "It is our text-book."

And to this text-book we must go with a becoming spirit. We are not to go to it to find certain things in it, as dogmatic theologians are often unjustly charged with doing. We are not to go to it with rejection of it as a whole in our hearts, or rejection of any essential contents of it, as Ritschl has done. We are certainly not to approach the book with the denial of all supernatural in it, as Bender is said to have done. We are to go to it to *discover what is there*. We are to take up book after book, observe carefully the cardinal facts and doctrines of religion as developed in the book, note these facts, and at the end of the book reduce the results to fitting order, and see what we have. Thus we proceed from book to book, noting the religious light and life of each age, comparing that light and life with that of preceding ages, and on suitable occasions making comparisons between the results obtained and the doctrines of our standards. And if the student returns from the investigation with a deep certainty that the great doctrines of our church are not supported by brief texts taken out of all relation with their context, but by the very spirit of wide tracts of Scripture; if he sees that whole books of Scripture are just redolent of these doctrines, then he will be able to meet the onslaught of the age as he should. After such a discipline, a man can deal suitably with the troubled members of his flock who are ready to drop the standards. He can distinguish between the truth and the error of his age. He can take the good. He can reject the bad. He can run with his age as far as it moves toward the right. He can resist it in its motions toward the wrong. He is unshaken by rationalistic dogmatism, or by

teachers of a biblical theology which is no biblical theology. He is no longer shut up to prescription, or to being tossed to and fro by the changing winds of the day. He can hold truth because he knows it is true. If of his age, as he should be, he can yet be above his age, *i. e.*, *quoad* religion. He can suitably guide his people in religion. The man, on the other hand, who has not made, in some way, this independent study of the Bible is not the man most needed in our generation. Sooner or later, he will be swept along by the current of the age. Prescription, sooner or later, invariably yields. If he is not a puppet to-day, he will become one to-morrow. Instead of holding his people steadily to the truth, he and they will drift alike before the breeze of the hour. He will be seized by the nearest by-current, and carried into all sorts of ephemeral whirlpools and eddies. He will never be heavy enough to catch the force of the current of the great gulf stream of God's truth, which moves with increasing light throughout the ages.

It is worthy of *special* remark, by the way, that the seminary is the place to get this discipline. There may be a thought in some mind that the future, in the pastor's study, is the time and place for this work. Some one may think: "The student here has not attained the point of view for this work. His acquirements are insufficient." But his attainments *are* sufficient. The facts mainly looked for for the purposes of biblical theology are of the plainer sort, as we have seen. Some one may object that "Time fails one, while at the seminary, for such work." The answer is: If time fails our students here, it will always fail them. They will never have time to investigate whether the theology which they preach is really biblical. The seminary should be a place where truth is searched for, and gripped eternally. Bishop Phillips Brooks, in his *Yale Lectures on Preaching*, draws a painful contrast between the way in which seminary students in some places work and the way in which students attending the professional schools of law and medicine work. The law-student may have loitered in his academical career, likewise the medical student, but in their professional schools they work with intense energy. "Then," says Bishop Brooks, "the work of their life comes into sight before them. It is the way in which a bird, who has been

wheeling vaguely, sees at last its home in the distance, and flies toward it like an arrow." "But shall I say to you," he goes on, "how often I have thought that the very transcendent motives of the young minister's study have a certain tendency to bewilder him, and make his study less faithful than that of men seeking other professions from lower motives? The highest motive often dazzles before it illuminates. "It is one of the ways in which the light within us becomes darkness. I shall never forget my first experience at a divinity school. The first place I was taken to at the seminary was the prayer-meeting; and never shall I lose the impression of the devoutness with which those men prayed and exhorted one another . . . I sat bewildered and ashamed, and went away depressed. On the next day I met some of those same men at a Greek recitation. It would be little to say of some of the devoutest of them that they had not learnt their lessons. Their whole way showed that they never learnt their lessons; that they had not got hold of the first principles of hard, faithful conscientious study. The boiler had no connection with the engine. The devotion did not touch the *work which then and there was the only work for them to do*. By and by I found something of where the steam did escape to. A sort of amateur, premature preaching was much in vogue among us. We were in haste to be at what we called 'our work.' A feeble twilight of the coming ministry we lived in. The people in the neighborhood dubbed us 'parsonettes.' Oh! my fellow students, the special study of theology and all that appertains to it, that is what the preacher must be doing always; but he never can do it afterwards as he can in the blessed days of quiet in Arabia, after Christ has called him and before the apostles have laid their hands upon him." According to your work here you will have a right when you go out hence to speak God's truth with a certainty approaching that of prophets, apostles, our Lord, or you will have no such right, but must speak as the scribes, the tradition of the elders, and wear the faces of shams. Time can be found for the study of biblical theology, one of the most vital needs of the hour, of which if a man is destitute he is adrift, without anchor, rudder or compass.

3rd, ANOTHER CRYING NEED OF OUR AGE IS THAT THE BIBLE SHOULD BE HEARD IN ITS OWN APOLOGY; that it be allowed to make its own defence against the heresies of the day.

It is sometimes said that the best course in apology is a course of quiet, positive teaching of truth. But this position does not seem to be true. We might, perhaps, grant it if we were able to find a sufficiently strong instinct in the student to the truth. But the much boasted hungering for truth supposed to be the possession of every rational soul is mightily counteracted in the minds of most men. There is an inertia, a sloth, a stupidity, a deadness to truth. The majority need, until they get it, regeneration of mind and a constant reawakening and stimulation.

One of the means which may be employed to arouse and to quicken the mind is to confront men with opinions contrary to those which they are accustomed to hear put forth. Let the counter opinion be set forth in all its strength of statement and plausibility of argumentative support. Let the student feel that, like the Indian infant boy in the river, if he will not swim by effort he must die, if he will not think he must go down before error, into error to be covered by it as by drowning waters. When he sees there is thinking to do for every one worthy of the name man, and that every one worthy of the name man must think, then if there is any possibility of the act in him it will show itself. Error serves, should be made to serve, to show the beauty and the value of truth, as darkness shows that of light, and thus wake us to the reception of truth. And, besides this, truth acquired in the face of errors is retained by intellect and heart as a more precious possession. The man who weighs the conflicting opinions, who wrestles with opponents maintaining always fairness and a supreme desire for the truth, goes away with the strength which comes of conflict and with *love* for the truth attained, since love always impinges on the object for which we make outlay of self. The man who in the midst of rampant error holds the truth and sees through the errors, *values* the truth. He will love it with all his strength of manhood and propagate it with virile power. He is like a patriot who has fought for the liberty and happiness of his state. *His* affection for the state is

lasting as life. But he who is not trained to hate error and to fight it is apt to be like the posterity of the patriot, grown easy and careless of his civic rights because he knows nothing of their cost. We may bless the Lord, my brethren, that he gives to the devil and his minions a loose rein, that he forces his church to be a church militant, for such *poor* creatures are we, that were we not forced to fight for his truth we would go to sleep concerning it and *lie in a dead stupor* touching it through the ages. That we may love the truth and hold it and push it, then let us set error over against it.

Furthermore, a course in apology is advantageous in that to forewarn is to forearm. Were a student taught positively the truth in the form held in this seminary and turned loose without an intimation of the phases of opinion he is to meet in the world, he would encounter some very rude shocks, and be put to hurtful and lasting confusion, perhaps. We are not mistaken in teaching the advantage of apology. John was an apologist. Paul was an apologist. And in the records of the life of our Lord more space is taken up in the telling of his controversies than in narrating any other kind of his teachings. These great teachers made no mistake. They did the wise thing and showed all subsequent teachers what they ought to do.

Now the best text-book on biblical apologies is the Bible itself. He was no fool who when asked to recommend that book which contained the ablest defense of the Bible, recommended "the *Bible itself*." He who has lived with one of our canonical writers, with John for example, until he really knows what John has said in his book, has appreciatively mastered the book *memoriter* say, knows that the spirit of the book is divine. And when he leaves for a time this communion with God's prophet, or God's Spirit, who speaks through his prophet, leaves that for the ordinary talk of men, he knows that the book is as high above man as heaven is high above earth. Let the truth have an opportunity then to vindicate itself by opposing constantly the error correspondent to the truth of any given passage, and the vindication will be perfect; *e. g.*, let the student come to the class with John's treatment of the nature of our Lord, as set forth in the preface to

John's Gospel, thoroughly mastered and well in mind. Ritschl's doctrine as to our Lord's nature, if clearly set forth, heighten the student's appreciation of the fact of our Lord's true divinity and deity, and will serve to receive itself an absolute refutation. And there are *multitudes* of errors, which current to-day, were current also in the time of apostle and prophet, and received a complete and definitive refutation at the hands of said apostles and prophets. Some of these refutations are recorded in the Bible. For example, men raise to-day with all the swelling pride of paternity the question: "What is to be the form of the absolute religion?" "What is to be the absolute religion?" But this question was asked in the Apostle Paul's day, and Paul answered it. He says and proves at length that the ultimate religion is to be his gospel of Jesus Christ. See the pastoral epistles. To the Bible then for its own defence.

Here, too, the English Version is the Bible to be used, since with it one may get a larger view of Scripture truth and a clearer one. That the Bible's own apology for itself may be appreciated it is exceedingly important to know a large part, if possible, all, of the Bible. Says Oehler,¹ "It is true of every intellectual product, that it cannot be rightly esteemed by those who concern themselves only with its outer features, or with individual fragments of it; and of the Bible this is peculiarly true. What is here unfolded is one great economy of salvation—*unum continuum systema*, as Bengel puts it—an organism of divine deeds and testimonies which beginning in Genesis with the creation, advances progressively to its completion in the person and work of Christ, and shall find its close in the new heaven and the new earth predicted in the Apocalypse; and only in connection with this whole can details be rightly estimated. He who cannot apprehend the" [Bible] "Old Testament in its historical context may produce in detail much that is valuable and worth knowing, but he lacks the right key to its meaning; . . . then he easily stops short at the puzzles which lie everywhere on the surface, . . . and from them he condemns the whole." To get even an approximate mastery of the whole Bible and thus allow the Bible to apologize for itself, we must use

¹ *Old Testament Theology*, Vol. I., page 2.

our versions, therefore. Master the whole Bible thus, and it will be seen that the work of the destructive critics must be, in order to their success, of a magnitude more than infinite.

Let us remark, to prevent misapprehension, that in all that has been said concerning the importance of the English Bible study no disparagement is intended of the other exegetical chairs. We yield to none in our appreciation of their importance. And we shall do all in our power to lead the student to increased dissatisfaction with the exclusive study of any mere version. But there is a vast deal of work that for lack of time cannot be done by those chairs, and which may be done in part by the one arm of the fifth professorship. This work we have tried to indicate as to kind, and to its value. In these several three ways the English Bible course could be employed with great profit. Such a discipline, faithfully pursued, would add greatly to the effective equipment of men for the ministry.

In conclusion, we observe, that it is entirely practicable to make a unity of this threefold discipline. That unity is obtained by making biblical theology the paramount discipline and the mastery of the contents and the apologetic work subsidiary. The mastery of the contents, in itself considered of almost measureless importance to the preacher, is the necessary precondition to the proper study of the facts of doctrine and its development; while, on the other hand, the presentation of error is an aid to the proper comprehension of the doctrines of the truth.

Somewhat less ground can be covered by this triple study than by but one kind of it. But there is compensation in the greater worth of results obtained. Nor do I see any sufficient reason why we may not hope, in sessions not far distant, to cover a vast tract of Scripture in this thorough manner. In a school of young ministers, a school which should rank as high as any university in the land for the kind and amount of work done in it, may we not hope to lay aside in some of the classes all kindergarten methods and even common-school pedagogics? May we not hope that these gentlemen, conscientious and diligent,—moved by the greatness of their work, the shepherdship of God's people,—will do the more elementary work with but little assist-

ance on the part of the teacher, prepare *themselves on the contents of a section* of the Scriptures, and help themselves by the aid of hand-books on geography and brief commentaries, recommended for the purpose, to a general understanding of its matters of archæology and geography? Our knowledge of past and present classes in the seminary induces us to believe that such is not a delusive hope. Let the classes come habitually to the class-room full of these contents, so that at the most the professor need only satisfy himself of the fact by a brief examination thereon. Let them do that, and the time in the lecture-room can be devoted to the development of the biblical theology and the needed apologies, and thus rapid progress may be made, great tracts of Scripture can be covered.

I would now reassert, honored sirs, that you have done wisely and well in establishing a department of English Bible study, wisely and well in defining it more particularly as a course of biblical theology. The step was urgently demanded by the needs of the age—the need of a knowledge of Bible facts, for the facts as pastoral provender, but with special reference to biblical theology, a sore need, and the need of Bible apologies. And may the God that created the chair, through you his instruments, bless the work of his and your hands and make it a means for the furtherance, powerfully, of the knowledge of the glory of his rich grace, and to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit be everlasting praise.

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IV. BABYLONIAN *VERSUS* HEBREW ACCOUNT OF CREATION.

THE so-called Babylonian account of the creation of the world, or cosmogony as given in the inscriptions, together with various comments thereon, are now accessible to the English reader in various forms.

[See Smith, *Chaldean Genesis*; English translation of Schrader's *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*; *Records of the Past*, new series, edited by A. H. Sayce, Vol. I., London, 1888; *Tiamat*, by George A. Barton, A. M., published in the fifteenth volume of the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, pages 1-27.]

In some recent discussions of the relation of this Babylonian cosmogony to the biblical account of creation, I have met with interpretations of the biblical narrative from the point of view of Assyrian scholarship, and inferences drawn from a comparison of the two accounts which seem to me erroneous, and to call for a re-examination and re-statement of this important matter. My statements will have special reference to the article on *Tiamat*, by George A. Barton, mentioned above.

As it is correctly stated in that article, the word *Tiamat*, like its cognate *tāmtu*, is an Assyrian equivalent of the Hebrew **תְּהוֹם** and is in Assyrian the name both of the sea, *i. e.*, not the ordinary (*t'hôm*), but the primordial sea, and of a female mythical sea-monster or dragon, the personification of this primordial sea. As such she figures conspicuously in the Babylonian cosmogony. It is needless to present this cosmogony in detail, as it would be tedious to quote the necessarily lame and imperfect translations of fragmentary and difficult inscriptions. It is sufficient for our present purpose to say that in our different sources of information about this matter, namely, Damascius, Berossos, and the cuneiform inscriptions, somewhat different accounts have been preserved. According to one conception, the early Babylonians supposed

that in its primitive condition the universe was a mass of waters, also called Tiamat, or the abyss, the universal, primordial sea. This sea the god Marduk (whose name appears in the proper name Merodach-Baladan, Is. xxxix. 1), also called Bel, or Lord, divided by means of winds and lightnings, and from its parts formed heaven and earth. According to another conception Tiamat is a female dragon, queen of a hideous host, who are hostile to the gods; with them Marduk fights, conquers and destroys them, cuts their leader in two, and of one part of her body makes heaven, of the other the earth; and, as a later conception, puts Tiamat's skin in the sky as the constellation of the dragon.

Anything more widely different from the sublime and unique account of the creation and formation of the world as given in Genesis we can hardly imagine. And yet it is just this crude, savage, hideous, repulsive, polytheistic conception that it is proposed to correlate to the biblical account, and the supposed points of resemblance and contact are detailed and elaborately drawn out. Thus we quote from Barton: "Putting the Hebrew and Babylonian conceptions side by side, we find that they have the following points in common: (1), The assumption of the existence of a mass of waters as the starting point of creation,—a mass which both peoples call by the same name, the Hebrew form being **תְּהוֹם** *t'hôm*, the Babylonian *Tiamat*; (2), The action of winds upon these waters during the creative process; (3), The dividing of the waters into two parts; (4), The formation of heaven from one part and of the earth from the other; (5), The belief among both peoples of a difference of sex in water."

It is but fair to add that the following points of difference are stated in addition to the points of agreement which have been mentioned. "(1), The difference in gender of the waters has nothing to do with the creation in the Hebrew narrative, the first creative impulse with them coming from the **רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים** [Spirit of God], while in the Babylonian Cuneiform all creative movement is traceable to this distinction of sex in water; (2), The waters in the Hebrew narrative are not in conflict with God during the creative process, but are gently brooded over by the **רוּחַ** and easily influenced by it; (3), The Babylonian account is poly-

theistic and extended, while the Hebrew is monotheistic and brief."

On the basis of the points of agreement, however, as he details them and also taking into consideration the apparent antiquity of the Babylonian conception, Mr. Barton comes to the conclusion that Jewish ideas of cosmogony, whenever Genesis may have been written, came from Babylonia. At the same time he admits that they must have received them at a relatively early date, not later than the date of the el-Amarna tablets (seventeenth or fifteenth century B. C.), and that as the conceptions of monotheism became more distinct among the Hebrews their cosmogony took its present form and developed those points of difference with the Babylonian which have been noted, and which lift it far above the latter.

We will now take up these supposed points of resemblance and examine them in detail.

1. It is stated that by both Hebrews and Babylonians the existence of a mass of waters was assumed and regarded as the starting-point of creation. That this is not an adequate presentation of the Hebrew conception underlying the account in Genesis must be obvious to all who will carefully study the matter.

The point at issue is briefly and simply this: The Babylonians assumed the existence of an abyss, a chaotic mass of waters, personified under the form of a female monster, or dragon, named Tiamat, as the starting-point of creation, or rather world-formation. It is distinctly asserted that it is material which was existing before even the gods existed, hence existing independently of the will of the gods; *i. e.*, not brought into existence by them. They find it at hand and work upon it in forming the world. As personified, the dragon Tiamat is hostile to the gods and must be conquered, and her brood, previously produced out of herself, and yet contained within herself, must be destroyed, annihilated, before she yields or furnishes material, so to speak, out of which the gods can form heaven and earth.

Now, the question is, Is this conception, in any way whatever, similar or parallel to the conception of the Hebrews as to the starting-point (if we may so call it) of creation? This question I

answer most emphatically in the negative. It needs, in fact, but to be fairly stated to receive its own answer.

In elucidating my position in this matter, the following points must be noted:

(1.) The account of creation in Gen. i. is headed by the summary statement: **בראשית ברא אלהים את השמים ואת הארץ** "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."

In these few words there are at once suggested several questions. What is the exact meaning of **בראשית**?

What is the exact meaning of **ברא**?

What is meant by the statement **את השמים ואת הארץ ברא אלהים**?

And what is the relation of these words to what follows?

בראשית is here used, not relatively, that is, in opposition to a second, third, etc., but absolutely, like the $\epsilon\nu \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ of John i. 1.

The meaning of **ברא** is given by some to be originally *to cut* or *to carve, to fashion*; but more probably it is to be associated with **ברד** *to make free, to cause or allow to go forth, to cause to appear*.

But whatever its primitive sense may have been, this is certain, that it is used to designate the idea of a divine production, or causative activity which brings forth, or causes to exist, something new, previously non-existent, whether in the realm of nature, as in Exodus xxxiv. 10; Numbers xvi. 30; or of the spiritual, as in Psalm li. 12. It is never used of human production, and never with an accusative of material.

When it is said, **אלהים ברא את השמים ואת הארץ** this we take to be a summary statement including all that follows, and perhaps more also (*vide infra*). It does not have reference simply to the world-stuff, so to speak; the primary, unorganized, undeveloped constituent elements, or elementary substances. But neither is it to be supposed with Dillmann (see *Commentary on Genesis*, p. 15), that these are excluded, and that reference is had only to the finished product, the orderly universe [*das geordnete Weltall*.—Dillmann], as the result of the divine activity. Both of these are included. The divine creation produces first the primary, unorganized, elementary substances themselves, and then shapes

and fashions them into an orderly whole. The statement, moreover, contained in these words we take to be complete in itself, grammatically. There are some who would construe as follows: "In the beginning, when God created the heaven and the earth, (the earth, however, was waste and empty, etc.), then God spake, Let there be light." Without going into details (as it is scarcely of any consequence for our present purpose which construction is adopted), it is enough to say that the reasons alleged for thus construing the connection are unsatisfactory. It is admitted to be a possible syntactical construction, yet there are objections to it which make it, to say the least, unlikely that it was the connection intended by the writer. But in whatever sense we may take this particular expression, the idea that God found, so to speak, the world-stuff, the chaotic mass, or elementary substances, ready at hand, and that his creative activity was restricted to the mere fashioning of this material, to imparting to it form and order, and that in this respect the Hebrew account stands on a par with the Babylonian account—this idea, I say, is distinctly and positively excluded by a true apprehension of the real Hebrew conception underlying this account of creation.

In the Hebrew conception, rightly apprehended, the starting point of creation is not the assumed existence of a mass of waters; the starting-point of creation is the fiat, the creative word or creative will of Almighty God, causing to exist a universe (or, as the Hebrews called it, heaven and earth), which was previously non-existent. In the Babylonian conception, the primitive mass of waters, or the abyss, existed at the beginning, presumably from all eternity; and it was the gods who appeared upon the scene as a later manifestation or development, as beings who began to be in time. In the Hebrew conception, on the other hand, as gathered not only from Genesis i., but also from such parallel passages as Psalm xc. 2; Psalm cii. 25-27, the whole universe, heaven and earth, previously non-existent, was brought into existence, and shaped and fashioned, by the word of God, whose being presents the greatest possible contrast to the limited, temporal duration of the world or universe, in that he exists from all eternity.

We will look at this matter a little more narrowly.

In general we may remark that in the study of Old Testament revelation, and Old Testament theological and religious ideas, conceptions and experiences there are two mistakes, two extremes to be avoided. On the one hand it is a mistake to neglect entirely the necessary differences of conception, differences in the point of view between earlier and later times. As individuals Abraham and Moses and David, Elijah and Isaiah doubtless stood far above perhaps even the highest of those who came after them, but this does not controvert the fact that in general, Old Testament revelation and religious and theological conceptions stand on a lower plane than do those of the New Testament. They could not stand on the same plane because the Lord Jesus Christ had not yet come. To imagine that even the leaders of Old Testament thought had possession of all the extreme refinements of later Christian dogmatics, ready-made, cut and dried is absurd on the face of it, for the various conceptions of Christian dogmatics are matters of growth and development. Revelation was gradual and progressive. Truth was imparted as God's people were ready to receive it. Often it has been conflict with opposing error that has led the church to clearer conceptions and to clearer, more thorough and more elaborate expression of these conceptions. But on the other hand it is just as serious a mistake to assume too great a difference of conception between the different periods, and too low a stage for Old Testament ideas. The Old Testament revelation contains not only jewels which, however beautiful in themselves, are destined always to remain the same, but above all germs which are susceptible of rich and varied development. These germs must be considered, not in themselves, but in the light of subsequent developments.

Now let us apply this principle to the subject matter in hand. I have made the statement that in the Hebrew conception of the creation of the world, as contrasted with the Babylonian conception, the starting-point of this creation is the fiat, the creative will and creative word of Almighty God causing to exist a universe which previously was non-existent. By this I do not mean to say that the writer of Genesis i. had completely reasoned out for himself with all its grounds, difficulties, problems and implications,

the metaphysical dogma of *creatio ex nihilo*. If we may be allowed to say so, the very fact of the primitive, and in a sense crude, nature of theological conceptions of that time made it impossible for him to be fully sensible of the difficulties of any position on this subject, and made it easy for him to soar to the heights of this conception, while utterly ignoring its difficulties, problems and implications. This has always been the difference between faith and reason. Faith seizes with her eagle eye upon the objective point in the heights above the plain, and with her eagle pinions cleaves the air and reaches the point by the simplest, shortest, most direct line of approach, while reason, even when divinely illumined and directed, must slowly and toilsomely and painfully creep and climb and drag with many risks of check, discouragement and failure, from precipice, and crevice, and glacier, until she too reaches the top.

But while the Hebrew conception need not have had, and perhaps cannot have had, the fully developed and elaborated metaphysical conception of *creatio ex nihilo*, yet they had all the essentials of this conception, although of course in a crude and primitive way.

This position is in substantial accord with the position of Dr. Hermann Schultz, in his work on *Old Testament Theology*, pp. 568-572. We quote, for substance, part of what he says: "We seek here (viz., in Gen. i.) in vain for explanations of philosophical questions which could be raised in connection with the idea of creation, as how it is related to time, how it is related to the existence (Vorhandensein) of the elementary matter (Grundstoff), whether this elementary matter must be considered eternal, or whether the world was simply created out of nothing.

"On the metaphysical question as to the way in which the world came into being out of nothing (*nach dem Werden der Welt aus Nichts*), and as to the origin of the world-stuff, as furnishing the ground or possibility of its existence (*Weltmöglichkeit*), our account gives no explanation. Such purely metaphysical questions are not even touched in the Chaldean and Phenician cosmogonies, and nowhere decisively answered in the Old Testament. That, however, the idea of the later Alexandrian philosophy, as to the

eternity of the 'μὴ ὄν' as the ground of the possibility of the existence of the world (*Möglichkeitsgrundes der Welt*), is decidedly irreconcilable with the real meaning of our narrative, may be conceded. Since God, the possessor or owner of heaven and earth, can make everything good, thus showing that he nowhere meets with any hindrance in anything that is already existing, or that having its origin in other being, opposes him, and since his word, 'let there be,' is ever followed by the willing, 'and it was so,' thus showing that matter itself stands before the divine command as a willing servant, it is certainly taken for granted that everything, including this chaotic material, which presented itself to this divine creative word, was included in the will of God, and by him called into being. And who could doubt for a moment that this was the conviction of the writer? That it is not expressly so stated, is simply owing to the fact that he had no occasion to raise such metaphysical question."

So far the words of Dr. Schultz. We find, however, two passages bearing on this matter in the Psalms (Psalm xc. 2; Psalm cii. 25, 26), together with the account in Genesis i., which it will be well to take up for further consideration.

I feel entirely at liberty to cite Psalm xc. as throwing light on the account of creation in Genesis i., because, in spite of what some critics dogmatically assume, there is absolutely no valid reason whatsoever for doubting the Mosaic authorship of this Psalm.

We may render, "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever there were formed (born) the earth and the world, yea, from 'Olām to 'Olām thou art God." The whole drift and tenor and purpose of this Psalm are to set forth the eternity, omnipotence, and immutability of God, especially in his gracious relations to men, as contrasted with the feeble, changing, and perishing nature of man himself, and of the world wherein he dwells. The mountains, the earth and the world are fleeting, subject to change and decay, because they had a definite beginning in time. There was a time when they did not exist. But God never began to exist. From the 'Olām before the beginning of the world unto the 'Olām after it shall have ceased to exist, he is the unchanging, eternal God. Even if we adopt the explanation of this passage given by some,

namely, that the reference here is to the time during which the power of God carried on the process of creation, as related in the first chapter of Genesis, from the first creative act to the advanced stage when the mountains appeared, and then onward till the work was finished, and that the *'olāms* by which measurement is made are the great days of creation, successive, immeasurable periods—even so, I say, the thought of God's eternal existence before his creative work began is by no means excluded, but is needed to complete the idea, which is the admonition, instruction and comfort suggested by the contrast between human weakness and frailty, on the one hand, and God's omnipotence, eternity, and immutability, on the other, especially, I repeat, in his gracious relations to men.

For reasons which I do not need now to specify in detail, I find it difficult to believe, however, that the reference here is to the great days or successive immeasurable periods of creation.

The idea of God's eternity and immutability is also presented with special reference, however, to the continuance of God's being after the universe, as we now know it, has perished, in Ps. cii.: "Thy years are throughout all generations. Of old hast thou laid the foundations of the earth; they shall perish, but thou shalt endure: yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed: But thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end."

I contend that from these passages it appears with incontestable clearness that in the Hebrew conception God was regarded as the eternally-existent, as the Being who never began to be and who never will cease to be, in contrast with whom the world, the universe, not simply in its present form, manifestation and constitution, but in its very essence, in its fundamental constituent elements is temporal; *i. e.*, it began in time and it will cease in time, and it is entirely dependent upon, and in the power of God, its supreme Creator.

(2.) The conceptions which the Hebrews had of the power of the creative word of God to call into existence that which previously did not exist, are also clearly brought out in the account of the creation of light. Before God created light there was not only no

light,—only darkness, the utter absence of light,—but not even the stuff of which light could be made **וַיִּשְׁרַח אֱלֹהִים אֶת הָאוֹר** וַיֵּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יְהי אֹר וַיְהי אֹר. “And God said, Let there be light, and there was light.” It needed only the word of God to cause the light to exist.

In two important respects, accordingly, in the conception of the eternal existence of God, as contrasted with the temporal, limited duration of the universe, both in its beginning and in its ending, and in the conception of the creative power of the word of God, bringing into existence what previously did not exist, the Hebrew conception, in regard to the creation of the world, differs most widely from and rises infinitely above the Babylonian conception. Another point of contrast to be noticed right here is this: In the Babylonian conception this primitive mass of waters called Tiamat comprehends both heaven and earth, or the whole universe. In the Hebrew conception **תְּהוֹמִים** (*t'hôm*) is applied *only to this earth*. The word “heaven” as used in the first verse of Genesis, embodies a distinctly different conception from that conveyed by the same word in the eighth verse. I will recur to this point presently. But from the second verse on, the account has reference only to this earth and its belongings.

2. It is assumed that in both conceptions the winds are represented as acting upon this primitive mass of waters during the creative process. It is true, we meet with this action of the winds in the Babylonian account. By means of winds and lightnings Marduk divided the Tiamat, or primitive mass of waters, and formed heaven out of one part, and earth out of the other. It is also involved in the conception of the fierce struggle of Marduk with Tiamat, personified as the Dragon. But this conception can only be assumed for the Hebrew account by erroneously translating **רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים** (*ruach Elohim*), “The wind of God.” *Ruach Elohim*, although some authorities translate it “wind of God,” really means *The Spirit of God*. Compare Psalm xxxiii. 6; civ. 29. The translation, “wind of God,” is excluded by its connection with the Hebrew word which is translated “moved” or “was brooding upon the face of the waters.” Compare Delitzsch and

Dillmann *in loco*. It has no connection whatever with the winds and lightnings of the Babylonian conception.

3. It is correctly said that in both conceptions we find the dividing of the waters into two parts. But it is entirely wrong to say that in both accounts heaven is formed from one part of these waters and earth from the other, and that, therefore, the two accounts are in some manner related. The Hebrews attached different ideas to the term heaven. Sometimes it simply meant the atmosphere, or the heaven of the clouds, as in Gen. i. 8. Sometimes it meant the heaven of the stars, the sidereal heavens, as in Gen. i. 1. Sometimes it is the abode of God, the heaven of heavens, as in Ps. ii. 4. In our account in Genesis the earth is conceived as existing independently of the sidereal heavens before the waters are separated. This separation of the waters had nothing to do with the formation of the *sidereal* heavens; it had reference only to the atmosphere, or heaven of the clouds.

Compare on this point Delitzsch in his *Commentary on Genesis*, page 50: "The relation of verse 1 to verse 2 is, at first sight, somewhat doubtful. If the heaven which is subsequently created on the fourth day is the same as הַשָּׁמַיִם of verse 1, then verse 1 would be the summary of what follows. But the heaven which is created on the fourth day is only the heaven of the earth-world (Erdwelt). The Scriptures, however, speak also of heaven of heavens (Deut. x. 14,) and heaven of heavens of the primeval world (Urwelt) Ps. lxxviii. 34 (33 Revised Version), hence heavenly spheres above and beyond the heaven of this earth-world, and, moreover, the word נַעֲשֶׂה (*faciamus*) of verse 26 presupposes beings in God's immediate neighborhood of whose creation the narrative makes no mention. Accordingly, verse 1 speaks of the act of creation in an extent in which the following account does not exhaust it. Within the all-embracing creative work of which the first verse speaks, the second verse takes its position at that point where the creation of the earth with its heaven begins."

And again a little later speaking of the רָקִיעַ vs. 6, he says it means the higher atmosphere (Lichbraum), the so-called aerial, or cloud-heaven conceived of as an arch, or vault, or hemi-sphere, stretched out over the earth and its waters. Moreover, we do not

read that heaven was made from the upper part of the divided waters, but the dividing element or instrument itself, the firmament or *expanse*, was called heaven. In this respect also accordingly the two conceptions differ fundamentally.

4. It is stated that among both peoples we find the belief of a difference of sex in the waters. This last point, however, is made out only by an appeal to the apocryphal book of Enoch, where according to Barton we read: "The water which is above the heavens is male, and the water which is under the earth is female." Hence this has nothing to do with the original conception as given in Genesis. Moreover the existence, in the Babylonian conception, of male and female principles in the primordial waters, had nothing to do with creation. It was fruitless for good, unable to produce anything abiding or worthy. What it did produce had to be destroyed before the real work of creation by Marduk began. This is the meaning both in Berossos and in the inscriptions when rightly understood. Please note this point carefully. Not only is it not true, as has been said, that in the Babylonian story the bi-sexual nature of water produces all life, divine and human, but this bi-sexual nature of water, with the brood which it produces out of itself, is something that not only antedates the existence of the gods and of the orderly constitution of the world but something with which the gods, under Marduk, enter into conflict in order that after its destruction they may put in its place that which is higher and better, namely, the present order and constitution of the universe. In Enoch, on the other hand, the difference in sex appears only after the waters have separated, and as it is correctly noted by Barton, the difference in gender of the waters has nothing to do with the creation in the Hebrew narrative. While I agree with him in this, I decidedly differ with him in the statement that in the Babylonian Cuneiform all creative movement is traceable to this distinction of sex in water, and I submit that in this statement in the apocryphal book of Enoch we fail to find anything really corresponding to the conception of the Babylonians.

We conclude, therefore, that every one of these supposed points of resemblance breaks down on examination. The two accounts have absolutely nothing in common.

In conclusion, the points of difference and contrast between the two accounts, as they have been incidentally touched or formally developed in this treatment of the matter, may now be summed up.

These points of difference, some of which are touched upon, but not sufficiently emphasized in the treatment of this matter by Mr. Barton, present the two accounts in startling contrast, and show how impossible it is that the one should have been derived from the other.

1. In the Babylonian conception, the primordial mass of waters was itself, apparently, uncreated. It must have existed from all eternity. According to the Bible, the elements of the universe owe their existence to the creative *fiat* of God.

2. In the Babylonian conception, the creation of the present order of the world, or cosmos, was brought about through dire conflict between Marduk, as the leader of the gods, and the primordial abyss, or chaos of waters, personified in Tiamat. In the Bible, God is represented as absolutely distinct from, and superior to, the elements, which He first creates, and then forms and fashions in the different stages of his creative work. There is no conflict between God and the elements. They are simply passive in his hands. "He spake, and it was done."

The repose, the calmness, the majesty of the Genesis conception of God as engaged in his creative work are absolutely unapproachable by any ethnic conceptions whatever of God or of creation.

It has been well observed by Dillmann that the incomparable superiority of the biblical account of creation does not lie so much in the material substructure, or in its new treatment of questions pertaining to physics (physical matter), but rather in permeating the material that has been brought forward with a higher knowledge of and faith in God. And just because the proper distinction between God and the world is clearly carried out, and God is thought of in all His loftiness, spirituality and goodness, therefore also the conception and presentation of the course of creation is loftier, worthier and truer than anywhere else, without any admixture of the grotesque and fantastic, but simple, sober, clear and true.

Hence, to say nothing of many other points which might be noted, such as the detailed account of different creative works, light, atmosphere, stars, plants, living beings, and man, the gradually ascending scale ending with the most glorious place assigned to man, made in the image of God, the third and last point of the superiority of the biblical account of creation to that of the Babylonians may be stated as follows:

3. The Babylonian conception is crude, absurd and repulsive. It is unworthy to be coupled with the true idea of God, besides being polytheistic. The biblical account is not only in accordance with the very highest and purest monotheistic ideas, but it is eminently dignified and worthy of the true conception of God, and fitted to foster in the mind of the reader an adoring reverence. It is felt to contribute most decidedly to that supreme end of all revelation, the manifestation of the glory of God, so that men may see, acknowledge and worship. "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honor and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created."

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V. THE PRE-INCARNATE CHRIST.

“God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds; who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high; being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they.” (Hebrews i. 1-4.)

“Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me: and the Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant, whom ye delight in: behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts.” (Malachi iii. 1.) “The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God; as it is written in the prophets, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee.” (Mark i. 1, 2.)

“I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth; when there were no fountains abounding with water. Before the mountains were settled, before the hills, was I brought forth: while as yet he had not made the earth, nor the fields, nor the highest part of the dust of the world. When he prepared the heavens, I was there: when he set a compass upon the face of the depth; when he established the clouds above; when he strengthened the fountains of the deep; when he gave to the sea his decree, that the waters should not pass his commandment; when he appointed the foundations of the earth: then I was by him, as one brought up with him; and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him; rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth; and my delights were with the sons of men.” (Proverbs viii. 23-31.)

These words of Scripture, taken in their logical sequence and connection, give us some insight into the character and conduct of the pre-incarnate Christ. We are not as apt to think of him in this light as were our predecessors. "The Angel of the Covenant" was a common and fruitful theme among those, who have "gone hence, to be no more." Students will find very attractive and instructive sermons on this subject among the writings of Dr. Chalmers and Dr. Payson; and if such men as these found the theme fruitful to their minds and very precious to their souls, we may rest assured, that with a similar reverence, we may do the same.

We are apt to think of our Saviour as only beginning to take an active, personal interest in the welfare of men when he himself became a man. There are many who seem to lose sight of the fact, that he was, and that he revealed himself to men, long before he was born as the babe of Bethlehem. In doing this, he sometimes assumed the form of a man, and sometimes the form of an angel. If he was the second Person of the Trinity, of course he must have been in existence before he became a human being. "Before Abraham was, I am," was the strange paradox that startled the minds, and kindled into wrath the bad tempers of the Jews, who were ready to stone him to death for blasphemy. But if he was God, as well as man, "two distinct natures and one person," there can be no doubt that he lived before Abraham was born.

But in the paragraph above, from the eighth chapter of Proverbs, there is something more than the divine nature predicated of the one who is there called "Wisdom." He is represented as looking on at the creation of this "cosmos," this order of things, with a profound and lively interest in all that concerned the creation of the world and the welfare of men. Even the earth itself, the physical earth, as it came out of chaos into perfect order and beauty, as the future abode of men, was an object of the deepest and truest and tenderest delight. And when men were created, and the world no longer a waste and howling wilderness, his "delights were with the sons of men."

He had the companionship of God the Father, and of God the Holy Spirit, and there were hosts of holy, unfallen angels who

were ever circling around the throne of this Triune God, ready to worship or to serve any one of these three coördinate persons, with equal adoration and delight. There were some of these angels too, who had sinned and fallen; and had it suited the plans and purposes of the Godhead, he might have assumed "the nature of angels," and not "the seed of Abraham." There was a whole universe of stars and systems, which we look upon and love to look upon in unbounded admiration and delight. These were worthy of his notice, and they must have received his constant, unwearied providential care.

But while he was mindful of all these, and never neglected the smallest meteor, but kept it in its eccentric orbit, he seems to lay special stress on the fact that he "rejoiced in the habitable part of his earth," and that "his delights were with the sons of men." And this means, that before he became a man, he rejoiced in the habitable parts of this earth, on which, one of these days, he was to become a man; and that he, in advance, felt a special delight in all that concerned the creation and salvation of the race of man, as the inhabitants of this earth.

I. "Rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth." What is the meaning of that strange expression, and why was it a source of joy to the pre-incarnate Son of God? In general we may say, Because he knew that this earth was to be the scene of his own human life, and of the most fearful tragedy that could ever be enacted.

He knew that the garden of Eden, for a time, was to be the happy home of a holy man and woman, married of God, as the progenitors of the whole human race. He knew that Satan would enter that innocent home, and leave the trail of the serpent on all that was fair to look upon. He knew, that driven away in sin and shame, these once holy beings would need a divine Redeemer; and that from the millions of their offspring, a vast multitude had been given to him, in the "covenant of grace." He knew each one of these by name; when they would be born, and where; and when and where they should be "born again." "Known unto God are all his works, in all places of his dominion."

We can conceive, then, of this Being, this Person of the God-

head, who, in the fulness of the time, was to become a man, as moving about from place to place, and looking, in advance, upon what was to take place there in the future. Here, to his omniscient mind, appeared the place where the garden of Eden was to be planted. Here was the very dust out of which he would create the body of Adam. Here was where he would cause a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and, under that first anæsthetic, perform the first surgical operation, by taking out a rib which he would fashion into a woman, a help meet for the lonely man. Here he would create the forbidden tree, and there is the spot where they would try in vain to hide away their shame. Here is where Cain will erect his altar, and there is where Abel will erect his. Here is where Abel will fall a victim of Adam's sin, imputed to Cain, and working out so soon in death, and there is where Cain will go forth with a brand upon his brow, horrid type of what has followed ever since. Here is the spot from which Enoch will be translated, after taking his last walk with God on earth. Here is where Noah will establish his ship-yard for the building of the ark. Here is where Abraham will offer Isaac. Here is where Esau will be defrauded by Jacob, and there is where Jacob will see the vision of the ladder. Here is where he will meet his brother, and there is where he and I will wrestle all night long, until he becomes Israel. Here is where Joseph will be sold, and there is where he will confront his guilty brethren. Here is where my own chosen people shall swarm, like locusts, over the land of Goshen. Here is where Moses shall lie hidden in the ark of bulrushes, and there is where I will talk to him out of the burning bush. Here is where he shall lead the people across the Red Sea, and there is where I will give him the Decalogue. Here is the wilderness around which they shall be led for forty years, and where they shall set up the tabernacle, and get ready for the land of promise. There is where Moses shall die, and there will I bury him in a grave never to be known; and there Joshua shall lead the people across the Jordan to the land of covenant.

And thus, coming on down the ages, we can conceive of this pre-incarnate Christ, "rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth," in advance of all the historic events which he foreknew would

occur at all these spots, whose names and deeds are recorded in the Old Testament Scriptures. And then, we can conceive of him as standing in the khan of Bethlehem, and looking upon the very spot where he was to be born the "Son of Mary." And from there he would go on to Nazareth, where he would be subject to his human parents; and from there to the Jordan, where he was to be baptized; and to the wilderness, where he was to be tempted of the devil. And thus, we may follow him during the three years of his public ministry; and toward the close of that short, but eventful life, we can conceive of him, as in advance, he went from Bethany to Jerusalem; from the Passover to the garden of Gethsemane; from Pilate to Herod; and from Herod back again to Pilate; from the trial to the crucifixion; from the cross to the sepulchre, and from the sepulchre back again to glory. All these places, and all these events, were known to him from the beginning; and we can easily see why it was that he took pleasure in all "these habitable parts of his earth." They were all to be identified, closely, intimately identified with all his own human life, and all the grand results that are to come from that wondrous life and death, as the incarnate Christ.

As merely human beings, we cannot anticipate as certainties what will befall us in the future. But we do love to revisit the places where we have been active participants in events that occurred, it may be, many years ago. Our birthplace, and the graves of our dead; the old home of our childhood; the desk where we first sat at school; the church where we first heard the gospel, and the place where we found a hope in Christ; the pulpit where we preached our first sermon; the place where we were married; and the places where our children were born; the rooms where our loved ones breathed their last; and the very graves, just how they looked, as we turned away with a broken heart. Yes, all these salient, prominent points in our personal history, come back to us, when we sit down and give place to memory.

But all that *would* be prominent in our Saviour's life as a human being was to him known in advance, seen in advance; and hence he was never taken by surprise, as we are. With us, the unexpected is what often happens. With him, all that *would* happen,

or that *could* happen, was expected, because known as a certainty before it did come to pass. And hence, just as we take pleasure in moving amid the scenes that are identified with our past history, so he took delight in moving in advance through scenes that were to be identified with his future history.

It is hard for us to realize and to understand this, because to us the future and what is to be in the future is unknown. We know not what a day may bring forth, and so we are as people who are groping in the dark. The clearest judgment and the wisest foresight cannot foretell what is to be on to-morrow. As Coleridge said:

"In to-day already walks to-morrow."

But the trouble with us is, that we cannot foresee what the causes now in operation are to bring forth hereafter. We can guess at these, but we cannot foretell them as certainties; and many a time we are sadly disappointed.

But the Being who here calls himself "Wisdom" was one Person of the Godhead, and knew all the future as well as he did the past or the present, for with him "a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years." "When the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy," he could look upon this new-created and perfect earth; and to his prophetic mind all the centuries to come, and all the events that were to be crowded into those centuries, were as plain as the lower valley is to us when we stand on a mountain-top. The whole scene, with all its details, was spread out before him as one unique and sublime panorama; and hence "he rejoiced in the habitable part of his earth, and his delights were with the sons of men."

II. "And my delights were with the sons of men." At first blush, or to the casual reader, this may seem strange and unaccountable. For, if he really did foreknow all that would take place, he must have known that Adam and Eve would disobey God, and fall into sin and shame. He must have known that God would curse the very ground on account of the sin; and that they would be driven out, "sinners under the wrath and curse of God." He must have known that, because Adam was the "federal head and representative of the race," "all mankind, descending from

him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him, in his first transgression." Cut off, then, from communion with God and with holy beings, we may well say:

"What was there in us, that could merit esteem,
Or give the Creator delight?
'Twas even so Father, we ever must sing.
For so it seemed good in thy sight."

But while this is true, does the inventor lose all interest in his invention, because, at first, it does not come up to his expectation? The very fact that he is baffled in his hope and expectation makes him more determined and careful to succeed. Does the potter throw away the clay, because the vessel was marred in the making? No; he just lumps up the clay and tries it over again, and succeeds. Does the mother give up the child, because it falls when she is trying to teach it how to walk? Why, the very fact that the little one cannot walk, and is doing its best to walk, inspires her with new hope, greater patience, in a more faithful effort to succeed. Does the doctor turn away in disgust from his patient, because his first efforts do not result in a cure? Not at all. Baffled and disappointed at first, he will go to work with a keener zest and watch with a keener interest each new experiment.

And so it was, in a higher sense, with this divine being in his first great experiment with man as a free agent. "Created in knowledge and holiness, and with dominion over the creatures," man had proven to be a tremendous failure, and might have well merited the contempt of his creator. But there was too much in man, too much of God's image and likeness, for God to let him alone and leave him to perish without hope. In his own freedom of choice he had sinned, and without a Saviour he could not be reclaimed. The one trial was enough to test his obedience, and no other mere trial of that kind would ever be given.

But now comes in another scheme, not for the trial, but for the salvation of man. It was a scheme of mercy, a scheme of love, a scheme of grace, a scheme of redemption, by a divine mediator between God and man. Not to be fulfilled now, but some four thousand years hence. Not in Eden, where the first Adam had sinned, but in that land of promise, where the second Adam

should be born and cradled in a manger. Not a mere man, but God and man; Emmanuel, God with us; Son of God, and son of Mary! It was he, who was now, long before his birth, "rejoicing in the habitable parts of his earth, and whose delights were with the sons of men."

This earth was to be the scene, and these sons of men were to be the subjects of that saving grace. Not to redeem angels, and not to redeem "that place prepared for the devil and his angels." No; but to redeem men, "bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh"; to redeem the earth, the very earth which had been cursed for the sin of man. This was what he would come for, and obey for, and die for; and as such he was "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world."

In all these coming generations of men he foresaw those "whom God had given him." They were his in that covenant, which is "well ordered in all things, and sure," They belonged to him, as his own inheritance, and were the royal seed that were to compose his royal family and kingdom by and by.

A true pastor will not only love his people, but he will love their children. They are the children of the covenant, and heirs of the covenant promises. To these he looks, and for these he labors and prays; because they are to be the future "subjects of the kingdom." So it was, in a higher sense, that the pre-incarnate Christ took delight in Abraham, because he was to be "the father of the faithful"; and in his descendants, because these were to be heirs of the same covenant promises and blessings. And thus it was all down the history of the church. In all its history, and all its membership, he felt the deepest and most abiding interest.

To us it seems strange that he could have taken delight in such a man as Noah, who got drunk; or Jacob, the supplanter; or David, the adulterer and murderer; and even after he had come in the flesh, it seems strange that he could take delight in such a man as Peter, who he knew would deny him. Surely there was not much in the personal character of such men to make them desirable as companions and associates in daily life. No; but there was a wonderful possibility in the case of each one of them. Saved and sanctified by grace, they might become wonderful in-

struments, in his hand, for the accomplishment of his great purposes.

When Florence Nightingale devoted herself to the sick and wounded in the Crimea, she delighted in the work, but not because it was any special pleasure for her to associate with these wounded sufferers. When a teacher gathers around him a number of careless, restless, thoughtless scholars, and tries to teach them a Sunday-school lesson, there is not any special delight in the mere companionship of such boys. But there is a delight, an unspeakable delight, in trying to do them good; in trying to teach them some wholesome truth, that will sink into the heart and do them good in maturer years.

And so it was with him, "whose delights were with the sons of men." "He came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." It was not to get good, but to do good; not to save himself, but to save others. It was love, pure, disinterested love, "a love which passeth knowledge," which brought him from heaven to earth; and the delight he had in these sons of men came from a knowledge of the fact that he was doing good, that he was "preparing many sons unto glory."

In this view of the case, we can easily see how "his delights were with the sons of men." It must have been a delight to him to teach Enoch how to "walk with God," until "he was not, for God took him." It must have been a delight, when he knew the deluge was coming to tell Noah to build an ark, and just how to build it, and then to stand on the deck himself and steer that quaint craft, with its precious freight, over a shoreless sea, and anchor it on the top of Ararat. It must have been a delight to talk with Abraham, "as a friend talketh with a friend," about the fire that was coming on the doomed cities of the plain; to take Lot by the hand and lead him out before the fire and brimstone rained down on the wicked place. It must have been a delight to him, to see that Joseph should grow up in a heathen court uncontaminated, until he became so honest and honored, that he was to save up food for his good old father and his cruel brothers. It must have been a delight to him, to see that "Moses refused to be called the son of Pharaoh's daughter," and from the burning bush,

to send him back to Egypt, to lead his people out from that state of bondage.

It must have been a delight to him to see the paschal lamb slain, and the blood sprinkled on the lintel and the door posts; the first great type of him, of whom it should be said, "Christ our passover is sacrificed for us." It must have been a great delight to him to project that pillar of cloud and fire to lead his people dry-shod across the Red Sea, to send them bread from heaven, and water out of the rock. It must have been a delight to him to talk with Moses on the Mount, to give him the written law, to tell him just how to build the tabernacle, and to enact for the people all those laws, civil and ecclesiastical, that were to set them apart from all the world, as a church, and as a commonwealth.

It must have been a delight to him to see that "holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," when writing the Bible. It must have been a delight to him to tell Moses how to write the Pentateuch; and to tell Joshua how to keep up the history, both in deeds and in an infallible record of those deeds. It must have been a delight to him to tell David how to write the Psalms; and to tell the prophets, in advance, things that were to come. In a word, it must have been a delight to him, to see that *every word in every book* of this Old Testament was *inspired*; and so become an infallible guide, both for the faith and the practice of his people.

When Dr. W. H. McGuffey was compiling his text-books for children, much of the work must have been very irksome to him. But when he thought of the thousands and millions of children who would learn to spell, and learn to read out of these little books, his own kind, pious heart must have thrilled with delight. And so, when our Lord knew, as he must have known, that through those inspired men, he was writing a book, the book, which was to be the text-book of religion for all the race of Adam, he must have been filled with inexpressible delight. And to carry the illustration further, Dr. McGuffey selected pictures to illustrate the words and truths taught in these primary lesson books. And just so, before him, our Lord had selected the tabernacle service, and the temple service, all the various rites and ordinances, as

types, a kind of visible, tangible illustrations, to make plain to his people those obscure, abstruse, spiritual truths, which must be understood before we can become "wise unto salvation." And so, we have here such as these: the manna, the water gushing from the smitten rock, the passage of the Jordan, Lot's wife, the ark, the scape-goat, the brazen serpent. All these, and many, many others, were pictures, illustrations in this text-book, which we, as children, can look at, and at a glance take in what he meant to teach us. And so, as an author, with all these human amanuenses writing a book for his own people in all the ages, "his delights were with the sons of men."

What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made. In him was life, and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not." (John i. 1-5.)

"And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father) full of grace and truth." (John i. 14.)

In these words we have a statement of the "great mystery of godliness." "The Word was made flesh." He, who was one Person of the Godhead, became a man, not an angel, but a man, and thus became the Saviour, not of angels, but of men. "For verily he took not on him *the nature* of angels, but he took on *him* the seed of Abraham." Oh, what wondrous love was this! To pass by "the devil and his angels," and come down to the low estate of man! And not only at his birth, but in the very creation, and all down the ages, he is represented as saying: "I was daily his (God's) delight, rejoicing always before him; rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth; and my delights were with the sons of men."

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VI. ROBERT BROWNING: THE POET.

KEATS, says Mr. Matthew Arnold, was "an Elizabethan born too late." This brilliant paradox cannot be construed too literally, for the very essence of creative power consists in its ability to embody in deathless form the thoughts and demands of the present or to anticipate and voice, seer-like, the needs and characteristics of the future. No great writer can be behind his age. Only the little are laggards. If the poet-seer is ahead of his time, it is not because he is voicing thoughts entirely new, but because, with an inspiration little short of divine, he catches the direction of the current of thought and reaches "a new landing-place in its onward sweep," while others with less prophetic vision and less vigorous powers are slowly, gropingly, unwittingly following in his wake. He thus makes known what they have either dreamed or only vaguely felt.

The poet who enshrines in verse of quenchless beauty the aspirations, struggles and sorrows of the era in which he lives is sure of an audience during that era, and in the countless eras to come, for the soul of man changeth not, and truth and beauty are immortal. All the greatest poets have caught and embodied the essential features of the living present. Homer vitalized ancient Greece and Troy; Virgil's *Æneid* is the apotheosis of the Roman Imperium in all its Augustan splendor; Dante is the exponent of mediæval Catholicism; Shakspeare, of the multifarious Elizabethan thought and action; Goethe, of German rationalism and nineteenth century doubts and fears; Victor Hugo, of Republican France. Such essential truth-tellers are the giant intellects of old that to-day we weep with Priam, exult with *Æneas*, tremble with Dante, and share the perplexities of Hamlet.

The poet, on the other hand, who endeavors to reach a new landing-place in advance of his age, is in danger of swirling into eddies of self-centred or isolated thought, until he is dragged into the main current by some undertow of irresistible

strength, or is left circling alone, moving all the time, but making no progress. If, however, with eye fixed on the goal ahead, he bravely and fearlessly presses on, he may succeed in diverting the channel of thought or dividing it until it flows delta-like into the common ocean of truth.

Browning is a poet of this last type. By persistent, unflagging effort he created a following, and succeeded in attracting to his dramatic power and vigorous individualism a public almost wholly given over to the idyllic graces of Tennyson, or the meditations spirituality of Wordsworth.

To appreciate the magnitude of this task it might be well to take a brief survey of English poetry at the time Browning's earlier poems appeared (1833-'40).

The powerful creative impulse due to the French Revolution had well-nigh spent its original force by 1820, and two decades of comparative stagnation followed—"an intercalary, transition period." During this time no old poet of the first rank was prominently before the public. The Byron fever was over; readers forgot the octo-syllabic jingle of *Marmion* in the keener zest with which they turned to the glowing pages of *Kenilworth*; Wordsworth, serenely isolated in the beautiful Lake District was breathing a poetic atmosphere too rarefied for mortals on a lower level; Keats' sensuous beauty was yet unfelt; Shelley's lark-like note was lost to duller ears; Cornwall's lyrics charmed a few; Hood drew smiles and tears alternately from the London public, and Moore's melodies were warbled by moonlight to many a trembling maid as she peered timidly through her latticed oriel. But *Hohenlinden* and *The Battle of the Baltic* seemed out of tune in the piping times of peace that followed the congress of Vienna in 1814-'15.

There was no one to voice the poetic needs of the hour, when the young author of the *Lotos Eaters* gave to the world his first volumes of poetry in 1827, '30 and '32. The new note of idyllic grace, the matchless melody of the numbers, the marvellous felicity of the diction, the firm, synthetic grasp of the thought, the English love of law, intense patriotism, abiding faith in English progress and in the central truths of Christianity,—all these ac-

corded well with the quieter, more contemplative mood that followed the stormy unrest of the earlier Revolution era. Here, too, was "a composite poet" in the best sense, with a manner all his own, and yet combining Wordsworth's meditative spirit and lofty views of nature with Keats' delicate sensibility to form and color, and Shelley's lyric ideality.

While Tennyson's numbers were charming the ear with a melody hitherto unknown, *Pauline* appeared, an anonymous poem, printed by the assistance of the young poet's aunt. The music was unfamiliar, the thought obscure, the individualism distinct in its self-centred isolation. No wonder the poem fell almost still-born from the press. Yet in later years Rossetti was so charmed with it, that he transcribed the whole work from the copy in the British Museum. Not so enthusiastic, however, were the reading public. They simply let it alone, and a brief examination of the poem will explain their attitude.

Pauline, as the author tells us, is only the fragment of a completed structure of which this poem was to be the beginning. By a kind of prophetic insight he seems to foreshadow in his Latin preface the strictures of future critics. "Many of hostile opinions with weak minds, many even malignant and ungrateful, will assail our genius, who, in their rash ignorance, hardly before the title is before their eyes, will make a clamor." He also directs us how to extract the gold from the ore: "You, also, who with fair wind shall come to the reading, if you will apply so much of the discernment of prudence as bees in gathering honey, then read with security. For, indeed, I believe you about to receive many things, not a little, both for instruction and for enjoyment." Browning was only twenty years old when he wrote these words. It need not surprise us, therefore, that the poem is immature and, at times, incoherent. It leaves no distinct impression upon the reader except that of its fragmentary merit. A few passages have been singled out by all critics as especially noteworthy. These are the references to Shelley, especially the beautiful passage beginning—

"Sun-treader, I believe in God and truth
And love; and as one just escaped from death

and pictorial power, other noteworthy qualities appear even here in the first work. He gives us a glimpse here of his subsequent mastery of blank verse, and of the tendency to leave gaps in the thought to be filled up by the reader's imagination. Here, too, we see the same predilection for abstruse metaphysical themes that dominates so largely his later work. We do not believe any poet has shown so much of himself in his first work, though, in point of execution, *Pauline* is extremely faulty.

A short interval of two years separates this poem from *Paracelsus*, but so great is the advance of the poet that the two works stand at almost opposite poles of excellence. *Paracelsus* is stamped with the impress of genius. The subject suited the poet's tastes. It was unconventional, it had in it great possibilities for tracing the development of a soul. Paracelsus, the "Reformer of Medicine," was a strange combination of genius and superstition; but in Browning's delineation the better nature is dominant. The character of Paracelsus is extremely difficult to understand, but according to most recent researches it seems that the poet's estimate of him is wonderfully trustworthy. Living in the stirring Reformation era, the great doctor aimed to do for medicine what Luther was doing for religion. The disciples of the old school of medicine proved too strong for the valiant assailant of their hide-bound prejudices, and it took two centuries to rescue his name from the obloquy heaped upon it by the orthodox followers of Averroës and Avicenna.

To Browning belongs the credit of rescuing from derision and comparative oblivion the name of the "divine martyr to science." Before he began the poem he sifted carefully the mass of evidence on the life of the philosopher, and extracted the essential truth from the maze of error that entangled the story. The poem is divided into five parts. In Part I. (*Paracelsus Aspires*), the philosopher, an ambitious young student of medicine determines to give up his career and travel in search of the concrete facts of nature, instead of wasting his time upon the fruitless theories of illustrious predecessors in the art of healing. From his earliest youth, the desire to do good to mankind has been his grand passion.

"I seemed to long
 At once to trample on and to save mankind;
 To make some unexampled sacrifice
 In their behalf; to wring some wondrous good
 From heaven or earth for them, to perish, winning
 Eternal weal in the act."

Friends, Festus and his wife Michal, endeavor to dissuade him, but to no purpose. In glowing colors he paints the dazzling picture of his future—

"Are there not, Festus, are there not, dear Michal,
 Two points in the adventure of the diver,
 One—when, a beggar, he prepares to plunge,
 One—when, a prince, he rises with his pearl?
 Festus, I plunge!"

In Part II. (*Paracelsus Attains*), he does rise but not with the expected pearl. The attainment is not success but perception of the cause of failure. He has dived deep but come up dry. Intellect has chilled emotion. There is no life without love. This lesson he learns from a poet, Aprile, whose life has been all love and no knowledge. Paracelsus perceives the mistake in each life and in the discovery that love and knowledge are "two halves of one dissevered whole" feels that he has attained.

But the lesson learned is soon forgotten and the self-centred life that he is soon to lead is without either aspiration or attainment. Hence, Part III. is fitly styled, *Paracelsus*. The intellectual giant is now a professor at Basel, holding students spell-bound by his brilliant lectures, and by the daring iconoclasm with which he shatters idol after idol worshipped by the followers of the older medical authorities. Still he is full of unrest. Ephemeral applause does not satisfy him, and he feels that it is not his life-work to deliver lectures "approved by beardless boys and bearded dotards worse," but to find truth though it be hid in the centre. His work is only a thing of shreds and patches. Part III. is merely an eddy of unrest in the onward movement of his life. "He aspired to know God, he has attained—a professorship at Basel."

The old doctors and their staunch allies, the apothecaries, all aided by faithless friends, conspire to oust him from his chair and banish him from Basel. His friend, Festus, finds him in Alsatia,

aspiring again (Part IV.). This time he aspires to drain the cup of joy and love to the dregs; but love turns to lust, and the renewed aspiration for the emotional half of life has landed him in the slough of sensual excess. Festus tries to reclaim him to purity but jeers are the only reward of his solicitude. The announcement of Michal's death, though, recalls the better self of Paracelsus.

This better self appears in Part V. where Paracelsus again attains. He is dying and his good angel, Festus, is again at his side. The thought of Michal, dead, awakens his love for her when alive and he finds sadly—

“Tis only when they spring to heaven that angels
Reveal themselves to you; they sit all day
Beside you and lie down at night by you
Who care not for their presence, muse or sleep,
And all at once they leave you and you know them.”

The body is leaving him just as the soul is catching bright glimpses of a life of future nobility and he feels keenly—

“How very full
Of wormwood 'tis, that just at altar-service,
The rapt hymn rising with the rolling smoke,
When glory dawns and all is at the best,
The sacred fire may flicker and grow faint
And die for want of the wood-piler's help.”

The closing speeches of Paracelsus, in fact all of Part V., are noble and inspiring. We do not wonder that some critics consider this poem the very finest that the poet ever wrote. With this judgment we do not concur, but this much is certainly true, *Paracelsus* is by far the simplest and most logically coherent of all his longer poems. Passages of uplifting splendor abound, and the style is unusually clear and free from characteristic eccentricities.

Sordello, however, which appeared in 1840, is probably the most difficult poem in the English language. No one that reads this strange exhibition of genius in a nightmare need discredit the stories circulated about its difficulty. These we are sure are better known than the poem. Lord Tennyson, says Mr. Sharp (though Mrs. Orr seems to think that the remark was made by Browning's

uncle), is reported to have admitted in bitterness of spirit: "There were only two lines in it that I understood, and they were both lies; they were the opening and closing lines, '*Who will may hear Sordello's story told,*' and '*Who would has heard Sordello's story told.*'" Douglas Jerrold, the famous wit, started to read *Sordello* during a convalescence after a severe illness. "Sentence after sentence brought no consecutive thought to his brain. At last the idea occurred to him that in his illness his mental faculties had been wrecked. The perspiration rolled from his forehead, and smiting his head he sank back on the sofa crying: 'O God, I *am* an idiot.' A little later when his wife and sister entered, he thrust *Sordello* into their hands, demanding what they thought of it. He watched them intently while they read. When at last Mrs. Jerrold remarked, 'I don't understand what this man means; it is gibberish,' her delighted husband gave a sigh of relief and exclaimed: 'Thank God, I am *not* an idiot!'"

Even a critic of such acknowledged excellence as Mr. Stedman says: "I cannot persuade myself to solicit credit for deeper insight by differing from the common judgment in regard to this unattractive prodigy."

We trust these *Sordelliana* will sufficiently excuse us from the task of attempting an analysis of this poem. While we cannot admit that the question of Browning's obscurity has been relegated by Mr. Swinburne to the "Limbo of Dead Stupidities," we venture to hazard the opinion that the obscurity of *Sordello* has been exaggerated. The greatest difficulty lies in the labyrinthine interweaving of obscure Guelf-Ghibelline struggles with the main thread of the story—Sordello's life—and with the main *motif* of the action—the development, or rather the unfolding and expansion, of Sordello's soul. The historical setting may easily be mastered by the aid of any Browning hand-book, such as Mrs. Orr's, but our advice to the reader is to ignore this part of the poem as much as possible, and confine his attention to the aspirations, struggles and final victory of the poet soul over its vulgar ambitions. Sordello dies triumphant, true to his people, and to his lofty ideals, though his life has been a splendid failure.

The poem can never become popular unless the tastes of the

reading public undergo a radical change; but the true lover of poetry will be willing to plunge into its depths for the sake of the jewels hidden within its dark syntactical and metaphysical recesses. The spasmodic style, with its sudden and often meaningless exclamations, and the involved parentheses are needless difficulties. Perhaps, too, the poet did not recognize clearly enough the intrinsic difficulties of an esoteric theme, for he leaves often between his thoughts a chasm so wide that however radiant they may be in their isolated beauty, the mind has to leap chamois-like from peak to peak and soon becomes exhausted in the effort.

The heroic couplet in which the poem is written is so fatally facile a measure that Browning, naturally long-winded and digressive, is tempted to push his characteristic faults to the verge of unreason. One example will suffice—

“ To need become all natures yet retain
 The law of my own nature — to remain
 Myself, yet yearn . . . as if that chestnut, think,
 Should yearn for this first larch-bloom, crisp and pink,
 Or those pale fragrant tears where zephyrs stanch
 March wounds along the fretted pine tree branch!
 Will and the means to show will, great and small,
 Material, spiritual,—abjure them all
 Save any so distinct, they may be left
 To amuse, not tempt become! and thus, bereft,
 Just as I first was fashioned would I be!”

It is *possible* to understand this passage, but one who tries to do so must sympathize with the old Scotch lady who mastered Carlyle's *French Revolution*, but was forced to confess that she “had tackled a varra deefeeicult author.”

It is fair to the poet to say that he himself recognized the inherent difficulties of his subject and its treatment, and contemplated a thorough revision of the poem. He never would admit, however, that it was really obscure. Doubtless it was perfectly clear to its author.

Pauline, *Paracelsus* and *Sordello* occupy a unique place amongst the poet's works, and stand, in a certain sense, apart from all the others. Nowhere else do we find the chief characters so self-centred. Introspection always plays a prominent part,

and the development of the inner life is a favorite theme, but this development is often quite as much influenced by external as by internal forces. In the three poems mentioned the internal forces are paramount.

The study of these three works is important, for they contain the germs of everything that is to come from the poet for half a century. No great writer ever repeated himself in a more dazzling variety of forms unless it be his great prose analogue, the lusty preacher of Work, Duty, Silence, Sincerity, and the Eternities. It is not too much to say that all of Browning's characteristic excellences and defects, as well as the chief tenets of his philosophy, appear in one or the other of these three earlier works.

Paracelsus is so dramatic in tone that it was thought the author could revive the legitimate drama, which had been declining ever since audiences had clapped their hands delightedly over the delicious absurdities of Mrs. Malaprop. At the urgent solicitation of the great actor, Macready, *Strafford*, Browning's first stage drama, was written. It cannot be called a success. The principal parts, *Strafford* and *Lady Carlisle*, were taken by Macready and Miss Helen Faucit respectively, but after a five nights' run the play was withdrawn. It is true that the reason for its withdrawal was the untimely defection of the actor who took the part of Pym, but it is a significant fact that there has been no demand for *Strafford* on the part of stage-managers. Nor can we wonder at this. None of the characters are forcefully drawn, the action halts and the dialogue is far from sparkling. Browning devotees constantly challenge comparison with Shakspeare. But compare *Strafford* in this play with Wolsey in *Henry V-III.*, and Browning's lack of constructive skill and knowledge of stage effects becomes glaringly apparent.

The Blot in the 'Scutcheon, however, is all aglow with the warmth of passion, and the action moves forward with vehement directness. The interest is not diffused, as in *Strafford*, but is finely centred upon a small group of characters. It is decidedly the best play Browning wrote, if we look at it from the actor's point of view, but the unhappy subject, the seduction of the heroine by the hero, justly prevents the play from ever becom-

ing popular. The following song shows that the young poet could be as melodious as Tennyson—

“ There’s a woman like a dew-drop, she’s so purer than the purest;
 And her noble heart’s the noblest, yes, and her sure faith’s the surest;
 And her eyes are dark and humid, like the depth on depth of lustre
 Hid i’ the harebell, while her tresses sunnier than the wild-grape cluster,
 Gush in golden-tinted plenty down her neck’s rose-misted marble.”

The other dramas of Browning are literary dramas, utterly unsuited to the stage. No other proof of this is needed beyond the fact that they are rarely acted. *Pippa Passes*, the best of these, is thought by some to be the poet’s masterpiece; but perhaps it is better to say that it bears about the relation to *The Ring and the Book* or *Paracelsus* that *Hermann and Dorothea* does to *Faust*; or that the quieter beauties of the pearl bear to the flashing splendors of the diamond. Pippa, a girl employed in the silk factory at Asolo, rises on the morning of her annual holiday, blithely plans the day’s enjoyments, and at length sallies forth from her room, singing, as she passes from place to place, snatches of hymn-like lyrics. Words of her song reach the ears of various groups, as she passes by their rendezvous, smite their consciences just as they are about to commit some flagrant wrong, and recall their better selves. Pippa all the while is serenely unconscious of the good influence she is exerting. Thus the unconscious power of a life of spotless purity becomes the *motif* of the play. The closing lines, put in Pippa’s mouth, sum up much of Browning’s religious creed—

“ All service ranks the same with God—
 With God, whose puppets, best and worst,
 Are we; there is no last nor first.”

After *Luria* in 1846, Browning wisely gave up the regular drama and turned his attention to lyrics and to the dramatic monologues of which he was soon destined to become a master. Only once more did he essay a drama (1853), and then it was only a fragment, *In a Balcony*, occupying Act III. or IV. of a whole play. All of the dramas show unmistakable dramatic power but little constructive ability, and often a total forgetfulness of the fact that audiences come to a play to be entertained, and that few

of them are capable of any severe intellectual strain. Lowell said of Emerson's style as a lecturer: "The many cannot miss his meaning, and only the few can find it." Of this "open secret of all true genius," Browning's works show but little trace. It was this that caused Shakspeare to be applauded to the echo in the sixteenth century, and it is this that makes him as fresh and as suggestive to-day. In order to understand *Colombe's Birthday*, one must be acquainted with the Jülich-Cleves controversy; to understand *The Return of the Druses*, the obscure history of an obscure sect must be known. One, we imagine, would get but a vague idea of *King Victor and King Charles*, if one knew nothing of the early history of Piedmont. Now isn't this too much to ask of the ordinary stage-goer? Can we vilify a theatrical public that ignores such plays, however brilliant they may be in detached passages?

We must believe that Browning saw that his genius was unsuited to the regular stage drama and that he very sensibly gave it up altogether and adopted a more congenial form of expression.

We have lingered long over these earlier works because in them we see all the leading traits of the poet. As his genius ripens, there is a firmer grasp of the subject and a far better command of expression; but the faults and excellences of the early work appear in nearly all to the very last.

In a succeeding number of the QUARTERLY, we shall examine Browning's lyrics and dramatic monologues, and shall attempt to give a general estimate of his genius, his influence and his characteristic excellences and defects as a poet.

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VII. NOTES.

THE CHURCH AND THE SOCIETIES.

The multiplication of moral societies and their methods of work are bringing up for consideration their relations to the church of God. Are they a part of the church? or are they handmaidens of the church? or have they an entirely different sphere of action?

These questions have been asked, and they *must* be answered by the church. They cannot be ignored, for they confront the church at every point to which it turns. The last Southern General Assembly received communications from the National Temperance Society, and the Young Men's Christian Association, and, until the above questions have been fully and emphatically answered, every subsequent Assembly will receive communications, not only from those two societies, but also from numerous others. The attention of the Assembly will not be allowed to be diverted from the question, but it will be thrust into its face until it is compelled to speak on the subject. Are they a part of the church? The visible church of God on earth is composed of all those various branches and denominations which accept Jesus Christ, the God-man, crucified and risen again, as their Redeemer, and believe in the Father, and in the existence and work of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, to be a part of the church, is to be a part of, or a member in, one of those branches or denominations.

But these societies are independent of every separate church, and acknowledge no head, except the one of their own creation. It may be that their members are also members of various branches of the church, but that does not make the society a part of any church, and no church has any control over the society.

Are they handmaidens of the church? When business men by a union of capital and energy form a society for the accomplishment of particular objects, they generally apply to the government for a charter of incorporation, by which are conferred on the corporation all the powers and agencies necessary for, or incident to, the effectuating of the purposes of the organization. The performance of acts outside of the scope of those powers, or by agencies not included within the

grant, is held invalid by the granting authority, and is prohibited. The corporation must act entirely within its charter, and by the agencies therein authorized, even when working for the accomplishment of the purposes of its creation.

The church of God is in reality a business agency or society, endowed with certain rights, privileges, and duties, the objects of which are the perfecting of the saints and the extension of the church for the glory of God. For this purpose Christ has given to his church the revealed word as its charter, and the ministry and ordinances as the agencies by which that charter is to be made effectual for the accomplishment of its purposes; and he has commanded his people to organize themselves into distinct, visible, ecclesiastical communities, with constitutions, laws, and officers, badges, ordinances, and discipline.—*Hodge*.

The church so organized is the "body of Christ," the "kingdom of heaven" in the earth. For the accomplishment of the objects of its creation this church is endued with the Spirit of God, who will make effectual its work by and through the agencies of its charter, the ministry and other offices, the ordinances, discipline, and constitution.

Is it, then, necessary or proper for the church to call these societies to its aid, as if that church, created by an Omniscient God, was not given the power of accomplishing the purposes for which it was created? as if it was unable to do what God has commanded it to do, by those agencies which Christ has promised to make effectual? Has God made a failure in the organization of his church? And must the Spirit be supplemented by purely human agencies? The answer must be in the negative, and, therefore, these societies are not properly handmaidens of the church. Their sphere of action, if any, is entirely outside of the church, and independent of it.

I do not refer to societies *within* the church, but to independent associations not subject to the control of some particular church. For prudential reasons, the former are proper *only* in a large local organization, where a division of labor is necessary. Each member of the church should be a *full* Christian, and his Christian education and association should be provided for the accomplishment of that end.

But we know that when a "large amount of energy is devoted to one function, less remains for expenditure in performing another." Absorbing devotion to any one object cramps the intellect in one attitude, and "the mental vision is stunted to one focus." Real life is *use* to the fullest capacity of the individual, complete disuse is death, and

partial disuse is partial death. Therefore, to make a full and complete Christian, it is necessary for the individual to take part in *all* the work of the church which belongs to his order, whether he be a minister, elder, deacon, or private member.

Experience has shown us that when the members of a church have been divided into various societies, the members of the Domestic Missionary Society become absorbed in that one branch of Christian work, to the neglect of the great causes of Foreign Missions, Education, and other branches of Christian beneficence, which have been entrusted to other societies in that church, and *vice versa*.

Whenever the membership of a particular church is not so large as to be unwieldy as a whole, the entire membership should constitute its Foreign Missionary Society, its Domestic Missionary Society, its Aid Society, and every other society which it can profitably use, all of which should be under the immediate control of the local church organization. Thereby every member would be interested in *all* of the church's work, and would be educated into a *full and complete* Christian.

But the use of independent societies depreciates work within the church by distributing the energy of the individual members. It is resorting to an agency not within the charter of the body, and it is calling to the aid of the church, as a part of its machinery, an organization to which the Spirit has not been promised. Being without the guidance of the Spirit, the result of its unsanctified work may be the opposite of the end desired. When our Saviour fed the multitudes, he blessed and brake the loaves and fishes, and gave them to the *disciples only*, who gave them to the multitudes. Not one of that great throng of hungry people was employed in receiving the food from the hands of the Master and distributing it, so that they might have been more quickly fed. And the church has no authority to use unhallowed agencies to hasten the time of the Lord.

The kingdom of heaven is like the leaven, which the woman covered in the meal, and which leavened the whole. The yeast had the inherent power of extending itself into the whole, and that without any assistance. And so the church of God, filled with the Holy Ghost, has the inherent power of extending itself into and over the whole world. The Bride of the Lamb is perfect within herself, so far as we have perfection on earth.

If the church has a right to do a part of its work through these societies, why may it not do the whole through the same agencies? Then

we might have the much-talked-of church-unity, by means of the societies. But the church itself would soon be dead, according to the law of non-user.

Visible church unity is a chimera; it is impossible and undesirable. The world had it for a thousand years, and it brought the dark ages of Europe, the Spanish Inquisition, and the flight of the Huguenots. The existence of the church in different branches is necessary for its purity.

Only one reason can be given why the church should use or give encouragement to these societies, and that is that good has sometimes resulted therefrom. The same reason is given in favor of female preachers. We recognize that as the Jesuitical maxim, that the end justifies the means, but surely the church is not prepared to adopt it. The Apostle Paul rejoiced that Christ was preached, whether of envy and strife or of good will, whether in pretence or in truth; but he certainly did not give his assistance and encouragement to those who were preaching him in pretence or of envy and strife. And while we might rejoice that sinners were converted under the preaching of Bill Murrell, the noted Mississippi outlaw, that is no reason why the church should use him or his like as its aid in spreading the gospel. While we rejoice that many vessels loaded with freight have successfully tried a shorter and quicker route through rocks and shoals, where others went down with all on board, let the Old Ship of Zion, the church of God organized under the Presbyterian form, with the Holy Spirit at the wheel, plough the blue waters of the deep sea in the pathway marked out for it on the chart of heaven, being well satisfied that the haven will be reached in God's own good time, and that *all* the precious freight, the redeemed of Christ, will be landed at the celestial city.

Again, it is improper for the church to aid and encourage such societies, because we cannot serve two masters. An illustration of this principle was had not long since in the organization known as the "King's Daughters," when the representative head of the order adopted a Unitarian platform. The inferior bodies and their members were thus brought face to face with this principle announced by the master. They were members at the same time of Unitarian and Trinitarian bodies! In the church they believed in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, the Triune God, while, as King's Daughters, they deposed Christ from his divine throne of equality with the Father, and made of him a mere man.

The "Young People's Christian Endeavor Societies," belong to the same class. They are independent of the church, or, if they are under the supervision of different branches of the church, as some of their advocates contend, they belong to two independent organizations, their head body and the local church. To which is their fealty due? In case of a diversity of views (which must necessarily exist), a choice *must* be made. If the society shall choose allegiance to its church, it will cease to be a Young People's Christian Endeavor Society, and will become a working association *within* the church, as it should be. If it shall hold to the parent society, it must necessarily repudiate church control. I have recently heard the leader in a large Young People's Christian Endeavor Society in a Northern Presbyterian church advocate before the society extreme Arminian views. What right has the church to interfere, when these views may not only be allowed by the head of the organization, but may be in accord with its constitution?

Another serious objection to our church members belonging to such societies is, that these associations are *quasi* religious and ecclesiastical. Our church members, being members of *quasi* religious bodies, composed also of members of other churches, which do not object to, or may advocate female lecturers and preachers, hear them frequently in these societies, and the tendency is to overcome their church training against such things. Even when they are well grounded in the doctrines of the church, the frequent teaching of errors believed by their associates *will* exert a deleterious influence over them.

A Young Men's Christian Association recently opened its hall to a woman lecturer on the new tomfoolery misnamed "Christian Science," thus giving it a semi-religious endorsement, operating as a request for Presbyterian members of the association to be present and hear her. Shall we advocate that kind of food for the young men of our church? Or shall we advocate the table where such food is set before them? If not, how can we object, when we encourage them to become members of such societies?

But it is claimed that there must be a common plane on which the people can meet and work together for the religious good of the community, and that this plane can only be found in such organizations, which adopt the essentials of salvation accepted by all the churches, and leave out the distinctive doctrines of the separate churches.

A moderate acquaintance with human nature shows to us the impossibility of this common plane. The human intellect is so formed that one mind cannot comprehend the system of salvation unless it is

clothed in the sovereignty and mercy of God, while another is in the dark unless he can see salvation by the light of his own works. Another can see Christ only through the beam of light deflected by the water, and another escapes punishment solely by the laying on of holy apostolic hands. There is no common road which all people can travel to heaven. There *is* a common plane which the paths of all cross and recross, until they all unite at the end in Jesus Christ, the Saviour; but each church must follow its own road to the common meeting point. Presbyterians will surely strike the stumbling-block of the "historic episcopate" when they attempt to travel that part of the High-Church road which does not coincide with theirs. Or, if they wander off into other paths, they will become entangled in the meshes of immersion or Arminianism; while the stray Episcopalian or Methodist would be awed into despair by a sight of the sovereignty of the great God.

It is best for each to work in his own proper sphere, in his own church, where he knows what he is doing, and where he knows that he has the promise of the Spirit, and let God bind the general result together for the good of the community and the world, and for his own glory.

Let our Southern Presbyterian Church work with the agencies with which Christ has endowed his body, knowing that he will fulfil his promise to be with us therein to the end of the world. In this way alone is prosperity assured to the church.

JOHN D. GILLAND.

Vicksburg, Miss.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1892.

This venerable body which so recently convened at Hot Springs was in many respects a remarkable one. It was notable as to the place and circumstances of its entertainment. For the second time in its history it met in one of our great sanitariums, one of our public resorts for health and recreation. On the former occasion, at Asheville, N. C., it met in the midst of a community largely Presbyterian, and was in great measure the guest of the congregation. In this case, our noble band of Presbyterians being comparatively small, the Assembly was the guest of the whole city, and right nobly and generously was the hospitality dispensed through that prince of hosts, Bro. Van Meter, whose thoughtfulness and kindness left nothing unsupplied that could minister to the comfort and enjoyment of the guests.

Another feature of the entertainment peculiar to this Assembly was that so large a proportion of the commissioners were entertained in the hotels and public boarding houses of the city. Usually the pastor who is to serve as host of one of our General Assemblies is besieged in advance with requests, if convenient to the committee of arrangements, to be assigned to hotels or boarding houses rather than to private homes. If such was the mind of this Assembly it has occasion of special thanks to Bro. Van Meter and his energetic committees. The largest and best hotels of the city were thrown open to the commissioners. Tickets admitting without charge to the luxurious bath-rooms with all kinds of remedial baths were furnished to all who desired them. The managers of the several hostelries vied with each other in attention to the guests. The writer is under obligations to Manager Kops, of the Hotel Pullman, and his assistants for uniform courtesy and kindness. The whole Assembly was delightfully and cordially entertained. Quite a novel feature in its entertainment was that all its sessions, whether for business or for religious services, except the Sabbath afternoon communion, were held in the public Opera-house, of the city. Anticipating that the audience-room of the church would be inadequate to the accommodation of the Assembly and its visitors, the session of the church had leased the Opera-house which has accommodations for eight hundred or a thousand people, and to avoid any technicalities, had by a vote of session adopted it temporarily as the place of worship of the congregation. To many of the brethren, no doubt, the surroundings of stage and parquette and dress-circle were at first strange. To be assigned for committee-rooms to box-office, dressing-room, green-room, etc., was somewhat startling; but when at the evening sederunt, they saw the crowds pouring in, filling the spacious ampitheatre to overflowing, and pressing into the galleries, they must have commended the wisdom of Bro. Van Meter and his session in securing so capacious and comfortable a place for the Assembly's sittings.

For the first time in the history of the church, the Moderator of the previous Assembly was not present to preach the opening sermon, and preside at the organization of the court. Rev. Dr. H. C. DuBose, of the China Mission, who during a visit to this country was elected Moderator, had during the interim returned to his distant field of labor. This fact was duly announced to the Assembly by the venerable stated clerk, and the duty of opening the Assembly devolved upon the undersigned, the last Moderator present.

Three names were presented as nominees for the moderatorship,

each the name of a brother honored and beloved, one that all would have been glad to see elevated to the Moderator's chair. Rev. S. A. King, D. D., of Texas, was chosen, manifestly for two reasons, the one that he had been so long and prominently connected with aggressive Home Mission work, the other that he was so strongly endorsed as an experienced parliamentarian and presiding officer. In the latter respect the Assembly was not disappointed. Whatever preferences brethren may have had for the other nominees, all will unite in testifying to the promptness and impartiality of Dr. King's rulings, to the orderly methods by which the business was brought before the Assembly, and the dispatch, without hurry, with which each item was brought to conclusion.

It was a working Assembly. It meant business. The work in the committee-rooms was well done, and wisely done, so much so that in almost every instance the report of the committee was adopted without change, or with such slight modifications as did not alter its character. And yet while intent upon business, the Assembly found time for an unusual amount of preaching. Instead of devoting, as heretofore, one night session to work among seamen, one to Home Missions, one to Foreign Missions, &c., the Assembly heard a sermon every night, and then gave such part of the evening as remained to addresses in connection with these various arms of service.

The Assembly of 1891 might be characterized as a Foreign Mission Assembly. With a foreign missionary in the Moderator's chair, it was perhaps natural that it should devote unusual time and attention to that great interest of the church, so that, as the reviewer in the *QUARTERLY* reports, "Home Missions did not receive the usual amount of attention from the Assembly." This could not be said of the Assembly of 1892. Whilst the interests of Foreign Missions received their due share of consideration, more than usual attention was given to the needs and prospects of the home field.

It would be impossible in the brief space allotted to an article like this to go over in detail the whole work of the Assembly. We think it best rather to emphasize a few of the points about which special interest gathered.

POWERS OF JUDICIAL COMMITTEES.

The only paper placed in the hands of the Judicial Committee of the Assembly was what purported to be a complaint of the Presbytery of Missouri against the action of the Synod of Missouri, in taking exception to the records of the Presbytery in a judicial case. The Pres-

bytery, in the exercise of its judicial authority, had directed a ruling elder of one of its churches to demit his office, because of unacceptability to a portion of the congregation. To this action the Synod, in its review of the minutes of the Presbytery, had taken exception on constitutional grounds. The Presbytery, being convened during the sessions of the Synod, gave notice in due form and within the prescribed limit that it would complain to the Assembly of the Synod's action. The Book of Church Order requires, in case of appeal or complaint, that, in addition to giving notice, the appellant or complainant shall "lay the reasons in writing" before the court, either before its rising, or within ten days thereafter. The Presbytery of Missouri, having given notice to the court that it would complain, and having appointed a commissioner to bear its complaint to the Assembly, appointed a committee to draw up a form of complaint, with the reasons, and adjourned without receiving a report from this committee, or adopting as its own action the form of complaint and reasons prepared by the committee, so that the paper lodged with the Synod was, the paper of a committee of the Presbytery, not the paper of the Presbytery itself. The representative of the Presbytery held that this committee, being a judicial committee appointed by the Presbytery to "digest and arrange all the papers," had authority to prepare and lodge with the Synod the complaint and reasons, and that its action was the action of the Presbytery. The Assembly's committee decided by a unanimous vote that the judicial committee had no such power; that the complaint and reasons, never having been adopted by the Presbytery, were not its own, and therefore the complainant was not before the Assembly in any constitutional way. The case seemed so plain, that the members of the Judicial Committee of the Assembly were quite astonished when, on presentation of their report, a substitute was offered returning the papers to the committee with instructions to prepare the case for trial, and when this substitute was only lost by the close vote of 74 to 75. It would have been an anomaly in the history of all courts, civil or ecclesiastical, if, under the solemn sanctions of a judicial process, the action of a mere committee should be recognized as the action of the body appointing it.

BENEFICIARY EDUCATION.

As might naturally be conjectured, this subject, which had occupied so prominent a place in the discussions of the preceding Assembly

came very promptly to the front in this. It was introduced by a resolution from Rev. J. A. Preston, of Alabama, requiring every candidate asking aid, to have a certificate of his church session to the fact of his inability to make his way without church aid. This was followed by a resolution from Dr. Marquess, of Missouri, instructing the standing committee of Education to report on the expediency of an entire change in the policy of the church in the matter of beneficiary education, so that all appropriations to candidates shall hereafter be in the form of loans to be secured by the individual notes of the candidates, bearing a low rate of interest from the time of their entrance upon ministerial work. The standing committee reported adversely to these propositions, recommending a continuance of the present method of affording pecuniary aid. The motion to adopt this report awakened a discussion which took very wide range, some of the speakers seeming to oppose all help to candidates, on the ground that parents and friends helped young men into other learned professions, but shifted upon the church the responsibility of helping them if they proposed to enter the ministry. Others advocated aid, but only after entrance upon the junior year in college. Others wished the aid limited to students in the theological course, while others still, like Dr. E. P. Palmer, of Mississippi, advocated larger liberality toward the candidates, proposing an increase of the amount appropriated to each student from one hundred to one hundred and fifty dollars per annum. The conservatism of the Assembly appeared in this as in every matter that came before it. It listened patiently to all the new methods and plans, and then wisely determined that, while urging upon the Presbyteries a more careful oversight of the needs of the candidate, and of the amount of appropriation asked for them, there should be no change in the system as it has been administered by the committee of education heretofore. There can be no doubt that the remedy for the evils alluded to by the speakers lies in the closer oversight of the Presbyteries as recommended by the Assembly. If, as was claimed on the floor, there are young men who are kept out of the ministry, because they will not be dependent on what they regard as the charity of the church, but who would be willing to accept aid in the way of a loan, there can certainly be no difficulty in the way of their executing in favor of the committee such legal obligations as they may choose for the return of the amounts appropriated by the committee. It would be a very different thing to require such an obligation as a condition of the appropriation.

LICENSURE AND ORDINATION.

Close akin to the discussion to which we have just referred was that awakened by the subject of a change in the terms of licensure and ordination. This subject had been even more prominent in the last Assembly than the one of beneficiary education. Indeed it seems to have stirred that Assembly more profoundly than any other question brought before it, and the ground-swell of the storm that had agitated that body was seen in the multitudinous overtures upon the subject that poured in upon this Assembly from every direction. Including overtures on the subject of "extraordinary cases," which fall practically under the same head, there were overtures from two Synods, and at least seven Presbyteries, some advocating change, some protesting against it. Into the merits of this question there is not space here to enter further than to say that in the very stirring debate that arose there were evidently three parties. First, on what might be called the progressive extreme, there were those who are evidently dissatisfied with the rigid requirements of our Book of Church Order in the matter both of licensure and ordination. They are for lowering the standard, for finding a short cut to the ministry. They are altogether out of sympathy with the time-honored position of our church in the matter of an educated ministry. They constituted but a small minority, but they represent an element in our church that is dangerous. Second, on what may be called the conservative extreme were those, embracing a large part of the Assembly who dread any change or innovation in the matter either of licensure or ordination, lest it should bear the appearance of a willingness to lower the standard, or should give encouragement to those who are clamoring for a less exacting standard of preparation for the ministry. Third, between these two extremes is a small, but growing class of thoughtful men, who look at facts as they are, who see that every year our candidates for the ministry after a single session in one of our theological schools, really exercise with the approbation of their theological professors, and the sanction of silence at least from the Presbyteries, all the functions of a licensed probationer for the ministry. They see further that, whilst licensure is technically to the position and work of a probationer, yet really there is little distinction made between the terms of licensure and those of ordination, the latter often following swiftly upon the former. Their judgment is that there should be a more marked distinction between licensure and ordination. They would change the qualifications for licensure, so that it may take place at the end of one year of theologi-

cal study, and our seminary students do with the authority of Presbytery regularly conferred that which they are now doing in an irregular way. They would leave the qualifications for ordination just as they are, except that the Presbytery in certain cases, at its own discretion, may omit the qualifications as to the knowledge of the original tongues of Scripture, and so omit them as not to imply any such stigma as now in the minds of many applies to the term "extraordinary case."

The report of the Committee recommended that no change is expedient, and the Assembly, with its usual conservatism, adopted the report by a very decisive vote.

SYNODICAL EVANGELISTS.

The question of the constitutional right of a Synod to appoint one of its ministers to the office of Synodical Evangelist was raised by an overture from the Presbytery of Mecklenburg. This overture asked five questions of the Assembly, each of which was evidently aimed at our present system of synodical evangelism. The first asked whether the Scriptures and the constitution of the Presbyterian Church recognize such an office as that of Synodical Evangelist. The second asked that if so recognized, the Assembly would define his powers. The third asked a definition of his relation to the Presbytery; the fourth, whether the Synod has a right authoritatively to make apportionments to the Presbyteries for the support of these evangelists, and the fifth, whether a Synod has a right to collect money through financial agents. To those of us who have been eye-witnesses of the wonderful work of synodical evangelism, and the marvellous blessing of God upon it, such an arraignment at the bar of the Assembly, for it was nothing else, seemed scarcely less than sacrilege. But the patience of the Assembly was wonderful. Upon the report of the Committee of Bills and Overtures, which was an excellent one, though speakers on all subjects, except chairmen of committees, had been limited to ten minutes, and these chairmen to twenty, the Assembly voted Rev. Roger Martin, as the representative of Mecklenburg Presbytery, unlimited time, and listened as for fifty minutes he endeavored to establish the unconstitutionality and unscripturalness of our great system of synodical evangelism, and when he was done adopted by an overwhelmingly large vote the answer of the Committee of Bills and Overtures to all the questions except the last. On that question, as to the right of a Synod to employ financial agents, the Assembly seems to have become confused as to the difference between the right of the Synod and the expediency or propriety

of employing such agents. It declined to answer affirmatively, and so left that question unanswered.

FINANCIAL AGENTS.

The subject of the employment of financial agents was evidently one that rested heavily upon the minds of the Assembly. On four distinct occasions, and in four different connections, it lifted up its voice with no uncertain sound against them. The first occasion was that of the report of the standing committee on Foreign Missions. That committee reported recommending that the minutes of the executive committee, which they had examined, be approved, except in the matter of their action touching the appointment by the Synod of Georgia of a Synodical Secretary of Foreign Missions, whose duty it should be to visit the churches of the Synod and raise money for Foreign Missions. It appeared from the minutes of the Synod of Georgia, as quoted in the minutes of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, that this Synodical Secretary was appointed by the Synod of Georgia at the suggestion of the Secretary of Foreign Missions. The Secretary, taking the floor, made the remarkable statement that he had made this suggestion to the Synod of Georgia without any consultation with the Executive Committee, so that he alone was responsible; but the Assembly held that even if he had failed to consult the committee, as he ought to have done before taking the action, the committee, on his return and report to them, had it in their power to decline coöperation in a plan which was manifestly inconsistent with the action of the last Assembly in reference to a field secretary of Foreign Missions, and so voted to sustain the exception, and virtually to disapprove of the Synodical Secretary who was really a financial agent for the raising of funds in the Synod. In taking this action the Assembly expressly disclaimed any intention to reflect upon the Executive Committee, of whose laborious and faithful service during the year it spoke in terms of highest commendation.

In the discussion of Home Missions, on Wednesday night, the same subject of the employment of paid agents by the lower courts for the collection of funds for the causes of beneficence under the direction of the General Assembly came up, and the Assembly a second time expressed its disapproval of their employment.

Finally, on the last day of the Assembly's sitting, the subject of financial agency was twice brought to the attention of the Assembly. The committees on the minutes of the Synods of Georgia and North Carolina both brought in reports recommending exceptions to the

records in the matter of the appointment of financial agents. Strangely enough in the first of these cases, that of the Synod of Georgia, the Assembly voted to strike out the exception, and in the other, that of the Synod of North Carolina, voted to sustain. Perhaps the Assembly thought it had sufficiently covered the case of the Synod of Georgia in its action upon the minutes of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions. But the consciences of the brethren evidently were not easy, for late Saturday night, upon the very eve of the dissolution of the Assembly, the action in the case of the Synod of Georgia was reconsidered, the exception recommended by the committee was sustained and the fourth distinct utterance on this subject given. It is to be hoped that this decisive and reiterated action of the Assembly will have due weight, for in this matter of synodical secretaries, superintendents of evangelization, etc., there is the entering wedge to the old *ante bellum* system of paid financial agents.

COMMUNION WINE.

It would have seemed in advance, that if there were any question upon which our people were a unit, it was that of the use of ordinary wine in the sacrament of the Lord's supper. If any of us dreamed that this modern innovation of the substitution of the unfermented juice of the grape had not as yet disturbed the equanimity of our church, our dreams were destined to a sudden and rude awakening. We were first startled by an overture from the Presbytery of Holston, asking for a deliverance on the use of fermented wine at the communion. We were still more astonished when we found that, in addition to the majority report of the Committee of Bills and Overtures, to the effect that the wine referred to in Scripture is fermented wine, but that the use of unfermented wine does not vitiate the ordinance, there was also to be a minority report contending that the wine of Scripture was unfermented wine, and that this was the proper element to be used in the sacrament. At first thought it seemed unfortunate that this subject was to be discussed whilst we were the guests of a congregation that used unfermented wine at its communion table. If the discussion had taken place before the communion service on Sabbath, the action of the Assembly, possibly, might have been a little less pronounced than it was. As our generous hosts had in everything else provided for us the very best that it was possible to obtain, it was fair to presume that the wine served at the communion would be and was the very best quality of unfermented wine. If so, there was a

practical break-down of the theory at the very outset. What was served to us was not only not unfermented, but it had passed beyond the vinous into the acetous fermentation. It was a weak quality of grape vinegar. It is strange that the advocates of the "two-wine theory" do not see the practicable impossibility of giving us unfermented juice of the grape, except in the grape itself. The mover of the minority report stated in so many words that the moment the juice of the grape comes in contact with our impure atmosphere, fermentation begins. The juice, therefore, that is given to the communicant is not unfermented. The process of fermentation may be artificially arrested, but it has begun.

A member of the Assembly who is a practical chemist gave it as his opinion that the wine served contained alcohol and also microbes peculiar to acetous fermentation. To a student of the original scriptures nothing could be more painful than to see a member of the Assembly, an honest, earnest ruling elder, misguided by the ministerial fanatics of our land who profess to study the Bible in the original, taking two passages of scripture in which the Holy Spirit uses the same identical word for wine, and authoritatively declaring, with a dogmatism which nothing but a supernatural inspiration in the speaker could warrant, that when the Holy Spirit used the word in one place he meant fermented wine, and when he used it in the other place he meant unfermented wine. Wherever the Bible speaks favorably of wine it was, according to the speaker, unfermented wine; wherever it had anything to say against wine it was fermented wine, although the same word in the original is used in each case. It is astonishing to see to what lengths the advocates of the "two-wine theory" are borne. Not a great while ago a pamphlet was widely circulated through the land, the author of which, laying claims to great erudition, actually asserted that the old Falernian wine, whose praises Horace, the scapegrace, sings, was unfermented and contained no intoxicating element.

There was one point which the speaker on behalf of unfermented wine as the scriptural element failed to notice, and that was that the Apostle Paul, when those irregularities were reported to him in the Corinthian Church and so severely animadverted upon by him, did not tell the men who were drinking to drunkenness at the Lord's table that they were using the wrong kind of wine. If the mover of the minority resolution had been there he would have advanced his "two-wine theory," but the inspired apostle did not, for the simple reason that he had never heard of it. It is the result of the higher criticism of the present day.

It is essentially rationalistic in its origin. Its leading advocates do not hesitate to say that if they believed that the wine made by our Lord at the marriage feast in Cana of Galilee was alcoholic wine, they would say, "down with Christianity!" The great cause of temperance, in which every Christian must be profoundly interested, can never be advanced by methods of this kind. Besides the majority and minority reports of the Committee of Bills and Overtures three papers were offered as substitutes. The first by Rev. Dr. Cecil, of Alabama, took the ground that the usage of the church for eighteen centuries was so well known that there was no need of a deliverance. The other two held substantially the ground that the Assembly declined to say whether the sacramental wine of scripture was fermented or unfermented, and either might be used. But the Assembly had been asked for an authoritative interpretation of scripture. The Presbytery was entitled to it. The Assembly gave it. The majority report, expressing the views of all the Committee of Bills and Overtures, except the elder from Kentucky, who introduced the minority report, was adopted by a very large majority, all substitutes for it having been voted down. This action is certainly as liberal as fidelity to the scripturalness of the ordinance will allow. Indeed, there are many of us who seriously doubt whether unfermented grape juice (so-called), whose effect upon the physical system is depressing rather than exhilarating, can fulfil the conditions of that symbol of our redemption which represents its joyousness, or take the place of the "wine which maketh glad the heart of man." As in the use of the bread, it is not necessary to take enough really to nourish, a crumb being sufficient, so in the use of the wine it is not necessary to take enough to exhilarate, a drop being sufficient. But that very symbolism which makes a crumb of bread and a drop of wine sufficient, imperatively demands that the bread shall contain nourishment, and that the wine shall contain exhilaration. The use of unfermented wine may be, as we say, "valid." It certainly is not "regular."

There are many other subjects which came before the Assembly to which it would be pleasant to the writer, and perhaps interesting to the reader to refer at some length if there were space. There was for instance the question of memorializing Congress in reference to the closing of the Columbian Exposition on the Sabbath. The conservatism of the Assembly exhibited itself in a reluctance at first to adopt such a memorial, lest it should seem to smack of intrusion into the things which are Cæsar's. But a calm and discriminating discussion of the

matter soon showed that it belonged to that class of cases of "humble petition and remonstrance," provided for by our standards, and that it involved no departure from the distinctive principles of our church. It would be pleasant to refer to the advance steps taken by the Assembly in the matter of the evangelization of the colored race in the South. There would be a melancholy pleasure in reverting to the fact that the name of our dear young brother Lapsley, who so recently fell at his post in "Darkest Africa," could not be named without the evidence of a wave of tender and tearful emotion passing over the Assembly. He has not labored in vain. We would like to dwell upon the subject of the hymnology of the church, as it came before the Assembly, developing the presence of three strong parties, those desiring the improvement of the old book of the church, those desiring a continuance of the contract with the publishers of "Hymns for Social Worship," and those desiring in preference to either the "Hymns of the Ages." The Assembly did the best thing in appointing an *ad interim* committee to take into consideration the whole subject and report. Doubtless, also the wisest course was taken with the Directory for Worship, in placing it in the hands of a new committee, but of this we have not time fully to write. It was pleasant to have such reports of advance all along the line—more money for Foreign Missions, more for Home Missions, more candidates for the ministry, more business done by our Publication Committee, etc., etc. It was gratifying to see the Assembly take such strong action in reference to the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance, solving all pecuniary difficulties by ordering our share of the expenses of that body to be paid out of the Assembly's treasury. It was above all gratifying that the Assembly, not troubled with any heresy-trials, or perplexed with any questions of alteration of our doctrinal standards, could devote its whole time to the consideration of questions connected with the expansion of the church and the enlargement of its work.

It was an Assembly in large measure of younger men. As one of the older brethren, with experience in several Assemblies, it gives me pleasure to testify to the ability, courtesy, and conservatism that characterized all its deliberations. No Assembly ever had a better right to sing as its closing hymn—

"Blest be the tie that binds."

T. D. WITHERSPOON.

Richmond, Ky.

THE NORTHERN GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1892.

THIS body, the first of all the great courts of the church in this country to meet on the Pacific coast, began its sessions at Portland, Oregon, May 19th. The occasion was taken advantage of by very many friends and members of the families of commissioners and others, for a journey to that distant point. The result was not only a full attendance upon the Assembly itself, but also an unusual number of visitors. The great trains that swept across the plains and over the mountains and through the valleys were full of interested Presbyterians. On the two principal routes westward, the Union Pacific and the Northern Pacific, the commissioners met with frequent special courtesies. The travellers by the latter route enjoyed notable receptions and held soul-stirring meetings at Helena, Tacoma and Seattle. Those coming by the former spent a Sabbath in Salt Lake City and made a grand Home Mission campaign of it, one of the immediate fruits of which was the formal offer to the Assembly, on the second day of its sessions, of lands in Salt Lake City valued at three hundred and sixty thousand dollars. The offer, which was accepted, was made by Mr. John R. Middlemiss to "the grand old church of his fathers" for the founding of an institution of learning, and was coupled with the condition that the name given the institution should be "Westminster," "in honor of the much-abused Confession of Faith." The long journey to Portland resulted in a rare and delightful sociability. The members on each route became well acquainted on the way. Doubtless, too, this pleasant association and intercourse facilitated more than the members realized, the actual business of the Assembly.

For perhaps the first time in its history, the Assembly found no ex-moderator's name on its rolls. The duty of presiding at the opening session devolved upon Rev. Dr. John G. Riheldaffer, of Minnesota, and the sermon of Dr. Green, the last Moderator, was read by the Stated Clerk. Of the nine nominees for the moderatorship, four were so warmly supported by the votes of their friends that it was not until the third ballot that the choice fell upon William C. Young, D. D., of Kentucky, whose father, Dr. John C. Young, presided over the Old School Assembly of 1853. This proved a most excellent choice, not only because it represented the wishes of the conservatives in the Assembly, but also because of the readiness, tact, fine spirit and constant fairness of the incumbent of the high and difficult office. In his appointment of chairmen of committees, Dr. Young very pleasantly

remarked that the Assembly had taken the matter out of his hands. He took pains to place the defeated nominees at the head of important committees.

Reports of the Boards.—These were, as usual, presented early in the sessions. Foreign Missions reported the million dollar point not yet reached in contributions, though passed in expenditures. The receipts were \$931,292.47. The deficit is not comfortable. It is noteworthy that the contributions of woman's boards lacked but sixteen thousand dollars of reaching the amount received from the churches, and that one-seventh of the entire resources for the year was derived from legacies. In Home Missions the receipts exceeded those of last year, amounting to a total of \$925,949.63, and enabled the Board to conduct its work and at the same time reduce its indebtedness of last year by more than thirty thousand dollars, leaving it now about sixty-seven thousand dollars. Both the Foreign and Home Boards asked for a special "Columbian thank-offering" on October 9th. The Board of Aid for Colleges reported another successful year, fully justifying its establishment and the prosecution of the end had in view. Its contributions amounted to \$95,192.29, from which it aided fifteen colleges and twenty-one academies. Two features of this work are noteworthy. First, the scheme contemplates the erection of this cause into one of the great causes of the church and laying the work of Christian education upon the hearts of God's people. Secondly, in all the institutions, desiring to receive aid from this fund, the systematic study of the Bible is positively required. These features were warmly endorsed by the Assembly. Publication and Sabbath School Work reported a successful year, with contributions exceeding any previous year by nine thousand dollars. We congratulate this board upon its passage through the year and the Assembly's meeting without an "investigation" of any kind. May it be permitted long to pursue its work, uninterrupted by the schemes or criticisms of those who think it so easy to improve on the business methods and plans of the wise and faithful men entrusted with this delicate and arduous work. An application of the "let alone" policy has proved wholesome. The Freedmen's Board presented about the usual report, and recommendations were adopted looking to the giving of greater prominence to the primary and industrial education of the colored people, and to an increased support from the church for the prosecution of the Board's work.

The Church Seal.—This most trivial matter, which occupied so much

time last year, was quickly disposed of. An open Bible with the words, "The word of God," on one side, and a cross and serpent (the latter very much reduced since last year, and not obtrusive) on the other, was adopted as the chief symbol.

Deaconesses—An overture was sent down to the Presbyteries, touching the re-institution of this order, and it was also recommended that institutions for the training of godly women be established.

A Short Creed.—Those who have advocated this project, were given what our dear friend, Dr. Skinner, now of blessed memory, used to call a "sockdological whackdologer." The Assembly peremptorily and unanimously declined to enter upon the consideration of the question.

The Consensus Creed.—The committee submitted a report touching the progress of its work, showing that several of the Presbyterian bodies of the world, were prepared to take part in the formation of such a creed. Such a creed was submitted to the Assembly for its information, not for action. It consists, as drafted, of twenty two articles, of which the following are a type :

"ARTICLE VI.—We believe that our first parents, being the root and representative of all mankind, death in sin and a corrupted nature were conveyed to all their posterity; that from this corrupted nature do proceed all actual transgressions; and that by sin mankind became liable to all the miseries of this life, to death itself, and to the pains of hell forever.

"ARTICLE VII.—We believe that God did not leave mankind to perish in their sins but so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son that whosoever believeth on him should not perish but have everlasting life, and that of his free and sovereign will, without the foresight of faith or good works as causes or conditions moving him thereunto, God did particularly and unchangeably choose in Christ to eternal life a great multitude which no man can number.

"ARTICLE IX.—We believe that the salvation which Christ has provided is adapted to all men, that it is sufficient for all, and that it is freely offered to all in the gospel. We believe that it is the imperative duty of the church to preach this gospel in all the world, to every creature; that the free offer of salvation is accompanied by the promise of Christ, 'him that cometh unto me I will in no wise cast out,' and that if any hearer of the gospel is lost it is because he will not come unto Christ that he might have life.

"ARTICLE X.—We believe that those whom God hath chosen unto life, and who are capable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word, he is pleased, in his appointed time, of his free and special grace alone, by his word and Spirit effectually to call out of the state of sin and misery to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; and that those dying in infancy and other elect persons who are not outwardly called by the word are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when and how and where he pleaseth."

Coöperation of Churches.—This matter was presented in several

forms. An *ad interim* committee, Dr. C. L. Thompson, chairman, presented a report, reciting the facts and needs as ascertained by an extensive correspondence, showing the deplorable divisions of the church in small communities, the inability in many places to group the churches, and the impracticability of coöperating with other denominations in many home mission fields. The Assembly, after some opposition, adopted the committee's recommendation that the Board of Home Missions be directed to instruct its synodical missionaries and their missionary agents to increased carefulness in the organization of new churches, and that it be urged to adhere strictly to its rule to grant further appropriations only after full conference with the Home Mission Committee of that Presbytery, and after a full consideration of all the facts connected with the situation, that Presbyteries be enjoined to exercise the utmost care, both in the selection of new fields, and of the men to occupy them, and to undertake new work only where it gives promise of growth, that a conference of the executive officers of the allied denominations be provided for, to be held in the near future, and that the committee on coöperation be continued.

The same subject came up also in a communication from the Southern Church, touching a plan of coöperation in the foreign mission work. Provision was made for a conference between the Executive Committee of that church and the Board of this church, with a view to preparing a plan for such coöperation, to be reported next year to both Assemblies. Still another form in which this vital matter appeared was in the determination to appoint a Committee of Conference with the Southern Church on work among the freedmen.

Subscription to the Standards, and the Nature of Ordination Obligations — The following most important and most significant paper was adopted. It speaks for itself, and its adoption indicates that the mind of the church is made up on the subject :

The General Assembly would remind all under its care that it is a fundamental doctrine that the Old and New Testaments are the inspired and infallible word of God. Our church holds that the inspired word, as it came from God, is without error. The assertion of the contrary cannot but shake the confidence of the people in the sacred books. All who enter office in our church solemnly profess to receive them as the only infallible rule of faith and practice. If they change their belief on this point, Christian honor demands that they should withdraw from our ministry. They have no right to use the pulpit or the chair of the professor for the dissemination of their errors until they are dealt with by the slow process of discipline. But if any do so act, their Presbyteries should speedily interpose, and deal with them for a violation of their ordination vows. The vow taken in the beginning is obligatory until the party taking it is honorably and properly released. The As-

sembly enjoins upon all ministers, elders and Presbyteries to be faithful to the duty here imposed.

Revision.—This formerly all-absorbing topic received comparatively slight attention in the Portland Assembly. The chairman of the Revision Committee, Dr. W. C. Roberts, presented that committee's report, embodying the proposed changes and recommending that the the revision be remanded to the Presbyteries in the form of twenty-eight separate overtures, covering the points in which additions or changes are suggested. After some debate, this recommendation was accepted, and the Presbyteries are called upon now to devote much study to this vital matter. It is apparent that complete revision is yet several years off, and really that it may not come at all.

The Union Seminary Case.—The matter of the relations of the Seminary to the Assembly came up in several papers, among them the report of the Committee of Conference appointed by the last Assembly, a communication from the directors of the Seminary, overtures from twenty-three Presbyteries and one Synod, the majority and minority reports of the Committee on Theological Seminaries, and various supplemental reports and substitutes. The position of the various parties to the case is so well known that we need occupy your space with no more than a recital of the result reached. This was expressed in the following resolutions :

1. That the Assembly indorse the interpretation of the compact of 1870, as expressed by the action of the Assembly of 1891.
2. That the Assembly decline to be a party to the breaking of the compact with Union Theological Seminary.
3. That the Assembly is persuaded that the church should have direct connection with and control of its theological seminaries.
4. That the Assembly appoint a committee of fifteen, consisting of eight ministers and seven ruling elders, to take into consideration the whole subject of the relation of the Assembly to its theological seminaries, to confer with the directors of these seminaries and report to the next General Assembly such action as will result in a still closer relation between the Assembly and its seminaries than that which at present exists.
5. That the Assembly dismiss the Committee of Conference, appointed last year, with courteous thanks for its faithfulness, and highest appreciation of the services rendered the church.

As supplementary to these resolutions the following paper was adopted :

Resolved, First, That this General Assembly recognize the *status quo* as to the different interpretation given by the directors of Union Seminary from that given by the Assembly's Committee on Conference, and in accordance with the proposition suggested by said Committee of Conference, this General Assembly agrees to

refer the difference of interpretation of the compact of 1870 as to transfers to a committee of arbitration.

Resolved, Second, That a committee of five members representing this Assembly shall be appointed by the Moderator, which shall select five other persons as arbitrators to meet a like number selected by Union Seminary; and these ten shall select five others, and by the fifteen thus chosen shall the interpretation of this compact as to the transfer of a professor be decided.

And on a later day, Rev. Dr. T. Ralston Smith, of Buffalo, N. Y.; Rev. Dr. B. L. Agnew, of Philadelphia, Pa.; George Junkin, of Philadelphia; Logan C. Murray, of New York, and E. W. C. Humphrey, of Louisville, Ky., were appointed the Assembly's members on the Committee of Arbitration. Thus was most happy provision made for a harmonious adjustment of a question which was involved in great difficulty. It is an acknowledgment on the Assembly's part of the honesty of purpose and view of the Union Directors, and yet there is no yielding of any rights or receding from any position before assumed.

The Briggs Case.—This came up on an appeal by the Prosecuting Committee of New York Presbytery from the action of that Presbytery in dismissing the case. The grounds of the appeal were: (1), Irregularity in the proceedings of the Presbytery; (2), Receiving improper testimony; (3), Declining to receive important testimony; (4), Hastening to a decision before the testimony was fully taken; (5), Manifestations of prejudice in the conduct of the case; and (6), mistake and injustice in the decision. In support of this appeal and its grounds, Dr. G. W. F. Birch presented an able argument, urging that the appeal was taken because the judicial advice and instruction which the constitution of the church commissions the Assembly to give was desired; because the Assembly is the bond of union, peace, correspondence and mutual confidence among the churches and must exercise its office in the effort to avert disunion, to blot out strife, to restore fraternity, and to strengthen confidence among the churches; because the case was one of intense interest to all Christendom; because it involved the fundamental truths of Christianity, and especially the doctrines of the Presbyterian Church; because of the large number of subordinate church courts that had spoken out with trumpet tongue concerning the Inaugural Address, and had been followed by the General Assembly itself in its veto of the appointment of the appellee to the professorship at the entrance upon which he pronounced that address; because the action of the Presbytery was so manifest an error in law that it justified relief, failing which, the church would be agitated for years to come; because the interests

involved were so great, the prosecutor in the case being the Presbyterian Church, and the cause being freighted with issues momentous to the whole church. He also showed good reasons for passing by the Synod in the appeal. Dr. Briggs' reply set forth the embarrassment which he felt in being the defendant of the Presbytery in a case in which he himself was the chief party, and thus appearing to be interposing obstacles in the way of his own trial. He then opposed the passing by the Synod and entertaining the appeal in the Assembly on the ground that the reasons were not sufficient to justify the Assembly's entertaining the appeal, that there are no precedents for it, that it would deprive the defendant of a right, that it would be an intrusion upon the Synod's function, that there is now pending a complaint against the same action, in the Synod, etc. "The law of appeals does not justify the passing over the Synod in the interests of the appellants. The precedents of appeals before the General Assembly are all against this appeal. To entertain it would be to deprive the defendant of his rights under the constitution; it would wrong more than one hundred ministers and elders of the Presbytery of New York by damaging or destroying their right of complaint; it would override the Synod of New York, the most competent and the only proper judicatory to determine the case; it would put that great Synod in the awkward dilemma either of disregarding the rights of complainants representing the majority of the Presbytery of New York, or of disregarding the decision of the Assembly, and so involving a conflict of jurisdiction: it would be against a precedent of the General Assembly which dismissed a case because notice was given to presbytery of appeal to synod and only subsequently of appeal to General Assembly. It would prevent the consolidation of the appeal and the complaint.

"You cannot entertain this appeal, finally, because this committee is stayed from appealing by a complaint pending before the Synod of New York, signed by a majority of those present and voting in the Presbytery of New York, and because until this interlocutory decision is reversed and determined by the Synod, there is no formal judgment in the case from which an appeal can be taken.

"I submit this argument to your venerable body with the request that you will do justice to the appellee, that you will recognize the rights of his co-presbyters, that you will credit the Presbytery of New York, and that you will trust the Synod of New York, all which you can do only by dismissing this appeal and referring the appellants to

the Synod of New York where they must appear in any case to maintain their own complaint before that judicatory and to resist the complaint of the majority of the Presbytery of New York, which must be considered and decided by the Synod of New York, at their next meeting."

After an able argument upon the legal aspects of the case by J. J. McCook, of New York, the vote was taken, and by a vote of 385 to 122, the minority report, which proposed to dismiss the appeal, was laid on the table, and the majority report adopted, declaring the appeal in order, and providing for its hearing. The result, after a patient consideration of all the aspects of the case and a faithful, careful attention to Dr. Briggs and his supporters, was: for sustaining the appeal, 302; sustaining in part, 127; not sustaining, 87; making a total of 429 in favor of sustaining, as against 87 for not sustaining. Those who voted to sustain in part did so largely on the ground of the appeal having been brought past the Synod to the Assembly. The judgment of the Assembly, prepared by a special committee, was expressed in the following minute, read by Judge Ewing, of Pennsylvania:

Your committee, appointed to draft a form of judgment to be entered in the case of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America against the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., respectfully report and recommend for adoption the accompanying form of decree and order:

The General Assembly, having on the 28th of May, 1892, fully sustained all the specifications of errors alleged and set forth in the appeal and specification in this case, it is now, May 30th, 1892, ordered that the judgment of the Presbytery of New York, entered November 4th 1891, dismissing the case of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America against Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and the case is removed to the Presbytery of New York for a new trial, with directions to said Presbytery to proceed to pass upon and determine the sufficiency of the charges and specifications in form and legal effect, and permit the Prosecuting Committee to amend the specifications of charges, not changing the general nature of the same, if in the furtherance of justice it be necessary to amend, so that the case may be brought to issue and tried on the merits thereof as speedily as may be practicable.

It is further ordered that the stated clerk of the General Assembly return the record and certify the proceedings had thereon, with the necessary papers relating thereto, to the Presbytery of New York

The foregoing succinct account of the Portland Assembly's acts will suffice to show the temper and purpose of the Presbyterian Church of the North. Comments are almost superfluous. The Assembly has reaffirmed the determination of the church to stand by the truth. It has reasserted its right to oversee and control its theo-

logical education. It has again stamped with its disapproval the advanced theories as to authority in religion, the destructive criticism of God's word, the looseness of subscription and laxity of conscience as to ordination vows. As a great mission body, meeting in its home mission field, it has strengthened that grand department of work. In its relations with other churches it has assumed a fraternal attitude which will encourage kindly feeling as well as confidence.

The next meeting will be held in Washington, D. C., in May, 1893.

THE CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN ASSEMBLY.

THIS body held its sixty-second meeting in Memphis, Tenn., at the same time that the similar courts of the Presbyterian Churches South and North were in session. Rev. Dr. Danley, of Kansas City, Mo., was made Moderator, taking the place of Rev. Professor Foster, of Lebanon.

The executive agencies of the church reported a year of progress. In all the departments of the church's work there were increased receipts, with the single exception of Ministerial Relief. In education the church pronounces its belief that it needs a theological seminary in one of the larger cities of the land, and a committee was appointed "to receive propositions for the location of such a seminary in the city of Chicago, provided, only, that no steps shall be taken to build until \$300,000 shall be secured." The faith of the church must be great that it seriously contemplates the establishment of such an institution in a city where, if we hear aright, there is not a single organized church of its denomination! The Publication work of the church has recently been greatly enlarged, and its facilities increased by the occupancy of a new printing-house in Nashville. In Foreign Missions there has been increased interest. A proposition looking to the withdrawal of the Cumberland mission in Japan from the Church of Christ, the united Presbyterian body in that land, was overwhelmingly defeated.

Lay evangelism was endorsed by the Assembly, but with the restriction that such lay preachers be licensed, by presbyterial authority, as "exhorters, or lay-preachers, to exercise their gift in public." On the other hand, a congregation was permitted to elect a woman as a ruling elder, and the Presbytery with which it was connected not censured for sustaining the action! The *in these* deliverance of the previous Assembly touching this point was a negative. The deliverance at the

recent meeting, on a concrete case from an Indiana Presbytery, was affirmative! It is also stated that her church has on the roll of ministers one female preacher!

From the general reports of the church it appears that it is progressive and earnest. Its growth, however, is largely to be found in the newer regions of our country, and in those sections where Cumberlandism prevailed fifty or sixty years ago, the congregations, especially in the country districts and small towns, have become very weak, and in many places well-nigh extinct.

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

PECK'S ECCLESIOLOGY.

NOTES ON ECCLESIOLOGY. *By T. E. Peck, D. D., LL. D., Professor in Union Theological Seminary.* Crown 8 vo. Pp. 205. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1892.

This is an exceedingly neat little book of 205 pages. The binding good, paper heavy, and objectionable only in the brightness of its sheen, which makes it a little disagreeable to the eyes. But the type is large, and hence the objection is not serious. Described in reference to its contents, it is *multum in parvo*. Nominally there are nineteen chapters, but seventeen of these are but brief compends of notes and references that were designed for expansion in the class-room. They represent little more than the diligent student could catch and transfer to his note-book while the lecture was in progress. These chapters are very refreshing, stimulating and helpful to one who was so fortunate as to sit at the feet of Dr. Peck as a student. They bring back those days of exalted privilege, and give the mind a fresh grasp of the great principles that constituted the frame-work of Dr. Peck's valuable course. They will be of permanent value on the preacher's shelf for the purpose of reference. In an exigency, they will furnish the most available and deadly ammunition in contending for the faith once delivered unto Presbyterian saints.

These chapters are not without great value to any intelligent reader. While much of the material is in such condensed form that the uninitiated may not be able thoroughly to masticate, digest, and assimilate it, there are great nuggets of the pure gold of truth lying on the surface that any one can gather up and store away as a personal treasure. Especially are some of these short chapters valuable to all readers for their clear-cut definitions. If Dr. Peck has one excellency as a teacher, more conspicuous than any other, it is his marvellous skill in *defining*, in marking off an idea, and drawing a verbal boundary around it exactly outlining its limits, and clearly revealing its form. He can define a mental concept with as much precision as the surveyor with his instruments can define a plot of ground. This skill in defining is a prime requisite in a teacher; and an absolute necessity in one who is to demonstrate truth by logical processes.

These seventeen chapters make up about half the book, and the remaining two chapters make up the other half. These two chapters discuss *Apostolic Succession* and *Relation of the Church to the State*. We doubt whether a more valuable discussion of these topics has ever been put in the same narrow limits. These are matters upon which Dr. Peck has expended the best mental energies of his life. For years his thoughts have revolved round these subjects. He has looked at them from every angle of observation. He has looked at them through the eyes of all the best thinkers who have written on them. His mental vision has been quickened and strengthened by an intense glow of devotional fervor. He has not studied

these subjects at the prompting of merely a curious interest, nor as a mere matter of professional duty; but his studies have been carried on under the impelling force of a heart burning with loyalty to Christ, and jealous to the last degree of his crown rights.

These are questions of permanent interest, and just now of growing importance. "The putrid figment of sacramental orders and sacramental grace" ought to be buried, as other putrid things are; but unhappily it is a living and growing *putrefaction*. It is a thing, therefore, against which the lovers of a pure and wholesome gospel will have to quarantine; and to prevent the spread of which they will need to use strong disinfectants. Nowhere can these disinfectants be found in more condensed and effective form than in the chapter on Apostolic Succession. The author's first and main contention is with the Papacy. He touches the very heart and core of this great "mystery of iniquity" in his exposition of the claims and asserted prerogatives of her pretended priesthood. The Papacy in its essence is a hierarchy grading up from the parish priest, through bishops, archbishops and cardinals to the pope, who "sitteth in the temple of God, setting himself forth as God." All the members of this hierarchy, from the highest to the lowest, claim to exercise the functions of a real priesthood. The sacrifice which they offer is the body and blood of Christ, which they offer in the consecrated host for the sins of the living and the dead. This priesthood is perpetuated through the "sacrament of orders," which involves a tactual succession from the apostles by the laying on of hands. Only the priests can offer sacrifice, and only by the offering of sacrifice and the actual participation in the sacraments can sins be remitted and salvation conferred. Hence the everlasting destiny of all souls is in the hands of the Romish priesthood, hands that have been stained with all crimes and made filthy with all vice. No one can read Dr. Peck's scathing denunciation of this God-supplanting and soul-destroying hierarchy without feeling the glow of a martial ardor warming his blood to the finger-tips. The church is indebted to Dr. Peck for inspiring his students with an unquenchable hatred of the scarlet woman "upon whose forehead is the name written, *Mystery, Babylon the Great, the Mother of the Harlots and of the Abominations of the Earth.*" It may be the sad and tragic fate of some of them to delude themselves with false hopes and share the doom of Judas, but they are not likely to go to perdition by way of Rome. They will not have the pope and his creatures to beguile their journey thither by means of their sacrilegious puppet-shows.

Dr. Peck disposes of Apostolic Succession as held by the "apists" in short order. He shows conclusively that to those who claim neither priesthood, nor sacrifice, Apostolic Succession is absolutely worthless.

The other question, which in this little book is elaborately discussed, is also a live question. What should be the relation of state and church? They cover the same territory, they embrace the same subjects, they each have their system of laws to which they demand obedience. How to define their spheres so that there shall never be any friction, so that neither shall interfere with the perfect autonomy of the other is a question which has engaged the profound attention of the greatest minds, among both statesmen and churchmen. Every phase of this question is passed in review by Dr. Peck, and by his lucid analysis he puts the reader at once in possession of the leading principles of the various theories which he discusses. With what seems to us the force of perfect demonstration, he vindicates

the doctrine of the Southern Presbyterian Church, the absolute separation of church and state. Cæsar must keep his hands off the Bride of Christ, and the Bride of Christ must neither court the smile nor fear the frown of Cæsar.

In this day of superficial thinking, and much writing, there are few books put on the market that represent as much patient labor, careful research, and profound meditation as this unpretentious volume. It is the compressed result of years of faithful work. Its clearness of statement, its vigor of logic, and its chasteness of rhetoric, are beyond all praise. Other men may look upon a broader landscape of truth, but few, if any, look upon a landscape bathed in clearer light; others may embrace more objects in the sweep of their mental vision, but none can see the outlines of the objects embraced more distinctly than Dr. Peck. A few years ago he was happily characterized by the editor of a Northern journal who said of him, "there is not a more orthodox man in the Southern church, nor *one who knows more clearly why he is orthodox.*"

We heartily commend this book to all those who, touching the matters of which it treats, desire "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

Charlotte, N. C.

R. C. REED.

CHEYNE'S BAMPTON LECTURES.

THE ORIGIN AND RELIGIOUS CONTENTS OF THE PSALTER, IN THE LIGHT OF OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM AND THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS, *With an Introduction and Appendices.* Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1889 on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M. A., Canon of Salisbury. *By Thomas Kelly Cheyne, M. A., D. D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture, and Canon of Rochester.* New York: Thomas Whittaker, 2 and 3 Bible House. 1891

In the *North American Review* for January a number of scholars gave their views as to "*The Best Book of the Year.*" Dr. W. A. Hammond named the *Century Dictionary*. Sir Edwin Arnold bestowed the palm upon one of Zola's nasty novels, which he read while crossing the Atlantic and then threw into the ocean in disgust. Professor Charles A. Briggs pronounced unequivocally in favor of the volume whose title stands at the head of this notice, as "the most important theological work of the year," and "the freshest, richest, and most fruitful piece of criticism that has appeared for many a year." The former statement may be true, but not in Dr. Briggs's sense. The chief value of this work, if we mistake not, lies in the demonstration it affords of the inevitable result of the adoption of certain critical theories which are now all too widely accepted, not only on the continent of Europe, but also in Great Britain and America. It will therefore hasten the reaction, which is certain to set in sooner or later, against the revolutionary treatment to which the Old Testament has of late been subjected, and the return to older and safer views. Much was hoped from the sanity and sobriety of the English mind when it should turn itself seriously to the study of these questions with which the more enterprising, but less reliable, genius of Germany has occupied itself so long and so fruitlessly. And this hope will no doubt yet be realized. Not, however, in such men as Canon Cheyne. The only way in which he will contribute to the result hoped for is in furnishing occasion, by such works as the one before us, for the common sense and critical insight of other English scholars to as-

sert themselves, and in provoking his less Germanized countrymen to make the more vigorous assaults upon the positions which he would fain establish. In this negative sense, then, it may be true that his book on the Psalter is "the most important theological work of the year," more important even than Principal Gore's remarkable contribution to Christology, or Canon Driver's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*.

The volume is apparently well bound, but as we turned the earlier pages, one leaf slipped from its place and fluttered to the floor. We picked it up, and found that it contained the well-known "extract from the last will and testament of the late Rev. John Bampton," in which he bequeaths his estates to the University of Oxford, and directs and appoints that eight divinity lectures shall be preached—"to confirm and establish the Christian faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics"—upon various subjects, one of which is "the divine authority of the Holy Scriptures." Had it not been for this trifling incident, we should scarcely have noticed again the language of the will. But in our humble judgment, Canon Cheyne had no right to deliver these lectures on that foundation. For, whatever may have been his object, the effect of these discourses, in some quarters at least, will be to disturb and unsettle the very beliefs which John Bampton wished to establish, and to raise painful doubts as to the divine authority of the Holy Scriptures.

According to the superscriptions as we now have them in our Bibles, David was the author of seventy-three psalms. Delitzsch thinks that only forty-four are rightly ascribed to him. Hitzig admitted the Davidic authorship of only fourteen, and Ewald of only eleven. Professor Cheyne, however, joins Reuss and Kuenen in denying that David wrote any of the Psalms. "The only two indubitably Davidic compositions" are the threnodies over Saul and Jonathan (2 Sam. i. 19-27) and Abner (2 Sam. iii 33-34). It is not unreasonable to conjecture that David wrote some *religious* songs also, but it is impossible to believe that any of them (if there were any) reached the spiritual level of the so-called Davidic Psalms. The religious ideas there expressed are far in advance of "the spiritual capacities" of that rude warrior and his "half-primitive" contemporaries. But not only are there no psalms as early as David, there are none that belong to any part of the pre-exilic or even the exilic period of Hebrew history (with the possible exception of Psalm xviii, which *may* be as early as Josiah). Putting that aside, the whole psalter is post-exilic, and may be divided into three sections, representing in the main the Persian, Greek, and Maccabean periods. Is that not enough to take one's breath away? But let us remember that in assuming this position Canon Cheyne has only pressed the radical view of the Old Testament to its logical conclusion. If the prophets are older than the law, then, as Reuss says, the psalms are younger than either, for they presuppose the law. If Josiah did indeed "promulgate the first Scripture," and if "the priestly portions" of the Pentateuch were composed in the fifth century before Christ, as these critics allege, then most of the psalms must have been written after the exile. Cheyne is at least consistent in his revolutionary folly. He sees what we would have all our readers see, that unless the late origin of the psalter can be made out, the critical opinions of Wellhausen, Kuenen, and Smith in regard to the rest of the Old Testament must be abandoned. For if the "Davidic" Psalms were written before the exile, it is impossible to deny that there was a pre-exilic "Hexateuch," or that there was such a pre-

exilic "religious development" as is demanded by the traditional view. The question here discussed is therefore one of vital importance to both sides, and it would not greatly surprise us if the whole Old Testament controversy should be shifted by this book, for a time at least, from the law and the prophets to the Psalms. We have no objection. The revolutionists will thereby be doomed to all the speedier defeat. We do not of course mean to deny that *some* of the psalms are post-exilic. Everybody grants that. Calvin concedes that there are psalms as late even as the Maccabean era. But we do most emphatically deny the position of Cheyne, that *all* the psalms are post-exilic, that, for instance, Moses did not write the 90th, nor David the 23rd and 51st; and we submit that there are certain incontestable facts in connection with the psalter which neither Cheyne nor any of his school can explain.

Why for example, if the bulk of the psalter is post-exilic, do we find so few references to the Babylonian captivity with its frightful losses of temple and country and nationality, and to the following restoration? It is the bondage in Egypt upon which the psalmists chiefly dwell. It is the deliverance from Egypt which they chiefly celebrate. It is easy for us to explain this. It is not easy for Dr. Cheyne. By the way, he makes frequent reference to an alleged oppression and deportation of the Jews by Artaxerxes Ochus, calling it "the third of Israel's great captivities," and making it the historical background of a number of psalms. We doubt whether there ever was such a captivity. If there was, why is there no mention of it in Josephus? Because of his silence, and for other reasons, it is not generally accepted by scholars as a fact. And yet, Dr. Cheyne confidently uses it to explain a number of psalms which he has torn out of their true historical setting. It is a typical instance of his use of what he calls "the historic imagination." This wonderful faculty enables a man to set aside the consensus of generations of Jewish and Christian scholars, backed though it is by continuous and trustworthy tradition, and to bring down the date of the noblest body of lyrics in the literature of the world from a great creative period in Israel's history, of which we have full accounts in the canonical Scriptures, to a late and unproductive era, concerning which we have only meagre and doubtful records. It was Simon Maccabeus (B. C. 142), who, according to Dr. Cheyne, "devoted himself to the reconstitution of the temple psalmody," and made the collection which we now know as the fourth and fifth books of the psalter. If so, how does Dr. Cheyne account for the fact that the writer of 1 Maccabees, when describing all that Simon did for the temple and its vessels, says not a word about the most important thing of all, viz.: the editing of the temple hymn book? Further, in several psalms, such as the xxi and lxi., we find the singer referring to himself as "the king." Dr. Cheyne says that in such places the word is used of the Maccabean princes. But we know both from history and from Maccabean coins that they were not called "kings." Those who admit that these psalms were written while the Hebrews still had "kings," *i. e.*, before the exile, are not under the necessity of thus contradicting contemporary evidence. Again, why is it that the "Davidic" psalms, though coming to us through the kingdom of Judah and not through the kingdom of Israel, make so few references to the disruption of the kingdom, and why, as Mr. Gladstone asks, is "the prevailing and distinctive name" of the chosen people "Israel" rather than "Judah?" Surely we should expect "Judah" *after* the exile. Once more, if David never wrote a psalm, and was spiritually incapable of doing so, if the Jews thought of him only

as warrior and not as Psalmist, why should even late editors have ascribed psalms to him? Why did they not make a reasonable guess while they *were* guessing, and ascribe the Psalms to some literary and spiritual man like Samuel, rather than to a rude and unspiritual man of blood, such as our author thinks David was? Again, Dr. Cheyne cannot answer. We can. We say that the editors of the Psalter, and the Jewish and Christian churches, have ascribed Psalms to David because David wrote psalms.

There are at least half a dozen other objections, either of which seems to us fatal to Cheyne's theory (the one drawn from the Septuagint, for instance). But it is impracticable as well as unnecessary to state them all. One more, however, we must mention, for it is the strongest of all. Dr. Cheyne says that the 110th psalm was written in praise of Simon Maccabeus. Our Lord says that "David himself" was the author of this psalm. (Luke xx.42.)

What we have now said about "the Origin" of the psalter, to the discussion of which Professor Cheyne devotes six learned chapters, has perhaps prepared the reader for what he may expect in the two remaining chapters in which the Oriel Professor of the "Interpretation of Holy Scripture" sets forth the "Religious Contents of the Psalter in the Light of Old Testament Criticism and the History of Religions." If we have not succeeded in thus preparing the reader, let him notice the "s" at the end of the last word, and that alone will suggest the character of the whole discussion. It is a labored attempt to show that the psalmists of Judea were aided by the religions of Babylonia and Persia, especially by Zoroastrianism, in developing some of the greatest doctrines of the Bible. And this leads us to inquire what Professor Cheyne means by his contemptuous reference to the hypothesis of a "heaven-descended theology." Is he already drifting into naturalism?

Hampden-Sidney, Va.

W. W. MOORE.

BISSELL'S HEBREW GRAMMAR, ETC.

A PRACTICAL HEBREW GRAMMAR. *By Edwin Cone Bissell, Professor in Hartford Theological Seminary.* Hartford, Conn.: The Hartford Theological Seminary. 1891.

THE HEBREW VERB: A Series of Tabular Studies. *By Augustus S. Carrier, Adjunct Professor of Biblical Philology in McCormick Theological Seminary.* Chicago: Max Stern & Co., Printers. 1891.

Both of these publications are of interest as showing that the revival of enthusiasm for the study of Hebrew, which began more than a decade ago, mainly under the influence of Dr. Harper, is not at all subsiding, but rather increasing. The first of them is from the hand of a veteran scholar and teacher, who needs neither introduction nor commendation from the present writer. It is the latest, though we hope that it will be by no means the last contribution of Dr. Bissell to the advancement of a sound and healthy Biblical scholarship among American students.

The second of them is from the pen of one of our younger scholars. We trust that it may prove to be but the first fruits of an abundant harvest. Its thoroughness and general accuracy augur well.

Both publications are from the pens of experienced teachers and designed for use in the class-room. Each will prove valuable in its own way. Neither of them is likely to supplant, yet each may supplement text-books now in general use.

A word or two of more detailed notice must suffice for Professor Carrier's brochure upon the Hebrew verb. Its object is to spread out before the eye in a series of tables the vowel and other changes which the Hebrew verb undergoes in passing from the "ground-form" to the form found in actual use. These tables are accompanied by brief notes of an explanatory character. As already intimated, the work undertaken by Professor Carrier has been well, and, in the main, accurately done. We notice, however, a few typographical errors. E. g., **הָם** for **הֵם**

(p. 6) and **הַקְטִילִי** for **הִקְטִילִי** (p. 7); and at least one inaccurate statement on p. 13, when the Gut **לִי** verb is said to have a "comp. s wâ in 3d. f. sing. and 3d c. plural."

The notes at some points ought, at least so it seems to us, to have been somewhat fuller and more explicit, as, for instance, those upon **ע"ע** verbs (p. 22).

Dr. Bissell's grammar is deserving of a more extended notice than we shall be able to give it. It has some decidedly good points about it. Leaving out of account the series of text-books published by Dr. W. R. Harper, it is superior as an Introductory Hebrew grammar to any that we have seen. Its treatment of the accents based upon that of Wickes, is more satisfactory even than that of Harper. Its exercises are copious and well selected, so are its vocabularies. Its mnemonic hints in connection with the vocabularies will be differently estimated by different persons. They do not impress us as specially valuable.

We are constrained to regard the following as blemishes: (*a*), The departure from the ordinary terminology and arrangement—e. g., *Hiqûl* etc for *Hi'phil*, etc.; "Voices," for "Species" (Green), or "Verb-stems" (Harper); the treatment of the Guttural in connection with the strong verb, instead of as a separate class; (*b*), The treatment of the vowel, especially the vowel *e*. For instance to fail to distinguish the *e* in the penult of **מִלֵּךְ** from that in the penult of **יִדְרֹם** is a grave mistake; (*c*), The interweaving of the Syntax with the Etymology; (*d*), The absence of an exhaustive Index; (*e*). And last, but not least, the great lack of illustrative examples.

We notice also the following typographical errors: *Na'ârâh* for *Na'ârâh*; *Ulyamim* for *Uleyamim*; *Yhōwâh* for *Y hōwâh*; 'Elôhim for' *Elôhim* (p. 9, Ex.); **לָמָה** for **לָמָה** and **לָמָה** for **לָמָה** (p. 27); **הַקְטִילָנָה** for **הִקְטִילָנָה** [as demanded by his own *Pardg.*] (p. 44, N. a.); **סוֹסִים** for **סוֹסִים** for **יִם** (p. 52); **הַגֵּשׁ** for **הַגֵּשׁ** (p. 79).

We must also call attention to the following statements, some of which strike us as of more than questionable correctness. On p. 15 **קִדְּשׁ** is said to come from **קִדְּשׁ** whereas it comes from **קִדְּשׁ**. On p. 33, it is said "the reason why the Impf. takes prefixes, while the Perf. has only affixes, lies largely in the fact that, in the one case, the emphasis is laid more on the act; in the other, on the one acting." This explanation we must confess appears to us to lie largely, if not wholly, in the imagination. On p. 34, the statement is made that the Perf. ex-

presses "customary" action. This statement, though countenanced by Green and Gesenius, seems subversive of a scientific treatment of the Hebrew tenses, and is hardly sustained by the examples cited. It is rejected by Harper and Driver.

P. 39, קָטַל is called a "ground form," and on p. 91 the "ground form" of the Imp. of verbs לִי is said to end in הַ and that of the Impf. and Parts in הַ.

This is a misuse of the term "ground form," that ought certainly to have been avoided. On p. 38, וְאִשְׁמְרָה is with Green and Gesenius regarded as a co-

hortative with ׀ consec. This, again, seems subversive of sound principles of Syntax. On p. 44, in speaking of the Hi. Inf. constr. it is said, "In the Inf. constr. and related parts (also the Part.), an original *i* of the second syllable has been lengthened to *î*," etc. The original vowel here, as Dr. Bissell is very well aware, was *ā*, not *i*, hence his use of the word "original" is mischievously misleading.

On p. 44, the Hi. Imp. 2. f. pl. is said to be הַקְטִילָהּ, but in the Pardg. it is given correctly as הַקְטִילְהָ. On p. 54, § 27, 4 strikes us as too vague to be

helpful. P. 66, § 34, on "Nouns of Peculiar Formation" might have been profitably expanded, and אֶהְיֶה is rather according to law than "by exception"

(cf. אֶהְיֶה). On p. 68, the statement that numerals from 3-10 disagree in gender with the things they enumerate, while common, strikes us as crude. Nordheimer is more satisfactory.

On p. 69, § 36, 1, the vowel *ō* in forms like קָטַלְי (Inf. constr.) is said to be in a "short syllable," but cf. Gesenius 61, 1, and see parallel form in Ruth iii. iv.; Jer. xlv. 1. Page 70, the form קָטַלְהֶהּ should have been explained.

On p. 75, מַה־לִּי וְלָכֶם is hardly = What have I to do with *thee*? (italics ours). On p. 82, the Inf. constr. of פָּ is asserted to be an I-class Segholate. This is a manifest slip.

There are other points that we had noted, but must omit as this paper has already exceeded the limits allowed it.

W. M. McPHEETERS.

Columbia, S. C.

STEENSTRA'S "BEING OF GOD."

THE BEING OF GOD AS UNITY AND TRINITY. By P. H. Steenstra, D. D., Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis in the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass. 12 mo., pp. vi., 269. Boston and New York; Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1891.

We opened this book with foreboding, fearing a dreary succession of hazy and profitless subtleties, suggested, naturally perhaps, by its title. We are glad to record a decided and agreeable surprise, for the little volume proved interesting "from egg to apple." The author deserves high praise for treating this abstruse theme in such a way as to inflict upon the reader no dull, heavy page from title to *finis*.

The volume embraces ten lectures delivered to students of the institution during the sickness of Dean Gray, Professor of Systematic Theology. The course is divided as follows:

- I. Preliminary Fundamental Questions.
- II. Arguments for the Existence of God—The Cosmological and Teleological.
- III. The Moral and Ontological Arguments.
- IV. Recapitulation—Transition to the Attributes.
- V. The Omnipresence, Eternity, and Omnipotence of God.
- VI. The Omniscience, Holiness and Love of God.
- VII. The Christian Consciousness in relation to the Doctrine of the Trinity.
- VIII. The Trinity, its historical Revelation.
- IX. The Trinity, its Interpretative Revelation.
- X. The Speculative Construction of the Doctrine of the Trinity.

Dr. Steenstra possesses the happy combination of acuteness and breadth, a somewhat rare union in our observation, the carver of cameos is not likely to be a sculptor of heroic figures. His style is clear and perspicuous, and his candor is very attractive. He not only recognizes his limitations, but frankly acknowledges them; there is a refreshing absence of that oracular dogmatism so often expressed in an equally oracular vagueness, the dignity and the dumbness of Minerva's wise bird. There are parts of the book that invite and deserve detailed criticism. We would take great pleasure in discussing some of the views advanced in connection with the omniscience and omnipresence and the eternity of God. Very interesting questions emerge in his treatment of these topics, but our space would permit only a very unsatisfactory allusion to the problems raised. We are greatly interested in the development of the modern and influential doctrine of the Christian consciousness. In Dr. Steenstra's discussion, it has reached the position of a Divine Revelation, if we misunderstand him not, well nigh coordinate with the Inspired Word. We will add, in conclusion, that the volume unfortunately impresses us as anticlimactic, in that the best portion of it is its initial half; it seem to us to weaken towards its close, and the last chapter is perhaps the least satisfactory of all. We take comfort, however, in the reflection, that to give satisfaction on such a topic, is probably more than ought to be expected from any merely human intelligence.

Columbia, S. C.

SAMUEL M. SMITH.

GORE'S "INCARNATION OF THE SON OF GOD."

THE INCARNATION OF THE SON OF GOD: Being the Bampton Lectures for the year 1891. *By Charles Gore, M. A.*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1891. 12mo. pp. xxi., 295. Price \$2.00.

With considerable diffidence we confess a feeling of disappointment in this book, in some respects agreeable, in others not so. In general character and scope, range and massiveness of thought, it fell below our expectation; in minor matters of detail, reference and suggestion, it was better than our hope. Possibly we read it too much under the shadow of Liddon's monumental work, which may have made it seem narrower than it really is in its range; at the same time in some respects it is more readable than the former. Moreover one is prone to overlook the fact that a volume avowedly limited strictly to the Incarnation must leave untouched many of the most profound and interesting doctrines that belong distinctively to

the Atonement rather than to the Incarnation, though in common thought almost inevitably and inseparably associated with the latter; and thus a positive merit in the discussion is liable to be construed as a defect unless the reader lay constant restraint upon himself to remember exactly what is before him.

The volume contains eight lectures preceded by an admirable "synopsis of contents," and followed by forty-two pages of notes, the characteristic *nuisance* of our learned English brethren's work, a perpetual interruption of the train of thought by turning over the leaves to find some irredeemable commonplace triviality cited from a sapient father of the early centuries.

There are many points suggested by these lectures worthy of discussion in any extended critique. The second lecture presents us with a number as may be naturally inferred from its title, "Christ Supernatural yet Natural." We incline to the opinion that the learned author sees more of the "natural" in the Incarnation than the humble writer of these lines has ever been able to find. There are certain inferences natural to his statements in many points that we would certainly question, *e. g.*, Probation after death, rejection of the gospel and its consequences, an inherent God, an arbitrary decree, the kenosis, inspiration, imputation, etc. Let our readers, however, bear in mind our use of the word "inferences" above. We would be slow to charge *explicit errors* on these points, yet we think we may with full justice to the distinguished lecturer assert that his views on many questions must be very different from those of the conservative readers of this QUARTERLY.

SAMUEL M. SMITH.

Columbia, S. C.

ANDREWS' "LIFE OF OUR LORD."

THE LIFE OF OUR LORD UPON THE EARTH. Considered in its Historical, Chronological, and Geographical Relations. *By Samuel J. Andrews, Author of "God's Revelations of Himself to Men."* A new and wholly revised edition. Pp. xxvii., 650. \$2.50. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892.

This is a new and thoroughly revised edition of a work which has been before the public for thirty years.

In some respects it differs very materially from the ordinary Life of Christ, with which we are so familiar. As the author clearly states in his preface, "it deals with the life of the Lord on earth in its chronological, topographical, and historical relations only. It does not design to enter into any questions respecting the authorship of the Gospels, the time when written, or their relations to each other. Nor does it discuss the point of their inspiration, but assumes that they are genuine historical documents, and true statements of facts; and deals with them as such. Nor does it attempt to explain the Lord's discourses or parables, or to discuss questions of mere archæology or verbal criticism."

This is an accurate statement of the scope of the work, and, within these limits, it is a discriminating and exhaustive treatment of the subject. A glance at the very formidable "List of Authors Referred to," embracing every writer of note upon this subject, assures us that our author is aware of the fact that the questions he discusses are not new ones. More than one-third of the two hundred or more works referred to are books which have appeared within the last thirty years, so that the work is fully abreast with the latest researches, and one may find here in a nutshell the views of every writer of note upon controverted points.

Two features of the book commend themselves as deserving mention :

(1.) Prefixed to each sub-section, there is given a most admirable summary of the contents of the particular portion of the gospels under consideration; and by placing these together consecutively, you have, in perhaps a half-dozen pages or less, a complete epitome of the gospel narratives, not omitting the least incident mentioned therein.

(2.) All extended discussions are in smaller type, so that they may be readily omitted by the reader who wishes simply results, without wading through the discussions by which they are reached. This, in our judgment, is a decided advantage; and especially to that large class of readers whose minds would only be confused by this mass of conflicting opinions.

The work is furnished with a good map, full indexes, a capital Outline Harmony, and should be on the shelves of every Bible student.

Yorkville, S. C.

T. R. ENGLISH.

MATSON'S "ADVERSARY."

THE ADVERSARY; HIS PERSON, POWER, AND PURPOSE: A Study in Satanology. *By William A. Matson, D. D.* Pp. xi. 238. \$1.25. New York: Wilbur B. Ketchum, 2 Cooper Union. 1892.

As indicated in the sub-title, this does not claim to be a systematic and exhaustive discussion, but simply "a study." Indeed the author states in his preface that he has purposely refrained from dwelling upon certain topics, falling naturally within the scope of such a work, for the reason that they had been adequately treated by another writer while this work was yet in preparation; and hence its fragmentary and desultory character.

After an introduction in which are set forth the grounds of our belief in evil spirits, we meet with the usual vain speculations as to the fall of the angels, etc., which in this instance strike us as being, if possible, vainer than usual. Leaving now the region of speculation, we have a presentation of the principal passages of Scripture bearing upon the subject, and the exegesis of the texts quoted is in the main good.

Then, beginning with the Dualism of the Chaldeans, there is given an interesting resumé of opinions that have obtained upon this subject, especial prominence being given to the views of the church, from the days of the apostles down to the present.

Touching the question of demoniacal possessions, our author strenuously contends that they still exist, and endeavors to distinguish between such possessions and pure lunacy, but after all the line of demarcation is a very uncertain one.

Whatever else may be laid to his charge, Dr. Matson cannot be charged with being a Sadducee; for, in addition to the good and evil angels, he holds to the existence of a third class of spiritual beings, intermediate between these, not so bad as the fallen angels, and yet not to be classed with the good. To this residuary class he assigns the "spirit of divination" possessing the damsel at Philippi, and to the same festive spirits he assigns those strange and unaccountable noises that disturbed the inmates of the Epworth parsonage, and many similar occurrences.

The concluding chapter, which treats of occult arts, magic, sorcery, etc., is a very interesting one. To our author, magic and sorcery, although shorn of much

of their power by the advance of science, are still terrible realities. He does not indeed refer to the Salem witchcraft, but from his standpoint our witch-burning ancestors are not to be laughed at.

Owing perhaps to an incorrect idea of what constitutes a true miracle, our author ascribes them to Satan, as well as to God, and says furthermore, that "we are taking unwarranted ground when we assume that miracles have ceased." He believes that in opposing superstition we have gone to the opposite extreme, and through fear of being thought superstitious, "many have suppressed the evidences of the presence of agencies, whether good or evil, from the unseen world," and he further declares his belief that "all things betoken that we are entering on the first steps of a career of demoniacal manifestation, the issues whereof man cannot conjecture."

The book is full of interesting material, much of it undigested, and while we may dissent from many of the author's conclusions, it will be found to be suggestive and stimulating.

T. R. ENGLISH.

Yorkville, S. C.

IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE. *Edited by Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, LL. D.*

THE GOSPEL OF JOHN. *By Marcus Dods, D. D., Professor of Exegetical Theology, New College, Edinburgh.* In two volumes. Vol. I. Cr. 8vo., pp. xvi., 388. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1891.

THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. *By the Rev. G. T. Stokes, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Dublin, and Vicar of All Saints', Blackrock.* Cr. 8vo., pp. xxiv., 424. \$1.50. The same publishers.

These two volumes complete the fourth series of this exceptionally fine publication, the method and terms of which we have so frequently described⁶ and commended.

In *The Gospel of John*, the author proceeds at once to the subject matter of the book, omitting all the usual preliminary discussion of its authorship, date, etc. His attractive style, evident ability and learning, and vigor of thought make it a most readable book. In the Introductory Note, he states John's purpose, namely, to promote the belief that "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God." This purpose was accomplished by the account given in the first twelve chapters, which are covered by the author's exposition of those events in Christ's life, culminating in the raising of Lazarus from the dead, by which the divinity of Christ was publicly shown in his works. The analysis of the Gospel is not elaborately made, but merely outlined, though with sufficient clearness to furnish the thoughtful reader with a proper guide in studying this most profound of all the Gospels. Those special views of the author, which have subjected him to so much just criticism of late, do not come out in this volume, and we can hardly refrain from wondering how, with his views, he can account for the fact that the fisherman of Galilee could write a book of which he asserts that "In the whole range of literature there is no composition which is a more perfect work of art, or which more rigidly excludes whatever does not subserve its main end. From the first word to the last there is no paragraph, sentence, or expression, which is out of its place, or with which we could dispense." The volume is thoroughly stimulating and suggestive.

Dr. Stokes' work on *The Acts of the Apostles* covers the first nine chapters of the book, where, at the account of the conversion of Cornelius and Saul, a new division of the book begins. The introductory chapter on the origin and authority of the book discusses very briefly the growth of the New Testament canon, the defects of German criticism and other kindred subjects. In the second chapter the author sets forth and contends for the true doctrine of the nature and origin of religion and the Bible, as a supernatural revelation, and argues forcibly against the development theory. In discoursing on Stephen he appears, however, to lean to the idea that the inspiration of the scripture writers was nothing more than that presence and indwelling of the Holy Ghost still experienced by believers. His views of the relations of science

and religion, considered in the same chapter, are wholesome. In the discussion of the diaconate, the author does not allude to the view held by many that this office was not unknown in the Jewish church, but gives a very full and candid exposition of its subsequent history, and rightly characterizes the present form in which it exists in prelatical churches as one which its early founders would not have recognized. The volume is written from the standpoint of a decided "churchman," but it will be found to be offensive in neither tone nor argument. The careful reader will eliminate much that it contains, but will have left also much that is discriminating and useful.

BUTLER BIBLE WORK. *By J. Glentworth Butler, D. D.* Royal Octavo. About 650 pp. each volume. Illustrated. **NEW TESTAMENT**, two Vols. Vol. I., The Fourfold Gospels; Vol. II., Acts, Epistles and Revelation. **OLD TESTAMENT**, six Vols., ready. Vol. I., From Creation to Exodus; Vol. II., Exodus and Wanderings of Israel, Legislation Codified; Vol. III., Joshua to End of Solomon's Reign; Vols. IV. and V., The Psalms; Vol. VI., Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Solomon. New York: Butler Bible Work Company, Astor Place. 1892.

We again cordially commend this great work. Dr. Butler has a genius for gathering the best things from every possible source, and putting them together in the most attractive and available form. He has in these rich volumes stored up the best and brightest thoughts of several hundred of the ablest scholars of all ages and all lands. It is a work for daily and domestic use. Technical terms, abstruse reasonings and questions, Hebrew and Greek quotations, have been rigidly ruled out, but the best results of sound scholarship and research have been garnered and put in place for the ordinary reader's use. The compiler is as worthy of praise for the skill and discrimination which he has displayed in the choice and arrangement of his material as he could be if the whole book were original. As we once before noted, among the authors cited are, Drs. James W. Alexander, Stuart Robinson, M. D. Hoge, R. L. Dabney, George D. Armstrong, B. M. Palmer, J. H. Thornwell, and others of our own church. The citations from Stuart Robinson are from printed, but unpublished lectures on the Old Testament, sent for use in this work.

THE PEOPLE'S BIBLE: Discourses upon the Holy Scriptures. *By Joseph Parker, D. D., Minister of the City Temple, Holborn Viaduct, London, etc.* Vol. XV. Isaiah xxvii., Jeremiah xix. 8vo. pp. 460. Cloth, \$1.50. New York and Toronto: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1891.

Another volume of "Parker's People's Bible" ready; and four more volumes of this large work, to contain the whole of the Scriptures not included in the twenty-one volumes already issued, will complete the series. Each succeeding number has surpassed in excellence the many merits of each preceding volume. The following titles of topics from the volume just issued will give an idea of the scope of its chapters: The Use of the Rough Wind; A Denunciation of Drunkenness; Foundations and Covenants; The Parable of Agriculture; "The Doom of Ariel"; The Unread Vision; Plain Speaking; The Source of Strength; Prophetic Warnings; Contrasts in Providence; The Blasphemy of Rabshaketh; Enquiry for Gods; The Distress of Hezekiah; Hezekiah Warned; Hezekiah's Mistake; Needed Comfort;

The Right of the Creator; Unconscious Providence; Catechetical Notes; Three Shameful Possibilities in Human Life; Contending Emotions; Dramatized Truth; Handfuls of Purpose; Jeremiah's Study of Providence; The Divine Potter; Divine Questions; etc. An index occupying several pages adds value to the book as a work of reference.

NOTES ON THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES: Explanatory and Practical. Popular Commentary upon a Critical Basis. Especially Designed for Pastors and Sunday-schools. By *George W. Clark, D. D.*, Author of "*A New Harmony of the Gospels*," "*Notes on the Gospels*," "*Harmonic Arrangement of the Acts*," etc. 12mo. pp. 415. Price, \$1.50. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1420 Chestnut Street. 1892.

We have in this volume a commentary prepared on the same plan as the author's well-known and popular commentaries on each of the four gospels. It is what is desired by far the larger portion of those who wish to study this interesting record of missionary work as carried on by the apostles. Each chapter has a carefully prepared series of notes—explanations that really explain, in clear and intelligible terms, the meaning of what the Evangelist Luke wrote for the instruction of the disciples of Christ in all ages, from the time of writing until the promised return of the Great Head of the Church. This constitutes the "explanatory" part, and is precisely what the pastor and the Sunday school need. The "practical" part is composed of a series of "practical remarks" following each chapter. Some chapters have twenty, thirty, forty or more than fifty of these remarks, giving to a minister in a brief and pithy form the material for a sermon, or to the Sunday-school teacher matter for an interesting talk to his class on some important truth or duty.

It was a very judicious selection to take "the Acts of the Apostles" for study in the Sunday-schools during the latter half of this year, "The Centennial of Modern Missions."

In matters touching on baptism, the book, as may be expected, interprets the passages from the immersionist stand-point.

THE VOICE FROM SINAI: The Eternal Bases of the Moral Law. By *F. W. Farrar, D. D.*, Archdeacon of Westminster. 12mo. pp. 314. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1892.

A series of sermons, most of them preached first in Westminster Abbey, on the Ten Commandments, one discourse being devoted to each commandment. The introduction and notes deal with some of the problems connected with the delivery of the law, as the name of Jehovah, the doctrine of imputation taught in the second commandment, etc., and give the author's opinions on these subjects.

THE OLD DOCUMENTS AND THE NEW BIBLE: An Easy Lesson for the People in Biblical Criticism. By *J. Paterson Smyth, LL. B., B. D.*, Senior Moderator and Gold Medalist, *Primate's Prizeman*, etc., etc., Trinity College, Dublin. THE OLD TESTAMENT. 12 mo., pp. xvi. 216. New York: James Pott & Co. London: Samuel Bagster & Sons. 1891.

A book on the lower or textual criticism, written in simple, unscientific language for popular reading. It consists of three parts: (1), The Old Hebrew Docu-

ments and the Question of Biblical Criticism ; (2), The other Old Documents and their use in Biblical Criticism ; (3), The New Bible, a Specimen of Biblical Criticism. In the first book the author discusses the Hebrew writing, earlier and later, its peculiarities, the nature of Biblical Criticism, and the history of the manuscripts from the earliest to the latest. In the second book, we have a full account of the Samaritan Pentateuch, of the Talmud and Targums of the Septuagint, of the Syriac Bible, of the Vulgate, etc. In the third book, the author describes the work and results of criticism. This book is really little more than a description of the methods and spirit of the recent revisers of the Old Testament, and a criticism of portions of their work. The volume is well illustrated, and contains a large amount of useful information concerning the methods of determining the text of the Old Testament Scriptures.

MODERN CRITICISM AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL. Being the Bampton Lectures for 1890. By *Henry William Watkins, M. A., D. D.* 8vo., pp. xxxix., 502. London: John Murray. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1892.

The author's purpose in these lectures is to answer the question, Has our age cancelled the judgment of centuries as to the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel. He gives a full survey of the discussion and examines the evidences from the second century to the present day, states the modern theories of destructive criticism, and makes a careful application of late discoveries, especially that of the text of Tatian's *Diatesseron*. The facts and arguments are clearly presented and well weighed, and will convince the student that modern negative criticism has not yet established its case against the authorship and authority of this book. Some irrelevant matter is introduced here and there, greatly marring the book. Especially is this true of the author's view of inspiration. He endeavors to prove that the doctrine of a verbal inspiration not only obscures the study and interpretation of this book, but that it has never been accepted by the church, calling up as his asserted witnesses a long line from Calvin down to Westcott and Lightfoot.

CHRISTIANITY AND SOME OF ITS EVIDENCES. *An Address by the Hon. Oliver Mowat, Premier of Ontario.* Published by special request. 12mo., pp. 90. Toronto: Williamson & Co. 1890.

A practical discussion of the subject from the standpoint of a layman and advocate. The credibility of miracles, the reliability of the New Testament narratives, the character of the principles inculcated, the progress and beneficence of Christianity, the character and life of those who have accepted it, are among the evidences specially unfolded. A marked feature of this admirable address is the attention it pays to current popular objections to religion.

JESUS CHRIST, THE PROOF OF CHRISTIANITY. By *John F. Spalding, S. T. D., Bishop of Colorado.* 12 mo., pp. 220. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co. 1891.

A series of twelve sermons or lectures, prepared and delivered at various times and for various occasions, but more or less connected, being upon one theme. The subjects are Jesus Christ as witnessed by prophecy, in his relation to the Scriptures, the desire of all nations, proving his divinity by his wisdom, the God-man, the heir

of the world, manifesting forth his glory, the light of the world, the founder of Christianity, establishing his kingdom, the enlightener separating men and revealing character, speaking of the church to his apostles. The author's disparagement of the Bible as a means of leading the unbeliever to Christ, his view of its errancy and argument that error and difficulties will not cause it to suffer, greatly mar a series of lectures that otherwise might be useful, though not particularly striking or able.

OBJECT SERMONS IN OUTLINE: With Numerous Illustrations. *By Rev. C. H. Tyndall, Pastor Broome Street Tabernacle, New York City.* Introduction by Rev. A. F. Schaufler, D. D. 12 mo., pp. 254, \$1.00. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1892.

To those who like this kind of thing, this is the kind of thing they'll like. It tells one how to make and preach pictorial sermons. For instance, in a sermon to the unconverted, on Isaiah xii. 3, "Therefore with joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation," he places six pumps on a long bench, two of them merely fastened to the bench, a third running down into a beer keg (!) with red liquid in it, a fourth into a white pail, with the words "Christ, World," painted on it and black water in it, a fifth and sixth running down into a pail having "salvation" painted on it and pure water within it. Another sermon is illustrated by a frog—a *live* one if possible! The spider and the fly, the star-fish, the "yellow jacket," grass, compasses, candle, salt, chaff, etc., are also made to do duty in the same way. The preacher to children will glean some valuable suggestions and ideas from the book, but most of us will prefer to leave the objects to the imagination rather than disfigure our pulpits with them.

PLACES THAT OUR LORD LOVED. *By Frederick W. Farrar, D. D.* Illustrated by F. Schuyler Mathews. Boston: L. Prang & Co. 1892.

In letter-press and illustration one of the daintiest and most beautiful collections we have ever seen. The illustrations are exquisitely colored. The descriptions by Dr. Farrar are in his most charming style. We know of no book of its kind more suitable for a gift-book.

THE MAN OF UZ: Lessons for Young Christians from the Life of an Ancient Saint. *By the Rev. S. A. Martin, Professor of Homiletics, Lincoln University.* 12mo. pp. 135. 50 cents. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. 1892.

Eight chapters, dedicated to the Young People's Societies of Christian Endeavor, on the life, character, patience, endurance and faith of Job. The treatment is popular and adapted especially to young people. The titles of the chapters will sufficiently indicate its scope and purpose: A Gentleman of the Old School; Satan at the Court of Heaven; Satan Let Loose; the Heroism of Endurance; An Ancient Creed; Mysterious Providence; the Young Man's Views; Out of the Whirlwind.

THE GREAT DILEMMA: Christ His Own Witness or His Own Accuser. *By Henry Bickersteth Ottley, M. A., Vicar of Eastbourne.* 12mo. pp. 232. \$1.00. New York: American Tract Society. 1892.

An American edition from the third English edition of a treatise which has been

well received abroad. The book is a series of lectures written for those who are not theologically educated, and setting forth, first, the momentous nature of the doctrines of Christianity, and showing their dependence upon the question of the personality of Christ; then, by setting forth clearly the distinct claims of Jesus of Nazareth to sinlessness, to truth, to be the one in whom the Mosaic Law was fulfilled and superseded, to be the founder, legislator and judge of the kingdom of God, to be a miracle worker, to co-equality with his Father, the author shows that if Jesus be not God he is not worthy of confidence, trust, admiration or reverence as a man, that he is an impostor. The argument is not new; Canon Liddon gave it popularity in his Bampton Lectures on the Divinity of Christ. But it is well put in the volume before us and deserves to be read and used.

GOD'S CHAMPION, MAN'S EXAMPLE: A Study of the Conflict of our Divine Deliverer. *By the Rev. H. A. Birks, M. A., Curate of Chigwell, Essex; Late Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge, etc.* 12mo. pp. 160. 60 cents. London: The Religious Tract Society. 1891.

A study of the Lord's temptation, in four books, entitled the Battlefield and Combatants; the Wilderness, the Tempter's Wary Onset; the Temple Pinnacle, a Masterpiece of Satan's Subtlety; the Mount of Vision, a Despairing Bribe. A fifth book discusses under the title, "The Fight Renewed and Final Victory," the last conflict at Calvary. All the usual questions connected with the temptation, as the occasion, purpose and nature of it, its typical character, the question as to how the Sinless One could be open to assault, etc., are fully, ably, and soundly treated.

ECCLESIASTICAL AMUSEMENTS. *By Rev. E. P. Marvin.* Introduction by Rev. Drs. Hall and Crosby. (Fiftieth thousand.) 12mo., pp. 64. 25 cts. and 10 cts. Syracuse, N. Y.: 1891.

One of the soundest and most suggestive treatises ever issued. In most striking language, pithy sentences, forcible illustrations, the author has shown how the invasion of the church by amusements of various kinds as a means of raising money, attracting attendance, popularizing the church, is fraught with evil. "The parlor is fast superseding the prayer-room; fire in the cooking-stove that of the altar." "The royal ordinance of preaching retires before the popular ordinance of entertainment." "We must bring in 'strange fire,' sugar-coat the gospel and play at church. The bare old gospel fails." "Government by 'Elders' retires before government by 'Youngsters,' and young preachers are wanted to join the sport." Such are a few of these sentences. These money-making and popularizing amusements are shown to be contrary to the precepts and examples of God's word; belittling, contemptible, and sometimes positively dishonest; an abating and corruption of the spirit of benevolence in the church and a subjection of the Bride of Christ to the bondage of the world; an evil in their desecration of our places of worship, and a degrading of them into places of merchandise; a silencing of the testimony of the pulpit against the stage, and even a promotion of the latter's interests; a turning aside of the church from her legitimate and heavenly calling, and a frittering away of her time and energies; a blight to her spiritual life, influence, activity, and usefulness, and a promotion of almost every species of carnality and worldliness. The author well characterizes them as "giving-made-easy patents for the convenience of stinging saints,

cloaks for covetousness, anæsthetics for the painless extraction of charitable(?) gifts from ungodly people, yoking up the sheep and goats for food, frolic and funds."

THE HIGHEST CRITICS VS. THE HIGHER CRITICS. *By Rev. L. W. Munhall, M. A., Evangelist.* 12mo., pp. 199. Cloth, \$1.00. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1892.

A popular treatise by a popular evangelist. The author finds in the apparent sympathy of our great dailies with skepticism, or at least their readiness to regard what is said against the Bible as more legitimate news than that which is said in its favor, in the popular accusation that the opponents of the Higher Criticism are indulging in personalities, in the prevalence and power of religious papers of pronounced unorthodox views or liberalistic tendencies, in the zeal and noisiness of the Higher Critics themselves and their active propaganism, a crying need for a little volume that will arm and help those who have not time or ability to go into a deep study of these matters. The "Highest Critics" are Christ and the Holy Spirit, whom he sets over against Eben Ezra, Jean Astruc, Hapfield, Baur, Kuenen, Wellhausen, Briggs, Harper and others. He pronounces in favor of the strictest and most orthodox view of inspiration, and bases his belief in the verbal inspiration of the word upon the testimony of Christ and the Divine Spirit. This little book is a valuable treatise for popular use for the very reason that it is not scientific in its methods. It will do good.

HOURS WITH A SKEPTIC. *By Rev. D. W. Faunce, D. D.* 12mo, 240 pages. Price, \$1.00. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1420 Chestnut Street. 1892.

Dr. Faunce is not unknown in the realm of literature. He has twice taken the Fletcher Prize offered by Dartmouth College for the best essay on prayer, and has written much else that has found its way into the periodical press. This book is not unworthy of aught else that has proceeded from his pen. In the form of conversations he has given a discussion of the main points in a volume of Christian evidences. They purport to be conversations with a skeptic, who, being stricken by a mortal illness, had desired them. In his preface Dr. Faunce tells us that this in the main is true, while at the same time there have been put into the volume arguments constructed for and used on other occasions. The book reminds one of Henry Roger's "Eclipse of Faith," and is not unworthy to be ranked in the same class.

Among the contents are, "Credibility of Evidence," Possibility of Miracles," "Personality of God," "The Soul's Immortality," "Authority in Religion," and "The Facts of Sin and the Atonement." These and other kindred topics are treated with skill and power, evincing a large acquaintance with the themes themselves and the literature which they have created. The central position of the book is to view things from a moral standpoint. Miracles are looked at in their moral character and relations, as also are the being of God and the atonement, etc. This feature of the book makes it especially valuable, and will help to make a place for it in the ranks of Christian apologetics. It will be of interest to all ministers, as well as to all others who desire to become acquainted with a thoughtful, strong exposition and defence of the faith in which they trust. A full and discriminating index has been appended which will add to the value of the book.

A DICTIONARY OF HYMNOLOGY : Setting forth the Origin and History of Christian Hymns of all Ages and Nations ; with special reference to those contained in the Hymn books of English-speaking countries, and now in common use, together with biographical and critical notices of their authors and translators, and historical articles on national Hymnody, Breviaries, Missals, Primers, Psalters, Sequences, etc., etc., *Edited by John Julian, M. A., Vicar of Wincobank, Sheffield.* Sm. 4to. Pp. xii., 1,616. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892.

Such a work as this has never been known. With labor which must have been no less prodigious than painstaking, the compiler has for many years been examining hymnological works, both historical and critical, and in many languages, gathering from every possible source the vast wealth of information embodied in this volume. One can form some conception of the range of the work when he ascertains that there are known about 400,000 Christian hymns, and that these are found in two hundred or more languages and dialects. Of the *Dies Irae* alone, there are more than one hundred and fifty translations, of which nineteen are in common use. Through this mass, and its development and history, the compiler carries us. German, English, Latin, Greek, Dutch, Welsh, Irish, even Abyssinian hymns are studied. The denominational development of hymnody is carefully traced. The history of many well-known authors in non-English as well as English speaking countries is given, as of Gerhardt, Gellert, Zinzendorf, Luther, and others. The book is a library in itself, and no student can afford to be without it. It is as marvellous in its condensation as in its comprehensiveness. The arrangement is a little inconvenient, resulting as it does from the constant growth of the work upon the author's hands, but a series of elaborate cross-indices serves to relieve in a measure the difficulties arising from the form of the work. Any one, however, who will glance into the book will feel a debt of gratitude to the compiler for his stupendous work. The careful use of it in our own church in the pending question of a new hymn book, will be most helpful in the ascertaining of the original forms of hymns, the history of their authors, the occasion of their writing, and other most valuable information. It is a monumental work.

CHARLES HADDON SPURGEON : Preacher, Author, Philanthropist. With Anecdotal Reminiscences. *By G. Holden Pike, Author of "The Romance of the Streets," etc.* 12mo. pp. xiv. 397. \$1.00. New York and London : Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1892.

CHARLES H. SPURGEON : His Faith and Works. *By H. L. Wayland.* 12mo. pp. 317. \$1.25. Philadelphia : American Baptist Publication Society. 1892.

The first of these books appeared within a very few weeks after the death of Spurgeon, the second a few months later. The first bears more marks of haste in preparation than the second. In other respects they are of about equal value, and for present purposes, quick and popular sale and use, are as good as could be expected. Time is essential to properly mature work like this, and to enable one to take the true measure of such a man as Spurgeon. One has well said that "engineers do not measure great mountains while standing near them on the foot hills." The two books before us are unique in one way. Both are made up of contributions from

different authors. They thus give us many view-points of the great Tabernacle preacher. The details of his life and work are well drawn out and described. Mr. Wayland's book is unusually rich in illustrations, adding greatly to its attractiveness.

SOCIAL AND PRESENT DAY QUESTIONS. *By F. W. Farrar, Archdeacon of Westminster, etc.* Boston: Bradley & Woodruff. 1891.

A collection of twenty-seven discourses or papers that have already appeared and met with popular acceptance, on topics of present day interest, as social amelioration, national perils and duties, the ideal citizen, etc.

BURIED CITIES AND BIBLE COUNTRIES. *By George St Clair, F. G. S., Member of the Society of Biblical Archaeology; Member of the Anthropological Institute, and ten years lecturer for the Palestine Exploration Fund.* 12mo. pp. x., 378. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1892.

A resumé of the results of recent explorations. The author claims no originality but merely seeks to gather the information which others give, and to present in one small volume the results of modern discoveries. In the first chapter he tells of Egypt, its hieroglyphs, the Rosetta Stone, the recent find of mummies, the store-cities, the route of the exodus, etc. The second chapter gives a summary of Palestine exploration. The third chapter is devoted to Jerusalem. The last chapter, entirely too brief to cover that most fruitful field, deals with Mesopotamia. The spirit of the author is good, and for popular purposes his work is good. For the student, however, the treatment is rather meagre. His style is pleasant, and the book is most readable. To each chapter is appended a list of the authorities consulted or quoted. An index would be of great assistance, nay, in such a work is indispensable.

CATALOGUE OF SELECT SABBATH-SCHOOL BOOKS: Selected from the lists of Publishers, and Approved for Sabbath-school use by the Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 12mo. pp. 48. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1892.

It is not usual to notice a catalogue of books. That before us, however, is so well prepared and so admirably adapted to be useful that we feel constrained to call the special attention of pastors and Sabbath-school superintendents and librarians to it. It has been carefully prepared by Drs. Campbell, Armstrong, Gordon, and others, after a close examination and reading of a vast amount of literature offered to our schools. The guiding principles in this selection have been that gospel truth in its application to the heart and life should be prominent, that every book should be sound in doctrine, that none be admitted that contain partisan politics or objectionable social views, that the literary character of every book should be good, and that there should be a due proportion of different departments of religious literature, as history, biography, illustration, etc., and of books suited to all grades of readers. The list may be safely relied upon by library committees and used without hesitation. We thank the committee and its assistants for issuing it.

THE VIKING AGE: The Early History, Manners, and Customs of the Ancestors of the English-speaking Nations, illustrated from the Antiquities discovered in Mounds, Cairns, and Bogs, as well as from the Ancient Sagas and Eddas. *By Paul B. Du Chaillu, Author of "Explorations in Equatorial Africa," "Land of The Midnight Sun," etc.* Two Volumes. 8vo., pp. xx., 591 and viii., 562. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1889.

The delay in the notice of these magnificent volumes is due to the long continued illness and final death of that most scholarly man and teacher, Dr. James F. Latimer. It will be a source of deep regret to all who are interested in the study of the beginnings of English history, that the rich stores of historical learning and the well-trained analytical power of Prof. Latimer were not laid before us in the results of that exhaustive study of this work which he had made, and which he had purposed to present in an elaborate article, many months ago.

None who love the English peoples, their history, their civilization and power, and who know the impress they have made upon the history of the world at large can fail to have deep interest in those who founded their race, those "progenitors who lived in the glorious and never-to-be-forgotten countries of the North, the birth-place of a new epoch in the history of mankind." It is to trace the career, history, customs, life, religion, and laws of this ancient people, that the distinguished author has spent years of toil in deciphering the smoke-begrimed Sagas of Iceland, in consulting the Frankish Chronicles, and in exploring the Museums of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, England, France, Germany, and Russia, with no less attention, in archaeological pursuits, to the treasures of the Louvre, and the Museums of Naples and Boulak, with their rich stores from Pompeii and Egypt.

The civilization and antiquities of the north, the Roman and Greek accounts of the Northmen, the settlement of Britain by Northmen, their mythology and cosmogony, the stone, bronze, and iron ages of their development, the customs, religion, superstitions, civic divisions, naval life and methods, expeditions and conquests, are some of the subjects most elaborately considered, and profusely illustrated. The stately volumes are as valuable as they are handsome, and make a monumental work upon a subject and time as full of interest as it has hitherto been unknown.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. *By John Fiske.* In two volumes. 12mo., pp. 344 and 305. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1891. Cloth, gilt top. \$4.00.

The author's purpose, admirably and successfully carried out, is to give us a narrative history of our land that will be neither too long to be manageable nor too brief to be interesting. He does not deal, in these entrancing chapters, with more of detail than will suffice to show the leading principles that were at work, wisely concluding that a multiplicity of details instead of discovering usually hides the relation of cause and effect. Leading lines and crises are carefully followed and studied, and as has been well said, the author has a keen eye for a focus of events, which does not always lie where the greatest outward show is taking place. The style is clear and and picturesque, and the execution of the entire work, as to its method and form, without a fault. We could wish that the author had placed a higher estimate upon forces that were at work outside of New England. That section was by no means the first nor the only one in which there was developed that independence of spirit that led

to throwing off the British yoke, and that so sturdily resisted the British forces until at last at King's Mountain the tide was turned and a plain militia—"dirty mongrels," Ferguson named them—humbled the oppressor's pride. The Mecklenburg Declaration was not made in New England, else it would have received more courteous treatment at the hands of our author, instead of the flippant thrusting aside as a spurious document based upon some county "resolves" and decorated with phrases from the Declaration of Independence of 1776. The Battle of Alamance, when the first organized, armed resistance was made to the British oppression, extortion and unlawful imprisonment, in 1771, is barely mentioned, though it was as significant as the early contests in 1775, except for the fact that the patriots met with defeat instead of victory. With such exceptions, to which, however, we who live out of New England have become thoroughly accustomed, this work is unquestionably the most faithful and engaging that we have ever read.

PLANTATION LIFE BEFORE EMANCIPATION. *By R. Q. Mallard, D. D.* 12mo. pp. xi. 236. \$1.00. Richmond, Va.: Whittet & Shepperson. 1892.

The purpose of the author has been to portray a civilization now obsolete, to picture the relations of mutual attachment and kindness which in the main bound together master and slave, and to give this and future generations some correct idea of the noble work done by Southern masters and mistresses of all denominations for the salvation of the slave.

The immediate occasion of the writing, and which showed the necessity for a faithful presentation of a subject in danger of being rooted historically under circumstances of great prejudice arising from unfortunate sectional differences, was the publication of an article in the *New York Evangelist*, written by a lady, a native of South Carolina, married and resident in the North, in defence of Southern Christian slaveholders from the aspersions of a Secretary of the Northern Presbyterian Freedmen's Board. The relations to the author in the field of his life's labors and the documentary evidence in his possession seemed to mark it as a duty on him to undertake such a work.

THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

NO. 22.—OCTOBER, 1892.

I. THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

THEY to whom the Bible is a sufficient rule of faith have this great question happily settled for themselves. For in the gospel, life and immortality are clearly brought to light. The doctrine is expressly asserted in a multitude of places, and is necessarily implied in the whole moral system which the Bible teaches. But unfortunately there are now many who hold the word of God as not authority. Christendom is infested with schools of evolution and materialism, which attempt to bring this great truth in doubt by their "philosophy, falsely so-called," and which mislead many unstable souls to their own undoing.

To such as will not look at the clear light of Scripture, we propose to offer the inferior light of the natural reason. The sun is immeasurably better than a torch, but a torch may yet save the man who has turned his back on the sun and plunged himself into darkness, from stumbling over a precipice into an unseen gulf. We claim that we are entitled to demand the attention of all such doubters to the rational argument; for as they have set up philosophy against the Bible, mere honesty requires them to listen to philosophy, the true philosophy, namely:

There is certainly probable force in the historical fact that most civilized men of all ages and countries have believed in the immortality of their souls, without the Bible. Even the American Indians have always believed in the Great Spirit, and expected a future existence in the happy hunting grounds. The

ancient pagans universally believed in gods and a future state, except where they were corrupted by power and crime like the later Romans and Athenians, towards the verge of national putrescence. Their mythologies express the real forms of their original popular beliefs. Their philosophers, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, held the immortality of the soul free from the fabulous coloring of the myths, but upon more solid and rational grounds. The fact that the ancient Egyptians certainly expected the future existence, not only of the soul but of the body, is manifest from their extraordinary care in embalming and preserving all the corpses of their dead. The ancient and the modern Chinese believe firmly in the future existence of the dead, otherwise their ancestor-worship, which is nearly the whole of their practical religion, would be an absurdity. The Indian races are firm believers in immortality, except as the pantheism of the Buddhist doctrine modifies their hope of an individual personal consciousness beyond death. The Scythians, Goths, and Scandinavians were firm believers in a future existence. The whole Mohammedan world holds immortality and a certain form of future rewards and punishments, just as distinctly and firmly as the Christian. We are also entitled to use the fact that immortality has always been the corner-stone of the Bible religion, among both Hebrews and Christians of all ages, as the factor in this historical argument. For this religion has either a divine origin, or it has not. To those who hold the former origin the question of immortality is settled; those who deny its divine origin must, of course, teach that Christianity, like the other religions of mankind, is the outgrowth of some natural principles of reason and feeling belonging to human nature. Our argument is, that on this lower ground Christianity must still be admitted to be the most highly developed, the most beneficial and the most intellectual of human religions. So that the question which agnostics are bound to answer is this: How comes this highest and noblest development of the religious thought of mankind to grasp the doctrine of immortality most clearly and strongly of all, unless there be in the human *essentia* a rational basis necessitating such a conclusion?

And here is presented the point of this logic from the almost universal *consensus* of mankind. How is it that nearly all men, of the most different ages and religions, when they think, are lead to think to this conclusion, concerning a fact purely invisible and beyond the range of all earthly experience? There must be rational and active principles in human nature controlling this result of the thought of mankind. Is it not a strange fact and one entitled to give men pause, that the supposed materialistic results of recent speculations, claiming to be scientific and advanced, bring their civilized advocates precisely to that lowest and grossest ignorance concerning man's spirit and destiny which characterizes the stupidest and filthiest savages in the world, Australian Blacks, and African Bushmen? It is these wretches nearest akin to brute beasts, who do the least thinking of all human beings, who are found to have thought downward to the same blank and grovelling nescience, which this pretended advanced science glories in attaining.

Let not the followers of Auguste Comte and of Bëichner and Spencer claim to be the original positivists and agnostics. The honor of their conclusions was anticipated long before precisely by those members of the human family lowest down towards the level of the ostriches and gorillas.

The proposition which soundest reason teaches us is this: that while the bodies of men after death return to dust and see corruption, their souls which neither die nor sleep have an immortal subsistence, which is continued independent of the body in individual consciousness and activity. This, of course, involves the belief that the earthly human person includes two distinct substances, an organized animal body, and an immaterial spiritual mind. It is of the continued substantive existence of this latter we are to inquire. Obviously the preliminary question must be concerning the real existence of such a spiritual substance in man. For if there is such a thing in him, it is at once a matter entirely credible that this thing may continue to exist, after the body is dissolved. It is a question for evidence; and affirmative evidence, if found, is, in the nature of the case, fully entitled to our credence. In order to determine the pre-

liminary question it is desirable to clear away certain very shallow misconceptions, and to settle certain principles of common sense.

What do men mean by a substance? The correct answer is in general, that substance is that permanent underlying *thing* to which our minds refer those clusters of properties, or qualities which our senses perceive. What the bodily senses immediately perceive is the qualities—the mind's own power of thought always leads it to believe in the underlying substance. Let us take a most familiar instance: A sensible child says, "I have an orange." If we ask him how he knows he has one, he will say: "I see it, handle it, smell it, and taste it." Just so; with his eyes he sees the yellow color, rough surface, and spherical shape; with his fingers he feels also its shape, its pimpled surface, and its solidity; with his nostrils he smells its odor; with the gustatory nerves in his mouth he tastes the flavor of the juice. Thus all that his bodily senses directly give him, is a cluster of qualities, yellowness, roughness, roundness, moderate solidity, fragrance, savor. But this child knows that he has in his hand something more than an associated cluster of qualities, a substantial orange. His common sense cannot be embarrassed by reminding him that he has not eyed or fingered, or smelt, or tasted, substance, but only properties. This child will answer: "That may be true, yet my mind makes me know that there is substance under all these properties." For while I see yellowness, if I should ask myself the question, Yellow what? I should try to answer, yellow nothing. This would be almost idiotic. If I know there is yellowness, then my mind makes me know there must be a *something* yellow. If I see roundness, I know there must be a something that is round, and so with all the other properties. If you forbid me to judge thus that there is a substantial orange in which all these properties abide, you will practically make me idiotic. I gave one simple instance. The same facts are true concerning every perception which rational human beings have concerning every concrete object.

This principle of common sense has also another class of applications. Whenever we see actions or functions going on,

we must think an *agent* in order to account for them. It does not matter whether we see the agent or not; if we know the actions or functions are going on, our minds compel us to believe that there is an agent producing them. Let us suppose for instance, that a clear-headed country child or red man, who had never seen nor heard of a church bell, should come to a town and there hear one ringing. His mind would prompt him to ask: "What makes that sonorous noise, the like of which I never heard before?" He is compelled to believe before he sees anything, there is some substantive agent that makes the noise, though as yet unknown to him. Try to persuade him out of this conviction; ask him: Do you see anything making the novel noise? No. Then why not conclude that nothing makes the noise? He will answer: because I am not an idiot; I hear the noise; if there were nothing there could be no noise to hear; I must know there is a substantive thing, an agent producing noise; otherwise noise could not be.

Now, these are the simple principles of common sense, which inevitably and universally regulate the thinking of every human being who is not idiotic or crazy, about every object of sensible knowledge. If the reader doubts this, let him watch the perceptions and thinking of himself and his fellow-creatures until he is fatigued and satisfied.

We come now to the simple application. Every man is absolutely conscious that he is all the time thinking, feeling, and willing; then there must be a substantial agent which performs these functions. Every man is conscious of powers and properties, of thought and feeling; then he is obliged to know there is a substance in him in which these powers and properties abide.

But what do we mean by the notion of substance? We are so familiar by perception with material substances, that possibly thoughtless persons may conclude that we have no valid notion of substance, except that which possesses the material properties, such as color, weight, solidity, size, shape; and such a thoughtless person, though compelled to admit that where so much thinking, feeling, and willing go on there must be a substance which thinks, might conclude hence that this substance

must be material, the body, namely, or some part thereof. But the use of a little grain of common sense corrects this folly. Anybody knows that air is a substance as truly as granite rock, but air has no color nor shape, nor do we find out by our senses that it has any weight. Every person not idiotic believes that light is a substance, or else a motion in a substance, ether. But this ether has no color, or shape, or weight, nor is visible or tangible, nor did anybody ever smell it, or taste it, or hear it. Yet all teachers of physics tell us they are as certain of its substantial reality as of that of granite rock. For why? Because our common sense makes us know that, if there were not such a substantive thing as ether, there could never have been any light for anybody to see. Thus we prove that the gross qualities of matter are not necessary to the rational notion of true substance. We are bound to believe in substances which have not those material properties. Then human souls may be one real kind of substances.

Does some one ask, What, then, belongs to the true notion of substance? Our common sense answers, It is that which is the real thing, a being possessed of sameness and permanency, the enduring basis of reality on which the known properties abide. This description includes spirit as fairly as matter. We assert that we shall find spirit to be that kind of substance which has no material sensible properties, but which lives, thinks, feels, and acts.

Suppose, now, some student of material science should tell us that none of his scientific observations have detected any spirit in any human anatomy. He means the observations made by his bodily senses. Now, how idle and silly is this! Of course, the bodily senses do not detect the presence of spirit, since it is correctly defined as a true substance, which has no bodily properties. This talk is just as smart as that of the booby who should say: "I don't believe there is any such substance as air in that hollow glass globe, because my eyes don't see anything in it; and when I poke my finger into it, I don't feel anything; and when I poke my nose and my tongue into it, I neither smell nor taste anything." Of course he does not, because what is

air? A gas transparent and colorless, without solidity, tasteless and odorless. Yet everybody except that booby knows that that glass globe is full of a real substance named air, for its presence there is proved by other reasonable evidences to common sense. So it is mere babble for the materialist to say that the presence of spirit is not attested to him by the observation of any bodily sense. For the question is, may there not be in man another substance not possessed of sensible, material properties, and yet as real and as permanently substance as any stone or metal?

Let our common sense now take another step in advance. When I am directly conscious of a thing, I know it as absolutely as I can possibly know anything. If I were to doubt my own consciousness, I should have to doubt everything else, because everything I know is known to me only through the medium of this consciousness. I now assert that the reality of the spiritual substance in me, is known to me by my immediate consciousness, and must be so known, every time I know anything outside of myself. For, the reality of the self which knows, is necessarily implied in the act of knowing everything else than self.

We are here stating the simplest possible truth of common sense. Let us take the plainest instance possible. We hear a wide-awake child exclaim: "I see the mule!" Who sees it, child? I do. Then there must be a *me* to do the seeing even more certainly than there is a mule to be seen. Child, if you are certain there is a mule, then you are still more immediately certain there is a *me*, a self, an *ego*. As soon as you state this the child sees that it is and must be so, unless he is an idiot.

This is exceedingly simple. Yes, so simple that no doubt the child often looks at mules, trees, houses, etc., without stopping to think about it. But when he is stopped by the question, he inevitably thinks it. He is more certain of the existence in himself of the *ego*, the substance which thinks, than he is of the reality of any and everything else about which he thinks.

These views of common sense are so simple, so easy, so indisputable, that people are tempted to overlook how much there is involved in them. Let us pause then and review. We have

found that wherever we see properties we must believe in substances to which the mind refers these properties. Wherever we see action going on we must believe in substantive agents. Sensible material properties are not necessary to a true and permanent substance. Since every man is conscious of much thinking, feeling and choosing, he must believe in the real existence in himself of a substantive agent which does this thinking, feeling, and acting. If he did not believe in the reality of the *me* which sees and thinks, he could not believe in anything he saw or thought. Therefore he knows there is in him a thinking substance, more certainly than he knows anything else or everything else in the world; and these principles of common sense are so simple, so fundamental, so regulative of all thinking and knowing that if you could really make any man deny their force you would make that man an idiot. So direct and perfect is our demonstration.

The doubter may reply: "Of course, so much is indisputable. I must know there is a substance in me which thinks; but may not that substance be body, the whole *sensorium* or nervous structure inside the bones and muscles? or the brain? or the little cluster of lobes between the top of the spinal marrow and the base of the brain? or the pineal gland in the centre of that cluster?" This is a fair question, and it shall be fairly met. We know the properties of matter pretty well through the perception of our bodily senses. The inquiry now must be, whether we cannot know through the perceptions of consciousness the essential properties of this something which thinks. When we have informed ourselves certainly of these, we can compare them with the material properties, and decide this plain question of common sense: *Whether or not the two kinds of properties are enough alike to belong possibly to the same kind of substances?*

As intimated, we learn the properties of material things by the observations of our bodily senses. We learn the properties of the something in us that thinks, chiefly by the observations of consciousness, and also by watching and comparing the actings forth of the thinking agent in our fellow-creatures. Now, we are actually told that some are silly enough to assert that no

observations are valid except those made upon outward things by our senses. When a child uses his eyesight to look at an orange, he finds out correctly that it is yellow. When he uses his ears to listen to the bell, he finds out certainly that it is sonorous. But they think this child finds out nothing certain concerning the being within, which does the seeing and listening, by watching its inward consciousness, because, forsooth, this is not sensuous observation! How stupid this is may appear by a plain question: would that child's hands and ears tell him anything about the properties of the orange and the bell, unless his sense perceptions of them were reported in his consciousness? Suppose he were asleep when the bell rang. These sonorous wavelets would pass through the air and agitate the *tympanum* and inner nerves of his ear just the same, but the child would know nothing about the bell. Why not? Because his consciousness does not take in the sound. Suppose that child is awake, and you hold the orange before his eyes, but his mind is so monopolized with an entrancing vision of next Saturday's picnic that he fails to notice it at all. Again, his eyes tell him nothing about the orange. Why not? He was not attending to it, which is to say, the perception of it did not enter his consciousness. It is only by the mediation of consciousness that the observations of the senses tell us anything certain. Then it is the testimony of consciousness which is immediate and primary, while that of the senses is secondary and dependent. If the observations of consciousness are not to be trusted, those of the senses are for the stronger reason not to be trusted.

Hence it follows, that of all the things which we certainly know, the things of the inner consciousness are the most certain. First, then, I am immediately conscious that the something in me which thinks and feels, the self or *ego*, is all the time completely identical; however I may notice it at different times, I am conscious of its complete sameness; for instance, I go to sleep, that is, my bodily senses shut themselves up and for a time remembered consciousness is suspended. I wake, consciousness revives, and immediately I know that it is the same identical self which went to sleep some hours before. Sleep has

made a deep gap in my sensations and my remembered thoughts and feelings; but I am certain it has made no gap at all in the sameness of the self. For, again, I am conscious of feeling the heat of fire, then afterwards of feeling the intense cold of the north wind; or at one time of being frightened by a malignant bull, and afterwards of being charmed by a mocking-bird; now of looking at an ugly clod, then of looking at the splendid sun. Now heat and cold are opposite sensations; fear and pleasure are opposite emotions; the ugly little image of the clod extremely different from the image of the sun; but I know that the self, the *me*, which experiences these different and opposite sensations and thoughts is completely the same. I believe in its perfect continuous identity; and let the reader notice that this belief cannot be a result from any process of comparison or reflection; because I must be sure beforehand of the sameness of the mind which does the comparing, or else the comparison is worthless, and concludes nothing. For instance, suppose two pairs of two children's eyes in separate rooms were looking at two apples; could there be any comparison determining which apple was the larger? What would the dispute be worth between the two little fools, each repeating that his apple was the bigger? Let one and the same pair of eyes look at both apples, then only comparison is possible deciding which is the bigger apple.

I purposely make these instances perfectly simple. They are fair, they convince us that the conviction of the mind's own identity has to be presupposed in order to authorize the mind to draw any other conclusions, by any process of reflection or comparison whatsoever. So that the first and most certain truth which I am obliged to know, concerning the something in me which thinks, is its perfect identity, its absolute sameness. But I see that nothing organized has this perfect sameness. No animal body, no tree, or plant remains the same two days, every one is losing something and gaining something, growing, dwindling, changing. Even the rock and the mountain change. The rain and the frost are continually washing off or scaling off parts. But I repeat; especially is perpetual change the attribute of every living, material organism, change of size and form, and

even of constituent substance. Now, none of those who deny the spirituality of the mind ever dream of saying that thought can be the function of inorganic matter. No, they try to say, thought may be the function of organized matter, of matter most highly organized. But they admit that the most highly organized material substances are those which change most quickly. I make, then, this point: the self which thinks must be immaterial, because it possesses absolute identity, and no organized body of matter ever remains the same, in that high sense, two days together. In the second place, I know that the something in me which thinks is an absolute unit. This is involved in its identity. It is impossible for me to think of this *me* as divided or divisible. I am conscious it is undergoing constant changes or modifications in the form of different successive thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and volitions; but I know that this *me* is the unit-centre in which all these meet and out of which all my volitions go. I experience a variety of mental modifications, but each one of these is qualified by the same absolute unity. If I try to think of my sensation, my idea, my feeling, my volition, divided into halves or quarters, the statement becomes nonsense to me. But with all matter the case is exactly opposite; the smallest body of matter is divisible into smaller. Each part subsists as an aggregation of smaller parts. The properties of matter are all divisible along with its masses. The whiteness of this wall may be literally divided along with the substance of the plastering into the whiteness of a multitude of points in the wall. Let an electrified steel rod be cut in two, we have two electrified rods; so the electricity may be subdivided along with the matter itself; but each affection of the mind is as complete a unit as the mind is. Thus I am bound to think that mind is immaterial. In the third place, my perceptions make me acquainted with the attributes of matter, and I perceive that they all belong to one class; they are all attributes of extension. The smallest material bodies have some size, all must have some shape or figure, they all weigh something, though some are lighter than others, they all subsist in the form either of gasses, or liquids, or solids. Most of them

have colors. But when I turn to mind and its processes, I know that none of these attributes of extension can apply to them at all. Let us make the attempt. Let us try to say that this fine mind is finer than that other, because it has a circular or elliptical shape while the inferior one is three-cornered. Attempt to explain the fact that Mr. Calhoun's mind was greater than a peasant's because it was so many inches bigger, or so many pounds heavier. Let us attempt to give figure to our thoughts and feelings, or color, saying that some are three-cornered, some square, some circular, some red, some blue, and some black. Let us try to think of the top and bottom of a sentiment or a volition as we do of the top and bottom of a brick or a house. We speak of arguments sometimes as solid, but what we mean is that they are logically valid. We know that we cannot think them solid in the material sense of stones or wooden blocks. The very attempt to fix any attribute of matter upon mind or upon its processes becomes mere idiotic nonsense. This shows that the attributes of matter are not and cannot be relevant to mind. Why? Because they are opposite substances. Mind is pure, immaterial spirit; all the bodies our senses see are extended, divisible, ponderous, figured, in a word material.

In the fourth place, when I watch myself I am immediately conscious of my free-agency. In certain respects I choose for myself what I attempt to do; nobody and nothing outside of self make me choose what I choose. The *me*, the thinking self, has this remarkable faculty of power, of self-determination. Thus self is an original spring-head of new actions and effects. Let no one deceive himself with the shallow notion that this power of free-agency is merely unobstructed execution by the muscles and members of purposes or volitions put into the soul. This is but half of the fact; the soul is free in forming those volitions. It is not forced to them, but is self-determined in them. Minds are originators of new actions and effects. Now matter has not and cannot have such free-agency. Science pronounces absolute *inertia* to be the first law of matter. Experience shows that if a material mass was once lying still it will be

still in the same place forever, unless a force from without pushes it. If it is moving in any line with any given speed it is obliged to move on thus forever, unless something outside of itself stops it. Matter can receive effects; it can transmit them; it never originates any effect. It is impossible to conceive of matter as exercising intelligent choice, endowed with rational free-agency. He who tries to think thus of matter makes himself to that extent idiotic. But mind has free-agency, it chooses, it originates. Therefore mind must be a different substance from matter, an opposite substance. Mind is spiritual, matter is corporeal.

In the fifth place, corresponding to our conscious free-agency is our consciousness of our accountability, or moral responsibility for our conduct. This is an immediate conviction of our conscience which it is impossible for us to escape. It is equally impossible for us to ascribe accountability to material bodies. If I, by a volition of my free-agency, strike and wound the head of a man without provocation, I know it is a sin for which I am morally responsible. The wounded man knows it, every spectator knows it. Another man when walking in the forest has his head struck and wounded by a falling branch which the wind blows from a tree; this is not a sin but an accident; neither the wind nor the dead branch is accountable for it. The man would be idiotic to seriously judge either of them morally responsible. Here then is the crowning contrast between mind and matter: minds are accountable because they are intelligent and free-agents; material bodies cannot be accountable; therefore we conclude again that minds and bodies are opposite kind of substance. Minds are immaterial substances distinct from the bodies which they inhabit for a time. They are indeed combined in the animated human person in a mysterious and intimate manner. Such combinations are credible, for similar ones frequently occur. But the two substances combined must be distinct, because it is impossible that any essential attribute of the one substance can be attached in thought to the other. Now let no one say that this is but a metaphysical argument. In the sense of such charges I deny it. It is not metaphysics, but the unavoidable

conclusion of common sense. I ask the reader to go over these five steps again carefully. He will find that there is not a single position assumed which every man does not know to be true by his own necessary consciousness without being a philosopher at all. Every point in my argument is one of those necessary principles of knowledge which are found universally regulating the thoughts of all the people in the world who are in their right minds, principles of thinking which no man can reject from his mind without reducing himself towards the position of a lunatic or an idiot. It is from these simple principles I have drawn the conclusion that the mind, the something in us which thinks, is not a mere function or quality of something else, but a true permanent substance in itself; and since all its essential properties are the opposites of those of material bodies, souls are distinct kind of substance, immaterial spirits. I invite the reader to break these conclusions if he can do it honestly and truthfully. The more he tries the more he will be convinced that he cannot, because the premises are the necessary first facts of knowledge, and the conclusions follow by the force of common sense.

This fact that our spirits are naturally monads, shows that they will never cease to exist, by a powerful analogical argument. They may be justly called spiritual atoms, single and indivisible, in the same high, absolute sense with the ultimate atoms of matter. All science teaches us that no such atom of substance, once brought into existence by the Creator, is ever annihilated. This is the fixed conclusion of the material sciences themselves, as astronomy, chemistry, physics, and biology. None of these sciences know of any kind of destruction of beings except dissolution and separation of their parts. The parts still exist as really as before in new states and places. When a piece of fuel is consumed in the fire, it is only ignorance which supposes that any of its substance is annihilated. All educated persons know that though the fuel is consumed, every atom of it still exists; science is able to catch and weigh every one of them. The mineral atoms remain in the ashes; the watery atoms have floated upward as vapor; a part of the carbon particles are sticking in

the chimney-flue in the form of soot; another part is floating off in the form of smoke, as volatilized matter, and a part in the form of transparent carbonic acid gas; not an atom ceases to exist. Every fact in the whole range of experience goes to prove that not an atom of existing substance is annihilated in the greatest changes known to man; they only change places and states. Why then should people suppose that any change can annihilate the spiritual atoms—rational souls? He who ignorantly thinks that death does so, has the whole analogy of human science and knowledge against him. On which side then does the burden of proof lie? Manifestly on the side of the unbeliever. Every probability is against him: he must bring us positive proof on the opposite side demonstrating that souls are annihilated at death; otherwise the whole powerful probability arising out of this analogy remains in force in favor of immortality, and I assert there is not a spot in all the realms of human knowledge where the materialist can find one real ray of rebutting evidence. Every fact of physical science is against him; every doctrine of mental science is against him. He discredits the resurrection of Moses, Lazarus, Jesus, and Tabitha as fabulous. Then according to him, not a single witness has ever come back from the invisible region beyond the grave to testify whether men's souls live there or not.

I admit that I have not yet proved the immortality of the spirit positively and affirmatively. But I have shown that this proposition is credible and may be capable of proof. For, since spirits are substantive beings, and distinct kind of substances from bodies, the destruction of the bodies they inhabit no longer presents any necessary evidence that the spirits are destroyed by bodily death. It is just as possible and credible that the death of the bodies may have no more influence on the continuing existence of the spirits than the stripping off of a child's clothing has upon his personal life. I am ready to admit that the first impression made on our sensations when we witness a death is different. The death of a human body is very impressive and awful. When we see the marble complexion, the glazed eye, the absolute and final arrest of sense and motion, the irre-

parable change from visible activity to dissolution and dust, it is not surprising that the first impression should be, with us sensuous creatures, This is the end of the whole being. The fact that the spirit of the deceased never returns in the ordinary course of nature to tell us whether it is still alive and active, awes the imagination, and suggests to the fancy the negative. But here we must remember how frequently the first sensible impressions are entirely delusive, and how they are contradicted by reason and fuller observation. The first impression with the child when he sees the acorn drop from the tree and lie frozen in the wintry earth, is that the acorn is dead. It is hard for him to believe that this little dry fragment of matter is the germ of a tree which will live for centuries a monarch of the forest. Nearly all the actual exploits of chemistry and electricity are equal surprises, wholly contrary to first impressions. Who supposed at first that gas tar, a thing black, stinking, and filthy, contained all the glories of the aniline dyes, until Hoffman proved it? How hard is it to believe that all the planets except two are much larger than this huge globe of ours, when they appear to us nothing but minute points of light in the nocturnal sky! Yet the astronomers prove by strict mathematics that they are larger than the earth. All intelligent persons see so many instances of the falsehood of these first impressions on sensation and fancy, that they cease to regard them as any tests of truth. We know that we must look beyond them for more reasonable proofs, and the question for us is, whether facts and reason do not prove that the immaterial spirit survives the death of the body.

The answer is, Yes.

For, *first*, strong probable proof appears in this fact, that the identity of the living spirit does certainly remain unchanged throughout sundry great changes undergone by the body. We know that every human body changes from a living *fœtus* to a living infant. It then changes into a grown man in his full vigor. It then passes into the decrepitude of age. But these impressive changes in the conditions of the body result in no change in the identity of the spirit which inhabits it. This is

conscious of its own sameness throughout the changes. Hence there is a clear probability that the next change, bodily death, also may not interrupt the being of the living spirit. The body not only grows, but it may lose half its substance by emaciation from sickness; it may lose a whole limb by wounds or amputation; but the spirit consciously lives on without change or diminution of spiritual powers. This shows it to be probable that the final amputation, cutting off all its limbs from its use, will not interrupt the spirit's life. Indeed, we are assured by physiologists that there is a constant change in the material molecules which make up our bodies at any one time. Every tissue experiences wear and tear and nutrition. Particles which yesterday were vital parts are now "*necrosed*," and are expelled out of the system as alien matter, while their places in the living tissues are taken by new particles which yesterday belonged to a different vegetable or animal. It is every way probable that there is not one single molecule at this time in our bodies which was there some years ago. But while, between these two dates, our bodies have undergone this sweeping change, and those of that previous year have as literally and absolutely returned to their dust as will the corpse of the friend whom we bury to-day, our spirits are certain of their unchanging life and identity. In one word, every man's body is daily undergoing gradual death; this makes no change in the life and identity of the spirit. Hence the summary death of such a body presents no real evidence of the destruction of the spirit.

Second, Every time we go to sleep and awake we have probable proof that the spirit remains awake after the sleep of death. We are familiar with this nightly change. It does not frighten us or impress the imagination. But let us consider it as a rational man would, should it have come to him as an entire novelty. When we grow drowsy we are conscious of approaching insensibility. The senses are all ceasing to act and closing up. If the mind had no experience to teach it better and listened to the first impression it would doubtless conclude: "This insensibility will be final; this last moment of consciousness is the last I shall ever experience." But every morning serves to correct this

awful impression. Every awakening teaches us that this mimic death of the body has not in the least interrupted the life and conscious identity of the spirit. Hence the probability grows strong that the deeper sleep of death will not interrupt it, that this also will have its sure awakening.

Third, It is urged by materialists that so far as all experience goes the thinking being is dependent for all its perceptions upon its bodily sense organs and for the execution of all its volitions upon its nerves and muscles; hence they would have us infer that the soul is entirely dependent on its body for all its knowledge and activity, which is practically being dependent on the body for its existence, since without either knowledge or activity the soul would be practically non-existent. But how does the soul use its bodily organs of sense and motion? Obviously in the same general mode in which it uses external instruments.

The soul feels external bodies with its arms as it would feel bodies somewhat more distant with a stick. The soul sees luminous objects with its eyes just as it sees with a telescope or opera-glass. It hears sounds with its ears, much as it hears them with an ear-trumpet. The blind man does not lose his power of feeling by dropping his stick. The huntsman does not lose sight by breaking his field-glass nor the sense of hearing by losing his ear-trumpet. We know perfectly well that these bodily organs are not our minds but only instruments which our minds employ; therefore the loss of the instruments does not imply the destruction of the mind: it only leaves us in ignorance as to the other instruments of knowledge and action which the mind will learn how to employ when it shall lose these bodily ones. But more correct thought shows us that the spirit in its disembodied state will most probably not need or employ any organic instruments of perception. The only reason why she needs them now is probably because she is immured in an animal body. Her case is that of a state prisoner, who is confined for a time within the walls of a castle. He has been allowed five loop-holes in these walls in order to hold some intercourse with the outer world. At death the liberator comes and proposes to demolish the roof and walls of his prison.

Shall the prisoner be so thoughtless as to complain and object that in destroying his walls they are depriving him of his loop-holes, in consequence of which he will be able to see nothing of the outer world? The answer is plain: the only reason he needed loop-holes was that the wall imprisoned him; now that it is gone he needs none. He has free unobstructed light and vision all around him.

Fourth, The independence of the separate thinking substance is more strongly proved by this fact: that a number of its higher functions are performed without any dependence upon any bodily organ. Our eyes are the instruments with which we receive visual perceptions; through the ears we receive the acoustic; through the fingers the tactual; through the nostrils the olfactory; through the palate the gustatory. But our abstract general ideas, our cognitions of God, of time, of space, of infinity, of subjective consciousness, are ministered by no sense organ. Every avenue of sense may be locked up or disused, and yet these highest functions of spirit are in full activity. The animated body is still there, but it is contributing nothing to these most important functions of soul. Especially does the spirit assert its essential independence in its self-prompted volitions. We will rest this argument more especially upon that well known class of volitions whose object is not to move any bodily organ or member, but to direct the mind's own attention at will to its own chosen topic of inward meditation; and whose impulse does not come at all from any outward impression, but from the preference and purpose of the mind itself. Every man knows that his mind frequently performs these acts of voluntary attention prompted by nothing outside the mind, and directed to nothing outside of it. Here are cases of the mind moving itself, with which the body has nothing to do. The mind in these actions is as virtually disembodied as it will be when it shall have passed at death into the spirit world.

Some recent physiologists do indeed assert, in the interest of materialism, that we are partly mistaken in these facts. They say that every action, even the most abstract and subjective, in the mind is attended with brain action in the form of some mole-

cular changes or readjustments in the nerve filaments and the particles of grey matter forming the outer surface of the cerebrum. They would have us believe that when a man, meditating with closed eyes, revives the mental idea of the horse or the tree which he saw a year ago, there is as real nerve action, and indeed the same nerve action, in the brain as that by means of which he first got his visual perception of that object. They would have us believe that when we think our most abstract cognitions of God or eternity, there must be as real brain action as when we are hearing the sound of a trumpet. Thus they would make out our premises to be false, denying that the mind performs any functions of thoughts or volitions independently of brain motions.

When we ask them how they prove all this, we find there is no valid proof, and the theory remains a mere wilful, idle guess. We ask them, Has anybody ever *seen* these motions of nerve matter and changes of relative position between filaments and particles of grey matter? They confess, Nobody. They confess that they will be too minute to be perceived by the human eye. They know that no human eye ever had, or ever can have, an opportunity to watch them, because no vivisection could uncover the ganglia at the base of the brain, where they imagine these things go on, without instantly killing the subject of the experiment. Their indirect arguments are nothing but vague suppositions. The only real source of the fancy is the stubborn determination to reject the teaching of common sense that there is a separate spirit in man, and to make him no more than a material animal. Their real logic amounts only to this worthless argument in a circle: We do not choose to admit the existence in man, no matter how strong the proofs, of anything except animated matter. We are conscious that a great deal of thinking goes on in man; therefore animated matter does it all; therefore nothing exists in man except animated matter. This theory of universal molecular brain actions has never been proved, it is only guessed; it never can be proved.

But were it necessary, we might admit that coördinate nerve actions in the brain attend and wait upon every, even the most

wholly abstract, process of mind, without in the least weakening our fourth argument. There are three remarks to which we ask the close attention of the reader, either one of which is sufficient to prove this. First, the wonderful faculty of memory must be accounted for, whatever theory is adopted. This materialistic theory must teach, as it avowedly does, that the brain is literally and materially the storehouse of memory. It must teach that the way ideas are retained in memory is this: A new mark is imprinted on a portion of the brain matter when the idea first comes through sense-perception; and the reason why the idea remains in memory, and may be revived in recollection, is that the mark remains permanently on the brain matter, like a scratch, for instance, made by a diamond upon a pane of glass; and the immediate cause why the idea revives again in recollection is this, that the portion of brain matter has moved again with a counter-movement, the exact re-action of that which took place when the mark was first printed on it.

Some of them give us descriptions of what they suppose the action and counter-action of the mark to be which are all as imaginative and as truly without proof as the history of Jack the Giant-killer and his beanstalk. The most popular guess is this, that when the sense-impression first came into the brain it caused a change of adjustment between the ends or tips of certain nerve filaments and certain little masses of grey matter. So when the idea is revived in recollection, this results from the re-actionary change of position between those little masses and nerve filaments. We care not to discuss the particular shape of any of this idle dreaming. According to its authors every idea received into memory and stored up is represented by a distinct material mark upon a material mass. Now one remark breaks all this down into hopeless folly, viz., that the brain is a limited body while the power of human memory is indefinite and unlimited. The more ideas an educated man has the more new ideas he can acquire. Some great men know a hundred or a thousand times as much as other stupid and thoughtless people. But their brains if they differ in size at all are only larger by a few ounces at most. Voltaire had a multitude of ideas and a

marvelous memory. His brain was one of the smallest found in a grown person. What is the use of saying that the mark printed on the brain by each idea may be very small? When the number that may be printed is absolutely unlimited the surface must get full no matter how small each mark, long before the stock of ideas in memory is completed. Now add another fact, that it is most probable no idea once gained by the mind is ever lost wholly from the memory, but that all remain there unconscious and latent, and capable of being revived by some mental stimulus of suggestion during our future existence: this theory of material nerve markings becomes worthless and idle.

Second, Every man's mind knows that it usually directs its own attention by its own will. When he is lying in darkness with closed eyes he thinks of absent and abstract ideas of God, of duty, of eternity, and not because he is made to do so by physical causes, but *because he chooses*. He directs his own attention to these supersensuous thoughts. We know that sometimes men's minds do drift in involuntary reverie, but we know that men can stop this when they choose. We know that in most cases the mind directs its own thoughts, that it is not led by the nose, by exterior physical causes, but guides itself by its subjective will. Now let it be granted that all our mind processes, even the most supersensuous, are *accompanied by* molecular movements in the brain. Consciousness gives the highest of all evidence. This assures us that if there are any such molecular movements they are only consequences and not causes of the supersensuous actions of the mind. It is the mind that starts the process, it is the brain which responds. Let us suppose that never having seen horses and mounted men until recently it so happens that every time that we have seen the men they were mounted upon their horses; thereupon some chopper of logic like these materialists begins to argue: Gentlemen, you have never seen those men except upon their horses; you have never seen the men move but what you saw the horses move with them; therefore you are bound to believe that the man and the horse are the one and the same being, that each is

the literal Centaur. We should reply to him: Nay but oh fool! have we not seen that it is the men who govern the horses, that the horses only move when the men spur them; therefore we know without waiting to see the man dismount that the horse is not one and the same being with the man but an inferior being and the servant of the man.

Third, We know that we are free-agents better than we know any physiology, false or true. We know that we are free-agents even better than we know that we have vitalized brains inside our skulls, for we know our free-agency by immediate consciousness; but we know every fact of outward observation only as it is reported through this consciousness. Now if this materialistic theory of thought were true, we could not be free-agents. Every thought, feeling, volition, which arises in us would be the effect of a material movement. But matter cannot have any free-agency; and if matter thus governed us we could have none, our very nature would be a lie. Our own hourly experience gives us a perfect illustration of this argument. Our minds do have a class of ideas and a class of feelings whose immediate causes are found in certain movements of our corporeal nerve organs; they are what we call sensations. And about having them, when once those nerve organs are impressed by any external body beyond our control, we have no free-agency at all. If the norther has struck us, we have no more free-agency about feeling chilly, if a stone thrown by a bully has struck us, we have no more free-agency about feeling pain, if another man holds a rose under our nostrils, we have no more free-agency about smelling fragrance than if we were machines or blocks of stone. The knowing subject, mind, has indeed gotten the idea, the feeling; but it has gotten it from a material nerve organ; hence the mind wields no freedom in having it. So, if this materialistic theory of thought were true, if all our supersensuous thoughts, feelings and volitions were propagated from material nerve organs, we could have no free-agency anywhere. But we know we are free-agents to a certain degree.

At this point the solution becomes easy with those cavils against the spirituality and immortality of the soul, which are

drawn from the results of concussions of the brain, suspending consciousness, and of lunacy and dotage. If the reader has attended to the remarks last made he will easily see that these facts do not prove the soul to be the brain. They only prove that in our present life the soul uses the brain as its instrument for a part of its processes. In dotage it is the bodily organs which are growing dull and decaying; this is the reason that recent impressions made through the senses are weak and consequently transient. But the facts impressed by sensation in previous years, when the old man was in his bodily prime, are as strong and tenacious as ever. The old man forgets where he laid his pipe half an hour ago, but he remembers the events of his youth with more vividness than ever. This proves that the decay is only organic. Were it spiritual it would equally obliterate early recollections and recent ones. Again, in the infirm old man, while the memory of recent events seems dull, the faculties of judgment and conscience are unimpaired. His advice is as sound as ever, his practical wisdom as just. The best scientific men now regard all cases of mental disease as simply instances of disease in the nerve-organs, which the mind employs while united to the body. Borrowing the language of pathology, cases of lunacy are but "functional derangements" of the mind. There is no such thing as "organic disease" of the spirit. Whenever the wise physician can cure the nervous excitement by corporeal means, sanity returns of itself to the mind. If lunacy continues until death, it is because the disease of the nerve organ remains uncured. The mind is not released from the disturbing influences of the incurably morbid action of its instrument until the mysterious tie which unites mind to body in this life is finally sundered.

Another objection may here be noted: that a parallel argument may be constructed to prove the spirituality and immortality of the souls of brutes. The higher animals seem to have some mental faculties, as sensation, passions, memory, and a certain form of animal spontaneity. It is asked: Why do not the same arguments prove that the cause in brutes which perceives, feels, remembers and acts, is a distinct spiritual sub-

stance, and therefore capable of separate and independent subsistence without the body? One answer is, suppose they did! This would be no refutation. The conclusion might clash with many of our prejudices, might surprise us greatly, might perhaps dictate a change in much of our conduct towards the animals. If the premises of a given reasoner are found to prove another conclusion in addition to that which he had asserted from them, this is no proof at all that his argument is invalid. Let us suppose that a prosecutor of crime has argued that certain established facts prove John and Thomas to be guilty. It is no answer to cry that the same facts would also prove Richard to be guilty. What if they do? It is still proved that John and Thomas are guilty. The only change in the case is that we now find the guilt extends further than was at first asserted. But in the second place, an argument for the spirituality and immortality of the higher animals will be found very defective when compared with the full argument for man's immortality. The heads of argument which we shall hereafter urge for the latter, are found to have no application to the brutes. But they are far the strongest arguments. The real nature of that principle in them which feels and remembers, is very mysterious to us; the medium of speech is lacking between us and them. The real nature of the brute's faculties is extremely obscure to us, and for this reason we are ignorant of what becomes of that principle when their bodies die. But the nature of the human faculties we can know thoroughly, and therefore we are able to infer what becomes of that spiritual substance endowed with those high faculties when men's bodies die. But obscure as is the nature of the sentient principles of brutes to us, it seems very clear that they lack those faculties and powers on which our argument, as to man, is chiefly founded.

Brutes have sense-perceptions, sensibilities, and memory. But there is every reason to believe that their memory is only of individual ideas of particular material objects. They never form rational, general concepts; they cannot reason concerning collective classes of things. They think no abstract, general truths; they have no judgments of taste or of conscience. Of all these,

which are the truly spiritual functions of mind, of all notions and judgments of the beautiful, of the sublime, the obligatory, the morally meritorious, the regulative principles of logic, the rational purposive volition, they seem as incapable as is a vegetable. But these are precisely the functions of human minds, which, we are conscious, go on independently of corporeal organs. These are our crowning proofs of the spiritual independence of human minds.

Fifth, Our argument for man's immortality must now involve as a premise another great truth, the existence of a rational, personal God. We shall not pause to argue this, because it needs no argument. Men can only deny it at the cost of outraging every principle of common sense. The very existence of a temporal universe proves an eternal God. The universal order of this universe, the appearance of design and contrivance everywhere in it, prove the existence of an intelligent and wise Creator. Every function of conscience within us recognizes a righteous, divine Ruler above us. Since the Creator is wise, we know that he had rational purposes for all that he has created. Therefore we know that if man had been made only for a brute's destiny, God never would have given man capacities and faculties so much above the brute's, so useless and out of place in a temporal and corporeal existence. The brute's instincts, animal sensibilities, and partial memory of particular ideas, coupled with his lack of reason, lack of forecast, lack of conscience, incapacity for religious and abstract knowledge, and lack of all desire for them, qualify him exactly for a temporary, corporeal life. But man's rationality, his unavoidable forecast concerning the future, his moral affections and intuitive judgments of duty, merit, and guilt, his religious nature, his unquenchable hopes and desires for unlimited moral good, are utterly out of place in a creature destined to only an animal and temporal life. No sensible man who believes in a God can believe that the Creator has made such a mistake. Does a rational man furnish sails to his ploughs, destined only to turn the soil of his fields, or cart-wheels to his ships, destined only to navigate the water, or eagles' wings to his gate-posts, planted fast in the soil?

Human experience fully confirms the verdict of Solomon, that the rational man who seeks his chief end in the enjoyments of the mortal life always finds it "vanity of vanities." Did not the wise Creator know that? Did he also perpetrate a vanity of vanities in creating a being thus needlessly endowed for a mere mortal existence, or dare we seriously charge upon him the reproach which the human anguish, in view of this futility and the death which ends it, only suggested: "Lord, wherefore hast thou made all men in vain"? Nay, this were blasphemy. To assert man's mere mortality is a parallel outrage upon all that is noblest in his nature. This outrage evolutionism, the recent and fashionable form of materialism, attempts to perpetrate. We ask it, whence man's mind with its noble and immortal endowments? It has to answer that it is only a function, evolved from mere matter, through the animals. Just as Dr. Darwin accounts for the evolution of the human hand from the fore paw of an ape, so all the wonders of consciousness, intellect, taste, conscience, volition, and religious faith, are to be explained as the animal outgrowth of gregarious instincts and habitudes cultivated through them.

To any man who has either a single scientific idea touching the facts of consciousness, or a single throb of true moral feeling, this is simply monstrous. It, of course, denies the existence of any substance that thinks, distinct from animated matter. It utterly misconceives the unity which intuitively must be found underlying all the processes of reason in our minds. It overlooks utterly the distinction between instinctive and rational motives, thus making true free-agency, virtue, moral responsibility, merit and moral affection, impossible. It supposes that as the sense-perceptions and instincts of the beast have been expanded by association and habit into the intellect of a Newton, so the fear and habit of the beast cowering under his master's stroke, or licking the hand that feeds and fondles him, are the sole source of the noble dictates of conscience and virtue. The holy courage of the martyr, who braves the fire rather than violate the abstract claims of a divine truth, is but the outgrowth of the brutal tenacity of the mastiff, when he endures blows, and torments rather than unlock his fangs from the bloody flesh of

his prey. The heroic fidelity of the patriot, in the face of the grimest death, is but the quality of the dog which will fetch and carry at his master's bidding. The disinterested love of Christian mothers, the heavenly charity which delights to bless an enemy, the lofty aspirations of faith for the invisible and eternal purity of the skies, the redeeming love of Jesus, all that has ever thrilled a right soul with deathless rapture of admiration and elevated man towards his divine father, are destined to have neither a future nor a reward, any more than the fragrance of a rose, or the radiance of the plumage of the bird, or the serpent's scales. After a few years, all that shall forever be of the creature endowed with these glorious attributes, will be a handful of the same dust which is left by the rotting weed. The spirit which looked out through Newton's eye, and read through the riddles of the phenomenal world the secrets of eternal truth and the glories of an infinite God, went out as utterly in everlasting night as the light in the eye of the owl or bat, that could only blink at the sunlight. These are the inevitable conclusions of evolutionism, and they are an outrage to the manhood of our race. What foul juggling fiend has possessed any cultivated man of this Christian age, that he should grovel through so many gross sophistries in order to dig his way down to this loathsome degradation? The ancient heathens worshipped brute beasts, but still they did not forget that they were themselves the offspring of God. It remained for this modern paganism to find the lowest deep, by choosing the beast for his parent, and casting his God utterly away.

Sixth, Pursuing this argument from the wisdom of God, we prove yet more clearly that he designs man for immortality by this marked human trait, that the faculties of man's spirit are so formed as to be capable of unlimited improvement and progress. The case of the brutes who are not designed for immortality is opposite. They can be trained and improved up to a certain very narrow limit, but there the progress stops. Some of their instincts are very wonderful, but the earliest generations had them just as fully as the latest. Neither individual animals nor races are capable of making continuous progress,

and doubtless the bees of Abraham's day built their honey-comb just as mathematically as those of our enlightened century. We presume that the literary pigs of the ancients were just as well educated as those of the modern showmen. The mahouts of King Porus of India, trained their elephants to be precisely as sagacious as those of Barnum, and the ancient Hindoo jugglers managed their snakes and dancing monkeys so as to present the same surprising tricks exhibited by the moderns. But with man it is wholly otherwise. He also like the animals has a body and a few animal instincts. These are capable of improvement, precisely like those of the brutes, within certain narrow limits. Gymnastic exercises enable the athlete to run somewhat faster, jump somewhat higher, lift somewhat heavier burdens, and wrestle or box somewhat better than common men; but his advancement in all these particulars is cut short by very narrow boundaries. He cannot pass beyond these any more than the ancient Greek. No corporeal dexterity is acquired in our day beyond that of the ancient jugglers and gymnasts. When we pass to the faculties of man's spirit, we find all different. These can be improved indefinitely and without any limitation whatever. The more the mind learns the more it can learn. When an Aristotle or a Cuvier has extended his knowledge beyond that of the peasant a thousand fold, he is better able than ever before to make further acquisitions. The same fact is true of the race. Each generation, may, if it chooses, preserve all the acquisitions both of faculty and knowledge made by parent generations, and may add to them. When we compare the powers of civilized man with those of savages, the former appears almost as a demigod to the latter; but civilized society is now prepared by virtue of these acquisitions to advance from its present position with accelerating speed. Recent events prove this; for the last forty years have witnessed an advancement in knowledge and power equal to the previous hundred years.

Why does an all-wise Creator endow our mental faculties with capacity for endless advancement unless he designs us for an endless life? Observation teaches us that wherever God placed a power in the human *essentia*, he has appointed some legitimate

scope for its exercise. It is incredible that he should have given this most splendid power to man had he intended to make it futile by cutting short man's existence. When we visit a nursery farm, where the little scions of apple trees and the great shade trees are cultivated for sale, we see that the nurseryman has planted them one foot apart in rows not more distant than corn-rows; but we see by experience that it is the nature of these trees to grow continually until each one occupies an area of forty feet in diameter. How is this? This nurseryman is surely cultivating these scions with express view to their transplantation into another and wider field of growth, otherwise he is a fool.

Seventh, The argument is crowned and made unanswerable by considering man's moral faculties. These centre in the following intuitive and necessary rational judgments, which are universal among right-minded men, and more indisputable if possible than the axioms of logic and geometry. We have an intuitive notion of moral good and evil, of the distinction between virtue and vice, right and wrong, which cannot be explained by or reduced into any other notion. Every man, not insane or idiotic, knows self-evidently that he is under obligation to do the right and avoid the wrong. Every man knows that there is good-desert in doing the right and ill-desert in doing the wrong. Every man feels the satisfaction of a good conscience when he does the right disinterestedly, and the sting of remorse when he does evil. Take this set of judgments and sentiments out of a man's spirit and he ceases to be a man.

The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, gives us this ingenious argument for immortality from this moral principle, "We know that it is our duty to practice all virtue and avoid all vice, as well as we know it is our duty to practice any virtue." That is to say, our judgment of obligation commands us to be morally perfect. Every sincerely good man is sincerely striving to be better and better, and no enlightened conscience will ever be satisfied short of moral perfection. This is then the voice of God, our maker, in our reasonable souls; and it is a voice of divine command. But experience teaches us that nobody has ever attained moral perfection in this mortal life.

Then surely there must be a future life in which progress in virtue may be made unto perfection. If God has not provided such a future state for us, he would never have laid this high command upon our souls. What should we think of his justice and equity if, after limiting our bodily growth to twenty-five years and fixing our bodily decay at three-score and ten, he had then commanded us every one to grow to be twenty feet tall? Nobody grows to much more than six feet in seventy years. How can we be commanded to grow to twenty feet if seventy years are the limit of our existence?

In the next place, our necessary judgment of demerit for sin and our sentiment of remorse make us all know that punishment ought to follow sin. Everybody expects that punishment will follow sin. We know that God is the fountain-head of moral obligation and the supreme moral ruler. We know that he wields a providential government over us. This is a truth so obvious as to force itself upon the dark mind of the pagan emperor Nebuchadnezzar, that God doeth his will among the armies of heaven and the inhabitants of this earth; and that there is none that can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou? On the one hand it is entirely agreeable to reason and conscience to regard the miseries of this life as the punishments, or at least the chastisements, of sin; but on the other hand, if there is no future life reason and conscience ought to pronounce these earthly punishments the whole punishments of sin.

Our intuitions ought to make us believe that, as this mortal life terminates, our penal debt is fully paid off, the ill-desert of sin satisfied and extinguished, and the creature, lately a transgressor, cleansed of its ill-desert and guilt. As the mortal approaches death, remorse ought to decline, and relax its pangs, so that in the moment of death the soul should be absolutely freed from death and fear and self-rebuke, and quit existence in a state of perfect moral peace.

But such is never the case with dying men, unless their intellects are oppressed by delirium or coma, or their consciences seared as with a hot iron. The soul of the dying man, if in a

rational state, knows that its debt of punishment for sin is not fully paid. It knows that earthly sufferings are only the beginning of that payment. Conscience is not satisfied, but denounces the ill-desert of the soul more clearly and awfully than ever before. Fear and remorse are not assuaged, but increase their torments, and culminate in the last dreadful period of exit from this world. Such is the experience of every rational soul in dying, who has not drugged himself with some deadly delusion, unless he is calmed by the hope of pardoning mercy in the Divine Judge whom he knows he is to meet beyond the grave. These moral convictions of dying men are dictated by the most universal, the most necessary, the most fundamental judgments of human reason. Were there no such fact of a future existence to ground them, reason itself would be a lie, and man incapable of moral conclusions.

It is very well known how materialists endeavor to break this testimony of nature itself to immortality, by crying that this fear and remorse are merely the results of superstitious fictions working upon the ignorant imagination. This explanation is as silly as it is false to rational consciousness. It is but the same which is advanced by the pagan atheist Ovid: *Timor fecit deos*. Mr. Edmund Burke sufficiently exploded the miserable sophism by the scornful question, *Quis fecit timorem?* No one is afraid, unless he believes there is an object to be afraid of. The belief in the reality of the object must be present beforehand, in order to generate the fear. Every man who is not trying to cheat himself knows that these moral judgments, which are so solemnly reinforced by death, are functions of the reason and not of the fancy. The imaginings of superstition with its morbid terrors are the abuse and travesty of these moral sentiments, and not their source.

There is another broad moral fact which completes the demonstration, both of a future life and of future rewards and punishments. When we compare our fellow-men together we see that they do not all receive their equal deserts in this life. Here wickedness often triumphs and innocence suffers. The wicked "spread themselves like the green bay tree," their

strength is firm and there are no bands even in their death; but the righteous are afflicted every morning and chastened every evening. Not seldom the purest human lives are darkened during their larger part by unkindness, calamity, or bereavement, and are terminated by a painful disease culminating in yet more painful death. No compensation comes to them, but the existence which was continued under the twilight of suffering ends in darkness. When we set these afflicted lives over against the prosperity of the wicked there remains a moral mal-adjustment abhorrent and frightful to every moral sentiment, unless there is to be a more equitable settlement beyond. These facts are impregnable. Righteousness deserves reward, and sin deserves punishment. There is a righteous God who rules this world by his providence. His benevolence and equity make it impossible that he should visit earthly miseries upon any moral agent except as the just punishment of his sins. Since all of us suffer more or less, all of us are more or less sinners, as our own consciences fully testify; but men are not punished in this life in due proportion to their relative guilt. Therefore it must be that God completes the distribution of penalties in a future life. To deny this then is to impugn the existence or the holiness and justice of God; it is a burning insult to him, near akin to blasphemy.

Such is a moderate statement of the rational arguments which prove the immortality of our spirits and our accountability beyond death for our conduct. The course of the proof also shows that the denial of our conclusion would make mankind practically brutes; for when we have proved that there exists in the human person a rational and spiritual substance, the spirit, we have virtually proved man's immortality. Prove successfully that man does not possess this distinct spiritual substance and *he is made a mere beast*. He may be a more refined beast than an elephant, a pointer dog, or a monkey, but still he is only a beast. That which alone differentiates him from brutes is gone.

It is known that there is a vain philosophy, which avows itself materialistic and which yet pretends to find something in this evolved and improved animal to which to attach a temporary

moral personality, moral sentiments, and moral accountability. We assure such vain thinkers that their attempt is futile. When we try it at the bar of common sense and sound philosophy, it meets these crushing refutations. Our mind is nothing but a refined function of a material organism, and its highest sentiments are nothing but animal instincts grounded only in organic sensibilities, evolved into some advanced forms; then it is impossible there can be any valid concept of the moral good higher than that of mere animal good. It is also impossible that there can be any moral motive directing and restraining actions. Where there are no moral motives there can be no just responsibility. Again, if all man's high sentiments are but advanced evolutions from animal instincts there can be no rational free-agency. Has the hen, for instance, any rational free-agency when impelled by her instinct to incubate her eggs? But where there is no rational free-agency there can be no just moral responsibility.

An all perfect God is the only adequate standard of righteousness, as his preceptive will is the only sufficient practical source of obligation. Without an omniscient administrator and a future life no adequate administration of justice is possible. Thus the logic of philosophy proves that when God, spirit, and immortality are expunged morality becomes impossible.

The great sensuous masses of mankind will reach the same result by a simpler and shorter path. "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." We may be assured this will be the logic of the average man when taught materialism: "The scientists teach me that I am only a refined beast. Then if I choose, I may act as a beast; there is no hereafter for me. Then I shall be a fool to deny myself anything I desire out of a regard for a hereafter. Experience teaches me that what they call wicked men may live very prosperously in their wickedness provided they are a little politic in observing a few cautions. Then there is no penalty for that sort of wickedness in this life, and as there is no future life, there is no penalty for it anywhere. Why should I not indulge myself in it? There is no such thing as an omniscient God, consequently I am free to do anything and

everything I desire, provided these short-sighted men do not 'catch me at it.'" Indeed, why should your materialists stop short of this unanswerable logic? "The scientists tell me that I am only a refined beast, and that my fellow-men are the same. A beast cannot be guilty of crime, and it is no crime to kill beasts; why then may I not kill any human beings whom I find it convenient to murder? Why may I not kill any of these scientists who have taught me this instructive lesson, provided I gain anything by it?" Practically, the result of this materialism always has been, and always will be, to disorganize human society, to let loose the flood-gates of crime, and to destroy civilization. In imperial Rome skepticism and materialism became the prevalent doctrines. With what result? History answers: The butcheries of Nero and his successors, the death of public virtue, and the utter putrescence of the once glorious Roman republic, which left it like a rotting behemoth to be torn to pieces by the Goths and Huns. Again, materialism became the dominant creed of the ruling faction in France in 1790. With what result? The fruit was the "Reign of Terror," which in five years annihilated fifty-two billions of francs of French wealth, made the streets of her cities run with the blood of judicial murders, perpetrated in the name of liberty more outrages and crimes against human rights than the autocratic Bourbons had wrought in five hundred years, and plunged Europe in two decades of causeless wars. Again in 1871 the International Communists, a faction of materialists, gained temporary possession of Paris. The consequence was a carnival of plunder and murder, until President Thiers crushed them out by force. Surely it is time then to learn that the tendency of this doctrine always has been, and always must be, by turning men into brutes, to turn earth into a hell. There is no adequate restraint upon the wicked tendencies of man's fallen nature short of the authority of an omniscient, almighty God, and the fear of the righteous awards of immortality.

Shall all these stern lessons of history and of common sense be rebutted by the assertion that quite a number of our scientific evolutionists and materialists are quite nice, decent gentle-

men? No doubt. But what makes them such? The traditional influences and habits of action resulting from that very Christianity which they are seeking to destroy. Their good citizenship is a temporary impulse communicated to them from God-fearing ancestors. Let them succeed in obliterating the belief in God and immortality, society will find too late that the whole source of the restraining impulse has been lost. The intellectual progeny will tend to become monsters, with the irresponsible ferocity of beasts energized by the powers of perverted rationality. Does a George Eliot, for instance, tell us that she still leaves an adequate object for the moral homage of her materialists in the noble concept of the "aggregate humanity," the worthy object of the humanitarian virtues? What is aggregate humanity? Where is it? According to her doctrine that huge part of the idol, which is composed of the past generations, is nowhere, is rotting in annihilation. According to her, the part of the idol which is to come in future generations is only an aggregate of beasts, a suitable object truly for moral homage! And worse still, this part is as yet a non-entity; and when it shall have become an actuality her votaries, whom she invites to worship it, will have become non-entities. Bah! Can the insolence of folly go further than this? Or are we told that these most decent scientists are doing nothing but following the lights of inductive science and bowing loyally to the truths of nature, wherever they meet them? We know that, so far as they array their zoölogy and histology as proofs of materialism, they are not paying loyal homage to the truths of natural science, but misconstruing and perverting them. We know that their attempt to disprove the existence of our rational spirits by means of the very exercise of the rational faculties can only turn out a logical suicide. It is as though one said to us, we have now proved experimentally that there are no eye-balls in human heads. We ask, gentlemen, by what species of experiments do you prove that assertion? They answer, By a series of nice experiments made with our visual faculty. But if there are no eye-balls there is no visual faculty. Such experiments would be impossible. The analogy is exact. If these scientists did

not possess a mind, endowed with supersensuous rational faculties, impossible to be the functions of mere material organism, faculties which are the indisputable signatures of distinct spiritual substance, the experiment of his biology would mean nothing to him. — He thinks he is sacrificing at the altar of pure scientific truth. He deceives himself. He is sacrificing to an intellectual idol. Solomon tells us of men, who, while “scattering fire-brands, arrows and death,” said, “Are we not in sport?” Ghastly sport it is! By what title can these mistaken interpreters of nature flatter themselves, that they are not scattering the fire-brands, arrows and death which their doctrine has always hitherto strewn among the nations?

II. A RELIGIOUS ESTIMATE OF CARLYLE.¹

CARLYLE himself has said: "It is well said in every sense, that a man's religion is the chief fact with regard to him. A man's, or a nation of men's. By religion I do not mean here the church creed which he professes, the articles of faith which he will sign; * * * but the thing a man does practically believe; * * * the thing a man does practically lay to heart, and know for certain concerning his vital relations to this mysterious universe, and his duty and destiny there."

Some bishop, I cannot just now recall who, said of Carlyle that "he was a religious man." This, and more than this, stands out so plainly on the man's character and writings, that one must think the bishop's remark an obvious commonplace. Carlyle's religiousness was intense to white heat. Religion was the great motive of his life. He seemed to consider his work a spiritual one. He had no patience with materialism, because he thought it irreligious. Money-getting, material progress, and "unexampled prosperities"—to use his own contemptuous phrase—were all a weariness to him, a sign of spiritual decadence and death. In all the ills and social wrongs of humanity he found the indications of religious disease.

Let us note a fact that exercised a powerful influence upon the development of Carlyle's religious consciousness, namely, the national religious environment in which he began his public career. That, surely, was a remarkable state of things which could produce in one brood Tractarianism, Irvingism, and scientific materialism, not to mention other aspects of less importance. It was an

¹Since this paper was written, the book, *Thomas Carlyle's Moral and Religious Development*, by Ewald Flügel, has appeared. But I see no reason to change the opinions expressed here. Flügel shows well Carlyle's relation to German philosophy, and its influence upon his religious life; but he fails to set forth the man's relation to the doctrines of historical Christianity. A serious defect of the German's book is his failure to reduce the characteristic exaggerations of Carlyle to proper dimensions, so as to arrive at the essence of his views.

era in which an honest man, religiously disposed, was left to shift for himself. The Church of England had reached its nadir of spirituality, and was given over to formalism and sham. Dissent was running into the absurdest fanaticism. The true spirit of religion had departed from the world, leaving a blank corpse which only the blind could mistake for a living body. On one side was the unendurable cant of insincere belief; on the other, the sincere cant of unreasoning and fanatic credulity. Between the two, the sincere and pious man who had his senses about him was in a sorry way for religious comfort. Matters were only a little better in Scotland, though Carlyle retained to the last a profound regard for the simple piety of his countrymen. His mind, often rash in rushing to conclusions, condemned in one sweeping generalization Catholicism, Anglicanism, and such forms of Dissent as he saw around him, as the symbols of all deceit and dishonesty.

Happily, the influence of such a spiritual condition was abated by the strong religious discipline of his early years. That humble Annandale home, as he delineates it in his journal and letters, is very beautiful with its warm and genuine piety. The rugged righteousness of the father, the gentler reverence and devotion of the mother, and the simple, but wholesome, religious regimen of the household, constituted a blessing which Carlyle duly appreciated, which he never forgot, and which he could not have escaped if he would. From this home came the stalwart moral principles that furnished him both defence and weapons of warfare.

One other thing helped Carlyle, too, in the religious disorders by which he was surrounded. This was the peculiar bent of his moral and intellectual natures. He had that combination of qualities which makes it impossible for one to become an atheist. He was one of the greatest poets of the English language. To write in rhyme is only an accident of poetry. That is the art aspect of poetry. Carlyle hated art. He called love of art cant, as it often is. His love of truth in its naked simplicity made rhyme impossible for him. The art of poetry, its rhythmical expression, requires some deviation from reality, and that he could not endure. But the true poet is he who has insight, intuition of hidden relations. The person whose spiritual vision is so subtly penetrating

as to pierce the shell of things and see relations in their ultimate aspect is the real poet, no matter how he may speak.

The poet communes with the soul of things. Therefore, I say, the poet cannot be an irreligious or a non-religious man, though he may be an immoral one. Do not our greatest poets prove this? Look at Homer, Virgil, Dante, Milton, Shakspeare, Wordsworth, and Tennyson. There is, then, no essential difference between the poet and the philosopher. The chief distinction is one of method. Carlyle combined the insight of the poet with the method of the philosopher. His religion was, therefore, a thing of his constitution, not of accident or choice. He could not have parted with it if he would. Despite the shams and insincerities around him, he could not dismiss religion from his life or his philosophy.

Froude says that Carlyle did not believe in historical Christianity. And in view of the studied reserve of the man in that respect, we shall have to accept the statement of his biographer. Nevertheless, the tenor of Carlyle's writings would seem to make this verdict of a friend, formed, no doubt, from the uncertain utterances of conversation, of doubtful authority. Though Carlyle was singularly reticent in speaking of Christ, yet he says enough to convince us that he was far from renouncing the historical, not to say the orthodox, faith concerning him. Nor is it certain what he thought of miracles. For here, again, his biographer has put against the silence of his public utterances a private statement. These considerations aside, however, the first great conviction that mastered Carlyle, and became the ground of all his other convictions, was his belief in God. He believed in God, not as a *Deus ex machina*, not as a vague, impersonal force, not as an unknowable abstraction, but as a veritable personality. God made and presides over the universe. He believed in a God with whom we, every one of us, have to do; to whom we are accountable; who demands justice and truth of us, and will punish us if we are not just and truthful. Men around him professed with their lips to believe this, it was an article of the creeds, but they denied it in their lives. Bishops and philosophers alike were stifling down in the heart of humanity the first and greatest of all truths, Carlyle thought this to be the cause of every injustice in

the world, the reason of social wrong, and private sin. His keen and philosophical mind saw this practical infidelity to have been the ruin of the Catholic Church, of the French monarchy, and of Charles the First. All the ills that affect society were traceable to the practical denial amongst men of the most axiomatic fact in the universe.

Carlyle's belief in providence was almost morbid, and bordered on fatalism. Some sort of faith in providence is the correlative of belief in a personal God. But it is quite uncertain what scope should be assigned to inferior wills and secondary physical energies. All the rigor of the Scotch Calvinism amidst which he was born is seen in Carlyle's doctrine of providence to the day of his death. As for himself, he purposed nothing and did nothing that did not fall within the bounds of the divine purpose. No element of chance or contingent circumstance entered into his conception of life. And yet his belief was always thoroughly spiritualistic. He despised all theories of materialistic necessity. Men are accountable for their acts, men and organized bodies of men.

Carlyle believed that the world is righteously governed. Justice is the object and goal of the divine purpose. If he seems sometimes to teach that might is right, it is only because he held that the right alone is mighty in the end. The world has a divine constitution. The character of God is fixed in every part of it. Man, above all other facts, bears the likeness of his Maker. The moral sense is God in him. The categorical imperative, upon which Carlyle laid great emphasis, is the sign of his kinship to God, not an "association of ideas," or "accumulation of ancestral experiences." "Material progress of the species" has no ethical signification. The aim of life is justice as between God and man, between man and man. To resist, to overcome, to subdue the ignoble within, and to vanquish the devil, these were prominent in his life philosophy.

All these things Carlyle believed with fierce intensity of conviction. Nor is this all. He often assured his old mother, troubled over his manifest departure from her own simple forms, that at heart, in the inner essence of doctrine, they yet agreed. We may believe that he spoke truthfully. It is the most sacred testi-

mony to be gleaned from all his writings on his own relation to religion. One who has had a similar experience,—and they are many,—will understand precisely what he meant. The larger vision that sees truth in new lights, the broader culture that discovers new relations amongst facts, these were the causes of the difference that had crept between mother and son. But at the core things were the same.

Carlyle reveals a very strong faith in immortality and the doctrines immediately related, in his journal and family correspondence. None drew greater comfort from the solacements of religion than he. The rest, the meeting of friends, the eternal hope, were very constantly upon his lips.

There is considerable inconsistency in his utterances concerning prayer. Sometimes he seems skeptical, again believing. At all times he was a praying man. I do not think that his experience was out of the common line in this respect. I suppose no one's view of prayer is uniformly consistent. If his journal and letters are not largely cant, which is impossible to believe, he had faith in prayer. But the forms of the church, from which the soul had departed, were an abomination to him; worse, they were a "simulacrum" which stood between men and the truth. His attitude towards public prayer was intended as a protest against prevailing error. It was, however, a remonstrance that sometimes confounded things that were different, yet never quite lost sight of the truth involved. There is no honest man, Christian or unbeliever, who sees the insincerities of formalism, and hears its mechanical mummeries, who has not felt in his heart as Carlyle did, and said as much to himself. Not that he practically does not believe in prayer and forms of prayer, but that he hates the shams which make prayer impossible. He is not a praying man who does not say with Carlyle that the truest prayer is unutterable.

Now it must be said that the loftiest principles of Carlyle's philosophy are the commonplaces of the gospel. Nor was he disposed to do his fellow-men justice in respect to their beliefs and practices. In his strenuous denunciation of cant, which, by the way, grew to be an affectation with him, he sometimes fell into cant. Truth, courage, faith, duty, these words were ever on his

tongue and pen; but they become tiresome, especially when we recollect his childish impatience, his moody and storm-breeding idleness, and his lack of courage in presence of life's ordinary ills. One cannot dwell too much on one thing, or one line of things, without becoming insincere.

Much as Carlyle came short, from the common point of view, in the fundamental facts of religion, not in this respect was he most deficient. Some of these facts were intuitively apprehended by his remarkable understanding. He did not reason to them as do others; they were amongst the insights of his mental vision. They were the axioms of his philosophy, and the postulates upon which all that he said and did rested. If it were possible to push ethical principles too far, he had done it. No more honest or upright man ever lived.

It is in connection with the heart that we find the most serious defect in Carlyle's religious consciousness. In the mild virtues which we attribute to personal faith and divine grace he was singularly deficient. The unspeakable pathos of his personal history and the melancholy trials of his domestic life were largely due to this aspect of his character. The progressive record of the personal experiences and home life of the man grows oppressive to the reader.

He was strangely inconsistent. Towards his contemporaries, many of them worthy of his entire respect, he manifested a spirit that was often paltry. He was peculiarly blind to the merits of every person whose theories differed from his own. There were honest men all around him, sensible of the ills of society, and anxious to ameliorate them, but Carlyle saw only error, hypocrisy, and cant in all their hypotheses and endeavors. He was unaccountably indifferent to the alienation of his best friends. He was selfish, too, to the utmost limit. His patient and suffering wife pined for companionship. A word of love, some little show of appreciation of her unceasing endeavors to make him comfortable, would have thrilled her with a great joy; but it never came. His own comfort and ease were as ungenerously prominent to his mind as they were unselfishly so to hers. He looked upon the world as a vast conspiracy to rob him of comfort.

Carlyle lacked resignation, repose, mental equipoise. In a sense he lacked manliness; he was utterly wanting in the humility of manliness. He was one of the most consummate egotists of literature. One can hardly find fault with so great a man for recognizing his superiority, or looking upon himself as of oracular dignity, if it do not result in myopia respecting all other human entities. But Carlyle's attitude towards other great men, like Mill and Macaulay, reveals a self-consciousness that borders on the morbid.

It may be said that much of his bad temper was due to his dyspepsia. Indigestion will engender many dark moods and much ill feeling. But Carlyle exaggerated even his dyspepsia. All facts indicate that he enjoyed more than the average share of health. Anyhow, there should have been something in the man to conquer a mere accident like that. Thousands of ordinary people suffer more than he without making martyrs of all around them. Suffering may be, and often is, very beautiful. But not Carlyle's. He got no benefit from it, and it was a heavy cross to his meek wife. He grew sourer and darker to the end. And if in the conversion of Teufelsdröckh he portrays his own experience, his life proves that that conversion comes far short of Christian conversion in that it was wholly wanting in the faith which softens trouble and sweetens character. The *Everlasting No* which marked the summit of Teufelsdröckh's victory did not include mastery over the selfish self. Were this not true, that journal, so full of unmanly complainings, would have had a different strain, and his "darling," as he calls her too late, would not have been immolated by his selfish neglect.

I say that Carlyle lacked that personal faith whose function is to control and give dynamic beneficent unity to the manifold elements of character. The electric fluid plays in lurid chain from crag to crag, or diffuses itself in livid flame across the surface of the storm-cloud, a thing chaotic and destructive. The electric magnet takes control of it, makes it amenable to will, and holds it to order and duty. In character that magnet is faith.

This faith is the optimistic element of religion, and so Carlyle was led into a hopelessness as regards religion from which he

could not extricate himself. He saw that divine justice demands justice of man, but did not see that it helps man to be just. It never appeared to him that in the divine government,—so exact in its workings, and exacting in its requirements,—there is any provision to enable man to realize the purpose of it. One thing alone can save a religious person from practical pessimism, namely, that God enables his creatures in some way to reach the object of their creation. And here hinges the central truth of historical Christianity, a divine mediator between God and man. Carlyle failed in personal apprehension of this fact, and for that reason his life ever fell short of his own ideals.

And yet he bitterly denounced the infirmities of men. He saw evidence of the need of this coming of divine help into man's life around him. How much better for him and his work had he found a different relation to the Christ, and possessed something of that medicinal sympathy and patient, helpful self-sacrifice by which He sought to cure the ills of life! The world is not to be cured of its moribund condition by denunciation. If so, Carlyle might supersede Christ. The influences of healing are love, sympathy, self-extinguishing devotion, and these Carlyle did not have either in his philosophy or in his character.

And yet the world must listen to this rugged and incorruptible champion of truth. It has few such prophets to listen to. His is another voice from out the abominable confusions and apostasies into which the world has fallen. I shall never forget with what astonished delight I first read his *Hero-Worship*. And after much study of what he has written, the impression remains that he never quite equalled those lectures. They were a genuine revelation to me. The profoundest convictions, the dynamics of the man's own soul, are in them. And all is so clear. As from the Bible, one rises from reading them with the resolve to lead a juster and a purer life.

Carlyle always speaks authoritatively against atheism and atheistic tendencies. To his mind there is no doctrine so entirely senseless, so blank in itself, and so destructive of noble thought and honest work, as atheism. In his thinking, the first of all truths is that this is God's world, not nobody's, not the devil's.

He set himself sternly against materialistic science, because materialism is logically atheism. It is a pity he did not get a chance at agnosticism. He would have made short work of it. At the same time many of his intimate friends were the apostles of advanced scientific theories. But he never became tainted. He was, perhaps alone, a philosopher and literary man with a distinct spiritual purpose from which he never swerved for friendship or money. The reader will probably recollect with what strenuousness Professor Huxley, not long ago, denied the charge of being a materialist, and how he even went further, and declared materialism to be an impossible hypothesis. One wonders whether Carlyle did not rescue this radical scientist from the evil trend of his own logic. But how badly he needs Carlyle now for his illogical agnosticism!

We can easily trace Carlyle's influence upon Froude, Arnold, Lecky, Huxley, and Tyndall. We should never cease to be thankful that this man made every doctrine of materialism and atheism impossible to those of proper self-respect. England was saved by him from French Encyclopedism, towards which it was swiftly drifting when he began to speak. That, with all its irrationalities, is out of the question for all who speak the English language.

It is to be regretted that men have not listened to him in respect to that social materialism which is responsible for so many modern disorders. Your average social philosopher imagines that every disease of the body politic is to be cured by material progress. The solution of all social problems is to be found in the discoveries of science, the invention of machines, and the multiplication of technical schools. Carlyle despised the sophistry of such logic. He perceived where material progress, unattended by spiritual improvement, would land us. He saw that material advancement would only increase the estuation of social elements, and is compatible with a decline of moral vigor and of public and private virtue. The elucidation of this theme was his motive in his *French Revolution* and his *Life of Cromwell*. The only hope of man lay in a return to truth, the abandonment of shams, the renouncement of the hypocrisies that lay over and stifled honesty, justice, and fair play. But it is hard for men to realize that the

world grows darker every step that it takes forward in a progress made up only of material factors. All prophets have failed to convince the world of this truth. Carlyle tried bravely, indefatigably, but he, too, failed. But God thunders the truth forth ever and anon in the shock of political and social revolution. So our philosopher taught, and he was right.

The champions of all creeds have great cause to quarrel with Carlyle. His dislike for creeds may have been the reason why he failed to write a statement of his own faith, as he long contemplated doing. He might have feared that it, too, would become a "simulacrum" to his spiritual children. It is regrettable that Carlyle shared the common prejudice against authoritative statements of belief. No one was ever more dogmatic than he. He was quite disagreeable, too, in his dogmatism. His opposition to religious symbols is one of the instances wherein he failed in nice distinctions. He knew that a conviction lay behind every worthy human achievement, his own amongst all. He knew that a creed was not the morbid outgrowth of the Reformation, but that it was before the Reformation, and gave rise to it. But he was not always logical; his prejudices were frequently violent, and confounded different things. We admit that he had some grounds for his feeling. He thought, with some truth, that creeds had come to be the signs of hypocrisy, things in which those who professed to believe did not believe, and knew that they did not. He suspected so eminent a churchman as Bishop Thirlwall of conscious insincerity. But Carlyle was unjust in his hasty judgments. Believable or unbelievable, the great majority did believe their creeds. If they did not, however, this furnished no sufficient grounds for his disrespect towards the articles themselves. His influence in this line has been thoroughly bad, and is all the more deplorable when we consider the destructive temper of the times.

With his conception of creeds, it is not a matter of surprise that he was utterly indifferent to all established and popular forms of worship. His treatment of church cults was weak and irrational. All forms, all endeavors at popular expression of religious emotion, were rejected by him as stupid and insincere. His contempt for his fellows in this respect is one of the worst and most repul-

sive aspects of his disposition. He did not seem to think that some symbolic expression is necessary to the being and the practical effect of every form of religious faith. Abstract truth can never influence practical affairs. Carlyle is sufficient proof of this.

It is dreary nonsense to talk of culture's making symbolism unnecessary to worship, or changing worship from vocal to silent form. Religious truth must have external utterance. The limitations of our understanding make it a necessity. This is not an accident of social evolution. Culture may refine, elevate, and limit religious forms, but cannot dispense with them. Carlyle has done as much as any man to weaken the hold of the church upon the public. The church may have many faults and be very full of shams and hypocrisies, but it is the sole practical embodiment of religious truth. To reject it on account of its abuses is to lose the only hope of forceful religious propagandism. And whatever the church may be, it is capable of indefinite improvement, and does constantly improve. It was very weak in Carlyle to adopt a vulgar error, an error, too, which springs from moral obliquity rather than rational premises. So we find his advocacy of truth hampered by a personal relation that went far to nullify the influence of his philosophy. He said, "It is better to act than to think." He said it, and exemplified it. He could only condemn and find fault with the spiritual condition of his age. He had no genius for action. He kept outside the practical conflict between truth and error, and exhausted his energy in savage denunciation of those engaged in the fray. So far as I can see, no real worker in the cause of man had his sympathy. Mr. Froude finds peculiar pleasure in exhibiting this phase of his "master's" character. Tainted with the same popular fallacy, he, no doubt, desires to justify it by the prestige of so great a name. But sensible people, not blinded by prejudice or biased by prestige, will see that this was a melancholy infirmity of the great philosopher.

From these considerations it will be seen to be a difficult task to strike an adequate estimate of Carlyle's influence. A bigot would magnify his opposition to established forms, and contend that it more than nullified any real service he may have rendered

to religion. A free-thinker would reverse the process. For myself, I have no special sympathy with either position. He has done, and will continue to do, both good and evil. Essential, fundamental truth, the truth that comes first in this universe of God in which we live, is his debtor for invaluable illumination. His understanding, the remarkable part of him, never compromised with known error, was never led into sin. The lovers of religion in a general sense can claim him as their untiring and incorruptible co-laborer in the cause of truth. So, too, in his life he ever exemplified the best principles of ethical philosophy. A most noble model, he, of rugged uprightness and stern incorruptibility. His heart, however, was seriously at fault. In that aspect of religion where whim is likeliest to get the upper hand of conviction he showed his more than common frailty. Not for the truth is this so to be regretted as for himself. But it embittered his life, and made him something of an Ishmael. It dimmed the star-like beauty of his character, and subdued the brilliancy of his reputation. Its power will be felt more and more upon his influence as the years pass by. For this the influence of Goethe is largely responsible in those days when Carlyle's religious consciousness was taking form. Carried away by the brilliant literary reputation of the great German,—a thing to which he aspired with his whole soul,—he came perilously near adopting Goethe's philosophy. Goethe's influence upon Carlyle was one of the greatest misfortunes of the kind that ever befell the world.

But, after all has been said, it remains distinctly true that Carlyle was one of the race's greatest spiritual seers. His was a soul enamored of true things, hating lies, and spending its mighty force in behalf of truth as it was given him to see it: a beacon of flame to all pilgrims below.

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III. ROMANISM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

ONE of the most important questions now engaging the attention of thoughtful citizens in this country, is that which relates to our common school education. There are certain postulates as related to this subject which are generally accepted. First, Education in this country should be *universal*. This is a special necessity in any republic, since all citizens exercise the functions of sovereignty, and should be prepared to use the elective franchise intelligently. Secondly, In order that education may be universal, it must be *free*. The wealthy and well-to-do must help educate the poor. To leave them in ignorance would be to jeopardize every interest of the country, and establish a menace to all our institutions. The masses are the foundation stones of the civil structure and give character to it. The education of the humbler classes benefits the highest classes, and extends its helpful influence through all the intermediate grades. Education contributes to the order of society, promotes the value of property, and advances every public enterprise which has in view the public good. Thirdly, Education should be *patriotic*. Love of country should be instilled and cultivated. Patriotism, not partisanism, is an imperative demand. National attachment, not local prejudice, should dominate our citizenship. In order to do this, the young must be students of history, and especially of American history. They must be made familiar with the salient principles of our form of government, with the superiority of our republicanism, with the geography and resources of our country. They should be taught to revere our national flag, to rally around it, and to give their loyal support to all its symbolizes of freedom, of beneficent rule and of national unity.

This brings us to another essential feature of education, the *religious*; the necessity for which the great majority of our people recognize, whilst there exists wide divergence of opinion among them as to the agency by which it is to be secured.

There are three theories respecting our common school education. First, that unsectarian religious instruction should be given in all schools supported by the state. The second, that all education, the religious being made prominent, should be under the control of the church. The third, that education by the state should be exclusively secular, since the state is a secular institution divorced from religion. It is not the province of the public school to teach theism but arithmetic; not morals, but how to read and write. It is as purely secular as a shoe shop or a plow factory. Morality is an incident or the product of intelligence. The last mentioned theory is, in the judgment of many, fraught with peril to the individual and the nation. Education is more comprehensive. Good citizenship requires more than secularists ask. The moral consciousness must be educated, and morality established. If we raise up a nation of atheists, we shall ring the death knell of our national freedom. A people who deny the existence of a personal God, to whose authority all are amenable, may occupy a land which is rich in its soil, beautiful and grand in its scenery, and possessing a climate equable and salubrious; but there has never been an instance in all history of such a people enjoying the blessing of civil liberty. That highest earthly good is granted only to such as acknowledge the being of a self-existent God, revealed in Christ, whose rule is universal, just and good. In the absence of such a belief, wrought into the daily life, a loose rein would be thrown on the neck of every depraved tendency of our fallen nature. For its own security, every state needs at least a theistic religion, and to transmit that religion from father to son. The relations of religion and liberty were affirmed by De Tocqueville: "The new states must be religious in order to be free. Society must be destroyed unless the Christian moral tie be strengthened in proportion as the political tie is relaxed; and what can be done with a people who are their own masters if they be not submissive to Deity?" Such testimony might be indefinitely multiplied. In token of this historical fact, and as an expression of faith in the God of nations, Prussia puts the Bible into the hands of every teacher in her public schools. The schools of Great Britain are religious. Leading minds in Russia have ex-

pressed the conviction that only Christian education can ever secure liberty to a people who are now, through necessity, ruled by an autocrat. In the early settlement of this country when our Puritan fathers, having escaped from under the heel of ecclesiastical tyranny, planted their homes among the primeval forests, they built the school-house beside the church. Religion was regarded as an essential feature of education. It was so imbedded in the profoundest convictions of the people and so entrenched in every department of culture that it never occurred to any one that it could be, or ever would be, dislodged. Then Protestant Christianity was the religion of the colonies. Lord Baltimore's colony in Maryland was the only exception, and that, set in an environment of Protestantism, gradually declined. But now, as a result of immigration from papal Europe, Roman Catholicism forms a large element in our population. Its attitude to our public school system has been one of invariable hostility, and its attacks have been made from directly opposite quarters. At first, our schools were disapproved on the ground that they were sectarian. It was alleged that a sectarian Bible was read in them. Much of the instruction imparted orally and through text books was sectarian. The schools were under the control of non-Catholics. The tendency of this system and the manner of its conduct were prejudicial to the interests of the Holy Apostolic Church, therefore Roman Catholics demanded release from all legal obligations to contribute to its support. Then, with a view of conciliating Romanists, there commenced the process of eliminating from our schools the objectionable religious feature. This has been well nigh accomplished. The Bible is almost, or wholly, excluded. If read on some anniversary occasion an apology is made for its use. The percentage of religious matter in all reading books has been reduced far below a moiety, and, through fear of being sectarian, our schools have become unchristian. Now Roman Catholics pronounce our education godless. They say the souls of the children are imperilled by it. They will have none of it. If any of their children subject themselves to it, they shall be denied the privileges of the church, and even greater deprivations. Now, they

ask a division of the public funds in order that they may maintain separate schools under the control of the church.

To the first position we reply that, whilst our schools were, in an important sense, religious, they were not sectarian. The Bible cannot, by any fair construction, be considered a sectarian book. No effort has been made since colonial times to teach any system of religion which was even Protestant in distinction from the Roman Catholic. The claims of the papal hierarchy, the celibacy of the clergy, the ritualism of the church, transubstantiation, the confessional, and dogmas which differentiated Romanism from Protestantism, have been neither denied nor taught. A common Christianity, and that only, has held a place in our public-school instruction. This much a Christian state had a right to demand, and should still demand, as necessary to its own security and continued existence. But Romanists have not stated the real ground of their opposition to our school system. If the Douay version of the Bible had been substituted for King James', their favor would not have been secured thereby. Rome discourages the reading of any version of the Bible. Holy Scripture is veiled from the people by its imprisonment in the Latin Vulgate. Portions of it are given in the Prayer-book, but the word of God in its entirety is withheld. Pius IX. said: "It is evident from experience that the Holy Scriptures, when circulated in the vulgar tongue, have, through the temerity of men, produced more harm than benefit. Warn the people entrusted to your care that they fall not into the snare prepared for their everlasting ruin. Several of our pre-cessors have made laws to turn aside this *scourge*."

Romanism exalts itself above the Bible. The sacred Scriptures are not to be accepted as our rule of faith and practice, but the church. The church was before the Bible. And now that the Holy Scriptures have been given, they must be interpreted by the church. The people cannot discover their meaning. They endanger their souls by the attempt. Therefore, the Bible should be left in the hands of the priests. They should be accepted as the teachers of saving truth, the custodians of immortal souls, and the only infallible guides to heaven. The Bible would be a "scourge" to the school, therefore any version of it must be excluded.

Then, as to the later charge brought against our public schools, that they are godless, we reply that, so far as this is true, Rome is chiefly responsible for it. The friends of unsectarian religious instruction in our schools have practically surrendered their ground; some, in order that they may conciliate Roman Catholics; some hoping thereby to prevent a division of public funds in the interest of sectarian Roman schools. In the latter instance it is, in fact, the substitution of a principle which is diametrically opposed to the one originally held, now denying to the state the right to give any religious instruction. The secularists have reached the vantage ground, and Romanists, joining hands with the doctrinaires and sciolists, have opened the way to it.

Now, there are certain principles underlying this discussion which, in the judgment of many, ought to be maintained and become regnant in our common-school education, to which some allusion has already been made.

1. That religious instruction is an essential element in this education. Physical, intellectual and moral training must go together. No one of these can be eliminated without greatly impairing the rest. This divinely instituted trinity must not be broken. The most important of these elements is the moral; but morality cannot be divorced from religion. We do not accept the statement of the *Freeman's Journal* that "there is no such thing as Christian ethics, whether recognized or unrecognized by American law, as distinct from denominational doctrines and dogmas." Not Romanism, not Presbyterianism, not Independency, not what is distinctive to any branch of the reformed church, should be the basis of moral instruction. There are certain fundamental facts in revealed religion which are the roots of morality. They are facts which are accepted by Christendom and are undenominational and unsectarian. They may be briefly stated: The being and personality of God; his will declared in natural and revealed religion; submission to his authority universally binding; obedience rewarded and disobedience punished; the conditions of divine favor and everlasting life unalterable; character and destiny eternal. This is not churchism, but religion. Christian consciousness, without respect to geographical lines or lineal descent,

caste or color, so affirms. Natural conscience utters no denial. These great facts, touching, as they do, the life which now is and that which is to come, the basis and support of noble character, of good citizenship, and that highest form of liberty which is always associated with subjection to rightful authority, constitutes an essential element in a healthful and symmetrical education, and should be taught in our public schools. The converse of this proposition may be stated as a logical sequence.

2. In the absence of religious instruction our schools would become the nurseries of atheism and strengthen every downward tendency of our fallen nature. Negation is practical denial. If there be no power to lift up, a power greater, diviner than that which inheres in every natural life, a power which left to itself is as dominant as is gravitation in its material sphere, then the downward trend of human life is inevitable. The education which is purely secular is wholly irreligious, and its fruitage pernicious and deadly.

3. The elimination of any element of education is injurious or destructive to the whole. The intellectual rests largely on the physical, and Christian morality is intimately related to both. Secular education cannot be committed to the state and religious education to the church. Dr. Alexander A. Hodge said: "The one cannot be taught in one school while the other, entirely purged of it, is taught in another school, because they necessarily inter-penetrate one another, just as God and nature, providence and natural law, penetrate each other in every event." The same sentiment as quoted by Cardinal Gibbons and repeated by a vigorous writer in the *PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY*, was expressed by Guizot: "In order to make popular education truly good and socially useful, it must be fundamentally religious. It is necessary that national education should be given and received in the midst of a religious atmosphere, and that religious impressions and religious observances should penetrate into all its parts. Religion is not a study, or an exercise, to be restricted to a certain place or a certain hour. It is a faith and a law which ought to be felt everywhere, and which, after this manner alone, can exert all its beneficial influence upon our minds and our life." History is

constantly revealing God. Geology writes his name on the rocks. Astronomy sets the stars in order and registers the attributes of God in the heavens. The chemistry of nature tells of the infinite wisdom which combines a comparatively few elements in numberless forms of organic life. The different forms of civil government, from the days of the Rameses to the present, declare that a pure Christianity is essential to the highest style of liberty. The decadence and final extinction of nations, going down under the weight of their iniquities, manifest the holiness of God and the necessity laid upon him to punish sin. The lives of men who have played a conspicuous part in the drama of human events, Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible, Gustavus Adolphus, William of Orange, and our Washington, as contrasted with a Metternich, or an Arnold, suggest motives for living, as seeing him who is invisible, and under the power of a world to come. The most elevated, purest and most helpful literature embraces a religious element. Among the poets who may find at least some place in the literature of the common school, Spenser, Shakspeare, Milton, Cowper, Dante and Dryden, draw largely from the Bible, and old mythologies bring into bolder moral relief the excellencies of that religion which came down from heaven. It is evident that secular knowledge is mutilated and emasculated when the religious element is eliminated from it.

Then it is clear that religious education cannot be exclusively committed to the church. Sixty per cent. of the children in this country, say some statisticians, (the percentage may be smaller), never come in contact with the Sabbath-school, the house of prayer, or the Holy Scriptures. They are not being prepared to exercise the functions of citizenship, and to be the guardians of institutions born in the throes of spiritual travail, and cemented with patriotic blood. And even if all the children of America were under the religious influence of the church and of religious instruction on the Sabbath, any healthful impressions thus received would be imperilled by a system of education which during six days of the week was purely secular and wholly atheistical. Judge Dunne, in the Roman Catholic Congress at Baltimore, said: "Insolent secularists say two hours a week will suffice (for religious

instruction), and they have tried it, and we know the result, and we'll none of it. We ask full education for all, but, failing that, as to our little ones 'an oath we have, an oath in heaven, from henceforth their souls, at least, shall have their daily food.'" The Romanists act in accordance with this view. They have already six thousand parochial schools in which they detain children until they are twelve years of age, and if further education is required, it can be furnished by their seventy-five colleges and the university at Washington. This movement is supported by Pope Leo, by all the leading ecclesiastics of the papal church in this country, and by the action of the late Catholic Congress, which said: "We are committed to a sound popular education, which demands not only the physical and intellectual, but the moral and religious, training of youth. As in the state schools no provision is made for teaching religion, we must continue to support our own schools."

But education by the church involves great expense. Romanists unwillingly pay taxes to support our public schools, and then maintain their own. Hence the several demands upon the state by which they would secure relief.

1. The division of the public school fund.

The Catholic Review denies the right of the state to foist upon the people a school system without consulting their religious convictions on the one hand, and their rights as citizens on the other, and adds: "Its assumption of the right to tax a powerful minority to support a school system which it will not use must be resisted. No taxation without representation. Catholics will not have the public school, therefore the state must allow their own system; and the day must come when the parochial school shall draw its support entirely from the state." This is vigorous and intelligible speech. Roman Catholics will make the division of the public-school fund their *ultimatum*, and reach it as soon as possible. This being granted, Roman Catholics would multiply parochial schools throughout the country, and would greatly augment their churchly power. To prevent this division of funds, which would disintegrate and ultimately destroy our school system, many consent to make our public education secular. Then Protestants and

Romanists would be placed on the same level, and sectarian instruction would be excluded by an absolute and dominating secularism. This furnishes no solution of the difficult problem. Romanists will not accept it. They will continue to demand in the United States what they have secured in the Canadas, the division of the school fund. Meanwhile, awaiting the consummation, a considerable portion of that church will insist on—

2. The voluntary system.

Since they would discourage a distribution of the school fund among all religious denominations of the country, many would prefer to incorporate the voluntary with the public system. The *Freeman's Journal*, March 29, 1890, urged this as an easy and natural solution of the whole question: "A school, in order to obtain its per capita grant, should of course have limitations and conditions made for it. It should contain, say at least fifty pupils for city districts, and twenty-five for country; and the state should further have the right to exact a standard of secular education equal to that of its own school. In regard to the religion taught in these voluntary schools, the state would and could have nothing to do. The state recognizes no religion as such, but it is equally true, on the other hand, that the state has engaged itself not to oppress any persons because of their religious creed. It will cease its discrimination against Catholics, and fulfil its professions, when it admits voluntary schools into its public system, not before." This, after all, is securing the division of school funds by a seeming consent to our present system. If this cannot be secured at once, then another element in the Romish Church would accept what may be designated, as—

3. The supplementary system.

After the regular school hours and the completion of the secular curriculum, they would detain the Roman Catholic children, and as many of the non-Roman Catholics as they could influence, for religious instruction. Thus they hope to correct the tendency of our present system to relax the ties which bind the children of Romanists to their church, and in some measure to counteract, as they claim, the secularizing influence of our schools. But it is probable that only a minority of our Roman Catholic citizens

would consent to this system. It would be largely inoperative from the first, and eventually go into disuse.

The Romanists of this country hope ultimately to gain exclusive control of our public schools. Any one of the three plans indicated would aid that accomplishment. The growth of the Roman Catholic Church is not by any means what is claimed, yet it is such as to encourage the hope of ultimate supremacy. The *Catholic World* says the question, "Do you believe this country will ever become Catholic?" is changing to the question, "How soon do you think it will come to pass?" Soon, very soon, if statistics be correct. The *Westminster Review* announces that, "in point of numbers, the Catholic Church is the National Church of the United States," and expresses the belief that it will be in every respect the church of the future. One of the leading Roman Catholic journals of the country quotes this statement and prediction with unfeigned pleasure, and putting aside the "farceical directory estimates which have not been changed for thirty years, because it would cost a little to change the plates annually," gives Bishop Hogan's estimate of the Roman Catholic population as 13,000,000, "which is much too low," whilst all the Protestant religions combined number 12,800,000. Archbishop Ireland, who claims this land for Romanism, estimates the Roman Catholic population at 10,000,000, and Daniel Dougherty does the same. It is well understood that these statistics, unlike those of the Protestant Church, embrace all baptized persons, and thus misrepresent the comparative strength of the two. Nevertheless the Romanists are firmly rooted in every large city in this country. They are the pioneers of the West, and are winning many of the freedmen of the South to their faith. Already they control the largest city of our republic, and wield a commanding influence in all centres of population from Maine to California. They are pushing their way to the front and hope to get there before many years, and then they will control our public schools and make them "religious."

This supremacy is largely contingent on their control of education. Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore, Administrator Apostolic, says: "It may be safely asserted that the future status

of Catholicism in the United States is to be determined by the success or failure of our day schools." The division of the public school fund would inure to the great advantage of Romanism. It does not require the spirit of prophecy to forecast the character of the education which the Roman Catholic Church seeks to conduct. It may be learned from the schools which are now under its control, and from well-established principles which are fundamental to its dominancy in any land. Mr. G. H. Doane introduces us to one of the primary institutions of the church. "The crucifix hangs on the walls of the Catholic schools, the image of the Blessed Mother is there, texts of Scripture and pious sentences meet the scholars' eye. The first exercise is prayer, the first lesson is the Catechism, the atmosphere of the school is religious." This is churchism, not religion. There is little in all this to cultivate the intellect, and general intelligence is designedly excluded. It is well known that the schools conducted by Romanists, except the higher institutions which are required for the priesthood and a select number of the laity, are, as a rule superficial. The maximum of secular education for the masses, who are controlled by the educated few, embraces reading, writing, a knowledge of the divisions of the earth's surface, and some acquaintance with the facts of history as furnished by the church. We would object to the division of our school fund to maintain a course of study so poorly fitted to prepare the young for American citizenship.

Then, it is obvious that the principles of freedom of conscience and civil liberty would not be taught in schools conducted by the Romish Church. To all such freedom Rome is, as it has been from the first, as it will be until the end, antagonistic. Pius IX., endorsing the bull of Gregory XVI., said: "Liberty of conscience is a most pestiferous error. From it spring revolutions, corruptions, contempt of sacred things, holy institutions and laws, and, in one word, that pest of all others most to be dreaded in a state, unbridled liberty of opinion." Monseigneur Segur, in a small book entitled *Plain Talk about the Protestantism of To-day*, for which he has received the papal benediction, referring to the Spanish Inquisition, approved by Sixtus IV. and Innocent VIII.,

which "immolated on its flaming shambles more than three hundred thousand victims," justifies this institution as "the most legitimate and most natural exercise of ecclesiastical authority." This *brochure*, which has the approval of Leo XIII., was evidently intended for private distribution among the Romanists of this country. It declares the unchanged animus of an infallible church. Bishop O'Connor holds the traditional faith, and publicly declares that "religious liberty is merely endured until the opposite can be carried into effect without peril to the Catholic world." We cannot consent that such principles shall be instilled into the minds of the future citizens and rulers of this American republic.

• Patriotism cannot be taught in schools conducted by Romanists consistently with that loyalty to the papal hierarchy which is a fundamental principle of the church. No doubt the pupils would be told that Columbus, a devout Catholic, discovered America, and planted the cross beside the flag of Spain; that the coming hither of the Catholics antedated the immigration of Protestants; that the Norsemen had flourishing colonies along the Atlantic coast before the Mayflower landed its human freight on Plymouth Rock. At the same time it will be insisted that the supreme allegiance of Roman Catholics is to the church, by which is meant the college of cardinals, who make and control the pope, an Italian prince. The syllabus of Pius IX. maintains that "the church has the right to exercise her power without the permission or consent of the state; to deprive the civil authorities of the entire government of the public schools; to require that their church religion shall be the only religion of the state, to the exclusion of all others; that the church has the power of requiring the state not to permit free expression of opinion." The church is supreme. Within a year, in the Bavarian Landtag, the Roman Catholic deputies were forced to admit that they did not regard their oath of office in the sense attached to it by the state. Leo XIII. will not be the willing subject of King Humbert. Over him the Italian government has no legitimate control. He demands a temporal kingdom, because he cannot be amenable to any civil power, but must be left free to enact such laws as he pleases, and to domi-

nate all the governments of earth. As the vicar of Christ, the king of kings, he cannot ask less. He extends his sceptre over this new world, and all who give their supreme allegiance to our republican government are in rebellion against his authority.

It is well-known that the system of education in the Romish Church is largely under the control of Jesuits. It is also an unquestioned fact that the Jesuit acknowledges no allegiance to any state. By solemn oath he binds himself to the papal throne: "I now, in the presence of Almighty God, declare from my heart, without mental reservation, that his holiness, Leo XIII., is Christ's Vicar General, and is the true and only head of the Catholic Church throughout the earth, and hath power to depose heretical kings, princes, states, commonwealths, governments, all being illegal without his sacred confirmation, and that they may be safely destroyed. I do renounce and disown any allegiance as due to Protestants or obedience to any of their inferior magistrates or officers. I do further declare the doctrine of the Protestants to be damnable and that they, themselves, are damned and to be damned who will not forsake the same. I will do my utmost to extirpate the heretical Protestant doctrine, and to destroy all their pretended powers, real or otherwise, all of which I do swear by the blessed sacrament." Surely the state which would perpetuate itself and maintain beneficent rule, will not commit the education of expectant citizens to an order of men who are sworn to seek its destruction and make the Pope of Rome the world's only potentate, whilst the world shall stand. The canon law of the Romish church supports the principles of this order, as when it declares that "The Pope has the right to annul state laws, treaties and constitutions; to absolve from obedience thereto, as soon as they seem detrimental to the rights of the church or those of the clergy." Referring to a recent encyclical letter of Pope Leo, the *Church Union*, after reciting some of the principles therein stated, says, "It follows, of course, that every American Roman Catholic owes an allegiance to a foreign potentate, superior to that which he owes to his own country." This conclusion cannot be escaped so long as it is maintained that allegiance is due to the church rather than to the state; to the Vicar General of Christ rather than to

earthly rulers. It is evident that patriotism cannot be taught in schools that are controlled by the Romish Church. A new interpretation must be put upon our national flag and the Roman tiara be substituted for the galaxy of stars.

It seems to us that our safety as a nation demands moral instruction in our public schools, and that as a Protestant Christian country we have the right to maintain it. America was settled by Puritans, Huguenots, Dutch, and after these by Germans from the Palatinate; Moravians from Herrnhut; Bohemians from the land of Huss and Jerome; Protestant Poles brought here by Count Sobieski; peaceable Quakers who settled in Pennsylvania and among the forests of Albemarle; the followers of John Wesley, earnestly devoted to truth and their adopted land. All these were Protestant Christians. They subdued the wilderness, laid the foundations of our institutions, secured our national independence, and have conserved our Republic until the present. They made America "what it was in our fathers' day; what it is in ours." In the Constitution of the thirteen original States were incorporated expressions of faith in God and in his Son, Jesus Christ, and unwavering confidence in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, "given by divine inspiration." Virginia stood alone at the first, in its silence respecting religion, but the revised statutes of the State were in harmony with the prevailing sentiment. Well did De Tocqueville say, "It is religion that has given rise to the Anglo-American communities. In the United States Christian sects are infinitely varied; but Christianity itself is an established and undeniable fact." Edgar Quinet, the French historian and poet, made similar statements and contrasted this country with the Roman Catholic empires of Mexico and South America which in the infancy of their existence, carry the wrinkles of Byzantium. The legislation of the several states has been favorable to Christianity. The appointment of chaplains in our army, navy and military schools, in the National Congress and State Legislatures; the administration of the solemn oath in connection with the version of the Bible in use when this nation was formed; the designation by national and state authority of days of thanksgiving and fast days, as generally observed as the Christian Sabbath, which

is guarded from desecration by civil law, and the origin of our public school system, which wedded religion to secular culture and enthroned the Word of God, all declare this land Christian, "as certainly Protestant Christian," said Dr. Chas. Hodge, "as Turkey is Mohammedan or India Buddhistic." And shall our schools stand alone in their irreligion? Shall the state open every door to the Bible, and prayer save that which admits to the school in which our youth are trained for citizenship? Surely we may insist on the instruction that builds up moral character and supports a course of life necessary to the highest style of citizenship and to the continuance of that national freedom, civil and religious, now enjoyed in a land once ploughed with the earthquakes of foreign invasion, and irrigated with the blood of Christian patriots. Surely we cannot surrender rights so dearly bought, and consent that they who come to us from countries Rome has dominated shall girdle the tree which shelters us, and would extend its grateful shadow over them. Sir J. William Dawson in a letter recently received, emphasizes the relations of public instruction to national rule, and adds, "you may rest assured that the schools which have no Bible must ultimately succumb." The New York Methodist Conference unanimously declared that "the common school system, imperfect though it may be, must be preserved, and we are not prepared to accept the secular theory nor the sectarian theory of its control while its existence can be perpetuated as a fit training school for a morally responsible citizenship, and we will resist all efforts to expunge facts of Christian history and the teachings of Christian morality from the textbooks of schools supported by the state."

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, in May, 1890, took the following action: "Whereas, a recent decision of the Supreme Court of one of our States, has affirmed the Bible to be a sectarian book, and its use in the schools to be unconstitutional, and whereas, we see in this decision no mere local matter, such as affects the people of that State, but the culmination of an effort being made with relentless pertinacity by a foreign hierarchy to overthrow the system of public schools throughout the land, therefore, resolved, that we affirm the importance of our

public schools to the welfare of the people; that with intellectual cultivation must go moral training, or the schools may prove a curse instead of a blessing; but this moral training must be based on religion, otherwise its sanction will not be strong enough to grasp the conscience of the people, or its utterances obligatory enough to shape their character; that as the Bible is the source of the highest moral teaching, we regard its exclusion from our public schools as a menace to national welfare, and we urge upon the members of our church to arouse the public thought on this subject, from the pulpit, the press, and ecclesiastical assemblages, that this book shall be restored to its true place in our system of education.

In connection with these deliverances may be cited the published opinion of William Allen Butler, LL.D.: "If, as the courts have held, the Christian religion is in fact a part of the law under which we live, then although we have no established church, we have an established religion based on a divine revelation; any malicious aspersion of which, or of its divine author and founder, constitutes a crime against society. The institutions of religion are protected and enforced by law. One of the plainest principles of public policy in a state thus maintaining and enforcing the Christian religion as a part of its customary and declared legal organization, public instruction ought to be Christian, and the Christian religion should be recognized and made manifest, not by way of doctrine deducted from its scriptures or interpretation of their meaning, but in attestation of the fact of its supremacy as a constituent part of the law of the land."

This, then, is our summary:

1. The public school system should be maintained as a necessity of our national life.
2. Christianity being the religion of this country, our public schools should be maintained in harmony with it. Therefore,
3. Public education should include, with physical and intellectual culture, that system of morals which is grounded on the authority and word of God.
4. Whilst it is the privilege of any religious denomination to

establish parochial schools, the genius of our institutions forbids the support by the state of sectarian schools.

5. In the present status of the public school question, our choice is apparently confined to the following things:

(1), A purely secular, atheistic education for the majority of our youth who receive no moral training from any other source.

(2), The establishment of parochial schools by the numerous religious denominations and the emasculation or overthrow of our present school system.

(3), Unsectarian moral training as an element of education, securing thereby, in connection with the religious instruction given in Christian homes and by the evangelical church, the preservation of our country from the secularism, materialism and general corruption which are a reproach to any people and would ultimately issue in despotism, anarchy or national extinction.

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IV. A MODERN JEHU.¹

SOME of the friends and representatives of the higher criticism have projected an *International Theological Library*. Rev. Charles A. Briggs, of Union Seminary, New York, and Rev. Stewart D. F. Salmond, of the Free College, Aberdeen, are the editors. Charles Scribners' Sons, of New York, are the American publishers. The book named in the note by Dr. Driver, is the first of the proposed series. Eleven others are already arranged for, and a glance at the names of the authors suggests that whatever merit may be wanting to the proposed library, it will not lack the merit of being abreast of the times. In fact, unless the times are very much in advance of the date assigned to them by the great majority of mankind, this library will set forth views considerably ahead of the times. It is possible that the millennium will come, or even the end of the world, before the times and the precedaneous views of these authors become cotemporary.

No disrespect is meant by the title of this review. One whose studies have made him familiar with the progress and results of the higher criticism might follow Dr. Driver without any sensation of dizziness. But when a neophyte watches his chariot wheels as they cut through the Old Testament Scriptures, turning up the yellow subsoil, and hurling fragments of rocks and roots and clay in every direction, his first thought is of the driving of Jehu, the son of Nimshi, "for he driveth furiously."

It is believed by the present writer that the time has come when every one who claims to be called of God to the special work of studying and expounding the Bible, should know something of what these enemies or allies, whichever they may prove to be, have done and are doing with our sacred Book. Once when they challenged busy preachers and pastors to a friendly or an unfriendly

¹ *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*. By S. R. Driver, D. D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ's Church, Oxford, Formerly Fellow of New College, Oxford.

conference, it might have been proper to answer their challenge as Nehemiah answered Sanballat, Tobiah, and Geshem, "I am doing a great work, so that I cannot come down. Why should the work cease, whilst I leave it and come down to you?" That was wise while Sanballat and his associates stood at a respectful distance. But suppose they had come up to the very walls, and had gone to undermining and removing brick, and threatening to bring the whole structure tumbling to the ground? Suppose that a process of desertion from Nehemiah's ranks had begun, and that it was growing in importance from day to day, that the deserters included some of his chief men? In these circumstances would it not have been wise in Nehemiah to lay aside his trowel, gird on his sword and come down and have a distinct and decisive settlement with Sanballat? Granted the supposed conditions, and nothing could have been more important than Sanballat's complete annihilation, and no amount of time consumed in this laudable endeavor would have been wasted. In other days the higher criticism was at a great distance. It was hedged off from the popular mind by the barrier of an unknown tongue. The higher critic was a spectacled German professor who, more to gratify the instincts of his prying nature than anything else, was practising his microscopic eye-sight. Having no experimental knowledge of religion, and constrained in virtue of his professorship to occupy himself with theological literature, he found it more congenial to his taste to divide hairs and split atoms than to teach the saving truths of Christianity. He had no more reverence for the Bible than for Homer, and it was fine entertainment for him to exhibit his acuteness by picking the Bible to pieces, and at the same time to create a sensation in the world of letters. There was no way by which he could so surely attract attention to himself, and have himself written and talked about, as to proclaim the discovery of something new about the Bible. The noise would be all the greater, if that something new was also something smacking of heresy. That day has gone by. The higher criticism is no longer a matter of pastime with German professors, and is no longer locked up from the English-speaking world in the German language. It has left Germany and crossed over to

Great Britain and the United States. It has learned the English language, and uses it with wonderful fluency, precision, force and elegance. It has entered and taken its seat in some of the most important chairs in the historic universities of England, and in the theological schools of Scotland and this country. It has stood before the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of orthodox Presbyterianism, summoned thither to answer the charge of heresy, and in every instance it has come off with flying colors. It is speaking in no timid accents from some of the leading pulpits in the centres of culture and influence. Its tone has ceased to be apologetic, and has come to be strongly dogmatic. It unblushingly claims to speak the last authoritative word touching the nature, structure and contents of the Bible. What is profoundly more significant, it has secured the admission of this claim by the compilers of the world's libraries, the great encyclopedias. It is writing books "for the people," and through the channel of magazine and church periodical it is sending its potent voice from one end of the land to the other. Last, but not least, it is now preparing an *International Theological Library* to garner up and put in usable shape all its rich harvest of results. This library is to cover the whole field of theological science, and its avowed object is to furnish a series of text-books for theological students. In the judgment of the higher critics the time has come when they must supply a literature to take the place of that which has become effete. This new library means that not only the musty tomes of mediæval schoolmen, the weighty volumes of Reformers and Puritans, must be laid aside, but also the carefully and prayerfully wrought theologies of the honored teachers of the present generation. Henceforth theological students must learn new names and acknowledge new masters. These benevolent gentlemen do not wait to be asked. Having discovered the need, they proceed on their own motion to supply it. Is this arrogance born of blindness, or is it confidence born of past success? The latter would seem not improbable in view of the facts already cited. The higher criticism has been regarded as an enemy, and some show of resistance has been made, but its progress has not even been retarded, much less checked, by the methods employed. From a disreputable birth,

and an unpromising childhood, it has grown to such lusty proportions in the face of scoff and derision, that it can now use scoff and derision rather more effectively than its adversaries. It has entrenched itself within the pale of the church. It is in possession of many of the strongholds of Zion. Its redoubtable champions get the "sinews of war" from the temple treasury. They draw their support from the "shekels of the sanctuary."

In this state of affairs, can the Nehemiahs decline the summons to come down and confer, on the plea that they are doing a great work? Sanballat, Tobiah, and Geshem are now actually engaged in undermining the walls, taking brick after brick from the foundation, and threatening ruin to the whole structure of sacred truth. Desertion to their ranks is going forward at an increasingly rapid rate, and among the deserters are men of conspicuous ability, and standing in the front rank of scholarship.

The object of the present writer is to furnish an article which shall serve as an eye-opener to those who are disposed to keep their eyes shut. He will touch on the aims, methods, results, tendency, and effect of the higher criticism, giving Dr. Driver as authority for results, and devoting most space to this phase of the subject.

I. *Aims.* Having discovered that the structure of the Bible is very different from what it was once supposed to be, that each separate book, instead of being the work of one author, is a compilation from various documentary sources, and represents the work of several agents, the higher criticism proposes to discover these various sources from which the Bible has been derived, to separate these sources from each other, to determine the character of each, whether historical, traditional, or legendary, to fix their several dates, and then, finally, to show their logical and chronological relation to each other. In other words, the one comprehensive aim of the higher criticism is to resolve the Bible into its primitive constituent elements, to examine and weigh those elements, to test their value, to see how much alloy, if any, enters into their composition, and by this means to reach a rational and scientific estimate of the worth of the Bible as a whole. The function of the higher critic is that of the assayer. He seeks

to separate the gold from the dross, and to place upon each its proper stamp. It is called the higher criticism to distinguish it from textual criticism. While the latter endeavors to find, amid innumerable, various and corrupted readings, the pure original text of each book of which the Bible is composed, the former rises higher, and proposes to point out the various sources whence, and the various times when, that original text emanated.

It is freely conceded that in prosecuting this aim the higher critics have not spared themselves labor. They have given to the Bible an amount of patient study that should put the average preacher to the blush. In looking at the results, one is painfully impressed with the idea that they have been searching for dross rather than gold, and that under their touch even "the gold becomes dim, and the most fine gold is changed," but there can be no doubt of the thoroughness of their work. They have analyzed every phrase, and put every word under the microscope. They have studied Scripture in the light of Scripture, and made each part bear witness to every other part. They have studied Scripture in the light of contemporary history, and, apparently, have left nothing undone to extort from every source whatever aid it can give to the solution of the questions at issue. However much we may deplore the conclusions to which they have come, they are entitled to recognition as men of ample scholarship and of profound and persevering research.

In their conclusions they rely mainly on two tests, one literary, the other historical. After these two tests have been applied and probable conclusions suggested, other subsidiary tests, such as theological and ethical ideas, may be used to confirm them. Literary criticism has to do with style and vocabulary. Historical criticism is chiefly concerned with the matter of dates. By looking at the history of any given period, the social, political and religious condition of the people, it undertakes to say what laws and institutions had or had not been promulgated before that time. It assumes that no laws were in the Book at any given time which cannot be found in the life of the people at that time.

II. *Results.* If by results is understood only those conclusions in which all the critics are agreed, the showing will be meagre

indeed. The critics agree that the old traditional view of the Bible is altogether erroneous, and that no one who holds it is entitled to the credit of scholarship or critical insight. They agree that the Bible is made up of scraps, pieced together by unknown hands; and that those who hold this view have a monopoly of learning and critical ability. They agree that no matter what conclusions they put forth it is presumption in any one to contest them unless he has spent his life in the investigation of the questions involved, and even then he is not to do it unless he has the critical discernment to see that their conclusions cannot be called in question. But if by results is understood conclusions that are acquiesced in by many, or most of the higher critics, conclusions that meet with general favor, then the showing is large.

Following in the wake of Dr. Driver we will glean and exhibit these results. The higher critics class Joshua with the five preceding books, and speak of the Hexateuch instead of the Pentateuch, this for the reason that these six books are made of the same material and built by the same architects. The Hexateuch is made up from four principal sources, designated as Elohist, Jehovist, Deuteronomy and Priest Code. Deuteronomy may, for the present, be eliminated as practically independent of the others. The first four books of the Bible and Joshua are of similar composition. The sources are three writings known as Elohist, Jehovist and Priest Code, but for convenience they are designated by the initial letters, E, J and P. Beginning with Genesis, let us make a rapid survey of each book of the Old Testament. The process by which Genesis was formed may be represented approximately as follows: The two independent, but parallel narratives of the patriarchal age, J and E, were combined into a whole by a compiler whose method it was sometimes to incorporate long sections of each intact, or nearly so, sometimes to fuse the parallel accounts into a single narrative. The whole thus formed was afterward combined with the narrative of P by a second compiler, who adopting P, as his framework, accommodated J E to it, omitting in either what was necessary in order to avoid needless repetitions, and making such redactional adjustments as the unity of the work required.

The structure of Exodus is the same as that of Genesis; the same sources P and J E appearing side by side, and exhibiting the same peculiarities.

Leviticus forms throughout a part of the Priest Code, in which, however, chapters xvii.—xxvi. constitute a section marked by certain special features of its own, and standing apart from the rest of the book. The higher critics call this section the "Law of Holiness." It is made up of elements derived from P, combined with excerpts from an earlier and independent collection of laws.

In structure, Numbers resembles Genesis and Exodus. J E reappears by the side of P, though as a rule not being so closely interwoven with it.

The structure of Deuteronomy is relatively simple. The body of the book is pervaded throughout by a single purpose, and bears the marks of being the work of a single writer, who has taken as the basis of his discourses partly the narrative and laws of J E as they exist in the previous books of the Pentateuch, partly laws derived from other sources; and who also, towards the end of his work, has incorporated extracts from J E, recording incidents connected with the death of Moses. One of the final redactors of the Pentateuch has likewise, towards the end of the book, introduced notices of P relating to the same occasion.

The Book of Joshua consists, at least in large measure, of a continuation of the documents used in the formation of the Pentateuch. Chapters i.—xii. are made up chiefly from J E; and chapters xiii.—xxiv. chiefly from P. There is, however, another element in the book of Joshua. J E, before it was combined with P, seems to have passed through the hands of a writer who expanded it in different ways, and who being strongly imbued with the spirit of Deuteronomy may be termed the Deuteronomic editor.

It is presumed that the reader would like to ask a few questions about the date and authorship of the Hexateuch. We pause to give him an opportunity. How many writers have contributed to the composition of the first six books of the Bible? Six principal writers, viz.: J and E and the compiler of these two, J E; P and the compiler of P and J E; and Deuteronomy,

known for short as D. Besides these there were a few minor writers whose initials have been lost.

Who was J? Nobody knows. Who was E? Nobody knows. Who was J E? Nobody knows. Who was P? Nobody knows. Who was D? Nobody knows. Who combined J E and P? Nobody knows. It is to be noted that the knowledge resulting from the labors of the higher critics is not unlimited. It can only tell us who did *not*, and not who *did* write the Bible. Which of these unknown scribes is the oldest? Critics are divided between J and E. When did they flourish? Not earlier than 900 B. C., the age of King Ahab; not later than 750 B. C., the age of King Hezekiah. When did J E combine J and E? Nobody knows. When did D write Deuteronomy? Shortly prior to, or during the reign of Josiah, 700 B. C. When did P flourish? Probably about 550 B. C., certainly subsequent to Ezekiel who belongs to the period of the Babylonish captivity. When did the last of them gather up the documents furnished by his predecessors and put the Hexateuch into its present shape? Nobody knows.

It will thus be seen that while many matters of interest are unknown, it is agreed among the critics that the oldest documents which enter into the composition of the oldest books of the Bible date subsequently to the division of the kingdom on the death of Solomon. There is general agreement among the critics that J belonged to the northern kingdom and E to the southern. These writers, J and E, made up their narratives mostly from tradition, but incorporated short fragments which possibly date from the age of Moses. The Bible, however, does not begin with the oldest writings. The first chapter of Genesis belongs to P, and P belongs to the period of the exile, or later.

Passing from the Hexateuch we note very briefly the results of the higher criticism as respects the other books of the Old Testament. Judges is a compound of fragmentary histories and oral traditions which became very much exaggerated as they passed from generation to generation. The book exhibits marked differences in language and style in different parts, giving rise to the probable conclusion that it is the work of more than one compiler.

Ruth was composed by a writer of the exilic, or post-exilic age. The basis of the narrative was family traditions respecting Ruth and her marriage with Boaz. These have been cast into a literary form by the author, who has to a certain extent idealized both the characters and the scenes.

I and II Samuel are made up of fragments; the compiler putting the material together without reference to chronological order, and attributing some events to one period of the history which belonged to another. The song of Hannah, for example (1 Sam. ii. 1-10), is not early in style, and seems unsuited to Hannah's position. The song was probably composed in celebration of some national success, and ascribed to Hannah because of certain incidental expressions.

I. and II. Kings were constructed in the same manner as the Book of Judges, *i. e.*, from preëxisting material, arranged together and expanded in a frame-work supplied by the compiler. This compiler was probably a cotemporary of Jeremiah.

I. and II. Chronicles are the work of an author who probably belonged to the priestly tribe of Levi, as there is an evident tendency throughout the books to magnify the priesthood. This author could not have written earlier than B. C. 300. His sources were the earlier historical books, from Genesis to II. Kings, other books now lost, and tradition. The additional matter supplied by this writer cannot be relied on as history. He was influenced by his surroundings, and imagined things on a much larger scale than they actually existed. He transferred to the times about which he wrote the ideas peculiar to the late age in which he lived.

Ezra and Nehemiah are a compilation made by an author who wrote long after the age of Ezra and Nehemiah, probably the same author who wrote the Chronicles. The basis of his work was partly the authentic memoirs of those two reformers, and partly other material, either documentary or traditional.

Esther is not strictly historical, but has a basis of historical truth. The elements were supplied to the author by tradition, and aided by his knowledge of Persian life and customs, he combined them into a consistent picture. The author belongs to the third century B. C. The moral tone of the book is not good;

and Esther and Mordacai can only be acquitted of blame by calling in question the accuracy of the history, "which happily an impartial historical criticism allows us to do."

Job is not the recital of literal history, but a drama based on a nucleus of fact. The date of its composition cannot be fixed with absolute certainty, but it will scarcely be earlier than Jeremiah, and belongs most probably to the period of the exile.

Of the seventy-three Psalms traditionally ascribed to David, the majority cannot be his. Ewald assigns twelve to him, and fragments embedded in three others. It is possible, says Dr. Driver, that this list is too large, but it is not clear that *none* of the Psalms contained in it are of David's composition. Discarding the titles of the Psalms as unworthy of credit, the date of each Psalm is to be determined altogether by internal evidence. The criteria relied upon lead the critics to as many different conclusions as there are critics. The only points of agreement are, that very few Psalms are of Davidic authorship, and that most of the Psalms are of much later date than that assigned to them by the traditional view.

The Book of Proverbs was formed gradually. It is divided into sections, but critics differ as to which sections are the older. They agree, however, that the present arrangement is not chronological, and the common opinion is that the oldest part of the book is the section embraced in chapters x.-xxii. It is not at all probable that Solomon had any hand in the composition of chapters xxx. and xxxi.; it is doubtful whether he contributed anything to chapters i.-ix. Of the remaining proverbs embraced in chapters x.-xxix., he was joint author with a number of other wise men.

Ecclesiastes was not written by Solomon. The language, the tone, the social and political allusions show that it is the product of a far later age. The tone is not that in which Solomon could have spoken. The author must have lived when the Jews were but a province of the Persian Empire. The probable date is not earlier than 332 B. C.

The Song of Solomon is certainly the song of some unknown author. Solomon's authorship is out of the question. Most mod-

ern critics agree that it was written in the northern kingdom in the tenth century B. C.

Isaiah. There is much difference as to the number of authors concerned in the production of this book. The majority of critics agree in ascribing chapters i.-xxxix. to Isaiah; and perhaps the majority agree in ascribing the remaining chapters, xl.-lxvi., to one whom they designate Deutero-Isaiah, and who wrote towards the end of the Babylonian captivity. But many critics divide the book into numerous parts, and assign the numerous parts to dates equally numerous.

The process by which Jeremiah assumed its present form is matter of conjecture. The chronological disorder and dislocations are decisive against the opinion that the prophecies were arranged as we now have them by either Jeremiah or his scribe Baruch. Jeremiah is the author of all but the fiftieth chapter.

In Ezekiel we have the rare exception of a prophet who seems to have done his own prophesying and his own writing. He was not much of a writer, however; having no poetic talent, the most uniformly prosaic of the earlier prophets.

As for Daniel, internal evidence shows with a cogency that cannot be resisted that this book was not written by Daniel, but must have been written not earlier than 300 B. C., probably not earlier than 168 B. C. The narrative is not throughout a work of imagination, but rests upon a basis of tradition.

Jonah was written after the exile by one who had forgotten most of the history. He did not know the name of the king of Nineveh. The materials of the narrative were supplied to the author by tradition, and rest ultimately upon a basis of fact. "The outlines of the narrative are historical, and Jonah's preaching was actually successful at Nineveh, though not upon the scale represented in the Book."

The book of Zechariah is the work of two prophets. Chapters i.-viii. are by one hand, and chapters ix.-xiv. by another.

The dual authorship of Micah is probable.

It will be seen from this brief summary of results that the higher criticism leaves unquestioned the authorship of only ten of the twenty-nine books of the Old Testament. Of these ten, only

one, the book of Ezekiel, is a book of any considerable size or prominence. The other nine belong to the list of minor prophets, and taken together contain only forty-eight chapters, fewer by eighteen than the one book of Isaiah. Small indeed is the residuum of Old Testament literature left to us with its genuineness and authenticity undisputed.

III. *Tendency.* The author from whom the foregoing results have been gleaned, says: "These conclusions affect not the *fact*, only the *form* of Revelation. They do not touch either the authority or the inspiration of the Old Testament." We cannot call in question the sincerity of the writer who makes this statement; we cannot but call in question the accuracy of the statement.

1. As a matter of fact, do the higher critics hold the same views of the authority and inspiration of the Bible as those who oppose them? Wellhausen notes that the forerunners of the higher critics were certain writers of the seventeenth century who called in question the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. The most conspicuous of these were Hobbes and Spinoza, one an atheist, and the other a pantheist. Of course neither believed in the divine authority and inspiration of the Bible. Jean Astruc, to whom the higher critics look up as their first parent, the Adam of their race, was a French infidel. Eichhorn, in whose fertile mind the seed dropped by Astruc first germinated and bore fruit, was a rationalist of the most pronounced type. Then followed De Wette, and after him Hupfeld, Noldeke, Vatke, George, and Graf. Each of these names marks a distinct stage in the development of Astruc's primordial idea; and they were all rationalists of the same spirit with Eichhorn. Kuenen took up the matter where Graf ended and pushed the development one step further, and then Wellhausen added the finishing touches which brought it to its present well-rounded state of perfection. These last two writers so far from holding to the divine authority and inspiration of the Bible are avowed enemies of supernaturalism in all its forms. It is safe to say that not one of the great names most closely identified with the origin and development of the higher criticism held to the authority and inspiration of the Bible in any such sense as would be acceptable to evangelical Christendom. Of the Eng-

lish and American followers of those German rationalists, what shall be said? Not one of them, so far as the present writer knows, but rejects the doctrine of verbal inspiration, and the idea of the inerrancy of the Scriptures. This is certainly true of such distinguished leaders as Prof. W. R. Smith, Dr. Marcus Dods, Profs. C. A. Briggs and C. H. Toy. Dr. Philip Schaff, a friend of the higher criticism, has recently said that it is impossible to hold the doctrine of verbal inspiration in the present stage of exegesis. Is it at all probable that Dr. Driver's own views of the authority and inspiration of the Old Testament have remained unaffected by the conclusions to which his critical theory has led him? What must he think of the inspiration of the author of the Chronicles whom he charges with the grossest exaggerations, and with ascribing to remote generations of the past ideas which were peculiar to his own age? What of the inspiration of him who wrote the book of Esther, and who in that book inculcates bad morals, and slanders Esther and Mordacai? It is certainly not too much to say that the inspiration of the writers to whose authorship Dr. Driver ascribes the greater part of the Old Testament is not the kind of inspiration which most persons think necessary to make the Bible "an infallible rule of faith and practice."

It must be something more than coincidence that those who are conspicuous as higher critics are also conspicuous for denying the divine authority of the Bible, or for holding loose and incoherent views of its inspiration. It is more than probable that they either espouse this radical theory because they have little reverence for the divine majesty of Scripture, or they come to have little reverence for the divine majesty of Scripture because they espouse this theory.

2. Admitting the theory of the higher critics as to the structure of the Bible, it is pertinent to ask, Who were inspired? The writers of the original documents, J, E, D, and P? If so, the redactors who took them in hand, and joined them into a connected narrative, were men sadly wanting in reverence for sacred writings. Think of a man's taking three inspired documents and tearing them to tatters, and then placing them together again

after the fashion of the redactor who manipulated J, E, and P! He does not place the three side by side, and let each tell its own tale. He tears a little strip from J, then a little strip from E, and then a little strip from P, and fits these together as best he can. As a specimen of his work, look at the fourteenth chapter of Exodus; verses 1-4 are from P; 5-7, from J; 8, 9, from P; half of verse 10 is from J, and the remaining half from E; verses 11-14 from J; 15-18 from P; half of verse 19 is from E; the other half, together with verse 20, is from J; one line and a half of verse 21 is from P, three lines from J, and the remaining line from P; verses 22, 23 are from P; 24, 25 from J; 26 and a part of 27 from P, the remainder of 27 from J; verses 28, 29 from P; 30, 31 from J. It will be seen from this specimen, that the redactor takes considerable liberty with his material. He tears his documents into fragments of all sizes and shapes. Moreover, if these little fragments do not fit smoothly when brought together, he tears from one and another, and throws away, until he secures a satisfactory joint. Or, failing in this, he supplies a little conciliatory material from his own inner consciousness, and joins them by this means. On the supposition that these redactors were dealing with inspired documents, they must have gone to the judgment burdened with quite a grave responsibility.

It is supposable, however, that the redactors were inspired, and that the material which they manipulated was not the product of inspiration. Then the question arises, of what value the result of their labors? One of the higher critics has himself answered this question. Professor W. R. Smith, in his *Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, says: "When it is admitted that the Bible history is based upon written sources, oral testimony and personal observation, no theory of inspiration can alter the principle that the knowledge of the writers was limited by their sources. Whatever they say which they did not find in their sources is not evidence but commentary." It is plain that an inspired man, no matter how plenary and unexceptionable his inspiration, cannot make inspired history out of uninspired historical documents.

3. The results of this criticism are such that they cannot but impair one's faith in the authority and inspiration of the Bible.

(a), This criticism attributes by far the greater part of the Old Testament to the authorship of men whose names and characters are utterly unknown and unknowable. It does not reassure us to be told that the human authorship does not affect the credibility of the contents of any given book. This is true only where we have reason to believe that the book was written under the supervision, or at least had the endorsement of a man who furnished credentials of his divine calling. This condition is not met in the case of these supposed authors, who, their names forever lost, must be designated like unknown quantities in algebraic equations. What "legate of the skies," proved to be such by the gift of prophecy, or the power of miracles, vouches for J, or E, or D, or P? These alphabetic spectres not only stand veiled in impenetrable darkness, but "none so poor to do them reverence." Should we try to exorcise demons by pronouncing over them these ghostly initials, the response would be, "Jesus, we know and Paul we know, but who are ye?" The critics themselves, though they have done them the high honor to place them in Moses' seat, Moses being thrust out, will not vouch for them.

It is evident that these nameless authors, supposing them ever to have had an existence outside of the fancy of the higher critics, thought there was something in a name. The book of Leviticus is supposed to be the work of P, who wrote in the exilic or post-exilic period of Jewish history. He was so intent on making Moses responsible as the human medium for the laws which he would foist on the church that he broke that short book of twenty-seven chapters into thirty-three paragraphs that he might introduce each one with the phrase, "The Lord spake unto Moses, saying." He never permits the reader to read a page without reminding him afresh that what he reads is what "the Lord spake unto Moses." There is every whit as much evidence that the laws of Leviticus were spoken to Moses, as that they were spoken by the Lord. It is preposterous, therefore, to tell us that the theory which eliminates Moses from the book of Leviticus does not affect the authority and inspiration of that book. The same reasoning applies to Deuteronomy. If D, who is supposed to have written Deuteronomy in the reign of Josiah, thought there was

nothing in a name, why did he put all his laws and discourses in the mouth of Moses? Instead of beginning his book by saying, "These be the words which Moses spake unto all Israel on this side Jordan in the wilderness in the plain over against the Red Sea," why did he not just out with the truth and say, "These be the words of me, D?" He must have thought that the church would yield a more ready assent to his teachings if it could be made to appear that they proceeded from Moses. No doubt he was right. And no doubt if the church of that day had found out what our critics have discovered, that he was attributing to Moses what Moses never wrote, it would have been necessary for him to emigrate. The church of to-day is, in this respect, like the church in Josiah's day, it will yield a much readier assent to Moses who exhibited credentials of his divine mission than to those whose resurrection from the grave of oblivion has waited so long that nothing remains to each but a single initial.

(b), This criticism tells us that much which purports to be history is not history. Some of it is tradition which has grown up around a nucleus of historic fact. How large the nucleus, and how extensive the growth of tradition in any given case are matters of conjecture. Some of that which purports to be history is merely a literary frame-work which a writer has constructed to serve as a setting for his moral precepts. Perhaps such a view of the narrative parts of Scripture does not affect the estimate which the higher critics place on the authority and inspiration of the Bible. But the minds of most persons are so constituted that they will doubt the truth of that which purports to be one thing and is in reality another.

(c), This criticism seeks to confirm its conclusions by pointing out not merely variations in style and language, but positive contradictions between different component parts of a given book. How do we know that the first and second chapters of Genesis are by different hands? One argument of the critics is the contradictory accounts which they give of the order of creation. In chapter first, man is made last; in chapter second he is made first. In chapter first man and woman are created at the same time; in chapter second quite an interval separates them. How do we

know that Leviticus and Deuteronomy are from different hands? They contain contradictory laws and institutions. It is in the interest of the theory to multiply and magnify these discrepancies and contradictions, and no critic who becomes an advocate of the theory is proof against the temptation. Hence the sad spectacle of men, bound by their ordination vows to honor the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as "the word of God, the only infallible rule of faith and practice," now engaged in the unholy task of trying to impeach its authority by convicting it of error. The higher criticism was born in infidelity, nurtured in rationalism, and it leaves the mark of its obnoxious parentage on all who embrace it.

IV. *Effect.* If the tendency is as indicated, the final effect of the higher criticism, should it prevail, can be nothing less than the total destruction of the whole Bible as a divine book. This involves the destruction of Christianity as a supernatural religion, reducing it to a system of human philosophy, which will have with each man just the measure of influence which his own judgment may allow to its internal worth.

1. The methods of the higher criticism are such that no book in the Bible can stand the test of their application. The Epistle to the Romans bears as many marks of unity of authorship as any piece of writing well could. Its compact logic, its parenthetic arguments, its sustained and almost impassioned earnestness carry an irresistible impression of one distinct individuality. But a brilliant critic has recently applied the same principles to it that have been used in dissecting the books of the Old Testament, and has resolved it into four distinct documents by as many different authors. He has accomplished this result by a fair and unstrained application of the principles. The documents, designated as G¹, G², J C, and C J, are clearly differentiated by doctrinal and linguistic peculiarities. Then using the same mathematical argument used by Dr. Harper on the first twelve chapters of Genesis, he makes a stronger case against the unity of Romans than Prof. Harper against the unity of Genesis. Now, if the Epistle to the Romans cannot escape destruction when subjected to the methods of the higher critics, evidently no book of either the Old or the New Testament can stand the test.

2. Such is the unity of the Bible as a whole that when one part suffers, all the parts suffer with it. The higher critic seldom puts his dissecting knife in any part of the Old Testament that he does not touch a vital part of the New. The name of Moses is not only woven into the texture of the Pentateuch, but it is also woven into the Gospels and Epistles. It is hard to believe that the influence accorded to the Pentateuch by the writers of the New Testament was independent of their faith in the inspiration of the man Moses. Jesus said, "had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me." We must do violence to language to so interpret this as that it shall have no reference to the man Moses. Every unbiased and unsophisticated mind must assent to the following propositions laid down by the author of "Deuteronomy, the People's Book;" "First, that Moses is spoken of in the New Testament as a man and not as a system; second, that the Hebrew law as a whole, in other words, the Five Books, are ascribed to him."

Isaiah is quoted twenty-one times in the New Testament, and eleven of these quotations are from that part of the book which the critics assure us that Isaiah did not write, that was not written till long after his death. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans says, "Isaiah is very bold, and saith, I was found of them that sought me not." The critics are much more bold and say that Isaiah never said any such thing, and that the man who did say it can not be found of them that seek him. In Matthew xxii. 41, and following, is the record of an interview between Christ and the Pharisees, in which Jesus asks them, "What think ye of Christ? whose son is he? They say unto him, The son of David. He saith unto them, How then doth David in spirit call him Lord, saying, The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou on my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool? If David then call him Lord, how is he his son?" What think ye of the critics who hesitate not to say that David did not write the Psalm from which Jesus quoted, and hence did not say in the spirit what Jesus attributes to him? Let it not be supposed, however, that in denying the Davidic authorship of that Psalm they mean to reflect on Christ as touching either his knowledge or veracity. But one is constrained to ask, Could any kind of testimony in the New

Testament as to the authorship of the books of the Old, balk the critics in the application of their methods? What seem to be mountains of difficulty in their way shrink into insignificant mole-hills at one wave of their critical wand. It is nothing to them that our Saviour and his apostles quote from writers what the writers never wrote, and ascribe writings to persons who never wrote anything. But the average mind will persist in thinking that such manner of quoting betrays either ignorance or dishonesty.

3. It was pointed out by Dr. Francis L. Patton, in the *Princeton Review*, for January, 1880, that there is a philosophy behind this criticism, the philosophy of evolution. It starts with the assumption that national life in all its forms, social, political, and religious, must grow from a crude beginning to a mature stage under the influence of purely natural forces. The national life of the Jews was not exceptional. It had a childhood and a growth from that to manhood. This growth covered all the intervening centuries between Moses and the captivity in Babylon. This growth involved the gradual development of religious laws and usages through all that period. Of course this philosophy will not square with the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. It must take the laws accumulated in those five books and distribute them, as to their origin, over the space of one thousand years. As a handmaid of the philosophy of evolution, the higher criticism is a necessity; and if there were no other way to account for the phenomena of Israel's checkered career, those who have given birth and nurture to the higher criticism would be worthy of all admiration and gratitude. But those who believe in the supernatural, who stagger not at miracles, have no need for the methods of the higher critics. They believe that a nation *may* be born in a day, and that a religious system instead of being a thing of slow growth *may* be the direct gift of God.

Dr. Patton is careful to say that the conclusions of the higher criticism may be adopted by men who have no sympathy with the materialistic philosophy of such men as Kuenen. As he was writing with a special reference to the views of Professor W. R. Smith, he was at special pains to exonerate him from such a charge as that of sacrificing Scripture to the demands of a godless philos-

ophy. He says that Professor Smith has unequivocally expressed his utter abhorrence of Kuenen's philosophy. Such abhorrence seems hardly consistent with the following from his *Old Testament in the Jewish Church*: "But from the days of Moses there was no change. With his death the Israelites entered on a new career, which transformed the nomads of Goshen into the civilized inhabitants of vineyard-land and cities in Canaan. But the divine laws given them beyond Jordan were to remain unmodified through all the long centuries of development in Canaan, an absolute and immutable code. I say, with all reverence, *that this is impossible.*" What is impossible? It is impossible that an elaborate system of immutable laws should be imposed on a nation at the beginning of its career. Why impossible? Because incompatible with the idea of development, the philosophy of evolution. The assumption that religious laws and institutions gradually develop underlies the arguments of Dillman and Driver, as could be easily shown, and no doubt, either consciously or unconsciously, affects this whole school of criticism. But if one accepts the philosophy of evolution, and makes that the basis of his reasoning, he must not only reject the traditional view of the Old Testament, but of the whole Bible. Evolution did not stop with the coming of Christ; neither, then, did the development of religion. If Moses could not legislate for the times of Solomon and Ezekiel, no more can Christ legislate for us. Every nation must develop under the same laws that governed the development of Israel. Here, then, is the final outcome. We are no longer to be trammelled by the religious and ethical notions of a distant past. We must go to our inner consciousness for our Bible. Usually the secular papers are with the latitudinarians, but the *New York Sun*, in a recent issue, drove straight to the mark when, speaking of the higher critics, it said: "They try to make themselves and others believe that they are only putting the authority of the Bible on a more rational basis, when in truth they are utterly destroying it, and along with it the supernatural basis of all theology and religion." Believing this to be true, we believe that the higher criticism is the most dangerous enemy that the church of God has to confront in this generation. R. C. REED.

Charlotte, N. C.

V. THE PENTECOSTAL BAPTISM.

WE venture to say that comparatively few persons have any clearly defined ideas of the Pentecostal baptism; and the views of these few differ widely. We propose in this paper a scriptural study of the subject.

Its importance none will gainsay. The administrator of this baptism is unquestionably the glorified Jesus; nor will it be disputed that John predicted of him that he should baptize. With water it is expressly said that Jesus baptized not, though his disciples did. As a baptizer, John contrasted himself with Jesus. He humbled himself as one who baptized with water only, while of Jesus he said that he was greater than himself, inasmuch as he should baptize with the Holy Ghost. That he so baptized for the first time on the day of Pentecost is surely indisputable. On the eve of our Lord's ascension, he said to his disciples: "Behold I send the promise of my Father upon you; but tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem until ye be endued with power from on high." (Luke xxiv. 49.) This promise of the Father, Peter declares to be the Holy Ghost first given at Pentecost: "Therefore being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this which ye now see and hear." (Acts ii. 33.) This promise of the Holy Ghost, Jesus himself identified with the baptism with the Holy Ghost: "Being assembled together with them, he commanded them that they should not depart from Jerusalem, but wait for the promise of the Father, which saith he, ye have heard of me; for John truly baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence." (Acts i. 4-5.) When Peter rehearsed the case of Cornelius, he said: "And as I began to speak, the Holy Ghost fell on them as on us at the beginning. Then remembered I the word of the Lord, how that he said, John indeed baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost." (Acts xi. 15, 16.) It is clear that the predicted baptism with the Holy

Ghost was first fulfilled on Pentecost. But why should we be so painstaking to prove from the Scriptures that which no one will deny? It will appear in the sequel that there is abundant reason for the emphasis.

The fact being established, we proceed to inquire as to its significance. What is baptism with the Holy Ghost? Here Christians part company. It is to be remarked, too, that their paths of divergence are not coincident with denominational lines. It may possibly be that our reading has not been very extensive, but it seems that the nature of this baptism is a field of speculation not yet staked off by formulated creeds. Here and there, parties from every ecclesiastical state and territory have claimed to find rich pockets of gold and auriferous strata. Theories are eagerly advanced, earnestly advocated and ardently embraced; but yet it seems to the writer that none of these theories have been subjected to close scriptural tests.

The theory most popular now, especially in Y. M. C. A. circles, is that of which Mr. Moody may be regarded as the honored champion. Mr. Moody is a devout Bible student, as everybody knows, and therefore his opinions justly have weight. His theory, if we may designate it his, is that the baptism with the Spirit *endues the Christian with power for service*. Christians are exhorted to pray for this baptism—a pentecostal baptism with power. Some Christians, therefore, are said to have it, while many others have it not.

Scriptural support for this “power-for-service” or “endowment-with-power” theory is sought in the words already quoted from Luke’s gospel: “Tarry ye . . . until ye be endued with power from on high.” Also in Acts i. 8: “Ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you.” Also the citation from Joel: “I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy,” etc. Countenance for this theory is sought also in the statement that tongues of fire sat upon each of them, when they were filled with the Holy Ghost; which tongues of fire are held to be symbols of consuming zeal. But is it a fact that tongues of fire sat upon each of them? The text says: “Cloven tongues like as of fire,” or luminous tongues. The

correctness of the interpretation that Pentecost fulfilled not only the baptism with the Spirit, but also the baptism with fire is here assumed. But is it so absolutely certain that this was the baptism with fire predicted by John? Such an interpretation reduces the baptism with fire to a mere coincidence and collateral of the baptism with the Spirit, while John's language respecting it is so grave as to lift it up into coördination with the other baptism. Said John: "Now also the axe is laid unto the root of the trees; therefore every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire. I indeed baptize you with water unto repentance; but he that cometh after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear; he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, and with fire: whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner; but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire." (Matt. iii. 10-12.) Is it not more correct to say that the whole race will be baptized? they who receive him, with the Holy Ghost; and they who reject him, with fire; when he with flaming fire will take vengeance upon them who obey not the truth, but obey unrighteousness.

Mr. Moody lays great stress also upon the preposition "*on*" or "*upon*." The Spirit, he correctly says, is *in* every believer, but the Pentecostal baptism, he asserts, was *upon* believers, enduing them with power for service. He contends that the promise of the Comforter to be in the believer, as given in John xiv.-xvi., was fulfilled, not at Pentecost, but on the day of Christ's resurrection, when we are told in John xx. 22, that Jesus breathed on the apostles (save Thomas, who was not present) and said: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." But see what John the Evangelist says of the anointing with the Holy Spirit, a figure which unquestionably represents the Spirit as "poured out," "shed upon" him who received him: "The anointing which ye have received of him abideth *in* you." (1 John ii. 27.) Such language should warn us against putting too much confidence in a theory whose corner-stone is a single preposition.

Furthermore, Mr. Moody is hard put to it when he is constrained to find in John xx. 22, in Christ's act of breathing *on* the apostles,

the fulfilment of the promise that the Spirit who was with them should also be in his disciples. If in that incident we do not find an enduement with power (just the very thing Mr. Moody says it was not) then it should be hard to find it anywhere. "As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you. And when he had said this he breathed *on* them and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained." If this was not an enduement with power (infallibility in declaring the conditions of salvation), we know not what it was. Certainly there is nothing in the incident which marks it as the fulfilment of the promise of the indwelling Spirit. On the contrary, the fact that Jesus had not yet taken his final departure is positive disproof, for Jesus had told them: "It is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart I will send him unto you." (John xvi. 7.)

But there is no need to weigh pros and cons in the consideration of this enduement-with-power theory, as though the argument were nearly evenly balanced. The scriptural disproof is clear and overwhelming in the indisputable fact with which we set out, and which Mr. Moody himself receives,—that the Pentecostal baptism was the predicted baptism with the Holy Ghost. Prior to Pentecost there had been no such thing as baptism with the Spirit. The evangelist says, "the Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." (John vii. 39.) Paul says: "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, . . . that (*iva*—in order that) we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." (Galatians iii. 13, 14.) The ascending Jesus said: "Behold, I send the promise of my Father upon you." (Luke xxiv. 29.) And Peter says: "Being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost." (Acts ii. 33.) Unquestionably, this *promise* was ~~not~~ fulfilled before the *glorification* of the risen Jesus, and yet power for service, as an endowment of the Spirit, was not uncommon in the ages prior to Christ's exaltation. Therefore the baptism with the Spirit is not enduement with power. Read Exodus xxxi. 2-6: "I have called by name Bezaleel, . . .

and I have filled him with the Spirit of God in wisdom, and in understanding, and in knowledge, and in all manner of workmanship; . . . and I have given with him Aholiab; . . . and in the hearts of all that are wise-hearted I have put wisdom, that they may make all that I have commanded thee." So, too, God raised up judges in Israel to deliver his people from their foes. To Jeremiah the Lord said: "Before I formed thee, . . . before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee; and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations." (Jer. i. 5.) Such instances of enduement with power for service by the Spirit of God are too numerous for citation here. The day of Pentecost bore witness to extraordinary and miraculous power, but such power was exerted by Old Testament saints, and by the apostles in our Lord's sojourn on earth. Even the power of raising the dead was conferred on the prophet Elisha. True, we read in Acts ii. 4, "They were all filled with the Holy Ghost," as a qualification for service, but of John the Baptist it was said by the angel that he should "be filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his mother's womb." Zacharias and Elizabeth, his parents, were filled with the Holy Ghost. So, too, as we have seen, was Bezaleel. It is clear, therefore, that enduement with power at Pentecost was not in fulfilment of the promised baptism, which was conditioned upon the glorification of Jesus.

Equally crushing is another fact: this baptism with the Spirit was on *all* believers. The enduement theory exhorts Christians to pray for this baptism. It declares that some Christians have never received it. Inefficiency in the ministry, unfruitfulness in service, is attributed to the lack of this baptism. Now we are far from saying that some Christians are not more efficient than others. Few men have been so useful as Mr. Moody; and we are equally far from denying that very much unfruitfulness is due to a lack of consecration. Many are never, and probably none are at all times filled with the Spirit. To be filled with the Spirit, all should earnestly seek, but absolutely all true Christians do receive, the baptism with the Spirit.

The proof of this proposition is not lacking. We read in John vii. 37-39: "Jesus stood and cried, If *any* man thirst let him

come unto me and drink. He that *believeth* on me, as the Scriptures hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. (But this spake he of the Spirit which they that *believe on him* should receive, for the Holy Ghost was not yet given because that Jesus was not yet glorified.)” This bestowment of the Spirit, consequent upon the glorification of Jesus, and so identified with the Pentecostal baptism, was for *all* believers. Compare the passage just quoted with 1 Cor. xii. 13: “By one Spirit are *we all* baptized into one body . . . and have been *all* made to drink into (of) one Spirit.” The passage heretofore quoted from Gal. iii. 13, 14, is also to the point. Christ was made a curse for us “that we might receive the promise of the Spirit *through faith*.” To the whole Galatian Church Paul wrote: “Received ye the Spirit by the works of the law or by the *hearing of faith*? Are ye so foolish, having begun in the Spirit, are ye now made perfect by the flesh?” (Gal. iii. 2, 3.) Of Christ’s exaltation Peter, speaking for the apostles, said: “We are witnesses of these things, and so is also the Holy Ghost whom God hath give to them that obey him.” (Acts v. 32.) So too, in speaking of Cornelius and his household, he says: “God gave them the like gift as he did unto us who *believed* on the Lord Jesus Christ.” To the Pentecostal audience, when they asked what they must do to be saved, he replied: “Repent and be baptized every one of you in (*upon i. e.* believing upon) the name of the Lord Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise (*promise*, again) is unto you and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call.” (Acts ii. 38, 39.) We have very great respect for Mr. Moody, but in the face of this plain teaching we cannot agree with him in a theory which restricts the baptism with the Holy Spirit to only a few earnest Christians.

There is another theory, emanating from no such amiable and devout temper, but on the contrary prompted by the wish to be rid of the Spirit’s baptism altogether, and which yet has more apparent Scriptural support than the theory we have just discussed. This theory identifies the Pentecostal baptism with the gift of tongues, and regards it therefore, as a thing of the past. It is

obscurely, but extensively propagated, and its animus is hostility to any baptism, save that immersion into water which is so-called.

The advocates of this theory contend for a gift of power qualifying for service, but a gift which was miraculous, novel, temporary, and conferred only by the laying on of the apostles' hands. If against them we urge that the baptism with the Spirit was unknown prior to Pentecost, their answer is: Certainly, the gift of tongues was something novel. If we allege that all Christians were baptized with the Spirit, they will not demur, but will assert that all received the gift of tongues, and that therein the gift of the Spirit was exhausted. This, too, is a power-for-service theory, but even more specious than the other, inasmuch as it adheres to the miraculous nature of that power, as a matter of fact, to its novelty, as an exercise of power, to faith only as the condition, and to the laying on of the apostles' hands as the means of its bestowment. Its vice is that, in confounding the gift of the Spirit himself with a manifestation of the Spirit, it discards a fundamental truth of the gospel. Its refutation will lead us nearer the true nature of the Pentecostal baptism.

This identification of the Spirit with the gift of tongues derives some plausibility from the Scriptural phraseology which so often seems to confound a grace with its appropriate sign. Thus, to the disciples at Ephesus, Paul said: "Have ye received the Holy Ghost since ye believed? . . . And when Paul had laid his hands upon them, the Holy Ghost came on them; and they spake with tongues and prophesied." So to the Pentecostal audience Peter said: "Therefore being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth *this*, which ye now *see* and *hear*." Again, in Acts x. 45, 46, we read that they of the circumcision with Peter were astonished "Because that on the Gentiles also was poured out the gift of the Holy Ghost, *for* they *heard* them speak with tongues."

But it were arbitrary to insist that these passages obliterate the distinction between the Spirit as cause and the gift of tongues as effect. It is legitimate to see in the miracle only a sign of the Spirit's presence. They of the circumcision with Peter were astonished that on the Gentiles was poured out the gift of

the Spirit; they were doubtless convinced that such was the case, because the gift of tongues was regarded as the appointed sign of baptism with the Spirit by the glorified Jesus. To the Spirit are referred all miraculous manifestations of divine power and all gracious affections. He worketh in us to will and to do of God's good pleasure. "Now the God of hope fill you with all peace and hope in believing, that ye may abound in hope through the power of the Holy Ghost." (Rom. xv. 13.) And again in verse 19 the apostle speaks of "mighty signs and wonders by the power of the Spirit of God." Against any confusion of the Spirit with his manifestations the apostle seems to protest: "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit." (1 Cor. xii. 4.) We are expressly told in Acts ii. 4, that *as* the Spirit gave them utterance, they began to speak with tongues. Said Jesus: "Ye shall receive power, *after* that the Holy Ghost is come upon you." (Acts i. 8.)

It cannot be maintained that the promise of the Father was specifically the gift of tongues. Peter at Pentecost claimed for the gift of tongues that it was in fulfilment of Joel's prediction, that in the last days God would pour out of his Spirit upon all flesh, as a result of which men should dream dreams, see visions, and prophesy, while many other wonders and signs should appear; but nothing was said of tongues. Again, those disciples at Ephesus, upon whom Paul laid his hands, and who received the Holy Ghost, not only spake with tongues, but also prophesied. Again, it were absurd to say that Christ was made a curse for us in order that, in fulfilment of the "Father's promise," the early Christians might receive the power to speak with tongues—a gift which the Spirit said should cease, and which, accordingly, has ceased. And again, it is right here that this theory breaks down utterly and obviously, for while it admits that only faith was the condition of the Spirit's bestowment, it fails to note that the promise of the Father is given all believers since Pentecost, while the gift of tongues was not conferred upon every believer even in the apostolic age. "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." (Rom. viii. 9.) "Hereby know we that we dwell in him and he in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit." (1 Jno.

iv. 13.) In 1 Cor. xii. 13, the apostle says: "By one Spirit are we *all* baptized into one body;" but in verse 4 he had said: "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit." These gifts in verse 7 are called manifestations of the Spirit. "To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom;" to another, this; to another, that; and "to another (v. 10) divers kinds of tongues." In verse 30 he asks: "Have all the gift of healing? do all speak with tongues? do all interpret?" The obvious answer is, No. In 1 Cor. xiv. 5, he says: "I would that ye all spake with tongues." All did not; but all were baptized with the Spirit. The "promised" Spirit has not been withdrawn; but, as Paul predicted, tongues have ceased.

We may note further, that in comparison with other gifts Paul seems to esteem lightly the gift of tongues. In 1 Cor. xiii. 1, he says: "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." In xiv. 5, he says: "I would that ye all spake with tongues, but rather that ye prophesied; for greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues." The Corinthian Christians were ambitious to possess showy gifts, especially that of tongues, but he tells them in xiv. 12, "forasmuch as ye are zealous of spiritual gifts, seek that ye may excel to the edifying of the church;" and in verse 19 he plainly shows which is most for edification: "*In the church* I had rather speak five words with my understanding . . . than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue." It is obvious that all believers did not receive the gift of tongues; but all do receive the baptism with the Spirit. Furthermore, some received the gift of tongues who were not baptized with the Spirit. The case of Simon Magus is in point. It is said of him that he believed, *i. e.*, he professed faith, and in conferring the gift of tongues by laying on of hands, it were unreasonable to suppose that the apostles excepted him, when we are told that they did not perceive he was in the bonds of iniquity until his proffer of money betrayed to them the real state of his heart. It was no part of the apostles' work to distinguish spurious from genuine believers, and therefore professed believers might receive the gift at the hands of the apostles, while only real believers were baptized by Jesus with the Holy Spirit. Some professing faith re-

ceived the gift of tongues; while all true believers received the baptism.

The refutation of this theory is not superfluous. Certainly not in this discussion, for it opens the way for considering the divine purpose in the gift of tongues. The Pentecostal baptism cannot be adequately considered if we take no cognizance of this purpose.

What, then, was its meaning and use? The apostle tells us that tongues were for a sign. In Mark xvi. 17, our Lord spake of it as such, and as only one sign among many: "These signs shall follow *them that believe*; in my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with tongues," etc. Whenever any one was sent of God with new revelations to men, God always accredited their mission with miraculous signs. Thus Moses when sent of God as Israel's deliverer, showed signs in attestation of his mission. So, too, even the testimony of Jesus was corroborated by miracles. Jesus appealed to his works: "Believe me for the very works' sake." By these Nicodemus was convinced: "No man can do these miracles which thou doest except God be with him." "How shall we escape," says the inspired writer of Hebrews, "if we neglect so great salvation, which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him; God also bearing them witness with signs and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost according to his own will."

But the crucifixion of Jesus must have seemed to the world an effectual disproof of his Messianic claim. True, his disciples testified as eye-witnesses that he was risen and ascended into heaven. But who would believe so stupendous a claim? Where was the boasted king and kingdom of Israel? Nothing but signs and wonders, marvellous and startling, would convince the world that the pretensions of Jesus had not met with disastrous failure. On this point the disciples themselves were anxious. They asked the Master (Acts i. 6), "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel? And he said unto them, It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power. But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you: and ye shall

be witnesses unto me." The power to work miracles, which they had before the Lord's crucifixion, had been suspended at his death; but it should be restored, accrediting them as witnesses unto him—after the promised baptism with the Spirit by himself. Luke's former treatise narrated what Jesus "began to do and to teach." The Book of Acts narrates what this same Jesus continued to do and to teach. It was of first importance, to prove that Jesus was not dead but living. "Let all the house of Israel know assuredly that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye crucified, both Lord and Christ." Peter hastened to disclaim the healing by his own power of the lame man at the Gate Beautiful, and referred it to the living Jesus: "Why look ye so earnestly on us, as though by our own power or holiness we had made this man to walk? The God of our fathers hath glorified his Son Jesus . . . whom God hath raised from the dead; whereof we are witnesses . . . And his name, through faith in his name, hath made this man strong." "With great power gave the apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus."

But it was not enough to prove the resurrection and glorification of Jesus. It was necessary to show that God had made Jesus "*Lord and Christ*," "Prince and Saviour." In his Messianic office what was he doing? What great work was he doing as the Christ? John had predicted that he should baptize with the Holy Ghost and with fire. The first baptism was an essential part of his redeeming work, for he was made a curse for us that we might receive the promise of the Spirit. John the Evangelist and Jesus himself had declared that this baptism would be consequent upon the exaltation of Jesus. And so on the day of Pentecost Peter argues that the gift of tongues was the appointed sign of the promised baptism with the Spirit which was then given; and points to the coming baptism of Christ's enemies with fire by a citation from the Psalms: "The Lord said unto my Lord, sit thou on my right hand, until I make thy foes thy footstool." Pentecost, the feast of first fruits, was fittingly chosen for the baptism with the Spirit. Because this baptism was not self-evidencing to those who were not the subjects thereof, therefore an appropriate sign was necessary. Therefore the language of Paul

in 1 Cor. xiv. 22: "Tongues are for a sign, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not." So it was that "*in the church*" Paul esteemed a few words of prophecy more for the edification of believers than many words in an unknown tongue. And inasmuch as the baptism with the Spirit was something hitherto unknown, a novelty, like the gift of tongues, was divinely chosen as its appropriate sign. Signal appropriateness is seen also in that it qualified its possessors to be witnesses, as on Pentecost, to men from every nation under heaven, that they might hear, every man in his own tongue, the wonderful works of God.

That the baptism with the Spirit is not self-evidencing is forcibly shown in the case of the first Gentile converts. To the apostles even, in this case, the gift of tongues was a necessary sign that the Spirit was given, for they were unprepared to believe that to the Gentiles also God had granted repentance unto life. And therefore it was that without the laying on of Peter's hands, which indeed he would have refused, Jesus, the Prince and Saviour, bestowed on Cornelius and the others the gift of tongues as a sign of their baptism with the Spirit by himself. Therefore Peter said: "Can any man forbid water that these should not be baptized which have received the Holy Ghost as well as we?" But for the appropriate sign Peter and they of the circumcision with him would have scouted the thought that Cornelius and his friends had received the Spirit. And let it be noted, as bearing directly on the nature of baptism with the Spirit, that Peter here speaks of it as necessarily associated with repentance unto life, and as guaranteeing salvation.

This sign of the tongues is associated with the "promise of the Father" as is no other miracle. In the case of the Samaritans, Philip preached Christ and wrought miracles; casting out devils and healing the lame and the palsied. But Philip did not confer the gift of tongues, neither at this time nor at the baptism of the eunuch. When the apostles heard that Samaria had received the word of God, they sent Peter and John, who "prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost, for as yet he was fallen upon none of them; only they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus. Then laid they their hands on them and they re-

ceived the Holy Ghost." We are next told that Simon saw that through laying on of the apostles' hands the Holy Ghost was given. That throughout the narrative the gift of tongues is called the Holy Ghost shows only how intimately the former was associated with the latter as its appropriate sign. The case of these Samaritans was somewhat similar to that of Cornelius. Their position may be conceived as half way between Jew and Gentile. Jesus himself had made disciples among them, and they received the rite of circumcision. But still not being Jews, Peter and John deemed their case uncommon and before laying hands upon them prayed that they might receive the sign of their baptism with the Spirit. This would dispel all doubt and settle their status.

But why was this power which Simon sought to buy conferred by the apostles only? A word here in passing as to the dogma of confirmation. The theory of confirmation by the laying on of hands is so palpably a blunder, that it deserves scant notice. The three passages which speak of confirming the disciples are these: "Confirming the souls of the disciples" (Acts xiv. 22); "Exhorted the brethren with many words, and confirmed them" (Acts xv. 32); "And he went through Syria and Cilicia, confirming the churches" (Acts xv. 41). In the first place, the parties confirmed were established churches, Christians who had often sat at the Lord's table. Secondly, they were confirmed, not by laying on of hands, but by exhortation with many words; by instruction they were established in the faith. Thirdly, it were absurd to suppose that the laying on of hands, with the consequent gift of tongues, was unknown to these churches till long after their organization. Fourthly, Judas Barsabas and Silas were not apostles, and, therefore, were, like Philip, incompetent to confer the gift of tongues, but were chief men among the brethren, whom they confirmed with many words. The laying on of hands by the apostles secured confirmatory evidence that Jesus was baptizing believers with the Holy Ghost, as the apostles were appointed to testify. Confirmation as a rite, wholly divorced from the doctrine of baptism, arrogating to confer the Spirit himself, which not even an apostle dared to claim, and challenging credence without the miraculous evidence which accredited apostles, is an eccentric vagary, a rash invention.

Let us return, then, to inquire why this power of conferring the gift of tongues was confined to the apostles. As a divine attestation of the truth of apostolic testimony to the Messianic exaltation of Jesus, it was indispensable that no one should be able to confer the sign save the chosen witnesses of Jesus. It certified their truth as witnesses. The believer receiving the gift became thereby a dispenser of the glad tidings to people of other nationalities. In miracles of healing the recipient experienced the power of the Spirit in his own behalf; by this miracle he was enabled to exercise miraculous power for the good of others. Whether the subject himself understood what he was saying is in dispute, but it is unquestionable that the hearers understood the wonderful things of God which were spoken in their own tongues. They were taught to regard it as a sign that the believer in Jesus received the Holy Ghost, according to the sermon of Peter: "Ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." In answer to the question, Whence received you this wonderful gift of tongues? the response would be, At the hands of the apostles, who witness that the crucified Jesus is risen, and ascended, and seated at the right hand of God, and has received of the Father the promised Spirit wherewith to baptize his followers. Thus the sign overwhelmingly corroborated the testimony of the apostles. And what sign could have been more fittingly chosen to accredit them whose mission was to go into all the world and preach the gospel to all nations?

It being settled that the gift of tongues was only a sign, and a sign of the baptism with the Spirit himself by the glorified Jesus, we return to the original question: What means this baptism? What do people mean when they pray for a Pentecostal outpouring of the Spirit? They mean that the mass of Christians may be revived, and that a multitude of sinners may be converted. They mean, in a word, to pray for a great revival.

Was there no such thing as a great revival before Pentecost? There were revivals in the days of Josiah, and Nehemiah, and John the Baptist. But of one thing we are assured, there was never before a baptism with the Holy Spirit. Pentecost witnessed something more than a grand revival.

That the Spirit operates upon the heart, effecting a saving change of the soul's disposition, enabling it to embrace Jesus Christ, is true; but that this is what the Spirit does *in his baptism* is an utterly untenable theory. The strange thing is that this is the current theory. Strange, in view of the fact that God had converted saints before Pentecost. Strange, in view of the fact that none but believers were so baptized at Pentecost. Disciples, and disciples only, were baptized by the Spirit. No one will contend that these were not already the subjects of saving grace. With the exception of Judas, Jesus pronounced the apostles "clean." Nor can it be disputed that none but believers were baptized with the Spirit. This point has already been sufficiently elaborated. These three facts, the novelty of this baptism, its administration to believers only, and the reality of conversion prior to Pentecost, utterly subvert the theory that by the baptism with the Spirit is wrought a change of heart. Pentecost inaugurated

THE INDWELLING OF THE SPIRIT.

"The *anointing* which ye have received of him abideth *in you*." (1 John ii. 27.) Is it objected that the Spirit dwelt in believers prior to Pentecost? Then, in the first place, will some one tell us what the baptism with the Spirit really was? We think we have shown conclusively that it was not enduement with power; nor was it the gift of tongues; nor was it the work of converting the sinner unto God.

In the second place, if the Spirit, prior to Pentecost, made the body of the believer a "habitation of God," "a temple of the Holy Ghost," what does Jesus mean when he says of the Spirit: "He is (abides) *with you*, and *shall be in you*"—*παρὸ ὑμῶν μένει, καὶ ἐν ὑμῶν ἔσται.* (John xiv. 17.) The ordinary explanation of these words is entirely arbitrary, inadequate, and unsatisfactory. That explanation makes Jesus say that hereafter the apostles would have a clearer conception of the truth. It makes him reiterate, in other words, his statement that when the Spirit was come he would lead them into all truth. Such was indeed to be the case, but it does not explain in what sense the Spirit was to come, he being already *with* them. Jesus said: "It is expedient that I go away, for if I

go not away the comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart I will send him unto you." It is said that not until the death, resurrection and glorification of Jesus could the disciples have a reassuring and comforting knowledge of the Messiah's finished redemption, and in this sense "the Spirit was not given because Jesus was not glorified." But again we ask, how does this comport with the fact that the comforter was then *with* them?

And further, let us recall the fact that the gift of the Spirit by the glorified Jesus was in fulfilment of his promised baptism. Now of that baptism it is written that by it we are all baptized into one body; by it we are baptized into Christ. Surely this language means something more than a better understanding of the gospel. Surely when Paul wrote, "Christ is made a curse for us, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit," he meant something more than a clearer conception of the plan of salvation. Surely when Peter preached, "Repent . . . and ye shall receive the Holy Ghost," he was not promising a clearer conception of the gospel. When Paul wrote to the Galatians, he surely did not mean to ask them if they received a completer view of the gospel by the works of the law or by the hearing of faith.

Upon this criticism it may be retorted, that it proves too much; that it makes the Pentecostal baptism a saving grace, inasmuch as baptism into Christ is essential to salvation. Such indeed it is. Our Catechism teaches that baptism (with water) signifies our engrafting into Christ. Surely baptism with water is a sign and seal of baptism with the Spirit. And inasmuch as there is but one baptism, inasmuch as Jesus has never administered but one baptism with the Spirit, then undoubtedly the baptism of Pentecost was that whereby we are now by one Spirit baptized into Christ.

But, the reader cries, how then were the Old Testament saints saved? Well, that is a problem. Recalling the words of Peter that baptism doth now save us (1 Pet. iii. 21), and the admitted fact with which this article sets out, that the predicted baptism with the Spirit was first administered at Pentecost, has the reader a theory which suffices to solve the problem? But, you will ask, how is it possible for the Old Testament saints to be saved without the

effectual calling of the Holy Spirit? The stubborn fact confronts us that Old Testament saints and disciples of Jesus prior to Pentecost, had been effectually called by the Spirit and were in a state of salvation. They were believers, and believers only were recipients of the Pentecostal baptism: Therefore, the baptism with the Spirit is not that effectual calling by which the Spirit works faith in us. The Spirit was *with* the disciples and the Old Testament saints in effectual calling, and in all his functions, ordinary and miraculous, but he was not *in* the saints until at Pentecost the crowning grace of baptism was administered by Jesus. As to the nature of this baptism, we would say that it is *not an operation*, but the *impartation* of the Spirit. It is not any work of the Spirit on the heart, but the communication of the Spirit himself. "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." "Ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be the Spirit of Christ dwell in you." The baptism with the Spirit has nought to do with sanctification or regeneration in the popular sense of those words, but with justification, of which it is the consummation because it makes us one with Christ. Jesus took part in our human nature, that we might be made "partakers of the divine nature." "He was made a curse for us that we might receive the Spirit." The Spirit never made a human body his temple, till he dwelt in the body of Jesus. When Jesus said, destroy this temple, he spake of the temple of his body, of which the ancient temple with its Shekinah was a type. When Jesus took to glory the body of a holy and righteous man, then redemption was finished, and the bodies of saints became habitations of God through the Spirit. We have fellowship *with* Christ in his finished work and its reward, only by fellowship (partnership) *of* the Spirit. "The communion of the Holy Ghost" is his indwelling, the Holy Ghost communicated. We are . . . justified in the name of the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of our God. We have access unto the Father by one Spirit. By the fellowship of the Spirit we are baptized into Christ.

But still the question recurs: how then were the Old Testament saints saved? The answer is easy. The sacrifice of Jesus for sin was just as necessary for their salvation, and yet Jesus had not

died. We say, the virtue of his death was anticipated for believers prior to his advent. Much more then was this baptism anticipated, for as we have seen repeatedly, Christ was made a curse that we might receive the baptism. If then for Old Testament saints the procuring cause was anticipated, how much more the resultant baptism. The one secured and the other consummated the work of justification. For sanctifying operation on their hearts, working repentance, faith, perseverance, joy, holiness, the Spirit was *with* the saints prior to Calvary.

This exposition harmonizes passages of Scripture seemingly at variance and removes, we venture to allege, a great stumbling block in the way of Calvinistic theology, viz: the gift of the Spirit after faith. "In whom after that ye believed ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise." (Eph. i. 13.) "Have ye received the Holy Ghost since ye believed?" (Acts xix. 2.) These are only two of the many passages adduced by Arminians to sustain their dogma that faith is not the gift of God, that faith preceeds regeneration, meaning thereby a change of heart. But is regeneration a change of disposition? This is the common view, but is it correct? Is regeneration the work of the Spirit enabling us to embrace the grace offered in God's call? What Scripture says so? We challenge the proof. On the contrary we think it clear that regeneration is identical with the baptism with the Spirit. The word regeneration—as also its equivalent *παλιγγενεσία*—appears but twice. In Matt. xix. 28, we have: "In the regeneration when the Son of Man shall sit upon the throne of his glory." The other and only relevant passage is Tit. iii. 5, 6: "Nor by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour." The *and* is here equivalent to *even* the washing of regeneration, even the renewing, etc. The words "washing of regeneration," clearly associate regeneration with baptism, and the last clause defines the baptism to be that with the Holy Ghost. So that the only passage which contains the word, associates it with the Pentecostal baptism which is "shed upon us abundantly through Jesus Christ" the administrator, and

which has been shown to be the communication of the indwelling Spirit. So much for the word "regeneration."

When we speak of regeneration every one's mind turns to our Lord's interview with Nicodemus. Twice in Jno. iii. 3 and 7, Jesus speaks of birth again or from above (*ἄνωθεν*); and three times (*Ib.* v., vi., viii.,) this birth is said to be of the Spirit. In verse 5 we have the words "born of water and of the Spirit." Here again the *and* is exegetical and equivalent to *even*—born of water, even of the Spirit. The first baptism is ritual; the second, real. Thus again the new birth is identified with that baptism with the Spirit of which baptism with water is the sign and seal. This relation between the two, was also asserted by Peter when he said: "Who can forbid water that these should not be baptized, who have received the Holy Ghost as well as we." Now, as we have clearly shown, the work of the Spirit, in the effectual calling of all God's saints in all ages is not to be confounded with the baptism with the Spirit which was first administered by Jesus at Pentecost; nor, therefore, with the new birth. With this view our Catechism is in full accord.

Our attention is arrested by the fact that the Scriptures are comparatively silent upon a matter of such transcendent importance as regeneration. Jesus said: "Except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God," and yet none of the evangelists, save John, say anything about it, and he, only in the third chapter. Further, in all the New Testament the idea of regeneration, or birth of God, is mentioned only by John in his gospel and frequently in his first epistle, except once, as we have seen by Paul, twice by Peter in his first epistle i. 3, 23 (*ἀναγεννάω*), and once by James (*ἀποξεύξω* i. 8).

We do not overlook the fact that Paul speaks of the adoption of sons (*υιοθεσία*) and the Spirit of adoption, and that accordingly, believers are frequently called the sons and children of God. And right here again, let us note that they who are born of the Spirit are all the children of God *by* faith in Christ Jesus. (*Gal.* iii. 26.) They receive the Spirit by the hearing of faith. Regeneration is not therefore that effectual calling whereby the Spirit "doth persuade and enable us to embrace Jesus Christ,"

but it is the baptism with the Spirit whereby we are engrafted into Christ, and, having fellowship with him in his Spirit, are thereby one with him, and have fellowship also in all the awards of his obedience unto death.

Not one scintilla of evidence is there in all the New Testament that regeneration is effectual calling. We are not made the sons of God by the sanctifying work of the Spirit in our hearts; but by being baptized into Christ we are made sons of God in him, and heirs of God because joint heirs with him. No amount of righteousness ever attained by man on earth will justify his adoption into the family of God, but by faith in Christ Jesus, we are all the children of God. It is therefore much to be regretted that the Committee of Confessional Revision for the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (northern), should have introduced new matter which invites the Assembly to put the seal of its approbation upon a popular error which the symbols as they now stand fail to countenance. The report reads: "The act of *regeneration wherein* being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is enabled to answer God's call and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it." In effectual calling, the Spirit enables us to embrace Christ; and this he has done in all ages; but regeneration is the indwelling of the Spirit, granted for the first time on the day of Pentecost in the baptism with the Spirit, after Christ had taken to glory the first human body that was ever a temple of the Holy Ghost.

So far from the Scriptures furnishing evidence that in regeneration the Spirit enables us to embrace Christ, they teach, on the contrary, that it follows faith. We have decisive testimony to the identification of new birth and the indwelling of the Spirit in Romans viii. 9. Jesus had said, Ye must be born again; that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit. Paul wrote to the Romans: "Ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit (regenerated), *if so be the Spirit of God dwell in you.*" Birth of the Spirit, baptism with the Spirit, communion of the Spirit, indwelling of the Spirit, these are all one and the same. While, as we have seen, the Scriptures seem to say little about regeneration, in point of fact it is a cardinal and conspicuous doctrine.

The same great truth is taught under the expression "sanctification of the Spirit." The believer is a saint, not because of personal holiness, but because he is "sanctified in Christ Jesus" (1 Cor. i. 2), accepted in the beloved. This sanctification is of the Spirit, because he baptizes us into Christ. So are to be understood 2 Thessalonians ii. 13, and 1 Peter i. 2: "Chosen to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit," and "elect through sanctification of the Spirit." Salvation is not through sanctification wrought in us personally, but because we are sanctified in Christ Jesus. We have the key in 1 Corinthians vi. 11: "Ye are washed, ye are sanctified, ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and *by* the Spirit of our God."

So, too, we are not "new creatures" because renewed in the spirit of our minds, but "if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature"; and in Christ are all they who are baptized into him by the Spirit. So, also, our "quickenings" is not due to a change wrought in our disposition. No man is alive unto God because he is changed, but because he is risen with Christ in baptism.

We repeat: The pentecostal baptism was the first administration of baptism with the Spirit. It was, therefore, something never before experienced by the saints. Hence it was not effectual calling, nor was it an ordinary revival, nor was it endowment for service. It was the fellowship of the Spirit, the gift of the indwelling Spirit, regeneration. Its effect was to baptize into Christ, to give fellowship (partnership) with Christ in the redemption wrought by him; to new-create; to quicken, or make alive in Christ. Prior to Pentecost all this was anticipated for the saints, just as was the sacrifice of Christ. They without us were not made perfect. Since Pentecost every one who receives Christ is at once baptized with the Spirit.

The prayer for a Pentecostal baptism is not, therefore, properly a prayer for Christians, but for the salvation of sinners, and that in great numbers, through faith in Jesus and baptism with his Spirit. He that believeth *and is baptized* shall be saved.

In conclusion, baptism with the Holy Ghost is baptism into Christ. Such baptism is not a sanctifying change of heart (*μετάνοια*), but the consummation of the work of justification.

The Son, by his own righteousness, has obtained eternal redemption for us; that redemption is applied to us, or made ours, by the impartation of his Spirit. It is, therefore, a baptism into Christ by the Spirit. The fellowship *of* the Spirit secures fellowship *with* Christ in righteousness and glory.

This view of the application of redemption was beautifully taught in Old Testament baptism. Under the old dispensation, there was no purification from serious or seven-day defilement except by the application of sacrifice in the sprinkling of the ashes of the burned heifer. That only was a baptism which applied the sacrificial element. The living water, in which was mingled a little of the ashes, was the vehicle of conveyance and the type of the Holy Spirit by whom we are sprinkled with the blood of Jesus, by whom his sacrifice avails for us. This, and not the Old Testament rite—not the washing away of the filth of the flesh—is that baptism which doth now save us. It applies to us the work of Christ, and thus purifies or sanctifies us, not in our own persons, but in Christ Jesus.

So we have one real sacrifice and one real baptism; on the other side of Calvary, one prophetic, typical sacrifice and one prophetic, typical baptism; on this side of the cross, one symbolic sacrifice and one symbolic baptism. We have one baptism.

JOHN W. PRIMROSE.

VI. NOTES.

SOME LITERARY ASPECTS OF THE BOOK OF JUDGES.

I PURPOSE in the following pages to examine the Book of Judges from a purely literary point of view; to study the manner in which events are narrated and characters portrayed, rather than the events and characters themselves. The antithesis, however, which Matthew Arnold has so emphasized, *Literature versus Dogma*, is altogether disclaimed; no such antithesis really exists. Whether verbally inspired or not, the Bible *is* a piece of literature, and as such deserves study.

"I will not ask," says Herder of the Book of Judges, "whether a narrative so characteristic and self-consistent could have been the work of fiction. I only say that it is strikingly correspondent to the age, and beautifully told."

Not historic truth, then, is here the important thing, but literary truth; not events in themselves, but rather the art, the vividness, the dramatic powers shown in the narration of these events.

The period covered by the Book of Judges was preëminently an unsettled and transitional one. Nägelsbach sums it up as follows: (1), "Israel shared the land with the heathen peoples The consequence was successive relapses into idolatry, and successive subjections to the idolaters" (2), "A lack of unity . . . ; the connecting bonds were lax" (3), "The third characteristic was the change in the divine revelations. In the beginning, God dealt personally with men, then through angels, then through prophets, until finally even these ceased after Malachi. The period of the Judges marks the transition from the second to the third species of divine revelation," *i. e.*, from revelation through angels to revelation through prophets.

The transition which Nägelsbach thus emphasizes is of importance chiefly to the theological student, just as the transition to monarchy is of importance chiefly to the historical student; but to the literary student the significant fact is that it was an age that appealed, in its contrasts and dramatic incidents, most powerfully to the poetic spirit.

No one can read the stirring narrative of Judges without feeling that it was an age of heroism. Leadership and responsibility were not, as immediately before and immediately after, confined to one man or to one class of men. A judge meant simply one whose personal powers had lifted him above his fellow-men. A skilful murder or a successful foray was sufficient to raise an obscure name into renown. Men did not have to wait for opportunities; opportunities were always at hand. The only road to glory was through valor, and valor was kept aglow by the memories of great ancestors, by intense national pride, and by the consciousness of divine approval.

There was no period of Bible history so favorable to the growth of a rugged border literature as the period of the Judges. The whole history is pervaded by the spirit of heroic poetry, so that Herder declares it "the poetical age of Israel."

The Book of Judges falls naturally into three divisions:—

(1.) Chapters I.—III. are introductory.

(2.) Chapters III.—XVI. contain the six great periods of the history, and include the names of (*a*), Othniel; (*b*), Ehud; (*c*), Deborah and Barak; (*d*), Gideon; (*e*), Jephthah; (*f*), Samson.

(3.) Chapters XVII.—XXII. narrate (*a*), local history; and (*b*), tribal history.

"That these two histories," says Nägelsbach, "were put at the end of the book is proof that the author had a plan for his work. They throw a flood of light upon the moral and religious condition of the people, and thus serve his purpose, and are a vital part of the book."

This evidence that "the author had a plan for his work" is noteworthy. In fact, these two appended episodes are to the whole book precisely what the two intercalated sections are to Tennyson's *In Memoriam*. They show that the author, while disregarding the sequence of time, was yet artist enough to feel the need of proportion and perspective, and thus, even in the midst of variety, to give to his work the general effect of unity. Greater variety is not to be found in any other book of the Bible. "Other portions of Scripture," says Stanley, "may be more profitable for doctrine, for correction, for reproof, for instruction in righteousness; but for merely human interest, for the lively touches of ancient manners, for the succession of romantic incidents, for the consciousness that we are living face to face with the persons described, for the tragic pathos of events and characters, there is nothing like the history of the Judges."

The important characters in the Book of Judges, around whom

almost the whole history groups itself, are Othniel, Ehud, Deborah and Barak, Gideon, Jephthah, and Samson. These will be considered successively, except Othniel, whose character and victory are sketched too briefly to allow literary treatment. Ehud (iii. 15-30), however, the left-handed Benjamite, stands out distinctly. The story is familiar:

Ehud is commissioned to carry a present to King Eglon, the oppressor of Israel. The wily Benjamite at once sees in this mission the opportunity of killing Eglon and freeing Israel, besides winning glory for himself. He girds his two-edged sword under his raiment, and in apparent unconcern approaches Eglon in his summer parlor. Few passages in the Bible show the Hebrew love of minute realism, of painful detail, more clearly than these verses:

21. "And Ehud put forth his *left* hand, and took the sword from his *right* thigh, and thrust it into his *belly* :

22. "And the *haft* also went in after the blade ; and the *fat* closed upon the blade, for he drew not the sword out of his belly, and it came out *behind*."

I know no writer who has more successfully caught this characteristic of Old Testament narratives—minuteness and abundance of details—than Defoe. This it is that gives to the pages of Robinson Crusoe so irresistible an air of truth.

If any one will read at a sitting ten consecutive pages of Judges and ten of Robinson Crusoe, he will feel the similarity better than by quotations.

But the story of Ehud has dramatic features. The whole scene of the murder,—the locking of the parlor doors, the whispering and idle conjectures of the servants outside, contrasted with the boding calm within,—has always impressed me with a feeling akin to that commented upon by De Quincey in his essay on the "Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth." To get the full effect of the picture, read De Quincey's essay and follow it with the story of Ehud. Eglon is Duncan; the "tarrying" of the servants before the parlor doors and their difficulty in effecting an entrance correspond to the knocking at the gate. Thus, the dramatic setting is in both cases almost identical. De Quincey wishes to show that it is only when the reaction sets in—the knocking at the gate—that we become fully sensible of the murder.

"Hence it is," he says, "that when the deed is done the knocking at the gate is heard, and it makes known audibly that the reaction has commenced, the human has made its reflux upon the fiendish, and the reëstablishment of the goings-on of the

world in which we live, first makes us profoundly sensible of the awful parenthesis that had suspended them."

Perhaps the most repulsive part of the story, at least to the nineteenth century mind, is where Ehud, wishing to get a good thrust at some vital part of the fat, unwieldy king, tells him, "I have a message from God unto thee." This stealing of the livery of heaven to serve the devil in had the customary and desired effect: Eglon rose at the mention of God, and the sword was buried in his belly. Herder's caution, however, must be borne in mind in all these narratives, especially in that of Jael, which is to follow.

"We must first," says Herder, "convert the hordes which made war upon Israel to well-ordered nations, and their times into ours, if we would apply our principles of right in war to them."

It is probable, moreover, that Ehud verily believed that he was doing God's service, that he did have a message from God. This is certainly the implied view of the narrator, and I doubt not that the Benjamites laughed heartily at the deception and Samson-like wit of "I have a message from God unto thee."

Deborah's ode (v. 2-31), which I shall next consider, commemorates the overthrow of the Canaanites and Jael's assassination of Sisera. Herder calls it "the finest heroic song of the Hebrews." Reuss styles it "the crown of the patriotic poetry of Israel, and the oldest long Hebrew poem which has come down to us." Yet Reuss declares that a chief characteristic of Hebrew poems in general is that "there is properly no beginning or end, no progress; so that the stanzas might be arranged differently without affecting the meaning of the poem in any way."

This seems to me true only of certain psalms which revolve, as it were, around some central topic. Progress is not required; the movement is circular, not forward. But it is not true and cannot be true of narrative poems. Progress is as clearly marked in Deborah's ode as in the story of Ehud or Gideon.

Verses 2-5 are introductory; verses 6-8 detail previous distress; verses 9-11 are a summons to praise God for deliverance; verses 12-24 delineate victors and victory; verses 25-31 describe the fate of the enemy.

Cassel thinks the song older than the prose version, and the prose version independent of the song. The latter supposition is highly improbable. Whoever the writer of Judges may have been, whether Samuel or a Benjamite of the court of Saul, he could hardly have

been ignorant of so stirring a ballad. "The feelings and words of this song" says Stanley, "ran on through subsequent times, and in the Prophet Habakkuk, and still more in the sixty-eighth psalm, we catch again the very same strains: the march through the desert; the flight of kings; the dividing of the spoil by those who tarried at home." Compare Hab. iii. 3, 10, 13, 14; Ps. lxxviii. 7, 8, 12, 13.

The ode contains more details, and is thus, even from a historical point of view, a better account of the battle than is the prose version. Nothing is said in the latter of the desolate condition of the land before the battle; compare with Deborah's "The highways were unoccupied, and the travellers walked through byways."

Nothing is said in the prose version of the help afforded the Israelites by the rain and the rapid rising of the river Kishon; compare with Deborah's

"The stars in their courses fought against Sisera.
The river Kishon swept them away,
That ancient river, the river Kishon."

Nor does the prose account mention the cowardice of certain tribes, notably Reuben, Dan, and Asher.

There is an apparent inconsistency in the two accounts of the assassination of Sisera. The prose version, at least in King James' translation, represents Sisera as transfixed to the ground by the tent-pin, while the ode has it that he "bowed," and "fell down dead." The inconsistency, however, is only apparent. A more literal translation shows that, while his temples were pierced by Jael's tent-pin, he was not necessarily fastened to the ground. But even if he had been thus fastened, the ode is not contradicted. The bowing and falling refer simply to the writhing and heaping and curving of the body in the agony of death. Geikie translates as follows:

"Between her feet he drew himself up, he fell, he lay;
Between her feet he drew himself up, and fell—
Where he drew himself up, there fell he, dying."

Cassel's version is as follows:

"At her feet he curls himself and falls,
At her feet he lies, curls himself again, and falls,
And as he curls himself again, falls—dead."

Coleridge, in his *Biographia Literaria*, cites the above verse as an excellent example of repetition to express intense and turbulent feeling. Repetition, however, or "parallelism," is the great characteristic of all Hebrew poetry. Its most common varieties, according to Lowth,

are, (*a*), synonymous parallelism; and (*b*), antithetic parallelism. The terms are self-defining. Examples of the first, from Deborah's ode, are—

“Why is his chariot so long in coming?
Why tarry the wheels of his chariot?”

“And with the hammer she smote Sisera, she smote through his head.”

“Curse ye Meroz, said the angel of the Lord,
Curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof;”

And again—

“Because they came not to the help of the Lord,
To the help of the Lord against the mighty.”

This sort of repetition is the distinctive characteristic of Edgar Poe's poetry. Any poem will illustrate it. I take at random the following:

“In the sepulchre there by the sea,
In her tomb by the sounding sea.”

“The leaves they were crisped and sere,—
The leaves they were withering and sere.”

“Out of which a miraculous crescent
Arose with a duplicate horn,
Astarte's bediamonded crescent,
Distinct with its duplicate horn.”

Antithetic parallelism is seen in such expressions as,—

“He asked water, and she gave him milk.”
“A damsel, two damsels, to every man;
To Sisera a spoil of divers colors.”

The closing part of this ode—the picture of Sisera's mother looking from her lattice and listening for the well-known roll of her son's iron chariot—is inimitable for vividness and intensity of suppressed feeling. Deborah shows the woman here, for no one but a woman would have thought of Sisera's mother in the hour of victory.

Every detail is consistent: Sisera's mother hushes her fears by repeating aloud the assuring words of her “Wise Women.” “She repeateth her words unto herself,” the marginal reading has it. How natural this is! Says Tennyson,—

“But, for the unquiet heart and brain,
A use in measured language lies;
The sad mechanic exercise
Like dull narcotics, numbing pain.”

—*In Memoriam.*

Her "Wise Women" have too much tact to intimate that her son is detained by the charms of captive "damsels:"

"A damsel, two damsels, to every man;
To Sisera a spoil of divers colors."

Deborah's imagination revels in the disappointment that awaits her foe; and to magnify this disappointment Sisera's mother is pictured as expecting not only her son's victorious return, but numerous presents for herself, presents that would minister to her love of flattery and personal display:

"A spoil of divers colors of embroidery,
Of divers colors of embroidery on both sides, on the necks of the spoil."

"A difficulty has been found by some," says Geikie, "in the praise given by Deborah to Jael for what must be held, according to our better lights, a treacherous murder."

This is narrow criticism even from the point of view of morality, and entirely irrelevant from the point of view of literature. How would Homer's heroines fare if laced up in a nineteenth century corset and bustle?

It should be observed that while the glory of this victory belonged to Deborah, there is a striking absence of self-praise in her ode. The victory was no insignificant one. "From that day," says Wellhausen, "the Canaanites, although many strong towns continued to be held by them, never again raised their heads." Yet Deborah awards the glory to the Lord first, then to the more valiant tribes, then to Jael.

There is no trace of jealousy in the mention of Jael:

"Blessed above women shall Jael be,

Blessed shall she be above women in the tent."

To me, this generous praise of Jael, which has been so condemned, is one of the most commendable traits in Deborah's character. I pass now from Barak and Deborah to Gideon and Jotham, from an ode to a fable.

The most significant fact in the story of Gideon (vi. 11-viii. 32), is narrated in the twenty-second and twenty-third verses of the eighth chapter:

"Then the men of Israel said unto Gideon, Rule thou over us, both thou and thy son, and thy son's son also; for thou hast saved us out of the hand of Midian. And Gideon said unto them, I will not rule over you, neither shall my son rule over you; the Lord shall rule over you."

This foreshadowing of monarchy is significant to the literary student not so much for the fact as for the use made of it later on by Jotham, Gideon's youngest son. Jotham's grandfather, Joash, had already shown a knack at happy retort (vi. 31, 32), and Gideon himself had silenced the whole tribe of Ephraim by a skilful metaphor (viii. 2): "What have I now done in comparison of you? Is not the gleaning of the grapes of Ephraim better than the vintage of Abiezer?" but to Jotham belongs the honor of a reply unique in Hebrew literature. It is in the form of a parable, but differs from the parables of Christ in being a fable as well as a parable. It differs also from Greek and Indian fables in representing not beasts and birds as talking, but trees.

The imagery employed was taken by Jotham from the scenes around and beneath him. The words, "Let fire come out of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon," are explained by the fact that on Mount Gerizim, where Jotham stood, the great sacrificial fires were kindled with brambles.

Where the Authorized Version has "go to be promoted over the trees," the Revised Version has "go to wave to and fro over the trees." The latter is much the more expressive. Jotham is alluding to the refusal of the crown by Gideon, and intimates by the words "wave to and fro," that his father knew the fickle nature of the people who had asked him to be king over them, and realized the instability of the honor offered him.

The fact that the trees all based their refusal on their usefulness in their present sphere to "God and man," suggests that Gideon had still another reason for declining the crown. "My father believed," Jotham seems to say, "that a good man could be as useful to God and to his fellow-men in a private sphere as he could in a public sphere."

There is thus seen to be a deeper meaning in Gideon's reply, "I will not rule over you," than could have been deduced from the statement alone; for just as the song of Deborah threw light on the prose version of the battle of Tabor, so this apologue of Jotham throws light on the refusal of Gideon, and enables us to see and admire the man and his motives at the most critical point of his career.

The difference between the character of Gideon and that of Jephthah, whom I shall next consider, is brought out most clearly in their behavior towards the haughty tribe of Ephraim (viii. 1-3; xii. 1-6).

Gideon, temperate and statesmanlike, replied to their insolent message by telling them that their victory over Oreb and Zeeb was greater

than his own. Jephthah returned defiance for defiance, and slaughtered forty-two thousand of them, who could not "frame to pronounce" Shibboleth.

It is this ill-starred spirit of rashness, however, that has joined Jephthah's name to the fate of his more renowned daughter. Of her story Stanley says: "It is one of the points in sacred history where . . . the likeness of classical times mingles with the Hebrew devotion. It recalls to us the story of Idomeneus and his son, of Agamemnon and Iphigenia. And still more closely do we draw near—as our attention is fixed on the Jewish maiden—to a yet more pathetic scene. Her grief is the exact anticipation of the lament of Antigone, sharpened by the peculiar horror of the Hebrew women at a childless death, descending with no bridal festivity, with no nuptial torches to the dark chambers of the grave."

Tennyson's description of her in "A Dream of Fair Women" is too long and too familiar to be quoted. Byron has sketched her not as Tennyson, during her two months' seclusion in the mountains, but as standing before her father, after her seclusion, and on the eve of death;—

"Since our country, our God—Oh, my sire!
Demand that thy Daughter expire;
Since thy triumph was bought by thy vow—
Strike the bosom that's bared for thee now.

And of this, oh, my Father! be sure—
That the blood of thy child is as pure
As the blessing I beg ere it flow,
And the last thought that soothes me below.

Though the virgins of Salem lament,
Be the judge and the hero unbent!
I have won the great battle for thee,
And my father and country are free!
When this blood of thy giving hath gush'd,
When the voice thou lovest is hush'd,
Let my memory still be thy pride,
And forget not I smiled as I died!"

Neither Tennyson nor Byron, however, approaches the pathos of the original narrative: "Alas, my daughter! thou hast brought me very low, and thou art one of them that trouble me; for I have opened my mouth unto the Lord, and I cannot go back. And she said unto him, My father, if thou hast opened thy mouth unto the Lord, do to me according to that which hath proceeded out of thy mouth; foras-

much as the Lord hath taken vengeance for thee of thine enemies, even of the children of Ammon." (vi. 35, 36, Authorized Version.)

In this short but sublime reply of Jephthah's daughter—a reply which alone has immortalized her—three of the noblest traits of the Hebrew woman are seen,—filial devotion, patriotism, and unquestioning submission to what she believes to be the voice of duty.

It is no wonder that the story of this nameless girl has sunk deep into the poetic heart of the world. She fleets like a vision across the page of history; but out of that darkened age no voice rings clearer or sweeter than hers, and none enforces with a tenderer pathos love of father, love of country, and love of God.

To pass from Jephthah's daughter to Samson (xiii.—xvi.), is to pass from tragedy to comedy. Nothing better illustrates the heterogeneous nature of the Book of Judges than the fact that two such characters are grouped together, the one vivifying by contrast the other. As in Chaucer's "Prologue to the Canterbury Tales," so in this "Prologue to the Book of Kings," the characters pass quickly but impressively before us, and photograph, or rather seat themselves upon the memory forever.

Though most nearly resembling the founder of a monastic order, Samson is yet the most frolicsome and wayward character that Hebrew literature has portrayed. He was a big, overgrown boy to the last; his wildest exploits were done with a smile and a jest.

"Love and levity," says Herder "were his greatest weaknesses," but levity, or rather wit, is the quality of literature which is most elusive in a translation. The jests of this clownish Hercules do not smack of Mark Twain or Artemus Ward, a fact to be accounted for not only by the inadequacy of a translation, but also by the difference between Hebrew fun and English.

Samson's riddle is familiar:

"Out of the eater came forth meat;
And out of the strong came forth sweetness."

The difficulty, it seems to me, lies in the fact that so many answers are possible. The words, according to the commentators, are all used in their natural sense; there is no catch-work about them. The answer might be found in some national event, or in some abstract truth, or in a personal application to Samson. The last conjecture happens to be the right one; but where so many answers are possible, the right one becomes almost impossible, and, when guessed, does not greatly impress one with its aptness.

A favorite college joke used to be, "Why is an elephant like a brick?" The answer was, "Because neither one can climb a tree." The indignation which this answer used to cause is, I imagine, akin to the feeling with which Samson's comrades heard the true solution from Delilah.

A more literal translation of Samson's boast at overcoming the Philistines, one that enables us to feel in a measure the humor of it, is as follows:

"With the jawbone of an *ass* have I slain one *mass*, two *masses*; with the jawbone of an *ass* I have slain an *oxload* of men."

The principle is that of antithetic parallelism, "ass," "mass"; "ass," "ox".

Tom Hood on his death-bed was by mistake given a spoonful of ink instead of a dose of medicine. "Now bring me a blotting paper," he murmured, and died. So a literal translation of Samson's last utterance shows that his old love of grim humor remained with him to the last, even in the presence of death: "And Samson called unto the Lord, and said, O Lord God, remember me, I pray thee, and strengthen me, I pray thee, only this once, O God, that I may be at once avenged of the Philistines" (not "for my *two* eyes" as both the Authorized Version and the Revised Version have it, but) "for *one* of my two eyes." This is about equivalent to saying, "One eye's worth of Philistines, Lord, will satisfy me this time"

The character of Samson seems to have taken a strong hold upon Milton; references to him are found in the "Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing," and also in the "Reasons of Church Government." In "Samson Agonistes," Milton has cast Samson in the mould of a classical hero. Few heroes were less fitted for such treatment; but, after all, it is not the character of Samson that brings him within the range of poetic treatment, but rather his misfortunes. Samson, the riddler, Samson, the freebooter, does not inspire poetic feelings; but Samson, the blinded captive, grinding for Philistine sport, rises at once into the realm of tragedy; and it is just at this point in his career that Milton has portrayed him.

"Ask for this great deliverer now and find him
Eyeless in Gaza, at the mill with slaves,
Himself in bonds under Philistian yoke."

"Oh, dark, dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon,
Irrecoverably dark, total eclipse,
Without all hope of day."

By way of conclusion, may I not repeat the quotation from Stanley? "Other portions of Scripture may be more profitable for doctrine, for correction, for reproof, for instruction in righteousness, but for merely human interest, for the lively touches of ancient manners, for the succession of romantic incidents, for the consciousness that we are living face to face with the persons described, for the tragic pathos of events and characters—there is nothing like the history of the Judges."

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BENEFICIARY EDUCATION—ITS PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY STATUS.

It is a painful duty to be forced to criticize work committed to other hands. If there is any truth in the statements which are to follow, it should have been brought to the attention of the church through the annual reports of the Committee of Education. So that it is with both hesitation and regret that we say that the present status of Beneficiary Education seems to be far from satisfactory.

Those who feel that this matter demands serious attention are divided, by their view of the remedy, into various classes. Some are for the abolition of the entire system; others prefer the loan feature; while yet others would seek the remedy in cutting off aid from those in academic preparation.

We belong to none of these classes. We believe in the system as inaugurated and carried on by the Assembly, and consider this as one of the noblest causes to which the church is permitted to give her money; our indictment is that the system has been heedlessly administered by the presbyteries; that very many are receiving aid who might pass unaided through the course, provided there was the same self-denial and exertion on the part of parents and friends, and the same self-help on the part of the candidates themselves, which are to be found in the case of candidates for the other professions.

We cheerfully admit that there are many who should be aided; we go further and say that in many cases the amount should be increased so as to prevent the almost starvation life of many of our students. But we repeat the charge, that many are receiving the aid who should not, and mainly through the fault of a system which encour-

ages the feeling that the money is to be had for the asking and which practically fails to draw the line at the question of need.

It is assumed that the theory underlying this cause is that aid is to be given only when *absolutely necessary*; there are those who advocate a different and to us false theory, namely, that the church should, as is done by the government at West Point and as is virtually done at many of the heavily endowed seminaries, take entire charge of the expenses of every student from first to last, that the church *owes* a living to a candidate so soon as received. It would be a sad day for the church if this false theory should prevail, as might easily be shown. This is, however, an entirely different question from the one before us, and we refrain from its discussion as being foreign to the matter in hand. The precise point is, given the theory that aid is to be given only when absolutely necessary, is the rule being violated?

The proof lies in the fact—astonishing beyond measure—that *at least* five-sixths of all candidates, actually engaged in study, are receiving aid, either through the Assembly's committee or from individual congregations! The figures which establish this proportion were laid before the late General Assembly and have since appeared in the religious papers, and, never having been challenged, it is not deemed necessary to repeat them; subsequent investigation leads to the impression that even five-sixths is too low an estimate, but we content ourselves with this fact as being sufficiently startling.

A slight attempt has been made to break the force of this argument by saying that it is not a question of proportion but of need; that if all needed aid it should be given. The answer is obvious, the very point of the statement is to show that all those receiving aid do not need it; for can it be seriously argued that, while the other professions educate themselves, and one of the learned professions through a course fully as expensive as the theological, in the ministry alone five out of every six should be unable to do so? It is painfully evident that inasmuch as the money *can* be gotten from the church the natural temptation is yielded to (unconsciously we believe), and the medical son is educated by private means and the theological son is carried by the church.

We lay no great blame at the door of either the parent or the candidate, for the need seems real. But none the less do we think it the duty of the church to better adjust her system, so that the revenue raised from her hard pressed people shall be expended with a careful hand.

That we are not mistaken in thus interpreting the facts in the case, is plain from the further significant fact, that the great cause of beneficiary education is rapidly falling into disrepute with many of our best people. Money is actually being withheld from this cause on the ground of abuse, and that not the money of the stingy, but *consecrated money*. During the single week of the late General Assembly, the writer heard three prominent Presbyterian educators, from different institutions, each in a separate Synod, express themselves in terms far more decided than those of this paper. The list has since grown, so as to include many of the prominent workers of the church, all basing their opinion upon actual observation of the workings of our system. Had there been no other facts in the horizon than this troubled feeling on the part of many of God's people, it would have been wise, in our humble judgment, for the General Assembly to have at least ordered its committee to have examined into the matter and to have reported the following year. When Presbyterians feel that all is not well, they are not satisfied with a vote to the contrary, even by the General Assembly, endorsed by such an esteemed brother as the author of the account of the Assembly in the last QUARTERLY.

Much might be said of the influence upon character of the right and wrong theories of beneficiary education; it could be easily shown that the help given, if properly received, should and does develop love for the church and devotion to her cause; not only is there nothing unworthy in receiving this aid, but the giving and receiving, according to Christ's commandment, appeal to the deepest instincts of brotherly love; that on the other hand, to claim the aid, when not necessary, develops selfishness and unmanliness, and tends rapidly to degrade the heaven-called ministry to the level of a secular profession engaged about religious business, than which there can be nothing more disastrous; we might also easily discuss the question as to how far this has gone with us and elsewhere, and to what extent there is foundation for the grave charges which were made in the speeches upon the subject during its recent discussion. But we forbear, partly for lack of space, mainly on account of the fatal facility shown by this question of being misunderstood.

When we come to search for the *remedy* for the existing state of things, it is suggested by the character of our candidates. They are noble young men, with rare exceptions, they are the best representatives of our best families; hence all that would seem to be necessary, is that the true theory on the subject be pressed upon the attention of

the church. Let pastors and papers, but especially the presbyteries, insist upon the fact that the scheme of education was inaugurated, not to develop a "mendicant ministry," but to give aid to brethren in need. When there is unwillingness to receive the aid of the church when needed, let it be pressed upon the candidate, lest there be loss of power and valuable time to the church. But where either youth or a possibility of help from friends or parents make such a course proper, let the aid be withheld. Let the truth be insisted upon, and it will prevail; just as ten years ago, the cry for more candidates was heard by the church, so will the truth upon the subject commend itself; it will relieve the church of unnecessary burdens, it will afford abundant means for those really in need, it will enrich the character of those seeking the ministry, and will open the hearts of God's people to give to this cause, for no money is so easy to raise as that for a self-helping young man, and none so hard as that for a common fund from which all who come may draw a share.

Then as to the *method* of work, much would be gained by throwing the responsibility upon the presbyteries where it properly belongs; theoretically this is now done; practically the Central Committee does the whole work. There is no good reason why the committee at Memphis should make the appropriations; its work should end when it decides how much can be allowed a given Presbytery, nor should the secretary have any financial connection with the individual students; instead of simply endorsing and passing on the name to the Central Committee as is done by Presbytery, the entire work should be kept where the responsibility belongs and where the candidate is known.

As a necessary result of the generalization of the work in the hands of a Central Committee, has grown up another custom which should be abolished, viz: a tendency to uniform appropriations. As it now is, no matter what may be the needs or the resources of a candidate, he usually applies for and receives as much as every other candidate, the pittance usually of \$75 or \$100. Thus some live in comfort, having additional resources, while others starve; nor can the system be different when managed by a distant committee ignorant of its candidates, but in the hands of the Presbytery it would be far different; they could use the Central Committee simply as a connectional agency, while they made discriminating use of the money entrusted to them. In connection with this, we commend a resolution voted down by the last Assembly, viz.: that each candidate shall furnish a certificate from his session that he needs the help. This is already done in many

presbyteries with reference to the candidate's spiritual qualifications; then why not with reference to his financial ability? A young man who cannot ask his own session to say that he really needs aid, should not knock at the door of a common fund. Many other questions of minor detail readily suggest themselves and need no exposition here.

We have large hope for this question. There are many who fear that no reformation will be had, until God's people have stranded the whole work by withholding their offerings. That this is a grave danger is all too evident, but it must not, it shall not come! On the contrary we look for and expect a glorious increase in this cause, when hundreds of Christ's choicest sons shall press into the ministry and when the church shall furnish all the needed money. This time will come and we believe ere long, but it will not come until the right, and not the wrong, theory prevails; then and not until then will this noble cause appeal to the affections and receive the offerings of God's people.

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VII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

THE INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY—ITS AIM AND ITS THEOLOGICAL AND CRITICAL PRINCIPLES.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. *By S. R. Driver, D. D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and canon of Christ Church, Oxford.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892.

The advocates of the New Theology and their brethren of the Higher Critical School, on both sides of the Atlantic, have taken a step in advance of all that has been hitherto attempted for the dissemination of their principles. It is proposed by them to furnish what they call *The International Theological Library*. The account of the origin of this movement, as given by the editors, is as follows: "Theology has made rapid advances in recent years. New lines of investigation have been opened up, fresh light has been cast upon many subjects of the deepest interest, and the historical method has been applied with important results. This has prepared the way for a library of theological science, and has created the demand for it. It has also made it at once opportune and practicable now to secure the services of specialists in the different departments of theology, and to associate them in an enterprise which will furnish a record of theological inquiry up to date. This library is designed to cover the whole field of Christian theology The library is intended to form a series of text-books for students of theology At the same time they (the authors) have in view that large and increasing class of students, in other departments of inquiry, who desire to have a systematic and thorough exposition of theological science The library is international and interconfessional. It will be conducted in a catholic spirit and in the interests of theology as a science. The authors will be scholars of recognized reputation in the several branches of study assigned to them. They will be associated with each other and with the editors in the effort to provide a series of volumes which may adequately represent the present condition of investigation, and indicate the way for further progress." This statement of this project is signed by the editors, Professor Stewart, D. F. Salmond, and Professor Charles A. Briggs, and is followed by a list of the authors who are to coöperate with them in the execution of the work.

It will be observed that this statement assumes that "theology has made rapid advances in recent years." and that "this has prepared the way for a library of theological science, and has created the demand for it." There can be no doubt that some theologians have made "rapid advances in recent years," but it may well be doubted whether these "rapid advances" have advanced the interests of genuine theological science. Certainly the men who seem to take the lead in this international movement have advanced rapidly enough, but it is just as certain that the rapidity of their progress has been owing to the fact that they have embarked upon the down-grade in the leading departments of theological investiga-

tion. They would have the students of theology and others to believe, that the text-books in the several departments of theological inquiry, hitherto regarded as trustworthy guides, have, through the triumphant achievements of the higher critics and their theological allies, become antiquated and are no longer entitled to a place in the theological curriculum of this latter half of the nineteenth century. These text-books may have done some service in a less enlightened age, and, indeed, may have aided in the theological development of these advanced thinkers themselves, but both the men and the age have out-grown the measure of these standards, and the demand is imperative that they give place to a series of text-books which "will furnish a record of theological inquiry up to date." This reminds one of an article by Dr. J. Addison Alexander, many years ago, in the *Princeton Biblical Repertory*, which opened with some such sentence as the following: "The latest phase of German theology, at least the phase reported on the arrival of the last steamer, was" so and so. What was then true of German theological speculation has held good ever since. Like the phases of the moon as she waxes and wanes, theory is ever succeeding and supplanting theory, and even when the full tide of theological radiance is attained it is found to be only theological moonshine after all.

As it has occurred in Germany so has it come to pass in Great Britain and America. No sooner has a new critical theory been hatched and equipped for flight, than a rival is heard pecking at its tiny shell, impatient to engage in the struggle for existence upon the theatre of critical conflict. In undertaking, therefore, "to furnish a record of the theological inquiry up to date," these brethren have set themselves no easy task, for the present projected series of text-books must be regarded as merely provisional and must, ere long, give place to others framed upon still newer lines of critical investigation. Whether there shall ever be a final series, or what shall be the characteristics of that series, is certainly a problem. As one of the editors is the author of *Whither*, and of the late *Inaugural* in Union Theological Seminary, New York, and the other, one of the aids and abettors of Professor W. Robertson Smith, it were vain to inquire regarding the critical goal toward which the movement tends.

With regard to the alleged "rapid advances in theology in recent years," it so happens, in the providence of God, that we have been supplied with the means for testing this claim in the two departments of Theology and Biblical Criticism. The Bible Company, embracing a fair representation of the biblical scholarship of the age on both sides of the Atlantic, labored for ten years and a half in revising the Authorized Version, produced by King James's translators more than 250 years before, and yet the textual emendations do not amount to ten per cent. and a large percentage, of even these, consists of the mere order of the words in a sentence. So far as criticism is able to judge, therefore, more than ninety per cent. of the existing text of Scripture must be regarded as having constituted part and parcel of the autographs of the sacred writers.

And as to the theological result of this important revision it cannot be claimed that it has affected a single doctrine of the analogy of the faith by one jot or tittle. If the boasted progress in theology means the discovery of hitherto undiscovered theological truths, this discovery has not been made through a fresh study of the Scriptures as they have come forth from the hands of the revisionists. The entire

round of the doctrines, as set forth in the Authorized Version, not one more and not one less, are to be found in the Revised Version. In neither department of theological research, therefore, can there be pointed out the slightest evidence of this rapid advance which we are told has rendered a new series of theological text-books a necessity, and created the demand which these theological experts have set themselves, with praiseworthy enterprise and genuine critical modesty to supply!

It is to be feared that one at least of the reasons which has moved this critical syndicate to project this new *International Theological Library*, is a desire to get rid of the theology of the old text-books, or as some of the younger and less cautious of them express it, the theology of the seventeenth century. Of all existing text-books there is none to which these friends have such aversion as they have to Hodge's *Systematic Theology*; and the reason is two-fold; its exposure of the false philosophy of German theological speculation, and its matchless vindication of the theology of the reformation. They talk of text-books "up to date." Well, if ever there was a text-book "up to date," it is this same systematic theology of the Princeton professor. There is no theory, philosophical or theological, ever invented by the wit of man, that is not to be found within the wide circle of its comprehension, stated with absolute impartiality, analyzed, tested by the word of God, and the principles of sound philosophy. Indeed, we have here an instance of the *actual* and the *possible* being synonymous and coincident. It would require more ingenuity than is represented by the leaders of this scheme, to devise a theory that is not already recorded and examined in this great work. It is "up to date" now, and as fresh errors are but old ones resurrected and refurbished, it will be "up to date" when *The International Theological Library* shall have taken its place in the literary theological sheol beside the mouldering remains of kindred discredited theological speculations.

It is the critical and theological principles of these brethren which have engendered such antagonism to the theology of the reformation, as confirmed and defined in the immortal standards of the Westminster divines. As we have seen in the *St. Giles' Sermon*, the old doctrine of the Atonement is contrasted most unfavorably with the Socinian view of Christ's mission, while another of these advanced thinkers, in his book on the *Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, comes out boldly and alleges that the worship of God by means of sacrifice, as a thing sanctioned by God, was unknown prior to the Babylonian captivity. The way of life, he tells his readers, before that epoch in the history of Israel was "to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with God." In other words, the way of life for about three thousand years of the history of our race, was that afterwards propounded by Pelagius and Socinus! It is no wonder that such theologians and their sympathizers wish to get rid of the old theological text-books in which the economy of redemption, full-orbed, is enshrined, with Christ as our sacrificial substitute as its centre. Nor is it strange, that in order to the attainment of this end, they find it necessary, not only to supersede the orthodox text-books, but to disintegrate the sacred record chronologically and theologically, and to relegate its sacrificial system to Exilic or Post-exilic times.

But passing from promise to performance, let us see whether the portion of the task already executed is such as to justify the claims advanced by our critical

friends. At the head of the projected series we are presented with one of these new international theological text-books. It is entitled *An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, and has been prepared for this library by S. R. Driver, D. D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, that university whence have issued the Romish theology and ecclesiology developed in *Lux Mundi*.

At the outset, and on the very threshold of his undertaking, Dr. Driver gives singular evidence of his unfitness to sit in judgment upon the Old Testament revelation. It certainly behoves a writer who undertakes to introduce his readers to the literature of the Old Testament—a literature which is the divinely authorized and sole medium ordained of God for communicating to men the knowledge of the way of life—it certainly behoves one who sets himself this task, to know what is the way of life the literature he is dealing with reveals. Well, the following statement, on page xviii. of his preface, may be regarded as expressing our author's view of what the Scriptures of both Testaments teach on this subject: "The aim of his (Christ's) teaching was a religious one; it was to set before men the pattern of a perfect life, to move them to imitate it, to bring them to himself." Now, it is submitted that no one who had mastered the teaching of the volume he criticises, or who had discovered its relation to the New Testament, could have penned that sentence and given it forth as a fair account of the way of life exhibited in the teaching of Christ. According to Christ's own account of the aim of his mission, he came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life (*α λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν*) a ransom for many. (Matt. xx. 28.) He saves his sheep, not simply by inducing them to imitate him, but by laying down his life for them. (John x. 15.) It is by his being lifted up from the earth, and not simply by exhibiting the pattern of a perfect life, he draws men unto him. (John xii. 32.) John the Baptist had a clearer vision of the aim of Christ's mission than these higher critics. He pointed him out as the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world. (John i. 29.) He saw in him what these critics have failed to see—the great antitype of the lambs which were offered under the Mosaic economy, morning and evening, as an atonement for sin. The way of life typified by the sacrificial system of that economy, and fulfilled by Christ, who recognized his relation to it as its antitype, is certainly very different from that sketched by Dr. Driver; and the difference is so great that no one holding the latter is qualified to write an introduction to the study of the literature of the Old Testament. If a writer proves himself, as our author has done, utterly unacquainted with the essential elements of the economy of redemption, as expounded by Christ and his apostles, surely he is out of place in analyzing the literature of that typical economy in which these elements were so graphically symbolized and foreshadowed.

In this connection Dr. Driver alleges that in no single instance (so far as we are aware) did he (Christ) anticipate the results of scientific inquiry or historical research He accepted, as the basis of his teaching, the opinions respecting the Old Testament current around him. (P. xviii.)

On these *dicta* it may be remarked: 1. That among "the opinions respecting the Old Testament current around him," and "accepted" by him, was the opinion, that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch. This opinion he endorsed again and again. 2. That another current opinion accepted by him was that the

Law of Moses, and the Scripture which contained it, were infallible to the minutest clause. 3. That by his acceptance and endorsement of these current opinions, he both anticipated and foreclosed (Dr. Driver to the contrary notwithstanding) two of the leading questions raised by the higher critics, viz.: the authorship of the Pentateuch, and the Plenary Verbal Inspiration of the sacred writers. 4. That the current opinions thus endorsed by Christ were either true or false. If they were true, the higher criticism is left as baseless as the flimsy fabric of a vision, leaving not even a critical rack behind. If, on the other hand, they were false, then our higher critics, who, by the way, exercise all their critical acumen to prove them false, have no alternative but to charge him, who is the Truth, as well as the Way and the Life, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, with the endorsement of erroneous opinions respecting the vital subject of the Old Testament Revelation! 5. And lastly, that as our author holds that our Saviour accepted these false opinions—false in the estimate of the higher critics—“as the basis of his teaching,” it must follow that his teaching founded thereon, cannot furnish a reliable basis of faith. If the temple of doctrine he established rests on a set of opinions which can be proved, scientifically, to be destitute of warrant, then, to use his own illustration, he has built his house upon the sand; and certainly, if we are to credit the prophets of the higher criticism, the fate that befell that symbolic structure foreshadows the doom that awaits the building erected by himself! Such, and such only, is the dread, irreverent, alternative that is open to those who reject the traditional estimates of the Old Testament which, unquestionably, was “accepted” and endorsed by Christ.

We have additional evidence of theological, and consequent critical, unfitness for the task our author has undertaken, in the choice he has made of a primary document which he distinguishes from the other documents as entitled to be considered the frame-work of our present Hexateuch. This document the higher critics distinguish by the letter P, and, although mixed up among the other documents, it can, we are assured, be disengaged from the rest of the narrative, and “when read consecutively,” the sections of which it is composed “are found to constitute a nearly complete whole.”

Well, let us see whether the narrative, thus singled out as furnishing the frame-work of the Hexateuch, is such as to meet the theological requirements of a fundamental Pentateuchal document. From the position it is assumed to occupy, it must have been designed to serve as an introduction and a basis to the history of God's dealings with the human race, as illustrated in the creation, fall, and redemption of man. The slightest inspection of this so-called documentary frame-work demonstrates its utter unfitness to serve any such purpose. After reciting the story of the six days' work and the institution of the Sabbath, embracing the first chapter of Genesis, and the first four verses of the second chapter, this document, as disengaged by the higher critics, makes a clean critical bound to the fifth chapter, vaulting over the stories of the creation of an helpmeet for Adam, the covenant of works, the breach of that covenant, the institution of sacrifice, as illustrated by Abel's sacrifice, and the murder of Abel by his brother Cain. This is certainly an immense critical bound. The height of the spring the critics must have made to clear all these obstacles is sufficient to entitle them to be, henceforth and forever, called the higher critics. But it is of critical interest to observe that,

while embracing the fifth chapter in this narrative, they have been careful to omit the twenty-ninth verse. We cannot be surprised at this omission, as it presumes the reader's acquaintance with the story of the fall which they have left out. This verse informs us of Lamech's reason for calling his son Noah. "This," he said, "shall comfort us concerning our work and toil of our hands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed." In Lamech's estimation this curse and the toil consequent upon it were no trifling matters. In the sweat of his face he had eaten bread, and he hoped that through this son there would come a time of rest to mitigate the rigor of his labor. In a word, in spite of the critics this verse, which they have eliminated from this primary document, compels a reference to the cause of the curse, and demands the restoration of the story of Eden and the fall.

And as this verse demands the restoration of the narrative of the fall, so does the third verse of this same fifth chapter, a verse which the critics have not omitted, demand the restoration of the story of Cain and Abel; for it informs us that Adam begat a son after his own likeness, after his image, and called his name Seth. For the reason of his naming his son Seth, we have to turn back to what Eve says about it, and we find her account of the matter in the fourth chapter, which the higher critics have left out of their so-called frame-work. She "called his name Seth: For God, said she, hath appointed me another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain slew." Our author tells us that this document, with these omissions, will read as a consecutive historical narrative. Well, as we now see, when these historical facts are left out, it won't read as a consecutive historical narrative at all; and we also see, that in order to make it read intelligibly, the parts omitted must be re-inserted.

But passing from these palpable critical blunders, what are we to think of the theory which puts forward as the frame-work of the Pentateuch with its divinely ordained priesthood and sacrificial system, a document which makes no mention of the fall of man, or the promise of redemption through the seed of the woman? Can any one believe that a document with these omissions can serve as a suitable introduction to such a sacrificial system. Apart from the story of the fall, the Mosaic economy and the story of Christ as the second Adam become an absolute anomaly, utterly inexplicable, and the critical theory which requires the omission of the momentous fact in the history of our race bears on its forehead the stamp of its own condemnation.

But it may be said this first volume of the new *International Library* is not an introduction to the theology, or the christology, of the Old Testament. As its title states, it is simply an *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*. According to the plan of the work the author was under no obligation to treat of the theological system exhibited in the sacred writings. This is very much as if a professor of anatomy who brought a living organism under his knife, and proceeded to reduce it to its constituent elements, should, when remonstrated with for the reckless cruelty of his vivisection, apologize by assuring the remonstrant, that he was not touching the immaterial principle, and had been careful to restrict his analysis to the physical tenement in which the immaterial principle dwelt. He would not be a very intelligent remonstrant who would accept such apology as satisfactory. An intelligent anti-vivisectionist would likely reply, the physical, and the vital principle are too intimately united in the organic whole to admit of

such treatment. The vital principle must take its departure when the physical tenement it inhabited has been reduced to an anatomical ruin, however scientifically the ruin may have been wrought.

This is precisely the case presented in the procedure of our author in his analysis of the Old Testament. He is the anatomist, and the Bible is the organism he has bound upon his table for critical dissection. To quiet misgivings on the part of those who have regarded the Bible as given by divine inspiration, and who, on the assumption that it has been so given, have accepted its teachings as divine verities, he assures us that : "It is not the case that critical conclusions such as those expressed in the present volume are in conflict either with the Christian creeds or with the articles of the Christian faith. Those conclusions affect not the *fact* of revelation, but its *form*. . . . They do not touch either the authority or the inspiration of the Old Testament." (Preface, p. 15.)

This is just the apology of the anatomist over again. However radical his analysis of the Scriptures, Dr. Driver assures his readers that he has not reached conclusions which affect the *fact* of revelation, but only the *form*. The creeds and articles of the Christian faith still abide, notwithstanding the critical ordeal through which he has caused the sacred record to pass. The *fact* remains, although the *form* has been modified. With equal truth the anatomist might say the immaterial principle abides, although the organism it animated has been reduced to its original constituent elements. This assurance of the author, which meets the reader as he enters the vestibule, may allay his fears for the time, but when he passes into the penetralia of this critical museum and sees the shelves and cases adorned with the skeletons of Moses and the prophets, in the chronological and theological disarray prescribed by the higher criticism, his misgivings are sure to come back upon him with all the force arising from an ocular demonstration of the ghastly reality. The question raised by the spectacle will not be exactly the one put to Ezekiel in the Valley of Vision,—“Can these bones live?”—but the still more perplexing one, Can these skeletons of Moses and the prophets awaken men to spiritual life? Can this anatomized and skeletonized Bible, presented to us in this volume of Dr. Driver's, over every book and almost every paragraph and sentence of which the dark shadow of critical doubt has been cast, prove itself, as the old organic record has done, quick ($\zeta\tilde{\omega}\nu$, living) and powerful, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, revealing itself as a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart? (Heb. iv. 12.) Only one answer can be given to this question. Rifled of its divine authority by being despoiled of its inspiration, the Bible must be unable to speak with the voice of God, and cannot serve as the Spirit's instrument in the salvation of men. Our author denies that the higher criticism touches the question of the inspiration of the record, but he has not ventured to state what he means by inspiration. His theory of the structure of the record precludes the possibility of ascribing it to the inspiring agency of the holy Spirit. How can any intelligent being regard the men as divinely inspired, who, if we are to believe these critics, selected and patched together, as parts of one narrative, a series of documents so incongruous that their incongruities can be pointed out so readily—incongruities, be it observed, which four or five redactors have been unable to obliterate or reduce to harmony? Common sense and the reverence due to the sacred record and its divine author forbid the acceptance of such a theory.

Now, the objection to this account of the origin of the Scriptures does not arise from its assumption of the pre-existence of documents of which the sacred writers availed themselves. Verbal inspirationists hold that the men who were moved to write by the Holy Ghost were guided in their selection of materials as well as in the committing of the materials selected to writing, so that the choice of the matter embodied in the sacred record was not of man, but of God. The objection to the documentary theory, as held by the higher critics, is that by substituting a number of unknown authors and redactors for the hitherto accredited authors, it leaves us without any evidence of the authenticity and infallibility of the result and record. In the case of the Pentateuch, for example, by substituting a number of unknown writers for Moses, these critics, if we are to accept their theories, have given us, in lieu of an author of whose inspiration and divine mission, as the great law-giver of Israel, there is the most unquestionable evidence, a number of writers of whose inspiration we have no evidence whatever save what may be inferred from their compositions—compositions which, be it observed, these critics have done their best to discredit by charges which, if well founded, would be sufficient to warrant the erasure of the names of their authors, if we knew them, from the roll of honorable or intelligent authorship. No one who accepts Canon Driver's literary analysis of the contents of our Bible can accept it as the word of God in any intelligible sense of that term. A few examples may suffice in justification of this estimate of the drift of this latest utterance of the higher criticism, for the fairest way of judging of a workman in any department of human activity is to examine his work.

Proceeding on this principle, let us examine the results of Canon Driver's critical labors on the early chapters of the Book of Genesis. He alleges that in the second chapter, the order is, man first, and vegetation second, whereas in the first chapter, the order is, vegetation prior to man. Of course the question here raised must be settled by an appeal to the record itself. Now, what does this second chapter say on this point of order? Does it represent man as created before plants or herbs? On the contrary, the statement is, that "in the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens, he made every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew; for the Lord God had not caused it to rain upon the earth, and there was not a man to till the ground. But there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground. And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." Here the order is just as it is stated in the first chapter. Vegetation precedes the creation of man, and, in order that it may be traced to the creative act of God alone, the writer is careful to point out the absence of rain and of man. The origin of plant-life cannot be ascribed to the mellowing influence of rain, for as yet there had been no rain; nor can it be ascribed to the agency of man, for as yet there was not a man to till the ground. Here, then, is the testimony of this second chapter regarding the question of order raised by Dr. Driver, and the account it gives is precisely the same as that stated in chapter first.

As the harmony of the two chapters on the question of order is manifest, one is curious to discover how our critic has managed to make out, with any show of plausibility, a charge of discrepancy. The method adopted is very simple. He mixes up the general account of the creation of plant-life and the creation of man

with the account given immediately afterwards of the special arrangement of a specially prepared residence for the man. Having, as we have seen, placed the creation of man after the creation of plants and herbs, the sacred writer proceeds to inform us of a special act of providence exercised toward man after he was created. God did not send him forth to range the primeval forests, which, at the time of his entrance upon the scene, may have been all but impenetrable in their luxuriance. In the exercise of his loving-kindness as Adam's Father, and in harmony with Adam's dignity as his son, he prepared for him, not a forest, nor a jungle, but a garden. It is of this garden the writer speaks, and not of the earth and its flora generally, when he says that "the Lord God caused to grow out of the ground every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil." Having made provision for the watering of the garden, and having stocked it with the choicest trees pleasant to the sight and good for food, he took the man whom he had formed, and put him into it to dress it and to keep it, asserting his own sovereign authority over both the man and the garden, by license on the one hand and limitation on the other. The inventory of Adam's heritage embraces all the trees of the garden save one. Of their fruit he may eat, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil he may not eat upon pain of death.

The story of Eden, therefore, and the preparation of it for the reception of the previously created man, cannot, with any proper regard to the principles of Biblical interpretation, be cited in proof of the order of creation, and as indicating the writer's views regarding the general question of the priority, or the posteriority of the creation of man to the creation of the *flora* of our world. The narrative is limited to an account of a particular locality, described as "eastward in Eden," and recounts a special providential procedure by which it was prepared for the reception of our first father. Nothing but the exigencies of a theory could lead any one to seek for the key to the general order of creation in what is manifestly an episode in the general history.

Dr. Driver finds further evidence of discrepancy between the first and the second chapter in the diverse accounts they give of the order of the creation of man and the lower animals. In the first chapter the order is the lower animals first, whereas in the second chapter he alleges the order is, man first and the animals afterwards. This charge of discrepancy he bases on the language of chapter ii. 18-23. "And the Lord God said, It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helpmeet for him. And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof. And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air and to every beast of the field; but for Adam there was not found an help meet for him. And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept; and he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof; and the rib which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man. And Adam said, This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman because she was taken out of man."

The charge preferred by Dr. Driver is twofold. 1. That contrary to the order set forth in the first chapter, the second chapter represents man as created before the lower animals. 2. That the second chapter places the creation of the lower

animals between the creation of the man and the creation of the woman. This Dr. Driver holds is evidently opposed to the order indicated in chapter first.

As to the first point, the alleged discrepancy in the accounts given in these two chapters regarding the order observed in the creation of man and the creation of the lower animals, let us hear the verdict of Dr. Franz Delitzsch. "Much fuss," he says, "has been made about the contradiction between this and the former account of creation. In the former the creation of animals precedes that of man, in this the creation of man that of the animals. But could this narrator really mean that the environment of man was till now exclusively a vegetable and a mineral one? And if his meaning had been, that animals were now first created, he would not have left water animals and reptiles unmentioned, whereas, he speaks only of wild beasts, and cattle and birds. The animal creation appears here under a peculiar point of view, which the narrator certainly did not regard as its motive in general. It is the first step towards the creation of woman, for the matter in question is an associate his equal in dignity, for man formed from man. On this account *wayitzer* will have to be understood as the foundation, recurring to what is past. . . . This is possible as far as style is concerned and suitable to the scriptural mode of writing history. . . . This backward regard is moreover brought about with a certain necessity, by the fact that this second narrative has man for its centre, and not like the first, which relates in a continuous line for its end and climax." Delitzsch *on Genesis*, Vol. I., 140-'41. It is unnecessary to say that Dr. Delitzsch was a competent authority in regard to the tenses of the Hebrew verb, and the scriptural mode of writing history. Well versed in both, he has no hesitation in dissenting from the charge preferred against this portion of the sacred narrative by the higher critics. In the passage in question, he regards it as consonant to Hebrew usage to give *wayitzer* a backward reference to the creation of animals mentioned in chapter first. This rendering of this verb leaves the higher critics without a vestige of a foundation for the charge of discrepancy.

In a foot-note (p. 7) Dr. Driver says, "the rendering 'had formed' is contrary to idiom." Well, Rabbi Laser of Philadelphia, who was as well acquainted with the Hebrew idiom as Dr. Driver, so renders this verb in this passage. Besides, we have the authority both of King James's translators and of the late revisers of their translation, for rendering the imperfect with *waw* conversive, by the English pluperfect. In the last two verses of Isaiah xxxviii, they so render the imperfect of the Hebrew verb *amar*. Dr. Driver has tried to discount the argument from this instance, and to weaken its force by simply alleging, that the rendering is not legitimate, but he does so in violation of the ultimate law propounded in his own little book on *The Hebrew Tenses*. After all he has written on the subject of the Hebrew tenses, and despite the mystery wherewith he has invested the use of the *perfect* and *imperfect*, he has to confess that in dealing with "passages on which some degree of uncertainty must rest, the conditions imposed by the context, interpreted in the light of parallel constructions, will usually reduce it within narrow limits." (Preface, p. vi.) This is simply confessing that there are difficulties arising out of the peculiarities of the Hebrew tenses that his book on *the Tenses* cannot solve, and that the remedy, if remedy there be in such cases, is to be sought in "the conditions imposed by the context, interpreted in the light of parallel constructions." Well, applying this rule to the two passages in Isaiah, there is no room for a second opinion on the subject. The context which

recites the story of Hezekiah's recovery, and the song he composed for the celebration of God's mercy therein, necessitates the rendering of *wayomer* in the plural perfect, for surely Isaiah did not tell the attendants on the king to put a lump of figs on the boil after he had recovered and had composed the song. Nor does Dr. Driver mend the matter by reminding his readers that *wayomer* has been transferred from its proper context in the Second Book of Kings. This reference to the original context simply confirms the rule that the context must determine the tense the translator is to employ, for in Kings *wayomer* is translated by the English, "said," and could not be otherwise rendered, while in the altered contextual environment in Isaiah, it is rendered and must be rendered by "had said." In fact, we have here an illustration of the narrowing effect of the persistent prosecution of one branch of study upon the human mind. Darwin so engrossed himself with the phenomena of the *flora* and *fauna* of our world, that the spiritual element of his nature became absolutely atrophied, and Dr. Driver has been so absorbed in the study of Hebrew and its cognates, that the sublime mysteries of which that language was the divinely ordained channel of communication, have, to a lamentable degree, been lost sight of by him, or reduced, as we have seen, to a theological *minimum*, utterly out of keeping with the grandeur of the economy of redemption revealed in Moses and the prophets, and fulfilled by the obedience and death of our Divine Redeemer.

With regard to the question raised by the separation made between the creation of man and woman, Dr. Driver admits that, if the narrative stood alone, it might, indeed, be reasonably explained upon the supposition that chapter second describes in detail what is stated succinctly in chapter first. Well, what is there in the latter narrative to shake confidence in this explanation? The answer given by our critic is, that the order in the other cases forms part of a progression evidently intentional on the part of the narrator here, and as evidently opposed to the order indicated in the first chapter. Now, the assumption here is, that the second chapter takes up and discusses the general question of the order of creation already set forth in chapter first. We have seen, however, as Dr. Delitzsch has demonstrated, that such is not the object of the second chapter; that in the second chapter man is the centre, whereas in the first, he is the end and climax. In a word, the point in which the second chapter differs from the first is that it describes in detail what is succinctly stated in the first, giving minute particulars regarding the origin of vegetation, the creation of man, and the arrangements for his happiness in the creation of an help meet and a residence for him befitting his rank, together with an account of his inauguration as the master and monarch of the whole animal creation. It is for this reason the wild beasts of the field and the fowls of heaven are brought before him to receive names from him. They are brought to do homage to him and to grace his inauguration as the ruler of this lower world; and as they were brought forward male and female, there was doubtless the additional design to make him feel his own loneliness. There is no ground for the charge of discrepancy between the two accounts of the creation of man. In chapter first we are told in general terms that God created man in his own image, and it is added, "male and female created he *them*." It does not say that the female was created at the same time as the male. The second chapter informs us that they were not created simultaneously, and that, whereas the man was formed from the dust of

the ground, the woman was not formed directly from dust, but, as the race was to spring from one fontal source, she was formed out of a rib taken from the man.

Dr. Driver thinks the charge of discrepancy between these two chapters is confirmed by diversity of style. Chapter first is "unornate, measured, precise, and particular phrases frequently recur. Chapter second is freer and more varied; the actions of God are described with some fulness and picturesqueness of detail; instead of simply *speaking* or *creating*, as in chapter first, he *fashions, breathes* into man the breath of life, *plants, places, takes, sets, brings, closes up, builds, etc.*, and even in the allied chapter third, *walks* in the garden; the recurring phrases are less marked, and *not the same* as those of chapters i. 1, ii. 4."

The critic has here, as these critics commonly do, furnished material for his own reputation. Are not the points in which he tells us the second chapter differs from the first just the points one might expect in a narrative of detail? Why should such a narrative not describe God's actions with "some fulness and picturesqueness of details"? If one of its defects was to give details of the divine actions, surely the use of these differential phrases must have become a necessity. As the first chapter simply said that God created man, and gave no further information regarding the mode of the divine procedure, is it unreasonable to expect that the second chapter should speak of his *fashioning* man out of the dust of the ground and of his *breathing* into his nostrils the breath of life? This account is one of "some fulness and picturesqueness of detail," but it were certainly a singular piece of criticism to seize upon points which must characterize a detailed narration and hold them up as proofs that they justified a charge of discrepancy.

Besides, the action expressed by the term *breathed* is certainly not out of place in a revelation which gives such prominence to the agency of the Spirit of God. Even in the first chapter, and on the very threshold of the six days' work, the Spirit of God is represented as moving upon the face of the waters, and his agency is recognized in the creation and garnishing of the heavens. "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made and all the host of them by the Spirit (*ruach*) of his mouth." (Psalm xxxiii. 6.) "By his Spirit (*ruach*) he hath garnished the heavens." (Job xxvi. 13.) In like manner his agency is recognized in the new creation. "Except a man be born again (*anathen*, from above,) he cannot see the kingdom of God . . . Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit (*pneuma*) he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." (John iii. 3 and 5.) He is also the efficient agent in qualifying the Christian ministry for their work. Both in that upper room in Jerusalem, and on the day of Pentecost, his agency in fitting the apostles for the execution of their office receives remarkable recognition. In the former instance (John xx. 26) our Lord appears to his disciples, and after pronouncing upon them the benediction of peace, and giving them a commission likened as to the manner of it to the commission he had himself received from the Father, "He breathed on them and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost." On the latter occasion (Acts ii.) there is a public demonstration of his agency when the disciples "were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance." In the latter case, as in the former, the gift of the Spirit is attributed to Christ. In the former, Christ is said to have *breathed* him upon the disciples; in the latter, he is said to have "shed him forth." These, of course, are merely a few of the numerous passages in which the agency of the Holy Spirit is mentioned in Scripture in connection with the work of creation and the work of redemption. He pro-

ceedeth from the Father and the Son, and it is through him, as the executive of the Godhead, the infinitely wise purposes of God are carried into execution. Dr. Driver can see, in the use of the term *breathed*, as descriptive of God's action in the creation of man, nothing beyond a fulness and picturesqueness of detail, on which he bases a charge of discrepancy; but a little deeper acquaintance with the full-orbed theology of the Bible might have led him to see in the use of this term a remarkable proof of the harmony of this passage with the scriptural account of the inner relations of the persons of the adorable Trinity, and with the structure and administration of the divine economies whether of nature or of grace.

Indeed, the second chapter cannot be contrasted with the first even on the score of "picturesqueness." The term employed in the second verse of the first chapter to express the action of the Spirit on the face of the waters, is as picturesque as any of the terms in the second which Dr. Driver has made the basis of his contrast. The term employed is *merachepheheth*, the Piel participle feminine of *rachaph*, to be soft, tender, which is used to express the action of a bird cherishing its brood, hovering over it, and reminds one of the action of this same Spirit in the creation of the humanity of our Lord, when the Holy Ghost came upon Mary and the power of the highest overshadowed her, and his action at the baptism of Christ when he descended upon him in bodily shape like a dove, and abode upon him. There is certainly no term in the second chapter of all those enumerated by Dr. Driver, more picturesque than this, and therefore the argument from the alleged diversity of style in proof of diversity of authorship is without warrant so far as phraseology is concerned, and phraseology pure and simple is one of the grounds on which the alleged contrast and consequent diversity of authorship are based.

Our author finds further evidence of diversity of authorship in the third chapter, in which God is represented as *walking* in the garden. Well, the answer to this is obvious. If the divine action could be likened to that of a bird brooding over her young, why might not the divine action be likened to that of a man walking in a garden? Is the action of walking in a garden more picturesque than the action of a parent bird cherishing her offspring under her wings? The vital critical question here is this: Is the diversity between these two figurative representations so great that the same author could not have used them both? The criticism that can discern diversity of authorship in such distinctions, must proceed upon critical principles that are neither literary nor scientific.

Dr. Driver discovers evidence of diversity of documents in chapter vi. 5-13. One of these extends from the fifth verse to the eighth, the other, which he alleges is a duplicate of this, extends from the ninth to the thirteenth. These verses furnish no evidence of reduplication, or diversity of documents. The section announces the divine determination to destroy man and beast, fowl and creeping thing, and assigns a reason for doing so. Then it informs us of the exemption of one man, Noah, from the determined catastrophe, and assigns a reason for this exemption. As the exemption is to embrace his family, the names of his sons are given—Shem, Ham, and Japheth. The critic who professes to find proof of documentary diversity and discrepancy in a section so closely concatenated, forfeits all claim to critical recognition.

Passing to chapter seventh, Dr. Driver discovers another discrepancy. In this chapter Noah is instructed to take of every clean beast seven into the ark,

whereas, in chapter sixth, two of every sort, without distinction, are prescribed. There is no discrepancy here. The sixth chapter recites an instruction given at the outset, when Noah was warned of the deluge wherewith God had determined to avenge himself upon an ungodly generation, and instructed regarding the provision he was to make for the saving of himself and his family. As it was a part of the divine plan to preserve a portion of the animal creation, Noah is enjoined to bring into the ark two of every sort, and it is added, "male and female shall they be." The main idea is the continuance of the species. In the seventh chapter we have an account of an instruction given a hundred and twenty years afterwards, when the ark was finished. Now, it is only by assuming that chapter seventh proposes to recite the same instruction as that given one hundred and twenty years before, that Dr. Driver manages to make out a discrepancy. This assumption is most unwarrantable. The context proves that the two instructions were separated from each other by the interval that elapsed between the commencement and the completion of the building of the ark.

This reduces the question to very small dimensions; and it is simply this: Could God consistently issue these two instructions? Could he, without violating some principle of truth or righteousness, tell Noah, when he was about to build the ark, to take into it two and two of every sort, and then, when the ark was finished one hundred and twenty years afterwards, tell him that of the clean he was to take them in by sevens? Critical presumption has arrogated to itself many high prerogatives, but it is questionable whether it will venture to affirm that it were derogatory to the divine character to issue to Noah a more liberal inventory of the clean in the second instruction than he had done in the first.

We should remember that Noah was an husbandman (which is the correct translation), and, no doubt, during the intermediate years he had often thought, as Shem and Ham and Japheth grew up to manhood, of the limited stock of the clean allowed him and his sons for agricultural purposes in the first instruction. Is it unwarrantable to assume that a man who walked with God as Noah did, must have brought the case of himself and his sons in regard to this matter before him, appealing to his benevolence and bounty, and that the God who established his covenant with him and his sons, heard his prayer, and enlarged the original gift? This is a perfectly reasonable hypothesis, in harmony with the principle that God so orders his providential administration as to make men feel the necessity of looking to him to supply their temporal as well as their spiritual wants; and it is surely to be preferred to the theory of the higher critics, who, despite the repeated revision of their irredactors, initial, medial, and final, still find, as the result of all their toil, a record whose incongruities and discrepancies are sufficient to prove them to have been a set of literary blunderers—men of whom it certainly could not be said, that they wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

The critical syndicate at whose request this volume has been prepared may regard it as "furnishing a record of theological inquiry up to date," and well fitted to introduce students to the literature of the Old Testament; but its critical inquiry has, in the main, been conducted by continental critics of the school of Kuenen and Wellhausen, whose irreverent disintegrations of the word of God, with slight modifications, it has imported, and clothed in an English dress. It has no claim to be entitled an introduction to the literature of the Old Testament, except in the sense in which the horse of the Trojan war introduced the Greeks

to Troy. The attitude of its author throughout is inimical to the claims of the sacred volume to be regarded as a truly divine revelation; and if his conclusions be accepted by those who are to occupy the pulpits of the churches of these lands, there will, ere long, be inaugurated, if divine grace do not interpose a barrier to its progress, a cycle of moderatism and skepticism such as has wrought the decadence of vital Christianity among so many of the churches of the continent.

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BRIGGS' THE BIBLE, THE CHURCH, AND THE REASON.

THE BIBLE, THE CHURCH, AND THE REASON; THE THREE GREAT FOUNTAINS OF DIVINE AUTHORITY. *By Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892. Pp. 298. Price, \$1.75.

This is a new book, but neither the theme nor its treatment can be called new. The main part of the volume consists in a repetition and expansion of the positions taken by Professor Briggs in his *Inaugural Address*. Several other discussions together with a number of appendices are added. To some extent these show the hand of the bookmaker as much as the pen of the author.

The book contains seven lectures and sixteen appendices. Their titles are: I. The Bible and the Church. II. The Reason as a great Fountain of Divine Authority. III. The Three Fountains of Divine Authority. IV. Is Scripture Inerrant? V. The Higher Criticism. VI. Biblical History. VII. The Messianic Ideal. In the preface Professor Briggs says that "five of these lectures (I-V.) were prepared in response to requests that I should set forth more fully the views expressed in my *Inaugural Address* on the *Authority of Scripture*," and he adds that "it was not his intention to publish these lectures, but he could not decline to comply with the many requests for their publication from all parts of the land." Accordingly these lectures were delivered in New York and vicinity, and then issued in the treatise now before us, with lectures VI. and VII., added. If the request for the delivery and publication of these lectures came from the friends of the professor he has need to pray "deliver me from my friends." Moreover, his own apparent readiness to respond to their request indicates a desire to obtrude his views in a way which left those who did not agree with him no alternative but to resist.

It is to be remembered also, that these lectures were delivered last winter, after the Presbytery of New York had concluded, largely in the interests of the peace of the church, to stay the prosecution for heresy against him. He seemed to assume that the decision of the Presbytery was a tacit approval of his views, and that it gave him liberty to promulgate them. The book before us is evidence of this. In this also is to be found an explanation of the fact that the same Presbytery, when electing commissioners to the General Assembly, sent a delegation that was almost entirely opposed to the views of Professor Briggs. Many of those who in the interest of peace voted to stay proceedings at one meeting of Presbytery, voted at the other meeting to send men to the General Assembly opposed to the Professor. These men were doubtless disappointed that Dr. Briggs seemed to misunderstand the decision of the Presbytery in the first instance, and that disappointment expressed itself most significantly in the second. But perhaps it is better as

it is, for truth is of more value than even peace, and the only lasting basis of peace in the church is purity of doctrine.

The tone of the book is, to say the least, unnecessarily severe. The almost contemptuous way in which the author speaks of the opinions of those who do not agree with him, makes it very necessary that his friends should apologize for "his unfortunate manner," while those whose opinions he treats with such scant courtesy, cannot but feel irritated if not aggrieved.

To show that we are not astray in this estimate of the spirit and tone of the book a few quotations may be made: "Protestants did not renounce Pope Leo X. in order to exalt pope Luther or Calvin, still less *those little popes* who appear in succession in the different countries and churches, and who try so hard to dominate theology by the use of such ecclesiastical machinery as may happen to be within their reach." (P. 10.) "If it be necessary that we should be controlled by traditional dogma in interpreting holy Scripture, any historical scholar would prefer ancient Catholic tradition to a tradition which goes no further back than the Swiss and Dutch Scholasticism of the seventeenth century, or to *its ill-formed and sickly child*, which was born in American schools of theology not a century ago." (P. 11.) Speaking of Cardinal Newman, he says: "I would rather follow Newman into the presence of my Master than *risk* the companionship of *those uncharitable men* who would exclude him from the kingdom of God. With the burning words of Jesus sounding in my ears, 'Woe unto you scribes and pharisees, hypocrites! because ye shut the kingdom of heaven against men,' I would fear lest the Master should say to such a company: 'I know you not, ye have none of my Spirit, ye are none of mine.'" (P. 19.) Concerning the salvation of the heathen, he assails certain dogmatic theologians by saying: "The prejudices derived from systems of dogma as antiquated as the map of Hereford (thirteenth century), and *the bigotry born of a pharisaic contempt* of the lower religions of mankind, are unworthy of our age." (P. 45.) Concerning "barriers," he says: "The *scholastic divines* of Protestantism erected a series of barriers about the Bible no less serious as *obstacles* to communion with God and *stumbling-blocks* to faith than the Roman Catholics had erected about the church." (P. 51.) Alluding to the Scriptures *being* or *containing* the word of God, he says: "These *polemic theologians* take their stand at the waters of life and demand of every one who would partake of them, 'Say the Bible is the word of God, or depart from the Bible and the church.'" (P. 100.) Another quotation, the most bitter of all, must suffice. "These three Americans (Professors W. H. Green, Howard Osgood, and E. C. Bissell) have not yet won a single scholarly victory or checked for an instant the advance of criticism in America. The contest ought to be a scholarly contest between critics who adhere to the traditional theory, and critics who have abandoned the traditional theory for the results of a more scientific study of the Scriptures. The chief difficulty in the situation is that *some ministers and editors who are not critics*, and who are ignorant of the history and terminology of criticism, endeavor to excite the public mind against higher criticism by *appeals to prejudice and brutal methods*. Our Saviour represents such *enemies of the truth as hissing serpents* (Matt. xxiii. 13). Paul writes of them *as dogs* (Phil. iii. 2). It is in accordance with such precedents that Eichhorn uses the term 'snort.' This term has been regarded by biblical scholars for a century as a graphic description of a kind of opposition they have had to contend with." P. 278-279. (Italics mine.)

The spirit manifested by these passages may be excused as the "unfortunate manner" of Professor Briggs, still we are inclined to think that it will entirely forfeit his claim to a place among the martyrs, should the church of which he is a minister deal with him severely.

Our space forbids careful review of the whole ground covered by this book, so that we confine attention to what is its main theme, as it was of the *Inaugural Address*. The first three lectures thus lie before us. Our author's discussion raises the important question of the source of authority in religion, and of the relative or coördinate claims of the Bible, the Church, and the Reason to constitute that source.

The first lecture deals with *the Bible and the Church*, and here our author's aim is to show that the church is "a great fountain of divine authority." Before he enters upon this main theme three preparatory topics are discussed. The first is, "The Authority to Define the Canon of Holy Scripture"; the second is, "The Authority of Interpreting Scripture;" and the third is, "The Westminster Doctrine of the Church."

What our author says in regard to the first of these topics is exceedingly meagre, confusing and unsatisfactory. Perhaps it is our own dullness, but we must confess our inability to learn what answer Professor Briggs really gives to the question of authority to determine the Canon of Scripture. Whether we are to make the Bible define its own Canon, or whether we must look to the religious consciousness, or whether again we should rely on the witness of the Holy Spirit in the Bible, or in our hearts, or both, is not made at all clear by our author. Here, too, as so often in the whole book, there is utter failure to distinguish between the objective ground upon which the authority of the Word of God rests, and the subjective experience of the saving power of that word in the soul.

Regarding the second question, Dr. Briggs says that the authority for the interpretation of Scripture is to be found in the Scripture itself. None will seriously object to this statement, for it is really the principle of the analogy of the faith as found in the harmony of Scripture teaching in all its parts. But all that Professor Briggs says here still leaves the real question practically unsolved. That question is, Who is to decide what the meaning of Scripture is? Is it to be the individual or the church, or have both rights in the premises? Now while the right of private judgment in the individual is to be held fast as against the Romish doctrine of the authority of the church alone to interpret Scripture, as well as settle its canon, still the interpretation which the individual makes must be in a measure modified or related to the interpretation made by the other individuals associated in the same ecclesiastical communion. In this way creeds and confessions arise. A creed is simply the interpretation of Scripture arranged in order which the church in her corporate capacity at any given time sets forth. Now while the Scripture is the only infallible rule, and while creeds have value only in so far as they agree with Scripture, yet the church's interpretation of Scripture as expressed in her creed binds for the time those who voluntarily assume relations with that church. Should anyone be convinced that the creed or its interpretation is not according to Scripture, several courses are open to him. He may withdraw from the church, or he may seek in an orderly and constitutional way to modify the creed in accordance with his views of Scripture. But he is not justified in concluding that he only is right and all the rest are in error, much less has he any

right to remain in the church and teach views which are inconsistent with the creed. Even in the case of a trial for heresy, the creed, as expressing the meaning the church takes of Scripture, forms the law which is to be administered. The accused cannot successfully appeal, in the process of trial, to the Scripture as he understands it, but his opinions are to be judged by the Scriptures as understood by the church. That understanding is found in the creed, and there is neither dishonor to the Scripture nor hardship to the individual in such a case.

Concerning the third question Professor Briggs maintains that the Westminster doctrine of the church is that it is a great fountain of divine authority. Christ, he says, in giving the church the keys of the kingdom, constituted it a fountain of divine authority. Unless this, he adds, be the case the church has no organization at all.

It is not going beyond the mark in the least to say that there is endless confusion in the views of our author on this point. It is quite true that the church, as a divinely ordained institute, receives its authority as divine from Jesus Christ. But the constitution of the church wherein Jesus Christ makes known the divine will and authority is the Holy Scriptures. It is true also that the Holy Spirit dwells in the church, and is present in her ordinances, but the very idea of the church itself and the form of the ordinances are determined by the Scriptures. Dr. Briggs seems hopelessly confused upon this whole topic.

Coming to the real question our author argues at length that the church is truly a great fountain of divine authority. He supports this conclusion by six arguments, as follows: (1.) "Christ and the apostles so teach." But it is not easy to see how the passages quoted prove anything more than that the church is a divine institute and the channel by which the blessings of the gospel flow to men, unless our author is willing to accept the exegesis and adopt the logic that lead to Rome. (2.) "Church history proves it." But so far as church history bears on the question it shows that popery is the natural product of authority in the church as against authority in Scripture. (3.) "The condition of the world" is another proof. But the question is not as to the condition of the world, but in regard to the mind and will of God upon this subject. (4.) "Biblical history also proves that the church is a great fountain of divine authority inasmuch as the church antedates the Bible." But does the church antedate the Bible? Certainly the church in the world does not antedate divine revelation, and that is all we need to maintain here. (5.) "Christian experience also proves it." But both the form and contents of a genuine Christian experience must be determined by the Scriptures, even though the Holy Spirit be the vitalizing agency in that experience. The church has no voice with which to speak to the Christian experience till God, speaking to and through her, gives her a voice and a message. (6.) "Prophetically the church is a great fountain of divine authority." What our author says upon this point bears far more upon the authority of Scripture than upon that of the church.

Summing up the results of our examination of this lecture we have to confess that repeated perusal of it has not removed the feeling in our mind that our author does much special pleading in the course of his discussion, and that he entirely fails to make out his case. To show that the church and her ordinances are of divine origin is not to prove that the church is a great fountain of divine authority. If the church be but the divine channel by means of which the blessings of grace

are brought to men, Professor Briggs has certainly been wasting his strength, for all admit this.

The second lecture undertakes to show that *the reason is a great fountain of divine authority*. At the very outset our author must be charged with failure to define what he means by *the reason*. It is not "the light of nature" of the first chapter of the Confession of Faith. He speaks of it as the "light of grace," as "the divine Logos shining in the heart," as "the working of the divine Spirit." Then, again, he seems to include along with reason, "the conscience and the religious feeling" as embraced under *the reason* which he thinks constitutes "a great fountain of divine authority." Such flexibility and ambiguity of language is inexcusable, especially when the term in question holds such an important place in the discussion. But a more serious objection still lies against our author at this point. He introduces certain doubtful metaphysical conceptions, partly Platonic and partly Kantian, when he speaks of the "inner light of the Logos," and of "the metaphysical categories" and of the forms of reason, and thereby is guilty of what in other connections he condemns in very strong language. Is Dr. Briggs himself free from scholasticism?

He first tries to find in the Confession support for his views in regard to the authority of the reason. He admits that the Westminster doctrine of the reason is defective at this point, and he gives a word of praise to the Quakers and the Cambridge Platonists for bringing out the true view. He seeks to distinguish between "the light of nature," in the confessional sense, and "the light of grace," and on the next page (32) seems to identify "the light of grace" with "the light of the divine Logos," but whether that divine Logos be "the Holy Spirit in the heart" or "the incarnate Redeemer," is not made plain either here or elsewhere.

But our author seems to be a man of great resources, for, with his usual boldness, he claims the right to go beyond the teaching of the Confession on this point. After sitting in judgment on the Westminster divines, and finding their doctrine of *the reason* to be defective, he proceeds at once to give a place to the reason which they did not, and then he seeks to bend other sections of the Confession into line to support his own acknowledged extra-confessional views. Such procedure is surely a little remarkable when we call to mind the severe things our author says about the "modern dogmatians" for going beyond the teaching of the Westminster divines. Then he quotes from the Confession (chapters i., x., xiv., xvi., xviii.) to show that *the reason* is a great fountain of divine authority. If the reader will turn to these passages, he will find that they all relate either to the question of the evidences of the divine authority of the Scriptures, or to the work of the Holy Spirit in regenerating the soul. None of these passages can be fairly taken to prove our author's peculiar extra-confessional doctrine of *the reason* as a great fountain of divine authority.

Our author next tries to reason from Scripture to establish his doctrine concerning *the reason*. The Wisdom literature, Hebrews, Biblical history, and the origin and growth of the Old Testament religion are the facts which he seeks to use here. But all his reasoning only goes to show that the Scriptures always represent man as a religious being. But this needed no proof.

The third proof adduced to show that *the reason* is a great fountain of divine authority is "the condition of the world." Here our author speaks chiefly of the destiny of the human race, and says some startling things concerning the salvation

of the heathen. With amazing forgetfulness of some of the most solemn passages of Scripture, he seriously informs us (page 45) that "there is no statement in Scripture that forbids the comfortable hope that the pious Mohammedan or Buddhist, or worshipper of sacred fire, destitute of Bible and church, may be earnestly seeking after God in the only way open to him, through the forms of reason." With equal forgetfulness of the fact that the Scripture can be our only authority on such a subject, he adds (page 47): "Christians do not now believe this dogma of the universal damnation of the heathen, because the reason, the conscience, and the religious feeling in our times shrink back from it with horror." This surely is a new test of truth, especially of religious truth. It is false because men do not believe it. Thus the Bible is superseded, and the gospel need no longer be preached.

Our author's fourth argument on this subject is drawn from "The nature of man." The analysis of man's nature here given is very meagre, and it seems to reduce religion to morality in an attempt to transform the authority of conscience into an organ of religious authority in the human soul, overlooking the fact that God to whom conscience points has given an external revelation of his will to which even conscience must be in subjection.

The fifth proof by which our author supports his position is found in church history. The Rationalists (he does not say what school of them) are assured that they may have "the high privilege of communion with God in the Spirit, through the forms of reason." (P. 52.) He says further (p. 53), "May not God's Spirit work in the reason of a Rationalist? May we not take such an honest, straightforward, truth-seeking scholar as Martineau at his word when he says that he could not find authority in the church, or the Bible, but did find God enthroned in his own soul." But the testimony of Rationalists is not church history.

The last reason by which our author endeavors to make out a case for *the reason* is to be found in Christian experience. Indirectly (p. 54) he asserts that the Christian religion is not confined to the Bible and the church. Indeed, (p. 55) "it is only through immediate communion with God in the forms of reason that the higher Christian life is possible." So far as this has any significance, it can only mean that the sphere of religious experience as generated by the Spirit of God is the soul of man. If this is all our author means it does not prove his point; if he means more than this it is not true.

On the whole this lecture presents our author's views on *the reason* as a great fountain of divine authority in a more objectionable form than did the *Inaugural Address*. And not only does the vague and variable use of the term *reason* come out more distinctly, but there is a constant confusion between the inner religious experience of the soul, and the agent and instrument by which that experience is determined. The confusion seems hopeless.

The third lecture takes the three fountains of divine authority together, and seeks to define their relations. This is an exceedingly important and practical question, and after what our author has said in the first and second lectures, our curiosity is aroused to see what he has to say on the theme of the third.

He first explains what he means by "a fountain of authority." He says that "seat," "source," "medium," and "fountain," of authority all mean about the same thing, but we have sought in vain for any clear statement of what our author means by the phrase, "fountain of authority." Moreover, if one wished to be at

all critical, it would be easy to point out that "seat" and "fountain," "source" and "medium" do not mean quite the same thing. That our author does not always use the expressions in the same sense is evident from this remarkable passage on page 58: "It is not taught that the church is the original source of divine authority, apart from and independent of God." Can anything, Bible, church, or reason, be a source of authority in any sense at all apart from God? What is the difference between "source" and "original source"?

Discussing the question of the relation of the three great fountains of authority already described, our author leads us on to the very point, and then disappoints us beyond measure. He says that they are not coördinate, nor is any one of them to be subordinated to any other. Then, as if to evade answer altogether, he declines to define the relation they sustain to each other. Then, again, as if half ashamed of this mode of treating the subject, he goes on in a timid way, so unlike his usual style, to discuss their relations. Perhaps he is anxious not to offend Rationalists and Romanists, and desirous of preparing the way for the union of all in one happy family.

Our author makes an important distinction here, and lays great stress on it. Scripture has what he terms "unique authority," and consequently it alone is entitled to be regarded as "the only infallible rule of faith and manners." Here we have the distinction between "fountain of authority" and "rule of faith" to puzzle us again. We have three fountains of divine authority, and only one infallible rule of faith; but how these are to be adjusted to each other practically we are not told. Is the church a rule, but fallible? Is reason a rule, but liable to err? Is the Scripture a rule, and infallible? Surely there is confusion of thought and ambiguity of expression here. If the Scripture be the only infallible rule, is it not reasonable to conclude that it is qualified to give the law with authority alike to the church and the reason? If, therefore, the church and the reason have any authority, it is subordinate to, and derived from, the Scripture. In the last analysis, authority in religion roots in God. If God speaks in the Scriptures, we have therein a transcript of his will. That revealed will gives the constitution to the church, and the law to reason and conscience. This we believe to be the true doctrine.

The fourth lecture discusses the question of the "errancy" or "inerrancy" of the Scriptures, and the fifth treats of the higher criticism. The same doctrine appears in both as is found in the *Inaugural Address* and our author's other writings. Inviting as these subjects are, we cannot enter on them at length. How the Professor can consistently maintain that an errant Scripture can supply a really infallible rule in the sense in which he uses the terms, passes our comprehension. In an appendix he gives a long list of Biblical scholars who have enlisted among the higher critics. But he seems to swell his list by assuming that if a man is not a higher critic, he is not worthy to be ranked amongst the Biblical scholars of the day. In the list given it is a satisfaction to us that neither Southern nor Canadian Presbyterianism can boast of a single higher critic. But the subject is a wide one, and we dare not trespass further on time and patience.

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MULLER'S NATURAL RELIGION.

NATURAL RELIGION. The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Glasgow in 1888. *By F. Max Müller, K. M.* Pp. 608. London and New York: Longman's, Green & Co., 15 East 16th Street. 1889.

This treatise on Natural Religion contains the first course of lectures in Glasgow University on the Gifford foundation. Lord Gifford the founder of this lectureship was a Scotch lawyer of eminent ability, who resided near Edinburgh. By untiring energy and constant industry he acquired considerable fortune, and for many years he discharged in a most honorable manner the duties of a judge on the Scottish bench. By his will, after making ample provision for his near relatives, he bequeathed the sum of £80 000, or nearly \$400,000, to found lectureships in natural theology in the four Scottish universities. By this bequest, Edinburgh received £25,000; Glasgow and Aberdeen each received £20,000; and St. Andrews fell heir to £15,000.

The main object Lord Gifford had in view in founding these lectureships may be gathered from the following extract from his will: "These bequests are made for the purpose of promoting, advancing, teaching, and diffusing the study of Natural Theology in the widest sense of the term, in other words, the knowledge of God, the infinite, the all, the first and only cause, the one and the sole reality, and the sole existence, the knowledge of his nature and attributes, the knowledge of the relations which man and the whole universe bear to him, the knowledge of the nature and foundation of ethics or morals, and of all obligations and duties arising therefrom."

Lord Gifford further directs that this subject is to be treated by the lecturers "as a natural science without any reference to a professed revelation." The lecturers, too, "are not to be required to submit to any test," nor "to subscribe to any declaration of belief"; and further, "they may belong to any or no denomination." "They may even be skeptics, agnostics, or free-thinkers, provided they be reverent men, true thinkers, and sincere lovers of, and earnest inquirers after, truth."

Professor Max Müller, the celebrated philologist and Sanscrit scholar of Oxford, was chosen to deliver the first course of lectures on the Gifford foundation in Glasgow University, and the result is the book before us, containing twenty lectures. The first of these lectures is full of interest, not only in itself, but as indicating the starting point of the entire course. In this lecture Professor Müller gives some account of Lord Gifford's life and views, together with a sympathetic exposition of the nature and conditions of the munificent bequest of the eminent jurist. It is specially worthy of note here that Professor Müller expresses hearty approval of the terms of the bequest, and that he regards the liberal terms according to which the lecturers are to be chosen, and the mode of treating the subject of Natural Religion, "to be one of the signs of the times, full of promise."

Our author gives us the additional information regarding Lord Gifford "that he deliberately rejected all miracles, whether as a judge for want of evidence, or as a Christian because they seemed to him to be in open conflict with the exalted spirit of Christ's own teaching." Yet he adds: "He always remained a true Christian, trusting more in the great miracle of Christ's life and teaching on earth than in the small miracles ascribed to him by many of his followers." We are

further informed by our learned lecturer that Lord Gifford "was satisfied to accept the traditional forms of public worship as a necessary tribute which every member of a religious as well as political community must pay for the maintenance of order, peace, and charity." Professor Müller, in the spirit of the terms of Lord Gifford's will, insists on "the scientific treatment of religion," and contrasts the slow advance in this field with the rapid progress made in the natural sciences. For this condition of things he blames theologians, and rejoices that Lord Gifford directs that natural theology in these courses of lectures is to "be treated as a strictly natural science, the greatest of all sciences; indeed, in one sense the only science."

In all these introductory explanations there is much to call forth remark, and not a little to provoke criticism. It may be seriously questioned whether a strictly scientific treatment of religion can coolly ignore the miraculous, or assume the negative position in regard to the supernatural claims of Christianity. A sound scientific method must surely take note of all the facts in the case, no matter what the problem may be. It is a fact that the Christian system involves the miracle, and claims to be supernatural in its nature. This fact must either be admitted or refuted; it cannot be simply ignored. Lord Gifford and Professor Müller are unscientific at the very outset of their professed point of view.

Again, to say, as our author does on page 12, "that religion should be treated as a spontaneous and necessary outcome of the mind of man, when brought under the genial influences of surrounding nature," is surely a very inadequate starting point from which to explain all religious phenomena. It is freely admitted—nay, held fast—that man has in his very constitution a religious factor. It is also acknowledged that external nature may have some effect on the development of that religious factor. But we are still bound to maintain that such a product as Christianity cannot be fully accounted for in this way, and without a supernatural revelation. If "the heavens declare the glory of God," his law is needed "to convert the soul, and make the simple wise."

From what has been said it will be seen that the whole discussion is projected on a purely naturalistic plane. To treat natural religion, as such, and as the basis of revealed religion, in this way, is quite proper; but to rob Christianity of its supernatural crown and royal sceptre, and to make it a form of Natural Religion like all the rest, and then to deal with it in a purely naturalistic manner, is a mode of procedure which the Christian apologist must rigorously resist. The able lectures before us are consequently open to serious criticism on this ground. Many of the expressions in Lord Gifford's will are essentially pantheistic in their nature; and pantheism, whether that of Spinoza, Hegel, or the Buddha, is out and out naturalism. Professor Müller makes no effort to hide his warm sympathy with Lord Gifford's aims and views. Consequently, we conclude that Müller's position is naturalistic, and as such, his treatment of Natural Religion must be pronounced entirely unsatisfactory to the Christian theist. But while we pronounce against the method of this treatise based on the terms of the Gifford bequest, we hasten to say that the distinguished lecturer has given us a treatise of much interest and value. There is much that will not be new to those who have read Müller's other works, especially *The Science of Language*, *The Science of Thought*, and the *Hilbert Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion*. Still there is a freshness and maturity in the whole discussion which make the lectures readable indeed.

This course is only an introductory one, paving the way for others which are to treat more fully of the whole subject of natural theology. Three main introductory questions are discussed in this opening course:

1. The definition of Natural Religion.
2. The proper method of its treatment.
3. The materials available for its study.

Four lectures deal with the first questions with titles as follows: "Definition of Religion," "Examination of Definitions," "Positivist Definitions of Religion," "My own Definition of Religion."

Our author first points out the three modes according to which the definition of religion may be framed. The first is the *etymological*. Here Müller, with Cicero and others, prefers to derive "religion" from *relegere*, instead of from *religare*, as Lactantius and others do. The second mode of defining religion is the *historical*. Here the biography of the ideas denoted by the term "religion," is given. The third method of definition is the *dogmatic*. Here we have more or less arbitrary definitions given of what "religion" does or should signify. Müller prefers the *etymological* and *historical* to the *dogmatic*, and in this treatise gives special prominence to the *historical* method of defining religion.

Müller also examines with some care many proposed definitions of religion, as those of Cicero, Goethe, Lavatar, Kant, Caird, Pfeleiderer, Martineau, Schenkel, Newman, Teichmüller, Mill, Spinoza, Schleiermacher, and Hegel. He gives no quarter to the efforts of Positivists to define "religion." Consequently, Wundt, Fuerbach, and especially Gruppe, who makes *selfishness* the source of religion, are severely criticised. He also pays his respects to Darwin, Niebuhr, Bunsen, and Lubbock in this connection.

After pronouncing all these forms of definition more or less defective, he proceeds to give his own, which is as follows:

"*Religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man.*" In *The Hibbert Lectures* Müller defined religion to consist in "a perception of the infinite." Pfeleiderer criticised this definition with justifiable severity, and now Müller seeks to fortify his definition by expanding it so as to include the moral element relating to the conduct of men. But if his defence is good against Pfeleiderer, still that defence may be open to attack from other quarters. Looking at the definition we note at once that the object of religion is not a personal being, but a pure abstraction—the Infinite. Then we are left utterly in the dark as to what category the "infinite" is to be placed under. Is it to be conceived as *spirit*, as *substance*, as *force*, as *cause*, or how? Müller gives us no information here which clears away the difficulties. Again, no good reason is given for believing that the infinite, or any other mere abstraction, can produce any moral results in man. The infinite, as set forth by Müller, has no moral attributes or qualities; and, this being the case, how can its manifestations influence the moral character of men? Müller takes for granted the very thing which he should have given good reasons for. Thus, once more, we cannot fail to ask how the abstract *infinite* comes to be conceived as in any sense *divine*, unless it be admitted that the human mind already possesses the notion of the divine latent in it. The *infinite* and *divine* are not interchangeable terms, and great confusion marks Müller's discussion as he plays fast and loose between them. Then, too, the way in which Müller conceives of the infinite in

its nature, and of the origin of our idea of the infinite, is open to serious objection, which will be noted in another place; and, finally, even if the infinite in certain of its manifestations can influence the moral character of men, the result would be morality, not religion. Religion includes morality, but morality is not the sum total of religion. Till Müller provides a better definition we prefer the old-fashioned statement that "Religion is a mode of knowing and serving God." (*Modus cognoscendi et colendi Deum.*)

The second great question with which these lectures deal is that of the proper *method* for the study of Natural Religion. In a general way, six lectures are occupied with this topic, although the discussion at times seems to have considerable latitude. This is specially the case with lectures VI. and VII. In lecture VI. the manifestations of the infinite in nature, in man, and in self, are considered, and in this way the whole field of natural theology is mapped out. The three divisions are: *Physical Religion*, from nature; *Anthropological Religion*, from the human race; and *Psychological Religion*, from the conscious self. These three great divisions Müller proposes to make the subject of future courses of lectures, and in this way the whole field of natural theology will be covered.

In discussing the proper method to pursue, Müller presents the merits of the *theoretical* and *historical* methods respectively, with decided preference for the latter method. He accuses the *theoretical* school of setting out with an ideal conception of what man must have been at the beginning in religion and everything else. He boasts that the *historical* school indulges in no such speculation, but seeks to gather the facts and make legitimate inferences from them. Müller here, as always, is a disciple of the *historical* school. Pursuing the historical line, Müller insists on the value of the comparative method of studying religious problems. Moreover, the true evolution of language, of thought, of morals, and of religion, is in this way to be discovered, according to Müller.

There is not a little that is interesting in these lectures, and not much objection need be made to our author's estimate of the value of the historical method of studying religious questions. History has its place and value, as all must admit, yet we are inclined to think that Müller does not give proper value to the theoretic method. Both have their place and great value. History may lead to the formulating of theory, and theory is to be tested by means of historic fact. Müller, perhaps more than once, is open to the charge of neglecting his favorite method, and following the theoretic. Then, too, history goes back only a little way, and for prehistoric periods the theoretic method has much value.

The remaining ten lectures are devoted to the discussion of the third and chief question of this course of lectures. This raises the important question as to "the materials for the study of Natural Religion." Müller arranges these materials in a very orderly way under four heads: *Language, Myths, Customs and Laws*, and *Sacred Books*.

Dealing with the first of these, Müller is on his favorite ground, and gives us, in several lectures, the substance of his views as set forth in his treatises on *The Science of Language* and *The Science of Thought*. Here he gives a good outline of the origin and growth of language, and maintains with great ability the Asiatic origin of the Aryan languages. He also holds that language is necessary to thought, but by thought he means the forming of distinct *concepts*, as distinguished from the reception or formation of sense *percepts*. "Language," he says (p. 356), "is not,

as is commonly supposed, thought *plus* sound, but what we call thought is really language *minus* sound." He adds: "We *think in words*," meaning by this that general names are necessary to the formation of concepts or general notions. In regard to the *origin* of concepts, he holds that their genesis is to be found "in our consciousness of our own repeated acts as one continuous action" (p. 373). Then, in the growth of language and thought, "they develop side by side, and are necessary to each other," as Noiré has so ably shown.

Now the bearing of this linguistic exposition on the question of the materials of Natural Religion is, according to Müller, pertinent and important. Language is necessary to thought, names to concepts. Hence, the origin and nature of religious ideas may be discovered, in part at least, in the names or titles given to deity. Language becomes the basis of mythology, and afterwards mythology affords the foundation of religion, and this through various stages of *animism*, *anthropomorphism*, etc. But the whole discussion cannot be regarded as at all satisfactory. To pass by many obvious criticisms, it need only be remarked that the religious theory here has no more value than the linguistic theory upon which it rests, and that Müller reduces the idea of the object of religion to a mere concept. If Müller's theory as to the relation between language and thought fails, his whole doctrine falls to pieces; and if the notion of deity be a deliverance of man's rational nature, and not a concept of the understanding, Müller's whole reasoning comes entirely short of its mark. Without pronouncing on the former position, we are sure that Müller's theory is defective at the latter point.

The second class of materials for the study of Natural Religion is *mythology*, and the three lectures devoted to this subject are amongst the most interesting in the whole book. Müller divides comparative mythology into three branches: *Etymological*, *analogical*, and *psychological*. The first deals with names and stories of the gods, the second compares myths which seem to spring from a common root, and the third deals with universal myths, and seeks to discover their inner relations. Each of these branches, according to Müller, affords fruitful material for the study of Natural Religion.

Little fault need be found with a great deal that our author sets forth in these lectures, yet it is not easy to see how it bears very directly upon the question of the origin and growth of religion. Mythology implies the existence of religion, and that men already have the notion of the divine, and instead of mythology being a stage in the upward growth of religious ideas, a strong case can be made out for the view that pagan mythologies are degenerations from a purer religious belief, which once prevailed among men. This consideration bears hard against Müller's theory.

The third class of materials for the study of Natural Religion consists in "customs and laws." Only a single brief lecture is devoted to this subject, and it is evident that the lecturer is not by any means as much at home in archæology as in linguistics and mythology. Various religious rites, ceremonies, such as festivals, sacrifices, and religious worship of different forms, are hurriedly described. The lecturer here clearly fails to show how customs and laws at first non-religious came to possess a religious character, and so to account for the origin of religion.

In like manner a single lecture is given to the fourth class of materials for the study of Natural Religion. He here deals with *sacred books*, and finds five centres where such books originated: India, Persia, China, Palestine, and Arabia. These

sacred books represent eight religions altogether. Of necessity, no adequate treatment of a theme which needs many volumes to discuss could be made in a single lecture, and it should not have been attempted. We must enter our protest against the placing of the sacred books of Christianity along with other sacred books as if they were all of the same essential nature. Here, again, Müller's persistent naturalism, already noted, comes out. He ignores the claims which the Scriptures themselves make to be or contain a revelation from God, and he seems to be better acquainted with the Vedas than with the Bible.

There are a few points of a general nature with which we close this imperfect review of a book of much ability:

1. Serious fault must be found with Müller's *psychological* doctrine. The fundamental error of our author here is that he has fallen into the snares of empiricism in regard to the theory of knowledge. Hence, we find him deriving all our knowledge directly or indirectly through the senses, overlooking entirely the fact that, while sense experience may be the *occasion* of the acquisition of knowledge, yet to all our knowledge, the mind itself brings an element which does not arise from experience, but is a necessary prerequisite to the possibility of the acquisition of any factors of knowledge. So when Müller deals with the infinite, he is practically helpless, and can only say, as he does, in the *Hibbert Lectures*, that the infinite is present to the senses in all our experiences of the finite. In like manner, when he deals with the origin of religious ideas, he is even more helpless, and can only say that in early times tangible, semi-tangible and intangible objects in nature supplied the germ of fetiches, semi-deities, and deities, respectively, and can give no account whatever of how the mind came to possess the idea of the divine, or of deity at all.

2. Müller's *metaphysical* doctrines are equally defective. This is especially the case with his doctrine of *the infinite*. His notion of the infinite is entirely defective. Turn the matter as we may, the infinite with which Müller engages our attention is only the *indefinite*. He confesses as much in the *Hibbert Lectures* and in the treatise before us the infinite is little else than something *beyond* the finite. At times he is willing to allow the contrast between the finite and infinite to be expressed by the terms visible and invisible. All of which is little short of metaphysical trifling with one of those root notions or fundamental beliefs of our nature, which no empirical theory can properly account for or explain the nature of in an adequate way.

3. On the *religious* side Müller's doctrine commits suicide. And this in several ways. Grant the cognition of the infinite, how does "the consciousness of the *infinite*" become the consciousness of the *divine*, unless we assume that the human mind already possesses the notion of the divine? Again, grant with Müller that prior to *animism* and *fetichism* there was an earlier stage of religious belief among men called henotheism, why not take the additional logical step, that prior to henotheism there was a purer stage of religious belief, when monotheism, and perhaps a primitive revelation, generally prevailed? If Müller has unsheathed the sword to destroy *positive* and *agnostic* theories regarding the origin and growth of religion, that same sword before he can sheathe it strikes through and spills the life-blood of his own theory. The moral is that all naturalistic and purely evolutionary theories of religion are inadequate; and we may be sure that, however much useful and interesting information Professor Müller gives us in his books that are

fragrant with the aroma of scholarship, still he proceeds to unlock the problems of religion, even of Natural Religion, with a key that will not fit the manifold combinations of the lock. Christian theism is the key to unlock the problems of Natural Religion, and the supernatural manifested in the sacred Scriptures, in the miracle, in the Christ of history, and in the church as a spiritual kingdom, is the key to unlock the mysterious and perplexing problems of Christianity.

We shall only add that we always read Professor Müller's writings with interest; and yet that interest is tinged with a measure of regret that one so well qualified to deal with the great problems of Natural Religion, should have pitched the tone of the discussion on such a low key that the broken accents of earth rather than the songs of heaven are chiefly heard.

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BOYD CARPENTER'S "PERMANENT ELEMENTS OF RELIGION."

THE PERMANENT ELEMENTS OF RELIGION. The Bampton Lectures for the year 1887. *By W. Boyd Carpenter, D. D., D. C. L., Bishop of Ripon, etc., etc.*, 12mo. Cloth. Pp. lxiv-423. MacMillan & Co., London and New York: 1889.

A pathetic personal interest attaches to this book in that it was placed in the hands of the lamented Latimer for review. During his long chivalrous fight with failing strength he retained it, and doubtless its pages were among the latest that engaged his gifted mind. This explanation of delay is due both the publishers and the public, and the present writer shares with them the regret that our noble brother was compelled at the last to leave to another the task he was so preëminently competent to perform. The volume is a historical study. We read on the first page of the Introduction:

"Before we can say what are the indispensable features of religion, we must study the religions of different races and times all the world over. To define a word by the exercise of the easy dogmatism of our study chair is not a scientific proceeding. The only definition worthy of the name is that which results from a large induction of facts. If we are to learn what religion is, let us leave our own preconceived ideas on one side, and let us interrogate mankind. From the study of man and his needs and requirements, we shall receive, if not a clearer answer, yet one which shall be founded on fact." A little further on our author states that "those elements which man imperatively demands in a religion," are what "we may call permanent elements of religion."

We confess that by the announcement of this method there was at the very outset created in our mind an impression distinctly and decidedly unfavorable. As this impression may to some readers seem unreasonable, we feel inclined briefly to indicate some grounds for it, as follows:

1. We understand the author's purpose to be the ascertainment and establishment of the essential characteristics of *true* religion, those elements which, amid all that may be merely incidental or accidental, and hence transient or at least changeable, shall prove permanent. His is no discussion of mere mythological systems, the interesting vagaries of the religious sentiment of mankind in all the varieties of its expression or the stages of its development. His purpose is distinctly different from this; his is a serious search after the elements of that religion which for all coming time can command the confident and intelligent acceptance of man, and prove his worthy guide in life, and his sufficient support in death. He is on no holiday excursion, he is exploring for a highway down which the feet of dif-

ferent races and times all the world over may confidently tread to find that city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God.

2. With this serious enterprise in view, we object to the implicit alternative suggested between "the easy dogmatism of our study chair," and what he calls "a large induction of facts," which latter we suppose to be "a study of the religions of different races and times all the world over." Were these two the only conceivable methods of procedure, his choice would command our immediate and cordial assent, though we should groan with exceeding weariness in the devious way.

But there is a third method, the recognition of which would have given his volume greater interest and greater worth, in some eyes at least.

3. To the question, What are the permanent elements of religion? we do not believe the wisest and safest answer is to be found "from the study of man." The best, as it is the shortest plan, it seems to us, is not "to interrogate mankind" but God; while we readily recognize in the nature and needs of man valuable confirmation and corroboration of truth, yet, at the same time, not "that which man imperatively demands" but *that which God authoritatively reveals*, we prefer to constitute our ultimate appeal. Our decided preference is to bring man's imperative demands to the bar of God's revealed will and test their character by it, rather than to try the claims of revealed religion by its consonance with the elements which a historical study may show to have inherited in "the religions of different races and times all the world over." Such is our criticism of the author's method; the reader can judge of its justice. It involves much.

In pursuance of his method the author collates a great number of definitions which have been given of religion, and out of these selects three elements as essential, viz: Dependence, Fellowship, and Progress. Any religion to be permanent must possess these three elements. He marks, however, three stages in the development of a religion.

1. Nature or God-consciousness.
2. Self-consciousness.
3. World-consciousness.

He then treats the question, Will religion survive? He believes that it will, for two reasons:

1. The experience of the past, which shows that religion lives, though religions die.
2. The nature of man—which is (a), permanent; and (b), religious.

There are in human nature certain constant laws marked out for permanence, and with these laws all elements of religion which are permanent must accord. These laws are:

1. The Law of Environment—"As we think, we are."
2. The Law of Organism—"As we are, we see."
3. The Law of Sacrifice—"No pains, no gains."
4. The Law of Indirectness—There must be a certain element of unconsciousness in the sacrifice. A man cannot perfect himself if he seeks perfection directly.

An abiding religion must recognize these four permanent laws of man's nature.

He then proposes an examination of all "universal religions" to discover whether there be in them the three permanent elements—Dependence, Fellowship, and Progress.

The religions to which he grants the claim of universality, upon very insufficient and unequal grounds, however, are three : Islamism, Buddhism, and Christianity. In his examination of these so called universal religions, he undertakes, not with uniform success, to show that man has always demanded in religion the three elements he has marked as permanent. He then asks how far these religions have the *native* power to meet this demand ; and by a comparison, he establishes the fact that Christianity alone of the three universal religions possesses originally and indigenously the three elements which the history of religions shows that man's nature demands.

He next shows that religion gives a sort of eternalism to righteousness ; that there are no adequate substitutes for religion, such as are proposed in " Knowledge," in " Altruism," and in " The Drift of the World ; or, The Evolution of Morals." The natural conclusion, then, is that religion is necessary to men. He then discusses religion and personality. Religion and morals are meaningless except they express relationships between beings who have wills and affections. The religion of the future, therefore, must be based on a person, not on a creed or a code. Christianity meets all these demands. The final issue of the discussion and comparison is that changes of form may be expected, but Christianity, in its essential elements, abides.

Such is a very unsatisfactory outline of the lectures. The reader cannot fail to see that there must be much in such a volume that will prove interesting. Some of his analyses strike us as strained, some of his inferences rather far-fetched, a good deal of the discussion altogether unnecessary, and not very profitable. His style is exceptionally good. The estimate of the work will depend largely on the view-point of the reader. Those who do not see any importance in our criticism of his method will probably welcome the work as a valuable ally to the cause of Christian evidences ; those who feel the force of our initial objection will, in all likelihood, rate it lower. *Tot homines, quot sententiæ.*

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ROBINS' "HARMONY OF ETHICS WITH THEOLOGY."

THE HARMONY OF ETHICS WITH THEOLOGY: An Essay in Revision. Is There Probation After Death? Is There Hope for the Heathen? Can Infants be Saved? *By the Rev. Henry E. Robins, D. D., LL. D., late President of Colby University (1873-'82); Professor of Christian Ethics in the Rochester Theological Seminary.* New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1891.

This essay is vigorously written. It palpitates with ethical earnestness and intellectual power. The author seeks to vindicate the moral correctness of the course of God's grace and providence. He sets up the case in this way: The race began its moral career under a law-system, whose condition was perfect obedience, and the probation was federal in its nature. Under this system the race failed, and death, spiritual and physical, would have ensued but for the interposition of God, who at once set up the grace-system. The mediatorial work of Christ had the effect of translating the entire race from under the law-system to a position under the grace-system, where the condition is that of the acceptance or rejection of Christ. Under the grace-system, according to our author, the entire human

race has a real probation, not federal but personal and individual in its nature. This main position of the essay is traversed by the scriptural doctrine of sovereign and unconditional and personal election, and by the doctrine of the sinner's spiritual inability. The grace-system is definitely and distinctly not a probationary system. It is just this very fact that signally discriminates it from the law-system, which was probationary. If God elects unconditionally to life, the result cannot be put into any sort of debate. If the sinner is spiritually disabled, he cannot stand trials and comply with conditions. The grace-system *saves*: it does not make the case *salvable*. The author is a Professor in a Baptist Theological Seminary.

R. A. WEBB.

ZIMMER'S "THE IRISH ELEMENT IN MEDIAEVAL CULTURE."

THE IRISH ELEMENT IN MEDIAEVAL CULTURE. *By H. Zimmer.* Translated by Jane Loring Edmands. 12 mo., pp. 131. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1891.

This little book is one of extraordinary interest to the student of history, especially of ecclesiastical history. It is characterized by the recondite learning for which the German scholars are noted, and is translated into elegant English. Its contents will be a revelation to many readers of history. Comparatively few are aware that during a period when learning had reached its lowest point on the continent and in Britain, "and the entire West threatened to sink hopelessly into barbarism." Ireland was the seat of many flourishing monasteries, such as Bangor, Armagh, and others, in which great scholars preserved, transcribed, and taught the works of Homer, Virgil, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. Nor is it generally known that Germany was largely evangelized by Irish missionaries, and that many of the great scholars in the reigns of Charlemagne and his sons and grandsons were natives of Ireland, or educated in her schools. John Scotus Erigena (the Irish-born Scot) was the "greatest thinker of his age, and his philosophical works mark an epoch in the world's literature." It is also clearly shown in this work, though that is not the object for which it is written, that the Irish church, so long and so disastrously dominated by Rome, was in those early days independent of the papacy. Its subjugation by the English led to its thorough subjugation by Rome. "It is a well-known fact that in 1154, Pope Hadrian IV. issued a bull, presenting Ireland to the king of England in consideration of the payment of a certain sum of tribute money, because the slight degree of independence assumed and maintained by the Irish church in regard to the church of Rome was to the latter a thorn in the flesh, and not to be endured. The conquest of Ireland by the English, together with the existence of certain social evils, destroyed the real independence of its people, and, as a consequence, of the Irish church."

There is, indeed, satisfactory evidence that the early Irish church was neither Papal nor Prelatical, but Presbyterian in its polity. It is a well-established historical fact that St. Patrick organized three hundred and sixty-five churches, and ordained over them three hundred and sixty-five bishops, and three thousand elders. One bishop or pastor and eight elders to each congregation would be an ideal Presbyterian Church.

ROBERT PRICE.

MUELLER'S "SCIENCE OF THOUGHT."

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. *By F. Max Mueller.* No Reason Without Language; No Language Without Reason. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1887. All rights reserved. Two vols., cr. 8vo; pp. xxix., 656. (Dedicated to Ludwig Noiré.)

The title of this deeply interesting book has been adapted to that of Max Mueller's earliest notable contribution to what he then styled "The Science of Language." The proper title to set forth the actual scope of these later volumes would have been something like this: "The Science of Thought as Related to Language"; or, still more precisely, "The Essential Correlation (up to a certain point, even Identification) of Thought and Language"—for just this is, in point of fact, the main thesis of the new discussion. Between these, the earlier and later of the more important, or at least more conspicuous of Max Mueller's publications in English on philology, and what, in a broad way, may be denominated the logic and metaphysics that are cognate to philology, the indefatigable author has interpreted the *Rig Veda* and *The Critique of Pure Reason*, and poured out an entire cornucopia of miscellaneous essays and similar lucubrations, which he has afterwards gathered up by volumes in successive issues from the press, chiefly on his favorite topic, the comparative study of language, but also on the old Indian and kindred literatures, histories, philosophies, and religions, as well as on many subjects of a more or less contemporary interest, upon which the famous Oxford professor's particular line of investigation had enabled him to shed what seemed to him a valuable, or else at any rate curious light. The principal fruit of the author's labors that appeared during that intervening time are embodied in the four volumes making up the well-known series entitled *Chips from a German Workshop*. One of these subjects is what it has become the fashion to speak of as evolution, particularly that form of it which seeks to derive man from brutes, and more especially the alleged evolution of the human mind and character. Professor Mueller, it is hardly necessary to remind our readers, has been, and is to-day, an uncompromising opponent of that theory when thus pushed to its extremity.

As to the truth of many of Professor Mueller's distinctive positions, and the value in general of his conclusions and ostensible discoveries, there has been a marked variety of opinions. An author whose name is one to conjure with both in America and Europe, in circles where Sanskrit and the classics are most accurately known, and where exact scholarship, philosophic acumen, poetic taste, and philological discernment are most in request and most in vogue, in a letter to the present critic exclaims boldly: "Max Mueller always somehow succeeds in filling me with a feeling of profound distrust." This is no doubt the sentiment of a large number of Max Mueller's readers. The explanation is an easy one: With all his immense acquisitions and thorough learning, and his undoubted and remarkable intellectual capacity, Max Mueller is widely suspected of a disposition to chase rainbows and follow will-o'-the-wisps. The uniform sobriety of his judgment and the prevailing accuracy of his logical deductions are both open to serious question in high quarters. It would be well if we were always able, as in this instance, to check the over-confident affirmations of Professor Mueller by the self-poised counter-affirmations of the less brilliant, but safer, and, as many think, more

astute, scholar, that ornament of Yale College and of American learning, Professor Whitney.*

Notwithstanding all this, Max Mueller is "a scholar, and a ripe and good one," a man of genius, a master of all foreign and domestic literature, and of the best and sturdiest English style. If he is sometimes, through his own "noble negligence" (to take a phrase from Dryden), or his own splendid daring, caught in strange and untenable localities, it is after all no mean courser but Pegasus himself, that has thus got himself entangled in the pound.

The book we are now reviewing shows our author in all his strength, but, at the same time in much of his weakness, and is on that account eminently characteristic of one of the most attractive and influential writers of the present era. Apart from the celebrity of its source, it is for several things a book of mark. Whatever may be one's judgment as to Professor Mueller's treatment of the relation between thought and language, that treatment must be admitted to be one of the amplest and most entertaining that is accessible. This book also gives us, as in a kind of *resumé* of his more elaborate treatment of that subject, an original and masterly account of Kant's philosophy, and a popularly instructive exhibition of the historic development of certain potent Sanskrit roots, together with a capital analogical and *ad hominem* argument derived from the linguistic presentation just referred to, and directed against the extreme advocates of the hypothesis of organic evolution. The passing remarks and *obiter dicta*, so to say, of the distinguished writer on all manner of topics would almost suffice to set up an ordinary scribbler in his stock in trade.

The first volume of the book strikes one, certainly on the first blush, as being the most interesting. After a preface of some length, the author proceeds to discuss the constituent elements of thought; what are the meaning and materials of thought; and to inquire whether sensations exist by themselves. The psychology of the cradle and the menagerie is amusingly, if not convincingly, decried. Arguments derived from the comparative scrutiny of the brains of animals and of men are largely discounted. Sense in the case of brutes, he argues, goes farther with them, even along what seem to be rational lines, than does reason. New and authentic stories of the instinct of animals follow. The results are also considered and illustrated of man's efforts to *teach* the lower creatures.

But it is far better, the author holds, to examine *ourselves* in order to find out what does or does not go on in our own minds. The alleged phenomena of what has been styled "unconscious cerebration" he would resolve, in part, at least, into what he calls "unperceived impressions" on the nervous system. He then takes up a number of philosophic terms, analyzes them, and draws from them significant intimations. He discourses shrewdly on sensation, which he thinks should not be taken barely, but as it is in reality, "impregnated with thought." Percepts, according to his definition, he contends, are inseparable from concepts. Space, time, and causality are, in Kantian fashion, held to be "the inherent conditions of our sensuous intuition." His complete statement is, that though sensations, percepts, and concepts are mutually distinguishable, "they are, within our own mind, one and indivisible." All this is made to lead up to the grand question

* See "Language, and the Study of Language," by William Dwight White. New York: Scribners. 1867. Pp. 410, 412.

debated in this volume—namely, whether concepts can exist without words. Language and thought are, in this sense, held to be inseparable. The philosophers, thinkers, and logicians of all ages are then summoned to the witness-stand. Mill, Condillac, the Greeks and Hindus in general as determined by their speech; Whately, Thompson, Jevons, Fowler, T. H. Green, Lotze, Locke, Plato (brought in incidentally), Abelard, Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Leibnitz, Kant, Hamann, Herder, Schleiermacher, W. Von Humbolt, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Sir William Hamilton, and Mansel, are cited in the order in which they are here named. It is ingeniously argued that most of these writers, on the whole, sustain the author's own view. It is our purpose to give this particular question a fuller discussion than would be here possible, in a future number of the QUARTERLY, and to connect it with the equally vexed question as to verbal inspiration. As this is the case, we now pass over the greater part of what Professor Mueller has to say directly on this, which is his all-absorbing theme. The author has some interesting remarks on the human "faculties," and protests, as so many have done before him, and as our psychologists would be apt to admit, that there are no such distinct things as mind, memory, reason, understanding, etc., inasmuch as the human soul is "a self-conscious Monon." Our Professor does not object to the use of such names, provided they are understood to denote only certain modes of mental action. This is probably all that would be demanded; and yet we have long suspected that too much insistence on these and like distinctions—or rather that too sharp and permanent a discrimination between the so-called "powers" and domains of the mind—has been fruitful of fallacies not only in psychology, but also in ethics and theology.

Perhaps Max Mueller goes to the opposite extreme. With the fervid zeal of a linguist, our author would have us believe that language is the true history of the human mind. Here is what he says further: "The true archives in which alone the historical development of the human mind can be studied are the archives of language; and these archives reach in an uninterrupted line from our own latest thought to the first word that was ever uttered by our ancestors. It is here where the human mind has left us what may be called its true autobiography, if only we were able to decipher it." (Vol. I., p. 81.)

At this point the author begins to compare the development of language with its true counterpart, as he regards it, the evolution of nature. The parallelism he here points out is, in the main, just and highly instructive. This parallelism had been vaguely anticipated at the earliest dates by the philosophers of India. In answer to the question, "Was man ever without language?" we are brought face to face with a startling rejoinder: "How, if our first tenet is right, if language and reason [in a sense elsewhere defined in this work] are identical, or two names or aspects only of one and the same thing; and if, secondly, we cannot doubt that language had a historical beginning, and represents the work of man carried on through many thousands of years, . . . there was a time when the first stone of the great temple of language was laid, and before that time man was without language, and, therefore, without reason." Other fearless investigators had come to the same conclusion. Physiologists, commenting on the oldest human skulls recently discovered, have noted the fact that some of them are destitute of the mental or genial tubercle (from *mentum*, or γένις, *chin*), "a small bony projection or excrescence, in which the muscle of the tongue is inserted." (P. 83.) The phys-

iologists are, it seems, supported by the philosophers, as, for instance, by Lazar Geiger, who is convinced that man was not always rational (p. 84). Whilst, as we saw, Mueller admits this conclusion, he subjects it to important modification. He has recourse here to a nice distinction, answering, however, he avers, to an immense difference, between what is signified by the word *rationalis* and by the word *rationabilis*. He quotes Noiré at this point as saying: "How is it possible that, from unconscious and non-sentient matter, consciousness and sensation should shine forth, unless the *inner quality*, though in a dark, and to us hardly perceptible manner, belonged before to these substances, from which the first animal life, in its most elementary form, was developed?" Kant had made this distinction in his *Pragmatische Anthropologie* (p. 652). (See Mueller II., 85, *note*.) The relation of this question to the terror-striking one of *qualitates occultæ* is discussed by our author with a sort of mystical brilliancy. The attack that almost immediately follows on Darwin's theory of evolution is preceded by a series of admirably striking observations. They are these:

"It would really take away one of the most important instruments of thought if we were not allowed to distinguish between what is possible and what is not, or, as, in our case, between what is *not yet* rational, and what *never* can be rational. The whole theory of development or evolution rests, or ought to rest, on this distinction; for evolution means neither more nor less than the turning of occult into manifest qualities, of changing the possible into the real, but also, I should add, in distinguishing vigorously between the possible and the impossible. If we admit that man may at one time have been a mute animal, it does not follow that every mute animal may in time become man; it does not follow that language, in which we mean to study the development of mind, presupposes nothing but what we find at present in every ape." (Pp. 86, 87.)

The theory of evolution, Professor Mueller afterwards says, to which he holds himself, and which seems confirmed to him more and more by every fresh discovery in the growth of nature, and in that too of the human mind as represented by language, is this: that "evolution in both starts from distinct beginnings and leads to distinct ends. *Ex aliquo fit aliquid.*" (P. 91.) He goes on as follows:

"I therefore deny in the growth of language what Mr. Darwin himself, differing thereby from most Darwinians, denies in the growth of nature, namely, one uniform beginning for all and everything; in other words, one primordial cell for all organic beings, one primordial root for all words." (P. 91.)

But we can pursue this subject no further than to lay before our readers Professor Mueller's *ad hominem* argument against all Darwinians, who are also like himself, devout disciples of the sage of Königsberg. If Darwin were right, and man were in reality the lineal or lateral descendant of some lower animal, the far-famed debate between Locke and Hume, on the one side, and Berkeley and Kant on the other, as to the source or sources of human knowledge, would be decided out of hand.

"It is agreed that animals receive their knowledge through the senses only, and if man was developed from a lower animal, Kant, and all who follow him, would simply be out of court." (*Ibid.*, 117.)

Then follows what is within the same compass perhaps the grandest, if not also the most accurate, exposition in our vernacular English of the fundamental principles of the Critical Philosophy.

The remainder of the first volume is occupied in the discussion of language

considered as the barrier between man and beast ; the renewed discussion of the constituent elements of language, especially in the light derived from the diverse development of such Sanskrit roots ("identical in form, different in power") as DA, to give ; DA, to cut ; DA, to bind, and DA, to know ; or GAR, to swallow ; GAR, to call, and GAR, to wake ; and the examination in a marvellous closing chapter of the origin of concepts and roots, in which the pages of the world's philosophers are all ransacked once more for their opinions on this head : Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mansel, Noiré, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Condillac, Kant, and Schopenhauer. Darwin is again overhauled in this fifth and final chapter, and Noiré is strongly shaken in a sieve.

The second volume is of hardly so popular a character as the first, but makes at least an equal appeal to the scholar and no less so to the thinker. The subjects treated of in the different chapters are: the roots of Sanskrit, the formation of words and propositions and syllogisms, together with a masterful conclusion, in which, in connexion with much new detail, the results of the whole discussion are summed up and re-stated. This final chapter takes up sixty-three pages. The main thing the author supposes to have been gained by his discussion is, that no one in future will be able to dispute the fact that "thought without language, or some other kind of embodiment, is impossible." Professor Mueller approaches very near to the assertion of the coincidence of logic and grammar. (*Ibid.* ii. p. 543.) Philosophy, he maintains, deals with language ; and he himself investigates once more the nature of language. Language, according to Max Mueller, begins with roots, not with nouns or verbs. He thinks a beginning has been made in the way of radical analysis by the reduction of all our thoughts to about 121 concepts, and all our words to about 800 roots. "We need no longer," he says, "stare at language as something wonderful by its complexity, but we may look at it intelligently, gain an insight into it, and admire it in the end all the more, not for its wonderful complexity, but for its far more wonderful simplicity." (*Ibid.* ii. p. 546.) The simplicity of thought and of the mind are affirmed, and interesting enouncements are made respecting poetry and argument. Poetry, in the widest sense, is a kind of shaking up of words and thoughts as in a kaleidoscope. Max Mueller is an ardent and subtle metaphysician, and never more so than in these volumes, and especially this closing chapter. His discussion here of *names*, though eminently modern, is not unworthy of the doctors of the Middle Ages. He is not unmindful of the objections that will be raised to his theory, and examines them with sufficient fulness and with great acuteness. Materialism is subjected to a searching and original analysis and scrutiny. The term matter is taken in its broadest acceptance. Materialism is condemned by Max Mueller as at once a grammatical and a logical blunder. He finds that it is a grammatical blunder, because it is the misapplication of a word which can be used only in an oblique case by using it in the nominative. He finds that it is a logical blunder, because it rests on a confusion between the objective and the subjective.

"Matter can never be a subject—it can never know, because the name was framed to signify what is the object of our knowledge or what can be known. Materialism, therefore, in the ordinary sense of the word, is self-contradictory. It begins with matter such as it is, namely, as objective, and then tries to show that by slow degrees it may become subjective. But A never becomes non-A." (*Ibid.* ii. p. 565.)

Spiritualism, in the philosophic sense, and species are treated in much the same way. The subject of definition is briefly but ably handled. He argues most plausibly that the term *species* is not wanted in natural history; and that "if Darwin's theory is right, there is an end of all species, or, at all events, there ought to be, for to speak of natural species, held together by a certain amount of resemblance, is nothing but inarticulate thought." (*Ibid.* ii. pp. 572, 573.) There is no room in nature, he holds, for more than two concepts—"namely, animals and plants possessing a common ancestor, and propagating among themselves, or animals and plants not possessing a common ancestor, and not propagating among themselves." (*Ibid.* ii. p. 572.)

À priori knowledge and *à posteriori* knowledge are carefully discriminated. Whewell's definition of *à priori* is weighed, and Mr. Herbert Spencer's compromise and later view rejected. Mill's position, which was taken earlier, and is still by some held tenaciously, is also fairly examined, and, in the light of philology, virtually repudiated. Analytical and synthetic propositions are once more distinguished—as by Kant. Professor Bain's notion of straightness is slightly criticised. The ground is firmly held that "we know in names," and that "names depend on essential attributes." Separable and inseparable, essential and accidental attributes are set off from one another. Unconditional truths are taken into the account, and Kant's well-known position on this subject is maintained. Due consideration is given to mathematics. The topic of the categories of the understanding, and notably that of causality, is resumed. Mill's views are taken into the estimate as well as Kant's. After the nature and necessity of *definition* have been again insisted on, attention is paid to the order of words, to verbal fallacies, and once more to matter. Socrates, Plato, Kant, Comte, Mill, Mr. Spencer, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, and Schopenhauer all come in for more or less of notice during this exhibition of philosophic pyrotechnics. Next to the care that is devoted to the views of Kant, the author in this book has laid out his chief strength in his exposition of the views of Mill and those of Schopenhauer. The work is enriched by an erudite and valuable appendix, and an admirable general index. Italics are wholly discarded from these volumes. Foreign words are printed as if they were English ones. Where italics would ordinarily be used, Professor Mueller, by a happy device that seems to have been invented in the newspaper offices, commonly employs strongly-leaded type, and *always* where he wishes to fix the eye on the word or words that should bear the emphasis.

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HUNT'S "ETHICAL TEACHINGS IN OLD ENGLISH LITERATURE."

ETHICAL TEACHINGS IN OLD ENGLISH LITERATURE. *By Theodore W. Hunt, Professor of English in the College of New Jersey.* Funk & Wagnalls Company. New York. 1892.

In literary circles nowadays we hear so much precious twaddle about the superior merits of an ethical and æsthetic culture divorced from the Bible that it is refreshing to read a book by a literarian who exalts the duty of religion rather than the religion of duty, the beauty of holiness rather than the holiness of beauty. Those who talk of art for art's sake, and maintain stoutly "the moral indifference

of true art," would do well to read Professor Hunt's book, and learn therefrom that their teaching is not only immoral, but un-English.

Even the superficial student of our literature, if his eyes have not been blinded by the over-nice speculations of German rationalism, and his mind has not been befuddled by the neo-paganism recently imported from Paris and the Himalayas by such men as Swinburne and Sir Edwin Arnold, must acknowledge that from *Béowulf* to Browning, religion has been the most potent factor in the development of English literature and English life, and that "the English language is what it is, and what it will be, mainly by reason of its vital relation to the English Scriptures." To this last proposition Professor Hunt devotes his last and possibly most interesting chapter, in which he demonstrates the potent influence of the Bible upon the diction, vocabulary, structure, and spirit of the English language. "For four hundred years the English Bible has given the language, words, phrases, sentiments, figures, and eloquence to all classes. It has been the source of the motives, acts, literature, studies. It has filled the memory, stirred the feelings, and roused the ideas which are ruling the world."

The remainder of the book before us demonstrates the prevalence of the ethical spirit in English literature from its dawn to the days of Roger Ascham, the pious and urbane instructor of Edward the Sixth and the Virgin Queen. The chronological order is strictly observed, and it is the best, for it enables us to see at a glance that there is no break in the normal, moral development of our literature. A literature built upon religion rests upon a solid foundation, and is distinguished by an air of sobriety so puzzling to a French critic like Mr. Taine, and at times tinged with a spirit of melancholy, which astute German critics discovered long ago in our first English literature. Eliminate the religious factor in our literary development, and it becomes an inscrutable puzzle to the student.

Professor Hunt has done his work well, and we are glad that he has made his book popular rather than erudite. It is now in a shape to correct much of the crude philosophy so common in literary circles. Few can read it without being stimulated to learn more of the subject under discussion. The author is a ripe scholar, and is so widely read in the literature of which he treats, that he is ever and anon throwing out, unconsciously, hints to the interested reader, and suggesting, incidentally, profitable books upon the several authors and subjects under treatment.

It is, perhaps, to be regretted that the style is too unmagnetic to attract any one to whom the subject itself may not happen to be interesting. For ourselves, we feel so deeply indebted to the author for his excellent presentation of a timely and most important topic, that we are disinclined to emphasize a fault which perhaps may not occur to another reader. Certainly the judicial and sober tone of the book is preferable to spasmodic outbursts of "soda-water" enthusiasm. To those clergymen who may not have time or opportunity to study our older English literature, we commend this treatise most warmly. It will emphasize and prove what they must always have felt in regard to English character and English literature.

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