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THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

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I. MATERIALS OF HISTORY.¹

THE materials of history may be classed under four heads; for mnemonic purposes, under four monosyllabic words: who, what, where, and when. Who: the names of the prominent actors in all the scenes of the thrilling drama, as Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Pharoah, David and the giant of Gath, Christ and Pilate, the Christian martyrs and the Roman Emperors, Athanasius and Arius, Augustine and Pelagius. What: what has been done; all the covenants, human and divine; all the religious rites and ceremonies; all the events of history. Where: embracing all of ancient and modern geography. When: the entire subject of chronology. But all this is not history, any more than the stones and timbers scattered along the river banks are the bridge; any more than the ten Arabic characters, unarranged, give the distances of the planets and the stars; any more than the twenty-six characters of the English alphabet are "Paradise Lost." What are the colors without the design of the painting? What are the trappings of the stage and the costumes and names of the actors to one who understands not the plot? Even so, the abstract materials of history may be as unmeaning as the scattered leaves of the Sibyl. History, therefore, is something more than names, and facts, and places, and dates.

As introductory, it may be proper to postulate, at the outset, a revelation from God, the exercise of creative power, and the sus-

¹ Inaugural address delivered by the author at his induction as Professor of Church Government and History in the Theological Seminary in Columbia, S. C., May 9, 1888.

taining and guiding power of God as essential in the subjective forces in history. That which is unfolded in time was God-originated, and it was communicated to men by special revelation. All along the line of history the life current has been supplied by creative power; for every soul born into the kingdom is a new creation. In addition to this, divine power is exercised in shaping and directing the course of events, with direct reference to the accomplishment of certain ends. With these statements we proceed to the consideration of what, for the sake of convenience, may be denominated objective history.

“I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.” (Gen. iii. 15.)

This is the initial point from which the church and her history proceed, except as they had slumbered in the eternal purpose of God. The language is germinal, and from it we take our *a priori* idea of history. It represents two parties in deadly strife, the serpent and the woman. The conflict is to be continued, since the seed of each is to take it up. It is to be hotly contested, since both are to inflict wounds. The party that is to conquer is indicated by the character of the wounds—head wounds in contrast with heel wounds. For verification of this *a priori* idea we follow down the centuries to hear the din of battle, to note how the parties define themselves, what the possibilities each develops, what the victories and defeats each achieves and suffers.

Four thousand years sweep by, during which there has been no truce for a single day. The fulness of time comes on, and Christ, who is pre-eminently the seed of the woman, recognizes, endorses and perpetuates the old party lines in addressing his enemies as “serpents” and “vipers.” The conflict continues, and will continue, for in the closing vision of the present dispensation, John sees the church under the figure of a woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars, while also he sees an angel coming down from heaven with a great chain in his hand, with which he binds the dragon, that old “serpent,” and leads him captive from the battle-grounds of ages. This, then, is the tiny strand with which, an-

chored in Eden, the birthplace of man, and where the first announcement of the evangel was made, we may span the ages, reaching down to the grand objective point of all history.

We come back, and, looking a little more narrowly into the record, we throw another strand. The first expansion of the Protevangelium by divine direction is seen in the bloody skins torn from the quivering flesh of lamb and kid with which the naked bodies of Adam and Eve are clothed—types of the needs of naked ruined souls. It is seen again when Noah builds an altar and “sacrifices of every clean beast and of every clean fowl.” And so the stream of history, starting out from Eden, has a crimson hue. Wherever a patriarch halted he built an altar. On the night of wonderful deliverance in Egypt the door-posts were reddened with blood. Moses, in the tabernacle service, extends, develops, and emphasizes this feature of the history, this element in the plan. And when we reach the dedication of the temple, the little rivulet of blood starting out from Eden widens out into a river as the tribes lead up to the altars the hundreds, and thousands, and hundreds of thousands of the best of the flocks and herds. Thus, for thousands of years, is the great fact written in blood upon the sin-cursed ground, which was formulated at a later day by an apostle: “Without shedding of blood no remission.”

We have followed the line of smoking altars, but where was the priest? As if to simplify the unfolding of the plan, and in order that the bleeding, dying victim may occupy the foreground of the scene, the priest is screened. At first each offerer is his own priest, then the head of the family, then the patriarch, all culminating in setting apart and solemnly consecrating, amid blood and death and fire, an entire family to the priesthood. Thus was unfolded in typical history one of the offices which Christ executes in the grand scheme of human redemption.

Going back again, and looking into the beginnings of history, we find imbedded in it the idea of ruling as well as of atoning, of king as well as of priest. Balaam, as he beheld from the rocks and the hills the hosts of Jacob spread out before him, testified, “the shout of a king is among them.” This feature in the history may be seen in the patriarch leading forth his clan as occasion re-

quires. Still more marked, it may be seen in Moses, the great military chieftain, heading an army of six hundred thousand warriors, followed by an elect nation. It may be seen again in Joshua conquering the nations of Canaan, and then in the Judges, slaying heathen kings and ruling Israel. But as the type widens out and takes deeper hold upon the popular mind, the importunate demand comes up, "Give us a king." And the culmination is reached in crowning David in Jerusalem, a man after God's heart, who from his throne, looking down through the centuries of conflict upon the rage of the heathen and conspiracies of kings and rulers, sings in grand type, "Yet have I set my king upon the holy hill of Zion;" "Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them to pieces like a potter's vessel." Thus was unfolded in type another of the Messianic offices.

But if we would not dismember history we must go back and follow down another parallel section. It is a triple development. While the teaching office necessarily antedates the others and underlies the whole, yet it reaches its culmination at a later day. Enoch prophesied, saying, "Behold, the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints." Noah was a preacher of righteousness. It comes out in the patriarchs—more prominently in Moses, who is declared to be a type of the great Prophet—decidedly and in a marked manner in Elijah, whose sudden and eccentric appearance in the prophetic line resembles that of Melchisedec in the line of the priesthood. This feature in the history widens out and culminates in the long line of inspired prophets, who with flaming tongue sing of him whom John afterwards saw in the midst of the throne, whose office was to lead and feed his people. The Old Testament history, therefore, formulates the answer to the question: "What offices doth Christ as our Redeemer execute?"

Having outlined in this way the general drift of the history, it may be taken up in detail in the light of the great fact antecedently settled, that the grand purpose is to prepare the way for the coming of Christ, the Redeemer of men, to execute the offices typified.

Before proceeding to the breaking up of the history into parts it may be well to emphasize its unity and continuity. It is the

unfolding in time of "one great economy of salvation," "*Unum continuum systema*," as Bengel puts it. Whatever divisions, into parts, chapters and sections, may be made, these are terms in a series, every one of which has both a consequent and an antecedent value. As the point in space has position but not magnitude—a somewhere but not a somewhat—so the isolated section of history severed from its antecedent and sequence connections, though it be a somewhat, who can interpret it? To interpret any one day in a man's life, it is necessary to go back to the first day, if no further, and follow down a wondrous life, noting the influences that come in from every side, from above, and from below, and that start up from within, rightly determining the possibilities of all, and from these estimate the possibilities of that day. History aggregates in its sublime sweep, as do the waters on their way to the ocean from a thousand bubbling springs and murmuring rivers. The superadded revelations during the period of Revelation, the guiding power of a Divine Providence, and the gift of eternal life to dead souls, along this line of development serve to preserve, not to break, the continuity. Recognizing a close connection and dependence of the parts, we pursue the line of history, taking it up and following it by periods and by chapters, noting the connections, relations and correlations, the contractions and expansions, the eliminations and new projections in the perspective. The periods: the Antediluvian, the Noachian, the Patriarchal, the Egyptian, the wilderness march with the inauguration of the Mosaic legislation, the conquest and settlement in Canaan, the rule of the Judges, the Monarchy, the Schism and parallel kingdoms of Judah and Israel, the Assyrian and Babylonian Exile, the return and revival under the Medo-Persian rule, the Macedonian Empire sweeping across the entire track of history, and then the gathering up of four thousand years' results under the iron rule of the Roman—these are the historic *stadia* of forty centuries.

This brings us to the great dividing line of history. It is a favorable elevation from which to look along the track of the past centuries, and to catch the gleam of the head-lights glancing into the future. Favorable points for like observation are to be watched for and used all along the line. Judaism has run its course and in

one sense is a failure. It was intended only as a shadow of good things to come, since it could not make the comers thereunto perfect. Grecian civilization, which was the sum total of all the outcome of human wisdom, has likewise failed. The Greek by wisdom has failed to know God. Physical force and prowess have conquered the world. All have failed to hush the cry of a lost world, but all together has served a grand purpose in preparing the way for something better.

There is a popular idea that since the old dispensation has been succeeded by the new, the former has become obsolete, which needs to be corrected. The Old Testament Scriptures, especially the historical, are sadly neglected by many Bible readers. A celebrated writer on the history of philosophy says: "Whoever is interested in philosophy ought not to be ignorant of its history and progress." Whoever is interested in the scheme of redemption cannot afford to be ignorant of its Old Testament record. Augustine said: "*Novum Testamentum in vetere latet, vetus in novo patet.*" When we can dismiss the Old Testament, then may we dismiss from our schools all the elementary branches and advance the pupils to the higher. The language of the Baptist, "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," could be understood only by those trained in Judaism.

Judaism, oriental philosophy and paganism, and Græco-Roman civilization have met and commingled as in common rendezvous. From amid this heterogeneity of philosophies and religions a new dispensation takes its initial point. This point is no less than a trinity of the incarnation, the crucifixion, and the resurrection. By the talismanic power and inspiration of all that is involved in this the church passes into a new corporate existence, and starts out upon a broadened plain of development. It is, however, the same church; the same grand old olive tree, with some of its natural branches broken off, but branches of the wild olive grafted in, and henceforth to partake of the root and fatness thereof. In this transition the New Testament writers seem to guard with special care the continuity of the history, by their frequent quotations and applications of Old Testament writings. The identity and perpetuity of the Abrahamic covenant is

stated and argued. The apostles link historic hands with a line of hoary prophets, kings and patriarchs reaching back to Adam, and as the history rolls on the line of succession is kept up by the fathers—Justin Martyr and Ignatius, of the second century; Origen and Cyprian, of the third; Athanasius and Basil, of the fourth; Chrysostom and Augustine, of the fifth, and on through the middle ages to Wickliffe, of the fourteenth; Huss, of the fifteenth; the Reformers, of the sixteenth, and on to the living army that girdles the earth to-day. All along this line of march but one flag has floated, the martial spirit and life-current the same.

The relation and treatment of outside history, if such be the proper term, is not to be ignored. Any view of church history that does not gather all into its sweep is contracted. "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee: the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." In reference to the unfolding of the Protevangelium everything is convergent or divergent. That that is divergent sooner or later passes into oblivion. But for their connection with church history, Pharaoh and his proud army and empire would have no remembrance except in a few dumb mummies and unmeaning hieroglyphs. When, in the purpose of God, the time approached to break down the middle wall of partition and to introduce a dispensation coterminous with the world and its wants, Alexander musters his armies, and, swift as a bird of prey, he swoops over Europe, Asia, and Africa, opens up intercourse with all the nations, colonizes the Jews, unlocks the Scriptures from what is becoming a dead language, and translates them into one in which is garnered all the wisdom outside the Bible. In connection with the plan of grace, how far-reaching and wide in its sweep is the conquest of Alexander! Separated from it, the empire of Macedon's hero, like Jonah's gourd, grew up in a night and perished in a night. And if the breaking up of the old crystallization was necessary to future growth, a new consolidation was no less needful, which was accomplished in the fourth great empire of antiquity. Let these allusions serve to suggest the relation of collateral history to that of the church and the interpretation thereof.

The first century of the Christian church is unique in its rela-

tions to the past and to the future. The strange mysteries of the wonderful past meet here for solution and verification. All that was typical in altar-sacrifice and priest, in prophet and king, finds its antitype here. Incarnate deity is the travail of the past centuries, if not of the past ages. The vast creation of the starry firmament was represented in celebrating the nativity, as witnessed by the Magi, who said, "We have seen his star." Heaven, too, sends out a grand delegation to do honor to the occasion, for there was "a multitude of the heavenly host praising God, and saying, Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace and good will to men." Here meet the joys and the sorrows, the faith and the hopes of all the past. It is not only the marking event in the history of one little world, but may it not be the marking event in the grand sweep of all the cycles of the divine dispensations? It signalizes all the past; it sustains a like relation to the future. The past, with all its fingers, points to the events of this century, back to it all the fingers of the future turn in reverse order. In this century the historian must find much of which to write. The world would not contain the books.

In this century God's revelation to man is closed with the solemn warning, "If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book; and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book." Henceforth these Scriptures are the rule of faith and practice. What is expressed, and what is rightly inferred, must constitute the theology and the ecclesiology of the church in all time to come. Henceforth the great book of revelation is to remain closed. From this time the great plan is to proceed under the superintendence of divine providence and by the renewing and enlightening power of the Holy Spirit. In the new dispensation Christ is *in actu* what he was in the old *in posse*. He is priest; there is, therefore, no room for a priesthood, or for the exercise of any of the functions thereof, in the church on earth. He is king in Zion; therefore all Erastianism and Papacy rob him of his crown rights. He is prophet; therefore his Word is the supreme law of the church.

Starting out upon this new line, we may mark it off by *stadia* as in the past. There is a strong *a priori* presumption that a like order of succession will be traceable in the future as in the past. We may, therefore, accept as something more than fancy the cyclological unfolding, or rather formulation, of theological science. This formulation has a history. It is the ground-work of ecclesiastical history. Following the classifications of theologians, the great section of biblical theology that first projects itself in history is the doctrine of the GODHEAD—trinity in unity, with its cognates. This emerged from the controversies of the second and third centuries, and reached a formulation in the first Ecumenical Council at Nice, A. D. 325. Then comes, at a later day, the formulation of ANTHROPOLOGY—man in his relations as a sinner to God. This reached a definite statement under the master hand of Augustine, and subsequently, after the dust of error through the dark ages had gathered upon it, was rebranded by the immortal Calvin. Then SOTERIOLOGY—the doctrines of grace, salvation by sovereign grace. This reached a culmination in the Reformation of the sixteenth century, and a formulation in the Lutheran and Reformed creeds. In all this, however, the Reformers did nothing more than to clear away the malformations, eliminate human elements, and expand and give organic form to what was original revelation. And then, parallel with this, and reaching still further, is ECCLESIOLOGY. In this grand battle electors, kings, emperors, popes, diets, councils, parliaments and courts figure. Banishment, exile, dungeons, the block, the stake, the bloody arena of wild beasts fill up the chronicles. The last of the *stadia* in this historic march is ESCHATOLOGY. These mark the theological feature of the history. Although we mark the succession of culminations, like the types of the three offices of Christ under the old economy, these great sub-divisions of a system pervade the whole history demanding formulation or defence. While we use these as signals along the philosophical and theological section of the history, we may propose, as something more tangible and reaching through all the centuries, the results of what has been done by the church in carrying out the great commission, “Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.” This

outlines the contractions and expansions of the visible church. And further, as running through the whole web of record, maintaining the continuity and evidencing the identity of parties and issue, is the conflict announced in the Protevangelium. It crosses the dispensations and re-appears in every chapter and on every page. The parties come up from every contest with bruised heel and bleeding head. Every inch of ground is hotly contested. This imparts a martial air to the history and makes it one of grand campaigns. The din of battle never ceases for a day.

Having indicated in some such general way some leading lines of development, we pursue the history in detail with reference to its bearings upon these.

First, the Ante-Nicene period. When the day of Pentecost was fully come and there were gathered at Jerusalem "men out of every nation under heaven," in fulfilment of prophecy and promise the Holy Spirit was poured out, and under the preaching of Peter three thousand souls were converted and the church was reorganized under the new dispensation. Into this organization were gathered Jews and Gentiles. The Jew, although converted, retained many of his Jewish prejudices, while the Gentile had his pagan prejudices. This produced friction in the church and afforded the occasion of the meeting of the first higher ecclesiastical court, when the apostles and elders met at Jerusalem, from which they sent down their decrees to the churches. "There arose a murmuring of the Grecians against the Hebrews, because their widows were neglected in the daily ministration," and this afforded the opportunity of completing orders in the church by the election of deacons. Then there arose persecution; this served to enlarge the boundaries of the church, by scattering the disciples over the Roman empire. As rude winds carry seeds to distant fields, the storms of persecution under the Roman emperors served to scatter everywhere the precious seed of the gospel. Besides, it was needful discipline for this young church, in order that she might transmit the blessings of the gospel to future generations, for thus it is that the church and individuals are made meet for the Master's use. There is a salutary lesson to be learned from this Ante-Nicene period. At no time has the church been called upon to

withstand fiercer antagonism and to resist more formidable adversaries than in her conflict with bigoted Judaism, corrupt and corrupting Paganism, and rationalistic Gnosticism. Christianity appearing in the midst of all this made it an age of ferment and sharp antitheses. The mutual attractions and repulsions growing out of what was common to all and peculiar to each made it the age of heresies. It seemed almost to exhaust the prolific source of heresies; for the best and the worst that succeeding centuries could do was but little more than to recast the old. In the midst of all this, as a further strain upon early Christianity, she encountered bloody persecutions from the Roman government, and yet—and this is the lesson—the characteristic of the age was “the rapid, simultaneous extension of the church and propagation of the gospel in various directions,” and the maintenance of apostolic simplicity and purity. The grandest achievements of the church have been when the old party lines between “the seed of the woman” and “the seed of the serpent” were most sharply drawn. The declensions and apostasies as to doctrine, government and worship, have occurred at times of the least activity between the opposing forces.

The succeeding century, which is marked by the Pelagian controversy and out of which grew the formulation of Anthropology, should not be separated from the first four, since its results are the fruits of the same. After the garnering of the fruits of this contest, sad decline sets in, which brings on the Dark Ages, and which is arrested only after a thousand years by a political, moral and ecclesiastical upheaval that convulsed all Europe.

One of the marking features of these Middle Ages is the history of church polity. The apostolical church, after being divested of its extraordinary and temporary offices, started out with its two classes of presbyters and deacons. Primacy was after awhile yielded to the more important churches and their pastors in the way of seeking advice. Out of this grew a claim to superiority and authority. What at first was advisory becomes authoritative. And so the parity is broken and the bishop is created. This is the first stage of usurpation. The next develops the patriarchate—another step in the hierarchy. Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch

and Jerusalem have their patriarchs. Rome and Constantinople are the two rival cities of the world. Their patriarchs are rivals for supremacy in the church. This resulted in the establishment of an oligarchy of patriarchs in the east and of a monarchy in the west. Early in the seventh century the pontiff of Rome obtained a decree from one who by murder had seized the imperial crown, "that the Romish Church, the apostolic seat of the blessed apostle Peter, should be the head of all the churches." But the pope, unlike his falsely-claimed predecessor Peter, and still less like the Master who had not where to lay his head, grasps territorial possessions and aims at civil power. And now the contest is waged, whether the pope shall crown the emperor or the emperor shall seat the pope. But Rome conquers, and the pope wears both the mitre and the tiara—on his girdle hang the keys and on his mitre is the triple coronet. Now follows many a page of history which cannot be dignified above a scuffle for the See of Peter, so-called; once as many as three claiming it and contending for it. All this terminates in preposterous and blasphemous claims, in wicked and licentious practices.

During the great middle period of history, which, as Dr. Alexander suggests, may be characterized as the period of deformation, it is an interesting question to trace in the downward progress the mutual relation of doctrine, worship and government in their action and reaction upon one another. By the authority of councils the great and fundamental doctrines of theology had received a crystallized form, and on that account were rendered more stable, while the development of government into the hierarchy had more freedom of action upon worship. Historically government seemed to dominate worship. Changes in worship in many cases followed in the train of changes in government. The priesthood first, then the altar and sacrifice; hence transubstantiation and the mass. First, the vicegerency of the pope, then the confessional, absolution and indulgences. Indeed, most of the enormities that stained history and corrupted the church were the logical outcome of the hierarchy, or were invented to sustain and aggrandize it. Rome's attempt to dominate everything determined more or less all the activities of the age. She occupied the vantage ground of having

started out upon the historic basis of divine revelation. This she was too politic boldly to deny, but like the Jews who made the commandment of God of none effect by their *tradition*, Rome did the same thing by her *addition*. And in this she pandered to the frailties and perversions of man's sinful nature. In this way the people were led to surrender their God-given rights and lent themselves to building up an ecclesiastical hierarchy that usurped the authority of Christ in the church and in the conscience of the individual. Rome accomplished her ends and brought on the Dark Ages, not by antagonizing human nature, but by gratifying it.

The history of monasticism running through this entire period, with its good and bad results, its position in philosophy and religion, and its relations to the hierarchy, is of intense interest to the student in history. Also the history of the crusades of the twelfth century as illustrating the invincible force of religious enthusiasm and fanaticism, when the great sea of popular feeling is stirred, is another prominent feature of this period of the history; both of which we pass over.

The redeeming feature of the Middle Ages, like rifts in the clouds anon letting through gleams of sunlight, are the solemn protests of the few and their demands for reform. The immortal "seven thousand" as a reserve force is preserved through all the ages. In France, Spain and Italy and elsewhere they record their solemn protest. Driven by sword and fire they gather into the Piedmont valleys, and there lift up their protest against antichrist, the worship of saints, monasticism, indulgences, purgatory, the mass, auricular confession and other corruptions of Rome. Historians differ as to the origin of the Waldenses. They may claim, however, apostolic succession as witnesses for the truth. Wycliffe, Huss and Jerome blaze out amid the thick darkness, harbingers of coming light.

Nature gives forth signs of coming events. Clouds hang around the horizon and utter mutterings of thunder before the burst of storm. The volcanic mountains give warning before they belch forth their liquid fire. These catastrophes in nature are culminations of silent and secret forces. History has its analogies. Revolutions and reformations are not the creations of a day.

Their causes run back and ramify the past, just as the rushing river that has come from its thousand trickling rivulets. Such an event as the Reformation of the sixteenth century, which has compelled the recognition of all historians as a marking period in civilization and Christianity, cannot be otherwise than of thrilling interest as to its causes and agencies as well as its results. The immediate preparation for the grand conflict may be seen in the characters that come upon the stage. An array of more capable men at any one time along the line of history would be difficult to find. Whether friends or foes, they are not to be despised. Francis I. of France, Charles V. of Germany, Henry VIII. of England, Leo X. of the Papal See, Sigismond the Great of Poland, and Solymán the Magnificent, of the Turks, with their counsellors, diplomatists, and generals, are formidable in council and on the field. All these may be regarded as enemies in the conflict, because there was not one of them but would and did sacrifice the truth to accomplish sordid and selfish ends. And while all these are marshalling their forces for mighty conflict, where are the champions of evangelical religion? It was in this case, as in all others of signal deliverances and victories, the enemy is allowed his best vantage ground, that the power may be of God, and not of man. The rod in the hand of Moses was mightier than the chariots of Pharaoh. The pebble in David's sling felled the giant. The son of an obscure miner, trained in the school of grace, issuing from a monastery with the everlasting Word of God, is more than a match for emperors, kings, popes and armies. Here it is that one chased a thousand, and two put ten thousand to flight. Here truth is stranger than fiction. It is not fortuitous that Martin Luther, and Melancthon, and Calvin, and others of like noble spirit appear at this particular juncture in the affairs of the world. God, by his providence and grace, fits men for their place in history. He has them always ready when the emergency arises. Blind is he who cannot see God in history.

This period furnishes a striking illustration of one of those great reactionary movements that occur so frequently in history. The church had realized the fruits of extreme consolidation. Organized power, the primary design of which is to guard individual

rights, had been used to enslave and oppress. The right of private judgment had been interdicted, and implicit obedience to usurped authority demanded and long enforced as the condition of life and salvation. Human forbearance has its limits, as despots have long since learned. But history has illustrated the difficulty of the maintenance of equilibrium in the great sea of human feeling and thought. The force of rebound from one extreme carries to another. The abuses and crimes of the one Catholic Church have brought about multiplied divisions and sub-divisions. The long surrender of individual rights of judgment and conscience has reacted in a sad lack of proper respect for constituted authority, both in church and state. The extreme of the arc in this direction doubtless is not yet reached. The abuse of private judgment and of personal liberty is as disastrous as the abuse of governmental power.

The most complicated, difficult, and yet most thrillingly interesting and instructive of all is the modern period of history. This necessarily grows out of the cumulative character of history. It is organic in its character, gathering up and assimilating as it moves on. Or, varying the figure, it is a succession of sowings and harvests in kind of geometrical ratio. The last three hundred and fifty years of battle and progress have distanced everything in the past. Nothing but a living faith in God can calmly survey the capabilities of the forces that are mustering to-day. The shots of skirmishers, along the lines, that may be heard should make all men serious. But I am reminded that I am going in advance of history. I have crudely sketched a few of the headlands along the great coast line.

I close this paper with certain suggestions in regard to the importance of this department of study.

First, Much the larger part of Revelation is historical. Much the larger part of the literature of the world is historical. Coupled with this is the unchallenged definition, "History is philosophy teaching by example." These facts alone entitle history to no second place in a curriculum of study.

Second, The importance of Church History, more particularly in its connexion with doctrine, polity, and worship. It reveals all

the avenues of unfriendly approach to the citadel of revealed truth which malicious art and cunning have been able to devise all through the centuries. There is scarcely a weakness that has not been assailed from within and from without. The modes of attack and the forms of apostasy, it would seem, are well-nigh exhausted. The enemy is reduced to the necessity of advancing upon some one of the old lines, while the church can only repeat mistakes. This enhances the importance of a thorough knowledge of history, especially to those who are to occupy the place of watchmen upon the walls of Zion. It will be unpardonable for the church to repeat her own mistakes. She is forewarned in history that she may be forearmed.

Such is the magnitude of the subject and its importance to the future ministry, as I conceive it, that I tremble in view of being made responsible for it in a course of Seminary instruction. In view of it, I cry from the bottom of my heart, "Lord God, I am a child; I cannot." But for the fact of having recognized the call of God to the work, I could not dare to undertake it. I believe when God calls one to occupy a given post, he will furnish him all needed grace. In humble reliance, therefore, upon divine help, I shall bring to bear all my resources and energies in performance of the solemn duties to which the Board and Synods have called me.

J. D. TADLOCK.

II. OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.

I.

It is characteristic of the eager spirit of philosophy that it must interrogate every new-comer whether, like the ghost in Hamlet, the strange visitant appear "in a questionable shape" or not. It was reserved for the inquisitive skepticism of modern times to interrogate what is at the same time declared to be devoid of hearing or speech, and not only to analyze, but in a measure to define what is admitted and asserted to be absolutely unknowable. It was hardly to be expected, then, that the beating heart of humanity at large could be rocked to sleep, like "an infant crying in the night," without a persistent attempt to satisfy its curiosity and allay its anxiety respecting the great future that lies before each one of us and before the world. Revelation has ever been ready to satisfy these tumultuous interrogations of the human spirit, but her offers to do so have either been unknown or have been generally overlooked or rejected.

There are two questions manifestly involved here. The one has reference to each human being in his own distinctive individual personality, and is the question so ingeniously and eloquently discussed by Mr. Mallock in his brilliant, but disappointing work entitled, "Is Life Worth Living?" The other has reference to man, considered as the *genus homo*, in all his complex relations and surroundings, and in the totality of his generations on the earth. These two questions are intimately connected. If the individuals all fare well, the race as a whole, which is made up of the individuals, must of course have the same good fortune; and *vice versa*. But it is evident that the individuals of any specific contemporary generation, or of a succession of such generations, might fare badly, or fare indifferently, or fare diversely, and yet in a comprehensive view and on a final estimate the race as a whole fare well. In a broad outlook these two questions may often be merged. As a practical inquiry the question about the individual (and the collection of individuals viewed as such) is unspeakably the more in-

teresting and important. It is, on the other hand, the question about the race, considered irrespectively of its individuals and its relation to the earth, that seems to have a more special charm for the philosopher. What is to be the terminus of history? What is going to be the progressive sequence of events, and what the complexion of the final consummation? If we had a glass in which we could scan the remote depths of that abyss of which even the nearest shallows are concealed from us, what, after all had been said and done, would turn out to be the ultimate fate of humanity? What, in short, is to be the outcome of all the warring agencies and influences that are at present shut up within the cauldron of time? Should the dominion be conceded to hope or to despair? Shall happiness or misery assume the throne now contended for by wistful expectation and fond solicitude? To sum up all in a word, are the rosy dreams of the optimist to be indeed crowned with fruition, or rather are the dark forebodings of the now unheeded pessimist, like the vaticinations of Cassandra, after all to be realized in fact?

The answers given to these questions, whether true or false, depend largely on temperament, on diet, on what Mr. Herbert Spencer and the late Charles Darwin, following Comte, call "the environment." They depend most of all, in a multitude of instances, on personal idiosyncrasy. The determining influences are without doubt to a certain extent hereditary. Some men are born to their career; other men conquer it or else fail to achieve it. As a rule a man's character and fortune are strongly affected, if not wholly determined, by those personal forces which begin to operate at birth. Some are by nature practical; others are imaginative, romantic, perhaps visionary. There are born poets and dreamers, and there are also born mathematicians and machinists. Just in the same way some are naturally inclined to ardent philosophic musing, whilst others as readily give themselves up to the colder labors of scientific criticism. The two types for all ages are Plato and Aristotle. The illustrious exponent of Socrates would have been the better (who can doubt it?) for the severe intellectual curb of his own pupil and successor, the equally renowned Stagirite; and the tutor of "Philip's greater son" would in his turn certainly

have been none the worse for more of that suffusion, of which Lord Verulam speaks, which the understanding receives from the will and the affections—and, it may be added, the feelings. The contemplation of the mystical (if dialectic) Platonist is apt to be rainbow-hued. The scrutiny of the rationalistic disciple of Aristotle is at best sombre, and apt to be darkly beclouded. The exaggeration of the first tendency results in the credulity of groundless hope; the exaggeration of the second tendency, in the unwarranted skepticism of fear, or the moral self-abandonment of despair. So that it is evident, that as there are men born with sanguine, and men born with atrabilious and melancholic temperaments; as there are also born mystics and born rationalists; so there are men who are born optimists, and there are men who are born pessimists. It does not by any means follow that both, or that either, of the opponent theories is wholly the creation of subjective prepossession. One weather-prophet, being sanguine, may be counted on, where other things are equal, to predict fair weather; another, having a naughty liver, to predict rain. It does not follow, though in the case supposed it might so fall out, that there are to be neither clouds nor clear skies.

The objective truth is obviously independent of the subjective view-point of the man who should in advance endeavor to put himself in a position to discern it. Because the person who says there will be sunshine has a rich store of red globules coursing in his veins, it is not to be inferred that the weather will be bad. Because the person who says there will be a downpour, or be showers, is afflicted with a dark skin and yellow eyeballs, one should not jump to the conclusion that the weather will be fine. As regards the matter under consideration, there are just these three possibilities: Either the optimist is right, or the pessimist is, or else the truth lies somewhere "betwixt and between" the two extremes. There will be sunshine at last, or the skies will be clouded, or the day will resemble that memorable one described by the Hebrew seer, except that in the evening there shall not be "light," but, as in the greater portion of the symbolical day referred to by the inspired prophet, the day, at its close, shall not be either wholly dark or wholly bright. To all appearance, this

last surmise is an improbable one. It would seem that at some unknown date in the future there must be a termination of the conflict, and that final victory is yet to sit upon the standards either of darkness or of light. This, however, should be made a subject of the most sober and convincing inquiry. If this middle alternative were to be ruled out, it would then be incumbent on the investigator to ascertain, if possible, which programme, that of optimism or that of pessimism, the only remaining alternative, is to be approved and accepted as the true one. At the same time it is proper to take notice that, in the nature of things, it is altogether possible that either one of the two extreme theories may be able to approve and establish itself without any special consideration whatever of the intermediate ground.

On the most superficial view, there is much to recommend the theory of the optimist, not only to the fancy and the mental and moral sensibilities, but also to that somewhat flexible faculty, the judgment. In a more reflective stage of experience the ominous finger points (not unwaveringly, it is true) towards pessimism. The grand discussion may assume a popular or it may assume a scientific form. As it is in religion, so it is in philosophy. A man's real philosophy is not always the philosophy that he preaches; it is the philosophy he *lives*. In this view of it, the question is not a question as to what a man says he thinks, but a question as to what a man *is*. In this sense, every man that is worthy of the name of a man, unless he be a rarely-gifted person, or one of rarely-balanced organs and powers, is an optimist or else a pessimist by nature. There must be few that are wholly and permanently indifferent on this subject. As Josephus went through the entire curriculum of the Jewish sects, so there may be human beings who have gone through all phases of conscious experience, if not of articulate theorizing, in relation to this matter. In the natural order optimism would be the earliest stage in the progression, then would succeed the cooler stage of critical deliberation and comparative neutrality; and, last of all, would come the stage of pessimism. As a general rule, where no counteracting influences are brought to bear, youth, as by the determination of a law of nature, is optimistic. Nearly all children, and a great majority

of young men and maidens, are what might be styled natural optimists. The complete maturity of the physical organs is, generally speaking, coincident with the culmination of the higher powers of thought. This middle period of life is apt to be a period of warfare between the two contending principles or forces, though commonly, whether owing to the survival of the efficacy of the impulse given in youth or not, optimism is still in the ascendant. The decay of the physical powers is often, but not always, synchronous with a decay of lively emotion and even of hope. Sometimes it is otherwise. The body may decay; but the soul appears to "renew its strength like the eagle's," and "joy and sorrow," instead of being revived or recruited, are overcome, and, like a vanquished host upon the field of battle, trail their banners ingloriously and "flee away." On the other hand, the pensive sobriety of world-worn experience may anticipate and precede the decline of nature.

But whilst it is true that one and the same man may, and frequently does, pass through these successive stages, it is usually the case that one man, by constitutional bias or from whatsoever cause, is throughout life characteristically optimist in his leanings, and another characteristically pessimist. History and literature are full of examples. In antiquity they are as abundant as they are striking. Alexander (or Alcibiades) was the type of victorious optimism, Diogenes of defeated pessimism; Cicero and Cæsar were optimists; Tiberius and Cato were pessimists. The Stoics were all essentially pessimistic. There were two schools of Epicureans, one of which was ostensibly pessimistic, the other ostensibly optimistic; yet Epicureanism in its very last quintessence must be identified with pessimism. The motto of Epicureanism in its most refined expression, though disavowing a literal interpretation of the words, might properly be, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Literature, as so largely a picture of life, and so ample an expression of personality, must not be left out of the account. Not only Juvenal and Persius, but pleasure-loving Anacreon himself, and the gay-hearted Horace, and even "the laughing philosopher" Democritus, were strongly tinctured with pessimistic stoicism; and, as has been pointed out before, the apathetic tone of

the Greek censor reappears in the *nil admirari prope res est unica* of the Roman bard. Among the Greek poets it is Pindar, the recording and inspiring genius of the Nemean and Olympic games, who stands as the unique and splendid, almost the ideal, representative of optimism. The Greek tragedies, revolving as the drama always does on fate, are all of them pessimistic; but the "Prometheus Bound" is pessimism itself. Homer, if he ever existed, appears to have hit the *juste milieu*, although it is not to be denied that the story of Hector, of Priam, of Hecuba, of Troy, is one of the most tragic and comfortless stories of all time. In the grand argument of the tale as a whole, Paris and Cassandra amongst the Trojans, and Ulysses and Thersites amongst the Greeks, may be taken as the opponent types. Scripture history abounds in contrasted instances. Moses would appear to have been constitutionally a pessimist, Aaron an optimist; Joshua, David, Solomon were optimists, Absalom and Jonah were pessimists.

In modern annals, Peter the Great and Charles XII. were both optimists; Philip II. and the Duke of Alva were pessimists; Luther and Zwingli were optimists, Calvin and Knox pessimists. Napoleon Bonaparte was at once optimist and pessimist: in some things by turns, in other things always, though in divers degrees according to the particular thing in which the quality or tendency was manifested. Charles V., William of Orange, William of England, and Washington were among the happy few who appear to have touched, or neared, the golden mean. Of the four, the author of Germano-Spanish consolidation (perhaps), and the successful defender of American independence, naturally inclined towards optimism, whereas the saviour of the Netherlands, and the statement might be plausibly made also of the hero of the English Revolution, was a born pessimist.

The late Lord Beaconsfield may be said to have been in his peculiar way a Horatian pessimist—a sort of Anglo-Hebrew Democritus. Mr. Gladstone was of old, and is to-day, an optimist of the first water. Mr. Parnell is probably by nature a pessimist, but by thought and aspiration an optimist. In citing such examples, it is of course not pretended that the classification at all

discloses the opinions of the men as to the future, either of the individual or of the race. It merely marks the trend or tendency in the one general direction or the other.

After much of this essay had been reduced to writing, an interesting critique on the late Matthew Arnold's estimate of Emerson fell under the eye of the writer, and will be found to be in many of its statements in pretty thorough unison with the tone of this paper. The following extract chimes in almost exactly with the general spirit of this discussion :

“Mr. Arnold rules that Emerson's persistent optimism is the root of his greatness and the source of his charm, as Carlyle's pessimism is of his ruin. This ought to be dealt with freely, for it is most important. I cannot see but that a pessimist is every whit as good as an optimist. The man who points out your faults is your best friend. The man who encouragingly tells you you are right will never mend you. There is something bordering on the ridiculous to me when Emerson says: ‘My whole philosophy, which is very real, teaches acquiescence and optimism. Sure I am that the right word will be spoken, though I cut out my tongue.’ If this were literally true there would be no reason for writing at all; and if every one were equally optimistic, the right word never would be spoken, every body would leave it to some one else to say it. It only means, I, Emerson, when I have done my best, am not going to eat my heart out because I get no immediate response from the world. This is a matter of temperament, and there is no special merit either way. It is of a piece with the virtue of Talleyrand, who held that happiness lay in ‘a good digestion and a bad heart.’ . . . But truth is, that the world is neither happy nor well-managed, and to believe against experience, your own and that of history, that the right thing will be done and the right word spoken, is to build castles in Spain and live on the mortgage. If such happiness be wise, Solomon was a fool, who summed up all his experience as vanity. Is not Dante full as he can hold of the wine of grief? Pascal is so skeptical and sad that he has reckoned up man's misery for his glory; Job found that man was ‘born to trouble,’ and there was another in Gethsemane whose woe is annually bewailed through Christendom, an exemplar to the rest, him above all they style *Virum dolorum*. In the face of such facts, what is optimism? The greater souls are tinged with sadness, the lesser sing like Anacreon's grasshopper, happy as kings, but very small. When the autumn is cheerful as the spring, I will vote for optimism, and those who can may pluck ripe fruit in May. When disease and decay and failing strength and the feeble knees are come, the senses droop. . . . Hopes are withered, prospects blighted, means perhaps crippled, smiles once fixed grow frowns; dead friends are lying under the cypress groves, and the raven hair is bleaching to an almond crown; have you so little pity you can flaunt your theory optimistic in the face of souls thus weighed? Were it not better said, dear dying brother, ‘All creation groaneth together until now,’ for this is no abiding place, the solid things visible are unsubstantial, the invisible things it is that are eternal, and this our soul is of them. There may be an optimism there, but to preach it here, to death-fed life, is to mock at man and not to lift him, as Peter the cripple at ‘the beautiful gate.’”

What follows needs of course to be strongly qualified.

"If wise, you will aim at performing well what is to be done, the device of the hour that presseth; discharge it in the best manner that you know how, and whatever little other good chance, favoring you, permits, neglect not. If you do right to that extent, you make for happiness, and you may yourself perhaps attain to a little of it; but it cannot last long in the very nature of things, and with so small a share of it it is absurd to talk of optimism. If, as Mr. Arnold tells us, Epictetus and Augustine both say that the desire of happiness is the root of man's being, but that he must seek it in the right place, then I reply that they have said nothing to the purpose; for the right place is only to be got at by right doing; the path to it is sorrowful; and though it is by far the best thing to be done, it will not bring what the world calls happiness, but a most subdued and very quiet satisfaction only. We are too subject to 'the skyeey influences' to be happy. The vast wretchedness of this world is the actual outcome, it may almost be said, of the foolish endeavors to be happy that most men make. Carlyle perhaps tried to be unhappy, and that is as foolish as any mad endeavor after the pleasant things can be. Do your duty strictly, limit your wants, enjoy or suffer equally what cannot be controlled, banish expectation and harbor no hopes. . . . All this is better than such rubbish as the happiness and eternal hope which Emerson's gospel preaches."¹

Apart from an occasional tendency to that maudlin diction known as "blank verse in prose," there is much in the foregoing extract to command attention and win approbation. The retort upon Matthew Arnold and upon Emerson is capital. The presentation of the case for pessimism is forcible and ingenious, though evidently influenced by the impressive exhibition of the same points by Schopenhauer,² and it may be also by statements of Hartmann. A good deal might, of course, be added, and has, to some extent, been already added in the present article, to what is said in the excerpt respecting the literary examples and kindred matters. Goethe, in "The Sorrows of Werther," and, above all, in "Faust," is one of the most conspicuous instances of literary pessimism in history. It must, notwithstanding, be admitted that Goethe's main drift is obscure and his language susceptible of different interpretations. In his songs, and elsewhere too, Goethe is pre-

¹ Mr. C. A. Ward, in *Temple Bar*, Vol. LXXII.; a fourth of page 246, the whole of page 247, and a third of page 248. London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1884.

² See Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, §§ 67, 59, ii. 46, qu. by Luthardt, *Apolog. Vortr. Vorles*, 2, Notes, and repeated in English by Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, Rivington's, London, Oxford and Cambridge, 1873, pp. 132, 133 and 134.

vailingly full as much the laureate of optimism as either Burns or Béranger. On the whole, the great German, like Shakspeare, and probably Homer, at least if the authorship of the Iliad and the Odyssey was the same, appears to have belonged to that noble and select class, "fit though few," who have been too "entirely great" to bend permanently under either one of the extreme influences which have been referred to and subjected to discussion in this paper. But if the Homer of the Iliad may be plausibly set down as a pessimist, it will be remarked that in this as in many similar cases the position can only be maintained in a limited sense. If the Homer of the Iliad is a pessimist, it is in a literary, not a personal sense; and he is a literary pessimist only *quoad hoc*. Virgil, on the other hand (in the *Æneid*), is in the same way a literary optimist. *Per contra* such writers as Rochefoucauld and Heyne were, in a characteristic and all but universal sense, literary pessimists; and Heyne at all events was equally a pessimist in a personal use of the term.

It is often very hard to tell whether an author is sincere in his avowed, or implied, manifestation of himself in his works, or whether he is only "shamming." This remark is preëminently applicable to dramatic writers, but is by no means to be confined to them. The signal instance of all time is of course that of William Shakspeare. In general it may be said that in the tragedies he is apparently pessimistic, in the comedies optimistic, and that in the smaller poems and sonnets he varies. There are two difficulties that beset one in trying to get down to his real, that is, to his deepest meaning. The first of these difficulties, which, however, does not everywhere exist, is to find out how the mighty thinker tricked out in his stage-clothes meant to be taken by his readers, speaking to them as he notoriously does not *in propria personâ*, but through the mask in the tones of his characters. The question here, it will be observed, is not as to what Shakspeare himself thought or felt, but as to what he intended to represent Richard, or Henry, or Bottom, or Iago, as thinking or feeling. In many cases, probably in most cases, this difficulty is either, as has been intimated, purely imaginary, or else is easily removed. In *Macbeth*, *Lear*, and *Othello*, with one possible exception Shakspeare's

noblest productions, the intended pessimism is transparent; albeit there may be no clear evidence that the pessimism is such in any other sense than *quoad hoc*. The case is different with Hamlet; which as an exhibition and discussion of the philosophy of human life is in the judgment of many the author's masterpiece, and at once the loftiest and profoundest reach of man's intelligence and genius in that direction. Here, too, there is a difference of constructions. On one view of the last scene, especially the concluding words, the meaning of which must be decisive as to the grand intent of the tragedy as a whole, Hamlet is to be regarded not only as one of the sublimest, but also as one of the darkest expressions of modern pessimism—of a pessimism as black and cynical as that which pervades the German speeches of Mephistopheles. Fortunately for the optimist, who is also a votary of Shakspeare, this construction of the language is open to debate, and is strongly contested in high quarters. The question as to the true scope and animus of Hamlet is, in point of fact, one of the subtlest problems in the annals of literature.

But when this question has been settled, then emerges the second of the two difficulties mentioned awhile ago. To what extent is Polonius, or Horatio, or Hamlet himself, to be regarded as shadowing forth the veritable sentiments of him who originally penned the words of the drama? In other terms, to what extent is Shakspeare here, or elsewhere, purely histrionic, and to what extent is he to be understood as making a personal revelation of himself? This has been a riddle ever since the Elizabethan era, and is a riddle that will in all likelihood remain unsolved.

Another source of dubiety as respects an author's real meaning, is that he may not only consciously or unconsciously hide, but deliberately dissemble or disguise his true intention or his personal sentiments. It is as much a question now as it was when Macaulay wrote his ingenious essay whether Machiavelli's "Prince" is or is not to be taken *au sérieux*. The question there is simply whether the book is to be accepted in dead earnest, or to be regarded as a piece of cutting irony. There are justly celebrated authors in whose writings the irony is plain enough to those who are not hopelessly color-blind. Much of Swift, much of Addison,

much of Goldsmith, and much of Irving, are of this description. There are other writers who require at times a peculiarly refined and exquisite organ of perception on the part of those who would approve themselves their appreciative readers. Charles Lamb and William Makepeace Thackeray may be cited as examples in point. It is one of the most characteristic traits of Thackeray in his writings, not excluding his letters, that he appears as though continually trying to make himself out to be a sort of Bluebeard, or gruff and devouring ogre, instead of what he is in fact, a great big, grown-up, richly endowed, sharp-sighted, quizzical, hypercritical, "happy-go-lucky," soft-hearted baby. Some one has finely observed that Thackeray is at bottom not a satirist, but a sentimentalist. A French critic has said of him, with unequalled felicity, that the bitterness of his tone is to be attributed to the fact that he had been disappointed at not finding the world better than it was. Thackeray's actual pessimism, like all sweet and noble pessimism, may be ultimately resolved into a species of ideal optimism; that is to say, it is precisely because Thackeray's optimistic ideal is so high that his real pessimism assumes such disheartening proportions.

But if Thackeray in a manner feigns an inhuman savagery that was utterly foreign to his true character, his great coeval Dickens too often simulates the accents of genuine sympathy and pathos. The tears of Dickens when weeping over "little Nell," and still more when weeping over little Paul Dombey, are for the most part very like crocodile's tears. Whole pages of his inimitable writings have a hollow ring about them, like that of counterfeit metal. Lord Byron unquestionably took dark and pessimistic views of human life and human destiny; but in "Childe Harold," in "Cain," in "Manfred," in his poems generally, he ostentatiously poses as the very incarnation of ruined hopes, as the very genius, so to speak, of a gloomy and cynical despair.

It is time now that certain things which have been, to a great extent, conjoined in this essay should, so far as possible, be separated. Literary, and especially what may be denominated dramatic or histrionic, optimism or pessimism, is, as we have seen, a very different thing from that pessimism or optimism that is abiding

and personal. We have had occasion to take notice, too, that the optimism or pessimism, whether merely literary or whether strictly characteristic and personal, may be simply *quoad hoc*, may be relative rather than absolute, may be qualified rather than unconditional.

Another important thing to be borne in mind, is that a native or constitutional bias towards optimism or towards pessimism in some vague and unrestricted sense is not to be confounded with a definite optimistic or pessimistic creed, in the technical and intellectual acceptation of the terms.

Furthermore, the literary expression that has been given to either one of the two diametrically opposing tendencies is only collaterally germane to the present discussion, or if directly germane to it, is only so apart from the intrinsic worth of formal arguments *pro* and *con*, as shedding light on the personal views and leanings of the literary men themselves, who in so many memorable cases have been the intellectual and spiritual luminaries of the race. At the same time it is frankly acknowledged that a complete and an exact exhibit of the opinions and feelings of all the literary men, and of all the human beings, that have ever flourished on the earth, would not suffice to settle this question beyond dispute. Biography and history have their own honored places, but they cannot occupy the province of reason and religion, in such sense as to oust the original and rightful possessors.

H. C. ALEXANDER.

III. WHAT IS A MIRACLE?

IN discussing the subject which forms the caption of this article, we assume at the outset that the universe is the product of an omnipotent creative will; that both matter and spirit, together with all their properties and all the laws under which their multiform operations may be classified, originated out of nothing in the fiat of an infinite, intelligent and personal First Cause. We assume, furthermore, that while the first cause infinitely transcends creation and is in no sense whatever to be confounded with it, he is at the same time, in some way inscrutable to us, immanent in the whole of it as well as in every part of it, so that "by him all things consist." While maintaining that second causes are veritable causes, and that, as real forces, they act and react one upon another according to the nature and the measure of their capabilities, and under the guidance of fixed and definite rules, we hold that their continued existence and their power to act are assured only by the inseparable connexion which they have with the author of all things. In a word, we begin with the assumption that the theistic conception of the universe is true; for it is only under this view of the origin and the preservation of the universe that the question of miracles has any significance at all. There is no room for the miraculous either in the system of the atheist or in that of the pantheist.

Referring, in "The Reign of Law," to "The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural," by Dr. McCosh, the Duke of Argyll says: "This eminent writer has approached the subject [of miracles] by the right method, because he has addressed himself first to the solution of the one question which is an essential preliminary to all subsequent discussion: 'How much is contained in the natural?' Not until this question is answered can the supernatural be defined. Yet the answer given by Dr. McCosh shows the inherent and the insuperable difficulty which attends the giving

of any answer at all. 'In this world,' he says, 'there is a set of objects and agencies which constitute a system or cosmos which may have relation to regions beyond, *but is all the while a self-contained sphere, with a space around it—an island so far separated from other lands.* This system we call nature.' This definition of the natural is perhaps as accurate and as full as any that can be given." If the Princeton professor's method in dealing with the question of miracles is correctly represented in the above quotation from "The Reign of Law," it has our unqualified approval. We cannot, however, but express surprise that such a profound thinker as the Duke of Argyll should have lent the sanction of his great name to so radically defective a view of nature as that of Dr. McCosh undoubtedly is. This surprise is not lessened when, almost with the same breath, he avows it as his conviction that the attempt to lay down the limits of the natural is essentially and insuperably difficult. What is this but virtually a confession that we are unable, even in thought, to construe the meaning of nature? Ought such a confession to be made by any theist? If it is one which the facts of the case warrant, why should scriptural theology prolong its controversy with the anti-scriptural science of the day in regard to the miraculous? Would it not be better to abandon the field at once and beat an ignominious retreat? For if the metes and boundaries of the natural cannot be determined, who can contend, with the remotest probability of success, that any other than purely natural phenomena have occurred at any time since the universe was created and sent adrift under the reign of law? If this is the only conclusion to which the battle can come—and from the Duke of Argyll's standpoint it unquestionably is—on the part of theology it is evidently not worth the fighting; to all intents and purposes the victory is on the side of science.

It is not true, however, that the natural cannot be defined. On the contrary, nothing is easier than to determine with logical precision the metes and boundaries of nature. This term, in a restricted sense, may be, and very often is, employed as a synonym for the whole order of terrestrial things that lies beyond man and man's works. Such is the meaning attached to it in perhaps all

the branches of physical science, astronomy excepted. It is of similar though less extensive import, in such phrases as "the study of nature" and "the love of nature." And such uses of it are convenient and legitimate, not only because of the poverty of language and its inability to furnish a separate term for expressing each particular phase of allied and kindred thoughts, but because man and his works—the works that he performs both within the realm of his own spirit and on the foreign matter that lies around him—have frequently to be viewed apart from, and in contrast with, the forces that are operating in the kingdoms external to him.

But although man, as rational and free, is immeasurably superior to all other known forces at work on the earth, and is so far lord of this lower world that he not only has dominion over the animal creation, but to a certain extent can change the normal relations of the physical powers about him, and compel them, in their new combinations, to subserve his purposes, he is nevertheless himself an integral part of the system in which he moves and to which he is confined. This being true, it follows of course that there can be no proper definition of nature which does not include man.

But the term is not yet exhausted. The earth may be an island floating in the immensity of space far from any other world. Strictly speaking, however, it is not insulated from every other world. It is rather like one of the islands of Japan, which are separate indeed, but together constitute a great empire. The universe is not disjointed, but connected, not fragmentary, but a unit. The earth is but one of a number of sister worlds, each of which, together with the sun as the bond of union, helps to form our solar system. Nay, this is not all. Not only does science not doubt that the solar system itself is but a part of a much larger and grander system, but pushes speculation farther still, until that which is undoubtedly the true conception of our solar system is believed to be the true conception of the universe. We do not say that the creed of the theist binds him to precisely this view; it is impossible, however, for any theist not to hold that each world in the universe is related to every other world as a product.

of the same creative intelligence. Nature then embraces more than man and the comparatively contracted sphere on which man has been placed to work out his destiny. It may be, and ought to be, extended so as to take in the sum total of created being—suns, planets, moons and comets, together with all the forms of animal and intellectual life with which they may be furnished. Thus used, it covers the same ground as the created, only perhaps suggesting a little more clearly and distinctly the idea of the concatenated and the orderly.

No one indeed can fully explicate the contents of this definition of nature. Even the little corner of the universe which we call earth is but partly known, though so many microscopic eyes have long been fixed upon it. How much less then may we expect the remote stars to surrender all their secrets at the bidding of the telescope and the spectroscope? The definition, however, is not on that account any the less complete and satisfactory. It is rigidly exact and comprehensive, taking in the whole of what it claims to define and presenting it as an object apprehensible by thought, though the compass of *the thing itself* is to us practically boundless.

If what has been said above is true—and it undoubtedly is—there is no difficulty in determining “how much is contained in the natural.” It is all, in the way of *activity* and all in the shape of *effect*, that has ever belonged, and that now belongs, to the domain of nature as already defined. Whatever may be the number and the character of the forces, whether material or immaterial, that enter into the constitution of the universe, they are all strictly natural forces; and whatever these forces, acting in obedience to the laws impressed upon them when they were created, have effected in the past, or are effecting in the present, must in like manner be referred to the category of the natural. If the nebular hypothesis is correct, the gradual evolution of our solar system, and of all other solar systems, from an antecedent chaotic state, in which there were only moving atoms and their properties, was a purely natural process. If geology speaks truly when it affirms that our globe became fitted for its occupancy, even by vegetable life, only after passing through a preparatory process of almost

fabulous duration and through the agency of such forces as heat and water and the atmosphere and the earthquake, this preparatory process was wholly a natural one. If the Darwinian hypothesis of descent with modifications gives a true account of the genesis of species, all the flora and all the fauna of earth have been evolved from a few primordial germs under the operation of forces acting solely under the direction of natural law, and are therefore to be classed under the head of natural products. If man, in the exercise of his inventive and constructive skill, has produced instruments which have enlarged his power over mere matter to an extent that would have been deemed incredible even a century ago, it has been nothing more than one part of nature working upon another part of nature and producing a natural effect. Nay, if a superhuman intelligence, inhabiting another world, should have access to our globe, and, putting forth superhuman strength, should cause a great wave to roll in upon the Eastern shores of the United States, and submerge every city within a hundred miles of the coast, such a phenomenon would be altogether natural; it would be exhibiting, only on a larger and more destructive scale, yet strictly within the limits of nature, that which always takes place when a heavy and long continued gale blows in upon the sea-board from the ocean.

Having satisfactorily ascertained the contents of nature and the natural, we can readily answer the question, What is contained in the supernatural? The Duke of Argyll quotes M. Guizot as saying that "God is the supernatural in a person." If we view the supreme being simply as discriminated from, and sharply contrasted with, nature, the great Frenchman's definition of God is not only correct, but felicitously expressed; for God is a living, self-conscious Spirit, and not only not a constituent element of nature, as created intelligences are, but altogether distinct from it and infinitely above it; so inseparably connected with it, indeed, that in him all things live and move and have their being, and yet in no sense whatever to be considered a part of it.

If "God is the supernatural in a person," the supernatural in a phenomenon would mark the phenomenon as one that did not originate in the operation of any of nature's forces, but was effected

solely by the immediate agency of the divine will. If the natural is the product of nature, in all her amplitude, as already indicated, working under the guidance of laws imposed upon her in the beginning, the supernatural is the product of the Omnipotent Spirit working independently of all second causes. It would seem to be an impropriety of speech to speak of creation as a supernatural effect, though proceeding directly from the will of God; for the natural and the supernatural are relative and antithetical, and existence must be predicable of *both* before *either* can properly be said to exist. But if the universe is of limited extent, and there are boundless tracts of space unoccupied by any world, it would be just as easy for the inexhaustible creative resources of God to produce a new universe as it was for him to call the present one into being; and if it should please him so to do, the new product would be purely supernatural, because it would be an effect to the production of which nature is not competent: although the moment such a universe appeared, it would take its place side by side with the present universe as one of the grand divisions of nature. Whether there is any truth, or no truth, in the hypothesis of evolution as an attempt to explain the order of the universe and the origin of species; if nature is incapable of transforming inorganic, dead matter into organic, living forms; if no conceivable combination of her forces, with billions upon billions of ages in which to work, can succeed in evolving life out of death; then the first appearance, at least, of life upon our planet was a supernatural phenomenon. Nay, if God, by an immediate act of his will and altogether apart from the employment of natural means, has, at any time since nature began to be, modified her original constitution by introducing a new working force into her domain, that causative act was supernatural, and the effect of it a supernatural effect, although the new force at once fell into line with the order of things about it and thenceforth wrought in obedience to the requirements of natural law.

Our only purpose so far has been to mark off sharply the lines of separation between the natural and the supernatural, in order that the two may be accurately discriminated in thought. This, of course, does not help us to determine whether any supernatural

phenomenon has ever occurred or not; it only serves to set in a clear light what it is that theology is contending for, when she proclaims that the supernatural must be defended against all attacks, whether coming from avowed enemies or led by pseudo-friends.

We are not yet, however, quite prepared to enter upon a discussion of the miraculous. We must first answer the question, What is meant by the uniformity of nature? and as preliminary to this, another, viz., What is to be understood by the phrase "natural law?" "The fundamental conception of law," says Drummond, "is an ascertained working sequence or constant order among the phenomena of nature. This impression of law as order it is important to receive in its simplicity, for the idea is often corrupted by having attached to it erroneous views of cause and effect. In its true sense natural law predicates nothing of causes. The laws of nature are simply statements of the orderly condition of things in nature; what is found in nature by a sufficient number of competent observers. . . . The natural laws originate nothing, sustain nothing; they are merely responsible for uniformity in sustaining what has been originated and what is being sustained. They are modes of operation, therefore not operators; processes, not powers." This definition is luminous and eminently satisfactory. It covers the case exactly, neither leaving out anything intrinsic, nor, as is so frequently done, introducing an extraneous element into the generic idea of law, which in its strictest sense is only mandatory and regulative.

When it is said, then, by the scientist that nature is always uniform in her operations, he can mean nothing more than that all her forces, the mightiest and the least alike, act, not in an irregular and capricious manner, but under the determination of fixed rules. He cannot mean that these operations repeat themselves in unvarying, constantly-recurring cycles, like the metonic or the solar cycle, for this is palpably untrue. It may be true of certain grand phenomena which originate in causes of such colossal power as not to be appreciably affected in their action by any of the changes that are continually modifying the aspect of our globe and the current of its history. It may be true, for example, of the movements of the heavenly bodies, so that astronomers can tell us, with

absolute certainty, when to expect a solar or a lunar eclipse, and when to look for the next transit of Venus, and when the moon will be in apogee or in perigee. It is not true, however, in regard to the great mass of phenomena that belong to terrestrial nature. There are no cycles here that are not more or less indefinite, both in their commencing and their ending. In the temperate zones the year has four seasons; but their character is so inconstant as to defy calculation beforehand of what it will be. It does not follow, because the sun at the summer solstice in 1886 occupied the same position in the heavens that he occupied at the summer solstice in 1887, that the thermometer registered the same temperature for the solstitial day of each of the two years. No meteorologist can inform the farmer, from any weather tables he may have in his possession, when to fear either floods or droughts. The great earthquake which visited Charleston in 1886 mustered its subterranean strength in secret; and the eruption of Vesuvius which buried Herculaneum and Pompeii gave those fated cities no warning of its approach.

Nay, this even does not exhaust the case. Not only are the old forces of nature continually entering into new combinations and surrounding themselves with new circumstances, but new forces are ever being introduced into her domain to become modifying factors in her after history. Every birth of a human being brings a new will-power upon the stage, to be incorporated as a new force into those already existing, and to contribute something, whether little or much, towards making the subsequent order of nature different from what it would otherwise be.

It is manifest, then, that the uniformity of nature, properly interpreted, implies only this: 1st, That so far as science can discern, nature seems to be a connected, orderly whole; and 2nd, That the same natural causes, in the same collocation and with the same favorable environment, will, if undisturbed by the presence of any other cause, invariably give birth to identically the same effect. It is competent for science to say, for example, that when hydrogen and oxygen unite chemically in certain proportions they always form water; that the attraction of gravity is always in the inverse ratio of the square of the distance; that when a ray of light im-

pings upon a reflecting surface, the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection; and that, when certain conditions of temperature, air currents, barometric pressure and atmospheric moisture conspire, rain will be the result. Nay, if the keen, critical eye of science shall at any future time discover the presence in nature of any force or set of forces not now known, it may assume that they are governed in their operation by fixed laws and address itself to the task of ascertaining them.

In the sense above given to the uniformity of nature, science—as that particular department of human inquiry which concerns itself exclusively with the investigation of purely natural phenomena, and with the effort to systematize the scattered facts which are furnished by nature and reduce them to order and unity—must adopt it as a prime article of its creed. Not only can it proceed on no other assumption, if it is to exist at all; but the assumption is shown to be valid by induction from a large number of particular phenomena.

Nor has theology any ground of quarrel with it on this score. If theology claims the right of reverently searching that book which it holds to be—and for good reasons, as it thinks—the revealed will of God, and of gathering up the scattered and unsystematized truths which it finds lying in profusion upon its pages and concatenating them into a system, a body of divinity, it cannot look suspiciously or threateningly upon science when it goes to the book of nature, written by the same divine hand, and endeavors carefully to assort its multiform phenomena into classes, and formulate the general laws which govern the operation of its forces. The procedure in both cases is the same; it is only the material on which they work that is not the same.

But theology has a quarrel with science nevertheless; we mean skeptical science, of course. And the point of the quarrel is, that science puts more meaning into the uniformity of nature than either its own necessities require or the ascertained facts of the case warrant. Theology admits that nature is uniform in the sense that, exactly the same conditions being given, exactly the same consequences will follow, and is willing for science to make all out of this concession that can possibly be made out of it. But how can

anti-christian science justify itself in the assertion that nature's uniformity is of such an inflexible, cast-iron kind as never has been deflected from, and never will be deflected from? Huxley says: "It is even more certain,"—more certain, namely than what he had affirmed in the immediately preceding sentence,—“that nature is the expression of a definite order with which nothing interferes.” In another lecture he says: “No physical geologist now dreams of seeking, outside the range of known natural causes, for the explanation of anything that happened millions of years ago, any more than he would be guilty of the like absurdity in regard to current events. The effect of this change of opinion upon biological speculation is obvious. For, if there have been no periodical general physical catastrophes, what brought about the assumed general extinctions and re-creations of life which are the corresponding biological catastrophes? And, if no such interruptions of the ordinary course of nature have taken place in the organic any more than in the inorganic world, what alternative is there to the admission of evolution?” Whatever Professor Huxley may believe as to the origin of matter and the origin of life, as the spokesman of the infidel science of the day, he here avows it to be a settled conviction of the scientific world that for millions of years there has been no supernatural occurrence. Now, it might have been admissible for him to affirm that, so far as mere science is empowered to speak, it has found no evidence in nature that any extraneous, modifying force has ever been introduced into her domain and aided her to reach her present stage of development. But what ground does the uniformity of nature, in the only sense in which it can be legitimately held, give him for denying, in so unqualified a manner, that at least for millions of years the divine will has not so much as once interfered to give a different coloring to nature from that which she would have had if left solely to self-development under the direction of natural law? Has science scanned all times and all worlds? Has it covered with a microscopic glass that lays bare all secrets, even an infinitesimal part of this little earth, which is but an obscure province in nature's vast empire? Did it witness the evolution of the universe from stardust? Was it present when the first and the lowest form of life

appeared on our globe? Has it gone down into the secret abode of the earthquake, or searched the dark chambers where the titanic might of the volcano lies dormant? Moreover, why might not the supernatural be at work under the very eyes of science, and yet escape detection? If the will of man can introduce phenomena into material nature, which confessedly do no violence to her order, but at once enter into harmonious relation with all other phenomena, may not the will of God, acting upon nature from without at different times in the past, have modified her order to a certain extent, and yet have left her as orderly, as natural, as she was before such interference? It is the baldest and most groundless of assertions, then, for science to say that the order of nature has never been modified by the introduction of new forces from without into her corps of regularly working forces. And if theology is to preserve its distinctive character, it must continue to join issue with skeptical science upon this point.

And just here it seems proper to advert to an unwarrantable and dangerous concession which has been made by the Duke of Argyll and others to the imperious demands of skeptical science and rationalistic theology, though in so doing we shall have to anticipate conclusions hereafter to be established. We question neither the honesty nor the motives of the pronounced and profound christian thinkers to whom we refer. At the same time we cannot but hold that they have committed a mistake which aims a deadly blow at the supernatural character of our holy religion. In their desire to go as far as possible towards conciliating that phase of anti-christian sentiment which is indissolubly wedded to the uniformitarian view of nature and scouts the idea of the supernatural, they have eliminated from the miracle that which is *its very essence*. Now, conciliation is a good thing if it proceeds upon good grounds; but if it is to be secured only by sacrificing the truth, better, a thousand times better, the alternative of war to the knife. As illustrating the correctness of the statement that the distinctive element in the miraculous has sometimes been surrendered by christian men, we subjoin the following from "The Reign of Law": "Mr. Mansel, in his *Essay on Miracles*, adopts the word 'superhuman' as the most accurate expression of his

meaning. He says: 'A superhuman authority needs to be substantiated by superhuman evidence; and what is superhuman is miraculous.' It is important to observe that this definition . . . does not involve the exercise of will without the use of means. It does not imply any exception to the great law of causation. It does not involve, therefore, that idea which appears to many so difficult of conception. It simply supposes, without any attempt to fathom the relation in which God stands to his own 'laws,' that out of his infinite knowledge of those laws, or of his infinite power of making them the instruments of his will, he may and he does use them for extraordinary indications of his presence." We shall see at the proper time that the miraculous is superhuman; but is the converse of this proposition true? Is all that is superhuman necessarily miraculous? It is certainly conceivable that a created intelligence, higher than man, and possessed not only of a larger acquaintance with material nature, but of greater power over it than man, might, in the use of purely natural means, effect results to the production of which man is not competent. But although extraordinary, wonderful, *superhuman*, would they be miraculous? Would they be "extraordinary indications of God's presence?" Would they serve to discriminate and authenticate a divine revelation? These questions Dean Mansel answers in the affirmative, if he employs the term "superhuman" in the strict meaning of the word. But allow him, in using it, the latitude which the Duke of Argyll allows him, does his position even then satisfy the demands of scriptural theology? Theology holds, and holds rightly, that God, though always above nature, is never to be dissociated from it or any of its operations; so that what we call ordinary, natural phenomena are nothing more than indications of his presence and expressions of his will. Does the miracle belong to this class of phenomena? Do we exhaust its meaning when we assign it to the category of effects produced by the will of God working, not immediately and in a unique manner, but altogether along the line of fixed and unchangeable natural law? If we do, as Mansel, interpreted by the Duke of Argyll, says that we do, then the miraculous is only the natural in an unusual form; it has nothing to differentiate it from the ordinary works of Providence

but the fact of its unfrequent occurrence. It is as wholly within the realm of nature as the rising of vapor to form the clouds or the outburst of an earthquake.

The above view, which we cannot but regard as altogether erroneous, commands the full approval of the Duke of Argyll. "There is nothing," he says, "in religion incompatible with the belief that all exercises of God's power, whether ordinary or extraordinary, are effected through the instrumentality of means, that is to say, by the instrumentality of natural laws brought out, as it were, and used for a divine purpose. To believe in the existence of miracles, we must indeed believe in the superhuman and in the supermaterial. But both these are familiar facts in nature. We must believe also in a supreme will and a supreme intelligence; but this our own will and our own intelligence not only enable us to conceive of, but compel us to recognize in the whole laws and economy of nature. Her whole aspect 'answers intelligently to our intelligence—mind responding to mind as in a glass.' Once admit that there is a being who, irrespective of any theory as to the relation in which the laws of nature stand to his will, has at least an infinite knowledge of those laws, and an infinite power of putting them to use, these miracles lose every element of inconceivability." He goes on to say: "This view of miracles is well expressed by Principal Tulloch: 'The stoutest advocate of interference can mean nothing more than that the supreme will has so moved the hidden springs of nature that a new issue arises on given circumstances. The ordinary issue is supplanted by a higher issue. The essential facts before us are a certain set of phenomena, and a higher will moving them. How moving them? is a question for human definition. . . . Yet when we reflect that this higher will is everywhere reason and wisdom, it seems a juster as well as a more comprehensive view to regard it as operating by subordination and evolution rather than by 'interference' or 'violation.' According to this view the idea of law is so far from being contravened by the christian miracles, that it is taken up by them and made their very basis.'"

The same vicious principle pervades all the foregoing explanations of the miraculous. In seeking to remove the prejudices of

anti-christian thought and conciliate its favor, they leave our religion the miraculous only in name. Under the manipulation of Mansel, the Duke of Argyll and Principal Tulloch, the essence of the idea vanishes. The miracle is no longer both an extraordinary and a supernatural occurrence, as we have been taught to believe that it is, but only an extraordinary natural phenomenon; unusual indeed, and therefore wonderful, yet proceeding from the will of God in precisely the same way that all other operations of nature proceed from it. That this view of the miracle is radically wrong can, we think, be easily shown by appealing to the Scriptures.

Trench says: "Every discussion about a thing will best proceed from an investigation of the name or names which it bears; for the name ever seizes and presents the most distinctive features of the thing. In the name we have the true declaration of the innermost nature of the thing; we have a witness to that which the universal sense of men, finding its utterance in language, has ever felt thus to lie at its heart; and if we would learn to know the thing, we must start with seeking accurately to know the name which it bears. In the discussion [of miracles] upon which we are now entering, the names are manifold. . . . Each of these will embody a portion of the essential qualities of [the miracle], will present it upon a single side; and not from the exclusive contemplation of any one, but only of these altogether, will any adequate apprehension of that which we desire to know be obtained." We admit that the name of a thing is often significant, but we shall seek in vain to discover the really distinctive nature of the miraculous from any or from all of the names which it bears in the Bible. We grant that, as "wonders," those phenomena which we call miracles indicate the astonishment excited in the minds of those who witnessed them; that as "signs," they were supposed and designed to possess an evidential value; and that as "powers" or "mighty works," they marked the presence of some extraordinary agent and the forth-putting of some extraordinary energy. Neither, however, in any one of what may be termed these disjointed and fragmentary views of the miracle, nor in all of them combined, do we find the *thing itself* laid bare and fully exhibited. It is no doubt true that the miracle had a moral purpose, and

awakened wonder, and was a mighty work. But in saying this, have we defined it? have we so marked it off from every other mighty work, that it stands outlined before thought as clear and sharply cut as a mountain peak upon the background of a crystal sky? Unquestionably we have not. We have only been playing about the surface. We must go deeper if we would uncover its heart. We must take it as it is given to us in the Scriptures, and subject it to a process of rigid, dispassionate analysis, if we wish to know what is its essence. This method of procedure is the only scientific one, and hence the only one that will yield us what we are in quest of.

The first miracle we examine is that of Christ's walking on the sea. The scene here presented is that of a human figure moving forward, in the face of a strong wind, upon the heaving bosom of Gennesaret, as naturally and as easily as if it had been an undulating pavement of marble. This is all that is discoverable by sense. How are we to explain it?

1. It is not correct to say that this "wonder" involved the violation or suspension of any law of nature. There is no necessity for resorting to such an extreme supposition. The laws of nature are inviolable. Its forces are always operative, and operative along an invariable line and in a fixed ratio to their divinely-given intensity. Identically the same result will always issue from the same environment and the same collocation of causes. In the instance under review the only law that could possibly have been violated is the law of gravitation, and the only force whose activity could possibly have been suspended is that of gravity. But did either of these happen in the case of the disciples, whose little boat, urged by their stalwart arms, was just as truly bearing them over the foaming tide of the lake as the Master's feet were bearing him over the same sheet of water? Or does either of these happen now when an adept in the art of swimming keeps himself afloat for hours? As little was gravity set aside in the phenomenon before us. It was at work all the while, and precisely to the same extent that it is at work to-day when a suicide flings himself into a well, or a sailor is washed overboard in a storm. Its normal effect was prevented simply by the introduction of a higher and

more powerful counteracting force. We can overcome gravity, and the commerce of the world is continually doing it; we do it, however, by using expedients which are furnished by nature itself, and which, from observation and experiment, we know to be effective. When Jesus walked upon the sea he did precisely the same thing, only he did not employ any of the artificial contrivances for counterposing gravity to which we are under the necessity of resorting under similar circumstances. As a matter of fact, gravity was just as active in the unique case we are considering, as it is on the high seas upon the ironclads of Great Britain or the merchant marine of the United States.

2. It is equally incorrect to say that our Lord's walking upon the sea was a natural phenomenon. His body had volume and weight, and, in its relation to the material system of which it formed a part, was subject to the same conditions that bind other human bodies in their relation to the physical world. Its specific gravity was greater than that of water, and the force of gravity was not suspended, but on the contrary was all the while in operation, tending, by a law which admits of no variation, to drag it down and submerge it. And yet, in defiance of what may be termed the inexorable requirements of the facts of the case, and without calling in the aid of any muscular effort like that which is put forth in swimming, that body not only kept itself erect for several hours on the surface of the waves, but advanced over the lake more rapidly even than the disciples laboring to weariness at the oars. Such a result nature was incompetent to bring about. She has no power to infringe her established order. She cannot deviate a hair's breadth from the line of procedure marked out for her in the beginning by the creative will. If she works at all, she must work strictly within the limits prescribed for her by the sovereign ruler of the universe. Accordingly, if no counteracting agency stronger than that of mere nature had been introduced, the uniformity which, as defined and set forth in a previous part of this article, is always characteristic of her, would have required the Saviour's body to sink: the attempt to walk upon the sea would have proved as disastrous an experiment as Simon Peter's threatened to be.

It may be objected that the proof of our thesis is not complete, because we have taken too contracted a view of nature. We may be reminded that the position contended for in this essay, and considered to be satisfactorily established, is, that nature is co-extensive with creation, and a natural phenomenon synonymous with whatever is effected by second causes. If therefore we should suppose angelic agency to have interposed in the instance before us, would not such agency be abundantly sufficient to account for the miracle ? And if it would, then the occurrence, although extraordinary and astounding, would belong to the category of the natural.

We affirm by way of reply, that no created being is competent to oppose any natural force and practically make it nugatory except through the instrumentality of some other natural force. If any physical cause does not produce its proper effect when the surroundings are favorable—supposing natural agency only to be present—it is only because a stronger physical cause has somehow been brought in to oppose it. Neither the instinct of the lower animals nor the will of rational creatures is alone sufficient to modify nature. A beaver that is without tail and teeth may have all the innate tendencies that are common to other beavers, but it will never succeed in building a dam. The instinct of the eagle might prompt it to attempt flight, but it would never rise more than a few feet above the surface if the great strength of its pectoral muscles, the shape and structure of its wings, the elasticity of the air and the force of gravity, did not all act in unison to lift it above the earth and bear it forward along its aerial path. And although the mastery which man has acquired over material nature is food for ever-increasing wonder, it has been obtained, not by direct command of what lies without him, but solely through the skill which often repeated experiments have given him in manipulating the forces which he has discovered. The same law applies to created intelligences of the highest order. Even the archangel himself cannot override natural law by a mere act of will. Analogical reasoning justifies this conclusion. If nature, so far as we know it, does not furnish a single instance in which the creature has succeeded in modifying the normal operations of physical force

except by introducing the counteractive agency of some other physical force, analogy warrants the conclusion that no other method of working is possible to the creature. This is not the same as saying that pure spirit may not act immediately upon matter. We know that it can. Every voluntary movement of the body is due to the action of the human will directly upon the motor nerves, and through them upon the muscles. And if angels did not some how possess the same power, we could not conceive it possible for them to be "ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation." What we claim, and claim to be settled by analogy, is that even an angel, with all his superhuman powers, is not able to work directly against nature, and in this way counteract one of her well-ascertained laws.

But we do not depend upon analogy alone to substantiate this view. If the opposite view were correct, it would imply that a being, who is himself but an integral part of a great system, can transcend the system to which he belongs; and to our mind this is inconceivable. If, for example, the archangel, by the mere exercise of his will, could make one natural law practically inoperative, there seems to be no reason why he could not so handle any other natural law, or, for that matter, an indefinite number of natural laws at the same time. But wherein then would he differ from the uncreated author of the universe? The exercise of such a power would carry with it the implication of a sovereignty that belongs only to God.

We conclude then that every created being is so hedged about by limitations which he cannot pass, that the miracle of Christ's walking on the sea cannot be explained on the hypothesis of angelic agency.

As little can it be reduced to an extraordinary phenomenon effected by the divine will in the use of means, as the Duke of Argyll and his school would have us believe. That is to say, it cannot have been simply an extraordinary work of Providence. Such a view is untenable, not only because there is no proof to be alleged in favor of it, but because all the evidence is against it. If the occurrence was wholly natural—wrought by God through natural instrumentalities—where were they, and what were they? We

know beyond a doubt that gravity was there; and that, in obedience to the requirements of the law which always governs its action under such circumstances, the body of Jesus would have inevitably sunk to the bottom of Gennesaret, if some superior counter-working force had not also been present. If that force, however, was a natural one, the narrative does not intimate the fact. Nay, search as we may, we fail to discover it. It certainly was not one of the forces ordinarily operative in that locality: for never before had it given any indication of its presence, nor has it ever done it since. It was a singular kind of force, then, to have been evoked into activity but once in the history of the world. The truth is, no such force was there, either dormant for thousands of years or introduced then for the first time to serve a specific purpose. Its existence is purely hypothetical, and philosophically unnecessary. The exigencies of the case do not require it. It is assumed only to bolster up a theory devised to conciliate anti-christian thought. So far as mere nature is concerned, there was no force within her reach that could possibly have counteracted gravity. And yet gravity was counteracted. The inference, then, is irresistible, that it was done not by the *natural*, but by the *supernatural*; not by the will of God acting *mediately*, but by the will of God acting *immediately*. No other explanation of the miracle is admissible. It is either altogether mythical and to be discredited, or altogether supernatural and to be received as a historical verity.

We proceed next to consider the record found in verses 16-21, of the fourteenth chapter of Matthew. The evangelist there states that, upon being blessed and broken by Jesus, five loaves and two fishes not only satisfied the hunger of five thousand men and a number of women and children, but furnished surplus food enough to fill twelve baskets.

In this astounding phenomenon no violence was done to the constitution of nature. Not one of her laws was contravened. Up to the point where Jesus interposed, every one of the processes by which, when left to her own resources, she provides man with his daily bread, had been successively completed. The seed had been sown, had gone through all the preliminary stages of growth, and

in due time had ripened for the sickle. The sheaves had been threshed. The grain had been converted into flour, and the flour into bread. The fish had obeyed the laws which govern the origin and development of piscatory life, and had been caught and dressed and prepared for the table in the usual way. Nature had been allowed to work unimpeded along her own line, and had done her work successfully.

But she could not advance a step farther. She had no authority and no power to invade her own order and transcend her fixed limits. She might have distributed what she had as far as it would have gone; but she was not in possession of any reserved and unused activities that would have enabled her to fill more than five thousand famished mouths, when the contents of her larder consisted of but five loaves and two small fishes. If a millennium had been given her in which to make the experiment, she would have failed. Much less could she have taken dead matter and in a few hours at furthest have enlarged its original bulk more than a thousand fold. She knows nothing of reconstruction and multiplication out of death, which is the supreme fact before us. If dead organic matter is all that she has to act upon, the invariable result will be corruption and disintegration. That life only is generative, and generative only of life, is one of the most conclusively established laws of biology. When, therefore, death seems to have become a generator, and that upon a startling scale, as is the case in the miracle of the loaves and fishes, we cannot but conclude that some force has been called in superior to any which mere nature is capable of supplying.

The validity of this conclusion will be questioned only by those who are disposed to regard the miraculous as simply the extraordinary. This class of thinkers, however, will not accept it. They will admit, indeed, that the feeding of the five thousand was a work of divine power, and also that it lay outside the circle of ordinary providences. But where is the necessity, they will urge, for God to have wrought independently of means, as we hold that he did, when he not only possesses infinite knowledge of nature and her laws, but has infinite command over them? Why resort to the hypothesis of an abnormal method of working on the part

of God, when his normal method of working will satisfy all the demands of the case?

But the trouble is, it will not. The only *rationale* of the miracle in question is that it was performed by God supernaturally, immediately, with no instrumentality whatever between his omnipotent will and the dead matter on which it operated. We concede, of course, that God's knowledge of nature and her laws is absolute; at the same time it is indisputable that, as long as he confines himself to the employment of second causes for effecting his purposes, his operations are determined and strictly limited by the nature of those causes. They are determinate causes. They have a definite number of properties which fix the nature, the direction and the measure of their activities, which determine, in a word, the extent to which the Creator can utilize them. This being unquestionable, it follows that if Christ had attempted by any natural process to multiply five loaves and two fishes into food enough for five thousand men, he would not have succeeded in doing it. The attempt would have been abortive, not because the will of Christ was less than omnipotent, but because the conditions necessary to success, according to the hypothesis under review, were not present.

It may be said, by way of rejoinder, that the last assertion is entirely gratuitous, and that the conclusion which is based upon it is consequently without support. It may be asked, How do we know that certain occult forces of nature were not present, needing only the will of Jesus to call them into action and make them effective, as instruments, in performing the miracle? For one thing, there is not the slightest ground for believing that there were any such forces available. The narrative of the evangelist gives no evidence of their existence. Besides, if they were then present in nature, they must have belonged to her from the beginning. They must have been a part of her regularly working force from the day when she received her constitution from the Creator. That is to say, nature must always have been competent, under a given set of circumstances, to effect just such phenomena as the one which is now under examination; for nothing is more certain, as we have already had occasion to emphasize, than that the same

juxtaposition of causes, when undisturbed by the presence of any other force, will issue in the same result. But an occurrence like that which is presented by the miracle under consideration has seldom been seen. So far as we know, it has not happened half a dozen times since the dawn of human history. But two prophets of the Old Dispensation wrought similar miracles. During the long centuries which intervened between them and Jesus, although the food-supply was often meagre, not an instance is on record in which nature consented to furnish it except in the ordinary way. Now, we submit it to the judgment of any sane mind to say whether five examples, occurring at irregular intervals of time and with apparently no causal connection between them, justify us in referring them to the operation of law? We confess that we cannot drive our faith, under the whip and spur of any seeming exigency, to so startling a conclusion. We cannot command the rash audacity which is necessary in order to believe that we are face to face with the reign of natural law, when we see Jesus go on dividing a small quantity of food until it suffices to appease the hunger of a vast multitude. We are constrained to accept the phenomenon as altogether supernatural, as wholly the effect of an omnipotent will working upon nature independently of means. We cannot but regard it as of the same character as the formation of Eve out of the body of Adam. The miracle was essentially a creative work, whether wholly out of nothing or out of previously existing matter cannot positively be determined.

The resuscitation of Lazarus is the next and the last miracle that we shall notice. Whether his body, which had been buried four days when Jesus stood by his sepulchre, had already begun to undergo putrefaction, or the tendency to decay had been held in abeyance by the operation of some cause or causes of which we are ignorant, the evangelist does not state, and is altogether immaterial. The undeniable facts are that he had sickened and died in spite of all the remedies employed for his recovery, and been laid away under the full sway of death and all the disintegrating forces which belong to death. It was in this state that Jesus found him, and it was out of this state that Jesus, through no perceptible instrumentality but a mere word of command, called him

back to life. "He cried with a loud voice, Lazarus, come forth. And he that was dead came forth."

It does not seem to us that any rational ingenuity can assign such a phenomenon to the category of the natural. We hold, of course, that it cannot have been due to a violation of nature; for the only uniformity of nature which we are warranted in contending for, is that which allows the normal operation of a certain set of forces to be practically nullified by the introduction of a more powerful opposing force. But that it was natural, in any of the senses attached to that word, we emphatically deny, and we base our denial upon the following propositions:

1. No fact is more universally recognized as indisputable than the fact that nature cannot evolve life out of death. There is no such thing known to science as spontaneous generation. Even agnosticism itself is forced to the reluctant admission that, constituted as nature now is, not even the most elementary living structure ever emerges from the womb of death. Much less can nature take a corpse and reanimate it, and set its complex machinery to work again, each organ instinct with its appropriate vital energy, and discharging its proper functions as regularly and perfectly as if it had never lost its life-force.

2. No conviction is better grounded than that the only issue of death is decay and dissolution, whenever it acts upon organic matter along the line of natural law. It is forced upon us alike by the fossil remains of the different geological eras and by the whole vegetable and animal world from the Adamic creation to the present day.

3. The Scriptures enforce a belief, not only in the existence of the soul as a spiritual entity, but in its existence as a conscious thinking subject when separated from the body by death; so that the problem before us is not simply to account for the revivification of Lazarus, but to explain how it was that his spirit was re-introduced into its old abode and the normal relation between the two reestablished.

4. "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." From this law there is no exemption, except by a special act of dispen-

sation granted by divine grace. The death of Lazarus was a part of the penalty which he had incurred as a sinner. Nature has been so organized as in every case, where not expressly forbidden, sooner or later to execute the sentence. Has she any provision by which she can undo what she has done in obedience to law? When she has reached the end appointed her, can she repudiate her own act and cause it to give place to another which exhibits her, not in the capacity of a servant, but seemingly in the light of a sovereign? Can she perform equally well the part of an unresisting executioner of a divine decree, and that of one who, having executed that decree, proceeds straightway to reverse it?

5. The evangelist seems to draw the distinction between what was possible to mere nature and what was impossible. Human hands were bidden to roll the stone away from the mouth of the sepulchre. And when Lazarus was called forth, he appeared in the cerements of the grave: "he came forth bound hand and foot with grave-clothes, and his face was bound about with a napkin." The whole significance of which, when interpreted by common sense, is that, even in working a miracle, Jesus would not do for any one what another could do for him; that where natural agency could act effectively he would not interfere.

6. It is evident from the narrative that the only instrumentality which Jesus employed in raising Lazarus from the dead was a command. "He cried with a loud voice, Lazarus, come forth;" that was all. The effect was instantaneous; "he came forth." No one can believe that the mere pulsation of a voice upon the ear of a dead man could restore him to life. Divine power must have accompanied the voice of Jesus—such power as that which is to accompany it in the general resurrection—else the sleep of Lazarus would have continued to be as profound and unbroken as that which now reigns in the myriads of earth's burying grounds. The voice was intended simply to connect Christ's causative efficiency, in the minds of the bystanders, with the wonderful effect which supervened.

We have now reached the limit of our inquiry. We have studied somewhat carefully three of our Lord's most notable miracles, solely with a view to ascertain, if possible, how much is con-

tained in the idea of the miraculous. We have not inquired into the possibility, the probability, or the apologetic value of miracles. We have sought only to obtain, from the Scriptures which reveal them, a definition which will adequately represent them; which will clearly show what we are to believe respecting them, if we accept them at all. And the conclusion to which our investigation has led us is this: *While a miracle is always wrought in the sphere of nature and upon nature, it is neither of nature nor against nature, but above nature.* Or, to express ourselves more fully: *The sole author of a miracle is God working upon material furnished by nature and producing an effect which nature cannot produce; not, however, in the use of instrumentalities, either ordinary or extraordinary, but wholly without means and by the direct forthputting of almighty power, yet so as that no violence is done to nature, and so as that the miracle at once adjusts itself to the surrounding order, and thenceforth becomes a part of it.*

The miracle, then, belongs to the class of the supernatural. This position is the only one that is scripturally tenable, and theology must not allow itself to be frightened from it by the hectoring attitude of any phase of anti-christian thought. The supernatural is woven into the whole web of revelation, and without it the beautiful fabric which God has given us becomes a bundle of disconnected and worthless threads. Eliminate the supernatural from the miraculous, and reduce the miraculous to only an extraordinary form of the natural, as some unwise christian apologists would do, and pray what becomes of the creation of man, the inspiration of the Bible, the incarnation of Christ, regeneration by the Holy Spirit and the final resurrection? The whole teaching of the Bible on these cardinal points will have to be surrendered. And when that is surrendered, there will be nothing left in revealed religion worth defending. Atheistic evolution may then preach its blasphemies without rebuke, and agnosticism rule the world without a rival.

JAMES MURRAY.

IV. CALVINISM AND CIVIL LIBERTY.

It was on the 27th of May, 1564, more than three centuries ago, that John Calvin closed his eyes upon the world about him, upon the arrowy Rhone, upon "clear and placid Lehman," upon the vine-clad hills above it, upon smoky Jura, towering towards heaven in its misty shroud, and completed that career which has been more beneficent and more potential upon the destinies of the human race than that of any other mere man who ever lived. His life was full of sorrows, full of suffering, full of fierce conflicts, and marred by faults, which possibly may not be excused by the necessities of his position; but in the fiery ordeal through which he passed it was purified, and that mortal life grew brighter and nobler and clearer as it hastened to meet eternity, like the Rhone, which enters Lake Lehman a turbid stream, but issues out of it and hurries toward the sea as pellucid as a mountain rivulet whose source is above the clouds. Physically weak, he was as prolific in prodigious labors as a Hercules. Physically timid, his life was a heroic defiance of danger. Arriving at Geneva as an exile from his native land, poor, friendless, without power of any kind, except that of intellect, learning, profound conviction and an iron will, in a few years he had become an autocrat in church and state, and a recognized apostle, not only of religious truth, but of political liberty. Before his death he had made his little city of refuge not only the citadel and the Mecca of the reformed religion, but the model of a free and conservative republic, and he had left its narrow bounds and crossed the Alps, not as Hannibal crossed them, with hordes of swarthy warriors, in all the splendors of barbaric pomp, with rumbling chariots and neighing horses and trumpeting elephants, to carry consternation to the gates of Rome; not as Napoleon crossed them, with an army magnificently equipped with all the enginery of destruction which men had invented, to swoop like a vulture from the heights of the Simplon upon the fair fields of Italy; not with any such parade of physical power,

but with the simple Word, with an evangel of peace to the nations as old as the apostles, with a religious creed and a church polity which contained a proclamation of universal emancipation from the tyranny of priests and of kings. It came to the tired nations as refreshing as a soft breeze to the sweating brow of labor, and spread over the world like a sunrise, exposing the dark places of power in church and state and raising, against all human innovations upon the simple truth, a spirit of Protest and Dissent which has never been subdued. The teachings of Calvin, conveyed in his works and through his disciples, before his death had permeated the thought of the people of France, of Germany, of Switzerland, of Sweden, of the Netherlands, and of the British Isles, and showed themselves wherever a heroic struggle was to be made against the encroachments of power in church or state.

These teachings of Calvin, which we call Calvinism, did not constitute a creed original with him, but were powerful expositions of the creed which was taught by the apostles. With a great intellect, which had been freed, even in his youth, from the tyranny of tradition and the influence of authority and the sophistries of the schools, and improved by the broadest culture, he devoted his great powers to the task of giving method and form to the ideas of the Reformation, and shaping from them a doctrine and a polity which have been wherever received the great creators and conservators of civil as well as religious liberty.

Men must think and feel upon great questions until their ideas have crystallized into convictions before they act; and the convictions which are most powerful in controlling their conduct are those which they entertain upon religious questions. Political opinions are subject to frequent change, to modification, to abandonment, as conditions vary. This is so true that statesmanship is hardly more than a genius for compromise and a facility in adopting expedients and in modifying opinions. But religious opinions are held with more earnestness, more persistence, more enthusiasm, and stronger conviction, and there is, as to them, no compromise and no balancing of expediencies. The necessary and logical sequence is that the religious opinions of men affect their political opinions, their spiritual relations influence their external

relations, and their political institutions are controlled and modelled, where special causes do not operate to prevent, upon their ecclesiastical institutions. As Carlyle has expressed it, "the spiritual will always body itself forth in the temporal history of men." The most striking illustration of this truth, and at the same time the most convincing proof of the *inherent democracy of Calvinism*, is that Presbyterian doctrine and Presbyterian government in the church, if left free to act, will produce free institutions in the state.

Calvin taught the undivided sovereignty of God, and that God controlled every event of every kind, whether it was the fall of a sparrow or of an empire; that all men were absolutely dependent upon him; that all men were responsible for their spiritual faith and practice, not to pastor, or priest, or pope, or prince, but to him alone; that all men, the poorest peasant and the proudest prelate, were equal before him—equal in their rights and responsibilities, with the same privilege to seek his mercy and the same reason to dread his wrath. The equality recognized by God could not be disregarded by his disciples; and therefore he gave to every man a voice in the organization of the church, the selection of its officers and the administration of its affairs. He taught that the church, thus created and controlled by its people, was absolutely independent of the state; and whilst the state should be respected as instituted by God, it should be resisted whenever it interfered with the rights and privileges of the church. In other words, he taught that you must give to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's. The true disciples of such a school, which cultivates their independence and develops their individuality, are thoughtful, conscientious men, doing their own thinking and disregarding all authority, unless it comes with the sanction "thus saith the Lord;" repudiating all mediation of man between them and their Creator, sacrificing but little to the Graces or the Muses when they sacrifice to God, but ordering their service with a severe simplicity, conservative and cautious, but capable of great exaltation of feeling, profound enthusiasm, and the most heroic devotion when stirred by a great principle or a great cause.

Such is Calvinism; such are its true disciples. With such doctrines impressed upon their minds and consciences, and exercising habitually the rights which result from them, it is not strange, indeed it is inevitable, that Presbyterians should carry these doctrines into all secular affairs, and should be the bold, uncompromising advocates of that freedom in the state which they enjoy in the church. No candid student of history can deny the statement that a republican form of government is the logical sequence of Presbyterianism.

This fact has been urged against the church by its opponents, by kings and queens, and princes and prelates, and scholars and statesmen, of the Roman Catholic and of the Anglican Church. They have declared that Calvin and Knox were republicans; that the Presbyterian Church was organized upon republican principles; that republicanism is *the* Presbyterian principle, the very soul and essence of its polity; and that the existence of the church in any country is a standing menace to any unrepublican form of government. This is said by the opponents of the church. This fact is stated, too, by many able and philosophic writers of our times, who have no attachment to the church, by Hallam, and Buckle, and Macaulay, and Froude, and DeTocqueville, and Taine, and Bancroft, and Motley, and commented upon by them as they would comment upon any other conceded fact in history. It is illustrated, besides, in the history of every country in which the influence of the church has been decidedly felt.

This tendency of Presbyterian doctrine and Presbyterian polity toward republicanism is as constant, as tireless, and as inevitable as the attraction of gravitation toward the earth. It was Presbyterianism which arrayed the Huguenots against Francis I., that king of the French whom Calvin recognized as his sovereign, and to whom he addressed the immortal dedication of his Institutes. It was Presbyterianism which roused the inhabitants of the Netherlands against the tyrannies of Spain, converted those simple people into a nation of heroes, and inspired them to continue the unequal struggle for their national rights and religious liberties for more than a hundred years. It was Presbyterianism which commenced the agitation in England against the abuses and tyran-

nies of the government of the Stuarts, and continued it for fifty years of peace and of war, rescuing Magna Charta from the load of abuses under which it had been buried, restoring free parliaments to England, and preserving the civil and religious liberties of its people. These are facts which can be proved without citing a single Presbyterian authority. And in our own country Presbyterianism was the principal power in securing the Declaration of the independence of the colonies, in sustaining their appeal to arms, and in giving form to the government under which we live. This is not an extravagant statement, but is one of the cold, hard facts of our history.

This country was settled mainly by Dissenters, and the largest and strongest element among them was Presbyterian. The Baptists are very dissidents of dissent, and whenever occasion has offered have always been the bold and uncompromising opponents of all tyranny in church and state. But at the commencement of the agitation for independence there were very few Baptists in this country, and they were without organization and without an educated ministry. The Methodists as a denomination did not exist. The Quakers were non-combatants, and quarreling among themselves with the characteristic virulence of non-combatants. The Episcopal Church, with a small but influential membership, was the established church in several of the colonies, organized by statute and supported by taxation. As it was an institution of the British government, with a clergy the majority of whom were born in England and who received their orders and livings from the Bishop of London as their diocesan, we should not be surprised that, whilst it furnished to the cause of American independence many of its most prominent leaders, the Episcopal Church was not a positive force in inaugurating rebellion against George III. The Presbyterians were strong, strong in numbers, strong in intelligence, strong in convictions, and strong in a ministry as remarkable for its character, culture and ability as it is to-day. They were principally the descendants of the Covenanters of Scotland, of the Scotch-Irish of the north of Ireland, and of the Huguenots of France. Their fathers, many of them, had been exiled from their homes, or had expatriated themselves rather than submit to wrongs

which they could not remove or redress. They were not, like others, lawless and desperate adventurers, seeking this country for glory or for gold, and prepared for piracy upon the high seas and for plunder upon the land. Some of them, under Condé and Coligni, (that first and noblest victim of the massacre of St. Bartholomew,) had won laurels upon battle-fields against the flower of the chivalry of France. Some of them had followed William the Silent. Some had waded across the Boyne. Some had lain concealed in the woods and caves of Scotland whilst Claverhouse and his troopers raided their homes. Some of them had belonged to Cromwell's terrible horse, which, under that great cavalry leader, rode down the cavaliers of King Charles. Many of them had in their lives adventures as thrilling as any romance, and situations as picturesque as any melodrama. But they came to this country as peaceable, law-abiding men, and their virtues as citizens were as marked as the courage and constancy which they had exhibited as soldiers.

The embarkations of these people were often as full of poetic and pathetic incident as the flight of Æneas from burning Troy. They had practically burned their homes behind them, and ventured their all upon the ships on which they sailed. Their families were there; the helpless babe; the father and mother, equally helpless, who went to lay their bones in an unknown land; the careless boy; the shrinking girl; the wife, clinging to the husband confidently, whilst she looked, with the speculation of loving care in her eye, across the deep sea toward the distant land. And the father of the family was there, with his household gods and goods, with his principles and purposes, with all the hopes left him in this world, and with his hopes of the next as firm as if the tossing bark beneath him was the Rock of Ages. Saddened by sorrows, stern from suffering, sobered by the peril of his venture, with a melancholy as sombre as his enthusiasm was profound, and with a courage as cool as his faith was sublime, he was the heroic figure in these family groups and lacked no quality of manliness. The vessels were not brave with bright bunting; no cheers or salvos of artillery sped them on their way; and as they swung loose from their moorings, and the farewells grew faint from the

land, and the land grew dim in a mist of tears,—if they had carried at their bows symbols like the galleys of old, I can imagine none so appropriate as that beautiful image of Melancholy and Faith in Milton's "Il Penseroso":

" Come, pensive nun, devout and pure,
Sober, steadfast and demure,
All in a robe of darkest grain,
Flowing with majestic train,
And sable stole of Cyprus lawn
Over thy decent shoulders drawn;—
Come, but keep thy wonted state,
With even step and musing gait
And looks commercing with the skies,
Thy rapt soul sitting in thine eyes."

But they crossed the seas, and prospered in the free air and large liberty of the American colonies. Before the Revolution, their descendants had spread from the coast into Western Pennsylvania and up the valleys of Virginia and into the Carolinas and Tennessee and the Eastern border of Georgia. They had carried their churches and their civilization with them; they had established schools and libraries and colleges even upon the frontiers of Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee. They founded flourishing communities along the mountain slopes and in the rich valleys and on the fertile uplands of these magnificent regions; and when the Revolution came they had all the elements of a strong and prosperous people.

Nor was there need to educate them in the principles of that great struggle; there was nothing new to them in the abstract principles announced in the Declaration of Independence. Milton had eloquently stated them long before Jefferson was born. They and their fathers had been familiar with them for more than a hundred years. There was little that was new to them, even in the recital of the wrongs inflicted upon the colonists by the Crown. There was hardly a count in that long indictment against King George which was not matched with something in the traditions of their families or their church. Presbyterians besides had grievances not recited in the Declaration; and this partly accounts for the zeal and alacrity and unanimity with which they espoused the

cause of American liberty. They were opposed to a union of church and state. Such union existed in New York, in Virginia and in the Carolinas, where the Episcopal religion was established by law. In Virginia, especially, the establishment was maintained with rigor, and Presbyterians under it were subjected to indignities and insults and persecutions for which they held the government of Great Britain chiefly responsible. Even the statute of Elizabeth, known as the Act of Toleration, which gave some rights to dissenters in England, was decided by the colonial authorities not to be of force in Virginia. Jefferson characterized the establishment as a "spiritual tyranny." The laws which constituted this spiritual tyranny sound strange to American ears to-day. The whole tax-paying population, a majority of whom were dissenters and principally Presbyterians, were taxed to support the clergy of the establishment. Jefferson declared that this was "an unrighteous compulsion to maintain teachers of what Presbyterians deemed religious error." The tax for the support of the clergy was collected in tobacco. The tax on tobacco, under the internal revenue law, is denounced by some people in Georgia as the robber tax. What would they say if the statutes of Georgia required its citizens to pay a part of their substance every year to support a ministry who were honestly believed by a majority of them to be teachers of religious error? A Presbyterian minister was compelled to procure a license to preach the gospel, and to conduct his services at a specified place, and if he did not observe the law was punished; just as the retailer of spirituous liquors in Atlanta to-day is obliged to pay a license before he can sell whiskey, and confine his business to a specified place, or subject himself to indictment. Some people inveigh against this liquor law. What would they say if it was enforced against the majority, whilst a favored minority of dealers were relieved from it entirely? If such class legislation in the matter of selling whiskey would be iniquitous, how much more iniquitous would it be in the matter of preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ? Such legislation would create a revolution in Georgia in twenty-four hours. But Presbyterians were compelled to submit to it under the royal government in Virginia, as Mr. Jefferson said, "without a hope

of relief." Even for the privilege of marrying or getting into their graves they were obliged to pay taxes to the establishment.

The first Presbytery organized in Virginia, the Presbytery of Hanover, protested against these and other burdens and disabilities imposed upon them by the union of church and state. Mr. Jefferson has been very much applauded for his efforts, begun in 1776, to abolish certain aristocratic and unrepubli- can features of the government of Virginia, and bring it into harmony with the principles of republicanism. He did draft laws against entails and the right of primogeniture, and a statute in favor of religious freedom. All this is true. At the same time, it is true that the Presbytery of Hanover had petitioned repeatedly against the union of church and state, years before Mr. Jefferson had moved in the matter. His bill was introduced in 1776 in the first republican legislature of Virginia. The Presbyterians, before its introduction, had flooded that legislature with strong remonstrances against the politico-ecclesiastical tyranny under which they had groaned for years. Their views were partially carried out by Mr. Jefferson's act, but they were never fully triumphant until they, with the aid of the Baptists and other non-conformists, by years of agitation, had forced the legislature to sell the rectories and the glebes of the clergy of the establishment (which had been bought with the money of the people), and pay the proceeds to the overseers of the poor, and to abandon finally the idea that the state, by taxation, must support the church. Mr. Jefferson is entitled to great credit for the liberal legislation which he accomplished; but in reference to the act for religious freedom, the Presbyterians are entitled to the credit of having been a long way in advance of him, and of having presented the whole argument in its favor before he had opened his mouth. These facts are referred to because they show that there was great irritation among Presbyterians against the government of Great Britain for years before the Revolution; that it was caused not alone by political, but by what Mr. Jefferson denominated "spiritual tyranny" toward them; and that they went into the Revolution under the impulse of religious as well as political feeling.

Again, in all the preliminary movements preceding the com-

mencement of hostilities, Presbyterians were, in action, in advance of all other classes of the people. In such a paper as this there is no time to elaborate ideas or to enter into any detail in statement. A few salient facts only can be referred to. We have seen how the Presbytery of Hanover, in Virginia, years before the Declaration, demanded the abolition of the union of church and state and the recognition of the civil equality of all denominations. The Presbyterians of other colonies were not behind those of Virginia; some were in advance of them. In New York, the friends of American liberty were known as the "Presbyterian Junto," and were indefatigable, as early as 1768, in using every means by which public opinion is formed to prepare the people for separation from the mother country. In Pennsylvania, the Presbyterians of Westmoreland county met as soon as they heard from Concord and pledged themselves to resistance if the British government did not repeal all obnoxious legislation. In the same month of the same year, May, 1775, the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians of Mecklenburg, North Carolina, assembled in delegate convention in the town of Charlotte, and in a series of resolutions solemnly declared their independence of the British crown. These resolutions were drawn with remarkable conciseness, clearness and force. They not only dissolved all the political relations of Mecklenburg county with the British empire, but established a complete system of government and police for that county until another should be prescribed by some higher colonial authority. They were sent to the Continental Congress at Philadelphia by a special messenger, who testified, forty years afterwards, that he delivered them to Caswell, Hooper and Hewes, the representatives of North Carolina in that body.

The Mecklenburg Declaration was made one year, one month and fourteen days before the more famous Declaration of the 4th of July, 1776. It contained words and phrases which re-appeared in the later Declaration. Mr. Jefferson says that he never saw the Mecklenburg Declaration; and the coincidence between its language and that of the Declaration of which he was the author will always remain one of the curiosities of our political literature. That Declaration was drawn by Ephraim Brevard, an elder of the

Presbyterian Church, who afterwards gave his life as a sacrifice to the cause of American liberty. The presiding officer of the convention was an elder of the Presbyterian Church; nine out of the twenty-seven gentlemen who signed it were elders of the Presbyterian Church; and all were from the Presbyterian congregations of Mecklenburg county. It was the first Declaration that the colonies were, and of right ought to be, free and independent. It was the act of the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians of Western North Carolina, and was as distinctly Presbyterian as any deliverance made by the General Assembly recently in session at Baltimore. Three months after its adoption, the Continental Congress was petitioning King George for a redress of grievances. Washington is on record as declaring, months after its adoption, that he abhorred the idea of independence. And it is doubtless true that the Presbyterians of Mecklenburg had in fact separated from the mother country, before many of those, who afterwards became leaders of the colonies in the cabinet and in the field, had seriously contemplated separation. It was this action of the people of Mecklenburg to which Bancroft refers when he says: "We shall find that the first voice publicly raised in America to dissolve all connexion with Great Britain came not from the Puritans of New England, nor the Dutch of New York, nor the Planters of Virginia, but from the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians."

Again, when hostilities actually began, the Presbyterian Church, in a body, espoused the cause of the colonies. Their unanimity was so remarkable that the Royalists declared that the Revolutionary war was a Presbyterian revolt against the Crown. One minister in North Carolina organized his male members into a company and led it to victory. The ruling elders of the church were known as fighting elders. The five commanders on the American side at the battle of King's Mountain—Col. Campbell, Col. Williams, Col. Cleveland, Col. Shelby, Col. Sevier—were all of them Presbyterian elders. Gen. Morgan and Gen. Pickens, who commanded at the battle of the Cowpens, were both Presbyterian elders; and in both of these decisive victories, which occurred at the turning point of the great revolutionary struggle, the majority of the troops engaged were Presbyterians. A vol-

ume of such facts might be compiled from the records of the war and the minutes of the churches.¹

And when the Federal constitution was adopted, it would seem that it was impressed with Presbyterian principles; at least, it is curious to note the striking similarity between the government it created and that of the church. They are as similar as two governments organized for such dissimilar purposes can be. Popular sovereignty is the basis of the government of the United States; so it is of the church. The government of the Union derives all of its just powers from the consent of the governed; so does that of the church. Abraham Lincoln says that the government of the United States is a government of the people, for the people, and by the people; so is that of the church. Calhoun says that the government of the United States is a democratic federal republic. It is democratic in contradistinction to forms of government which are aristocratic, monarchical, or autocratic. Its cardinal maxim is that the people are the source of all power; that the government was created by them and for them; that the powers conferred on them are held in trust, and that they can be rightfully exercised only for the objects for which it was created. It is a republic in contradistinction to an absolute democracy; that is, its powers are exercised through representatives, not directly by the people; and it is therefore controlled, not by the numerical, but by the concurrent majority.

How like all this to the government of the Presbyterian Church! It, too, is a democratic federal republic, and the fundamental doctrine of its polity is that the people are the source of all power. It does not recognize any classes or orders or distinctions among its people. There is an absolute parity among its ministers—all are elders, all are bishops, all are equals. The highest has no precedence over the lowest. In the whole church there is no one-man power; in the whole church there is no self-perpetuating power; in the whole church there is no official to whom it has committed the oracles of God and submitted its doctrine or its discipline. It has no supreme law but the Bible, and

¹ See *Calvinism in History*, by N. S. McPetridge; *Centennial Historical Discourses of 1876*; *Presbyterians in the Revolution*, by W. P. Breed; *Presbytery of Hanover*, by J. H. Patton; *Jenny Geddes*, by W. P. Breed; *Ecclesiastical Republicanism*, by Smythe.

no law-giver but its Author. In matters of conscience, its humblest member is an independent sovereign, subject only to the standards of the church, and, if he shall so choose, only after those standards have been construed by the supreme court of the church. In short, the principle of democracy runs through the church and controls, through a system of representation, just as it does in the government of the United States. It does not recognize fealty to any government as a part of its creed or as a condition of its communion. It does not know anything of rescripts or pragmatic sanctions; and if any official of the church should venture to issue a rescript to Presbyterians, dictating to them their action upon a political question, even though in his opinion it involved a question of morals, they would treat it simply as a ridiculous impertinence.

It should be permitted Presbyterians in this centennial year to show some exultation. They have a right to be proud of their great apostolic church, which is to-day the largest Protestant church in the world. They have a right to be proud of the history of their church. They have a right to be proud of the record which it has made in its devotion to human rights. They have a right to be proud that they can point to the "plain house" which John Calvin occupied at Geneva, as the cradle, not only of European, but of American liberties. They have a right to be proud of the practical unity which it has maintained through all the religious and political changes of the centuries. They have a right to be proud of their succession—not an apostolic succession, in the transmission of ecclesiastical functions, which cannot be established, but that succession of sound doctrine which they have received from St. Paul, St. Augustine, Calvin, Knox, Witherspoon and Edwards; and they have an especial cause of congratulation in the fact that they live under a government whose principles are so much in harmony with the principles of their church polity that devotion to the principles of that government is devotion to the church.

May it be the great conservative, as it was the great creative force of that government. We trust that it has a century of prosperity and of peace before it, but if its banner has to be raised in conflict of argument or of arms, may it bear upon its folds the old legend, "A church without a bishop, and a state without a king."

JAMES T. NISBET.

V. THE LOTTERY.

THE Bible reveals God to us in two characters: First, As the Creator of all things, and the supreme and sovereign Ruler in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of earth; secondly, as the God of providence, watching over and providing for all of his creatures. But the blessings of his protecting care and fatherly love are conditioned on man's obedience to his commandments. This is illustrated by the following passages of Scripture: "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that *fear him.*" "*Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.*" When the tempter came to Christ in the wilderness he proposed to him, that if he was the Son of God he should command the stones to be made bread. Our Saviour replied, "It is written, Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." To understand this, we turn to the passage referred to by Christ (Deut. viii. 3), where Moses, speaking of God's dealings with them, says to the children of Israel, "And he humbled thee and suffered thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna, which thou knewest not, neither did thy fathers know: that he might make thee know that man doth not live by bread only, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God doth man live." Again, when the tempter took him up on the pinnacle of the temple and bade him cast himself down, reminding him of the promise, "He shall give his angels charge concerning thee, and in their hands shall they bear thee up, lest at any time thou dash thy foot against a stone," the Saviour replied, "It is written again, Thou shall not tempt the Lord thy God." Turning to the passage referred to by Christ (Deut. vi. 16), we find Moses again speaking to the children of Israel, and saying, "Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God, as ye tempted him in Massah. Ye shall diligently keep the commandments of the Lord your God, and his testimonies and his statutes, which he hath commanded thee. And thou shalt do

that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord: that it may be well with thee, and that thou mayest go in and possess the good land, which the Lord sware unto thy fathers." The temptation at Massah was where the children of Israel spake against the Lord and his servant, Moses, on account of a lack of water. On another occasion, provoked by their murmurings, the Lord sent fiery serpents among them. Speaking of these, Paul, in 1 Corinthians x. 9-11, says: "Neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them also tempted, and were destroyed of serpents. Neither murmur ye, as some of them also murmured, and were destroyed of the destroyer. Now all these things happened unto them for ensamples; and they are written for our admonition."

Thus, we find the doctrine of God's protecting care conditioned on man's obedience among the earliest truths taught the people of God on leaving Egypt, as it had been taught to their fathers before them. And we find it confirmed by Christ and his apostles.

We then conclude, that no one can claim these promises contained in God's word, pointing to his protecting care of his people, who wilfully disobeys his commandments; that as exemption from the penalty of the law, which declares that the soul that sinneth it shall die, is conditioned on faith in Christ, so the right to claim God's fatherly care and protection is conditioned on obedience to his commandments. Such, and only such, can console themselves with the promise, that all things shall work together for their good. The path of duty is sometimes so narrow, and to the unreflecting so liable to be overlooked, that many sincere persons fall into error. But, it must be remembered, that he who turns his back on that path, however dark and obscure it may appear, leaves behind him all the promises of God and turns his face toward the wilderness. In the path of duty we have the promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come. How carefully, then, should we search the Scriptures, for in them we think we have eternal life.

We come now to inquire as to the sin of the "Lottery;" and under this title we include what is commonly called the "Raffle," and all other games or enterprises where a prize is the object sought, and where its acquisition depends on what is popularly called "chance."

Sin is well defined to be: Any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God.

Turning to the commandments we find this language: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."

This commandment is not violated simply by profane swearing. A thoughtless prayer is a violation of it, because it is not treating with becoming reverence that great Being into whose presence we come when we pray. "I will, therefore, that men pray everywhere, lifting up holy hands, without wrath and doubting." (1 Tim. ii. 8.) "Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not thine heart be hasty to utter anything before God: for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth." (Ecl. v. 2-4.) "Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God. And be more ready to hear than to give the sacrifice of fools; for they consider not that they do evil." (Ecl. v. 1.) A moment's reflection will convince us that the lottery is condemned by this commandment.

In studying the subject, let us bear in mind that there is no such thing as "chance." We are accustomed to speak of things as occurring by chance, but that is an expression for which we have no authority in the teachings either of revelation or nature. Law is stamped upon all things around us. The mutation of the seasons, the succession of day and night, and the movements of the planets are all marked by an orderly arrangement; while every event, physical, moral and social, has its corresponding cause, which, in its turn, was the result of some other cause that antedated it. These causes are sometimes so obscure that we cannot trace them, but reasoning from the known to the unknown, we are warranted in the conclusion that every event is the result of some antecedent cause, and that such result was brought about by the operation of one of those laws many of which science has revealed to us, but some of which lie in that region beyond the present limits of human knowledge. Turning to the Bible, we find the testimony of science confirmed by Revelation. In 1 Samuel ii. 6-9, we find this language: "The Lord killeth, and maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up. He raiseth up the poor out of the dust, and lifteth up the beggar out of the dunghill, to set them among princes, and make them

inherit the throne of glory: for the pillars of the earth are the Lord's, and he hath set the world upon them. He will keep the feet of his saints, and the wicked shall be silent in darkness; for by strength shall no man prevail." Solomon says: "The lot is cast into the lap, but the disposing thereof is of the Lord." Joseph says to his brethren: "God sent me before you to preserve you a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance." Our Saviour says: "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered." Paul speaks of God as "upholding all things by the word of his power." David says of him: "The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heaven, and his kingdom ruleth over all." Thus science and revelation concur in testifying that all the events of this life are the result of laws stamped upon nature, animate and inanimate; and that God is the author of these laws. So that it can be truly said, that all the events of life are ordered of the Lord. Then, when we have eliminated what we miscall "chance" from our view of life, we are driven to the conclusion that every act we perform is followed by a consequence resulting under the operation of some one of God's laws. We then find ourselves by our acts continually putting in operation causes, whose effects must be beneficial or injurious to us according to the operation of those laws of cause and effect which God has established and which he controls. If we plant seed in the ground we know that the result is to be governed by certain laws of germination and fruitage which God has ordained. If we give to the poor, by a law as certain as that of germination our heart is enriched and made glad; and if we wrong our neighbor wilfully, by a law equally as fixed our heart is hardened.

Seeing, then, that the result of all of our acts is with the Lord, and must be governed by the operation of those laws by which his providence works for the care of his creatures, we cannot escape the conclusion that our acts are as much appeals to him as are our vocal prayers. In the one, we by words invoke his blessing; in the other, by an unuttered prayer, but no less a prayer, we make an appeal to him; for, knowing that the act must be followed by

a consequence in accordance with his will, the very fact that we commit the act proves either that we defy his power or invoke his guidance and protection for the consequences of that act. Now, if to approach him in vocal prayer in an irreverent or thoughtless manner be taking his name in vain, how much more is his name taken in vain when the lot is cast into the lap, (knowing, as we do, that the disposing thereof is of the Lord,) unless it be for some purpose recognized and approved by him. If it be not for such a purpose, it is a hideous blasphemy—a reckless mockery of God. To cast the lot into the lap merely to see who of a certain number of persons shall receive the prize drawn for, is to mock the Almighty as truly as did the servants of the high priest mock our Saviour, when they blindfolded him and buffeted him and then called on him to prophesy who smote him. Christ bore the insult in silence, as God to-day bears in silence the sacrilegious attempt to set him up at the raffle or the lottery under the form of “blind chance” and bid him prophesy whose the prize shall be. What greater mockery of God could there be? The murderer and the thief break his laws, but they do it with fear and trembling. But the ticket-holder in the lottery and the chance-holder in the raffle, without pausing to think of the monstrous blasphemy they are committing, clothe the Great Ruler of the universe in the cast-off garments of a heathen superstition (for the belief in chance is only a heathen superstition), and, bowing the knee, without reverence or fear, invoke his aid in obtaining another’s money. Silent, indeed, God may be, but an unseen hand hurls back the impious prayer, to rankle like the canker-worm in the vitals of him who offers it. And yet we sometimes hear of the professed church of God standing by and approving such blasphemy, and then gathering up the proceeds and impiously laying them on his altars. Can Christ say of these, as he said of the men of Rome and Judea, “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do”? Can any plead ignorance when God has plainly said to us: “Thou shalt not bring the hire of a whore nor the price of a dog into the house of the Lord thy God for any vow”?

Again: To employ the casting of the lot as it is used in the lottery and the raffle is a profanation of sacred things. The peo-

ple of God, with his approval and by his direction, used the casting of the lot as a solemn appeal to God and an act of worship, in cases where his guidance and an expression of his will was desired to decide some question that was beyond the wisdom of man. Thus, in Leviticus xvi. 8, it is said: "Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats: one for the Lord, the other for the scape-goat." By God's direction, the land was divided among the tribes of Israel by lot, God using that means of making known his will in the matter to his people. When a successor to Judas was to be chosen, the disciples prayed and cast lots, and the lot fell on Mathias.

In every instance mentioned, so far as I know, where the lot was cast, it was a solemn act of worship—an humble and reverent appeal to God for direction and guidance. Then, to use this solemn act of worship lightly and irreverently, merely for gain, it matters not what the end in view may be, is as much a profanation of sacred things as was the abuse of the Lord's supper by the Corinthians, which the apostle so severely condemns, saying: "He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself." If those who sold doves in the temple were guilty of profanity, how much greater blasphemy is he guilty of who dares to use this solemn act of worship and appeal to God for the mere purpose of gain? He who laid unholy hands upon the ark of God was smitten in his tracks. The earth opened and swallowed up those who burned strange fire upon his altars. Belshazzar was profaning the sacred vessels of the temple when his doom was traced in blazing letters upon the wall of his palace. There was nothing, *per se*, in the ark, the altar and the vessels, but it was the insult to God, which was committed by prostituting to a profane use things set apart by him for a sacred purpose.

I have said that the casting of the lot is as much an appeal to God as the utterance of a vocal prayer. I would not be understood as saying that we cannot pray for God's guidance in our temporal affairs. But for a number of persons to contribute to make up a sum of money, and then, by casting lots, appeal to God to determine whose it shall be, is trifling with the majesty of heaven,

and is as much profanity as he is guilty of who lightly and irreverently calls upon the name of God.

1. We come now to consider the character of the lottery, and to see how far it is opposed to the commandments of God in its operation. The theory of the moral law is that man shall eat his bread in the sweat of his face; that he shall live by the exercise of those powers, mental and physical, with which the Creator has endowed him; that wealth gotten by vanity brings grief, while honest toil brings health and happiness. "He that makes haste to be rich shall find sorrow." "Trust in the Lord and do good: so shalt thou dwell in the land, and verily thou shalt be fed." The law of compensation is eminently a divine law. Obtaining property for less than its value, and failing to make due compensation for what is received, either in the nature of service or property, is severely reprehended by the divine law. The lottery is directly opposed to all of these principles. The prize is obtained without labor, and by means over which he who invests his money has no sort of control or direction. It is wealth obtained by vanity, for there can be nothing vainer than investing one's money in a scheme where the return, if any there be, is wholly the result of so-called "blind chance." We had as well cast our money into the sea and expect it to gather more and come back to us with the accumulation on the returning tide. And if we obtain the prize, there is no compensation whatever made for that which we obtain. Our wealth results in the poverty of our fellow-man to the same extent; for, for every dollar we receive our fellow-man loses the same amount and fifty per cent. in addition, for which he receives no compensation whatever, for the receipts of the lottery must equal the prizes and then leave a large sum over for the dealer. A glance at the reports of the drawings of any lottery will demonstrate the truth of this. We thus combine with numbers of our fellow-citizens to pay a man \$50,000 to turn a wheel and give us one chance in one hundred thousand to draw a certain proportion of another \$50,000, which we also pay into the concern. Each man, therefore, who draws a prize of \$10,000 knows that to do so he must take from the pockets of his fellow-men, for which they receive no compensation whatever, between \$13,000 and \$15,000.

It is no justification to say that the losers do this with their eyes open. The infirmity of human nature is recognized both by divine and human law. Because of those infirmities the Lord doth pity us as a father pitieth his children, and has provided a substitute to bear our iniquities. Human law throws around the citizen certain protective restrictions to shield him from his folly. It exempts certain portions of his property from sale under execution for debts, so that his misfortune or his folly may not leave him penniless, and denies jurisdiction to its courts to enforce contracts made at the gaming table or in the stock exchange, where gambling is of the essence of the contract. The State prepares asylums for its insane, though the insanity be the result of their own folly and excess, and makes provision for the pauper reduced to want by his own folly. This is the result of a christian civilization. The most brilliant civilizations of the past left man to suffer the consequences of his folly. Their justification was, he acted with his eyes open. He has had his day and failed; let him suffer the consequences of his failure. Can the christian, in the light of this christian civilization, justify himself for robbing his neighbor with the same sort of reasoning? But some will say, We do it only for amusement, for the excitement of the thing. We do not feel the amount we invest, even if we lose it. Possibly the person thus speaking may not feel the amount *he* loses, but when he wins let him remember that many of the dollars that make up his prize are the earnings of some poor man's day's work, which he cannot replace, because the income of each returning day is consumed to buy food for his family. Others would salve their consciences by proposing to give of their winnings to some religious or charitable object. Suppose they build a church. Do they ever think, if they could trace every dollar they have put into that church to its source, what they would find? Some of them, stained with the blood of the suicide (for statistics show that on the night of one drawing in England fifty suicides occurred among the losers); others wet with the tears of the hungry child; while with the ring of the gold would be mingled the cry of the poor for bread, which the passion for gambling had denied them. Do they imagine they could have an easy conscience while worship-

ping in that church with the ghosts of the suicides hovering about them and shaking their gory locks in their faces, and, ringing above the music, in a wild shriek, the cries of the hungry poor? The specious argument that there is lottery in every transaction of life misleads many and satisfies some tender consciences. The answer to the argument is almost too plain to merit notice. The definition of a lottery is, where a pecuniary consideration is paid, and it is to be determined by lot or chance, according to some scheme held out to the public, what and how much he who pays his money for it is to receive. Money thus paid, in case no prize is drawn, is lost entirely to the purchaser of the ticket. He may draw a prize and he may not; and he thus hazards the money he invests on the chances of drawing by lot. But he who invests in property, even where it is to be delivered at a future day, gets a certain return for his money. Errors in judgment may lead to serious losses. The moth and the rust may consume. Prices may depreciate and sweep away anticipated profits. Fire may destroy or the resistless cyclone sweep away the noblest structure. But when all the contingencies of life are taken into the account, there is still left the fact that we invested our money in something tangible, or which represents something real and substantial; and if we have lost from the operation of natural or commercial causes, we still know that when the investment was made we got for our money something that had an actual existence and value, and gave to him from whom we received it value for value, and that we retained control of our investment and could direct the operations which must result in profit or loss. In the case of the lottery we buy nothing, but try to imagine it something, and call it "a chance." The moment our money leaves our pockets our control over it is at an end. No act of ours can increase the prospect even of its return, far less of a profit on it. We get nothing to represent it, except a piece of paper, the meaning of which is that we have bought one chance in several hundred thousand for a sum of money much larger than that we invested, and if we do not get that, we get nothing.

It has become a fashion of late in bulletins from the sick chamber of some distinguished person to represent his condition by the

expression, "His chances are one in so many." Conceding this to be a correct statement of the case, how much more hopeful is that man's condition, even where his chances are only one in a thousand, than that of the holder of a lottery ticket? The sick man's chances may be increased by medical skill. The watchful and loving attentions of wife or mother, who, from morning till night and night till morning, with tireless patience hovers about his bed, breathing with every sigh a prayer for his recovery, will greatly reduce the chances against him. But for the laboring man who invests his earnings in the lottery, flattered by dreams of sudden wealth, there is neither medical skill, patient watching, nor even a prayer, for he has entered on a scheme which, think of it as he may, he dare not lift on the wings of prayer to the God he is accustomed to worship. All he can do is to wait, helpless to add one to his chances, and well knowing that he has not only to contend against the chances of thousands of others in like case with himself, but also against chances retained by the dealer himself, as well as the dealer's dishonesty, to which there is great temptation and unlimited opportunity.

The drawing comes and his money is lost. But that is not all. His moral is greater than his financial loss, for he has lost that manly independence which the man feels who carves out his own competency. But he has lost even more; for to some extent at least he has become a slave to the passion for gambling: for he who woos the fickle goddess of fortune and is repulsed, seems impelled by a resistless demon to avenge himself upon her for the ill-usage he has received at her hands, and another day's earnings goes; and this is repeated, until anxiety, disappointment and repeated losses unman him, and the habit of trusting to luck which he has acquired urges him into dishonest practices, with the honest but vain determination to redeem his fortune and replace what he has wrongfully taken. To the honest man, willing to eat his bread in the sweat of his face, losses may come. Fire may consume, or the tornado destroy, but the swift-winged telegraph bears the news, and thousands hasten to assist the victims. But the victim of the worship of blind chance is branded as a felon, and finds his only solace in hiding himself in a felon's cell. There is no lottery in

the ordinary affairs of life. He who obeys the laws stamped upon his nature by the God who made him, and commits his way to that God, will surely be fed. But he that goes off after other gods, and worships in the temple of chance, will come to that point where he fain would "fill his belly with the husks that the swine did eat."

2. There is one other reason why investing money in the lottery is a sin. It is forbidden by the law of the land. All the States, save one, have laws forbidding it. Acts which we think we do not find forbidden by the strict letter of the moral law we are apt to regard it as no sin to perform, even though they be forbidden by the law of the State. We hear a good deal of *malu in se* and *mala prohibita*, but the attempt to apply that distinction between the moral and the civil law must, in the nature of the two laws, be a failure. It is said that what is forbidden by the moral law is evil in itself, but that those acts which are not expressly forbidden by the moral law, but which, for reasons applicable to the conditions of society, are prohibited by the statute law, it is not a sin to commit, they not being, in themselves, wrong.

This distinction a few reflections will show to be fallacious. The idea advanced by some writers, that men, originally feeling the need of some form of government to protect their rights of person and property, met together and formed society and elected the most popular person among them to be their king, is an absurdity so glaring that no intelligent person would countenance it to-day. The need of some power to protect those rights and enforce the performance of the duties owing from man to man is, no doubt, the reason which lies at the foundation of society, and the sense of that need which man becomes conscious of from the moment he begins to think is the strong foundation upon which civil government rests. But the origin, authority and sanction of civil law is from the Author of all law, the Great Ruler of the universe. Paul, in writing to the Roman christians, at a time when obedience to civil law must have been among them an exceedingly questionable duty, for the civil law was then only an engine of oppression and persecution and afforded them no protection what-

ever, says: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resists the power resists the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation." These are the words of one whose study of the most perfect system of government the world has ever seen, in addition to his inspiration, made him eminently fit to speak *ex cathedra* on the subject, and he does not hesitate, speaking by inspiration, to apply to the Roman government the same rule which he had learned at the feet of one of its greatest masters to apply to the Mosaic law. If this was true of the government of Rome, so completely autocratic as it was at that period, with how much more force must it apply to a government like ours, where all law is but the expression of the will of the people given through their representatives. If, then, the powers that be are ordained of God, wherein consists the distinction between the violation of the moral and the civil law? There can be but one distinction, that of degree, as the difference between the sin of murder and that of some minor offence. Both are sins. The former is the greater sin, but no more a sin than the latter. The Israelite was as surely punished for the violation of some law applicable to the Jewish state as he was for the violation of the law given on Sinai. The citizen is as deserving of punishment who disobeys a prohibitory decree of a court as is the one who breaks a law under the sanction of that power whence the court derives its existence and authority.

It is true that the laws applicable to the Jewish state were directly from God, but not more certainly from God than are the laws of the civil government. If the powers that be are ordained of God, they are ordained for a purpose, and that purpose is legislation and the enforcement of the penalty for violation of that legislation. Now, if it be true (and it is a maxim of common reason as well as of law) that what one does through another he does himself, we must concede that in all the laws of civil government God is himself speaking as much as he spoke on Sinai, and such laws are as much binding on the conscience as is the moral law. The christian, then, can no more violate the law of the State under which he lives without sin than he can violate the moral

law without sin. From the State he derives protection for his rights of person and property, and this protection is as much from God as are the early and latter rain, the abundant harvest, the limpid stream and the cooling breeze. God gives the latter through the operation of those laws of nature which he has ordained. He gives the former through the operation of those laws of civil society which he has equally ordained. Every good and every perfect gift cometh down from the Father of lights, and as he will not hold him guiltless who violates the law traced by his own hand on the tables of stone, neither will he hold him guiltless that violates the law traced by his ordained and authorized agent upon the statute-book of civil society. Of course the right of revolution against a government which has ceased to perform the functions for which human governments are ordained is not denied. But so long as the government is fulfilling those functions, all of its mandates not inconsistent with the moral law are binding on the conscience.

3. Having seen that the law against lotteries is in accordance with the moral law, and therefore of the same binding force on the conscience as that law, let us now see if there are any special reasons for obedience to that law to be found in the character of the evil it is intended to destroy. It has been said by a writer, and from the teachings of history we may say, with more truth than poetry, that man is a natural robber. From the days when the strong preyed upon the weak, when the robber-barons of Europe fortified themselves in strong castles, and went forth to prey upon their unprotected neighbors, to the present time, this is true. The form of the robbery only has changed. Instead of the armed highwayman, the mailed and helmeted "lord of the manor," we have the polished gambler, who by most seductive artifices leads his victim on to ruin, that he may profit thereby. Christian civilization having driven the freebooter from the land and sea, his natural progeny in the shape of the forger, the faro-dealer and the vender of the lottery has come to the front, and in the dress of the gentleman and the guise of the cultivated man of the world, preys upon society far more disastrously than ever did the most famous of his progenitors. It is to protect society from these

harpies that civilized governments have enacted such rigid laws against gambling and the lottery. These laws are not the mandates of an autocrat, knowing no law but his own will, but they are the honest convictions of an enlightened people, crystallized into the form of laws. In a free government like ours they have the highest sanction that any law, short of the divine law, could have. They embody the sentiments of the whole people, speaking through their representatives, and declaring that the lottery is a crime of such magnitude against society that it shall be hedged about with the severest penalties. The Federal government denies to those engaged in the business the use of the postal facilities of the nation; the lottery ticket is placed on the same level with obscene literature; and we venture the assertion that there is no man with any pretensions to respectability who would say that the laws are wrong.

But we said that these laws were made to protect society from the harpies who prey upon it. Let us see if society does not need that protection. The origin of the lottery is said to date back to the time of ancient Rome. A writer says of them: "They were used first as a means of amusement for the people, but they were gradually introduced into their customs, then into their laws. Individuals used the lottery as a means of speculation, and the government to raise revenue. They were organized after the manner of those which date from the Saturnalia, and belong to that system of amusements and largesses with which Augustus and his successors amused the people. They were the complement of the representations of the circus, and were supported out of the public treasury. This developed the passion for play." The lottery then extended to all countries from Rome, and was soon taken hold of by speculators. The lottery took special hold in Venice, Genoa and Pisa, where commerce had created great wealth and inspired an inveterate love for gain. It was imported from Italy into France in the sixteenth century. Francis I., in 1539, established one to help to pay the expenses of a war, and in the reign of Louis XIV., in 1700, the lottery was definitely adopted as a part of the revenue system of the government. From this rapidly grew private lotteries. They multiplied under every pretext, for charitable,

social and religious purposes, as well as private speculation. Up to 1762 we hear of no effort to check the lottery. In that year, however, the Colonial Assembly of Pennsylvania passed a most rigid law against the lottery. This was followed by the edict of the Republican Convention of France, in 1793, which abolished the lottery in France. In 1794, however, the convention, pressed for means, restored it, and it was not finally eradicated from the French revenue system until 1836, when private lotteries were also suppressed. Lotteries were suppressed in England in 1826, and in Belgium in 1830.

During the contest against the lottery in France, a writer said: "The legislator who sanctions such a tax votes to sustain a certain number of thefts and suicides each year. There is no pretext of expense that can justify provocation to crime." After the overthrow of the Bourbons in France, the Republican Convention, in its decree abolishing the lottery, gives its reasons in these words: "It is an invention of despotism to make men silent about their misery by enticing them on with a hope which aggravates their distress." The language in which the preamble to the act of the Colonial Assembly of Pennsylvania abolishing the lottery is expressed, is this: "Whereas many mischievous and unlawful games, called lotteries, have been set up in this province, which tend to the manifest corruption of youth and the ruin and impoverishment of many poor families; and whereas such practices may not only give opportunity to evil disposed persons to cheat and defraud the honest inhabitants of the province, but prove productive of vice, idleness and immorality, injurious to trade, commerce and industry, and against the common good, welfare and peace of the province; for remedy whereof, be it enacted, that all lotteries whatsoever, whether public or private, are common and public nuisances, and against the common good and welfare of this province." Then follow four other sections, in which the heaviest penalties are denounced against the sale of lottery tickets. This was the first act for the suppression of the lottery of which we have any account, and has been the model upon which all subsequent legislation on the subject has been formed in this country and in England.

You may ask, Are the statements contained in the language

I have quoted true? I answer by asking you to listen to the testimony of history. The lottery established by Louis XIV. offered a prize of ten millions of francs, and it realized a net profit to the government of twelve millions of francs. Louis was in heavy straits for money at the time. Listen to the seductive language used by this royal lottery-vender to induce his people to risk their earnings in the nefarious scheme: "His Majesty, having noticed the natural inclination of his subjects to risk their money in private lotteries, and desiring to afford them an agreeable and easy means of providing for their families, and a sure and considerable revenue for the remainder of their lives, and even of enriching their families, by risking sums so small that they cannot cause them any inconvenience, has judged it opportune to establish, at the Hotel de Ville, a royal lottery, with prizes to the amount of ten millions of francs." This royal lottery advertisement has been substantially copied by lottery-venders ever since. All their ingenuity has failed to improve on the skill with which seductive falsehood is there stated. This lottery, as I said, netted Louis twelve millions of francs, which, added to the amount of the prizes, wrung from the people twenty-two millions of francs; and a most significant fact connected with the lottery in France shows whence came the larger portion of that immense sum. In the month of January succeeding the decree abolishing lotteries in France, the deposits in the savings banks of Paris alone increased five hundred and twenty-five thousand francs. Thus we find that the lotteries consumed in Paris alone some five hundred thousand francs per month of the people's earnings, and this was principally from the laboring classes, for we know that it is those classes who use the savings banks principally.

But history speaks again. During the long contest which preceded the final suppression of lotteries in England, it was demonstrated that no greater enemy ever existed than lotteries to prevent the accumulation of wealth by the poor and middle classes, and that in every country where the lottery exists savings banks have always been a failure. The night of the drawing of one lottery, with a capital prize of one hundred thousand pounds sterling, was signalized with the suicide of over fifty unlucky ticket-hold-

ers. The testimony taken by the various committees appointed by the House of Commons during this contest, shows a degree of misery produced by lotteries that would shock and astonish one who has never investigated the subject. This testimony came from all portions of the kingdom, and from men in all the vocations of life and all classes of society, and demonstrated beyond question that it made bad husbands, bad wives, bad children, and bad servants; that it was the most fruitful source of suicide, hardly a day passing that one of its victims did not cut his throat or hang himself. The fight in England for freedom from the clutches of this monster, which had fastened its fangs upon the very vitals of the body politic, was a most desperate battle. It was a battle of giants. Wilberforce, Canning, Buxton, Lyttleton and Castlereagh, opposed to the lottery, met Eldon, Wellington and Peel, and for a time the contest seemed doubtful; but when the immense mass of testimony taken by the committees of the House of Commons came pouring in, reeking with statements of vice, crime and misery, the English people became aroused, and there was wiped away one of the darkest stains that ever rested upon Britain's proud escutcheon.

The main fight against lotteries in the United States began in 1834 by the Pennsylvania Society for the Suppression of Lotteries, organized in Philadelphia. This society obtained an immense mass of information as to the effect of lotteries in this country, and in their report, made in 1837, they say: "If a committee were appointed by each State Legislature to ascertain from living witnesses the effect of lotteries within their respective jurisdictions, a mass of private distress and public injury would be brought to light, the magnitude of which it is difficult to conceive. We should witness the severance of the closest and dearest connexions of life, the violation of the sacred vows of wedlock, and the disruption of the tender ties of consanguinity and nature. Woe would meet our gaze in the various forms of hopeless bankruptcy, cheerless and unmitigated penury, incurable intemperance and infamous vice. The colors of the picture would be too sombre, the scene in its collected deformity too hideous, for exposure to the open day."

Tracing the careers of several victims of the lottery, the committee say : "He becomes poor by successive losses. His poverty leads him to petty villainies. He slowly proceeds from one impropriety to another, till at last his feelings become blunted and his reputation tarnished. Low dissipation and idle phantasms of golden showers, from being long indulged, have so impaired his faculties and weakened his character as wholly to destroy his ability for any useful pursuit. He looks around for assistance, but the avenues are closed. He is in debt beyond hope of extrication. His native energy is gone and his respectability is wasted. Thus prepared for some reckless effort to repair his fortune, where can he seek refuge but in the principles he has imbibed ? What counsellors can he listen to but his desperate necessities ?"

A distinguished representative from Louisiana, speaking a few years ago on the floor of the national House of Representatives in reference to the Louisiana Lottery, said : "It has existed as a blot on the body corporate for over fifteen years, and no cause so mighty has ever operated to bring every branch of the government, state and national, into more general disrepute. The reports of courts, both state and national, show the general demoralization. The ermine of the judge is sullied ; the administration of justice prostituted to the most unworthy ends ; the press, that palladium of liberty, bought up or muzzled by fear or ignorance ; the official head, from governor to constable, dependent on its good will ; every office-seeker at its beck ; the whole commonwealth prostrate at its feet ; no institution existing but at its mercy. This is not an exaggerated condition of a once-powerful sovereignty." Thus we see that the lottery not only corrupts all who deal with it, but, growing powerful on the money stolen from its victims, becomes the master of a whole State, and defies even the people assembled in their Constitutional Convention to destroy it. Its agents are everywhere. The law has no terror for them. The boats that ply our rivers carry these agents, and at their various landings the colored laborers come aboard and invest their small earnings in the lottery-ticket, dreaming of sudden wealth, and waking to find themselves disappointed, but anxious to invest again.

In the light of such facts, can any one wonder that the French Convention should have denounced the lottery as an invention of tyrants? And let it be remembered that this convention was no Puritan body, straight-laced in religion and austere in morals. It was a body that had denied the existence of God. It had abolished the Sabbath-day. It had trampled on every precept of the moral law, and, in the language of Mr. Allison the historian, it had torn down the altars of religion, and reared on their ruins the altar of reason as their only god. Yet, reeking with the blood of hundreds of victims, they shrunk from fellowship with this monster of vice and crime, and, laying hold of it with the mailed hand of power, in the name of liberty and patriotism they hurled it from its high estate. And the same war is being waged against it to-day; not, certainly, by the infidel and the atheist, but by the enlightened and christian sentiment of the age. The laws against it are but the crystallization of that sentiment.

We have thus, we think, demonstrated that the purchase of lottery-tickets is a sin—*First*, Because it is forbidden by the law of God; *Second*, Because it is contrary to the law of the land; *Third*, Because it encourages the most monstrous vice of the age.

I ask again, in the light of the facts I have given, what is the position of the church member who buys a lottery-ticket? If the men of Benjamin were denounced because they came not up to the help of their brethren in the hour of battle, what shall be said of the church member who, in this great contest between the christian patriotism of the land and this monster vice, not only does not come up to the help of his brethren, but is found lurking in the enemy's camp, giving aid and comfort, and by his example leading away recruits to the enemy from the ranks of the young and unsuspecting? What a contrast between his professions and his acts!

SAMUEL M. SHELTON.

VI. ORGANIC UNION: THE PROPERTY QUESTION.¹

The fact that organic union between the Northern and Southern Presbyterian Churches demands so great and serious a change in the status of the latter, and must be fraught with momentous consequences to her future welfare and usefulness, makes it the part of true wisdom to examine and weigh carefully all that is involved in the proposed change.

Among the questions needing to be thus considered, that of the effect of the change upon the property rights of the church is of great importance. To reach a just and true answer to that question it is necessary to ascertain what is the law governing church property.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in the famous Walnut Street church (of Louisville) case, *Watson vs. Jones*, decided in April, 1871, and reported in 13 Wallace, p. 679, announced a principle of law as controlling questions of church property altogether different from that which, up to that time, had been recognized in the whole Presbyterian Church of this country—Old and New School.

The Northern General Assembly (Minutes 1872, pp. 52, 53, 177–190) adopted this decision as the true law, and ordered it to be embodied in its Digest. Union with that church would seem to be an admission of the correctness of this law, or, at least, an avowal of consent to be bound by it hereafter. It becomes, therefore, the solemn duty of the rulers in the Southern Church, to whom has been entrusted so much property, to examine carefully and dispassionately this question, and determine whether it raises any well-founded objection to such union.

When the decision in *Watson vs. Jones* was rendered, it attracted great attention, and, in an able, calm and thorough discussion, was reviewed by Rev. R. L. Dabney, D. D., in the Janu-

¹ On account of professional duties, I was unable to prepare the whole of this article, and have been materially assisted in its preparation by my pastor, Rev. G. W. Finley, and my brother elder, Hon. Samuel L. Flournoy. J. D. A.

ary No., 1878, of the *Southern Presbyterian Review*. The conclusion reached by him, in which his brethren generally concurred, was that the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court was unsound, unjust, and dangerous.

Of late years Revs. R. R. Howison and Samuel J. Baird, D. D., have, in no measured terms, expressed their dissent from Dr. Dabney's view of the opinion in this case, and their own approval of the court's decision.

Not so much in defence of Dr. Dabney, though we would deem it a privilege and an honor to strike a blow for him if he needed it, but because many of the present rulers in the church have become such since this decision was first discussed, and because we believe that the law announced by the Supreme Court and accepted by the Northern Assembly is, and ought to be, a serious obstacle to union, we propose to review the whole subject.

First, let us see *what was decided* by the Supreme Court in this case. The tenth point in the syllabus, (13 Wallace, 680,) which professes to give the pith of the decision, is as follows: "In such cases where *the right of property* in the civil court is dependent on the question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule or custom, or church government, and that has been decided by the highest tribunal within the organization to which it has been carried, the civil court will accept *that decision as conclusive*, and be governed by it in its application to the case before it." In other words, the decision by "the highest tribunal within the organization" of any question over which that tribunal *claims* jurisdiction will leave the minority who oppose such claim without any remedy in the civil court; for the civil court will not inquire into the constitution of the church, but will accept and be bound by the *church court's construction of its power under its constitution*, although the minority might be prepared to demonstrate that such claim and action by the church court was in plain violation of the constitution of the church and an exercise of the crushing power of the unrestrained and unrestrainable majority.

But even Mr. Howison cannot approve the principle so clearly enunciated in this tenth point of the syllabus, and he therefore argues that it is defective, and does not properly state the decision

of the court, but should be amended by adding the words, "Provided the civil court *be satisfied* that the highest tribunal within the church organization *had jurisdiction* in the premises;" that is to say, provided the civil court be satisfied that the church tribunal, under the constitution of the church, *had* the right, did not *usurp* it, to take the action, and, unless so satisfied, the civil court will take jurisdiction of the case and right the wrongs done by the church court.

There can be no question that the law *has been* and *should be* as laid down in Mr. Howison's amendment. But did Justice Miller, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in this case, so declare? Certainly the Northern General Assembly and the able jurists, in a number of the States, who have expressed officially their opinion of the law laid down in this case did not so understand him.

The Minutes of that Assembly (1872) show (pp. 52 and 53) that that body had appropriated the large sum of five thousand dollars to assist in carrying on the litigation in this case, and when the decision was rendered it was heartily approved, "the opinion of the court at length" ordered to be published "in the Appendix to its Minutes," and a committee appointed to prepare and insert in their forthcoming Digest "a faithful abstract thereof."

In the Appendix (p. 177), we find the Assembly's authorized expression of its view of the opinion of the court on the point covered by the tenth section of Mr. Wallace's syllabus in these words: "3. A spiritual court is the *exclusive* judge of its own *jurisdiction*; its decision on that question is binding on the secular courts."

There is no room here for affording an opportunity to the civil courts to be "satisfied that the church tribunal had jurisdiction." The General Assembly approved that interpretation of the opinion which makes it mean (as we contend it does) that the civil court cannot inquire into the question of jurisdiction at all, but must accept the Assembly's *ipse dixit* as conclusive of that question.

Mr. Howison, in exclaiming "May God forbid that the principles established by that court as to church property should be over-

thrown," and the General Assembly of the Northern Church in endorsing the opinion of the Supreme Court, both seem to rejoice in possessing such a panacea for numberless ills to the body ecclesiastic; but the Assembly takes the medicine just as it comes from the doctor's hands, while Mr. Howison tries to "sweeten it to his taste" before it will go down his throat at all.

But further, the record of the case of *Watson vs. Jones* will show that the Assembly's construction of the decision is the true one, and that the opinion is correctly stated by Mr. Wallace in the tenth point of his syllabus.

The controversy was first brought into the Louisville Chancery Court, and the issue raised was mainly the right of certain parties to act as elders. As the case of *Watson vs. Avery* (2 Bush) it went up to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, which reversed the chancellor's decree. Now we have, on p. 732, 13 Wallace, Justice Miller's own words for it, that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky did take up the question of the General Assembly's jurisdiction, and became satisfied that it was lacking, and the Assembly's action therefore invalid. From this opinion Justice Miller emphatically dissents, and argues against it in support of his own and opposite opinion, that the civil court should not inquire into the church court's jurisdiction.

Before this case of *Watson vs. Avery* was finally settled in the State courts, a suit, *Jones vs. Watson*, was instituted in the United States Circuit Court against *Watson and others*, and went by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which rendered the opinion now under discussion. We may profitably look to the points decided by the judge of the United States Circuit Court to ascertain what the Supreme Court held, for his decision was affirmed, without qualification, by the Supreme Court. The decision of the Circuit Court on the point in question is thus given (p. 698, 13 Wallace): "And in determining what was the true Presbytery of Louisville and the true Synod of Kentucky, having *jurisdiction* over the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, its officers and members, *this court and all other civil tribunals were concluded by the action of the General Assembly of said Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.*"

Unquestionably this means, what the General Assembly of 1872 understood Justice Miller to assert, that the Assembly was the "*exclusive* judge of its own *jurisdiction*," and its "*decision* of that question binding on the secular courts."

The learned counsel, Col. Bullitt, who argued the case before the Supreme Court, recognized this question of the right and duty of the civil court to examine the constitution of the church as the point on which the case turned. On p. 707, after referring to the views which had hitherto prevailed both in England and in this country, he says: "Yet the court below assumed that these being matters of an ecclesiastical nature, or arising upon a construction of the law of the church, are subject to exclusive cognizance and jurisdiction by the ecclesiastical court, whose judgment thereon must be accepted as conclusive by the civil court. The position assumed does not stop with asserting that *if* the decision of the question in controversy has been committed by the constitution of the church to a particular tribunal, or *if* the act or judgment in question has been performed by such tribunal in pursuance of a power vested in it by the constitution, *in such case* the act or judgment is conclusive on the civil court. It asserts an exclusive right in the General Assembly to determine the extent of its own power and duties under the constitution; to determine in every case whether it has itself violated the constitution or abandoned the principles of the faith." On p. 708 he impressively adds: "If the principle of the decree herein is affirmed" (and it was affirmed), "it sweeps away all limitations imposed upon church courts by their fundamental laws, and renders it impossible that churches can be organized under rules or limitations which shall bind the judicatories of their own creation."

The record shows that Justice Miller squarely met the question thus presented to the Supreme Court. After disposing of the preliminary question of the jurisdiction of the United States Courts over the case, he proceeds to divide the holdings of all church property into three classes: the third, and the one applicable to this case, being that in which property is held by an ecclesiastical body which is a subordinate member of a general organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals culmi-

nating in a supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization. "In this class of cases," he says (p. 727), "we think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relation of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority, is that, whenever the questions of discipline or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or *law* have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunal must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them in their application to the case before them."

Certainly there is no material difference between the propositions thus laid down by Justice Miller and the tenth point of Mr. Wallace's syllabus. The more searching the analysis and comparison of the two statements, the more clearly will their identity be seen. Justice Miller does not *restrict* the application of this "rule of action" to matters of mere faith and discipline, but without qualification extends it to all that is embraced under these comprehensive terms "ecclesiastical *rule, custom, or law.*" Nor does he even hint at the limitation of his doctrine with any proviso that such supreme church tribunal *must have* jurisdiction and the civil court *be satisfied* that it *has*. On the contrary, he purposely omits such limitation, for the reason that the question of jurisdiction of the church court is one dependent upon the construction of this very ecclesiastical *law*, and whenever the supreme church court has asserted its jurisdiction, it has passed *its* judgment on that law, and *its* construction of *its* own power under it he says is final and binding on all civil courts. Moreover, in justification of this position, he argues (p. 729), "it is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case to one which is less so." Was it possible for the Justice to have met more directly the point presented by Col. Bullitt?

But further, and as necessary to a proper understanding of the

scope of this decision, we present the facts which lead up to this controversy as detailed by Mr. Wallace in his official report, pp. 690-694:

"From the beginning of the war to its close, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, at its annual meetings, expressed in declaratory statements or resolutions its sense of the obligation of all good citizens to support the Federal Government in that struggle; and when, by the proclamation of President Lincoln, emancipation of the slaves of the States in insurrection was announced, that body also expressed views favorable to emancipation and adverse to the institution of slavery. At its meeting in Pittsburg, in May, 1865, instructions were given to Presbyteries, the Board of Missions, and to the sessions of the churches, that when any person from the Southern States should make application for employment as missionaries, or for admission as members or ministers of churches, inquiry should be made as to their sentiments in regard to loyalty to the government, and on the subject of slavery, and if it be found that they have been guilty of voluntarily aiding the war of the rebellion, or held the doctrine announced by the large body of the churches in the insurrectionary States which have organized a new General Assembly, that the system of negro slavery in the South is a divine institution and that it is the peculiar mission of the Southern Church to conserve that institution, they should be required to repent and forsake their sins before they could be received. In the month of September thereafter, the Presbytery of Louisville, under whose immediate jurisdiction was the Walnut Street Church, adopted and published in pamphlet form, what is called *A Declaration and Testimony against the erroneous and heretical doctrines and practices which have obtained and been propagated in the Presbyterian Church of the United States during the last five years.*

"This Declaration denounced in the severest terms the action of the General Assembly in the matters we have just mentioned, declaring an intention to refuse to be *governed* by that action, and invited the coöperation of all members of the Presbyterian Church who shared the sentiments of the Declaration in a concerted resistance to what they called the usurpation of authority by the Assembly."

The General Assembly of 1866 denounced in turn the Declaration and Testimony, and declared that "every Presbytery which *refused to obey its order* should be *ipso facto* dissolved and called to answer before the next General Assembly."

Mr. Wallace's narrative proceeds to state that in consequence of this action the Presbytery of Louisville and the Synod of Kentucky divided—a part of the congregation of the Walnut Street church adhering to the Declaration and Testimony party, and a portion to the other party, *both* however "professing to hold to the same General Assembly"—and so continued to do until, on June 1, 1867, the General Assembly declared that the Presbytery and Synod recognized by Watson and his party were "in no sense a

true and lawful Synod and Presbytery in connection with and under the authority of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America," and that they were *permanently excluded* from connexion with or representation in that body.

After this action, the excluded Synod of Kentucky, on June 26, 1867, accepted this "sundering of relations," and in the following year (1868) united with the Southern General Assembly.

In view of these facts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals gave that decision which we have seen was dissented from and severely criticised by Justice Miller, and in regard to which Mr. Wallace says (p. 693): "The grounds on which the Court of Appeals reversed the chancellor's decision were, of course, that the General Assembly, Synod and Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church were all subject to *constitutions* (the standards, mentioned at the beginning of this report); that, when they violated these, their acts were beyond their jurisdiction and void; that whether they had violated them or not, was a matter which the civil courts, upon an examination of the constitution, could properly pass on; and deciding further and finally as fact, after an examination by the court itself of these standards, that in their declaratory statements and resolutions and other deliverances *enforcing loyalty*, they had violated them; and that their acts were accordingly void."

In refusing to recognize these principles as sound, and in arguing that the civil court must not examine into the constitutionality of the action of the church court, does not Justice Miller assert that the church court is and ought to be the *exclusive* judge of its own constitution and its powers under it? Can there now be any reasonable doubt as to what the decision of the Supreme Court in *Watson vs. Jones* is, or that it is correctly reported by Mr. Wallace?

If we approve and praise the principle of this decision, and apply it to the facts in this case which have been recited, can we escape the following conclusions?

1. The General Assembly, as the supreme court of the church, *had the right* to judge for itself how far it should go into political questions, to make its own protestations of loyalty, to demand the abolition of slavery, to require that every Southern man seeking

to enter its communion should repent of the sin of aiding voluntarily the war of the rebellion, etc., etc.; and that when the General Assembly, "the exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction," had acted upon such matters, it was the duty of all the lower courts to submit.

2. When, therefore, the Louisville Presbytery issued their famous Declaration and Testimony, denouncing the action of the Assembly, refusing to be governed by it, and inviting concerted resistance to it, they were guilty of heresy and schism in their worst forms.

3. The General Assembly rightfully exercised its *authority* when it declared that every Presbytery refusing to *obey its orders* in these matters should be *ipso facto* dissolved, and cited the Louisville Presbytery to answer at its next meeting.

4. That when the General Assembly "permanently excluded" the *remonstrating* Synod and Presbytery, it rightfully put into practical operation the principle afterwards laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Now on what ground can we or a civil court give such conclusive force and effect to the action of the church court? Logically, can it be upon any other theory than that the supreme ecclesiastical court, or visible head of the church, must be presumed to be *right* in all matters of ecclesiastical law and government? But this lands us inevitably on the proposition that such ecclesiastical head, whether it be a tribunal or a person, possesses the attribute of *infallibility* whenever acting officially.

The *ipso facto* dissolution of the Louisville Presbytery, declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in this case to have been legal because unreviewable by *any* earthly tribunal, has its parallel only in the bulls of excommunication emanating from the supreme and infallible (?) head of another church, whose claims have not been heretofore by any means conceded by Presbyterian divines as scriptural or worthy of imitation by Protestant churches. Is there any difference in principle in the excommunication of Dr. McGlynn for holding certain political principles now, and the *ipso facto* dissolution of Louisville Presbytery for refusing to make loyalty a test of church membership? We can see none.

It is this feature of the Supreme Court's decision—the giving

of such exclusive power to the church court—that compels us to unite with Dr. Dabney in calling it “popish” and “revolutionary,” and to decline to join Dr. Baird and Mr. Howison in the insinuation that Dr. Dabney is too ignorant of the facts, or too prejudiced to see them in their true relations on this subject. The failure to draw an obvious and just distinction, to which we will come subsequently, alone gives any color to the charge of Dr. Baird that Dr. Dabney makes “Cæsar,” who is no more “trustworthy” than the church, supreme.

Dr. Dabney’s assertion that this principle of law in *Watson vs. Jones* is a “new rule,” and that it was announced by a “bare majority” of the Supreme Court has been denied.

As to the “bare majority,” we go to the official record. Of the nine justices composing the court at that time, all agree that Chief Justice Chase did not sit in the case. Dr. Baird claims six of the remaining eight, while Mr. Howison argues that, though only “six concurred fully in the opinion of Miller, J., two, Clifford and Davis, dissented, not, however, on the merits of the case, but upon a mere question of jurisdiction; therefore, the decision was practically *unanimous on the merits*” (*italics ours*). Now, the record shows that Justices Clifford and Davis expressly state (p. 738) that they do not “think it proper or necessary to express any opinion on the merits of the case;” and a note on page ix. of 13 Wallace shows that Justice Nelson did not sit in any case reported in that volume.

Thus five, Justices Miller, Field, Bradley, Swayne, and Strong, only are left, a “bare majority” of nine, Dr. Baird and Mr. Howison to the contrary notwithstanding.

Against the assertion that this is a “new rule” and “revolutionary,” it is claimed that it is in the line of American cases; Mr. Howison saying that “the very principles so lucidly and powerfully set forth and upheld in Mr. Justice Miller’s opinion have been repeatedly affirmed in American courts,” while Justice Miller himself declares that his views “are supported by the preponderant weight of authority in this country” (p. 729); and in this Dr. Baird seems to concur. We take issue with the Justice and his supporters, and again affirm that the contrary is true. We

have examined a number of the cases referred to by them and the Justice, and think we can show that they do not sustain his opinion.

Let it be understood that we unhesitatingly concede that, upon purely religious and spiritual questions not involving property rights, and in all questions over which the constitution of the church gives its own tribunals the authority to act, the civil courts have no right to review such ecclesiastical decisions, whether right or wrong. But we withhold our assent to the proposition of Justice Miller, that an ecclesiastical tribunal, acting in contravention of such constitution, or *usurping authority* not conferred by it, can arbitrarily dispose of the temporalities of the church or any of its congregations, and the parties aggrieved be denied all right of redress. On the contrary, we hold that whenever property rights, acquired or held under a constitution, are involved, it is the right and duty of the civil court, whose judges are trained to construe written instruments, a right and duty they cannot abdicate or relinquish, to look into the constitution of the church and decide for itself whether that charter of powers conferred the authority assumed by the ecclesiastical tribunal, and, if it does not, then to declare the acts of such tribunal invalid. And we respectfully submit, in all candor, that this position is not open to the charge that in any sense it improperly intrudes the power of the state into the sacred domains of the church, or renders to Cæsar the things that are God's.

With this obvious and just distinction, this statement of the *true* issue in this discussion, which seems to have been overlooked altogether on the other side, we turn now to the cases cited as authorities for the decision of the Supreme Court.

Inasmuch as Justice Miller concedes that the English and Scotch cases are against him (pages 728, 729), and argues that they are inapplicable to this country, we pass them by, and take up one mentioned by both Dr. Baird and Mr. Howison, though singularly omitted by Justice Miller, after Col. Bullitt, the counsel in the case, had called his attention to it. It is the celebrated case of *The Commonwealth at the relation of Todd, etc., vs Green, etc.*, the suit between the Old and New School branches of the Presbyterian Church, reported in 4 Wharton, 603, and *fully* in

S. Miller, Jr.'s "Presbyterian Church Case," from which we quote.

To see on which side in this discussion this case is authority, we will give the principal facts reported and extracts from the opinion of Judge Gibson, who presided at the trial in the higher court.

The General Assembly of 1837 repealed the Plan of Union, and adopted what were known as "The Exscinding Acts," and directed their clerks, in making up the roll of the next Assembly, not to enroll commissioners from the twenty-nine Presbyteries included within the excised Synods. When the Assembly of 1838 met in the Seventh Presbyterian church in Philadelphia, commissioners from these Presbyteries presented their credentials, and the clerks refused to enroll them; and when the Assembly was called to order, both before and after the reading of the roll prepared by the clerks, various efforts were made to get the names of these commissioners added to the roll, but which were frustrated by the rulings of the Moderator, Dr. Elliott. The New School party then, ignoring Dr. Elliott, went through the form of electing another Moderator, and of adjourning to meet immediately in the First Presbyterian church in that city.

They met in that church with the commissioners from the excised Presbyteries, and declared themselves the true General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, and elected Todd, etc., trustees in the place of Dr. Green, etc., elected by the Old School.

A writ of *quo warranto* was sued out to determine which were the legally elected trustees, and the case was first tried by a jury, Judge Rogers presiding.

While the main question tried was which of these Assemblies was the legitimate successor of the Assembly of 1837, the whole subject of the constitutionality, under the constitution of the church, of the excising acts and the proceedings of the Old School Assembly at its organization in 1838, was considered. The New School contended that all of these acts were unauthorized by the constitution of the church, and were therefore null and void, and, not being valid, that the New School was the legally organized General Assembly. The record of the case clearly shows that both

the court below and the higher court *looked into the constitution* of the church to determine whether the acts of the Assembly complained of *were authorized* by that instrument or not—the lower court holding that they *were not*, and therefore invalid, while the higher court decided that *they were* so authorized, and therefore valid; both courts acting upon the principle that if the constitution of the church gave to the church court the right and power to act upon the question, its decision was binding upon the civil courts, whether right or wrong, and if the constitution did not give the church court such right and power, its decisions were not binding.

Judge Gibson, who presided in the higher court, has always been justly considered one of the ablest jurists this country has produced. Yet neither he, Judge Rogers, nor any of the counsel in the case—George Wood, of New York, William C. Preston, of South Carolina, and William M. Meredith, Josiah Randall, John Sergeant, Joseph R. Ingersoll, and F. W. Hubbell, of Philadelphia, as eminent as any lawyers in the land—ever intimated that the Assembly of 1837 having *decided* its acts to be constitutional, such decision was conclusive of the question, and that the civil courts could not examine for themselves that constitution and see whether or not it gave the power claimed, as Justice Miller holds in *Watson vs. Jones*.

Judge Gibson (p. 588, Miller) says:

“In justification of this apparent irregularity, it is urged that the constitutional moderator had refused an appeal to the commissioners in attendance from his decision, which had excluded from the roll the names of certain commissioners, who had been *unconstitutionally* severed, as it is alleged, from the Presbyterian connection by a vote of the preceding session. It is conceded by the argument that if the Synods, with the dependent Presbyteries, by which those commissioners were sent, had been *constitutionally dissolved*, the motion was one which the moderator was not bound to put, or the commissioners to notice; and that whatever implication of assent to the decision which ensued might otherwise be deduced from the silence of those who refused to speak out, about which it will be necessary to say something in the sequel, there was no room for any such implication in the particular instance. It would follow, also, that there was no pretense for the deposit of the moderator, if indeed such a thing could be legitimated by any circumstances, for refusing an appeal from his exclusion of those who had not color of title, and consequently, that what else might be reform would be revolution. *And this leads to an inquiry into the constitutionality of the act of excision.*”

In prosecuting this "inquiry" he discusses (pp. 589-'91) the constitutional questions, and declares that the Plan of Union had been "*constitutionally enacted and constitutionally repealed* by an ordinary act of legislation; and those Synods which had their root in it could not be expected to survive it."

"That body" [the Assembly of 1837] "*resorted to the only constitutional remedy in its power. . . . Even as a legislative act it may have been a hard one, though certainly constitutional, and strictly just.*"

"We have, as already remarked, no authority to adjudge its judgments on their merits, and this principle was asserted with conclusive force by the presiding judge who tried the cause. Upon an objection made to an inquiry into the composition of the Presbytery of Medina, it was ruled that with the reasons for the proceedings of 1837 (the act of excision) we have nothing to do. We are to determine only what was done; the reasons of those who did it are immaterial. If the acts complained of *were within the jurisdiction of the Assembly, their decision must be final, though they decided wrong.* This was predicated of judicial jurisdiction, *but the principle is necessarily as applicable to jurisdiction for purposes of legislation.*"

"If, then, the Synods in question *were constitutionally dissolved*, the Presbyteries of which they had been composed were, at least for purposes of representation, dissolved along with them. . . . It is immaterial that the Presbyteries are the electors; a Synod is a part of the machinery which is indispensable to the existence of every branch of the church. It appears, therefore, that the commissioners from the excised Synods *were not entitled to seats in the Assembly*, and that *their names were properly excluded from the roll.*"

Thus we see, that it is upon *an examination into the rights and powers conferred upon the General Assembly by the constitution of the church* that Judge Gibson bases his decision.

But, this is precisely what the Supreme Court, in *Watson vs. Jones*, decided could not be done, and declared that the civil court *must not consider* such constitutional questions. Yet, Dr. Baird says that the decision in *Todd, etc., vs. Green, etc.*, "is precisely in the line of the Walnut Street church decision!" To his and Mr. Howison's amazing statements of the ground and scope of Judge Gibson's decision in this famous case, we are content to refer to that Judge's own words as we have quoted them. Both of these decisions accord in this, that in matters purely religious and spiritual, and in all over which the constitution of the church gives the Assembly power and authority to act, or, to use the legal phrase, jurisdiction, its decision, whether right or wrong, is conclusive and binding on the civil court. They differ in this: Judge Gibson recognizes that if the Assembly transcends its authority and

usurps a power not conferred on it by the constitution of the church, its conclusion is not binding, and if property rights are affected, the civil court may look into the church constitution to determine whether the act complained of was constitutional or not. This was the *old rule*.

Justice Miller, on the contrary, holds, in the Walnut Street church case, that though the Assembly usurps powers and disregards the limitations and prohibitions of the church constitution, and the adherents to the Assembly ask the civil court to lend its aid to enforce the decision of the usurping church court, and to take away from the supporters of the constitution the property given on the faith of its provisions and bestow it upon the violators of that constitution, the civil court is bound to do this, and will not examine the church constitution at all, or, as Justice Miller puts it, will accept as *final and conclusive* the construction of its own powers under the constitution by "the more learned tribunal in the law," that is, the Assembly itself.

This is the *new rule* which rewards the covenant-breaker and punishes the covenant-keeper, to which, with Dr. Dabney, we strenuously object.

Justice Miller refers to the following American cases: *Shannon vs. Frost*, 3 B. Monro, 253; *Gibson vs. Armstrong*, 7 B. Monro, 481; *Watson vs. Avery*, 2 Bush, 332; *Harman vs. Dreher*, 2 Speer's Equity, 87; *John's Island Church Case*, 2 Richardson's Equity, 215; *Ferraria vs. Vasconcelles*, 23 Illinois, 456; *Den vs. Bolton*, 7 Halstead, 206; *Chuse vs. Cheny*, 58 Illinois, 509; *Watson vs. Farris*, 45 Missouri, 183; *German Reformed Church vs. Seibert*, 3 Barr, (Pa.) 291; and *McGinnis vs. Watson*, 41 Pa. State, 21, as furnishing "the preponderant weight of authority" for his opinion.

Of those which we have had opportunity to examine, we remark generally that in them the question of jurisdiction in the church court was not raised or discussed before the civil court; or that they sustain Justice Miller only on the points we have already conceded, viz., questions purely religious and spiritual, involving no property rights, and questions over which the constitution of the church gives the church judicatory authority to act.

Thus in *Harmon vs. Dreher* and *Chase vs. Cheny*, his quotations show that the doctrine of these cases is restricted to "the administration of ecclesiastical *discipline*, and where no other *right of property* is involved than loss of clerical office or salary incident to such discipline."

In the case of the *German Reformed Church vs. Seibert* the official report shows that the church judicatories of that organization consisted of three heads: the Consistory, the Classis and the Synod, and by its organic law it is expressly provided that "when any person may think himself aggrieved by the decision of a lower judicatory, he has the right of appeal to a higher, and whatever is concluded in such judicatory by a majority of votes is valid and binding, unless it can be *shown* to be contrary to the Word of God and the constitution of the church." Seibert was excommunicated by the Consistory, and *without appealing* to the higher church tribunals, applied to the civil courts for a *mandamus* to have himself reinstated. This was refused, and the language of the judge delivering the decision shows that he had looked to the church constitution: "Until a *final adjudication* by the church judicatories, we think the relator is without remedy by *mandamus*"; and this reason is strangely overlooked or omitted by Justice Miller, although it immediately follows the passage quoted by him; besides, his own quotation clearly shows that the court limited its doctrine of the incompetency of civil courts to "supervise" the judgments of church courts, to "matters *within their jurisdiction*."

McGinnis vs. Watson, while holding the same principle as the case just mentioned, also has these limiting words: "The act of a Synod is binding upon the congregations composing it as members, *so far* as the act is in *accord* with its *own laws*."

While the case of *Watson vs. Farris* accords with Justice Miller in giving the property in question to the adherents to the Northern Assembly, its decree seems to some extent to be based upon altogether different grounds. For the court in giving its opinion refers to and approves the decision in *Todd, etc., vs. Green, etc.*, in this language: "It was held by a court of the very highest authority and respectability, that the General Assembly did not

exceed its powers, and that the excising orders amounted to ordinances of dissolution and were the valid exercise of a constitutional power." Such is the line of authorities to which Justice Miller and those who agree with him triumphantly point as sustaining the rule laid down by him—that civil courts must not examine the organic law of ecclesiastical organizations to ascertain whether or not, in cases involving property rights, that organic law conferred their authority to act—and we submit that these cases do not by any means support the "new rule."

In addition to the cases cited by Justice Miller and those who hold with him, we now refer to some which we have examined, which refuse to assent to and follow the Supreme Court's opinion in *Watson vs. Jones*.

In *Perry vs. Wheeler*, 12 Bush, 541-557, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky says:

"While we recognize the principle as firmly and correctly established that civil courts can not and ought not to rejudge the judgments of spiritual tribunals as to matters within their jurisdiction, whether justly or unjustly decided, *we cannot accept as correct the principle* contended for in argument for the appellee, *that whether the Synod had jurisdiction and power over the subject on which it acted under the Presbyterian system, is a question purely ecclesiastical, to be settled by the Synod itself and the General Assembly.* Such a construction of the power of church tribunals would in our opinion subject all individual and property rights confided or dedicated to the use of religious organizations to the arbitrary will of those who may constitute their judicatories and representative bodies, without regard to any of the regulations or constitutional restraints by which, according to the principles and objects of such organizations, it was intended that said individual and property rights should be protected; and when rights of property which are secured to congregations and individuals by the organic law of the church, are violated by unconstitutional acts of the higher courts, the parties thus aggrieved are entitled to relief in the civil courts as in ordinary cases of injury resulting from the violation of a contract or the fundamental law of a voluntary association."

In the case of *Watson vs. Garvin*, 54 Mo. 353, the court held "the title to the church property of a divided congregation is in that part of it which is acting in harmony with its own law." "Where property rights are concerned, the ecclesiastical courts have no power whatever to pass upon them so as to bind the civil courts."

In this same case, we find the following clear and strong discussion of the principle at issue:

“At the threshold of this inquiry, we are met with the startling proposition that, in cases like this, the judgment or decrees of ecclesiastical judicatories are final and conclusive, and that the civil courts have no authority in the premises, except to register those decrees and carry them into execution. It is to be regretted that loose expressions by elementary writers, and also by judges in delivering their opinions, have given too much foundation for this false doctrine. Even the Supreme Court of the United States in *Watson vs. Jones*, 13 Wal. 679, gives prominence to this idea by making it the *chief foundation* of their opinion. That court seemed to think the judges not sufficiently learned in ecclesiastical law to pass on such questions, and that the ecclesiastical courts, being better qualified than themselves, ought to be allowed to be the exclusive judges. The civil courts are presumed to know all the law touching property rights, and if questions of ecclesiastical law connected with property rights come before them, they are compelled to decide them. They have no power to abdicate their own jurisdiction and transfer it to other tribunals.

“The true ground why civil courts do not interfere with the decrees of ecclesiastical courts, where no property rights are involved, *is not* because such decrees are final and conclusive, but because they have no jurisdiction whatever in such matters, and cannot take cognizance of them at all, whether they have been adjudicated by those tribunals or not.

“This principle forms the foundation of religious liberty in republican governments.

“The civil authorities have no power to pass or to enforce laws abridging the freedom of the citizen in this regard, and hence in matters purely religious or ecclesiastical the civil courts have no jurisdiction.”

The courts also of New York and Pennsylvania, in recent cases, have had similar questions before them and expressed their dissent from the opinion in *Watson vs. Jones* (vide *Ker's Appeal*, 89 Pa. Stat. Rep. 97, and *Connitt et al. vs. The Reformed Dutch Church of New Prospect et al.*, 54 N. Y. Rep., 561).

We have thus, at perhaps too great but unavoidable length, gone over these cases. They show that “the preponderating weight of authority” is not with Justice Miller; and also give the reason for and excellence of the “old rule” as compared with “the new.” The distinction between matters as to which church tribunals have exclusive control, and those in which resort may be had to the protection of the civil courts, is so clearly drawn in these cases as to leave no foundation in fact for the charge that those who disapprove Justice Miller’s views are disloyal to Presbyterianism and preachers of “Erastianism.”

And now we ask the calm and dispassionate consideration of every ruler in the Southern Church to this subject. Reflect upon

the bearing it must have on the question of organic union. Dismiss from your minds all the prejudice that may have been excited by the erroneous representations of the principles contended for by Dr. Dabney and those who agree with him in reference to this case. If you will but examine for yourselves, you cannot fail to see that neither he nor they have ever argued for a supervisory power of the civil over the church courts in religious and spiritual matters, or questions of obedience by the members to the teachings of the Bible and the laws of church.

He and they favor the old rule, and object to the new in *Watson vs. Jones* so far only as the latter goes beyond the former, and declares that the church courts, in questions affecting property rights, is the exclusive judge of its power and authority under the constitution of the church, and so makes the highest church court omnipotent. This he and they insist is true, and the necessary effect of the Supreme Court's decision, so that in this land of liberty and constitutional law there is no protection for the property rights of a minority in the church against the usurpations of a majority. For the same ruling and upon the same grounds that took away the property of Walnut Street church from *Watson*, etc., the parties claiming to hold it under the constitution empowered the Northern Assembly to take every dollar of property belonging to the Synod of Kentucky, every church and manse and cemetery, with every endowment held by the Declaration and Testimony party, provided any members could be found in any of these churches, etc., holding with the General Assembly in its claims of constitutional power.

In the reunited church, the Southern members will be a minority, and the large amount of property which they now hold which was given to them under the old rule hitherto recognized as correct, will come under the power of the new rule which makes the decision of a majority of the Assembly *conclusive* as to its power under the constitution. If the Southern Church goes into such union, it will be with a full knowledge of what the Northern Church now claims as to its right of jurisdiction. If, then, they should violate our constitutional rights, and our people should deem it their duty to again separate from them, how could we as

honorable Christian men claim our property, even though the State courts should repudiate the decision in *Watson vs. Jones*? Would we not justly subject ourselves to the charge that, in attempting to hold that property, we had violated an implied, if not express, contract, that we had brought strife and division into the church only because the General Assembly has exercised a right and power which they plainly told us they claimed when we united with them?

We cast no improper reflections upon our Northern brethren. We do not believe that the men engaged in bringing about a union would deliberately violate any agreement they might make to effect it. We give them credit for the same honesty of purpose we claim for ourselves. But we are not children, and the Scriptures commend as "prudent" the man who "forseeth the evil and hideth himself." We must judge of what may be done in the future by what has been done in the past.

Some exciting questions may arise, stirring the thoughts and passions of men, as in 1837 and in 1861-'70, and the General Assembly under that excitement may take some action which the large body of the Southern Church members may believe to be a plain violation of the constitution of the church. But what can we do? Our mouths will be shut by our own action in uniting with a church with this rule approved by it staring us in the face. Unfortunately there is already more than one such question now smouldering which will require only a few breaths to kindle them into fiercest flame.

Suppose the two Churches should now agree upon some constitutional provision which Southern men think will protect them against the dreaded negro domination, and union is formed. After a while, under some passion or excitement, it is violated by the majority, Where is the remedy? Or suppose an effort is made to control Union Seminary by the General Assembly in a way that wholly perverts it, in the judgment of the Synods of Virginia and North Carolina, to whom that property now belongs, from the purposes for which it was founded and endowed. These Synods oppose the Assembly, and are not very prudent in expressing that opposition, and the Assembly determines to put it down. How

easy to attach a sufficient membership from some other Synod—say that of the Atlantic—to overcome the majority opposed to the Assembly, or to declare that unless the majority cease their opposition and repent of the sin of having made it, they shall be dissolved, and the minority adhering to the Assembly shall be the true Synod. Now the majority as honest men cannot abandon their principles, and are accordingly cast out of the church. With this decision in *Watson vs. Jones*, approved by the General Assembly when they united with it, could they go to the civil courts? No, no! For all our traditions of the sacredness of plighted faith bind us to swear to our own hurt and change not.

But this, it will be said, is an extreme and therefore an improbable case. Is it not the very case of Louisville Presbytery and the Walnut Street church? Is it wise to court such peril to our beloved church?

JAS. D. ARMSTRONG.¹

¹ Nothing is said in the foregoing discussion about the *relative* strength of the two parties to the controversy in the Walnut Street church case, for the reason that the principle of law announced in *Watson vs. Jones* is not and cannot be affected by *numbers*. It would give the property to *one* adherent to the General Assembly, although *a thousand* were on the other side. It may be well, however, in view of sweeping and repeated assertions about the facts in the case touching this point, to add a brief statement drawn from official records:

In 1865 and 1866 *a majority of the session*, including *Watson*, with *nearly half of the members*, were on the side opposed to the action of the General Assembly; *one elder* and the remaining members composed the other side.

It was not until 1868, and more than *two years after the division in the congregation had taken place*, that the proportion of about thirty to one hundred and fifteen, as reported by Mr. Wallace, (13 Wallace, pp. 694, 695,) existed.

This proportion had been reached by the admission during these two years, *after the troubles began*, by the pastor and session of the Northern party, of at least sixty-eight persons as members of the Walnut Street church, not only *without the consent of the majority of the session* as it existed at the beginning of the controversy, but *against* that majority's persistent refusal to recognize any *constitutional right* of that pastor and session to receive such persons as members, or to give them any valid claim upon the church property.

Special Chancellor, A. Barnett, Esq, in *Fulton et al vs. Farley et al*, (decided in Louisville Chancery Court, October, 1869,) in his decree gives the names of these sixty-eight persons, and declares that the pastor and session who claimed to have admitted them were not lawfully pastor and session of the Walnut Street church, and that the persons received by them were not lawfully members of that church. Among these sixty-eight were *Jones and wife*, and Lee who brought the suit in United States Circuit Court.

J. D. A.

VII. NOTES.

THE ETHICS OF TRADE.

WITH rare exceptions, all teachers of morals in civilized lands hold that love is the fundamental law of social ethics. The only question is as to the primacy of self. Some will say, Love thyself first, thy neighbor next; others more truly teach, Love thyself last. The Christian rule is not always correctly read. Paul says: "Love is the fulfilling of the law." Moses wrote: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But Christ announced the true and full form of the law when he said: "A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another." It is clear that the newness does not lie in the injunction, but in the standard, of love. The Christian is expected to love his neighbor in the manner and to the extent that Christ has loved him. The Christian law, therefore, not only binds men to the golden rule of reciprocity, but makes Christ's love to us the measure of our duty to others. We must do to others what we would have them do to us, were our positions exchanged. More than this, we must do for others what we judge Christ would do for them were he in our stead. It is the golden rule measured by Christ's example, animated by his Spirit: full justice benevolently interpreted.

Let us apply this rule to the current dealings of men with each other in the relations of trade. *Monopolies* are either artificial or natural. China has a natural monopoly of the growth of tea, Cornwall for the export of tin to America, Louisiana for the cultivation of the sugar-cane in this country, the Gulf States for the raising of cotton. These, of course, do not concern us now. It is sufficient to say, that it is the duty of all blessed with the natural monopoly of a good thing to use it justly and benevolently. Many artificial monopolies are proper, beneficial to others as well as to the holders, or else manifestly grounded in right. The law gives to authors and inventors the exclusive right to the sale of their productions. This is surely just. It is equally expedient to give to a ferryman in a small town the sole right to transport passengers across the river on which the place is situated. Monopolies, therefore, whether natural or artificial, are not necessarily

wrong or hurtful. A *Trust* is an artificial monopoly. Is it innocent, beneficial, or harmful? Is it in accordance with, or does it violate, the golden rule? What is a Trust? It is a combination of those engaged in a special kind of business for the purpose of controlling that business. The combination is called a Trust, because a company is formed representing those engaged in the special business, to whom the management is entrusted. Say that there are a dozen firms in this country engaged in the refining of crude sugar. Instead of these firms working independently of each other and in competition, they unite and entrust the entire direction of sugar refining to a Trust Company, composed of representatives of the several firms. This Trust Company determines how much sugar shall be refined, what shall be the wages of the workmen, and what the price of the refined product. Is there anything wrong in all this? Surely there need not be. If men can combine their capital, labor and skill to engage in the operation of a single refinery, why may not a dozen of these firms similarly combine? There is a good purpose in these combinations; it is to prevent the evils of over-production. Operating independently, more sugar may be refined than the market demands, with the resulting price lower than is profitable. This leads to the failure of the weaker firms, a great decrease in the manufacture, and a subsequent price inflated beyond what is reasonable. Manifestly these Trusts, conducted by prudent, Christian men, may be a blessing to the land. Why, then, the outcry against them? Because, in addition to the good purpose already noted, they have all the evils that are incident to monopolies when in the hands of selfish men. It is not difficult to see these evils: 1. To those rivals not in the combination they often bring loss, and sometimes ruin. Either they are not allowed to enter the combination, or they are unwilling. As the purpose of the combination is to control the business, it must be so managed, it is often thought, as to crush out all competition. As the Trust is able to create the product somewhat cheaper than an individual firm can do, sugar is undersold by the combination long enough to drive the competitor to bankruptcy, into the Trust, or else out of the business. Is this according to the golden rule? Would Christ do such a thing? 2. To the workman, the Trust sometimes does a wrong by depriving him of the benefit of competition among employers. If all the refineries in the country join the Trust, the wages of their employé's can be fixed by the managers. The workman is helpless; for should he refuse the scale at one refinery and go to another, he will find the same management there.

The rate of wages may be just; if so, no wrong is done. But when a Trust uses its power to grind the faces of the poor, it violates the golden rule, and acts contrary to the Spirit of Christ. 3. To the general public, the Trust may act as it does towards its workmen. If all the sugar of the country is refined by the Trust, the public is powerless, and must pay the price demanded, however unreasonable, or else do without what has become indispensable for comfortable living. The sugar Trust is said to have arbitrarily raised the price of its product this past season some twenty-five per cent., and thus realized millions of dollars, most of which came from the hard-earned wages of the poor. Is this the golden rule? Would Christ have acted thus?

The *Protective Tariff* is a political expedient; but, as it is levied at the instance of a portion of the industries of the country and is designed to affect trade, it fairly comes within the range of our subject. What is a Protective Tariff? It is a tax laid on an article brought into a country for the purpose of increasing its price, so that the same article, produced at home, may compete with it. Suppose crude sugar can be made in this country and furnished to the New Orleans market for four and a half cents a pound, and that foreign sugar can be put there for two and a half cents. In order that our sugar may not be driven from the market, a tax, say of two cents, is laid upon the imported article. This puts the home producer upon an equal footing with the foreign planter, and so protects his industry. This seems to be fair and just. Take another case. A few years since the wholesale price of domestic quinine in New York was about three and a half dollars an ounce. At the same time, the European article could be sold in the same market for two dollars or less. In order to protect our factories, an import tax of one hundred per cent. was laid upon the foreign article. This seems right. Let us see if it is. Suppose that one-half of the people manufactured quinine and the other half did not. One-half of the people would then be favored by the duty on quinine, and the other half would be injured to the extent of over a dollar for every ounce of quinine which they were compelled to buy. Is this just? Why should the unfortunate sick be compelled to pay two prices for their medicine, in order that their neighbors may be enriched? Suppose that nine-tenths of the people manufactured quinine, is it just to require the other tenth to pay twice as much as is necessary for the recovery of their sick? Is it an answer to say that quinine cannot be produced in this country for less than three and a half dollars an ounce? It does not seem so, from the ethical point of view. If I can-

not manufacture quinine for you at the rate some one else can, am I justified in forbidding you to buy from my rival and requiring you to buy of me at the double price? Would I not better stop the manufacture of quinine, if I cannot do so upon the same terms as others? Is not this the golden rule? Suppose now that only one-tenth of the people make quinine and nine-tenths use it, is it either just or politic to force the nine-tenths to pay tribute to the one-tenth? Suppose that only three firms in the whole country make quinine, is there any moral propriety in forcing every poor wretch in the land that shakes with the ague to contribute to the support of three firms, who cannot compete with their European rivals? We have yet to deal with the most serious fact in this case. Suppose that quinine can be made at a profit in this country for less than two dollars an ounce; that the assertion to the contrary is a mere pretence for the sake of securing an exorbitant gain; that our factories can live and prosper and compete with their European rivals without any protection,—what then? Is there any question as to the moral obliquity of those who demanded a tariff of one hundred per cent. as necessary to their protection? These last suppositions are the substantial facts of this case. For years the people of this country were compelled to pay two prices for their quinine, because a duty of one hundred per cent. was put upon it for the protection of three firms who made it. The duty was not removed until a member of one of the firms died, and the papers announced that he had left an estate of ten millions of dollars, largely contributed by the ague-stricken sufferers of this country in the exorbitant price they were required to pay for their medicine. To-day quinine is quoted in New York at a wholesale price of less than seventy cents! It is not asserted that every protected article in this country will furnish a parallel to quinine. It is asserted, however, that the principle is the same, that no government has the moral right to forbid its citizens buying any useful article wherever they may prefer; that it has no moral right to require its citizens to pay one dealer more for an article than they can buy the same thing for from another. It is further believed, that, in many cases where protective duties are now laid, they are not needed, and operate simply to increase the gains of the protected to an exorbitant amount. The reasonable ground of this belief is the fact, that the wealthy men of the country are the men whose industries are protected, and to whom the hard-toiling masses are compelled to pay tribute. The underlying motive of the system is selfishness, and its continuance in this free and intelligent land is mainly due to two causes: the igno-

rance, lack of union, and scare of the unthinking masses who are not protected, and the combination of those who are protected. The latter is the main cause, as may be seen in the fact that four thousand articles are included in the schedule of protection, in order to enlist so many interests in the scheme. No one, nor a hundred of these could succeed without the coöperation of the others. It is similar to the usual River and Harbor Bill, which is a combination of a few worthy cases with a multitude of jobs all over the country. No tax should ever be levied which it is the interest of any class of persons to perpetuate, especially should that class be large and influential. A tax is a tribute upon industry, and should be as small and as short-lived as possible. The golden rule clearly forbids political favoritism.

The buying and selling of *Options* is now practiced in all the cities of the land. What is this? It is a speculation in future values. Take wheat. One class of men, bulls, believe that its price is now low and that it will rise in the future. They buy now to be delivered a month or more hence. Another class of dealers, bears, think that the present price is high, and that it will surely fall. These sell to be delivered a month or so ahead. When the day of settlement comes, if wheat has risen, the bear pays the bull the difference between the market on the day of sale and that of delivery; if wheat has fallen, the position of the parties is reversed. This seems a very simple and legitimate transaction. Now, should the bull require the bear to actually deliver the wheat on the day of settlement, is there any moral objection to the transaction? It would seem not, for it is a *bona fide* purchase and sale. Is the case morally changed should there be no delivery of wheat, but merely the payment of the marginal difference? It is. It is not a genuine buying and selling of real values, but a simple betting upon the fluctuations of the market. Mr. Bull virtually says, "I bet that wheat will rise ten cents." Mr. Bear responds, "I accept the bet to the amount of the marginal difference upon ten thousand bushels." Mr. Bull replies, "Agreed." They put up the stakes, which is the marginal difference, and then await the issue. Mr. Bull does not want any wheat, although he has nominally bought ten thousand bushels. Mr. Bear has no wheat, and does not expect to have any, although he has sold the same amount. This is not trade; it is speculative gambling. Does Mr. Bull give Mr. Bear any equivalent for the money paid him should wheat rise? Mr. Bear is as sheer a loser as though it had been a game of cards. Had the other card turned up, Mr. Bull would have been the loser and Mr. Bear the win-

ner. In legitimate trade both parties are benefited. Options violate the golden rule, for in them each party is seeking to gain an advantage over the other.

Growing out of options we have another American institution, the *Corner*. In this transaction, the party who makes the corner buys stealthily very largely of options in the article to be cornered. If it be wheat for the next month's delivery, he will buy more than can possibly be delivered in the market where the corner is made. The transaction goes up into the millions of bushels. Perhaps all the wheat accessible to that market is needed for the bread supply. There is but little, if any, surplus, and here are millions called for and only a few thousands to be had. The result, of course, is that wheat assumes an unnatural, purely fictitious value. For the bread supply it is not worth more than ninety cents per bushel. This corner, however, runs it up to more than a dollar. Every consumer of bread finds that the staff of life costs him twenty-five per cent. more than it should do. Every bear in the option ring finds that he has lost twenty-five cents on every dollar's sale which he has made. The clique of bulls, who have produced an artificial scarcity, gloat over their success and pocket their unrighteous gains to the amount of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The bulls who made the corner are enriched. The bears who were cornered are bankrupted. The innocent outside public must eat corn-bread or pay an exorbitant price for their flour. The case is this: There are a thousand people living on an island, two of whom buy up all the bread and then force the remainder to pay them what price they choose to demand for it. No one is so obtuse that he cannot see how grossly this violates the golden rule and how far this is from the love of Christ.

Another scheme of civilized robbery is what is vulgarly known as *Freezing Out*. One of the small towns in the Missouri Valley is built upon a coal-bed, the mining of which caused the formation of a local company. It was the most profitable business in the community, especially after a railroad, which had been largely subsidized by the county, had connected the mines with a neighboring city. As is frequently the case, this railroad had its rings, composed of the leading officials, organized to benefit themselves in outside matters by their connexion with the road. Seeing that these coal-mines were profitable, they bought out all the small stockholders until they had secured a majority of the stock and a controlling interest. They then approached the larger holders and offered to take their stock. These did

not wish to sell, as they considered it the best investment they could make. An examination, however, convinced all but one that they would better sell at first, as they would be forced to do so at last. One large holder, however, refused, and they proceeded to *freeze* him out. Having the control of the company and the management of the railroad, they made themselves the officers of the coal company, and voted themselves large salaries. They charged the company high rates for the transportation of the coal to the city. Of course, the mines ceased to be profitable. All the gains were absorbed in salaries and freights, which went into the pockets of the freezers. In a year or so the old, persistent stockholder, finding that his dividends were gone, offered to sell his stock to the syndicate. "Very well," said they, "but you must see that the company is not making money now, therefore the stock is not as valuable as it was when we offered to buy you out." Yes, Mr. W. saw at last, and took what they chose to give him for his interest. This is a case of freezing out and the usual mode in which it is said to be effected. Highway robbery no more violates the golden rule or the Spirit of Christ, and is more noble, in that it shows a degree of courage and does not steal under the protection of the law.

Watering Stock is the last of the tricks of trade whose moral character will come before us for review. A syndicate bought one of the prominent railroads of the interior some years ago for eight millions of dollars, and immediately capitalized it at thirty millions. There were eight parts milk and twenty-two parts water in that stock. This seems an innocent transaction. Whom does it wrong, and how? It is a pertinent inquiry to ask these waterers, "Why do you thus nominally increase your stock so much beyond its cost and value?" What answer would they give? There must be some object, and surely it is not for the childish pride they may feel in saying that they own stocks to the amount of millions. It is not difficult to divine the purpose. The public are presumed not to know of the fictitious increase of their capital, as they usually cover it up by claiming that it represents improvements made in the property. The road that cost eight millions is now stocked at thirty millions. Six per cent. is a modest interest for the country through which that road runs. The company must receive such rates for freight and passengers, and it must pay its employés such wages as will allow that modest rate of interest on the capital of their road. Six per cent. on thirty millions, the nominal capital, is twenty-two and a half per cent. on eight millions, the real capital. Is it strange that there have been

two general strikes of the hard-worked and poorly-paid laborers on that road, and that those sections where it has a monopoly execrate its management? Is this the golden rule? Is this the Spirit of Christ?

It is said that a large moiety of the colossal fortunes which have been made in this country since our civil war have been acquired in some one or more of these dubious ways. The virtuous poor may well rejoice that they have not been overwhelmed in this sea of selfishness, that they try to live by the golden rule, and to show the spirit of him who came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many. To the selfish millionaire, whose wealth is a monument to his rapacious trickery, we would quote the solemn and prophetic words of James: "Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl for your miseries that shall come upon you. Your riches are corrupted, and your garments are moth-eaten. Your gold and silver is cankered; and the rust of them shall be a witness against you, and shall eat your flesh as it were fire. Ye have heaped treasure together for the last days. Behold the hire of the laborers who have reaped down your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth; and the cries of them which have reaped are entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth."

J. A. QUARLES.

THE SUNDAY-SCHOOL: ITS TRUE NATURE AND MISSION, AND RELATION TO THE CHURCH.

The modern Sunday-school, in its historical development, has passed through three stages, and is now entering upon a fourth. It originated outside of the church, in an effort to give a secular education to the children of the ignorant and vicious classes. Next, the church took hold of the enterprise and introduced a religious feature. By and by she began to train her own children in these schools, and thus the missionary and charitable feature ceased to be the most prominent. And now we are gradually realizing a still higher idea of the institution and entering upon a new era of Sunday-school work.

As it has been conducted hitherto, the Sunday-school has embodied two fundamental errors, in its organization and in its design. It has been organized as an institution in a great measure distinct from and independent of the church, with its own officers, government, and worship. Its mission has been merely the instruction of children; its standard has been simply that of a primary school. To be "the

nursery of the church" has been its highest aim. The evils of such an institution are many and serious.

First, The independency of the Sunday-school has tended to estrange our youth from the church. Its methods, so different from the government and worship of the church, have had little tendency to cultivate loyalty and love for the latter. There has been too little effort in the school to instruct its members in the doctrines, train them in the government, and awaken in them an interest in the worship of the church. The teaching service has been but little preparation for the preaching service. That which should be the training school of the church has alienated her children from her.

Second, The irresponsibility of Sunday-school officers and teachers has led to corruptions in doctrine and worship. Teachers have been engaged, doctrines taught, modes of worship observed, hymns sung, literature circulated and clap-trap methods employed that would not be tolerated in the church. Where the church authorities do not control the school, there is nothing to check any aberrations of irresponsible officers and teachers.

Third, The pastors of the church have by this system been debarred from official oversight of the most important part of their flock. When they have come into the school it has been in an unofficial capacity, or if they have exercised authority at all, it has been by virtue of official relations to the Sunday-school, and not to the church. Such conditions have failed to cultivate in the minds of our youth any respect for their rulers or regard for ecclesiastical authority. The Sunday-school superintendent is in many instances perhaps better known, loved, and respected than the minister of the Word. Many of our children probably do not even know that there is such a body as the Session, and have no personal acquaintance with its members.

Fourth, Another thing connected with the Sunday-school that has been a fruitful source of evil, is an over-crowded Sabbath. The older church members claim their two services and the children one, and many faithful workers are expected to attend all of these services. This is a violation of the fourth commandment: "the Sabbath was made for man," as a day of physical and mental rest, as well as of spiritual activity. With many Christians Sunday is one of the hardest working days in the week. As a consequence of the physical, mental and spiritual weariness resulting from so many services, we have at each of them fewer numbers and less interest, and from them all less benefit, than two would afford. His two preaching services leave the

minister no time for that most important element of his work, the "feeding of the lambs." Nor is there much time left to the faithful worker for his private devotions. Here is the defective side of the Christian life of to-day; in the intense activity, the absorbing duties, of Christian work, we are losing that devotional, meditative spirit which is essential to the highest development of spiritual life. Again, great complaints are being made about the decline of family religion, home worship and parental instruction. But how can these things be properly cultivated if our Sabbaths are taken up exclusively in public services? No busy housekeeper can attend three services a day, taking an active part in one at least, and then find time to teach her children at home. Nor is the business man or laborer in a very proper frame of body or mind to conduct worship for his family at night, when, after all the toils of the week, he has walked three times to church on Sunday. The non-observance of these duties on the Sabbath leads to their neglect throughout the week.

Having described the Sunday-school as it has been, and still is to a great extent, conducted; having pointed out its errors and their evil consequences, let us now see what is the nature of that higher ideal to which we are gradually attaining. We are realizing at last that the Sunday-school should be a regular public church service, coördinate with the preaching service. As we should have a morning preaching service for young as well as old, so we should have an afternoon teaching service for old as well as young. These two should constitute the only services of the day; and as the worship and instruction of the latter, like those of the former, should be for the whole congregation, so its direction and control should be by the governing body of the church. All false distinctions between church and Sunday-school should be obliterated; the very name "Sunday-school," with all its old associations, should be abolished, and the name "Teaching Service" substituted in its stead. If then the question be asked, "What should be the relation of the Sabbath-school to the church?" the answer is in one word, "Identity." It ought not to be "the children's church," nor "the nursery of the church," nor "an arm of the church," but *the church*; not a church work, but the church at work, assembled for the study and teaching of the Word.

The gradual adoption of this idea is making certain radical changes in the constitution, government, and methods of the Sunday-school. As to its constitution: the older members of the church are learning that it is their privilege and duty to participate in this service, and

we shall soon have schools after the scriptural model: "Call a solemn assembly; gather the people, sanctify the congregation, assemble the elders, gather the children." With only two services, every attendant of the church can easily go to both.

As to government: the officers of the church are beginning to exercise, without any special election, their respective functions in this second service. Our Sessions will soon assume the whole direction and control, appointing teachers, regulating methods, arranging classes, selecting literature, appropriating funds, etc. They will see that none are appointed to teach but those who are qualified intellectually and spiritually, and that every candidate is examined as to his or her biblical knowledge and experimental religion. They will notice and correct any incompetency or negligence of officers or teachers. The minister of the Word, having no second preaching service, will take the lead in this, training the normal class, conducting the teachers' meeting, and expounding the catechisms to the school. There will be no secretary and treasurer, for the deacons will discharge their own office.

As to methods: they will be more closely conformed to those of the teaching service; so that the Presbyterian teaching service will embody and illustrate the principles of Presbyterian doctrine, polity and worship. With independency of organization will go diversity of methods.

The effects of these changes will be most beneficial.

First, There will be a great improvement of both services as to numbers, interest and spiritual benefit. Instead of the diverse and conflicting interests of church and Sunday-school, we shall have harmony and coöperation.

Second, By bringing the church officers into constant contact with the children in their official capacity and yet in the pleasantest relations, there will be developed in our youth love and reverence for their rulers, and habitual obedience to their authority. Especially will the minister be to them a shepherd whose voice they know and whom they follow.

Third, The teaching service, instead of weakening loyalty for the church, will strengthen church ties. When the officers, government, worship and teachings of the two services shall be as nearly identical as the different conditions will permit, then will the one be indeed a training-school for the other. There will be developed in our youth knowledge of, and pride in, the church, her doctrines, her order and her history; and then will they delight in her worship. The church will no more be to them a strange and unloved institution.

Fourth, The efficiency of our teachers will be vastly increased. There will be more and better to chose from. Many of the very class from which teachers should come, the parents, have hitherto stayed away from the school. They have confided their children's most precious interests, in many cases, to a lot of incompetent, giddy, unsanctified girls. Again, the examinations before the Session will elevate the standard of our teachers. Nor will it decrease their number, for the office will then command enough respect to attract worthy candidates. It is now entirely too cheap. Moreover, with no third service to attend, our teachers could devote their Sunday evenings to the preparation of the lesson of the following week. Thus three causes will promote the efficiency of our teachers: a greater number and better persons to chose from, a higher standard, and more time for preparation.

It has long been a matter of grave doubt with many as to whether we have any scriptural warrant for our independent, extra-ecclesiastical "Sunday-school." But about this church "teaching service" there can be no debate. "Gather the people together, men, and women, and children, and the stranger that is within thy gates, that they may hear, and that they may learn, and fear the Lord your God, and observe to do all the words of this law." "Ezra the priest brought the law before the congregation both of men and women, all that could hear with understanding. And he read therein." Then his assistants "caused the people to understand the law: and the people stood in their place. So they read in the book in the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading." Here you have the model teaching service, with the priest for superintendent and the Levites for assistant teachers.

E. C. MURRAY.

SHAKSPERE-BACON REDIVIVUS.

THE first suggestion of the Baconian authorship of Shakspeare's plays appeared January, 1856, in *Putnam's Monthly*, and emanated from the pen of Miss Delia Bacon, a gifted teacher, an eloquent lecturer on history and literature, and a woman of great but erratic genius. Her article in *Putnam* was followed a few years afterwards by a more elaborate argument against Shakspeare in "The Philosophy of Shakspeare's Plays Unfolded." Such a storm of derision greeted the appearance of this book that the author's mind, already impaired by

extreme poverty, anxiety and monomania, gave way, and a bright but misguided intellect was lost forever to the world of letters.

The absurdities of Miss Bacon's book were a severe blow to her theory, and the Baconian question was soon relegated to obscurity. But in an epoch which gives birth to a man who would subject religion to rigid natural law, and to another who would abolish poverty, no novel theory can long remain unheralded. The Baconian theory, therefore, has had many advocates during the last twenty years; but as yet no prominent Shakspearean scholar has entered the lists as a special champion of the Baconian authorship of Shakspeare. The most daring special pleading for Bacon is found in the last important contribution on this subject, "The Great Cryptogram: Francis Bacon's Cipher in the so-called Shakspeare Plays," by Ignatius Donnelly, of Minnesota. Ever since 1884, when it was announced that Mr. Donnelly, the author of the two sensational geological works, "Ragnarok" and "Atlantis," had discovered in Shakspeare's plays a cipher revealing the whole story of their Baconian authorship, the unfortunate ex-congressman has been assailed on all sides by the gibes and taunts of the newspaper men. Such a startling revelation of course called for immediate confirmation; but the unraveling of the cipher was a work of no little difficulty, and the harassed ex-congressman from Minnesota was forced to toil laboriously to satisfy the excited curiosity of the literary public. Ever and anon, however, the public excitement was whetted by the appearance of articles giving hints about the cipher, and thus judiciously advertising the forthcoming book. At last the book made its appearance in May, 1888, and the excitement over it has steadily subsided since that time. The reasons are obvious, as we hope the sequel will show.

The very title of the ponderous volume is a misnomer, as the great cryptogram, or cipher narrative, occupies only about one-third of the book. By far the larger part of the work is devoted to the pro-Bacon arguments for the authorship of the plays. These constitute Book I., styled by the author "The Argument." Book II., "The Demonstration," unfolds the intricacies of the cipher. Book III., the last, contains brief sketches of prominent Baconians (the author modestly omits himself), and a slight excursus on "Other Masks of Bacon," in which Mr. Donnelly proves (to his own satisfaction) that Bacon wrote "Montaigne's Essays," "Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy," and fifteen plays sometimes attributed to Shakspeare, but not included in ordinary editions of his works. To these must be added a set of poems signed

“Ignoto,” a work on ciphers, all the works of Marlowe, and probably those of Marston, Massinger, Middleton, Greene, Shirley, and Webster. The Shakspeare plays, and presumably the foregoing, were, according to Mr. Donnelly, the “works of his (Bacon’s) recreation.” If so, he must have enjoyed the “secular leisures of Methuselah.” If we add acknowledged works to the above stupendous list, Bacon would be an author of not only unparalleled genius, but of a fecundity rivaling the prolific Lope de Vega with his twenty-one millions of verses.

Mr. Donnelly reaches such an *ultima thule* of absurdity in this part of his book that we feel like applying to him his own maxim, “False in one, false in all,” and treating the great cryptogram as a ponderous joke or the raving of a deluded enthusiast. For the sake of the question involved, however, we shall endeavor to give the subject careful consideration. As the cipher narrative is distinct and independent, we shall reserve it for future consideration, and confine ourselves at present to Books I. and III.

The first glance at the book awakens the inquiry: “Why divide the work into an argument and a demonstration?” If the demonstration demonstrates, what need of further argument? This query the author anticipates, and answers by saying that much of interest is developed in the argument which will serve to illumine the cipher. The reader who masters the intricacies of the cipher will not be disposed to quarrel with the author for the abundance of irrelevant, but often interesting, matter with which he beguiles him. Other beguilements lure the unwary into the labyrinthine mazes of the cipher. Attractive, clear type, well-arranged subject-matter, convenient headings, and a very large number of refreshing quotations carefully culled from good authors and judiciously interspersed with the author’s own work, go far towards exciting one’s interest. Mr. Donnelly’s style, too, is clear, and often forcible, though illumined here and there by the glare of a lurid rhetoric. For example, speaking of Miss Bacon’s detractors, he says: “Their asinine hoofs beat upon the great, sensitive brain of the shrinking woman, and every blow was answered by a shriek.” But the style, of course, sinks into insignificance in comparison with the argument, to the consideration of which we now turn. As might naturally be expected, Mr. Donnelly first attempts to prove that Shakspeare did not write the plays, and then proceeds to demonstrate that Bacon did. Destruction being always easier than construction, Part I. is naturally much more forceful than Part II.

The first anti-Shaksperean argument adduced is the startling discrepancy between the author and the man. This incongruity has often been noted by both Shakspereans and anti-Shakspereans. "I cannot marry the man to his verse," says Emerson in substance, and Furness, the greatest Shaksperean in America, echoes the same sentiment. But the same contrast is often observable in other authors. It is only the more remarkable in Shakspere's case, because his genius so far transcends that of any other author. The abandoned and profligate Colton was the author of the highly moral aphorisms in *Lacon*. The melancholy Cowper penned the merry lines in *John Gilpin*. But it is needless to multiply examples. They will occur to every reader of literature. But what are the main points of difference between the author and the man, according to Mr. Donnelly?

Shakspere, the man, was born in a vulgar environment, was raised in a "bookless neighborhood," had few or no school advantages, was a youth of sottish and otherwise irregular habits, marries in an extraordinary way, becomes horse-holder in a London theatre, then call-boy, then "supe" on the stage, then manager, by judicious financiering secures a fortune of \$25,000 a year, purchases a home in his native place, and there dies from the effects of a drunken bout. Add to this that he is a skinflint, that he attempts to enter the gentry by false representations, that he fails to educate his children (Judith couldn't write her name), that he shows no respect for the memory of his father, that his very name is vulgar, being an Englishing of Jacques Pierre, *i. e.*, Jack Peter, and that his known chirography is most erratic, five crazy-looking autographs constituting all that is left us of his handwriting. If we accept the above biography, well might we exclaim with Mr. Donnelly:

"What a thrice double ass
Was I to take this drunkard for a god,
And worship this dull fool!"

But we do not accept it. In the distorted mind of the ex-congressman from Minnesota probabilities become certainties, and mere fiction assumes the guise of a high grade of probability. But we have not exhausted his anti-Shaksperean diatribe. Where is Shakspere's correspondence, where are his note-books (it was an age of commonplace books), his manuscripts, and his library? Why doesn't he own his plays, and why are the authentic representations of him so woodenly inexpressive?

Now look at the other picture. Shakspere, the author, abounds in

classic allusions and references to the untranslated works of French, Italian and Spanish authors. Besides, scholarly words, such as "evitate," "legerity," occur in his works, and an encyclopedic range of information characterizes them. Finally, the writer of the plays shows such intimate acquaintance with the law that he must have been a member of the bar.

Such, in a nutshell, are Mr. Donnelly's anti-Shaksperean arguments. Though they contain a few new points and are stated in convenient form, the case against Shakspere is not so forcefully argued as it is by Holmes in the "Authorship of Shakspere," or even by Appleton Morgan in his "Shakespeare Myth." But the author, doubtless, is so secure of his cipher that he deems lengthy argumentation needless. Let us examine Shakspere, the author, first. With due allowance for the extravagant astuteness of commentators, there are a great many classic allusions in the plays. But as most of the classics were then translated, might not a reader of an absorptive and assimilative mind glean much from translations, and thus make quite a display of his classic acquirements? We know how liberally Shakspere used North's translation of Plutarch. Even in the references to untranslated authors, by no means so numerous nor so well authenticated, might we not *assume* (Baconians ought not to quarrel with assumptions) that Shakspere gathered much from the learned classical scholar Ben Jonson? A superficial knowledge of the modern languages was not strange in cosmopolitan London. Surely the French in Henry V. is not extraordinary. One need not be a Mezzofanti to acquire Shakspere's knowledge of the languages.

As to his legal lore even the unlegal reader of Shakspere must see that it is largely confined to law terms. Cannot the unscientific writer use accurately a few scientific terms for literary purposes and yet be unable to explain the precession of the equinoxes? As suggested by Mr. Wilkes (*Shakspere from an American Point of View*, p. 87,) Shakspere might have gained all his legal lore by reading elementary law-books, attending the courts at Stratford, and frequenting the Inns of the Court in London. Besides, he was an owner of real estate and was known to have been engaged in law-suits. Lawyers, too, disagree as to Shakspere's legal acquirements. Note page 116, where the author's friend, Senator Davis, of Minnesota, remarks that, though Bacon was a Lord Chancellor, there is not in the plays "a single phrase, word, or application of any principle peculiar to the chancery," and another lawyer and friend attempts to refute this statement.

As in the law, so in every other department Shakspeare's acquirements, admittedly great, are grossly exaggerated by those specialists who eviscerate the plays to support their peculiar hobbies. It is passing strange that Mr. Donnelly, while emphasizing the sweep and accuracy of Shakspeare's mind, takes no note of the crass ignorance of the great dramatist. Could Bacon, the much-lauded historian of Henry VII., have been guilty of the notorious inaccuracies in the historical plays? What shall we say, too, of Spanish rapiers on Roman soldiers, of a convent at Ephesus before the introduction of Christianity, and of countless other anachronisms in the plays? Shakspeare, the actor, might naturally set the seal of the Elizabethan age upon his plays, but would Bacon, the scholar, have been guilty of such sciolism? Bacon is rejected "by a sort of intellectual alibi."

The omission of this point in the controversy is of a piece with the characteristic unfairness of the whole book. Let us see how Mr. Donnelly treats Ben Jonson's testimony in favor of the Shakspearean authorship.

Ben Jonson, honest, sturdy, cultivated, the most gentlemanly of the Elizabethan dramatists, Shakspeare's intimate friend and boon companion, writes a long poetic eulogy on the dramatist in the Great Folio of 1623. This contains all the plays except "Pericles" and "Two Noble Kinsmen," which are only partly by Shakspeare. Could "rare Ben Jonson" have been the partner to a fraud? Yet so Mr. Donnelly would have us believe. Let us see how the intellectual contortionist writhes in the presence of this problem. He solves it glibly in six pages, while he devotes twenty-three to wondering queries about Shakspeare's lost library and MSS., of which every one is confessedly ignorant. But it is easier to theorize about the unknown and unknowable than to refute the resistless logic of stubborn facts. The author not only impugns Ben Jonson's testimony, but has the audacity to confront his impeachment with the clear, frank eyes and noble intellectual brow of the author of *Sejanus*.

Mr. Donnelly admits that "if there was any secret in connection with the author of the plays, Ben Jonson, as Bacon's friend, as play-actor and play-writer, doubtless knew it," and adds: "And it is upon Ben Jonson's testimony that the claims of William Shakspeare of Stratford principally rests." From his own point of view, therefore, this testimony is extremely significant. Let us see how he deals with it. Facing the Droeshout engraving of Shakspeare, which first appears in the Folio of 1623, Ben Jonson writes the following verses:

"This Figure, that thou seest put,
 It was for gentle Shakespeare cut;
 Wherein the Graver had a strife
 With nature, to out-doo the life:
 O, could he but have drawne his wit
 As well in brasse, as he hath hit
 His face, the Print would then surpasse
 All that was ever writ in brasse,
 But, since he cannot, Reader, looke
 Not on his Picture, but his Booke."

These simple lines hide a deep mystery according to Mr. Donnelly. "Gentle" is a covert sneer at Shakspeare's pretensions to gentility. As the engraving is not a work of art, "out-doo the life" pokes fun at the artist, and, indirectly, at Shakspeare. But the acme of absurdity is reached in the comment on the lines, "O could . . . But since." Here it is: "That is to say, his wit drawn *in brass* would surpass, *in brass*, all that was ever written. Is not this another way of intimating that only a brazen-faced man, like Shakspeare, would have had the impudence to claim the authorship of plays which were not written by him?" In the name of the prophet—figs! And yet Ben Jonson says of Shakspeare, "I loved the man, and do honor his memory, on this side idolatry, as much as any."

The eulogistic verses in the first folio (too long and too difficult to be quoted entirely by Mr. Donnelly) are inscribed by Ben Jonson "To the memory of my beloved, the author, Mr. William Shakespeare, and what he has left us." These last five words, says the author, couldn't refer to the plays, for "we speak of the memory of persons, not of productions." "What did William Shakspeare leave behind him that held any connection with the plays? Was it the real author, Francis Bacon?" Could anything be more puerile? Yes; hear this. Jonson says: "Thou art alive still while thy book doth live." Our astute commentator says this couldn't refer to Shakspeare, for he was dead! So, in the lines,

"What a sight it were
 To see thee in our waters yet appear,"

the last two words would be absurd if applied to a dead man, but significant if applied to Bacon, who was alive in 1623. Again: Jonson in his eulogy thinks Shakspeare superior to "all that *insolent Greece or haughty Rome* sent forth," and in his "Discoveries," printed 1640, after Bacon's death, says that the great Lord Chancellor "is he that hath filled up all numbers, and performed that in our tongue which may

be compared or preferred either to *insolent Greece* or *haughty Rome*. To the ex-congressman from Minnesota the repetition of this remarkable collocation of epithet and substantive is fraught with significance. Is it remarkable, though, that a pedant like Ben Jonson should repeat a pet phrase? What Jonson means by "filled all numbers" we cannot undertake to say, unless, with Spedding, the recent biographer of Bacon, he places an unduly high estimate upon Bacon's acknowledged poems. "We can even imagine," says Mr. Donnelly, (his imagination is extravagantly fertile,) "that in the lines—

'And though thou hadst small Latine and less Greek,'

Ben Jonson has a jest at the man (Bacon) who employed him to write these verses." This, forsooth, because Jonson was a better classical scholar than Bacon! This unique disposition of testimony I have given in full. The Shakspeareans may still rest on Ben Jonson's evidence. This is the only direct testimony that Mr. Donnelly mentions. Yet Meres, a contemporary of Shakspeare and an A. M. of Cambridge, refers to twelve plays and to the sonnets. The curious reader is referred to Mr. Ingleby's "Centurie of Prayse" for other witnesses. This kind of testimony, which the Baconians so slightly refer to, or so dishonestly handle, is that upon which mainly rests the authorship of the gospels and all the known classics. All this minimizes the force of the objection that Shakspeare doesn't own his plays or mention them in his will. Why should they be owned in any other way except by the affixing of his name to the printed editions? This is done in most cases. Perhaps he had already disposed of his plays when he made his will. Copyright, too, being unknown there was no need of mentioning them.

Need we now retrace our steps to examine the lurid picture of Shakspeare the man? Its very extravagance arouses suspicion. Many of the details, such as the handwriting, are immaterial. The drunkenness is grossly exaggerated. It is not even certain that Shakspeare drank freely. As to the coat-of-arms question, Mr. Donnelly says, "William Shakspeare had no more title to his coat-of-arms than he has to the great dramas which bear his name," and also that these arms were never granted. When the great "Cryptogram" appeared in London, May 1, "the Pursuivant-at-Arms published an official statement to the effect that the records of his office show the grant of a coat-of-arms to John Shakespeare in 1596!" Fact *vs.* fiction again.

Shakspeare was a skinflint, because he was rigidly business-like in his money transactions. But it would be a wearisome task to knock down all Mr. Donnelly's men of straw, so we pass by minor points to

say a few words about Shakspeare's education. It is true that we know little of his early training in books, but neither do we know when or where Chaucer was educated. What his acquirements were can be gathered only from the learning he displays in his works. The knowledge, too, displayed by Shakspeare is such as may well have been acquired by a receptive mind of exceptional reproductive power. The same line of argument will apply to his linguistic acquirements in foreign tongues, in tavern billingsgate, and in exquisite London English.

We have dwelt at some length upon the anti-Shakspearean arguments, because, if they are proved to be worthless or insufficient, the pro-Bacon arguments are needless. We shall, therefore, pass over them lightly. Briefly put they are these: Bacon was "myriad-minded," being a poet, a philosopher, a historian, a lawyer and a scholar. Besides having written acknowledged poems, he was "a concealed poet," a wit and a humorist, a traveller, a linguist and a close observer of nature, thinking nothing too mean for reflection. Furthermore, when Bacon was poor and needy, the plays appear. When he rises in power and influence under James I. they cease, and in 1623, two years after his fall, the "Great Folio" appears. This is not all. The geography of the plays is Baconian. The author of the plays and Bacon are at one in politics, religion and aims. Bacon, too, was a known lover of plays, and shows from his letters that he has a secret means of income. As an irresistible *pièce de resistance*, the author closes with two hundred pages of parallelisms between Bacon's works and those of the so-called Shakspeare. These embrace similarity or identity of expression, metaphor, opinion, quotations, use of unusual words and expressions, errors, studies, characters, and style—a most formidable catalogue, but a monument of wasted industry if the pro-Shakspearean arguments are not overthrown.

Let us examine some of the Baconian arguments. Was Bacon a poet? If so, it is strange that literary critics scarcely notice his acknowledged poems. Can they be ignorant of his poetic powers? If we examine the specimens of his poetry given by Mr. Donnelly (pp. 127-132), presumably his best, our unbiassed judgment must rank him lower than any good magazine poet of to-day. Isn't it odd that his acknowledged poems are so immensely inferior to such unacknowledged poems as the "Merchant of Venice" and "As You Like It"? Is this another case of "intellectual alibi?" Bacon is said to have attempted court masks, yet in comparison with those of Ben Jonson, they have attracted no attention. But Bacon, say his advocates, shows a

strong poetic faculty in his prose. Wouldn't the same line of argument prove that the brilliantly metaphorical Hawthorne was a poet? The contemporaneousness of Bacon's life with the appearance of the plays is at best only a singular coincidence.

Much comfort, of course, the Baconians derive from the fact that Bacon calls himself "a concealed poet." Yes; so effectually concealed that the general acknowledgment of the fact was delayed until the ramping Baconians took up the cudgels in defense of his poetic reputation. Sir Tobie Matthew, too, Bacon's Boswell and his "other self," appeals mightily to their acute appreciation of the mysterious. Sir Tobie, in a letter to Bacon, says: "I shall give you measure for measure." This, forsooth, is a hint of the Baconian authorship of the play! Again: Sir Tobie, in the postscript of a letter from the continent to Bacon, says: "The most prodigious wit that ever I knew of my nation, and of this side of the sea, is of your lordship's name, though he be known by another." The last six words, printed in small caps, refer, it is assumed, to Shakspeare. Might we not *assume* that Sir Tobie refers to one of Francis Bacon's numerous titles? But we need not assume anything. In the absence of other proof we have no right to refer the words to Shakspeare simply because we don't know what they mean. But Sir Tobie is not the only confidant of Bacon. Mr. Donnelly's disreputable and boorish Shakspeare must have been in the secret. Edmund Spenser suspects it. Ben Jonson knew it. The printers of the Folio, on account of the complicated cipher, must have been suspicious. Green, the dramatist, alludes to it. Besides, the wives of all these men must have heard of it. Could a secret known or suspected by so many have been kept, not only during Bacon's lifetime, but over two hundred years after his death, and this too in spite of the microscopic study of Shakspeare?

In treating the geography of the plays, the author makes much of the fact that Stratford, Shakspeare's birthplace, is never mentioned, while Bacon's home, St. Albans, occurs twenty-three times. The reason is obvious. Self-effacement is the first law of the great dramatist. Besides, St. Albans is a prominent military centre in the Wars of the Roses, and would, therefore, naturally occur in "Henry VI." and such plays. But the puerilities of the author excite impatience. If we grant that the religion, the politics and the aims of Bacon and Shakspeare were the same, this would not prove that they were one and the same person. Here, as elsewhere, the author indulges in his usual faulty argumentation. But we must pass on to the parallelisms to

which Baconians attach so much importance. Parallelisms, it must be premised, are deceptive. It is said that in Pope's translation of the *Odyssey*, the astute critics could not detect where Pope left off and his third rate coadjutors began. Again, single words, expressions and metaphors wrenched from their environment, give us but little idea of an author's style. He must be examined as a whole. The Baconians, therefore, who make so much of parallelisms, are guilty of a well-known logical fallacy. Because a number of metaphors and words are alike in Bacon and Shakspeare, therefore their style, which is something more than the sum total of these expressions, is alike. Again, as the number of words then was much smaller than now, the number of similar expressions in two authors would be greater. But after all, the parallelisms are often very far-fetched, a few striking ones, like "discourse of reason," being offset by many such as this: "The fire maketh them soft and tender" (Bacon). "Soft and tender flattery" (Shakspeare). As the metaphor is nothing more than the illumination of the abstract by correlating it with the concrete, it is not surprising that Bacon and Shakspeare should each make comparisons with objects drawn from the world of sense. As the most forceful metaphors, too, are drawn from the commonest objects, we cannot wonder that Bacon and Shakspeare, both imaginative and possessed of wonderful comparative faculties, should compare things with the hands, the feet, plants, the air, the sun. In the identical opinions, by far the larger part are those that would naturally be held by all men of sense. The force of the author's seventy to eighty identical opinions is greatly minimized by the fact that most of them are such as these: "Both had a high admiration for equanimity in misfortune;" "Both refer to the effects of terror upon the rising of the hair."

The same line of argument applies to the identical quotations. As to the studies, it is not singular that two contemporaries should be fond of gardening, music, the study of medicine, and the character of Julius Cæsar. Neither is it strange that errors common to the age should be found in both. It is true, the author says, these errors are peculiar to Bacon, but when he cites as peculiarly Baconian such as belief in spontaneous generation and the toad-stoné, one naturally becomes suspicious.

As to character, both were industrious, thorough students, used commonplace books, were egotistical (is this true of Shakspeare?), had splendid taste and great powers of observation, were wise, tolerant, benevolent, witty, self-constrained, good, and had high aims. All this

admitted, what does it prove? Both were secretive, says Mr. Donnelly, and then proceeds to derive Shakspeare's secretiveness from the existence of Bacon's cipher in the plays!

Most critics recoil from the task of pigeon-holing with epithets the varied style of Shakspeare. Not so, however, with the ex-congressman from Minnesota. In comparing the two men, he says that both were geniuses, both coined new words (the general tendency in the Elizabethan age), both were pleonastic (another general tendency of the exuberant renaissance), both were given to aphoristic utterances (every writer of note nutshells his great thoughts), and both were given to catalogues of words. But do these peculiarities constitute style? Again, of course Mr. Donnelly mingles much slag with a few grains of ore. He gives many interesting examples from Bacon to show his tendency to use triple forms, such as "studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability;" but when we come to the same forms from Shakspeare, the author sometimes manipulates his quotations in order to bolster up his views. Thus (p. 496) "as Cæsar loved me, I weep for him; as he was fortunate, I rejoice at it; as he was valiant, I honor him; but as he was ambitious, I slew him." The author calls this a triple form, and numbers the first three clauses, but not the fourth. Again: Bacon's triple forms have a mathematical nicety of adjustment unknown to the splendid freedom of Shakspeare's diction. There are triplicates and triplicates. On p. 501, the author contemptuously disposes of the euphonic test of Prof. Taverner, a distinguished elocutionist. As every writer has a rhythm peculiar to himself, this test is important. For the benefit of the reader who may not have access to Prof. Taverner's remarks, we make a short quotation from them in Wilkes's "Shakspeare from an American point of view" (p. 443). These remarks are not noticed by Mr. Donnelly. "Where," says Prof. Taverner, "can we find in Bacon passages admitting of guttural vibrations, embodying the sentiments of scorn, pride, spleen, aversion, such as may be found in *Coriolanus*, and *Timon of Athens*? . . . Where the possibilities of the aspirate, in its several features of heartfelt earnestness growing out of a variety of emotions? Where the expression of sarcasm and irony, as it attaches to *Constance* in the midst of her maternal grief? . . . To *Margaret of Anjou*, in her panther-like rage? We might as reasonably demand the same throughout nearly the whole scale of the passions." The same writer conclusively proves that the musical ear and emotional natures of Shakspeare and Bacon were entirely different. With the parallelisms closes Book I.

Book III. is a very superficial collection of odds and ends.

Among the Baconians we looked in vain for any prominent Shakspearean scholar. Most of the names belong to the list of the great unknown in letters. In "Other Masks of Bacon," the author uses in an extremely diluted form the same kind of arguments that he applies to prove the Baconian authorship. As usual, he proves too much, and thus destroys the force of all his previous argumentation. An *ex parte* vindication of Bacon's ingratitude and corruption is a fitting close to the whole book.

Book III. is a serious blot on the work, and completely effaces the good impression that may have been produced by Book I. That the same age produced the greatest dramatist in the world and the greatest philosopher of the age is wonderful enough. That these two are one, surpasses belief. What shall we say, then, of the *pot-pourri* which the author labels "Bacon," in his chapter on "Other Masks of Bacon"?

Mr. Donnelly's arguments will weaken the Baconian cause appreciably by making it ridiculous in the eyes of every intelligent, unprejudiced student. But nothing will ever shake the faith of the Bacon worshippers. The votaries at his shrine seem to have

"Eaten on the insane root
That takes the reason prisoner."

W. S. CURRELL.

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

LE CONTE'S EVOLUTION AND ITS RELATION TO RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

EVOLUTION AND ITS RELATION TO RELIGIOUS THOUGHT. *By Joseph Le Conte, Professor of Geology and Natural History in the University of California.* New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1888.

The author of this book is an evolutionist of the most thoroughgoing type. He has faith in his evolutionary hypothesis, and such faith as transforms hypothesis into established science. Lamarck, the author of the *Vestiges*, Darwin, Spencer, are but pioneers of the now perfected system set forth in this book—a system not born of yesterday, but taught for some decades by the author in the discharge of his official duties. So satisfied is he of the claims of his hypothesis to take rank as a science that he says, “the law of evolution is as certain as the law of gravitation. Nay, it is far more certain. The nexus between *successive events in time* (causation) is far more certain than the nexus between *co-existent objects in space* (gravitation). The former is a *necessary truth*, the latter is usually classed as a contingent truth.” “I have,” he adds, “used, and may continue to use, the term evolutionist, but if so it is only in deference to the views of many intelligent persons who do not yet see the certainty of the law” (p. 66). In the hands of our author Newton’s discovery of the law of gravitation is of small account, as it is a mere contingency (that is, a thing that may be, or may not be) that every portion of matter in the universe attracts every other with a force varying directly as its mass, and indirectly as the square of its distance. Our author’s perfected science of evolution is far above the science of astronomy, which some men entitled to some consideration have been in the habit of designating one of “the exact sciences.” This new science can claim as one of its characteristics *causation*, while astronomy has nothing to boast of save *gravitation!* That is, *gravitation* is outside the pale of *causation!* This is certainly a marvellous statement for a professor of science in a modern university; and one is all the more inclined to marvel at it as coming from the author of this evolutionary scheme, for he claims that the law of evolution reigns throughout the empire of the inorganic kosmos, and that under it the orbs of heaven have been evolved. One is curious to know how the evolution of the different sidereal systems has come about, if gravitation be destitute of causal efficiency. This, however, in passing. Let us see what the author’s theory is:

“1, All inorganic forms, without exception, have originated by a process of evolution; 2, All organic or living forms within the *limits of observation*, *i. e.*, every living thing, has become what we now see by a gradual natural process, *i. e.*, by evolution; 3, All taxonomic (class) groups, except species, have undoubtedly become what we now see them by a gradual process, following the laws of evolution, and therefore presumably by a natural process of evolution; 4, By artificial means, breeds, races, etc., very similar, at least in many respects, to species, are seen to

arise by a gradual natural process, *i. e.*, by evolution; 5, In some instances at least, natural species are observed to pass into one another by intermediate links in such wise that we are forced to conclude that they have been formed by a natural process."

Such is the basis of our author's theory, and taking his stand upon it he asks:

"May we not, then, safely generalize and make the law universal? Is not this a sufficient ground for confident induction? Even though some facts are still inexplicable, is that a sufficient reason for withholding assent to a theory which explains so much? In all induction" [he proceeds] "we first establish a law provisionally from the observation of a comparatively few facts, and then extend it over a multitude of facts not included in the original induction. If it explains these also, the law is verified. The law of gravitation was first based on the observation of a few facts, and then verified by its explanation of nearly all the facts of celestial motion. There are some outstanding facts of celestial motion still unexplained, but we do not, therefore, doubt the law of gravitation. The same principle applied in biology ought to establish the law of evolution, for it explains all the facts of biology as no other law can." (Pp. 63, 64.)

Now accepting, for the time, his own statement of the facts to be accounted for, the question is, do the facts stated warrant the author's generalization? Is it true that our evolutionary biologist has, in the facts as narrated by himself, the same scientific warrant for his generalization as Newton had for his immortal epoch-making law? Why, the qualifications interspersed throughout the essential *data* of the basis on which he founds his hypothesis discredit his induction. Science discards in its account of facts such terms as "presumably," "very similar," "at least in many respects," "in some instances at least." Artificially produced "breeds," which are merely similar "in many respects to species," cannot be accepted as a satisfactory basis for a scientific biological generalization regarding the origin of species. The facts on which Newton founded were not of this equivocal character. They were not simply "very similar," or "in many respects" alike. They were exactly identical in kind.

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 "The very law that moulds a tear,
 And makes it trickle from its source,
 The same preserves the earth a sphere,
 And guides the planets in their course."

The facts revealed in the fall of an apple from its parent stem to the earth were precisely the same *in kind* as those revealed in the continuous fall of the moon and the planets along the curves of their orbits. There can be no such gaps pointed out in the series of facts relied on as the basis of the astronomical induction, as our author is compelled to confess, by the very language he has felt it necessary to employ in the description of his biological *data*. The parallel won't hold, and the claim to scientific rank based upon it in behalf of evolution must be dismissed on the merits.

But is there no truth at all in our author's account of the biological facts of which he treats? This is not charged. What is alleged against his speculation is, that there is no evidence of such a law of evolution as that for which he claims scientific authority. Against his hypothesis it is contended that the fact of the evolution of existing organic forms from their respective germs does not warrant the generalization that they are all derived from a common ancestral form through in-

intermediate modifications. There is revealed in the facts adduced a law of progress, but not a law of derivation and blood-relationship. It is perfectly true, as evolutionists say, that the history of life on our globe, as recorded in its strata, reveals a law of progress from lower to higher forms; but all this may be true, and yet it does not follow that the advance from lower to higher forms has been effected through the transmutation of organisms of a lower type into organisms of a higher organic structure. There is evidence unquestionable of progress in the series of living forms which have succeeded each other, but there is not one particle of proof that this progress has been achieved by derivation and transmutation. When the advocates of evolution are called upon for proof of such relationship existing among the members of the series, they are constrained to have recourse to analogy and conjecture, and to make drafts upon their imagination in regard to what may have occurred in the course of the different transitions through which the earth, with its freight of life, must have passed during the several geologic ages. That this book is not an exception to this method of defence and vindication is too manifest to require a lengthened elucidation.

To begin at the beginning, our author takes "the egg as a type of evolution."

"Every one," he says, "is familiar with the main facts connected with the development of an egg. We all know that it begins as a microscopic germ-cell, then grows into an egg, then organizes into a chick, and finally grows into a cock; and that the whole process follows some general, well-recognized law. Now, this process is evolution. It is more; it is *the* type of all evolution. It is that from which we get our idea of evolution. Whenever and wherever we find a process of change *more or less* resembling this, and following laws *similar* to those determining the development of an egg, we call it evolution." (P. 3.)

Now, without remarking upon the unscientific character of the terms marked in *italics*—terms which are utterly out of place in scientific discussions—issue is at once joined with our author, and his chosen type of evolution shall furnish the battlefield. He begins with the egg. With all due deference, he shall not be permitted to begin with the egg, even in its incipient germ-cell form. No mortal eye ever discovered the germ-cell of an egg, or the egg itself, which did not come from an antecedent, parental, full-grown organism. Eggs are not orphans. They are not found lying about loose on the theatre of life. An egg, fitted for the process of development referred to by our author, is still less likely to be found without an adequate ancestry. "Every one," he says, "is familiar with the main facts connected with the development of an egg." The main facts—the determining facts in this controversy—are facts which precede and condition the formation of the egg. Not only must there be a parent organism, fully developed, to give being or birth to the egg, but there must be an arrangement for the fertilization of the egg. Apart from such antecedents, the egg would never "organize" into either "chick" or "cock." These are biological facts that cannot be gainsaid, and they raise a grave question for our evolutionary friends. The question they raise is, 'Which is first in the evolutionary chain, the perfect organism or the egg?' This question, of course, admits of but one answer—the mature organism gives being to the egg, and without it the egg had never been. This answer mars our author's chosen type. If the case of the egg is to determine the question at issue, his whole scheme is placed in imminent peril. According to our author, the development of the egg into a "chick" or "cock" presents us with the type of the genesis and develop-

ment of the whole chain of life, from the mollusk to the man. The humblest phase of life appears first, and the highest last. But according to the biological facts presented in his boasted type, the perfect organism antedates and gives being to the egg. If such be the law of the type, it must also be the law of the antitype. Our author's antitype, if his type means anything, must be the whole ascending series of organized life, from its first manifestations to the appearance of the human form divine. The law of the egg must have ruled throughout the series. But the law of the egg is that the perfect organism precedes the egg. Scientists talk of protoplasm and bioplasm, and the terms are not only not objectionable, but convenient, in the discussion of the science of life; but they must be used with a full understanding that there is no such thing as either protoplasm or bioplasm apart from an antecedent living mature organism.

To apply the principle now established: we are entitled to claim that, in every instance throughout the progressional series of the biological forms that have come into being on our globe, the mature organism appeared first. First the hen and then the egg, and, first in the chain of *specific* life, the perfect *specific* organism. If the case of the egg is to rule, a species could not spring from anything save a perfect organic form, possessing all the specific qualities and distinctive characteristics of its future progeny.

Equally at fault is our author's argument from the tadpole:

"It is well known," he observes, "that the embryo or larva of a frog or toad, when first hatched, is a legless, tail-swimming, water-breathing, gill-breathing animal. It is essentially a fish, and would be so classed if it remained in this condition. The fish retains permanently this form, but the frog passes on. Next, it forms one pair and then another pair of legs; and meanwhile it begins to breathe also by lungs and by gills; *i. e.*, both air and water. Now, the lower forms of amphibians, such as sireon, menobranchus, siren, etc., retain permanently this form, and are, therefore, called perennibranchs, but the frog passes on. Then the gills gradually dry up as the lungs develop, and they now breathe wholly by lungs, but still retain the tail. Now, this is the permanent, mature condition of many amphibians, such as the triton, the salamander, etc., which are, therefore, called caducibranchs; but the frog still passes on. Finally, it loses the tail, or rather the tail is absorbed, and its material used in further development, and it becomes a perfect frog, the highest order (*anoura*) of this class." (P. 132.)

This is another of the typical facts adduced in support of evolution. The order of the stages in the development of the embryo of the frog, our author holds—

"Is undoubtedly the order of succession of forms in geological times; *i. e.*, in the phylogenic [racial] series. . . . Fishes first appeared in the Devonian and Upper Silurian in very reptilian, or rather amphibian, forms. Then in the Carboniferous, fishes still continuing, there appeared the lowest—*i. e.*, most fish-like,—forms of amphibians. *These were undoubtedly perennibranchs.* In the Permian and Triassic, higher forms appeared, which were certainly caducibranch. Finally, only in the Tertiary, so far as we yet know, do the highest form (*ansura*) appear. The general similarity of the three series is complete." (P. 133.)

Here, then, are the so-called typical facts, and their antitypical geological facts brought face to face, and we are left to draw the inference that they furnish evidence of evolution, while all that the author has achieved, when he has set them in array over against one another, is, as he is constrained to confess, that he has pointed out "the general similarity of the three series." It cannot be necessary to point out the wideness of the gap that yawns between the facts and the inference in this anal-

ogy. Similarity in the order of succession between the stages in the development of the embryo of the frog and the organic forms of the geological times, is a very slender basis for the sweeping generalization at which our author has arrived. Similarity in the order of occurrence does not prove 'ontogenic,' or genetically connected succession of organic forms by derivation. Till this connection has been proved by facts, evolution must be treated as a mere unverified hypothesis.

But to return to the case of the tadpole; it will be observed that our author, as in the case of the egg, begins with the embryo. This, as we have already seen, is an unscientific procedure. It is not the starting-point fixed by nature. Nature says that the perfectly organized frog precedes the embryo. Had there been no frog-spawn there had been no tadpole, and had there been no frog there had been no frog-spawn. If these typical processes—of the egg and the tadpole—are an index to the order of nature in the genesis of the various organic forms that have taken their place in the geological æons, the proper inference must be that the higher forms must have appeared first. The order indicated is not, as evolution requires, spawn, tadpole, gill-breathing animal, lung-breathing and gill-breathing animal, and lastly frog. On the contrary, the order is the perfect frog, and then its progeny developed after its kind, with the parent as the standard and goal of the process. In this process there is no break, and no missing link. There is a physical antecedent, and a physical consequent, and an indubitable, not an imaginary, causal relation of the former to the latter. These elements of the types are all wanting in the anti-types, and their absence justifies us in rejecting the evolutionary scheme so confidently propounded in this book.

Let us look at these breaks. In the first place, and at the very outset of the evolutionary programme, there is a great blank which needs to be filled up. "All inorganic forms," we are told (p. 63,) "have become what we find them by a natural process, *i. e.*, by evolution." It is not unreasonable to ask, 'By evolution from what?' Of course the answer is, by evolution from pre-existent inorganic matter. But whence this inorganic material, so admirably adapted to the evolution of these inorganic forms? Has inorganic matter itself been evolved "by a natural process?" Does the author carry his principle of continuity, like the authors of the *Unseen Universe*, backwards and backwards, through an endless series of universes, stretching from eternity to eternity? Except he does, inorganic matter, in its ultimate elements, has not become what we find it "by a natural process," and hence, our author himself being judge, not by evolution.

Here, then, at the very outset, we have a series of forms inaugurated by *supernatural*, and not by *natural* agency. The elemental universe, embracing forms and relations almost as wonderful as can be pointed out in the organic world, came to be what it was at first independently of the law of continuity, by the direct agency of the Creator. The different elements were not evolved from one another, nor from a common stock of "*similar*" antecedent materials. Oxygen was not evolved from hydrogen, nor nitrogen from either, nor were the precious metals derived from the baser.

Nor can we regard as exceptions those combinations of these elements on which our author relies (p. 297) as proofs of the derivation of higher from lower forms, such as when oxygen and hydrogen combine to form water, and as when these and other elements "are brought together under certain conditions; *viz.*, in the green leaves of plants in the presence of sunlight, living protoplasm is then and

there born, a something having entirely new and unexpected powers and properties." For, in the first place, the chemical combinations have their law of limitation in the mutual affinities and antipathies of the ultimate elements, which affinities and antipathies are as decided and determining as are the attachments and repugnances of the different organic species. And, in the second place, where living protoplasm appears, it is traceable, not to mere chemical combination, but, whether in the green leaves of plants, or in the egg, or in the frog-spawn, to a perfect antecedent organism, apart from which it has had, and could have had, no existence.

This failure of our author to apply his principle of continuity so as to fill up the gap between the being and the non-being of matter prepares us for another serious break in the order of physical succession. He has endeavored to fill up the gap between the simple elements of matter and organic forms by the introduction of living protoplasm. However, when we look closely into the arrangement we find that, instead of the protoplasm being *proton*, it is *deuteron*. Whether in plant-leaf, or egg, or frog-spawn, it owes its being to a parental organism. Is it not time that this attempt to evolve life out of dead matter were abandoned? Our author criticises Dr. Bastian for attempting to reduce his own theory to practice on the ground that the conditions under which life arises can occur but once, and cannot be repeated. But, in the passage above cited, he has himself undertaken to present us with the conditions under which life is ever reproduced, and has endeavored to identify vital with chemical forces without a particle of proof. In spite of such unscientific theorizing, the motto of genuine biology still is, "*omnis cellula e cellula*," to which may be added, *primaria cellula ex organismo*. After all, Moses was in perfect harmony with the results of scientific investigation when he wrote: "And the earth brought forth grass, herb yielding seed after its kind, and tree bearing fruit, wherein is the seed thereof, after its kind." (Gen. i. 12.) God did not produce the life-cell and thence evolve the tree, or the herb. He created the perfect organism, with its seed in itself, for the production of other organisms like itself. This is the order proclaimed in the inspired narrative, and it is the only order that will bear scientific inspection, as science knows nothing of a primary life-cell which has not originated in an antecedent organism.

Passing from the gap between dead matter and living matter, we meet with another which yawns between species and species. This gap, our author seems to think, has been filled up "by artificial means." His account of the process has been already given in the outline of the elements of his evolutionary scheme. Attention has been called to the manifestly unscientific character of the terms he has been constrained to employ in his description of the elemental materials with which he has sought to close this untoward chasm. Let us, however, examine more closely the pillars and arches of this evolutionary bridge.

1. In the first place, the means by which it is claimed the gap between species and species has been closed are acknowledged to be "artificial." The reason of this confession is well known, for it is only where art has seized the reins and taken control of natural agencies that even a bush has been laid in the gap. If, as our author alleges, and as the theory requires, "evolution means, first of all, continuity," it is respectfully submitted that this gap between species and species must be filled up by something more respectable and efficient than the bramble of a "breed." This make-shift of "breeds" is but an expedient to close up a chasm

which evolutionists have never been able to bridge. "Breeds" are nowhere found in a state of nature. They are, as our author confesses, products of art by "a gradual natural process"; and all that is or that can be claimed for them is, that they "are very similar, at least in many respects, to species"! This is science! All that nature, under the presidency of art, has been able to contribute towards the filling up of this deadly breach in the evolutionary fortification is a "breed," not identical in kind, not altogether similar even, but "very similar, at least, in many respects, to a species"! How can gentlemen write and think in this loose, unscientific, illogical style, and yet expect their incongruous, incoherent generalizations to be accepted as the infallible deductions of scientific thought? In every attempt which evolutionists have made to connect species genetically with species they have called in the help of cattle-breeders and pigeon-fanciers, for, in the domain of nature, they can find nothing of the specific character needed to eke out the facts which the theory demands. After all that the "art" of the cattle-breeder has done, a Guernsey, or a Tees-water, or a Southdown, is but a cow, and Seth Wright's Ancon "breeds" are never mistaken for anything but sheep; and when the pigeon-fancier has exhausted the resources of his "art" in the manipulation of the denizens of the dove-cote, his highest achievements are pigeons still, nothing but pigeons; and even Esther P.'s progeny, with their progressive digital variations, on which Dr. Struthers and Mr. Spencer have laid such stress, are simply men and women. The fact that one of Esther's great-grandchildren had a few digits more than its great-grandmother never led any of the neighbors to imagine that the family were on their way to the founding of a new evolutionary dynasty. But, then, these rustics were not, like Struthers, and Spencer, and Le Conte, advanced scientific thinkers.

2. But however difficult it may be to get even a bush to fill the gap, it seems to be still more difficult to guard it against the brands of the anti-evolutionists. This is not to be wondered at, as the evolutionists themselves, by their very attempts to guard it, are constantly calling attention to its inadequacy as a repairer of the breach. Varieties, which our author designates "breeds," are ever blasting the hopes of the evolutionists by reverting to their original typical forms. He feels called upon to account for this fact and reconcile it with evolutionism. Here is a specimen of the manner in which he has discharged his functions in this department of evolutionary apologetics:

"The reason of this tendency to reversion," he says, "is obvious: First, The time is too short, the rate of change was too rapid, in the artificial formation of these varieties. There was not time enough to accumulate a fund of heredity on each successive stage of the change. Therefore the form is unstable and the tendency to revert is strong. Compare the fleeting days and the hurrying impatience of man with the infinite time and the divine patience of nature. But mere instability is not the principal cause of reversion. Secondly, In the case of artificial forms in a wild state, *natural selection compels reversion*. But artificially made forms are in harmony with the artificial environment of domestication, but not with the environment of nature. In nature the fittest survive, but artificial breeds are not fit to survive in a state of nature. They are therefore quickly destroyed in the struggle for life, or must be modified. Nature immediately begins to select the fittest, and gradually in the course of time produces one or more uniform species, similar to that from which they came, or perhaps to what they would have been by this time if left to the operation of natural causes under the conditions supposed. But natural species, if they are formed as the derivationists suppose, by the operation of natural causes, cannot revert unless the conditions revert, for the same cause which operated to produce, still continue to operate to keep, the species." (P. 212.)

In illustration and confirmation of the truth of this apology, reference is made to the development of the form, the habits, and the instincts of the pointer :

"This form and these habits and instincts, so laboriously produced, would be quickly destroyed by nature. The pointer, left to himself, must either change or become extinct, because not adapted to the wild state. But suppose for a moment that these habits and instincts were useful to the animal in a wild state; evidently they would be instantly seized upon by natural selection, and not only perpetuated, but intensified until a very distinct species would be produced. The same is true of all other races of dogs. If the Newfoundland, the greyhound, and the pug were all turned loose in a forest, and if each of these kinds were admirably adapted to some place in the economy of nature—for some special mode of food-getting without corresponding disabilities in other directions (as must be the case if made by natural selection)—there can be no doubt they would each survive and their characters [be] intensified; intermediate forms would disappear (for reasons which we shall see presently), and we would soon have three distinct species, or perhaps we would call them distinct genera." (P. 213.)

Such is the author's attempt at the reconciliation of the doctrine of evolution with the unquestionable fact that varieties, or "breeds," invariably, when left to themselves by the withdrawal of the hand of man to which they owe their origin, revert to their original typical forms, habits and instincts. 1. "*Natural selection compels reversion.*" The italics are his own. That is, natural selection is the foe of variation, and sets itself to obliterate what art has done in opposition to it. This is all one with admitting that nature is the foe of variation; and, as there can be no evolution without variation, it is all one with the admission that nature is the foe of evolution. 2. His illustration from the pointer and other "breeds" of the dog, is pointless, as a "breed" is but a "breed," and not a "species." His defence from these cases is simply a *petitio principii*. He assumes that useful habits, induced under the influences of art, may result in the origination of a new "species," while there can be no instance pointed out of the genesis of anything but a new "breed," which reverts to the original type as soon as the artificial agencies which produced it have ceased to operate. 3. The third element in his apology is the element of time. Artificially generated species are got up in a hurry, and are therefore, as yet only in a state of unstable equilibrium. The stock of heredity is not sufficient to withstand the antagonism of an unfriendly environment. Man, the manipulator of the new breed, is impatient, but Nature, having cycles of duration to draw on, can afford to operate slowly, and bide its time until the stock is potent, or omnipotent to resist all reversional influences and maintain the favorite in its distinctive characteristics as a species. This is the old expedient of evolutionism when confronted with the fact that "breeds" revert to type, and that no "breed" has ever progressed from its native category to the high rank of a "species." Pressed by this unquestionable fact, evolutionists reply: 'The time is too short. Wait a while. Just allow the æonian sand-glass to get two or three more turns, and all we contend for may come forth from the womb of time!' And these gentlemen who make these æonian drafts on duration to eke out the dearth of facts, and combine the prophetic with the scientific function, set themselves up as the leaders of scientific thought in Europe and America!

Our author's account of "the missing link," or the absence of "Intermediate Forms," is worthy of remark. He accounts for the absence of intermediate forms in a way that leaves nothing to be desired by an anti-evolutionist. He says they are absent "because the intermediate forms are eliminated in the struggle for life, and

not reproduced by cross-breeding. If artificial races always bred true—*i. e.*, without crossing, as natural species do—they would probably soon be as sharply demarcated." (P. 214.) It is questionable whether the history of apologetics has ever produced anything to equal this. The great chain of life as it stretches through the geologic ages lies in unconnected sections, while evolution requires that these sections should be joined together by intermediate links. When asked to produce these missing links, the answer given amounts to this, that the sections never were connected, for natural species never cross-breed. What is this but a confession that it would be unnatural for natural species to originate through intermediate forms? If it is only artificial species that cross-breed, and by cross-breeding produce intermediate forms, surely it is vain to speak of missing links in connexion with natural species where no cross-breeding ever takes place, and consequently where no intermediate forms could arise. The sections of the chain, therefore, have never stood in genetic relation, and this fact of itself discredits the evolution hypothesis.

But these unproducible intermediate forms were, it seems, nevertheless produced, and their disappearance is accounted for by the struggle for life, in which they were eliminated, as well as by their non-reproduction by cross-breeding. This theory of the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest is an essential of Darwinism, but it does not account for the absence of the particular links in question, for these are just the links that in the struggle were fitter to survive than the links that are extant and which are confessedly inadequate to fill up the gap. If our ancestors were anthropoid apes, or an animal which was the common ancestor of the anthropoids and of our race, through intermediate forms, surely the forms nearest to man must have been fitter to survive in the life struggle, than those inferior anthropoidal forms which have come safely out of the conflict. Why should the stronger, which, on the theory, were the fitter to survive, be eliminated in the struggle, while the weaker and less fit have escaped the doom of elimination? Evolution cannot answer this question, and the reason is that it is a hypothesis which cannot be reconciled with the actual history of life upon our globe.

But this book undertakes the reconciliation of evolution with "Religious Thought." A word in closing may therefore not be out of place in regard to the species of religious thought with which the theory is said to harmonize. There is much need of discrimination here. A man may regard his thought as religious thought, while his thought is anything but Biblical. Evolution may be in harmony with his thought, while it may be utterly out of harmony with Revelation. This is just what we find in this book. Our author's thoughts of God's relation to the universe are simply Pantheistic. It is true he repudiates this charge, and we accept his repudiation of it so far as to believe that he does not mean to be a Pantheist. But it is very difficult to distinguish between a theory of the divine immanence which represents "the forces of nature as naught else than different forms of the one omnipresent divine energy."

"Remember," he says, "that, as just shown, this divine omnipresent energy has taken on successively higher and higher forms in the course of geologic time. Now this upward movement has been wholly by *increasing individuation*, not only of matter, but also of force. This universal Divine Energy, in a generalized condition, *unindividuated*, diffused, pervading all nature, is what we call physical and chemical force. The same energy in higher form, individuating matter, and itself individuated, but only yet very imperfectly, is what we call the life-force of plants. The

same energy more fully individuating matter and itself more fully individuated, but not completely, we call the *anima* of animals. This *anima*, or animal soul, as time went on [one would think the author witnessed the whole process] was individuated more and more, until it resembled and foreshadowed the spirit of man. Finally, still the same, completely individuated as a separate entity, and therefore self-conscious; capable of separate existence, and therefore immortal, we call the spirit of man." (Pp. 299, 300.)

If this be not Pantheism, it is certainly very like it. Like Pantheism, it speaks of a universally diffused Divine Energy which is ever taking on higher and higher forms, and progressing towards and eventually reaching self-consciousness in man. Now, as there can be no energy apart from an energizing substance, and no Divine Energy apart from the Divine Essence, this universally diffused energy must be the energy of God himself, and the universal diffusion must be the universal diffusion of his own essence. But this energizing essence is not only diffused, but individuated, and individuated in matter as well as force, and in plants as well as in animals, and in the latter as well, though not as fully, as in man. It is without life in matter; it sleeps in plants, dreams in animals, and awakes to conscious intelligence in man. What is this but Pantheism? This is not the Scripture doctrine of the divine immanence, which teaches that God is present upholding by his presence and power all that he has created and made. On the contrary, it is simply an irreverent speculation, which breaks up the divine essence into matter first, and then into plants and animals and men. Of course on this theory the doctrine of original sin, as a subjective estate, is excluded. When the divine energy has awoke into self-consciousness in the infant, it cannot have taken on, as a "higher form," the form of sin, for the divine essence cannot assume a sinful form, or be regarded as energizing towards such a goal. Equally repugnant is this speculation to the Scripture doctrine of inspiration. As every individual soul is simply a portion of this individuated divine essence, every man, as our author teaches (pp. 310, 311), is a medium of revelation. "It is given to all men as conscience; in greater measure to all good men as clearer perception of righteousness; in preëminent measure to Hebrew prophets and Christian apostles; but supremely and perfectly to Jesus alone. But there is, and there can be, no test of truth but reason. We *must* fearlessly, but honestly and reverently, try all things, even revelations, by this test. We must not regard, as so many do, the spirit of man as the passive amanuensis of the Spirit of God. Revelations to man must of necessity partake of the imperfections of the medium through which it [they come] comes. As pure water from heaven, falling upon and filtering through earth, must gather impurities in its course, differing in amount and kind according to the earth, even so the pure divine truth, filtering through man's mind, must take imperfections characteristic of the man and the age. Such filtrate must be redistilled in the alembic of reason to separate the divine truth from the earthly impurities."

Such is our author's theory of inspiration, and it merits no elaborate refutation. If man's mind be the filter "and must take imperfections characteristic of the man and the age," it is surely not unreasonable to ask Professor Le Conte where the necessary filter is to be found by whose agency "the divine truth" is to be separated from "the earthly impurities"? What man, or what age, shall supply the uncontaminated alembic? Man's reason cannot furnish it; for, as it is

man's reason, our author himself being the judge, it must take imperfections characteristic of its owner and of the age he lives in. It is true he finds a perfect medium in Jesus; as our Lord, however, wrote nothing himself, but made all his revelations through imperfect human filters, it must follow on this theory that we have in our Bible no infallible revelation.

To conclude: genuine science must pronounce this book a failure. Its defence of evolution breaks down on the critical point of CONTINUITY. While the theory it advocates demands continuous, causal, physical consecution of antecedent and consequent, it has simply proved the existence of a mere order of sequence. This order, however, exhibits such sudden advances from lower to higher forms that it confounds the counsel of our author's philosophy, and compels him to admit that Nature has not, in such instances, acted naturally, but has progressed *per saltum*. His chosen type, "the egg," typifies not his own doctrine, but the doctrine the book has been written to disprove; for this type, fairly interpreted, teaches that the different orders of life on our globe must have had their origins in perfect organisms, and not in undeveloped life-cells. His theology is Pantheistic, as it deifies an omnipresent energy, which it pronounces divine, and distributes it among plants, and animals, and man. It denies the infallibility of Scripture, the doctrine of the fall of man, and of original sin, viewed as a sinful subjective estate. "*Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis tempus eget.*"

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HUMPHREY'S SACRED HISTORY.

SACRED HISTORY FROM THE CREATION TO THE GIVING OF THE LAW. *By Edward P. Humphrey, D. D., LL. D., Sometime Professor in the Danville Theological Seminary.* New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1888. Octavo. Pp. xiii., 540.

We have read this book with no common interest, and rise from the perusal of it with the conviction that it ought to be in the hands of every intelligent Christian, certainly of every pastor, in the church. It is the work of a man as strong as he is devout, and well crowns a long life given to the diligent and reverential study of the Bible.

Perhaps the strongest single impression made by the book is that of the author's unwavering loyalty to the Scriptures as the plenary inspired Word of God. The reader perceives quickly that he is in no atmosphere of doubt. Yet the confidence of his guide is not that of a man who is ignorant of anything that the most advanced representatives of the so-called Higher Criticism have to say. Our author has given himself the trouble to know what they have written, and has evidently weighed their arguments with a candid and judicial spirit. He has found nothing to shake his faith in the old-fashioned doctrine that we have in the sacred writings the very Word of God. This confidence is contagious, and communicates itself to the reader. He proceeds with a sense of safety under the conduct of a guide who is in no danger of leading him into the quagmire and leaving him to flounder hopelessly there or help himself out as best he may.

But while Dr. Humphrey holds thus unhesitatingly to the strict inspiration of the Bible, he does not fail to recognize the fact that we have in the Scriptures an infallible record only of what bears upon the spiritual interests of man and is essen-

tially connected therewith. "There is not the least reason to suppose that the sacred writers were better informed than their contemporaries in human knowledges. Their special and only office was the communication of religious truth. For that purpose they were inspired of God, and for no other. In their daily thoughts, language and modes of expression, they were not distinguished above their neighbors. They were infallible in divine truth; but they were fallible, like all other men, in all questions of science and history, except so far as a better knowledge was necessary to the communication of religious truth. To allege that they shared fully in the ignorance of their day, and accepted as true contemporary superstitions, is no impeachment of the truth of what they spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. Indeed, the more notorious their ignorance of current learning, the more remarkable is the inspiration which prevented them from declaring as historically and scientifically true what is historically and scientifically false." (P. 9.) The Holy Spirit, under whose influence they wrote, was possessed, of course, "of an absolute, though silent, foreknowledge of the discoveries, even the most surprising and brilliant of them, in all coming generations and in all lands." This foreknowledge, however, manifested itself simply in restraining the inspired penmen from committing themselves to any scientific statements or so expressing themselves that their language, properly understood, could be taken for commitment to any scientific theories.

"While the sacred record is instinct with this divine prevision, it does not go before scientific investigation and reveal its findings in advance of their discovery. It is no part of the divine purpose to tell men the secrets of nature which they are able to find out for themselves. The introduction, moreover, into the Bible of a perfected astronomy, geology, chemistry, and kindred sciences, would have swelled the Bible to the dimensions of an encyclopædia. It would have been impossible to thresh out of this ponderous mass the golden particles of divine truth which now illuminate every line of the Word of God. Let it be imagined, moreover, that Moses had been moved by the Holy Ghost to describe, in Genesis, the solar system as seen from the sun. The doctrine would have been unintelligible to the great mass of his countrymen. It would also have been treated as a preposterous speculation during all the centuries which went before the establishment of the Copernican system. Instead of doing that, he was led by the Spirit to represent the movements of the heavenly bodies according to their phenomena, and yet to construct the record so that it should be in harmony with the reality of things." (P. 8.)

All this being true, it follows that there can never be any real conflict between the Bible and science, unless it be possible for science to produce evidence in disproof of some fact to which the Bible has committed itself as being essentially connected with man's spiritual interests. Such a fact is the unity of the human race. In regard to this there can be no question as to the meaning of the Scriptures. Paul on Mars Hill simply sums up the explicit teaching of Moses in Genesis when he declares that God "hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth." (Acts xvii. 26.)

Now the question is, Can science ever impeach this unequivocal teaching of the Word of God that the entire human race sprang from a single pair? "Comparative philology," Dr. Humphrey tells us, "is relied upon to break the force of this declaration. The number of languages and dialects, living and dead, known to mankind, is estimated at one thousand. The contention is that the countless diversities of these tongues prove the plural origin of the race." (P. 21.)

We had expected to find our author taking the ground that it is impossible, in

the nature of the case, that the science of comparative philology should ever render doubtful the doctrine of the unity of the human race. But we nowhere discover evidence that he was ready to commit himself to the defence of such a position as this, defensible as we shall find it to be. Instead of that, he contents himself, first, with the statement that "philology is in its infancy,—it was born among the last of the sciences,—and is therefore incomplete;" which means that it is, as yet, too immature to be listened to on such a question. It must wait until all the facts are in.

While, however, he contends, in the earlier chapter (II.) from which we have just quoted, that the science is too young to be heard, when it is made to speak against the unity of the race, in the chapter on Babel (XI.), he insists that "the new science of comparative philology" shall be heard in *favor* of that doctrine. He thinks that its discoveries all point in the direction of *proving* the original unity of languages, and, therefore, the original unity of the race. (Pp. 159, *sqq.*)

This inconsistency suggests that Dr. Humphrey is not at home here as he is when dealing with his subject proper; and we trust we may be permitted, after all that has been said in praise of his learning in that proper sphere, to express regret that he should have undertaken, even in a popular manner, to expound a science with which his acquaintance is of the most elementary and faulty kind. This will appear at once when it is mentioned that he asserts that "the Sanskrit, though long since dead, was the *mother-tongue* of the Hindoos, the Persians, the Armenians, and of all the European peoples; among them the Greek, Latin, Russian, Saxon, Celtic, and Icelandic families. From this circumstance, the Sanskrit *and its offspring* take the name of Indo-European." (P. 159.) As another example, may serve his citing the English words *domestic*, *nautical*, and *navigation* as proof that the English language is Indo-Germanic. It never occurred to him that, however true his proposition was, these particular words have nothing to do with the proof of it. He could just as well have cited the word *algebraic* to prove that our language belongs to the Semitic family.

Recurring now to Dr. Humphrey's assumption that the science of comparative philology, by offering evidence (if it could) of the original unity of all languages now spoken on the earth, would thereby be furnishing evidence to corroborate the Scripture doctrine of the unity of the race, a fuller acquaintance with that science would have made him aware that there is no necessary connexion whatever between the two propositions. The circumstance that two peoples speak kindred tongues is no proof at all of ethnic kinship. Over and over again, within the historic period, whole nations have exchanged one language for another. Who would think, for instance, of arguing that the French of to-day are of Roman rather than Celtic origin because they speak a language which unquestionably descended from the Latin? Suppose it could be established, as it cannot, that the Semitic tongues are related to the Aryan in the same way as the German is to the Greek, only more remotely; that could never prove that the mother tongue of the Aryans was the same as that of the Shemites. It would always be open to an objector to say that the one people may, in prehistoric times, have adopted the speech of the other. Original identity of speech could never be proved, and therefore the argument for ethnic kinship, based on any facts which it is possible that comparative philology may ever establish, must fall to the ground.

But we return to the question first raised, Can the science of comparative philology ever disprove the unity of the human race? The answer must be negative,

for the simple reason that even if the philologist could prove, beyond all possibility of doubt, that the mother tongue of each of the families of speech was so diverse from every other that it was certain that no two of them had a common origin, that would not disprove, nor even cast doubt upon, the unity of the race for one who accepts the eleventh chapter of Genesis as an inspired record of facts. "Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth: and they left off to build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth." (Genesis xi 7-9.) Here is sufficient explanation, even though the diversity be proved as great as supposed; and its correctness can be impeached only by proving that there was no such miracle as the confusion of tongues, or that, at least, it was not complete enough to account for the degree of diversity. But neither comparative philology nor any other science can invade the sphere of the supernatural and disprove a miracle such as this.

We had hoped to be able to speak at some length upon the chapters which deal with Abraham and the covenant made with him, but it would be impossible in the space assigned to such a notice as this to do justice to that discussion. Nowhere do we remember to have seen a clearer or more satisfactory exposition of this subject. In Chapter XX., entitled, "THE COVENANT ENDURING FOREVER," the argument for the identity of the church under the old and the new dispensations is stated with exceptional force. Take this as a sample:

"A contract between two parties cannot be abrogated until all its provisions are executed. A man enters with his son into an agreement, written, signed, sealed, and recorded in due form. He gives to his son several valuable estates, real and personal, with the provision that he shall come into the possession of the estates, one by one, at certain future periods; and with the further provision that such of the property as is capable of transfer shall go to his heirs and assigns forever. It is obvious that the engagement is binding until the estates are all turned over to the son; and as to such of the property as may pass by sale or inheritance, the agreement runs against all time to come. Now among the gifts conveyed by God's covenant to Abraham were a chosen seed, the chosen land, a blessing on him and on his offspring, a blessing on their friends and a curse on their enemies, and finally the transcendent promise of the Messiah, lineally descended from him. These promises have been fulfilled. Another, to the effect that the gospel preached to Abraham should be offered to the Gentiles, has been performed in part; and that is a connecting link between those that have been fully discharged and those that are outstanding. The argument is, that the covenant must stand good until all its outstanding provisions are executed. . . According to one of the most prominent provisions of the covenant, the salvation flowing from Abraham shall fill the earth. . . A cherished purpose of Christ in regard to his own kindred remains to be executed. . . 'For,' says God, 'this is my covenant unto them when I shall take away their sins: as concerning the gospel, they are enemies for your sakes; but as touching the election, they are beloved for the fathers' sake.' (Rom. xi. 27, 28.) That is to say, the covenant with Abraham will secure the salvation of the Jews as a people. . . All these provisions of the covenant in regard to the salvation of the Jew and Gentile remain to be executed; the covenant, therefore, which contains them holds good to this day." (Pp. 289, 290.)

The chapter on Jacob and Esau (chap. xxiii) is for insight, skill in delineation of character, felicity in the use of language, and movement in the presentation of the entire subject, worthy to stand beside the best work of the masters.

Dr. Humphrey's plan included another volume which would have covered the entire Old Testament period. That death found him with his task only half accomplished is our irreparable loss.

The table of contents is more than usually full, and is carefully made. There is also an excellent index. We have noticed one or two errors which should be charged, we are convinced, neither to the author nor the printers. They look like careless editorial work. As, for example, the statement made on p. 328, and repeated on p. 365, that Isaac died at the age of one hundred and forty-seven years instead of one hundred and eighty. Isaac's age at his death is confounded with that of Jacob. We have noticed very few typographical errors. The publishers have left nothing to be desired in the getting up of the book. The paper is heavy, the type is large and well leaded. The volume is somewhat ponderous, but we are sure that no wise man will quarrel with this who reflects that the little that has been sacrificed in handiness has been compensated for so handsomely in the splendid letter-press which brings no weariness to the eyelids.

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SCHAFF'S HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. *By Philip Schaff, Professor of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary, New York.* Christianus sum: Christiani nihil a me alienum puto. Vol VI., MODERN CHRISTIANITY—THE GERMAN REFORMATION: A. D. 1517–1530. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1888. 8vo, pp. xv., 755.

This new volume of the *History of the Christian Church* fully meets the expectations created by those which have preceded it. There are people who regard ecclesiastical history as a dry and uninteresting subject. These are persons who have no acquaintance with the pages of Dr. Schaff, or persons who have sat down to their perusal with such lack of mental furniture as would make serious history of any kind uninteresting. Every page of this work bears witness to the profound learning of the author in his department, and yet every page is witness to the fact that he has not forgotten the difficulties with which the beginner approaches the subject. He knows how to tell enough to prevent obscurity, and, at the same time, where to pause lest his narrative prove tedious. He recognizes the fact that history is not a mere chronicle of events, but the interpretation of them as bearing to each other the relation of cause and effect; yet his pages are never burdened with jejune disquisitions on the philosophy of history. The arrangement of his material is always felicitous, so that the reader experiences little of that confusion which so easily results from abrupt transitions from one topic to another, or from one period to another.

In this connexion it should be mentioned also that Dr. Schaff is master of a style remarkable for its simplicity and clearness. It is no less than marvellous that one who grew to manhood in the use of a foreign language as his mother-tongue should have acquired, even after a residence of forty years in this country, such easy and idiomatic command of English. Now and then, at rare intervals, there occur unidiomatic phrases, mostly close translations of the German;¹ but they are

¹ As a sample of these departures from the English idiom may be mentioned the title of § 61, Vol. VI., *Luther on the Wartburg (Luther auf der Wartburg)*, where he gives us German in

so few and far between as scarcely to be noticed. In spite of these, the excellencies of the style are such as to make it hardly extravagant to call it a model of its kind. The reader proceeds without ever having suggested to him a doubt of the meaning which it is intended to convey, and the pleasure he experiences grows, at length, into positive gratitude to a guide who conducts him through the most intricate ways without sense of weariness.

In the preparation of this volume, as well as of all the rest, the author has taken great pains to give a complete presentation of the literature of the subject. First, in § 14, we have the *General Literature on the Reformation*; then, in § 15, the *Literature of the German Reformation*; and again, in § 17, *The Luther Literature*. In each section there are given, first, the *Sources*, Protestant and Romish; then the *Histories*, carefully arranged according to the religious point of view of their respective authors. Complete as are these catalogues, our author has not contented himself with preparing them, but almost every section in the book is introduced with an account of the special literature of the subject therein handled. The reader has, therefore, not only Dr. Schaff's presentation of any given topic before him, but is put in position to proceed intelligently to the investigation of the subject for himself in the sources (many of which are easily accessible) and in special histories. We deem it proper to call attention thus distinctly to this feature of the work under discussion, because nowhere else, so far as we know, can the student so readily obtain accurate information as to the literature of church history as in Dr. Schaff's pages.

This sixth volume, which bears the subordinate title of the *History of the Reformation, Vol. I.*, is devoted exclusively to the *German Reformation*, and that to the first thirteen years of it (1517-1530). The inference may readily be made from this fact that the treatment is full and adequate, and this presumption a perusal of the volume confirms. Chapter I., under the title of *Orientation*, is devoted to the Relations of Mediæval to Modern Christianity, a comparison of Protestantism with Romanism, the Necessity of a Reformation, the Genius and Aim of the Reformation, the Authority of the Scriptures, the Priesthood of the Laity, the Reformation and Rationalism, Protestantism and Religious Liberty, etc., etc. Chapter II. is taken up with *Luther's Training for the Reformation* (1483-1517). Chapter III. carries forward the history of *The Reformation from the publication of Luther's Theses to the Diet of Worms* (1517-1521); Chapter IV., *The Reformation from the Diet of Worms to the Peasants' War* (1521-1525); Chapter V., *The Inner Development of the Reformation, from the Peasants' War to the Diet of Augsburg* (1525-1530). Chapter VI. discusses the *Propagation and Persecution of Protestantism*; Chapter VII. *The Sacramentarian Controversies*; Chapter VIII., *The Political Situation between 1526 and 1529*; Chapter IX., *The Diet and Confession of Augsburg*.

Probably the most interesting and instructive chapter, taken as a whole, is the first. Yet to one familiar with the first volume of the author's *Creeeds of Christendom*, not all portions of this chapter are entirely new; and in §§ 11 and 12, devoted to *Protestantism and Religious Liberty* and *Religious Intolerance and Liberty in*

English words. (Cf. also *Luther on the Coburg*, § 123, for *Luther at Coburg*.) On p. 536 he speaks of Ambrose's six books on Genesis as "very thin," and repeats the phrase just below concerning certain of Jerome's commentaries. At first blush, the reader wonders if it can be possible that Dr. Schaff has dropped into *slang*; but it is evident that he had in his mind the German word *dünn*, which, in such connexion, conveys the notion of *meagre*.

England and America, Dr. Schaff has confessedly drawn largely on previous publications of his own.¹ This use of what had previously been published is, however, no slavish repetition. All has been rewritten and placed in new relations, and could ill be spared from this introduction to the Reformation Period.

The picture given of Charles V. (§§ 50-52, pp. 262-286) is admirably drawn, and brings out with telling effect the greatness and the littleness, the astuteness and the folly, of this man, made heir by fortune to the grandest opportunities mortal man ever enjoyed, yet ending his life a confessed failure in the seclusion of a cloister.

The personality of Luther also stands out on these pages with a prominence worthy of his heroic proportions. Luther is just the man to be unwisely praised by his friends, and unjustly abused by his enemies. His virtues are conspicuous, but not less glaring are his faults. Among Protestants, and especially among Lutherans, he is a hero of the faith who deserves to stand beside Paul; with Roman Catholics, he is a sort of arch-fiend in human shape. These estimates, so wide apart, are explained by the fact that one party has disregarded too much his faults, the other has failed entirely to appreciate his virtues and study his faults in connexion with them. Dr. Schaff treads the middle way, and, in this case, most certainly the safest. His Luther is great in intellect, in moral courage, in spiritual power; a true hero, raised up by God to lead the grandest revolution since the days when the apostles and their immediate successors turned the world upside down. His is a faith as sublime as any that ever sustained mortal man, and his love for the gospel and its author not inferior to that of any martyr who ever sealed his devotion with his blood. Yet, at the same time, there was in him a strain of coarseness, inherited doubtless with his peasant blood, which constantly manifested itself. Not only this; there was a violence of temper, which, especially towards the end of his life, manifested itself by mingling curses of his enemies and those from whom he differed with the very prayers he offered up to the God of love and peace. So extraordinary was this violence as to suggest to us that at times he was partially demented. His attitude towards Zwingli, and those who sympathized with his view of the Lord's supper, is a matter of notoriety. Dr. Schaff, while condemning Luther's course, yet says in apology for him:

"It would be great injustice to attribute his conduct to obstinacy and pride, or any selfish motive. It proceeded from his inmost conviction. He regarded the real presence as a fundamental article of faith, inseparably connected with the incarnation, the union of the two natures of Christ, and the mystical union of believers with his divine-human personality. He feared that the denial of this article would consistently lead to the rejection of all mysteries, and of Christianity itself. He deemed it, moreover, most dangerous and horrible to depart from what had been the consensus of the Christian church for so many centuries. His piety was deeply rooted in the historic Catholic faith, and it cost him a great struggle to break loose from popery. In the progress of the eucharistic controversy, all his Catholic instincts and abhorrence of heresy were aroused and intensified. In his zeal he could not do justice to his opponents or appreciate their position. His sentiments are shared by millions of pious and devout Lutherans to this day, whose conscience forbids them to commune with Christians of Reformed churches. We may lament their narrowness, but must respect their conviction, as we do the conviction of the far larger number of Roman Catholics, who devoutly believe in the miracle of transubstantiation and the sacrifice of the mass." (Pp. 663, 664.)

¹ *The Development of Religious Freedom, in "Christ and Christianity;" and Church and State in the United States, Papers of the American Historical Association, Vol. II., No. 4.*

While this is doubtless the best apology that can be made for Luther's unreasonable conduct, we believe that most of our readers will consider it a very poor one. It was a palliation of the conduct of Saul of Tarsus in persecuting the church that he did it ignorantly, but it did not excuse it, because his ignorance resulted from unwillingness to know the truth; and in this matter, Luther's opinions were due to a similar unwillingness. When reason was seen to be against him, he repudiated reason, and laid down principles which, if accepted, would have made a knowledge of the meaning of the Scriptures impossible, and therefore his demand at Worms, that he should be refuted by arguments drawn from those Scriptures, absurd. His conduct in the eucharistic controversy "proceeded," Dr. Schaff tells us, "from his inmost conviction," but so did Saul's, for he could say, "*I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth*" (Acts xxvi. 9). Paul the apostle never thought that anybody ought to respect that conviction of his. He certainly did not respect it himself, after he came to recognize it in its true character; but because he had entertained it and acted upon it, he considered himself as "less than the least of all saints" and as "the chief of sinners." Luther himself was very far from respecting the convictions of those who, on account of them, continued to practice the idolatries of Rome; and he was right. Why should we respect a conviction in him which is manifestly based on prepossessions just as unreasonable as any of those which he had discarded when he broke with the papacy?

The closing sentence of the above quotation is one among a multitude which might be selected from Dr. Schaff's historical writings to illustrate, what we are constrained to characterize as, his excess of charity. That is a noble motto suggested by the heathen poet's verse, which he has adapted to his purpose and placed upon his title-page, *Christianus sum: Christiani nihil a me alienum puto*. Whenever he finds that which is truly characteristic of the Christian, he will embrace it as akin to himself and honor it as a manifestation of Christ-likeness. We believe, after having read a large part of what Dr. Schaff has written, that he is really dominated by the spirit which these words breathe; but he not unfrequently goes too far in the application of his principle. Sometimes his admiration for that which is Christlike in a man makes him hesitate to condemn that which is of another spirit in him. It should always be remembered that what is *alienum a Christo* in the Christian is to be reprobated all the more because it is in the Christian; that it cannot be right to "respect convictions" in any man which are dictated by an un-Christian spirit, no matter how eminent a Christian that man may in other respects be.

Another abuse of this principle we find in our author's application of it to the Romish communion. His study of ecclesiastical history has revealed to him much that was good, in spite of the bad, in the mediæval church. Many noble saints of God, whose lives were devoted to the imitation of Christ as they understood his life, illumined with their piety those centuries. The Church of Rome was then still a true church of Jesus Christ, and, defective as it was, he made it a blessing to the world in those gloomy ages of tyranny, rapine, and blood. All this Dr. Schaff knows, as every student of the history of the church knows. Dr. Schaff sympathizes in all that was Christlike in the life which that church, in some measure, fostered; he glories in all the triumphs over the dark and cruel passions of men which that church achieved. Every true Christian acquainted with the facts shares that

sympathy and joins in that glorying. But when Dr. Schaff concludes, from what the Roman Catholic Church was in the middle ages, and from what it did then, that the Romish Church of the present time is a true church, as he does in section 85 of this sixth volume, he is extending his principle too far. He does not give sufficient weight to the fact that only since the Council of Trent has that church, as such, been committed to those travesties of the fundamental doctrines of salvation which *individuals* held before, which make the gospel another gospel. Only then did that communion, already deserted by the great body of those who loved the truth, promulgate a creed which if a man intelligently embrace as a whole, he rejects Jesus Christ as his Saviour. No one will deny that there are those who *call* themselves Roman Catholics who are true followers of Christ. But it is in spite of the creed of the Church of Rome. By a happy eclecticism they accept of what she teaches only that which is not fatal to salvation, and fail to understand the import of the rest, or reject it in their hearts. The Romish Church cannot entirely banish, in this age, the Word of God. In spite of her efforts, many of those who are called by her name possess this treasure, and the Spirit of God blesses the truth to the salvation of souls wherever it is read and pondered. Dr. Schaff is right to recognize in these followers of Christ, even though they are blinded to the true nature of Rome, fellow-christians, and to say in reference to them, *Christiani nihil a me alienum puto*. But it is utterly illogical to conclude that, because they are in it, the Church of Rome, which means the establishment of which the Pope of Rome is the acknowledged head, is a true church, with ordinances which we must recognize as the genuine ordinances of the house of God. He cannot escape under cover of the distinction which he makes between the Roman Catholic Church and the form of her government. In admitting that the papacy is antichrist, as he does, he allows what condemns the visible Church of Rome as anti-christian; for without the papacy there is, and can be, no Roman Catholic Church. The Pope, now recognized as the infallible head, is, in a true and proper sense, the visible Church of Rome. He *constitutes* it. Without him there may be an organization, but there can be no Roman Catholic Church. There is really no longer any meaning in such a statement as this: "The claims of the Roman Church rest on a broader and more solid base than the papacy, which is merely the form of government," (p. 533,) unless by "Roman Church" he meant something else than the visible organization which people are accustomed to designate by that name.

But we had no intention of arguing this question at length. We simply desired to call attention to what we regard as the most serious defect of Dr. Schaff as a historian of the church: his too great charity for the Romish communion as it exists to-day. Though we record our protest in this matter, we still have no hesitation in saying that he has given us, so far as he has gone, the best extensive history of the church in the English language. No minister who has not already access to it, should be content to continue longer without it. Most directly helpful, we judge, will prove Vol. I., which deals with the Apostolic era; but each volume possesses its peculiar excellence. The third volume may be specially mentioned as being notably rich in its contribution to the history of doctrine, in connexion with the controversies of the Nicene and post-Nicene ages. The fifth volume, which is to cover the period between the accession of Gregory VII. and the Reformation (1073-1517) has not yet appeared, but it is to be hoped that it will soon be forthcoming.

So far as the printer's art, strictly considered, is concerned, the publishers have

dealt munificently with this volume, as with the rest. The type is large, well-spaced, and clear. The paper is excellent, and happily lacks that gloss which often tries the eyes so severely. The binding, however, is utterly inadequate—a flimsy muslin, which soon wears out, even under very careful usage.

We see no evidence, in this most recent production of his pen, that our author's three-score years and ten sit otherwise than lightly upon him. But he still has before him no inconsiderable portion of his undertaking, if it be his purpose to treat as exhaustively the entire Reformation period as he has done the earliest years of it. It is a task which sorely needs to be done, and there is no living man who is better furnished for the task than is Dr. Schaff. May a good Providence spare him and give him strength until his work is completely done.

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CHEYNE ON THE BOOK OF PSALMS.

THE BOOK OF PSALMS; or, The Praises of Israel. A new translation, with commentary. *By the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M. A., D. D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture at Oxford, Canon of Rochester.* New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1888.

It is now more than a century and a half since a patient scholar counted up six hundred and thirty separate commentaries on the Psalms. The number has been increasing ever since. And, such is the perennial literary interest as well as spiritual value of these inspired lyrics, that the number of commentaries upon them will continue to increase in every succeeding age. In the quaint language of Gabriel Harvey: "What festivall hymnes so divinely dainty as the swete Psalms of King David?" And Johann Arndt sounds the deeper note when he says: "What the heart is in man that the psalter is in the Bible"—a sentiment echoed by the most famous of living statesmen, who speaks of the psalter as "the whole music of the human heart, swept by the hand of its Maker." For these reasons, to say nothing of the fact that of all the citations in the New Testament from the Old, nearly half are made from the Psalms, there never will be a time, and there never should be a time, when the Psalms will cease to be a fruitful subject of study to the devout scholarship of Christendom.

The latest, and by no means the least notable, of these contributions to the study of this portion of the Hagiographa comes from the prolific pen of Professor Cheyne. This industrious scholar has published in rapid succession commentaries on Isaiah, Jeremiah, Hosea, Micah, and other minor prophets, Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes, and now he adds a rich and learned treatise on the Psalms. And yet there is not a line of slipshod work in any of them. Errors of a certain sort there are in plenty, but they result from no lack of thorough investigation or close attention to style, but rather from a wrong principle cordially accepted and consistently applied. It is well known that the "Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture at Oxford" is one of the leading representatives in England of the Kuenen-Wellhausen school of criticism. The volume before us, however, has little to say about critical theories, the questions of the Higher Criticism and the consideration of Psalm theology being reserved for another occasion. In this volume, therefore, more than in any other of his writings, Bible students of every critical school can enjoy the real excellences of Dr. Cheyne's work, unaffected, or but

slightly affected, by their disagreement with his views of authorship, date and integrity. Enough is said, however, even in this volume, to show that he regards most of the Psalms as of very late origin, that, like Ewald, he acknowledges less than a dozen of them as Davidic—here, by the way, differing from Kuenen, who admits no Davidic psalms—and that he makes subjective emendations of the text with the most culpable freedom.

By comparing him in a few points with other great commentators on the Psalms, we can perhaps bring out more clearly some of his admirable qualities as an expositor. It has been finely said of Luther that “he cannot always shake himself free of the allegorical cobwebs of patristic interpretation. They still cling to the mane of the lion, who in his strength has trodden down the thicket.” There is scarcely a trace of this fault in Prof. Cheyne. Calvin himself was hardly more free from mystical conceits. Nor does he manifest that supercilious egotism which characterizes so many of the writers of his school, for instance Ewald. “*L’etat c’est moi*,” said Louis XIV.; Ewald has justly been accused of a feeling not unlike this—“Exegetical science, it is I;” but quite different is the spirit of Cheyne. Ewald rarely quoted from any one but himself, and was exceedingly harsh in his condemnation of those who ventured to hold other views. Cheyne levies upon all learning and is uniformly courteous and charitable, conceding to Ewald himself “that personal religious experience which alone can qualify any one to be a sympathetic interpreter of the Old Testament saints.” In this respect his example is commended to those slashing writers of our own country who seem to think that the best argument against the higher critics is personal abuse. As to style, there is in Cheyne’s book none of the learned prolixity of Delitzsch or “the laborious dullness of Hengstenberg.” He excels in condensation, and the number and variety of his illustrations from literature are remarkable. Homer, Æschylus, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Goethe, Browning, Wordsworth, Emerson and many others are freely quoted—Dante, Milton, and Browning more frequently perhaps than all the rest. And yet this is not a popular work. It is not a book to be hastily read, but thoroughly studied. Working on this commentary after reading Spurgeon’s “Treasury of David” is like drilling through compact granite after wading through loose sand. But the patient quarryman finds here many a goodly block of building stone such as no popular works afford. It is not claimed that this is as good a commentary as Perowne’s. That surpasses all other commentaries on the Psalms. But Cheyne’s book, with its critical scholarship, conscientious exegesis, and condensed suggestiveness is one of the best supplements for the thorough study of these profound lyrics that we have yet seen, and has fewer faults, perhaps, than any equally able product of the school to which he belongs.

In order to diminish the amount of necessary exposition the author tells us he has bestowed special care upon the clearness of the translation. The first edition of this translation, without commentary or critical notes, appeared in 1884. The fact that Dr. Cheyne publishes a new edition of it so soon after the appearance of the Revised Version shows that he shares the opinion of scholars generally that, notwithstanding the vast superiority of the Revised Version to the Authorized Version in many respects, there is still need of something better. Indeed he says distinctly that “the careful but still somewhat antique Revised Version does not sufficiently reveal to the educated reader the thoughtful, radiant beauty of Hebrew poetry.” A venerable professor of Hebrew in one of our Southern seminaries wittily

says that the title page of King James' version—"The Old and New Testaments translated out of the original tongues; and with the former translations diligently compared and revised"—ought to read as follows: "Translated out of the former translations; and with the original tongues not very diligently compared." The Victorian Revisers are not open to that charge: but their translation is a compromise between the various members of the committee, (to which, by the way, Dr. Cheyne belonged), as well as a "compromise with popular prejudice;" and this prejudice has always been peculiarly strong against revision of the Psalms, on account of their sacred associations. Considering these difficulties the Revisers did well. Dr. Cheyne's translation, being more independent, is superior to the Revised Version in accuracy, but is not to be named with it in point of felicity, grace and harmony; and, of course, is still less comparable in these respects to the Authorized Version.

As already intimated, he has a theory about the structure of Hebrew poetry, under the influence of which he assigns different parts of the same psalm to two or three different authors with the utmost confidence, and coolly fills up numerous imaginary lacunæ in the text without a particle of objective evidence. This is just as indefensible as that astounding statement made by the late Dr. E. P. Humphrey in his *Sacred History*: "The record exists in its integrity. No canonical book has been lost out of the volume, nor is any one of them mutilated or interpolated or otherwise corrupted. We have them as they came from the pen of their writers . . . No error, no discrepancy marks the record." That writes the science of textual criticism out of existence. The two extremes represented by Dr. Humphrey and Dr. Cheyne have done incalculable harm. The truth lies between. The text has not been miraculously preserved from all error. It must be restored, however, not by conjecture, but by evidence. Dr. Cheyne often makes these unwarranted additions in order to preserve the regularity of the rhythm throughout a particular psalm. But is it not clear that as to form the Hebrew poets belong rather to the order of Emerson than to that of Tennyson? They care little for the "Roman roundness" and infallible elegant symmetry of the latter. Profound feeling oftentimes disregards the rules of rhetoric: witness some of Paul's impassioned passages. And in Hebrew poetry "the internal spirit sways and controls the form with absolute, yea, even capricious power."

It is gratifying to see that Prof. Cheyne has done what the American Committee in vain urged the British Revisers to do; he has retained "Jehovah" instead of substituting "Lord." By their failure to preserve this covenant name the English versions have ignored the divine command (Ex. iii. 15), have obscured the progressive character of revelation, have thrown undue emphasis upon one divine attribute at the expense of others, and have sacrificed one of the most irresistible arguments against Unitarianism; for, as Coleridge has well said, if that name had been retained, "Socinianism would have been scarcely possible in England."

We had marked certain palmary passages in the Messianic and imprecatory psalms for special discussion, as illustrating both Dr. Cheyne's merits and faults as an interpreter, but these must be reserved for some other occasion. We conclude for the present with two remarks. Prof. Cheyne is not a safe guide; and certainly his book is inadequate as a minister's main help in the study of the Psalms. But as a purely critical commentary it has few superiors.

W. W. MOORE.

CRAWFORD'S TRANSLATION OF THE KALEVALA.

THE KALEVALA : The National Epic of Finland. *Translated into English verse by Dr. J. M. Crawford, of Cincinnati.* Two volumes. Cloth. Gilt top. Pages 744. \$2. John B. Alden, New York. 1888.

At some period of their history, the great heart of every patriotic people bursts forth into a spontaneous poetic song, glorifying the nation or a hero that embodies its ideal excellences. Greece has her Iliad, Italy her Æneid, Portugal her Lusiad, France her Chansons de Roland, Persia her Shahnameh (Epic of Kings), India her Mahabharata, England her Beowulf, Germany her Niebelungen Lied. Even in the frozen regions of the North there are not a few who 'kindle their incense at the muse's flame and wake to ecstasy the living lyre.' Iceland has her poetic Edda and Finland her Kalevala (*i. e.*, the Land of Heroes). The legends in the poem, some of which antedate the Christian era by at least a thousand years, and all of which exhibit a thoroughly pagan spirit, pass down from lip of sire to lip of son, but preserve their ancient garb, and are infused with the spirit of a hoary antiquity. These precious legacies of the olden time were collected mainly by two Finnish scholars, Drs. Topelius and Lönnrot. The latter, with great zeal and unflagging enthusiasm, visited the most inaccessible districts, and gathered the poetic lays as they fell from the lips of the aged sires of the race. These he grouped about epic centres, and the result of his labors was the Kalevala, first submitted to the Finnish Literary Society in 1835, and now fully translated for the first time into English verse by Dr. J. M. Crawford, of Cincinnati. A small fragment was translated by Prof. Jno. A. Porter, of Yale, in 1868, so that to Americans belongs the honor of putting this poem within the reach of English-speaking readers. The American publisher has given us two goodly volumes, with attractive type, binding, and paper, generous margins, and the conventional, æsthetic ragged edges.

The poem consists of fifty runes, or cantos, with a proem and an epilogue. The verse is a faithful reproduction of the original, which is a trochaic, octosyllabic measure without rhyme, similar to the metre of Longfellow's Hiawatha. The English ear, attuned in epic themes to the stately march of the iambic, is offended at first by the apparent jingle of the tripping trochaic. One soon recognizes, however, the adaptability of the metre to the abrupt, incisive utterances of the speakers, and the rapid swing of the narrative.

As the poem exhibits few, if any, traces of foreign influence, it is preëminently a national epic and a faithful mirror of the Finnish people in their primitive state. Prof. Max Müller ranks it along with Home and the great epics of Persia and India. The hero of the Kalevala is the great wizard, Wainamoinen, though his brother Ilmarinen, the magic blacksmith, and a reckless warrior, Lemminkainen, play parts almost equally conspicuous. Every hero is a sort of demi-god and magician, though all apparently recognize the supremacy of Ukko, the creator, who affably answers almost all prayers, whether good or evil. As we cannot follow the footsteps of the heroes whose extravagant prowess puts Munchausen to the blush, we shall call attention to some of the few main points of interest in the poem. The enmity between the Finns and Lapps is emphasized by the constant struggles between the Finnish heroes and Louhi, the presiding genius of Lapland. The Lapps were probably the original owners of the soil. The Finnish heroes, however, seek the hands of the fair daughters of Louhi in marriage, and most of the episodes

cluster around the struggles, the courtships, and the marriages. These struggles seem to personify the perpetual contest between the powers of good and evil, the Finns typifying the good and the Lapps the evil. In this and in other respects the poem illustrates the continuity of human thought. The eternal principles of right and wrong, and the value of chastity, courage, industry, patience, and endurance are as clearly recognized then as now.

But the most fruitful study suggested by the Kalevala is comparative mythology. Mythological stories, we believe, are traceable to two sources mainly: perversion or imitation of the Bible narrative and personification of the powers of nature. The first may be illustrated by the Greek account of the flood, the second by the Apollo or sun-myths and the Diana or moon-myths. So in Kalevala, when Louhi steals sun and moon and hides them in a mountain, this evidently prefigures the disappearance of these luminaries during the long Arctic winter. The return of summer is signalized by their release through the agency of the good Wainamoinen. This is only one of many instances.

Another point of interest to all Americans is Longfellow's indebtedness to the Kalevala for the inspiration of his poem, Hiawatha. The opportunity of comparing the two carefully is now afforded for the first time, and the comparison will be interesting. That Longfellow did make use of the Kalevala is admitted. How far he used it, a patient investigation alone will decide. Interesting in itself, suggestive in its bearing upon comparative mythology and folk-lore, and all aglow with the warmth of poetic fancy, the Epic of Finland should command the attention not only of Finnish scholars but of all lovers of good literature.

W. S. CURRELL.

IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. With Analyses and Illustrative Literature. *By O. S. Stearns, D. D., Professor of Biblical Interpretation in Newton Theological Institution.* 12mo, pp. 148. Boston: Silver, Burdett & Co. 1888.

A remarkably complete syllabus. The author has compressed into short compass a vast amount of information concerning each book of the Old Testament, its authorship, date, contents, chief critical difficulties, and the literature that the student will find of use in studying the book or determining its questions. He leaves such subjects as the languages, the history and the integrity of the text, and the inspiration of the authors and the supernatural character of the text to general introduction, not discussing the critical questions pertaining to the reconstruction of the Old Testament, but assuming the canonicity and authenticity of the various books. In some cases, as for instance in the consideration of the unity of the authorship of Isaiah, the origin and structure of the Pentateuch, etc., he gives succinctly the leading evidences and arguments both for and against the orthodox position. Yet while it is his purpose merely to open the way to each student to form an opinion for himself, it is quite evident that the author realizes the strength of the argument for the old view. The book can be heartily recommended, and will be found exceedingly useful by laymen in our Sabbath-schools as well as by students and ministers.

BIBLICAL ANTIQUITIES. A hand-book for use in seminaries, Sabbath-schools, families, and by all students of the Bible. *By Edwin Cone Bissell, D. D., Professor in Hartford Theological Seminary.* With numerous illustrations and tables. 12mo, pp. 420. \$1.50. Philadelphia: American Sunday-school Union. 1888.

Under the provision of the John C. Green fund, "for the purpose of aiding in securing a Sunday-school literature of the highest order of merit," the Sunday-school Union has been able to produce the above-named book. The preparation of the volume has been by one thoroughly competent to the task, Dr. Bissell being one of the ablest scholars of the day, and withal characterized by the soundest orthodoxy. He has taken advantage of the latest researches and of the advanced scholarship of the day, and produced a book which will be eminently useful. He has prepared it for popular use, and therefore gives the latest accepted results of scientific study rather than detailed processes. Hebrew and Greek terms are written in the simplest phonetic form. The citations from the Scriptures are full and explicit, and are usually taken from the Revised Version. As a complete, comprehensive work on Biblical antiquities, we know of none that surpass it, and especially so in respect to its adaptation to popular use.

THE EPISTLE OF PAUL THE APOSTLE TO THE ROMANS. With Notes, Comments, Maps, and Illustrations. *By Lyman Abbott.* New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1888.

Dr. Abbott is already well known in the department of exposition. His commentaries on the Gospels and the Acts are widely used, and are, in most respects, acceptable and faithful. His bright, illustrative language, original and popular methods, and happy way of putting things, make him most readable. All this, however, only makes the new commentary the more to be carefully handled and used. Dr. Abbott regards Paul as "the evangelist rather than the philosopher, a poet rather than a scholastic," and in his commentary seems to keep this view of the apostle constantly in sight. As a result, he reduces Paul's theology to a minimum, and makes the little that is left the result of the personality and environment of the apostle rather than the work of inspiration or the logical outcome of the faith delivered to the saints. He repudiates such well-defined, settled terms as "justify" in the forensic sense, "propitiation," "forgive," etc., and, with great assurance, rejects what he is pleased to regard as the antique, scholastic, theological method of interpretation. The work is the outcome of the "New Theology," and as such shows what that school would do with the foundations of our faith. Paul would hardly recognize himself in the picture which the new Plymouth pastor gives of him.

BIBLE STUDIES FOR 1889. *By Geo. F. Pentecost, D. D.* 5 x 7. Pp. 403. Paper 50 cts.; cloth \$1.00. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1888.

Dr. Pentecost has done well to continue his work in this department. The success of his effort in *Bible Studies for 1888* was unquestionably and deservedly great. The Studies for 1889 are prepared upon the same plan. They are evangelical, as all who are acquainted with Dr. Pentecost will know. They are clear, suggestive, and scholarly, and will be found exceedingly helpful to the teacher or student of the International Lessons. The author is very happy in applying the truths of the text, and thus giving the teacher useful suggestions as to the end to be attained in properly conducting a Sabbath-school class.

STUDIES IN MARK'S GOSPEL. *By Rev. Charles S. Robinson, D. D.* 12mo, pp. 299. Cloth \$1.25. New York: American Tract Society. 1888.

Of the numerous volumes which will be offered as helps to teachers in the lessons of the new year this book will easily occupy a place in the front rank. It is not a commentary, but, as its title indicates, a series of "studies." The writer delivered them in his regular pulpit work, and they will be found eloquent, tender, and forcible, abounding in that clear illustration in which Dr. Robinson excels, and full of unction. As the discourses are not designed for the lessons of the year, though splendidly adapted to them, they will be of permanent value to the church, and will be models of exposition to the preacher as well as helps to the people.

GOSPEL SERMONS. *By James McCosh, D. D., LL. D. Litt. D., ex-President of Princeton College, etc.* 12mo, pp. 336. \$1.50. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1888.

Dr. McCosh has been best known as a philosopher and educator. Here, however, he appears as the preacher. And he appears well. He shows himself at home.

We wonder that he has not been better known as a herald of Christ. The sermons are models of evangelical truth, simplicity, directness, sympathetic grasp of the needs of the human heart and of the power of the gospel to supply these needs. They are *Gospel Sermons*. The gospel is placed above philosophy; yet, the philosophy often appears, in simple, direct form, to be the hand-maid of the gospel. Among the eighteen sermons, all of which we read with keen interest, we cannot discriminate as to merit. The subjects discussed are incidents from the life of Christ, the nature of faith and repentance, man's tendency to trust in his own righteousness, the offices of the Spirit, Christian humility, growth in grace, the resurrection, etc. The sermons are remarkable as the plainest and simplest possible discussions of great elementary truths, by one of the profoundest thinkers of the age. The volume will outlive the majority of similar collections.

WHITHER? *By James Henderson Smith.* Richmond, Va.: Whittet & Shepperson. 1888. 15 cents.

Those who have been delighted with the articles of this author in the QUARTERLY, and his many friends everywhere, will find great pleasure in reading this beautiful brochure. It is dedicated to the faithful people whom he served and loved in the ministry, from which sickness has, for only a short time we trust, laid him aside, and is based upon the Lord's words to his disciples, "Will ye also go away?" Mrs. Margaret J. Preston gives with the brochure, and as an introduction, a beautifully appropriate religious sonnet, and the printer's art as here displayed is perfection itself. We would be glad to see the booklet in every Christian home.

THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD. An Outline of the Great Religious Systems. *By David James Burrell, D. D.* Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school work. 1888. 12mo, pp. 332. Price, \$1.25.

This book ought to have interest for all who desire to know why Christianity is the only true religion. The ten chapters consider in their order, Fetichism, The Religion of Ancient Egypt, Zoroastrianism, Brahmanism, Buddhism, The Religion of Greece, The Religion of the Norsemen, Confucianism, Islam, the True Religion. Under their several heads each system is outlined, so that readers acquire a knowledge of the character of all the great religions of the world. In the case of each the test applied is, "How would the system answer the question, 'What must I do to be saved?'" The book is written in a popular style, the author's aim being to furnish instruction not so much for the learned as for the many who, not having time for extended research, must have their reading in simple, plain, compact and concise terms. It is a book in which every working pastor will find in compendious form what he needs to make himself familiar with the subject. Our Sabbath-school superintendents and teachers will find the volume not only intensely interesting, but helpful to them in their work.

THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH. *By Rev. John W. Primrose.* Wilmington: Jackson & Bell. 1888.

This tract of seventeen pages, by one of our most accomplished and successful pastors, will be found most useful for distribution. It sets forth in an admirable and practical manner the distinctive features of the Presbyterian Church, in its history, government, liberty, liberality, and doctrines.

THE ETHIC OF FREE THOUGHT. A selection of Essays and Lectures. *By Karl Pearson, M. A.* London: T. Fisher Unwin. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1888. Pp. 446. Price, \$4.80.

In noticing this volume of sheerest radicalism, nonsense and blasphemy, we shall quote for the reader a few sentences as a sample of what he will find in the book; then point out certain doctrines held and advocated by the author; then advise him to waste neither his time nor his money upon this handsome volume, in every respect a paragon of printing and binding.

Mr Pearson says: "These lectures included in this selection have been delivered to Sunday and other audiences." "I set out from the standpoint that the mission of free thought is no longer to batter down old faiths; that has been long ago effectively accomplished, and I, for one, am ready to put a railing around the ruins, that they may be preserved from desecration, and serve as landmarks. Indeed, I confess to have yawned over a recent vigorous indictment of Christianity, and I promptly disposed of my copy to a young gentleman who was anxious that I should read a work entitled *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, which he told me had given quite a new width to the faith of his childhood." "The free thinker is not an atheist, but he vigorously denies the existence of any god hitherto put forward." "I shall assume, therefore, that the majority of my audience are free-thinkers; that they do not accept Christianity as a divine or miraculous revelation." "If, like the frogs or the Jews, who would have a king, we insist upon having a god, then let us call the universe, with its vast system of unchangeable laws, god." "So cried Clifford to two scientists of repute who stooped in 1875 to dabble in the mire of 'natural theology.'"

These citations are sufficient to reveal the author's spirit towards Christianity; and the argument is as shallow as the spirit is contemptuous.

Mr. Pearson denies the existence of God, and refuses to spell Jehovah's name with a capital "G," lest by so doing he should show some respect to the idea; and "ethic of free thought" is that knowledge which we may obtain after this fundamental denial. The teleological method of reasoning he describes as "the prostitution of science," and himself holds the hypothesis of the eternity of matter, and of the spontaneous generation of life. He denies the distinction between mind and matter, and contends in italicised language that "all life is matter." Freedom from "phenomenal slavery," consists in the "renunciation of human passions"—a task which, without supernatural grace, is equal to the feat of jumping out of one's own skin. "Service to society and reverence for society" is, in his opinion, "the moral basis of socialism"—a socialism which "lays down no transcendental code of morality, accepts no divine revelation as a basis of conduct; asserts the human origin, the plastic and developable character, of morals." Finally, he is an advocate of "Woman's rights" and of gross "Freeloveism."

Mr. Pearson, then, is an atheist in theology, a materialist in philosophy, an evolutionist in science, a socialist in ethics, and a radical in sociology.

A CRITICAL HISTORY OF SUNDAY LEGISLATION FROM A. D. 321 to A. D. 1888. *By A. H. Lewis, D. D.* New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1888.

A careful examination of this book shows that, instead of being a thoroughly critical and impartial history of Sunday legislation, it is really an unskilful attempt to prove the theory of the author, who is a Seventh-day Baptist and the editor of

the *Outlook*, the organ of the Seventh-day people. The first part of the book is an elaborate attempt to prove that our Sunday, as the sacred day, is of purely pagan origin, and that there is "only a certain presumptive evidence in favor of any observance of it until after the church passed under the control of pagan influences." He asserts that "all the most ardent friends of Sunday are compelled to admit" that Constantine's edict in behalf of Sunday was not for the purpose of honoring the Lord by honoring his day, but to honor Apollo. His account of the origin of the American Sunday laws as derived solely from Puritanism, is inaccurate historically; and here he contradicts himself, for he states further on that it was upon the act of Charles II., passed after the great reaction from Puritanism, and under the Cavaliers, that our early laws were based. His later chapters, in reciting the Sunday laws of this country, in characterizing them as inoperative and wrong in principle and based upon the wrong idea, are an unwarranted disparagement of those laws. The book does not deserve, and will not receive, cordial commendation from any except the author's co-religionists.

THE SUNDAY-SCHOOL; Its Origin, Mission, Methods, and Auxiliaries. The Lyman Beecher Lectures before Yale Divinity School for 1888. By H. Cloy Trumbull, Editor of *The Sunday-School Times*, author of *Kadesh Barnea*, *The Blood Covenant*, etc. 8vo, pp. 415. Philadelphia: John D. Wattles. 1888.

Dr. Trumbull's course of lectures at Yale, embodied in this volume, afforded him a rare opportunity to take up, systematize, and complete the material which he had gathered in thirty years' experience in the Sunday-school. This volume is the most complete and elaborate that has ever been given on the great subject with which it deals, and is both able and opportune. The author discusses with special care the great question of the relation of the Sunday-school to the family on the one hand, and to the ministry and the church on the other, and wisely concludes that if the common objection that the Sunday-school is a rival of either be valid, or the objection to the institution based upon this supposition be well founded, "the Sunday-school neither can have, nor ought to have, the intelligent approval of the lovers of God's order in the plans of God's ordering." His tracing of the church school as the historical source of the Sunday-school is worthy of special study. He distinctly affirms his belief in the control of the school by the church, in the selection of officers, the lessons taught, and the moneys received and expended; and he emphasizes the duty of the church to *support* the school in making proper provision of time for its exercises, of room for its gathering, and of money for its expenses. The work is too full for more at this time than a statement of general features like these. We wish we could give the whole book to every reader instead of this brief notice of its great worth.

SURE TO SUCCEED. By J. Thain Davidson, D. D., Author of "*The City Youth*," "*Talks with Young Men*," etc. 12mo, pp. 289. \$1.25. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1889.

A series of addresses or sermons to young men, and abounding in wholesome principles and practical suggestions. The preacher deals with those difficulties and snares which lie in the way of youth, and presents the gospel of Christ as the best guide, the best solution, the best antidote. It is a good book to put into the hands of young men for Sunday reading. The author is sympathetic as well as convincing and sound. The beautiful press-work and binding admirably adapt it for a gift-book.

THE NONSUCH PROFESSOR, in his Meridian Splendor; or, The Singular Actions of Sanctified Christians. *By the Rev. William Secker.* With an Introduction by Rev. T. L. Cuyler, D. D. 12mo, pp. 367. \$1.25. New York: Robert Carter & Bros. 1888.

This quaint book is a reprint, after a disappearance of fifty years. Of the author, William Secker, an old-time preacher of Londonwall, nothing is known; but judging by this work, he must have been a remarkable man. His sentences are keen and incisive, displaying wonderful insight into human nature and gospel truth. He is describing the life of practical godliness, which one would hardly infer, nowadays, from the title. This he does in language at once true and new. Matthew Henry was not more quaint, nor Benjamin Franklin more sententious in style. Pithy aphorisms, keen epigrams and striking antitheses abound on every page. As specimens, we read "God is nearer to us than we are to ourselves." "The world is very large in our hopes, but very small in our hands." "When we hold the stirrup, it is easy for Satan to leap into the saddle." "Sin is like a nettle which stings when it is gently touched, but hurts not when it is roughly handled." The publishers deserve thanks for bringing out such a casket of gems.

THE SPIRIT OF BEAUTY. Essays, Scientific and Æsthetic. *By Henry W. Parker.* 12mo, pp. 252. Cloth, 75 cents. New York: John B. Alden. 1888.

Sound judgment and a fine poetic sense unite in giving us in this book a collection of essays remarkable for their strength and gracefulness. The author, having defined beauty, traces its manifestation in the material world and proves that it leads the mind to the conclusion that an Intelligent First Cause must exist. Starting from this idea he develops throughout the book the one great principle which underlies the essays, viz., that "selection," as understood in the theory of evolutionism, can never account for nor explain the beauty which is in the world about us. The work is handsomely done, and is characterized by great originality and incisiveness as well as force. The author well deserves the encomiums of Dr. Peabody, Prof. Tyler and others, who gave their unqualified approval to these essays when they appeared, separately, in the *North American Review* and *Scribner's*.

MANIFOLD CYCLOPEDIA OF KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE. With Illustrations. Each Vol. about 600 pp., 7½ in. by 4½ in. New York: John B. Alden. 1888. Cloth, 50 cents; half morocco, 65 cents.

Since our last number, volumes eight, nine and ten of this valuable publication have been received. They are fully sustaining the reputation made by the earlier volumes, and enable one to appreciate and realize the value of the work more and more fully. As a Dictionary the work is as complete as an "unabridged," and as an Encyclopædia, it furnishes just as much as any one would ordinarily wish to know. Except to the specialist who wishes to enter thoroughly into the minuter details of some branch of knowledge, we know of no work of its class which will prove more satisfactory. It is comprehensive, clear, and as far as we have examined accurate. Its popular price, as well as its merits, should make it a very popular book. There are few people who cannot afford it, as there are few who will not find it extremely useful.

THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

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I. WOMAN IN THE CHURCH.

As straws show the direction of the wind, so recent events in church and state indicate the movement of a popular current, more or less clearly defined, towards the removal of what are called woman's disabilities, and her enfranchisement in what are claimed to be her civil and ecclesiastical rights. There is not room in an article like this for a discussion of the genesis of this movement, or for a review, however cursory, of the debates and deliverances of various public assemblies, social, political and ecclesiastical, in which the strength of the movement has recently made itself felt. There is, we think, no just ground for fear that its current will gain momentum enough to sweep away the conservative barriers within which woman's agency is rightly confined. We have no sympathy with the fears expressed by a distinguished speaker in one of the recent Northfield conferences, when he says, "We behold woman to-day in a condition in which she is absolutely a menace to human society; grown restless and discontented; clamoring for rights when Christianity has brought her all that she has; at times divorced from the church, listening to the siren's song of infidelity, threatening to depart from the church that would withhold from her any privileges or rights she would claim; in the very capital of our nation threatening to join hand with anarchists to secure under another government what she may not secure here." It would be a gross injustice to the noble women of our land to hold them responsible for the incendiary utterances of a few restless spirits amongst them, or to suppose that they endorse the revolutionary sentiments of the speaker to whom Bishop

Hendrix refers. On the contrary, we think the real state of the case is admirably presented in a recent communication to the *New York Star* from one of the brightest and most gifted of our Southern women, Mrs. Fanny Casseday Duncan, when she says on behalf of the Christian women of the land, "We wish to protest against these woman's congresses assuming to represent us as their constituency. They no more represent the great body of women in the United States than the two or three women who demanded seats in the Methodist Conference represented the great body of noble wives and mothers of the Methodist Church out of whose bodies and hearts have arisen the bones and sinews, the thews and brawn of the men and martyrs who have made the Methodist bishops and ministers pioneers of religion in the waste places of the earth. In the quiet homes of the land, where the silent influences of ten thousand mothers are developing, moulding, ennobling, governing men, and making laws for their highest evolution, the very names of these leaders are possibly unknown."

There is no danger of upheaval of our social system, but there is danger that the constant agitation of the subject of woman's rights may prove a serious element of disturbance in our national and religious life, and there is need therefore for a calm and thorough review of the whole question of woman's legitimate sphere, her true position in society, and her appropriate work both in the civil commonwealth and in the church of God.

A discussion of this subject in its civil aspects would be aside from the purpose of the present article, and would fall more properly within the purview of the statesman and political philosopher. We confine ourselves exclusively to woman's position and work in the church:

I. And the first position we assume is that woman should be encouraged to occupy the highest positions, and to enter upon the widest spheres of labor and influence in the church that are consistent with the limits fixed by the word of God. A large proportion of the membership of our churches is made up of women. On most of our communion rolls the proportion of names is as two to one, and on many three or four to one. Ordinarily two-thirds of our congregations on Sabbath and at prayer-meetings are

composed of women; and the disproportion would no doubt be greater were it not for the number of men brought to church by the importunity of wives and sisters, and the number of women kept away by the spiritual inertia of husbands and brothers, whose habits of self-indulgence put serious obstacles in the way of the church attendance of the female members of the family. Two-thirds of our Sabbath-school teachers are women. For nearly all our work among the destitute, the sick and the degraded, we are dependent upon women. They enter as a principal factor into the zeal, activity and success of every congregation. Where they are the most heartily encouraged and the most wisely and judiciously directed there the highest spiritual results may be expected. No pastor serving a large congregation in one of our great centres of population could keep at all abreast of his pastoral work if it were not for the efficient and untiring aid rendered him by the devoted Christian women of his flock. No one, therefore, whose heart is in the work of the Master need feel any jealousy as to the influence that may be acquired and the honors that may be won by the sisters in the church. On the contrary, gratefully recognizing the peculiar endowments with which God has fitted them for service, every door that he has not closed should be thrown wide open before them. They should be not only permitted, but encouraged, to enter every proper sphere of labor; and if the lay-brethren have not consecration and enthusiasm enough to follow, they may at least breathe a hearty Godspeed as their sisters in Christ press forward along these pathways of self-denial and service.

II. A second position which we must assume is that there are certain positions in the church and certain spheres of labor the door to which God in his providence, and by his Spirit, speaking through his word, has effectually closed against woman. Into these she may not venture; and if she should be so unwise as to seek them, the church of God cannot, for all the love it bears to her, and all its sense of the invaluableness of her service, decline to interpose its authority and restrain her from entering upon offices forbidden her of God.

An enthusiastic Christian woman, writing recently in one of our church journals, after assuring us that if tears could be shed in

heaven, the apostle Paul would no doubt weep to see "how his teachings are being wrested by the learned and stable to close the door against woman's work in the church," closes her jeremiade with this appeal:

"O sister woman, when the Master is come and calleth for thee, for thy tongue, thy pen, thy work, which no other can do, what though the chief priests and the scribes and the rulers of the people are sore displeased! This much thou mayest know even now, that over all thy errors and mistakes his gracious hand shall write hereafter, 'Her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much.'"

It probably did not occur to this earnest Christian woman to ask herself the question, Why should there be "errors and mistakes" over which the Saviour's hand must write words of forgiveness in a matter so plain as that of woman's proper sphere as it is marked out for her in the word of God? Why should she wander from a sphere so wide, so influential, so blessed, so fruitful of results, so suited in every way to her temperament and to her lot in life, one in which, if she is faithful, the Master will write words not of forgiveness, but of commendation? Surely she had better avoid the mistake of entering a field into which he has not called her, and confine herself to that to which her commission is clear, so that at last she may hear the words, "Well done, good and faithful servant," and not simply, "Her sins, which are many, are forgiven her." A planet moves more smoothly and accomplishes its destiny more successfully by keeping within the orbit God has marked out for it than by wandering from it; and if these "chief priests and scribes and rulers of the people" are only contending that woman shall continue in the orbit of service marked out for her in the word of God, the fact that they are "sore displeased" should lead her and all the friends of the "woman's movement" to proceed cautiously, lest "haply they be found to be fighting against God." The sole authority in this matter is the word of God. As far as the word of God authorizes woman to go the church should encourage her and help her to go; but with the same firm and unflinching hand with which it closes the door of office against men who are without the proper evi-

dence of a divine call, must it exclude woman in so far as it shall appear from the word of God that her sex disqualifies her.

The question then is, How far does woman's sex act as a disqualification? From what offices, if any, does it exclude her?

(1.) She is inhibited from entering the ministry of the gospel. The subject of public preaching by women has been a fruitful source of disturbance in the church. There has scarcely been a century of the Christian era in which there has not arisen some gifted, brilliant, or consecrated woman, possessing talents of such a character that if found in one of the other sex they would, humanly speaking, have ensured success in the ministry of the word. In one of the letters of Sir Thomas Buxton, the great British philanthropist, referring to the ministry of Priscilla Gurney, the Quakeress, he says: "I deem her as perfect a speaker as I ever heard. The tone of her voice, her beauty, the singular clearness of her conception, and, above all, her own strong conviction that she was urging the truth,—and truth of the utmost importance,—the whole constituted a species of ministry which no one could hear, and which, I am persuaded, no one ever did hear, without a deep impression."

There can be no doubt that in many cases woman possesses the natural gifts and the spiritual graces requisite to a public preacher of the word; but it is equally clear that "he that shutteth and no man openeth" has effectually closed the door of the ministry against her. There are certain passages of Scripture that settle the matter so authoritatively as to leave us in no doubt; and it is a noteworthy fact that these passages are from the pen of the apostle who makes most of woman's work in the church; who alludes so gratefully to the "faithful women who labored with me in the gospel;" who sent messages of affection to "Tryphena and Tryphosa, who labor in the Lord," and to "the beloved Persis, which labored much in the Lord." Surely if the door of the ministry could have been thrown open to woman, he who set such store by her labors would have been the first to recognize her right and to avail himself of her services in this office. It will only be necessary to refer to two passages in the writings of the apostle. We quote them in full:

“Let your women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak: but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home: for it is a shame for women to speak in the church.” (1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35.)

“Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence. For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression. Notwithstanding she shall be saved in child-bearing, if they continue in faith and charity and holiness with sobriety.” (1 Tim. ii. 11-15.)

It will be observed that in each of these cases we have a distinct and specific enactment. It is not a mere passing allusion, or an incidental reference. We are not left to inferences from the apostle's reasoning upon other subjects. He lays down a definite law. He utters an inspired and authoritative command. Women, he says, must keep silence in the churches. They are not permitted to speak. It is a shame for them to speak in the church. He does not suffer a woman to teach. She must be in silence in the public assembly. She must learn in silence with all subjection. She may not even ask publicly for information, but must wait and ask her husband at home. If it is a violation of the law of sex-relation which God has ordained, and therefore a shameful thing, for a woman to open her lips in public religious services, even to ask a question for her own information, upon what possible ground can one advocate her right to preach?

To break the force of these passages two different lines of argument have been pursued. First, it has been maintained that the words “speak” and “teach” do not refer to public preaching, and therefore cannot be construed as prohibiting that which was not in the apostle's mind when he wrote. Thus we are reminded that the word in the original translated “speak” in the passage from Corinthians is not either of the two words generally employed to denote the public preaching of the gospel, but a word whose literal meaning is *talking*, and that all the apostle meant was to prohibit the Corinthian women from interrupting the public assem-

blies with light, incoherent or frivolous questions and remarks. Thus Barclay, in his celebrated "Apology for the Quakers," says in defense of the right of women to preach, "Neither think we that of Paul (1 Cor. xiv. 34), to reprovè the inconsiderate and talkative women among the Corinthians, who troubled the church of Christ with their unprofitable questions, anyway repugnant to this doctrine." One or two considerations will show how groundless this explanation is. In the first place, the word *λαλεῖν* is frequently used in the New Testament to indicate preaching in its most public and solemn forms. It is translated *preach* in numerous passages, as Mark ii. 2; Acts viii. 25; xi. 19; xiv. 25; xvi. 6, etc. It is used of public preaching in an indefinite number of others, as "It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you." (Matt. x. 20.) "He spake many things unto them in parables." (Matt. xiii. 3.) "Go stand and speak in the temple." (Acts v. 20.) "While Peter yet spake." (Acts x. 44.) "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery." (1 Cor. ii. 7.) "To speak the mystery of Christ." (Col. iv. 3.) "These things speak and exhort." (Tit. ii. 15.) "If any man speak let him speak as the oracles of God." (1 Pet. iv. 11.) These are only specimens taken from an immense number of similar passages. Let any man take the context in this epistle and with his concordance go through the list of references under the word "speak," including such as "speaking in the Spirit," "speaking with tongues," "speaking mysteries," etc., and he will see how far the apostle is here from referring to inconsiderate or indecorous talking in the pews. But further, it is evident that the prohibition of the apostle proceeds upon the principle, not that the thing forbidden is wrong in itself, but that it is wrong to be done by a woman. If we should concede to our opponents what they claim, but what is not very gallant towards the sex whose rights they are so sedulously guarding, that the women were the chief or even the exclusive offenders in this supposed disturbance of public worship, this would not account for the apostle's peculiar language. Under those circumstances he might be expected to say "Let your women keep silence in the churches," but why should he add, "for it is not permitted unto them to speak?" Notice the force of the "unto

them," which clearly limits the prohibition to women. If the apostle had been speaking of indecorous talking or disorderly interruption of public discourse, which would have been as improper in a man as in a woman, he would have said "let your women keep silence for it is not permitted any one to talk in church." As the language now stands it clearly implies that it is only women who are forbidden to talk; that men, as far as the apostle's authority goes, have a right to babble as much as they please. The same thing applies to the clause, "It is a shame for women to speak in the church." Why "for women," and not "for any one?" Is it not evident that the apostle refers to something which it is right for a man to do, but which is wrong for a woman—something which is wrong from sex-relation—and therefore not inconsiderate questioning or interruption of speakers, which would be as wrong for men as for women, but that which is implied in the constant use of the word "speak," namely, the public preaching of the word, which to a man is permitted under proper circumstances, but to a woman—never?

The advocates of this theory have still greater difficulty in bringing their minimizing interpretation to bear upon the passage in Timothy, "I suffer not a woman to teach;" for, leaving out of view the fact that the words "teach and preach" are associated all through the New Testament as the representatives of the two great phases of the public ministry of the word, indoctrinating in the truth and urging to the acceptance of salvation, it is only necessary to examine the context to see that in every instance in which the apostle uses the word in his Epistles to Timothy he refers exclusively to the ministry of the word: "These things command and teach;" "these things teach and exhort;" "faithful men who shall be able to teach others also." This is evidently the kind of teaching to which the apostle refers when he says, "I suffer not a woman to teach." As far as his inspired authority is law, woman is by her sex incapacitated for the gospel ministry.

The second line of argument, intended to break the force of these texts, admits that the apostle had reference to public speaking or preaching of women, but contends that the prohibition was local and temporary, growing out of a due respect for the social

laws and customs then in vogue, which made it disreputable for a woman to appear in any way conspicuous in public assemblies, but of no authority now when these social customs, and the scandal to the church which would have arisen from a violation of them, are alike numbered with the things of the past. We are told that the apostle's words had reference only to "the present necessity," and that it would be a great and cruel wrong to hold our noble Christian women of the present day under the bondage of social customs that with paganism have happily passed away.

But there is not a line in all that the apostle has written to indicate that his prohibitions grew out of deference to social customs or usages of society that were local and temporary. On the contrary, the reasons he gives for forbidding women to speak and to teach are of universal application, and as binding upon women in the United States in the nineteenth century as they were upon women in Corinth in the first century of the Christian era. In both the passages quoted above the reasons are grounded in the original and divinely constituted relationship between the sexes, which requires that the woman shall always maintain towards the man a relation of subordination incompatible with her assumption of the role of a public preacher or expounder of the word. In the first passage quoted, the apostle merely alludes to this original and universal law of sex-relationship, when he says, "For they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law," meaning by "the law" the Old Testament Scriptures. In the first passage, therefore, the apostle enjoins silence, not out of deference to social customs, but in distinct recognition of a subordination enjoined of God in his inspired word. In the second passage, the apostle enters still more specifically and minutely into the reasons. He not only states that public teaching by woman is contrary to the law of subordination as revealed in the Old Testament; but he goes further, and gives us an inspired explanation of the grounds of that subordination. These grounds are two: first, "Adam was first formed, then Eve," the creation of the woman after the man and avowedly as an helpmeet for him, showing the order of subjection and the sphere of subordination in which her life-work was to be done; second, "Adam was not deceived, but

the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression." Here the apostle declares that to the original law of subordination springing out of sex-relation another law is added springing out of the peculiar relationship of woman to the first sin, a law distinctly promulgated to her in the hour of her first transgression in the words, "Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." Upon these two primordial and unchanging laws of God's government over men does the apostle base his prohibition, and not upon any social customs or questions of expediency for "the present necessity." The first law is the law of the original creation, and is binding wherever man and woman exist. The second is the law of the fall, and is binding "far as the curse is found." It is idle to attempt to escape their force. Much as we would enjoy the public speaking of some of our gifted and noble women, we have no discretion in the matter. The assumption by woman of the office of preaching is unnatural; it is unscriptural; it is subversive alike of true social order and true ecclesiastical regimen. In the light of God's word, which should be the end of all controversy, it cannot be.

But we will be asked, no doubt, what about those daughters of Philip, "which did prophesy?" (Acts xxi. 9), and what about the prediction of Joel, that under this new dispensation the "sons and daughters shall prophesy?" and what about Paul's reference, apparently without condemnation, in 1 Cor. xi. 5, to "a woman praying or prophesying?" Are not these instances of public prophesying of women fatal to the theory that woman may not preach? Not at all. It is certainly very strange to see the confusion in many minds as to the distinction between prophesying and preaching. To contend that because a woman, under the New Testament dispensation, may prophesy, therefore she may preach, is as logical as to contend that because I may write and deliver with authority a sermon, therefore I may write an inspired epistle and have it inserted in the Canon. The gift of prophecy was miraculous. It was, like the power of speaking in unknown tongues, the gift of healing, etc., a supernatural and extraordinary endowment of God, conferred and exercised for the purpose of attesting the truth of Christianity. It was not intended to be a per-

manent function in the church. Practically it ceased with the apostolic age. It had nothing to do with preaching. It had a different object and a distinct organon of expression in the church. The apostle allowed these inspired women to utter the prophecy God put into their mouths, as we would do to-day, if any woman amongst us gave evidence of supernatural and miraculous inspiration. But he who allowed a woman to prophesy if she only kept her head properly covered never in a single instance authorized her or even suffered her to preach.

(2.) In deference to the same inspired and therefore infallible authority we must add, woman is inhibited from holding any office or administering any function in the church which involves the exercise of authority over men. Here comes the apostle's explicit and inexorable law, "I suffer not a woman to usurp authority over the man." This is the principal, though not the sole ground, of her exclusion by him from the ministry. The minister is a spiritual ruler. The office is one of authority. For a woman to enter it is to usurp authority over the man, and this the apostle does not suffer. The same rule applies, of course, to every office which involves the exercise of spiritual rule in the church; and it is just at this point that the authority of Scripture comes into conflict with the ambitious designs and wishes of the modern advocates of woman's rights. In her address before the last Annual Convention of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Miss Frances E. Willard, president of this national organization, uses the following words: "By what righteous principle of law or logic are we excluded from church councils, when we so largely make up the church's membership? Who that did not know it beforehand would believe that good men actually desire to keep us out? Antecedently I would have made my affidavit that nothing could have pleased them so much as to have had us come in and share with them the power and honor as we do the burdens and responsibilities of the church home. . . . When everything else pertaining to the great Conference gathered here in May last shall be forgotten, the fact that it rejected duly chosen women delegates, just because they were women, will still be remembered and recounted as an injustice fitted to make angels weep."

If anybody thinks that a finality was reached on that memorable day of our defeat, he must be so loftily insulated on some official non-conductor that the swift currents of the people's thought and purpose have not reached him with their electric shock. . . . The time will come, however, and not many years from now, when, if representation is still denied us, it will be our solemn duty to raise once more the cry, 'Here I stand, I can do no other,' and step out into the larger liberty of a religious movement, where majorities, and not minorities, determine the fitness of women as delegates, and where the laying on of hands in consecration, as was undoubtedly done in the early church, shall be decreed on a basis of gifts, graces, and usefulness, irrespective of sex."

It will be noted, too, that the issue with the authority of the word of God is made distinctly and squarely. Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, in an article in the *Woman's Tribune*, under the title "The Chief Obstacle in the Way of Woman Suffrage," says, "The women who crowd our Christian temples are sedulously taught their inferiority in the scale of being, and their subjection to man. Paul's epistles abound with lessons of her obedience to man as sovereign, and the Old Testament represents her as a marplot in creation, an after-thought, the origin of sin, in collusion with the devil, cursed of God in her maternity, and marriage for her made a slavery. With such lessons taught in the Bible, and echoed and reëchoed on each returning Sabbath day in every pulpit in the land, how can woman escape the feeling that the injustice and oppression she suffers are of divine ordination? She is educated to reverence the priests and bishops, to believe in the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, and as both alike teach her subjection and inferiority, it is not easy to teach her terms of self-respect and equality."

Let the Christian women of our land ponder these words of this apostle of woman's rights. Let them hear her as she further says in the same article from which we have quoted, "It is woman's position in the church, and the holy books accepted as authority, that make political equality so difficult," and they will see that this so-called woman's movement that is now agitating the land is the spawn of infidelity, and can be consistently supported only by renouncing the authority of the church and denying the inspira-

tion of the word of God. From this unnatural spectacle of woman's revolt against the truth that has made her free, it is pleasant to turn again to the gifted Southern woman from whom we have already quoted, and read, "Christ loved to have women following him, influencing, persuading, ministering. This was in harmony with God's original decree for her. Did Christ reverse the Father's action? Did he commission a woman as one of the twelve? To what office in the infant church did he, dying, appoint Mary, his mother, she who had been thought fit to bear, to rear the Saviour of mankind? Ah! he consigned her to the loving care of the beloved disciple, that she might have a man's strong arm to lean upon, and that she might fit John to become the great apostle of love. So we need not fix upon Paul alone the wisdom that foresaw, and the voice which protested against woman in the glare of public life. Kick against it as we may, the fact remains firm and invincible, that God at creation, Christ at redemption, and St. Paul as the exponent of the new religion, each iterated and emphasized woman's place in the home, in public life, in the church."

As the teaching of Scripture upon the subject of woman's right to preach and rule in the church is clear and explicit, so the practice of the church has been in the main consistent and scriptural. Bingham (*Antiquities*, xiv., iv., 5) says, "As to women, whatever gifts they could pretend to, they were never allowed to preach publicly in the church, either by the apostle's rules or those of succeeding ages." And whilst there are individual instances in which, through the corruptions of the times, women were introduced into the office of presbyter and even of bishop, yet in almost every case the act was performed without proper ecclesiastical authority, and was condemned by the universal church.

As early as the year 1832, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in this country, in a pastoral letter to the churches in reference to dangers to be avoided in revivals, calls attention to a tendency then just beginning to appear, and uses this strong language (*Baird, Digest*, p. 220), "Meetings of pious women by themselves for conversation and prayer, whenever they can conveniently be held, we entirely approve. But let not the inspired prohibitions of the great apostle of the Gentiles, as found in his

Epistles to the Corinthians and to Timothy, be violated. To teach and exhort, or to lead in prayer in public and promiscuous assemblies, is clearly forbidden to women in the holy oracles." In the year 1872, a distinguished minister of Brooklyn having admitted a woman to his pulpit, the matter was brought to the attention of the Presbytery of Brooklyn, and that body, with only one dissenting voice, condemned the action of the pastor, and adopted an overture to the General Assembly North, asking that body to "adopt and transmit to the Presbyteries for their approval such rules as shall forbid the licensing and ordaining of women to the gospel ministry, and the teaching and preaching of women in our pulpits or in the public and promiscuous meetings of the church of Christ." To this overture the Assembly made answer (Moore's Digest, p. 353), "That there is no need for a change in the constitution of the church touching this question; and the memorialists are referred to the deliverance of the Assembly of 1832, which expresses the judgment of this Assembly."

It is highly gratifying to find our brethren of the other Assembly standing, as late as 1872, so fairly and squarely upon that most admirable deliverance of 1832; but our enthusiasm meets with a great damper when, only two years later, we find the General Assembly of 1874, (in answer to an overture from the Presbytery of Rock River, asking if the ruling of the Assembly applies to "the regular weekly prayer-meetings of the church,") answering in these words (Moore, p. 485), "The Assembly expresses no opinion as to the scriptural view of woman's right to speak and pray in the social prayer-meeting, but commits the whole subject to the discretion of the pastors and elders of the churches." Compare this with the action in 1832 in reference to "leading in prayer in public and promiscuous assemblies," and you will see at once how far the old ship has drifted from her moorings under the force of this current for woman's rights. If the weekly prayer-meeting of our churches is not a "public and promiscuous assembly" we would like to know what is.

In our own church, legislation on this subject has been very limited, but very much to the point. By a singular oversight in the revision of our Book of Church Order, the provision contained

in the old book that "in all cases the persons elected [ruling elders and deacons] must be male members in full communion in the church in which they are to exercise their office" was omitted. Thereupon certain critics contended that there was nothing in our constitution limiting the right of office to males, and that, in so far as our organic law is concerned, a woman might be made either an elder or a deacon. This led in 1880 to an overture to the Assembly from the Presbytery of Roanoke asking the restoration of the missing clause. But the Assembly declined to take steps to insert the clause on the ground that "the Book is sufficiently explicit, and does thus limit eligibility to males." At the same Assembly an overture was received from the Synod of Texas, asking, "Do our standards forbid the introduction of women to our pulpits? and if not, is it an offence according to the definition in the Rules of Discipline, Chap. III., Art. I., for a minister or church session to permit a woman to preach in one of our churches?" To this the Assembly returned the following answer (Alexander, Digest, p. 31): "Inasmuch as the public preaching of the gospel is a branch of the ministerial office, to the authorization of which ordination or licensure is essential, and inasmuch as inspired Scripture, as interpreted by our standards, nowhere in the case of women sanctions such a solemnity, but, on the contrary, does clearly prohibit it, this Assembly does therefore declare the assumption of this sacred office by women to be opposed to the advancement of true piety and to the promotion of the peace of the church, and this to such an extent as to make the introduction of women into our pulpits for the purpose of publicly expounding God's word an irregularity not to be tolerated." These are the only instances we can now recall in which our church has been called upon to testify as to the right of woman to administer public functions in the church, and in each case her testimony, like that of the word of God, has been clear and unmistakable.

III. Having considered the spheres from which woman is excluded, it may be well to look for a moment at some of those departments of effort which are open to her, but in which her agency has not been as fully recognized or as thoroughly and systematically developed as it might have been. Outside of the ministry,

and apart from all functions of rule, there is a great wide field suited to woman's characteristics and relation to the church, one in which her Christian faith and love may find widest scope and most beneficent exercise. There are meetings of her own sex for prayer and conference as to Christian work. There is Sabbath-school work and Bible-class work at home, Mission-school work and Zenana work abroad. There are Mission Societies, Dorcas Societies, Sewing-schools, Flower Missions, etc., besides the thousand forms of more private service which open themselves to every Christian woman whose aim in life, like that of her Lord, is "not to be ministered unto, but to minister." But there is one form of service to which woman is specially adapted, for her assignment to which we have both apostolic warrant and the usage of the early church, and yet which, as a regularly organized form of service, is not to be found at present in any branch of the Protestant church. We refer to the setting apart and employment of women, under regular authority and oversight of the church, as deaconesses, for service amongst the poor, the sick, the afflicted, and those who are out of the way. At present there is not a Protestant denomination that has any such order of deaconesses in its service. There are large institutions for the training and service of deaconesses at Kilburn and Mildmay, in England; at Kaiserwerth, in Germany; at Berne, in Switzerland, and at other points, but they are the outgrowth of voluntary organizations, and are not contemplated or provided for in the constitutions of the churches they serve. We have in this country, in a few places, sisterhoods under the auspices of the Protestant Episcopal Church, but such orders constitute no part of the regular machinery of the church. The public mind is awakening to a proper sense of this defect in our organization. At the last General Conference of the Methodist Church a plan was adopted for the introduction of an order of deaconesses in that church, whose duty it shall be "to minister to the poor, visit the sick, pray with the dying, care for the orphan, seek the wandering, comfort the sorrowing, save the sinning, and, relinquishing wholly all other pursuits, devote themselves in a general way to such form of Christian labor as may be suited to their abilities." The act provides that candidates for the office must be at least

twenty-five years of age, must have spent at least two years in continuous service; must be recommended by a Quarterly Conference and approved by an Annual Conference, when a certificate may be issued to them entitling them to recognition as deaconesses of the church.

The Cumberland Presbyterian, one of the organs of the denomination whose name it bears, commenting upon this action of the General Conference, says: "Our Methodist brethren have done a wise thing in providing for the organization of such of its devoted women as desire to consecrate themselves entirely to the work of ministering to the needy and afflicted, and winning souls. The constitution of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, adopted in 1883, provides that 'where it shall appear needful, the church session may appoint godly women for the care of the sick, of prisoners, of poor widows and orphans, and in general for the relief of distress.' So it will be seen," continues the editor, "that in this matter our (the Cumberland Presbyterian) Church is several years in advance of the Methodist."

The editor of *The Cumberland Presbyterian* ought in all candor to have added that this provision of the constitution of his church was taken *verbatim* from the Book of Church Order of the Presbyterian Church South, which, several years in advance of his own church, had engrafted upon its constitution a provision for the admission of woman to the office of deaconess, after the example of the apostolic church. It seems a little singular that our Southern Presbyterian Church, which is generally regarded as so ultra-conservative, should be in the lead in this matter, but such appears, as far as we can ascertain, to be the case.

As further evidence of the general awakening as to woman's work, we may state that, at the last General Council of the Presbyterian Alliance in London, a very able paper on this subject was presented by a committee, of which Rev. Prof. Charteris, of Edinburgh, was convener. This report, which, as the convener said, expressed the unanimous judgment of the committee, recommends, (1), "That in every congregation all women should be enrolled who are engaged in the service of Christ in connection with the church, and also all who desire to be taught and trained to serve

the Lord Jesus Christ;" (2), "That such as have had successful experience in work should be enrolled by the kirk-session as those to whom others might naturally look for help. This enrolment would include experienced Sabbath-school teachers and visitors, nurses, teachers of Bible classes, and heads of temperance organizations, workers in the service of song, makers of clothing for the poor, those who bring up friendless children," etc.; (3), "That after several years of experience or training, those women-workers who are willing to devote their lives to Christian work in connection with the church should be set apart and enrolled under the sanction of the courts of the church as *deaconesses*. They might be set apart by the presbytery or by the kirk-session; the former is more in accordance with the custom of the early church; the latter is more easy in operation, especially at the outset."

The report from which we have made these brief abstracts is a very long and elaborate one, giving a historical review of the relations of woman to the work of the church from the beginning. The influential character of the committee that framed it, the thorough organization of woman's work which it contemplates, and the marked favor with which it has been received, indicate the just awakening throughout the church to the importance of woman's work, and to the wisdom of directing into right channels of thoroughly organized service, energies that, if not wisely and appreciatively guided, may break over into forms of service that are unscriptural and hurtful to the purity and peace of the church. It only remains to suggest that our Southern Presbyterian Church, having led the van in making provision in its constitution for organizing woman's work, and having within its bosom the noblest type of Christian womanhood to be found in the world, may well take the lead in this matter of practical organization, and give us an order of deaconesses whose ministrations by the bedside of the sick and the suffering shall carry with them all the fragrance of sweet Christian charity, without the superstitions that mar the service of similar orders in the Roman Catholic Church.

T. D. WITHERSPOON.

II. OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.

II.

It remains to consider with a still closer examination the grand question that was propounded at the very outset, Is the theory of the avowed and outright optimist, or is that of the avowed and outright pessimist, or is either of them, as to the future of society and of the world, the true one?

Since the ancients¹ the most conspicuous advocate of dogmatic optimism was the illustrious and many-sided Leibnitz, who was opposed in his own day by Bayle; and the most redoubtable antagonist of that system, and the great formulator and defender of scientific pessimism, was Schopenhaur.

It is not the purpose of this disquisition to go over the arguments which have been hitherto employed on both sides, or on either side, of this seemingly interminable controversy, but to make use of such considerations as suggest themselves and to arrive at such conclusions as are judged to be alone warranted by the premisses. The contention will be to establish one of the antagonistic theories (qualified or unqualified) as exclusively the true one. This will of itself, and on the obvious principle already referred to, of course dispose at once of the intermediate or compounding view. A most important, a vitally essential factor in the determination of this problem has in the previous discussion been intentionally left almost wholly out of sight. That factor must now be mentioned, and must presently be formally brought in and carefully considered. That factor is religion, and more particularly Christianity, the religion of Jesus Christ.

If there were no such thing as religion, or no such thing as true religion, the quest for the right answer to our inquiry would still be a difficult, perhaps, absolutely regarded, a hopeless one; but the likelihood would undoubtedly incline decisively in one or other direction—in favor of one or the other of the two contradictory schemes. Although there were no such thing as true religion, if

¹ The popular representatives for antiquity of optimism and pessimism respectively are Democritus and Heraclitus (the "weeping philosopher").

we never came to *know* the fact we should remain in puzzled doubt. Even could we be made to know that all religion is a mere figment of the brain, chances would still exist in favor of "a good time coming," of a stable and progressive and culminating prosperity in the approaching *avenir*, though these chances would have to be overwhelmingly discounted under the rigorous operation of the doctrine of probabilities. If natural and supernatural religion were both ascertained to be false, then pessimism would unquestionably commend itself as on the whole the true philosophy. We ought to be assiduous in the endeavor to avoid one-sided and partial views on this subject. The child, and many men and women, as has been pointed out, see everything *couleur de rose*. This may be due not more to original and acquired disposition, than to a special habit of contemplating one class, to the almost total exclusion of the opposite class, of the phenomena. Whoever thinks only of May and June, will of course be oblivious of December; and *vice versa*. The one who lives wholly amongst the soft fair skies and shining streams and umbrageous reflexions and verdant meads, and primroses and daisies and morning-glories and roses, and larks and cuckoos and thrushes and nightingales, of spring and summer, will give himself no concern about the withered leaves and chill winds of autumn, or the snows and frosts of winter. And so, in turn, the man who rivets his mind upon the autumnal or wintry landscape, will have no eye or thought for the revolution inaugurated by the vernal season. Just in the same way, one man may fix his attention upon the benignant aspect of nature and of the cycle of events, and be an optimist; another upon the forbidding aspect of nature and of the cycle of events, and be a pessimist. No theory can be the true one that does not allow and provide for all aspects of the fate or fortune—the weal or the bale—of this ever turning, ever beaming, ever cloud-flecked, surface-chequered, light-sifting, shadow-darkened world in which we all "live and move and have our being."

On the first blush the theories of both the rival schools are alike and equally superficial. Each of them appears to be one-sided, and consequently to be wrong-sided. The optimist dwells too much on the smooth skies and seas, on the years of health and

plenty, on the peaceful incidents and epochs, on the physical, political, and social good there is in the earth; and forgets, or neglects, the earthquake, the cyclones, the avalanches, the volcanic eruptions, the fields of battle, the protracted wars, the congenital taints and malformations, the suffering of infancy and of old age, the carnivals of disease, of accident, of death, the daily multiplication of widows and orphans, the ruthless upheavals of dynasties, the petty crimes, the atrocious invasions of the moral order. The pessimist, on the other hand, reverses all this.

But upon a thoughtful and impartial deliberation on the whole matter, is not the pessimist (apart from the instructions of religion), as contrasted with the optimist, entirely justified in his conclusions, extreme and melancholy as they seem and as they are? If the question related to the present or the past, the scales would be nicely balanced; but as the question relates to the future, and as the outlook of the future, without the magnifying lens afforded by religion, is only "dark, dark, irrecoverably dark, total eclipse," what deduction can be regarded as logical, except that of the sad but stringently consistent pessimist?

Religion, as has been stated, introduces a new and vitally essential element into the discussion; for religion professes at least to be able in its grand outlines to foresee and portray that future which is otherwise hidden from mortal scrutiny.

But the religions of the earth may be classified as either true or false; and the trouble with false religions is precisely this, that they have no foundation in fact on which the optimist might rear the solid palace of his hopes. All false religions may thus be immediately and summarily ruled out of the account in this debate; and the same may be declared of the untrue or groundless portions of all composite or borrowed religions—religions which are made up of elements that are partly true and partly false.

Again: all true religion must be considered under the two-fold distribution and description of natural and revealed. As the grand flaw in the averments of false religions is that they are, where differing from the true, without basis in fact, so the vice in the intimations of natural religion is that they are intimations only, not averments; or if averments, that they are too often averments

without adequate, because without satisfying, evidence, and thus "leave the mind bewildered in a dubious road."

The pessimist, then, may well maintain that in the *cause célèbre* in which the optimist stands as plaintiff in the action, the only righteous verdict, in a case where only false or dubious witnesses have been cited against the defendant at bar, should be that one so familiar to the jurists and courts of Scotland, the verdict of "NOT PROVEN."

The indifferentism of the ordinary worldling, refusing, as it does, to avail itself of the aids of religion, or even to take into consideration the question of the truth or falsity of religion, or so much as recognize the momentous nature of its protestations, is in a predicament that does not differ substantially from that of the agnostic or of the atheist.

Now, we do not hesitate to affirm, in the light of the exhibition that has just been made of the true state of the case, that apart from the clear and solid teachings of revealed religion the pessimist is right and the optimist is wrong. The acceptance of natural religion would preclude the adoption of dogmatic pessimism in its complete, which is its extremest form; for natural religion sheds a ray or two of hazy light upon what would otherwise be the profound abyss of darkness. The assertion of the pessimist might and should still be made, but not made without the qualification due to the known possibility of error. Pessimism would still be the only tenable theory in the absence of all real proofs of optimism. For your irreligious or non-religious worldling, however, no less than for your outright atheist or remorseless naturalist, there is no logical alternative to a pessimism at once dogmatic, unlimited, unqualified, and final.

Agnosticism urges in its own behalf that, by its own humble pretensions, it cannot consistently adopt the scheme either of the optimist or of the pessimist. It is but fair to acknowledge that this is strictly true, so far as a positive and unqualified affirmation of either one of the opposing alternatives, in its extremest form, is concerned. Yet where the scales are so evenly balanced, the absolute uncertainty as to the future which is thus implied must of itself cause the weights to preponderate in favor of a pessimism

which, if not strictly unrelieved and unconditional, is practically as dark as Erebus, and as devoid of hope as the deepest circles of Dante's Inferno. For, according to agnosticism in its purest expression, we do not, and, what is more, we cannot, know whether there is a hereafter, whether there is a resurrection from the dead, whether there is an immortal soul, whether there is a continuously distinct personality, whether there is a future recompense, whether there is an eternal God, or even so much as a compensatory principle—like the Karma of the Buddhist—that in the long run “makes for righteousness” and the reward of virtue. But it must be borne in mind that the actual agnosticism of our day is utterly untrue to its own definition. Agreeably to the definition, agnosticism ought to be impartial and indifferent in its attitude towards any and all religions, not excepting Christianity itself. This was in fact the avowed attitude towards Christianity of that modified Comteist, that materialistic idealist, that most acute of contemporary skeptics, John Stuart Mill. *Per contra*, the *soi disant* agnosticism of the day assails, denies, denounces, and sometimes reviles, the religion of the Christ and the claims of supernatural revelation in any of its forms. The *soi disant* agnosticism of the day, therefore, in its relation to the vexed question of optimism or pessimism, differs little from atheism, and not at all from the other forms of ancient and modern unbelief. All the several streams of skeptical infidelity find their point of confluence and their logical outlet in the chimerical and monstrous absurdity of thoroughgoing Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonism has a coward dread of committing itself to any assertion, but with ghastly face and trembling hand it points, with no easily mistaken insinuation, towards the universal contradiction of the nihilist. Atheism and agnosticism have united with Pyrrhonism in spreading the bier of religious peace and comfort, in preparing the funeral of religious aspiration, and in creating the apotheosis of mundane wretchedness and despair. Of either one of them it might be said that, like the uplifted arm of the human figure in the cave in the well-known allegory in the “Spectator” (or the “Tatler”), it forever dashes down the lamp, and dashes out the light, of the only knowledge and hope that were before accessible to mortals.

Looking at the matter then from the *a priori* point of view, and apart from the suggestions of revealed religion, "in the stern conflict of reason with reason," of which the English critic speaks,¹ it is evident that the pessimist has much the best of the argument. This is, as we understand him, the main drift of Mr. Mallock's fascinating volume. If modern skepticism be well-grounded in its positions, then surely life is *not* worth living. In this his central contention Mr. Mallock is unassailable. In the negative, which is the principal part of the argument, the author himself could hardly improve upon either the substance or the form of what he has himself written. It is only in the latest pages of the book, where, instead of grounding himself immovably on the bed-rock of our common Christianity, he goes out of his way to find a treacherous foundation for his positive structure in a sublimated and mystical yet superstitious and at the same time rationalistic Romanism, that he fails.

The pessimism which underlies so much of the worldliness and permeates so much of the speculation and literature of our time is, to a commanding extent, to be regarded as due to an acceptance both of the premisses and of the final and unavoidable conclusion of the atheism, the agnosticism, and the Pyrrhonism of the age in which we live, and live—so, at least, the skeptical logic runs—only to doubt, to pine, to lament, and to despair. Pessimism is thus seen to be, in large measure, the honest and inevitable revolt of human reason, in the lack of a better and a higher faith, against the deceitful promises of false religion and no religion.

True, the *a posteriori* view of the matter presents the cause of the optimist in a somewhat more favorable aspect. It is very difficult to determine, but on calm review and inspection it certainly appears as if things were on the whole growing better, instead of on the whole growing worse. When the tide is going out individual waves now and then outstrip their gradually receding fellows. So, when the tide is coming in, individual waves now and then fall behind their gradually advancing fellows. Those who are with a child day by day hardly notice the evidences of its growth. Indeed, there may be intervals during which nutrition

¹ Macaulay, in one of his most splendid paragraphs.

is impeded and growth retarded or set back ; and yet, in a comprehensive sense, it may be affirmed that all the time that was a growing child. The proper course is not to consider a few insulated facts here and there, but to consider the sum total of the facts. The way to assure one's self as regards the child is not to contemplate it when it is in specially blooming health, nor when it is the victim of some acute or chronic malady, but to observe it after a lapse of months, or, better still, of years. To vary the supposition slightly, the man in his coffin had evidently grown since he was the infant in his cradle. If we judge the world in the same manner, the result, so far as it goes, is encouraging rather than depressing. For one thing, the area of civilization has greatly increased, and is daily increasing. For another thing, the humanity and altruistic feeling of the world have been greatly augmented.

An English journal recently—and with the very purpose of making this point—contrasted the gladiatorial shows at Rome, under Caligula or Nero, with their bloodless but otherwise close imitations in the Italian Exhibition at Olympia near London under Victoria during the present summer. There are many who are sanguine enough to look forward to the cessation of wars as a state of things that is sure to be realized in the future. We do not speak of those, and their name has long been legion, who base their expectations on the dictates of holy oracles or on the forecasts of inspired prophecy. We refer to those who, proceeding exclusively on natural principles, argue that as the world, under the operation of its own internal forces, and by some inscrutable process of evolution and natural selection, grows wiser, more economical in the expenditure of its resources, more fertile in the suggestion of happy expedients, and in the discovery of milder and consequently of more rational means and measures, more tolerant and more altruistically sympathetic, there will be a gradual disruption of the armaments of nations, and a gradual abolition of the arsenals and ultimately of the schools of war. It has notwithstanding always been, as it is to-day, the firm conviction of the Christian theist, that so long as the constitution of human nature remains essentially the same that it has continued to be

during all the centuries of recorded history, human nature unaided by divine grace will never be able to reclaim itself, the kings and potentates of the earth will go on shedding the blood of innocence on the field of arms, and the tears of unfortunate affection will not cease to bedew the monuments of honored but hapless valor. In the past history of mankind wisdom has never within the same bosom, whether of an individual or nation, proved itself a constant match for wrath; and why should it prove itself such in the future? The passions of anger, revenge and pride, and the lust of ambition, must often, on the ordinary principles of human nature, obtain the ascendant over sound judgment and a mere calculating self-interest. It is nevertheless a rather curious fact, that after all the *a priori* speculation on the subject, there is an observable tendency to precisely the condition of things in relation to the world's attitude towards peace and war that the optimist predicts will one day be fully realized. The terror of the new death-dealing weapons, the study of political economy, the balancing of national armaments and equipments in self-defence, and the growth of a more rational and humane spirit, have given arbitration a place of commanding superiority. It must, however, not be left unnoticed that this result, even if admitted, could not fairly be attributable solely to natural causes, without taking into view the all-important factor of religion, especially the Christian religion, to which as one potent, if not—as is the opinion of a countless multitude—the main, or even the exclusive cause to which the production of the effects in question should be ascribed. But take the extreme case. Let the supernatural be allowed no hearing, and let nature and the world itself have all credit for their own partial regeneration. Furthermore, let it be conceded that the dream of Virgil in his famous eclogue, and that of Juvenal in his noble satire, are to be fulfilled as though they had been veritable prophecy; and that the vague impression referred to by Tacitus in his "History" as prevailing extensively in the times of Vespasian, of something like a return of the golden Saturnian age that had originally blessed the earth, is to be one day justified by the facts. Let all this concession be made, and what does it all amount to upon a critical, a dispassionate, a profound and far-reaching ex-

amination? Even though the cycles of the future were to be uniformly cycles of light and not of darkness for each succeeding generation on the earth, *cui bono?* might well be the desponding exclamation of the pessimist, since we are all none the less creatures of the dust, a procession of transitory notes in the sunbeam; since there is no hereafter for the sensitive and conscious person beyond the grave, no glorious climax after death in the form of a completing and compensatory paradise for the suffering body and the immortal soul, for the individual subject, of whatever is possible in the experience of pleasure or pain, of happiness or misery, in the unknown allotments of the future.

This is the true explanation of the melancholy, the sadness, the cynicism, the heartlessness—even at times the brutality, which to so remarkable an extent hangs like a pall over the boasted light and culture of the nineteenth century. If there is no deeper and more reviving draught than is to be found in the chalice commended to us by the atheist and the agnostic, then all the sources of earthly wellbeing must be broken cisterns. If the withered branch proffered us by the materialist be all that is left of a once burgeoning world, then all the blue has gone out of the sky, all the green from off the globe, and all the bloom and all the perfume have been taken from existence. The current materialism has not only snapped—it has crushed the “fading flower” of life; its loveliness is departed and its precious odor is exhaled. With nothing to guide them but the malicious fox-fire of modern speculative science and the few dim rays afforded by natural religion struggling obscurely through the heavy atmosphere that conceals the firmament and involves in miasmatic gloom the inhabitants of the earth, surely it is little wonder that the finer spirits should bewail the everlasting orphanage of the creation and the unspeakable vanity of human wishes. It is this which imparts to almost every line of the Chopin-like poetry of Clough the pensive tone, as of a landscape in India-ink, of a softly-shaded *nocturne*, of a threnody on the fate of human happiness, or the solemn tread of a *marcho funèbre*. It is this which induced another of the most brilliant and candid minds of our time, who died in the morning of his precocious fame, the mathematician, philosophic critic, and literary

artist, the late Professor Clifford, to grieve inconsolably over the loss of him whom he strikingly styles, "The Great Companion," and to yearn with inexpressible but hopeless tenderness and sympathy after one of the unhistorical and impossible "days of the Son of man."¹ It cannot be denied that this is an exceedingly unusual and peculiar, as well as cultivated and refined, utterance that has been given to one of the characteristic and dominant—nay, leaving Christianity out of the question, to the most characteristic and most dominant spirit, in relation to the highest questions, of our time. The praises of the century that is now rapidly nearing its termination have undoubtedly been widely and greatly exaggerated. It does not admit of debate, however, that it has been preëminent among all the centuries for two things; for its objective and practical tendency and achievements, and for its reflective, introspective, and subjective way of dealing with mental and moral as well as even with physical laws and phenomena. That such a century—where not too strongly influenced by the Christian religion—the last century, so far as our knowledge yet extends in "the tide of time,"—in spite of a powerful bias towards objective optimism, should have yielded, and in circumstances surprisingly favorable to a right decision, to an opposite bias towards subjective pessimism, seems to us a fact of the utmost significance. It looks very much like the decision of human reason at its highest point of development in its relation to such matters, acting independently and (as by a sort of power of contrary choice; that is, more accurately, without compulsion or partiality,) almost as *in equilibrio*. Whether it be the best judgment of the unenlightened, or imperfectly enlightened, human reason, it is a judgment which under the same conditions is amply and emphatically affirmed by the declarations of Holy Writ.

Apart from the special teachings of Christianity regarding the future, optimism finds, as we have had occasion to see, little countenance from natural religion, and no countenance whatever from the Word of God. Several of the Psalms, in part, at least, much of the book of Job, and the whole of the Ecclesiastes, are intensely pessimistic. There have been two orthodox theories of

¹ This last statement is an extension beyond what Clifford says.

the difficult book of Ecclesiastes. One of them is that the book is a psychological autobiography, and that the author, with wonderful dramatic power, reproduces for the benefit of his readers the musings and conclusions of his past life, and of his days of sin and folly. The other theory of the book is, that it is *ex professo* an argument, and that much which upon the first theory must be regarded as bitter irony is really to be taken in solemn earnest. Upon either of these theories the scope of the book is to teach the awful lesson that there is no alternative to the happy optimism of the sincere believer but the unalleviated pessimism of him who has abandoned all thoughts of happiness, and accepted the creed and submitted to the direction of despair. On the one hand, "the conclusion of the whole matter," which should be heard and heeded by all, is, that the fear of Jahveh is the secret not only of duty, but also of wisdom and abiding welfare. On the other hand, the fatal dictum is established, that any different course will be found to issue only in ruin and eternal misery. *Vanitas vanitatum*—"all is vanity and vexation of spirit," is the legend that is written in advance above the approaches of every avenue that can be traversed by the foot of any child of Adam—a legend as mournful and horrifying as that which was pointed out by his ethereal guide to the dreaming poet of Firenze, as the inscription over the door of hell—"He who enters here leaves hope behind." What place is there in such a tragic scheme as this for the delusive enticements of fancy, for the frivolities of a doomed society, for the baits of honor and ambition; in brief, for "the sunny optimism," as it is denominated by Canon Liddon, "of Leibnitz?" Well might the dejected psalmist, overwhelmed with this view of the subject, exclaim in bitterness of spirit, "O God, why hast thou made all men in vain!" This melancholy outcry has been made the text of two remarkable sermons, one by John Howe, and the other by Robert Hall. Howe's discourse had the priority in time, gave Hall his model, and therefore possesses the higher claim to originality. It should also have the praise of superior massiveness and grandeur, but Hall's should probably be preferred for compactness, elegance, and instantaneous impression. Both bring out the psalmist's meaning with a lucidity and cogency that cannot be gainsaid, and

a fulness of illustration that leaves no room for additional comment.

The most frightful picture that has perhaps ever been drawn of the present condition and future prospect of the world on the modern agnostic and atheistic hypotheses is in the latest and most objectionable work of Strauss, "*Der alte und der neue Glaube: ein Bekenntnis*,"—"The Old and the New Faith: A Confession (or Creed)." According to this powerful writer, the world is a sort of fiery Moloch between whose all-embracing arms the children of the human race are thrown to be destroyed. He also compares the world we live in to an enormous mass of machinery, with bands and axles and horizontal and perpendicular rods, and colossal wheels, and remorseless, jagged teeth, grinding and tearing and smashing everything to pieces that has life and yearnings and aspirations and that is beautified and warmed with hope. Strauss, who began his career as a pantheistic *pseudo*-optimist, wound it up as an avowed materialistic and atheistic pessimist.

A wholly different but harmonious expression had many years before been given to the same idea by the well-nigh prescient genius of Edgar Allan Poe. It is in one of his strangest, his most thrilling poems that, like Shakspeare, he conceives of life on the earth as a tragedy on the boards, "a play of hopes and fears." The theme of the drama is the inevitable triumph of death. Agreeably to Poe's fine thought, this tragedy is acted in the presence of a body of angelic spectators covered with veils and "drowned in tears," by "mimes in the form of God on high," who "mutter and mumble low" and shift the scenes "at bidding of vast formless things," and whose own life's blood slakes the thirst of a hideous but victorious creeping thing. The music that is silently going on all the time is "the music of the spheres." The last stanza is terrific, where the lights are said to be "out—out all," and "the curtain, a funeral pall," is described as coming down "with the shock of a storm." The *finale* is in full keeping with what had preceded it—

"And the angels, all pallid and wan,
Uprising—unveiling, affirm
That the play is the tragedy, Man,
And the hero THE CONQUEROR WORM."

And now the argument must be summed up and the verdict rendered. Attention has been directed to what was at first sight a seeming contradiction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* considerations, the first, when wholly severed from inspired teachings, clearly favoring pessimism, while the second apparently leaned towards optimism. It was seen that this appearance of conflict between the two classes of evidence is removed on a deeper investigation; for the *a posteriori* proof does not assure the stability of the progress, and the *a posteriori* argument does not point to uninterrupted progress in the case of the individual. All that remains of what was supposed to be the antagonism between the two classes of evidence is the undoubted fact, that in so far as the complexion of the future can be guessed from the complexion of the past and the present, and in so far as the *a posteriori* considerations can be relied upon at all, the improvement of the race as a whole, and of its environment in the world, is pointed to with some steadiness as the most likely of two opposite events. So far as this particular argument goes the fate of individual mortals is still as bad as ever. Now it certainly must be admitted to be somewhat of an anomaly that the race should advance, and the individuals composing that race should retrograde.

This brings us to the last and most important stage in the discussion. An announcement is presently to be made which, if it can be substantiated, removes this anomaly, as well as any suspicion of conflict between the different sorts of evidence, and at the same time solves the main problem under review. Before we take up this new position, in order to have the whole case before us, it is desirable to notice in a passing way the only remaining ground that is imaginable on which optimism, apart from Christian theism, might be justified. It is a view of the matter which underlies all the exhibitions of ancient or modern pantheism, is articulately formulated by the higher philosophic Buddhism, and has been revived by Comte and certain of the positivists and agnostics. The notion at the bottom of this view is that altruism, itself the growth of the ages, at the ideal point of its nobility and elevation is absolutely disinterested. An altruism like this alone knows how to be virtuous in the highest sense; *i. e.*, with no re-

ference to a God, whose nature, whose very being it may be is unknown, and with no prospect of future recompense.

Several things might be said in rejoinder. The exalted benevolence that shines so resplendent in this, the subtlest of all the forms of refined and thoughtful optimism, is itself but a reflex of biblical theism, and never was completely evolved and stated before the general promulgation of the Christian religion. Another thing, and one that must strike the common sense of mankind, is that it is perfectly chimerical, being wholly unsuited to the condition of fallen beings. Whether it is adapted to a state of un-fallen excellence we do not care to discuss. Whether even the holy angels are in any degree actuated by a principle of legitimate self-love we shall not argue. Certainly, as man is at present constituted, he can only be restrained from crime, if restrained then, by the sense of divine obligation, by the apprehension of future punishment, or by the expectation of future reward. The old Tractarian pretension, "No church without a bishop, no state without a king," has been in certain quarters opposed and ridiculed. A far wider homage has been done to the truth, that there may be the parody of religion, as in the case of the theophilanthropists of the French Revolution, and of the humanity-worship of Auguste Comte and his most faithful disciples, but no religion in the proper sense without a God. Yet the theophilanthropists worshipped a woman as the goddess of reason, and Hegel and Comte, like Herod and Pilate, join hands in the deification of man.

The sincerity of excessive protestations of devotion and loyalty has always been looked upon with distrust. Who of them all so obsequious to Othello as Iago? It was once said by an eminent personage of a contemporary who was an over-zealous monarchist, that he was *plus royaliste que le roi*. We believe that it was General Benjamin Butler who voted fifty (or was it a hundred?) times in the Democratic convention for Mr. Jefferson Davis. Herod may be out-Heroded. We have, we confess, no patience whatever with a theory of liberty, or a theory of temperance, or a theory of altruism, that goes beyond the mark so carefully and so plainly drawn in the Word of God.

But, as the discerning reader has already anticipated, the altruistic optimist relies upon the *a posteriori* argument for his prediction of ever-brightening cycles of prosperity in the coming generations of the human family ; and this has been shown to be an utter perversion of the tenor and force of that argument.

We are now, it is to be presumed, in a situation where it is no longer advisable to prolong the main contention or to defer the final enunciation to which reference has been already made, which is to decide the grand issue. A surprising anomaly was signalized in the circumstance that, as the facts appear to stand, the race is making regular progress, whilst the individuals are in the present, just as in the past, uniformly perishing. This anomaly disappears on the assumption, which is an undoubted certainty, that the bettered condition of the world is due to Christianity, which equally and notoriously undertakes to provide a lasting remedy in the case of individuals for the ravages of death and a panacea for every other evil. The consideration of the influence of the Christian religion upon human society has so far not been allowed to have a place in this debate ; and yet the fact that that influence has been felt and been extraordinary is conspicuous and admitted.

But the primary teaching of the materialistic and skeptical philosophy itself is that the existing state of any organism, or collection of organisms, is the joint product of its own internal forces and of the whole environment to which it has been subjected. Now that for nearly nineteen centuries the world has been subjected to the mysterious influence of Christianity, and that that influence has been no less mighty than extensive, is questioned by no one. But it cannot be controverted that, *a priori*, that influence was entirely favorable to a progressive and ultimately a complete improvement of society ; whereas, upon purely naturalistic principles, the result, on the *a priori* view, confessedly pointed the other way. The law of nature, according to our adversary, is unambiguously pessimistic. The law of grace, it must be owned by all who are fair-minded, is unambiguously optimistic. The *fact* is, so far as the *a posteriori* argument can carry us, that the state of the world to-day, as compared with the state of the world in former times, is one that is immediately and perfectly accounted for by referring

it to the Christian law of amelioration, but is utterly anomalous and perplexing, if we refer it to the natural law of deterioration. This is a convincing proof that the diminution of evils and the augmentation of good within the record of human history is due more to supernatural than to natural causes, and, in its most important features, is to be attributed wholly to the powerful, direct and indirect, influence upon mankind of the blessed religion of Jesus Christ. Agreeably to the theory advocated in the present essay, all difficulties are thus satisfactorily explained. Under the scheme of Christianity alone every semblance even of contradiction at any point between the *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments is obliterated, and all discordant appearances are brought into a state of harmonious reconciliation. The Christian programme comprehends not only the rectification of social wrongs and the elevation of the human species, but also the eternal well-being of the individual.

The upshot of it all is, that a purely naturalistic theory as to the destiny of the world and of mankind, logically regarded, should be the lowest form of pessimism; whereas a theory taking note of all the facts in the case, and consequently including a reference to the data and forces of supernatural Christianity, logically regarded, should be the highest form of optimism. It has been justly remarked by a sagacious thinker, that of a plurality (or duality) of proposed solutions of a given problem, that is the true one which vindicates itself by actually solving the problem. This unrivalled achievement in the present instance philosophic Christian theism has manifestly accomplished.

It will be readily perceived that this, which is the true scheme of Christian optimism, is radically antagonistic to the scheme of the Manichean and the Pelagian errorists, on the one hand, and the universalist and restorationist errorists, on the other. The theory of the "impreventability of sin," as it has been styled, and of its fatal consequences, has been held in common alike by dualists and unitarians, by acknowledged advocates of the trinity (as Bushnell and Young), as well as by Socinians. Pantheism virtually denies sin altogether, by regarding it as a necessary incident of growth. Bushnell adopts the same view, and compares sin to a

“suspension” in music. The old gnostic and Manichean view (which seems to have been anticipated by Aristotle) was that the Almighty was absolutely barred from interference by a remorseless and eternal necessity. The Pelagian view was that he was relatively barred from interference, because interference would be inconsistent with the conditions of a moral system. All these views are optimistic in the sense that everything has been, and is now, going on as well as it could do.

Universalism passes to the opposite extreme. Instead of denying the possibility, universalism and the kindred heresies affirm the certainty of such a condition of ultimate perfection that sin and evil will be utterly banished from the universe. The Scriptures teach the contrary; and, furthermore, that such a sentimental *dénouement*, in the face of impenitent rebellion on the part of angels and men, could not take place except at the sacrifice of the divine honor, and upon the overthrow of the system of righteousness and moral order. Christianity notwithstanding has provided for the salvation of all men who will accept its simple and reasonable terms.

We sum up, then, that if we leave Revelation and the Christian religion out of the reckoning, the only tenable theory is that of the pessimist; but that if—as we must—we take them into the account, then the only tenable theory is that of the optimist. It thus turns out that, in the ultimate determination, if we apply the principles of the skeptical speculative science itself, optimism takes the palm. It has, however, just been shown that this is not the counterfeit and deceitful optimism of a spurious religion or a bastard philosophy, but that securely guarded system which looks for its sanctions alike to the events of human history and to the oracles of God.

Natural, as assisted by revealed, religion, or, to speak more accurately, the revelation of nature as assisted by the revelation that is supernatural, now assumes an importance which natural religion, or the revelation of nature, pure and simple, did not possess. The volume of natural religion was a faint palimpsest, and much of the original writing could not be deciphered without the glass of a superior revelation, or as characters in sympathetic ink require the

heat of the fire to bring them out. The testimony of the two witnesses, the revelation that is natural and the revelation that is supernatural, is, when combined, discovered to be consentaneous. Bishop Butler, for instance, in his "Analogy," has made it clear that the course of virtue on the earth, after ample allowance has been made for the many exceptions, is in general also the course of individual as well as of public well-being and happiness.

If it should be demanded why it is that the almighty and omniscient Creator, in the exercise of his omnipotence and unfathomable wisdom, did not forestall the necessity of an atonement for sin, and ensure the realization of an absolutely ideal optimism, by preventing the introduction of sin itself into the world, we have little to reply. This is the problem that is at the foundation of all theological problems, and is still the opprobrium of all attempted theodicies. Bishop Butler has, however, triumphantly evinced that it is a problem that is not peculiar to natural as contradistinguished from supernatural religion, but is common to the two. In considering the question of optimism or pessimism, we are surely called upon to deal with facts as they are, and not with an imaginary state of things without even the shadow of basis in reality. But the two unimpeachable witnesses, natural and revealed religion, unite in attesting the facts of sin and of obdurate impenitency, and in pointing towards a future and eternal retribution. That the Divine Being acted rationally and wisely in allowing the entrance of sin into the universe, we infer from the fact that he is God. What his reasons were it is vain for man to conjecture.

It may be contended that the *a posteriori* argument as employed in this essay is made to prove too much. If Christianity had been the great operative factor in human improvement, it may be urged that the improvement must have been greater, must indeed have been complete. Professor Drummond has lately taken up this point in a brilliant address, of which we have only seen a brief notice. The title-theme of this address is "The Programme of Christianity;" and the eloquent apologist accounts for the admitted shortcomings of the church on the ground that Christians have not lived up to their own ideal. But does not the Christian

theory stand pledged to the assurance that Christian men and women shall live up to their ideal? Yes, in the heavenly condition of the church. All that is certainly promised as to take place before the day of judgment is the overthrow of the preponderance of ungodliness and evil in the world, and the general conversion of the world, and a wonderful outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the church. The signs of such a consummation—so amply predicted and so “devoutly to be wished”—are already appearing in the most unlikely quarters of the globe, and beginning to flame upon the clouded heavens like the victorious *labarum* of Constantine. The event is becoming more and more correspondent with the inspired anticipation. By far the grandest triumphs of the cross are yet future. Glorious things are spoken of Zion. “All the promises do travail with a glorious day of grace.” The “awful rose of dawn,” the poet speaks of, already begins to dapple the forefront of the coming era. The phenomenal success of modern missions within the last hundred years, which has just been celebrated at the great International Centenary in London, is but the first dropping of the mighty showers that are one day to descend upon the earth. Seers and apostles agree in looking forward to the euthanasia of the present state of the globe itself, and a renovated earth and sky.

The benefits of this optimistic jubilee will not accrue to all. Pessimism at its worst will still be realized in the doom of the unpardoned enemies of Jesus. But there will be a mighty difference. Optimism, with its centre in heaven, will radiate its unspeakable blessings throughout the universe; whereas pessimism, with all its dark and discomfited legions, will be confined to a hopeless, because an inflexible and an eternal Gehenna. Leibnitz—with whom we have always sympathized—is at last sustained in his principal contention, though not by his own argument or in his own sense. The watchman of the celestial guard shall one day be able to cry, “The followers of Immanuel have been redeemed, the opposition to Jehovah has been subdued, and all is well!”

H. C. ALEXANDER.

III. APPLICATION OF THE METAPHYSICAL CAUSES TO SAVING FAITH.

IN the Christian system faith occupies a position of conspicuous and fundamental importance, as is evinced by the multiplied statements concerning it which are to be found throughout the entire Scriptures. Its chief office, as exhibited in the Bible, may be concisely described as that of a spiritual *connective*, by which the soul is brought into union with Christ, and made a partaker of the benefits of his atonement—an indispensable *sine qua non*, upon which God has been pleased to suspend the availability of salvation, and without which none of its blessings can be realized in individual experience.

Christianity is thus exhibited as an original and unique religion by the very position which it assigns to faith. While the doctrine of faith in the Old Testament was precisely the same as it is in the New, yet no one can fail to see that it has been taken up, clarified and republished in the Gospels and Epistles as the one absolute condition of practical salvation. The emphasis which Christ laid upon faith more than once astonished his Jewish hearers. On one occasion the multitude, fresh from the mighty miracle of the loaves and fishes, which had furnished our Lord the opportunity of exhorting them to "labor not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life," utterly misunderstanding the purport of his discourse, inquired of him, "What shall we do that we might work the works of God?" The form of their question shows how utterly they misconstrued him, and also how completely overcast by legalistic ideas their views of the way of salvation were. They were amazed at his answer, "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent." At another time he said, "If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins." at which the Pharisees burst out in astonishment, "Who art thou?" Now, undoubtedly faith was the instrumental condition of salvation under the old dispensation; but that economy was one requiring legal and ceremonial observances, through

which faith was to look forward to the predicted Messiah, and thus attention was, by and by, so exclusively directed to these forms and rites that an intense system of ecclesiasticism sprang up, and, at the coming of Christ, nothing was so improbable as that a Jew would hasten to embrace a religion which set forth faith as the exclusive condition upon which its advantages and blessings could be obtained. Of course "the chosen people" had perverted the Old Testament idea; but if the Jewish nation, so long under special, divine tuition, were, at the coming of Christ, astonished at the doctrine of faith as he inculcated it—as he republished it from their own Testament—and found it so difficult of comprehension as he, a master teacher, expounded it, how much more novel and even wild must it have appeared to the untutored Gentile world! Now, as from this reasoning it might be presupposed, no heathen religion gives faith such a position and office. Neither have human philosophies, though they have made deep and daring excavations in the effort to discover a scheme of religion which would satisfy all the facts and meet all the demands of human nature, ever hit upon that state of mind represented by faith, and pointed it out as the complete condition of man's salvation. This makes Christianity a novel and exceptional religion.

How shall we account for the prompt and full instalment of faith in a position so prominent, so fundamental, and so unique? The fact is explicable only upon the supposition that Christianity understood itself, and it could not have understood itself except it had been inspired. The originality of the idea of faith as a condition of salvation must be credited to the mind of God, and not to that of man.

Perhaps the clearest, most comprehensive, and yet the briefest way of expounding the nature of that faith of which we are writing will be the application to it of the five metaphysical causes. These are: (1,) The efficient cause, or that which brings into existence; (2,) The material cause, or that out of which a thing is made; (3,) The instrumental cause, or the implements used in the construction; (4,) The formal cause, or the special shape which the finished article assumes; (5,) The final cause, or the end for which it was made.

I. The efficient cause of saving faith—that which brings it into existence—is the grace of the Holy Spirit.

As to the origin of faith, there are only three suppositions worthy of being considered: Either faith is exclusively a human product, or it is generated by the power of the gospel as a system of truth, or it is the supernatural gift of God.

That it does not, in accordance with the first hypothesis, lie within the power of man to originate that faith which savingly and consciously connects him with the atonement of Christ, follows from what the Scriptures teach us concerning our inability to perform any spiritual acts without the influence of divine grace. Paul, in the Ephesians, describes men, in their natural and fallen state, as “dead in trespasses and sins.” In the Romans he strikes the contrast, “The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.” But Christ, in the fifth chapter of John’s Gospel, runs a parallel between dead bodies, sealed up in their graves in the ground, and dead souls, sealed up in their graves in sin, and affirms that it takes the same plenipotent “voice of the Son of God” (the Holy Spirit) to raise dead souls from their sin-sepulchres that it requires to raise dead bodies from their earth-graves. Now, the exercise of faith is a spiritual act, and it is preposterous to talk about a soul, whose spiritual condition is figuratively described as above, performing such an act. We may as reasonably expect the functions of respiration to continue in a perfect vacuum, or those of circulation to be uninterrupted after every artery of the heart has been severed, as to expect the soul to continue to perform spiritual acts after communication with God has been cut off. Can the dead body act? The Scriptures make it the analogue of the dead soul as it is related to spiritual things. “Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots? Then may ye also do good that are accustomed to do evil.” “Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? not one.” “The god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them.” If the natural man, uninfluenced by divine grace, can and does believe, then since faith is the bond of union with Christ, it follows

that the spiritually dead may move themselves back into life; that the Ethiopian can change his own skin, and the leopard his spots; that a thing as clean as faith can come out of a heart as unclean as a sepulchre filled with dead men's bones; and that the god of this world has not so blinded the mind of unbelievers that the glorious light of the gospel cannot shine therein. All this is grossly contradictory to the Word of God, and the theory that the natural man is the author of faith must be discarded.

Neither can saving faith be generated in the soul by the power of the truth as contained in the gospel. The will is involved in every act of faith, and an involuntary assent to a proposition is as absurd as an ignorant credulity. All truth, whatever its character, is mighty in its influence upon the human understanding, but in itself and nakedly considered, no truth possesses the power to force conviction against the will. Against the clearest and most cogent expositions of the truth, man may still withhold the assent of his heart and intellect. Upon what other principle can you explain philosophical idealism, which refuses to believe in the reality of the external world as a substantial entity? If the truth had the inherent power of forcing conviction, this fiction of the imagination could not be entertained among the sober beliefs of the philosophical world. Now, the gospel, viewed merely as a system of truth, possesses more of this sort of power than any other system, and yet it cannot compel even an historical faith, much less saving faith. If the truth as contained in the Bible possessed an inherent moral influence strong enough to constrain faith, how can the infidelity within the bounds of Christendom be accounted for? If the faith-giving power is resident in the truth of the gospel, then every one who investigates the system must receive it, unless it be assumed that he is mentally too weak to comprehend it. But it is grossly contrary to the Scriptures to regard unbelief as a mere intellectual infirmity, and not as a sin. "Ye will not come to me that ye might have life." To come to Christ, that is, to believe, the resistance of the opposing "will" must be broken down, a new will-power must be created. No truth, however mighty in moral influences, possesses *creative power*. The gospel, without the Spirit, has the task imposed upon it of convincing a man of the truth and power

of religion against his will, against his understanding, against his heart; or, in other words, it must so renew the will that he can come to Christ, it must so enlighten the understanding that it can perceive the beauty and truth of the gospel, and so change the affections as to make them love God and holiness. The task is an impossible one.

Saving faith consequently must be of divine origin. The Scriptures plainly and repeatedly assert the fact. "No man cometh unto me, except the Father which sent me draw him;" "As many as were ordained to eternal life believed;" "God, who commandeth the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined unto our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ;" "For by grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God." These passages are clear enough to defy all quibbling. They inculcate the doctrine that God is the author of saving faith, and as he performs all acts in the economy of grace through the Holy Spirit, who is at the present time the sovereign agent of the Trinity in applying the benefits of Christ's mediatorial work, the proposition will stand, that the efficient cause of saving faith is the grace of the Holy Ghost. Nor is it meant that faith is the immediate product of what is technically called regenerating grace, for regeneration strictly and theologically speaking is an *act*, and that peculiar grace which was expended in the performance of the single and sharp act discontinued with the production of the effect. Another and additional infusion of grace after regeneration, logically speaking, is needed to quicken the regenerate soul into the exercise of faith. In the child, for example, the regenerate principle may be lodged in its heart in the early months of infancy, or while yet in its mother's womb, and the regenerate life not manifest itself for years after maturity. It has been waiting, dormant in the heart, for the second infusion of grace resulting in conscious and active faith. Chronologically considered, the act of grace which results in regeneration, and the act of grace which results in conscious faith, may be indistinguishable as distinct acts; we may not in many cases be able to take any account of the time element; but logically considered, that is, in the actual order of

their occurrence, the grace of regeneration precedes and conditions the grace of faith.

II. The material cause of faith is the Bible and the Bible's Christ. We are under this head to inquire after the objects of faith.

We have stated the case in exact accordance with the Confession of Faith: "By this faith a Christian believeth to be true whatsoever is revealed in the Word, for the authority of God himself speaketh therein, and acteth differently upon that which each particular passage thereof containeth; yielding obedience to the commands, trembling at the threatenings, and embracing the promises of God for this life and for that which is to come. But the principal acts of saving faith are, accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life, by virtue of the covenant of grace." This passage teaches that that saving faith which unites us to Christ involves these two essential elements: (1), Assent to the whole testimony of God as furnished in his Word; (2), Trust, or implicit reliance upon Christ, and upon Christ alone, for all that is involved in a complete salvation. In other words, saving faith is made up of belief in the Word and trust in the Son. Not one, but both, are its constituent and inseparable factors.

1. Saving faith receives as truth the whole contents of God's Word, without exception. After determining what books belong to the inspired canon of Scripture, and what is the correct text of those books, then a true faith wraps its arms around the whole volume, and embraces all its parts and statements as the Word of God. It believes God to be a faithful, competent, and credible witness, and receives as true his whole testimony as recorded in the Bible. "He that hath received the testimony [of Christ] hath set to his seal that God is true. For he whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God." "He that believeth not God hath made him a liar; because he believeth not the record that God gave of his Son." "This is the witness of God which he hath testified of his Son." Paul called the gospel which he delivered to the Corinthians "the testimony of God." Christ is called "The Truth" and "The Word," and the gospel is but an edition of

Christ, so to speak, since it is the published truth and printed Word. Now God is a witness to the truth of this edition of his will made known by his Son, and, under the solemnities of an oath sworn by his awful and uncreated self, delivers his testimony, and "he that believeth not God hath made him a liar"—contradicts him when he says, "The Bible is a correct record of my Son and his work." Further: To prove that those whom he inspired to take down his testimony have not falsified it, he confirms their record by "bearing them witness, both with signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost." And to give us still further assurance that the record of the inspired recorders is a true rescript of God's will, or testimony concerning his Son, he causes the Holy Ghost to become a witness at the inner bar of the souls of believers: "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirits." "Whereof the Holy Ghost is a witness to us." Therefore to discredit the record of his Son—that is, the Bible—in whole or in part, is to discredit the evidence of God given under the awful solemnities of an oath, to discredit the evidence by which he was pleased to accredit his chosen penmen who copied his testimony at his dictation, to discredit the testimony of the Spirit as he witnesses at the bar of the inner consciousness. A true and saving faith cannot pursue a course which would thus impeach the competency and credibility of God as a witness. It would thus and at once transmute itself into a gross infidelity. The very essence of faith is assent to truth upon testimony. To discard the Bible is to discard the testimony of God concerning his Son. It is perfectly evident, therefore, that the whole contents of the Word of God must constitute one of the objects of faith.

2. The second constituent of saving faith is a personal trust in Christ as he is offered in the gospel. Our Lord repeatedly declares that what men are to do in order to be saved, and what they will be condemned for not doing, is to believe in him, and to believe "on" or "in" a person is to *trust* him. He was lifted up on the cross, "that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life." "He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of

God." "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." "This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life." "Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that believeth on me hath everlasting life." "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent."

Further: That Christ is the immediate object of saving faith is taught in all those passages in which we are said to receive Christ, or the testimony of God concerning Christ, and in which this act of receiving him is described as securing our salvation. "As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name." "He that hath the Son hath life; he that hath not the Son of God hath not life." "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God." "The righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe." "For ye are the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus." All these passages, which are but samples of the multitude scattered throughout the Bible, undeniably point to the personality of Christ as an object of saving faith, and teach us that we are to trust in him, and implicitly rely upon him for all that is involved in a complete salvation.

These are the two elements of saving faith—belief of the Word and trust in the Son. They constitute the material out of which the grace of the Spirit constructs this article of saving faith. Neither by itself is saving faith, but both put together. The one is a cordial approval of and compliance with the divine plan of salvation, the other is an implicit reliance upon Jesus Christ as a personal Saviour. The one is *fides externa, historica, or theoretica*, the other is *fides interna, habitualis, or specialis*. Both brought together constitute *fides salvifica*. Saving faith consequently is not a mere historical or theoretical belief of the propositions of religion contained in the Bible, but this belief with an element of trust in Christ as a personal Redeemer superadded. It is not a mere sentimental trust, but an intelligent trust united with a knowledge and belief of the contents of God's Word. Historical faith without trust is dead, and trust without historical faith is an

ignorant sentimentalism. Both are necessary to make up the full complement of saving faith.

III. The instrumental cause of saving faith is any means by which the soul is brought into contact with the gospel. It is summarily comprehended in the Scripture phrase, "*Faith cometh by hearing.*"

Romanists against Protestants deny that knowledge is essential to saving faith. Protestants, of course, admit and contend that there are mysteries in the Bible, truths which are incomprehensible to the human intellect, and that these mysteries are proper objects of faith. They repudiate the doctrine of rationalism, which affirms that we can believe only that which we can so elucidate as that it will appear true in its own light. Their contention is that knowledge is the measure of faith. We can believe only what we know. If a proposition be announced in our hearing, we cannot believe it unless we understand its import. Suppose it were announced in an unknown tongue, how could we believe it? Put a Hebrew Bible into the hands of an unlettered man, and what can he make out of it? Tell him that it is the Word of God written in Hebrew, then prove the statement to him, and you have prepared him for believing the contents when they shall be discovered to him. This is exactly the argument of Paul to the Corinthians: "Except ye utter by the tongue words easy to be understood, how shall it be known what is spoken? for ye shall speak into the air. There are, it may be, so many kind of voices in the world, and none of them is without signification. Therefore, if I know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be unto him that speaketh a barbarian, and he that speaketh shall be a barbarian unto me. . . . When thou shalt bless with the Spirit, how shall he that occupieth the room of the unlearned say Amen, at thy giving of thanks, seeing he understandeth not what thou sayest?" To say amen to a proposition is to endorse it. How can an ignorant man say amen to a Latin prayer? How can any man say amen to the Bible, that is, believe it, when he is ignorant of its existence, of its contents, of its Redeemer? *What lies beyond knowledge lies beyond faith.* A *fides generalis* is assent to the propositions of the Bible. How could there be such an assent when the contents of the

Scriptures are not known? A *fides specialis* is trust in Jesus Christ as a personal Redeemer; how could there be such a trust in a person when his name and character are not known? A *fides salvifica* is a compound of *fides generalis* and *fides specialis*; how could there be such a faith when the Bible and the Saviour are both unknown objects? Of the unseen and eternal we can believe only what has been revealed, and of what God has revealed we can believe only what we know. But, it may be objected, much of the Bible is confessedly closed to our comprehension, and yet he who believes the Bible to be the Word of God is said to believe all that it contains. This is not a full and correct statement of the case. The man who believes the Bible to be the absolute and inerrant Word of God, when at the same time he is ignorant of many things contained therein, does not by receiving the whole Bible, in lump, act faith upon the particular parts of which he is ignorant, but he is prepared to believe, upon the authority of God, everything contained in the Bible, whenever it shall be made known to him. *What lies beyond knowledge lies beyond faith.* This proposition does not prevent us from believing the existence of a fact, where, as in a multitude of cases, we are powerless to explain the fact and exhibit the grounds upon which it rests.

So then the instrumental cause of faith, that by which the efficient grace of the Spirit persuades men to embrace the Redeemer, is all those means by which the soul may be made acquainted with the objects of faith. "How," says the apostle to the Romans, "shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?" In this splendid sorites the case stands thus: God will have all classes and conditions of men to be saved; but to avail themselves of his offered salvation they must call upon him; and in order to call upon him they must believe; and in order to believe they must hear or become acquainted with his scheme of salvation; and in order to hear they must have a preacher; and in order to preach he must be sent. It is perfectly evident, therefore, that all those means and agencies, and notably the reading and preaching the Word,

whereby the soul is made acquainted with the Bible and Christ, constitute the instrumental cause of faith.

IV. The formal cause of saving faith, that which distinguishes it specifically from all other forms of faith, is the illumination of the Holy Ghost. This is the formal ground, not of *fides generalis*, but of *fides specialis*, the peculiar quality which constitutes its distinctive and unique character.

The formal ground of *fides generalis*, *externa*, or *historica*, is research and argument. The wickedest sinner on the earth, if he have the intelligence and the information, may demonstrate at the bar of his own reason that the Bible is what it professes to be, and that Christ is the historical personage predicted by the Old Testament prophets, and be so firmly persuaded of these facts that his conviction will stand against the shrewdest and severest assaults of infidelity; and yet they may not have the slightest influence on his life nor throw the faintest ray of hope into the darkness of his future destiny. In order to develop this theoretical faith into a saving faith, a faith that will have power over the life and destiny of the believer, the soul must be so wrought upon by some supernatural influence that it will be able to look upon the promises contained in the Word and call them "my promises;" upon the threatenings, and say, "They have been turned away from me;" upon the Redeemer, and call him, "My Lord and my God." That which discriminates saving faith from all other forms of faith is its use of the first personal pronouns when it talks about the Bible and the Bible's Christ. Unrenewed men can feel the power of historical research and the weight of compact argument, and the degree of conviction will depend upon the fulness of the information, the clearness of the reasoning, and the freeness of the mind from prejudice; but regenerate men alone can spiritually discern the holiness and excellence of the Word, apprehend its suitability to their needs and natures, meditate upon the things spiritually perceived with delight, complacency and love, bring the life under their influence, perceive in Jesus Christ a willing and able Saviour, incline the soul to repose upon him alone for all that is involved in a complete salvation, and feel a *personal, possessive* interest in the Way, the Truth, and the Life. In regenera-

tion the Spirit flashes into the soul the principle of a supernatural and redemptive life; but as regeneration is a single and indivisible act, which exhausts itself in the single work done, namely, the implantation of the new germ of life, a second operation of the Spirit must ensue upon the first and quicken the regenerate seed principle into faith, a saving faith, that at once folds its arms around the Bible and the Bible's Christ, and joyfully cries, "They are forever mine." It is this influence of the Spirit upon the principle which he imparts in the act of regeneration, causing it to put forth an act of conscious faith; it is this peculiar, warming, illuminating work of the Spirit that discriminates saving faith from all other forms of faith. It is not the object which gives it its peculiar and distinctive quality, but it is the supernatural manner in which it is developed within the soul, which constitutes the specific difference of saving faith. That this is a correct delineation of the formal nature of saving faith may be proven by sundry Scriptures.

John xvi. 8: "And when he [the Comforter] is come, he will reprove [convict] the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment." This passage teaches that the Spirit will convict that portion of the world designed to be saved: 1, Of sin, and specifically of the sin of unbelief; 2, Of righteousness, and preëminently of the rightfulness of Christ's claims upon their faith and service, using as his main argument the Saviour's resurrection; 3, Of judgment, employing as his argument in producing this conviction the overthrow of Satan, which fact proves that God will judge the world in righteousness. The three-fold state of mind here depicted is a precedent condition of the exercise of saving faith, and it belongs specifically to the Spirit to produce such convictions.

1 Cor. ii. 14: "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man." Here we are taught: (1), That in the revelation of God there are some things which the unrenewed man does not receive; (2), That these same things, rejected by the natural man, are received by the spiritual man; that is, the man under the influences

of the Holy Spirit ; (3), That the reason for this difference consists in the fact that one has not the faculty of spiritual discernment, and the other has ; (4), That this spirit of discernment apprehends the very meaning of the gospel with delight, which was foolishness to the natural mind. Now this spiritual discernment is but another name for the power of saving faith, and this discernment is spiritual ; that is, created by the Holy Spirit.

Matt. xvi. 17 : " Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona : for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven." Other men had precisely the same external evidence of the divinity of Christ which Peter had. If his faith had been due to that evidence alone, what entitles him to so honorable a distinction ? There must have been some difference between this confession as it proceeded out of the mouth of Peter, and the same confession as it may have been made by other men. Now what constitutes the difference ? The answer is, " My Father in heaven by his Holy Spirit has specially revealed it to you." It is the internal witness of the Spirit that makes the difference, and constitutes the grounds of the blessedness which was pronounced upon Peter.

2 Cor. iv. 3 : " But if our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost : in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them. . . For God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." Here we are taught : (1), That wherever and whenever the gospel is preached, the glory of God, as illustrated by Jesus Christ, is set forth ; (2), That if any fail to perceive and admire this glory, that is, embrace the gospel by faith and be saved, it is because the god of this world hath blinded their spiritual eye ; (3), That if any do behold it, and believe to their salvation, it is because God hath shined unto them, by his Spirit flashing light and knowledge into the darkness. If one cannot see the splendor of the sun as it blazes out of a cloudless sky, it is because he is blind. If he cannot perceive the beauties of nature and of the fine arts, it is because he has no taste. If

he cannot enjoy the concord of sweet music, it is because he has not a musical soul. If he can find nothing attractive in virtue, it is because his soul is depraved. If he cannot "look up through nature to nature's God," it is because his natural religion is perverted. In the same analogical way, if one can read the Bible without feeling a personal interest in its revelations, or can hear Christ preached without being drawn towards him as his personal Redeemer, it is because he lacks the "spiritual discernment." If, on the contrary, he can plant his feet upon the Bible, and feel that he has a solid foundation for his hopes, and then lean back in his Redeemer's arms conscious that he rests upon the bosom of his personal Saviour, it is because he possesses the "spiritual discernment." This, the possession of the "spiritual discernment," constitutes the formal nature of saving faith.

V. The final cause of saving faith is, proximately, the justification of the believer; ultimately, the glory of God. This is too patent to justify discussion after all that has been written upon other points.

Resumé: The efficient cause of saving faith—that which gives it its origin—is the grace of the Holy Spirit; the material cause—that upon which the grace of the Spirit directs faith—is the Bible and the Bible's Christ, which gives the two elements of belief in the Word and trust in the Son; the material cause—that which the Spirit employs to awaken faith—is all the means and agencies by which the soul is made acquainted with the Bible and its Saviour; the formal cause—that which distinguishes saving faith from all other forms of faith—is the spiritual discernment produced by the illumination of the Holy Ghost; and the final cause—the end for which the Spirit produces saving faith in the life of any man—is proximately the salvation of the soul, and ultimately the glory of God.

ROBERT A. WEBB.

IV. THE CHRISTOLOGY OF GENESIS.

THE religious convictions of men are commensurate with their historic development, and, admitting the possibility of theophanies, their *apprehension* will be as varied as the conditions of human life. In Genesis, as a whole, we find the remarkable phenomenon of prophecy conforming to this general principle. It accompanies the growth of the Hebrew nation from the common beginnings of human development, *gradually* becoming more special, inaugurating and characterizing, in brief and general terms, each special phase of national progress.

Biblical hermeneutics in this age is so largely apologetic that it is exceedingly difficult for men to divest themselves of their preconceived views concerning the Bible, and *eisegesis* is taking the place of *exegesis*. If we would write to any purpose, there must be no forced interpretation. The day is passed when the loudest dogmatism can stand in the place of truth. The interpretation of Scripture is a *growth*, and *historical hermeneutics* only commands the attention of thoughtful men.

While admitting that the historical method of biblical study alone points towards any definite results, we are far from admitting that the Bible is not God-given. The Christ of history is equally the Christ of God. Criticism has exhausted itself upon the New Testament, and the Old Testament is to-day feeling its keen thrusts. Now, if ever, men are needed to defend the truth of God's word.

Passing by the many hypotheses concerning the authorship of the Pentateuch, and hence of Genesis, we will deal only with facts, in setting forth the teaching of Genesis relative to Christ. We must assume that the reader is sufficiently acquainted with these several hypotheses, to place each passage, as it passes in review, in its appropriate historical setting. We will have to do with *time* and *facts*, not with authorship.

In order that our argument may be as clear and strong as possible, we will proceed—*first*, to give the literal *exegesis* of each

passage, for the view entertained of the meaning and collocation of words, will determine all arguments drawn from them; *second*, to discuss each passage as to its *internal* messianic teaching; and *third*, to show the *historico-messianic* element in each passage.

I. Gen. iii. 14, 15. *Exegetical argument.* שָׂרָפָה, so called from its hissing noise. LXX., τῆ ὄφει; Vul., *serpentem*. The serpent is not questioned. כִּי connects אֲשֶׁר־נִשְׂרָפָה with אֲרָרָה, giving the reason for the curse, which has its causal ground in the tempting of the woman. (Cf. Deut. xiii. 15; Levit. xx. 15; Gen. ix. 5; Exod. xxi. 28, 29; Gen. iii. 17; 1 Sam. xv. 3.) מִן. *From among* all cattle and from among every beast of the field; not comparative, for there is no mention of any curse pronounced upon other animals; not instrumental, for the curse proceeds immediately from God; but *from among*, indicating conspicuousness, separateness. (Cf. Deut. xiv. 2; Judg. v. 24.) God is here dealing with one special animal, and the curse here pronounced is not referable to Paul's statement (Rom. viii. 20, 21), for the "bondage of corruption" he affirms to be grounded in the sin of man (*vide* Keil and Delitzsch *in loco*).

Upon thy belly shalt thou go. A change as to external form, (Josephus, Hengstenburg, Lange, Keil, and Delitzsch); from which we dissent, because, while such is possible, it is not probable, and therefore is conjecture only. The words simply mean that henceforth the serpent's crawling motion should be to it a sign of disgrace. In Gen. ix. 13, God says to Noah: "I do set my bow in the cloud." Yet no one who has any right to an opinion on the subject would maintain that God at that time formed the "bow," or thenceforth gave to it a position it had not previously occupied. God simply chose an obvious attendant phenomenon of the cloud as a reminder of his promise. So here God makes the grovelling position of the serpent a reminder of its curse, and this new significance will guarantee that enmity ending in its destruction by the seed of the woman.

Dust shalt thou eat. Not that the serpent's principal source of nourishment shall be dust, but, as another mark of its disgrace and a consequence of its crawling upon the ground. Biting the dust is indicative of disappointment and of defeat, (cf. Deut. xxxii.

24; Isa. xlix. 23; Ps. lxxii. 9; Mic. vii. 17; Rev. xii. 7-17). And when the universal curse shall be removed from all flesh (Isa. lxxv. 25), the instrument of man's temptation shall remain degraded, in obedience to the command, "all the days of thy life." The words certainly imply the *materiality* of the serpent and the *reality* of the curse, and the אָרִיִּים has been thoroughly fulfilled.

Enmity, אִי־בָה, hatred of each other. LXX., ἔχθραν; Vul., *inimicitas*. אֲשִׁיתָ, I will establish as a fixed principle. Here is a distinct departure. הוּא refers to its immediate antecedent, וְרָעָה but וְאִתָּה is the object addressed, and is referable to the serpent only. It shall bruise *thy* head. Now observe: The *seed* of the woman shall bruise the *serpent's own head*, and the serpent itself, not its seed, shall bruise the *woman's seed's heel*. The strife shall be perpetual between, 1, The tempter and the tempted; 2, Between the seed of the tempter and the seed of the tempted; 3, Between the *tempter* and the *seed* of the tempted, and not between the tempted and the seed of the tempter. יְשׁוּבְךָ רֵאשׁ—He shall bruise thee as to thy head (double accusative after, and active verb; cf. Ewald's Syntax of Heb. Language, E. T., p. 54, and Deut. xxxiii. 11; 1 Kings xix. 21; Deut. xxii. 26; Jer. ii. 16; Ps. lxxviii. 22). The difficulty arises as to the meaning of שׁוּב. The word occurs in but two other places in Scripture, Job ix. 17, where it is translated *breaketh* by both the A. V. and R. V., without any marginal note; and in Ps. cxxxix. 11, where in the A. V. it reads *cover*, and in the R. V. *overwhelm* (margin, *cover*). Gesenius, following Ewald, prefers שָׁבַךְ or חָבַךְ. Calvin, followed by Fürst, gives שָׁפַךְ, and Noble derives the word from שׁוּף and שָׁאף. The LXX. reads αὐτὸς σου τηρήσει, and the Vul. *ipsa conteret* (the *ipsa* of the Vulgate is manifestly a mutilation of the text, by which the pronoun has come to be referred to the Virgin). The Chald., Syr., and Rabb. authorities have established the meaning of the word from שׁוּף, to rub, to crush, to bruise, and this rendering is strengthened by Paul's version στυριβεῖν (Rom. xvi. 20).

רֵאשׁ is contrasted with עֲקֵב, and the contrast arises from the

nature of the foes. It is not affirmed that the struggle between the tempter and the tempted will ever find a conclusion in time, but, if such should be the case, there is no doubt relative to the issue. עֲרִי is certainly collective, yet it is possible for it to have a mental unity (cf. Gal. iii. 16); so the abstract may become a personal unity, as is indicated by the separate stages of development in Shem, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and, though not affirmed here, their posterity may, through the agency of one person, triumph over the tempter. (Rom. xvi. 20.) This is strengthened negatively by the fact that the *original tempter* will be finally bruised by the seed of the woman.

II. Gen. iii. 14, 15: *The Internal Messianic Element.*

Inceptive comprehension is quite necessary in explaining inceptive action. The context, its relative position as regards the whole book, the avowed claim of the book as regards its own teaching, the personality of the author, the subjective conditions under which he wrote, the historical conditions formative of the whole, must be fairly considered if we seek for truth. The point is not so much what we think of a passage of Scripture, but *what meaning did it have for those by whom, for whom, and to whom it was written.* All Scripture is not equally light-bearing.

The first question, then, is what is עֲרִי? The different views that have been entertained on this point have been concisely put by Medus in *Poli Commentar*.

1. Quidam statuunt maledictionem latam in serpentem solum (quia hic confertur cum aliis bestiis) non in diabolum quia is auteam maledictus erat.

2. Allii in diabolum solum quia brutus serpens non poterat justi puniri.

3. Allii applicant v. 14 ad serpentem v. 15 in diabolum at vero tu et te idem sunt in utroque versu.

4. Allii existimant eam in utrumque latam. Quam sententiam verrissimam judico.

That the serpent spoken of is a real serpent seems highly probable, because—

1. עֲרִי, as used in the context: It is more subtle than all the beasts of the field (Gen. iii. 1); it crawls upon its belly (Gen. iii. 14); it "eats dust" and "bruises man's heel."

2. The passage occurs in a book of strictly historical character, and itself being cast in poetic form argues nothing against its accuracy; and so true is it that the serpent is more subtle than all the beasts of the field, that "as wise as serpents" has become quite a proverb.

3. The condition of mankind announced here as a curse actually exists. The race is propagated in pain, man lives by the sweat of his brow, and there is an enmity between serpents and men which actually results in bruising each other.

4. It is closely connected with the history of the same pair who are actors in the scene, and whose history is carried forward, and who are organically connected with the creation.

5. There is the absence of any indication that the author intended any allegory, of which perspicuity is a prime requisite, and which is decidedly wanting when this passage is explained by allegorical interpreters.

6. The theory of a philosophical myth, as advocated by Davidson *et al.*, is fully met by the fact that substantially much of the same account existed among the Hindoos and Chaldeans.

7. Against the theory of a historical myth, as urged by Tholuck, it may be answered that the creation of man and the fact of sin are as likely myths. These events are soberly narrated and closely associated as cause and effect.

8. The account of the creation and fall of man in Genesis is referred to in many passages of Scripture as historically true. (Cf. Ps. viii. with Gen. i. 25-28; Gen. iii. 19, with Eccle. xii. 7; Gen. iii. 14, with Ps. lxxii. 9, with Isa. xlix. 23, with Mic. vii. 17.) Like Adam, men transgress the covenant. (Hos. vi. 7.) All the Old Testament sacrifices are inexplicable, if you eliminate the third chapter of Genesis, for they are grounded in the felt need of man's reconciliation with God. The מוֹת הַמּוֹת of Gen. ii. 17, grounds the מוֹת יוֹמָת of the Mosaic legislation. (Cf. Ex. xxi. 12-15; xxii. 18; Lev. xx. 2, 9; xxvii. 19.) Hence the Old Testament idea of, and hope for, the Messiah are grounded in Genesis iii.

Historical light is also thrown back from the New Testament upon the Old Testament. At this point compare Matt. xix. 4, with Gen. i. 27; Matt. xix. 5, with Gen. ii. 24; Mark x. 6, with Gen.

i. 27; Mark x. 7, 8, with Gen. ii. 24; 1 Cor. vi. 16, with Gen. ii. 24; 1 Cor. xv. 45, with Gen. ii. 7; Eph. v. 31, with Gen. ii. 24; Heb. iv. 4, with Gen. ii. 2; 2 Cor. xi. 3, with Gen. iii. 13; 1 Tim. ii. 13, 14 and 1 Cor. xi. 8, 9, with Gen. iii. and iv, in which the man is first formed, then the woman, and Rom. v. 12 affirms that death has come upon all men through the sin of one man. It appears, therefore, that a real serpent was engaged in the temptation. But was it "a serpent only, and nothing more?"

1. For the serpent to converse with man, it must have transcended the sphere in which it now moves and the position assigned to it in the creation of animals. This is, at least, a presumptive argument against its having acted independently.

2. The words of the serpent appear as an effect of evil. It insinuates doubt as to God's goodness and love (Gen. iii. 1); as to God's righteousness and justice (Gen. iii. 4); as to God's honesty and truthfulness (Gen. iii. 5).

3. The "naturalistic" interpretation would vacate Gen. i. 25, which affirms that every animal which God had created was *good*. Nor does Gen. iii. 1 militate against this view, for the serpent is there said to be עָרוֹם with reference to *natural* sagacity.

4. The first chapter of Genesis makes quite a distinction between the irrational animals and man, and here the serpent is accredited with human speech, and is the author of a *moral* temptation to man.

5. The nature of the curse implies that the offender is something more than an irrational animal. Man is created with "dominion" over the serpents; and when God speaks to, and puts enmity between the serpent and man, this suggests an agent more responsible than the serpent.

6. Objectors say that we find no analogy either in Scripture or experience of such a temptation of man by an evil power in the guise of a serpent. But it is equally true that we find no analogy of the original creation or of the fall of man. Besides, intrinsic probability is not the measure of the credibility of testimony, and that the Scriptures refer to the enemy of God and man under the figure of a serpent will be clearly shown in the following section.

7. Such an interpretation would force Genesis, in one of its most *ethical* passages, to flatten down into a mere physical anthro-

pological observation. The temptation to disobedience is clearly brought out, and the commencement of evil soberly narrated. The relation between good and evil, between obedience and disobedience, is determined for all time.

8. The final decisive conflict will be between the seed of the woman and the serpent, and not between the seed of the serpent and the seed of the woman.

9. And as the "seed of the serpent" has its *unity* in the final conflict, so the seed of the woman (though not here so affirmed) may have its unity in *one*, who shall bruise the serpent's head. (Rom. xvi. 20.)

10. The enmity occasioned by an ethical event must be *essentially ethical*. Only in such a sense can men become the seed of the serpent (1 John iii. 8; Acts xiii. 8-10; John viii. 44; vi. 70). Spiritually, then, men may become children of the devil. There is nothing isolated in the fact that the serpent is cursed, because through it injury comes to man (cf. Gen. iii. 17 and ix. 5; Ex. xxi. 28, 29; Lev. xx. 15; Deut. xiii. 15; 1 Sam. xv. 3); but the sentence goes beyond the mere infliction of *physical* suffering and death; and as the serpent is destitute of *moral* responsibility, we must look beyond it, in the sentence of *well merited punishment*.

III. Gen. iii. 14, 15: *The Historico Messianic Element*.

As the *internal* evidence can furnish only a strong presumption as to the true explanation, so the light flashed back upon the account by the historic development of succeeding ages is largely confirmative of our position as the true solution.

It has been held that the account before us is, 1, Mythical, either a historical or a philosophical myth; 2, That it is simply an allegory; 3, That the account is literal only; 4, That the account is partly literal and partly symbolical; *i. e.*, a historical foreground is set off by a symbolical background. The first and second have been sufficiently answered in the preceding section; the third and fourth only need detain us here.

Prof. Kuenen is a thorough and strong exponent of the "naturalistic" school.¹ In his "Prophets and Prophecy of Israel" (p.

¹ Dr. Kuenen is not doing a useless work. That he is very extreme in his principles and deductions few will deny, for such principles logically carried out

376, E. T.), he translates "I will put enmity between thee and the woman and between thy seed and her seed": "this (seed) shall lie in wait for thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for his (that seed's) heel. . . . The serpent is—a serpent, and nothing more. . . . Finally, the conflict which is so picturesquely represented in the curse upon the serpent is nothing else than the perpetual battle between man, and his dangerous creeping enemy. . . . Gen. iii. 15, when thus interpreted, has no connection with our subject, and must lose the name of *protevangeli*um, or 'Paradise Lost,' which it owes to the traditional but positively incorrect view."

There is something naïve in the words of Professor Kuenen when he says, on page 22, that in "historical investigations . . . dogmatic presuppositions must be laid aside." He is happily consistent in using the term *presuppositions*, since he can freely lay down dogmatic suppositions. Nothing exceeds his dogmatism, unless it be the degree to, and confidence with which, he begs the question at issue. His view is brought forward exclusively from the side on which it is realized in the individual. He is quite sure that "the expositors who find a spiritual conflict and its issue here indicated, exclude all conflict between the woman and the offspring of the serpent, and between the offspring of the serpent and the offspring of the woman, while frequently referring to Keil, Delitzsch, Hengstenburg *et al.*, who find a spiritual significance with no such exclusion. He wishes to show that only a real serpent was meant in the Hebrew narrative. Observe his method. He begins by violating Hebrew syntax in his translation (cf. *supra*), and then, without any demonstration of the correctness of his position, he at once affirms that "the serpent is a serpent, and nothing more." If each critic is allowed to make his own grammar, and formulate his own method of hermeneutics, Scripture may be adduced to prove any theory. But the historic relation of the passage is the most complete refutation of the purely "naturalistic hypothesis." Schröder, in his book, "The Cuneiform In-

will make inspiration a vanishing quantity, and will minimize the divinity of Christ. Yet Dr. Kuenen is a natural rebound from unnecessary symbolism and allegorism; and when the church oscillates back to her true position men will recognize that Dr. K. has made a real advance in scientific hermeneutics. The truth of God in its contest with error has nothing to fear in the final issue.

scriptions and the Old Testament," (p. 37, E. T.,) says: "We meet with the serpent in figured representations on the Babylonian inscriptions, and it assumes a form that we can see that it has some *religious significance*;" and the idea of a conflict between the powers of good and evil, under the figure of a serpent, or dragon, as one of the combatants, is very fully brought out in George Smith's work, "The Chaldean Account of Genesis." Max Müller, in his "Chips from a German Workshop," Vol. I., pp. 150-154, says: "The principle of evil in the Avesta is called serpent," and the "spirit Ahura, who created the world and rules it, defends it against the power of evil" To this point Kalish remarks: "Almost throughout the East the serpent was used as an emblem of the evil principle of the evil spirit of disobedience. . . In the first characteristic our narrative leans to the general oriental tradition. In the second it is the original conception of the Hebrew writer; and the point of divergence is in the absolute sovereignty with which God pronounces the malediction upon the serpent." I submit that it would be quite anomalous for the Hebrew lore to have the same symbol of evil, in common with other historic religions, and yet differ from all in having no spiritual significance. Prof. Kuenen's hypothesis, when viewed with this extra scriptural lens, is obsolescent. The Old Testament refers repeatedly to evil spirits. (Cf. Isaiah xiii. 21, xxxiv. 14, Lev. xvi.; also Job i. and ii.; Zech. iii. 1, 2; Ps. cix. 6.) There are further *a priori* grounds for believing that there was among the Hebrews, an idea of a thoroughly evil spirit or principle. The normal place that the Pentateuch held among the Israelites (not among modern critics) makes it highly improbable that a doctrine which in later development held so important and prominent a place should not have existed, at least in its incipiency, in the books of Moses. In the later books, he is introduced as quite a well-known being. Indeed, much of the Jewish cultus is inexplicable if you eliminate the idea of Satan.

The Targums confirm this spiritual significance.¹ The bruising of the serpent is thus conditioned upon rectitude of life. The

¹ *Onkelos*: "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy son and her son. He will remember thee what thou didst to him at the begin-

Book of Wisdom, ii. 24, also affirms that, by the envy of Satan, death came into the world. And, finally, the New Testament is pronounced on this point. Matthew xix. 4 refers to Genesis i. 27 as a historic fact, and in xix. 5 the sacredness of the marriage is consequent upon the manner of creation (Gen. ii. 24). Compare Mark x. 6, with Gen. ii. 24; and Mark x. 7, 8, with Gen. ii. 24; also Paul, 1 Cor. vi. 16, with Gen. ii. 24; 1 Cor. xv. 45, with Gen. ii. 7; Eph. v. 31, with Gen. ii. 24; Heb. iv. 4, with Gen. ii. 2. These passages are not "homiletically" referred to by the writers of the New Testament, but soberly, as historical events. The tempter is referred to as the serpent beguiling our first parents (2 Cor. xi. 3); he is called the devil (Rev. xii. 9; xx. 2), upon whom power is given to the true Israel of God to tread (Luke x. 19). He is the tempter of Jesus. (Mark i. 3; Matt. iv. 3; Luke iv. 3.) He taketh away the good seed from the heart. (Mark iv. 15; Matt. xiii. 19, 20.) He binds the children of Abraham. (Luke iii. 16.) He incites Judas to betray his Lord. (Luke xxii. 3; Matt. xxvi. 14; Mark xvi. 10; John xiii. 20-27.) He seeks possession of the children of God. (Luke xxii. 31.) He is the author of falsehood. (Acts v. 3; John viii. 44.) He is able to keep men in darkness as to God's truth. (Acts xxvi. 18.) He shall be bruised under the feet of God's children. (Rom. xvi. 20.) The incestuous are to be delivered unto his power. (1 Cor. v. 5.) He is still the tempter of men. (1 Cor. vii. 5.) He is the recognized enemy of man. (2 Cor. ii. 11; xii. 7.) He hinders the people of God in their work. (1 Thes. ii. 18.) He works "with all power and signs and lying wonders." (2 Thess. ii. 9.) He works for the apostasy of God's people. (1 Tim. i. 20; v. 15.) His synagogue and kingdom is opposed to God's. (Rev. ii. 9, 13; iii. 9.) He is the deceiver of the whole world. (Rev. xii. 9.)

ning, and thou shalt be observant unto him at the end." *Jonathan*: "The woman saw Sammael, the angel of death, and was afraid." It boldly places the victory of the woman's seed upon the *keeping* of the law. "And it shall be when the sons of the woman consider the law and perform its instructions, they shall be prepared to smite thee on thy head, to kill thee; and when the sons of the woman forsake the commandments of the law and perform its instructions, thou wilt be ready to wound them on the heel, to hurt them; . . . and there shall be a healing of them in the days of King Messiah."

He is *διάβολος*, the slanderer. (Matt. iv. 1, 5, 8.) The sower of evil seed. (Matt. xiii. 39.) The whole armor of God is needed to contend against him. (Eph. vi. 11.) He ensnares men. (1 Tim. iii. 7.) He is to be resisted by submission to God. (James iv. 7.) He seeks to destroy men. (1 Pet. v. 8.) He sinneth from the beginning. (1 John iii. 8.) He will cast men into prison. (Rev. ii. 10; xii. 12.) And he will be finally overcome. (Rev. xx. 10; xii. 9; xx. 2.) The Pauline parallel (Rom. v.) between Christ and Adam indicates that Christ confronted the same tempter that seduced Adam. Christ's own words are confirmative of the historicity of Genesis iii. (John viii. 44.) Ye are of your father, the devil, etc. Christ was speaking to Jews who believed that death was consequent upon the temptation and fall. (Wisdom ii. 24; Rom. v. 12.) Now, our conclusion is that Genesis iii. 14, 15, was a historical event, having, it is true, a symbolic background, and that the real tempter used the serpent as his instrument. Delitzsch well remarks, that in regard to this there is no doubt that in the Holy Scriptures there lies before us a connected line of testimony, whose object is ever the same demoniacal tempting spirit, reaching from Genesis iii. 14, to Revelation xx. 2, 10. Strauss says, in his book "The Old Faith and the New," p. 22, "that one of the ugliest features of Christianity is the belief in the devil," and to this Goethe well replies, that "the devil is a thoroughly biblical conception, and if Christ, as St. John writes, (1 John iii. 8,) appeared on earth in order to destroy the works of the devil, he might have been dispensed with if no devil existed."

Thus viewed, this passage falls in with the whole trend of Scripture. The words do not "exclude" allusion to Messiah, for the nature of the finally victorious "seed" must be modified by the nature of the foe; *i. e.*, a spiritual enemy must have a spiritual conqueror. Yet it is only in general and national terms that the inception of deliverance from evil is brought forward, which fact is entirely in harmony with the whole of revelation and with our opening remark. But the champions in this struggle between good and evil are not arbitrary selections. Seth, Shem, Abram, Isaac, Jacob, Judah *et al.*, are selected according to their characters; the choice in each case is based upon *ethical* grounds,

and ceases to be co-extensive with *physical* descent; and as the strife is constantly maintained by the "seed of the woman," *a fortiori* the holiest of that seed will conquer most successfully. That seed culminates in Christ, who trampled upon the serpent, and who will bruise him under the feet of his children. (Romans xvi. 20.)

The protevangelium thus becomes a faithful miniature of a struggling, hoping humanity, the general idea of a "promised deliverer," around which the rest of Scripture groups itself, and out of which revelation is unfolded. Grace is no after thought, "but enters the world side by side with sin." This is the foundation of Scripture until revelation reaches its fulness in Christ. Its outward form is obscure; its inner meaning lays the broad basis for all future revelation.

The "tree of life" was not destroyed, but when sin and death shall have been taken away by the conqueror of the serpent (1 Cor. xv. 26) it will grow and bear fruit upon another soil in the new earth and beside the living waters of the heavenly Jerusalem. (Rev. xx. 21.)

IV. Gen. ix 25-27: *Exegetical Argument.*

According to the Bible, the *subsequent progress* of mankind is contingent upon the fall of Adam. The corruption of man prior to the flood had hindered the realization of the successful struggle against the "serpent." Once more the race has its unity, formerly in Adam, now in Noah, and a new development begins. On the part of Noah this covenant relation with God is begun by an emphatic expression of sinfulness and *hope of salvation*, which is fittingly expressed in his sacrificial offering to God, his deliverer, who graciously accepts the offering with a promise that he will not again visit upon man so sweeping a chastisement.

Thus בְּרִיתִי is the solemn conditioning by which God specialized his relation to men. The Adamic blessing is repeated (compare Gen. i. 28-30 with Gen. ix. 1-3), and a new race begins its course in reliance upon God. This covenant relation is not made absolutely dependent upon Noah's fidelity, but the covenant is a gracious one, in which God binds himself by a voluntary promise. Noah's past fidelity to God secures for mankind for all time ex-

emption from a similar repeated visitation of God's displeasure. (Gen. viii. 21, 22.) "The continuance of creation in beautiful harmony, the unbroken development of human history, is the fruit of divine grace, which will not let God's glorious plan in reference to creation, humanity and redemption be frustrated by man's sin, and that gracious decree is linked with Noah's name." So that after the covenant with Noah the race development begins anew along three distinct lines, as indicated by the patriarch's words. The race development in Genesis, third chapter, is according to natural unity, but from Noah onward it is *historically* characterized by *ethical diversity*.

The sin and fall of Noah served to reveal to him the character of each of his sons. Ham sees his father's nakedness, and his sensual delight leads him to make known the fact to his brethren, while Shem and Japheth, with touching reverence and innate purity, going backward, place a covering over their father. To Noah the hidden tendency and character of his sons are made manifest in this occurrence, and these characteristics could but develop in their generations. He has received a deep insight into the inner life of each of his sons, and he sees that their varied characters will impress a differing stamp upon the main branches of mankind. "The fact that God's relation to all nations, as previously his attitude toward all creatures, is here traced back to an ethical ground," forms a noteworthy *introitus* to the history of the world and of redemption, in which God will of his free grace choose a particular nation, yet not without their coöperation on ethical grounds.

Vs. 25. אָרֶר, *Cursed be Canaan*. The term applied in Gen. iii. 14 to נָחַשׁ, degraded, infamous (cf. Deut. xxvii. 15, xxviii. 16, *sq.*): כְּנָעַן, not "lowland," (and hence post Mosaic,) as descriptive of the topography of the country; because, 1, The land is hilly (Deut. xi. 11) and mountainous (Deut. iii. 5); 2, כְּנָעַן is never used of natural lowliness; 3, It occurs here *first* in connection with servitude, and is repeatedly used of humiliation. (Cf. 1 Kings xxi. 29, 2 Kings xxii. 19, 2 Chron. vii. 14, xii. 6, 7-12; xxx. 11, xxxii. 26, xxxiii. 12, 23, xxxiv. 27, xxxvi. 12); 4, The country receives its name from the inhabitants, and is called

אָרֶץ כְּנָעַן (cf. Gen. xiii. 12, xvi. 3, xxiii. 2-19, xxxiii. 18), and from כָּנַע, to stoop, to submit (cf. Deut. ix. 3, Judg. iv. 23).

This is the *second* curse pronounced upon a human being (Gen. iv. 11). Ham is not mentioned, but Canaan and his descendants only are directly cursed; nor are the other descendants of Ham mentioned; but as they are neither included in the blessing of Shem nor the enlargement of Japheth, the curse probably, to some extent, fell upon them. Nothing is said of the *perpetuity* of the curse, the ground of which is to be found in Canaan's *character and is no arbitrary selection*. Canaan's own character forecasts the character of his race, as did Shem's and Japheth's.

A servant of servants. (LXX. Παῖς οἰκέτης; Vul., *servus servorum*.) A term of comparison by the juxtaposition of a repeated noun (cf. Ewald's Syntax of Hebrew Language, p. 169, E. T.; also Deut. x. 17; Josh. xxii. 22; Ps. cxxxvi. 2; Dan. ii. 47; xi. 36, for similar expressions).

And he said, Blessed be the Jehovah God of Shem. בְּרָךְ applied to man is an invocation of good (Gen. xiv. 19); and applied to God is inscription of praise (Gen. xiv. 20). This is the first passage in which God is called the God of any one. The covenant Jehovah shall be preëminently the God of Shem, (Deut. xxxiii. 20; Gen. xxiv. 27,) whose name indicates the spiritual exaltations and advancement of his race. "If Jehovah is the God of Shem, then is Shem the recipient and heir of all the blessings of salvation which God as Jehovah procures for mankind."

And Canaan shall be a servant to them. לָמוֹ; LXX., Παῖς οἰκετής αὐτου; Vul., *Servus ejus*. This is not singular, but plural, equivalent to לָהֶם, referring to the relation that Canaan and his descendants will sustain towards Shem and Japheth and their descendants.

Wide let Elohim make it to Japheth, and let him dwell in the tents of Shem. Jehovah the covenant God is Shem's, and Elohim, the name by which God was designated as the creator and ruler of the world and as the dispenser of worldly blessings, is the name by which he is known to Japheth. LXX., Πλατύναι ὁ θεός τῶ Ἰάφεθ. Vul., *Dilatet Deus Japhet.* יִפְתָּ אֱלֹהִים לְיַפֶּת

is an evident paranomasia. פתח, not to *persuade*, for in that sense the word usually has a bad signification (cf. 1 Kings xxii. 20; Ex. xxii. 15; Prov. i. 10; 2 Sam. iii. 25; Jud. xiv. 15); and in that sense it is not usually followed by לו, but takes the accusative; but to *open*, to *enlarge*, (cf. Prov. xxii. 19,) including both ideas of extension and prosperity. Some of the critics claim that this passage from verses 18 to 27 is Jehovistic, while others maintain that it belongs to the Jehovistic redactor, and, referring to the conquest of Canaan, is *post eventum*. But the expression *servant of servants* would not be historically true of the conquered Canaanites, besides the significance of the names explains their use. The Japhetic material and intellectual prosperity stand in harmonious contrast to the Shemitic religious cultus.

And let him dwell in the tents of Shem. Is יְהוָה or אֱלֹהִים the subject of שָׁב? Prof. Briggs, in his "Messianic Prophecy" (pp. 82, 83), adopts the latter, because, 1, It favors the parallelism of the two clauses. But parallelisms cannot determine the meaning of phrases, since all parallelisms are not synonymous, and no parallelism can determine a specific meaning in opposition to a settled usage; and it is thoroughly possible that the subject of the latter clause should be found in the indirect object of the previous clause. (Cf. Gen. x. 8; 1 Chron. i. 10.) 2, Prof. Briggs' next argument is that a change of subject would make Japheth the hero of the prophecy. But this is *non sequitur*. 3, It is highly in keeping with Shem's blessing that God should dwell in his tents. But it may be answered that Shem's blessing is specialized by the favor of *Jehovah*; and it would be out of harmony for him here to be characterized by the dwelling of Elohim in his tents. (Cf. Ex. xl. 34.) 4, Unless Elohim be the subject, Japheth is made the conqueror of Shem, which would be little better than the curse of Canaan. But this is assuming an exclusive meaning for שָׁב, which is not true historically.

With Dillmann *et al.* we believe יְהוָה to be the subject: 1, Because God is never mentioned as dwelling in tents. 2, The plural is not applicable to God's dwelling. (Cf. Ex. xl. 34, 35; 2 Chron. xxvi. 16; Ps. xv. 1; Ezek. iii. 6; iv. 1; Ps. xi. 4; Jer. vii. 4; Mal. iii. 1; Hab. ii. 20; Heb. viii. 2; Matt. xxi. 12; xxvi. 16;

Rev. xi. 1, 19.) 3, לְמֹֿרָא in vs. 26 and 27 requires such an interpretation. 4, Jehovah, not Elohim, is specialized as the relation God sustains to Shem. 5, If Elohim be the subject, it would be substantially a repetition of Shem's blessing in vs. 26. 6, The reverential act of Shem and Japheth, as opposed to Ham's conduct, favors the idea that the two former would sustain similar relations to the latter. 7, Such an interpretation would introduce an allusion to the superiority of Shem's blessing in the midst of Japheth's. Thus this ancient oracle stands out in three-fold relation: 1, The curse of Canaan; 2, The blessing of Shem; 3, The enlargement of Japheth; each factor emphasizing Canaan's curse. Historic fulfilment demands an explanation for this projection by Noah of the earth-tribes. The Shemitic religious cultus, the Japhetic culture and prosperity, and the continuance of Canaan's posterity in degradation and sin—this forms indeed the world historic partition of mankind. These are the differing attitudes which the several branches of the human family will thenceforth assume towards God until the "fulness of time."

V. Gen. ix. 25-27. *The Internal Messianic Element.* Competency to interpret the real meaning of an author's words is obtained only by finding the point of view from which he observes things in their relations. To interpret Calvin from Arminius's point of view, or Calvin from Kuenen's view-point, would be the surest way of missing the real meaning of the writer. True, they serve and worship the same God, but their theoretical faith-ladder is very differently constructed. To interpret George Eliot's writings, and hence her character, from a Christian view-point, (as that term is used when applied to faith, and not to ethics,) would be manifestly the surest way of remaining in ignorance of the real spirit of her writings, if, indeed, such a course be not sheer dishonesty. The best way surely of finding a writer's view-point is to give credence to his avowed claim, and then to the claims for him of those most in sympathy with him and understanding him best; hence Noah's character must be considered in understanding the import of his words. He found grace in the eyes of God (Gen. vi. 8). A just man, and walked with God (vi. 9). He was obedient to God's commands (vi. 22, vii. 5). He worshipped God (viii. 20). God speaks to him (vi. 13, vii. 1, viii. 15, ix. 8,

17). Hence his acts are performed in constant communion with and reliance upon God ; so that, whatever else is in the region of doubt, this is certain, that Noah's outward life is but a reflex of his inward piety, and that his acts and words are grounded in his attitude toward God.

It is further obvious that Noah's words are not prompted by personal feelings, either of anger against Canaan, or of kindly feeling for Shem and Japheth: 1, The fact that the curse was pronounced against Canaan, and not against Ham, the immediate offender, bars any element of anger; 2, The character of Shem's blessing equally lifts the words of Noah out of the region of personal feeling, and its religious aspect trembles on the verge of Messianic foresight; 3, The blessing of Japheth, whom Elohim will prosper, but to whom there is no Jehovah relation, when explained on the simply "naturalistic" grounds, is simply grotesque; 4, Noah's reference to the future and his emphasis of what will come to pass eliminate any element of personal feeling; 5, Noah's blessing upon Japheth is proof, at least, that he appreciates the different relations which God sustains towards men, and is quite a poser to the critics, for it will not conform to critical rubrics. And as Noah was actuated by no personal feeling, so his words are not based upon any personal desires concerning his children, but upon the *character* of each. This is further confirmed by the nature of Shem's blessing, which is purely *ethical*. The God with whom Noah walked is to be the covenant God of Shem and of his posterity, and Noah promised this blessing, assured that he knew whom he believed, and that his favor was more than life. Eliminate this personal element from Noah's words, grant to him the conviction that his words are grounded in his attitude toward God, and you lift the passage out of the reach of the purely human; and though the aged servant of God may not have seen distinctly a personal Messiah, his words tremble on the verge of Messianic prophecy, for he clearly sees a collective Messiah in the pious Shem and his descendants, who will become the channel of God's covenant, saving blessings to mankind. Japheth shall ultimately dwell in Shem's tents, enjoying the blessings of Shem's covenant God, and Canaan shall serve them; and in that sphere he too, in his

offspring, shall be brought to a knowledge of him who is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, who sees the heart, who is no respecter of persons, and whom to obey is better than sacrifice.

The words of Noah, then, are spoken from a pronounced *religious* point of view. The curse upon Canaan is a *spiritual darkness*, with its attendant servitude and degradation. Nor are the Canaanites to be worse at once. The divine Nemesis gathers along with human development. The rule of ignoble impulse, the absence of nobler feeling, of finer sentiment, of reverential regard, which showed itself in him who is cursed, will, in the course of history, develop on a larger scale in a race given up to sensual sin and the abandon of that higher, nobler life which is the outcome of that image of God stamped upon each man, and which, though sullied and dishonored, is still divine. The sin of the father, which is often transmitted to the son in increasing ratio, will not go unpunished (Ex. xx. 4-6), until that time shall come when the pure monotheistic religion of Shem, the servitude of Canaan, and the culture and prosperity of Japheth shall unite in glorifying Jehovah, and each shall be a factor in that force that is widening the skirts of light and narrowing the skirts of darkness, and Christ, the true Messiah, shall be the inspiration of every heart. This is "that one far off divine event towards which the whole creation moves."

VI. Gen. ix. 25-27: *The Historico-Messianic Element.*

The curse of Canaan was national, and not individual, as was the blessing upon his two uncles. The curse was to a large extent ethical, nor does it preclude the idea that many of the Canaanites might attain to a very high degree of prosperity. The name is synonymous with merchant (Prov. xxxi. 24). Egypt, Thebes, Babylon, Nineveh, and Carthage witness their worldly success. To the Canaanites the descendants of Shem were for a time subject in Egypt, and they, *i. e.*, the Canaanites, have been the world pioneers. Yet the great world-historic powers, the Chaldeans, the Medo-Persians, the Hindoo, the Greek and Roman, as well as the modern rulers of mankind, were and are of Japhetic origin.

As a nation or race the Canaanites are, comparatively speaking, in servitude. They form not even a mediocre force in aiding the

progress of humanity. No healthful influence from them blesses mankind. But in the sin of Ham "there lies the great stain of the whole Hamitic race, whose chief characteristic is sexual sin." They are in no sense a "light of the world," and the light of civilization and of God's truth has shone so far, but dimly, upon their benighted race. Sodom and Gomorrah, largely inhabited by the Hamites, have become synonymous with the deepest degradation, (Lev. xviii.) so that Crenzer well remarks that "the Canaanitish religion (?) silenced all the best feelings of human nature, degraded man's mind by superstition, alternately cruel and profligate. We may look in vain for any influence for good it could have exercised upon the nation."

The curse upon Canaan has had its literal historic fulfilment. They were partly exterminated and reduced to slavery by the descendants of Shem (Josh. ix. 23); and those of them unaffected at that time were subdued by Solomon (1 Kings xxiv. 21). The early Babylonians, the Phœnicians, the Carthagenians and the Egyptians were subjugated by the Assyrians, the Persians, the Macedonians and Romans, and the Africans in different places to-day are but hewers of wood and drawers of water. The causal-ground of that race-condition is to be found in their attitude toward God. A nation is what its religion makes it, and history clearly shows that each nation's world-life, so far as influence and prosperity go, is conditioned upon monotheistic belief and fidelity to the one true God. Polytheism segregates a nation's effort and dissipates its energy. Truly "thou shalt have no other God before me," is the *ἴνα* of the world's progress.

And Jehovah has been the God of Shem. Though oppressed in Egypt, and afterwards conquered by the descendants of Japheth, they maintained (though not uniformly to the same degree) the worship of the true God. From them the prophets sprung. To them theophanies were granted until through them "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us."

When the Persians conquered Babylon they restored the Jews. They were protected by Alexander when he conquered Persia, and the Romans, long after their conquest of Palestine, befriended the chosen race, granting to them a large share of self-government

and freedom. The race of Shem maintained monotheism against western polytheism and eastern pantheism, thus becoming the exclusive channel of salvation to men. Divine foresight only could have seen how excluded would be this medium of God's blessings to the world. And Noah's burst of thanksgiving for Shem forecasts the hallelujahs that were to arise unto God from all mankind for the birth of that son of Shem in whom all the nations of the earth were to be blessed.

The enlargement of Japheth has been geographically fulfilled. He is the progenitor of a large number of the the inhabitants of Asia, Europe, and America. Intellectually and influentially it has been fulfilled for the metaphysics, of the Hindoos, the philosophy and art of the Greeks, the jurisprudence of the Romans, and the modern science and civilization of the world have come through the Japhetic race. And if the translation be correct, that Elohim shall dwell in the tents of Shem, there is ample fulfilment in the Shekinah¹ and the Incarnation. God commands a sanctuary for his dwelling-place. (Ex. xxv. 8.) He will dwell among the children of Israel and not forsake them (1 Kings viii. 13), yet conditioned upon their fidelity (Ezek. xliii. 9). He will not forsake his people (Zech. viii. 3), and the nation that has God for its inheritance are blessed by him (Ps. lxx. 1; xxxiii. 12; cxlv. 14), and in Christ God verily dwelt among his people in a unique sense. (John i. 14.)

But if our interpretation be the correct one, viz., that Japheth shall dwell in Shem's tents, there emerges at once a cosmical significance in the reciprocal interchange of blessings upon their dwelling together. Jehovah becomes the God of Japheth, whose prosperity is sanctified to his glory. (Ps. cxxxiii. 1; Is. lx.)

We are all dwellers in the tents of Shem, and the New Testament is but the account of our entering upon their privileges. Israel, though conquered by other nations, became the spiritual conquerors of the world. The religious privileges once belonging exclusively to Shem belong now to Japheth. Carried by Jewish missionaries like Paul throughout the Roman world, they have become the property of the leading members of the Aryan race.

¹ The Targum of Onkelos reads: "Shall make the Shekinah to dwell in the tabernacles of Shem."

The propagation of the religion of the Messiah of Shem is now in the hands of Japheth.¹

But chiefly does this interpretation harmonize with the words and spirit of Scripture. There will be a universal blessing by means of the obedience of one (Gen. xii. 3). Idols shall be destroyed and nations shall seek God (Isa. xlv. 14 *ff.*, confirmed in Acts viii. 27, also Zeph. iii. 10, and Isa. xix. 25); and the time is foreseen when the blessing of the Jehovah of Shem will be universal in its saving effect, (Isa. lv., compare also Ps. lxxviii. 32, and Joel iii.); and though Christ affirms that the time is come when no particular place shall be for the worship of the Father, but *every where* the true worshippers shall worship him in spirit and in truth, for the Father seeketh such to worship him, yet this cosmical privilege and blessing descends from Shem, for salvation is of the Jews (John iv. 21-23), and though they have rejected the blessing which they themselves have brought for mankind, they are not forgotten of God. (Rom. xi. 11 *ff.*)

In the protevangelium we find the human side of the Messianic idea in the promise to the seed of the woman. Here we have the divine side in God's advent, and the beginning of his more complete revelation to his chosen race. Upon these two ideas the whole Scripture is projected.

Surely no mere human foresight or conjecture could have so completely anticipated the race-partition of men or the consummation of all things in a fuller revelation. Whether or not Noah comprehended the full import of his words does not affect the facts of history, which demand an explanation in reference to this first assurance that Jehovah is the God of man in a special sense. Whatever may be said as to the truth of prophecy, the prophecy of the truth remains.

B. F. WILSON.

SPARTANBURG, S. C.

¹ *Jerusalem Targum*: "The Lord shall beautify the borders of Japheth, and his sons shall be proselytes and dwell in the tents of Shem."

V. PASTORAL THEOLOGY.

There is an impression somewhat prevalent in these parts that the Presbyterian vehicle is "going slow." There are two possible methods of accelerating its speed: one is to get another horse, the other is to grease the wheels. The first method is, we fear, impracticable; we cannot very well dispense with all our present ministry and get a new set. The plan has been tried in individual cases, but on a large scale we fear it would not work. The other alternative remains: we must lubricate the running gear.

An examination of the catalogues of Union and Columbia Theological Seminaries will disclose this somewhat remarkable fact: There are, in the former institution, five professorships—one of Didactic and Polemic Theology, one of Church History and Polity, and three whose instructions cover the broad field of Exegesis. Columbia Seminary now possesses three professors (the fourth professor having recently met with an accident¹), teaching the same three branches of theological lore. The surprising thing hereby disclosed is, that one feature of theological instruction, second in importance to none of the above, is conspicuous by its absence from the apparatus of these schools of the prophets. We allude to that important topic the name of which stands at the head of this article. [The catalogues and advertisements of both seminaries do say something to the effect that provision will be made for instruction in the department of Pastoral Theology until the chair can be filled. That is, the duties of the missing pastoral theology man are to be saddled on the other professors, and they are expected to work the miracle of rightly attending to their own business and somebody else's too.]

In Union Seminary it does not seem to have yet dawned upon the theological mind that a separate professorship of Pastoral Theology is needed. And in Columbia Seminary Pastoral The-

¹ Written before Dr. Beattie's election as Perkins Professor, which does not alter the point of our criticism, but rather adds keenness to it.

ology is made to play second fiddle, and this manifestly since upon the reorganization of the Seminary the other chairs are filled and Pastoral Theology is deferred to a more convenient season.

And yet it certainly would appear to an ordinary mind quite as important to be taught how to go from house to house in pastoral visitation, to conduct a protracted meeting, to handle judiciously and tenderly the mourner, the inquirer, or the skeptic, as it is to learn how to dig up a Hebrew root, to narrate the personal history of Arius, or to dissect and refute in detail the Arminian dogma of common sufficient grace. These last our students are superabundantly taught to do; of the former, as the catalogues of the seminaries will show, they can learn little or nothing. For our part we are almost tempted to say that we would rather dispense with instruction in the original languages of Scripture, and far rather give up all knowledge of church history, than send out young preachers and pastors who know everything but how to preach and how to do pastoral work. We know whereof we affirm in this matter. We spent two years in one of these beloved institutions, and one year in the other, and were ordinarily diligent in the improvement of our opportunities; and when we left those walls knew as little practically of how to run a church as how to run a steam engine. We knew who was the morning star of the Reformation, and could distinguish carefully between mediate and immediate imputation, but when a young Metfodist woman joined our church and asked for some readable tract upon the doctrines of the Presbyterian Church, we were in a quandary. We feared to lend her our *Turretini Opera*.

But right here let us give our views more fully as to what that professor who does not teach pastoral theology at Union or Columbia Seminary should teach if he ever got a chance. It is barely possible that this article may not secure our election to that vacant professorship in Columbia Seminary, and we have a fear that a new chair will not at once be created in Union Seminary for our special occupancy; so that this may be our only opportunity to give the church the benefit of our views on this neglected subject. The professor who, some time between this and the millennium, will have the privilege of instructing our rising ministry in Pastoral

Theology, ought to do a work for them very different from what the other professors in the seminaries are doing, or should do. The business of those other professors is to teach them *what* to preach, his business to teach them *how* to preach. The professors of theology, exegesis, and ecclesiastical history, *instruct* the seminary student; the professor of Pastoral Theology *trains* him. While every other professor in the institution crams and stuffs him, the professor of Pastoral Theology should exercise him; the others put tools into his hands, he teaches him their use. They teach the physician of souls how to mix his drugs; he teaches him how to prescribe for his patient.

With just enough of theory to give consistency to the future minister's work, the preponderating aim of instruction in this department should be intensely practical. Teach your young preacher to work; make a fisher of men, a soul-winner, a sheep-feeder out of him; these practical objects should be our professor's great aim. He can rely on the brethren occupying the other chairs to make of him a theologian and an exegete.

But, to be more specific, "What sort of a course of instruction would your professor follow?"

We would say in answer, that, of course, he should give thorough instruction in homiletics. The making of a sermon, its delivery, the very important question of extemporaneous or manuscript preaching, the best drill in vocal culture, these and kindred topics should be carefully treated, with exercises appropriate to each. Doubtless "Dabney's Sacred Rhetoric," long time a text-book in Union Seminary, would furnish an excellent basis of instruction upon some of these topics. But special attention should be paid to numerous suggestions upon homiletics dropped by prophets, apostles, and evangelists, in a volume not specifically devoted to that subject, and yet exceedingly rich in suggestions upon it. *Suggestions*, did we say?—we mean positive *directions*; for we consider a preacher as much bound to get the *manner* of his preaching out of Scripture as he is its *matter*. Why did he who has called him to be a pastor and teacher, specifically direct that the preaching should be, "not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but in the words that the Holy Ghost teacheth," if this

and like explicit directions were not to be followed? Our professor, then, should lay especial stress upon the homiletic maxims and models which he finds in the inspired word. If it was said of him whom the common people heard gladly, that "without a parable spake he not unto them," our professor might very properly say to the future ministers of the Word before him, "My young brethren, your sermons can never be good sermons, if sermons at all, unless they contain abundant homely, pointed illustrations." If Peter's sermon upon the day of Pentecost, reported for us by inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and embracing twenty-four verses of the second chapter of Acts, is found to contain twelve verses of direct quotation, and five of exposition of these quotations, our professor might well exhort his pupils to this effect: "The less original matter, and the more scriptural material, plainly expounded and pointedly applied to the people, your sermons contain, the more likely is it that your hearers will be 'pricked to the heart and cry out, men and brethren what must we do?' under your preaching." We should not be surprised if our professor might derive from the same source some light upon that vexed question of manuscript *versus* extemporaneous preaching to which allusion has already been made. It has always seemed to us a little inconsistent that the Presbyterian Church, which sets its face as a flint against the reading of prayers, should tolerate a read sermon.

The basis of objection, as we understand it, to the liturgical form is, that it conflicts with "likewise the Spirit helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought." Can the man be said to know not what to pray for as he ought, and so need the Spirit's aid, who has it all printed before him? And in the same manner how can that man preach entirely in "the words which the Holy Ghost teacheth," when he too has the very words cut and dried on paper before him? It seems to us that the ideal of pulpit manner (not "manners") consonant with both the example and precept of Scripture, is that of him who, having studied his text on his knees, and grouped together in outline Scripture truth and every-day illustration and application around it, goes into his pulpit looking to the Holy Ghost to

“teach him in that same hour what he shall speak.” That very uncertainty as to the verbal success or failure of his effort which makes him cast himself utterly on God; the power to mould the sermon at will to the suggestions of the ever-present Spirit; making unpremeditated application to the case of this or that hearer; seizing on the illustrations of the time and place; shortening this point or enlarging on that one, as the Spirit gives him utterance—all this confers on the extemporaneous sermon a sense at once of freedom and dependence, a flexibility and spiritual power, which the written sermon (unless extemporaneously delivered) cannot by any possibility possess. And this our professor should exhort and teach with all authority. If the beloved reader will pardon a little digression here, we will say that we mean no reflection on such of our older ministry who have habituated themselves to the use of the manuscript. We simply desire that our professor of pastoral theology should enjoin upon the ministry of the future “a more excellent way.” We are heartily in sympathy with that suggestion of the new Directory which expresses decided preference for the extemporaneous over the reading method. By the way, while the new Directory was undergoing that presbyterial scrutiny two years ago which consigned it to the *limbus infantum* (or *limbus patrum*, which is it?) we were not a little amused at hearing a brother beloved, who is joined to his manuscript, make a speech against that feature of the new Directory recommending extemporaneous preaching. The strong point of his argument was that he and other older brethren could not now learn to speak extemporaneously, and this he urged in a most vigorous *extemporaneous* speech!

But to return to our professor’s course of instruction. He would naturally direct the young brethren as to all the usual duties pertaining to the pastoral office, give such hints as he thought best with regard to the visitation of the sick and afflicted, the solemnization of marriage and the burial of the dead. But right along here he would step out of the beaten track and inculcate most earnestly upon them the duty of knowing the spiritual state of each member of their future flock. He would say something like

this: "My dear young brethren, a week before you go to Smyrna, or Thyatira, or any other church to which you may be orderly called, do you prepare a list of questions such as these: 'When and how were you converted?' 'Have you evidence of growth in grace since your conversion, and if so, what?' 'What is your plan of Scripture reading, and do you *study* your Bible as well as read it?' The afternoon of the day after you settle in Thyatira, do you start at the house nearest the parsonage, and, with this list in your hand, securing, if possible, a private interview with each member of the family who is a member of your church, examine them by these questions. Do it with tact, as delicately yet as faithfully as possible; and when you have run this list of questions through your whole congregation, you will find your work among them on a solid basis." In like manner our professor would go out of the beaten track in some other particulars. He would say: "Part of your work, my dear young brethren, is to give direction to that quickening spiritual energy which faithful preaching and house to house visitation is certain to arouse. When you have exhorted your members to work, you must be very sure to point out, and if need be to furnish work for them to do. Hence I will now suggest to you some ways of organizing your members which will greatly facilitate the process of putting them to work." And then the professor will make the young brethren take down in their note-books certain tried and proven plans,¹ such as giving individual members the watch-care of one another, getting each to pledge himself to pray and work for the conversion of some unbelieving friend, helping in the prayer-meeting, and taking personal part in increasing church attendance; and all those numberless ways which the accumulated experience of the most successful pastors has suggested, and by which, through the simple agency of giving them some plain work to do, lifeless church members have been transformed into active, useful ones.

The subject of protracted meetings and other special work for the unconverted would be given a due share in his instructions. Two things we are certain our professor would insist on. One,

¹ See *Methods of Church Work*. By Sylvanus Stall. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1888.

that not one of his students should ever close a sermon to the unconverted without some species of practical proposition, by which an immediate decision for Christ would be pressed upon them. "Draw the net," he would say, "whenever you have let it down, whether you invite them to come with you at once into the session room,¹ or to come forward and give the hand in token of immediate acceptance of Christ,² or appoint an inquiry meeting at which they may be present;³ always give them some practical proposition which brings them face to face with immediate decision." And second, he would lay much stress upon the advisability of special and protracted services, the wisdom of which the Scriptures ought to settle beyond question, even if abundant experience had not demonstrated their utility.

The apostles seem to have made the early history of the Jerusalem church one long protracted meeting, to say nothing of the Old Testament example of three protracted meetings a year—the Feasts of the Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles. (Ex. xxiii. 14–17.) And we would have our professor lay himself out right here. We are firmly of the opinion that while the stated Sabbath and week-day services, year in and year out, are, if properly conducted, sufficient to gather in the children of the church, and to secure that ordinary increase natural to every church which has any life in it; yet for anything like rapid ingathering from the world at large the protracted service is indispensable.

And we would have our professor so drill his students that they could be independent of a "vagrant revivalist" to hold these services for them. Let the coming ministry be instructed to accumulate a stock of discourses suitable for seasons of reaping, as well as for steady years of sowing. Let them be shown how a congregation may be so drilled that when such season comes each man will be able to beat his plow-share into a reap-hook. Let the student when he leaves the seminary have at his fingers' ends the most judicious, sound and sympathetic methods of answering the anguished cry, "what must I do to be saved?" In short, let every one of our rising ministry be able to do the work of an evangelist

¹ The late Dr. Hoyt's method.

² Dr. Guerrant's method.

• ³ D. L. Moody's method.

for and with his own people, being thoroughly instructed in the common sense and Scriptural methods which the best evangelistic work of former and present times has suggested and proven.

To our country congregations, with preaching only one or two Sundays a month, (which comprise the bulk of our churches, the ratio to city churches in the Synod of South Carolina, for example, being four to one,) the protracted meeting is a necessity to their onward progress, and woe be unto them if a pastor settled over them has not learnt somewhere and somehow to wield effectively the evangelistic arm of his ministry.

Nor is it simply needful that our professor should train the seminary student in the methods of evangelistic work, but it would be well for him to drop a few hints as to how that "disastrous reaction" supposed to follow even genuine revivals is to be avoided. With regard to that reaction we want to say a word. We have observed the same "disastrous reaction" in business affairs after the cotton season in southern cities. We have heard every year in warehouses and offices the cry of "Dull! Dull!" from February to September; and yet, strange to say, that disastrous reaction does not deter these same cotton-men from going into another cotton season as soon as the Fall rolls round. And we have thought that just as foolish is it for a church to lazily hang back from seasons of special effort, because in religious work, as in everything else human, there is an ebb as well as a flow of the tide. But when such a revival goes along with efforts of the pastor and his people, rather than is timed by the arrival and departure of an imported revivalist, we do not see why there should be any reaction, anything more than the settling back from *special* to *steady* work. We know from experience that there is not. The most interesting time in our church experience is after the revival, when we and our older members are "breaking in" a lot of new members to the steady routine. To us the joy of seeing the soul putting forth the activities of the new life is second only to the joy of witnessing its first entrance into the kingdom. And in our church it is a popular belief that the seraphs tune their harps anew when they behold the prodigal, now at home in his Father's house, begin to lift his voice in public prayer or leave the pater-

nal roof only to go out into the highways and hedges and compel other prodigals to come in. And so back to our professor again, he should say to his students: "Brethren, when God has given you a revival—and he will continually grant them, if in faith and prayer you put in operation these methods of revival work—see to it that you give a place in the ranks of the workers to every man, woman and child thus added to your numbers; and God will grant your church not only steady increase, but fresh, young life continually; and the raw recruit and the aged veteran will stand shoulder to shoulder in ranks which have all the steadiness of age, with the vigor and onward rush of youth."

One thing more about our professor, and then he retires into obscurity. How is he going to spend his vacations? Well, the poor fellow has a notion that the best exercise and recreation under the sun is preaching the glorious gospel of the blessed God, and so every summer, taking with him a band of students whom example as well as precept will not hurt, he and they are going into the mountains of West Virginia and North Carolina, or the sand hills of South Carolina and Georgia, and they are going to "stump" that entire region in a better cause than ever politician advocated. And it may be that while he and those students hold a good Presbyterian camp-meeting in some region where people do not hear the gospel often enough to get tired of it, he may take up a collection or two that will give those struggling "theologues" no small lift through the financial straits of another seminary year. It is true that our professor is going to be cut off prematurely and die of *angina pectoris*, like Daniel Baker, at the age of sixty-two, or Guthrie, at the age of seventy. But if permitted to do until that age one-half of the work suggested to him in these pages, his life in our southern Zion will not have been in vain. Here we part from him, however, and may a blessing attend his labors whenever that good day shall come that he, or some one after his likeness, shall take his place in one of our seats of theological learning.

We close, as we began, expressing our firm conviction that the one thing the Southern Presbyterian machine needs just now is *greasing*. We do not need a new team; it is our candid belief

that we have as able, sound and devoted a ministry (*quorum pars fui!*) as any church need possess. It is not a new body, wheels, axle or tongue that we want—our doctrine and polity are *jure divino*; and for this we would most earnestly contend. But we do sadly need grease on the running gear—the practical adaptation by our ministry of our faith and government to the masses of mankind. And we need this nowhere so much as on the fifth wheel, our theological seminaries, where, by the present constitution of our two leading institutions, the whole subject of practical adaptation, sometimes called Pastoral Theology, is left almost out of sight.

The stream does not usually rise higher than the fountain. And let a ministry receive their training at theological institutions where they are taught principally what to preach, but not how to preach it, how to study books, but not how to reach and mould mankind, and you will see in the church to which they minister the unique spectacle that our beloved church presents—a church first for orthodoxy, first for learned ministers and well-instructed congregations, and yet far behind in the grand race of bringing the world to Christ.

ROBT. A. LAPSLEY.

VI. THE DISCOVERY OF PITHOM.

“And they built for Pharaoh treasure cities, Pithom and Raamses.”—Exodus i. 11.

THE Egypt Exploration Fund was established in England in 1883. The chief promoters of the enterprise were Mr. Reginald Stuart Poole, Keeper of Coins in the British Museum, and Miss Amelia B. Edwards, Ph. D., LL. D., whose recent work as an archæologist has eclipsed even her most brilliant exploits in the field of fiction. In the Prospectus it was stated that the object of the Society was “to conduct excavations in Egypt, especially on sites of biblical and classical interest.” No organization for archæological research ever vindicated more quickly and completely its right to exist. It achieved immediate and indisputable success, for in the very first expedition, and after less than a week’s work, the great discovery was made which constitutes the special subject of this paper. Since that time the ruins of Zoan, Goshen, Naukratis, Bubastis, Tahpanes, and other sites have been thoroughly explored; a number of priceless additions have been made to the Egyptian Museum at Boolak; five quarto volumes, giving accounts of all these discoveries, have been published, besides many minor contributions to various learned journals; a new interest in Egyptology has been awakened in Europe, and the Fund has secured an active representative in America, the Rev. W. C. Winslow, D. D., LL. D., 525 Beacon street, Boston, Mass., Vice-president and Honorary Treasurer. All donors or subscribers of not less than \$5.00 are entitled to the annual illustrated volume, containing descriptions, reports, and lectures. The previous volumes also can be procured at \$5.00 each. But, while all these publications are of the greatest interest to classical students, the most interesting and important to biblical scholars is “The Store City of Pithom,”¹ not only because that is the record of the first, the most startling, and

¹ “*The Store City of Pithom and the Route of the Exodus.*” By Edouard Naville. With thirteen plates and two maps. Third edition. London. Messrs. Trubner & Co., 57 and 59 Ludgate Hill, E. C. 1888.

the most revolutionary discovery ever made under the auspices of this Fund, but also because it is the one most intimately connected with the inspired narrative, and therefore the one most valuable to the scriptural apologist and exegete.

THE LAND OF GOSHEN.

In the Eastern Delta of the Nile, about fifty miles northeast of Cairo, there is a valley called Wadi Toomilat, which extends from Zagazig, on the Nile, to Ismailiah, on the Suez canal. It is not improbable that at some very remote period in the past a branch of the Nile flowed through this valley and emptied into the Red Sea; for, as we shall presently see, the opinion is rapidly gaining ground that even within historic times the Red Sea extended as far north as Lake Timsah; and the same causes which determined the southward recession of the head of the Red Sea may also have choked up this ancient mouth of the Nile and eventually closed the natural waterway through Wadi Toomilat.¹ But, however this may have been, it is certain that before the building of Pithom by the Israelites the Pharaohs had cut a canal through the valley, and doubtless it was the abundance of fresh water thus introduced that made this region "the best of the land" in the time of Joseph (Gen. xlvii. 6, 11). Like the rest of Egypt, it was "the gift of the Nile," without whose fertilizing waters it would be desert. Traces of the old Pharaohnic canal which served this beneficent purpose are still found, as well as portions of the later channel which irrigated the Wadi before the digging of the present Ismailiah Canal in 1860. The railroad from Cairo to Suez also runs through Wadi Toomilat, and at one of the stations near the western end of the valley was fought in 1882 the battle of Tell-el-Keber with Arabi Pasha. Here, where the railroad and the canal are but a few feet apart, was moored in the following year (1883) an Egyptian *dahabiyeh*, or house-boat, for the accommodation of tourists who wished to visit the battlefield. The boat was owned by Thos. Cook & Sons, the well-known tourist agents. Twenty miles east of this point, at a station called

¹ M. de Lesseps states that even now, when the river is high, the waters of the Nile occasionally find their way through the entire length of this depression.

Rameses,¹ was moored another *dahabiyeh*, also belonging to Messrs. Cook, but generously lent by them to a scholar laboring in the interests of archæological science; for it was in a hill just across the canal from Rameses and the railroad that Mons. Edouard Naville, the distinguished Swiss Egyptologist, was then digging for the monuments and inscriptions which were destined to identify Pithom and solve many of the problems that had long perplexed students of the Oppression and Exodus of Israel.²

THE SITE OF PITHOM.

This hill, which lies twelve miles west of Ismailiah on the southern side of the canal, is called by the Arabs *Tell-el-Maskhoota*,

¹ So called, because erroneously supposed to be the site of the "Raamses" mentioned in Ex. i. 11. It will be shown below that this is a misnomer.

² A striking testimony to the eminence of Dr. Naville in this department of learning is the fact that at the Congress of Orientalists held in London in 1884 he was appointed to make a critical collation of the best copies of the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*. The manner in which he discharged this tremendous task has placed all Egyptologists under lasting obligations to him. He visited Dublin, London, Paris, Marseilles, Leyden, Rome, Florence, Naples, Berlin, Cairo, and other places; collated nearly a hundred hieroglyphic papyri; collected thousands of variant readings; recovered twenty-one chapters that were before unknown or inaccessible; reproduced, with the utmost accuracy, the vignettes on the different papyri; and in 1886 published the results to the world in his monumental book *Das Ägyptische Todtenbuch der XVIII. BIS. XX. Dynastie*. This scholar had in 1881 visited and reported upon the ruins of Tanis, as we learn from Miss A. B. Edwards's interesting article in *Harper's Magazine* for October, 1886, entitled, "The Story of Tanis." Miss Edwards adds a bit of information about the discovery of Pithom which is not given in the official memoir: "Though not yet a regularly organized society, there existed at the time a little English coterie, the members of which were anxious to promote the progress of discovery in Egypt. Upon these persons M. Naville's picturesque narrative made so lively an impression that when 'The Egypt Exploration Fund' became an accomplished fact they hastened to invite him to make Tanis the scene of the young society's first venture. M. Naville accepted that invitation, and went out accordingly. Arrived in Egypt, however, and having but a few weeks at his disposal, he came to the conclusion that his time was too short for the commencement of any very large undertaking. He therefore decided in favor of the Wadi Toomilat; excavated the much-disputed mound of Maskhoota; and, by discovering the long-sought "treasure city" of Pithom, achieved the most brilliant biblical identification of modern times. It is not generally known, however, that M. Naville, when he started for Egypt in 1883, was actually bound for Tanis, and that but for his unexpected change of plan Pithom might have remained undiscovered to this day."

i. e., "the mound of the statue." It took this name from a monolith of red granite which was found on the spot by the engineers of Napoleon Bonaparte, near the close of the last century, and which represents Rameses II. seated between two solar gods, Ra and Tum. From his central position among the divinities, Lepsius was led to regard Rameses as the tutelary god to whom the city was consecrated, and for whom it was probably named. That is, he identified Tell-el-Maskhoota with the treasure city of "Raamses," built by the children of Israel. This theory was generally adopted by Egyptologists,¹ and seemed to be confirmed by the later discovery on the same site of several other monuments, all belonging to the reign of Rameses II.² Hence the application of the name of Rameses to the station already described, on the opposite side of the canal. But, as a matter of fact, all these monuments are shown by the inscriptions upon them to have been dedicated to the god Tum. Now *Pi-Tum* would mean *the abode of Tum*, and would be the Egyptian equivalent of *Pithom*.³ Therefore M. Naville concluded that Tell-el-Maskhoota was the site, not of Raamses, but of *Pithom, the city or the abode of Tum*. The results of the excavations have shown that he was right, and that Lepsius and his followers were wrong.

THE EXCAVATION OF THE RUINS.

He began operations on the 5th of February, 1883, assisted by the eminent French engineer, M. Jaillon, and a gang of about one hundred workmen. Parts of an enormously thick wall, built of very large bricks, stood out here and there from amid the sand. The whole of this wall was laid bare, and it was then seen to be the enclosure of a square area about ten acres in extent.⁴ *The en-*

¹ Brugsch, however, placed Rameses at Zoan, and Chabas placed it at Pelusium.

² These monuments were removed to Ismailiah, where they now stand in one of the public squares.

³ Furthermore, the Hebrew פִּתּוֹם and the Egyptian *Pi-Tum* would be exactly rendered by the Greek *Πάτουμος*, the name applied by Herodotus to a city which he places on the ancient canal between the Nile and the Red Sea.

⁴ This enclosed area was simply the nucleus of the city, and was probably the part specially dedicated to Tum, and therefore the only part called *Pi-Tum* or *Pithom* (the residence of Tum), as it was here that M. Naville discovered the tem-

closing wall itself was twenty-two feet thick, and about six hundred and fifty feet long each way. The space within is occupied for the most part by strange rectangular chambers of various sizes, separated from each other by brick partitions from eight to ten feet thick. Some of the bricks in these dividing walls are made with straw, some with stubble, and some without either, and they are laid in mortar.¹

There is no communication between these chambers. They have neither doors nor windows. About ten feet from the ground a recess or ledge runs round each room, and just below this are holes at corresponding distances on each side, apparently designed to support beams. And, in fact, pieces of timber were found still sticking in them. Moreover, the walls above this ledge show traces of plaster, while below they are plain. Evidently, therefore, the buildings had originally two stories, and the ground floor was accessible only from above. It is plain that these doorless and windowless rooms, effectually separated by their solid ten foot walls, could never have been used as residences. For what then were they used? The Genevan explorer answers without hesitation that they were storechambers. Here, in this fortified border city, were gathered the grain and other provisions necessary for armies and caravans about to cross the desert. It is not improbable that in the days of the Ptolemies they were used as warehouses for various kinds of merchandise. Dr. Lansing's view that they were simply immense substructions upon which the buildings of the city proper were erected, lacks confirmation. But, even if it could be established, it would not invalidate the identification of the place as Pithom. The word *מִסְכָּנֹת*, in Exodus i. 11, is obscure; but the identification of Pithom is certain, as we shall see

ple bearing his name and erected for his worship. Around this fortified and sacred enclosure on all sides stretched the civil city called *Thuku* (Succoth), traces of its buildings having been discovered in every direction.

¹ Before M. Naville's excavations, and while many were still trying to establish the identity of Tell-el-Maskhoota with "Raameses," Dr. Schweinfurth "went there to find straw in the bricks, and because he found none (there *is* none in the enclosing wall), he decided it could not have been built by the Israelites, since they had been expressly commanded to find straw. Nevertheless it was built by the Israelites, and there is plenty of straw in the interior walls."

farther on, whether the words עָרֵי מְסֻבֹּת mean "treasure cities" (A. V.), or "store cities" (R. V.), or "fortified cities" (LXX.), or "residence cities" (Vulgate and Lansing), or "temple cities" (Brugsch).

Besides these store-chambers, which occupied the greater part of the enclosed area, M. Naville unearthed in the southwest corner a ruined temple, having its own wall of enclosure, separating it from the rest of the buildings, and marking the limits within which were found all the monuments except one statue that had been thrown into an adjoining store-chamber. These statues, pillars, and tablets bear the names of Rameses II. (XIX. Dynasty), Shishak, Osorkon II., Takeloth (XXII. Dynasty), Nectanebo I. (XXX. Dynasty), and Ptolemy Philadelphus, and therefore cover a period of about eleven hundred and fifty years (from Rameses II. 1400 B. C. to Ptolemy II. 250 B. C.).

In addition to these Egyptian remains inscribed with hieroglyphics, a Roman milestone and two other stones were brought to light, one bearing a brief Græco-Latin inscription, and one having the single Greek word *Ἦρον*, making thirteen inscriptions in all.

WHAT THE INSCRIPTIONS PROVE.

I. *That Pithom was situated at Tell-el-Maskhoota.*

Several biblical sites in Egypt had been identified by the survival of their ancient names, but this etymological argument is notoriously unsafe, and none of these identifications had ever been confirmed by monumental evidence. But that of Pithom is put beyond question by explicit statements inscribed upon monuments which were discovered on the spot. We stated above that M. Naville's preliminary study of the monuments which had been taken from Tell-el-Maskhoota to Ismailiah led him to expect that the city he was about to exhume was not Raamses but Pithom, because the inscriptions upon them showed that they had been dedicated to the god Tum. But the name of *Pi-Tum* itself is not found on the monuments at Ismailiah. On those which Naville uncovered, however, it occurs in full no less than five times, thrice on the statue of the Lieutenant of Osorkon II. (B. C. 866), who is called "the good recorder of Pithom," and twice on the great

tablet of Ptolemy Philadelphus (B. C. 247), while the name *Tum* in other combinations occurs constantly.¹ Especially frequent are the references to "Tum the great living god of Succoth." The identification then is absolute. No proof can be stronger than that afforded by contemporary records engraved on stone and discovered *in situ*.

If it were not superfluous to fortify Gibraltar, two additional lines of proof might be presented, drawn from two other names of this famous city. One of these names is *Succoth*.² In the inscriptions this word is accompanied by a determinative which shows that it is the name of a border land, inhabited by people of a foreign race. It is also designated as a city. Now we know from contemporary papyri that Succoth was first a district, and that the name was then given to the chief city of the district. And as a matter of fact, in the official lists the capital of the eighth nome of Lower Egypt is called both Pithom and Succoth. That an Egyptian city should have two names is nothing uncommon. Just as Egyptian kings had a proper name and a throne name, so Egyptian cities often had a sacred name and a civil name. The temple name of this city was Pithom. Its civil name was Succoth. Now the Egyptians speak of Succoth as being "at the entrance of the East," an exact description of the position of Tell-Maskhoota and Pithom, as will be more fully shown below.

Pithom had still another name, though at a later period. One of the Roman inscriptions mentioned above is a double one, the first two lines showing the Græco-Latin words *Epo Polis*, and the last two showing the Latin words *Ero Castra*, the camp of Ero. The other Roman inscription, which is much longer, states that the distance from Ero to Clysma is nine miles. There was found also a small fragment with the Greek word *ΗΡΟΙΣ*. Is Pithom, then, also Heroöpolis? Let us see. In Gen. xvi. 28, we read that Jacob "sent Judah before him unto Joseph, to direct his face unto Goshen." Now the Septuagint Version, which was made in Egypt, has here instead of Goshen, "near *Heroöpolis* in the land of Ram-

¹ I have myself counted twenty-four occurrences of it.

² The Egyptian word is *Thuku-t*, the Hebrew transcription of which is תִּבְכֹּת.
Cf. Σεβέννυτος, Sebennytus, from *Theb neter*.

eses;" and the Coptic Version, which was translated from the Septuagint for the use of Egyptians, has: "near *Pithom*, the city in the land of Rameses." The identification of Heroöpolis with the store city of Pithom is further confirmed by a hieroglyphic inscription which calls a certain priest *Mer Ar*, that is, *the keeper of the storehouse*; for this word *Ar*, meaning *storehouse*, and transliterated by the Greek *HP*, is the first half of the word Heroöpolis, which therefore means *storehouse city*.

II. *That Rameses II. was the Pharaoh of the Oppression.*

On the 6th of July, 1881, in a subterranean tomb opposite Thebes, Herr Emil Brugsch, Keeper of the Boolak Museum, discovered the mummied remains of a great number of the most illustrious kings and queens of Egypt. These mummies were all removed to the museum at Boolak, and there the tourist may to-day look upon the faces of the mightiest monarchs of antiquity. The most interesting member of this august and solemn company is Rameses the Great, the *grand monarch* of the Egyptians, the Sesostris of Greek legend, the mighty builder whose works are more numerous than those of all the Pharaohs for two thousand years. That this man was the Oppressor of Israel nearly all Egyptologists have for some time believed. And the extraordinary length of his reign, the character of his government, the condition of the country, the multitude of his monuments, the enormous number of laborers necessary for the erection of his public works, as well as the considerations drawn from the identification of his son Menephta as the Pharaoh of the Exodus, have indeed made this view strongly probable; but not until M. Naville's discovery had it ever been established beyond question. What all these other facts could only render probable, the inscribed monuments of Pithom prove. These monuments show that Rameses II. was the founder of the city, for his are the earliest of all the inscriptions. But we know from Ex. i. 11, that it was the Pharaoh of the Oppression for whom Israel built Pithom. Therefore Rameses II. was the Pharaoh of the Oppression.

No one can fail to be impressed by the strange providence which has thus brought to light almost simultaneously the imperishable flesh of Israel's Oppressor and the very city built by his

groaning captives. Buried for ages, the one in his rock-hewn sepulchre, the other in its own rubbish, these remains of the ancient enemy of God's people are now disinterred to confound the modern enemies of his church and to vindicate the historical accuracy of his word. The pride of modern rationalism, like the pride of ancient Egypt, shall doubtless perish, except, perhaps, some dark relics, which in coming days shall mock the very pomp they were designed to commemorate and bear unwilling testimony to the immovable truth of the Word of God. "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee."

III. *That the route of the Exodus lay through Wadi Toomilat.*

Until the discovery of Pithom-Succoth not a single station of that memorable itinerary from Goshen to Sinai was positively known. Dr. Heinrich Brugsch, who is probably the highest living authority on the geography of Egypt, has recently (1874) endeavored, with a great waste of learning and ingenuity, to establish the wild theory that the Israelites started from Zoan, which he identifies with Rameses, marched along the direct and northernmost road to Palestine, and, instead of passing through the Red Sea, as commonly supposed, merely crossed a tide-swept sand bank between Lake Serbonis and the Mediterranean Sea, and then turned southward to the Sinaitic Peninsula. In Ex. xii. 37, it is said that "the children of Israel journeyed from Rameses to Succoth," and in Ex. xiii. 20, that "they took their journey from Succoth, and encamped in Etham, in the edge of the wilderness." Now the natural interpretation of these statements is that it was one day's march from Rameses to Succoth and one day's march from Succoth to Etham. If so, Dr. Brugsch's identification of Zoan as Rameses falls to the ground, for it is too far from Succoth for a single day's march. But, in any case, Brugsch's theory goes to pieces, because we now know where Succoth is, and therefore we know that Israel did not take the northern route, but on the contrary, passed through Wadi Toomilat.

Where Rameses, the other store city, was, we do not yet know. Naville believes he has found it in the ruins of Saft-el-Henneh, near the western entrance of the Wadi, in the very centre of the Land of Goshen proper; but while it is certain that Rameses was

in Wadi Toomilat, and in the western end too, his identification still lacks the conclusive support of monumental evidence. Etham he would identify with the region lying north and east of Lake Timsah. This is the very land which the papyri call *Atma*, and the determinative used indicates that it was a border land, so that both in name and location it answers to "*Etham in the edge of the wilderness.*"

Conjectural identifications of Pihahiroth, Migdol, and Baal Zephon also are suggested by M. Naville, but we shall not enlarge upon these, as his philological arguments, while ingenious and enticing, are not confirmed by hieroglyphic records.

IV. *That the Red Sea extended much farther north when Israel crossed it than it does now.*

Herodotus, speaking of the canal through Wadi Toomilat constructed by Necho and Darius, says: "The water is derived from the Nile, a little above Bubastis, and *it runs into the Red Sea near Patumos, the Arabian city.*" Patumos, as we have seen, is Pithom. Therefore Pithom was once "near" the Red Sea. Moreover, Strabo says that Heroöpolis was near the end of the Arabian Gulf; hence it is called also the Heroöpolitan Gulf. But we now know Heroöpolis to be simply another name for Pithom. It is incredible that the city should have given its name to the gulf if the gulf had been as distant as the Gulf of Suez now is from the site of Heroöpolis.

Again, the Roman milestone discovered at Pithom states twice, once in Latin and once in Greek, that the distance from Ero to Clysma is nine miles. Now, St. Epiphanius and Philostorgos both say that Clysma was at the head of one of the gulfs of the Red Sea; but the head of the nearest gulf of the Red Sea *now* is fifty miles from Pithom.

From all this it is evident that the Red Sea once extended far to the north of its present limits, and included the Bitter Lakes and even Lake Timsah. The objection to this view, so ably urged by President Bartlett and Dr. Trumbull, that the rock barrier of Chalooof is a tertiary formation, and therefore the sea could never have extended beyond it in historic times, cannot be regarded as conclusive so long as it fails to convince such eminent authorities

in geological science as Sir J. W. Dawson and Prof. Edward Hull, to say nothing of Count de Lesseps, who cut the canal through Chaloof. In 1883-'84 Principal Dawson made a careful examination of the country in person, and on his return to England published an interesting volume entitled, "Egypt and Syria," in which he says: "There are some geological reasons for the belief that there has been in modern times a slight elevation of the isthmus on the south side, and probably a slight depression on the north side. It seems also certain that in the time of Moses a large volume of Nile water was during the inundation sent eastward toward the Red Sea. There is, therefore, nothing unreasonable in supposing that, as assumed in this chapter, the Bitter Lakes, at the time of the Exodus, constituted an extension of the sea. Further, such an extension would be subject to considerable fluctuations of level, occasioned by the wind and tides. These now occur towards the head of the sea. Near Suez I passed over large surfaces of desert, which I was told were inundated on occasion of high tides and easterly winds, and at levels which the sea now fails to reach there are sands holding recent marine shells in such a state of preservation that not many centuries may have elapsed since they were in the bottom of the sea." To this he adds the following foot-note: "M. Mauriac, as quoted by Dr. Bartlett and Dr. Clay Trumbull, seems to think that the fact that the slight elevation at Chaloof near Suez is of tertiary rock, effectually precludes the idea of its having been under the Red Sea in modern times. But of course such an argument can have no geological weight, since there is no conceivable reason why these, any more than other rocks, should not have participated in the slight and probably gradual elevation which the head of the Red Sea has experienced, and which has apparently continued into historic times. These gentlemen have, no doubt, been misled by their inability to distinguish between the phenomena of elevation and those of erosion."

Further, if in the time of Moses Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes constituted a northward extension of the Red Sea, it follows that the usual theory as to the place of Israel's crossing is wrong. That theory puts the crossing at the present head of the gulf, near Suez, where there are shallow fords which, it is claimed, could

have been laid bare by the natural agency employed on that occasion, viz., a strong and steady east wind, leaving in the depressions on either side deeper water to serve as a wall of defence to their flanks. But the same things are true, and even more emphatically true of the narrow and shallow part of the sea which lay between the basins of Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes. No reason can be imagined why they should have gone farther south to cross the sea, and there were very cogent reasons for their not doing so. For instance, the district about Suez which they would have reached by such a southward march west of the sea has always been destitute of water. Moreover, the sacred narrative implies that they covered the distance between Etham and the crossing place in a single march, which would have been impossible had the crossing been at Suez. Again, it is stated in Ex. xv. 22, that after crossing the Red Sea Israel "went three days in the wilderness and found no water." But if they crossed near Suez they would have found water at once, for the wells of Moses are just opposite Suez, and only two miles from the shore of the sea; whereas, if they crossed between Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes they would have been just about three days journey from these wells. Therefore we think Dawson is right in identifying Marah with the wells of Moses.

Another point in confirmation of this view seems to have been overlooked by all who have written on the subject. If Marah was not at Ayun Musa it must have been at Ain Huwarah, as travellers and scholars since Burekhardt have generally agreed. The conclusive objection to this is that Ain Huwarah is only two hours distant from the fertile and beautiful valley of Gharandel where nearly all students of the route place Elim. It is impossible to believe that Moses, thoroughly acquainted as he must have been with the Peninsula, did not know that two hours farther on there was abundance of sweet water as well as all other requisites for a comfortable camp. But if Marah was at Ayun Musa, as we contend, there was good reason for his desperation, since the next place where any water could be found (Huwarah) was more than thirty miles distant. Thus all the conditions of the narrative are fulfilled and all the stations fall into place at natural intervals; *e. g.*,

Num. xxxiii. 7-8, "They departed from before Pihahiroth, and passed through the midst of the sea [at a point between the present Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes] into the wilderness, and went three days journey in the wilderness of Etham, and pitched in Marah [Ayun Musa]. And they removed from Marah, and came to Elim [Wadi Gharandel]."

There are three places, one in the Land of Bondage, one in the Land of Training, and one in the Land of Promise, an exact knowledge of which is essential to any satisfactory reconstruction of the route of the Exodus. The position of every one of these points has been determined within the last two decades. In 1869 the British Ordnance Survey settled forever the exact location of Mt. Sinai and the scene of the Law Giving. In 1881 Dr. Trumbull, by his re-discovery of Rowlands's Kadesh, settled with equal decisiveness the location of that famous landmark which was the headquarters and rendezvous of Israel during the thirty-eight years' wandering. In 1883 M. Naville dissipated all doubt as to the situation of Succoth. So that our immediate generation enjoys the honor of having recovered by scientific exploration the three great angles of the Exode, Succoth, the starting point, Sinai, the scene of the promulgation of the Law and the establishment of the Covenant, and Kadesh, the first objective point in Canaan and Israel's rallying centre for a whole generation. Such are some of the recent gains to the department of Biblical Geography for which the world is indebted to the enterprise, the learning and the liberality either of individual scholars, like Dr. Trumbull, or of enlightened organizations, like the Egypt Exploration Fund.

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VII. NOTES.

THE PRESBYTERIAN PASTORATE.

THE influence of the pastorate in the Presbyterian Church is eminent. The emphasis and honor placed upon the relation constitute it a decided if not a distinctive feature of the Presbyterian polity. True there has always been provision in our standards, and ample need in our work, for the other offices of the ministry; but for a long period of time the pastorate has seemed the only practical relation contemplated by Presbyterianism between preacher and people. Indeed, the Form of Government by which our church has been shaped and its policy directed makes mention of no other ordinary and perpetual officer in the ministry; while devoting a whole chapter to bishops or pastors, it refers only incidentally to the evangelist at the conclusion of a long chapter on the election and ordination of bishops or pastors; and though our Revised Book of Church Order shows decided advance in this direction, there is yet wanting that full recognition and regulation of the evangelistic office and work which their growing importance and increasing need imperatively demand.

Such emphasis in the progress of the years has developed the pastorate in Presbyterianism to an extent unknown in any other branch of the great ecclesiastical family. Through this long course of special development we are prepared to appreciate at once the elements of its strength and the elements of its weakness. The former have long been recognized and justly valued. There is undoubtedly a range of influence and a leverage of power afforded by a long and successful pastorate that is not at all overdrawn in the amiable Cowper's classic picture. But even a virtue, if exaggerated, may sometimes trench hard upon the borders of a vice; and so we believe a conviction is growing in our church that we have perhaps unduly emphasized the pastorate. Study and observation have suggested the suspicion that there are elements of weakness also in our application of the pastorate.

The present writer's attention was directed incidentally to the matter several years ago by a study of the Acts of the Apostles. We were struck with the absence from apostolic usage of precedent for our practice. If there is in the New Testament any special warrant,

either expressly set down or by good and necessary consequence deduced therefrom, for the confinement under specific contract of one minister exclusively to one charge for a term of years, definite or indefinite, we failed to find it. Our theory is a development under the wisdom of experience, and derives its authority from expediency. It may be providential, but it cannot claim to be scriptural. Of course this, if true, does not condemn the theory. We believe in the indwelling and guidance of the Holy Ghost; and under his blessed and precious ministry the church may have been led into the large wisdom of unfolding growth; but while it does not condemn the theory, it nevertheless leaves the matter distinctly open, under the varying development of succeeding years, and the yet larger wisdom of still wider experience, to such modification as the exigencies of growth may suggest.

The pastorate we believe to be the ideal of established conservative work. For the thorough culture, the systematic and comprehensive development of a congregation, already strong enough to be self-sustaining, it is easily and far superior to any other arrangement yet known; but its very virtues in this direction unfit it for other and equally important work; its excellencies here become defects there. Because of its very fitness for conservative work, it must necessarily fail as an instrumentality for propagandism; its strength in one becomes its weakness in the other. Believing this, we are therefore shut up to the conviction that our policy, in its undue emphasis of this relation, has stood decidedly in the way of our aggressiveness.

1. In the outset we said that the pastorate seems for a long time to have been practically the only relation contemplated by Presbyterianism between preacher and people. We add here, that to this day it remains the only relation recognized in our standards between a preacher and a congregation. And how does our custom accord with our creed?

The last Assembly Minutes furnish the following figures: Leaving out of count the vacant charges and the Foreign Missionary Presbytery of Indian, we have seventeen hundred organized churches supplied with regular preaching, and of these, nine hundred and twelve are without pastors; *i. e.*, over half of such churches as maintain the stated means of grace do so irregularly, that is to say, in a way not recognized in our constitution. But this falls short of the true state of the case; for when we apply the more comprehensive measure of the whole roll—the only just test—we find that our theory, after the trial of a hundred years, seems to suit the circumstances of only seven hun-

dred and eighty-eight churches out of two thousand two hundred and sixty-two, *i. e.*, in practical application, the constitution *works* in about one-third of the churches under our care! This fact is significant; we take it to be in itself a demonstration that our policy is not broad enough for our work. It suits admirably the strong churches, but proves plainly impracticable in the weak ones. Our theory is not sufficiently elastic for our life; when we put the new wine of a growing work into this skin the result is seven hundred and eighty-eight whole bottles and fourteen hundred and seventy-four broken ones.

2. Even in those instances to which it is applicable, we fear it fails in the wise distribution and economical administration of our strength.

There is in the *application* of our theory no practical provision for the interests of the general cause. Pastorates are instituted at the instance of a congregation and pastor-elect, with often very limited acquaintance and inadequate knowledge each of the other. There is in the arrangement no adjustment of conflicting claims and competitive needs. The only interests entering into consideration are those of the preacher called and the congregation calling. If these are mutually satisfied the pastorate is formed, though, in the opinion of the Presbytery, there may be a half-dozen fields to which the pastor-elect is better suited, a half-dozen preachers who would better suit the field, and possibly a dozen places, in any one of which the pastor-elect would be far more serviceable to the general cause of Presbyterianism. Moreover, if this silent conviction of the Presbytery should be justified by the event, and in the wedding pastor and field prove mismated, it is exceedingly difficult to correct the error; divisions and alienations result, factions and cliques arise, great and often lasting damage ensues.

This twofold danger of damage calls for some balance-wheel to congregational machinery in one direction, and in the other some representation, real and practical, of the work at large; a voice of authority that, in answer to the Macedonian cry ascending from promising mission points and struggling churches, shall say to the minister, Go, and he goeth; and to the licentiate, Do this, and he doeth it.

3. Another result of our system is that the pastor belongs to a *church* rather than to *the church*, to a particular congregation rather than to the cause at large. His installation vows take precedence over those of his ordination; he is ordained to the work of the ministry; he is installed over one congregation; his gifts however diversified, his ability however great, his influence however commanding, are all absorbed by that one field. His sympathies and his interests are in

creasingly narrowed to its bounds. His people are likely to be impatient of any disposition on his part to answer the calls of his brethren or to meet the demands of destitution in the region around. With some honorable exceptions, congregations are jealous of their ministers' labors, and when this is the case, a pastor, knowing that he is under contract with the people, is slow to deprive them of what he and they consider their rights under the call. We have known the evangelistic spirit in a pastor to work serious discontent in his congregation. Some ministers, whose hearts are in the Home Mission work, find it a difficult and delicate business to fill even the missionary appointments assigned them by the Presbytery. The congregation believes that the pastor belongs to them. They have contracted for his time, and feel that they have a right to it, and to all of it. Now, it is notorious that our pastors generally do much less mission work than they might do, and we suspect it is due largely to this feeling. Congregations and pastors need the more catholic spirit that will grow out of a feeling that they *all* belong to Christ, and that their service is due whenever and wherever the interests of his cause are to be promoted. Were this duty and privilege recognized as such, our aggressive work would receive an immediate and wonderful impulse.

4. We incline to the opinion that the influence of our pastorate develops another difficulty in aggressiveness.

Every observer is aware of the slowness of Presbyterian congregations to colonize, and many are familiar with the friction incident to the effort. A large, strong, influential church ripe for branching, with the growth of the city inviting this policy, resolutely resists it. The formation of a second church is generally an unwelcome project and one which results in a rent oftener than in a harmonious division for the good of the general cause. The mother, instead of lovingly "setting up" a daughter in ecclesiastical house-keeping, peremptorily forbids the bans; and if, encouraged by all the friends of both parties, the daughter persists, the result is long alienation, and the mother becomes friendly and opens her door and her heart only when the daughter has at last struggled through a protracted period of *res angustæ domi* into such a condition as no longer to need maternal countenance and support.

Our tendency is to concentrate on the congregation as the unit, with the pastor as its visible head and coherent force or bond of union. Under a successful pastorate this unity intensifies, and as the prestige and power of the congregation increase, so increases its *esprit de corps*,

until the disposition is to magnify it even to a forgetfulness of the interests of the general cause, so that these interests are not seldom sacrificed to the importance of the individual congregation.

We believe this to be the case with Presbyterians more frequently than with any other denomination; they seem more reluctant to colonize than any other church, and we think that in the majority of instances the root of reluctance is grounded in the influence of the pastoral relation. It is this that makes the sundering so serious.

Another illustration of this spirit is afforded by the many instances of Presbyterians now standing aloof from practical church connection and active Christian work because of disinclination to remove their membership from some cherished church. This is an amiable, but decided weakness, and we do not hear of it in any other church to the extent to which it obtains in ours. This *local* attachment, so distinctive of the Presbyterian Church, we think, in its last analysis, may be traced to our undue emphasis of the pastoral relation.

Such are some of the difficulties and defects which have gradually grown out of the long dominance of our policy. But what of the remedy? This, we believe, is not far to seek nor difficult to apply.

The thoughtful reader cannot have failed to notice in most of these difficulties a constant feature; common to nearly every instance, constituting its element of weakness, there is clearly discernible a constant factor, and that constant factor is *Congregationalism*. The remedy for the manifold defects that under its influence have hindered our progress, is simply a return to the principles of a sound and consistent Presbyterianism; the constant and practical recognition of a fundamental doctrine of our polity, viz., that the power of the whole is over the power of every part, with a resolute and habitual exercise of this power wherever and whenever the interests of the general cause demand it. Let Presbyteries summon sufficient nerve to act always in accordance with their silent convictions. This is the needed balance-wheel to congregational machinery; this the centrifugal force which, for the general progress and growth of Presbyterianism at large, shall check the too prevalent centripetal force that tends to centralize our strength in a comparatively few favored localities, so that the strong grow stronger and the weak grow weaker. Let the episcopal power of the Presbytery be felt along the whole line of denominational activity, and a crying need will be met. When the leaven of Congregationalism is purged out by a pure Presbyterianism we shall see decided improvement in our progress.

We need also a return to the primitive practice of Presbyterianism in the department of evangelistic work. Our church has departed so long and so far from the traditions of its fathers that many consider the evangelistic spirit a distinctive feature of the Methodist Church, being ignorant of the fact that their own church was once the pioneer in this work. In the progress of time it has become almost a lost art with us. Let us return to it and honor the evangelistic office and work; let us promote it and encourage it in every feasible way. We need to place it on a par with the pastorate, as an ordinary and regular office in the ministry, worthy of double honor because of the sacrifices it involves and the service it renders.

When these two reforms shall have been effected most of our deficiencies will vanish and our reproach will be removed.

We close by noting a hopeful and stimulating advance in both directions. We believe that, even during the writer's short experience in the ministry, there has been marked improvement, both in the department of presbyterial oversight and in that of evangelistic work. These are cheering signs, and they contain the promise of increased prosperity. They are the seeds of a great and glorious growth. May the providence of God and the enlightened wisdom of our church foster them to a full fruitage.

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PRAYER-MEETINGS.

It certainly seems to be an anomaly that the clergy hold so persistently to this service, and that the mass of the laity as persistently stays away. Are the absentees living in violation of plain duty? Surely the God-fearing men and women in the churches are more numerous than those found at this service, even making the most liberal allowance for those who would come if they could so arrange it. Moreover, a very fair percentage of those who do attend, do so, it is certain, out of deference to their pastor, and not from any real desire to go. If the pastor's feelings would not be hurt, and if he would not be discouraged by their absence, they would certainly stay away very often. This is my own case, and it is also true of our best and most useful elder. I have never attended but one series of prayer-meetings that I really enjoyed, and that was some years ago. It is easy to say: "A clear case of spiritual declension." Possibly this *is* the reason, of

course; but I should be greatly grieved to think so. When I search my conscience about it, I find reasons that go a long way towards satisfying me; and as I know that quite a number of very good people think and feel pretty much as I do on this matter, it may be that a plain statement of our position will be helpful. As my name is withheld (for obvious reasons) I can say that I am a regular attendant on the prayer-meetings—one of the “stand-bys,” in fact. I was brought up to think this was a religious duty *per se*; and though I do not think so now, still I do consider it my duty to help and encourage my pastor, and as long as he thinks he must have this service expect to attend regularly. But I very rarely go from any other motive; very rarely because I find it pleasant to go, for generally I don’t, to tell the honest truth about it; and an honest confession is said to be good for the soul. If what I have to offer seems in any sense to antagonize the prayer-meeting, I want to disclaim such an intention. What I want to do is to examine in the light of Scripture the authority for this service, and for the condemnation so generally visited upon those who stay away.

First, I find that I am commanded to let no man judge me in respect of an holy day; and as the prayer-meeting is held on a secular day, it undoubtedly comes within the scope of this command about holy days, just as the various feasts and fasts in the Episcopal Church do. If I were an Episcopalian, I suppose my rector would want me to attend all the services of “the church,” and to go through with the prescribed fasts, etc.; but if I refused to do it, I could still claim that he had no right to condemn me as coming short in my religious duties. All these week-day services are of man’s appointment; and it strikes me that when attendance on them is made a criterion of religious life, there is a savoring of will-worship.

“But don’t you feel the *need* of breaking in upon the week’s work and joining with God’s people in prayer and praise?” *No.* Candid again, you see. I meet with them three times on Sunday (counting the Sabbath-school service), and usually have family worship twice a day at home; and honestly I think it is very strange that a Christian should be looked down upon as lukewarm or derelict if he does not attend this meeting of man’s appointment. I enjoy Christian society, and delight at times to converse with fellow-Christians on the great themes we are all supposed to take an interest in. But I am by no means alone in thinking the ordinary prayer-meeting is dull and unedifying. Let me describe the prayer-meetings I have mainly attended.

1. We met from house to house. The minister conducted the meeting. He would read a chapter, give out a hymn, and after the singing he would call on some one of the brethren to lead in prayer; and then he would travel around this circle about three times more. The singing, as is natural, was generally of a very poor order. Nobody's fault, of course; but it was not enjoyable for all that. I have never yet learned to enjoy prayer-meeting singing. If that is wrong, I humbly hope I may have my conscience enlightened and my ear for music (poor even now) made—poorer! Then the prayers of the lay brethren are often such perfunctory work—very hard work, and evidently very perfunctory. I have often been afflicted by the labored prayers of others, and have lamented that I have afflicted them. But then my pastor wanted me to lead in prayer, and I was not willing to shirk what was presented to me as a duty, and so there was no help for it. That was one kind.

2. Ordinarily this routine is varied by a brief talk from the pastor. "Why do you not enjoy these talks, then, *i. e.*, provided you enjoy *any* meeting together with God's people? You say you often enjoy *conversation* on Christian topics. Why can't you enjoy the pastor's weekly lecture?" Well, friends, I wish I did derive pleasure from these prayer-meeting talks, but I don't, and no good is to be accomplished by pretending that I do. I certainly do not find fault with the ministers. They no doubt do their best; but it is a hard thing for one man to talk three times a week to the same set of people on the same general lines of thought and interest them. Few men have very much originality; and our ministers hardly have more than their share. I happen to have an unusually good preacher for my pastor, one who is much above the average; but if our places were reversed, and if I had his gifts, I should very greatly doubt my ability to interest him three times a week year after year. Very few men have this gift. There may be some way of making prayer-meetings attractive to more than the extremely few who attend them, but the secret seems to be very well kept.

I wish some one would tell me *when* it began to be looked upon as fundamental to the life of a church that its members should meet during the week as well as on the Lord's day. I have seen it stated in one of our church papers that "the church in all ages has had such meetings. The prophet Malachi tells us that in his time 'they that feared the Lord spake often one to another.'" No doubt of it; and even I, as already stated, enjoy Christian conversation. But I hardly think

Malachi was talking about prayer-meetings. To my mind the words suggest something quite different.

The same writer held that Thomas was absent from a prayer-meeting after our Lord's resurrection and before his ascension; and the whole article (a type of a good many on the same subject) was in support of what we all understand by "the prayer-meeting," so that the regular Sunday worship was, of course, not intended. But the meeting from which Thomas was absent was held *on the first day of the week* (John xx. 19); and if you will consult Dr. Dabney's excellent book, *The Christian Sabbath*, published by the Presbyterian Board of Publication in Philadelphia, you will find on pages 60 and 61 that this meeting is one of the strong links in the chain of argument going to prove the transfer of the day of rest from the seventh to the first day of the week. The disciples held another meeting eight days afterwards, *i. e.*, eight days according to the Jewish mode of reckoning—*seven* days afterwards as we should count it. Now observe: we have no mention of any meeting they held on any of the intervening *secular* days. It was to them a time of excitement, danger, and alarm. They were few in number, and surrounded by enemies, and we all know how closely people are drawn together by a common danger. (See Acts xii. 1-5.) And yet, so far as the record shows, the disciples seem to have had their next meeting *only when Sunday came round again!* Or, if they met on a secular day in a "prayer-meeting," the Bible does not record it for our example. In Acts i. 14, we read: "These all continued with one accord in prayer and supplication," which proves too much as an example for us to follow, for the disciples were in a very peculiar position at the time. Their Master had been taken away, and they were waiting for the Pentecostal outpouring.

Next, I ask you to observe this striking thing in Paul's history. When he was on his way from Greece to Jerusalem (Acts xx. 2, 3, 16,) he waited a whole week at Troas (verse 6), although he was pressed for time (verse 16), and preached to the converts there on the first day of the week (Sunday again, you see), intending to continue his journey as soon as the day of rest was over (verse 7). Dr. Dabney (page 65,) makes the point that Paul waited all this week "in order to join in their public worship" on "the church's sacred day." Query: If the church at Troas had a weekly prayer-meeting, why did not Paul make his talk then and not lose more time? Or if he did unite with his Christian friends in a prayer-meeting on a secular day, is it not strange that again no record is made of it?

A seemingly clear case is the meeting in progress at the time when Peter was delivered by the angel (Acts xii). But how do we know that that was one of the regular and stated series of meetings on a particular secular day? How do we know that it was not on the Lord's day? Even if we knew it was not, the special emergency would naturally lead to a special meeting, and furnishes no argument for "the regular weekly prayer-meeting."

But let me hasten to say that I do not pretend to think that every kind of religious meeting held now a days must have its special type or pattern found in the Bible. That would be very weak ground to take indeed. Such an argument, if valid, would make against our meetings for Foreign Missions, Y. M. C. A. religious meetings, etc. All these are of course perfectly right. No one is foolish enough, I suppose, to claim that we are limited to copying the precise *forms* of the meetings we read of in the Bible. The *spirit* of Bible teachings amply justifies any decent and orderly assembling of ourselves together for religious purposes. But that is not the point. It is the *insisting* upon prayer-meeting attendance as a *religious duty* that I object to. We all believe in family worship, I take it. In my household we have it regularly twice a day. But I know three ministers in my own family connection who have prayers only in the morning. Are they to be set down as luke-warm in the interest they take in the spiritual welfare of their households? Monthly meetings for Foreign Missions are held in some churches as statedly, I believe, as the weekly prayer-meetings are; but my pastor never has any of these meetings. Perhaps the majority do not. Even if they were held in our church by my pastor, am I to be counted as falling short of Christian duty if my interest in Foreign Missions does not take the form of making me enjoy these meetings? Oh, brethren, surely there are ways, plenty of ways, and good ways too, of showing a lively interest in the welfare of our church and in the advancement of Christ's kingdom without making such a great ado about stated attendance on a meeting of man's appointing once during the secular days of the week. Nothing in the Bible justifies it, so far as I can find out, though I am open to conviction, and want to be set right if I am wrong.

Sometimes it has seemed to me that ministers exalt the prayer-meeting even above the Sunday services. They speak (or write) of it as "the thermometer," or "the spiritual index" of the church. They are fond of calling it "the place of special promise," because of the promise that "where two or three are gathered together in my name,

there am I in the midst of them." As to the "thermometer" argument, I would say that we are told what "pure religion and undefiled before God" is; and in Matt. xxv. we have some of the tests by which our blessed Saviour recognizes his own; and while I have not the least desire to use these passages for more than they are worth, still, can I be wrong if I hold that a church has *just as good ways* (to put it mildly) of showing itself animated by Christian zeal as going to the prayer-meeting is? And as to the "place of special promise" argument, it strikes me as a sort of boomerang. Notice: the slim attendance is bewailed, and Christians urged to attend in larger numbers, *because of this special promise* to two or three. But what if the argument proves so convincing as to send *large* numbers? The "thermometer" would indicate a high spiritual temperature, but the special promise could no longer be pleaded. There are too many present! So that we should have no right to look for any more blessing than we count on receiving at the Sunday services! Again, many families omit "prayers" on the prayer-meeting night. They leave a place where maybe only three or four are gathered together to go to where perhaps twenty or twenty-five are assembled. Do they not have a better right to claim this "special promise" at their home worship than at the prayer-meeting?

I will tell about the one prayer-meeting I did really enjoy. It was a union prayer-meeting, and we had nearly all denominations. A committee was entrusted with the work of securing leaders for the meetings. Mr. A., for example, was requested several weeks in advance to conduct the meeting of such a date. He selected his topic beforehand, and on the Sunday before the prayer-meeting this topic was announced from the pulpit, so that any who chose could make it the theme of meditation. When the evening arrived, the one appointed conducted the opening services, consisting of a hymn or two, a prayer, and a passage from the Bible. Then he made a brief talk of from five to ten minutes in length, and when he was done the meeting was "thrown open" to all present. No one was ever *called on* to lead in prayer. All who led in prayer did so voluntarily. Consequently I never went, as I often do now, feeling that "I would give *so much* if only the minister would not call on me to lead in prayer to-night." This voluntary system did not produce confusion or conflicts. Before rising to say "Let us engage in prayer," the brother who did so would glance around to see if any one else was about to rise. Instead of leading in prayer, one might rise to express his thoughts on the topic for the evening, and we ob-

tained in this way a pleasant interchange of ideas, and the whole meeting had a delightful *social* feature about it, and was free from the routine and the cut-and-dry methods usually found in our prayer-meetings. If some means could be devised to take away the stiffness and formality we usually see, it would be a great relief. Why do our ministers think they must always "lecture," that is, preach a sort of short and informal sermon? It puts a great strain on them, and nearly everybody has to admit that in the large majority of cases our prayer-meetings are dull and (as many say) unedifying. By insisting on holding to this unwelcome service ministers assume a weight, which, if laid aside, would enable them to run with greater patience the race that is set before them. How many of you, brethren in the ministry, feel that the cold, lifeless prayer-meetings do more to chill your hearts and clog your efforts than almost any other one thing? A goodly number, I am sure.

One word more. Please do not misconstrue these remarks as an attack on the prayer-meeting. It is an attack on the spirit that would unduly exalt this service, and make attendance upon it a necessary sign of healthy Christian life. But my hope is that I may do some good by calling attention to the matter, and that other and able pens may take it up and see if this service cannot be robbed of its tedium. I expect to keep on going, anyhow, for the reasons given above, but it is hard work, and I should like to have it become a pleasure. I should like to see pastors feel perfectly free to drop this service if they wanted to, and to see the people perfectly free to stay away, if *they* wanted to, without giving any offence, and without discouraging the pastors. It seems to me that, with this freedom, both parties might be benefited.

"A VIEUZX."

LIBERTY LESS LICENSE.

THE liberty of American citizenship is equal to the liberty guaranteed by the constitution, less the license exercised by the body politic.

A pertinent and much-needed lesson for the people of the United States just now to learn is that "Surfeit is the father of much fast." Our land has given to the world the conception and actuality of civil and religious liberty. In this, and this only, has she advanced beyond the national life of the old world. This is her crown of glory. It threatens to become her garment of shame. There are certain outgrowths of freedom most inimical to freedom.

The fact that this is a free country acts as a magnet to the worst elements of European and Asiatic population. Much of our best population have we drawn from the culture and sober, thrifty circles of the old world, but it has been at an enormous price. With them have come vast hordes of the disreputable, diseased, debased, vicious, free-thinking, and free-living. These have been invested with all the rights and privileges of citizenship. They vote, and their voice is as potent as that of the native-born in determining the destiny of the nation. To their untutored minds liberty means license—permission to do as you please, regardless of the rights of others. Their creed is selfish greed, and to gorge themselves they would slaughter a thousand. Their notions are most industriously promulgated, so that they may not be measured like cattle, per capita. The home population has caught the vile contagion, which, like smallpox or yellow fever, surcharges the very atmosphere.

There is current a theory of personal rights which the fathers would never recognize as the thing for which they fought; and before it liberty is crumbling into license. This spirit is spreading into every type of life, attacking every representative institution, and unless the strong arm of some brave reform is uplifted to stay it, our liberty will be lost in a despotism which is the worst of all, because it is a despotism of self.

1. Like every movement, be it noble or base, this one first reveals itself in the philosophical and economic speculations of the times. There it takes the form of what might be termed *anarchistic law*. It would enfranchise the individual with the right to thrust forth upon his fellow-men any sentiment, it matters not how godless, any deed, it matters not how offensive, provided he be acting forth honest convictions. In short, it overrides all law, both human and divine, and thus itself becomes lawless. Anarchistic law is the genius of Mr. George's "Progress and Poverty," which professes to make poverty progress, but which surely would make progress poverty. It is anarchistic law that Mr. Ingersoll and men of his ilk flaunt in the face of the church and a Christian land. They affirm that they are sincere in the opinions which they hold; and then, *mirabile dictu*, they claim that sincerity gives incontestable right to express and promulgate. While it may be true that man within the sphere of self is supreme, so soon as he touches a fellow-man that sovereignty ceases, and he becomes amenable to a law for the common good. The untrammelled right to advocate any opinion one may cherish is not liberty, but license, and since it is license, it is liberty's foe.

2. Philosophical sentiments soon formulate into creeds and materialize into deeds. Hence we need not be surprised at the socialistic, anarchistic, and nihilistic movements that every now and then develop, and are suppressed only by the blunt force of police and military power. These are ruder, rougher children, but nevertheless legitimate children, of anarchistic law. Granted that so far these agitations have been only bubbles that have appeared for a moment on the surface of the stream, remember that the bubble proves an active disturbance beneath the surface.

"Strikes" and "trusts" would be impossible were it not that the philosophy of the masses is rotten on the subject of personal rights. Anarchy is license come down from the cloud land of anarchistic law into the dirty streetways, filled with mobs, and the ill-odored halls packed with clubs and cliques, listening to incendiary harangues from disturbers of the peace. It was license, rank and vile, that emanated in the form of a sermon from a certain New England preacher, who professed to have received, while in his study, a special baptism of the Holy Ghost, divinely inspiring and directing to go preach, on the next Lord's day, that the execution of the Chicago anarchists was kindred in nature and equal in magnitude to the crucifixion of Jesus Christ!

It would require a veritable allegorist, with marvellous penetration "between the lines," to find in the religious liberty guaranteed by the constitution the right thus to desecrate all religion, and make religion itself labor in the vile service of such an unclean spirit. Amid the darkness of early times it was the barbarous custom of our ancestors to prove innocence and ascertain the judgment of God by holding a red-hot bar of iron in the hand, or by sinking when cast into the water. More horrible by far is this fashion, prevalent in this age of light and in this land of lights, which makes sincerity the infallible test of innocence and private opinion the supreme criterion for the judgments of the Almighty.

3. Another bold step has license taken. It has assailed the law-making idea, and insists upon the unconstitutionality of any law which controverts what the individual regards as his personal rights. In this it has gone to the very throne, and if it can accomplish its purpose here, it will be easy work elsewhere. If it can make the law consonant with its idea of rights, the land must yield. It is very much like "Standard Oil piety," which will serve the Almighty provided it first be allowed to serve itself. "O yes," they say, "we want laws. We believe in the majesty of the law, and we are law-abiding citizens."

But to this bond they add the non-detachable coupon of a mental reservation, insisting that nothing can become a law which contradicts their conception of individual rights. And their notion of rights is very much like that of an East Tennessee mountaineer, "What's mine, my own; what's his'n, our'n." They believe in the right of private judgment with all the vim of their righteous souls, provided it is their private judgment.

Most notably has this feature of license showed its cloven foot in the effort making to limit or prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage. It is urged that such a statute would contradict the law-making idea, would outrage private rights, and trample on the sacredest and simplest claims of justice. We would humbly submit that liberty is not infringed when a blackguard's mouth is stopped or a murderer's neck is broken; neither is it an infringement of private rights for the law to say to the whiskey-vender, "Stop that leech-like business of yours, sapping the life-blood of society and home."

By what right, either public or private, either innate or acquired, may a man, giving himself soul and body to dollars and cents, become even indirectly the means of destroying your manhood, of blasting the happiness of your home, and of defiling the purity of society? He is like the mistletoe, that fastens itself upon the old tree that has stood the storms of many years, and sucks the life sap until the old tree dies. And to throw over such work as this the mantle of freedom is but to prove how far in the public mind license has taken the place of liberty.

4. If we will follow farther the trail of this same unbridled, irresponsible spirit, it will lead us from the legislative hall to the pulpit. It is finding its way into our theological thought, and there its mandate is that one ought not to subscribe to a creed whether he believes it or not. It deplors "the narrow bigotry of creeds," "the barbarous doctrine of creeds," "the savage despotism of creeds," "the antediluvianism of creeds."

This spirit in theology has received the name of HIGHER CONSCIOUSNESS. It seems that somewhere in man's soul, the exact locality has not yet been made a matter of revelation, there is a faculty, more magical than the wand of an Arabian conjurer, by which unrevealed truth is discovered and ascertained truth infallibly tested. This faculty is called higher consciousness, and although your higher consciousness may affirm something positively contradictory to my higher

consciousness, we must believe that both are right. This is liberty's demand. Higher consciousness not only spurns the shackle of any creed, but it likewise rises superior to the Word of God.

Is it tyranny to make a man promise to tell the truth before you sanction his work? Is it circumscribing a man's religious liberty for a church to demand of its ordained representatives a subscription to its faith before they shall receive its *imprimatur*? You may believe a lie as much as you please, but you have no right to try to make me believe it. What these ecclesiastical mountebanks and religious tumblers seek is license, not liberty. With a brazenness that has nothing to commend it has this spirit, rife in our land, dared to enter the sacred realm of religion, and with the shameless blade of free thought, higher consciousness, it has assailed the idea of religious liberty, which is alike the representative of the constitution and the Bible. Not yet has it succeeded, and we pray God that it may never; but its thrusts have made angrier the ugly sore in the side of liberty.

5. Just one more instance evidencing the same tendency. License has gotten into female circles, and there it is working "confusion worse confounded." It is said that woman is entitled to a larger and more mannish sphere. Not only may she appear before mixed audiences, not only may she follow certain vocations heretofore demanding masculine qualifications for *candidacy thereto*, but she is entitled to a voice in legislation. She should vote. This defection has not yet grown sufficiently strong to call for more than grave apprehensions. The worst that it has done has been to link itself to and thereby damn certain moral reforms in themselves desirable.

The strongest argument in favor of the license of female suffrage is that it will ensure the success of the temperance movement. Not stopping to discuss the possibility of buying female votes and corrupting the female ballot, let it be supposed that a prohibitory law has been enacted through the votes of the women; what would it be worth? Not more than the paper which holds it, for there would not be power enough back of the law for its enforcement. Voting is not and never can be the right of woman, for the simple reason that God has not made her capable of bearing arms. No one has an intrinsic right to a voice in the affairs of his country save he who can defend his country. As well attempt to prevent a financial crisis by the manufacture of paper money as to destroy the liquor traffic with female ballots. There is no power in the ballot itself. The power lies in that which the ballot represents. Some one has said that "just as paper money must

have metal behind it—the dollar, so the ballot must have metal behind it—the bullet.”

But female suffrage is something more than useless. It is the vilest license, in that it is a violation of nature's laws. God never intended woman to suffer suffrage. Not one word would we say against those women, true and good, for the noble work they have done against the liquor curse. Rather would we praise, but at the same time lift a warning voice against that devilish ingenuity that has coupled female suffrage to the cause of temperance.

Thus may be traced the workings of a spirit which, produced by our national life, is the nation's foe. From what has been said one may get an inadequate conception of how far license has permeated our thought and practice. Surely it has gone so far that a warning voice should be heeded. If it be asked, What is the remedy? who is the patriot that shall chop off the head of this demon, dammed by greed and sired by ignorance? it may be replied, that the question contains its own answer. It goes without the saying that the guardians of liberty are the church and the school. It is only the love of the gospel that will annihilate greed, the mother of license, and it is only a liberal education that will annihilate ignorance, the father of license. Hence he is the true patriot who is the friend of the church and the friend of the school.

America's pride is her freedom. Woe! if it should become her shame. To-day her liberty is less her license. We must not forget that preservation is as essential as creation. Freedom best is FREEDOM KEPT.

Alexandria, Va.

JAMES I. VANCE.

MEMBERSHIP IN PRO-RE-NATA MEETINGS.

A QUESTION has been raised in one of our church courts as to the right of membership in *pro-re-nata* meetings of Presbytery, especially in those that may be held between the meeting of Synod and the following stated meeting of Presbytery. There were three opinions—first, that the right belonged to the member of the last stated meeting; second, that it belonged to the Synodical representative; third, that there should be a new election. And it is possible that a similar variety of opinions exists in other parts of our church. We here consider the nature of the meeting, and who may join in the call; the *status* of elders in Synod, and the logical consequences.

The Form of Government, Chap. V., Sec. IV., Par. 8, defines as follows the manner in which such a meeting shall be called:

“The Presbytery shall meet on its own adjournment; and when any emergency shall require a meeting sooner than the time to which it stands adjourned, the Moderator, or in case of his death, absence, or inability to act, the stated clerk shall, with the concurrence or at the request of two ministers and two elders, the elders being of different congregations, call a special meeting. For this purpose he shall send a circular letter, specifying the particular business of the intended meeting, to every minister belonging to Presbytery, and to the Session of every vacant congregation, in due time, previous to the meeting, which shall not be less than ten days. And nothing shall be transacted at said special meeting besides the particular business for which the judicatory has been thus convened.”

In one important particular this account is defective, since it does not indicate what particular elders may join in the call. It leaves it an open question, and thus leaves room for a doubt whether the call convenes the stated meeting or provides for a new judicature. And, as a matter of fact, opinion varies on this point, probably as a result.

Our own Assembly, Minutes 1872, says:

“When an elder is appointed to attend a stated meeting of Presbytery, he may, without any new appointment, meet and act with the Presbytery until its next stated meeting, unless the Session shall appoint some other member of the bench of elders to act in his place.”

This language seems to imply that ordinarily it is proper to hold a special election for a representative of Session to sit in a *pro-re-nata* meeting. It implies that in such a meeting the elder who represented the Session at the stated meeting sits by concession or courtesy, but not by absolute right. It ignores the idea that there is any vital relation between the *pro-re-natu* and the stated meeting. Yet there must be some such relation; otherwise, why should it devolve on the moderator of the stated meeting to call the *pro-re-natu* meeting and preside over it?

The confusion of ideas on this point may arise from the fact that the compilers of the Digests, both Baird and Moore, fail to give the whole scope of the original enactment, failing to state the circumstances which produced it.

It occurred in this way. The following query was presented to the Synod of New York and Philadelphia in 1760:

“How many ministers are necessary to request the moderator of the commission of Synod or of any of our Presbyteries to oblige the moderator to call any of these judicatories to do occasional business?”

Synod replied :

“The Synod judge that meetings of judicatures *pro-re-nata* can only be necessary, on account of important occurrences unknown at their last meeting, and which cannot be safely deferred till their stated meeting, such as scandal raised on a minister’s character, tending to destroy his usefulness, and to bring a reproach on religion; or feuds in a congregation, threatening its dissolution; or some dangerous error or heresy broached; but not for matters judicially deferred by the judicature, except some unforeseen circumstance occurs, which makes it appear that some principal thing on which the judgment depends may then be had, and cannot be obtained if it is deferred till their stated meeting; nor for any matters that ordinarily come in at their stated meetings. And when such occasional meetings appear necessary to the moderator himself, it is proper to call the judicature together, or upon the application of any two members judging it necessary, provided always that reasonable notice be given to all the members of the occasion, time and place of the meeting, and that it be appointed at such a season as may render the attendance of the members practicable.”

This answer informs us, that in both meetings the moderator and members were the same. It asserts the same principle for the commission of Synod and the Presbyteries, namely, that they were not dissolved till their successor was regularly appointed. They were counted as being in session until the next stated meeting. And the *pro-re-nata* meeting was nothing more than the regular Presbytery performing *pro-re-nata* business. It was simply a re-assembling of a still existing judicature. Consequently, no elder holds his seat in the the *pro-re-nata* meeting by sufferance or by courtesy, but as a right which is his because he is a member of the stated meeting; and furthermore, no elder has a right to sign a call to a *pro-re-nata* meeting, who is not a member of the previous stated meeting.

MEETINGS CALLED BY SYNOD.

Synod also has the power to convene Presbytery in a *pro-re-nata* meeting. (Minutes, 1848, p. 60.)

“*Resolved*, 1, That Synod has power to order a Presbytery to meet and transact such business as in the judgment of Synod is intimately connected with the good order and well-being of the church.

“*Resolved*, 2, That as such meetings are of the nature of *pro-re-nata* meetings, the rules that are laid down in our Book for the regulation of such called meetings ought to regulate and govern in all cases these meetings ordered by Synod, except when ordered to meet during the sessions of Synod on business immediately connected with the proceedings of that body. In such cases Presbytery may be required to meet at once by order of Synod.”

At called meetings of this nature representatives of the churches, who are members of Synod, without dispute, take their places as

regular members of their respective Presbyteries, although they may not have been members of the previous stated meeting. Frequently they were not. Cases occur on the floor of Synod, where not a single elder of a given Presbytery was a member of the previous stated meeting of that body. But subsequent to the stated meeting, they were chosen to represent their Sessions in Synod. In the nature of the case, they were clothed with all the rights and privileges of a member of Synod; one of which is the privilege of sitting as a member of Presbytery in the *pro-re-nata* meetings held by order of Synod.

Our legislation would direct Synod to order such meetings in vain, if it did not at the same time extend its authorization, to respond, both to Presbyteries and Sessions. The law cannot direct Synod to call such meetings at will, except by guaranteeing the presence of those constituent elements of Presbytery which the sessions must provide. It must, therefore, be construed as defining the *status* of elders in Synod as corresponding to the requirements of the law, that is to say, that they, by their position as members of Synod, are qualified to sit with their Presbyteries in the meetings specified.

In that case, what becomes of the natural right to sit in the *pro-re-nata* meeting, of the elder who represented the same Session in the stated meeting? It cannot be said that the member of Synod sits as an alternate, for he sits in a higher court. Neither can it be said that he receives from Synod the right to sit in Presbytery, because Synod has no power to constitute membership in a lower court. This is a fixed principle of our law.

The church Session alone is competent to qualify an elder to be a member of Presbytery; and it can only do so by electing him a member. His membership is vacated by the expiration of his term or by a new election. And the election of an elder qualified to sit in Presbytery at Synod necessarily vacates the membership of his predecessor, since no Session is entitled to more than one representative in Presbytery. The appointment to Synod, which carries with it the right and duty of sitting in Presbytery, constitutes an elder the latest representative of his Session. The conclusion seems unavoidable, that unless the right of his predecessor be restored by a new election, it will become his duty to represent his Session in subsequent meetings of his Presbytery which may occur between that meeting of Synod and the next stated meeting of his Presbytery.

It is in accordance with this line of argument, whether intended or not, that the Assembly, in 1888, (Minutes, p. 425,) defines the elder's

term of service in Presbytery as extending from one stated meeting to another, “*unless* the Session otherwise direct.” This is an explicit admission that Session has the right to *otherwise* direct and supersede the first appointment. And most certainly it does supersede, when, instead of sending the first elder, it sends another to Synod, with the included right to sit in Presbytery in the meetings convened by Synod. Thence till the next stated meeting he must continue to hold his seat in Presbytery, “*unless* Session otherwise directs.”

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HENRY M. SMITH.

WHAT SHOULD BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH TOWARDS FASTING ?

TOUCHING upon the duty of Presbyterians in regard to fasting, the Directory of Worship, Chap. XIV., Par. 4, makes this observation: “If at any time the civil power should think it proper to appoint a fast or thanksgiving, it is the duty of the ministers and people of our communion, as we live under a Christian government, to pay all due respect to the same.”

The law of non-interference between church and state we both recognize and heartily endorse. The church, being spiritual in her character and aims, has no right to guide the policy of the state or to “compel men to accept her doctrine and yield to her dominion.” The state, on the other hand, while bound to protect the church in all its rights of worship, and from all tyranny and illegal forms of usurpation, is, by the secularity of its nature, estopped from any further interference; and hence all effort in this direction should be resisted even unto death. Bearing this plain and broad distinction in mind, we pass on to the question, What should be the attitude of the church towards fasting? At present it is one of sublime indifference.

In Presbyterian circles, the time-honored custom of fasting has well-nigh fallen into utter disuse. Indeed, many seem to think that this duty pertained entirely to the old dispensation, and, with that, ceased to be either binding or necessary. That this is not the case we hope to show, and thus, at the outset, boldly assert that the present attitude of the church is to be condemned, and that more zeal and practical activity are greatly to be desired. This assumption is based upon three facts:

1. *The duty of fasting is scriptural, and therefore cannot be neglected with impunity.* Turning to the New Testament we find no positive, express command in regard to the discharge of this duty, yet by good and necessary inference it is made just as binding and clear as that of family worship, or of the observance of the first day of the week instead of the seventh as the Christian Sabbath. The vital importance of family worship is conspicuous to all, for the family is the nursery of the church: and yet for this duty there is nowhere to be found a "thus saith the Lord." Upon what, then, is the duty based? As remarked by Jay in his preface to his "Prayers for the Use of Families," it rests upon "the example of the faithful; the commendations which God has bestowed upon them in his Word; his promises and threatenings; the obvious and numberless advantages resulting from domestic devotion as to personal religion and relative government, with regard to those that preside in the family; and as to instruction, restraints, and motives, with regard to relations, children, and servants; all this must surely be enough to induce any man capable of conviction to terminate with a broken heart the mischiefs of neglect, and to swear unto the Lord and vow unto the mighty God of Jacob, 'Surely I will not come into the tabernacle of my house, nor go up into my bed; I will not give sleep to mine eyes, nor slumber to mine eyelids, until I find out a place for the Lord, an habitation for the mighty God of Jacob.'" The duty of family worship, then, rests not so much upon any specific command of scripture as upon the example of patriarchs, prophets, and apostles.

So with the observance of the first day of the week instead of the seventh as the Christian Sabbath. Nowhere, and at no time, did Jesus say to his disciples, ye *shall* make the change, but because he honored the day by rising from the dead; after the resurrection by meeting on the first day of the week with his waiting and worshipping disciples; by giving to the church on the first day of the week (the day of Pentecost) his Spirit in an extraordinary manner—all this, with the example of the apostles, led the early church to adopt the day we now call the Lord's day, one dear and sacred to the believer's heart, one which loyalty to Jesus will constrain us to remember, honor, and keep until death has been swallowed up in life and the King seen in his beauty. If, then, we pronounce family worship, the observance of the first day instead of the seventh as the Christian Sabbath, scriptural duties, fasting deserves to be placed in the same category, for it has the same support, having received the sanction of Christ and

his apostles, the observance and respect of the church through all the ages of the past.

Passing by for the present the day of fasting enjoined by the law of Moses upon the solemn day of expiation, and all others recorded in the Old Testament, let us study the attitude of Christ, his apostles, and the early church. That the Saviour was not indifferent towards this great duty is evident, both from his example and his words. When the disciples of John demanded of him "Why do we and the Pharisees fast oft, but thy disciples fast not?" he at once made this happy reply, "Can the children of the bride-chamber mourn as long as the bridegroom is with them? but the days will come when the bridegroom shall be taken from them, and then shall they fast." "The religious life," as remarked by one, "like all human life, has its alternations of depression and joy; and to be thoroughly natural it must find for both becoming forms of expression." While the Master yet mingled with and magnetized the disciples with his personal presence, there was no occasion for mourning, fasting or sorrow, but rather manifestations of joy; but when once the shadow has fallen upon their hearts, and they are left "orphans," then it is not only fit and proper, but says Jesus, "*Then shall they fast.*" This declaration, though not of the nature of a command, is without doubt a *quasi* endorsement, and as Jesus neither would nor could endorse a duty in the least sinful, the inference is, fasting was right then, is now, and will be through all time to come. Indeed, had it been wrong, either in practice or in theory, it is natural to suppose that Jesus would at least have discouraged it, if not openly condemned it. But when we turn to the sermon on the mount, that sermon, so practical, yet so pregnant with duty, we find just the reverse. The numerous, ostentatious and uncalled-for fasts of the Pharisees he openly and publicly condemned, but to the disciples he said, "When *ye* fast be not as the hypocrites, of a sad countenance, but anoint thine head, and wash thy face, that thou appear not unto men to fast, but unto thy Father which is in secret." (Matt. vi. 16, 17, etc.) In this passage there is no prohibition, but on the other hand, another endorsement, coupled with the proper regulations, necessary to make fasting acceptable, and to obtain the blessing of the Father that seeth in secret and rewardeth openly. So much for the teaching of Christ.

Turning next to the apostles, we find that, on more than one occasion, they recognized fasting as an imperative duty and without hesitation fasted and prayed. And so while Barnabas and other teachers

at Antioch ministered to the Lord and fasted, the Holy Ghost instructed them to separate Barnabas and Saul for the work of foreign missions. This they at once did, but it was not until they had fasted and prayed that they sent them to their fellow-men, whom they saw bound with the chains of wickedness and superstition, oppressed by Satan and the slaves of sin. The doctrine and practice of our Lord and his apostles respecting fasting may be thus described: "Our Saviour neglected the observance of those stated Jewish fasts which had been superadded to the Mosaic law, and introduced especially after the captivity, to which the Pharisees paid scrupulous attention, and he represented such observances as inconsistent with the genius of his religion. The practice of voluntary and occasional fasts he spoke of as being not unsuitable on certain occasions, nor without its use in certain cases. He fasted himself on a great and solemn occasion. The doctrine of the apostles on this subject was to the same purport, considering fasting lawful unless it should involve some breach of some moral and Christian duty." (See "Ancient Christianity Exemplified," p. 552.)

The early church, feeling that fasting was both helpful and scriptural, adopted the custom. Indeed, fasting was regarded with so much respect that "Tertullian, a Montanist, in his treatise, 'De Jejunio,' complains heavily of the little attention paid by the Catholic Church to the practice . . . for in his day a large portion of orthodox Christians exercised that liberty of judgment which had been sanctioned by the apostles." And so from that day till the present, the church has been more or less mindful of this important duty, which, as we have shown, has the undoubted *imprimatur* of Christ and his apostles, and hence is still worthy of recognition and practice. Why, then, the present attitude of indifference? One of three reasons must answer the question: either the church has ceased to recognize the duty as scriptural, or else she recognizes the duty and is willing to neglect it, and thereby sin; or there are to-day no occasions which justify or call for a season of fasting, humiliation and prayer.

That the duty of fasting is acknowledged to be scriptural is evident from the teaching of our standards: "Nevertheless, to observe days of fasting and thanksgiving . . . we judge both scriptural and rational." (Directory of Worship, Chap. XIV., Par 2.) That the church is willing to neglect a well-defined duty is contradicted by her zeal and activity, both at home and abroad, and hence we are driven to the conclusion that she sees no occasion for the exercise of this duty which we deem "both scriptural and helpful."

Such may be the force of logic, but is it a true statement of facts? In order to answer this, we must first ask and answer another: What would constitute an appropriate occasion for the discharge of this duty? In reply we would say: any calamity or dire misfortune, in church or state, calculated to produce sorrow and eventuate in evil, injuring the church and the cause of Christ; any threatened schism calculated to split or disturb the peace and unanimity of the church; any heresy which has stalked abroad, dressed in the garb of truth; any alarming degree of coldness and indifference, whether manifested by clergy or laity; in short, anything which has to such an extent weakened the influence and effectiveness of the church as to cause her loyal sons to feel sorrow and sadness of heart.

What are the facts as we see them to-day? Foreign missions calling for money and men; both here; but the one is not given and the other will not go. Five hundred vacant churches sitting in widowhood, having no one to teach them the way of life. The ranks of the ministry depleted by disease and death, and while thousands of our brightest and most moral young men choose other professions, because forsooth, they are more lucrative, few, alas! very few, feel constrained to preach. Ecclesiastical discipline, once deemed essential to the purity of the church, wellnigh fallen into disuse. Intemperance, drunkenness, theatre-going, Sabbath desecration, no longer confined to the unbelieving, but countenanced by church sessions, and *practised* by professors of religion. Surely the most optimistic must see in these things enough to fill their hearts with profound sorrow and deep regret, and lead them to feel that the church, in view of these evils, ought to fast as well as pray. With the humble and contrite heart God has promised to dwell: upon the proud, the careless, the indifferent he bestows no blessing; and hence, if the church would avert the calamities that seem to threaten her, go forth conquering and to conquer, she would do well to encourage, within due limitation, the duty of fasting, which is both helpful and scriptural.

2. *Another reason for the observance of this duty is, it is a most excellent assistant in the discharge of other duties, especially public prayer.* Now, by public prayer, in this place, we do not refer so much to such prayers as are offered on each and every recurring Sabbath in the various houses of worship, but to those upon *extraordinary occasions*, such as the "week of prayer," or the annual day of prayer set apart by the General Assembly for colleges, schools, etc. The aim and purpose of these seasons is, the concentration of all hearts on some one

definite thing, the united prayers of God's people for the bestowal of such a blessing as will impart new life and increased vigor, helping the church to fulfil the high duties which she has been commanded by Christ to discharge.

In God's ancient church, fasting and prayer were, as it were, inseparable. Threatened with calamity in the days of Joel, this was the injunction, "Therefore saith the Lord, Turn ye to me with all your heart and with fasting, with weeping and mourning, blow the trumpet. . . Sanctify a fast, call a solemn assembly, let the priests, the ministers of the Lord say, Spare thy people, O God; and the Lord will pity his people and answer." At a little earlier period, Joshua and his men, having been defeated by the men of Ai, prostrated themselves for a day before the ark, observing a solemn fast, and then in the next conflict carried the day, having received through fasting and prayer additional vigor, courage and strength. Esther, wishing to save the lives of her people who had been decreed to destruction, first fasted and prayed, and then, and not until then, did she, with sublime confidence in God, peril her own life in order to ask for the lives of others. And so many other instances in the Old Testament might be mentioned, but these suffice to show that fasting gives power, tone and effectiveness to prayer and Christian duty, and that the two united are productive of good.

Often the Christian wishes to feel penitent, but cannot; to pray in earnest and worship in sincerity, but the disposition is not present. Under such circumstances God's ancient people fasted, for nothing is better calculated to clear the mind and humble the soul; and thus, as Calvin has well observed, "Whenever supplications are to be presented to God on any important occasion, it would be right to enjoin the union of fasting with prayer." Indeed, the Saviour himself intimated as much, for said he, "This kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting." True, the reference here is primarily to the working of a certain miracle, the casting out of demoniacal spirits, something which the church has no power to do; yet, as Alford has well suggested, "It is but a definite way of expressing the general truth, that great and difficult duties require special preparation and self-denial." Nothing is impossible to faith, yet "such a height of faith as is requisite for such triumphs is not to be reached either in a moment or without effort," and hence when either the church or the believer wishes some special manifestation of God's love, some outpouring of his Spirit, something that is needed for future welfare and success, nothing is better calcu-

lated to enable the petitioner to prevail than a fixed and definite period of fasting and prayer. This principle the early church fully recognized, "for when they had ordained them elders in every church, and had prayed with fasting, they commended them to the Lord, on whom they believed." (Acts xiv. 23.)

That the church should lay down fasting as a positive requirement would, perhaps, be an infringement upon that liberty of conscience which is to-day the boast and glory of the Presbyterian Church; yet to enjoin such as occasions may require, and especially in view of her present destitution, seems both proper and eminently right. Indeed, if her annual day of prayer for the youth of the land were preceded by a day of fasting, results would perhaps be far more glorious, and thousands who are now out of harmony with Christ might be brought to a saving knowledge of the Saviour, and even to proclaim his truth. True, the Saviour said, "Pray ye the Lord of the harvest," yet, as we have endeavored to show, the heart prays best and the faith shines brightest after that discipline and that humbling which invariably follow upon some definite, protracted abstinence from food. In the mere abstinence from food, fasting *per se*, there is and can be no virtue; but as a preparation for the exercise of other spiritual endowments, it has the sanction of Christ and his apostles, the usage and commendation of all past ages, and is to-day worthy of the attention of the Christian world. In the Presbyterian Church in Scotland, and in the Methodist Church of this country, fasting is duly observed; and that our own beloved Zion would awake and be more vigilant and attentive, is the wish of many who are trying, by God's grace, to lengthen her cords and strengthen her stakes.

3. Involving as it does self-denial, fasting thereby becomes *a species of witness-bearing*, and as this is a part of the church's mission, negligence involves her in criminality. If, then, the church would discharge a duty which we believe to be scriptural and just, one calculated to humble men in the sight of God their Saviour, and at the same time aid in the production of a higher and deeper type of piety; and, lastly, show that she is willing to mourn over her sins, the coldness, carelessness and utter indifference of many claiming to be her sons, and testify of her willingness to make any and every needed sacrifice, she must lay aside her present attitude of indifference, and call to her children, inviting them, not only to penitence, but to fasting and prayer.

And now, with the three cautions given by Calvin, that father and theologian whom we honor and revere, we close:

(1.) "The first caution necessary . . . is that suggested by Joel: 'Rend your hearts and not your garments.' God sets no value on fasting unless it be accompanied with a correspondent disposition of heart, a real displeasure against sin, sincere self-abhorrence."

(2.) "Lest it be considered as a meritorious act, or a species of divine service."

(3.) "That it be not enforced with extreme rigor as one of the principal duties."

With a due observance of these cautions, good, and not evil, will surely be the result.

E. GEDDINGS SMITH.

Claussen, S. C.

THE WALNUT STREET CHURCH CASE.¹

OUR esteemed brother-presbyter, Judge J. D. Armstrong, of Romney, West Va., has filled more than *eleven* columns of your issue of May 4th² with an article from his pen, entitled, "Organic Union—the Property Question." The central and prevalent motive of his labored article is evidently to censure, and if possible, to nullify, the authoritative influence of the Supreme Court of the United States as to its decision in the now well-known cause entitled *Watson v. Jones*, reported in the thirteenth volume of Wallace's Supreme Court Reports.

As I have heretofore, in articles appearing in the *Central Presbyterian* in August and September, 1882, and in July, 1887, commented very fully upon that reported cause, and sought to show that the decision therein was righteous and equitable, and gave the only safe ground on which questions as to church property in the United States can be decided consistently with our principles of civil and religious liberty, I would not now deem it desirable or needful to write anything more on the subject, but for the fact that Judge Armstrong has thought it necessary to make some personal allusions, and to undertake a special refutation of the views upheld by me in those articles. How entirely he has failed in his undertaking, and how completely

¹ *The Presbyterian Quarterly* (January, 1889) having republished Judge James D. Armstrong's article entitled, "Organic Union—the Property Question" in which there are allusions and comments that give Mr. Howison, in justice, a right to reply, the readers of this periodical will find here the reply which was made at the time of the article's first appearance. In addition, there is a comment upon Judge Armstrong's *addendum*, as it appeared in a foot note on p. 106, Vol. III.—EDITORS.

² *The St. Louis Presbyterian*, in which the article first appeared.

Watson v. Jones maintains itself as a decision of far-reaching righteousness and equity, can, I humbly believe, be shown in an article of about one-fourth the length of that longitudinal essay which, although apparently imposing, is really unsound and misleading, although it, beyond doubt, expresses the honest convictions of our learned brother and of his co-workers in preparing it.

Early in his article, Judge Armstrong makes a full and candid admission which will go very far towards the desirable object of saving your readers from a great deal of toilsome labor and perplexing thought on this subject. His admission is in the following words: "There can be no question that the law *has been* and *should be* as laid down in Mr. Howison's amendment."

A brief explanation will set this matter in a clear light before all candid minds. Our learned brother does not deny the statement made by me in the articles referred to, that it has been not at all uncommon for reporters, in seeking to perform the very delicate and difficult duty of giving an accurate *syllabus* of questions of law and equity discussed and decided in the long written opinions of the judges, to make mistakes either of excess or defect, of commission or omission, and thus to misrepresent or to fall short of correctly representing the real decision. Every well-read lawyer knows that this is so; and therefore when a large and important cause is under argument the mere *syllabus* is never relied on, except by the more feeble and incautious members of the bar.

Now, although Mr. Wallace is, in general, an able and accurate reporter, he is not infallible. That he has made a serious slip in the *tenth* clause of his *syllabus*, and has omitted a very important qualifying element which ought to have been appended by him to the clause, is a *fact*, not only apparent to my own mind, but apparent to many other judges and lawyers who have carefully examined the *syllabus* as it is printed, and compared it with the lucid and convincing opinion of Mr. Justice Miller.

The clause left out in the *syllabus* as printed is as follows: "Provided the civil court be satisfied that that highest tribunal within the church organization had jurisdiction in the premises."

Now, Judge Armstrong admits that this "amendment" would, if it correctly represents the real decision of the court, make it apparent that the decision is what the law *has been* and *should be*. The *italics* are his, not mine.

This narrows the question down to the simple inquiry, Was the

decision of the court, as announced in the written opinion of Mr. Justice Miller, one which adopted and included the principle set forth in this statement, viz., "provided the civil court be satisfied that that highest tribunal within the church organization had jurisdiction in the premises."

I affirm that it was. Judge Armstrong denies. No evidence is admissible on this question except that of the opinion itself. To that I confidently appeal. The whole opinion is based on the fact that the Walnut Street Church, of Louisville, Ky., was under the jurisdiction of the Northern General Assembly, and that, in deciding the questions of construction and of church law and church matters involved, that General Assembly did not usurp jurisdiction not lawfully belonging to them. To maintain the affirmation I need only refer intelligent and candid readers to the opinion itself as printed in full in Wallace, 13th volume, especially to that part of it on pages 732 to 734, inclusive. There it will be seen that Mr. Justice Miller had his mind specially called to this question of jurisdiction, and dealt with it fairly and squarely, according to its merits and its application to the cause decided.

But Judge Armstrong is so anxious to repudiate the decision in *Watson v. Jones* that he introduces a great deal of irrelevant matter. Of this character is his quotation of a crude and unfounded *dictum* of the Northern General Assembly put by it into the "Appendix to its Minutes" in these words: "A spiritual court is the exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction; its decision on that question is binding on the secular courts." No such absurdity as this is found in or can be logically inferred even from the defective *syllabus* of Mr. Wallace; and no such principle is decided in *Watson v. Jones*. On the contrary, the opinion distinctly negatives it. (Pp. 732-734.)

It seems to me strange that Judge Armstrong did not see that his own statement of the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the celebrated Presbyterian Church case (arising out of the disruption of 1837, 1838,) completely sustains the opinion in *Watson v. Jones*, No American civil court of appeals of final resort has ever decided that, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the church court had or had not jurisdiction as to questions of church property, the civil court has not power and authority to look into, and *as far as needed*, to interpret church constitutions, articles and agreements. But when once the civil court is satisfied that the church court of highest resort *had jurisdiction* as to the questions decided, the civil court can go no

farther. Whether the church court decided *right or wrong*, the civil court is bound by its decision. This principle is so distinctly laid down in Judge Gibson's opinion in the great church case, *Todd et al. v. Green*, that he who runs may read. And it is exactly on this principle that the decision in *Watson v. Jones* is founded.

This brings us to the finality of this matter. Judge Armstrong and his diligent co-workers, in all their labors, resulting in the article of eleven columns, have done nothing to disturb or overthrow the facts involved in the Louisville *Walnut Street Church* case. Those facts were simply these: That church was organized in 1842, nineteen years prior to the war. It was *always* under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. It *never* was for one moment under the jurisdiction of our Southern General Assembly. After the war, and after the painful circumstances which resulted in the "Declaration and Testimony," some officers and about *thirty* members of the Walnut Street Church were dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Northern General Assembly and adhered to the "Declaration and Testimony" party, but all the other officers and *one hundred and fifteen* members approved of the proceedings of the Northern General Assembly, and disapproved of the "Declaration and Testimony." And the decision of the United States Circuit Court for Kentucky was this: that the officers and the *one hundred and fifteen* members, and the congregation who chose to adhere to them, had a right to the possession and enjoyment of the Walnut Street Church property, and could not be ousted by the few recalcitrant officers, and the *thirty* members who retired from the Northern Church. And this righteous and equitable decision was righteously and equitably affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.

I repeat again the earnest prayer that the principles decided in *Watson v. Jones* may never be overthrown. They are American principles, and are the true antagonists to the *Erastian* principles of Lord Eldon and the English House of Lords.

The foregoing is the reply made and published eight months ago to the essay now again brought to public notice. I add a comment on the statement in the *addendum* to Judge Armstrong's article (p. 106), as to alleged facts concerning the varying numerical proportions of the officers and members of the Walnut Street Church at various stages of the disturbance and conflict, which was ended by the final decision in *Watson v. Jones*. This statement is, in many respects, irrelevant and unfortunate. For it is entirely *dehors* the record in *Watson v. Jones*,

and no rule is more firmly settled in law and equity than this, that for the evidence of facts in the cause, counsel and court are confined to the written or printed record. And this rule is just and salutary, for it is the right and duty of the counsel on both sides to see that every material fact bearing upon the merits or upon any important question involved be presented in the evidence. Is it seriously pretended that Col. Bullitt managed the cause badly on his side? I think not.

But this *addendum* suggests a worse error still on the part of its writer. For it attempts to attach weight to a decision of a Special State Chancellor in Louisville, Kentucky, upon a question of church law and church discipline, arising out of this Walnut Street Church controversy. He seems actually to have claimed to decide (in his civil court) who were the lawful pastor and session, and who had been lawfully admitted as members of the church! This is the analogous question to that which the Judge at *nisi prius* decided in the great Pennsylvania church case of *Todd et als v. Green*, and for which he was reversed by the Supreme Court of that State. If anything is settled in our country it is that when a church court has jurisdiction and decides such church questions as those above stated the civil courts are bound by the decision and cannot review it or alter it in any wise.

Braehead, near Fredericksburg, Va.

R. R. HOWISON.

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

SHEDD'S DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. *By W. G. T. Shedd, D. D., Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology in Union Theological Seminary, New York.* Two vols. 8vo, pp. 1,349. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1888.

The author of this treatise needs no introduction to the public. He has already become known by not a few works which have given him a place in the front rank of the profound and conscientious thinkers as well as of the accomplished writers of his times. His Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans has no superior, if it has any equal, in the sphere of biblical exegesis. His History of Christian Doctrine is a learned and luminous exposition of the stages through which the fundamental faiths of the church have passed in her endeavor to give adequate expression to them in her creeds or in the writings of her great teachers. His treatise on Homiletics and Pastoral Theology, while on a somewhat lower plane of thought, exhibits still the same master-hand. His volume of Theological Essays has had the effect of inspiring its readers with an ardent desire to see the whole science of theology handled by the man who wrote the essays on Original Sin and on the Atonement. This desire is now fulfilled in the publication of the work whose title stands at the head of this notice; and it is with sincere pleasure and congratulations that we commend it to the study of our readers.

If dogmatic theology has lost its interest for the church, as has been alleged, or if the so-called "biblical theology" has taken its place, it is not easy to account for the fact, that in the last twenty years there have appeared in this country alone, to say nothing of Europe, no less than seven or eight treatises of this kind; and that some of them have been reprinted more than once. It has been also alleged that Calvinism is dying out; and yet all of the treatises above referred to, with the exception of one, are Calvinistic! It would seem, that if Calvinism *is* in a moribund condition, its actual decease cannot be very near.

The general type of doctrine expounded and defended by Dr. Shedd is described by himself as "the Augustino-Calvinistic." Upon a few points the elder Calvinism has been followed in preference to the later; and this, he says, is probably the principal difference between his work and contemporary ones of the Calvinistic class. His favorite authors (not to speak of the Westminster Standards, which are cited on almost every page) seem to be Augustine, Anselm, Calvin, John Owen, John Howe, Turretin, and Jonathan Edwards. He cites them with approval more frequently, perhaps, than any others. The systems of Drs. H. B. Smith and Dabney appear in several instances in the "literature" prefixed to the chapters, but we do not remember to have noticed any quotation from either of them, though in more than one instance we thought there was evidence that some of the more elaborate discussions in the works of these writers had been duly pon-

dered. Dr. Chas. Hodge is frequently quoted, sometimes for adverse criticism. The profound and quickening lectures of Dr. Thornwell on Original Sin are no where referred to. We are a little surprised at this, as those lectures present a theory of the relation of Adam's posterity to him and to his first sin so near akin to that held by Dr. Shedd and by Dr. S. J. Baird, as by some to be identified with it. As we have mentioned the name of Dr. Baird, we take occasion to say that it must be very gratifying to that learned and laborious servant of Christ to find his "Elohim Revealed" and his "Bible History of Baptism" highly appreciated by so able and accomplished a judge as Dr. Shedd. We trust that Dr. Shedd's favorable notices will have the effect of giving a wider circulation to Dr. Baird's works. No Christian man can read them without being edified and stimulated, whether he can adopt all his views or not.

Dr. Shedd, as will be anticipated by all who are familiar with his previous publications, has no admiration for the so-called "progress" of modern theology. He acknowledges the excellences of the present period in respect to the practical application and spread of religion, but does not regard it as preëminent above all others in scientific theology. It is his conviction that there were some minds in the former ages of Christianity who were called by providence to do a work that will never be outgrown and left behind by the Christian church; some men who thought more deeply and came nearer to the centre of truth upon some subjects than any modern minds. Anselm's thinking upon the metaphysical being and nature of God, Athanasius's upon the Trinity, Augustine's upon the mystery of sin, have never been surpassed in depth, in comprehensiveness, in precision. In drawing from these earlier sources the author justly thinks systematic theology will be made both more truthful and more vital. Confinement to modern opinions tends to thinness and weakness. The latest intelligence is of more value in a newspaper than in a scientific treatise. "If this treatise," he says, "has any merits, they are due very much to daily and nightly communion with that noble army of theologians which is composed of the *élite* of the fathers, of the school-men, of the reformers, and of the seventeenth century divines of England and the continent; and let it not be supposed that this influence of the theologians is at the expense of that of the Scriptures. This is one of the vulgar errors. Scientific and contemplative theology is the child of revelation. It is the very Word of God itself, as this has been studied, collated, combined, and systematized by powerful, devout, and prayerful intellects." The author, after forty years spent in theological research and meditation, is oppressed more than ever with the vastness and mystery of the science. "But," he says, "the evangelical irradiations of the Sun of righteousness out of the thick darkness and clouds that envelop the infinite and adorable God are beams of intense brightness, which pour the light of life and of hope into the utter gloom in which man must live here upon earth if he rejects divine revelation."

Forty years' study of any subject by a man as able and conscientious as Dr. Shedd entitles him to be heard; and when that study has been expended on a subject of which the matter and the evidence are derived from divine revelation, he may be pardoned if he expresses himself in a tone of calm confidence, and even of dogmatism. He knows what he says and whereof he affirms, and knows also all that can be said against it. It has been said of Dr. Charles Hodge's writings that the pronoun "I" does not occur anywhere in them, voluminous as they are; and

the same may be said of this work of Dr. Shedd. It is impersonal throughout. The propositions are laid down, explained, proved, and defended as propositions of science. They are matters of certain knowledge, whether his readers like them or not. The only fault that can be found with this manner is, to use the words of Dr. Thornwell in reference to the scholastic theologians, that "it gives no scope to the play of Christian feeling; it never turns aside to reverence, to worship, or adore. It exhibits truth nakedly and boldly, in its objective reality, without reference to the subjective conditions which, under the influence of the Spirit, the truth is calculated to produce." The dogmatic tone is so natural to Dr. Shedd that it pervades even the speculative parts of his work. It is very noticeable in his treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity and of the theory of traducianism. The certain teachings of revelation are not always as clearly discriminated from the precarious deductions of unaided reason as they ought to be.

One very pleasing and impressive feature of the author's treatment of some topics is his citation of the great poets—Dante, Shakspeare, Milton—men of heaven-born genius, who have been prodigally endowed by their Creator and commissioned to expound the universal judgments and the universal *sentiments* of mankind. It is the most impressive form in which the argument from the *consensus populorum* can be presented. Grotius, we think, was the first author in modern times to set the example of this method and to make a copious use of it.

Dr. Shedd has not followed the "Christo-centric" method of his predecessor in Union Seminary, Dr. H. B. Smith. He prefers the method of the Westminster standards and of most of the great theologians of the seventeenth century. He adopts also the leading subdivisions of the science of theology in common use: 1, *Theology* proper, or in the narrower sense, embracing the doctrine concerning God, his Existence, his Trinitarian Personality, his Attributes, his Decrees, his Works of Creation and Providence, and his Miraculous Works; 2, *Anthropology*, embracing Man's Creation, Primitive State, Probation and Apostasy, Original Sin and Actual Transgression; 3, *Christology*, embracing Christ's Theanthropic Person, Divinity, Humanity, Unipersonality and Impeccability; 4, *Soteriology*, embracing the Mediatorial Offices of Christ and the Work of the Holy Ghost, and the Means of Grace; 5, *Eschatology*, embracing the topics of the Intermediate State, the Second Advent of Christ, the Resurrection, the Final Judgment, Heaven and Hell. It will be observed that "Ecclesiology" is omitted; for the same reason probably that it is omitted in the systems of Hodge and Dabney; that is, because this branch of theology is in our seminaries generally separated from the others and taught by a different professor. The elder theologians, as Calvin, Turretin, Marck, De Moor, treated it very fully. It is a subject of immense importance; inferior only to that of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. History shows, indeed, that these doctrines have not been held fast where a false ecclesiology has prevailed. Dr. Shedd has prefixed to the usual subdivisions of his science another which he calls "Bibliology," which corresponds in the main with historical apologetics, and forms a part of "Introduction" in some schools (Union Seminary in Virginia, for example). It embraces the subjects of Revelation and Inspiration, the Authenticity, Credibility and Canonicity of the Scriptures.

The preface to Dr. Shedd's work indicates the topics upon which he differs from other theologians of the same general school. These are (in theology) the validity of the ontological argument for God's existence and the construction of the

doctrine of the Trinity with reference to the necessary conditions of personality and self-consciousness, and the objections to the personality of the Infinite introduced by modern pantheism; (in Anthropology) the subject of Adam's sin and its imputation. He expends eighty-odd pages upon the Trinity in Unity. The scriptural argument is clearly stated, and the doctrine is conclusively defended against Arianism, Socinianism and Sabellianism; the answer to the objections made by modern pantheists to the personality of the Infinite is sufficient; but his discussion of "the necessary conditions of personality and self-consciousness" in God will be felt by many of his readers to be an intrusion into a domain that lies utterly beyond the faculties of man. It is a revival of old scholastic speculations for which no man was ever the wiser, except so far as they served to produce a more enlightened conviction of his own ignorance.

The author gives us ninety-odd pages on "Man's Creation," the greater part of which is occupied with the defence of traducianism and of his realism. He is not a realist in the mediæval sense of that term, as opposed to nominalist. He is neither a Platonic nor a Peripatetic realist in the sense in which those terms are commonly used in the histories of philosophy. "The dispute," he says, (II. p. 69) "between the realist and nominalist is easily settled if the parties distinguish carefully between specific and non-specific substance; or, in other words, between organic and inorganic substance. When specific or vital substance is in view, then realism is the truth; the species is a reality equally with the individuals that are produced out of it. Both species and individuals are entities. But when there is no species, no vital specific substance out of which the individual is produced, then the only reality is the individual." Whether, therefore, the name of a concept has an objective reality corresponding to it or not depends upon the *nature of the thing* referred to. There is a reality corresponding to the term *man*; there is none corresponding to *inkstand* or *crystal*. When we use the term "species" of these last it is only an abstract term, denoting a collection of individuals, which are the only reality (*res*) in the case.

"Adam and Eve were two human persons created by God on the sixth day. In and with them God also created the entire *invisible* nature of the human species; the masculine side of it in Adam, the feminine in Eve." . . . "By ordinary generation the specific nature was sub-divided and individualized into millions of persons. He who looked upon Adam and Eve in Eden the moment after their creation saw the whole human race in its first form. And he who shall look on the millions of individuals in the day of judgment will see the same human race in its last form. The difference between the two visions is formal, not material." It is well that the author explicitly admits that Adam and Eve were *persons*, as he uses expressions elsewhere which might be taken to imply that the "specific nature" in Adam had no more personality than the human nature of Christ.

If the theory of traducianism as expounded and defended by Dr. Shedd be true, then the *representative* character of Adam falls; and so Dr. Shedd admits. "The idea of representation by Adam is incompatible with that of specific existence in Adam" (II. 39). "The covenant of works was made with Adam as a *public person*," says the Larger Catechism, Quest. 22. This does not mean, says our author, that Adam was a "representative" person. "The term 'representative' is not once employed in the Westminster standards. It has been introduced from the outside to define a 'public person.' The Catechism here defines a public person as one 'from whom all mankind descend by ordinary generation.' The Confession

(VI. 3) uses the expression, 'root of all mankind.' Natural, not representative union, is the only union referred to. A representative is not the root of his constituents, nor do they descend from him by ordinary generation." (II. pp. 45 ff.)

Upon these statements it may be remarked: 1. That "public person" is defined in the Larger Catechism, Quest. 22, by the words which follow immediately, "Not for himself only, but for his posterity." The remoter words, "from whom all mankind," etc., only define the sphere or extent of the representation. This, at all events, seems to have been the understanding of commentators on the Catechism. (See Vincent's Explanation of the Shorter Catechism, Quest. 16.) Vincent was a contemporary of the Westminster divines, and his little work was commended by such men as John Owen, Caryl, and Calamy. The last two were members of the Westminster Assembly. (See also Fisher's Catechism, a work quoted with approval several times by Dr. Shedd, Quest. 16, sub-questions 17-19.) This was the common view of the Calvinistic theologians of the seventeenth century. (See *Marck's Compend.* XIV. 16, *Medulla* XIV. 16, approved by his pupil and commentator, De Moor, III. pp. 66-68) So Turretin (IX. 9-12) calls Adam "*persona publica et repræsentativa.*" So Witsiu's (O. F., I. 2-15) "*Adam sustinuit personam, omnium ex stirpe ipsius nasciturorum.*" Besides, these divines connect with this representative relation of Adam the *imputation* of his first sin; but Dr. Shedd says there is no imputation (in the sense of "*rei alienæ.*" see Turretin, IX. 9, 10) of that sin, because no representation. Adam's posterity committed it, as well as Adam himself. Dr. Baird, less consistent here than Dr. Shedd, admits the representative character of Adam (*Elohim Revealed*, p. 308).

There is a lesson of charity to be learned here. Five names of eminent theologians in the Presbyterian Church in this country have been mentioned in the course of this review, all of whom are heartily at one as to the fact of the utter ruin of the human race in Adam, and also as to the way of salvation from that ruin, presenting an undivided front against Socinians, Pelagians, and Arminians, and yet no two of them explain the "Adamic connexion" in the same manner, and some of them are very far apart.

But the limits assigned to this article have been already transcended. We cannot conclude without particularly mentioning the discussion of the subject of hell in the last chapter of Dr. Shedd's work. It is the ablest argument for "endless punishment" we have ever met with, and a crushing refutation, even upon rational grounds, of the whole tribe of universalists, restorationists, future probationists, etc. The substance of it was published by Charles Scribner's Sons in 1886, under the title of "The Doctrine of Endless Punishment," in a volume of 163 pages. We earnestly advise our readers who cannot afford to buy the "Dogmatic Theology" to procure and study that little volume. T. E. PECK.

BRIGGS' MESSIANIC PROPHECY.

MESSIANIC PROPHECY. The Prediction of the Fulfilment of Redemption through a Messiah. A critical study of the Messianic passages of the Old Testament in the order of their development. *By Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D., Davenport Professor of Hebrew and the Cognate Languages in the Union Theological Seminary, New York City.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1886.

The writer proposes in this article to do little more than to give an analysis of the views of the author before us, in the form of an outline of his system.

I. He defines prophecy as "religious instruction" which "claims to come from God and to possess divine authority. The prophet is an officer of the Deity, with a commission from the God whom he serves." He cites Melchizedek, Jethro and Balaam to prove that genuine prophecy is common to all religions. He traces all that is excellent in them to genuine prophecy rather than to tradition of "primitive divine revelations," or to the direct influence of Bible prophecy. He claims that it is scientific to subject Hebrew prophecy and heathen prophecy to the same tests. (See pp. 1-5.)

II. He finds three phases of genuine prophecy common to all religions, "the dream, the vision, and the enlightened spiritual discernment;" and that these are, neither of them, peculiar to Hebrew prophecy. (Pp. 5-12.)

III. He defines the higher order of prophets as those who "through retirement and contemplation of the sacred mysteries of religion have been spiritually enlightened to discern truths of a higher order than their fellows, and to experience emotions of a deeper and more absorbing intensity. They have wondrous powers of insight and forecast. They read and interpret character and affairs," etc. "Such prophets of a higher grade exist among all religions," "guided by the divine Spirit in the ordinary influences of the divine providence in their spiritual reflections and activities while they have been feeling after God." This is the psychological basis on which he puts the highest phases of prophecy, whether Hebrew or heathen. (Pp. 10, 11 and 13.) This degrades prophecy to a mere intellectual process of insight and forecast. All that he says about revelation needs to be interpreted in the light of these fundamental definitions.

IV. He seems to characterize the old theory of the prophet's inspiration as "Montanistic," and wholly inadequate, except, perhaps, for the "vision" and the "dream," and then states the "naturalistic" theory as the other pole of thought (Carlisle?). This also he seems to reject, but only *seems* to do so, for he finds the superiority of Hebrew prophecy solely in the results, which superior results only argue a larger spiritual energy on the same "physical and psychological basis." The free use of orthodox and scriptural phrase in other places does not set aside these deliberate discriminations. (Pp. 12-22.)

V. He makes the "witness of the Spirit" to the believer and the prophet's inspiration to be one and the same operation, differing only in the "content of the influence and in the measure of the energy." (Pp. 21, 22.)

VI. He makes "conformity to the truth and fact" the sole test of prophecy, and rejects the miracle as the prophet's testimonials. He rather seems to base the credibility of the miracle on the truth of the prophet's utterances. (Pp. 22-24.) And in insisting on the "inherent truth and reality of the prophecies" as "the determining factors and final tests of genuineness," he scouts all *a priori* claims of the prophet which may be based on signs and wonders, and he denounces such claims as "unscriptural" and "immoral," and classifies them along with the "signseeking of the Pharisees." In a volume of 499 pages he so persistently ignores the miracle in its relations to the prophet's commission and the people's faith, that one is led to doubt whether he does not reject miracles altogether, or at least put them on the same debatable ground with the "great signs and wonders" of "false messiahs and false prophets" which, if possible, shall "deceive the very elect."

VII. In discussing predictive prophecy he claims that its essence is a "pre-

dicted ideal" clothed in the "forms of the present and the past," and that "these forms are not real and literal representations of the future, but ideal and symbolical." He rejects the doctrine that prophecy writes history in advance and that the interpreter may not expect to find a literal fulfilment, and he does not hesitate to say that all attempts to do so have been disastrous. (1'p. 34-45.)

VIII. On page 55, he discusses the limits of predictive prophecy. Let one sentence suffice as the key of his position. "The prophets, looking into the future, follow the lines of the movements of their own times, tracing them to their results. Their insight and foresight are intensified by the energy of the divine Spirit, which enlarges their native intellectual and moral powers to the extent that may be necessary for the purposes of prediction." If these be the limits, then actual communication of truth from a personal Spirit to a personal prophet becomes an impossibility, and the operation of the Spirit is but an enabling operation, and all the subsequent allusions to "divine ideas," "supernatural energy," and "spiritual enlightenment" degenerate into mere figures of speech, to be understood within the aforementioned limits.

IX. In giving what purports to be an exhaustive discussion of Messianic prophecy, the author absolutely ignores the elaborate ceremonial and ritual system of the Old Testament, both Mosaic and pre-Mosaic. This system has been regarded as an elaborate system of object-lessons, setting forth the plan of redemption through a personal, mediatorial and atoning Messiah, the "shadow of things to come." He easily finds the Protevangel in the promise to the woman, but ignores the lessons of the altar and the sacrifice of Abel. Such an oversight is inexcusable, even though he may consider the growth of the Hebrew ritual as post-Mosaic and its completion as post-exilic. He does speak of types freely (pp. 46-49), but makes scant, if any, reference to the ritual, and degrades typology to the level of a mere illustrative symbolism. "The exact correspondence of type and anti-type is impossible." He reverses the natural and logical order by requiring "the interpreter to find the key of the symbol, and by it unlock the mystery of the representation;" or, in other words, the Messianic ideal is clad in symbolic forms, and the interpreter must first discover the ideal before he can see the force of the symbol.

X. So far our author's system is confessedly destructive of the old and accepted notions of prophecy and the methods of its interpretation, in order to prepare the way for the construction of such a theory of Messianic prophecy as will be both scientific and scriptural, and stand against all assaults. He finds the solution of all the difficulties in the one word "ideal," and all prophecy is religious teaching aiming at and approximating to an ideal. Now, according to Webster, an ideal is "a conception proposed by the mind for imitation, realization or attainment; a standard of perfection or duty." Our author uses the term in this sense. We study the work of an artist, whether he be painter or poet, and we mount up from the imperfect execution to the more perfect ideal. An elaborate picture combines in one complex ideal many lesser and independent ideals, adjusted to each other so as to make a complete whole. Now, if we could realize in nature the growth of a painting; that germinal seeds of the several lesser ideals could be planted and grown, each according to its own genius and spirit, and that new plantings could be made from time to time, and that these should all grow and reach their perfection at the same time and as parts of one complex whole; could this be realized, such a picture in its separate parts would present a continuous life and growth and

development, and a continuous approximation to the separate ideals, and the combined whole would be a living and advancing organism from the beginning, growing into a full realization of the complex and completed ideal. Such is our author's Messianic ideal, with perhaps enough of truth behind the theory to make it attractive and even fascinating.

XI. I will now attempt to state the author's theory, and in his own words as far as practicable: "The central theme and culmination of Hebrew prophecy is the Messianic ideal" (p. 60). "Messianic prophecy is an advancing organism expressing in ever richer and fuller representations the ideal of complete redemption through a Messiah." "It is yet an ideal in continual development" (p. 63). He says that "each prophet as he comes with a fresh message sees farther, wider and deeper than his predecessors," and that earlier prophecies "must be from the nature of the case partial and incomplete." He represents these partial revelations as "so many folds of a developing germ" (p. 60).

In chapter XV. we find eleven distinct ideals discussed in summary, as the separate ideals which go to make up the complex Messianic ideal—"an organic system constantly advancing on the original lines, and expanding into new and more comprehensive phases with the progress of the centuries." These ideals belong to two lines, "the human" and "the divine," and these two lines are never confounded in the development of each ideal from its original germ. These germs are started first at different and widely separated times in the historical development of the Messianic ideal, and in exact conjunction with the advanced and advancing experience of redemption as apprehended by the faith of the people and directed by the deeper insight of the prophet. Each growing ideal but voices the yearning and embodies the experience of God's people at each succeeding stage, and in this way "history constantly approximates the Messianic ideal."

The *first* ideal is the "Ideal of Mankind;" or, "The ideal man of the poem of creation and of the codes of the Pentateuch." This ideal is traced through the fall and through the history of its final realization in a redeemed race. The *second* ideal is found in the Protevangel, "The Conflict with Evil:" "The conflict in this primitive prophecy is with the serpent and his seed [evidently a literal conflict with snakes]. But in subsequent prophecy the combat is between good and evil in families, tribes, nations, the powers of heaven and earth, until it becomes a universal struggle." The *third* ideal is the "Divine Advent:" "God comes to dwell in the tents of Shem, as a god of the race." He dwells with the patriarchs, then in the tabernacle, and then in the temple. The *fourth* ideal is the "Holy Land," introduced by the blessing of Abraham. The *fifth* ideal is "Jahveh, the Father and Husband:" "Jahveh adopted Israel as his firstborn." "The sonship of Israel unfolds into the sonship of David and his seed." The *sixth* ideal is "The Kingdom of God," constituted at Sinai, enlarged in David, dismembered by the secession, and so on. The *seventh* ideal is "The Day of Jahveh," introduced first by Joel the prophet, a day of judgment and redemption. The *eighth* ideal is "The Holy Priesthood:" "The covenant with Israel at Horeb, making Israel a kingdom of priests, is unfolded in the covenants with Phinehas and David." The *ninth* ideal is the "Faithful Prophet:" This ideal becomes prominent only after the exile. Strangely enough, our author ascribes the Messianic sufferings to this head. The *tenth* ideal is "The Messianic King:" Jahveh adopts the seed of David as his son, whom he will chastise by human agents, for sin, but will never forsake. The

eleventh ideal is "The New Covenant:" "Hosea first introduces it into the Messianic idea in the form of a remarriage of Jahveh to Israel."

Now, our author supposes each of these ideals to be developed into its own completeness independently of the others, and that they altogether form an organism called the Messianic ideal. No wonder, he says, "Vast and complex that organism is—so complex that the wisest sages of Israel could not comprehend it." He evidently teaches further, that it was not possible for any one to find unity in all this variety and complexity or to unite all these ideals in one personal Messiah and his work, until Jesus Christ was born, the full realization of the Messianic ideal.

XII. There is still one modification of this exposition to be stated. "Complete redemption" (the Messianic ideal) is not yet realized as set forth in prophecy; the "horizon of prophecy" includes also the second advent and the final judgment and all the struggles and triumphs which intervene after the first advent. Only a part of the complete ideal is realized or fulfilled, and "the rest is taken up in New Testament prophecy and carried on to a higher stage of development." The author promises to elucidate this matter with a second volume, and then to add a third to trace the history of the Messianic ideal in the Christian church and show its importance in the development of Christian doctrine.

Reader, does your mind reel and stagger like ours in trying to realize such a load of truth at once? Perhaps it is because we are too deeply committed to "scholastic," "montanistic," and "traditional" schemes of interpretation to emerge at once into the full light of the truth. If our author's theory of interpretation be true, it would seem that it was hardly fair in our Saviour to say to the disciples in the way, "O fools and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken;" and how can we, who are but partially enlightened, possess our souls in patience till the other two volumes appear?

XIII. So far we have pursued the main current of the author's thought; we will now note several matters which are incidental to his theory and, perhaps, necessary to it.

1. His doctrine of Deity in the Old Testament does not rise higher than a pure monotheism. He teaches that the doctrine of the Trinity is exclusively a New Testament doctrine. His "Jahveh" (LORD) represents "The Deity as an ever-living, acting person, who enters into personal relations with his people, and would have them address him by a proper name."

2. The notion of a personal Messiah seems to form no part of the Messianic ideal till the time of the later prophets. Even as late as Amos there is only "a generic reference to the house of David and the people of Israel;" and even when the person of the Messiah does appear in the time of Isaiah, it is in such contradictory phases as to be practically useless for the faith of God's people.

3. It is difficult to decipher our author's scheme for the salvation of the people of God before Christ. It certainly was not faith in the atoning work of a personal Saviour to come, for they had no sufficient revelation of him.

4. It is difficult to see that our author himself believes in the atonement in the old-fashioned sense of that word. The following sentences are taken from an article from his pen in the *Sunday-school Times* (Vol. XXX., No. 22.): "The priestly functions of the Messiah were not exercised during his earthly ministry." "Hence the predictions contained in the Messianic ideal of the holy priesthood found no fulfilment during the earthly life of Jesus, but point to his mediatorial reign."

And on pp. 491, 492, he groups all the prophetic sufferings around the ideal *prophet* and concludes with this proposition: "The servant suffers as a substitute and dies a martyr's death;" and adds, "But his heroic patience and self-sacrifice are rewarded." If, then, he holds the orthodox view of the atonement, his point of view is strangely variant from it.

5. The doctrine of a universal resurrection is treated as post-exilic. On pp. 266, 267, he limits Ezekiel's vision in the valley of bones to "the resurrection of Israel as a nation and their restoration to the Holy Land." He then adds, "It becomes associated in subsequent prophecy with the doctrine of a universal resurrection, etc. But this wider outlook was not granted to Ezekiel." How drear must have been the personal outlook for the future in the faith of God's ancient people.

6. In making the details of prophetic utterance mere symbols, even to the numbers so often employed, he makes all literal fulfilment impossible. He seems also to limit all revelation to the horizon of the prophet. For example, he denies that Rome is the fourth kingdom of Daniel, because "The Roman Empire had not yet risen in the most distant horizon of prophecy, and it is against the analogy of prophecy to transcend its horizon." He even gets rid of a fourth kingdom altogether, by telling us that the number *four* is symbolical of the wide extent of a thing. "It indicates here the wide extent or compass of the kingdoms rising up against the holy people," etc. And yet, with an inconsistency which characterizes our author's logic in many places, he proceeds to name the first, second and third kingdoms, and to discuss the fulfilment of details, and strangely ignores the "high symbolism" of the numbers one, two, and three.

7. We are not surprised to find him talking of the development of Old Testament theology, because his position on that subject is well known from his previous writings; one, however, cannot but be shocked to read this: "The imperfection and the grossness of the earlier Hebrew religion, and the morals of the earlier stages of Hebrew prophecy, are patent to all;" and this: "There is this strife between the divine ideal and the historic reality which makes the history of Israel seem like a series of apostasies."

8. He assumes that we have recorded in the Bible all the religious instruction given by God to the race at successive stages of the history. And he interprets each brief record within such narrow limits as best comports with the theory of a race emerging from the profoundest depths into successive stages of a higher development. Indeed, he seems to hold that a larger revelation of truth at any given period would have been not only unprofitable, but absolutely incompatible with the experience and hopes of men, and that the light of truth was given only as they were able to bear it. Such views are in entire accord with the popular doctrine of the evolution of civilization and religion from the primeval savage. However, he does not say *evolution* once, or else we have failed to note it.

9. We sometimes judge and classify a man by the company he keeps. Our author quotes Dr. Mandsley, Cicero, Delitzsch, Müller, Oehler, Kuenen, Küper, Rheim, Wellhausen, Keil, Driver, and others of the various destructive schools of critics, to confirm the general trend of his thought, though he does sometimes enter a caveat against their too destructive tendencies; while on the other hand he hardly calls the name of a single orthodox expounder of prophecy, even to pay him the empty tribute of a refutation, but grandly brushes them all aside under the non-complimentary appellatives, "scholastic," "montanistic," and "traditional."

10. It would hardly seem necessary to remind the reader that his point of view is the higher criticism. He believes in the composite character of the Pentateuch, and of almost all the other Scriptures as well. His Messianic ideal would not live for an hour in his own mind on any other theory; in this respect it resembles some other so-called sciences, based on unproven hypotheses. But more yet: he adopts his theory of an advancing organism as a law by which to determine the relative place of every prophecy, and by it he settles dates and authorship as daringly as any of his predecessors. For example, many of the Messianic psalms are made post-exilic for the sole reason that such clear views of the Messiah and his work were impossible at an earlier period. He first rearranges the supposed conglomerate, and then educes therefrom a principle of interpretation, and then under its authority proceeds to rearrange still further in order to make his theory possible and probable. This he calls the scientific and scriptural method.

XIV. In concluding this notice it is necessary still to note three points.

1. The superior scholarship of the author, as displayed by his books, has been often commented upon. It is well known that the schools of the higher criticism lay claim to all the true scholarship, with the quiet assumption that it is lacking with their opponents. Now there are some forms of scholarship which it is hard to endorse because of their fruitage; and there are some who have a passable old-fashioned scholarship, who are not sufficiently in sympathy with a scholarship which takes a fragment of Hebrew trimeter and supplies the missing link and corrects erroneous and corrupted words in accordance with the Messianic ideal, and then determines its place and its authorship by the same standard.

2. The highly devout character of the book has also been most highly commended. Many of its passages are simply grand, and unsurpassed in their ascriptions of glory to God for the revelation of himself and of the methods of his providence and his grace. But one is led to wonder, after all, if the recent doctrine is true which makes devoutness the test of legitimate criticism.

3. We have only proposed to give a succinct and intelligent analysis of the author's views. If we have succeeded, we think that the orthodox will consider the statement of his views a sufficient refutation. We are aware that there is much in the book which may be cited to show that this exposition is not strictly accurate; and it may be further claimed that the quotations made do not exhaust his views. The same may be said in the case of every errorist when you bring his work to the crucible. There is always found much of truth in the popular and rhetorical parts of such writings, which parts are always quoted in extenuation of views more formally and definitely expressed elsewhere. One further fact is often overlooked. We often admit the truth of much we read in books of evil tendency, because we read those parts in their accepted meaning, and also according to our own accustomed use of similar words and phrases, whereas careful study would reveal the fact that the writer means something different, and that this different sense is necessary to the whole scheme of the book; so that, instead of saying of such a book, "There is a great deal of truth in it," it would be often safer to say, "There is not one word of truth in it." Most men, however, say that it somehow lacks logical coherency rather than bring so uncharitable an indictment; and so does your humble reviewer say of the book before us.

Davidson College, N. C.

J. B. SHEARER.

BEATTIE'S METHODS OF THEISM.

THE METHODS OF THEISM: AN ESSAY. *By the Rev. F. R. Beattie, Ph. D., D. D.*
Brantford, (Ontario): Watt & Shenston. 1887.

This work of 138 pages, by our new Professor at Columbia Seminary, South Carolina, indicates an unusual amount of research on the part of its scholarly author. Its aim "is to give a concise and critical statement of the various ways in which the belief in God is explained, accounted for, or vindicated." The book is divided into two parts:

I. The methods of the origin of the idea of God.

II. The methods of the proof of the existence of God.

In the first part there are four chapters: 1. The method of natural evolution. Under this there are three sections: (*a.*) Fetichism, as advocated by Comte; (*b.*) Henotheism, or the worship of single natural objects. This is advocated in Max Müller's Hibbert Lectures. It is to be distinguished from both Monotheism and Polytheism, as being "the doctrine of single gods, each equal to, or quite independent of, all the others." (*c.*) Ancestor worship, put forward by Herbert Spencer. This is well characterized as a visionary theory, unhistorical, defective in its view of the facts in the case, and failing with other theories to account for the existence of the theistic idea in the minds of men.

Chapter II. The Methods of Divine Revelation. Dr. Beattie criticizes this, admitting, however, "that the clear, definite and complete knowledge of God which prevails in Christian lands is largely the product of revelation." But he holds that this method does not account for the genesis of the theistic conception.

Chapter III. The Methods of Ratiocination. "According to this method the origin of the idea of God in the human mind is due to some kind of a reasoning process." Here the views of McCosh in his "Divine Government," and his "Intuitions of the Human Mind," and of Prof. Flint "in his admirable treatise on Theism," pass under review. Dr. Beattie distinguishes between "the vindication of a belief," and "the genesis of that belief," and deems it "better to say that the belief in God is the natural and native deliverance of our being, which is endowed with a theistic capacity."

Chapter IV. The Method of Intuition. The author condemns the pantheistic intuition of the absolute, the God-consciousness of Jacobi and Schleiermacher, and the Hegelian conception of God's coming to self-consciousness, and hence self-knowledge in man. After remarks on Calderwood and Hodge, the author suggests the view "that the primitive theistic conviction in the human mind is to be regarded as God's testimony in man's soul or spiritual nature to His own actual existence.

Under the second part of the book we find: 1, The Onto-theistic argument; 2, The Actio-theistic argument, depending on the principle of causation, or the first cause; 3, The Cosmo-theistic argument, the principle of adequate ground or sufficient reason; 4, The Eutaxio-theistic argument, the principle of order, or natural law; 5, The Teleo-theistic argument, . . . special adaptations in the universe; 6, The Eso-theistic argument, where the proof grows out of the intuition of God in the human mind; 7, The Ethico-theistic argument, depending on the principle of morality; 8, The Historico-theistic argument, the consensus of theistic belief in all ages, and the divine guidance and direction of individuals and nations.

From this resumé a good general idea of the author's method can be gained. There is much that we feel inclined to say, but our limits restrict us to a few points.

1. The author's style is good, unadorned, yet perspicuous, clear, and strong. For his purpose a better style could hardly have been chosen. There was no room for the oratorical glow of Chalmers or the profuse illustration of McCosh, Flint, and Janet, but only for a concise lucidity.

2. There is a general soundness of view in the work which will commend it to right-minded men. Dr. Beattie is to be considered a valuable acquisition to our Southern theology, and we may hope to see the pages of the *PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY* enriched by thoughtful articles from his pen. We specialize his aversion to empiricism, that bane of all philosophy.

3. If, amid much that is meritorious, we should dissent from aught, it would be from an extreme recoil from empiricism and an over-fondness for the intuitional. Thus Dr. Beattie speaks, we think, too favorably of Anselm's famous argument, which, after repeated consideration, we regard as a pure sophism, while it is acute enough for the father of scholasticism himself.

Paley was certainly deficient in metaphysical acumen, but does not deserve disparagement. The enemies of theism hate him, but cannot answer him. Janet follows Paley's method in an exceedingly beautiful chapter; and as the method is excellently adapted to pulpit presentation, it is highly desirable for all students of theology and candidates to master it thoroughly. L. G. BARBOUR.

LONG'S ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY.

OUTLINE OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY. For the Use of Colleges, High Schools, and Theological Classes. *By Rev. Isaac J. Long, D. D., President of Arkansas College, Batesville, Ark.* 12mo, pp. 125. Cloth, 60 cents, post-paid. St. Louis: Farris, Smith & Co. 1888.

The Rev. Dr. Long may be numbered with that goodly company of Christian instructors who believe thoroughly in the policy of placing at the foundation of all sober instruction offered to the rising generation the principles of Christian truth. He is keenly alive to the danger of a purely secular education. He has counted the cost to this great commonwealth of even the negative method of dealing with the young during the educational stage, which consists in a simple avoidance of all strictly religious truth. He evidently understands that such a method will produce a generation of careless, conscienceless, if not skeptical men, upon whom neither state nor church can build with safety. To meet the danger arising from this too prevalent method, he is not content with occasional mention of vague morals in the presence of his students, the very vagueness of the reference intimating the timidity of the instructor in regard to all important religious questions; but he comes out boldly with the clear statement of Christian truth, and seeks to impress the student with the conviction that this branch of the teaching is the most important in the entire curriculum. In addition to regular Bible instruction, Dr. Long gives to the students of Arkansas College an outline course in ecclesiastical history. This is a capital idea. Here, as the fortunes of God's Israel, passing through the world, are reverently followed, may be seen Bible truth transmuted into lofty human character. Here, in the onward movement of the living church, may be found the most satisfactory proofs of the truth of the divine oracles. Here may be had the noblest

incentives to holy living. Here, we make sure, ingenuous youth may be interested, even to the point of fascination, in the story of their kind. And by this rare study many a young man may be stimulated to seek a saving interest in the great central person around whom all history revolves. For the last ten years Dr. Long has taught the classes, in the college over which he so successfully presides, ecclesiastical history by a course of written lectures. To make the instruction in this branch more satisfactory to pupils, he has thrown these lectures into the form of a textbook, with the title at the head of this notice, and now offers it to the public as a compend of information on the subject treated, which may be of service to other teachers, and to Christians generally who may not have access to larger works. Dr. Long has done his work well. His divisions are natural and comprehensive. His statements are clear and accurate. His treatment of topics started by the divisions, while brief, is intelligent and just to the spirit of history. For the purpose intended the little volume is excellent. A teacher who understands the art of oral instruction, from the manual could lead his students, by means of this little book, to a very satisfactory acquaintance with the leading principles and most important details of this great department of human learning.

WILLIS G. CRAIG.

DR. PATTON'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

THE INAUGURATION OF THE REV. FRANCIS LAIDLAY PATTON, D. D., LL. D., AS PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON COLLEGE. Princeton, N. J., June 20, 1888.

This pamphlet of forty-four large octavo pages contains a short address by Prof. James O. Muray, speaking as the representative of the College authorities; a yet shorter address by Dr. Henry Van Dyke, speaking as the representative of the Alumni; and President Patton's inaugural address.

President Patton in his address discusses topics out of the ordinary track of inaugural addresses, yet most appropriate to the occasion, and for this reason it is worthy of especial notice. A large part of the address is occupied with a discussion of the two questions: (1), What should be the character of the American University? and (2), What relation should the American University sustain to the Christian religion?—both of them questions of great practical importance—living questions of the present day.

For President Patton's views respecting the proper character of the American University, the reader is referred to the address itself, the limits allowable for a brief review precluding the possibility of entering with any profit on the discussion of so large a subject. To his answer to the second question, What relation should the American University sustain to the Christian religion? we will devote what space we have, assured that the views expressed will meet with the hearty approval of most thoughtful Christian men, and hoping that the masterly presentation of these views by President Patton may help to decide some hesitating souls, hesitating under the influence of the plausible sophistry which would eliminate all teaching of the Christian religion from the university course of instruction.

On this subject, in general, President Patton says: "True culture culminates in religion. True philosophy has God as its postulate; true science reaches God as its conclusion. The education, therefore, that is to prove a valuable element in civilization cannot afford to be indifferent to the claims of divine truth. The best Christians are the best citizens. Without faith in the next world we shall soon lose

interest in this. It is not enough, therefore, that we seek to train men who are skilled in mathematics, and cultivated in the knowledge of the great literatures of the world. It is not enough that we be abreast of the times in regard to the great inductions of science, or that our professors are well-read in the latest utterances of German philosophy. It is not enough that we maintain no hostile attitude to religion, and that we teach men to think on the great problems of the social economy without prejudice to their hereditary beliefs. It is not enough that we have Christian services on Sunday, and that ample accommodations are furnished those who by taste and training are disposed to engage in concerted effort to promote a wholesome religious sentiment in the college. There should be distinct, earnest, purposeful effort to show every man who enters our college halls the ground for entertaining those fundamental religious beliefs that are the common heritage of the Christian world. The necessary effect of education is that of awakening the spirit of inquiry on all subjects. And we have no right to conduct a course of study the object of which is to tell a man to think, to induce a man to think, to train a man to think, and the effect of which is a tendency at least to bring the naïve convictions of childhood before the bar of reason, that they may show cause why they should not be abandoned, without at the same time doing something to strengthen faith, and give it a reasoned position." (Pp. 42, 43.)

Referring to the fact that the College of New Jersey was originally founded as a Christian college, and that as such it has been endowed by Christian men, President Patton quotes and endorses the remarks of Dr. Ashbel Green, president of the college from 1812 to 1822: "It is hoped that the guardians of Nassau Hall will forever keep in mind that the design of its foundation would be perverted if religion should ever be cultivated in it to the neglect of science, or science to the neglect of religion; if on the one hand it should be converted into a religious house like a monastery or theological seminary, in which religious instruction should claim almost exclusively the attention of every pupil; or, upon the other hand, should become an establishment in which science should be taught, how perfectly soever, without connecting with it and constantly endeavoring to inculcate the principles and practice of piety. Whatever other institutions may exist or arise in our country in which religion and science may be separated from each other by their instructors or governors, this institution, without a gross perversion of its original design, can never be one;" and adds, "These words I make my own to-day, and so help me God, during the time of my administration Princeton shall keep faith with the dead." (P. 23.) "*Keep faith with the dead,*" that is honorable, that is honest; and yet how lightly esteemed are such honor and honesty by many in our day!—in how many instances in our higher institutions of learning are endowments left by Christian men now dead used to propagate doctrines they abhorred!

On one other subject, intimately connected with the proper conduct of a Christian university, President Patton speaks so much to the point that we cannot close this brief notice of his address without giving the reader the benefit of his utterance. "We hear much 'just now of university freedom. Kant advocated it a hundred years ago, and Helmholtz sounded its praises in 1877. I believe in freedom, but in concrete experience we must take note of the qualifications of freedom. The genius of the university is freedom, but the genius of such a university as this is qualified freedom. The trustees have responsibilities; so have the professors. These limit freedom. We have no scientific confession of faith, but we would not

let a communist teach political economy, nor Mr. Jasper astronomy; we would not give academic standing to the substantial philosophy of Mr. Wilford Hall, nor permit one of the flat-land people to instruct in physical geography; we would not allow Mr. Sinnett to teach esoteric Buddhism, or entertain a class with Madam Blavatsky's vagaries, because we believed in the freedom of philosophizing. We should also close our doors to the crude idealism professed by the so-called Christian scientists, and the metaphysical healers. It is no part of university freedom to shelter nonsense or give learned leisure to the charlatan. Nor is it part of university freedom to open the halls of science and philosophy to men who teach atheism or belittle the Christian faith." (Pp. 27, 28.)

GEO. D. ARMSTRONG.

GREEN'S HEBREW GRAMMAR.

A GRAMMAR OF THE HEBREW LANGUAGE. *By William Henry Green, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J.* New edition. Carefully revised throughout and the Syntax greatly enlarged. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1889.

The venerable Professor of Oriental and Old Testament Literature at Princeton "still brings forth fruit in old age." For more than forty years he has been a teacher of Hebrew, and for nearly thirty his Grammar of the Hebrew Language has been before the public. During this time he has not been idle. On the contrary, he has been steadily adding to his ample stores of learning, and constantly enriching the literature of his department by his own contributions. Even those who for a quarter of a century have recognized his preëminence among American Hebraists and have observed to some extent the fruitfulness of his pen, would perhaps be surprised by the length of the list if they should attempt an enumeration of his books, to say nothing of the strong and full flow of his review articles, continued from year to year and touching every subject, philological, exegetical, and critical, that has interest for the thoroughgoing student of the Old Testament. We can ourselves recall seven volumes that he has published since 1861. The estimation of his ability and general scholarship by those who have had the best opportunity of knowing him was shown in 1868 by his election to the presidency of the College of New Jersey, which on being declined by Dr. Green was tendered to Dr. McCosh. The estimation of his character and learning by other scholars in the same department may be inferred from his election as chairman of the American Old Testament Company of the Anglo-American Bible-Revision Committee. The appearance of a new work, or of a revised edition of an old work, by such a man must be a matter of interest to all critical students of the Scriptures.

The brief but pregnant preface begins with these encouraging sentences: "The twenty-seven years which have elapsed since the first publication of this Grammar have been exceedingly fruitful in the philological and exegetical study of the Old Testament. And important progress has been made toward a more thorough and accurate knowledge of the grammatical structure of the Hebrew language. This edition of the Grammar has been carefully revised throughout, that it may better represent the advanced state of scholarship on this subject." Certainly these statements will raise the expectations of every scholar who reads them. Just as certainly, however, he will be disappointed to some extent when he reads further. Excellent as

this Grammar is in many respects, we fear Dr. Green's excessive conservatism and his constitutional attachment to what is merely old have prevented him from fulfilling in the largest sense the promise held out in the remarks above quoted. Most of the changes, except the very great enlargement and improvement of the Syntax, are such as make the impression that he has been swept forward by the rising tide of scientific Hebrew study somewhat against his will. He relinquishes reluctantly, or not at all, an antiquated nomenclature, time-honored errors of transliteration, and exploded theories of etymology. *E. g.*, he insists upon retaining the terms *preterite* and *future* as names of the tenses, instead of *perfect* and *imperfect*. Of less moment are his classification of verbs as *perfect* and *imperfect* instead of *strong* and *weak*, and his classification of syllables as *simple* and *mixed*, instead of *open* and *closed*. His system of notation is very defective; ׀ is represented by *v*, *k* stands for both ׀ and ׀, while *s* transliterates both ׀ and ׀, thus failing to distinguish letters that are entirely different; but the gravest fault of all is the failure to recognize any difference between tone-long and naturally-long vowels. Akin to this last point, though not a matter of mere transliteration, is his superficial view that Seghol is always short. The utterly inadequate explanations of the ׀ and the ׀ in ׀ Imperfects, Imperatives, and Participles (§170, *c*), and in the Absolute and Construct forms of ׀ nouns (§217, 2, *a.*), are unworthy of such a scholar as Dr. Green, and are all the more strange because his explanation of the feminine ending ׀ in the Construct state shows that the key was in his hand and needed only to be applied.

The absence of any such general view of the Semitic group as that which Gesenius gives, or any such suggestive and appetizing discussion of the characteristics of Hebrew as may be found in Ewald's Grammar, our author's reactionary statement in regard to the original form of the article (§230, *a.*), his failure to suggest any explanation of the masculine plural Construct termination ׀, of the plural forms assumed by some prepositions before suffixes, of the difference in form between ׀ the preposition and ׀ the sign of the definite object when used with the pronominal suffixes, as well as his treatment of many other points upon which recent scholarship has thrown light, justify the announcement which he himself makes: "Little occasion has been found to alter the more general and comprehensive statements, which are distinguished by being printed in large type. The changes are chiefly in the addition of fuller details, enlarging and multiplying the paragraphs in small type." These sentences of the Preface describe this Grammar as to its Orthography and Etymology much more accurately than those first quoted. We must think that the author shows too much deference to Jewish grammarians, and too little to modern philology. The book makes a strong impression of his enormous capacity for drudgery, and his astonishing mastery of details, but it is a work of analysis rather than synthesis, of collation rather than induction, of phenomena rather than philosophy.

Here our strictures end. Such defects in a less admirable grammar than Dr. Green's would scarcely have called for notice. As it is, the general excellence of his work makes them somewhat glaring. But it must not be forgotten that, after all necessary abatements, we have here the most complete and exhaustive grammar of the Hebrew language that American scholarship has ever produced.

The Syntax, of which we cannot now speak in detail, deserves special commendation. The forty-seven pages given to this subject in the old edition are here expanded into one hundred and twenty-six. "While every part of the Syntax is much more fully developed than before, special attention has been paid to the use of the tenses, which is so thoroughly discussed in the admirable treatise of Dr. Driver." It is here that Dr. Green most fully establishes his claim to have brought his Grammar abreast of "the advanced state of scholarship on this subject." These richly freighted pages constitute a thesaurus of Hebrew Syntax which has no equal in the English language, and which should receive careful study by every progressive student of that ancient and beautiful tongue which "the Hengstenberg of America" has done so much to elucidate.

Hampden-Sidney, Va.

W. W. MOORE.

LANSING'S ARABIC GRAMMAR.

AN ARABIC MANUAL. *By J. G. Lansing, D. D., Professor of Old Testament Languages in Theological Seminary of the Reformed (Dutch) Church, New Brunswick, N. J.* 8vo, cloth, pp. 200. Price \$2, net. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1887.

This is an *Elementary Arabic Grammar*, of which only a few brief notices have appeared. It is much more complete and thorough in every part than other similar works that have been published. It is the very book that is needed for the beginner in the study of Arabic. Not a few have hesitated to enter upon the study of this noble language because there were no treatises suitable for beginners. Some Elementary Arabic Grammars heretofore published are too meagre and imperfect to supply the wants of the student, though most excellent standard works. Others, such as Wright's Arabic Grammar, in two volumes, are too exhaustive and voluminous for the beginner. Prof. Lansing's Manual, therefore, supplies a need long felt. He has succeeded admirably in observing a happy mean.

It is worthy of note that this is the first Arabic Grammar printed in America. There is, perhaps, not another man in America so well qualified to do what Prof. Lansing has so well done. As we are informed, he has a thorough practical acquaintance with Arabic, speaking it as fluently as he does English. An examination of the Manual leads one to the conclusion that its author not only knows the *phenomena* of Arabic, but is also perfectly acquainted with all the underlying *principles* that control and mould the language. The book is not made up simply of remarks about the surface facts of Arabic, but there is a logical statement and scientific explanation of these facts.

In the general preface to the work the author states that the need of such a manual "has come to be experienced largely through the recent revival in Hebrew and Shemitic studies generally." It must necessarily follow that if there is a genuine revival in the study of Hebrew and its cognates, Arabic must also receive due attention. The author mentions several weighty reasons why the study of Arabic should occupy a prominent place in connection with the study of the other Shemitic languages. (*a.*) Its antiquity. In this respect it is not inferior to the Hebrew. (*b.*) Its Shemitic affinity. Having more that is common to all the Shemitic languages than any other member of the same family. (*c.*) Its logical structure. Hence its great value as an aid in the study and elucidation of the other

members of the same family of languages to which it belongs. (*d.*) Its preserved purity. While the other languages of the same family have suffered change in forms and meanings, the Arabic has remained comparatively pure. (*e.*) Its lexical richness, in which it surpasses the other languages of the same family. (*f.*) The literary importance of the Arabic is another reason why it should be studied and cultivated. Its literature is very extensive. (*g.*) The Arabic is now spoken by about seventy millions of people as their vernacular, while it is read by about two hundred millions.

In a special preface the author treats of the three short vowels which constitute the most important key to the language. The facts here stated in reference to the importance of the short vowels, have received comparatively little attention from other authors. Prof. Lansing points out the controlling power of these vowels, and shows that it runs through the whole language. (*a.*) They mark a verb as active or passive; (*b.*) As transitive or intransitive; (*c.*) They determine the moods of the verb; (*d.*) They effect changes in the radical letters of a weak verb according to the rules of euphony; (*e.*) They mark the cases of nouns; (*f.*) They mark a noun as definite; (*g.*) The regular plurals are formed from the short vowels. These principles thus stated in the special preface also receive attention in connection with the different parts of speech. They are especially illustrated in sections 36 and 46.

The principles treated of in each section are clearly stated and defined, and illustrated by numerous examples. Thus everything is made plain to the student as he advances. Full paradigms are given in regular order. The Chrestomathy following the paradigms consists of three parts:

1st. We have the first three chapters of the Arabic text of Genesis. Two are given with the vowel points, the third without the vowels. Then follow selections from the Curan, consisting of the 1st, 64th, 96th, and 93rd Suras.

2nd. We have a transliteration of Genesis i. 1-19, followed by an exact translation of the same. This is followed by an analysis of Genesis i. 1-5. A transliteration is given of the first Sura, followed by an analysis of part of the 64th Sura.

3rd. The third part contains a vocabulary of all the words found in the text, besides a few others. Thus we have in Prof. Lansing's Manual all that the beginner of Arabic needs.

It is indeed refreshing as well as instructive to study this Manual, even after one has studied Wright and others. It is a book that bids fair to be of great service to teachers and students of that language which Arabia's admiring sons call *the language of the angels*. The execution of the work is admirable, and reflects great credit on the publishers. It is printed on good paper, and well bound. The type is exceedingly clear, and not so trying to the eyes as most other works of the same kind.

D. S. SYDENSTRICKER.

WITHEROW'S FORM OF THE CHRISTIAN TEMPLE.

THE FORM OF THE CHRISTIAN TEMPLE: Being a Treatise on the Constitution of the New Testament Church. *By Thomas Witherow, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Church History in Magee College, Londonderry.* 8vo., pp. 368. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner & Welford. 1889.

Dr. Witherow has long been known as an able and lucid writer on ecclesiology and church history. That admirable treatise, "The Apostolic Church: Which is

it?" we have long regarded as one of the most useful for general purposes that has ever been published. Its enunciation of the principles of church government, their importance, their source, their authority, their application by the Apostles, and the test of Prelacy, Independency and Presbytery by them, is the clearest and most satisfactory that we have ever read, and the wide distribution of the little book has been productive of great good in confirming the faith of the people in the divine origin and order of Presbyterianism. Dr. Witherow's present work, however, is upon a much larger and more elaborate scale, and therefore, while not adapted so well for general reading, will be more satisfactory to the student and expounder of God's Word. We must confess that in laying down the other little book, it was with a sigh of regret that the author had not made it four times as large, so palatable was the little taste he had given. The present volume is the great feast, rich, plentiful and good.

In "The Form of the Christian Temple," Dr. Witherow makes the postulate that all the Christian verities are contained in the Bible, and that anything not expressed or implied in the inspired record, however beautiful or useful or old, is only human and no part of the faith which was once delivered unto the saints. This is solid ground, nay, he has gone down to the bed-rock to lay the foundation of his argument. He then brings before the reader all those passages of Scripture which are supposed to bear directly or indirectly upon the subject of church polity, with a view to finding out the principles or facts which these passages underlie, and to combine these principles and facts with a view to inquiring whether they do or do not contain the outlines of a form of church government. This inductive method must commend itself to every fair mind as the best that can be adopted, and it is hard to conceive how any except the most prejudiced can resist or set aside conclusions arrived at by such a process. Thus the author seeks to answer the important question, "What form of church government is laid down in the Word of God?" not by taking up each prevailing form as we now have it, and proving the scripturalness of the one and the unscripturalness of the other, but by first ascertaining the general principles and facts of church government as found in the Word, and then marshalling each form before these divinely given principles and seeing wherein it meets or disagrees with them. It remains only to notice briefly the manner in which the author accomplishes his purpose.

The work is divided into three books. In the first of these the author presents and examines the passages which set forth the *temporary agencies* employed in the establishment of the church, as the apostles, the prophets, the evangelists and Charisms. These he shows to have been merely like the scaffolding essential at the erection of some great edifice, but to be taken away at its completion. The only exception which we would take at this point is to the author's classification of the evangelist with the temporary agencies of the church. True, the evangelist, strictly so called, only occupies a district until he has seen the church permanently provided with officers of its own; but at the same time he is a part of the gospel ministry, and ranks universally in the Scriptures with the pastor or teacher and the "governments," the only difference between him and the local pastor being as to the extent of his field.

In the second book the author inquires into the facts and *permanent principles* which entered into the constitution of the church, and which received the approval of the apostles. In grouping the passages of Scripture bearing upon this part of

his treatise he does not attempt to arrange them in the order of their importance, but in the order of their clearness, gradually rising from the simplest and plainest to those that are more complex and difficult. The ministry, the diaconate, the eldership, the presbytery, the election of officers, ordination, church rule, giving and receiving, the association of churches, synodical jurisdiction, and kindred subjects, together with the great underlying principle of the Headship of Christ, are the topics here considered. One cannot but wish, in this connection, that the author had sought more than he evidently felt inclined in the Old Testament records for the form given to the church in her officers, rules, etc. It adds no little strength to the argument when we are enabled to see that even the visible church is one in all ages and that there was a "pattern shown in the mount," nay, given to the patriarch himself, the father of the faithful, of that which should afterwards come.

In his consideration of the origin of the diaconate Dr. Witherow attributes its rise solely to the necessities growing out of the enlargement of the church and the complaints of certain elements of the church, as recorded in Acts vi. He asserts that the "seven" chosen at that time, "were the first officers of the order to which this name was afterwards applied," and of this he adds that there can be no reasonable doubt. In this he will find many to disagree with him. And he himself, before giving the passage from Acts vi., quotes several passages as bearing upon this office, and especially those in which reference is made to the "young men," whom many believe to have been "deacons," who bore out the bodies of Ananias and Sapphira.

The Third Book is a consideration of the *human additions* that have crept into the church, as the priesthood, penance, prelacy, apostolic succession, the papacy. It would be difficult to examine and refute in one volume all the errors that have, under the guise of utility or ornament, so strangely and sadly altered the constitution and purpose of the church. The author realizes this, and therefore singles out only a few of the more fundamental and general of these evil principles and practices. He rightly characterizes them as not "parts of the original plan and essential to the grandeur of the building," but "needless, mere clumsy contrivances of human skill, without the sanction of the Great Architect, intended to please the unspiritual senses, and in reality obscuring the divine."

The method of the author, his familiarity with the literature of the subject, his reverence for God's Word, his conviction of the importance of the subject of church polity, his rare skill in showing the evils resulting from even minute departures from God's plan, his sense of the need of purity of polity as coordinate with purity of doctrine and purity of worship in a witness-bearing church, and his earnestness and simplicity, combined with strength and acumen, render this volume one that will live and do a grand work. After all, it is not so much his work as it is God's Word, and the author's part is only to point out, intelligently and distinctly, the authority, the principles, and the facts which God himself has given.

IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE SECOND BOOK OF SAMUEL. *By the Rev. Professor W. G. Blaikie, D. D., LL. D., New College, Edinburgh.* Crown, 8vo., pp. 400. \$1.50.

THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS. *By Thomas Charles Edwards, D. D., Principal of the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth.* 8vo., pp. 337. \$1.50. Both published by A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. 1888.

These are the latest additions to "The Expositor's Bible," issuing from the house whose *imprimatur* they bear. The admirable plan of this series of expository lectures has already been described in these pages. It remains here only to say that the publishers are carrying out most happily and handsomely their promise of a series which will be of great practical value to the student and expounder of God's Word.

As in his previous volume upon First Samuel, Dr. Blaikie pursues the plan of giving discourses upon salient features of the book or salient points in the history recorded, rather than verbal exposition or detailed criticism. The result is a work which is of great value in the lessons derived from the events recorded and applied to the conditions of modern life. In thus presenting the matter of the book, Dr. Blaikie practically applies the principle that these things "are written for our admonition." In drawing the lessons, however, he shows a master hand in interpretation, in never unduly straining the passages considered in order to get more out of them than we believe God intended. We would most cordially recommend the volumes on the Books of Samuel for use in the study of the International Lessons of the latter half of the present year. They are sound, judicious, scholarly and practical.

In the volume on the Epistle to the Hebrews, the author states that criticism is rigidly excluded, and that his object is to trace the unity of thought in the epistle. He dismisses the question of the authorship without discussion, with the simple statement that he is convinced that Paul is neither the actual author nor the originator of the treatise. In a series of sixteen chapters he then applies himself, happily in the main, to the accomplishment of the purpose set before him. The subjects, or titles, of the chapters are suggestive and usually well conceived; as The Revelation in a Son; The Son and the Angels; Fundamental Oneness of the Dispensations; The Great High-Priest, etc. In his brief and somewhat unsatisfactory discussion of vi. 4-6, he holds that the writer of the Epistle is here declaring in stronger language the same truth set forth in the second chapter concerning the impossibility of those who neglect salvation shunning God's anger. "How shall they escape his wrath who crucify afresh the Son, and put him to an open shame? Such men God will punish by hardening their hearts, so that they cannot even repent. The initial grace becomes impossible." And yet a little later he says that the question whether the apostle speaks of converted or unconverted men is entirely beside the purpose, and may safely be relegated to the limbo of misapplied interpretations. We confess that

a clearer exposition of this much contradicted passage would have been helpful. His position as to Melchizedek, also, is to be demurred to. He speaks of the apostle's reference to Melchizedek as "the allegory of Melchizedek," stating, however, that the use of the term is not to insinuate doubt of its historical truth, but to express the idea that the reference to Melchizedek cannot be intended by the apostle to have direct inferential force. His position is that the principle bearing of the case of Melchizedek upon the apostle's argument is found in the "silence" of inspiration. "What is known of him wonderfully helps the allegorical significance of the intentional silence of Scripture." The silence, leaving Melchizedek without formal genealogical record, constitutes him preëminently a type of the eternity of the priesthood of Christ. In respect to the position of the author of this volume on the great doctrines of our faith there can be no question. As to the impossibility of falling, when once in a state of grace, the fixedness of the finally impenitent in their lost estate, the impeccability of Christ, the Trinity, etc., he is thoroughly sound. Take it altogether, and the book is full of force, incisive, suggestive, stimulating.

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF PETER. Revised Text, with Introduction and Commentary. By Robert Johnstone, LL. B., D. D., Professor of New Testament Literature and Exegesis in the United Presbyterian College, Edinburgh. Pp. xxii, 417. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1888.

The author's discussion of the address, the date, and the relations of the Epistle will at once commend itself to the student and evince the thorough scholarship and skill of Professor Johnstone. A further examination, especially into his treatment of the famous passage in iii. 19-22, leaves the reader assured that the commentary is as sound as it is learned. Prof. Johnstone, with Alford, and against Calvin, Bengel, Weiss, and others, claims that the Epistle is addressed to all Christians in the provinces named in the superscription, and not merely to the Jewish Christians dispersed thither. He also claims the Babylon named in the last chapter as the literal Euphrates Babylon. His treatment of the statement concerning Christ's "preaching unto the spirits in prison" is very full, and his conclusions sound. He has no fancy for the idea that the "spirits in prison" are disembodied souls in the place of the departed awaiting the final judgment, but argues, with force and conclusiveness, that the expression has reference to those to whom Christ, by his Spirit, preached in some former time, and who were now dead, and that the intention of Peter was to appeal to those to whom he wrote to endure the suffering by which they were tried, by recalling the fact that the antediluvians had enjoyed the same opportunities, but were lost because they wretchedly abused or neglected them. The entire commentary can be commended for its exegetical skill, reverent spirit, and genuine orthodoxy.

DR. WILLIAM SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE: Comprising its Antiquities, Biography, Geography, and Natural History, Revised and Edited by Prof. H. B. Hackett, D. D., with the Co-operation of Ezra Abbot, LL. D., Assistant Librarian of Harvard College. 4 vols. 8vo. Pp. 3667. \$20.00. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1888.

This is a reprint of the English edition of this well-known and deservedly popular work. The entire work is reprinted *without abridgement or change*, except

the correction of some minor errors. This edition, however, has some new features, which enhance the value of the work very materially. Without attempting to point out in detail the improvements made, we simply note the fact that quite a number of topics have been introduced which were overlooked in the original work, while supplementary articles have been added where they have been demanded by the advance of biblical science. Since this great work appeared, a quarter of a century since, it has gained such a reputation that commendation is almost superfluous. It is confessedly without a peer in its own department. Each article has been prepared by some scholar, selected with special reference to his acquaintance with that particular topic, and so we have, combined in one work, the best efforts of ninety-seven of the foremost biblical scholars of England and America. The work is almost a biblical library in itself, being particularly strong in the department of Introduction, as will be seen by reference to such titles as "Pentateuch," "Isaiah," "Psalms," etc., and will be found, on trial, to displace whole shelves of books ordinarily found in a minister's library. In this age of biblical study no student can afford to be without this work, and if it does not already adorn his shelves, we would say, as our Saviour did concerning a sword, "Let him sell his garment and buy one." The publishers are to be commended for their rare judgment in selecting such a work for republication, and they are entitled to the thanks of a Christian public for the excellent manner in which they have performed the work.

THE CLERICAL LIBRARY: Outlines of Sermons to Children, Platform and Pulpit Aids, Anecdotes Illustrative of New Testament Texts, Anecdotes Illustrative of Old Testament Texts. 12mo, each about 300 pp. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1886. 1888.

These four volumes of the "Clerical Library" will be found most useful to the judicious minister. They contain many of the best thoughts of the best writers, and are valuable in their illustration of Scripture truth. The subjects treated and illustrated are those that are practical rather than controversial, and hence the volumes are adapted to ministers and students of all evangelical denominations. Each volume is complete in itself.

THE SERMON BIBLE. Vol. I., Genesis to 2 Samuel. Pp. 500. Vol. II., 1 Kings to Psalm lxxvi. Pp. 520. 12mo, cloth, each Vol. \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1888.

These are the first two volumes of a series of twelve which it is proposed to issue, covering the entire Bible. The work is not designed to be critical, but purely homiletical. It is a compilation of the best homiletical work of the leading preachers of the present age, in the form of very brief outlines of sermons preached upon various single texts or passages, followed by a list of volumes of sermons, magazines, or other books, in which are found discourses upon the same text. Only the most striking or choicest texts are treated, and the reader will find that the proportion between the different books or parts has been well preserved. In his selection from the vast amount of material at his hand, the editor has not confined himself to any one denomination or school of thought, but has given what he deems the best that is to be had upon a given text. To the preacher who carefully guards against the abuse

of such ready-made helps, and who will conscientiously devote himself to the study and application of God's Word, these volumes will be useful, because of their suggestiveness and for the range of sermonic literature of the best type with which they will make him familiar. The volumes are models in printing and binding.

JESUS IN MODERN LIFE. *By Algernon Sydney Logan.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1888. \$1.25.

The title sounds well enough, but the book rules Christ out, by reducing him to nothing but a mere teacher of a certain form of idealism. The writer adopts Renan's dictum, "That if we confined ourselves to what we positively know about Jesus, we could only say that such a person once existed and was put to death by the Jewish Sanhedrim." He rejects "the bulk of the first three Gospels, and the whole of the fourth." The "old Christianity" he regards as a conglomerate of "belief and misconception," and he would substitute for it his idealism, "the elements of which are a sense of man and a sense of beauty, a reverence for the knowable, and a yearning after that which is yet to be revealed." Where Christ is left in this system, we cannot readily tell.

THE TRAINING OF THE TWELVE; OR, Passages out of the Gospels Exhibiting the Twelve Disciples of Jesus under Discipline for the Apostleship. *By Alexander Balmain Bruce, D. D., Professor of Apologetics and New Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow.* 8vo., pp. xii., 552; Cloth, \$2.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1889.

This work has been familiar to the bibliophile since its first appearance in 1871. That it has reached a fourth edition is unmistakable testimony to its worth. In this edition the author gives attention to the readings in the Revised Version, and also incorporates into his work, or presents in footnotes, much of the result of the more recent studies or works relating to the gospel history. The author's object is to furnish a systematic account of the effect upon his disciples of the teaching and training of their Master. The accurate scholarship, devout spirit, and clear, popular style of the author will make this book a useful and suggestive one for many years to come. It is published by the Armstrongs in uniform size and binding with those more recent and now well-known works of Professor Bruce: "The Miraculous Element in the Gospel," "The Parabolic Teaching of Christ," and "The Humiliation of Christ,"—the four volumes making a series well worthy of a place in every student's library.

ELIJAH: His Life and Times. *By Rev. W. Milligan, D. D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism, Aberdeen.* Pp. 205; and

ISAIAH: His Life and Times, and the Writings which bear his name. *By Rev. S. R. Driver, D. D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford.* Pp. 214. Each 12mo. Cloth, \$1. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1888.

These volumes, a part of the "Men of the Bible" series of the Messrs. Randolph, are well worthy of a place in that admirable collection. The life and times of Elijah are presented in language at once forcible and interesting, manifesting an appreciative and able insight on the part of Dr. Milligan into the pecu-

liar relations of the fiery prophet of Israel, and the circumstances in which he lived. The condition of Israel in the time of Elijah, The Training and Discipline of Elijah, Elijah's Reformation, Elijah at Horeb, and Elijah and the Companies of Ahaziah, are most instructive chapters. The last chapter, The Second Elijah, discusses the prophecy of Malachi (iv. 5, 6), and strongly advocates the idea, correct, we think, that in John the Baptist the prophecy met its complete fulfilment, and that no second appearance of Elijah is to be looked for.

In the sub-title to the *ISAIAH: HIS LIFE AND TIMES*, the author suggests the idea which he expands in the body of the book: "The writings which bear his name." He devotes a special chapter to the consideration of the authorship of the prophecy, and holds that there were unquestionably two "Men of the Bible," two "gifted instruments," each endowed with his own special excellence, and each employed by the Spirit of God "to pour forth its voice upon the world." This position he endeavors to maintain by an elaborate argument drawn from the internal evidence, the evidence of language and style, and the theology and thought of the book. The part of the book ascribed to another than Isaiah is chapters xl.-lxvi. With the exception of this theory—and even here one should wish to know the grounds of the belief of such eminent scholars as Driver, Cheyne, whom he follows, and to whose version he seems most partial, and others—the volume is a fine, critical and suggestive study, and will take its place permanently in the literature of the Old Testament. In the entire series to which it belongs the editors and publishers are succeeding in furnishing graphic and fascinating accounts of the "Men of the Bible."

THE LIFE OF ST. PAUL. By Rev. James Stalker, M. A., *Kirkcaldy, Scotland.* 12mo., pp. 183. Cloth, 60 cents. New York: American Tract Society. 1888.

In this short treatise, the author deals with Paul's place in history, his unconscious preparation for his work, his conversion, his gospel, the work awaiting him, his missionary travels, his writings and character, his ideal of a church, and his end. A chapter containing hints to teachers and questions for Bible students is added. To those who cannot afford the time to read or the money to buy Lewin or Farrar, or Conybeare and Howson, or other elaborate works on the Life and Epistles of Paul, this little book will be very useful. It is well adapted to the higher classes in our Sabbath-schools.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER. By J. J. Stewart Perowne, D. D. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co. 1887. 60 cents.

This little book consists of two discourses, one on The Real Presence, the other on The Eucharistic Sacrifice, in both of which the author presents earnestly the true doctrine on these subjects and testifies against the errors which have crept into the church of which he is a distinguished Dean. He asserts that English clergymen are guilty of Romanizing the communion service by interpolating into it from the Canon of the Mass words and symbolic acts which are in "flagrant opposition to the teachings of our Articles and our Liturgy," and claims that "the whole Liturgy is framed on an opposite view. It is a witness and a protest against sacerdotalism. She (the church) knows of no earthly priests except presbyters or elders." This is strong language, and from a strong man. It is to be regretted that there is need for such earnest protests.

INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC IN THE PUBLIC WORSHIP OF THE CHURCH. *By John L. Girardeau, D. D., LL. D., Professor in Columbia Theological Seminary, South Carolina.* 12mo., pp. 208. Richmond: Whittet & Shepperson. 1888.

This work has appeared just as the printers are completing the present number of the **QUARTERLY**. There is therefore no time for that careful examination and review of it to which the recognized ability and reputation of the author, as well as the importance of the subject discussed, justly entitles it. It is therefore reserved for elaborate notice, with the statement that it is composed of a series of lectures delivered before the last Senior Class of Columbia Seminary, and that its design is to prove the negative of the question, "Is the use of instrumental music in the public worship of the church *justifiable*?" The leading chapters are, General Argument from Scripture, Argument from the Old Testament, Argument from the New Testament, Argument from the Presbyterian Standards, Historical Argument, and Arguments in Favor of Instrumental Music Considered. The book is handsomely printed and well bound.

THE CHURCH IN THE SUB-APOSTOLIC AGE: Its Life, Worship and Organization, in the Light of the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles. *By the Rev. James Heron, B. A.* London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1888.

This is one of the numerous treatises resulting from the discovery by Bryennius of the "Didache," and is an admirable work. The author first gives a translation of the "Didache." He then discusses its design and character and age. He places its original appearance at the beginning of the first century. The application of the "Didache" to church questions of the present day, however, is the most interesting part of this work. This constitutes the second part of the book, and the author brings out clearly and distinctly the testimony of the now famous document to the Presbyterian form of government and to the proper view of baptism. The work is faithfully and thoroughly done.

A STUDY OF RELIGION: Its Sources and Contents. *By James Martineau, D. D.* Two vols. 8vo. Pp. 417 and 410. \$6.00. London and New York: Macmillan & Co.

The introduction discusses the questions, What is Religion? and, Why Ethics Before Religion? Then follow books on The Limits of Human Understanding, Theism, Review of Opposing Systems, and The Life to Come; or, The Immortality of the Soul. The author is a Unitarian, a "liberal" of the most advanced type, and an unbeliever in the supernatural. His style is not popular, being decidedly metaphysical and abstruse. He declares himself to be an evolutionist of the Darwinian type, and acknowledges his readiness to accept all the logical results of that view. His position in reference to all such questions may be readily inferred from the following words: "I am aware that these volumes conflict with the prevailing opinions and tendencies of the time. The approbation which they must, therefore, forego will, at all events, be replaced by the more wholesome benefits of a correction and disarming of their errors. Possibly, among persons accustomed to reflect, there may be found a minority who may find in these discussions the satisfaction of fellowship, if not some clearing and confirmation of conviction." This is enough to show how both the author and his book may be regarded.

DAY-DAWN OF CHRISTIANITY; or, The Gospel in the Apostolic Age. *By Rev. Thos. M. McConnell.* 12mo. Pp. 448. Cloth, \$1.00. Nashville, Tenn.: Publishing House of the M. E. Church, South. 1888.

In a style remarkable for its clearness, and that holds the reader's attention constantly, Mr. McConnell has given in these thirty-two chapters the story of the early struggles of the church and of her heroic apostolic founders. He disclaims all pretensions to originality, but at the same time no one can read the book without feeling that he has shown a genius in gathering and arranging most attractively the best material to be had from all sources. At the close of each chapter there are given, in short, pithy paragraphs, "truths to be treasured," these being the truths derived from the preceding narrative, and which God's dealings with his people or the various phases of their work for him warrant us in accepting and prizing.

PAUL'S IDEAL CHURCH AND PEOPLE: A Popular Commentary, with a Series of Forty Sermonettes on the First Epistle to Timothy. *By Alfred Rowland, LL. B., B. A.* 12mo. Pp. 304. New York: E. B. Treat 1888.

The author, an active and experienced pastor, first gives an introduction to Paul's experiences and to his pastoral epistles. Following this is a brief exposition of the First Epistle to Timothy, after which there are forty discourses, modestly styled "sermonettes," in which the reader will find many useful lessons to apply to the times in which we live and to the activities of church and family life. The book may prove especially useful to laymen in conducting prayer-meetings and similar work.

EVANGELISTIC WORK IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE. *By Rev. Arthur T. Pierson, D. D.* 12mo. New York: The Baker & Taylor Company. 1888.

The book consists of two parts. In Part I. the author states the problem, discusses its solution, shows the duty and the delight of the work, and tells of the hindrances and helps, the "weights and wings," of the evangelistic spirit and evangelistic work. In Part II. he describes a number of well-known evangelists, and shows their work, as Whitefield, the Field Evangelist; Howard, the Prison Evangelist; Finney, the Revival Evangelist; Chalmers, the Parish Evangelist; Spurgeon, the Pastoral Evangelist; Shaftesbury, the Philanthropic Evangelist. No question is of more present and practical importance than that of the evangelist's place and work in the church, and this admirable book, by a man as eminent for his evangelistic spirit as for his successful pastoral efforts, will contribute largely to a proper understanding of the subject.

THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY, with Special Reference to Contemporary Problems. *By David J. Hill, LL. D., President of Bucknell University.* The Newton Lectures for 1887. 12mo. Pp. 231. Cloth, gilt, \$1.25. Boston: Silver, Burdett & Co. 1888.

Many writers have entered the field traversed by this volume, but few have shown as thoroughly philosophical a spirit. The author's object seems to be to give a permanent treatise rather than a compilation of current thoughts intended for temporary popular effect. Long experience in teaching economics and sociol-

ogy, extensive travel, and a wide and accurate acquaintance with the literature of the subject, qualify President Hill for his work, and are manifest throughout the book. The leading views regarding the nature of society, both ancient and modern, are comprehensively stated, traced in their development, and intelligently criticised from a scientific, Christian, and American point of view. The central ideas of Christianity, which the author carefully distinguishes from the church, are admirably defined, and their influence upon society historically studied. After this more general treatment the social relation of Christianity, considered as the influence of Jesus Christ, is elaborated in a brief, clear, and conclusive manner with reference to the contemporary problems of Labor, Wealth, Marriage, Education, Legislation, and the Repression of Crime.

WITNESSES TO CHRIST. A Contribution to Christian Apologetics. *By William Clark, M. A.* Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1888.

The volume contains the Baldwin Lectures before the University of Michigan, delivered in 1887. The author deals with certain phases of contemporaneous thought in a manner characterized by great freshness and vigor, and deals some heavy blows to such errors as materialism and pessimism. Among the themes discussed are the Phases and Failure of Unbelief, Civilization and Christianity, Personal Culture and Religion, Unity of Christian Doctrine, The Insufficiency of Materialism, The Pessimism of the Age, The Resurrection of Jesus Christ. The book is a valuable contribution to the department of apologetics.

WHAT DO REFORMED EPISCOPALIANS BELIEVE? *By Rt. Rev. Charles Edward Chaney, D. D., Bishop of the Synod of Chicago, Ill.* Pp. 193. Philadelphia: Reformed Episcopal Publication Society. 1888.

A series of eight discourses, setting forth the grounds of separation from the Protestant Episcopal Church, and the great gospel principles upon which the body stands of which the writer is a founder and leader, and the belief and practice of those who believe with him. The sermons are a concise and valuable statement, and vindicate the Reformed Episcopal Church's claim as a branch of the true church of Christ. The volume is a valuable contribution to the ecclesiastical history of this century.

THE LORD'S CARE. A History of God's Work through his People for the Thornwell Orphanage, being the testimony of a grateful heart. Pp. 75. Full cloth, 35 cents; flex. cloth, 25 cents; paper, 20 cents. Clinton, S. C.: Thornwell Orphanage Press. 1888.

Instead of merely noticing this little book, printed by the boys of the Orphanage, we would like to transfer its entire contents to these pages. And this, not because the book has any special literary charms or will take rank with elaborate treatises of any kind, but because it is the story, simply, touchingly, tenderly told, of that noblest charity of Southern Presbyterianism, THE THORNWELL ORPHANAGE. Its writer, himself the founder and president, with characteristic modesty hides himself behind the work: but his great heart cannot be hid, and as they read this little volume, all who know the love of Christ and have felt the goodness of the Father, will give praise and thanksgiving for the life of the noble man who has in

faith and patience and unflagging energy made this orphanage a home to scores of fatherless and motherless little ones and a means of bringing many to know the Saviour. As this history shows, the work is not done, but only begun. It needs now more than ever the sympathy and support of all God's people. Let every one who reads these lines respond to the call and help these fatherless ones who are "The Lord's Care."

THE CHEQUE BOOK OF THE BANK OF FAITH. Being Precious Promises Arranged for Daily Use. With Brief Experimental Comments. *By C. H. Spurgeon.* 12mo, pp. 370. Cloth, \$1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1889.

The very unique but suggestive title of the book is readily understood when the sub-title is seen. It is a collection of the promises of God, arranged for daily reading. Accompanying each promise are comments upon the words, in Spurgeon's happiest vein, practical, earnest, sound, helpful, the whole forming a volume which for devotional purposes has never been excelled. Says the author, "A promise from God may very instructively be compared to a cheque payable to order. It is given to the believer with a view of bestowing upon him some good thing. It is not meant that he should read it over comfortably, and then have done with it. No, he is to treat the promise as a reality, as a man treats a cheque. He is to take the promise, and endorse it with his own name by personally receiving it as true. . . . He must believingly *present* the promise to the Lord, as a man presents a cheque at the counter of the bank. . . . Some fail to place the endorsement of faith upon the cheque, and so they get nothing; and others are slack in presenting it, and these also receive nothing. This is not the fault of the promise, but of those who do not act with it in a common-sense, business-like manner. God has given no pledge that he will not redeem, and encourages no hope which he will not fulfil."

BIBLE ANIMALS, and the Lessons Taught by Them. *By the late Rev. Richard Newton, D. D.* 12mo., pp. 450. \$1.25. New York: Robert Carter & Bros. 1888.

"He being dead yet speaketh." The voice of the great "children's preacher" is heard again in these sermons, published by his own dying request. They are sixteen in number, each one based upon some passage of Scripture which refers to an animal, its traits, its likeness, and the illustrations it gives of Bible truth. The children will read the book. It is an excellent and an interesting one to place in their hands, as we have found. Preachers to children will also find many useful suggestions in the study of Dr. Newton's methods here set forth.

THE REPOSE IN EGYPT. A Medley. *By Susan E. Wallace, author of "The Land of the Pueblos," etc.* With illustrations. 12mo., pp. 391; Cloth, \$1. New York: John B. Alden. 1888.

For odd half-hours this is one of the most delightful volumes issued during the past year. The style is most beautiful, the descriptions vivid, and the features of Oriental life portrayed the most interesting. The larger part of the book, which gives its title, is hung upon an exceedingly slender thread of story, but it is not this that gives a charm to the book, or that holds the reader's attention. It is the author's matchless ability to express in choicest words the scenes and incidents of

weeks of rest spent on the Nile. The wife of the author of "Ben Hur" is as brilliant a writer as her thus far more distinguished husband. The only objection that one can find to any part of the book is a seeming, though not real, glorification of Mohammedanism, because of the earnestness and devotion of its adherents, and an apparent minimizing of the miraculous element in the author's account of the plagues of Egypt.

NOBODY KNOWS; or, Facts that are not Fictions, in the Life of an Unknown. *By a Nobody.* 12mo, pp. 290. \$1.25. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1888.

The cover is unique, the style is unique, and the thoughts are unique. Altogether it is a curious book, the record of a hard-working man, who finds the best life that which is spent in serving the humblest, and who in glorifying good works in every day life goes too far in reflections upon creeds and churches. In the disjointed, fragmentary, crude sentences, however, one will find many gems.

HOME AND WORK BY THE RIVERS OF EDEN. *By Rev. M. P. Parnallee, M. D., American Missionary in Persia.* 12mo, pp. 199. Philadelphia: American Sunday-school Union. 1888.

The author, whose home has been for many years in Erzeroum, as a missionary, here vividly describes the customs, religions, people and natural features of a country which many believe to have been the cradle of the human race. His experience did not prove it an Eden to him, however much it may have been such to Adam. As an account of mission work it is full of facts, illustrating the needs of the people and the method of supplying them, and will be found useful in the Sabbath-school library.

TROPICAL AFRICA. *By Prof. Henry Drummond, F. R. S. E., F. G. S.* With six maps and illustrations. 12mo. Cloth, \$1.50. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1888.

In ten chapters, some of them before published or delivered as lectures, the accomplished author describes certain features of the Dark Continent which will interest students of natural history, philanthropists, statesmen, and Christians. Regarding the larger features of a country as more important than the details of travel or personal observation, he gives only so much of the latter as is needful to add interest to the former. His clear, striking descriptions of African customs, scenes, social conditions, and religious needs strongly enforce his appeal to his countrymen to apply proper remedies to cure the "heart-disease of Africa," as he calls the slave trade of the region which he visited, and parts of which he describes as being at the mercy of hostile Arabs, who have almost depopulated certain districts by their nefarious business or the fear they have inspired. Pointing out the fact that the issue is directly and squarely made as to whether European or Arab shall dominate the land, and setting forth the great activity of Portugal, Germany, and other countries in establishing themselves in Africa, he appeals to England to secure a strong foothold in the Nyassa country before these other governments can secure control. This, he thinks, will be the most effectual means of curing the "disease" of tropical Africa.

UNDER THE MAGNOLIAS. *By Lyman W. Denton, M. D.* 12mo. Pp. 317. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1888.

A curiously-constructed book, carrying the reader from one end of the country to another "without rhyme or reason," and oscillating singularly between "befo' de wah" and very recent months. It is a singular collection of pictures of Southern life, Northern impressions, the evils of anarchism, intemperance and reconstruction, and the need for suffrage reform. The author says some very good things, but in a rambling way, which will prevent their having as good an effect as they deserve.

STRANGE THREADS. *By J. Douglas.* 12mo. Pp. 343. Cloth, 50 cents. New York: John B. Alden. 1888.

A very simple tale, woven into an account of foreign travel, and not very successfully sustaining the reader's interest in either respect. The printer's and binder's arts were never more beautifully displayed, and deserve to enclose and preserve a stronger work.

THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

NO. 9. — JULY, 1889.

I. PRESBYTERIANISM AND EDUCATION.

“EDUCATION” is that word which names for us whatsoever is gotten by means of instruction; and where this instruction is of the best, its outcome is found in a rightly-shaped understanding, in a widened scope of thought, in the safe direction it imparts to the affections, in the proper determination it impresses upon the will, and in the various treasure it furnishes for enriching the entire life: making life, by that much, more worth the having. Well, with such an education—such in all its degrees—Presbyterianism stands identified.

There is a sense in which education—of a sort—comes to multitudes without the use of books or of schools. Countless influences are at work, some of them as silent as they are resistless, to whose moulding touches all minds are subject, with or without their consent: those potencies which move in the atmosphere of home, or emerge from those rivers of humanity, the streets, or are awakened amid the voices and noises of the workshop, or are borne upon the wide-winged newspaper that flies everywhere, or that get shape and momentum at the platform meeting where speech burns upon its hottest anvil, or that dart about and about in the circlings of conversation. Character is ingrained and tempered, for good or ill, by the action and re-action of those nameless currents which, with no traceable law, flow turbid or pure through all the conditions of human living. Sometimes even *high* character is thus insensibly builded, where there has been no opportunity for acquiring letters. God’s great works have perhaps constituted the university

wherein it has grown, and nothing has been heard by the listening soul more articulate than mountain sceneries or ocean swellings.

But the training of such a mighty agent as the human spirit ought not to be left to the chance winds that shift through each day's happenings. An orator of instruction is needed, of greater eloquence even than that which impresses in the speakings or the silences of nature. Accordingly the Supreme Father, who cares for his children with the wisest love, ordained his *church*, and endowed her to be the foremost of all this world's teachers, in the use of processes of discipline which are elsewhere unknown. So that, were this stupendous institute of learning now removed from its dominating place, a night that might be felt must fall upon the race, confusing, if not obliterating, every path of progress, both in mind and morals. It is, therefore, in this thought that we derive a view of things with which to explain the wording of our present subject, to justify the blending into a single idea the two cognate themes, "Presbyterianism and Education," and to illustrate the proposition that Presbyterianism is precisely such a leading representative of the church as to be, in all its make-up, an educational power than which there is none mightier.

Along with its many and honored co-representatives, to whom on every side it extends the warm fraternal hand, its *main* errand is, indeed, to recover lost souls, and this weighty errand it discharges, all will agree, with successful zeal. Other ecclesiastical organizations there are, however, which gloriously *rival* and sometimes may *outdo* our own in this most important respect, and palzied be the hand which would lay the touch of arrest upon *their* efforts to win spiritual triumphs, more plentiful than the stars, for the glory of the common Lord. Here there is abundant room for all, of every Christian name, and in the race for preëminency, with *salvation* as the watchword, echoing among the hills of Zion, "Let not the Ephraims and Judahs envy one another."

Meanwhile, the several denominations of Christendom, if they *also* present, each in its own special way, the means for *educating* the minds it addresses—is it going too far when we affirm that this is signally the case with Presbyterianism? Why, we might refer for proof to its mere *history*, so replete with instructive matter

for all who love to trace great influences to their sources, or to observe the conspicuous rise of men and of communities, whose exploits in behalf of mankind and of the glory of God have never been excelled, or to note the sway of truths for whose maintenance tough men and tender women were willing to die when death was the most tragical, a history which, taken altogether, possesses an enchaining interest and a preceptive power, such as, by itself alone, constitutes a very school wherein all the world may study lessons which cannot fail to invigorate the mind and improve the heart.

But whilst in this single respect Presbyterianism is truly an education, it has likewise proved to be so even in its form of churchly *government*, by which it furnishes a tuition that explores the profoundest principles of human freedom, and at the same time discovers these in the play of a most healthful activity. Here the people rule, not without a *supreme Lord*, indeed, who alone enacts every law to which obedience is in conscience due, nor without visible officers, representative at once of the unseen Head and of the body that composes his dependent church; the whole, however, so adjusted and harmonized, by means of lower and higher courts, as to signalize an authority of limitations and balances, under which no right which the humblest may claim is infringed, and no privilege which the obscurest may demand is withheld; the whole presenting a structure of representative democracy which, as almost nothing else ever served to do, has taught an observing statesmanship how best to govern in civil affairs; so that, as such men as Mackintosh and Froude and Bancroft have admirably noted, it proved a most powerful instrument in revolutionizing western Europe and in inaugurating modern history; whilst, as we all know, it constitutes the model upon which our own American liberties might have been framed.

But Presbyterianism wields an educational directorship in quite other ways and by quite other means. The didactical *history* to which our church can point, and her illustrative government, would be hardly worth the learner's trouble, were it not for her *theology*, without which her almost romantic memorials of trial and of triumph could have little value, indeed could never have

been ; nor could her methods of administering rule have had any distinctive place in the world. This theology, describe it as Augustinian, designate it Calvinistic, or distinguish it by a far higher term than either of these, *Pauline*, is and always has been, we boldly aver, the chief guiding light of mankind, having for its originating source *no man* or combination of men, but that immense spirit of truth who inspired revelation itself ; a theology, therefore, which, because of its closer agreement with holy Scripture than that of the very best of its rivals, can have no superior as a divinely delegated instructor. We of course do not forget that this same theology has been well illustrated in the teachings of many who cannot be called Presbyterians. We are thankful to remember that among its eminent expounders are found the names of noted Baptists, such as Hall and Spurgeon ; of memorable Episcopalians, such as Toplady and Scott ; of distinguished Lutherans, such as Kurtz and Muhlenberg, to say nothing of him who illustrated the earlier Methodism, the renowned Whitefield, and of not a few who have adorned the annals of Congregationalism. Nevertheless, it is a theology which is most commonly associated with Presbyterian distinctiveness, and not seldom, as all are aware, in the way of objection, if not of derision, by such as do not know what they are prating about. And *how* this conspicuous body of doctrine comes to be a school of education we need not stop to explain, any more than one might be expected to show how it is that when the sun shines the earth is illumined, or when rains descend it is revived. *All* truth is indeed educational, just as all lamps are designed for emitting light ; but especially is this the case when the truth in question, like our peerless theology, makes the strongest appeal that is possible to the reason, as it also does to the principle of faith, and which stirs the affections as mightily as it stimulates the *will*—at once the highest of the sciences and the widest of the arts ; the science that contemplates the entire nature of God, the art that comprehends the whole duty of man. Moreover, it is a theology which has always acted the part of a true educator by encouraging in all who come under its control the spirit of freest inquiry, and limiting the researches of speculative thought only where these must consent to be bounded by a “thus

saith the Lord ;” but nowhere does it interpose the repellent or restraining authority of a merely human dogma. Stern it is with divine command ; none the less is it strong with divine entreaty ; yet at every point this injunction is heard : “ Think, O man, for yourself ; be not *compelled* ; understandingly assent.”

And for proof of its training power, see what a people this theology, generation after generation, has served to rear ! The world through (enemies being the judges) well-instructed Presbyterians have had no superiors in point of manly intelligence ; none for masterful enterprise, or for magnanimous patriotism ; none for courage and endurance amid storms of war, or for submission to law in the sunshine of peace. And surely this might have been expected ; for when you rightly estimate the doctrines which our pulpits are appointed to elucidate, doctrines which, in duly exalting God, do not unduly debase man, and which track to their origin, whilst tracing all the lines of their free interaction, the relations which God and man sustain to each other, the one as absolute sovereign, the other as dependent subject, the surprise is that ever there can be a stated hearer of its lessons who does not become a thinker of such sort as not only enlarges him as a Christian, but also emphasizes him as a citizen. For it is a vast mistake, the mistake of supposing that one may be taught a shallow *theology* and yet reach as firm a manhood as if he were being influenced by a theology which is more profound. The theology of *heathenism*, even when represented by the philosophy of a Cicero, or by the morality of a Confucius, or by the integrity of a Cato, has failed to impress the obligations of virtue or improve the advantages of reflection. The theology of an Arius, or a Socinus, or a Kant, has had well-nigh no power upon conscience, and has availed almost not at all, either to quicken or to deepen the love of truth. The theology, too, of *Rome* ! What has it achieved in enlarging or invigorating the human understanding ? What could it do so long as it tolerated the monstrous idea that “ *ignorance* is the mother of devotion ” ? No ; give to any people a theology which meets every demand of inquiring thought, after having freed thought from all its shackles, and which contents every yearning of the heart, after having delivered the heart from all its

prejudices, and satisfies every want of practical life, after having shown this life's true connection with a solemn hereafter, and you have given to that people a theology which at all points builds them up both sure and high.

Then, too, mark the *literature* to which this theology has given existence, than which there is none more valuable, or that is more likely to last; and although it is a literature that is sometimes dry, it is seldom dreary; and whilst it is occasionally ponderous, with its loads of erudition, it is never misleading. Inspired by this theology, Bunyan dreamed so truly; Butler drew out his great Analogy; Charnock wrote on the Attributes as never before had been done; Chalmers prepared his eloquent works; Edwards set the world to thinking anew; the Erskines revived the heart of Scotland; not to mention our own Alexanders, and Hodges, and Masons, and Thornwells, and those hundreds of others who, both in Europe and America, have enriched all libraries and enthralled innumerable readers, young and old, everywhere.

But the literature to which we are calling attention is by no means confined to subjects that are strictly religious. Space would utterly fail us were we to attempt a complete exhibition of the fact that minds whose powers have been disciplined in our theology have entered into *all* departments of human knowledge, and done much to illustrate and to enlarge them. Knowing well that there is no branch of study which has not its value; knowing, too, that because Christianity occupies the very throne of truth, all lower truths are her subjects and supporters, not a few of our divines, in many instances our elders, and more numerous our private members, have succeeded in opening upon all sides the widest doors possible through which whosoever will may freely pass for ascertaining the utmost that can be known throughout the manifold kingdoms of the universal Lord: being sure that to his feet the least as well as the largest of the acquisitions that shall be made, must, sooner or later, be brought for reflecting his glory; and to this end labor untold has been expended, wealth unmeasured has been poured out, as well as original contributions of scholarship not to be reckoned, have augmented the sum of human knowledge and added to the glories of discovery.

We do not now need to occupy attention with a full description of the theology to which we have thus referred, although the task would (to ourselves at least) involve only a pleasing labor. See it in our great "Confession," and its companion catechisms, substantially unaltered since the day when the famous Westminster Assembly adjourned in 1644, and whose compacted propositions and unequalled definitions are evermore a fresh surprise to the lovers of logical statement, as well as a constant source of intellectual training to all who care to interest themselves in a study of the most important truths, the most perspicuously worded, and which, along with the King James version and Bunyan's Pilgrim, have served to preserve to our English language the full bloom of its Saxon youth.

We now, however, signalize these immortal documents, not alone for the purpose of pointing to a completed exhibition of our Presbyterian standard of doctrine, the educational influence of which through many generations cannot be estimated. We name them for the reason, also, that their mention serves to emphasize a peculiar qualification (on the part of those by whom they are properly prized,) which entitles them to the very largest place amongst the instructors of the world in spheres other than the distinctively spiritual.

All are aware of the fact that it is not a mere acquaintance with the various certainties of things, as they lie scattered upon one and another field of enquiry, that adequately informs or robustly strengthens the mind, so as to impart to it a secure and seemly independence. One has no true proficiency in the domain of history, *e. g.*, when he shall have memorized its critical *dates*, or is enabled to recite, in chronological sequence, its principal events. He is not to be credited with understanding the nature of the soul when he can enumerate its several properties, or with knowing the world around him when he has become familiar with its various phenomena. No subject of importance is thus to be learned; for the facts which belong to it are not as so many units that stand isolated, each repellent of all the others. On the contrary, they are to be viewed as a closely concatenated whole, the *principles* of whose unity must be ascertained in order to a

forceful setting forth of their *collected meaning*, and of course before any real *education* therein is possible. You have to deal with them as our symbols of faith have dealt with the great facts of revelation; you must reduce them to such system as each case will admit of, expose their mutual connections, marshal them about their common centres, put each in its fitting place with reference to its associated companions, and thus secure a hold upon the very *philosophy* that explains their combined result when taken altogether. Not until this is done is your knowledge either as secure or as serviceable as it ought to be. But who is competent to achieve such a result? Not the smatterer, with whose loosened links of pretended scholarship the world is, to its heavy cost, only too familiar. Not the mere empiric, whose opinionative charlatany serves only to darken wherever it touches. Not the mechanical pedagogue, who, himself undisciplined, would substitute *rules* of thought for its actual processes. It is rather he who, trained to accuracy and accustomed to look at the objects of his study all through, from the bottom upward, knows where the smaller parts belong, and where the larger, and what is the leading principle that binds them in one; thus giving to the intellect that upon which alone it can healthfully feed, and in which alone its powers can freely move—enduring *light*. Now, whilst Presbyterianism by no means arrogates to itself a monopoly in this style of solid instruction, yet it must be allowed that those habits of comprehensive survey which it encourages, and of which its doctrinal symbols present so eminent an illustration, ought to single it out as a chief fountain of educational power. And what thus ought to be has long actually been. For both in the old world and the new the extensive profession of teaching has, for ages, recruited its ranks and added to its leadership by constantly drawing upon those of the Presbyterian faith and training.

There is still another peculiarity of our Presbyterianism which renders a true education precious to it, and at the same time imparts urgency to its methods of mental cultivation. We allude to the fact that, in some respects, Presbyterianism is the special champion of that *Protestantism* to which all the world owes so much. By no means does it stand alone in the discharge of this

great service; this it cannot claim. Almost every other organized form of the common Christianity has a share in it; for all of the evangelical churches of all names have cause for remembering those throes of the Reformation in which was born that gigantic protest whose voice is still as the voice of lingering thunder; and so long as its echoes remain in the air, it becomes the *entire body* of the Lord's people to show a front of holy war towards his enemy and theirs, that yet enormous Romanism which is to-day as potent as it is pernicious. Whilst, however, this war is not exclusively our own, which, single-handed, we are expected to prosecute, nevertheless, it so happens that Presbyterianism presents an antagonism to popery which is broader and more positive than that of any one of its confederates. We will not stop to explain *why* this unfriendly attitude is so marked. Suffice it to say that, *doctrinally*, we are, in the main points, at one with Luther and his associates, who long ago set the battle in array; and, in respect of government, at one with Knox and his co-organizers, who, about the same time, delivered their so heavy blows upon all hierarchical assumption; and thus we occupy the very opposite extreme, at its very sharpest edge, from that towering system of error with which those heroes of the sixteenth century dealt so roughly. But as a large part of *their* armory was filled with the weapons which *education* supplied, so is it now with us; they knowing what we also know, that in proportion to the amount of true knowledge men have, in the same proportion must superstition loosen its grasp upon the soul, just as mists relax their mephitic hold upon the earth at the ascendancy of the sun. Accordingly, must Presbyterianism have a *learned ministry*, chiefly, indeed, for its own growth's sake, but likewise on account of the controversies which have emerged out of that protracted contest, where scholarship has from the first moment of its awakening been utterly forbidden to sleep again or to loiter, and which, almost alone of all *human* agencies, can radiate such a light as the opposing darkness shall dread. Hence, too, the necessity for learned men, who shall explore the very depths of truth and climb to all its heights, from which to convince men beyond a doubt of the real nature of a Christianity which is the heritage of all men alike; and so as to ward off the

danger of an apostasy in Protestantism itself, like that which befell the church when almost all learning was hidden in monasteries, or was driven to the silent closets of those who, free to think, dared not to speak; and to these ends the old Greek tongue was to be, and to stay, revived, the Latin to be raised from the dead, the Hebrew to be diligently studied, all the sciences too, to be brought to contribute of their stores, the histories to be compelled to testify, and the entire round of speculative thought to be made subservient, so that God's inspired word should, at no point, lack an exposition such as lettered and unlettered might alike apprehend.

Taking now into the account what we have thus suggested—and we have done little more than suggest—it cannot but appear that Presbyterianism and Education are, indeed, most intimately related by the tie of a common blood, if, indeed, they be not *identical*. Certainly you no sooner mention the one than the other is brought to mind. Other ecclesiastical organisms, we are glad to acknowledge, place a high estimate upon the potencies of education, but they do not, in all instances, feel the need for assessing it at so high a value as is the case with ourselves. We are free to say that as a church we cannot prosper—we had almost said *exist*—apart from its co-efficiency. But no more, when largely viewed, can true Christianity; the alliance between it and education being not that of a mere *treaty*, which may, at any time, be broken off, but that of coincident *nature*—as imperative as a universal law. Accordingly, it has always been true that in proportion as the element of education has been eliminated from the offices of Christianity, in equal proportion has Christianity itself suffered loss. And it is this proposition (for whose establishment no proof is needed), upon which *Presbyterianism* rests its justification, whenever any defence is required of the fact that it leans so heavily upon the supporting arm of education. But it is also in the fact that these twin agencies are inseparable, that we as instantly discern the dependence of education itself upon Christianity, as we perceive the converse. That is to say, Presbyterians—regarding the Christian religion as they must—do always insist upon an education which is not merely and baldly *secular*.

A godless education is simply heathenish—and all *unchristian* education is essentially ungodly; an injury, therefore, and by no means a blessing—a dwarfed plant which is destitute of nourishing soil, and what fruit it bears is unavoidably sapped with poison. It is not, therefore, *every kind* of education for which we plead. Away with it, if it be not transfused and illumined with the smile of heaven. It is spurious. More, it is deadly. It is not a torch for light, but for conflagration.

Not much space is now left in which to answer the question: But *has* Presbyterianism educated; *i. e.*, apart from the immediate power of its doctrine and its polity? Has it gone into the world at large, and, in the spirit of a genuine philanthropy, responded to the call for knowledge and for nurture everywhere?—imparting intellectual life and moral force in whatsoever direction these have been needed? If so, where are its schools, its colleges, its universities; its variety of gymnasia, as required for the exercise of the soul's faculties from childhood onward? In order to a comprehensive reply we must hold in mind the *extent* of Presbyterianism. Those branches of the many-membered family of churches which are entitled to this denomination, do, together with their near relative, the Lutheran, comprise, in their wide embrace, more than half of Protestant Christendom—a vast moiety which is peculiarly characterized by the spirit of an apparently exhaustless energy that has long displayed the resolve to chase ignorance of every degree from all its corners and citadels.

Does any one ask, then, what is it actually doing for the achievement of so great a result? Shall we mention its *homes*, with a head over each, who has vowed that, whatsoever else may be neglected, the children shall experience a nurture in the knowledge of their living and loving Lord? And although this pledge is not always made good, nevertheless count, if you can, the number of domestic circles (to be found in all the classes of society) wherein an educating process is going on, the whole outcome of which is too immense even for conjecture, and which, accordingly, no census statistician has ever attempted, so much as approximately, to calculate. Or need we point to those innumerable gatherings of the waifs of the people which Presbyterian charity has

assisted to summon from the haunts and holes of a ragged destitution in order to impart to minds that otherwise must prove a curse to themselves and many others, some inkling, at least, of the rays of a better guidance? What an amount of teaching, too, from the A B C upwards, is provided for the hopelessly poor in the thousands of Sabbath-schools that are embraced in our Presbyterian system, which is thus in happy unison with the genius of Christianity, as exemplified by other churchly methods that are touched by us at almost no other point of resemblance! We might speak also of that free, public, every-day schooling in the moulding and furthering of the institutes for which Presbyterian influences have been so decidedly and so deeply felt, and in the proper management of which the best of our people have shown so intelligent an anxiety and extended so helpful a hand.

But is it still asked, Where are those *institutions* of learning of one grade or another which owe their *exclusive* origin to Presbyterianism, and of which, with an honorable pride, it may be boasted that they remain altogether its own, having upon them its special image and superscription? Where *are* these! Nay, where are they *not*? Travel the earth around, and you see it dotted, rather emblazoned, with specimens of them on every hand: in the far-off islands of awakening Japan; in many of the towns of vast India; in Turkey, with its Robert College at Constantinople for the shining head of a large body of subordinate academies; throughout agitated but hopeful Bulgaria; in not a few of the German States; in reluctant Greece, too, and ragged Italy, and republican France; in mountainous Switzerland; here and there in Russia even; and in the Scandinavian monarchies. Need we name indomitable Holland, or pass over to great England, to covenanted Scotland, to struggling Ireland? Is it necessary to do more than mention our own United States, where Presbyterianism has grown proportionately faster than the fast-growing population, and planted its various schools by the side of its augmenting churches from flowering Florida to frozen Alaska, and from where Canada (itself full of our institutions) extends hitherward her cold hands to where California warms her feet in the genial Pacific? Through all lands, from Australia and Tasmania to both Americas, and to

where east melts into west at almost every point of the juncture-line, Presbyterianism has persistently followed the sun in his course, and will follow, until none of the hours of that sun's mighty clock shall strike without the echo of a response from some chime that may announce the presence of a seminary of learning, lowly or lofty, out of whose open doors will stream a light superior even to this sun's own!

But why, it may be asked—it has often been sneeringly asked—why do Presbyterians have so much to say upon the subject of education—and will not let the world rest until in this it agree with them? May not an uneducated people be saved? Yes; but it cannot become the best type of a Christian people—and this best type is that which *all* the churches should strive to produce. Plants grow despite a brazen sky or a backward soil; but these are neither the most useful nor the most vigorous of their kind. So grace, which often seeks an earthly home in souls where there is not even the ability to read, may here minister to the hope of heaven in an atmosphere of childish ignorance; and who is not ready to bless its benignant author and bestower that such is the fact? But the great kingdom prefers to lay its foundations and rear its temples in souls where cultivated mind has prepared a firm ground for an intelligent and, thus, a propagative faith. There were thirteen apostles, but the mightiest of these was the scholarly Paul. There are thousands of gospel preachers; yet, with rare exceptions, the most influential are they who are the best furnished with knowledge and the best disciplined in ability to think. There are myriads of believers, but the most energetic and aggressive of their number are usually such as have been trained to habits of reflection.

We are, therefore, prepared to hail the day whose dawning shall witness, in every church organization, the prevalency of a zeal for education which shall at least equal the fervor of its preaching power, and thus behold a generation of Christians who shall be more fully equipped than were its predecessors, to commend the great articles of their belief to others, in the face of every doubt which an abashed infidel scholarship may presume to suggest.

J. R. WILSON.

II. DARWIN AND DARWINISM.

No writer has exerted a greater influence on the current of scientific thought in the last half of this nineteenth century than Charles Darwin. No one can read his writings, and they are somewhat voluminous, and not award him a chief place among the naturalists of our day. For careful observation of facts in the several departments of natural history to which he devoted his attention, for an explicit and honest statement of the facts observed, and for acuteness of judgment in devising methods of investigation and indefatigable industry in following out these methods, he deserves, as he has received on all hands, the highest commendation. This on the one hand.

On the other hand. When he has turned from the record of facts to reasoning upon those facts, from what is distinctively called science to philosophy, as in his "Origin of Species," and "Descent of Man," no writer has provoked more controversy, no hypothesis has awakened more discussion than the one now popularly known as Darwinism, advanced and defended in these books. His "Origin of Species" was published in 1859, and his "Descent of Man" in 1871, scarce thirty years ago, yet the literature of Darwinism will to-day form a library of very respectable dimensions.

In such circumstances, thoughtful men naturally desire to know something more of Charles Darwin than can be learned from the study of his works alone. To all such the publication of his "Life and Letters," by his son, Francis Darwin—the American edition which is before me is from the press of Appleton & Co.—is a very welcome event. The work is made up largely of Mr. Charles Darwin's own letters, written at various times during the course of his public life as an author; letters received by him in reply to these; and of an autobiography, begun in 1876, when he was sixty-five years of age, and completed in 1881, the year before his death. Respecting the last-mentioned of these, the autobiography, "written originally for his children without any thought of its publication," the author says: "I have attempted

to write the following account of myself, as if I were a dead man in another world, looking back at my own life. Nor have I found this difficult, for life is nearly over with me." (Vol. I., p. 25.) A marked characteristic of this autobiography is the evident candor with which it is written; indeed, candor is characteristic of all Mr. Charles Darwin's writings, even those somewhat controversial in their character. The selection of letters contained in these volumes, both those written by Mr. Darwin himself and those received by him from his friends, has been made with excellent judgment, and so as to supplement the autobiography. After reading the two volumes of "Life and Letters" through, one feels as if Mr. Darwin had been a personal acquaintance, and that of long standing.

I. DARWIN'S WORK IN THE LIGHT OF HIS PERSONAL CHARACTER.

I have already referred to the fact that Mr. Darwin's work as a naturalist has met with universal acceptance. His statements of fact are received as of the highest authority, and I do not think I exaggerate when I say that his contributions to science in this department are not equalled by those of any other naturalist of our day. But when we turn to his writings in the department of the philosophy of science, more especially to his advocacy of the hypothesis of the origin of species by natural selection—what is distinctively called Darwinism—all this is changed. No hypothesis of modern science has provoked more controversy than this, and if we may accept the judgment of a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* for April, 1888, "this theory, about which, before he passed away, he sometimes spoke in vacillating tones, is already on its way to the lumber-room of discarded theories."

When we turn to his biography, we find, I think, an explanation of this. In his autobiography he tells us that when eight years old he was sent to a day-school at Shrewsbury, and adds:

"By the time I went to this day-school, my taste for natural history, and more especially for collecting, was well developed. I tried to make out the names of plants, and collected all sorts of things, shells, seals, franks, coins, and minerals. The passion for collecting which leads a man to be a systematic naturalist, a virtuoso, or a miser, was very strong in me, and was clearly innate, as none of my sisters or brothers had this taste." (Vol. I., p. 26.)

An amusing illustration of the strength of this passion he gives us in writing of his life at Cambridge :

“One day, on tearing off some old bark, I saw two rare beetles, and seized one in each hand; then I saw a third and new kind, which I could not bear to lose, so that I popped the one which I held in my right hand into my mouth. Alas ! it ejected some intensely acrid fluid, which burnt my tongue so that I was forced to spit the beetle out, which was lost, as was the third one.” (Vol. I., p. 43.)

Towards the close of his autobiography he gives this estimate of himself :

“I think that I am superior to the common run of men in noticing things which easily escape attention, and in observing them carefully. My industry has been nearly as great as it could have been in the collection and observation of facts. What is far more important, my love for natural science has been steady and ardent.” (Vol. I., p. 83.)

Mr. Darwin was evidently a “born naturalist;” and naturalists, like poets, are “born, not made.” When we take into account the fact, in connexion with all this, that five years of the prime of his life—from his twenty-second to his twenty-seventh year—were spent in a voyage around the world, in H. B. M. ship *Beagle*, as naturalist of a scientific expedition, the great excellence of his writings on Natural History are fairly accounted for.

On the other point under consideration, the author of the article in the *Edinburgh Review*, already referred to, writes :

“Mr. Francis Darwin’s careful work does not allow us to remain in any doubt as to the quality of his father’s mind with respect to philosophy. Indeed, Charles Darwin himself tells us: ‘I read a good deal during the two years (1837 and 1838) on various subjects, including some metaphysical books; but I was not well-fitted for such studies.’ And again: ‘My power to follow a long and purely abstract train of thought is very limited; and therefore I could never have succeeded with metaphysics or mathematics.’ In writing to Mr. Graham at nearly the end of his life, he observes: ‘I have had no practice in abstract reasoning.’ Just after publishing his ‘Origin of Species,’ and when occupied in preparing his argument that man is as the beasts which perish, he writes to Sir C. Lyell: ‘I have thought (only vaguely) on man; . . . psychologically I have done scarcely anything.’ In writing to Huxley respecting some philosophical objections to his views about man, he says: ‘Having only common observation and sense to trust to, I did not know what to say in my second edition of my “Descent.”’ To Mr. Virtue he observes: ‘I find that my mind is so fixed by the inductive method that I cannot appreciate deductive reasoning.’ . . . A constitutional, inherited, congenital inapitude in Charles Darwin for the highest branch of science, or rather for the foundation of all science, was a bad preparation for constructing a permanently enduring and really philosophical theory of organic nature.” (*Edinburgh Review*, 1888, pp. 429, 430.)

As further illustrating this character of Mr. Darwin's mind, let the reader take the following extract from a letter of his, addressed to Prof. Asa Gray, under date of November 22, 1860:

"I grieve to say I cannot honestly go as far as you do about Design. I am conscious that I am in an utterly hopeless muddle. I cannot think that the world, as we see it, is the result of chance, and yet I cannot look at each separate thing as the result of design. To take a crucial example, you lead me to infer that you believe 'that variation has been led along certain beneficial lines.' I cannot believe this; and I think you would have to believe that the tail of the fantail was led to vary in the number and direction of its feathers in order to gratify the caprice of a few men. Yet if the fantail had been a wild bird, and had used its abnormal tail for some special end, as to sail before the wind, unlike other birds, every one would have said, 'What a beautiful and designed adaptation.' Again, I say I am, and shall ever remain, in a hopeless muddle." (Vol. II., p. 146.)

In the mental peculiarities, illustrated above, we have a satisfactory explanation of the fact that Charles Darwin, the first naturalist of the day, was, at the same time, "a bitter bad philosopher;" and Darwin, the naturalist, I believe, will be remembered and honored long after Darwinism has been consigned to "the lumber-room of discarded theories."

II. THE CHARACTER AND HISTORY OF DARWIN'S RELIGIOUS VIEWS.

Darwinism, as is acknowledged on all hands, stands intimately related to the Christian religion; and it is in the religious history of Mr. Darwin the readers of the *Quarterly Review* will feel especial interest. Fortunately, his biography enables us to get a clear idea of that history, from the beginning of his life to the very end. Chapter VIII. of his "Life and Letters" is devoted to this particular matter; and the subject is not unfrequently referred to in his letters to his friends given us in other parts of the work.

In his early youth his mind seems to have had a decidedly religious turn. While a school-boy at Shrewsbury he used to go home in the long intervals between "callings-over" and locking up at night, and he tells us:

"I remember in the early part of my school life I often had to run very quickly to be in time, and from being a fleet runner was generally successful; but when in doubt I prayed earnestly to God to help me, and I well remember that I attributed my success to the prayers and not to my quick running, and marvelled how generally I was aided." (Vol. I., p. 29.)

His religious views in early manhood may be learned from his statement:

"After having spent two sessions in Edinburgh, my father perceived, or he heard from my sisters, that I did not like the thought of being a physician, so he proposed that I should become a clergyman. He was, very properly, vehement against my turning into an idle sporting man, which then seemed my probable destination. I asked for some time to consider, as from what little I had heard or thought on the subject I had scruples about declaring my belief in all the dogmas of the Church of England; though otherwise I liked the thought of being a country clergyman. Accordingly, I read with care 'Pearson on the Creed,' and a few other books on divinity; and as I did not then in the least doubt the strict and literal truth of every word in the Bible, I soon persuaded myself that our creed must be fully accepted. Considering how fiercely I have been attacked by the orthodox, it seems ludicrous that I once intended to be a clergyman. Nor was this intention and my father's wish ever formally given up, but died a natural death when, on leaving Cambridge, I joined the *Beagle* as naturalist." (Vol. I., p. 39.)

Of the change in his religious views he tells us:

"While on board the *Beagle* I was quite orthodox, and I remember being heartily laughed at by several of the officers (though themselves orthodox) for quoting the Bible as an unanswerable authority on some point of morality. I suppose it was the novelty of the argument that amused them. But I had gradually come by this time, *i. e.*, 1836 to 1839, to see that the Old Testament was no more to be trusted than the sacred books of the Hindoos. The question then continually rose before my mind, and would not be banished, Is it credible that if God were now to make a revelation to the Hindoos, he would permit it to be connected with the belief in Vishnu, Siva, etc., as Christianity is connected with the Old Testament? This appeared to me utterly incredible."

"By further reflecting that the clearest evidence would be requisite to make any sane man believe in the miracles by which Christianity is supported—and the more we know of the fixed laws of nature, the more incredible do miracles become—that the men at that time were ignorant and credulous to a degree almost incomprehensible by us; that the gospel cannot be proved to have been written simultaneously with the events; that they differ in many important details, far too important, as it seemed to me, to be admitted as the usual inaccuracies of eye-witnesses; by such reflections as these, which I give, not as having the least novelty or value, but as they influenced me, I gradually came to disbelieve in Christianity as a divine revelation. The fact that many false religions have spread over large portions of the earth like wild-fire, had some weight with me."

"But I was very unwilling to give up my belief; I feel sure of this, for I can well remember often and often inventing day-dreams of old letters between distinguished Romans, and manuscripts being discovered at Pompeii, or elsewhere, which confirmed in the most striking manner all that was written in the gospels. But I found it more and more difficult, with free scope given to my imagination, to invent evidence which would suffice to convince me. Thus disbelief crept over me at a very slow rate, but was at last complete. The rate was so slow that I felt no distress." (Vol. I., pp. 278, 279.)

Subsequently he writes :

“At the present day the most usual argument for the existence of an intelligent God is drawn from the deep inward conviction and feelings which are experienced by most persons. Formerly I was led by feelings such as those just referred to (although I do not think the religious sentiment was ever very strongly developed in me), to the firm conviction of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul. In my journal I wrote that while standing in the midst of a Brazilian forest, it is not possible to give an adequate idea of the higher feelings of wonder, admiration and devotion which fill and elevate the mind. I well remember my conviction that there is more in man than the mere breath of his body. But now the grandest scenes would not cause any such convictions and feelings to rise in my mind. It may be truly said that I am like a man who has become color-blind, and the universal belief by men of the existence of redness makes my present loss of perception of not the least value as evidence.” (Vol. I., p. 281.)

How complete Mr. Darwin’s “disbelief” became we may learn from his letter to a German student, written in 1879, in which he says :

“I am much engaged, an old man, and out of health, and I cannot spare time to answer your questions fully; nor, indeed, can they be answered. Science has nothing to do with Christ, except in so far as the habit of scientific research makes a man cautious in admitting evidence. For myself, I do not believe that there ever has been any revelation. As for a future life, every man must judge for himself between conflicting vague probabilities.” (Vol. I., p. 277.)

As throwing light upon the way in which this great change in Mr. Darwin’s religious views was brought about, I would ask the reader’s attention to the following statements. Mr. Darwin, in his autobiography, writes:

“I have said that in one respect my mind has changed during the last twenty or thirty years. Up to the age of thirty, or beyond it, poetry of many kinds, such as the works of Milton, Gray, Byron, Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley, gave me great pleasure, and even as a school-boy I took intense delight in Shakspeare, especially in the historical plays. I have also said that formerly pictures gave me considerable, and music very great delight. But now for many years I cannot endure to read a line of poetry; I have tried lately to read Shakspeare, and found it so intolerably dull that it nauseated me. I have also lost my taste for pictures and music. Music generally sets me to thinking too energetically on what I have been at work on, instead of giving me pleasure. I retain some taste for fine scenery, but it does not cause me the exquisite delight which it formerly did. On the other hand, novels which are works of the imagination, though not of a very high order, have been for years a wonderful relief and pleasure to me, and I often bless all novelists. A surprising number have been read aloud to me. . . . My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts; but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain

alone on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive. A man with a mind more highly organized or better constituted than mine, would not, I suppose, have thus suffered; and if I had to live my life again, I would have made a rule to read some poetry and listen to some music at least once every week; for perhaps the parts of my brain now atrophied would thus have been kept active through use. The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the emotional part of our nature." (Vol. I., pp. 81, 82.)

In a letter to his intimate friend, Sir J. D. Hooker, he writes:

"I am glad that you were at the 'Messiah;' it is the one thing I should like to hear again, but I dare say I should find my soul too dried up to appreciate it as in old days; and then I should feel very flat, for it is a horrid bore to feel as I constantly do, that I am a withered leaf for every subject except science." (Vol. II., p. 273.)

His son, in the work before us, tells us:

"It was a sure sign that he was not well when he was idle at any time other than his regular resting hours; for as long as he remained moderately well, there was no break in the regularity of his life. Weekdays and Sundays passed by alike, each with their stated intervals of work and rest. It is almost impossible, except for those who watched his daily life, to realise how essential to his well being was the regular routine that I have sketched, and with what pain and difficulty anything beyond it was attempted. Any public appearance, even of the most modest kind, was an effort to him. In 1871 he went to the little village church for the wedding of his eldest daughter, but he could hardly bear the fatigue of being present through the short service." (Vol. I., p. 104.)

In giving an account of his father's religious views, Francis Darwin makes the following quotation from a manuscript of his father:

"Another source of conviction in the existence of God, connected with the reason and not with the feelings, impresses me as having much more weight. This follows from the extreme difficulty, or rather impossibility, of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a first cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist. This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the 'Origin of Species'; and it is since that time that it has very gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt, can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animal, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?" (Vol. I., p. 282.)

Of similar import with the above, in a letter to W. Graham, written in 1881, the year before his death, he writes:

“I have no practice in abstract reasoning, and I may be all astray. Nevertheless, you have expressed my inward conviction, though far more vividly and clearly than I could have done, that the universe is not the result of chance. But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?” (Vol. I., p. 285.)

Such is the account which Mr. Darwin himself gives us of the great change in his views on questions of religion of which he was the subject; and I have quoted from his “Life and Letters” at much greater length than I otherwise would, that those of my readers who may not have access to the work itself may yet be able to judge for themselves of the extent of that change and of the way in which it was brought about. Attempting a brief summary of the truth in this case, I remark:

1. From a person of a decidedly religious turn of mind in childhood, and one who in early manhood “did not in the least doubt the strict and literal truth of every word in the Bible,” he came in his later years utterly to reject the claim of the Bible to be the “word of God,” so as to declare, “I do not believe that there ever has been any revelation,” and to lose all faith in the existence of a personal God and all confidence in man’s immortality. From a thoroughly Christian man, in the wide sense of the word Christian, he became an atheist, a man “without God in the world.” He preferred, as his son tells us, “the unaggressive attitude of an agnostic.” (Vol. I., p. 286.) And certain it is Mr. Darwin never became a blatant atheist, seeking to propagate his atheism among his fellow-men. But such is the relation which man sustains to God that an agnostic, *i. e.*, one who does not know whether there is a God or not, is, for all practical purposes, an atheist, *i. e.*, “without God in the world.”

2. This great change in Mr. Darwin’s religious views did not occur as the result of a vicious life, as in very many cases such a change does. As to his course of life, he writes, in a note added to the manuscript of his autobiography in 1879:

“As for myself, I believe that I have acted rightly in steadily following and devoting my life to science. I feel no remorse from having committed any great sin, but have often and often regretted that I have not done more direct good to my fellow-creatures.” (Vol. II., p. 530.)

His case was not unlike that of the young nobleman of whom we read in the gospel, who, when our Lord said to him, "Thou knowest the commandments, Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Defraud not, Honor thy father and mother," answered and said, "Master, all these have I observed from my youth up." (Matt. x. 19, 20.) It has been truly said: "*Integer vitæ scelerisque purus* might emphatically be the epitaph of this simple and kind-hearted naturalist."

3. Nor can the change in Mr. Darwin's religious views be attributed to the logical force of objections to Christianity carefully examined. In reply to Dr. Abbott, requesting him to become a contributor to *The Index*, he wrote:

"I have never systematically thought much on religion in relation to science, or on morals in relation to society; and without steadily keeping my mind on such subjects for a long period, I am really incapable of writing anything worth sending to *The Index*." (Vol. I., p. 276.)

In his own account of this change, already quoted at large, the objections to Christianity which he tells us influenced him, are, as he admits, "without the least novelty," are all objections which have been answered time and again in a way to satisfy the ablest and most careful thinkers of our times. Had Mr. Darwin studied the claims of Christianity with half the care with which he studied questions of science, his conclusions would have been, I believe, very different from those which cast their dark shadows upon the later years of his life.

4. The change in Mr. Darwin's religious views was a very gradual one, and began with the rejection of the Bible as the word of God—first of all, of the Old Testament Scriptures. In his words, "Disbelief crept over me at a very slow rate, but was at last complete. The rate was so slow that I felt no distress," and "I had gradually come by this time, *i. e.*, 1836 to 1839, to see that the Old Testament was no more to be trusted than the sacred books of the Hindoos," and because of the intimate connexion in which the New Testament stands to the Old, in rejecting the one he felt bound to reject the other also. Just in what way he came to see that "the Old Testament was no more to be trusted than the sacred books of the Hindoos," he does not tell us; but I think

it fair to infer from what he does say, it was because of what seemed to him to be irreconcilable discrepancies between certain of its statements and what he considered established truths of science. Many scientists have in this way reached the same conclusion with Mr. Darwin. On the other hand :

“At the time of the meeting of the British Association, in 1865, some six hundred and seventeen scientific men signed a paper containing the following declaration, viz. : ‘We conceive that it is impossible for the Word of God, as written in the book of nature, and God’s word, written in holy Scripture, to contradict one another, however much they may appear to differ. We are not forgetful that physical science is not complete, but is only in a condition of progress, and that at present our finite reason enables us to see as through a glass, darkly; and we confidently believe that a time will come when the two records will be seen to agree in every particular.’”—*Current Discussions in Theology for 1883*, pp. 7, 8.

5. This slow and gradual, yet ultimately complete change in Mr. Darwin’s religious faith and feelings is to be attributed, in large measure, to the fact that for years together, beginning with his preparation of the scientific reports of the voyage of the *Beagle*, he occupied his thoughts and attention with scientific matters, to the practical exclusion of all others. His early religious beliefs seem quietly to have dropped out of his mind, rather than to have been distinctly rejected; and hence his atheism assumed the form of agnosticism rather than that of a positive denial of the existence of a God.

It was not in the department of religious faith and sentiment alone that the effect of such a course of life was manifested. In his taste for poetry and music it was equally apparent. “As a school-boy,” he tells us, “I took intense delight in Shakspeare, especially in his historic plays. . . . But now, for many years, I cannot endure to read a line of poetry. I have tried lately to read Shakspeare, and found it so intolerably dull that it nauseated me.” And there is something pathetic in the tone in which he speaks of his loss of taste for music when, writing to an intimate friend, he says: “I am glad that you were at the Messiah. It is the one thing I should like to hear again; but I dare say I should find my soul too dried up to appreciate it as in old days; and then I should feel very flat; for it is a horrid bore to feel, as I constantly do, that I am a withered leaf for every subject except science.”

The effect of such a course in the case of his religious faith and emotions was doubtless aggravated by the fact that, as his son tells us, "there was no break in the regularity of his life. Week-days and Sundays passed alike, each with their stated intervals of work and rest." He who made us and best understands our nature, at the very beginning "blessed the seventh day and sanctified it." In the copy of the moral law, written on tables of stone by God himself, the commandment, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy; six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work; but the seventh is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God," stands side by side with, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; and no man can persistently disregard either the one or the other without his religious nature suffering deterioration thereby. Writing of the effect of his exclusive attention to science upon his taste for poetry and music, Mr. Darwin writes: "If I had to live my life over again, I would have made it a rule to read some poetry or listen to some music at least once every week; for perhaps the part of my brain now atrophied would then have been kept active through use. The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness; and may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and more probably to the moral character." Would that he had early in life adopted some such rule; and in the same spirit and for the same, if not for higher reasons, made it a rule to suspend all scientific work on the Sabbath, and to devote its sacred hours to the all-important subject of religion. Then would he not have found himself in his old age "without God in the world." Eminent scientists have pursued such a course as this, and as a consequence their early piety has ripened with a blessed fruitage. Sir Isaac Newton was an eminently pious man; or to mention cases nearer our own time, Sir Humphrey Davy, in England, and Prof. Joseph Henry, in our own country, lived as distinguished for their Christian faith as for their eminent attainments in science and their great discoveries.

6. The finishing touch to Mr. Darwin's atheism was given, according to his own statement, by the doctrine of evolution, in the form in which he adopted it. According to his view, man is as truly and as naturally the product of evolution from the ape, as the ape is from some animal occupying a still lower position in

the scale of being. As M. Mivart has well said: "The essential bestiality of man is an integral part of the system." In view of this fact, it should cause us no surprise to find him writing to Mr. Graham, the year before his death: "You have expressed my inward conviction, though more vividly and clearly than I could have done, that the universe is not the result of chance"—or, as he expresses the same idea on another occasion, "I feel compelled to look to a First Cause, having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to man. But, then, with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of a man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value, or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there be any convictions in such a mind?" Granted the premises, and this conclusion does not seem an unreasonable one. But does it not seem strange that Mr. Darwin should see so clearly this consequence of his doctrine of evolution when applied in the department of religious thought, and not see that it must, of necessity, apply with equally destructive effect in every other department of human thought? If the human mind, because of its "essential bestiality," cannot be trusted in the matter of the existence of a God, for the same reason it cannot be trusted in the matter of "the origin of species."

Such is, in brief, the history of Mr. Darwin's change in religious belief and sentiment, as gathered from a careful study of his "Life and Letters." Turn we now to an examination of the hypothesis of genetic evolution as held and taught by him—what is popularly termed

DARWINISM.

On first reading "The Origin of Species," shortly after it was published, the impression made upon my mind was that Mr. Darwin did not hold the hypothesis of evolution in its atheistic form. This opinion was based upon the fact that he speaks of evolution as "a mode of creation"; and postulates the existence of certain "primordial forms," as the starting point for the evolution of all higher forms for which he contends. A careful examination of his letters satisfies me that on this point I was mistaken. In a letter to Sir C. Lyell, bearing date October 11, 1859, he writes:

“We must under present knowledge assume the creation of one or of a few forms in the same manner as philosophers assume the power of attraction without any explanation.”

And again:

“I would give absolutely nothing for the theory of natural selection if it requires miraculous additions at any one stage of descent. I think that embryology, homology, classification, etc., etc., show us that all vertebrates have descended from one parent; how that parent appeared we know not.” (Vol. II., pp. 6, 7.)

And writing to the same person under date of October 20, 1859, he says:

“I have reflected a good deal on what you say on the necessity of continued intervention of creative power. I cannot see this necessity; and its admission, I think, would make the theory of natural selection valueless. Grant a simple archetypal creature, like the mud-fish or lepidonsiren, with the five senses and some vestige of mind, and I believe natural selection will account for the production of every vertebrate animal.” (Vol. I., p. 528.)

Prof. Sedgwick, a personal friend of Darwin, and the one under whom he studied geology at Cambridge, in a review of “The Origin of Species,” published in 1860, certainly takes this view of the matter, for he writes:

“I cannot conclude without expressing my detestation of the theory, because of its unflinching materialism; because it has deserted the inductive track, the only track that leads to physical truth; because it utterly repudiates final cause, and thereby indicates a demoralized understanding on the part of its advocates. Not that I believe that Darwin is an atheist, though I cannot but regard his materialism as atheistical. I think it untrue, because opposed to the obvious course of nature and the very opposite of inductive truth. And I think it intensely mischievous. Each series of facts is laced together by a series of assumptions and repetitions of the one false principle. You cannot make a good rope out of a string of air-bubbles.” (Vol. II., pp. 91, 92.)

Such is Darwinism, by which is meant evolution as held and taught by Darwin himself. Burdened as it is with all the objections to atheistic materialism, to refer to no other objections, it has never had many advocates in Great Britain or America. Prof. Asa Gray, under whose supervision the first edition of “The Origin of Species” was republished in this country, though adopting evolution in a distinctly theistic form, never did adopt it in the form in which Darwin proposed it, as is abundantly evident from his letters contained in the volumes before us; and later ad-

vocates of evolution, almost without exception, distinctly repudiate it in its atheistic form. Darwinism, having lived out the brief life usually enjoyed by such speculations, is now, beyond all question, "on its way to the lumber-room of discarded theories."

That a theory of evolution, *accounting for the origin of species*—and it is such evolution alone which has ever been in controversy—distinctly theistic in its character, can be constructed, will not admit of question. The conception of evolution as but "a mode of creation," in the proper sense of the word creation, is perfectly intelligible. Evolution is not necessarily atheistic.

The question whether or not a Christian theory of evolution can be constructed, *i. e.*, a theory of evolution which will be in harmony with the teachings of Scripture considered as the "Word of God," is an entirely different question. The attempt to construct such a theory, has been made by men of high standing in science and philosophy, but as yet—to say the least of it—with very indifferent success.

Professor Drummond has made the attempt, but finds such discrepancies between evolution and the plain statements of Scripture—especially statements contained in the earlier chapters of Genesis—that he feels constrained to substitute what he calls "the Bible of modern scientific theology," for "the Bible accepted by our fathers;" of which two books he tells us: "The chapters, the verses, and the words are the same in each, yet in the meaning, the interpretation, and the way they are looked at, they are two entirely distinct Bibles." (*Popular Science Monthly*, 1886, p. 107.)

Professor LeConte, in his lately published "Evolution in its Relation to Religious Thought," seems to have encountered the same difficulty, and disposes of it in a very similar way:

"There is, and in the nature of things there can be, *no test of truth but reason*. We *must* fearlessly, but honestly and reverently, try all things, even revelations, by this test. We must not regard, as so many do, the spirit of man as the passive amanuensis of the Spirit of God. Revelations to man must of necessity partake of the imperfections of the medium through which it comes. As pure water from heaven, falling upon and filtering through earth, must gather impurities in its course differing in amount and in kind according to the earth, even so the pure divine truth, filtering through man's mind, must take imperfections characteristic of the man and the age. Such filtrate must be redistilled in the alembic of reason to separate the divine truth from the earthy impurities." (Pp. 310, 311.)

What all this means is abundantly evident from the writings of the "advanced thinkers" of the present day. From the fact that adopting the theory of an unbroken evolution from the lowest to the highest forms in nature has led such men as Mr. Darwin, Prof. Drummond and Prof. LeConte, either explicitly or impliedly to reject the claim of the Bible to be received as the "Word of God," it seems fair to infer that the construction of a Christian theory of evolution is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

Dr. McCosh in his "Religious Aspect of Evolution," seeks to give the theory a Christian character in an entirely different way. Reverently accepting the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament as the Word of God, and "the only rule of *faith* and obedience," he modifies the theory of evolution as held by Darwin and Drummond and LeConte, by introducing divine agency, in the form of creation, at different points in the course of progress by which our world has reached the position it now occupies. The points which he specifies are: (1), The origination of matter, and (2), The introduction of light, (3), Life, (4), Sensation, (5), Instinct, (6), Intelligence, and (7), The moral sense. Of these he says: "No mundane power can produce them at first, and it is reasonable that we should refer their production to God, to whom all power belongs, even the power of evolution. As evolution by physical causes cannot do it, we infer that God does it by immediate fiat, even as he created matter, and the forces that are in matter. We certainly know of no other power capable of doing it. This seems a legitimate conclusion. It calls in a power known otherwise to work, and to be competent to produce the effect. . . . God may be a continuous creator as he is a continuous preserver." (*Religious Aspect of Evolution*, p. 54.)

The philosophical ground on which Dr. McCosh breaks up the continuity of evolution, and introduces the creative agency of God at the seven points mentioned above, he states in the words: "It is a law of causation anticipated, as can be shown, from an old date, that a cause—I am speaking only of physical causes—can give only what it possesses. Causation cannot create anything new; it cannot give what it has not within itself. There is nothing in the effect which was not potentially in the cause, that is, in the agent

which constituted the cause." (*Religious Aspect of Evolution*, p. 52.) This is certainly sound philosophy; and when on this ground he demands the introduction of the creative agency of God, at the introduction of life, for example, the demand is a reasonable one. Dead matter does not possess life, even potentially. This is proved by universal observation, and by elaborate experiments which have been made more than once to test the matter.

Let us apply this sound philosophical principle to the question of "the origin of species." Has any lower species of plant or animal within itself, even potentially, the next higher species? *e. g.*, Has the ape within itself even potentially, the man? I know of but one way to answer this question in accordance with the settled laws of scientific research; and that is, either by observation of what is actually going on in the world around us, or by direct experiment. True science deals with facts, not fancies. It seeks to ascertain, not what might be, but what is. I ask, therefore: Has any one ever seen a new species produced from an old in the ordinary course of nature? Has any one, by experiment, succeeded in producing a new species from an older one? Both of these questions must be answered in the negative. The two well-established laws of "the infertility of hybrids," and "reversion to type," have preserved, in so far as we know, all natural species of plants and animals such as they were at the beginning. In the words of the Duke of Argyll: "That any organism, therefore, can ever produce another which varies from itself in any truly specific character, is an assumption not justified by any known fact." (*Primeval Man*, p. 46.) New varieties of plants and animals often spring out of the old naturally; and, by way of experiment, man has produced many new varieties in our day. But varieties differ essentially from natural species; and, the fact that the needful changes are so often and easily produced in the one case, only makes their entire absence in the other the more noteworthy and significant.

The question respecting the permanence of species, by which naturalists mean, not the continued existence of species throughout all time, for many species of both plants and animals which once existed have disappeared, but the permanent retention by natural species of their specific characters, so that one species is never

transformed into another, is not a new question which has first arisen in connexion with the controversy about genetic evolution, but one which, in connexion with other questions, has engaged the attention of naturalists for more than a hundred years. And there are few questions in the whole range of natural science which have been more carefully and thoroughly examined than this. The result of this protracted examination Prof. L. Agassiz, the highest authority in such matters as this, gives us in his words: "Breeds (*i. e.*, varieties) among animals are the work of men; species were created by God." (*Study of Natural History*, p. 147.) Knowing all this, Mr. Darwin writes: "The belief in natural selection must at present be grounded entirely on general considerations. . . . When we descend to details, we can prove that no one species has changed (*i. e.*, we cannot prove that any single species has changed)." (Vol. II., p. 210.) From time to time particular instances of the change of one species into another have been reported, like that which Dr. McCosh mentions as having been observed by a Russian naturalist bearing the unpronounceable name of Schmankewitsch, (see *Religious Aspects of Evolution*, p. 26,) but in every instance, when scientific men have thoroughly sifted these cases, the changes have been found to be varietal, and not specific; so that it remains true to-day, after an examination protracted through a hundred years, that "we cannot prove that any single species has changed."

In view of all this, the permanence of species ought, in the present state of our knowledge of nature, to be considered a settled matter, and the conclusion a sound one, that a higher species does not exist, even potentially, in a lower. On Dr. McCosh's own principle, then, we must break the continuity of the progress by which our world has reached its present condition, and introduce the agency of creative power, not at the seven points alone which he mentions, but wherever a new natural species has come into being. And so we are brought back to just the old theory of creation—nothing more, nothing less. All the evolution there is about the case is simply the evolution (in the literal sense of that word, an unfolding) of a plan of creation by God; like all other plans of God, a wise plan, its wisdom appearing conspicuously in

this, that each particular natural species of plant and animal has been brought into being as the environment which the earth presented became suited to its life.

Now, if in addition to this, we limit what Dr. McCosh calls "continuous creation" to the age—I know not how long that age lasted—which closed with the creation of man, and was immediately followed by a day (or age), in which "God rested from all his works which he created and made," we get a theory of evolution, but it is the evolution or unfolding of a divine plan only, which is in harmony with the ascertained facts of science, and with the plain teachings of the Word of God as well; in other words, a Christian theory of evolution, if any one chooses to call it so. For myself, I prefer the old name, creation; and this, I believe, is the only Christian theory of evolution which will ever be established.

GEORGE D. ARMSTRONG.

III. THE RELIGIOUS NOTIONS OF MATTHEW ARNOLD.

THERE is a popular tendency to rate Mr. Arnold as a mere literateur, and, were he living, he would doubtless protest against it. A literary man he was, not only in the bulk of his work, but in spirit, and in the controlling conviction that literature plays an increasingly large part in the development of civilization. This belief made him seek in literature an opportunity for solving many perplexing human problems; led him to use his calling in various efforts to clarify and extend our knowledge; and gave to his literary activities a certain originality of method and boldness of design, especially noticeable in his dealings with religious questions. The Bible has always been committed to philosophers and theologians, and they have been considered the only proper authorities on its teachings. The Bible was thought to be theological and metaphysical. Mr. Arnold, however, boldly contradicts the popular conception, and charges vast wrong against the Bible and against man by its operation. He claims a right to speak authoritatively of its teachings from the literary point of view, and, in fine, holds that literature furnishes the most, if not the only, trustworthy criteria for judging it.

The evidences of Mr. Arnold's deep religiousness are plentiful in his writings, and are strong and impressive. We have here no idle and light jester, though his remarks on Puritanism are sometimes harsh, while his sallies toward certain well-known English churchmen who had paid their respects to him are frequently playful to the verge of flippancy. On the whole, however, his spirit was serious and his manner reverential, as though he realized the awe-inspiring nature of religion and its symbols, and felt depressed by the widespread and thoughtless skepticism so loud and rampant in our time. The whole tenor of his writings reveals the earnest and devotional nature of the man. If an iconoclast, it was from no pleasure at the demolition of popular idols. Wherein he

destroyed it was that he might build again; build more wisely, more truly, more lastingly; which, indeed, stands in very sweet and refreshing contrast to the frivolous destructiveness of popular infidelity, and, one may say, to the thoughtless contradictions of the prevailing scientific spirit.

The chief interest in Mr. Arnold's religious writings and in his religio-literary philosophy arises from the fact that he acted as a mediator between the opposing camps of religion, namely, the theologians and the scientists. He acted the mediator consciously and purposely. Religion he thought to be in danger equally from both, and his mission, or at least the task he assumed, was to show both sides their errors and reconcile them to the truth and to each other, lest religion, man's chiefest and truest concern, should perish amidst the confusions of their fanatical strife.

Let it be said now that Mr. Arnold introduced and emphasized an almost overlooked element in the determination of religious truth. Some may deny that the Bible is inspired, some even that it is a revelation; but scarcely could any be found to deny that it is one of the most instructive and impressive literary monuments of the race; not many will contradict the statement that from the beginning the world's greatest geniuses have spoken to men from the Bible. Victor Hugo ranks Isaiah and John along with Æschylus, Shakspeare, and Goethe; and surely Mr. Arnold himself was no mean judge of literary excellence. The estimate of a writer in a late number of the *Princeton Review* hardly accords him the merit and prominence to which he is entitled. If there is a certain intellectual hesitancy in his reasoning which causes him to halt, repeat, and move slowly in the development of his thesis, yet it is all in a style so pure and lucid, so incomparable for ease and strength of statement, that one readily forgives these faults, which sometimes seem to reflect on the reader's understanding.

But he had a neglected idea to clear up and enforce. This was a hard task when one considers how the idea had so long escaped men, and how it even seemed to conflict with their cherished notions about the Bible and religion. Therefore he must insist and repeat, even if he should be called tiresome. He saw the ex-

planation of all man's religious follies and entanglements, and it was his business to get it before others; others, too, who were prejudiced, and combative and stupid.

That Mr. Arnold carried his notion of a literary solution of vexed religious questions to an almost fanatical extreme must appear to all who read his books, especially *Literature and Dogma*, and *St. Paul and Protestantism*. He did just what the theologian and the scientist, against whose spirit and methods he fought, did; that is, he took a narrow and one-sided view of truth, and so weakened his own work, and made his religious influence malevolent where it might have been helpful and beneficent. Theologians are afraid of him, and will have nothing to do with him; scientists look upon him as a playful dilettante, who knows and cares nothing for *solid facts*.

As the consequence of his literary egotism it cannot, one supposes, be said that Mr. Arnold enjoys any religious prominence, much less leadership, unless Robert Elsmere points to something of that kind. The present writer does not know whether the Elgood Street New Church is a reality or a mental idealization of the writer's brain. One thing is certain, though, and that is, that it is an attempt to display the practical fruits of Mr. Arnold's teachings. The novel,—though I have seen no reference to the fact in the supernumerous criticisms of it,—is simply a practical, ideal development of the brilliant authoress's uncle's peculiar doctrines. For Mr. Arnold was not content to be a theorizer; his thought was a stimulus to action. He deplored the inanition of popular unbelief, and the slender hold and practical effect of the churches on the masses. His last essays on the Church of England, as well as his own conduct, prove that he was not a mere *doctrinaire*.

And yet, in one important respect, his opinions lack weight and sanction. He charged upon the defenders and patrons of popular religion a want of "intellectual seriousness." By that he means the insight to discern the evidential strength of facts, and the relative worth of doctrines.

Now, with how much cogency can this charge be retorted on him. The whole tenor of *Literature and Dogma*, and less prominently of *God and the Bible*, is of such playful character, and his

train of thought admits of so many irrelevant and even personal sallies, that one may well be in some doubt of the intellectual seriousness of the effort as a whole. Or, if we take particular phases of his religio-literary work we will be struck by the same trait, a trait for which he professed great dislike, and held responsible for many errors: almost all errors. His doctrine of the Bible is a signal instance of his lack of gravity. Is the Bible a simple literary production, and must it necessarily be measured by literary canons alone? He says, yes, and in saying so exhibits as absurdly an imperfect grasp of the truth as the scientist who tests it by the dirt measure, or the theologian who insists on its dogmatic character—at least inferentially dogmatic. All of them are right and all are wrong, and all work out true and false reports, the one being as laudable and blamable as the other. Because there is poetry in the Bible, and much has been mistaken for fact which is poetry, one should not include the whole Scriptures under that category, and assert,—running to the verge of seriousness, if not plunging into comicality,—that the story of the Fall, or of the Incarnation is poetry.

Nor has Mr. Arnold made it possible, by any constructive work respecting the Bible, for us to believe that his theological efforts were sufficiently governed by a serious spirit. This may be owing to the fact that he was more literary than logical. Logical he certainly was not to any useful and saving degree. If he had been, he would have seen the shortages of his own criticisms, their total inadequacy, not only to meet the needs for which he put them forth, but even to sustain their own weight, and to establish themselves as permanent elements of man's religious consciousness.

Mr. Arnold's desire and his self-confessed aim were to save the Bible, to rescue it from dangers which threatened to engulf the truth in it along with the popular errors about it. But if he had been logical, as we say he was not, he might have seen that, according to his religious hypotheses, there is and can be no Bible. The theologian, rightly or wrongly, let us not declare, yet logically, holds that the Bible is such by virtue of its being a divinely-inspired and progressive revelation, embodying throughout a su-

pernatural element. The supernatural element is what gives it unity, makes it an organic whole, in short, unifies its variant parts into an orderly and purposive whole. Abstract the supernatural, and your whole, the Bible, falls into numberless pieces, which fragments are not bounded by our books, but, going further, break up into little paragraphs, atoms flying in every direction. One might as well bind Æschylus, and Xenophon, and Homer, and Herodotus, and Plato into a volume and call it the Bible; for they would have the same unity as the Hebrew Bible on our author's literary theory, that is, the unity of a national environment and consciousness. And one might just as easily have an English Bible, throwing in Spenser, Shakspeare, (as Mr. Ingersoll would desire,) Newton, Milton, Bacon, and so on, *ad libitum*. These would make a very notable and noble assembly; but cannot any one see that they would not make a Bible in any proper and true sense of the word? Nor is the difficulty in the least abated when Mr. Arnold tells us that the preëminent authority of the Jews is because they gave special attention to "righteousness." As a matter of fact, they did not give special attention to it, or to *conduct*, which our author uses as convertible. They were morally one of the very weakest and most sinful of nations. And yet naturally, and without any divine impulse, they produced geniuses of conduct to which the world must yet go for light and guidance. On the theologian's theory one can understand this; on Mr. Arnold's one cannot. But if we suppose that Israel gave special attention to righteousness, and that the prophets were the offspring of the national consciousness, which they were not, but were opposed to it, is that sufficient to give supreme conscience and authority to Israel as the race's religious guide? Some may doubt the Israelitish ideal, and still more the Israelitish practice, as having no adequate motive behind it; and if any did not do this, can it be presumed or argued that religion needs no sterner and more authoritative sanction than art? We will go, says our author, to the Jews to learn of righteousness for the same reason that we go to the Greeks to learn of art, viz., because they gave special attention to that particular thing. Now, one who has a proper sense of the relative object and value of things must find

emphatic fault with this naïve jumbling of unlike elements. Certainly art and religion are not equal in this comparison. Art needs no sanction; religion does. If any one denies this, and says one thinks so simply because of theological abuses, the Aberglaube of religion, one can only point him to the Jews themselves as proof of what is said, or to those who surrounded Christ and heard his words from his own lips. Everything was true for them, if not for us, and yet they present stern and indisputable evidence that religion, in its simplest and purest form, does not appeal with any force to man, and that it demands for its sanction and propagation a supernatural agency.

It is really very melancholy that a man and critic like Mr. Arnold should make no straightforward and *distinct* effort toward a reconstruction of the Bible. This is said in good faith, for it will forever be impossible for these critics to realize what and how much they destroy in elimination of the supernatural from religion. Large generalities are easy to reach, but they are vague and unsatisfactory. And until anti-supernaturalists actually undertake a revision of the Bible they will never apprehend that they are standing on quicksand.

One may make this plain by reference to a particular belief of Paul, concerning which Mr. Arnold has much to say. Paul's doctrine of a spiritual death and resurrection he heartily accepts as the essence of the apostle's teaching; but he rejects the apostle's notion of a physical resurrection, and sees apparently no relation between the two, indeed, goes so far as to say that Paul recognized none. Now all this seems very perverse to one who believes in the supernatural in the Bible. To such an one there is a direct *nexus* between the two doctrines which makes the spiritual truth dependent on the physical one.

If one could have been there,—Mr. Arnold would have done,—and extracted from the consciousness of Paul his belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus, how much can one suppose he would have written of the spiritual rising? Or, if one could go through his epistles and cut out the influence of this belief, how much of a remainder would there be; and what authority would it have?

Again, one may illustrate the futility of such criticism by

reference directly to the resurrection of Christ. Did he not believe in his own rising? How can one be satisfied with the dogmatic averment, that when he so speaks he was using poetical language? It requires a larger faith to believe that he was humanly so much above his contemporaries, humble and unlearned as he must have been, than to believe that he was divine in the truest sense of the word. A human Christ and yet of such divinely colossal dimensions as Mr. Arnold portrays is the most incredible of human conceptions.

Christ believed in his own resurrection, and so did his disciples. Now, let us suppose that the influence of that unique and masterful conception had been withdrawn from their religious consciousness, would any valuable or competent insight or authority have remained to them? Or, if its influence were now abstracted from their teachings, what authoritative truth would remain? Certainly truth in some degree would remain, but wherein would lie its peculiar sanction and power; for Mr. Arnold supposes it to possess a quite unique potency.

We fully believe that Robert Elsinere is a practical setting forth of Mr. Arnold's philosophy, and must confess that there is an all but laughable conicality in the dual creed of the Elgood Street Brotherhood: "In thee, O Eternal, do I put my trust." "This do in remembrance of me."

It would not avail anything for one to tell Mrs. Ward and her admirers, that they have cut the ground from beneath their own "creed"; that it has no base to stand upon; and that its parts are not only gratuitous assumptions, but are also logically incongruous. But if there is any desire on the part of the New Religionists of Elgood Street to test the authority and worth of their faith, to realize the ideal of their regenerate and purified religious conception,—if Mr. Hugh Flaxman and Mr. Murray Edwards have any mind, and money, and muscle for actual experiments, we will make a practical suggestion to them.

There are in the city of Chicago two or three hundred souls,—they would probably deny that they are souls,—who offer a most inviting field for a trial of the New Religion. They are completely disgusted with the old religion,—and we may suppose that

the old religion has itself to blame,—and having forsaken the churches, are at this writing inaugurating Sunday-schools to “counteract the baneful influence of the churches.” Here is the precise result which Mr. Arnold feared, and against which he labored to provide, and now what a victory for the rejuvenated faith if it will send a missionary to the spot and show to the world that it is not sin which lies at the bottom of the Chicago revolt, but the abuses of the churches, and that these people are really pining for the pure gospel of Christ. Even the churches themselves might be aroused to a sense of their guiltiness could they see these “working men,” who have finally separated from them, eagerly grasping the new creed as expounded by another Elsmere, and being transformed into humble and pure Christians; from which they are indescribably distant at present.

Mr. Arnold, as the reader will remember, often twitted the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester on their desire “to do something for the honor of the Godhead of our blessed Lord.” But he has laid himself as liable to such irony as the bishops because of his obtrusive purpose of doing something for the honor of religion. Religion is being ruined, destroyed, by those who profess to be its friends and teachers, and he felt that it was his task to rescue it from the clutches of its foes. Whoever assumes such a large and responsible undertaking is sure to get into trouble, and is likely to make himself ridiculous. Truth is not dependent on man’s advocacy, and it is quite presumptuous for one to say: “This truth is in danger, and will perish if I do not do something for its honor.” It is sufficient answer to such arrogations to say that the truth, whatever it may be, the Godhead of Christ, or the divinity of the Bible, is abundantly able to care for itself; and that the only way one can honor it is by *living* it. One’s arguments and theories add no honor whatever to the truth.

Perhaps the greatest fault or weakness of Mr. Arnold, as a religious teacher, was his failure to perceive the many-sidedness of religion. For example, he opposed its literary side to its metaphysical or philosophical side. The truth is, they are different phases of the truth, and are in no way antagonistic to each other. Neither can one supplant the other. For the proper display of

religion both processes are necessary in the management of its symbols. But Mr. Arnold had a great dislike for metaphysics, and could not see that they are worthy of any honor. The reason may have been that he was deficient in metaphysical insight. How curious a proof of this do we find in his dealing with the "Power *not ourselves* that makes for righteousness." He declines to use the word God because it has become the toy of metaphysicians; it stands for First Cause, Person, &c. Now, a moment's reflection ought to convince any one that a more practical conception of that "Power" could not be expressed than the one conveyed by the name God. Whatever its derivation, whether it mean "the good," "the disposer," "the swift," or "the shining," it is an attempt to define that Power's practical relation to the world, yea, to man. How does our author rectify the metaphysical blunder of the theologians? Why, by choosing the most distinctly metaphysical terms in the language. The "Eternal," the "Power," are the chief words employed by him. The first raises all the metaphysical conceptions of being, time, space, relation, and so on *ad infinitum*. One could not preach a sermon on the Eternal who (or that) makes for righteousness without raising all these thoughts, —at least no one but Elsmere,—whereas one might talk indefinitely of God, the good, or the disposer, that is, providence, without getting into metaphysics. The second term, "Power," raises the ghosts of personality, cause, law, will, and everything for which men have quarreled in the old metaphysical wars of the past. The only way one could be at ease with these designations would be by repressing one's disposition to question and to reason. There is in them no assurance of escape from the confusions of men's metaphysical irrationalities; rather do they invite to further bewilderments. The origin of Mr. Arnold's objection to metaphysics will be found, we think, in his misapprehension of the dogma of the Divine Personality, which degrades itself always, so he taught, into a low and sordid anthropomorphism, the "magnified and non-natural man in the next street." But the critic's deficiency of philosophical insight was again at fault. The church's creeds do nothing more than follow Scripture here, combining in their dogma both the knowable and the unknowable elements found there.

The slur thrown by critics at the dogma of the Divine Personality so frequently in these days, is one of the crudest criticisms conceivable. Anthropomorphism is not a corollary of that dogma, but a necessity of worship; an accommodation to human limitations, rising to its highest level in the Incarnation. Mr. Arnold maintains that we cannot conceive of God as a person without making him a "non-natural" man, and therefore the personality of God should be given up. But we say again, it is not our conception of God's personality that lands us in anthropomorphism, but our human limitations. Elsmere said: "Herbert Spencer is quite right. We no sooner attempt to define what we mean by a Personal God, than we lose ourselves in labyrinths of language and logic." We may say that both Herbert Spencer and Elsmere are quite right, and further, that they are quite in accord with sensible theologians, and with the Bible itself. But if one is to reject the doctrine of the Divine Personality on this ground, then *a fortiori* he must cease to speak of personality at all, and cease to treat it as an element of consciousness. Personality in its simplest form,—if it have gradations of form,—is beyond the grasp of thought. One cannot conceive the personality of his nearest friend. All one can do is to say that certain phenomena pertain to certain things, and men agree to call these things Persons; that is, from certain centres emanate will, thought, love, sympathy, moral judgment, and this unique spring of action, entirely inscrutable in its essence, and its processes, men have decided to call personality. If we try to go further than the perception of these phenomena in our friend, "we lose ourselves in labyrinths of language and logic." No one has demonstrated more clearly than Mr. Arnold the necessity of thinking of God in this way. His word "righteousness" is, of all words, perhaps the most characteristic of that mysterious centre of force which men have agreed to call personality. One cannot move away from the word along any line of thought without finding himself in a moment in the midst of the most distinct ideas which attach to personality. Order, intelligence, will, love, justice, and pity, are all necessary branches from the parent stem of righteousness. And Mr. Arnold had simply chosen a term which is large enough to include all

others, and, like the Trojans with the wooden horse, did not perceive the true inwardness of the thing, but was deceived into thinking he had reached bottom rock, and founded his theology on a simple and irreducible element.

Theologians may have indulged in many unprovable and unprofitable speculations on the subject of the divine personality, but Mr. Arnold has to thank his barrenness alone for deliverance from the same yawning depths. Theologians have,—we may freely admit, and do deplore,—made many speculative and metaphysical blunders in their zeal for the truth, but Mr. Arnold is really one with them in demonstrating the fact that religion and morality require in the source whence they appeal to us the attributes which belong to what all men agree we must have a specific name for, and have fixed upon the word Person to represent.

Now, it matters very little that one should shift customary terms, in some instances, and remain discreetly silent in others; for the practical development of the thing will reveal the futility of that kind of work. To write, "The Eternal, *not ourselves*, that makes for righteousness," is very easy indeed, and may seem to avoid a multitude of the perils which beset Person, Cause, Law, and so on; but when one comes to peer into the matter one soon perceives all the old ghosts. The word Eternal has no secret by which it can command the conscience and heart of man without his reason, and therefore men will begin in the first place to inquire into the meaning of the creed framed on it.

And so, too, men will regard that word "*makes*" with suspicion as scenting of "old unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago." But not only does the Eternal, this new-simple foundation of religion "make," but it, (or he, or whatever it be,) "*makes*" for an object, namely, "righteousness." Surely Mr. Arnold had not completely delivered himself from bondage to the old fictions of the theologians. It were a very easy matter for one with less literary eminence but more logic than he, one of less religious reverence combined with more intellectual seriousness, to develop his famous condensation of the Old Testament into the Athanasian Creed, which he so utterly abominated and did his best to avoid.

We have said that Mr. Arnold was distinctly and hurtfully one-

sided in his view of religion. If he had not been, we can conceive that he might, and in all probability would, have put the religious world, that is, the world that loves the Bible, under incalculable obligations to himself. Not that the world is not already under some debt to him; for he has said many true and beautiful things of religion in general and the Bible in particular, which needed to be said, and which all lovers of those things ought to thoroughly acquaint themselves with.

But surely we cannot follow as a religious teacher one who, in dealing with religion and the Bible, was such a slave to literature and its epigrams. No one can wish to deny that literature affords facilities for a right understanding of the Bible; but who is willing to confess that the science of theology is a fraud and delusion, and these only, while all science and all "abstruse reasoning" are to be eschewed in the interpretation of the Bible? And is there not an astounding arrogancy in the charge that all theologians have sacrificed literature to "abstruse reasoning," and that they are men of limited literary attainments but of a decided talent for speculation? Only a literary fanatic, a dogmaphobist of the most ultra type, could venture such a wild asseveration; and yet Mr. Arnold reiterates it over and over.

It is, however, in his addiction to epigrams that Mr. Arnold's extreme one-sidedness is most astonishingly disclosed. The whole vast and complex matter which we call religion is hung on a mere catchword, and all its various truths are compressed into the compass of a phrase. The Bible with its infinite diversities of thought, feeling, expression, and disclosure is hammered into a single thought, and if any of its parts prove recalcitrant they are nonchalantly disposed of by relegation to the boundless Aberglaube, or extra-belief, that is, the addendum to the divine element. Who that has read *Literature and Dogma* does not yet hear ringing in his ears the phrase, *Conduct is three-fourths of life*? Just how this mathematical formula was arrived at we are not told, but it is used with all the confidence and precision of one of the dogmas of the theologians, or a geometrical axiom. Not only so, but Mr. Arnold splits the remaining fourth of life into two parts which he assigns, one each, to science and art. We must acknowledge that

this is a mathematically dogmatic scheme of life which might fascinate the dogmatic disposition of Mr. Arnold's opponents even; and it has the further merit,—which he assigns to theological dogmas,—of being utterly beyond conceivability. We write with great caution of this epigram, because we suspect our own ability to apprehend its meaning, and yet feel that something should be written of it, for the reason that it has all the precision, in the author's estimation, of an arithmetical addition, and, moreover, underlies about all he has said on the subject of religion. And well it might, for the truth he imperfectly grasps is indeed fundamental to religion. It would be futile to contradict the epigram, but it is pertinent to inquire how Mr. Arnold discovered that *one-fourth* of life is *not* conduct; or even to go further, and ask how he has been able to assign definite bounds to his categories? For he puts art and science down as constituting the other fourth.

The truth is, this is criticism run mad, philosophy gone to seed. Art and science are as much within the scope of conduct as any of the elements of life. Indeed, it is silly to break life up into such parts; one only clouds and confuses the truth by so doing. *Conduct is all of life*; else man has a nature not only of brute derivation,—as the evolutionists contend,—but also of brute destination. We mean, that the part of him which attends to art and science is without moral responsibility and import. One may say, without irrelevancy, that this may be a comforting thought to the lovers of the shamelessly nude in art, the patrons of the outrageously prurient in the drama, and the scientific dirt-theorisers; but its great misfortune is, that it cannot be true.

Another example of Mr. Arnold's harmful addiction to epigram is found in his peculiar apprehension of the sacred writers. The mind will easily revert, in his interpretation of Paul's epistles, to the talismanic catchword of, "dying unto sin, and rising unto righteousness." And here again he has only to call on the capacious and ever-present Aberglaube to get rid of stubborn and rebellious elements. Not often do we find a more suggestive bondage to the letter of Scripture in one whose entire attitude professes to be a protest against literalism. And what is worse, it is a literalism which is self-contradictory and requires for its reten-

tion that all dissimilar thoughts be ejected from the apostolic teaching; a literalism that allows no room for the reconciliation of antagonisms, for the inferences of logic, or even for the presence of kindred truths. Here, too, is inspiration run wild; that Paul could keep and teach the truth while holding and mixing the truth up with so many and grievous errors. Rationalism—we remember that Mr. Arnold censures rationalism; but nevertheless he was a rationalist; rationalism will never learn that it presents a thousand difficulties where it removes one, never realize that its results require a primitive and uncultured credulity which is impossible to any sane Christian.

We cannot leave the thought we have been discussing without calling attention to one more epigrammic freak of Mr. Arnold, which illustrates his religious top-heaviness. He hinges the whole of Christianity on the text, "Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity." That this is an important expression of religious duty need not be controverted; and one might find a thousand others equally important scattered through the New Testament. But it is an evasion of difficulties, not a solution of them, to claim that this, or any other single sentence, may be used as a universal statement of scriptural truth. To use it so, however, is quite in keeping with a philosophy which disposes of religion, the greatest of all human concerns, under the category of morality. If religion is only heightened morality, "morality touched with emotion," then it may be proper to rank a simple and matter-of-course statement of Christian obligatoriness as a formula of the entire Bible development. If, however, morality is simply a phase of religion, an expression of the principles which inhere in and govern religious character, we can scarcely be satisfied with a substitution of partial results for both cause and effect. And this last is the proper place of morality in our conception of religion. Religion deals with man's supreme relation, that is, his relation to God. That includes morality, but is not included in morality. Religion would exist without the giving of law, or the necessity of adjustments between man and man. Religion is intercourse between man and his Maker, natural and original; morality exists by virtue of a non-natural order of things. Morality

applied to God would be an idle word, and none the less applied to an order of creatures without sin. But religion would be most natural and pure in a sinless order.

This false conception of religion vitiated all of Mr. Arnold's reasonings on the subject. For one cannot handle the Scriptures successfully who starts with the notion that they are a moral handbook. And if one desires to epitomise their teachings one must not choose so obviously a partial statement as the one above, but one which professes to set forth the universality of Christian doctrine, as when Christ summarizes the law into a full expression of religious truth: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and mind and strength; and thy neighbor as thyself." Or again, as in the case of Peter, who first lays down faith as the substance of Christian doctrine, and then proceeds to build on this foundation a true and logical morality. "Add to your *faith*, virtue; and to virtue, knowledge; and to knowledge, temperance; and to temperance, patience; and to patience, godliness; and to godliness, love of the brethren; and to love of the brethren, love."

Now, says the apostle, if these things be in you and abound, you will be neither barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of Christ. Here, then, we find what religion is. In the first place, it is *faith in Christ*; and again, this is used convertibly with *knowledge of Christ*. And religion produces morality in three directions: It furnishes one for duty, giving virtue, which is valor, the courage of convictions; and knowledge. Secondly, it inculcates self-control; and this takes two forms—first the subjection of the carnal appetites, and the carnal mind, temperance, patience; and again, the upward development of the spiritual nature, godliness. Thirdly, it gives the great motive for our treatment of men; the special affection born of a like faith, and, toward all men "sweet charity," love. This is a biblical definition of religion, or the gospel, much more complete than the one chosen by Mr. Arnold. But it would not have answered his purpose so well, because he was incorrigibly bent on degrading religion to men's really low and half-sensual idea of morality. In truth, in all his religious discussions, Mr. Arnold shows a lamentable indifference to precision, and every sort of definition. This might be excusable were he

criticising "poetry" as a poet. But he constantly avers that his object is to give men something *solid and verifiable*. All the speculations and dogmas of theology are swept away to make room for the certainties of the new faith. Theologians have spun cobwebs; the new apostle will teach only the most palpable verities. The result reminds us of that absurdly futile book, *Philosophy without Assumptions*. As if one were Infinite and could frame a philosophy without assumptions. Such egotism must always end in grotesque humiliation.

So Mr. Arnold, discarding God, gets his irreducibly simple idea, the Eternal; and, denying will, provides that his Eternal shall "make"; and, repudiating the ideas of law and government, he shows the Eternal to make simply for "righteousness." A simple statement of the process is sufficient to exhibit its futility to the simplest mind. Not a difficulty is eliminated, not an old theological ghost is downed, and yet the results are held forth as being easily *verifiable*. Moreover, the entire cogency of his case is dependent on an assumption of the most debatable character, viz.: that the grand motive to righteousness is found in the fact that it insures happiness; and happiness is the object of life. Every one who ever lived has had to argue with himself as to the effect of righteousness. The general verdict is that here in this world it does not even tend to happiness. Every writer of the Old Testament contended that God favored the wicked, and the general consensus of Israelitish opinion was, "It is vain to serve God; and what profit is it that we have kept his ordinance, and that we have walked mournfully before the Lord of hosts? And now we call the proud happy; yea, they that work wickedness are set up; yea, they that tempt God are even delivered."

To rescue righteousness from the doom of inexorable failure, religion has enlarged its view so as to comprehend the future life. Give us that, and the doctrine of probation respecting this life, and we can contend that righteousness produces happiness. But Mr. Arnold has nothing to say of the future life; he even leaves us in doubt as to whether he did really believe in it. He dogmatically averred that the righteous will be happy, and that, we say, is not only unproved, but the weight of testimony is against it. The

great majority of men cannot be persuaded that it is so, or else they would use the means of becoming righteous. Against Matthew Arnold we may put an equal, if not superior, philosopher: Carlyle, who execrated the theory that righteousness results invariably in happiness, and even denied that happiness is the object of life.

Utilitarianism, whether of Mr. Arnold or of Mr. Herbert Spencer, is the most uncertain and hazy of philosophical conceptions. It is presented as something tangible, something *verifiable*; but, instead, it is utterly beyond the limits of knowledge. The word *happiness*, as the object of life, is capable of infinite labyrinthine interpretations. No man knows what it is; how it can be best promoted; or in what issues it will terminate. The will of God offers a definite norm of conduct; happiness leaves conduct at the mercy of individual ignorance and selfishness. The will of God buoys us with eternal and invincible hope in spite of all temporary and temporal contradictions; happiness, as the rule of life, baffles us with perpetual frustration, and plunges the majority into endless despair. To say that happiness is the result of righteousness comes far short of having the cogency, as saying that righteousness is the will of God, and that doing righteously is to put one's self into line with God, and that it is well for one to be in line with God, exceedingly ill for one to be against God. The first motive is low, and circumscribed to the limits of self; the second is high and universal.

We have spoken of the fact that if Mr. Arnold's criticisms were even half-honestly prosecuted, nothing of the Bible would be left, and now we remark that his theology is as bare and stunted as his revelation.

It would result in a most melancholy theological fiasco to undertake to save anything definite and tangible from amidst the inchoate wreck of his iconoclastic genius. And yet he tires us with the repetition of the statement that his object is to save religion. The religion he finally succeeds in rescuing from the deadly theologians would hardly seem, to a religiously hungry person, worth so much fighting and mental anguish. The race could not have been any the worse off if all had been lost.

In spite of Elsmere's success, and the hopefulfulness of Mrs. Ward, it is hard for one to believe that the world is waiting for the rejuvenated faith. Its moral beauty has no advantage over the old, and it has been shorn of the old's sanctions. The old has every attraction for the pure and spiritual; every admonition for the sensual; every inducement for the righteous; every deterrent for the wicked; every reward for the persevering believer; every punishment for the incorrigible sinner, conceivable. But the new has none of these. It lacks all positiveness. It is the vaguest possible statement of the vaguest possible assumptions. It has lost God, immortality, the incarnation, and the resurrection, heaven and hell,—which are but the determinations of conduct, and whose absence is as weakening to the new faith as to the old,—the Divine Fatherhood and human Brotherhood, and above all, and the cause of all, a trustworthy Bible.

And what does it offer for these losses? A poem written amidst the crudities of a moral midnight; a dim perception of something so imperfectly discerned that language was only "approximately thrown out" at it. And the Eternal, in place of God. Not One, not he, not a "Person who loves and thinks;" not one to be worshipped, prayed to, and feared; but just the Eternal:

"A stern colossal image with blind eyes,
And grand dim lips."

The most inconceivable of all inconceivabilities. And for the concrete notions of the old faith, its faith, and love, and righteousness, and grace, and *life*, we are given the most unauthentic generalities concerning "righteousness"; and that without once being told what righteousness is.

Now all this has been done by one who repudiates philosophy and professes to despise argumentation; a profession one may well accept when one recalls such chapters as those on *The God of Miracles* and *The God of Metaphysics*, and particularly the latter. Mr. Arnold's etymological treatment of the words existence, being, essence, etc., and his conclusions therefrom might excite a smile on the face of the veriest tyro in philosophy. And the ease with which he disposes of Descartes is one of the most astonishing intellectual feats in controversial literature. All the more astonishing

is it, too, because of Mr. Arnold's often-repeated suspicion of precision and definition; for the ground of his rejection of Descartes' famous formula is nothing else than his (Descartes) failure to define *being* as implied in the inference, *I am*, because I think.

Indeed, the two chapters named above can hardly be taken as a serious polemical effort, though they were intended as a reply to very weighty objections to *Literature and Dogma*. They are, perhaps, the most eminent instance of persiflage in dealing with questions of transcendent gravity to be found in the literature of philosophical controversy. Their *debonnaire* treatment of miracles and metaphysics may be satisfactory to the literateur,—for it is doubtful if literature is ever profound, or its followers disciplined to thought,—but it can never prove acceptable to one whose sense of moral responsibility is greater than his zeal for poetry. It is a matter of little importance that Mr. Arnold should have disposed of Descartes in such a summarily cavalier style; that philosopher, though dead, is abundantly able to take care of himself for awhile yet, at least; but a sense of fitness, and respect for the honorableness of the living whom he combated, should have deterred him from such idle flippancy on the dogma of God.

In fact, not only did Mr. Arnold eschew argument for the securing of his position, but he rather gloried in being free from so exacting and tiresome a thing as the reasoning process. Only lately Professor Huxley has said in a review article that a miracle is not an inconceivable or impossible thing, once having allowed the existence of God, therein shifting, as many of his readers think, his former position. If this statement be granted,—as it must be except where men are science-mad,—it is useless to argue against miracles on *a priori* grounds; and that being the case, the only possible opportunity for discrediting miracles is found in connection with the evidence by which they are supported. Therefore attention has been turned of late from the old anti-miracle negation of law, to the “critical spirit,” or “historical spirit,” as the influence which will overthrow belief in the supernatural. And even here the direct results of the destructive criticism are not so damaging to Christianity as the anti-supernaturalists could wish. Strauss and Baur have ceased to afflict the religious world, and for

all save a credulous few, who can still swallow their absurdities, they have already fallen into "innocuous desuetude." M. Renan, the airy and poetical Frenchman, is read and cast aside, as one would read an eastern poem or legend; he has no influence with men who prefer to think rather than to dream.

These facts ought to be discouraging to the anti-supernaturalists, but they have the grace of perseverance in a large degree, and do not readily yield to the pressure of history. Mr. Arnold evaded the force of scientific failure and "critical" barrenness and futility by taking refuge in the, to him, omnipotent and infallible zeit-glist. He contends that it is not worth one's while to argue against the supernatural in general or miracles in particular; nor is it of much importance that neither science nor the "critical spirit" can point to definite and tangible anti-supernatural results; there is an absolute certainty that the supernatural cannot longer abide in human thought. The zeit-glist is quietly but surely pushing it out of men's minds and beliefs. We may contend, if we will, that the zeit-glist is irrational and unphilosophical, but nevertheless it will not halt, turn aside, or desist until the last vestige of the miraculous has been eliminated from men's faith. There is no need of controversy; let science be true or untrue, theology human or divine, the zeit-glist cares for nothing whatsoever except that all haunted houses shall be emptied of their ghosts, and that all men shall admit that only natural law is visible in the operations of the universe.

Now we confess that this looks very much like a dogma born in Mr. Arnold's brain; and feel like insisting that there are not sufficient facts to support the dogmatic induction; and further, no effort is made to array facts on its behalf. It is taken for granted. Those of us who heard, or have read Mr. Arnold's American lecture on *Numbers* will wonder at such exquisite confidence on his part in a popular tendency, even granting that he was right in estimating the preponderance of opinion on the question of the supernatural.

The zeit-glist is only what we republican Americans call the majority, and Mr. Arnold himself has told us to beware of the majority, and that it is generally in the wrong. It is somewhat

discouraging to those who were drawing some comfort from this doctrine to discover that their teacher was not consistent; that, indeed, on the most transcendently important of all questions he incontinently surrendered, not to a certainly ascertained majority, but to a hastily fancied preponderance of sentiment.

But if a supernatural religion could be extirpated by the simple operation of the zeit-glist, how long ago would the Bible and its child, Christianity, have been dead and buried things without a memory lingering behind. If Mr. Arnold had been as diligent a student of *history* as of *literature*, he would have learned the failures and dangers of the zeit-glist; and it would be well for all those rash people who deliver themselves over without questioning to the current of the zeit-glist to reflect upon the peril of such child-like intellectual simplicity.

In the first place, it is a very easy matter for one to mistake an obtrusive local sentiment for the zeit-glist. This we fear was the trouble with Mr. Arnold. His intimates were such men as Carlyle, Froude, Huxley, Spencer, Clifford, and Harrison. One can easily imagine what that atmosphere would be. But in spite of their prominence and weight, these men can hardly be said to determine the zeit-glist, or to represent it. They represent certain more or less popular tendencies of thought, but not the preponderating ones, or the ones that have in them the promise of prevalence. The universally solid sentiment that is sweeping quietly along, carrying the world to its destiny on its current, the true, prevailing temper of the generation, is cognizant of the supernatural in man's history, and realizes the necessity of it. These are they who have an eye for the spiritual forces of history, and are not capable of being persuaded that man's career has its origin and end in matter. Science is particularly noisy just at present, and the less probable the theory it attempts to foist on the world the more tumultuous the clamor of its insistence on that theory, until one who is not of even mental balance might easily imagine that supernatural religion is in its grave, though one might wonder at the prolongation of its obsequies by the priests of the new order. Though Mr. Arnold apportioned only one-eighth of life to science,—imagine the disgust of Professor Huxley,—yet uncon-

sciously he lent too willing ears to the pretensions of those who pose as the expounders of science *par excellence*, but who really are only a small branch of the scientific world, respectable in name and works, but wild and open to correction in their philosophical conclusions from the facts of science. The voice of this element is not the zeit-glist; it is only a noisy attempt to stay the zeit-glist.

In the second place, if one should admit that Mr. Arnold has discerned the true nature of the zeit-glist, one might yet argue that it is hardly flattering to a person's intellectual individuality to confide in its triumph and permanence so trustingly; for the zeit-glist is often temporary, and followed by a reaction. Abundant evidence may be adduced from the history of religious thought to prove the above statement. A very notable illustration is several times repeated in the Jewish people. And the protest of the prevailing sentiment was not unlike that of our day. The zeist-glist found expression in such language as this, from Job: "What is the Almighty,"—not who,—"that we should serve him; and what profit should we have if we pray unto him?" Or this, from the Psalms: "And they say, How doth God know; and is there knowledge with the Most High?" Or this, from Malachi: "It is vain to serve God; and what profit is it that we have kept his ordinances?"

In the idolatries and apostasies of Israel we have again and again the essential revolt against the supernatural which confronts us now; the preponderance of sentiment, the zeit-glist pushed God out of men's affairs, and banished him from the world. But against the zeit-glist the prophets testified, and the prophets were always in the right. They declared such a zeit-glist to be destructive of society,—as the church now declares,—and the stern and iron facts of history always sustained them and forced a change in the zeit-glist.

The rise and decline of Deism in England furnish us with telling evidence respecting the uncertainty of the zeit-glist. And again, it was not unlike the present intellectual movement; it was a revolt against the miraculous. And Deism was more a universal temper than any opposition to supernaturalism now existing,

for the world can never—at least let us hope so—repeat such folly. The learned and unlearned united to put down the superstition of the supernatural. It was argued in clubs, laughed at in parlors, decried in learned treatises, until it did really appear as if the world had swung sheer away from the old belief. But the reaction quickly came, and not so much by Bishop Butler, as according to that inexorable law by virtue of which falsehood defeats itself; and Deism waned to *nil*, and the awful zeit-glist was found to be only a temporary intellectual aberration.

Did time suffice, we might illustrate the point by reference to German Rationalism, once the zeit-glist, now falling into disrepute, or again, by the history of revolutionary ideas in France, or more pertinently still, by contemporary developments in the latter country. But it is not worth while to extend the present article to exhibit facts so well known.

Through all the perturbations of man's intellectual development the supernatural element of his history has held its own. It has been often assaulted, and often pronounced dead, but it has survived notwithstanding, and is to-day the liveliest fact of man's increasing life. It survives, not only by the inexpugnable basis of evidence upon which it rests, but also by reason of its absolute necessity. Without it history is a baffling and inscrutable mystery; without it the past is a lie and delusion, the future a mirage, and man a monstrous dupe of fate. The supernatural is the necessary interpreter of the past and prophet of the future.

FRANCIS L. FERGUSON.

IV. THE CAPACITY OF PRESBYTERIANISM AS A FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR RAPID CHURCH EXTENSION.

WHEN Christ's mediatorial work on earth was finished and the ascension was at hand, the scope of the apostles' commission was enlarged, and they were commanded to go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature; to disciple all nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. This commission did not expire with them. It was meant to be the great King's standing orders to the sacramental host as long as it should continue to be a host militant. It was meant to impose an aggressive policy upon the church in all subsequent ages, as one of the necessary conditions of her rightful claim to be called loyal to her ascended Lord. She must either be aggressive or surrender her charter. If she ceases to be a missionary organization, she ceases *ipso facto* to be Christian. She cannot be indifferent to the perishing without perishing herself. To seek to monopolize the gospel is the very way to lose it. Having freely received, she must just as freely give, else all that she has will certainly be taken from her.

It would be sheer audacity for any denomination of Christians to assert that it had fully complied with the demand made by the great commission upon the church universal. If the whole of nominal Christianity were suddenly confronted with the presence of our Lord, and the question were asked, "How far have you caught the spirit of the apostolic commission and embodied it in evangelistic effort?" shame would rise in mantling blushes to every cheek and silence sit unbroken on every lip. This question our common Presbyterianism, no less than Prelacy and Independence, might often put with profit to itself. The same question would not be out of place wherever a Presbyterianial body meets to deliberate with regard to the interests of Christ's kingdom. As it does not fall, however, within the province of this discussion to

ask, and attempt to answer it, we dismiss it, and proceed to inquire, To what extent is the Presbyterian system of church government adapted to a rapid extension of the church?

Although too much stress ought never to be laid upon *mere form*, it is nevertheless apparent that the form of an instrument has a great deal to do with its effectiveness or its ineffectiveness. A dozen differently-shaped swords may all be intended for cutting or for thrusting, and yet one of them in the hands of a trained dragoon may be immeasurably superior to the others, not because made of better steel, but solely for the reason that it is perfectly adapted in form to the end had in view. And precisely so may it be with the various systems of ecclesiastical polity. They all look to the achievement of the same result—the conversion of the world to Christ. It does not follow, however, from this that *structurally* they are all equally suited to the accomplishment of the common end.* They might all adopt substantially the same doctrinal symbols, and their ministry preach along much the same line of truth and in much the same way, and yet the peculiar excellence of one as an evangelizing agency might give it an immense advantage over the others in conducting the aggressive work that Christ has made obligatory upon every branch of the church visible.

How does Presbyterianism stand at this point? In the march of the church universal to ultimate victory, has it ever suffered detriment on the ground of its being Presbyterian in structure, and not Prelatical nor Congregational? The contention in this discussion is that it has not; on the contrary, that in Presbyterianism considered simply as a form of ecclesiastical government, the church of Christ possesses an instrument which eminently fits her for rapidly extending her domain both at home and abroad.

I. The first argument submitted in support of this proposition, is, that as a system of government, it is Scriptural. We do not mean by this to assert that it can point to the Bible as authority for each one of its numerous and minute details; we mean that the great underlying, germinal principles, out of which it has grown into a fully-rounded, organic whole, are matters of revelation, and not the products of human wisdom or the dicta of mere expediency.

1. The Headship of Christ as the only Prophet, Priest, and King in Zion, and, as corollaries from this great primal truth, no traditionalism, but only the pure oracles of inspiration as the one infallible rule both of faith and of practice; no pope or sub-pope to bind the conscience, but Jesus only; no sacerdotal order to offer sacrifice, to make intercession, or to pronounce absolution, but only the "great High Priest that is passed into the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God;" no office-bearers but such as have been designated and appointed by the King; and no functions legitimate for these office-bearers when acting in their official capacity, but such as are wholly spiritual, not only as regards teaching, but also as regards serving tables, ruling and administering discipline—these are the basal tenets of Presbyterianism as understood and held by our Southern Church at least, and clearly revealed in the Word of God.

2. We also recognize the absolute right of the Christian congregation, without constraint, and without restraint as well (save within divinely prescribed limitations), to elect their own office-bearers—a right not merely conceded by the apostles, but emphasized by them, when the diaconate was instituted, in such language as the following: "Look ye out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business."

3. A third scriptural feature of our polity is the parity of the ministry—the most strenuous advocates of prelacy themselves admitting, as no sound scholar of any theological school will hesitate to admit, the identity of presbyter and bishop in the New Testament; and betaking themselves elsewhere than to these two official titles to find a ground-work for Diocesan Episcopacy with its graded clerical orders.

4. It should be noted, in the fourth place, that every Presbyterian church is organized in accordance with apostolic precedent and practice. It is composed, not only of a body of believers associated for the worship and service of the triune God, but of a diaconate for serving tables, and a ruling and teaching eldership for ruling and teaching.

It may be doubted—indeed some Presbyterians have doubted—

whether the New Testament draws the line between the function of ruling and the function of teaching as sharply as post-Reformation Presbyterianism has drawn it. It is not altogether certain that in the apostolic church there was a class of rulers, as there is in the modern church, who ruled but did not teach. The great classical passage on this point—which is found in 1 Tim. v. 17, and reads, “Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine”—is not absolutely decisive. It admits, without doing violence to any principle of exegesis, of two entirely different interpretations, one favoring the generally-accepted view of its meaning, the other opposing it. It is not quite certain, therefore, that in the early days of Christianity the two functions of ruling and teaching were not inseparable from the one office of presbyter. If they invariably met in the same church officer, we have departed slightly from primitive usage. But even conceding that we have, the divergence from apostolic practice is comparatively small. We retain the essential and scriptural idea at least, which is, that the spiritual oversight of the congregation is committed to a Presbytery which unites in itself the functions both of ruling and of teaching.

5. Our ecclesiastical polity is still further seen to be scriptural in the fact that it recognizes the value of the evangelist, an officer of divine appointment, whose distinctive work as a minister of the gospel, in apostolic times, seems to have been that of a travelling preacher, confined to no particular pastoral charge; a missionary, in the modern sense of the term, whose specific duty it was to carry the gospel into new districts, and to plant, and give orderly form to, churches in places where no church had existed before.

6. A sixth feature in the Presbyterian system of government is that which not only emphasizes the idea of ecclesiastical unity, but, as far as the irresistible logic of facts will permit, gives expression to that idea in a series of Presbyterial courts, gradually ascending until the highest is reached, which exercises jurisdiction over the whole. Beginning with the session as the formative unit, it aggregates a number of these units into a larger one, and a number of these larger into a larger still, continuing the process

until the unity of the whole is realized and represented in one supreme judicatory.

This summary of Presbyterianism as a system of graded courts, each higher claiming and exercising a wider jurisdiction than the one next below it, is only a rough sketch, as every intelligent Presbyterian well knows. When we ask, *Is it scriptural?* it is not likely that any one of calm and dispassionate judgment will contend that a specific divine warrant can be found for each one of our judicatories, with their clearly defined and constitutionally limited powers. But when we seize upon the undoubtedly scriptural truth that the government of the congregation is committed to a Presbytery elected by the congregation, and combine this with the idea of the unity of Christ's kingdom, and take in the additional thought that a government for the whole seems to be no less indispensable than a government for each one of its constituent parts, we can scarcely escape the conclusion that the Presbyterial polity is essentially scriptural. And as confirmatory of this view, it should be borne in mind that, while Independency differs radically from Presbyterianism on this point, it gives practical recognition to the need of a system like ours, in the lower and the higher advisory councils which it has instituted, and without which, like Samson shorn of his locks, it would be destitute of the greater part of its aggressive force.

It may be claimed, then, without unseemly boasting, that the proposition with which this discussion began has been fairly established, that is to say, that the Presbyterial polity is substantially scriptural. Can we, then, believe that such a system is cumbrous, badly constructed, out of accord with the necessities of the case, and hence but little adapted, as an instrument, to the work for which the church was instituted, and the doing of which has been explicitly enjoined upon her by her exalted Head? All Christians agree that it is the grand mission of the church to glorify the triune God in the evangelization of the world. This being true, can it be that Presbyterianism, which finds in the Bible the mould in which it has been cast, is "cribbed, cabined, and confined," by reason of the very fact that it conforms so closely to the divine model? Are we not driven, indeed, to just

the opposite conclusion? Granting the premise that our polity is scriptural, the inference is unavoidable that, in every respect, it must be such a vehicle as the church of Christ can use to the greatest possible advantage in the successful prosecution of her evangelistic work. Everywhere in nature, both animate and inanimate, a correspondence has been established by the Creator between form and function. Does this great law, which seems to pervade the heavens and the earth, break down only at its point of contact with the Christian church? Has the wisdom of God suited the means to the end even where the movements of microscopic life are involved, and contravened this broadly-marked principle of its working only where the end is one of transcendent importance, of no less moment indeed than the glory of his grace in the salvation of countless millions? We dare not believe that it has. Our logical reason constrains us to believe that it has not.

The argument so far has proceeded on the ground that the cardinal features of Presbyterianism have a scriptural basis and support, and is purely *a priori*. That our ecclesiastical polity is equal to a rapid prosecution of the work of evangelization,—the specific work that has been assigned to the Christian church,—is a logical inference from the fact that it brings to bear upon this work a system of government which conforms, in its general structure, to the pattern that is outlined in the Word of God.

II. We shall pursue a different method, however, in the remainder of this discussion. We shall briefly, but somewhat carefully, examine the Presbyterian polity in detail, with a view to discover, by analysis, how far it seems capable of being made rapidly aggressive; we say, *capable of being made rapidly aggressive*: for the question, be it remembered, is not, Whether Presbyterianism has measured up fully to the responsibilities attaching to every branch of the visible church; nor, Whether it is historically true that it has, or has not, been outstript in missionary zeal and evangelistic effort by some other ecclesiastical systems; but, To what extent do its principles fit it as a form of government to take and hold a commanding and enviable position in spreading the gospel among the nations?

1. The first point here to be noted, and noted with emphasis, is, that *theoretically* the organization of each particular church is perfect, containing nothing irrelevant or superfluous, and omitting nothing desirable or indispensable. As an ideal it is complete, and hence not susceptible of improvement in its equipment, either by addition of what it has not or by subtraction from what it has. It is in all respects above criticism, inasmuch as it takes into consideration, and makes satisfactory provision for, every conceivable spiritual want, both of the individual Christian and of the whole body of associated believers. It provides for liberty of thought and action without license, for sound instruction without dogmatism, for pastoral oversight and care without obtrusive, inquisitorial impertinence, for government without tyranny, and for mutual helpfulness without engendering a sense of self-humiliation in those who receive help.

Does Christ constrain his people to believe that his poor will always be among them, and that to neglect them will be regarded as disloyalty to him? Does experience, moreover, show that the religious interests of a congregation are intimately connected with the management of its temporalities? The supervision of both these important objects belongs to a divinely appointed diaconate filled by men, who are presumed in every way to be qualified for the office to which the voice of their Christian brethren has called them.

Has every believer rights which cannot, even to the slightest degree, be infringed without thereby displeasing, dishonoring, and wounding the Lord Jesus? In the Presbyterian Church these rights have all the safeguards that it is possible to give them. Not one of them is entrusted to the keeping of arbitrary power. They are guaranteed and guarded by constitutional provisions which apply equally to all. These constitutional provisions are administered by a college of presbyters chosen from among the people by the free ballots of the people, virtually neither altogether lay nor altogether clerical, but occupying a position somewhat midway between the pulpit and the pews; *of the people*, and therefore bound to them by the strongest ties of sympathy, yet *over the people* as their scripturally constituted rulers, and therefore under a

solemn engagement to exercise authority righteously; and hence, under the highest conceivable incentive, from every point of view, to weigh with judicial fairness every case that may come before them, and adjudicate it upon its merits. Add to this, that if the rights of any should ever be invaded by either a prejudiced or an incompetent session, the privilege of appeal to the higher courts remains.

If we pass now from that which, technically speaking, is discipline, to that which may properly be termed purely pastoral supervision, we have as little ground for dissatisfaction with the Presbyterian polity. The teaching elder and the ruling elders together constitute a body of pastors who have been called by the people to their high office because of their supposed fitness—by reason of their intelligence, their energy, their sound judgment, and their ripe and consistent piety—to take pastoral oversight of the whole congregation, and who are not only authorized, but in virtue of the most sacred vows voluntarily and publicly assumed, bound by an inviolable obligation, both jointly and severally, to act as faithful bishops of souls—neglecting none, showing partiality to none, supervising and caring for all, being themselves in all things an example to all, and by timely counsel, warning, or reproof, contributing all that a wise, watchful and loving pastorate can contribute towards perfecting the religious life of the believers committed to its care, and training them, singly and collectively, for ever-increasing activity and ever-widening usefulness.

And, as the keystone in the congregational arch, binding all its separate parts together into the unity of a complete, strong and symmetrical structure, next comes that which is not only the preaching, but preëminently the pastoral office, an office which, because of the special training that it exacts and the limitation of its duties to the handling of things spiritual exclusively, may properly be expected, not only by the stimulus of a godly life and a wise discharge of the functions of oversight and rule, but no less by sound instruction both in doctrine and in duty, to render conspicuously effective service in the work of advancing the congregation of believers to greater heights of Christian attainment and along broader lines of Christian endeavor.

As far, then, as it is related to the congregation and its wants, our Presbyterian polity is marked by neither an excrescence nor a defect. Mere organization, of course, accomplishes nothing. It is as ineffective as a locomotive without steam. It is an expression, not of actual power, but only of the possibility of power. In so far, however, as organization conditions power, determining, as an instrument, the direction in which, and the effectiveness with which, power may be applied, it is not empty boasting to say that every Presbyterian congregation, when equipped with its scriptural complement of officers, is a perfect organism of its kind, and ought to be a vitalizing spiritual force, exerting a tremendous influence for good in the field it occupies. Its divinely ordained machinery, if energetically, systematically, and patiently worked, cannot but secure the most encouraging and satisfactory results. No religious destitution need long exist either within its bounds or in the territory immediately contiguous to it. With the pastor, the ruling elders, the deacons, and private Christians, each one at his post, and all acting in concert, there is no reason why the gospel should not be put in contact with every soul that is accessible. Under the Presbyterian system it is possible, by preaching, by prayer-meetings, by Sunday-schools, and by visitation from house to house, to reach every family that lies within reasonable distance of the central point where the ordinances of religion are stately administered. It appears, therefore, that, if congregational work in all its various departments can be systematized and pushed forward vigorously and hopefully under any form of church government, it unquestionably can be under the Presbyterian.

Now extend this line of thought. The congregation is the ultimate, indivisible unit, upon the efficiency or the inefficiency of which the efficiency or the inefficiency of every ecclesiastical body in large measure depends. If, then, in the Presbyterian Church the ultimate unit is *structurally* perfect; if it is furnished with a complete set of organs which have only to preserve their normal relation to each other and perform their appropriate functions in order to ensure to the organism as a whole the largest and most healthful growth attainable; when these units combine under the

government of Presbyteries, and these Presbyteries unite to form Synods, and these Synods mass themselves under the jurisdiction of one General Assembly, the result is a grand organic whole, which can challenge comparison with any other ecclesiastical body on earth in respect to equipment for purely congregational work; a grand organic whole which, if success depended only upon organization, might justly boast that each one of its congregations, at least in the territory accessible to it, promised to achieve the largest success possible under the circumstances.

But, as a divine institute, the church of Christ has a much wider mission than that which has just been outlined. It is not enough, however desirable it may be, that every local church should reach the highest development practicable within and the broadest expansion practicable without. It is not enough that it should be a disk of pure gospel light streaming radiance into the surrounding gloom as far as its light-emitting capacity will permit—a circle with a radius of ten or twelve miles would ordinarily absorb it all. One General Assembly may nominally embrace a continent. The whole Synod of Brazil contains fewer ministers than the Presbytery of Lexington. There are Presbyteries in Texas as large territorially as a compact, well-constructed Synod ought to be, and exercising jurisdiction over comparatively a few widely scattered congregations separated by vast stretches of unoccupied territory, inviting indeed to Christian effort and full of promise to faithful labor, but practically inaccessible to any one organized Presbyterian Church, because of their remoteness. Now the ideal church must be able to grapple successfully with such facts as the foregoing. They had everywhere to be encountered in the early days of Christianity. To the sickening of the stoutest heart and the unnerving of all but the strongest and most courageous faith, they have to-day to be encountered by every missionary that sets foot upon pagan soil. And they continue to confront the church even in those highly favored States, where the march of the gospel has endeavored steadily to keep step with the march of population towards the Pacific. The ideal church, it has been said, must be competent to deal with such a condition of things. She must have an organic fitness for reaching and re-

moving *all* the religious destitutions that may exist within her borders, and not those only that may be found in close proximity to her organized congregations. She must be provided with some agency that will enable her to give the gospel to those who are remote from it, and to plant new churches which, as time goes on, shall increase both in number and in efficiency, and form closer and closer connecting links with those already in the field: and this process she must be organically fitted to pursue for an indefinite period, as long at least as any community shall be unsupplied with the holy ordinances of the Christian religion. How far do the principles of our Presbyterian polity adapt the Presbyterian Church to the hopeful prosecution and rapid completion of such a work? And this leads us to observe—

2. That the Presbytery—whether a Presbytery as defined in our Book of Order, or that which we term a Synod, or the court of last resort, which we name General Assembly—meets all the requirements of the case. That is to say, if every congregation organized on a Presbyterian basis is as fully equipped, instrumentally, as we can conceive a congregation to be, for forming the religious character of the individual believer, and for stimulating the whole body of believers to earnest aggressive work wherever such work is practicable; when we take a number of such congregations and place them under the supervision and direction of a Presbytery, we have in the Presbytery an ecclesiastical organism which *structurally* lacks nothing that may be required by the exigencies of any field lying within its jurisdiction. It need not confine its attention to its organized churches. It may take, and ought to take, into consideration the religious wants of all the territory that it covers. There is no reason, in the nature of the case, why one of its destitute communities should remain undiscovered and unexplored, or a single promising but neglected neighborhood continue long to be unknown.

And not only may it become conversant with all the facts of which it must be put in possession in order to be able to institute wise action, it may utilize its knowledge by the adoption of such feasible measures as may be suggested and demanded by a fair view of all the circumstances of the case. Through its ministers

and ruling elders it can inform all its congregations of the evangelistic work which ought to be done, and which, relying upon their co-operation, it has resolved to undertake. It can employ the same means to impress them with a sense of their obligation to be thoroughly imbued with a missionary spirit, and to give their countenance and hearty support to every scriptural agency that looks to the evangelization of any unevangelized part of the world. It can urge their authorized office-bearers to be untiring in their efforts to inflame them with holy zeal and incite them to the largest liberality in their free-will offerings to the great cause of missions. It can lay its hands authoritatively upon any or all of its pastors, and detach them for a time from their regular congregational work, and send them to those points where destitution most abounds. It can judiciously determine when new churches should be organized; and when their organization is effected—without a jar to any part of its existing machinery, without introducing an incongruous element into its already established order, and without any suspicious innovation in its fixed method of working, as naturally as a tree multiplies its boughs and twigs—it can take them under its jurisdiction, from that time onward to become lights to the communities in which they are planted, and to co-operate vigorously with their sister churches in carrying gospel truth into the regions beyond. And this method of church extension, so simple and beautiful, and at the same time so effective, provided only the laborers and the money be forthcoming, is equally adapted to any field, the largest no less than the least. The process, once begun, may go on without interruption from year to year, and with continually accelerating speed, until the breadth of a continent shall be traversed, and every town and hamlet supplied with the glorious gospel of the blessed God.

But this review of Presbyterianism as a form of government eminently adapted to the effective and rapid prosecution of evangelistic work, is not yet quite complete. It has one other, and that a most important missionary agency, whose value as a potent factor in evangelization has already been tacitly assumed; we mean,

3. The office of the evangelist.

If the preceding delineation of Presbyterianism were exhaus-

tive, the system would plainly be radically defective. It might keep the old homestead in a fair state of preservation, but could not easily enlarge the place of its habitation. If it encroached at all upon the uncultivated forest, its progress would be difficult and slow. If it contained nothing more than so far it has been represented as containing, however admirable it might be in some respects as a polity, it would possess but little value as an aggressive force, and would be compelled to pronounce itself a failure in the face of the great commission, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature."

If the strictly pastoral office were all that could be relied upon for extending Christ's kingdom, the universal triumph of that kingdom would still have ages of weeping and waiting before it. For the labors of the pastor and the session are necessarily confined within small spatial limits. The congregation cannot dispense with their almost undivided and constant attention. The very terms in which their call is couched and accepted bind them down to the oversight of a particular charge; and in meeting the spiritual wants of that charge, and evoking its activities, and impelling it along such lines of Christian endeavor as may be pursued with good results, even in the smallest parish, but little time is left for other work. If they can succeed in developing the religious life of those who are under their immediate care, in rooting and grounding them immovably in the faith, in beautifying their character with all the graces of the gospel, in permeating and saturating them with a thoroughly missionary spirit, and in inciting them to enter and take possession of the fields that are easily within reach, little more can ordinarily be expected of them.

But this evidently is not all that is required of the church. She must somehow make her way into those regions where a preached gospel and organized congregations are both unknown. This she can do in the person of the evangelist, a minister without a settled charge, and with a commission as broad, it may be, as a province or a state. He is the long right-arm which she stretches out in her Christ-like love to the destitute at home and abroad, and with which she draws them first to the cross and then to her protecting and fostering embrace. He is the lone voice in the wilderness

through which, from her settled habitations, she speaks to the wanderers, and calls them from their aimless, endless, weary tramping over waste and wild to the comforts and joys of a well-ordered, lasting, happy home. He is the plenipotentiary whom she sends in the name of the great King to treat with his rebellious subjects in distant parts, and win them over to an allegiance which they have never known, and of which perhaps they have never heard. Only let the men that are to fill this office be furnished, and then go to their arduous, self-denying work encouraged by the sympathies and prayers, and supported by the gifts of the whole church, and the victories achieved by Presbyterianism for Christ will soon be recorded in every land under heaven.

The preceding brief and hurried review of Presbyterianism gives us no cause to blush for our polity, whether viewed as an organic whole or considered in any of its characteristic and essential features. If it is not adapted to the work of rapidly extending Christ's kingdom and placing it, when established, on a firm and solid basis, we can conceive of no ecclesiastical system that is. In form and structure it is as faultless as any organization can be. It is a machine of master workmanship complete down to even the smallest detail, without a superfluous wheel, an unnecessary screw, or a useless lever; and if it has not been worked up to the full measure of its capability, it is either because the motive power has not always been wisely and faithfully applied, or because we have too often attempted to effect with only a part of the machinery what was designed to be effected by the machinery as a whole.

Or, to change the figure. If the Presbyterian Church has at any time failed to move in the very forefront of the great advancing host, to be the first to plant the cross on the captured breastworks of the enemy and raise the shout of victory, and then push on to meet and break other advancing lines of battle, it has not been for lack of a perfect organization. If there has been failure, as few perhaps will claim that there has not been, the cause must be sought, not in a faulty ecclesiastical system, but in something more fundamental and vital than even organization is acknowledged to be.

JAMES MURRAY.

V. PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

WHAT is the value and use of the Old Testament in the Christian church? Few questions stand to-day in greater need of an authoritative answer. Our time is characterized, perhaps to an unprecedented degree, by the study of the Old Testament writings as monuments of human literature; and as men trace out the human characteristics, and come more fully to appreciate the human genesis of the several books, their eyes are apt to become more or less dulled to their divine qualities and origin. A Babel of voices is accordingly clamoring around us, each proclaiming a special private view of what the Old Testament is, and how it must be esteemed and used. It is good to escape from the confused noise back to the testimony of those authoritative founders of our religion whose witness is true or else our faith is vain. They are not silent as to so important a matter. In every way possible, by example, explanation, precept, they make known to us what the Spirit which was in them would have us believe concerning the Old Testament Scriptures, and what manner of use he would have us make of them. One passage in particular¹ is distinguished among the rest as compressing within the rich compass of its three short verses nearly the whole essential teaching of the apostles on this subject. It stands near the end of the last epistle of the Apostle Paul, written as he lay in the Roman prison, awaiting his undeserved death, as his final pastoral charge to one of his chiefest helpers in the ministry of the gospel, and through him to all who desire to be followers of him as he was of Christ. We wish to ask what the Apostle Paul teaches us as to the nature, value, and use of the Old Testament in this his dying testament to the church of which he, perhaps above all men, was the founder.

Let us begin by noting the setting of the passage. It forms the concluding portion of a paragraph in which Paul exhorts his own son in faith, in view of the corruption which was threatening

¹ 2 Timothy iii. 15-17.

the church, to stand steadfast in the truth of the gospel as it had been delivered to him (2 Tim. iii. 1-17). The apostle begins this paragraph by drawing a sombre picture of what men are, and what may be expected of them in bad morals and foolish teaching (ch. iii. 1-9), and by placing opposite to this the brighter spectacle of Timothy's faith and devotion when, with a full understanding of all it involved in the way of hardship and persecution, he undertook to be a follower of Paul (ch. iii. 10, 11). He does not gloze the trials of the Christian life; he intimates rather that both persecution and corruption were to increase (ch. iii. 12, 13). But he does not find in this a reason why Timothy should desert the faith or the cause for which he had undertaken to fight and to suffer. For rather, he turns here suddenly to press upon his beloved son a warm appeal to abide, despite all sufferings and all temptations, in the teaching which he had learned and been assured of: "All that would live piously in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution, while evil men and imposters shall wax worse, deceiving and being deceived. But as for thee, do thou abide in what thou didst learn and wast assured of!" (ch. iii. 12-14).

Two reasons are assigned to clinch this ardent exhortation. The first is drawn from Timothy's confidence in his teachers, by whom surely are meant his instructors in the Christian doctrine to which he is urged to cleave, and among them primarily Paul himself: "Abide in what thou didst learn, . . . seeing that thou dost know from whom thou didst learn" (ch. iii. 14). The second is drawn from the life-long privilege he has enjoyed of knowing the truth: "And because thou hast from a babe known sacred writings, such as are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith in Christ Jesus" (ch. iii. 15). The argument is that Timothy knew, on the one hand, that those who had taught him the gospel had plenary knowledge of the truth, and were trustworthy in its delivery to him; and on the other, that his life-long acquaintance with such Scriptures as had stood open before him from babyhood rendered him especially without excuse should he fall from the truth. The ignorant heathen who up to yesterday had no Scriptures to which to go, or the blinded Jew for whom the veil that covered for him the Old Covenant had been

but yesterday uplifted, might indeed fall a prey to those who had a form of godliness but denied the power of it. But he—he had stood at the knees of his pious grandmother, Lois, and his like-minded mother, Eunice, with an open Bible spread before his youthful eyes; and from his tenderest years had been made familiar through their faithful offices with its most precious truths, such as were mighty to make wise unto salvation through faith in Christ Jesus. For him to fall would be a fall indeed.

It seems like a work of supererogation to turn aside here to emphasize the obvious fact that these "sacred Scriptures" which Paul represents Timothy as having had knowledge of from his youth up, were none other than the writings of the Old Testament. What other Scriptures are "sacred" in the writings of Paul—from Thessalonians to Timothy? What other "sacred writings" would be taught with such assiduous care by those pious Jewesses to their infant son? Nevertheless an, no doubt somewhat tentative, attempt has been made of late to cloud this manifest fact, in its full implication, on the ground that Paul does not say here "*the* sacred Scriptures," but, omitting the article, speaks only of certain "sacred writings" which Timothy had known from his youth, without farther defining their contents or extent. We shall not stop to defend the genuineness of the article, although its omission by the editors, despite their practical unanimity, is opposed by the weight of external evidence. No doubt if it be genuine, or, let us even say, if it were genuine, the reference to the Old Testament as a whole would be indisputable. But to plead the absence of the article—if it is to be omitted—as lessening this indisputableness is a perversion of the implication of this construction. When we speak of the blessing of "an open Bible," it is no more doubtful what Bible we mean than if we had called it "the Bible;" when we declare that the citizens of the United States live under the safeguard of "a constitution," no one is justified in falling into doubt as to what constitution we mean. In like manner the omission of the article here simply emphasizes the character of these Scriptures as written documents, as over against the oral teaching which Timothy had received from Paul, so that he lacked neither oral instruction nor the written pages of the Word in his indoctrination into the truth:

“Abide in what thou didst learn . . . seeing that thou dost know from what teachers thou hast learned it, and because thou hast from youth up read it in sacred pages.” The indefiniteness of the expression is but part of the chosen method of speech of the apostle, determined by his point of view, and in no sense lessens the definiteness of the body of sacred writings to which he refers. No one supposes that we can determine the canon of the Old Testament from this passage; but whether we read or omit the article, it is equally certain that the apostle speaks here of a definite body of sacred books, to all of which indiscriminately what he has further to say applies. What books entered into the collection which Paul knew and speaks of as “the sacred writings,” it is the part of historical inquiry to determine; but, that once determined, it is of that whole collection that Paul here speaks—the collection of holy books that was “sacred” at once to Paul and to Timothy’s Jewish mother and grandmother before him—that constituted, in a word, the inherited canon of the Jews. We may with confidence, therefore, understand the apostle in all his affirmations concerning these sacred writings, to speak of as much of our Old Testament as we can show to have entered into the canon currently accepted by the Jewish church of his time.

It is the fact that Timothy had been fed from childhood on these sacred writings, that Paul urges as a reason why he must not now fall away from the truth, as both he and they had consentiently taught it to him. We see at once that Paul attached a high value to the Old Testament as a teacher of the same truth that he proclaimed in his gospel, and as a safeguard against error in doctrine and sin in conduct. He dwells upon this theme with evident pleasure. Not content with the bare statement, as it has already come before us, he alike supports and enhances it with the broad and positive declaration that these sacred writings, in all their parts, breathe with the Spirit of God and are profitable to the man of God in fitting him to perform every good work. It need not be said that in this statement we reach the heart of Paul’s witness to the Old Testament.

There is some initial difficulty in the construction of the sentence, which need not, however, detain us long. There is no

question but that when Paul says, as our Authorized Version has it: "All scripture is given by inspiration of God and is profitable, &c.," the word "scripture" looks back upon the phrase "sacred writings" of the preceding statement, the value of which is here more fully explained. But it is a question whether he speaks here conjunctively or distributively; whether, in other words, we are to translate him, "all scripture" *i. e.* "the whole of scripture," as the Authorized Version does, or, "every scripture" *i. e.* "every passage of scripture," as the Revised Version prefers. The latter seems the preferable view, in which case the "sacred scriptures" of the preceding clause is distributed in this, and the affirmation that is made is declared to be true of all their parts alike. It is evident, however, that the essential meaning of the statement is not different, whichever way it be taken; it is practically all one whether we declare that what we are saying is true of the whole of the sacred writings of which we are speaking, or of every part of them. There is question still further, whether we shall read the apostle as saying that every scripture is "theopneustic and profitable," or that every "theopneustic scripture is as well profitable;" in other words, whether we are to take the word "theopneustic" as an attributive adjective here or as part of the predication. Again, the meaning remains essentially the same in both constructions. It is practically all one whether Paul first, by assigning to it this attributive, asserts these sacred writings to be in all their parts theopneustic, and then asserts of these theopneustic scriptures that they are as well profitable; or whether he assigns to them at once the paralleled characteristics of being theopneustic and profitable. There is reason to believe that the latter is the truer construction; but in either case Paul makes two affirmations concerning all or every part of the sacred scriptures of the Old Testament. The first of them is that they are theopneustic,—for it is best, at the present stage, to retain the Greek word; and the second of them, which is grounded on their theopneustic character, is that they are, therefore, profitable to the man of God, even in this Christian dispensation, in his efforts to attain to the perfection of the Christian character. If we will attend to these two affirmations, we shall arrive at Paul's teaching as to the nature and value of the Old Testament scriptures.

I. What, then, does the apostle mean, when taking up distributively the "sacred scriptures," of which he had already spoken, he tells us that they are in all their parts "theopneustic"? The exact shade of sense which the word bears, it must be admitted, is somewhat difficult to determine. It makes its first appearance in literature in the present passage. It does not occur in the whole range of classical or heathen Greek; and with the one not very certain exception of the fifth Sibyl, which was probably written by a Jew of the second century, it occurs nowhere where it might not possibly have been derived from our present passage. From the analogy of other similar compounds and from its later usage, however, it is clear that it must mean one of two things: either "breathed by God," in the sense of given out by, made by God's breath, or else "breathed into by God," in the sense of "filled with God's breath," redolent of God and hence breathing God. If the former sense be accepted, what the word declares is that every such scripture is divine in its origin,—was produced by an outbreathing from God, and hence is a word spoken by God. If the latter sense be accepted, what the word declares is that every such scripture is divine in its characterizing quality,—is, as a matter of fact, filled with God, redolent of the divine, breathing out God with its words, so that what it says, God says. In the former sense the words of scripture are declared to be God's words, because God has breathed them out and placed them there; in the latter sense the words of scripture are declared to be God's words, because God has entered into them repletively, and what they say, he is saying. Both assert them to be divine, the difference lying only in the point of view from which the term looks upon the divine in them; whether it declares that God was so concerned in the origin of scripture that he is the responsible author of its every part and so speaks its words, or whether it leaves all question of mode of origination to one side and declares of scripture as it stands that God is immanent in its every part and so speaks its words.

The ancient versions, Latin, Syriac, Ethiopic, understand the word in the former of these senses—"as breathed out by God"—and so make it teach that the Scriptures originated in an out-

breathing from God. It must be admitted, however, that the usage of the word, so far as it is traceable in the meagre material that is at our disposal, is distinctly in favor of the latter sense—that of “breathed into by God”—so making it teach that the Scriptures as they stand are filled with the breath of God. There is, indeed, one passage in Plutarch¹ where, if the reading were genuine, we should obtain the sense of “God-given” or “God-sent,”—“theopneustic dreams” being contrasted with “natural” ones, in that they come necessarily, and are not framed according to its mood by the soul. But here the text is probably corrupt, and the true reading is perhaps *θεοπέμπτους*. In no other passage is this meaning suggested. We read of “theopneustic fountains,”² which are, of course, not “God-given” fountains, not fountains which have originated by an outbreathing from God, but fountains which have been breathed into by God and filled with his presence. We read again of “theopneustic men,” (in one case as a parallel to *χριστόφοροι*),³ which again are, of course, not men which are the product of God’s out-breathing, but men who have been made what they are by God’s in-breathing,—God-filled men, who communicate what of the divine that is in them to others. We even read, in a paraphrase⁴ of the well-known passage of the gospel, of Christ’s sandals which John was unworthy to draw near to in order to unloose, as “theopneustic sandals,” which again, of course, does not mean sandals which have been given by God, which have come into being by an out-breathing from God, but sandals which, by contact with those divine feet, have caught somewhat of their divinity, and have become, in some sense, themselves divine. Only a single other early passage remains, the earliest of all; and this speaks of “theopneustic wisdom” in a

¹ *De plac. phil.*, v. 2. : “Herophilus affirmeth that dreams divinely inspired (*τοὺς ὀνειρούους τοὺς θεοπνεύστους*) come by necessity, but natural dreams (*φυσικουῶς*),” etc.

² *Sibyl.*, V. 308.

³ *Sibyl.*, V. 406 : *Vita Sabae* (Wetstein); *Marcus Eremita* (Wetstein).

⁴ Nonnus, *paraphr. Ev. Joh.* i. 102 seq. : “I am not worthy to bring my human hand near to the tip of the foot, though only to loose the thongs of the theopneustic sandal.”

context in which "God-given" would serve indeed, but in which "God-filled," "God-breathing" serves much better.¹

If we bring this sense, commended by the usage of the word, to our present passage, it may, perhaps, seem to be commended also by the context. Paul was not concerned here with how the Scriptures originated, he was concerned with what they are; his mind was less on their genesis than on their nature. And the fact that they are repletively filled with God, and breathe out God to the hearer, forms the better preparation for the exhibition of their usefulness in making the man of God perfect.

If, then, as it seems we ought, we accept this sense as the true meaning of the word, we will observe that the passage tells nothing expressly of how the Scriptures originated, but confines itself to telling us of their essential nature. They are, says the apostle, however they became so, in the truest sense a body of divine writings,—God-filled, redolent of God, breathing God, so that what they say he says. The conception is not that God is shot through them; it is that he repletively fills them. It is not that he is in them as a gold thread is in a fabric through and through which it is worked; but that he is in them as the water is in the cavity of the sea, filling every part, seeping into every crevice and lapping out on every shore. There is no part of them where he is not, and no word of them can sound where his voice is not heard.

So understood, it is not to be claimed that the word "*theopneustic*" here is the exact synonym of our word "*inspired*" in its technical theological sense. But, as a predicate of the Scriptures, it certainly throws the strongest possible emphasis upon the somewhat more important matter² of that characteristic of theirs which inspiration, as understood in its technical sense, is affirmed to secure; it asserts that God is so in Scripture that its words are his

¹ *Ps Phocyl*, 121: "God hath given to each thing a weapon; to bees he hath given a natural safeguard in stings, while speech is the defence of men, and speech is best of all,—the expression of theopneustic wisdom."

² "With Dr. Chalmers we fully agree," writes Professor Smeaton (*The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*, 2nd Ed., p. 167,) "when he says: 'The important question with us is, not the process of the manufacture, but the qualities of the resulting commodity.'"

words, and he speaks them to all who hear them. Leaving it to other occasions to explain how they became so, Paul here simply asserts that the Scriptures of the Old Testament are divine—in the highest and truest sense, God's word. And it is worth while to recall at this point that this is not an isolated affirmation, either of his or of the New Testament writers. The constant and consistent teaching of the New Testament as to the Old is simply here crystallized in one pregnant word. Everywhere the Scriptures are represented as the "Oracles of God;"¹ what they say God says,² and that even in the narrative parts³ and other portions not assigned to God in the Old Testament record itself.⁴ We may be perfectly sure, then, that we have caught Paul's meaning correctly when we understand him to affirm that the Old Testament is in all its parts filled with God, and that it breathes out a divine message in its every word. This is what Paul teaches us as to the nature of the Old Testament.

II. And on the truth as to its nature Paul finds his teaching as to its value and usefulness. Replete with God, it is "itself instinct with Spirit;" redolent of God, it diffuses divine influence wherever it goes. He that drinks of this fountain drinks a living water; he who eats at this table receives a food which will make him strong unto every good work. It is a natural corollary to the assertion that the Scriptures are in their every part breathed into by God, to add that they are, therefore, in their every part, also "profitable," "advantageous," "useful," "helpful." In enumerating the directions in which they are thus "helpful," the apostle does not aim at any detailed exhaustiveness of statement, but brings together, in an obviously climactic order, such items as, taken together, assert the divine helpfulness of the Old Testament in every sphere in which the man striving to lead a Christian life needs aid. This Scripture, breathed into by God, is thus affirmed to be "helpful for teaching, for conviction, for correction, for training in righteousness." It is useful to us, in that it teaches us the right way in which we ought to walk; in that it convicts

¹ Rom. iii. 2; Acts vii. 38.

² Rom. ix. 17; x. 19.

³ Heb. iv. 4.

⁴ Acts xiii. 35; Heb. viii. 8; i. 6, 7, 8, etc.

us of our sin when we fall from the way; in that it works amendment in us after our wandering; in that it educates us in righteousness. Nor is this to be understood as if the Old Testament were asserted to be useful for all these high purposes for a little way only, to be afterwards discarded in favor of a better aid by which we may complete our course. In the highest strivings of the Christian life it retains its helpfulness: the apostle designates the goal to which it aids us to attain: "in order that the man of God may be perfect, perfectly furnished unto every good work."

Language would fail to provide the means for a more distinct statement of the helpfulness of the Old Testament in the cultivation of every department and every stage of the devout life. We have need only to remind ourselves that this was spoken by a Christian man to a Christian man, after he had received long training and had presumably made great progress in Christian doctrine and living, to enable us to appreciate the meaning of so broad a commendation of the usefulness of the Old Testament scriptures. In these words Paul does not tell us what the Old Testament was to the saints of old, before the gospel had brought grace and truth to light in the world; he does not tell us how valuable its rush-light was to enable those who sat in darkness dimly to trace out the right way, before the Sun of Righteousness rose; he tells us what the value of the Old Testament is to those of us who walk in the light, and what use we who know the gospel can make of the writings of the Older Covenant, when seeking to know the way, to be convicted of our sin, to be set on the right path, to be educated in righteousness—when we desire to be perfect, perfectly fitted for every good work. Paul was not writing to Timothy the Jewish youth, but to Timothy the Christian man and herald of Christ, within whom dwelt unfeigned faith, and who was following "the teaching, conduct, purpose, faith, long-suffering, love, patience, persecutions, sufferings," of the apostle himself. We cannot fail to perceive that the scriptures of the Old Covenant, because they have been breathed into by God, are here announced to be of perpetual usefulness to the Christian man in all his efforts to realize, in thought and life, the doctrines in which he has been instructed.

If Paul is to be our guide, then, in our estimation of the Old Testament, we are to understand that it has been breathed into by God—is filled with him in its every part, so as to convey a divine message to every listener; and is, therefore, of indefectible usefulness to every man of God, of however high a stage of Christian knowledge and attainment, in his efforts to know, keep and walk in the true way, and to perfect his life and character. In a word, he affirms the complete divinity and the ceaseless usefulness of the Old Testament scriptures. There is no part of them which is not filled with God; there can come no time when any part of them shall lose value as an aid to holy living.

Do our theories square with the apostle's teaching? We do not here argue with those who believe that the apostles were "inspired and guided" only "by the current opinion" of their day, and who, therefore, are able to speak of their doctrine as "thoroughly erroneous and untenable," when they teach (as they are freely confessed to teach) that "the whole Old Testament is plenary inspired," and that "it is God that speaks in scripture, and that the words of scripture, in all 'its divers portions,' are the "words of God pure and simple."¹ We who know that it was not the spirit of the times, but the Spirit of Truth, that was in those men of God when they testified of the things of the kingdom, own a willing bondage to their words. Yet, if we be not watchful, as we build our theories as to the nature and use of the Old Testament, we may haply find ourselves some day running athwart their testimony when we are least expecting it. Let us note some of the adjustments of our thinking, that may be needful if we would not thus wander from the way.

1. First, then, we must adjust our theories as to the origin of the Old Testament, as a whole and in its several parts, to the teaching of Paul that it is everywhere divine. We do not in this arraign the validity of what is technically called the "higher criticism." We would have the Scriptures critically studied. We pro-

¹ These phrases are quoted from Mr. James Stuart's elaborate volume, entitled "*Principles of Christianity*," and fairly represent his position, which confesses that the New Testament writers thoroughly believed in the verbal inspiration of the Old Testament, but refuses to be led by their erroneous notions.

foundly wish that the circumstances under which each portion of them was composed could be so fully reproduced to our thought that we could mentally realize the whole process of the delivery of God's revelation of redemption, and thus live over again the whole history of Israel, from the moment when the divine hand was first stretched out to him, to the coming of the promised Messiah. We do not believe that the several parts of this revelation fell, each complete, like the stone of Zeus from heaven. Each part was conceived first in a man's heart and given thence to the people; and we earnestly desire to know this man, in his innermost individuality, and as the conditions of his growth and training worked upon and moulded him, that we may the better understand the message which God sent through him. It is this human element pervading the Scriptures which it is the province of the higher criticism to discover, elucidate and make a living reality to us. But it must not be permitted to "press beyond its mark," and in too exclusive a devotion to the human in Scripture, not merely forget, but even deny the co-presence of the divine. That the Old Testament is human is not inconsistent with its being also divine; but that it is divine in all its parts is inconsistent with its being everywhere—or anywhere—stained to its core with human error and human sin. Just because the Scriptures were not mechanically given through men who were merely pens in the divine hand, but the concurrence of the mind and heart of the human instrument was required by the divine author in all his revelations, we are justified in believing that the instruments employed by God in this great work were always fit—whether the fitting were the work of his providence, of his grace, or of the revelation itself. Nothing that is purely human is alien from such Scriptures, and we expect to find the impress of the human conditions under which each book was written stamped on its fabric. But nothing that is false or sinful can be of the warp and woof of writings which holy "men of God" produced as they were "moved by the Holy Ghost," declaring what the Spirit of Christ that was in them did signify. Let us prosecute with all diligence the work of the higher criticism. But if we find that the special theories upon which we are working are leading us to assert the origin of certain books in

fraud and deceit; or require for their support the assumption of numerous mistakes, errors, inconsistencies, immoralities, within their structure—let us suspect the accuracy of the formulas under which we are working, just as the mathematician will discard formulas which constantly yield false results. Scriptures which are replete with God, cannot lend themselves to the support of lies, and cannot have grown up out of a soil of deception and falsehood.

2. Secondly, we must adjust our theories as to the delivery and development of doctrine in the Old Testament to the teaching of Paul that its every word is a word of God. Again, we do not, in any way, question the fact that both the doctrine and the morality of the Old Testament is progressive. This progress is recognized by scripture itself; the revelation through Moses was a new revelation and was marked as such by God himself; the law was given by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus Christ; it is only in the gospel that life and immortality are brought to light. It is also obvious on the face of the record. The protevangelium does not reveal all the facts concerning Messiah that are contained in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. But the biblical theologian, no less than the biblical critic, may easily sink the truth of scripture in the formal completeness of his science. The human mind has something like a passion for distinctions, and will often read them into the record when it cannot justly read them out of it. As a matter of mere fact (and we are glad to use the language of so liberal-minded a scholar as Prof. A. B. Davidson here), "broad distinctions are rare in the Old Testament," "the course of revelation in which is like a river, which cannot be cut up into sections." But the rage for distinctions is only a fault of science so long as, in order to obtain them, we only exaggerate peculiarities which really exist. For instance, we may truly say that Amos emphasizes God's righteousness, Hosea his love, and Isaiah his sovereignty; and we are only scientifically wrong if we leave the impression that each prophet confines himself to the single conception of God which is thus attributed to him. This would only be a gross exaggeration of the great truth "that God, in order to reveal the full round of his being, chose for the pur-

pose, one after another, a succession of men, in the mind of each of whom some one of his attributes was strongly reflected." But we become fatally wrong, if, in order to gain the broad distinctions which we desire, we ascribe false and unworthy conceptions of Jehovah to some of the Old Testament writers. If the Scriptures are breathed into by the God of truth in all their parts, each part must be true; and the revelation which each part makes must combine with that made by all the rest in rounding the whole truth. Development implies continuity and successive growth in the same line, not change and repeated correction. We may find incomplete and partial views in scripture, but not incorrect and false ones. We may find undeveloped morality, but not immorality. If God speaks out from it in all its parts, he cannot represent himself on one page as an unethical tribal Moloch and on another as the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long suffering and abundant in goodness and truth.

3. Thirdly, we must adjust our theories as to the proper method of interpreting the Old Testament to Paul's teaching that God is in it everywhere, causing it to be everywhere profitable in building up the Christian life and in making us wise unto salvation. Once again, we are far from suspecting the validity of historico-critical exegesis; we only insist that we must yield ourselves fearlessly to it, even though its consistent application means the uncovering of hid treasures of truth in even the oldest strata of the Biblical writings. We listen calmly to protests against what men call "reading the New Testament into the Old," and to a demand for a "historical exegesis," which proves to mean a limiting of what scripture will be permitted to say to what the latest theory of historical development will allow to have been currently believed by the contemporaries of its several writers. This is not the way that the New Testament writers interpret the Old Testament. This is not the way we should deal with a book breathed into by God, in its every part, that it may bear a helpful message to every age. Nay, this is not scientific procedure. We may well ask, in the face of such attempts to subject the Scriptures to the bondage of contemporary thought, whether the author of scripture is the generation that received it or the God that gave

it. Nor is it so very difficult to picture to ourselves how doctrine may be progressively delivered, and yet at each stage the teaching be so framed as to retain permanent or even acquire increasing usefulness, for the coming years. We may easily imagine a Faraday or Henry, for instance, as so teaching the elements of physics to a school-boy as that only the simple elements shall be conveyed to his youthful mind, and yet in after years he shall be able to perceive that the statements were so fully conditioned and underlaid by complete knowledge of the deepest truths of physical philosophy, as necessarily to imply them and inevitably to suggest them to the sufficiently instructed mind. For him now to read this philosophy in them, would not be to read it into them, but truly to see what had been from the first part of their contents. As a matter of mere fact, apart from theory, this "springing" sense as it may justly be called, is characteristic of the Scripture record. Look at the Biblical statement of physical fact. Take the first chapter of Genesis. Is it not certain that Moses there tells us more than any one of his time,—more than any one up to our time,—did or could read out of his words? Those before whose eyes this wonderful writing was first laid, could not fail to see in it what was placed there for their instruction. No knowledge of science before the time of science was forced upon their attention; but that God is the maker of all things, and by his power they were and are created, this they could not fail to understand. But whatsoever things were written aforetime, were written also for *our* instruction. And after we have learned somewhat of the methods of creation from the book of nature, we look back into Genesis and we find all that we have learned presupposed there. It is not obtruded upon the reader; the record was not written to teach a true science to all generations. But it so underlies and conditions the statement of how God created the heavens and the earth, which was given for moral ends, that he who knows the facts cannot fail to see them presupposed. Thus it happens that while the cosmogony of Hesiod, say for example, cannot be made, by any violence of interpretation, to harmonize with the science of the nineteenth century, that of Genesis cannot be forced without violence out of harmony with it. It has, in a word,

a "germinant" or "springing" sense which has thus far kept it abreast of advancing knowledge. Look again at the biblical prophecies. The oracles of Delphi do not grow in wealth of content with the advancing years; those of the Old Testament become more precious with every age. Each prediction served its purpose in the day when it was delivered. But each is found, as succeeding prophecies more and more illuminate the future, and successive fulfilment explains the details, continually to grow in richness and beauty. What our first parents understood by the *protevangelium* is a delicate historical problem; but what we are to understand by it is not to be determined by its solution. Looking back upon it in the light of all that has been revealed and has happened since, we would be dull indeed not to perceive, not that it may be made to teach much concerning the redemption of man which Adam and Eve could not understand, but that it cannot be made not to. Whoever framed this prophecy, while he adapted it to the capacity of those who were in need of milk and not strong meat, nevertheless framed it out of plenary knowledge of God's plan of redemption; and we can only pity those who refuse to read out of it to-day what its author placed in it, lest, perchance, they should assign a teacher to the infancy of the race who knew more of God's purposes with it than the infant race itself could understand. The New Testament does lie latent in the Old, and it only needs the light of the fulfilled gospel to bring it out. The Old Testament is something like a room, nobly furnished, but dimly lighted; it needs but the sun to shine into it to reveal many splendors which the dwellers in its darkness had not suspected it to possess. Without hesitation we take our stand by Paul, and declare it good science to see in the Old Testament all that God has placed in it, and to draw out of it, not merely what those who sat in the twilight of the past could discern by the faint light that alone illuminated its pages for them, but all that the full glory of the New Testament revelation brings into relief in its words.

4. It is but a corollary from this to add, fourthly, that we must adjust our theories as to the proper use of the Old Testament to what Paul teaches us here of its continuous value for the instruction and edification of the Christian man. Nor are we here

advocating an "indiscriminate jumble" of Old and New Testament texts in our proof of doctrine or our enforcement of a holy life. What we insist upon is a discriminating use of the Old Testament "for teaching, for conviction, for correction, for education in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, perfectly furnished unto every good work." We certainly do not advise that proof texts should be adduced for doctrines which they do not fairly teach. We certainly do not commend the too-common practice of forcing out of unwilling texts exhortations to lines of conduct with which they have nothing to do. But we certainly do believe that when God speaks, in whatever age, what he positively declares to be true in faith or right in conduct is true and right forever; and that his declaration remains a proof of its truth, as his exhortation remains an incitement to right doing, of eternal validity. A declaration of the Old Testament of right conduct, positively commanding us, is an unshakable foundation for morality. A proof text from its pages which positively asserts a doctrine is as firm a basis for building a dogma upon as though the sky should open and God speak from the heavens to our own ears to-day. Hesitation to use its dicta in support of our ethical or doctrinal teaching can arise out of nothing else than a false view of the development of doctrine, and betrays a lurking fear lest in the development there has been change as well as growth. It may well happen that we shall find no proof texts in the earlier portions, or even in the whole, of the Old Testament for certain doctrines which are fully taught in the New, or no express commendation of certain of the more delicate Christian graces; this belongs to the essence of development. But it cannot be that Old Testament texts will positively teach for truth, or positively inculcate for right, what the New Testament will condemn. God is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, and does not teach one thing in one age and an opposite one in another. The light of the Old Testament may run back into twilight, but it is *light*; and though it may seem at times too weak to guide our steps in certain paths, it will never mislead them.

5. Finally, let us observe that, if we follow Paul's teaching here, we shall be in no danger of professing a merely book reli-

gion. There is a sense in which Christianity is a religion of a book; but there is also a sense in which it is a life. The book is precious because it is a life-quickening book, because it is God's chosen means of preserving a living religion in the world. When Paul asserts that the Old Testament is breathed into by God, he adds that this is in order that it may be helpful in forming, fostering and perfecting a godly life. God is in the Scriptures repletively; and he has entered into them, not that we may sit idly before them and offer them idolatrous worship, but that he might by his presence in them render them helpful to us as we fight the good fight and work out our salvation with fear and trembling. Therefore, when he asserts that the Old Testament is mighty to make wise unto salvation, he adds that this is only "by means of faith in Christ Jesus." Though God be repletively in the Scriptures, they are useless to us, even for the holy purpose for which they were given, unless they be "united by faith with them that hear." They are profitable only to the *man of God*; they are mighty to make wise unto salvation, but only *by means of faith in Christ Jesus*. What is a savor of life unto life to some may be a savor of death unto death to others. And it is therefore faith, not the Scriptures, which, after all, is the real dynamic of the Christian life. In a word, Paul is here the forerunner of the Reformers, who with such rare tact united the two conceptions of justification by faith and the exclusive authority of scripture as the mutually supporting principles of a true religion. It is as Dorner truly says: "The actual experience of redemption through Christ accredits the authority of Holy Scripture, so that it is by the help of Scripture that we believe in Christ; and again it is for Christ's sake that we believe in the divine authority of Scripture." Even Scripture cannot appeal to any but a living soul; yet how shall we believe unless we hear? BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

V I. N O T E S.

IS THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE ITINERANCY A WEAK POINT IN PRESBYTERIANISM?

THE pastoral office, for obvious reasons the most attractive sphere of ministerial effort, is perhaps held at its highest premium in the Presbyterian Church. In no church are the facilities for long, quiet pastorates more carefully secured; in none are such so frequent as in this. Whether advantageous or no, protracted pastorates have a mellow Scotch flavor which is very pleasing to the average Presbyterian mind. The growth of the apostolic church, and all other active evangelical movements, historically have contravened this sentiment; a large proportion of itinerants or missionaries has ever been essential to the propagation of a faith and the true aggressiveness of a church. Yet this undisputed fact of ecclesiastical history has not been equal to correct the gravitation of our American Presbyterianism towards the traditional Scotch idea. Even conceding that the pastorate is the *summum bonum* of ministerial aspiration under the conditions of *Scotch* society, which is very doubtful, the mixed, restless and transient elements of our American population constitute a factor dictating a careful revisal of this view. Since fifty years after the Revolution, however, Presbyterian theories of ministerial preparation and settlement seem more and more steadily to have drifted towards this Scotch idea. The genesis of the first enterprises for ministerial training in the American Presbyterian Church largely resulted from the *missionary* demands of the colonies. The tenants of Log College were men of burning missionary spirit. At Whitefield's request, Gilbert Tennent left his study and his divinity chair to make an extensive and arduous preaching tour through New York and New England. Of Gilbert Tennent and Samuel Blair (another Log College alumnus), Dr. Archibald Alexander says: "They saw a great harvest before them, and the Lord seemed to attend their labors everywhere with a blessing. . . . They felt as did the apostles and first reformers, that they were called to go everywhere preaching the gospel, without regard to prescribed limits of Presbyteries and congregations, especially as they observed that many pastors

neglected to inculcate on their hearers the necessity of a change of heart." (Log College, p. 50.) The religious destitutions, especially in New Jersey and the Southern Colonies, were urged upon the Synod of New York and Pennsylvania in support of the first movement to endow a theological chair at Princeton, and in the same year, 1767, this Synod appointed as *missionaries* Messrs. Bay, Potter, Alexander, M'Creary, James Latta, Jr., Anderson and Jackson, to spend at least six months in itinerant labors in Virginia, North and South Carolina and Georgia. (Hodge's History Presbyterian Church, p. 290.) The first professor of Didactic Theology at Princeton, Dr. Archibald Alexander, imbibed his broad spirit of missions and evangelization under similar influences. The Synod of Virginia signalized its first meeting, after the organization, whose centennial was celebrated last October, by a great evangelistic movement, bold as it was honorable. In the year 1789 it appointed the *Commission of Synod* (consisting of four ministers and four elders), to carry out the following purpose:

"*Resolved*, That we will take all proper care to seek for men of knowledge, integrity, and piety who may travel through our bounds as missionaries to preach the gospel, to catechise and instruct the youth, and to discharge such other parts of ministerial duty as they may be authorized to perform."

The third resolution of the same paper provides "that it be recommended to the different Presbyteries to raise such contributions as they may be able in their respective bounds, which shall be put into a general fund for the support of such missionaries" Under this plan Dr. Archibald Alexander and Mr. Benjamin Grigsby were sent out as itinerants in 1792. They made an extensive tour across the Blue Ridge and through Piedmont and Southern Virginia, abounding in active itinerant labors, which, at least by Dr. Alexander, were in measure continued until his settlement at Philadelphia ten years afterwards. The Evangelistic Committee of the Synod of Virginia did a valuable work from 1790 until 1797, sending out fifteen missionaries and evangelists through all parts of the State, and even across the mountains into Kentucky. The selection of such devoted men as Nash, Legrand, the Lyles, Graham, and others gave a great impulse to early Presbyterianism. While the movement was pressed, the growth of the church was rapid and encouraging. The tendency to sacrifice the itinerant work for the settled pastorate became more decided notwithstanding, and we are informed that "during the years 1798-'99, 1800, and 1801, the commission could not obtain new missionaries; those who had been in their employ all settled as pastors. The commission,

therefore, in 1801, proposed a dissolution of the body; there the file of the records stops." (Foote's Sketches of Va., p. 530.)

Could this work, so well inaugurated, have been actively maintained, and a full corps of young men trained as evangelists have been continually sent forth to satisfy the growing demands along the lines of western emigration, the vantage ground which Presbyterianism held after the Revolution, sustained beyond all by the fidelity to Scripture of its doctrinal system, justifies the belief that it would to-day be largely the preponderating religious influence in America. The demand for equipping men of gifts as evangelists for the church is one that grows as the Presbyteries and Synods realize that the pastorate alone will not reach our destitutions.

The love of quietude and home life common to meditative men, the opportunities of study and ministerial preferment, and the force of local attachments, are all calculated to discount itinerant labors in any church. Positive influences are demanded to counteract these, or the result in a universal preferment of the pastorate is inevitable. A corresponding neglect of missionary effort is the consequence. Now, does the Presbyterian system of ministerial training supply any corrective to this tendency? The teachers in our seminaries are students called from the quiet pastorate to the cloister life of the professor's sanctum. The traditions and *literature* of the church, always excepting the New Testament, as well as their personal experience, contribute to decide the great aim of their instructions and efforts *to train good pastors*.

The pressing demands of the extensive home missionary fields, with their arduous self-denying exactions, and taxing itinerant labors, require special appeals and preparation, or the absorbent powers of the settled pastorate will leave no supply for the apostolic itinerancy. Then those active labors among the poor and destitute people which the evangelistic work judiciously pressed secures, will supply for Presbyterianism that vigorous self-denying element known as the yeomanry of a country, a factor which, in American more than any other society, is constantly coming to the front as the ruling power in our social life. From this class, too, the church largely draws her ministerial candidates. The seclusion of country life and that exemption from the whirl and excitement of commercial avocations which is secured to the youth of our rural churches are particularly favorable to those habits of quiet and meditation which usually precede a call to the gospel ministry. As the growing drift of Presbyterianism in the South, from the poorer rural districts to the centres of commercial life, becomes

more decided, there is reason to fear that our ministerial candidates will decrease and our vacancies increase.

The great corrective is to obey the example of Jesus; preach the gospel to the poor; to fill our young men with this inspiration—as the poor in purse, under the pressure of adversity more than any other social class, realize their need of the consolations of religion. Here will the church of Christ find the most accessible and impressible element. The pagan field abroad and the poor classes at home appeal in the most emphatic manner to the consecration and unselfishness of the church. In labors *here* will she find her inspiration, her strength, her most vigorous life. The church which improves her golden opportunity to secure this class will find all others gravitating towards her. In the memory of this generation, the Presbyterian Church has never seemed so fully aroused to the obligations and attractiveness of this wide field as now, and as a consequence, Presbyteries and Synods are eagerly casting their eyes over the ranks of the ministry for itinerants and evangelists. With more than ordinary opportunities for observation and experience, the writer can testify to the great and lamentable difficulty in finding supplies for these urgent demands. Our young ministers, it is discovered, are not trained for evangelists and home missionaries, but for pastors. Grateful testimony to the fine mental and theological training they have received at the seminaries is freely given, but this has not been entirely in the needful direction, or more correctly it has not gone far enough. The active missionary spirit and a flexibility and power of adaptation to the varied conditions of itinerant work is lacking—a deficiency so great that the average common sense and piety of our young men are failing to supply it under existing conditions. Authorities on the conduct of foreign missions, under a sense of this deficiency, are advocating special schools for training men for this work. How shall the want be met for the *home field*? Two forcible articles from authors in different parts of our church, emphasizing our need of evangelists, and suggesting some means of supplying the demand, have recently appeared in two successive numbers of this QUARTERLY. Both of these writers advocate the founding of lecture-ships on Evangelism. These should be established in connection with our divinity schools, or at points readily accessible to young ministers, to theological, and if possible, to *college* students. Our church has already in theory committed herself to this plan. Nearly three years ago the able committee of our General Assembly (which met at Augusta), of which the venerable Dr. J. T. Hendrick was chairman, pre-

sented its report on Theological Seminaries, involving the following action:

“*Resolved*, III., and lastly, in reference to the overture from Lafayette Presbytery, touching evangelistic work, your committee would recommend, 1, That the Assembly express its coincidence of judgment with that of the Presbytery, that too little importance has been attached to the evangelistic work and office, and that perhaps to this lack may be attributed the rise of so much irresponsible evangelism through the land.

“2. That the Assembly remind the churches, (a) That Presbyterianism cannot accomplish its mission unless it become more aggressive; (b) That constant aggressiveness, in other words preaching the gospel to the regions beyond, is one *great* mission of the church; (c) That preaching the gospel to the poor is the distinguishing characteristic of the true church.

“3. That the Assembly hereby recommend our seminaries to make due provision for proper instruction upon this subject, either by procuring annually a series of lectures by some regularly ordained and experienced evangelist, or by adding to the course on Pastoral Theology the full instruction concerning evangelism, which its pressing importance demands.”—(Minutes of Assembly for 1886, page 44.)

The writer does not know in what degree our seminaries have endeavored to comply with these earnest recommendations of the Assembly. Effective measures, which have not been reported to subsequent Assemblies, may have been adopted, but it is certain that the demand for such training, urgent already, is rapidly increasing in the Presbyteries and Synods of our church; and seminaries which can induce such lectureships, either through existing resources or by securing an endowment for this purpose from munificent individuals, will greatly enhance their usefulness and their popularity in our church.

W. D. MORTON.

MEMBERSHIP IN *PRO-RE-NATA* MEETINGS.

THIS question was raised by an article in the April No. of this Review, written by Dr. H. M. Smith. The same question was before the Synod of Mississippi, at its last meeting, on an overture from the Presbytery of New Orleans. In my judgment the constitution of our church itself, as well as interpretations of it by our church courts, decides this nice question differently from Dr. Smith. Law and order are one thing, usage and custom quite another. It is always a safe and sound position to allow law to direct and mould our customs, rather than force law, or strain its interpretations into endorsement of our customs. We prefer for ourselves hats made for our heads, rather than have our heads pressed and compressed to fit the hat.

There are two, and only two, positions to be argued and maintained in this discussion.

I. First, what constitutes membership in *pro-re-nata* meetings?

II. How are such called; or, does right and power to call affect in any wise membership in such meetings?

I. What, then, is a *pro-re-nata* meeting of Presbytery? See Form of Government, ch. V., sec. IV., par. 8. From this the inference is clear that it is a regular Presbytery, called in extra session,—a regular meeting limited to transact business specified in the call,—its constituency the same as in a regular meeting, and unchanged by the power or authority which thus assembled it lawfully in special session. “It is the re-assembling of a still-existing judicature.”

Now, what determines the constituency of a regular Presbytery? Answer: Three or more ministers within a certain boundary fixed by Synod, such are standing members; churches in the same territorial limits, which are also standing members. The roll, which remains in the hands of the stated clerk, defines “who is who.” This roll, called at each meeting, fixes the constituency of that body, by the only competent authority having any right or authority to determine who are its own members. On the call of that roll, the church answers through its chosen representative; this representative, duly elected by session, sits by right in both regular and called meetings, a member of *pro-re-nata* Presbytery, *because a member of regular Presbytery*. Membership in all called meetings is based upon membership in stated meetings, either claimed or exercised.

“The election of an elder qualified to sit in Presbytery at Synod, necessarily vacates the membership of his predecessor, since no session is entitled to more than one representative in Presbytery.” (P. 275 of article under review.) This is an impossibility, and *non sequitur* also. Impossible, since no church session ever elects elders as such, “qualified to sit in Presbytery at Synod.” They are elected to Presbytery. Their right to sit during Synod is the question in dispute, and cannot be covered and secured by a double qualification such as this statement implies. An elder elected by his session to represent his Presbytery at the stated meeting, holds membership from one regular meeting until the next, unless “session otherwise order.” (Minutes General Assembly, 1888, p. 425.) The election of an associate elder to Synod leaves undisturbed his right to a seat in Presbytery, unless his session, AT THE TIME OF ELECTION, limited his term of service to a single meeting.

In perfect harmony with this view of our system and church government is the language of the Assembly of 1872 (p. 164). "When an elder is appointed to attend a stated meeting, he may, without any new appointment, meet and act with Presbytery until its next stated meeting, unless the session shall appoint some other member of the bench of elders to act in his place." This language defines a right. It is no grant of permission, no tender of a courtesy, any more than the Constitution of the United States or the State of Louisiana, which says that on reaching his majority at twenty-one, a youth *may vote*. This confers right. The session, consequently, which fails to appoint a delegate to a regular meeting may meet and send one to a called meeting, while the session which did appoint to a regular meeting has no need of a new appointee. The deliverances of our General Assemblies and Synods have all along been in harmony with our system. There is but one way to constitute membership in regular and called Presbyteries, *i. e.*, by election of the church session. This election holds good until the expiration of the term of office, or by limitation at the time of holding said election. It is not, and cannot be, set aside possibly by an election to a higher court.

II. How are *pro-re-nata* meetings called? Does the right to call affect membership in such? (Form of Gov., ch. V., sec. IX., par. 8; ch. V., sec. I., par. 4; ch. V., sec. II., par. 4; ch. V., sec. III., par. 6.) The constitution inferentially allows this right to Synods; also upon the moderator or clerk of the Presbytery, at the call of two ministers and two ruling elders. Their powers are confined to this call.¹ To call together, to convene this same judicature, which is a regular Presbytery for special business: their powers begin and end there. The constitutional prerogative is exhausted in the call; simply this, "only this, and nothing more." The Synod has no right of construction, either expressed or implied, as to the constituency of a Presbytery in called meetings. The

¹Strictly speaking, *pro-re-nata* Presbyteries can only be called as prescribed in our Form of Government, ch. V., sec. IV., par. 8. The General Assembly of 1848 (see Minutes, p. 60,) did allow that the Synod had power to order the Presbytery to meet and transact such business as in the judgment of the Synod was intimately connected with the well-being and good order of the church; also construed such called meetings as of the nature of *pro-re-nata* meetings, and ordered that rules governing *pro-re-nata* meetings ought to govern and regulate such meetings when ordered by Synod, except when ordered to meet during sessions of Synod. In such cases Presbytery may meet at once—*i. e.*, waiving the ten days' previous notice, as required in par. 8 of ch. V. The Synod, however, may order meetings of Presbytery which are not *pro-re-nata*.

Presbytery determines its own constituency, and the Synod stands on the same footing, precisely, with the moderator or clerk of Presbytery in making this call. "Our legislation," says Dr. Smith, "would direct the Synod to order such meetings in vain, if it did not at the same time extend its authorization to respond to Presbyteries and sessions. The law cannot direct the Synod to call such meetings at will, except guaranteeing the presence of those constituent elements of the Presbytery which sessions must provide. It must, therefore, be construed as defining the status of elders in Synod as corresponding to the requirements of the law; that is to say that they, by their position as members of Synod, are qualified to sit with their Presbyteries in the meeting specified." The best reply to this is Dr. Smith himself in the same article. "The church session alone is competent to qualify an elder to be a member of Presbytery, and it can only do so by electing him a member." The election to the Synod by same session of an elder, makes that elder a member of the Synod only, and the Synod cannot say, by virtue of his position as member of Synod, he is thereby qualified to sit also in the Presbytery. No church session would allow a Synod to usurp its constitutional rights. Indeed, there may be reasons, good, solid and substantial, why church sessions want different elders in the Presbytery from those representing them in the Synod. Now, the Presbytery has the right, and there may be issues involving this right which it might want to maintain or conserve, which it could not do if the Synod is allowed the *ad interim* right to step in and change the entire complexion of its constituency, by saying that elders elected to Synod vacate the place of elders elected to stated meetings; *e. g.*, in a Presbytery like that to which the writer belongs, Red River, where churches entitled under our system to representation are largely in excess of ministerial representation, the action of a regular fall meeting may be set aside during a called meeting at Synod: since at the regular meeting an elder was deposed for crime; or a minister suspected of heresy was denied enrollment. Now, let churches elect new elders to the Synod; and since, according to Dr. Smith, election there vacates the seat in the Presbytery, all that is necessary is for the Synod to call the Presbytery to receive the suspected minister, and it could be done, and so alter entirely the action of the last stated meeting. We affirm, then, as true Presbyterianism, that the church session alone is competent to elect an elder, and he is a member of Presbytery in virtue of this election only. Again, in the second place, that the church session alone can elect elders to

Synod, and this election to Synod makes him a member of Synod ONLY, "unless the session otherwise order." Our opinion is that this right to order otherwise is never enforced or used by a church session to displace its chosen representative, except for cause. That cause being this representative's disqualification or resignation, consequently a delegate from the session to the Presbytery has the right under our system of claiming his seat in all *pro-re-nata* meetings, according to the General Assemblies of 1872 and 1888.

An election to the Synod in the fall of 1888 vacates the predecessor in the fall of 1887 in Synod only. In like manner an election to Presbytery in the spring of 1889 vacates the predecessor to the fall meeting of 1888, with called meetings intervening between these dates. The custom is wrong and unlawful of allowing members of Synod to sit in *pro-re-nata* Presbyteries, as duly qualified elders, who were never elected by the church session, either to regular or *pro-re-nata* meetings.

In harmony with this view I read the deliverances of 1872 and 1888. The action of 1872 says he may rightfully sit from one regular meeting until another. The action of 1888 saying he may do the same, unless "session otherwise directs," proves our position that this right belongs to it, *to it* ONLY. That is to say, the session shall always say who shall represent it in both regular and called meetings, whenever and wherever called. And Synod cannot construe its silence not "to order otherwise," by saying the last representative from the church session shall supersede. The Synod has no such powers under our constitution. "The power of the whole is in every part. The power of the whole is over the power of every part." The power of the whole is in the session; this "unless it otherwise directs," proves it is so. So that from one stated meeting until another its representative to the regular meeting must continue to hold his seat, there and in all called meetings, "unless session otherwise directs." This right "to otherwise direct" must be exercised at time of holding election to regular meeting.

Shreveport, La.

MATTHEW VAN LEAR.

MR. DONNELLY'S BACONIAN CIPHER.

IN a recent number of THE QUARTERLY we examined Books I. and III. of Mr. Donnelly's "Great Cryptogram," reserving for the present paper the cipher narrative in Book II., which, in reality, is independent of the other two books. The cipher may be correct, and yet the rest of the work may be absolutely worthless. It is not fair to the au-

thor, therefore, to cast aside his ingeniously intricate cipher because his pro-Bacon arguments are inconsequential. A laborious, painstaking piece of workmanship, the cipher does great credit to the author's fertile imagination and marvellous ingenuity. One cannot help regretting, however, that so much time, talent and industry have been wasted in building an unsubstantial structure upon a basis of sand. It is not surprising, therefore, that the whole edifice falls at the first puff of adverse criticism, even the Baconians being unable to prop up the tottering structure. But let us follow the workman in his toils, and note first, how he "became certain there was a cipher." Long convinced of the Baconian authorship of Shakspeare's plays, Mr. Donnelly naturally wondered why Bacon should sever himself from these children of his intellect. He must have appreciated their value. These thoughts seethed in the cauldron of Mr. Donnelly's brain, until he chanced one day to read in one of his children's books a chapter on cryptography, containing a complex word cipher of Lord Bacon's. "Could Lord Bacon have put a cipher in the plays?" was the wondering query that flashed through the mind of our author. Bacon's works are searched. *De Augmentis* has a chapter on Cipher. Word ciphers are preferred by the great philosopher. What words would be most likely to furnish a clue? Obviously "Francis," "Bacon," "William," "Shakspeare," "Nicholas" (Bacon's father), "St. Albans" (Bacon's home), in fact, the whole statement, "I, Francis Bacon, of St. Albans, son of Nicholas Bacon, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England, wrote these plays, which go by the name of William Shakspeare." This explicit statement the author, of course, does not find, but its substantial equivalent is extorted by a rare exercise of cryptographic skill.

A few significant words immediately attract the eye already squinting Bacon-ward, and "Bacon" is naturally the first. "Merry Wives of Windsor" furnishes this nugget. In this same play an irrelevant (?), obscure character, "William," occurs, lugged in, of course, by the wily Lord Chancellor. Dame Quickly, whose garrulity is so oracular to Mr. Donnelly, says: "Hang hog [pigeon Latin for *hanc, hoc*] is latten for Bacon, I warrant you." Sir Nicholas (Bacon's father), in trying a man named Hog, who is about to be executed, says, by way of repartee, "Hog is not Bacon until it is well hanged." The inference is obvious. Francis put his father's jokelet into Dame Quickly's mouth.

Mr. Donnelly's sense of humor is painfully obtuse, otherwise he

would not have been guilty of the following absurdity: Falstaff, blissfully ignorant that his hurried military order is pregnant with cryptographic significance, says to his accomplices who are about to rob the travellers, "On, Bacons, on!" The command does *not* seem to be given to the travellers, as Mr. Donnelly asserts. (See 1 Henry IV., Scene 2, Act II.) Even if it had been, Falstaff had just spoken of them as "bacon-fed knaves," and would naturally abbreviate in consequence of his excitement. Hear our cryptographer on this passage: "Falstaff calls the travellers [?] *Bacons*. Think of it! If he had called them hogs, I could understand it: but to call them by the name of a piece of smoked meat! I can imagine a man calling another a bull, an ox, a beef, but never a tenderloin. Moreover, why should Falstaff say, 'On, Bacons, on!' unless he was chasing the travellers away? But he was trying to detain them, to hold on to them, for the stage direction says, 'Here they rob them and binde them.'" Of course, all this is entirely irrelevant, if Falstaff is giving orders to his co-robbers; and this is certainly the natural interpretation. But to resume: "When I read that phrase, 'On, Bacons, on!' I said to myself, 'Beyond question, there is a cipher in this play.'" If it were not for the intense earnestness of our author, we should call this "very midsummer madness." In the same connection in the play thieves are called "St. Nicholas clarks." The author thinks St. Nicholas is dragged in for cipher purposes; whereas, if we are to believe Mr. Hudson's natural explanation of the passage, St. Nicholas is a cant term for the devil, who is a patron of thieves, a most appropriate function for the prince of the powers of darkness. Many of the significant words, the author notes with delight, occur on two or three successive pages of the Folio of 1623. But these are not the only places. Francisco, in Hamlet, will do excellently well for Francis. So in Merry Wives of Windsor occur "shakes" and "peere-out." Why not marry the two vocables, widely separated in the text, and make Shakspeare? Later on we find abundant material for this name. "Shake," "shakes," "shak'st," or "Jack," combined with "peer," "spear," "spur," "sphere," will make Shakespeare *ad libitum* with all possible sibylline contortions of orthography. When Bacon gives out, then "beckon," "beacon," similarly pronounced, will answer all purposes. If these fail, why not join "bay" to "con," or "ba" to "con"? But I am insulting the intelligence of THE QUARTERLY'S readers. Yet all the above are genuine illustrations, and there are many more like them. (*Vide*, pp. 539-544.) Not satisfied with contributions from the

pages of Shakspeare, the author makes equally ludicrous citations from other Elizabethan dramatists, for it is a part of his theory that Bacon wrote most of the dramas of that day.

Such is the method by which Mr. Donnelly becomes convinced of the existence of a cipher. It must be recollected that he at first presumably had no cipher data whatever, and is only groping after what he expects to find. Under such circumstances, is it surprising that his eyes were abnormally far-sighted? As ordinary editions scarcely ever transcribe the original text, the author naturally had recourse to the First Folio of 1623. The librarian of Columbia College, New York, permitted him to take a *fac simile* of part of the famous Phoenix First Folio, said to be "one of the best preserved and most perfect in existence," and upon this he bases the part of the cipher worked out by him. This embraces only a small part of 1st and 2nd Henry IV. Further instalments of cipher narrative may naturally be expected, unless the author dizzies the arithmetic of his memory by his complicated calculations, or loses his eyesight by a minute examination of the blurred text of the First Folio.

The cipher is so marvellously intricate that it would be impossible to explain it fully in a short article. The explanation will be found on pages 575-585 and 647-669 of the "Great Cryptogram." A perusal of these pages will reveal the extreme flexibility of the author's figures, the obedient sérvitors of an ingenious brain. Everything depends upon the root numbers, 505, 506, 513, 516, 523. The key to these Mr. Donnelly refuses to reveal. They apply only to 1st and 2nd Henry IV., and for fear some one may slip in ahead of him, he preserves a discreet silence. But he has since been assured that the copyright laws will protect him. If they didn't, his own ingenuity certainly would. No one else could work out further the same cipher, for it involves too many contingencies, and follows no fixed law. It depends upon pagination, hyphenation, italics, bracketed words, and the addition and subtraction of certain numbers, under apparently flexible conditions. Sometimes the bracketed and hyphenated words are counted, sometimes not. Besides, the hyphenated words may be counted singly or as one compound expression. We count also from various starting points, backwards, forwards, down the column, and up the column. The root numbers are subject to numerous manipulations, and one root number or two is used to work out a story. These are only the salient conditions, other minor ones meeting us at every turn. Even after the words are worked out by such elaborate arithmetical processes, we have no

assurance that they are being put together in the right order. There is apparently no definite rule to guide us in this important particular. Suppose we should encounter in our cipher manipulations the words "Bacon," "Shakspere," "said," "plays," "the," "wrote," "I," "to"? This might read, "Bacon said to Shakspere, 'I wrote the plays,'" or "Shakspere said to Bacon, 'I wrote the plays.'" Order in English is vital, as every embryonic grammarian knows. Of course the imaginary example above is an extreme case, as the order would often be dictated by the sense. When the sense is previously known by the cryptographer, however, the task of arranging the words is an easy one.

As far as we have examined Mr. Donnelly's figures, they are correct, but his explanation of the cipher is enough to convince one of its utter fatuity. But lest we should seem unduly severe in our estimate of the cipher, we quote from Prof. Thomas Davidson, who, says Mr. Donnelly, (p. 937,) "was sent to my home by the *New York World*, in August, 1887, to examine the proof-sheets of this work (The Great Cryptogram). He came believing that William Shakspere was undoubtedly the writer of the plays; he left convinced that it was almost impossible; and since then, in numerous newspaper articles, he has presented most powerful arguments in support of his views. Only a great man could thus overcome, in a few hours, the prejudices of a life time; only an honest man would dare avow the change. Professor Davidson is both." Yet this learned gentleman, sometime member of the Harvard Visiting Committee, (the Admirable Crichton of recent times,) says, (*Shakespeariana*, December, 1888, p. 550, quoted from the *New York World*, April 29, 1888,) "No person who had not made up his mind beforehand with regard to what he wished to find, could by any possibility make it (the cipher) bring out anything coherent, for all the coherency in Mr. Donnelly's curious results is due to arbitrary counting. By his extremely elastic method of counting backwards and forwards, it would be possible to reach any word on a page. . . . Any one of these (the root numbers) diminished by x when x may be almost anything, will produce almost any number." This is the opinion of a quondam partial endorser of Mr. Donnelly's work—surely no prejudiced investigator. Judge Nathaniel Holmes, "the apostle of Baconianism," and by far its ablest and most sober-minded advocate, says, (*Shakespeariana*, Dec., 1888, p. 539,) "The (cipher) message, the symbols, and the key appear to be alike the sole device and pure invention of the author's own fervid

imagination." Mr. Appleton Morgan, once, and possibly now, an agnostic on the subject of the authorship of the plays, and President of the New York Shakespeare Society, goes even further, for he says, "I cannot agree with Professor Davidson, however, when he says that the publication of Mr. Donnelly's Great Cryptogram will not dispel or affect the Baconian theory. In my opinion, it will bury it deeper than ever plummet sounded. And it will be suicide, not homicide." Well might Mr. Donnelly exclaim, in agony of spirit, "Save me from my friends!"

But "what are the results obtained by the cipher?" the curious reader may ask. Briefly, the cipher narrative is as follows: Bacon hears the bad news that Cecil is going to force the players to reveal the true author of their plays, incidentally tells the story of Marlowe's unhappy life and the beating of Hayward by the Queen for his complicity in bringing out the seditious pamphlet history of Richard II. Omitting all minor incidents, the startling revelations about Shakspeare are as follows: Cecil says Shakspeare did not write the plays, being incapable of so doing. He is a "poor, dull, ill-spirited, greedy creature." Cecil suspects that Bacon gets half the proceeds taken in at the theatre, and that his kinsman writes first under Marlowe's name and then under Shakspeare's. The old deer-stealing story is told, but with many graphic additions. Sir Thos. Lucy and his son pursue Shakspeare and have a fight with him and his fellow-poachers. Shakspeare is frightfully wounded in the struggle, and is afterwards imprisoned.

The pseudo "Bard of Avon" is described by the Bishop of Worcester as a "rascally knave," who leads a life of most disgusting debauchery, as the result of which he becomes the victim of a loathly disease, which makes him prematurely old at thirty-three. His marriage, his aristocratic pretensions, his incapability of writing the plays, and the fact that he was the original Falstaff, are all set forth by the worthy "cipher" Bishop. These are some of the most important revelations. I have given them as connectedly as I could. The author himself has not thoroughly worked out the story yet, and therefore gives us only scraps of narrative here and there. The gross inconsistencies and absurdities of the narrative I leave for the reader's own investigation. They would appear even more palpably in the full text, pp. 673, *seq.*

The author, far from being disturbed that there is no mention of most of his facts (?) in history, glories in this apparent difficulty, and says if they had been known to history they would not have been in cipher. True enough; but the author must be surer of his cipher

before he can expect us to believe that Shakspeare was in the last stages of a most loathsome disease at thirty-three, when he died at fifty-two in honored affluence. Even if the cipher itself were more consistent, the results obtained by it are grossly absurd or incredible.

The builder, then, is a dreamer, his building is unsubstantial, and its occupants unreal. Let us look finally at the foundation upon which the whole structure rests.

As before mentioned, the cipher is based upon the First Folio, and according to the author the results of the cipher are obtained "by the most careful and delicate adjustment of the words like the elements of a profound puzzle." Two or three errors, therefore, in the text would throw the narrative into confusion. Now, the First Folio is notoriously inaccurate. The pagination is capricious, the names of actors are inserted sometimes for the names of characters, many passages are obviously meaningless, and misprints are not infrequent. It was "printed from inaccurate quarto editions and mutilated stage copies," and its pages are "little better than proof-sheets." Besides, there are many copies of the First Folio, and these copies, it is needless to say, are not all alike. Can we be sure that the Phoenix First Folio, which the author used, is the one that would have received Bacon's *imprimatur*? A number of errors have been noted in the Phoenix Folio. If the First Folio represents, according to Mr. Donnelly, Bacon's final revised edition of the plays, how are we to explain its gross inaccuracies? How are we to explain the fact that the earlier quartos are often manifestly and admittedly superior to the later Folio edition of the same play? If Bacon were so anxious to leave a lasting monument to his fame, wouldn't he have put the parts together better, and made each part more symmetrical? Is it probable that all the inaccuracies are the work of design? Mr. Donnelly thinks the capricious pagination was intentional. But its irregularity is not regularly irregular, for different copies of the Folio have slightly different paging. But even were they all alike, the irregular paging is easily accounted for. "No one printing-office in London, in 1623, had the necessary type in sufficient quantities; nor was any single publisher willing to assume all the financial risks involved in printing this edition." . . . The work was divided, some of it being done in one "establishment, some in another. Hence the pagination is not regular and continuous"; for it would be "impossible to determine precisely how many printed pages a given quantity of manuscript would fill, and, of course, the printer who took the the latter portion of the copy must labor under a great

deal of uncertainty as to the paging and signature of his sheets." These same exigencies of the seventeenth century printing would probably account for the curious arrangements of printers' signs, which Mr. Donnelly thinks so significant. He seems to judge early printing by modern standards. Mr. Marsh tells us that in John Smith's "Generall Historie of Virginia," 1624 (one year after the First Folio), there occurred a hiatus of ten pages in consequence of the manuscript being printed in several establishments. These blank pages the author fills with complimentary verses from his various friends, and thus apologizes for their introduction: "Now seeing there is much Paper here to spare, that you should not be altogether cloyed with Prose, such Verses as my worthy Friends bestowed upon New England I here present you, because with honestie I can neither reject nor omit their courtesies."

While the printer's art was in such a crude state, is it conceivable that the printers of the First Folio could have introduced into it a cipher of ingenious complexity? Mr. Donnelly admits that the printer must have been in the secret. Could the chief printer, and others necessarily apprized of the cipher, have kept the secret after Bacon's death?

But brushing all of these difficulties aside, let us look at some of the other antecedent improbabilities of the existence of a cipher. Could Lord Bacon have introduced a complete and intricate cipher into the Folio text without destroying the unity and majestic freedom of the plays? Twistings and contortions of the text seem inevitable, for otherwise the count would go wrong constantly.

Passing over all these insuperable difficulties, when did Bacon find time to do the active work of a statesman, a philosopher, a poet, a historian, to write the works assigned to Shakspeare and Marlowe, Montaigne's Essays, dozens of other works, and, besides all this, introduce an elaborately ingenious cipher into a designedly misprinted, mis-paged, and inaccurate edition of a set of designedly mutilated plays? For the First Folio inaccuracies must all be the work of design, according to Mr. Donnelly's theory. Genius may accomplish wonders, but it cannot annihilate time. If we add to the enormous time-consuming drudgery of cipher insertion the almost equally laborious task of correcting the proofs of so nice a piece of printing, we need more than one Bacon for so stupendous an undertaking, and a life of patriarchal longevity to boot. Yet Bacon died at the age of sixty-five, and the Folio of 1623 was published at a time "when his failing health

caused him to press forward the publication of all his works." But we have detained the reader long enough. It would be an endless task to unveil the many inconsistencies and absurdities of the "Great Cryptogram." We trust we have proved satisfactorily that Bacon did not write Shakspeare's plays; that if he did he couldn't or wouldn't have inserted an accurate arithmetical cipher in the inaccurate First Folio; that if he had, it could hardly have been Mr. Donnelly's cipher, and that the revelations of the cipher narrative controvert history and common sense.

W. S. CURRELL.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1889.

CHATTANOOGA has a number of very handsome churches. Several of them are grouped near the central part of the city. The First Presbyterian Church is one of this group, and has a fine situation in the angle of two streets. The pastor, Rev. J. W. Bachman, D. D., did much to make this session an exceedingly pleasant one by his untiring and genial courtesy to all the members.

Most of the commissioners were in place when Rev. J. J. Bullock, D. D., the retiring moderator, entered the pulpit to preach the opening sermon. Rev. James Woodrow, D. D., and Rev. W. E. Baker took part in the opening services. The sermon was preached from Mark xvi. 15, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature," with Rom. i. 16, "For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ," etc., and from Rev. xi. 15, "The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ." The aim of the sermon was to show that the gospel was God's power to redeem this world; that it was able to accomplish this, though it had to work on such sinful creatures as Paul pictures in the first chapter of Romans; for it is the *power of God* unto salvation. Through it was the final victory to be accomplished, and the kingdoms of this world must become the kingdom of our Lord.

The Assembly was then constituted with prayer, the roll was called, and the members awaited with much interest the nominations for moderator. Rev. J. L. Rogers, D. D., nominated Rev. H. G. Hill, D. D., from the Synod of North Carolina. Rev. J. W. Rosebro, D. D., nominated Rev. G. D. Armstrong, D. D., from the Synod of Virginia. Rev. H. S. Yerger nominated Rev. J. W. Lupton, D. D., from the Synod of Nashville. Rev. J. C. Williams nominated Rev. James Woodrow,

D. D., from the Synod of Georgia. These nominations were made in speeches that set forth the merits of the different brethren and their ability to preside over the highest court of our church.

Disraeli says it is "the unexpected which happens." The nomination of Dr. Woodrow could not be classed with the unexpected. It would have been a surprise had he not been nominated. His nomination gave the Assembly its

FIRST BREEZE.

Mr. James Lyons, of Virginia, opposed this nomination on the ground that Dr. Woodrow had publicly and improperly criticised the action of the Assembly of Augusta. He was proceeding to prove his charges by reading extracts from the *Southern Presbyterian*, when the moderator called him to order. He thought criticism of any nominee out of order, though, he said, the question was a new one, as he had never before known a similar occurrence.

In the judgment of many Mr. Lyons was not out of order, though they regretted the attack, and considered his action due "to inexperience." They saw, however, before the session closed, that notwithstanding his youthful appearance, his experience was of much value; though having been acquired in the legislative halls, at this point it was rather unsuited to the procedure of ecclesiastical courts.

At the earnest request of Drs. Armstrong and Lupton, their names were withdrawn. Dr. Woodrow pronounced the charge of Mr. Lyons "entirely incorrect." After proclaiming his loyalty to the church and the evidence he had from all quarters of the world that God had approved his teaching, he asked to have his name withdrawn. This having been done, Dr. Hill was elected without opposition.

While Dr. Hill at times became somewhat confused in the multitude of "points of order" thrust upon him, and thus sometimes there was confusion as to the question and debate was provoked, still his unflinching courtesy made him an acceptable presiding officer.

One was struck in looking over the body, with the number of younger and not widely-known men who made up this Assembly. It was a fine looking body, with enough gray hairs to give it a crown of glory. They proved themselves to be men who think for themselves. They were like the Scotch elder—"open to conviction, yet would like to see the man who could convict him." They had their own opinion, yet evidently had come there to get all the light they could, and then decide the questions discussed in the fear of God and love of the truth.

The spiritual tone which pervaded everything, the lack of acrimony in debate, the spirit of courtesy and love manifested, made this a delightful assembly. One could not but feel here are men who have no private ends to serve, no pet project to carry through, but who are here earnestly and conscientiously to discharge their duty. Several times the effort was made to postpone the devotional exercises, but always without success, and the effect on all of stopping thus in the midst of the most absorbing topic to engage in prayer and praise was most happy. We felt that God's Spirit was there, and to this was due the fact that no bitterness marred the debates, and that the Assembly was led to decisions on all the important questions before it which have commended themselves so generally to the church.

There were three questions of great interest which chiefly engaged attention—viz.: The rebuke given by the Synod of South Carolina to the Presbytery of Charleston; the report of the *ad interim* Committee on Coöperation with the Northern Assembly; and the differences in the Foreign Mission Executive Committee.

THE ACTION OF THE SYNOD OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

At the Fall meeting of the Presbytery of Charleston the following resolution was adopted: "Presbytery hereby informs its ministers, ruling elders, and deacons, that the General Assembly has judicially affirmed the decision of the Synod of Georgia declaring that the 'belief of . . . Jas. Woodrow, D. D., as to the origin of the body of Adam was contrary to the word of God as interpreted in the Standards of the Church;' and, therefore, that this Presbytery regards the holding of said form of evolution as 'contrary to the word of God as interpreted in the Standards of the Church,' and forbids the public contending against the decision of the Assembly."

The Synod of South Carolina condemned the action of the Presbytery of Charleston as "unconstitutional, irregular and unwise," and ordered the Presbytery of Charleston to meet and correct its proceedings, "which the Synod now condemns." Rev. J. E. Latham, chairman of the Assembly's Committee on the Records of the Synod of South Carolina, recommended—

1. That this action of the Synod be approved in so far as it declares the action of the Presbytery of Charleston "unwise."

2. That it be disapproved, together with the reasons assigned, so far as it declares the action of the Presbytery of Charleston unconstitutional and irregular.

As a substitute for this report of the committee, Rev. T. C. Whaling offered the following :

“*Resolved*, That this General Assembly approve of the records of the Synod of South Carolina”—

And began speaking on this substitute when the hour of recess came. When the subject came up again as unfinished business, it was determined that Rev. T. C. Whaling, representing the Synod of South Carolina, and Rev. J. L. Girardeau, D. D., representing the Presbytery of Charleston, should each have an hour to speak, with half an hour each for rejoinder; that Rev. J. B. Adger, D. D., should have half an hour, and that all other speeches should be limited to ten minutes.

This discussion was conducted in admirable spirit. While the brethren earnestly contended for their views, there was no acrimony in the debate.

Rev. T. C. Whaling opened the discussion in a strong speech. He insisted that this matter should not be confounded with the evolution question; that it no more affected Dr. Woodrow than any other man in the Presbyterian Church; that the issue related to the very nature and character of Presbyterianism. Charleston Presbytery was the aggressor, and had unnecessarily and gratuitously precipitated this question, inasmuch as no officer or member of that Presbytery had publicly contended against the decisions of the Assembly.

He argued: 1. That a judicial decision is not to be taken as law outside the case with which it is connected. Therefore the Synod of South Carolina was right in holding that the decision of the last Assembly had no legal authority apart from the case which it concluded. Right or wrong, the decision settles that particular case, and must be received with submission. But the Presbytery of Charleston believes the decision to be binding in all cases. 2. Even if judicial decisions were law, Presbytery had no constitutional right to forbid discussion. They went farther than the Assembly of Baltimore was willing to go, and their action is an unwarrantable infringement upon liberty of speech. The “interdict” was without precedent, and was an act for which the constitution gives no power.

The argument of Dr. Adger was mainly on the constitutional right of the Presbytery to pass such a resolution as the “interdict.” He claimed that Presbyteries or church courts have no right to “forbid” anything, not even sin. They can only testify that such a course is contrary to the word of God. They cannot forbid your travelling on Sunday; they can only say God forbids it. This act of the Pres-

bytery had never been exceeded in folly and high-handed lawlessness and tyranny. Notwithstanding the advanced age of this venerable brother, his speech was very forcible and delivered with much fire.

To these arguments answer was made by Dr. Girardeau. While he objected to their action being called "unwise," he most strongly protested against its being called "unconstitutional." Courts have rights as well as individuals, and if individuals revolt against the court, they must take the risk and bear the consequences. He claimed that the severe criticisms of our courts which appeared in the *Southern Presbyterian*, several of which he read, had gone beyond the rights of the individual, and become such an evil in the bounds of the Presbytery where the *Southern Presbyterian* was published and was circulated in their families, that the Presbytery was justified in using a strong remedy to stop the agitation. This was what the Presbytery forbade, and not proper discussion. He claimed that injustice was done the Presbytery by the Synod's refusing to admit the Presbytery's explanation of their action, which was spread upon their records. That explanation of their meaning was given when they answered the protest of W. A. Clark and others against that action, by saying their interdict did not seal the lips of any one from making such criticism as was made in a "constitutional manner." Also, when Prof. Flinn applied for reception into the Presbytery and declared that he reserved his legal right to express, in a constitutional way, his opinions on the subject, the Presbytery received him without protest or objection, showing that they meant no restriction on free speech uttered in a constitutional way, but only intended to stop the hurtful agitation. The Synod erred, therefore, in condemning the Presbytery for what it did not intend to do, and for what it assured the Synod by its records it did not intend to do.

This case has been presented thus fully because it was an unusual one, and involved grave questions, and because of the interest given to it by its connection with the matter which has troubled the church so much for some two years or more. It is true it was not, as was claimed, the evolution question. It was, however, one of the ill-favored children of that hypothesis, and the vote of the Assembly was influenced by that fact.

The spirit of this discussion was in almost all respects most commendable. The arguments of Dr. Adger and Mr. Whaling were most forcibly put and in admirable temper, while Dr. Girardeau strengthened himself by the generous spirit manifested to those opposed to

him as to the division of time, and by the tone of his argument as well as its strength. There was great pleasure felt that these brethren had allowed no bitter personality to mar the debate, and had given no cause for grief to those who pray for the peace of Jerusalem, nor cause for ridicule to those who rejoice in the dissensions and evil speaking that sometimes disfigure our church courts.

Mr. James Lyons, of Virginia, here offered an amendment to the substitute of Rev. T. C. Whaling, which, after reciting the action of the Presbytery of Charleston and its condemnation by the Synod of South Carolina, concludes thus: "This General Assembly disapproves this action of the Synod of South Carolina, together with the reasons assigned, inasmuch as it appears to the General Assembly from our inspections of its records, that the action of the Presbytery of Charleston was not intended to limit either liberty of private judgment or the constitutional right of proper discussion." This was carried by a final vote of 113 to 31, when the amended substitute was voted upon.

The "question" was called on this before Dr. Woodrow could secure the floor, and he seemed to think this something of a personal indignity, but the Assembly simply meant to say it had had enough discussion and was ready to vote. Besides, Mr. Whaling had assured the Assembly that this question did not concern Dr. Woodrow any more than it did any other Presbyterian.

There were many who felt that it was not a "wise" act for the Presbytery to have passed this "interdict," because it thus opened the way for more agitation, which was at least connected with the disturbing question that our highest court had adjudicated. If it was to be thrust with hurtful persistency on the church, the Presbytery ought not to have given any pretext even for its being done. The provocation was admittedly great when such "contending" against the Assembly was permitted in the *Southern Presbyterian*, as was quoted by Dr. Girardeau and Mr. Lyons, when the Assembly was compared to a drunken fool, whose "intentions were good but whose head was weak;" when it was said the Assembly must say with Saul, "I have played the fool and have erred exceedingly;" when it was called a "packed body," and the "tool" used by an "unscrupulous and malignant intriguer," "wherewith to work out his personal spite;" when such unbecoming phrases as that its action "involves a violation of the law of God itself," and that "Satan had taken possession of them, and they like fiends incarnate"—. . . Still, many felt it would have been better to "bear all things" in view of the personal relation of some in that Pres-

bytery to the past agitation and not subject the church to further discussion of what it is heartily tired. There is a growing sentiment that we must have rest from it; that the church's patience is about exhausted with this draught on her time and thought, turned away from her true and aggressive work. The church protests against further agitation, and that was largely the meaning of the emphatic vote sustaining the Presbytery; for, from the records of the Presbytery and from the declaration of its representative, the Assembly was satisfied that the Presbytery of Charleston meant to forbid *improper agitation*, not free discussion. The language of the "interdict" was not carefully worded to express this, but the records sustained that view; hence the amendment of Mr. Lyons was adopted. Otherwise it certainly could not have been carried by so large a majority. Nor would the Assembly have taken action which would declare that we have no right to express in becoming language our judgment of the doings of any church court. The right of private judgment and the proper criticism of the acts of any church court belongs to every Presbyterian.

It was claimed that the explanation given by Dr. Girardeau, of what the Presbytery *meant* by its resolution, and that its recorded explanation of its meaning given in the answer to the protest, ought not to be allowed to influence the decision of the Assembly. The analogy in civil courts can throw some light on this. A lawyer of eminence here tells me that any court would read a statute passed by any legislature with the light thrown on it by their subsequent action; that in a statute whose meaning was doubtful or disputed, the explanation of its meaning given by the legislature at the same session, composed of the same members who passed the original statute, must be taken along with the statute and the case so decided, the object being to put the court deciding the question in the same position with the body framing the statute.

Of course the thing we are to seek in any statute is *the thought or intent which it expresses*. The Supreme Court of the United States said: "In construing laws it is the duty of the court to effect the intention of the legislature," and allows "an act declaring the true intent of a previous act to control the judiciary in deciding the true construction of the first act."

The analogy seems very clear, therefore, that the Synod ought to have allowed the Presbytery to interpret its own act, and that the Assembly decided wisely in disapproving the action of the Synod of South Carolina.

* This decision seemed to please both parties. To those who defended the Synod of South Carolina, it seemed this action virtually sustained them in that it declared the right of free speech; to those who sustained the Presbytery of Charleston, it gave satisfaction by not declaring their action unwise or unconstitutional.

COÖPERATION WITH THE NORTHERN CHURCH.

This was the most absorbing topic before the Assembly. It is not necessary to fill up the pages of the Review by quoting the long report of the *ad interim* committee. Their report was an admirable one. The interest centered around two points—coöperation in home mission work, especially along our borders, and deciding the status of the work for the colored people.

The Assembly decided to let all parts of the church be heard from by calling the roll and allowing every commissioner five minutes to express his views. This took time, but it proved more satisfactory than having the subject discussed by a few, whose words might reflect the opinion of very few in the church.

Dr. J. R. Wilson, in a very happy speech, introduced the matter and let us look at it somewhat as the committee did in their long deliberation. Then the roll-call began.

There were a few pronounced speeches in favor of organic union, though not so many as were heard in Baltimore last year. All these favored the adoption of the plan of coöperation, because they thought it would lead to organic union. Many good sentiments were expressed in this connection about the importance of brotherly love and the beautiful illustrations the old soldiers had given of the way animosities ought to be buried. They stood opposed to each other on the battle-fields; but now arm in arm, with true concord, met as comrades and friends, and forgot the bitterness of the past.

At the same time some in the Northern Assembly, like Judge Breckinridge and others, who could be satisfied with nothing less than organic union, opposed the plan of coöperation, because they thought it would retard or prove a bar to union. Thus extremes meet.

Some opposed coöperation because they said the Northern Boards and their agents would not faithfully stand by the plan when they saw that it would be chiefly a benefit to the Southern Assembly. Such a plan had already been tried in Texas, and had produced rather than relieved friction. So they thought it would be on the larger scale this plan proposed.

The great majority, however, thoroughly approved the plan and wanted it tested. Its effect would be to relieve friction, to bring the two churches closer together, to keep us from losing places open to us when we had neither the men nor the money to occupy, by calling on our brethren in the Northern Presbyteries to take possession of the land, and also help us to supply our own vacant fields along the border, deeming it better they should be taken by the Northern Church than lost to Presbyterianism entirely.

We believe it will help us preserve our separate existence with dignity and yet coöperate in all aggressive work in the spirit becoming two such churches. We thus show to our brethren that we are willing to do all in our power to establish the truest fraternity, to avoid all ground for bitterness and all unseemly squabbles about property; but at the same time show we are not so insecure in our separate existence, that we must keep them at a distance lest we should fall so much in love with them that we should rush into their arms regardless of consequences.

The majority of the brethren along the border strongly advocated the adoption of the plan, and their opinion had much weight in deciding the question.

The committee were criticised by some for keeping their report secret till it was submitted to the Assembly. The point was also made that only the Presbyteries could decide the question of coöperation, and that the Assembly ought to send it down to them, and not attempt to settle it; but that opinion did not prevail.

Aside from the different views of the two churches as to the spirituality of the church, which stand as a bar to organic union, the difference in the policy of each church as to its work among the colored people perhaps best measures the separation between us. The brethren in the North imagine we are so blinded by prejudice that we cannot impartially decide what is best for our brother in black, and that they understand the whole question and are the only ones qualified to legislate concerning him. It was a matter of surprise that the members of the *ad interim* committee representing them had ever agreed to the words of the report; it was *not* a matter of surprise when their telegram came announcing that they had stricken out these words: "While by conceding the existing situation it approves the policy of separate churches, Presbyteries and Synods, subject to the choice of the colored people themselves." This was stricken out they claimed, not to outline their future policy, but to state their history correctly. To this amended

report the Southern Assembly assented, though they are not in love with the "explanatory resolutions," which seem to abound in the Northern Assembly.

This report shows conclusively that at present no coöperation in our work for the colored people is practicable, and shows how widely divergent is the policy of the two Assemblies. The Southern Church has had its hands tied in large measure for this work, and it will no doubt be so for some time in the future. We could not in the first ten years after the war have reached them had we possessed the men and the means adequate for the work.

We can never agree to the policy of the Northern Church, unless the blacks should be moved to the North, leaving only a few scattered thousands among us. In that event there would certainly be a tremendous change in the sentiment of one of the Assemblies! Which one that would be it is needless to inquire, but it is reasonable to suppose that the one living a thousand miles away would not be the best fitted to legislate concerning the difficult problem that could not practically affect them.

Our Northern brethren may as well recognize this fact at once, that organic union is impossible on their position. We cannot subject our churches, our people, our property, to the control of a great majority whose avowed policy is so entirely opposed to ours; who may at any time feel constrained by their conscientious convictions to enforce on us what we could never agree to. Then would come harsh words and excruciating acts, and with that decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Walnut Street Church case, which settles the property rights, we would be powerless against any edict the majority might promulgate. Would it not be an act of suicidal madness, therefore, deliberately to put ourselves where we would be a hopeless minority, whose only remedy against what we might deem wrong would be a feeble protest of words?

We look at the facts presented to us from a thorough knowledge of the negro and of our people, while they deal with these questions as matters of sentiment. It seems such a dreadful thing for a church to declare that it must separate the whites and blacks, that they will not tolerate that wrong sentiment in their Southern brethren, no, not for an hour.

Let more of their leading men, like Dr. Field, come among us with their eyes open and their prejudices blindfolded, and, like him, they will go home, as he candidly confesses, "a wiser man." Their plan

will never operate well. See the experience of their own missionaries; the families of many of them unite with Southern white churches, though their husbands are pastors of the colored churches; their representatives in Florida have well-nigh ceased attending ecclesiastical meetings because they found it neither pleasant nor profitable. But the most determined opposition to it will come from the blacks themselves. White people, no matter who they were, would meet a cool reception if they attempted to attend regularly any colored church. A colored church in East Hanover Presbytery, in Virginia, found itself much prejudiced amongst its people by the fact that two of its trustees were white men. See, too, the embarrassing difficulties in which the Episcopal Church finds itself entangled by the same policy which the Northern Church holds. They are threatened with division, and the present compromise cannot hope to hold very long. We must guide ourselves by the facts, and we certainly claim to know more of the perplexities of the difficult problem than those can know who live at a distance, or than the various agents of Northern Boards can learn in their brief sojourn.

The meagre results that have followed their tremendous outlay of money, which seems to have started questionings among them (as was manifested in the violent debate in their last Assembly), might lead them to have more confidence in the judgment and convictions of those who have known the colored people from their infancy. And is it not time for us to stop our annual wailing over our work among them, as if we had been criminally neglecting them because of ill-feeling or prejudice? In that admirable Narrative prepared by Rev. S. H. Chester it was said, "Almost nothing is being done," etc.; and so yearly our reports make the impression that there is a great lack of interest on our part. Do these reports set us right before the world? It is true we might have accomplished more in some directions, but have we not done in most places about as much as they would let us do, or as we have had the ability to do? Perhaps the *Christian Observer* stated it too strongly when it said in some recent very telling articles on this subject that the Northern missionaries "enticed" them away from us, but the facts presented then ought to be known to all. We claim for ourselves, without qualification, that we are not held back from laboring for the colored people by prejudice. We feel the perplexities and difficulties of the question. We are anxious to do all we can to solve it, and will unite with the Northern Church in any way we can to benefit this rapidly-increasing race, for whose spiritual progress we feel the

deepest interest. But we cannot risk the domination of ignorance, and if the sentiment in the Northern Church is so strong they cannot work on any other plan, then both sides ought candidly to say so, and not try to walk together except they be agreed.

FOREIGN MISSIONS.

There were many fears of disagreeable debates, of unpleasant charges and counter-charges, as the grave issues of this important cause came up for discussion. It was known that for some time there had been serious differences between different members of the Executive Committee; also that the compromise made by the last Assembly had met the fate of most compromises—it had failed to settle the difficulty. There was a general feeling of sorrow when the secretary presented a paper requesting the investigation of these difficulties.

The secretary is an honored and successful servant, whom the church was unwilling to lose. Those who differed with him were equally honored and valued, who had done most self-denying and generous work, who had testified their love and zeal for the church by many acts that had largely helped to put the work of Foreign Missions on the high vantage ground it now occupies. The Assembly felt the need of wisdom to guide it to the right settlement of the question, that this great cause might not be injured.

The Standing Committee gave all parties interested the fullest hearing they desired. Then, most earnestly considering the whole matter, after listening for twelve hours to the statement of grievances, they, with one exception, recommended changing the location of the Executive Committee from Baltimore to Nashville, and left the nomination and election of the secretary to the Assembly.

There were some who thought that there ought to be a clean sweep, the location changed, and a new committee and secretary appointed. But if the location was changed, and a new committee wholly inexperienced was appointed, it rendered it important to retain the secretary. The brethren in Nashville said they did not wish the committee sent there if a new secretary was to be appointed. So the Assembly decided by a large majority to move the committee, and re-elected Dr. Houston. This decision could not please all, but to the majority it seemed the wisest course.

A motion was made to grant the privileges of the floor to Dr. W. U. Murkland and Mr. Inglis during the discussion, but it was opposed simply because the Assembly was unwilling to have the personal differences

between men who stand so deservedly high paraded before the church and sent over the land. It would have been as promptly opposed had the request been made for Dr. Houston, and could not be understood as in any way putting an affront on Dr. Murkland. It was as much for the sake of the brethren most interested, as for the sake of the cause they represented, that the Assembly was unwilling to open up the matter in public.

This action was not meant to "vindicate" either party, nor to cast reproach on either. Moving the committee from Baltimore was not meant to cast any blame on the committee there, nor was the reelection of the secretary meant to vindicate him. They found nothing censurable in the official conduct of the secretary, and they pronounced no judgment on the differences, but expressed in warm terms their appreciation of the generous and self-denying labors of the committee. Did any consider it otherwise, they mistook the spirit of that body whose sincere aim was simply to do what would most benefit the work so dear to all hearts.

SYSTEMATIC BENEFICENCE.

This paper, however, is long enough, and we will only touch on one more point. The important work of Systematic Beneficence, the question of the best way to secure the gifts of the people, was left to the last, to be discussed and decided by a few members. Would it not be wise to have a matter so vital to the work of the church discussed when we could have the benefit of the judgment and experience of all the secretaries and of wise financiers from every part of our field? The plan adopted gives to every church the opportunity of contributing every Sabbath, if they deem best. It aimed to provide against the danger of risking the revenue for any cause on one Sabbath, when the contingencies of weather or some local cause may prevent the gathering of the gifts of the people. The plan deserves a faithful trial.

The desire was expressed in several of the committees to reduce the expenses of the Executive Committees wherever practicable. This was done in the Foreign Mission Committee by combining the office of Treasurer and Assistant Secretary. There was also some discussion in the Standing Committees of Education, Home Missions and Systematic Beneficence, with reference to transferring the work of the Executive Committee of Education either to the Home Mission Committee in Atlanta, or to the Publication Committee in Richmond. The cause of Education was once in the hands of the committee in Richmond, and was moved from there when the disaster fell on it in 1877-'78,

but the chaos that existed then has now been reduced to admirable system. Dr. Hazen has, by his financial skill and well-balanced judgment, not only freed the committee from debt, but also made it self-sustaining, so that all money contributed is spent in benevolent work. The work of the Education Committee could now be done in Richmond with very little, if any additional expense. The duties of that committee are largely clerical. The Presbyteries must bear the responsibility of deciding on the fitness of candidates to receive aid, and the Committee of Education can do little more than obey these recommendations. These suggestions did not arise from any spirit of criticism of the work of the present committee, or of its faithful secretary, Dr. E. M. Richardson, but simply from a desire to most wisely use the church's money. The Assembly is fortunate in having as secretaries of the various committees men of such fitness for their work, and of such industry and zeal in their work. The record of the past year's work has been most gratifying, and we trust these beloved brethren may be long spared to do even better things. J. W. ROSEBRO.

THE NORTHERN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

THE meeting of any great religious body is a matter of interest to all Christian people. It gives expression to the religious sentiment and life of the people it represents, and gives shape and impulse to the outflow of that life as it is yet to manifest itself in the future. The late meeting of the General Assembly in New York is a more than usually striking and forcible illustration of these thoughts. It was impressive, both by the number and character of its members. The cosmopolitan character of the Assembly was manifest in the appearance of the body, where were white men, red men, and black men; men from America, both North and South; from the distant mission fields of Europe and Asia, and from the islands of the ocean; representatives gathered from all the great fields of activity in which the church is at work, both at home and abroad.

The material of this Assembly was certainly equal to its best gatherings, though many new faces and younger men appeared possibly for the first time, and, what was interesting and hopeful, many new names sprang to prominence, and hitherto untried debaters thrilled the Assembly, and assured us that as the older servants of God give way, these younger and earnest men will fully supply their

places. A good impulse was given to the work of the meeting by the able, eloquent, and comprehensive sermon of the retiring moderator, a sermon that took a hurried glance at the century of our ecclesiastical existence just receding, and then, gathering strength and impulse from the organization and office of the church to-day, boldly outlined the way along which the voice and providence of God are calling her to press forward in her great work. The new moderator was a representative man, standing in a very prominent way for the two great ideas of our home work, higher education imbued with sound religion and the evangelization of our own country, he having been one of the home secretaries, and now president of Lake Forest University, one of our Christian and Presbyterian colleges, making rapid strides toward the full realization of the idea of the great university.

But this Assembly was specially remarkable for the number and importance of the questions that came before it for consideration. Not less than twenty-six special committees appointed by previous Assemblies had to report to this meeting, and almost all of them on important and far-reaching topics. Besides these special subjects brought by mature deliberation before the body, there were the always important matters of yearly consideration connected with the growing work of missions at home and abroad; the securing a supply of competent and thoroughly-prepared ministers for her many fields, and the great and pressing question or questions connected with education in general, and of the ministry in particular.

Among the most interesting matters that came early before the body was *the report of the Conference Committee*, appointed to consider the question of coöperation with the Southern Church. This able committee had very thoroughly matured the subject which they had been engaged in conferring about with the committee of the Southern Assembly, and came prepared, not only to state clearly what they had agreed upon, but calmly and lovingly to advocate the adoption of the same by the Assembly. Dr. Smith, the chairman, almost excelled himself in clearness, earnestness and affectionate conciliation, as he patiently explained and plead for the full acceptance of what they had so thoughtfully prepared. Two reports were presented, representing in some sort the two classes in the Northern Church in regard to this question. The majority, the report agreed upon by both committees, presented the views of many who think that the time for any kind of organic union has not come, and that it is good and wise—the very best that can be done—harmoniously to coöperate in all the work

where the two churches come together, until God shall, by a more manifest providence, make the way plain for a closer union. The other report expressed the sentiment of many others, though not so many as the first, that there can be no healthful coöperation until there is a spirit and readiness for real union, and that union ought to be the end sought and nothing else. A year ago there was a very strong feeling and hope in the Church North for an early and harmonious union of the two bodies, and many seemed to think that the warmth and enthusiasm of the centennial services would certainly carry the two bodies lovingly together. But the reception of that expectation and desire by the Southern Assembly checked and chilled these hopes, so that now there seems to be less expectation or even desire for the union than has existed in the Northern Church for several years, or perhaps at any time; yet, the feeling of the mass of the Northern Church is not resentful, nor unkind but a settled feeling that the time for union is not yet, if it ever will come. In the discussions of the reports before the Assembly, the questions pertaining to coöperation alone occupied the attention, and very little was said as to a union of the two bodies, except occasionally as it was thought that some one of the propositions under consideration might effect, in the future, the possibilities of a closer connection.

It was quite a surprise to many of the members, and a gratification to all, to learn that a very large measure of coöperation, in fact all that could be expected, was already exercised by the agents of the two churches in both the Foreign work and the Publication departments. The chief and most earnest discussions arose about the other two propositions, one relating to coöperation in the home field, and the other in the work among the Freedmen, or what should be the status of the negro churches and Presbyteries.

The second clause in the report in reference to home mission work drew forth the warmest debate on that subject. Some of the speakers seemed to fear that so close and cordial a coöperation as it proposed would work so effectively that union would be put far away. Others seemed to feel that too great advantage was given to the Southern Church by offering them both men and means. But both these were grandly answered by a clear-headed elder and a broad-minded New York pastor, that because of the character and faith of the Southern Church, we could well afford to offer them any such advantage as might be in the proposition, especially as we were the stronger and more able to give, closing with the sentence: "What is money com-

pared with brotherly love?" This clause was adopted by a very large and enthusiastic vote.

The third clause seemed acceptable, except for a technical reason offered by some one, that the home board could not render any assistance even to churches of our own people if their presbyterial connection was with another church. It was proposed, therefore, to strike out the last clause of this paragraph which begins: "And where such persons are found in sufficient numbers to organize," &c. But as the fourth clause of the report on this part of the subject seemed to be a relief and supplement to the third, the figure 4 was stricken out at the head of the clause and the two clauses consolidated; and so the report in reference to the work in the home field was cordially adopted.

The part in reference to the Freedmen aroused close attention and stirred the feelings, as any question about the negroes has always done for long years past. The great difficulty in regard to the settlement of questions in reference to these people is, in the first place, that these questions are always approached with too much and too long cherished feeling, and secondly, that no one seems to know clearly what is the right thing to do. Dr. Smith, chairman of the Northern committee, well said: "The race problem is a great problem that is too vast for man to solve. The same providence that settled slavery will sometime settle the race question." The very mistiness of the conceptions of men on these matters appeared in a brief and pointed question put to some one on the floor, as the paragraph from the report was being discussed about the policy of our church, "The settled policy of our church will be to accept the existing situation," &c.; the voice asked: "What is our settled policy, and what is the existing situation?" A laugh followed, but no explanation was offered that seemed any way satisfactory. Finally, after a warm but courteous debate, one sentence of the report was stricken out which had reference to the policy of the Northern Church in regard to its negro churches, Presbyteries and Synods, simply leaving it where in fact it is, without any very definite policy. Opinions were freely given as to what was the mind and purpose and policy of our church on either side, but it was thought wise to throw out that sentence; and so the policy is left to form itself under the wise guidance of a future providence. So this great question was concluded, seemingly to the satisfaction of the great majority of the Assembly; and having ordered the changes made to be telegraphed to the Southern Assembly, answer came afterward that they had accepted the changes.

The report of the Special Committee on the work of the Freedmen's Board, and the advisability of uniting the work of that Board with that committed to other Boards, gave rise to some of the most spirited debates of the session. But the interest did not turn on any particular form of the work among these people, nor to any proposed change in the work itself, but to the agencies by which it could best be accomplished. In fact, after the careful and thorough work of the large and able committee, considering it in all its bearings for a year, there would have arisen almost no discussion in reference to their report, except for some dissatisfaction in one of the Presbyteries in reference to the management of the Board in regard to a particular field. There was no manifest difference of opinion in the Assembly as to the conclusions reached by the committee in reference to continuing the agency of this special Board, nor as to the recommendations about some changes in its methods of work. But the whole discussion, quite protracted, and at times quite animated, arose about a paragraph in the report warmly commending the wisdom and fidelity of the Board in its past work. And it seemed that the Board richly deserved that modest commendation and much more, and would have readily received it but for the dissatisfaction of that one Presbytery. How far its displeasure was justified by the facts never appeared, as the facts upon which its opinions were based were not, in all the debate, made known to the Assembly or to the standing committee. The report of the committee was finally sustained by a large majority and a very enthusiastic vote. The Board, therefore, is continued as it was, its hands strengthened both by the debate and by the additional arrangements suggested, as well as by the fact that doubt as to its separate existence is now removed.

Temperance and Prohibition. The subject of temperance comes before every Assembly now by the report of a permanent committee, and this again by a standing committee on the subject. Of course, all the members of the Assembly are earnest advocates of temperance, and many of them are active and effective workers in the cause. But the difference of opinion, and the warmth of discussion when the report comes up, is as to the best methods to secure the end desired. Some believe High License is the surest way to reach the result; others are strong advocates of the Local Option plan, while many are persistent and determined that nothing but absolute prohibition can accomplish the work desired. All this might still exist, and the men of different opinion work to the advantage each of the other; but unfortunately

for the cause, these parties each think their own plan the only one that can do what is needed, and all others not only not feasible, but morally wrong. Then, besides all this, the Prohibitionists have formed a party in state and national politics, and have so come to be regarded as a political party. Now, when the report came up from the standing committee this year, it attempted to encourage all the classes working for temperance by proposing resolutions broad enough to cover every well-defined and systematic effort for the suppression of the evil of intemperance, and yet avoid putting the Assembly on record as for only one mode of work, or as favoring any political party. The resolution referred to, after reaffirming former deliverances of the General Assembly, said, "We sympathize with the wide-spread movement now in progress in favor of the complete suppression of the traffic in intoxicating liquors as a beverage." Attempts were quickly and earnestly made to amend this resolution. The one most conspicuous and most ardently pressed amendment was to insert the words, "The wide-spread movement in favor of constitutional prohibition." But after a very spirited debate, the amendment was laid on the table, and even with the word "constitutional" stricken out was again rejected, and the original report adopted by a standing vote of 210 to 105. No doubt this result was reached by the sincere desire of the Assembly to treat all workers alike, and to avoid seeming to take part with any party that had assumed a political attitude. And this result was greatly aided by the splendid work of Dr. Howard Crosby, of New York, in suppressing the saloons of that city, and his manly presentation of the value of that kind of work for the great cities, and that as the only kind of work that can succeed in them.

In the evening of the same day a singular turn was manifested by the Assembly, not uncommon in such large deliberative bodies when they are startled with the thought that they may have done wrong. The Prohibitionists had taken counsel during recess, and found an old action of a former Assembly to their purpose. They gave this into the hands of an earnest and popular speaker, who had just resigned the honor of the Moderator's chair; and making the plea that the public regarded the Assembly as retreating from its former stand, and that the present decision was very oppressive, not only on those who were upholding the work against much opposition in the prohibition States, but that it would tend to weaken the efforts of others who were contending just now for prohibition in States soon to take action on the question, the resolution of 1883 was reënacted with a very

large vote. Dr. Crosby gave notice of protest, and others were joining him. But the next morning Dr. Crosby presented the following resolution: "*Resolved*, That the deliverances of this Assembly on the subject of prohibition are not to be construed as the advocacy of any particular political party." This was seconded by the the prohibition leader, and passed unanimously. The real sentiment of the Assembly was no doubt expressed by its first vote on the report of the standing committee, and all its after votes were efforts to adjust itself to pressing influences and urgent demands.

Revision of the Standards. One of the most serious and far-reaching questions presented to the Assembly created the least debate, but produced, and is producing, a profound impression; *i. e.*, the revision of the Confession of Faith. The reasons for such silence are that men are thinking more than talking, and the question is hardly ripe for discussion. Men want to know what is the mind of the church on the question; what are the demands of the complainants, and how far and to what purpose these importunate petitioners are seeking to go. Then, too, much discussion had been in the papers and Presbyteries and private assemblies, where these questions have been mooted for a year or more. The parties agitating the question seem to be actuated by different motives, and are certainly seeking different ends, or the same end substantially by different processes. It will be remembered that a little while ago the Congregationalists, tiring of their formerly accepted standards, undertook to make a new creed; and albeit none, or not many, seem satisfied with the new product, yet, it was the assertion of their right and inclination, and the assumption of their ability to make a standard of faith for their church better than the one they professed to have "out-grown." The United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, which was supposed to be very conservative, although the least so, perhaps, of any of the strong Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, formulated a plan of consent, or a way of adopting the standard that was meant to relieve weak Calvinists from the terms regarded severe in the Confession. So the English Presbyterian Church is engaged in making and formulating a new confession, and now it is said the Free Church of Scotland is agitating the same question. Many of our theologians love to keep abreast, as they say, with the movements in these European churches, and many of our young preachers who have gone over there to spend a year after their ordinary term of preparatory study at home is completed, desire to show their appreciation of their foreign training by following the movements

of their foreign professors. This, with the influence that grows out of it, gives us one division of those seeking a change.

Then there are those who have come into the ministry of the Presbyterian Church, in the United States, who were not trained under our standards, and adopted them, when called to one of the pulpits of this church, without much reflection or much study; and besides, many of those trained in our own schools, who have never thoroughly understood or accepted the standards, and have preached on without greatly considering what these standards require. Now that the question is once started, they all rise up and regard it a great relief to their oppressed consciences to have these old standards changed. Then there are conscientious and tender men who have often been called on to explain the hard places in the Confession and Catechisms, and have found it difficult and not to their taste; and so, rather than just point these cavillers or offended ones to the Word of God and leave them to settle it with God and his truth, they think it would be easier and more accordant to public opinion to change the Confession; and, though they would never have introduced the matter, yet now that it is up, they wish it might be made easier and more to suit present opinions. Of course there are some good strong men who desire the change because they do not believe the doctrines, or think these special ones are made too prominent. But one of the largest classes seeking a change are those who have adopted the Confession with mental reservations, or for "substance of doctrine"; that is, that the Confession of Faith contains the substance of their faith, but that they by no means adopt all its statements. Some do this with perfect consciences, never meaning to deceive or conceal anything; others feel that there is wrong in so accepting of a clearly written document, and always feel injured in conscience by publicly accepting and adopting what, in their heart, they do not believe. All these parties want a change, if not in the Confession itself, at least in the terms of adopting and accepting it.

So there are three ways proposed by these various parties to satisfy their wishes: First, Change the wording of the Confession, notably the third chapter about the decree of God in reference to lost men, election, &c.; tenth chapter relating to "effectual calling"; same chapter about "elect infants," &c. Second, To construct new, or as many of them say, go back to the old terms of adoption, so as to free men from any pressure of conscience about doctrines which they do not accept. Or, third, Make an entirely new and shorter Confession,

according to the advanced biblical learning of this age. It is not necessary here to discuss any of these, as this paper is only designed to give the history of these opinions as they appeared in the debates of the year.

Now one year ago the Presbytery of Nassau sent up to the Assembly a request to consider the subject of revision. At that time the Assembly, at the recommendation of the Committee on Bills and Overtures, referred the overture to the next Assembly. In the meantime the Presbytery of Nassau sent their overture to perhaps all the Presbyteries under the care of the Assembly, asking each one to join in the request. There are under the care of the Assembly two hundred and nine Presbyteries, three but lately constituted. Of these, fifteen sent up requests, more or less modified, in reference to the revision of the Confession. The rest either did not act or refused to join in the request.

When it came before the Assembly the plea was made that here is a large number asking for some modification. Those desirous of action claimed that it would be disrespectful to those asking, and show weakness and want of confidence, if not cowardice, if the men of the Assembly did not give the Presbyteries, to whom the right of saying if they want any revision belongs, the opportunity to express their mind. So the Committee on Bills and Overtures brought in the recommendation, which passed almost without debate:

“Resolved, That this General Assembly overture to the Presbyteries the following questions: 1. Do you desire a revision of the Confession of Faith? 2. If so, in what respects and to what extent?”

Under the circumstances this was the only wise and consistent course for the Assembly to pursue. Agitation could not be quelled; it would seem unwise to ignore all the signs and sounds that insist that revision is desired. It will bring out the real state of the case from the source where the power lies, and it will still all complaints until this voice can be heard. Of course it will not stop agitation nor discussion, but truth can always hear the strongest agitation and only shine the brighter and endure the keenest discussion, and only be the better understood and the more admired.

Many other questions of profound interest came before this Assembly, such as the now urgent and impending question of religion and higher education. The struggle is already begun, and the matter is being pressed upon ministers and people. Who shall educate our young men and women—men of faith in God’s word, or men of unbelief

or indifference? And upon what plan shall the highest form of education be conducted—with God and the Bible recognized all through the work, or by methods that ignore or are indifferent to both God and his holy word? The conflict will be with those of wealth and power, backed by strong secular support. But all the grand things of this nation have come to it through conflict and heroic achievement, and so will this one restore to the men of God and to the church this imperiled interest of greatest importance for the future—our schools of higher training. This was brought vividly and grandly before the Assembly, both by the exhaustive and matchless report of Dr. Morris, of Lane Seminary, chairman of a special committee on the subject, and also by the men of the youngest of the boards of the Assembly, the Board of Aid for Colleges and Academies.

The Assembly also had presented before it voluminous and exhaustive reports, full of light and force and information on the pressing questions of our large immigrant population, of Sabbath observance, and the great matters that are handled by the various boards acting in behalf of the church in all the great lines of work conducing to the evangelization of the world.

It was a busy, active, earnest Assembly, where one gets a verifying conception of what the power of our great branch of the church is, and what grand things Jesus is doing by it for his glory in the world.

New York City.

JOHN M. WORRAL.

VII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

LICHTENBERGER'S HISTORY OF GERMAN THEOLOGY.

HISTORY OF GERMAN THEOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. *By F. Lichtenberger, Dean of the Faculty of Protestant Theology at Paris.* Translated and edited by W. Hastie, B. D., Examiner in Theology, University of Edinburgh. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1889. 8vo, pp. 624. \$5.60.

This is one of the translations of German works presented to the English-speaking public by those indefatigable publishers, the Messrs. T. & T. Clark, of Edinburgh. It is made accessible to Americans by Messrs. Scribner & Welford, of New York. The mechanical execution of the book is beautiful. The paper, the type and the binding are of the most attractive style.

Mr. Hastie's translation of M. Lichtenberger's History is excellent. His "Translator's Preface" derives its chief interest from the fact that it lets in some light, to those of us who feel a deep interest in the state of theological thought in Scotland, upon the question, What is the present doctrinal tendency in the churches of that country? Mr. Hastie is Examiner in Theology in the University of Edinburgh. One would naturally infer that he is a representative of the prevailing drift of theological thinking in the Established Church. It is, therefore, somewhat striking that such a typical theologian, in his preface, exalts German theology and depreciates British; and that he speaks with undisguised contempt of the jealous caution with which the English and Scotch have been accustomed to witness the increased importation of German speculative views into the institutions of their country. He goes further than this: he extols the theology of Germany at the expense of the Reformed theology on the Continent outside of that country. The Swiss, the French and the Dutch theologians are all treated as inferior to the German. The Preface begins with these words, which sound strangely as coming from a Scottish divine: "In the nineteenth century, as in the sixteenth, Germany has been the living heart and head of Protestant and progressive theology." It would be irrelevant to the purpose of this notice to discuss Mr. Hastie's views. We only pause, *in limine*, to indicate the fact that German theology is certainly making more and more impression upon the religious thought of a people from which American Presbyterians have chiefly derived their ecclesiastical descent, and their doctrinal beliefs. The fact is significant; it merits most serious attention as one of the ominous signs of the times.

M. Lichtenberger, the author of this History, gives unmistakable proofs of his sympathy with what it is usual to characterize as the "progressive" spirit of the German theology. This is shown not only by his positive utterances, but also by the fulness with which he expounds the systems of those theologians who have stamped upon their speculations the form of certain dominant schemes of philosophy, and have in their analyses and syntheses labored to find, for the distinctive

doctrines of redemption, a basis in some philosophical principle of unity. This is what he commends as a free, scientific development in opposition to the steadfast maintenance of the statements of theological truth contained in the Symbols of the Reformation period. These are viewed as antiquated dogmas, resting on Confessional authority, and needing to be recast under the influence of modern science; that is, of the untrammelled inquiries of the reason, and the results attained by it, in the fields of physics, of philosophy and of criticism.

It may be said that it is not requisite to take into account the individual sympathies of an historian in order to form an estimate of his work. Perhaps so in the abstract, but certainly not so in the concrete. What an historian ought to be, or might be, is one thing; what he is, quite another. The reader, therefore, of this work must not be surprised if he finds more attention devoted to the opponents than to the maintainers of orthodoxy, even of that latitudinarian kind of orthodoxy which would be pronounced heterodoxy from a Puritan point of view. But, notwithstanding these drawbacks, the history furnished by M. Lichtenberger is very valuable. Any tolerable exposition of German theology embracing biographical sketches of German theologians is a *desideratum*. We have lying before us Dorner's very able work, entitled, "History of Protestant Theology, particularly in Germany, viewed according to its Fundamental Movement, and in connection with the Religious, Moral and Intellectual Life." The work is distinguished by great ability, but it was not designed, as the title suggests, to furnish a view of German theology alone. It extends its observation to the Protestant theology of Europe, including Great Britain, and, to a very limited extent, even America. M. Lichtenberger's history, on the other hand, is confined to Germany, and is consequently far more particular than Dorner's in its account of the theology and the theologians of that country. It labors, even with this restriction, under the difficulty that anything like an adequate history of German theology would require more than one volume, portly as this of the author's is. The necessary result was, that systems regarded as leading and epoch-making by the author, are expounded with some fulness—that of Schleiermacher and his school, for example—while others, which from a different point of view would be considered as of at least equal importance, are either simply named, or sketched with scant and disappointing brevity. But, while this history is far from being exhaustive, it is, as we have said, extremely valuable. Indeed, to English readers who consult translations for a knowledge of German theology, we regard it as indispensable. What they need to know is the facts. For the individual predilections or antipathies of the historian they are able to make allowance.

The plan adopted by the author is to divide the history into two periods, the first extending from Schleiermacher to Strauss, 1799–1835; the second, from Strauss to "the present time," 1835–1888. The treatment of the first period is distributed into an introduction and seven chapters. The Introduction considers the influence of political events and the movement of philosophy, and under the latter head briefly expounds the leading features of the systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. The first chapter deals with the "old schools" of Rationalism and Supranaturalism. The second is occupied with a biographical sketch of Schleiermacher and an account of his theological productions, together with the influence which they exerted. The third considers the life and writings of the disciples of Schleiermacher, who are enumerated as Neander, Nitzsch, Twesten, Julius Müller,

and Ullman. The fourth treats of the New Orthodoxy, of which the prominent exponents are said to have been Claus Harms, Hengstenberg, Hahn, Harless, Kurtz, and Sartorius. The fifth takes up the Speculative School, the principal representatives of which who are specified being Daub, Marheineke, Göschel and Rosenkranz. The sixth depicts the influence of what the author designates as the Classical Literature, Schiller and Goethe being signalized. The seventh portrays the influence of the Lyrical School, and devotes considerable attention to Romanticism or the effects of what is known as the Romantic School.

The treatment of the second period is divided into an introduction which sketches the Influence of Political Events, the Reaction and Literature, the Ecclesiastical Struggles, and the Relation of Philosophy and Theology, and eight chapters, the subjects of which are as follows: Of the first, Strauss, his life, writings, and influence; of the second, the Radical School; of the third, the New Biblical Criticism; of the fourth, the New Lutheranism; of the fifth, the School of Conciliation; of the sixth, the New Liberal Schools; of the seventh, the Neo-Kantian School; and of the eighth, the Catholic Theology, embracing an account of the Old Catholics. An Appendix is from the fertile pen of Dr. Philip Schaff, and is chiefly bibliographical.

Our space does not allow us to follow the historian in his analysis of the doctrines and influence of the respective schools which he has passed under review. The question, however, is a fair one, and may be allowed to elicit a few general comments, What is the general impression made by this history in regard to the genius and "progress" of the German theology in the century now drawing to a close. Everything in an answer to this question will depend on the views of the answerer. It is hardly necessary to say that the point of view here assumed is that of evangelical orthodoxy, as determined by the symbolical Calvinism of the Reformed Church—the Reformed Church as it has existed in Germany itself, in Switzerland, in France, in Holland, in Great Britain, and in the United States. And along with this standard of judgment may also be taken, in good measure, the Confessional theology of the Lutheran Church. For when the Reformation was first established as a great European movement in opposition to Popery, there was a substantial concurrence of the Lutheran and Reformed bodies in their symbolical statements of doctrinal truth. Looking at the case from this point of observation one is obliged to reply to the foregoing question by saying that German theology has, to a remarkable extent, departed from the evangelical orthodoxy of the Reformed Churches, and that the spirit which has controlled this defection has, in the main, been that of Rationalism.

This is a judgment as extraordinary as it is serious, in view of the fact that the Reformers, in explicit opposition to Rationalists on the one hand, and Romanists on the other, the former holding that reason is the source and judge of religious truth, the latter arrogating that supreme office to the church, maintained as a regulative principle the infallibility, perfection, and supremacy of the Scriptures. As between the three contending claimants for the throne of the *Principium Theologiæ*—the authority of reason, the authority of the church, and the authority of God's written Word—they deliberately and resolutely declared for the last. To say, then, that Germany, on which the glorious light of this great reforming principle first broke in effulgence, and in which the Reformation based upon it first took on the proportions of an organized national movement, has, in recoiling from the despo-

tism of Rome, swung away to the extreme of Rationalism in the development of her theology, is to express a conclusion which could, against an antecedent improbability, be sustained only by historical facts. The facts which support it are, we must think, furnished by the histories of Dorner and Lichtenberger. It is claimed that "Rationalism is dead." Dead? That may be so, as far as the school which bore that denomination is concerned. The school, as such, may have dissolved, the school-house may have decayed; few may now be found to avow the principles of Paulus, Eichhorn, and the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist; but the genius of the party still survives and infuses itself, to a greater or less extent, into nearly all the theological thinking of the present.

The truth is, we venture to say, that the conflict has always been, and is now, between only two great principles, namely, the authority of reason and the authority of the Scriptures. The theory of Rome, when sifted to the bottom, is essentially rationalistic. For, the authority which ultimately determines the meaning of the Scriptures and the force of tradition, and enounces its own supreme decisions as infallible, and, therefore, as such, binding the conscience, is confessedly a human authority. This must be the authority of reason, unless the infallible human oracle be inspired. That the gift of inspiration is continued to the Church of Rome is a vain pretence, which can afford no unimpeachable credentials as its warrant. Rome founds her decisions upon reason. The same is true of Mysticism, either in its philosophical or its strictly religious aspect. As philosophical, it claims the identification of man with God, the absorption of the finite into the Infinite. That is Pantheism, and surely Pantheism is rationalistic. As religious, it pretends to immediate revelations of the divine Spirit, which communicate new, original truth apart from the Scriptures. Now, either this is inspiration or not. If inspiration, the proofs of it would undoubtedly be exhibited. But they do not exist. The virtual claim to inspiration is, therefore, negated. If not inspiration, these professed immediate, extra-scriptural revelations of the Spirit are nothing more than the suggestions of the human reason in the form of a sublimated imagination. Mysticism is, in the last analysis, rationalistic. The contest, then, is between the authority of reason and that of the Bible. Whatever does not spring from the latter emanates from the former. The alternatives are: either a scriptural theology or a rationalistic; that is, either a theology founded alone upon the supreme authority of God's written Word or one based in the supreme authority of reason.

Had we room, we might, by a painfully extensive induction of instances, show that most of the prominent German theologians are smitten with this *rabies* of Rationalism, sometimes breaking out into utterances which are simply audacious. Take, for example, these remarks of M. Lichtenberger with reference to Tholuck, who has in this country enjoyed the reputation of having been evangelical: "He is not anxious about being orthodox. It might be said that he is less afraid of not being in harmony with Scripture or with the symbolical books than of clashing against the philosophical spirit of the time." "Tholuck in like manner lays bare the poverty of orthodoxy by a multitude of striking sketches ably put together, and in such a way as to demonstrate to the most prejudiced mind that the century in which pure doctrine reigned did not exactly shine by an earnest display of the Christian life." Was it meant that doctrine acknowledged to be pure is opposed to holiness? "We ought also to mention two very remarkable articles on the *Doctrine of the Inspiration of Scripture*, which he restricts to the truths re-

lating to salvation." "No prediction [of the Old Testament] has been made from a view to posterity." "Tholuck does not hesitate to say that, as regards the grammatical sense, we understand the Old Testament better than the apostles did." Yet the historian ranks him as "an apologist of the faith in opposition to Rationalism, of which he is the declared adversary." He was not a Rationalist; he was only rationalistic! From this criticism, which is susceptible of general application, we rejoice to except such witnesses for orthodox theology as Hengstenberg, Hahn, the Krummachers and a few like them, who buffeted the sea of Rationalism rolling against them—*rari nantes in gurgite vasto*. In every instance of defection from the gospel on the part of a church, God reserves to himself some who refuse to bow the knee to Baal; who, taught of his Spirit, continue in the face of opposition and contempt to bear an unflinching testimony to his truth. These faithful witnesses, in an age of latitudinarian indifference, are, like their Master, crowned with thorns. M. Lichtenberger pours scorn upon Hengstenberg and the orthodox school. Fortunately, he will not occupy the seat of the Final Judge.

The question is a profoundly interesting one, and did our limits permit it, we would like to discuss it at length: What are the causes which have produced that laxity of German theology that is a source of sincere grief to the lovers of orthodoxy? Only a few observations in regard to this question are now possible.

1. German theology has, to a very large extent, broken with the vitally important principle of the Verbal Inspiration of the Scriptures. That doctrine is relegated to the age of dead Confessional orthodoxy, of antiquated, unscientific, unprogressive "dogma." It must be admitted that there is a sense in which it is surrounded by an atmosphere of death: it is death to the inflated conceptions of human wisdom, to the wild and visionary dreams of speculators and errorists. Schleiermacher and his school could not have lived under its influence. For who, holding to the verbal inspiration of the Word of God, could talk of the impersonality of God or of Christ, could deny the objective facts of the gospel, the atonement and the resurrection of Jesus, and prate of the Incarnation as infusing a Christic principle into humanity which induces the organic development of church life,—a view which not only dispenses with atoning blood, but the saving offices of the Holy Ghost? Why a church should reject the doctrine of the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures can only be adequately accounted for on the ground that the suggestions of human reason are preferred to the "judgments" of God. We are satisfied that the tendency to give up this doctrine is a symptom of degeneracy in any church, and that every true, genuine revival of the spiritual life recalls a church to its assertion. Dorner, in regard to the Scottish Church, remarks, that "on the whole, the formal principle [that is, the normative authority of the Scriptures] still preponderates, and Gausson's work on *The Verbal Inspiration of Holy Scripture* expresses the present prevailing orthodoxy of Scotland." This is true; but since his history was written, a growing disposition to abandon this doctrine augurs no good for the theology of that highly-favored country, which has been "a burning and a shining light" of Protestant Christendom. The full recovery of Germany to evangelical orthodoxy will depend upon her re-affirmation of this generally rejected but all-important principle. Its recognition renders impossible an irreverent and licentious handling of the Word of God; its rejection powerfully conduces to that fatal habit.

2. Another trait which marks the German theology is the subordination of the

objective authority of the Scriptures to the standard of subjective apprehension, involving an abusive application of the right of private judgment. The reason, it is granted, has the right to discharge a preliminary function in the investigation of the evidence upon which a professed revelation claims to be from God. But when the question has been settled favorably to such a claim, reason abdicates the right to judge, and should recognize its subjection to the supreme authority of the Scriptures. True, the doctrines of redemption are affirmed to a living, evangelical faith by the sure testimony of God's Spirit rendered in consciousness; but the Lutheran theologians have overlooked the fact that faith supposes the Word upon which it rests, and that its authority cannot transcend or even equal the authority of the Scriptures in which it is grounded. Dorner's astute discussion of the relation of the material element in the "Reformation principle," namely, living, evangelical faith to the formal element in that principle, to-wit, the normative authority of the Scriptures, labors under the defect of not noticing this important consideration. He coördinates faith and the authority of Scripture as one composite standard, and indeed goes far towards making faith the ultimate factor of judgment. It is easy to see how in other and less conservative hands the subjective element is magnified as predominantly authoritative. In yielding to this tendency, German theologians have deflected from the great canon of the Reformation which affirms the supremacy of the Word of God. The Westminster Confession avoids this danger. It makes the Scriptures the supreme Rule, and the Holy Ghost speaking in the Scriptures (not faith) the supreme Judge, in matters of religion.

3. It is almost superfluous to remark that German theology has been characterized by an excessive, and sometimes wholly unwarrantable, tendency to philosophize concerning the doctrines of Revelation. This is at once its glory and its shame: its glory to those who boast of its profundity and breadth; its shame to those who deplore its arrogance and folly. We are far from denying that there is a field in which theology and philosophy meet in joint exploration, and that *there* common results may be reached. Further, it may be admitted, that in that field philosophy has the independent right to pursue her investigations beyond the statements of Scripture. We refer to natural theology, the truths of which, while republished and confirmed in the Bible, are not created by it. But when the boundary is touched between natural theology on the one hand, and on the other, the supernatural contents of natural religion, and especially the transcendent matter of redemption, the right to philosophize is checked by the incompetency of reason, and its utter dependence upon a supernatural revelation. The Germans are liable to two charges: First, that, where they have had the right to philosophize, they have philosophized wrongly; secondly, that, where they had no right to speculate philosophically, they have done so with immeasurable license. They are subject to the first criticism, in that they have made the Absolute and Infinite comprehensible by the discursive understanding, and in boldly attempting to construct a science of the Absolute and Infinite have left out of account the indispensable element with which they should have begun—the empirical conditions of consciousness. This was bad enough; but it was inconceivably worse to attempt the recasting of the theology of redemption by the organ of this groundless philosophy of the Absolute. This, perhaps, has been the most direful spring of that Iliad of woes to which the theology of Germany has been subjected. That Kant, who was the prince of Le-galists, and who had no use for Christianity, and Fichte, the subjective Idealist,

and Schelling, who affirmed an "intellectual intuition" of the Infinite, and Hegel, who reduced God to an Idea and identified him with impersonal Thought,—that these men should have been made the finishers of theology, their philosophy its consummation, is a repetition of the Titanic attempt to scale the heavens by piling mountain on mountain, to reach the infinite by heaping finite upon finite, to grasp the supernatural by adding natural to natural. One might as well attempt to reach Aleyone by a railway. Finishers of theology they were, in a sense; for when the last touches of their philosophy were put to it, it was like a corpse magnificently arrayed for the grave. There may be in a certain sense, a "philosophy of redemption," but redemption is not a philosophy. The philosophers who sought to explain the Incarnation by reducing the two natures of Christ to unity upon the principle of the Infinite, were engaged in a labor less promising than those of Sisyphus, and the daughters of Danaus.

There are other causes which might be noticed, as having operated to impress a latitudinarian type upon German theology, such as, the depreciation of the historical evidences of Christianity, the rejection of miracles as contraventions of natural law, and especially that *soi-disant* scientific progress, which means the disparagement and relinquishment of the glorious truths enshrined in the Creeds of the church and the Confessions of the Reformation period; but our limits admonish us to make an end. We regard the chief value of the German theology of the nineteenth century, as portrayed in the history of M. Lichtenberger, to lie in the fact, that it furnishes a solemn warning to orthodox churches to avoid the rocks upon which it has split. American Presbyterians have no reason to be ashamed of the theological products of the nineteenth century on their own soil, while they are able to point to the dogmatic systems of Hodge, Thornwell, and Dabney. May they have a double portion of the spirit of these illustrious men, but may they never grow more German than they!

JOHN L. GIRARDEAU.

LOTZE'S METAPHYSIK.

METAPHYSIK. *By Hermann Lotze. English translation.* Edited by Bernard Bosanquet, M. A. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Hermann Lotze was born May 21, 1817, at Butzen, Saxony. He studied philosophy at Leipsic, where he was appointed professor in 1843. Soon after he followed a call to Göttingen, where he was professor for nearly forty years. In the last year of his life he was called to Berlin, where in 1881 he died. As a philosopher he may be regarded as the chief representative in Germany of the theistic view of the universe. His mastery of natural science made him a powerful opponent of the prevailing materialism of his day. He took strong ground against the pantheistic wing of the Hegelians on the one hand, and vindicated his philosophy against the attacks of atheistic materialism on the other. Philip Fischer, Fichte the younger, Hermann Weisse, Ulrici and other theistic philosophers were his eminent and friendly contemporaries.

In his Religious Philosophy he sets out with the basal ethical relations of man to his Maker, and closes with results which are justified by the central doctrines of Christianity. The whole drift and aim of his philosophy is away from materialism. Professor Ladd, in the preface to his translation of the Outlines, says: "The disciples of Lotze—should he make any among us—would feel uncommonly at ease

concerning the ultimate results, upon our fundamental faiths and aspirations, of materialistic science and destructive criticism." I hasten to mark his theistic position, not as offering a guarantee for the accuracy of his conclusions, but as a pre-supposition in their favor. Undoubtedly, the best that can be said about a philosopher should be first said. There is an inveterate impression among many people that a rigid fundamental philosophy, especially if suspected of Idealism, has no object but to betray and pervert the youthful mind. Professor Bain says "it is hard to free philosophy from the suspicion of word-jugglery." It may be suggested as harder still to remove from subject-studies the prejudgment; that in becoming scientific, they become thereby the incubators of infidelity. No doubt philosophy has suffered from the contagion of its infidel supporters, but this seems no sufficient reason to proclaim perpetual quarantine against it.

The philosophy of Lotze, while realistic, is distinguished by its consistent opposition to the dictum of Natural Realism that we know things by immediate perception. It is also idealistic, but differs widely from that Idealism whose extreme statement reduces the universe to a mere conceptual existence. His position in philosophy may be provisionally stated as about midway between the extremes of Realism and Idealism. *In medio tutissimus ibis* is, in this case, perhaps only suggestive; since the middle is, of course, as indeterminate as the limits, but if intellectual ease be a prime consideration, the metaphysic of Lotze justifies the maxim.

This concession, however, is not expected from those who are prepared to give his philosophy but slight attention. It must be understood, also, that no compromise is likely to settle the perception difficulty.

Schlagel is credited with the saying that "all men are born either Platonists or Aristotelians." With quite as much truth it may be said, every man is born an idealist or a natural realist. These names are synonyms of conflict. Their antagonism is based on a deep antithesis of perception.

"There is a world of external things in space witnessed by my consciousness, and these are independent of my mind," says Realism. "An independent, external world involves a contradiction in terms—*esse* is no more than *percipi*," says Idealism. This conflict, either by formal statements or with numberless interpretations, haunts every phase of philosophy.

In his introduction, Lotze traces the origin and course of this conflict while indicating the subject-matter of metaphysics and the inquiries about which it must ever concern itself. "It is not that which explains itself, but that which perplexes us, that moves to inquiry. Metaphysics would never have come into being if the course of events in that form in which it was presented by immediate perception had not conflicted with expectation, the fulfillment of which men deemed themselves entitled to demand from whatever was to be reckoned as truly existing or truly taking place." (P. 2.)

We learn from his introduction that the purpose is not to inquire into those formulated and ostentatious principles which appear to be drawn up for contentious designs, but into those everyday suppositions which although unuttered are affirmed in practice. His plan is simple, elementary. He does not fix our gaze upon an indisputable principle capable of development after the manner of Fichte, nor engage us with the forms of judgment after the manner of Kant, but with those spontaneous questions which we ask ourselves when we perceive the opposition of the external world.

Proceeding further we learn his position in reference to Natural Science. He regards it as probable that this science, after reaching a certain limit, will be obliged, in order to further progress, to return to the task of defining, in the most thorough manner, those centers of relation to which it has been able, without embarrassment, to attach its rational processes without adequately determining their nature. In such case a new metaphysic seems inevitable. But then, even as now, such metaphysic can have no higher object than to discover and unfold those typical forms to which the elements of the actual must always be coördinated. Metaphysics cannot, by direct process, supply any doctrine of proportions to its concepts, so that a real world can be constituted either qualitatively or quantitatively by any prefigured mechanical arrangement. Mathematical order and sequence must be relegated to experience. Metaphysics must, however, be so far worthy of respect as to be able to offer reliable tests to the results of experience, and even demand that its dogmas shall conform to the general laws of reality. Natural science is diversified everywhere with presuppositions concerning an essence of things of which it professes entire ignorance, nor can a science, founded on experience, be completely freed from such unmethodical assumptions. It has a habit of taking refuge from the observed recurrence of phenomena in the *essence of things*, regarding everything that transcends experience as altogether unknowable. Just here Lotze designates a place for his metaphysic, "It would be a mere eccentricity to refuse to admit that a confession of the inscrutability of the essence of things *in a certain sense* must at last be elicited from every philosophy, but what if the more exact determination of this sense, and the justification of the whole assertion of this inscrutability, should be just the problem of metaphysics which only promises to inquire, but does not fix the limits within which its inquiry may be successful?" (P. 13.)

Too often those who write upon metaphysics suppose that the whole duty of man, in reference to inquiries into the problems of reality, has been discharged by making some general remarks concerning the limitations of human knowledge. The average natural realist discourses somewhat after this manner, "But what can be said of being? Verily little can be said of it. All that we can say of being is that it is being." After this indefatigable research and learned explanation all ontological inquiry is of course laid quietly to rest! If, however, it be insisted that the laws of reality can only be determined by the dictum of experience, the only answer metaphysics is entitled to offer in rebuttal is the complete execution of its aims. Physical science proceeds in its inquiries, as it must, according to the formal laws of thought, but if these laws are trustworthy in the investigation and correlation of phenomena, they must be equally valid in their application to an inquiry into the existence of that unknown—that somewhat and somewhere—whence their phenomena proceed. Lotze takes offence at the many attempts to found a metaphysic on the psychological analysis of our cognition. Theories of cognition have occupied the attention of philosophy too long. He compares these efforts to the tuning of instruments in an orchestra, with this difference, that the harmony which the performers are trying to establish is known in advance and therefore attainable, while in the other case the so-called powers of the mind are to be compared with a canon which is confessedly unknown. The cognitive power must establish the limits of its own validity. In order to this, that is, to determine its competence to judge of the nature of the real, it should in consistency be able to arrive at a clear conception of those necessary suppositions which it makes about the real, for by these

suppositions alone can the content of the conceptions of the real be determined; as also it is this content which can warrant the reason in maintaining the unknowability of its object, or in deciding that the object of the concept has no independent reality. "The process of our cognition and its relation to objects must, whether we like it or no, be subject to those judgments which our reason passes as necessities of thought upon every real process, and on the effect of every real element of reality upon every other." (P. 18.) Hence he concludes Psychology, as also Natural Science, must be based on metaphysics.

It may be well to pause a moment to point again to the simplicity of the plan which Lotze proposes to himself. His method is quite different from that of any of the great ideal systems of philosophy. It is a rigid, but not pretentious, inquiry into our spontaneous metaphysics. For a little consideration will satisfy us that the spirit of metaphysics is immanent in all our thinking, and constantly vindicating itself by the numberless questions thrust upon us by the manifoldness and change of the being of things, as opposed to the permanency of the being of ideas. He meets our inquiries in the simplest manner possible. His philosophy is not, therefore, a dialectic in the Fichtean sense, nor is it a system of categories, nor a form of dogmatism, nor a criticism in the doctrinal sense; nevertheless it is incisively critical in that it proposes to call in question our common suppositions concerning natural phenomena, and to discover, in a scientific manner, their import and the ground of their harmony. And as things precede phenomena as well as relations and events, and as these in turn are severally grounded in being, a metaphysic of things must consistently be first a metaphysic of being. This is decisive then as to his clue, or the starting point of his inquiry, which is the fundamental notion or concept.

BEING.

Being is a word of wide significance, and may be applied, no doubt logically, to every object of thought, but in its proper metaphysical sense it is used to indicate any substantive existence. In ordinary thinking things possess a common likeness in one respect at least, that is, their being, and beyond this also appear to have a certain reality, which reality differs from the reality of laws, relations and events. Thus realities differ. If a thought has being, it must be actual as distinguished from that which is merely thinkable. A being of a sensation or emotion is our experience of it. But without trying further to fix our thoughts by means of definitions which may require modification, let us at once seek for that reality or being which we conceive things to possess. We should certainly be able to define our notion of being, but in doing this we need not be charged with the duty of explaining how being came to be. How something came to be where nothing was, is not a metaphysical question, or at least it is not a question for metaphysics. But it is proper for us to inquire for the mark which is to distinguish real being from the unreal, or being from non-being, the universal from the particular. But universal being is simply pure being, and pure being is nothing. The formal definition of pure being, that which is without power, quality or relation, condemns it to non-existence; nevertheless it is this spectre of being that plays so important a part in common-sense philosophy. It is useful as a plaything or scientific toy, because it is anything, and it is anything on the express condition that it is nothing. It is useful only as it serves to support the necessary fiction of our every-day language. Thus we speak of the concepts of geometry as if they were real apart from their predi-

cates. Thus when we say a surface has length and breadth and area, we seem to imply the existence of the surface as a reality independent of its predicates. But this formal distinction of thought has no existence in the thing. The surface does not exist away from its area, length or breadth. The logical distinction in thought leads to no error except as we regard this distinction as existing in the thing itself. Thus, further, when we say steam has power, we mean no doubt that the steam supports the power. The steam then does nothing but be, while the power proceeds to do the work. We might ask what is this steam upon which the power maintains its existence? But this question brings us at once to the Lotzian idea of pure being. What is that merely conceptual notion of being which does nothing, explains nothing, exists in no relations, but simply consents to be? He answers promptly, "Nothing." A postulate which explains nothing and is itself unexplainable has no place in philosophy. How steam comes to be, or how any other agent acts is not the question, but if the question were asked, it could be answered negatively, that an agent cannot be conceived to exist through the confluence of two abstractions—as power and pure-being.

How anything can be or act is beyond comprehension, but the hypothesis of a substratum of non-active being affords no relief. But if this notion of inhering power introduces a puzzle into metaphysics, it revolts the mind of the student in physics. How the atom, molecule or particle can be made the home of so many powers, now chemical, now attractive, and now electrical, without changing its capability of maintaining power and its own unity, and especially how it can use these powers in turn or collectively without itself possessing power, is a question which suggests an early revision of the concepts of natural science.

Activity, then, we conclude must be the mark of being. And if it is to be, it must be somewhere; in other words, being either unrelated or inactive is impossible.

But it is affirmed as a final position, by the children of sense, that we know things as having quality and exercising power. The expression, however, cannot be allowed as a metaphysical statement. It is indeed the form which our thought necessarily takes as subject and predicate. Its metaphysical significance is just what we want to know. We must not suppose that our common suppositions about external objects express ontological facts. For, if body really exercises power, then that power must be the instrument which the thing employs, and thus power is made to appear as an entity, whereas it is an abstraction. To hypostatize an abstraction has been the dream and error of philosophy, because it cannot be admitted without the regression of all thought into the notion of pure being, and pure being is, as we have pointed out, nothing. The popular impression that any form of objective reality can itself be divided into factors, as being and power, or body and power, has no metaphysical value. Substantive realities do not exercise, they are, powers. The children of sense, driven to a last resort, by the proof that the affirmation of body or substance exercising power vanishes in pure being, retort that such being might exist. But such being, however comforting to sense, can have no value in metaphysical study. "A being which might be but is not, would for us," remarks Lotze, "be no being at all." (P. 52.)

IDENTITY.

No one doubts the philosophical importance of a true theory of identity. To this theory Lotze makes valuable contributions under the head of Becoming and

Change. His theory of Becoming falls in well with his doctrine of the Being of things. Common sense is quick to take offence at any proposition to inquire into the nature of being or the being of things, and in this position claims to have the advantage of the skeptic. But this is also the thesis of the skeptic—"we do not know what things are." How, then, common sense is to meet and overwhelm the skeptic at this point with an identical affirmation is not wholly clear.

We have no time to follow Lotze in his inquiry into the being of things. The determination of a thing is the determination of the reality of its being. Things as opposed to their presentations, he tells us, do not have a rigid nucleus, or lump of being which constitutes their reality. Reality is found to be rather a process—a law. Qualities of matter do not inhere in an unalterable, persistent substance. Body cannot be conceived as possessing power or exercising quality, nor do things have moods or states. Intuition does not reveal what the thing is. The thing undoubtedly acts and changes, and these activities are moulded by law, and law is the thing's nature—this concrete law is the thing. The being of things consists in the reality of their relations, and when we have defined these relations we have defined being. The argument for the conception of a thing as a concrete form of law is too extended to be embraced here. How the conception of a thing as a concrete law is justified or becomes a necessity of thought will, however, appear more clearly further on. Just now we are concerned with the endeavor to reconcile identity and change. To this end we may well ask, What does the principle of identity require? It is taken as a self-evident fact that relations and states of being come into existence and pass away. Does the being of things likewise change, or is their being indestructible? If indestructible, then, in our view, as it will be seen, their relations and states are unchangeable. There must be actual absence of all variation. How, then, shall we maintain the principle of identity with the changeableness of things? What, in the first place, do we understand by our own identity? It may have been already surmised how we must regard the soul. Certainly not as a fixed kernel of being upon which certain faculties have been superimposed, but rather as a permanent unit constituted by memory and self-consciousness. We are thus conscious of identity, but we are also conscious of change. In personality, then, we readily reconcile both change and permanence. It is, then, from the region of personality we must construe our notion of the identity of being.

Recurring now to our notion of a thing, wherein shall we say consists its identity? We are prepared to say that it does not consist in some nucleus of being with changing states, and to assert, also, that a new state indicates a new thing. The classic example of the common view is water, now in a state of ice and now in a state of vapor. Here, it is said, we have an example of identity and diversity—a changeless thing in different states; but why the ice should be viewed as a state of the water, rather than water as a state of the ice, does not appear. It is alleged, however, that in these changeable states there is an unchanged substance, and in this consists its identity. But we have seen that this abiding something upon which phenomena are supposed to play is, in its analysis, pure being. For the notion of a something which forever hides itself, and as such can be distinguished from the qualities it exhibits and the powers it exercises, must be abandoned as without metaphysical significance. No doubt this subjective form is a necessity of our thought, but its metaphysical interpretation must, all along, be regarded as a part of our inquiry.

We have now to maintain the assertion that a new state is not such in fact, but is a new thing. If we speak of colors we do not say that one color becomes another, nor if we speak of tastes do we say that sour becomes sweet, but we say that each quality, in changing, is replaced by another. We do not, for instance, say that red is the same, although it appears now in the definite condition of black. Why is it less ontologically contradictory to speak of anything as changing and yet as remaining the same? Our ordinary notion of things contains the conception of change and identity as a fact. The thing changes its states but not its being. There is a kernel of substance which remains hard and fast in all our observation of the thing. We commonly admit the mystery, perhaps the contradiction, but nevertheless maintain the fact.

We say that quicksilver, under a law of conditioning, may appear as a solid, a liquid, a vapor, just as water, by the same law, may assume these three similar states. If A, A¹, A¹¹ represent the first series, B, B¹, B¹¹ will represent the second. A¹ and A¹¹ are said to be states of A, as B¹ and B¹¹ are states of B, so that while there has been confessedly a change in A and B, A¹, A¹¹, B¹, B¹¹ are other forms of A and B, with which they are identical in essence. But if A does not change in reality when it becomes A¹, there is no assignable reason why its state should change. Here, as in the concepts of physics, a rigid reality is assumed as the background of things.

The physicist is ready to tell us that things do not change, but that their relations change; we behold a world of changeable appearances supported by a world of changeless atoms. But this postulate of fixed elements explains nothing. Established in one relation it is impossible to tell why they should ever leave that relation in preference to another. On the other hand, the activity of the atoms is sufficient to account for a change of relation and a change in the things through and through. Returning, now, to the above series, the common thought of sense is that A is the same as A¹ by reason of some fixed identity of being. Contrariwise we deny the changeless being, and assert that A is the same as A¹ only on the ground that A¹ can be propagated from A and differs from B in that it cannot be propagated from B. In the same manner, by a fixed continuity, B becomes B¹ and by a proper law of regress B¹ returns to B, but does not become A, nor any member of the A series. In neither case is the series discontinuous; A remains A till it becomes A¹, and as A¹, it is no longer A. If there is a time when A appears to be constant, its apparent fixedness is due to the incessant becoming of itself. The identity consists in the ceaseless reproduction of A=A, B=B, and there is no evidence of change till the law varies, and then A becomes A¹, B, B¹. Hence A and B are always becoming, maintaining their relations and themselves as apparently fixed identities, or by a law of translation passing into the new things A¹, B¹, A¹¹, B¹¹ respectively. We call each member of the series a thing. Viewed metaphysically, however, each is a process sustained by law, of which law the thing is always a concrete form. All reality must be grouped under the conception of instant becoming, or that of incessant reproduction of itself. Aside from this, there is no sameness consistent with change. A and A¹ must be regarded as definite things and as having no relation, except that A may be recovered from A¹ by reversing the law by which it became A¹. Our ontology, then, falls in with experience in this, that no reality abides—all is flow, nothing is fixed but the law of change.

Why does not law itself change? Because law does not found either being or

its processes, law neither forms nor deforms reality. It is simply our notion of a thing's action, both in form and succession. It is concrete only as we identify it with the definite activity which it is conceived to regulate. But it may be asked, What is the thing in the series A, A¹, A¹¹? The answer is, one is as much the thing as another, and each the same as the other, in the sense that each may be produced from the other by the progress or regress of the self-same law. Still the question returns, How do we constitute permanence and change? If all is flow—if the banks move with the stream, where is the determining factor? For at least we do affirm a continuity, a numerical identity in the history of every objective thing. Whence this effort of self, environed by naught but flow? Why speak of permanence in things? It is a reflection of the soul itself. Its own unity and identity are the spontaneous affirmation of memory and self-consciousness. There is, then, the fact of the unity of consciousness, and the subject of this knowledge we call substance. Here, then, is permanence. But the soul, as a substance, is perpetual flow. Its history is a development, continuously connected with its past and losing nothing of its experiences. The certainty of consciousness as to the oneness of its subject is *eo ipso* the certainty of a substance, and this substance is that which can experience and produce effects. "So far and so long," says Lotze, "as the soul knows itself as this identical subject, it is, and it is named, simply for that reason, substance." (Book III., p. 179.) But this substance is no fixed nucleus with changeable states; it is itself a flowing activity. To the personal, then, alone belongs identity, constituted by memory and self-consciousness; to the impersonal, continuity, process, flow.

RELATION BY INTERACTION.

The world is a system of interacting things. Each member of this system is and acts because it is a member; while also it determines, it is determined by, every other thing. How a thing can be, or, being what it is, act, is surrendered at once as a bottomless question. That there is agency in the outer world is a necessary assumption; that we, ourselves, are actors is a fact of consciousness. How this experience becomes possible, how we can act upon ourselves in any degree, exciting or controlling our mental states, is wholly beyond our knowledge. In all the world around us we see change and becoming, but we see no cause. In the self-conscious spirit alone do we find a fountain of permanent activity. The determination of our own activity may be the determination of all activity. The problem of all agency may be the problem of our own. We know how our own action is limited, but we cannot know that all action is thus limited; and yet, if we do not construe the impersonal from the side of the personal, all impersonal activity must continue to be impervious to our reason. But this conclusion must not be interpreted to mean that the system of Lotze is about to take refuge in the independent, self-conscious monads of Leibnitz, nor to seek relief in the spiritualized matter of Berkeley. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the conception of pure being and that of body as exercising power have been considered and abandoned. At the same time the causal idea must be retained. Causation is something more than antecedent and consequent. We may hold that all action is personal, but why this should be asserted is not at all clear. It is certain, however, that this activity is real, and as a presentation of sense this activity appears to connect a multitude of independent objects. The concepts of natural science are directed to things and

their activities. It is sought to explain the movement or excitement which takes place when things, previously unaffected by each other, suddenly change their preëxisting relations. To account for this change a determining agent is assumed to appear upon the scene, which, while producing no new substances, produces new states. With this common sense view its disciples are comforted and satisfied. The causal notion seems justified when the proximate agent of the effect appears. But the metaphysical inquiry lies beneath the presentations of sense, and is concerned with those hidden relations which have ever attended the thing's history. The demand, in other words, is to supply the complement of the idea of cause without contradiction in our thinking. To meet this demand it has been the fashion of philosophy to endow things with a fixed substance, and this in turn with certain determinate properties which make it possible for each thing to receive its appropriate impressions on the one hand, and to convey a determining influence to its neighbor on the other. In this sense things may be said to be agents, in this sense to mutually determine each other, and in this sense also to stand in relations. These relations are the instantaneous reciprocal actions which the things incessantly exchange. Beyond these mutual determinations and the things themselves there is no reality. We admit the reciprocal agency but deny again the fixed substance. We must also deny the popular conception of the agency of things. Things are not causes; they are the grounds of changes which appear as effects. These effects are grounded in the interactions of all things of the system. No one thing can be the ground of an effect. Hence all things must be regarded as mutually determinative, but as such they are not causal. A formula may determine a fact, it does not cause the fact. Impersonal activity is only a mode of the personal.

This is the key to Lotze's position. He is constrained to it by the method of exhaustion. He first considers the crude efforts of the child of sense to construct a metaphysic from the content of immediate perception. Unreflecting thought seizes upon the sense-image of a passing influence, which takes name and conception according to the impression it appears to make on matter. If it is inquired how a thing can act when it is not, direct vision or some observed facts in experimental physics are supposed to meet the requirements of the answer. An object is said to transfer its state to another, or remain inactive because their natures are alien, or their relations in space forbid their receptivity. But that a condition or influence is to be transferred from one thing to another is to suppose it is to exist without a subject, which is unthinkable. That space-properties have anything to do with energy, or that one thing is more receptive than another, is simply the description of our ordinary presentations, and as such is without metaphysical significance. Mere sensationalism fails equally to give any relief to our inquiries. Denying first innate ideas and then causation, it proceeds to cancel itself. For, manifestly, if sensation is our only hope of knowledge, it is not only useless to seek the cause of phenomena, but self-contradictory to attempt any explanation of the causal notion.

The theory of Occasionalism does indeed explain interaction, but at a fearful strain upon our metaphysical thinking. It rather answers than satisfies our inquiries. By this theory there is established a plurality of independent things, and their changes, if by any possibility they can experience change, are consequently independent. Matter does nothing except by the direct agency of God, and since it does nothing of itself, and has no subject, it is a pure negation.

Neither have we anything in Positivism. We can, it tells us, only study phenomena. We are not concerned with metaphysical reality. Indeed, we do not know if there be any such, or if there be, its pursuit is as vain as the search for the horizon. "We have no knowledge of anything but phenomena. . . . All phenomena without exception are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions, either natural or supernatural, interfere. The essential nature of phenomena, and their ultimate causes, whether efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us."—*J. S. Mill*. Metaphysical study is therefore useless. This assumption, then, offers no explanation of interaction, and as such is of no value to us. It may, however, suggest the question, Why should a doctrine of nescience be less illegitimate in philosophy than in religion? For certainly no greater sin against the understanding can be stated in the terms of a philosophy than Mill's doctrine, since it would constitute every phenomenon an independent event, without antecedent or any other relation. If any given phenomenon is not determined, any other might have followed. Its antecedent also might have been anything else. We should be treated to a discontinuous series, in which each member would be something or nothing, and all phenomena doomed to a lawless and unintelligible changeableness.

With much greater cogency of thought appears the doctrine of preëstablished harmony. The whole world-system exists by virtue of a plan in which everything severally becomes individual and independent. Each part is what it is, and remains what it is, by a strict determinism. All parts run in unison and keep their appointed times, like a system of controlled clocks. It is interaction only in appearance. Strictly construed, it is a denial of interaction. Since the things are souls, or at least intellectual activities, self-contained and with a definitive purpose to fulfil, the system, also each member, never loses its autonomy. Sometimes blindly, sometimes in its own self-consciousness, but always under ordained impulses, each thing, as an individual, demonstrates a pre-determined mission. Each thing becomes itself by an inner, self-contained symmetry. All its energies were performed by its Creator. Each comes to its appointed task, and takes its part in the system by an innate pre-concert. Hence the appearance of interaction. Substance is that which acts. There is no matter which is not also activity. A thing is because it acts.

Here, then, in this doctrine of Leibnitz, we obtain the clue or starting point of Lotze. Both agree in rejecting the notion of substance as stuff. Activity is the only manifestation of a thing's nature. Leibnitz assumes, what Lotze regards as impossible, an indefinite number of mutually independent elements. Hence, for pluralism Lotze substitutes monism. These statements, however, we had intended to reserve for the conclusion—they are certainly not to our purpose just now; we are concerned only with the problem of interaction. The theories we have examined contribute nothing to this point, and yet we cannot rid ourselves of the causal notion. It is an ordinance of our nature to posit an agent back of every change. The question returns, How shall we think of a system of things in reciprocal action without involving our thought in hopeless contradiction? What are the conditions of this interaction? We have already seen that if things are independent of each other they do not interact. If things interact they must act as individuals or by inherent powers; if as individuals, they cannot form a system; if by their inherent powers, we are met by the contradiction of pure being. Powers do indeed exist, but they are not grounded in an impersonal subject. Things exist

only as they act, and change only as they change through and through. Hence, we return to that reality which has already been foreshadowed—the personal. All finite activities must be regarded as a form of energy on the part of the One. We dispense with the conception of a world of real operating atoms as a metaphysical necessity, and substitute for this idea of the atom a real immanent act of the One Being, and this act we conceive as standing in definite relations to other similar acts, which by reciprocal action undergo instant changes.

We have, then, apparently, to choose between the conception of a universe of substantive atoms, existing by virtue of the stuff that is in them, and displaying a multitude of inherent or superimposed powers, or the conception of a universe of elementary activities on the part of that One Being who grounds all acts in himself, with the adscititious notion that all these acts are related to one another by a reciprocal action, entirely similar to that supposed to connect a plurality of independent beings. There remains, however, another view, which must also be excluded for the reason that it may possibly be mistaken for the doctrine of Lotze. Philosophy has created a being without a self—a being of impicturable but definite qualities and fulfilling functions which belong only to personality. We cannot afford to maintain, in our philosophy, a being out of all affinity to our spirit. We do indeed, in our conception of the world, fill many a hiatus in our knowledge by an appeal to an Unknown, but that object must not be such as to conflict with the constitution of our nature. Hence the Monism of Lotze must not for a moment be thought to have any resemblance to the thing-in-itself—the pure Universal Will of Schopenhauer; nor to the Monism of Hartmann, the Will and Intellect in the Unconscious. It is nothing to the purpose to say that these objectionable systems are inconceivable or unintelligible. Such an assertion may be due to mental impotence. But it is quite to the purpose to show that these theories are hopelessly inadequate to the end for which they were created. We do not wish to be treated to a procession from which nothing proceeds. Even if there were such determinate processes of the Unconscious, or were there such volitions of Matter, the necessary regress of thought would demand a Person to project the end for this, otherwise groundless, show. But if the causal notion were effectually suppressed, things, without consciousness, would gain no additional importance by being established outside of the One.

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GIRARDEAU'S "INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC IN PUBLIC WORSHIP."

INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC IN THE PUBLIC WORSHIP OF THE CHURCH. *By John L. Girardeau, D. D., LL. D., Professor in Columbia Theological Seminary, South Carolina.* 12mo, pp. 208. Richmond: Whittet & Shepperson. 1888.

The author in his eloquent conclusion anticipates that some will meet his arguments with sneers rather than serious discussion, which he proposes to endure with Christian composure. It is a reproach to our church, which fills us with grief, to find this prediction fulfilled in some quarters. Surely persons calling themselves Presbyterians should remember that the truths they profess to hold sacred have usually been in small minorities sneered at by the arrogant majorities. So it was in the days of the Reformers, of Athanasius, of the Apostles, and of Jesus himself.

The resort to this species of reply appears the more ill-considered, when we re-

member that Dr. Girardeau is supporting the identical position held by all the early fathers, by all the Presbyterian reformers, by a Chalmers, a Mason, a Breckinridge, a Thornwell, and by a Spurgeon. Why is not the position as respectable in our author as in all this noble galaxy of true Presbyterians? Will the innovators claim that all these great men are so inferior to themselves? The idea seems to be that the opposition of all these great men to organs arose simply out of their ignorant old-fogyism and lack of culture; while our advocacy of the change is the result of our superior intelligence, learning and refinement. The ignorance of this overweening conceit makes it simply vulgar. These great men surpassed all who have succeeded them in elegant classical scholarship, in logical ability, and in theological learning. Their depreciators should know that they surpassed them just as far in all elegant culture. The era of the Reformation was the Augustan age of church art in architecture, painting and music. These reformed divines were graduates of the first Universities, most of them gentlemen by birth, many of them noblemen, denizens of courts, of elegant accomplishments and manners, not a few of them exquisite poets and musicians. But they unanimously rejected the Popish Church music; not because they were fusty old pedants without taste, but because a refined taste concurred with their learning and logic to condemn it.

Dr. Girardeau has defended the old usage of our church with a moral courage, loyalty to truth, clearness of reasoning and wealth of learning which should make every true Presbyterian proud of him, whether he adopts his conclusions or not. The framework of his argument is this: it begins with that vital truth which no Presbyterian can discard without a square desertion of our principles. The man who contests this first premise had better set out at once for Rome: God is to be worshipped only in the ways appointed in his word. Every act of public cultus not positively enjoined by him is thereby forbidden. Christ and his apostles ordained the musical worship of the New Dispensation without any sort of musical instrument, enjoining only the singing with the voice of psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs. Hence such instruments are excluded from Christian worship. Such has been the creed of all churches, and in all ages, except of the Popish communion after it had reached the nadir of its corruption at the end of the thirteenth century, and of its prelatric imitators. But the pretext is raised that instrumental music was authorized by Scripture in the Old Testament. This evasion Dr. Girardeau ruins by showing that God set up in the Hebrew Church two distinct forms of worship; the one moral, didactic, spiritual and universal, and therefore perpetual in all places and ages—that of the synagogues; the other peculiar, local, typical, foreshadowing in outward forms the more spiritual dispensation, and therefore destined to be utterly abrogated by Christ's coming. Now we find instrumental music, like human priests and their vestments, show-bread, incense, and bloody sacrifice, absolutely limited to this local and temporary worship. But the Christian churches were modelled upon the synagogues and inherited their form of government and worship because it was permanently didactic, moral and spiritual, and included nothing typical. This reply is impregably fortified by the word of God himself: that when the Antitype has come the types must be abolished. For as the temple-priests and animal sacrifices typified Christ and his sacrifice on Calvary, so the musical instruments of David in the temple-service only typified the joy of the Holy Ghost in his pentecostal effusions.

Hence when the advocates of innovation quote such words as those of the Psalmist, "Praise the Lord with the harp," &c., these shallow reasoners are reminded

that the same sort of plea would draw back human priests and bloody sacrifices into our Christian churches. For these Psalms exclaim, with the same emphasis, "Bind your sacrifice with cords, even unto the horns of the altar." Why do not our Christian æsthetics feel equally authorized and bound to build altars in front of their pulpits, and to drag the struggling lambs up their nicely carpeted aisles, and have their throats cut there for the edification of the refined audience? "Oh, the sacrifices, being types and peculiar to the temple service, were necessarily abolished by the coming of the Antitype." Very good. So were the horns, cymbals, harps and organs only peculiar to the temple-service, a part of its types, and so necessarily abolished when the temple was removed.

If any addition can be made to this perfectly compact argument, it is contained in this suggestion of an undoubted historical truth: that the temple-worship had a national theocratic quality about it, which cannot now be realized in Christ's purely spiritual kingdom. Israel was both a commonwealth and a church. Her political government was a theocracy. Her human king was the viceroy representing on earth her true sovereign, God. Hence, in the special acts of worship in the temple, in which the high priest, Messiah's type, and the king, God's viceroy, combined, they represented the State Church, the collective nation in a national act of homage. This species of worship could not lawfully exist except at one place; only one set of officials could celebrate it. It was representatively the nation's act. It is to be noted that, when at last musical instruments were attached to those national acts of homage to Israel's political king, Jehovah, it was not by the authority or intervention of the high priest, the religious head of the nation, but by that of the political viceroy. David's horns, harps and organs were therefore the appointed instruments of the national acts of homage to Jehovah. The church now is not a nation, but purely a spiritual kingdom, which is not of this world. Hence there is no longer room in her worship for the horns, harps and organs, any more than for swords and stonings in her government, or human kings and high priests in her institutions.

Let the true inference from this partial use of instruments of music in the typical, national worship be fairly and perspicuously stated. It is but this: since God saw fit to ordain such an adjunct to divine worship for a special object, it proves the use of it not to be *sin per se*, like lying or theft, for a holy God would not ordain an unholy expedient for any object, however temporary. The same argument shows that incense, show-bread and bloody sacrifices in worship cannot be *sin per se*. But how far short is this admission from justifying the use of any of them in worship now? Just here is the pitiable confusion of thought. It is not enough for the advocate of a given member of the church's cultus to show that it is not essentially criminal. He must show that God ordained it positively for our dispensation.

Dr. Girardeau's opponents stubbornly forget that the burthen of proof rests on them; he is not bound to prove that these instruments are *per se* criminal, or that they are mischievous or dangerous, although he is abundantly able to prove the latter. It is they who must prove affirmatively that God has appointed and required their use in his New Testament worship, or they are transgressors. Doubtless the objection in every opponent's mind is this: That, after all, Dr. Girardeau is making a conscientious point on too trivial and non-essential a matter. I am not surprised to meet this impression in the popular mind, aware as I am that this

age of universal education is really a very ignorant one. But it is a matter of grief to find ministers so oblivious of the first lessons of their church history. They seem totally blind to the historical fact that it was just thus every damnable corruption which has cursed the church took its beginning; in the addition to the modes of worship ordained by Christ for the New Dispensation, of human devices, which seemed ever so pretty and appropriate, made by the best of men and women and ministers with the very best of motives, and borrowed mostly from the temple cultus of the Jews. Thus came vestments, pictures in churches, incense, the observance of the martyrs' anniversary days—in a word, that whole apparatus of will-worship and superstition which bloomed into popery and idolatry. "Why, all these pretty inventions were innocent. The very best of people used them. They were so appropriate, so æsthetic! Where could the harm be?" History answers the question: They disobeyed God and introduced popery,—a result quite unforeseen by the good souls who began the mischief! Yes, but those who have begun the parallel mischief in our Presbyterian Church cannot plead the same excuse, for they are forewarned by a tremendous history, and prefer Mrs. Grundy's taste to the convincing light of experience.

That a denomination, professing like ours to be anti-prelatic and anti-ritualistic, should throw down the bulwarks of their argument against these errors by this recent innovation appears little short of lunacy. Prelatists undertake every step of the argument which these Presbyterians use for their organ, and advance them in a parallel manner to defend the re-introduction of the Passover or Easter, of Whitsuntide, of human priests and priestly vestments, and of chrism, into the gospel church. "God's appointment of them in the Old Dispensation proves them to be innocent. Christians have a right to add to the cultus ordained for the New Testament whatever they think appropriate, provided it is innocent; and especially are such additions lawful if borrowed from the Old Dispensation." I should like to see the Presbyterian who has refuted Dr. Girardeau in argument meet a prelatist, who justifies these other additions by that Presbyterian's own logic. Would not his consistency be something like that pictured by the old proverb of "Satan reproving sin"? Again, if the New Testament church has priests, these priests must have sacrifice. Thus, consistency will finally lead that Presbyterian to the real corporeal presence and the mass.

To rebut further the charge that Dr. Girardeau is stickling for an unimportant point, I shall now proceed to assert the prudential and the doctrino-psychological arguments against the present organ worship.

1st. Sound prudence and discretion decide against it. The money cost of these instruments, with the damaging debts incurred for them, is a sufficient objection. The money they cost, if expended in mission work, would do infinitely more good to souls and honor to God. In our poor church, how many congregations are there which are to-day mocking Dr. Craig with a merely nominal contribution to missions on the plea of an organ debt of \$1,600 to \$3,600! This latter says it is able to spare \$3,600 for a Christian's use (or does it propose to cheat the organ builder?). I ask solemnly, Is it right to expend so much of God's money, which is needed to rescue perishing souls, upon an object merely non-essential, at best only a luxury? Does the Christian conscience, in measuring the worth of souls and God's glory, deliberately prefer the little to the much?

Again, instruments in churches are integral parts of a system which is fruitful

of choir quarrels and church feuds. How many pastoral relations have they helped to disrupt? They tend usually to choke congregational singing, and thus to rob the body of God's people of their God-given right to praise him in his sanctuary. They almost always help to foster anti-scriptural styles of church music, debauching to the taste, and obstructive, instead of assisting, to true devotional feelings. Whereas the advocates of organs usually defend them on grounds of musical culture and æsthetic refinement, I now attack them on those very grounds. I assert that the organ is peculiarly inimical to lyrical taste, good music, and every result which a cultivated taste pursues, apart from conscientious regard for God. The instrument, by its very structure, is incapable of adaptation to the true purposes of lyrical music. It cannot have any *arsis* or *thesis*, any rhythm or expression of emphasis, such as the pulsatile instruments have. Its tones are too loud, brassy and dominant; all syllabication is drowned. Thus the church music is degraded from that didactic, lyrical eloquence, which is its scriptural conception, to those senseless sounds expressly condemned by the apostle in 1 Corinthians xii.-xiv. In truth, the selection of this particular instrument as the preferred accompaniment of our lyrical worship betrays artistic ignorance in Protestants, or else a species of superfluity of naughtiness in choosing precisely the instrument specially suited to popish worship.

It so happens that the artistic world has an amusement—the Italian opera—whose aim is very non-religious indeed, but whose art-theory and method are precisely the same with those of scriptural church music. Both are strictly lyrical. The whole conception in each is this: to use articulate, rational words and sentences as vehicles for intelligible thoughts, by which the sentiments are to be affected, and to give them the aid of metre, rhythm and musical sounds to make the thoughts impressive. Therefore, all the world's artists select, for the opera-orchestras, only the pulsatile and chiefly the stringed instruments.

An organ has never been seen in a theatre in Europe; only those instruments are admitted which can express *arsis* and *thesis*. I presume the proposal to introduce an organ into the Italian opera would be received by every musical artist in Europe as a piece of bad taste, which would produce a guffaw of contempt. This machine, thus fatally unfit for all the true purposes of musical worship and lyrical expression, has, indeed, a special adaptation to the idolatrous purposes of Rome, to which purposes all Protestants profess to be expressly hostile. So that, in selecting so regularly Rome's special instrument of idolatry, these Protestants either countenance their own enemies or betray an artistic ignorance positively vulgar. Consequently, one is not surprised to find this incorrect taste offending every cultivated Christian ear by every imaginable perversity, under the pretext of divine worship. The selections made are the most bizarre and unsuitable. The execution is over loud, inarticulate, brassy, fitted only "to split the ears of the groundlings, capable, for the most part, of naught but inexplicable noise and dumbshows." The pious taste is outraged by the monopolizing of sacred time, and the indecent thrusting aside of God's holy worship to make room for "solos," which are unfit in composition, and still more so in execution, where the accompaniment is so hopelessly out of relation to the voice that if the one had the small-pox (as apparently it often has St. Vitus' dance) the other would be in no danger of catching the disease, and the words, probably senseless at best, are so mouthed as to convey no more ideas to the hearers than the noise of Chinese tom-toms. Worshippers of

true taste and intelligence, who know what the finest music in Europe really is, are so wearied by these impertinences that they almost shiver at the thought of the infliction. The holy places of our God are practically turned into fifth-rate Sunday theatres.

I shall be reminded that there are some Presbyterian churches with organs where these abuses do not follow. "They need not follow in any." I reply that they are the customary result of the unscriptural plans. If there should be some sedate boys who are allowed to play with fire-arms, but do not shoot their little sisters through the brain, yet that result follows so often as to ground the rule that no parent should allow this species of plaything to his children. The innovation is in itself unhealthy; and hence, when committed to the management of young people, who have but a slim modicum of cultivation, such as prevails in this country at large, has a regular tendency to all these offensive abuses.

2nd. I find a still more serious objection to instrumental music in churches when I connect the doctrine of God's word concerning worship with the facts of human psychology. Worship must be an act of *personal homage* to God, or it is a hypocrisy and offence. The rule is that we must "glorify God in our bodies and spirits, which are his." The whole human person, with all its faculties, appropriately takes part in this worship; for they are all redeemed by him and consecrated to him. Hence our voices should, at suitable times, accompany our minds and hearts. Again, all true worship is rational. The truth intelligently known and intelligibly uttered is the only instrument and language of true worship. Hence all social public worship *must be didactic*. The apostle has settled this beyond possible dispute in 1st Corinthians. Speaking in an unknown tongue, when there is no one to interpret, he declares can have no possible religious use, except to be a testimony for converting pagan unbelievers. If none such are present, Paul expressly orders the speaker in unknown tongues *to be silent* in the congregation; and this although the speaker could correctly claim the *afflatus* of the Holy Ghost. This strict prohibition Paul grounds on the fact that such a tongue, even though a miraculous charism, was not an articulate vehicle for sanctifying truth. And, as though he designed to clinch the application of this rule upon these very instruments of music, he selects them as the illustration of what he means. I beg the reader to examine 1 Corinthians xiv. 7, 8, 9.

Once more: man's animal nature is sensitive, through the ear, to certain sensuous, æsthetic impressions from melody, harmony and rhythm. There is, on the one hand, a certain analogy between the sensuous excitements of the acoustic nerves and sensorium and the rational sensibilities of the soul. (It is precisely this psychologic fact which grounds the whole power and pleasure of lyrical compositions.) Now, the critical points are these: That, while these sensuous excitements are purely animal and are no more essentially promotive of faith, holiness, or light in the conscience than the quiver of the fox-hunting horses' ears at the sound of the bugle or the howl of the houndwhelp at the sound of his master's piano, sinful men, fallen and blinded, are ever ready to abuse this faint analogy by mistaking the sensuous impressions for, and confounding them with, spiritual affections. Blinded men are ever prone to imagine that they have religious feelings, because they have sensuous, animal feelings, in accidental juxtaposition with religious places, words, or sights. This is the pernicious mistake which has sealed up millions of self-deceived souls for hell.

Rome encourages the delusion continually. She does this with a certain consistency between her policy and her false creed. She holds that, no matter by what motive men are induced to receive her sacraments, these convey saving grace, *ex opere operato*. Hence she consistently seduces men, in every way she can, to receive her sacraments by any spectacular arts or sensuous thrills of harmony. Now, Protestants ought to know that (as the apostle says) there is no more spiritual affection in these excitements of the sensorium than in sounding brass or in tinkling cymbal.

Protestants cannot plead the miserable consistency of Rome in aiding men to befool themselves to their own perdition by these confusions, for they profess to reject all *opus operatum* effects of sacraments, and to recognize no other instrument of sanctification than the one Christ assigned, THE TRUTH. But these organ-grinding Protestant churches are aiding and encouraging tens of thousands of their members to adopt this pagan mistake. Like the besotted Papist, they are deluded into the fancy that their hearts are better because certain sensuous, animal emotions are aroused by a mechanical machine, in a place called a church, and in a proceeding called worship.

Here, then, is the *rationale* of God's policy in limiting his musical worship to the melodies of the *human voice*. It is a faculty of the redeemed person, and not the noise of a dead machine. The human voice, while it can produce melodious tones, can also articulate the words which are intelligible vehicles of divine truths. The hymns sung by the human voice can utter didactic truth with the impressiveness of right articulation and emphasis, and thus the pious singers can do what God commands—teach one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual songs. For his Christian church, the non-appointment of mechanical accompaniment *was its prohibition*. Time will prove, we fear by a second corruption of evangelical religion and by the ruin of myriads more of nominally Christian souls, how much wiser is the psychology of the Bible than that of Mrs. Grundy.

The reader has by this time seen that I ascribe this recent departure of our Presbyterian churches from the rule of their fathers in no degree to more liberal views or enlightened spirit. I know, by an intuition which I believe every sensible observer shares, that the innovation is merely the result of an advancing *wave of worldliness* and ritualism in the evangelical bodies. These Christians are not wiser but simply more flesh-pleasing and fashionable. That is exactly the dimension of the strange problem. Other ritualistic adjuncts concur from time to time. Nothing is needed but the lapse of years enough for this drift, of which this music is a part, to send back great masses of our people, a material well prepared for the delusion, into the bosom of Rome and her kindred connections.

This melancholy opinion is combined, in our minds, with a full belief in the piety, good intentions and general soundness of many ministers and laymen who are now aiding the innovations. No doubt the advocates of instrumental music regard this as the sting of Dr. Girardeau's argument, that it seems to claim all the fidelity and piety for the anti-organ party. No doubt many hearts are now exclaiming, "This is unjust, and thousands of our saintliest women are in the organ-loft; our soundest ministers have organs," &c., &c. All this is perfectly true. It simply means that the best of people err and unintentionally do mischief when they begin to lean to their own understandings. The first organ I ever knew of in a Virginian Presbyterian church was introduced by one of the wisest and most saintly, of pastors, a paragon of old school doctrinal rigor. But he avowedly intro-

duced it on an argument the most unsound and perilous possible for a good man to adopt—that it would be advantageous to prevent his young people from leaving his church to run after the Episcopal organ in the city. Of course such an argument would equally justify every other sensational and spectacular adjunct to God's ordinances, which is not criminal *per se*. Now this father's general soundness prevented his carrying out the pernicious argument to other applications. A very bad organ remained the only unscriptural feature in a church otherwise well-ordered. But after the church authorizes such policy, what guarantee remains that one and another less sound and staid will not carry the improper principle to disastrous results? The conclusion of this matter is, then, that neither the piety nor the good intention of our respectable opponents is disparaged by us; but that the teachers and rulers of our church, learning from the great reformers and the warning lights of church history, should take the safer position alongside of Dr. Girardeau. Their united advice would easily and pleasantly lead back to the Bible ground all the zealous and pious laymen and the saintly ladies who have been misled by fashion and incipient ritualism.

R. L. DABNEY.

KEIL'S BIBLICAL ARCHEOLOGY.

MANUAL OF BIBLICAL ARCHEOLOGY. *By Carl Friedrich Keil, Doctor and Professor of Theology.* With alterations and additions furnished by the author for the English translation. Vol. II. Translated from the German and edited by the Rev. Alex. Cusin, M. A., Edinburgh. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1888.

The first volume of this valuable work appeared in the autumn of 1887. On the fifth day of May following the distinguished author died. In his death the cause of conservatism loses a champion who for sixty-five years, as professor at Dorpat and writer at Leipsic, had withstood that storm of criticism which has swept nearly every other eminent continental scholar before it. The preface to this second volume informs us that his latest alterations and additions had already been forwarded for use in the English translation; so that we have here the most complete edition of his *Archæology*.

In the PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY for April, 1888, when noticing the first volume, we commended warmly the general excellencies of this treatise, and need not repeat our encomiums now. Its chief vice, perhaps, is fanciful speculation in regard to symbols. There is much less of that in this volume than in the first, a difference due, doubtless, to the difference of subjects, the present volume being chiefly taken up with the Social and State Relations of the Israelites rather than their Religious Relations. A hundred pages, however, even of this volume, are devoted to the discussion of Worship in relation to the times fixed for its observance. And here in the very outset we differ from him in his statement that "the Sabbath was first instituted by Moses." His remark about the Sabbath in the cuneiform records shows that he was not acquainted with the most recent literature of that subject; and in fact the book is behind the times on several points. Take, for instance, his statement that in mathematics the knowledge of the Israelites "hardly went beyond the four simple rules which suffice for the common wants of life, which they may have learned in Egypt, along with the elements of surveying required for the division of land." No one who had studied the Siloam Inscription could have placed so low an estimate upon their mathematical attainments, for that inscription shows that in cutting the

aqueduct through the hill Ophel, the workmen began simultaneously at the two ends and met in the middle, a feat of engineering which speaks well for their skill in mathematics. Again, we thought it was pretty well agreed among scholars that "Cadmus" was simply a mythical personification of the east (קדמוס), but Dr. Keil writes about him as if his faith in the Cadmus of his childhood had never been jostled.

Some of our author's statements are correct so far as they go, but are inadequate; *e. g.*, in his account of corporal punishments there is no mention of the bastinado, though that is one of the most common forms of punishment in the east (Deut. xxv. 2); and in his account of the Passover there is no attempt to reconcile the two interpretations of בֵּין הָעֵרְבִים (Ex. xii. 6). His view of the prohibition, "Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk," is the common and shallow one that it was designed to prevent unnecessary cruelty. If that were the whole meaning of this interdict, it would be impossible to explain its frequent inculcation and honorable juxtaposition (Ex. xxiii. 19; xxxiv. 26; Deut. xiv. 21). Dr. Keil rightly denies the connection alleged by the Rabbinites between the Sanhedrin and the college of seventy elders named by Moses (Num. xi. 16-30), but he does not go to the root of the matter by showing the precise difference of function between the Sanhedrin and the seventy assistants of Moses.

At times fanciful, at times antiquated, at times inadequate, yet in the main sound, able and learned—that is our estimate. We, therefore, adhere to the opinion that for critical students this is the best of the manuals of Biblical Archæology.

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MCCOSH'S FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS.

FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. Being a Treatise on Metaphysics. *By James McCosh, D. D., LL. D., Litt. D.* 12mo, pp. x., 360. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1889.

In that memorable gathering at Philadelphia of those whose names had become identified with the progress of Presbyterianism, perhaps no figure attracted more attention and inspired more reverence than the venerable form of him who was styled on the floor of the General Assembly "the greatest living Presbyterian." As we recall the whiteness of his hair and the manifest marks of advanced age, we are the more impressed with this book just fresh from hand. That a man standing hard by the borders of four-score should write a book is something wonderful; but such a book as this, a sustained treatise on one of the subtlest departments of human thought, embracing some of the most perplexing problems that have ever vexed the mind of man from the days of Socrates to the present,—this achievement we regard as something phenomenal. It may justly be said of the distinguished author's intellectual life, as of the great leader of Israel, that his eye is not dim nor his natural force abated; for there is in this work no slightest trace of age, except a certain sound conservatism, together with a rare and gracious alliance of seemingly contradictory qualities, which, like the body and bloom to old wine, comes only at the suit of years; the strength of dogmatism without its austerity; a criticism as courteous and con-

siderate as it is close and keen; the independence of decided individuality untainted with the offence of egotism; learning and research, wide and thorough, yet unassuming and natural.

Dr. McCosh himself describes this volume as the cope-stone of what he has been able to do in philosophy. It treats of metaphysics, defined as the science of First and Fundamental Truths. The author sets himself earnestly to inquire what these are; to determine their nature, and to classify and arrange them into a science. The discussion is divided into three general sections: *General View of Primitive Principles; Particular Examination of Primitive Truths*, classified as Primitive Cognitions, Primitive Beliefs, Primitive Judgments; *Intuitive Principles and the Sciences*.

The fundamental postulate of his philosophy is that the mind, in its intelligent acts, begins with and proceeds throughout on a cognition of things. In keeping with this, his philosophy is thoroughly and consistently realistic, as opposed to the idealism of Berkeley, the semi-idealism of Hamilton, the skepticism of Hume, the sensualism of the French school, the nescience of Spencer, and that agnosticism for which Kant unwittingly furnished the principles.

The happy characteristics of the work are a strong common-sense that recognizes the limits of knowledge, and preserves that safe medium between legitimate claims and unwarranted assumptions; an excellent style, clear, simple, concise, with here and there sufficient glow and warmth flashing out to indicate reserves of eloquence; evidences of exhaustive culture and profound personal study in a chosen and loved field, and an ever-present reverent faith in God.

We have not had the pleasure of examining any of the other works which have been the direct fruits of Dr. McCosh's professional study, and there are many points suggested in this volume, elaborated, doubtless, in other volumes, upon which we would be greatly pleased to read our author at greater length. We will close this short and very unsatisfactory notice by giving readers a specimen of the admirable spirit and style of the work before us:

“The two, knowledge and faith, differ psychologically, and there are important ends to be served in distinguishing them; but, after all, it is more important to fix our attention on their points of agreement and coincidence. The belief has a basis of cognition; the cognition has a superstructure of beliefs. The one conviction, equally with the other, carries within itself its validity and authority. No man is entitled to restrict himself to cognitions and refuse to attend to or to yield to the beliefs which he is also led to entertain by the very constitution of his mind. No man can do so, in fact. He who would do so must needs go out of the world. Every man must act upon his native beliefs, as well as upon his cognitions. He requires no external considerations to lead him to trust in the one any more than in the other, for each has its sufficiency in itself. He who would weakly give up his native faiths because assaults are made on them, and doggedly resolve to yield to nothing but immediate cognitions, will find that the skeptic who has driven him from the beliefs will go on to attack the cognitions likewise, and that he can defend the cognitions only on grounds which might have enabled him to stand by his credences likewise. On the other hand, I grieve over the attempts, for the last age or two, of a school of thinkers who labor to prove that the understanding, or the speculative reason, leads to skepticism and nihilism, and then appeal to faith to save us from the abyss before us. I have no toleration for those who tell us with a sigh, too often of affectation, that they are very sorry that knowledge or reason leads to insoluble doubts and contradictions, from which they long to be delivered by some mysterious faith. It is time to put an end to this worse than civil strife, to this setting of one part of the soul against another.”

“He who dwells in infinity is at once a God who reveals, and a God who conceals himself. We can know, but we can know only in part. The knowledge which we can attain is the clearest, and yet the obscurest, of all our knowledge. A child, a savage, can acquire a certain acquaintance with him, while neither sage nor angel can rise to a full comprehension of him. God may be truly described as the Being of whom we know the most, inasmuch as his works are ever pressing themselves upon our attention, and we behold more of his ways than of the ways of any other; and yet he is the Being of whom we know the least, inasmuch as we know comparatively less of his whole nature than we do of ourselves or of our fellow-men, or of any object falling under our senses. They who know the least of him have in this the most valuable of all knowledge; they who know the most, know but little after all of his glorious perfections. Let us prize what knowledge we have, but feel, meanwhile, that our knowledge is comparative ignorance. They who know little of him may feel as if they know much; they who know much will always feel that they know little. The most limited knowledge of him should be felt to be precious, but this mainly as an encouragement to seek knowledge higher and yet higher, without limit and without end. They who, in earth or heaven, know the most, know that they know but little after all; but they know that they may know more and more of him throughout eternal ages.”

Washington, N. C.

SAMUEL M. SMITH.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH GENERAL COUNCIL, ETC.

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ALLIANCE OF THE REFORMED CHURCHES HOLDING THE PRESBYTERIAN SYSTEM. *Edited by William G. Blaikie, D. D., LL. D.* London. 1888.

The Rev. Dr. Blaikie deserves the thanks of the Presbyterians throughout the world for placing before them so succinctly the doings of this notable body. From the sermon of the Rev. Dr. Dykes and the reception at the Argyll Lodge to the closing meeting, the reports are most correct and the editorial work most careful. The range of topics is wide, but they are all vital to the interests of the church. The first subject, an eminently practical one, presents two excellent papers, one from the Rev. Dr. Thompson, of Edinburgh, the other from the Rev. Dr. Drury, of the Reformed Dutch Church (New York). In discussing the question, “How best to work the Presbyterian system,” the necessity for special training for elders and deacons is insisted on, as well as the duty of pastoral visitation. Some suggestions are made in regard to the “rotary eldership,” but they did not meet with great favor.

“Some Elements of Congregational Prosperity” is discussed next by Theodore Monod, of France, and others. In speaking of prayerfulness Dr. Monod refers to the “*Les Adieux D’Adolphe Monod*,” and says that this dying saint spoke of “prayerfulness” as the prime element of prosperity in the church. Dr. Pierson’s address on “The Contact of Congregational Life and Work with the Vast Masses of our Population” is a thrilling one. His suggestion is that these masses be incorporated into the church life, not by means of evangelists or mission chapels, but by bringing them directly into the churches and by carrying the churches with the *best* people directly to them, an excellent thing if God’s people had the grace to carry it out.

The ablest papers, perhaps, of the whole meeting are those on the next topic, viz., the “Intellectual Tendencies of the Age.” Those by the Rev. Dr. Ellinwood on the “Duty of the Church with Reference to the Speculative Tendencies of the

"Times," and the Rev. Dr. G. F. Moore, of Andover, on the "Modern Historical Movement," are clever, discriminating and particularly able.

Another very strong paper was offered in connection with this subject by Principal Edwards, of Wales. It so enthused one divine that he cried out when the principal took his seat, "Well done, Welshman." This topic also called forth the speech of Dr. Marcus Dods, of Glasgow, which caused a decided sensation. It was able like the others, but not like them, orthodox. Indeed, it was so far from it that it seemed to many to be not consistent with the fundamental article of the Alliance, and in the review of this subject it was roundly condemned, only one or two being found who would even attempt to apologize for it. This failure was a noble testimony to the conservatism of this great body. If time allowed, the writer would like to refer to the salient features of this address, as well as to those of the others, so brilliant and scholarly are they. The "Social Tendencies of the Age" are ably handled by Dr. Marshall Lang, of Glasgow, and Rev. Moses D. Hoge, D. D., of Richmond. This last speaker, the only one from the Southern Church, made a capital speech.

The ventilation of the subject of "Coöperation in Foreign Missions" is especially desirable at this time, and this is thoroughly done in this volume. Towards coöperation and union in the mission fields, the energies of the Alliance have been constantly directed, and we are indebted to its beneficent influence for the union we have in Brazil and Japan to-day, and for much of the coöperation in China and elsewhere. But though the Alliance so strongly favors union it does not wish to consummate any union at the sacrifice of truth, well knowing that the end of any such union would be disastrous.

The "Women's Work" receives its share of attention. Prof. Charteris, of Edinburgh, convener of the committee on this subject, presented a thoughtful and able paper recommending that the women be organized for work under the control of the governing bodies of the church, and especially that the order of deaconesses be established. This last recommendation has been anticipated by the Book of Order of the Southern Presbyterian Church. While many may not agree with the exegesis, etc., of this report, all must acknowledge that the organization of women for all kinds of suitable work is a pressing necessity.

The "Worship of the Church" is skilfully treated at the hands of Pasteur Bersier, of Paris, on "Liturgical Worship." Also by Rev. Dr. Donald Fraser, of London, on "Presbyterian Worship." In all the very admirable remarks on this matter reference is made to the use of the liturgy by Knox, Calvin, and the Reformers generally, as if they were not attempting to adapt themselves to a peculiar state of affairs at that particular time; and while there are many branches of the Alliance which use the liturgy and insist on it, those who do not seem disposed to leave matters as they are. Some, however, even among these, are in favor of a modified form of some sort, in order, as they aver, to "dissipate the baldness of the service." But it is a striking fact that the most successful churches on this continent are those without a liturgy, and that these, under very great disadvantages, have far outstripped the liturgical bodies.

The "*Desiderata* of Presbyterian History," "The Care of the Young," and the "Aggressive Work of the Church," all receive their due proportion of attention, and the discussions of these questions cannot fail to repay the reader richly. A very touching and absorbing part of this record is that which has to do with the

European continent. Here we find the appeals from those struggling little bands on that continent who have long been borne down by the heavy hand of persecution, and who, with the smell of fire even yet on their garments, appeal so pathetically to their more powerful sisters to foster and gather them together, those scattered remnants holding the illustrious faith, and thus save them from utter extinction.

Not one of the least valuable features of the report is the statistics found in the appendix. They are compiled with great care and are remarkably accurate. With some improvements they will constitute the most complete body of statistics in the possession of any Protestant church. The figures cover the "Organized Churches," the "Theological Seminaries," the "Literature of the Churches," as well as their "Evangelistic and Missionary Statistics." From these figures it appears that the churches represented in the Alliance have 4,000,000 communicants, and counting five persons to a communicant, that it represents a constituency of 20,000,000 souls. The contribution of each member is less than £2, or something less than \$9. The aggregate contribution is about £6,000,000 per year. About 50,000 converts have been gathered by its churches from heathendom. Among its missionaries are 500 ordained ministers. Presbyterian papers are published in the Chinese, Japanese, Kaffir, Hindustani, Syriac, Arabic and Turkish languages. In the appendix will be found the famous "*Livre des Anglais*," or register of the English Church at Geneva, under the associated pastoral care of John Knox and Christopher Goodman, 1555-'59. This was the "*Disaspora*" under Bloody Mary. It is in *fac-simile*, and one of the entries runs thus: A. D. 1556, the 16th December, 1556: "When ye first year was ended, then the whole congregation did elect and chuse John Knox and Christopher Goodman to preche the Word of God and mynyster the sacraments."

In the closing meeting will be found a short speech from Signor Gavazzi, lately deceased. This grand old man had under his cleric's garb a lion's heart. He it was who, after his faithful service with Garibaldi, became a preacher of righteousness, and died a minister in the Free Church of Italy.

It is impossible to call attention to one tithe of the rich and indispensable matter contained in these pages. It only remains to say that the meeting, of which it is the record, was a success in every particular. It has abundantly demonstrated its right to exist, even if it had done nothing more than compile these statistics, call forth these contributions to theological literature, suggest these lines of coöperation, or body forth the unity of the Reformed churches.

EMMETT W. McCORKLE.

SCHAFF'S TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES.

THE TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES; OR, The Oldest Church Manual. The Didachè and Kindred Documents in the Original, with Translations and Discussions of Post-Apostolic Teaching, Baptism, Worship, and Discipline; and with Illustrations and *Fac-Similes* of the Jerusalem Manuscript. By Philip Schaff, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Third Edition. Revised and Enlarged. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1889. 8vo, pp. x., 325.

The profound interest awakened among scholars by the first publication of the Didachè at the close of the year 1883 was not confined to them, but speedily com-

municated itself to all intelligent students of religious literature. To this wider interest Dr. Schaff has probably contributed more largely than any other of the numerous writers who have undertaken to illustrate this oldest Church Manual. The work, which now lies before us in a third edition, revised and enlarged, first appeared in 1885, and it was at once recognized, both in this country and abroad, as furnishing the most complete critical apparatus for the study of the Didachè. But, as has already been intimated, the book is of interest, not only to the scholar, but also to the more general reader, especially to the average, busy pastor, who needs an experienced guide in forming his opinion as to the matters illustrated by this early document.

Written, as it probably was, in the last decade of the first century, the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles" affords us a glimpse of the transition which the church underwent, just as that transition began. Its chief value, we think, lies in the fact that it demonstrates the baselessness of the claim that the apostles left the church with a prelatical organization; but it also throws much light upon the worship and discipline of the church at that early period. Dr. Schaff's mastery of the materials of ecclesiastical history gives him peculiar fitness for the task he has assumed in the thirty-three chapters with which he prepares his readers for appreciation of the Didachè and the kindred documents which follow. Here will be found three chapters on the mode of baptism: *Baptism in the Didachè* (Chap. XV.); *Baptism and the Catacombs* (Chap. XVI.); *Immersion and Pouring in History* (Chap. XVII.). Then follow, after a chapter on the *Eucharist*, four chapters on the constitution and officers of the church: *Ecclesiastical Organization* (Chap. XIX.); *Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Government* (Chap. XX.); *Apostles and Prophets* (Chap. XXI.); *Bishops and Deacons* (Chap. XXII.).

The first chapter of the book is devoted to a short account of the Jerusalem Monastery in Constantinople, in which the treasure lay concealed so long; the second describes the *MS.* of the Didachè and illustrates by two fac-similes, one being the first lines of the document as they were written "by the hand of Leon, notary and sinner," as the copyist chooses to designate himself. In Chapter III. we have an account of Bryennios, the discoverer of the Didachè. The final chapter (XXXIII.) is devoted to the *Literature* of the subject up to 1885. The First Appendix (pp. 297-306) gives an account of the additional literature up to March, 1886. In the Second Appendix, consisting of fourteen pages, mention is made of what has appeared from March, 1886, to the beginning of the current year. It will thus be seen that we possess, in the third edition of Dr. Schaff's book, in addition to his own illustrations of this valuable document, a complete conspectus of the Didachè-literature. By this, as in so many other ways, has the *doctor indefatigabilis* placed us under lasting obligations to him.

The publishers have done their part well. The dress is worthy of the contents of the book, and when this is said there need be nothing added.

Union Theological Seminary in Virginia.

JAMES F. LATIMER.

VIII. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

BIBLE STUDIES ON ELECTION. *By James D. McLean.* 18mo, pp. 60. Richmond: Whittet & Shepperson. 1889.

The treatise is precisely what it claims to be. The arguments for Election drawn from the general doctrine of the decrees, providence, original sin, etc., are not suggested. The book simply gathers together and classifies the direct Scripture statements on the subject, under such chapters as the Meaning, the Author, the Objects, the Time, the Method, the Effect, the Cause, the Purpose, and the Benefits of Election, and How the Subject should Affect the Christian. The famous passage in Ephesians i. 3-7 is taken as the foundation text. The tract is well adapted to its purpose, and may be most effectively used by pastors. It presents Election from the Bible standpoint solely, and thus commends itself to the masses in our churches, and furnishes absolutely unanswerable proof of this great distinctive doctrine of our church. That this doctrine is now assailed with unusual virulence, both in the popular form of fiction and in the misdirected efforts of only half-hearted Presbyterians in the cry for revision, renders the appearance and distribution of this little work most timely. We commend it heartily.

FUTURE PROBATION EXAMINED. *By William DeLoss Love, Pastor at South Hadley, Mass.* 12mo, pp. 322. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1888.

The interest with which the subject of this book has been invested of late has resulted in giving to the world a large number of treatises, of greater or less length. So far as we know, however, no single one has attempted that which is the object of this author, viz., the collection within the compass of one small volume, of the testimony of the fathers and religious writers for three hundred years before and after Christ. A very small part of the book is original or deals with the application of the testimony. A mechanical analysis would show not more than five or ten per cent. to be the author's comment. The rest of the book is composed of citations from the Scriptures, the uninspired writers before Christ, and the early Christian fathers. The Apocrypha, the Targums, the Book of Enoch, and the writings of Josephus and Philo, are the uninspired and unchristian sources most drawn from. The Epistle of Barnabas, the Pastor of Hermas, the Clementine Recognitions, and writings of Justin Martyr, Papias, Irenæus, Cyprian and others are the patristic witnesses whose testimony is presented. In twenty-five chapters, bearing such titles as "God Eternal," "Life Eternal," "Punishment Eternal," "The Resurrection," "The Heathen Guilty," etc., the compiler has grouped whatever testimony he could find in these writers or authors upon the subject under consideration. Thus we have ready, at hand, a great mass of thought and opinion, bearing more or less directly upon the subject of future probation and affiliated themes. It may be said, in candor, that many of the authorities are little to be relied upon or their statements accepted; so that in those cases where the testimony appears to favor any aspect of the second probation theory, or to teach broad views upon the question of

the salvation of infants and the salvability of the heathen, one need be little disturbed. The collection of testimony is mainly useful in a historical way; for it is the word of God alone that is to decide this vital question.

JESUS CHRIST THE DIVINE MAN. His Life and Times. *By J. F. Vallings, M. A., Vicar of Sopley, Honorable Fellow, sometime Subwarden of St. Augustine's College, Canterbury.* 12mo, pp. viii., 226. Cloth, \$1. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co.

The author's special aim is to treat of the Saviour's life in its spiritual unity and moral aspects, and with special reference to its relation to missionary work, and the contact of Christianity with non-Christian religions. He does not use his space in elaborate discussion of the disputed points as to the origin, the genuineness, the authenticity, the harmony of the gospel narratives, but accepts the conclusions of Westcott, Hort, and others. He often meets the difficulties, however, indirectly and suggestively. The brevity required in the treatise has held the author from that large amount of highly colored description, lofty rhetoric and occasional rhapsodizing which are so common to works on the life of Christ, and which the exaltation of the theme seems almost to demand. The book is written in a conservative, reverent spirit, and deserves a place beside the more elaborate works of the same kind. It is one of the series of "The Men of the Bible," coming from the press of the Randolphs.

JEREMIAH. His Life and Times. *By Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M. A., D. D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture at Oxford, Canon of Rochester.* 12mo, pp. xii., 205. Cloth, \$1. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co.

Another of "The Men of the Bible" series, and a companion volume, in its critical aspects, to Driver's "Isaiah." The author applies all along the results of the higher criticism. He seems to think that the time has come when the results of critical study should be given to the people in popular form. He especially applies them here in treating of the origin of the Book of the Law, which Hilkiah found, and which he claims to have been written but a little while before its discovery, and as late as Josiah's day, and which Hilkiah certainly believed and declared to be Mosaic in its origin and authorship. He accounts for all this by the suggestion that the book discovered was "written as Moses would have written it had he been recalled to life for this purpose!" and attempts a justification of Hilkiah's deceit by the declaration that he practiced not delusion, but illusion. "Novalis," says our author, "may exaggerate when he says 'error is the necessary instrument of truth; with error I make truth.' But he is strictly correct in his following words: 'All transition begins with illusion.' Both historically and educationally it is clear that at certain stages of development men cannot receive the pure truth, which must, therefore, be enclosed for a time in a husk of harmless error." The chapter discussing this matter is significantly entitled "Fraud or Needful Illusion." In dealing with the allusions of the Book of the Law, which one finds in 2 Kings xxii. 13, and 2 Chron. xvii, 6-9, the author is so hard pressed that he must resort to the statement that the narrative in 2 Kings contains patent improbabilities, and is inconsistent with facts derived from the Book of Jeremiah, and to the further statement that the chronicler is "biased by what we may call his ecclesiastical interest," and further, that the compiler of Chronicles was "a man of fervent piety, from whom we have much to learn, but most inaccurate as a historian." This surely is criticism

run mad. We are glad to think that the church at large is not yet ready to accept such conclusions, and that there are yet left able scholars who can resist the sneers and patronizing tone of the higher critics, and who are yet willing to hold to what the latter gentry so contemptuously call "the traditional views."

THE PROPHECIES OF ISAIAH. *Expounded by Dr. C. Von Orelli, Basel, author of "Old Testament Prophecy."* Translated by Rev. J. S. Banks, *Headingley College, Leeds.* 8vo, pp. 350. \$3. New York: Scribner & Welford; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1889.

This commentary is characterized by great brevity, but comprehensiveness. It enters into no elaborate discussions or statements of possible meanings or interpretations. It divides the book of Isaiah into sections, according to the subject, without regard to the chapters, presents the author's translation, and gives an exposition of each section or paragraph, with illustrative information, and in foot-notes gives new readings and more detailed and grammatical criticism. The editors of the series of which it forms a part state that certain parts of the Old Testament "lose nothing in dignity, while they gain in intelligibility, and therefore in value for the reader, if assured results of real science are accepted in the place of opinions which, although they have existed for centuries, are still supported by no ancient tradition in a conclusive way." Under this specious statement it is not hard to see the real meaning, and it is not surprising to find that our author follows that class of critics like Driver, Cheyne, and others, who attribute a double authorship to the book of Isaiah. In his Introduction to the second part of the book—chapters XL.—LXVI.—he gives, with somewhat more elaborateness than we would expect, the various reasons for accepting the exilic authorship of this part. The arguments are the same as those familiar from Driver's treatise upon the same subject, and present no new matter.

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. PAUL. Studies in the First Eight Chapters of his Epistle to the Romans. *By the Rev. J. Oswald Dykes, M. A., D. D.* 12mo, pp. 280. Cloth, \$1.75. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1888.

Dr. Dykes states, in his preface, that this work is neither a commentary nor a treatise in theology; that it sets forth no novel interpretation of the apostle's teaching; that there is small likelihood that after centuries of study it has been reserved for this generation to discover the right sense of Paul's most important Letter. He then declares his aim to be the re-statement of the course of the argument and development of thought through these famous chapters in such plain, non-technical language as may prove of assistance to readers who possess an intelligent interest in evangelical truth. He has succeeded admirably. The chapters are all rich and suggestive. The author's style is both elegant and vigorous, his scholarship, which does not protrude itself, accurate and extensive, his orthodoxy unquestioned, and his temper and spirit thoroughly warm and evangelical. The book is fascinating from beginning to end, and will be found happily adapted to the general reader. To the preacher, also, its style and method of presenting truth and unfolding the word of God make it an admirable pattern. The practical and popular style adopted may, in a few places, make it seem that the author lays too much stress on the part that man has to do in "making his own election sure," but we think that this is merely an impression which the remembrance of the fact that the author is here dealing with his subject practically rather than technically will entirely account for.

THE TRUE SITE OF CALVARY, and Suggestions Relating to the Resurrection. *By Fisher Howe, Author of "Oriental and Sacred Scenes."* With an Illustrative Map of Jerusalem. 8vo, pp. 68. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1888.

A new edition of one of the earliest works in which the argument was given in an orderly form in support of the belief that the hillock over the Grotto of Jeremiah is the True Site of Calvary. The monograph has lost none of its freshness, and its position has received much confirmatory testimony from numerous sources since it was first printed. As a succinct, clear statement of the reasons for the now very common belief as to the place of the crucifixion, we can commend it. The more recent explorations at Jerusalem might have made fuller the topographical argument of the author, but would only have added strength to his conclusions.

THE LORD AND THE LEPER, and Other Sermons Preached in 1888. *By C. H. Spurgeon, of London.* 12mo, pp. 390. Cloth, \$1. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1889.

Comment upon the pulpit work of this great preacher is no longer needed. One can only express surprise at his wonderful endurance, his unfailing powers. Each succeeding volume of his sermons equals its predecessor, and shows that the preacher's bow abides in strength. With his increasing years, however, one can readily trace a growth in richness and ripeness, and the great doctrines of grace appear more and more sweet and precious as the old warrior contends for them with the vigor of earlier life.

THE INTERWOVEN GOSPELS. The Four Histories of Jesus Christ Blended in a Complete and Continuous Narrative in the Words of the Gospels. According to the Revised Version of 1881. *Compiled by Rev. William Pittenger.* 12mo, cloth, with maps, 75 cents. New York: John B. Alden. 1889.

In this ingenious work the four biographies of Christ are given in the language of the gospels, but so arranged and blended as to form one continuous narrative. When known, the period and place at which the events described occurred are noted. Where the Evangelists have given more than one account, the fullest one, or the one which best harmonized with the preceding subject, has been taken and the peculiarities of the others interwoven therewith. There are also maps of the Holy Land, many helpful foot-notes, and a table for finding any passage of which the chapter and verse are known. The compiler set himself a difficult task when he undertook this work. Few problems have engaged as serious attention as that of presenting a satisfactory Harmony. The special value of the book will be in its adaptation to young people in their first introduction to the study of the New Testament, as it will give them the gospels as ordinary, connected history.

MANIFOLD CYCLOPEDIA OF KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE. With Illustrations. Each Volume about 625 Pages, 7½ inches by 4½ inches. New York, Chicago, and Atlanta: John B. Alden. 1889. Cloth, 50 cents; half-morocco, 65 cents.

Volumes eleven, twelve, and thirteen of this popular publication lie before us. The work is apparently more comprehensive than its projectors contemplated, as the last volume only brings us through "Exclaim." The increasing comprehensiveness, however, will add largely to its value. The special feature of the work, as

already noted in these pages, is its combination of the Dictionary and Encyclopædia ideas. It gives those who wish more than a mere dictionary and yet cannot afford an expensive encyclopædia a set of volumes, beautifully bound and remarkably low in price, which answer the ordinary needs of the general student for both purposes. The present volumes are characterized by the same thoroughness and fidelity which have distinguished those issued before, and we commend the entire work for its practical usefulness, timeliness, and popular price.

AN INTRODUCTORY NEW TESTAMENT GREEK METHOD. Together with a Manual, Containing Text and Vocabulary of the Gospel of John and Lists of Words, and the Elements of New Testament Greek Grammar. By Wm. Rainey Harper, Ph. D., Professor in Yale University, and Revere Franklin Weidner, D. D., Professor of Exegesis in Augustana Theological Seminary, Rock Island. Pp. 520. Cloth, \$2.50. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1889.

Those who know Dr. Harper, as the writer does, both wonder and delight in the appearance of this book. The wonder is that in the multitude of professorial duties demanding his time, of cares involved in the editorship of *The Old Testament Student* and *Hebraica*, in the arrangement and conduct of the many summer schools of Hebrew, and in the superintendence and personal work in his vast correspondence school, this man has not killed himself, much more that he has prepared another book! The delight is in the application to Greek study that is found here of that method which has within the past ten years wrought such a revolution in Hebrew study and so popularized it that hundreds now pursue it with enthusiasm and success, where formerly ten struggled through it in a painful and perfunctory manner. The two authors, Drs. Harper and Weidner, have adopted what is known as the "Inductive Method." Instead of learning first the principles of the language as they are laid down in the grammar and then applying them to selected words or sentences, and then being "plunged headlong into the reading of some classical author," the student is introduced at once to a sentence of the language he is about to study, is given all the facts that are found in it, is then given another and another sentence or verse, and its facts, until, having acquired a certain number of these facts, he can properly group them in their specific classes and relations. Thus the student makes the grammar, so to speak, as he progresses. The cardinal principle of the method is that the grammar of any language is but the classification of the facts of that language. The method is therefore natural: first gather the facts, and afterwards classify them. This is the method in which the child learns its mother tongue. He would make slow progress if the old system of teaching the Hebrew or Greek or Latin were applied to him in youth. The "Introductory New Testament Greek Method" before us pursues the new method, not rigidly, but in the main, the departure being only at those points where a more complete treatment of a given subject or class of facts than the facts already encountered warrant is demanded for its clearer elucidation; yet all along, the greatest care is exercised to give as little as possible of what has not been brought out by the passages under immediate inspection. To the gathering of these facts of the language, necessarily a large amount of memorizing is at first essential, until the student begins to recognize analogies and to make his own groupings. The authors wisely claim, however, that the memorizing of the facts is less drudgery than the memorizing of principles without a knowledge of the facts. We are confident that this new and natural method will give a decided impulse to the study of New Testament Greek.

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I. THE NEGRO IN ECCLESIASTICAL RELATIONS.

THE negro question, as it is called, presents one of the most perplexing problems of our age. Every phase of it, social, political, and ecclesiastical, involves difficulties sufficient to tax the wisdom and philanthropy of the most enlightened. The difficulty is increased by the malign influence of sectionalism. Both sections of our common country essay the attempt, and each embarrasses the other. The North would speedily settle it were it not for the South; and the South would have settled it long ago but for the North. The conscientious convictions of each party stand in the way of the best intentions of the other, so that the well meant efforts of both fail, to the scandal of religion and the sorrow of philanthropy. Two opposing policies are presented by the two sections. This want of harmony was at first explained and excused by the heat of passion lingering like smoke around the recent battle fields, and there was confident prophecy of its speedy disappearance. The passions of war, however, have long since subsided, and the hostiles have "shaken hands across the bloody chasm," and the lines of opposition, like those of breastwork and battle-field, have been long ago obliterated, while this conflict still rages. These policies have confronted each other now for a quarter of a century, and they are as unreconciled if not as irreconcilable in 1889 as in 1865. There is something very significant in this.

Moreover, whatever suggestion is offered by either fails of influence on the other, each being discounted—the South by the North upon the allegation of prejudice, the North by the South upon that of ignorance.

The foregoing circumstances heighten the difficulty well nigh to the insuperable. Though we are of decidedly optimistic temperament, and greatly disposed to hope for the best in most troubles, yet we feel constrained to confess that increasing acquaintance with the various elements and circumstances of this question has but served to emphasize its difficulty and enhance its darkness.

We think it inevitable that people, however wise and good, who essay the solution of a practical problem from a distance must be liable to mistake; nothing is more unreliable and unsatisfactory than long range theory and speculation anent problems of practical policy; the world universally resists and resents such criticism as unjust and unfair; alien interference and dictation in matters of this sort can never be helpful, and therefore never wise or welcome. It is no imputation on the intelligence or virtue of the North to assert this.

The Rev. Dr. Field, the able and accomplished editor of the *Evangelist*, in one of his "Letters from the South," says:

"If the confession of ignorance is the first step in the road to knowledge, I think I am in a way to learn something, though it may leave me in the end both 'a wiser and a sadder man.' When I came South, I thought I knew something of its peculiar social and political questions; but I find I have a great deal to learn, and that, while my sympathy for the colored race remains as before, there are difficulties in the adjustment of its relations to the white race, which could not be seen at a distance, but which on a near approach become distinctly visible."

"It (the North) can help them in the way of education; it can give money for schools and colleges, but it cannot interfere in political and social affairs. That the South would resent, as we should resent any outside interference with the affairs of the City or State of New York. We have many things that are bad enough, such as ballot-box stuffing and false counting of votes; but we do not call on the national government to put them down. That is our business. We believe in home rule, and if that is the law in New York, so it must be in Georgia and Mississippi. As to its internal affairs, the South must work out its own salvation."

The observation of any candid Northern man who has spent several years of *bona fide* residence in the South will corroborate Dr. Field most heartily. Consult a man who, like Dr. Dorland, has had some direct dealing in immediate contact with the negro, and if he speaks without reserve, you will infallibly find that the opinions and views and policy cherished when he came South have been very materially altered by practical personal experience.

As to the allegation of prejudice on our part, of course no mere disclaimer is of any avail; it is barred by the very nature of prejudice. At the same time it is well to remember that prejudice is not necessarily nor altogether a fault of one party only to an issue. It is perfectly possible that there may be prejudice on both sides of the same question. Here is a possibility that seems never to have entered the minds of our brethren of the North; they may be as strongly and as unreasonably prejudiced in their view as we in ours.

Again: granting the existence of it, it is none the less an element in the problem demanding and deserving consideration. In all practical concerns prejudice, if existent, must be taken into account; it cannot be ignored, it cannot be ridiculed or scolded away. This perpetual cry and condemnation does not relieve the difficulty. Twenty-five years insistent assertion of it has brought no benefit; it has neither lessened nor lightened the evil.

Moreover, there is evidence not little nor doubtful of the existence, in the North itself, of the very feeling for which we are so uniformly and unsparingly condemned. There are rumors that even the rare and enlightened atmosphere of New England is not absolutely free from its insidious inroads. Of course there is not so much of it in the North, for exactly the same reason that there is not so much wool on black sheep as on white; the scarcity of the brother in black necessitates a corresponding scarcity of this "wool;" but nevertheless when we go a shearing we do not altogether return with our labor for our pains.

Some readers may remember something of the Glenn Bill introduced into the Georgia Legislature. Referring to this the *Advance* says:

"When, a few months ago, the Glenn Bill, professedly typical of the 'southern civilization,' came so near being enacted into a law in the State of Georgia, for the purpose of making it legal to send to the 'chain-gang' the professors in the Atlanta University if found guilty of allowing their own young children to recite in the same classes with colored youth—where was there a Presbyterian newspaper, or a Presbyterian minister, or a Presbyterian church that ever ventured to utter one word of outright protest against the exhibition of the genuine color-caste spirit so heinous and hateful? 'Comment would the text confound!'"

Now *per contra* read the following from the *New York Nation* upon the same Glenn Bill:

"If the question had come to an issue when it was originally brought up, Republican organs in the North would have been able to make a strong point of the bitterness of race prejudice which it showed to exist in the South. But recent occurrences in the North have effectually spiked their guns. A fierce outburst of race prejudice in the Republican State of Ohio has followed the action of the last Legislature in repealing the 'black laws,' and requiring white and black children to attend school together. Oxford is a town of Butler county, conspicuous for its educational institutions, containing Miami University, Oxford Female College, and the Western Female Seminary. Its colored population is small, the whole number of negroes in Butler county, according to the census of 1880, being only 1,140, against 41,435 whites. In short, it is just the sort of Northern town that has always been filled with indignation over any exhibition of race prejudice in the South. But when the time came for opening the fall term of the public schools, and it was discovered that the colored children were to be seated beside white children in Oxford, the public, without distinction of party, rebelled. A meeting, consisting of about four hundred white men, was held week before last, and by an almost unanimous vote instructed the Board of Education to withdraw the colored children from the building attended by the white children, a leading banker agreeing to stand between the Board and harm in thus violating the law. The Board thereupon held a meeting and unanimously resolved that, 'in compliance with the above request, the superintendent be, and he is hereby instructed, to assign the colored children to the north building to-morrow.'

"On the next Tuesday evening another large public meeting was held to express the popular satisfaction over the action of the Board. The *Commercial Gazette* thus describes the gathering: 'Quite a number of colored men came to the hall, and were greeted with cries of "Rats," "Take him out," etc. One might imagine that, for the nonce, instead of being in free and enlightened Ohio, he was in South Carolina or Mississippi. It was a shameful exhibition of unmanliness and bravado, the strong domineering over the weak. If the steps taken were necessary, they should have been taken in a quiet way, without making such a public and race-prejudice-producing demonstration. To the shame of some of these men, it must be stated that they were Republicans, blinded by a fanaticism that cannot but result in harm to this beautiful little town.' In calling the meeting to order, the chairman 'asked the boys to be as quiet as possible—that while they had cause to feel jubilant, they could at the proper time give vent to their feelings.' The banker who had engaged to defend the School Board made a speech in which he said: 'The colored people have the right of suffrage. More than this they cannot expect. As for their social qualifications, there are few of us here ready for that question.' Another speaker 'expressed himself highly satisfied to know that the children had been driven from the schools.' The *Commercial Gazette's* report concludes as follows: 'Joshua Fry, an ex-banker, responded to calls next. His exact language was this: "I don't want to be called upon, for I have kept out of this whole trouble. If I was to express my opinion, I would say that I wouldn't allow a nigger in the town. I won't harbor them in any form or about my place. I've no use for them." This short speech was cheered and applauded until it seemed

that the house would fall. The meeting then adjourned, after passing a vote of thanks to the Board for its "manliness" in acting as the meeting requested.'

"At the same time comes news of a similar outbreak of race prejudice in another Republican State at the North. Fort Scott is the capital of a Kansas county which cast 2,974 votes for Blaine to 1,671 for Cleveland, and its Board of Education is strongly Republican. The colored children have hitherto been taught in a separate building, but of late they have insisted upon mixed schools, as they have a right to do under the laws of the State. The Board of Education, however, with the exception of one colored member, resisted this legal demand, and instructed the teachers of the different schools to exclude colored children should they attempt to enter. At four school-houses small delegations of colored children were refused admission; at a fifth, a girl with so little negro blood in her veins that the principal did not know she had any, slipped in the first day, but was turned out as soon as the facts were learned; at a sixth, the colored children marched in fifty strong, and took possession, but the teacher refused to instruct them, devoting himself exclusively to the few whites who remained. The matter has been carried into the courts, which appear bound to decide in favor of mixed schools; but it is evident that the great body of the whites will not accept this policy, the opposition being so strong that the local Republican organ protests earnestly against any attempt to enforce it.

"It has been a long time since a more impressive lesson on the necessity of charity has been taught the people of this country, and in no other way could it have been so forcibly taught as by such outbreaks of race prejudice in John Sherman's State and in 'bleeding Kansas.'"

We remember to have read of a similar scene at Felicity, Ohio.

An editorial brief in the *Interior* relates the following:

"Our colored waiter at a dinner *café*, Johnny, is about to be married. Johnny is of a clear yellow complexion, tidy, agreeable, saving. We happened to ask him why he did not take unto himself a wife. That brought out the pleasant secret at a glance, and he owned up. 'Hope you are getting a good wife, John.' 'Thank you, sir, very much, and I know I am. She is industrious and has no vanity about her.' The establishment of confidential relations between ourselves and John was followed by the request on his part that we should help him to get a decent house in a decent quarter of the town, at the rental charged to white people—and we did some real estate interviewing on his behalf. Though success finally attended our joint enterprise, the fact came out clearly that a negro cannot, without special favor, get a respectable place to live in Chicago without paying at least double what would be charged to a very mean sort of a white man. The demand for caterers, in so large a city, gives good-paying employment to a great many colored men. But they are quietly ruled out of most of the avenues of wage-earning, nearly as rigidly as they are in South Carolina. They do not have here, as there, a monopoly of carriage and cab driving. Probably no one has seen a negro coachman on our streets. True, there are not a large proportion of them here, relative to population, but it is true that they have no equality with white men in the struggle for daily bread."

The Rev. William V. Tunnell, a colored minister of Brooklyn, has evidently felt the iron enter his soul, and he utters his protest in a letter to the *Independent*. After speaking of "what are commonly understood as civil rights," he goes on:

"But when these are granted his advantages practically end. If he is allowed to spend his money on an equality with the white man, he is not permitted to make it on an equality with him. He is debarred from pursuits which are remunerative or which promise ultimately to be. Colored boys are not admitted to learn trades in Northern workshops; colored mechanics or skilled laborers who may migrate from other parts hither can find no employment, not because there is none to be had, but because 'no colored need apply.' The principle that there will be a 'strike' if colored men are admitted to work at the same bench or on the same material with white laborers is so universally conceded by employers, that on the one hand it results in making them, however well disposed to colored people, or however philosophical in their views of labor as a commodity regardless of the color of the laborer, mere machines in the hands of their employees; and, on the other hand, it deprives a respectable quota of our citizens not only of a legitimate and helpful sphere of aspiration, but in most cases of an adequate and self-respecting means of a livelihood. In this respect the Northern colored man is far worse off than his Southern brother. Slavery taught the social heresy that labor is a disgrace, and so, becoming the badge of inferiority, it became odious in the eyes of the white man. The poor white would, therefore, rather loaf or steal than labor. This resulted in placing the handicrafts in the hands of the colored people, so that they became carpenters, masons, blacksmiths, men skilled in the various manual arts, to whom was confined almost exclusively the exercise of them. Not so, however, is it with the Northern colored man. The opportunity for the acquirement of any skilled mechanical pursuit is very rare, and Southern and West Indian skilled laborers who immigrate here, with the greatest difficulty, if at all, can find sphere for the exercise of their trades.

"Almost invariably it has proved futile, and in many cases disastrous, for colored men to undertake business enterprises because of the pecuniary outlay necessary, and the risk and the harrowing uncertainty of patronage. Occasionally a bold little bark launches out upon that stormy sea, only in five cases out of six to be engulfed in the cruel waves of financial embarrassment—not in every case because of incapacity or inattention to business, but because, by the logic of events, they were not patronized by the general public, and so expired from atrophy. The most successful, indeed, preëminently the only successful colored merchant in New York is a retail druggist, and the condition which has made his business prosperous and his wealth possible is that where he is located there is no sharp competition, and thus an unwilling patronage has been forced in his way. Had there been the usual competition it is doubtful if this gentleman could have achieved the success and amassed the wealth he has—not because of any lack of business capacity and devotion on his part, but of the lack of business patronage. As a result, the negro appears to be hopelessly doomed to servile and unremunerative occupations—the men to waiting, coaching, bootblacking, erranding; the women to washing, scrubbing, cooking, etc. No one ever thinks of giving a colored lady an oppor-

tunity to exercise her brain and fingers at a telegraphic machine or type-writer, and an application from one such would be deemed an impertinence. And it has come to pass that occupations wherein the negro was the acknowledged lord and monopolist are being handed over to the more prosperous white artisan. White-washing, carpet-beating, barbering, catering, for example, have been almost entirely diverted from him, and if he does anything of the kind he is required to do it at a reduced price. The colored man, seeing the door to legitimate aspiration and advancement fast barred against him, is under a sore temptation to become discouraged, fall into a state of utter indifference, and at last into positive inertia.

“But there is another phase, and that not the least important, which makes the lot of the Northern negro one of extreme trial, and which already is operating to drive him to despair of his lot and his future. It is the impossibility for even respectable colored people to rent suitable houses in reputable neighborhoods. It is notorious that colored people in Brooklyn and New York have to live in the vilest neighborhoods, in ‘mud’ and ‘duck’ alleys, in ‘bedbug row,’ in any purlieu or hole where prejudiced or grasping landlords may allow them to find shelter. Whenever a particular neighborhood has degenerated and is in ill-repute, and the landlords see it is to their interest to raise its moral tone so that their property may not depreciate, it is an open secret that they sow in a colony of colored people to redeem in a measure the reputation of the locality. If the houses are good, colored people are invariably glad to get them, but it is always at an advanced rent. As a class they receive the lowest wages of any wage-earners in the community; they are compelled to pay the highest rents for the shabbiest houses in the most undesirable neighborhoods. The writer has himself felt this even enter his own soul. Renting of necessity a floor in the immediate rear of which are four large boarding stables, the odor and the flies in hot weather were intolerable. Next door is a large wholesale milk dairy, where from midnight till late morning heavy trucks come trundling in. The noise incident to the unloading of the larger and the loading of the smaller wagons, hitching up and unhitching of horses, profanity, etc., of course defies the somnolent powers of a Rip Van Winkle, and much more the reduced nervous energy of a young city missionary. We have walked ourselves footsore in search of a desirable house in some pleasant locality, but we are invariably told of apartments in some alley, or that ‘people will object to your color.’ This objection to color is so persistent that cases are numerous in which light-complexioned colored people, hiring a house without proclaiming their slight mixed blood, have had, on discovery, their rent refunded and a peremptory notice to move. Said a brother clergyman engaged in the real estate business (who knew I was laboring among colored people, but who was unaware of the presence in me of a little mixed blood), after telling me he had nothing on his list to suit me, ‘advertise,’ he said, [here he gave the form of the advertisement, price, etc.,] ‘and perhaps somebody will make it an object to secure such as you.’ ‘But,’ rejoined I, ‘you know people don’t want colored people about them.’

“‘That’s true,’ he said; ‘you will not be able to meet your parishioners at your house, so you will have to appoint office hours and meet them at your church.’

“‘We have no church building. The congregation worships in a hall at present,’ I said,

“‘Then,’ concluded he, ‘you will have to meet them there, for people won’t

have them around!' If all colored people were scavengers, or low, ignorant brutes, such a repugnance might have a show of desert.

"Right in the North, therefore, are abundant opportunities for the exercise of practical sympathy and fair play. The enterprising and philanthropic, who are ever devising plans for the comfort, health, and moral well-being of our foreign population, would deserve and receive the gratitude and the earnings of our colored citizens if they would stretch forth a helping hand to relieve a situation which daily seems to be growing more and more hopeless."

And here is another item indicative of the same general feeling:

"A dispatch from Marion, Illinois, says: 'What threatens to prove a serious race war has broken out in this city. A few weeks ago the firm of F. M. Westbrook & Sons, tobacco packers, imported a number of colored men to work in their factory, claiming that there are no white men here capable of performing the work of stemming and stripping. This action on the part of the company greatly enraged a number of the white workmen, and they sent notices to the colored men warning them to leave town within ten days or receive summary punishment. Threats were also made to burn the factory and the homes of the imported laborers. But little attention was paid to the threats, and Saturday night a lot of men went to the home of Logan Collins, a colored boss, and fired five shots into the house. Collins procured a revolver and returned the fire, but no one was hurt on either side. The factory owners say they will not discharge the new men, and an outbreak is believed to be imminent.'"

These extracts are all taken from prominent papers of the North; if they tell the truth about their own section, our Northern brethren ought to be more tolerant, certainly less abusive, of "Southern prejudice," inasmuch as they are not perhaps in the most advantageous position possible for casting the first stone.¹ Even admitting their charge of "caste feeling so heinous and hateful," there seems to be place for the proverb teaching that a certain very attractive grace begins at home. A more candid and Christian proposition, from their view-point, would be that we both walk backward over these years of recrimination and strife, and

¹ Since the above extracts were set up by the compositor, we have read the following in a religious paper: "An exchange furnishes this: The Rev. J. Francis Robinson, a Baptist preacher of good character, has been visiting in the city of Auburn, N. Y. The day after his arrival he wished to get shaved, and went to a barber-shop, but was refused attention. He went in succession to several other barber-shops, but received the same treatment at each house. The trouble was, that the Rev. Mr. Robinson has a black skin, and, as one of the barbers said, 'I refused to shave him, because it is against the rules of the trade to shave a colored man.'"

cast the mantle of a mutual charity over the shame of a common sin.

While our past observation and experience give little hope of a candid hearing, if any at all, at the hands of these brethren, we propose to submit our views of one phase of this negro question, limiting our paper at this time to the proposed commingling of black and white in the Presbyterian Church in the South. This is the distinctively Northern policy as opposed to the Southern plan of grouping the churches of this race wherever possible into presbyteries and synods of their own; it stands at the threshold of every proposition for reunion; this appears with increasing clearness upon every occasion that brings reunion tangibly to the front.

On January 16, 1888, the able and influential Presbytery of Cincinnati adopted by an almost unanimous vote the following resolution:

“*Resolved*, That in the opinion of this presbytery, the General Assembly, which is over all sessions, presbyteries and synods, and where all are represented, should have the liberty, on petition of a sufficient number on the ground, to organize or continue presbyteries or synods on the same territory of white and colored churches, with their pastors, and such other ministers as are laboring with or for them, or might be received by them.”

Here we have a very cautious and guarded proposition, not in favor of an independent African church, mark it, for this policy was expressly condemned in the preamble, but in favor of allowing, upon petition of those concerned, the organization or continuance in the South of separate presbyteries and synods. Upon this proposition the *Africo-American Presbyterian* (which owes its very existence to the color-line, and lives, moves and has its being in the color line) thus delivers itself:

“Doubtless it will carry in the Presbytery of Cincinnati, where this non-presbyterial, ecclesiastico-color-line, religio-caste and unchristian theory had its origin. Should it become possible for the Presbyterian Church to commit the supreme folly of adopting this third article in order to open a front door for the entrance of the Southern Church, it will by the same act open a back door for the exit of the colored Presbyterians. What, then, of union? A union that produces divisions, and leaves the last state worse than the first! For there will be apparent unto all that the Presbyterian churches of the country are divided only by the color-line formally established.”

And the *Philadelphia Presbyterian*, while insinuating a mild rebuke of the colored brother's rant, substantially endorses his position.

Moreover, the colored Presbytery of Catawba, in Western North Carolina, adopted the following:

"*Resolved*, That the Presbytery of Catawba is in favor of such a change of the Form of Government as will admit of the establishment of more than one presbytery within the same territory."

This presbytery is in Western North Carolina, and is composed chiefly of colored ministers.

This, too, the *Philadelphia Presbyterian* opposes in an elaborate editorial leader.

The position of these two papers has since been endorsed by the decisive action of the Northern General Assembly, on the report of the Committee on Coöperation.

So that not only is the Northern Presbyterian Church opposed to an independent African organization; not only is it opposed to the policy of setting the negroes into separate presbyteries and synods, with representatives in the General Assembly; but it is opposed to allowing the negroes at their own option to set themselves off; even though the colored Presbytery of Catawba should vote, nay, has voted, to retain its autonomy in a reunited church, it is not to be allowed to do so. Whether the white Presbyterians of the South wish it or not, whether the colored Presbyterians of the South wish it or not, nay, even though both agree in wishing it otherwise, yet, nevertheless, *nolens volens*, whites and black *shall be mixed in the South*. This is the unequivocal and inexorable demand of our Northern brethren. The issue is joined, and the Northern Presbyterian Church stands squarely on that platform, with both feet fixed and rooted; there is to be no more distinction of race or color in ecclesiastical relations than there is in political; the fifteenth amendment is to run right through the constitution and government of the Presbyterian Church, just as it does through those of the United States: with this difference, that in political and civil matters the negro is left to his own option as to the exercise of his rights and privileges of equality,—he may claim them if he chooses,—whereas in the ecclesiastical sphere he *must*, whether he chooses or not.

This then is the settled, avowed, distinctive policy of the North; submission to this demand is the condition of the approval and goodwill of our brethren. Such is the situation.

In our discussion of this demand we remark, *first*, that it looks as if the North in making it were discriminating against the South. In the interests of fraternity or fusion, or of peace and harmony, there have been in history instances of what are called "elective affinity presbyteries" organized upon the very plan we have proposed as the best solution of this negro question. This same plan has been worked in the North. Commenting on the Cincinnati resolution the Rev. Dr. Montfort writes:

"There are many instances where presbyteries and synods cover the territory of other presbyteries and synods in whole or in part. There are three white churches and two white ministers within the bounds of Catawba (colored) Presbytery and Synod that have been attached to Holston Presbytery and Synod of Tennessee. Another case is found in an act by the Assembly, at the request of the parties concerned, allowing the Georgia missionaries and Indian preachers and churches to unite with Union Presbytery, though within the limits of another presbytery. The Second Presbytery of Philadelphia (1832-'34) approved by one Assembly and disapproved by another, was on the same ground with the First Presbytery. The ground of objection was that the line of separation was doctrinal. The Synods of Missouri and of Indian Territory have churches in the same territory. There are many precedents, and in every case a reason existed to justify, and this should always be required. . . . It is not necessary to enact a law. All that is needful is to act upon the doctrine that there may be such presbyteries, and create them as occasion may require, as has been done in the past, beginning in 1822 with the Second Presbytery of New York."

Now there is at least an apparent inconsistency here. This pepper and salt doctrine seems adapted to Southern soil only; the warmth of this fraternal feeling for the brother in black seems limited to our latitude, a strange sort of force that increases directly with the distance. There are thousands of negroes in some populous centres of the North, and no one has yet arisen to point a moral or adorn a tale by citing a single instance in which the pepper and salt doctrine receives a practical endorsement on its native heath. During the discussion of the Cincinnati resolution this challenge was thrown out again and again; it remained unanswered, and will continue so because there is no answer to it. It has been repeatedly asserted in leading papers of the North that there is no place in the United States where the color line is

not drawn, and drawn in the churches. We have already quoted somewhat liberally, but as we wish to establish our position firmly, readers will bear with us in this particular. They will notice that all our extracts are from Northern papers; the South is so "prejudiced" on the subject that we are driven to the North for unbiassed, trustworthy evidence. As it is so good and reliable, we propose to furnish it *ex abundantia*. Let us, then, hear the Cincinnati *Commercial Gazette*; in its issue of 26th May, 1889, it says:

"The color line is everywhere. It is in the Northern Presbyterian Church. It is in every Northern church. It is in society. It is in politics. And there is no class that knows this better than the colored people.

"However it may be in politics, we are sure the colored people desire their own churches. They may be Methodists, or Episcopalians, or Baptists, or Presbyterians, but they prefer their own organizations. There may be a sentiment in favor of wiping out the color line, but it is not honest.

"There is nothing in our history that does not afford evidence of this. From the beginning to the end it has been so. In politics all men are equal before the law. In church courts all men are equal. Nobody denies this in politics. Nobody denies it in the church, but in spite of all this the color line exists. And what are we going to do about it? There is a sentiment in the Northern church against the color line, but it is only a sentiment. In the Southern church there is an honest view. In the Northern church the view is not an honest one. The color line is in the pews and it is in the pulpit. To settle this the only way is the honest way; and this should be especially pursued in the church. This is the way the Assembly at New York, in the face of all its talk, all its resolutions, all its protests, and all its professions, adopted. There can be no mingling of the races in the church any more than there is in society. In politics it is different. There should be no color line there, as there is no social line.

"These are the points to be considered, and they have nothing to do with the color line in heaven. The best way to settle the matter is to be honest about it. . . .

"Where is the Northern church in which the color line is not drawn? Is there one in Cincinnati in any denomination? We do not know it. Does anybody know it? Is there one in any city or anywhere?"

It would not be seemly in us to use such language as this, but we may note an appearance of inconsistency in our brethren. If it is thus at the North, where the negro is scarcely an appreciable proportion of the population, how much more is it to be expected in our country, in many portions of which they are numerically equal to the whites, in some sections of which they largely outnumber them. It looks as if our Northern friends were prescrib-

ing for us a rule by which they themselves, under infinitely more favorable auspices, are not willing to be guided.

Again, it seems inconsistent to make the African in the South an exception to their approved race policy. The only other race they deal with in numbers sufficient for an analogy is the Indian. Do they ignore the line here and require an absolute, imperative commingling of the white and Indian races? We are told upon unimpeachable authority that there is in the Northern Presbyterian Church an Indian Presbytery coterminous with five white presbyteries. The very "primary principles of Presbyterianism" would be violated and the spirit of Christ outraged by allowing the colored Presbytery of Catawba, even at its own request, to continue coterminous with Concord and Mecklenburg Presbyteries, but the Indians may be segregated into the Presbytery of Dakota, though it spread over the territory of *five* white presbyteries.

Still further and more decisively, their policy in dealing with the negro is inconsistent with its very self. They protest vigorously against any color-line in the South as something un-Presbyterian, sinful and intolerable in general; and yet their whole negro work draws the color-line distinctly and sharply, in that it is prosecuted from beginning to end by separate agencies; it is all distinct from the white; they have separate boards, separate academies and schools, separate theological seminaries, separate collections; the very money that pays for the work is kept in a separate purse. This fact is emphasized in the controversy occasionally sprung between our Northern brethren; when *they* fall out then *we* get our dues. Here is an illustration in two little "spats" of *The Interior*; first, with the *Evangelist* (Presbyterian); and, second, with the *Advantage* (Congregational):

"The New York *Evangelist*, in a somewhat offensive manner, says that *The Interior* knows that there is no colored presbytery or synod to be found anywhere between Florida and Mississippi. Such a contradiction is mere foolishness. No distinction is as yet made in name by the Assembly, except by approving the report of the Board of Missions for Freedmen, in which report the distinction does appear; but the distinction *in fact* is as broad and as impossible of concealment as the continent. We have had some commingling of white and colored churches in the same presbyteries in the South, but they soon separate, as naturally, and we may say, comparatively speaking, as promptly as oil and water. *They will not stay together.* That fact has already been demonstrated.

"This setting up of the Congregational churches as differing from the Presbyterians on this subject is the uttermost and nethermost humbug. There is not a mixed white and black Congregational Church in the world, and there never will be, unless amalgamation comes to be regarded as desirable. We said in our note to the *Advance* :

"Let me call your attention to the fact that the "color-line" is as sharply drawn in your church as in ours, and in both it is as sharply drawn as it ever will be. The color-line in the churches is fundamental, and it cannot be confused by any means short of the marital commingling of the two races. The colored people are not found in any of your white Congregational churches in Chicago. Why? You are most kindly disposed toward them. The reason is that people, white or black, will not attend a church in which all the possibilities of social life are not open to them. You may have an exceptional old uncle or aunty in some of your churches, as we do, but you cannot hold a single family of young people. Your church neither has nor can do this thing anywhere, North or South, unless by compulsion, as possibly among the students of Berea or Oberlin."

"To this the *Advance* replies :

"As to Dr. Gray's assertion that Congregationalists, even in the North, do the same thing as is proposed and implied in this scheme of reunion, it is simply not true to the facts. Nowhere, North or South, does the Congregational fellowship of churches sanction in any way this caste-spirit."

"Our contemporary says this with the facts under its nose, that the churches in Georgia, organized by the Congregational Home Missionary Society (white), and those organized by the American Missionary Association (black) have pulled apart into separate white and black associations. Our contemporary runs the color-line from top to bottom."

We may be furnishing only another instance and evidence of that silly and sinful prejudice that darkens the mind and hardens the heart of the Southern Presbyterian, but we must confess that the position of our brethren with reference to the negro looks, in the several particulars we have mentioned, a little inconsistent. It certainly seems to justify our *first* point, that the North in its policy appears to discriminate against the South.

Our *second* point is this pregnant fact, that no church has been able to work this pepper-and-salt policy in the South.

The Methodist and Baptist churches have fortunately never attempted it. In these two churches the color-line was drawn long ago, with the largest prosperity to both white and black; at least nineteen-twentieths of Africo-American Christendom is in these two flourishing independent colored churches.

The Congregationalists of Georgia, after actual experiment, have felt forced to divide on the color-line, and reunion now hangs fire even under the whip of the power of the purse and the

unequivocal threat of non-recognition at the hands of the National Association. The exigency that can nerve a missionary body to resist such potent persuasion must be little short of the danger of extinction.

There has been a painful dissension in the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of South Carolina on this negro question, and a lamentable schism has been prevented only, if at all, by a compromise, allowing the one colored member to remain but denying admittance to all others. Concerning which compromise the conservative, and usually dignified, *Philadelphia Presbyterian* has this to say:

“A moral question has been settled in the Episcopal Church in South Carolina, under the canon defining a clerical delegate as a Christian minister in holy orders, by a straddling compromise on the color line which weakens both parties, and which is at variance with the Scriptures and the primary principles of church purpose and life. It is a sacrifice to race prejudices and race oppressions, and will never avail until the question is settled on the basis of the divine authority of ordained men to call to all men to be saved. Some seceders announced their willingness to return to the fold if there could be a complete separation of the races, so that the respectable white Christians would be by themselves and the negroes somewhere outside in a missionary section. The canon laws were then amended so as to exclude negro clergymen who may hereafter apply for admission. This was a compromise which ought to have satisfied the seceders, since it conceded to them the principle of excluding black men; but they bitterly resented the neglect of the Convention to eject the one colored minister who had already got in under the old canon, now so old and rusty that it will not go off any more. The old canon and the black Episcopalians will be sent out of the lines. Peace is now expected to be as a river, and righteousness to flow as the waves of the sea. An absurd procession of the Southern Episcopal Church of white sheep and the black goat browsing at the rear is thus given as a spectacle to men and angels. As these white Christians could not get into the world without the negro, for many of them drew life from black breasts, they cannot get on to heaven without one black face following after.”

This editorial paragraph may be taken as a specimen of the spirit in which our Northern friends deal with this question. This is a criticism upon a body of intelligent Christian people seriously transacting their own church business. While there may perhaps be some difference of opinion as to the good taste of such a paragraph in such a paper, there will be doubtless general unanimity as to its *force*. It hails from a section that bewails Southern prejudice on the subject.

A recent news item gives the Virginia Diocese's solution of the same question :

"The Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Virginia has decided, by a vote of one hundred and twenty-four to sixty-three, to retain the word 'white' in the qualifications for delegates to the council."

Here is another verdict in the case:

"At the recent session of the North Carolina Lutheran Synod, in St. John's Church, Cabarrus county, a number of measures were adopted of considerable importance to the church. Among them was the organization of the colored Lutheran ministers of the State into the Alpha Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Freedmen in America. There are four colored Lutheran ministers in the State. Rev. D. J. Koontz, of Concord, was elected President of the Alpha Synod, and Rev. W. P. Phifer, of Charlotte, Secretary."

Here, then, we have the experience of the Methodists, Baptists, Episcopalians, Congregationalists and Lutherans, all endorsing the position of the Southern Presbyterian Church. This is experience against theory. In view of such facts, it seems strange that any reflecting man should fail to recognize the propriety of reconsidering his views, and asking himself if there be not something worthy of weight in a unanimous verdict rendered by the Christian heart and conscience of so many different but concurrent bodies of believers.

There are few topics upon which there has been written or spoken so much that is irrelevant or sophistical. There is no argument in the allegation of prejudice upon which the changes have been rung with such monotonous melody; and moreover, whatever force such writing might otherwise have in the line of hortation is much weakened by the conspicuous difference between the preaching and the practice of our brethren.

All appeal to the analogy of politics is pointless. The North has had some success in carrying politics into their religion, but they will have to carry a good deal more religion into their politics before the latter can be held up as stimulus and example to ecclesiastical reform. Political equality is no reason under heaven for ecclesiastical equality; it does not rise even to the height of a presumption. Discussion along this line is waste of breath. Contrasts, therefore, drawn between state and church will have no

weight with any thinking persons. Such campaign material as editorial leaders in religious papers ending with the statement that "the state is more Christian than the church" (*i. e.*, the Southern church, of course), may be quietly relegated to the limbo of the *ad captandum vulgus*.

Again: when the most prominent Presbyterian paper of the North in a long editorial advances the idea that the politics of the South is really the opposing spirit in the church, and concludes with saying:

"Unless there is a radical change in the politics, and new and diverting questions withdraw the public mind from its present drift, there will be no organic union. It is not church antagonism, doctrines, policies or faith that hinders—it is politics steadily holding back those who would, if only ecclesiastical issues were at stake, unite like a well-set fracture on first intention."

—when we meet a few columns of this kind of politico-religious philosophy, there is no need of committing it to memory; it would be a comparative waste of time.

Appeals based on the propriety of "accepting the situation," are equally irrelevant. Our brethren sometimes declare, with great seeming surprise, that the South is as reconstructed as ever, that we have not accepted the situation, that the leaders of our church seem not aware that the war is over, etc., etc. Now all this stuff is either greatly insincere or grossly absurd.

To say that we have not submitted to the arbitrament of the sword would be palpably false; moreover, our brethren repeatedly use this very submission as ground for the acceptance of their ecclesiastical policy also. By "accepting the situation" they can mean only such change of our views as would imply a recognition of error in the principles for which we contended. If this is their meaning, then of course we have not accepted the situation, nor will we ever. The surrender at Appomattox did not decide a single ethical principle, nor did it reverse a single moral judgment, nor did it alter a single conviction we before entertained. From the nature of the case it could not. Our brethren seem sometimes to proceed from the assumption that when the South was overpowered, every position maintained by the North was thereby established as proven correct! Such assumption lies at the basis of

all this talk about not "accepting the situation." As we stated, this is either greatly insincere or grossly absurd.

Lastly on this line: It is often stated that in the South a black skin is an insuperable bar, an invariable disqualification, etc., etc. All this emphasis laid upon "the black skin" is an appeal to prejudice entirely unworthy of those who stoop to it. The implication invariably is that in all other respects the negro is equal to any privilege claimed for him; that the only difference between the two races is the color of their skin.

Alas! the negro-ness of the Negro is a great deal darker and deeper than his skin. None are more radically convinced of this fact than Northern residents in the South; you will never find such persons indulging in this line of remark. There is greater and more radical difference between the whites and the blacks than there is between our Northern friends and the Chinese, towards whom they evince a loving toleration so general and remarkable as to be proverbial.

We do not think we are wrong in saying that nine-tenths of Northern discussion of this question is made up of just such points as we have here passed in review, and therefore just about that proportion of it we must consider irrelevant. The only thing that approximates an argument in favor of the position of the Northern Presbyterian Church is the use made of the Scriptures in Gal. iii. 28: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." This text is the standing resort of those who deem it worth while to use discourse of reason on this subject. It has appeared again and again in print, and has been made more than once to do duty on the floor of church courts; but none of the users thereof have seen fit to pause and establish his interpretation of the text or justify its application to this subject. It is quoted as if the interpretation was one only and unquestioned, thus furnishing unequivocal Scripture authority for the position it is cited to establish, and should be consequently an end of all controversy.

Such interpretation and application we are most decidedly disposed to dispute. The context in its integrity reads thus: "For

ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus."

The whole intent and application of the passage is evidently to be determined and limited by the words "in Christ Jesus," used as equivalent to the preceding phrases "baptized into Christ" and "have put on Christ." The words "in Christ Jesus" are constantly quoted in this discussion as synonymous with "in the church;" all the force of their application, all their pertinence, depends upon the equivalence of the two phrases.

Now we maintain that such an interpretation is utterly unsound, and is a palpable perversion of the passage. The phrase "in Christ" has in the Scriptures a definite, fixed meaning and a uniform usage; we are not aware of a single instance in which it has the significance assumed or assigned in the current application of it to this argument. The words are used regularly to signify that union legal, personal, vital with Christ which constitutes one a child of God, as the same apostle says elsewhere, "If any man be *in Christ*, he is a new creature." The passage in Gal. iii. 26-28, therefore, teaches the blessed doctrine that the salvation of God's grace is not circumscribed by any earthly line of race, nation, sex or condition, nor limited by any worldly circumstance whatever, "for there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek; for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him. For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." (Rom. x. 12, 13.)

With this interpretation and reference agree also the other parallel passages: "For as the body is one and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body, so also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink unto one Spirit." (1 Cor. xii. 12, 13.) "And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him: where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircum-

cision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free ; but Christ is all and in all." (Col. iii. 10, 11.)

These passages are all collated from the same writer, and they all clearly treat of one and the same subject. Is there a doubt in the mind of any candid reader as to their meaning and application? It is something new under the sun for Presbyterian preachers to be found basing an argument upon such an interpretation of these passages as compels their reference to the visible church! One may judge of the exigencies of our brethren's position, when they are driven to such straits to maintain it. According to our interpretation, and heretofore the general, if not universal, one among Presbyterians, of these passages, every believer, every regenerated soul, of whatever country, clime, race or color; with whatever denomination of Christians associated; whether white, yellow, red or black; whether Romanist, Episcopal, Lutheran, Disciple, Methodist, Baptist, Congregationalist, Presbyterian, or what not; every such believing, regenerated soul is by virtue of his union with Christ a member of this "one body" independent of any and of all church ties. This is a doctrine that, so far as we are familiar with discussion, has never in Presbyterian circles been denied, disputed or doubted.

Perhaps a respondent rejoins, "True; but if a member of the invisible church, why not *a fortiori* a member of the church visible? Does not membership in Christ involve the right to membership in the Presbyterian Church?"

We note now that this is a total change of base; this is not Scripture argument we deal with here. We claim to have estopped the appeal to the Scriptures; at this point we are discussing an inference only. With this reminder, we answer, No; membership in Christ does not necessarily involve the right to membership in the Presbyterian Church, nor in any particular branch of the visible church. This statement may sound a little startling to some persons, but reflection will establish its correctness. Every church claims and exercises the right to prescribe terms of fellowship. The Baptists admit the Christianity of the Pedo-Baptists, but deny fellowship; the Episcopalians acknowledge the Christianity of the Presbyterians, but decline fellowship; a Presbyterian

session would be strictly within the exercise of its rights and of its duty in denying membership to one, however godly he might be, who avowed his disbelief of infant membership and declared his purpose to disregard the practice and injunction of our church there-anent. Nay, more; our respondents themselves furnish us with a historic answer to their own rejoinder, in an authoritative deliverance of their highest court:

“Church sessions are also ordered to examine all applicants for church membership by persons from the Southern States, or who have been living in the South since the rebellion, concerning their conduct and principles on the points above specified; and if it be found that, of their own free will, they have taken up arms against the United States, or that they hold slavery to be an ordinance of God, as above stated, such persons shall not be admitted to the communion of the church till they give evidence of repentance for their sin, and renounce their error.” (Minutes of General Assembly, 1865, pp. 562-’3.)

Now, unless our respondents are prepared to deny membership in Christ to every Southern Christian, they must admit that such membership does not necessarily involve the right to membership in their own church; and this inference, therefore, falls to the ground.

But the text is not advanced to justify the membership simply of the African in a white church. Against this there is neither law nor usage. We are not in this article contending against the membership of a negro in a white church; for though the Southern Presbyterian Church, or any church, has undoubted right to exclude them, if such exclusion is necessary for the peace, harmony and prosperity of the church, and advise them to seek connection with congregations of their own color; though any church has this right, yet as a matter of fact the Southern Presbyterian Church has always welcomed the negro to her fellowship. We doubt if a negro has ever been refused membership on account of his race. During the short experience¹ of the writer, he has always had negroes under his pastoral care; has received them into the communion of the church; has visited and prayed with them in sickness, and has buried them when dead. Moreover, this was uniformly true of the South until the close of the war; so much

¹ This remark applies to the town of Washington, N. C., in which, up to the time of the writing of the article, had been the writer's only pastorate.

so that it was rare to find a Southern Presbyterian church without its quota of colored communicants, and in some there was a large membership of them. This fact is so notorious that it is difficult to understand the language attributed to Rev. Dr. Stryker on the floor of the latest General Assembly :

“Rev. Dr. Stryker, of Chicago, said that he would vote for no report that asked one Christian to stand aside at the communion table in favor of another.”

The truth is—and how the eminent speaker could be ignorant of it is a mystery—that the Southern Presbyterian Church has never asked the negro to “stand aside at the communion table.” *If such had been the case, there would be now no negro question in the Presbyterian Church.* A large majority of our negro membership was after the war transferred bodily and irregularly to the Northern church; and all the zeal and liberality exhibited in twenty years’ work have added a very meagre percentage to the fruits of our work which they reaped, and for which they now claim credit.

Oh! no; the Southern Presbyterian Church did not ask the negro to stand aside from the communion table; if it had done so, the roll of the Northern church would be now shorter by about six presbyteries.

But we return from this digression to repeat that it is not a question of membership merely that is under discussion. The pepper and salt policy advances a doctrine distinctly different. We wish to make this patent, and we wish to make it prominent. The policy we oppose is a demand for the negro of equality of rule; and this, mark it, not in negro churches, for such right of rule is undisputed. The *presbytery* is to be pepper and salt; these six negro presbyteries are to be blended with the present coterminous white presbyteries, and the new bodies, thus resultant, are to be composed of white and colored preachers and white and colored elders, representatives of white and colored churches, all upon the same footing in the administration of the government of the now united Presbyterian Church; and in any question that concerns the government of the First Church of Wilmington or Charlotte, the First Church of Atlanta or Charleston, the negro ruling elder is to have equal voice and vote with the white elder. *The demand*

is that the negro shall have equality of rule over white churches. It is just this and nothing less. This is the intent and effect of all the argument on the Northern side of this question. *There is nothing else at issue between the North and South on this negro question.* As we said before, it is just simply and solely the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States run right through the Presbyterian Church.

Now this doctrine is sought to be sustained by an appeal to Gal. iii. 28; this stock text is cited really to establish for the negro equality of rule over white churches. Is such doctrine deducible from it?

We have claimed already an estoppel of argument from this text on this subject; if it does not involve equality in rights of membership, *a fortiori* it cannot justify equality in right of rule; but waiving this, and granting, for the sake of argument, that the text does teach equality in church membership, does it therefore involve equality in the right of office? Or to put exactly the same question in a different shape, Is every church member eligible to office? To this we answer unhesitatingly, No. We argue a distinction here, one made most evidently by all Presbyterians North and South; nay, more, made by this very apostle himself; for though he says "there is neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus," at the same time he denies to the female the function of rule in the church, thus disqualifying at one sweep more than half the membership, and the most pious part at that! He mentions, moreover, certain circumstances that bar and limit this privilege even in the male membership; but it is needless to quote these other disqualifications. This one instance of sex as a bar is sufficient to destroy the whole argument.

Do our brethren hold that every male member of the church has a right to office? Do not our common standards designate certain definite qualifications as requisite for office-bearing? What proportion of the male membership of any well-ordered or wisely-officered church is considered eligible for the eldership? To say that every man has such privilege is absurd.

Our position on this question is a very simple one; it is just this, that the negro has not the proper qualifications for the func-

tion of rule over white Southern Presbyterians. If the North considers him qualified to rule over them, we shall not question their judgment; they have a right to it, and we wish them the freest exercise of it; but we do not think him fit to rule over us; his character, ignorance, prejudice, habits, and associations all disqualify him; he would be merely and only a stumbling block and an offence in such a position. There is no law of God or man, no principle or practice of the Presbyterian Church North or South, that justifies this ruinous policy to which our brethren stand committed.

If this right be claimed for the negro, it must be claimed simply because he is a negro, for certainly no white man of his grade of character and intelligence could be permitted to exercise the functions of the eldership in the Southern Church, and we have yet to see any one advance the negro-ness of the negro as a positive qualification for office in the church.

In this discussion we have been studious to avoid thus far all reference and appeal to the distinctively social features and political influences that are indissolubly blended with the question, and enter therefore inevitably into it. We have done this in order, as far as possible, to place our argument upon grounds that might appeal to any reader, regardless of locality or latitude. But we are unwilling to allow any to suppose that we do not recognize the existence or force of such elements.

The influence of politics enters the question in the fact that the negroes almost *en masse* are opposed to the whites; they were unfortunately the willing tool and cat's paw of that horde of fortune-seekers who introduced the carnival of corruption which did all that was possible to make a hell of our home in the period that will ever be shame and reproach to our great nation. They did all that they could to perpetuate it, and they stand ever ready to reproduce it. It is the goal of their hopes and efforts still. They are solidly and persistently hostile to us. This is true of them as a race, and they are invariably united against us. They would be the same in any question of church policy. They would vote as solidly in this sphere as in the political. They themselves draw the color line distinctly in politics, and they maltreat any colored

man who votes otherwise. They would do the same in ecclesiastical matters. Of course any attempt to unite two such hostile elements in one church fellowship would be sheer folly. The influence of politics is very indirect, but nevertheless it is a real element in the question, to the extent that we have noted.

The social feature is of much more direct and potent influence. Our Northern friends seem disposed to pooh-pooh any objection based on this feature as purely imaginary; but we know the negro a great deal better than they do. This fact Dr. Field recognized in the extract we quoted from him some pages back. He seems also to have gained some inkling of the negro's disposition, judging from the following bit of advice:

"If I might, without being obtrusive, say a word to my colored brethren, it would be this: You too must work out your own salvation! That which is the law in entering the kingdom of God, is the law in all great moral undertakings: it is the law for every man, and you are no exception.

"Above all, don't try to be what God never made you to be, and what you cannot be, however much you try. The great trouble with the colored people of the South, is that they want to be white folks. But can the Ethiopian change his skin? In this foolish desire to be what they can *not* be, they lose the opportunity to be what they *can* be: to take a position of their own, in which they can keep their independence and their self-respect.

"Can anything be more childish than to complain that we are not treated with proper consideration? I sometimes hear a good honest colored man say 'white folks don't treat him 'spectful,' by which he means that they won't have anything to do with him socially. Well then, my good fellow, if I were in your place, I wouldn't have anything to do with them. They like to be by themselves, and so do you, for you feel a great deal more free, and enjoy yourself better; and if I were in your place, when I wanted to have a good time, I wouldn't have any white folks around!"

This disposition of the negro that Dr. Field criticises would surely lead to social complications. And we would interject here that the patent panacea for all negro defects, education, does not mend matters in the least; an "educated" negro is just as much negro as before, just the same raw hide volume with the incongruous addition of a gilt edge; he is only a little more aggressively offensive than his less ornate brother. Social complications are not at all lessened by education, nor mitigated by "light complexions" either.

Not very long ago, at a meeting of the Convention of the

Episcopal Diocese of N. C., in Raleigh, the bishop gave a reception to his clergy, and there was a very near approach to a disturbance growing out of just such a social complication.

While the majority of Northern writers agree in ridiculing this difficulty, some of them seem to appreciate it. We quote here from a letter by the Rev. George Miller, of Missouri:

"There seems to be but one of two possible issues to this vexed problem—either an exterminating race war, or amalgamation. And while the nation at large might find serious the task of preventing the one, the nation at large could not enforce the other. Appalling alternatives! . . . We of the North cannot reasonably blame our Southern brethren for declining to accept any basis of union, the trend of which is toward amalgamation. We would just as strongly revolt at doing so for ourselves, if it were with us a practical home question, as it is to-day with them. It may be wrong for them to demand an entirely separate church organism for the freedmen; but it is clearly both reasonable and just on their part to demand separate congregations, if not even separate presbyteries and synods. We of the North ought to place ourselves where our Southern brethren find themselves to-day; and we ought not, in Christian charity, to try to force on them possibilities against which we ourselves would indignantly revolt.

"Let us suppose a case. Here is a congregation made up of white and colored members. The colored people being more numerous will soon have a large majority. A pastor is to be called, and they vote in a colored brother. He is your pastor, your wife's, your daughter's pastor. He is, therefore, your equal socially; his children the peers of your children. His son calls on your daughter! Here comes the crisis; and how would you meet it? Are you ready to encourage amalgamation in your own home? No. You would do just as Abraham did (Gen. xxiv. 1-4), and feel as Rebekah felt (Gen. xxvii. 46). Until we are ready to invite such an event to our own homes can we insist upon forcing it upon others?

"Of course, in the case of mixed presbyteries and synods, the trouble is largely modified; and yet the tendency remains in sufficient strength to divest them of the character of a *sine qua non* to union."

To sum it all up, we believe that every consideration of propriety, expediency, justice and right, justifies the position of the Southern church on this question. The dictates of reason and common sense, and the results of observation and experience, all agree in the support of our policy.

We have one remark to make in conclusion. It is frequently represented in the North that the Southern Presbyterian Church is held reluctantly in abeyance by the dominating influence of a few leaders whose age and prejudice and war memories embitter and blind them; that the body of the membership and the younger ministers feel very differently on all questions at issue between the two churches.

Now, we wish to say that we have grown to man's estate since the war, and its memories are mainly a tradition to us; moreover, our bitterest enemy could not accuse us of being a "leader in the Southern Presbyterian Church." Our views are generally our own, and they are eminently so in this instance; but we believe they are shared by our church with as absolute and hearty a unanimity as ever gave force and value to the convictions of an intelligent Christian people.

Columbia, South Carolina.

SAMUEL M. SMITH.

II. PROBATION AFTER DEATH.

“MANKIND believe in hell.” It is not a doctrine purely of revelation that the wicked are punished in another world. The belief in such a doom is as universal as the belief in God and in the immortality of the soul. Philosophers who aspire to reach the summits of intelligence, and poets who aspire to sound the depths of the human soul, alike recognize the fearful reality; and the power of both lies in their ability to give expression to what all men think and feel. The philosopher and the poet, as has been well said, are more men than other men; they see more clearly and feel more profoundly than other men; they have greater power of expression; and hence homage is done to them as the hierophants of those mysteries which are enshrined in the recesses of every human soul. This explains the difference, so eloquently expounded by De Quincey, in duration and destiny between what he calls the literature of mere knowledge and the literature of power. “It is the grandeur of all truth which *can* occupy a very high place in human interests that it is never absolutely novel to the meanest of minds; it exists eternally by way of germ or latent principle in the lowest as in the highest, needing to be developed, but never to be planted. . . . It is in relation to the great *moral* capacities of men that the literature of power, as contra-distinguished from that of knowledge, lives and has its field of action.” The “moral capacities” of mankind are the same in all and the same from age to age, like the appetites of hunger and thirst in the human body; and the literature which deals with them, if it springs from genius, is destined to be permanent. The *Principia* of Newton has already been antiquated: *Macbeth* is “triumphant forever, as long as the languages exist in which it speaks or can be taught to speak.” The great subject of *Macbeth* is penal retribution for sin, and its tremendous power lies in the human conscience, which responds to its awful representations. Shakspeare was no theologian, but who can read this

tragedy and not feel that there is a hell, or, if there is not, that there ought to be? Plato, Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakspeare, Milton, when they present this dreadful topic, only voice the sentiments of the human soul. Mankind believe in hell.

But they do not believe in it as they do in some other things, because it is their pleasure to do so, because the wish is father to the thought. Not at all; they are compelled to believe in it by the operation of the same power which compels them to believe in God, the power of conscience. The fool who says in his heart "no God," of course will also say "no hell." But as God will not allow his Being to be disowned, so he will not allow his moral government, his righteous purpose to punish sin, to be disowned. Either of these convictions may be resisted and even suppressed for a time, but only for a time. Men may deny that there is a God, or that they have souls, or that there is a world external to themselves. The zeal and persistency with which they endeavor to prove that there is no hell is no argument against the reality of it; rather the contrary. "What man," says Dr. Shedd, "would seriously construct an argument to demonstrate that there is no such being as Jupiter Ammon, or such an animal as the centaur? The very denial of endless retribution evinces by its spasmodic eagerness and effort to disprove the tenet, the firmness with which it is intrenched in man's moral constitution."

There are many methods of assault upon the doctrine. One is to admit that the Bible teaches it clearly, and then to make this fact a proof against the Bible's inspiration and authority, the doctrine itself being too absurd and monstrous to be believed. Another is to admit the inspiration and authority of the Bible, and upon this ground to argue that it cannot teach the doctrine, and that the places which seem to teach it must receive some other interpretation. These two methods are the same in principle. In both the reason of man is made the judge as to what a revelation from God ought to contain. A third method, near akin to the last, if it can be called a method, feeling rather than logic being judge, is simply to take one's stand on the *goodness* of God, and say it cannot be. This seems to have been John Foster's position, and was probably Origen's. Thousands have passed through just such

a struggle as Adolphe Monod describes in his own case, though not always with the same result. "There was a time," says he, "when I was unwilling to believe in endless punishment either for any man or even for the devil; and when I wrote these foolish words, 'If one single creature of God must be eternally unhappy there is no happiness possible for me.' But as I believed at the same time that the Bible was the Word of God, and that consequently I could not in peace reject the endlessness of punishment so long as I found it taught in the Bible, I endeavored to persuade myself that it was not taught there. For this purpose I read, I meditated, I commented—attenuating the places which seemed to favor the doctrine—hunting up, exaggerating, forcing those which I hoped to find contrary to it. I did all I could not to find endless punishment in God's Word, but I did not succeed. I was convinced by the irresistible evidence of the testimony of the Scriptures. . . . I yielded, I bowed my head, I put my hand on my mouth; I believed in endless punishment with a conviction all the more profound that I had long fought against it."

These good men knew of course that there was an incalculable amount of suffering in this world, and not only suffering but *penal* suffering. They believed that all this suffering was consistent with God's *infinite* goodness; but they could not believe that such goodness could consist with *endless* suffering. Hence, perhaps, the origin of the notion of a probation after death. Such a notion was a sort of flanking of a doctrine which could not be successfully attacked in front. There can be little doubt that this notion is practically Universalism. It is taken for granted that every man who dies in his sins will avail himself of his chance in the next world, and so no man's punishment will be endless, but all will be saved. The fear of future punishment will practically cease to operate. "The spirit of man," says Monod, "being immortal is so made that that which must have an end cannot appear to him long. A child who had heard it said that the abode of the wicked in hell should be only a thousand years, being threatened for some bad conduct with hell, answered, 'What care I for hell? I shall stay there only a thousand years.' This word was profound as it was artless, and by the mouth of that little child spoke

the whole human race." A very striking confirmation of this is seen in the effect of the pagan and papal doctrine of purgatory. Purgatory, according to the Roman doctors, is not a place of *discipline*, but of true and proper *punishment*, to all intents and purposes a temporary hell. Yet how many thousands and millions prefer the prospect of it to the pains and self-denials of a life of repentance and holiness here!

The notion of a probation after death is, therefore, virtually Universalism; and it is the most dangerous form of that deadly heresy, for the reasons already suggested. It is more dangerous because it is more respectable; more reverent towards God, because it recognizes his moral character and his moral government, and "concedes the force of the biblical and rational arguments respecting the guilt of sin and its intrinsic desert of everlasting punishment;" and more reverent towards man, because it respects and does not outrage the judgments and instincts of his moral constitution. It is further respectable in that it concedes that there is no other way of salvation than through the work of Jesus Christ and the work of the Holy Ghost. At any point in the history of the sinner, whether in this world or the next, if he obtains salvation it must be through regeneration, faith and repentance. It is true that some who hold to probation after death, perhaps the majority of those who so hold, would object to the statement just made of their concessions to "orthodoxy." Their idea of probation *here* is such as to imply a "self-determining power of the will," or at least a synergistic operation of the will in turning to God; and they have the same idea of probation after death. One great inducement to accept the theory of a *post-mortem* probation is the fact that the evidence then will be too overwhelming to be resisted, and that multitudes whose will was proof against all the appeals of the law or the gospel here, will break down under the light of eternity. They are of the same opinion with Dives in the "parable," that the main reason why men do not repent is that they have not evidence enough, or evidence of the right kind.

While it is the purpose of this essay to discuss the question of fact whether there is a probation after death, in the sense simply

of the possibility of a change from a state of sin to a state of salvation, without reference to the *rationale* of that change, yet it may not be amiss to say a few words upon the Pelagian or semi-Pelagian view of the subject.

According to this view, the change from a state of sin to a state of salvation is brought about by "moral suasion." Man was not killed by the fall in Adam. The Pelagian says he was not even hurt; the Low Arminian that he was stunned and seriously hurt; the High Arminian that he was as good as dead, as Euty-chus was after he had fallen from the third story; but that, in consequence of the embrace of God's love, his life was still in him, was not allowed to become extinct, or was immediately restored, as in the case of Euty-chus in the embrace of Paul. No direct, quickening agency of the Spirit, therefore, is necessary to make him alive. He is to be persuaded by argument, expostulation, remonstrance, entreaty, to stir his torpid, slumbering life into activity and to decide for God. To help him in doing this, the most awful pictures of hell and the judgment are presented to him. If he remains undecided in this life, then we may hope that he may be persuaded by the vision and experience of the reality after death.

Now all this speculation falls to the ground at once if it be true, as the Scriptures teach, that the sinner is "dead in trespasses and sins," that he needs to be "quickened," "raised from the dead," "new created" by him "who quickeneth the dead, and calleth the things that are not, as though they were." The sinner in this world *will* not turn to God; *will* not come to the Saviour that he may have life. The very *gravamen* of the difficulty is in his *will*; he is incurably averse to God, hates God, and no power of logic or eloquence can change his mind. A clearer revelation of God is only a clearer revelation of what the sinner hates; and if there is to be a clearer revelation of God in the other world, what other effect can it have than to drive the sinner further off from God? Besides, sin is prevented here from developing itself fully by the kindly restraints of domestic and social life, by public opinion and by human law. There is no reason to believe that those restraints will continue to exist in the future world. The

dead soul is, as it were, embalmed in this world with the sweet spices of charity and compassion; in the other world the natural process of putrefaction will take its course. These considerations harmonize exactly with the "parable" of the Rich Man and Lazarus. Dives makes no prayer for repentance for himself. He does not pray even for deliverance from his torments, but only for a slight alleviation of them. He does not pray for repentance to be *given* to his brethren. He only thinks of repentance in an external way as a condition of escaping torment, not as a hearty turning away from sin unto God. Moreover, he expresses his belief that repentance would be the result of the going to them of one from the dead. But as he himself already has the evidence which he desires for them, and yet does not repent, why should he think that *they* would repent? The only reason is that he knows them to be still in a state of probation and his own probation to be ended. There is a possibility of repentance for them, as they are still living, but there is none for him, even if he desired it, and of such desire there is no trace.

Even on the Pelagian and Arminian view, the probability that a man who has all his life resisted the commands and invitations of the gospel will in the other world be more inclined to faith and repentance, is exceedingly small. Do not these men know, and do they not teach sinners, that the longer the offers of salvation are resisted the less likely it is that they will ever be accepted? Why then annul the force of their exhortations to speedy, to immediate repentance, by teaching that repentance may be postponed to a time even beyond death, and yet be obtained at last?

Let us return now to the question of fact. Is there any proof of a probation after death? It is conceded that the proofs must be obtained from the Scriptures, if there are any proofs at all.

One of the passages—it may be said the fundamental passage, the *locus classicus*—is that of 1 Pet. iii. 18–20. This passage is relied on even by such a man as Professor Godet to prove that "the gospel shall be preached to every human soul before the judgment, either in this life or in the next." (See his Commentary on Rom. ii. 7, 8, Funk & Wagnall's edition, p. 119, with Dr.

Talbot W. Chambers's very clear and able criticism in the Appendix, pp. 517 ff.)

On this passage it may be remarked, first, that the Bible proof of a probation after death must be very scant, when the advocates of that view are compelled to appeal to it for support. Everybody knows that it is one of the most obscure places in the New Testament, and that the ablest interpreters are divided in their views about it. In regard particularly to the act or work of Christ there described interpreters differ. *When* was that work done? In the days of Noah, or in the interval between Christ's death and his resurrection? *What* was the work? Agreed that it was a preaching or making a proclamation; agreed also that it was a proclamation concerning the work of redemption which he had just achieved upon the cross, the question still remains, For what purpose was the proclamation made? For the purpose of affording to the "spirits in prison" another opportunity of salvation, or for the purpose merely of announcing and celebrating in that dark abode the victory of the Redeemer over the powers of darkness? It is contended by Prof. Godet, and those who agree with him, that the time was the interval between the death and the resurrection of Christ, and that the purpose of the proclamation was to offer salvation. It is contended by others that the time was the time of Noah, and the proclamation was the offer of salvation. It is contended by others still, as by Dr. Chambers, that the time was the interval between Christ's death and his resurrection, but that the proclamation was *not* the offer of salvation, or at least that such a purpose is not expressed in the passage, is not necessarily implied in the fact of preaching, and is forbidden by the tenor of Bible teaching. The writer of this paper thinks that the second of the views just mentioned harmonizes best with the scope of the passage and with the reference to Noah and the antediluvian generation, and prefers it for these reasons, while acknowledging the grammatical objections to it. But it is not necessary to arbitrate among these different views. The point here made is that such a passage is too precarious a support for such a notion as that of probation after death, especially as that notion is conceded to be not in har-

mony with the faith of the church or with the seeming tenor of Bible teaching.¹

Dr. Chambers, in the criticism above referred to, has another thought of much weight. It is this: "Even admitting (which is not admitted) that the words do mean or may mean that the Lord proclaimed a gospel to the spirits in prison, this proves nothing in respect to the case of others before or since the time of the proclamation in question, for the simple reason that there the circumstances were peculiar and extraordinary; and what is done on momentous occasions is no precedent for ordinary days. Because the conduits run wine instead of water when the king receives his crown, we are not to expect that they will do the same when the coronation is over." (P. 520.)

Another text is 1 Pet. iv. 6, upon which it is needless to dwell. If it proves a probation after death, it proves also the salvation of *all* the dead; and the boldest Universalism is the result. The apostle evidently refers to what took place in the lifetime of the dead. The gospel was preached to them when they were living, so that they might indeed be condemned by their fellows in "the fiery trial" (verse 12); "but nevertheless their spirits enjoyed immortal life with God" (see Chambers, as above).

Once more, the advocates of a *post-mortem* probation urge the passage in Matt. xii. 32, which seems to imply that some sins may be forgiven in the world to come. Dr. Dorner goes so far as to say (Christian Doctrine, § 83 c, p. 72, of Vol. III., T. & T. Clark's Trans., Edinb., 1882) that the sin against the Holy Ghost is "the only sin which is not forgiven either in this world or the next." All other sins are punishable, but this only will be punished. But of this more in the sequel. Meantime, the point here is that the form of the expression implies that there are sins which if not forgiven in this world may be in the next. The answer is, as Dr. Chambers remarks, that this is turning rhetoric into logic. The

¹ Let it be noted that Prof. Godet, and others who contend for a probation after death only for those who never had the offer of salvation in this life, have no right to this passage in support of their view. The antediluvian sinners *had* the offer of salvation. Noah was a preacher of righteousness to them (2 Pet. ii. 5), and the Spirit of grace strove with them (Gen. vi. 3) while the ark was preparing.

thirty-second verse is merely a rhetorical repetition of the thirty-first. Our Lord was considering not the *time* of forgiveness, but the question whether there was forgiveness at all in the case of a certain sin. In order to make the negation as vivid as possible, and to show that the sin he is speaking of shall never be forgiven, he combines the two periods, this world and the world to come. The same meaning is expressed in the parallel passage in Mark iii. 29: "Whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin" (thus in the Revised Version).

So much for the scriptural arguments in favor of probation after death. Whatever force they might seem to have, considered by themselves, and this has been shown to be very small, entirely vanishes in the presence of the scriptural arguments on the other side. Let us look at them:

First, the Bible is profoundly silent about any "intermediate place" in which the people dwell who are still, after death, in a state of probation. It speaks of a Sheol or Hades in the sense of the grave or in the sense of the unseen world, or of the state of the dead; but in this sense *all* the dead are there. It speaks of a Hades in the sense of a place of torment, not distinguishable in effect from Gehenna; but this would not be a proper place for the confinement of those who are not yet condemned, and who *may* be justified. It speaks of a "Gehenna of fire," but this is not for those who are still on trial, but for those who are finally and irrevocably condemned. It speaks of heaven, but this is the residence of those whose probation is past, and who have entered into eternal life. Papists are sagacious enough to find some traces of a Purgatory there; but if there were such a place, it would be, according to those heretics, the abode of *pious* people who have died in the communion of the church, and who are to pay the remnant of the penalty left unpaid by the Redeemer. It would be no place for the wicked, whose final destiny is still undecided. Some find another place called, they say, a "ward" or "place of safe-keeping," as Bishop Horsley renders the word for "prison," in 1 Pet. iii. 19; but this is a place almost the same as the *limbus* of the Papists, a place in which *pious* people are kept, without suf-

fering, in expectation of their future blessedness. It has been shown, however, that this view has no foundation in that text; but even if there were such a place, it would not be suitable for the wicked on probation. There is, then, no place provided for such a class in the next world, and the inference is natural, if not inevitable, that there is no such class.

Again: In that awful passage, the story of the rich man and Lazarus, which was first spoken by our Lord and then recorded for the purpose of revealing something concerning the state of the dead, and which contains the clearest and fullest view of the fate of the wicked, there are only two places mentioned. It matters not whether or not Abraham's bosom be identified with heaven and Hades with Gehenna, the point is that there are only two places, one a place of "comfort" and the other a place of "torment." It is to be noted also, that the entrance into either place follows immediately upon the article of death, and that there is a great gulf fixed between them, so that there can be no passing from one to the other. Further, let it be remembered, what has already been noted, that the rich man seeks no repentance for himself, evidently neither expects nor desires it, and asks for no deliverance from his doom. The conclusion from this passage against a probation after death is so clear and certain that it cannot possibly be evaded, except by a method of interpretation which would reduce the Bible as a rule of faith to an utter nullity.

In other passages death is spoken of as the event which fixes and determines the destiny of the wicked. For example, Prov. xiv. 32: "The wicked is driven away in his wickedness; but the righteous hath hope in his death." This implies that the wicked hath no hope in his death. Prov. xi. 7: "When a wicked man dieth, his expectation shall perish." Heb. ix. 27: "It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this judgment," or, as the revision has it, "cometh judgment." The word "judgment" is without the article, and the reference is rather to the sentence which immediately follows death than to "the day of judgment." The text teaches that prior to death man's destiny is not decided, he being not yet sentenced; but after death his destiny is settled. When he dies, the private judgment, that is, the

immediate personal consciousness either of penitence or impenitence, occurs. . . . The article of death is an event in human existence which strips off all disguises, and shows the person what he really is in moral character. He "knows as he is known," and in this flashing light passes a sentence upon himself that is accurate. (Shedd's Theology, II. p. 694.) In 2. Cor. v. 10, the reference is clear to the final or general judgment, and the teaching is that the sentence which shall be then received will be determined by what was done *in the body*, implying that when the soul left the body the account was closed. If the probation extended beyond the residence in the body, the apostle could not have used this form of speech. Again, our Saviour (Jno. viii.) says more than once to the Pharisees, "If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins." To die in their sins can mean nothing else than to die in the state of condemnation and pollution in which they had been living in consequence of their rejection of their Messiah and Redeemer; and if the mention of their death in such a connexion does not signify the decisive crisis beyond which there is no hope of salvation, it is impossible to devise a rational meaning for it. If our Saviour knew that his hearers would have after death another and a better opportunity to weigh his claims, it would have been more natural to say, "If ye believe not now that I am he, ye will no doubt (or probably) believe when death shall have given you more evidence." At all events, if his hearers had known or believed that their probation would be continued beyond death, they would have laughed at his threatening as a mere *brutum fulmen*. And the same would have been the consequence of all the threatenings of the New Testament, of John the Baptist, of his master Christ, and of the apostles.¹

As to Christ, who says more about the destiny of the wicked in the next world than all of his apostles put together, as we might have anticipated he would from his superior compassion, we must either suppose him to have been ignorant of the fact that there was probation after death, or, if he knew the fact, that he deliberately, for his own private ends, used language which im-

¹ See this point well stated and illustrated by Dr. Chambers in the criticism on Godet, above quoted.

plied the contrary, as some preachers who have turned out to be arrant hypocrites and knaves were accustomed to preach the hell and damnation in which they did not themselves believe in order to gratify their lust of gold and of power. But what Christian does not recoil with horror from either supposition as to his divine and immaculate Redeemer?

There are scores of other places in Scripture which would be emptied of their force and meaning by the supposition of a probation after death. There is no space in the limits assigned to this essay, for full citations. Some of them may be found in Gen. vi. 3; Ps. xcix. 12; Prov. i. 24, 28; Eccl. ix. 10; Luke xiii. 24, 25; Matt. xxiv. 42, 50; 2 Cor. vi. 2; Heb. iii. 7; x. 26; Rev. xxii. 11, 12. See Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, II., pp. 698 ff.

The discussion thus far has been one concerning probation after death, without limitation as to any particular class of sinners dying in impenitency. But there are many who are willing to concede that the argument is a good and valid one against a general *post-mortem* probation, and yet hold that there are rational and ethical grounds for believing that a probation will be given to all human beings who have not had the offer of salvation made to them in this life. This is just now the most popular and plausible form in which the doctrine is proposed and defended. It is the form in which it is advocated by the professors of the "New Theology" in New England, and, what is of much greater consequence, by Prof. Dorner and by Julius Müller. It is reported in the public prints that Dorner's *Theology* has been adopted as a text-book in one of the theological schools of Presbyterian Scotland instead of the system of Dr. Chas. Hodge (which is very like substituting darkness for light, as Dr. Dorner was, in point of style, one of the obscurest writers on this planet, and Dr. Hodge one of the clearest); and if this is the fact, it furnishes a clew to the kind of changes which the would-be revisers of the Westminster Confession in that country propose to make. Dr. Müller is a sounder thinker on the whole subject of sin than Dr. Dorner, which makes it the more to be deplored that he should give his countenance to so grave an error. The soteriology of both these learned men is inconsistent, in this particular, with their Hamar-

tology, as Dr. Shedd says; but the inconsistency is more glaring in the case of Müller, on account of his profounder treatment of the subject of sin.

The fundamental position of Dorner is that, beside the generic character of sinner which belongs to every man by virtue of his connexion with Adam, or, in other words, beside original sin and the actual transgressions which flow from it, something more is necessary to make him damnable, worthy of being damned. "The good must be placed before his eyes, not merely as the voice of conscience or as 'the letter,' but in its most lucid and attractive form, as personal love, in order that decision for or against truth may have decisive significance. This for the condition on the objective side. On the subjective side there must be full freedom of decision from the innermost personality. For good and definitive decision the possibility of evil must still stand open, otherwise it would not be free, so that the knowledge of good cannot yet be absolutely determining for the same. On the other hand, evil decision can only make ripe for the final judgment if it is in nowise naturally necessitated—for example, by generic sin—but if the subject is somehow put into the position to freely strike the decision of himself, and therefore himself to incur the guilt of decided rejection of personal love, which is only possible by means of self-incurred infatuation and falsehood. Now this subjective and objective possibility of free decision is given by God through Christianity as the absolute religion, and therefore Christianity is also the religion of freedom. The manifestation of Christ urges, therefore, irresistibly to decision for or against him, and at the same time, in spite of original sin, makes free decision possible" (*Theology*, III., pp. 69 ff. of T. & T. Clark's Translation).

The sum of all this is, that "no one will be damned merely on account of the common sin and guilt; but every one is definitely brought to guilty personal decision only through the gospel." No man can be considered a full person or fully a free agent until he is confronted with Christ (a new version, by the way, of Christ's words, "the Son shall make you free"). It is only then that the sin against the Holy Ghost becomes possible; and this sin, says Dorner, is "the only sin that is not forgiven either in this world or

in the next." "This is an entirely new position," says Dr. Shedd (Theology, II., p. 701), "not to be found in the past history of eschatology, and invented apparently to furnish a basis for the doctrine of a future offer of redemption." No such absurdity is found in Müller. He founds his hope on Matt. xii. 32. He denies and combats Dorner's position that sin against the gospel is the only damning sin. (See Shedd, *ut supra*.)

Now, if it be true, as Dorner affirms, that prior to Christ, "the incarnate personal love," there was no precise and decided personal character, whether good or evil, no freedom in such a sense as to imply damnable guilt, no "definitive unbelief," and no definitive faith; if this be true, then the larger portion of the Bible is a mass of nonsense and falsehood. One feels the same kind of difficulty in arguing with a man who can hold such a view as he would feel (to borrow an illustration from Henry Rogers) in arguing with an inhabitant of the planet Saturn, where, according to Voltaire's "Micromegas," a crime of enormous turpitude inspires absolute envy, and the three angles of a triangle are *not* equal to two right angles. One feels that he has no common ground on which he stands with Dr. Dorner, no principles accepted on both sides by which any question can be decided. The only possible method of argument is to appeal from Dorner drunk to Dorner sober, to show that he contradicts and stultifies himself. One of the best discussions in his Theology is that on the necessity of Christ's satisfaction to divine justice. He holds that this satisfaction was necessary for the pardon of any man's sins, Jew or Gentile; yet he holds that the only thing which exposes a man to the damnation of hell is the fact that such a satisfaction has been rendered! The penalty would never have been inflicted if Christ had not satisfied God for it. When we are reading Dorner on Christ's Priestly office, we cannot help wondering whether it is the same man who wrote the section on "Personal Free Decision" in the same volume. Here (on the Priestly Office, III., p. 425,) he defines the "wrath of God" (Rom. i. 18,) to be his holy *justice which punishes moral evil*, and then adds: "This justice is not merely directed against the sin of definitive unbelief (the sin against the Holy Ghost), as Ritschl thinks, as if all antecedent guilt and sin needed no expia-

tion. God's wrath is directed against *all* iniquity." (Rom. i. 18.) He also quotes John iii. 36, and says: "The wrath of God abides on sinners even before they despise the gospel." Here he either takes back the pernicious nonsense he had written on "Personal Free Decision," or he must mean that the wrath of God abides upon the sinner because salvation is intended for him and God foresees that he will despise it.

The heathen, according to the great theologian of Germany, are in no danger of eternal death unless they should chance to hear the gospel, and God is obliged to give them the gospel either in this world or in the next. So thought not David: "The wicked shall be turned into Sheol, and all the nations that forget God," (Psa. ix. 17). So thought not Jeremiah: "Pour out thy fury upon the heathen that know thee not, and upon the families that call not on thy name," (Jer. x. 25). So thought not Paul: "They that have sinned without law, shall perish without law," (Rom. ii. 12); and read Rom. i. 18-32, an appalling description of those who, according to Dr. Dorner, have not attained to their majority or full personal freedom, people who have discourse of reason and yet insult their Creator by likening him to corruptible man, to birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things. Dr. Dorner says they are not worthy of death, that is, (as he defines death, III., p. 425,) the "destruction of the soul, misery, all evil." Paul says: "Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them." Paul says again, (iii. 19,) that every mouth is to be stopped, and the whole world to become guilty before God; and this statement is based upon another appalling description of Dr. Dorner's sinners in their "minority." By no process of "criticism," experts as the Germans are acknowledged to be in all the varieties of that fine art, can the modern professor be reconciled with the ancient apostle. One or the other must be abandoned.

It is very evident that, if Dorner's doctrine be true, the benevolent impulse which has prompted and sustained missions to the heathen is a blind and fatal impulse. There might be other reasons for foreign missions, but there could be no benevolence. "If

no man can be lost," says Dr. Shedd, "without the knowledge of Christ, then none of the past heathen world who died without this knowledge incurred perdition for the 'deeds done in the body,' and none of the existing heathen world who are destitute of this knowledge are liable to perdition from this cause. In this case, it is matter of rejoicing that the past generations of pagans never heard of the Redeemer, and it should be an earnest endeavor of the church to prevent all of the present generation of pagans from hearing of him." (Dogmatic Theology, II., p. 702, note.)

It may be noted, in conclusion, how completely the advocates of after-death probation reverse the positions of Scripture in regard to the justice and mercy of God. These positions are, that while justice and mercy are both of them necessary attributes of God, yet there is this difference between them, that God is always just to all, is unjust to none, but he is not merciful to all. "He has mercy on whom he will have mercy." Mercy, in its exercise, is sovereign; justice is not. The after-death probationists deny that this is so, or ought to be so. Like the Universalists, they insist upon God's treating all men alike. It is natural, therefore, in Dorner to avow expressly the opposition of his doctrine to that of Luther and Calvin; that is, the doctrine of predestination. He is right. If his position is the true one, Calvinism is out and out false, and *tremendously* false.

T. E. PECK.

III. PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF PRESBYTERIAN POLITY.

THE word Presbyterian suggests rather a system of doctrine than a system of government. In the world's thought, the name covers a much wider field than its etymology warrants. Pronounce it in the ear of the first man you meet and probably the thought awakened in his mind will be a thought about election and predestination. The explanation of this is that the Presbyterian Church has come to be the recognized champion of that system of doctrine labelled Calvinism. It was not so from the beginning. In the early years of the Reformation, Calvin was the theologian of Protestant Christendom. His exposition of doctrine was universally regarded as Augustinianism purified and carried up into closer conformity with the word of God. It must never be forgotten that in those days when men often had to choose between truth and life, the truth which they chose in preference to life was truth cast in the logical mould of Calvinism. Whatever may be the state of the case now, the time has been when truth stated in Calvinistic phraseology was held so dear by the Christian heart that life was held cheap in the comparison. When persecution and the prospect of martyrdom made men think soberly and profoundly on what they believed, they thought that Calvinism was true. Whatever increase of light has been thrown on the teachings of Scripture by the subsequent development of knowledge, whether along the line of biblical and textual criticism or along the line of physical science, has had no effect on the Presbyterian Church in the way of modifying its conception of the great doctrines of grace or their logical relation to each other. No increase of light was needed to reveal those doctrines in their proper proportions and relations. The devout soul of the sixteenth century, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, and with the Bible before it, had all the facilities that one can ever have for the understanding of the leading doctrines in the plan of salvation. The only reason that Presbyterianism has come to be so intimately associated with

Calvinism as to be identified with it in the popular mind is that the Presbyterian Church still occupies the ground which was once the common ground of Protestantism. It occupies this ground still because it sees no outlet from it except an outlet that leads away from the word of God. Presbyterians are sometimes twitted with being afraid to preach what they profess to believe. The reason this charge is made against them is that their creed harmonizes so perfectly with the Bible that when the truths of both are thrown into popular form for pulpit use, the most practiced ear cannot detect any difference. When they preach their creed the critic asserts with confidence that they are preaching the Bible, and when they are preaching the Bible, he asserts with equal confidence, that they are preaching their creed.

When, however, we look for that which has ever been distinctive of Presbyterianism, we must look beyond its system of doctrine to its system of government, and it is this latter which it is our present purpose to expound.

Leaving out of view the Papacy, there are only three radically different theories of church government, viz.: the Episcopal, the Congregational, and the Presbyterian. These correspond very nearly to Monarchy, Democracy, and Republicanism in the civil sphere. Episcopacy lodges the exercise of power in the hands of one man; Congregationalism puts it in the hands of the whole brotherhood; while Presbyterianism places it in the hands of representatives chosen by the brotherhood. These representatives are called elders or presbyters, from the Greek word *presbuteros*, hence the name Presbyterian. This name, however, is not given to the church which bears it because it is the only church that has the office of elder. All denominations of Christians have officers to whom they give this title. But the Presbyterian Church gives much more prominence to the office of elder than do the other churches, and for this reason the title of the office came to be used as a descriptive title of the church. The Baptists are not the only people who baptize; but they ring the changes on *baptidzo* so constantly, rolling it as a sweet morsel under their tongue, that it is only a proper concession to their zeal and affection to allow them to wear this word as a denominational name. Episco-

papalians are not the only people who have *Episcopoi*, or bishops; but no other denomination loves a bishop with so much fervor, nor bows to him with such lowly homage—hence it is nothing more than their due to let them enjoy a name that is musical with the sound of *Episcopoi*. In like manner the Presbyterian Church has earned a right to its name by the honor which it has ever placed on the office of presbyter.

I. The Presbyterian Church lodges the exercise of power exclusively in the hands of its elders. All its governing bodies are composed of elders alone. It is as an elder that the preacher sits in the Session, the Presbytery, the Synod, and the General Assembly; and he sits in these courts merely as the peer of the elder who does not preach. The most distinguished D. D., LL. D., with Ph. D. thrown in, and the most illiterate back-woods elder meet together as official equals. No matter how splendid one's natural gifts, nor how many provinces of knowledge he may conquer, he can never climb to a higher rank than that of elder. No matter how humble one's natural gifts, nor how meagre his attainments, if he has been exalted to this rank he has reached the summit of official dignity. Two questions now demand an answer—

1. Can this estimate of the eldership be justified from the Scriptures? The first officer bearing the name of elder of which mention is made in the Bible, was Abraham's servant, "the elder of his house who ruled over all that he had." (Gen. xxiv. 2.) The next elders mentioned were the elders of the land of Egypt who went up with Joseph to bury his father. The next were the elders of Israel to whom Moses was sent when God appeared to him at the burning bush. From that time forward elders are mentioned with great and growing frequency. They were associated with Moses during the wanderings in the wilderness. The office continued after the Israelites entered Canaan, and was preserved intact amid all the great changes and political revolutions through which the nation passed down to the day of Pentecost. Elders are referred to during the time that the nation was governed by judges, afterwards when it was governed by kings, and still later, when it was captive under the power of Babylon. They are frequently mentioned during the Saviour's lifetime, and also

after his death. This brings the history of the church down to the time when it passed from its Jewish to its Christian form. This transition involved great changes both in the government and in the worship of the church. Many old things passed away, and nearly all things pertaining to outward structure and form became new. What became of the time-honored institution of the eldership? Did it vanish? A negative answer is given by Acts xi. 29, 30. Soon the church took on another marked feature. From the days of Abraham it had been confined to the Jewish nation. Now, its borders are enlarged, and it is commissioned to go forth and gather into its fold every tribe and kindred and tongue. Does the eldership pass over from the Jewish into the Gentile church? An affirmative answer is given by Acts xiv. 23. If anything further were wanting to show the continuity and perpetuity of the eldership, it could be found in the fact that when the heavens were opened to John's vision on Patmos he saw elders seated round about the throne in the glorified church above. Thus elders are found everywhere from Genesis to Revelation—in Abraham's household, in Egypt, in Canaan, in the Jewish church, in the Christian church, in the church below and in the church above.

2. What is the nature of the office as indicated by these references? Manifestly the elder of Abraham's house was a domestic officer. The Egyptian elders were state officers. Among the Jews the office had a wider scope. At one time the elders are representing the people in a solemn act of worship; at another time bearing with Moses the burden of government. They installed David in his kingly office, and under the reign of Solomon they are found exercising the office of civil magistrates. During the life of our Lord they belonged to the supreme tribunal of the land, and took part in the trial and condemnation of Jesus. In the Christian church they were associated with the apostles in ordaining certain decrees which were enjoined on all the churches. Paul charges the elders of the church at Ephesus to "take heed to the flock over which the Holy Ghost had made them overseers." From these various teachings of Scripture three things are apparent: (1.) The elder was an officer in the family, in the state, and

in the church; *i. e.*, in every sphere of government ordained of God, the office of elder has found place. (2.) The chief function of the office is to bear rule. (3.) The elders constitute an unbroken chain, binding together all dispensations of the church. The office took its rise in the Patriarchal church, was continued in the Jewish national church, and carried over into the universal Christian church. Now, if any other denominations think they have whereof they may boast in the way of antiquity of descent, Presbyterians more. Talk they of apostolic succession! Presbyterians are just getting fairly under weigh in tracing their pedigree when they reach the apostles. They run on back through the Babylonish captivity, the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, the period of the Judges, the wilderness wanderings, and sit as corresponding members in a presbytery convened by Moses and Aaron in the land of Egypt. (Ex. iv. 29.) The apostles fall about the middle of the presbyterial chain which stretches across thirty-five or forty centuries. The church has always been presbyterial in its character—it has always been governed by elders. Moses, the great law-giver, was required to recognize their governing functions. David, the great king, was anointed by their hands. The arbitrary and despotic Ahab did not ignore their authority. Not even the inspired apostles presumed to usurp their prerogatives. The claim is confidently made that the Presbyterian Church is following divine precedent in magnifying the office of elder. It is but copying the example set by inspired men when it places all exercise of church power in their hands.

II. The Presbyterian Church gives prominence to the eldership by multiplying the number of elders, so as to have two or more ruling jointly in every congregation. There is nothing to which Presbyterianism is more averse than to one-man power. It holds that the normal condition of the church is one in which every congregation is presided over by a court composed of the two classes of elders, and every function of government is to be discharged by this court. Is the Presbyterian Church scriptural in this respect? Perhaps the shortest way to determine this point is to take one of the apostolic churches, and use that as the standard of measurement. In Acts xx. 17, it is said that Paul sent from Miletus and

called the elders of the church at Ephesus. In the twentieth verse is recorded the charge which he gave them: "Take heed therefore to yourselves and to all the flock over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you bishops." This is the first place in Scripture where the word bishop is used as the title of a church officer. In common usage this word is restricted to churches of the Episcopal order. Episcopacy means a government by *episcopi*, or bishops. The very name which these churches bear would indicate that they emphasize their claim to the scriptural bishop. It would awaken surprise for a Presbyterian elder to claim a right to the title. But this is confidently set forth in his behalf. It is claimed that every pulpit in the Presbyterian Church is occupied by a bishop, and every congregation is ruled over by a plurality of bishops. The Presbyterians are Episcopalians on a grand scale; they have a hundred bishops where the Episcopal Church has one. Perhaps this accounts for the difference of treatment accorded them in the two churches. A bishop is something of a rarity with the Episcopal brethren, and consequently they show great reverence and regard for him. From this it often results that he comes to entertain a fairly good opinion of himself, and disdains to associate on a footing of ecclesiastical equality with his less pretentious brethren of other communions. On the other hand, a bishop is such an everyday occurrence with the Presbyterians that they treat him as if he differed very little, if at all, from other people. But whose bishop is most like those at Ephesus? Three things are put beyond question: (1), Those Ephesian bishops were called elders; (2), They all belonged to the same congregation; (3), They were charged to take pastoral care of that congregation. Do not the familiar features of the Presbyterian bishops appear in this picture? (1), Presbyterian bishops are called elders; (2), A plurality belong to each congregation; (3), They are charged with the pastoral care of the congregation to which they belong. The likeness is so striking that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it was drawn from life, that Paul was giving a charge to the session of a Presbyterian Church which he had previously established at Ephesus. Now, lay an Episcopal bishop by the side of this picture, and see to what extent their features correspond: (1), Has it ever been known in an Episcopal

Church that the same person who was called bishop was also named elder? Never. In all Episcopal churches bishops are distinguished in rank and office from elders. (2), Has it ever been known in the Episcopal Church that two or more bishops belonged to the same congregation? Never. Each bishop rules over a diocese including several congregations. (3), Was it ever known in the Episcopal Church that the bishops were charged with the pastoral care of any particular congregation? Never. The functions of the bishop relate chiefly to the inferior clergy, and not to the congregation. In what respect, then, do bishops in the Episcopal Church correspond with the bishops in the church at Ephesus? In no respect whatever. The two have no single feature in common. Even the doctrine of evolution cannot trace a modern Episcopal bishop back to the ancient Ephesian bishop. The difference is too great to be accounted for by difference in development of organs common to both. The chasms separating them are too broad to be bridged by "missing links." In fact, Episcopal churches do not claim that their bishops have been evolved from scriptural bishops; the claim is that they are "successors of the apostles." Why not call them apostles? Children should be called by the name of their parents. It is confusing and misleading to take a name that is used uniformly in Scripture to designate an elder, and apply it to a successor of an apostle. Because of this perversion of the title, Presbyterians have practically discarded it from their ecclesiastical nomenclature.

But how stands the matter between the Presbyterians and the Congregationalists? The latter have elders and therefore bishops if they choose to call them such. May it not be that their elders are the true successors of the Ephesian bishops? The theory of Congregationalism is that all the elders mentioned in the New Testament were preachers. Hence in Congregational churches there are none but teaching elders. Supposing this theory correct, then all the elders at Ephesus were preachers, and the Congregational churches have departed from the primitive practice, in that they have only one preacher to each congregation. If it be said that the church at Ephesus was a very large church, and for this reason was exceptional in having a plurality of elders, the re

ply is that Paul and Barnabas ordained "elders in every church" which they organized on their missionary tour; and Paul left Titus in Crete to ordain "elders in every city." If the Congregationalists have the scriptural bishop, it is evident that they are unscriptural in having only one bishop in each particular church. Moreover, they have a strong antagonist to their view in the person of the Apostle Paul, who says, "Let the elders that rule well be accounted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine," plainly implying that there were elders who only ruled, and did not labor in word and doctrine; *i. e.*, elders who were not preachers. Demonstrably there is no place in either the Episcopal or Congregational Church for these Ephesian elders. The Episcopal Church wants only one bishop for a multitude of congregations, and the Congregationalists are abundantly satisfied with only one for each congregation, whereas Paul and Barnabas ordained elders—more than one—for each church. The Presbyterian Church is the only one that can furnish accommodation for so many. It can put from two to two dozen in each congregation. True, they will not all be required to preach, but if the majority will only rule well, they will be esteemed worthy of double honor.

III. The Presbyterian Church gives prominence to the office of elder by giving him a wide field for the exercise of his official functions. Selected by one particular congregation, and charged primarily with the pastoral care of that congregation, he is in virtue of the church's unity empowered with the right of rule throughout the length and breadth of Christ's earthly kingdom. Responsible primarily for the peace, purity and prosperity of the fold that elects him, he becomes in his measure responsible for the well-being of the universal flock.

This wide extent of jurisdiction is secured by means of a series of courts, all of which are properly called Presbyteries, inasmuch as they are composed exclusively of presbyters, but for the sake of convenience they are discriminated by different names. The Session is composed of the elders of one congregation; the Presbytery is composed of elders representing several contiguous congregations; the Synod is composed of elders representing a still

larger territory; and the General Assembly is composed of elders representing the whole church. Appeals lie from each lower court to the next higher, and the proceedings of each lower court are subject to the review and control of the next higher. In this way every act of every Session, before it becomes final, has the sanction of its Presbytery, and every act of the Presbytery the sanction of Synod, and the act of the Synod the sanction of the General Assembly. So that every act of every Session, before it terminates, has become the act of the whole church. Is Presbyterianism scriptural in this respect? It is not pretended that either precept or precedent can be found in Scripture for all the detailed workings of this series of courts. It is claimed, however, that precedents and principles can be found from which these several courts legitimately take their rise. They have their source chiefly in two great doctrines of Scripture, viz., the parity of the elders and the unity of the church. If the elders are officially of the same rank and order, they must rule jointly. If the church is one, then the act of a part must be the act of the whole. That the elders are of the same rank is sufficiently proven by the fact that they all have the same official titles, and all are charged with the same duties. That the church is one is proven by such considerations as the following: (1), The figures of Scripture indicate it. The church is represented as one body, one fold, one family, one living temple, one kingdom. These figures imply that the whole church is under the same Head, the same laws, the same methods of administration, is animated with a common life and bound together by community of interest. (2), In the nature of the case, unity of faith, feeling and practice tends to resolve itself into organic unity. Where these inner affinities exist, the members will have the same care one for another, and their sympathies cannot be restricted within the limits of a single congregation. Inevitably they will seek for wider fellowship, and attempt to avail themselves of the strength which comes from interchange of helpful counsel and beneficent aid. The truth of this is illustrated in the history of Congregationalism. The churches of that persuasion group themselves into associations, and bind themselves together in bonds only a little less strong than the covenant vows by which

Presbyterian churches are bound. (3), The first serious dispute which arose in the early church was not settled by the society in which it originated. It was referred to a joint meeting of apostles and elders at Jerusalem; and when settled by them, it was settled not alone for Jerusalem and Antioch, but for the whole church (Acts xvi. 4). The Presbyterian Church claims for its elders precisely the same extent of jurisdiction that belonged to those of the primitive church, and which was exercised by them with apostolic consent and approval.

Three great distinctive principles of Presbyterianism have now been pointed out. These are primitive and formative, and are seen to rest upon the solid bed-rock of Scripture.

1. Presbyterianism is a government exclusively in the hands of elders chosen by the people, these elders being divided into two classes, but all of the same rank and authority.

2. It is a government in which the elders rule jointly, thus requiring a plurality in every congregation.

3. It is a government which realizes the unity of the church by means of a series of courts rising one above the other, each lower subject to the review and control of the next higher, and so placing the power of the whole church over the power of each part.

To say that this government is scriptural is to claim that it is the best government that the world has ever seen, better than any that the wit of man ever has devised or can devise. The great endeavor of all ages has been to establish a government which should have sufficient strength, on the one hand, to protect life and property against the depredations of lawless passion, and which should be so hedged in by restrictions, on the other hand, as that it could not itself become a trespasser on the rights of its own subjects. The great object is to secure liberty without license and order without oppression. The difficulty is to hit the golden mean where the government shall have delegated powers sufficient to prevent the aggressions of selfishness, and the subjects shall have reserved power sufficient to prevent the encroachments of tyranny. Hitherto all endeavors have resulted in failure, and consequently the pathway of history is strewn with the wrecks of empires, king-

doms, and republics. That nice equilibrium of powers between the rulers and the ruled which is necessary to the perfection and the permanence of government has never yet been secured. But it has come to be the settled conviction of the wisest statesmen that the nearest approach to it is found in a representative republic. Perhaps the theory of civil government which obtains in the United States is as nearly perfect as anything that has yet been elaborated by human thought. First, there is a written constitution, freely adopted by the people, which sets forth to what extent and with what limitations the powers of government shall be exercised. Then the people by their ballots select those with whom the exercise of this power shall be entrusted. The people say both how they shall be governed and who shall govern them. This would seem to be as much liberty as is consistent with the ends of government. It is very accurately defined as a government of the people, by the people and for the people. There is, however, one important distinction to be noted, viz., that between the will of the people as expressed in the constitution, and the will of the people as expressed in the ballot-box. The rulers are bound to rule according to the former, and not according to the latter. The constitution was framed by the wisest men of the nation, analyzed, and debated section by section, and then deliberately adopted as the highest possible achievement of political sagacity. It may be presumed, therefore, that the will of the people expressed in the constitution is a safe guide for rulers. The will of the people as it is expressed by ballot is a different thing; it is not a will acting dispassionately and under the directing influence of the "dry light of reason." Rather it is a will that easily yields to the passions of the hour, that may be excited and directed by the most unconscionable demagogue. Here is the chief danger to free republican institutions. Political power is often lodged in the hands of those who for selfish and partisan ends are ready to trample on the wise limitations of the constitution and pander to the varying caprice of the popular will. If only the true theory of this great republic could be realized in the practical exercise of power, possibly the perplexing problem of the ages would be solved.

Now, the Presbyterian system of church government, while

not the product of human wisdom, accords in a most remarkable manner with the conclusions of the wisest statesmanship. It is a representative republic. It differs from the civil government in that its constitution, instead of being the product of the highest political sagacity, is the product of divine wisdom. It is framed for the church, and given to it by the Lord Jesus Christ, the only Head and supreme Lawgiver of his people. This constitution is the Bible, which points out with a wisdom far transcending that of the loftiest human intellect to what extent and with what limitations the powers of ecclesiastical government shall be exercised. But to the people belongs the right of saying with whom the exercise of this power shall be entrusted. This is as much liberty as is consistent with a proper loyalty to Jesus the King. The people first choose him as the source of all law, and then choose those who are to administer this law.

From the foregoing exposition it is easy to see several points of superiority which this system possesses over either of the others with which it has been compared.

1. It is superior to Episcopacy because it provides more effectually against the play of unholy passions and prejudices. Ministers are subject to the same frailties and imperfections with other men, and the history of the church abundantly illustrates that a thirsting for preëminence is the besetting sin of ecclesiastics. Out of this grew the Papacy, which kept the world bound in the manacles of spiritual tyranny for centuries. To exalt one preacher above his brethren and clothe him with power over them is to put a strain upon human nature that it is hardly strong enough to bear. Servants often pay court to their master with an eye to their own advancement; but the pride of the natural heart appropriates to its own use, and feeds with delight upon, the flattering homage. The result is an overgrown self-conceit which looks with contemptuous eyes upon those whose shoe-latchets it is not worthy to unloose. It has been aptly said that "no man ought to be willing to rule alone, and no church ought to be willing to let him." For more reasons than one, "in the multitude of counsellors there is safety."

2. It is superior to Congregationalism in that it puts the gov-

ernment in the hands of those who are selected for their prudence and piety, and who are therefore the best qualified to administer it. No promiscuous assembly of men, women, and children is fit to discuss and decide grave matters of doctrine and discipline. Recognizing this fact, churches of the congregational order sometimes improve upon their system by associating with the pastor a committee of selectmen. This is a virtual abandonment of Congregationalism, and a practical endorsement of Presbyterianism. But it is still at a disadvantage, in that these selectmen have only a temporary appointment. The office of ruling should be permanent, so that those elected thereto may qualify themselves for responsibilities so great and solemn.

3. As each congregation elects its own rulers, it can not only select persons of approved piety and discretion, but of necessity it must select those who are bound to that particular congregation by peculiarly tender ties. The rulers sustain to the ruled the relations of father, brother, friend, neighbor. This ensures that the government will be mild and parental in its character, and robs submission of everything approaching to abjectness.

4. While all government begins in the congregation, yet the different courts of the Presbyterian Church are so related that every member of the church has his rights protected by the whole church. If wrong should be done the humblest disciple through the inefficiency or partiality of the lower court, the wrong can be redressed by the larger wisdom and broader impartiality of the higher court. There is only one thing about Presbyterianism more admirable than its polity, and that is the system of doctrine which it stands pledged to maintain and to propagate. It is the most powerful and the most consistent champion of that system of doctrine which crowns God with the glory of absolute and universal sovereignty, which prostrates man in the dust and bids him adore the justice that condemns, while he rejoices in the grace that saves; a system which bows the intellect of man in humble submission to God's word, and at the same time offers a support to faith by exhibiting the perfect consistency between the teachings of the inspired writers and the severest demands of logic.

IV. PAPAL POLICY.

WHILST we gladly realize the fact that many members of the Roman Catholic Church, especially among the laity, evince a sincere Christian piety, and an honesty which is above suspicion, we cannot avoid the belief that the hierarchy of that church is engaged in a deadly conspiracy against the conscience-rights of Protestants, and the civil liberties of Americans. Our reasons for so believing are drawn not only from past history but from current facts. In spite of charity, of magnanimity, and the social qualities which often mark the intercourse of the priesthood with their Protestant cotemporaries, we are compelled to embrace a conviction which an ignorant public, always superficial in its judgments, may denounce as bigotry, but which would command the assent of any enlightened and unbiased audience listening to the evidence.

It is impossible, in a brief paper, to cover the entire ground, and in a case like the present it is altogether unnecessary. To follow Romish casuists through the tortuous paths of verbal mysticism in which they delight, would consume a lifetime very unprofitably, as always appears in a controversy with them. We have never known them to face an issue in an honest, direct and candid spirit. To mystify the question, to quibble about terms, to tease or fret an antagonist, to arouse temper by shameful personalities—in short, to do a little skillful fencing for the delusion of the public, and retire from a nominally drawn battle with an air of triumph—seems to be the peculiar ambition of these Jesuitical polemics. We have been mortified frequently at the obtuseness of the American citizen of the frivolous type, in accepting such displays of skill as proof of innocence. The political demagogue is unconsciously exposing himself to the contempt of many Protestant Christians when he announces his confidence in the patriotism of the Romish priesthood and the safety of our country in their hands. The ignorance of such politicians is just enough to render them pliable in the manipulating power of the most

crafty and unscrupulous association of designing men the world has ever known.

Our arraignment is exceedingly simple. We fearlessly affirm that the significant words of representative Romanists are in direct conflict with the great mass of historical and cotemporaneous facts. It is well-known that, in the United States, the bishops of that church make positive assurances to the American public of their admiration for, and cordial support of, our political system. No Protestant patriot could surpass the gush of these servants of a foreign prince in the expression of devotion to the principles of our government. These proclamations have been in recent years repeated, by various spokesmen of the church, with so much emphasis that the moral sense of our own people has been shocked at the audacity of their authors. The world has long been accustomed to unscrupulous dodging by this class of controversialists, but it has been reserved for our day and country to hear from Romish bishops the astounding statement that church and state are happily united under our constitution and laws, in the very sense which their church prefers! There is no lack of boldness in such an assertion. The man who could write it down and publish it must have been desperately anxious to satisfy the jealous vigilance of the American people by verbal guarantees in the face of overwhelming proofs that the statement cannot be true. We have often heard of men voluntarily sacrificing *life* for the truth or for their native land, and there is always a responsive chord in the human breast that sounds in unison with the recorded deed. But the sacrifice of *reputation* for the sake of impressing a gross falsehood upon a community, is a novel style of heroism, and a suspicious display of virtue in the eyes even of an infidel world.

That such is the bold proposition of eminent and representative men of the Romish Church is now beyond dispute, unless Talleyrand was right in affirming that language is an expedient for the concealment of ideas. A bishop of that church in the United States, some time since, had an exchange of shots with some Protestant ministers in a political paper, the *Dispatch*, of Richmond, Va., and one of his paragraphs, now lying in print before our eyes, reads as follows, with italics just as we find them:

“I should be pleased to have Rev. Dr. Pollard give the public his definition of union of Church and State. I am certain that I but voice the unanimous sentiment of American Catholics, lay and clerical, when I assert that were we in a numerical ascendancy we could not wish to do more than perpetuate the existing order of things, and for this very good reason—that, as Dr. Brownson wrote years ago, ‘the Church has here nearly all the rights guaranteed to her, and in some respects more freedom than she secures by her most advantageous *concordats* with the Catholic Powers of Europe or America. She is freer and more independent here, and is more effectually protected by the Constitution of the American republic than she has ever been in France since Philip the Fair; in Germany since the extinction of the Carlovingian Emperors; in England since the Norman conquest; or in Spain since the death of Isabella the Catholic; although she is not once recognized by name in the Constitution, and the fathers of the republic very likely had no intention of recognizing or protecting her at all, for they regarded her as dead and no longer a danger to their protestantism or infidelity. *There is here a real union of Church and State in our sense of the term; and though not perfect, yet almost as perfect as has ever existed anywhere.*’ (No. 1, New Series, *Brownson’s Review.*) I fancy Dr. Pollard considers the support of the Church and her ministers as the very essence of union between the two orders—spiritual and temporal. Were this true, there is just as much union of the Protestant churches with the State in France, Austria, and other Catholic countries as there is with the Catholic Church, since Protestant ministers receive even larger salaries in those countries from the government than do Catholic priests.”

There could not possibly be a more explicit declaration than this here made by the Bishop of Wheeling, that he, and his fellow-Catholics of the United States, regard the union of church and state as constitutionally established in our country; that is to say, no union at all, and as almost the best union ever devised. If a loyal subject of the Turkish Sultan should write and print the opinion that the American Executive office is about the best form of monarchical government ever seen, indeed “almost perfect,” the reading world would stare with unutterable amazement. And yet such a sentiment on the lips of a Turk would be quite as consistent as the one here emanating from a high dignitary of the Church of Rome! Such an attempt to throw dust into the eyes of millions of our people strikes us as no less conspicuous for its absurdity than for its hardihood. For surely even the most ignorant political demagogue must know that if there is a union of church and state in our country, even the Mormon Church is established, not to refer to other monstrous delusions, because polygamy has been condemned as an *immorality*, and not as a heresy. According to the sapient dignitary of Wheeling, the Mormon *religion*

and that of the Jews, and even of Buddhism, are all included in the church which is here "united" with the state, and are but an insignificant imperfection in the glorious system. But, soberly speaking, it appears from his own express words that the *absence* of all union between the two is the perfection of union; for there is no other response to the insane proposition than to say, in the name of the American people, that no union between church and state exists in the United States.

But, in whatever relation the civil and ecclesiastical authorities stand to one another here, it is plainly signified to be such as would satisfy the Romish hierarchy *in every other part of the world*. They would, forsooth, gladly see such a state of things in the different kingdoms and republics of southern Europe! They would rejoice to see all legal restrictions withdrawn from Protestants in the Spanish and Portuguese communities of the Western Hemisphere! And this lovely spirit of regard for the conscience comes from a church whose head insists upon being again invested with the *temporal power at Rome*, and would immediately suppress every Protestant church and mission in that city! An affectation of saintly piety by Satan himself could hardly be more incongruous than such a mockery of spiritual freedom on the lips of a thorough-going papist. A few years ago the pope was a petty despot over the States of the Church, of the type of Philip the Second of Spain, and Louis the Fourteenth of France. If he was a dear lover of liberty, as those spiritual slaves of the infallible pontiff are trying to make us believe, why in the world did not the pope introduce our admirable institutions into his dominions, and remove all their disabilities from his Protestant subjects? And if the Bishop of Wheeling, who prates about honesty, is sincere in his professions, why do not he and the other members of the hierarchy in the United States openly and earnestly implore their master to use his authority and influence to secure the same degree of religious liberty which Catholics enjoy in the United States, for the Protestants of Spain, of Cuba, of Belgium, of Brazil, and of Spanish America?

Mere words are nothing. "Beware of false prophets." "By their fruits ye shall know them." The "wolf in sheep's clothing"

was not peculiar to our Saviour's times. He reappears now in a subtle priesthood, which pretends to love the free institutions and principles of the United States, but has shown itself the staunch supporter of despotism, and the enemy of equal rights, in every modern state where the two principles have been in conflict.

If we had similar evidence that the Episcopal bishops in the United States regarded the *separation* of church and state in our country as a better *union* of the two than their denomination enjoys in England, we might well understand how the English bishops might differ from them *in toto*. The two bodies are not bound together by an infallible head. But it is the boast of the Romish Church that its principles are *the same all over the world*. It follows, then, that their church has no fixed principle on that subject; for if it had, its priesthood would not be ardent advocates of opposite principles in different lands. Americans, worthy of the name, contend for the equality of all sects of Christians before the law, not only in the United States, but in every nominally Christian country on the globe. They maintain, on principle, that a Catholic Christian has a sacred right to enjoy and extend his faith without restraint in England and Prussia as fully as Protestants. And they consistently insist that a Protestant shall possess equal privileges in Rome, in Vienna, and in Madrid. But the entire world knows that the disabilities and restraints imposed upon Protestants in countries most intensely Catholic have never been contrived by the civil powers *in opposition* to the objections of the papal authority. History rises to her feet and solemnly swears that all such restraints would have ceased centuries ago to stain the annals of many Catholic nations, if the Romish Church had only spoken out distinctly in favor of liberty of conscience.

The half-educated and self-seeking demagogue in the United States exposes himself to the scorn of the cultivated and patriotic Christian when he confides in the hollow professions of the Jesuit that his church is American to the core. That these claims are the devices of a conscious conspiracy must appear obvious from their very extravagance. The political views conveyed in the paragraph we have copied are but a part of the monstrous display. We find the same hierarchy figuring in the van of moral reform,

and eclipsing the zeal of many descendants of the Puritans in their ardent advocacy of the sanctity of the Sabbath, the temperance agitation, the purification of popular amusements, the spirituality of public education, and the suppression of divorce. Truly the *role* of reform has been taken up in this country by a body never known on any other theatre to manifest a similar ardor in that line! But the strongest card employed in this game of skill is the assumed championship of a pure and permanent union of the sexes. The sanctity of the marriage tie has no more pretentious defenders than the same hierarchy which has crimsoned its history with *dispensations* allowing the marriage of royal persons within the bounds of what it calls *incest*. Two years have scarcely elapsed since uncle and niece were thus permitted by the present pope to enter into this relation, which ordinary mortals do not dare to assume.

But still these very conscientious ecclesiastics are the most pronounced opponents of these unnatural alliances, and wish to impress Americans with a conviction that no church can compare with their own in zeal for the purest and most sacred relations between man and woman! Their abhorrence of Mormonism is beyond words, and one would think, from their efforts to express it, that chastity is the darling virtue of the Catholic priesthood. In fact, we know of no reason to impute to them a failure in this point *in the United States*. Their clergy are socially as reputable as any; but what gives us pause is the unanimity of the testimony of Protestant missionaries in *popish* countries that the Catholic priests in several of them are often found living in concubinage, whilst others, though unincumbered, are shamefully licentious. If we are not grossly misled by voluminous statements of missionaries and travellers, large numbers of priests in Mexico are frequenters of the gaming table and the cock-pit, and are degraded by other vices; and the Brazilian parish priests are often so sunk in debauchery as to be the scorn of the better classes of the people. Such facts, if true, raise the question, *Why* the Catholic Church, a boasted unit in orthodoxy and morals, is so different under the eyes of Protestant communities? Why is His Holiness of Rome so tolerant of immorality and indecency in Mexico and South Americaa, mong

his own commissioned servants, and so intolerant towards the efforts of Protestant missionaries to distribute the Scriptures and inculcate virtue among his late Roman subjects? Alas! it appears too evident that in the judgment of this church, to dissent from its arbitrary dogmas is a grosser crime than habitual contempt for the moral law of God; to think and speak otherwise than the pope allows is an offence far blacker in enormity than a life of profligacy, debauchery, sacrilege and shame!

Let the words used in the foregoing paragraph be particularly noticed: "There is here a *real* union of church and state in one sense of the term." The Catholic sense of the term is equal freedom of all denominations to disseminate the faith they hold among mankind, whether that faith be true or false! It is to be supposed, therefore, that the hierarchy cordially accepts as good and true in principle the explicit language of Jefferson and Madison in the celebrated Act of Religious Freedom, adopted by the Legislature of Virginia, in words following, to-wit:

"Be it enacted by the General Assembly, that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities."

The laws of almost every one of the States, and the Federal constitution itself, all correspond in unequivocal language with this act of Virginia of 1785. The Federal instrument expressly forbids the passage of any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The people of the United States are thus fully committed *against* the union of church and state, any form of establishment, and any restraint upon religious freedom. And now we have the Romish Church, by its representative men, professing to regard all this as a "real union," and a most satisfactory establishment, closely approximating perfection! We deliberately pronounce such a declaration as furnishing irresistible internal proof that the policy of that church in the United States is one of intentional deception, cunningly devised to mislead the unsuspecting citizen.

In every sense imaginable the statement we have quoted from the Bishop of Wheeling is as directly opposite to the truth as the east is to the west. Is there "a real union" of church and state in our country in the Catholic sense? If so, that church uses language in a way that Protestants cannot possibly understand. When the constitution of the United States *prohibits* an establishment of religion, the Romish Church understands the words in the opposite sense of *permitting* an establishment. When a State law with the utmost precision forbids a union of church and state, the Catholic Church regards this very law as an act allowing such a union, and glories in it. It is "a *real* union in our sense of the term." Yes, and not in the *public* sense. The language of history, of science, and of legislation requires to be reversed and invested with the opposite meaning, as if by a white rose one should understand a black one!

The witness whom we are examining admits that, in the earlier history of his church, there was a very beneficial union between it and various states, but he does not mean a *real* union, such as he finds here. It was, however, a literal union in the non-Catholic sense. And this brings us to a most important point in our present investigation. The authorities of the Church of Rome cannot deny that it was firmly united with many European states in the middle ages, and they proclaim that this union was according to their mind. It received papal sanction in countless instances, and is often referred to as a sort of golden age for the church, which was not yet broken by the Reformation. If this union was then approved and enjoyed by infallible popes, the question arises, what guarantees can Protestants have that such a union may not be again sought after and secured on these shores of ours? We ask the question, not of Jesuits who would resort to verbal *finesse* in the answer, but of American patriots who do not choose to hazard their liberties on the bare word of parties bent upon their destruction.

The case is this. A man who habitually boasts of his own uprightness, and can recognize little virtue in others, spends a large portion of his life in adultery. He finally seeks his fortune elsewhere, and proposes "a real union" with another woman. In-

quiry is made for his antecedents, and he thinks it ought to suffice that his present conduct and his present professions are irreproachable. A neighbor assists his suit by testifying negatively to his apparent innocence. But the family of the lady are not satisfied. They want more information, and beg to know if the stranger bears a good character in the community where his previous life was spent. Still no satisfaction can be obtained. The suitor protests that his offer is honorable and so absolutely pure as to be well-nigh angelic!

Now we put this question to the Protestant Americans, Is it wise to confide in such an individual? If not, how can it be wise to trust in the professions of the Church of Rome, when she cannot dare to respond to our inquiries into her recorded past? All other sects are free to confess their errors in other ages. The Presbyterians never dream of justifying their alleged single atrocity, the execution of Servetus. No Episcopalian in America will now vindicate the persecutions under the Protestant Tudors and the Stuarts. No New England Puritan will say that Roger Williams and the Quakers and witches were justly treated. The only sect that refuses to purge itself of such abominable atrocities is the Church of Rome. She never confesses that she did wrong in the past. The massacres in France and Ireland, the dragonnades against the Huguenots, the persistent efforts to extirpate the Waldenses, the burning of John Huss and Jerome of Prague, and of Latimer, Ridley and Cranmer in England, as well as innumerable other crimes at which the modern blood runs cold—all these are as justly chargeable to her account as are the persecutions attributed to Protestants chargeable to other churches. But the wrong of her many cruelties she still refuses to confess and deplore. At this moment Protestant missionaries are exposed in several Catholic lands to popular violence by Romish mobs instigated by priests, in one sense all the meaner and more cowardly because generally bloodless. The governments are, for the most part, in the hands of educated unbelievers, and the laws are copied from the most enlightened nations. In Mexico and Brazil Protestants are, to a great extent, protected by infidels from the violence of the papists, whose weapons now are stones, brick-bats, and rotten eggs. The

occurrences are so frequent that in many places Protestants cannot address the people on religious subjects without an armed guard. We never hear of rescripts or any other form of message from the pope being sent out publicly, enjoining Catholics in such regions to treat Protestant missionaries as their own are treated here.

We have thus abundantly shown that the papacy, as a witness in its own case, is altogether unworthy of credit, and that those politicians and demagogues in our midst who treat such unblushing evidence as if it were true are either wilful enemies of their country and its Protestant interests, or the shallowest and most benighted sons of a free and enlightened land. The ignorance of such people is like the darkness of Egypt, so dense as to be felt. It is felt in pity for the unborn millions whose welfare is thus desperately staked upon the present apparent harmlessness of a power which elsewhere and in other times has been infamously associated with the oppressors of mankind, and has never repented of its crimes.

Confession is a duty which Rome everywhere exacts of her subjects and her enemies, but has never practiced herself. Her policy is to transfer the responsibility of her enormities to others, or to deny their turpitude. She would have us believe that the cruelties of the Inquisition in some countries and of the temporal authorities in others against heretics, were committed in opposition to her urgent protests. The zeal of Bloody Mary and haughty Louis XIV., and of the sanguinary Duke of Alva, was indulged, in her own behalf, in spite of her pleadings for mercy! She could do nothing to restrain the ferocious loyalty of her own son Torquemada! This most compassionate mother wept and implored in vain for the sparing of her enemies, but could not induce her faithful children to abate their love of blood and their delight in torture and fire! But the world is beyond measure puzzled by the strange phenomenon, because this infallible spiritual mother has so utterly failed in the use of her spiritual influence, and has trained up at her knees such an intractable brood of tyrants and persecutors; and when they were indulging their bloody appetites upon poor heretics, she could find no means whatever to rid herself of them. Charles IX. of France and Louis XIV. were her

dear sons; so were Philip II. and the Emperor Charles V.; so was James II. of England, the royal gentleman who enjoyed scenes of torture more than a banquet. All the most sanguinary monsters whose names are embalmed in the abhorrence of history were the progeny of this very gentle and considerate mother. Their atrocious cruelties were practiced to please her; but whilst disapproving of them, as her historians affirm, she was absolutely impotent to arrest their course! She seems to have forgotten the warning contained in the Scriptures, where Eli the highpriest was so signally rebuked by Jehovah because he restrained not the iniquity of his children.

All confidence in such a system disappears in the light of her own apologies, and this renders it unnecessary to dwell upon the abundant proofs at hand that the Church of Rome connived at and abetted many of the most horrible persecutions ever suffered for heresy in modern times.

The superficial and inconsiderate Protestant is apt to refer us to the *charities* of the Church of Rome, and the heroism and self-denial of many of her members. Such facts cannot be denied, and ought never to be overlooked in our searching for truth. That church was not originally evil. It is a perversion of Christianity as it came from the hands of Christ. Many of the best features of its original may still be found in its modern form, as it is known in Protestant lands. The principle of true piety may actuate many of her sons and daughters to lives of sacrifice and trial for the good of others; but it cannot be forgotten that a false principle mingles extensively with the true, and that many of the ascetics in that communion seek suffering in her service from motives very similar to the self-inflicted misery of Hindoo devotees. In both religions the doctrines of self-justification and supererogation are widely prevalent, and the Hindoo and the Romanist torture themselves alike for the purpose of purchasing the favor of the gods or the saints.

Still we are prepared to recognize a genuine Christian spirit in many of the more enlightened servants of the Catholic Church. Virtue is heavenly wherever it springs from a pure motive. Grace is divine whenever it manifests itself in a Christ-like devotion to

the welfare of others. But our Protestant apologist for Rome totally ignores the influence of what scientists call the environment. We venture to claim that the best specimens of Catholic piety are ever to be found in communities where Protestant principles have a free development.

It is the system, however, that we aim to expose, and not individuals. This system is a unit in its intentional and premeditated adaptation to different nations. It is a high compliment to the United States that it is compelled to wear its most spotless robes in our favored land. It is on trial here, and is conscious of the inspection of millions of intelligent eyes. It appears before them as an angel of light, compared with its manifestations in many other portions of the world.

There are degrees in the confidence which Americans can entertain towards this hoary system of error. One extreme is witnessed when popular fury is invoked against its subjects, and brutal mobs, in disregard of every religious restraint, wreak their lawless vengeance upon the persons, families and homes of our Catholic fellow-citizens. The true religious sentiment of all American Protestants revolts universally at such occasional outrages. On the other hand, an equally unjustifiable extreme is embraced when Protestants bend the bow backwards, and insist upon encouraging the increase of that class of our population, not only by immigration *en masse*, but by patronizing their schools, and heaping honors on the hierarchy which no other sect can ever receive.

The middle path is the one of wisdom. *In medio tutissimus ibis*. Equality before the law should be amply secured and cordially conceded to the Catholics throughout our country. But when the flippant and uninformed young American, who has perhaps no knowledge of ecclesiastical differences, and has thoughtlessly leaped to the silly conclusion that one church is as nearly right as another, insists upon fostering and sustaining the institutions of that church as so many supports of our free government and popular interests, we protest with all possible earnestness against the stupendous folly. It is too bad for such rash experimenters to seize the reins of state or national policy, and plunge our country into irremediable ruin. It is our chief aim in this paper

to impress our fellow-Protestants in this democratic republic with the necessity of a vigilant and discriminating view of the Romish Church, resolving to preserve its just rights, but equally determined to withhold from it an unadvised confidence.

This system has no analogue in history, unless that of Mahomet may be so used. But the latter religion is open and explicit in assuming that it may be consistently propagated by force. The Romish Church has long ago been obliged, and now hypocritically professes to prefer, to extend its influence by moral means in certain countries farthest advanced in civilization. But it differs from Protestant denominations found in the United States in claiming unity of principle everywhere, and yet practicing opposite principles in different nations. And we cannot be mistaken in this charge, because no amount of reproach from Protestant critics ever suffices to stimulate its infallible head to plant the principles it advocates in the United States in countries where his influence predominates. Who ever heard of papal interposition in such states in favor of equal privileges for Protestants?

A considerable portion of the nominally Protestant population of the United States has been won over by the flattering language of this cunning hierarchy, not to its communion, but to a shameful subserviency to its cause. It is very common for uneducated parents who have acquired wealth, to pass by all Protestant institutions of learning, and place their children in the hands of Romish teachers, from whose precept or example they soon learn the beauties of idolatry. It is also common for moneyed *parvenus* to subscribe heavily for the founding of their sectarian colleges and universities, designed to pervert the youth of our country, and flood it with a celibate priesthood. In one of our most respected Protestant churches we are pained to find a considerable body of its accredited ministers persistently aping the symbolical and pictorial methods of worship which the Church of Rome has retained in its ceremonies for the purpose of enticing the æsthetic sentiment of our people, whilst the grosser forms of dramatic representation are reserved for the semi-pagan populations of Mexico and South America. If these Anglican imitators are honest, they betray great ignorance of Catholic duplicity; if they are not

true Protestants, their own duplicity is all the more conspicuous from their equivocal position.

The moral of our argument is not hard to state. The Romish Church is entitled to all the equal privileges accorded to her by our Protestant fathers. She is not entitled to a particle more of popular respect than her consistency warrants. Were several millions of Turks introduced into our country, with the Koran and the mosque and the exponents of their religion, it would be gross folly for Americans to felicitate one another on such an addition to the population. Would mere verbal assurances suffice to quiet our fears? Could we imagine their spiritual guides to be sincere in their professions of devotion to the free principles of our country? Could we feel confident of their patriotism so long as we should find them still tenacious, in Turkey and Arabia, of the old despotic and arbitrary principles which their religion has everywhere else sustained as far as possible?

Our moral is, No! the papacy cannot be safely trusted. One thing is still wanting to inspire us with confidence. The chief spiritual authorities of that church must deal fairly with mankind, and put themselves on record as the friends and advocates of religious freedom in every part of the world. It is clear from all modern evidence that those who know the priesthood best are the slowest to entrust themselves into their hands. A very small minority of the Protestant ministers of Ireland has been found willing to sustain Mr. Parnell's scheme of Home Rule in Ireland, notwithstanding the immense influence of Mr. Gladstone in its favor. We thus see a strange development. The great body of Protestant dissenters, contrary to all their antecedents, are now arrayed with singular unanimity in support of the conservative administration of England. The Methodists, the Baptists, the Presbyterians, and Episcopalians of Ireland, are afraid to trust the Catholics with its government.

Our chief concern now is to forewarn American Protestants against the extreme of liberality which many of them affect. There is no call whatever for us to go so far as to foster and encourage the Roman Catholics rather than our own people. It is easy to be kind and just and considerate, without being patronizing or

subservient. There is a principle in the way of such excesses. It is *wrong* to act in such a manner as to manifest indifference for the fundamental truths of the Christian religion. Dr. H. M. Field, of the New York *Evangelist*, in his controversy with Col. Ingersoll, made a good defence of our faith, but in our judgment went beyond the line of duty in his social relations with his antagonist. This overdone courtesy seems to us equivalent to a verbal declaration that religious feeling ought to yield to worldly friendship. We have not so learned Christ. A bold blasphemer, a habitual jester with gospel themes, an uncompromising enemy of our sovereign Lord and bleeding Redeemer, may be the subject of our prayers and the object of our spiritual concern, but should never be so met in the social scene as to indicate our own want of feeling in reference to his conduct.

But the same principle applies to others besides Ingersoll. We may by our course towards the Romanists proclaim to the world through actions, which always speak louder than words, that we regard their system as an insignificant error; that it is a small matter to pray to creatures, to buy masses for the dead, to burn Bibles, and to maltreat heretics. Besides this, we may thus express our confidence in the aims and efforts of a hierarchy which professes to be very democratic in the United States, and very earnest in favor of full equality of all Christian churches before the law in this part of the world, but is uniformly found resisting the same sort of equality in almost every country where it is safe to do so.

The popes have been for centuries, until a recent date, petty despots over a miserable population inhabiting what were called the "States of the Church" in Italy. The equality before the law, which Catholics so fully enjoy in this country, was a thing which the papal government never tolerated in its own dominions. Since the temporal power of the pope was overthrown and his Italian subjects were united with the rest of the nation under a free constitutional government, initiated by the great statesman, Cavour, this ecclesiastical tyrant has been fretting, like a spoiled child, over his dethronement and the liberation of the people. There is not a bishop of that church in our republic, so far as we

know, who does not advocate his restoration. There is not one, in our opinion, who would sign a paper advocating an equality before the law of Protestants and Catholics as a fundamental condition of such a restoration. And yet Americans, nominally Protestant, are found in abundance who suffer themselves to be blindfolded by the hierarchy, and to disgrace their own intelligence by contending that the Romish Church is as harmless as a fangless serpent, in the United States. That it professes to be so is not denied. But we insist that the *fungi* are still there, and the boasted harmlessness is an affectation for a purpose.

There is another class of American Protestants whom it is difficult to reach. We mean those sentimental religionists whose special tastes incline them to a form of Christianity as far removed from its primitive simplicity as possible. They are ritualists by nature and culture, and nothing is more objectionable to them than a worship such as may be inferred from the language of the New Testament. According to them, the best model in sculpture and painting, the refinements of the drama and the opera, gorgeous robing and artistic attitudinizing of the priesthood, the intonation of Latin litanies, and the delicious strains of artistic, vocal, and instrumental melodies, are far more essential elements of an inspiring service than psalm-singing, scripture reading and gospel sermonizing. Such persons may linger long in the Anglican communion, but their hearts are constantly attracted to the will-worship of the Mass. In the matter of doctrine they are so indifferent that they readily embrace the most monstrous superstitions and the grossest perversions of Christian dogmas for the sake of indulging themselves in sensational exhibitions at the altar.

Many of our young women are influenced by romances and the flattering suggestions of a venal press to a warm admiration for conventual life, and fondly dream of fancied enjoyments in the cloister, and of many tranquil years to be spent in holy seclusion, meditation, and devotion before crucifixes and madonnas, under the pious care of a Mother Superior and the spiritual guidance of a Father Confessor. They have found little satisfaction in their Bibles and on their knees before the one appointed Mediator and Saviour, and, unbelieving and disappointed, turn away from the

spiritual cross to a visible representation—from a living, all-sufficient Christ, to the Virgin Mary and Holy Church.

It is impossible to reason effectually with people who have conceived a loathing for the simple piety of the gospel, and been fascinated by the meretricious charms of the Romish ritual. Prevention is in such cases better than cure. Protestant parents are false to their own principles when they suffer their children to acquire a distaste for spiritual religion, under impressions derived from fictitious reading and improper associations. Conscience ever longs for repose, and when our young people fail to find peace in believing, they may readily fall as willing victims into the arms of a church which proposes to satisfy conscience with ascetic austerities, and to provide enjoyment for the mind by the devices of art. To such susceptible natures the overtures of the Church of Rome come with a peculiar charm. The lot of a vestal who has assumed the veil is imagined to be not only full of peace, but eminently pure and holy, and the life of the nun is deemed to be more like heaven than any sphere of usefulness a Protestant lady can occupy.

It is owing to the opportunities afforded by our free institutions for the employment of such proselyting methods, applicable to ambitious and ill-informed demagogues on the one hand, and romantic youth on the other, that the priesthood of the Church of Rome is so extravagantly laudatory of our political system. Nowhere else in the wide world do they find so many advantages for their favorite employment—the enticement of weak Protestants from their inherited faith. Thanks be to God, the over-acted farce is likely to bear very different fruit from that which the actors hope to gather.

JAMES A. WADDELL.

V. THE PRESENT PROMISE OF MISSIONARY WORK.

WE intend in this article to seek an answer to the question, "What is the prospect now before the church in its missionary work?" And out of abundant caution—perhaps needless—we take occasion to say in the outset that we are not raising the question whether success will finally come. We hold, as the church holds, that uncertainty on that point is shut out by the promises and prophecies of the word of God. We see no room for doubt that every effort of the people of God will tell on the result, and that this will be so even in those cases where the effort seems to end in failure. We would emphasize the word *now* in the question written above. There is always interest in the inquiry as to the visible progress made by us toward the completion of the Master's commission.

There are three ways of meeting that inquiry, each of them valuable, one of them exceedingly common. We may go back along the line of our history for a few years and compare the present with the past. In doing so, we shall see that numbers have increased and zeal and enterprise have grown, until even the marvellous industrial and economic progress of the nineteenth century has been outstripped by the visible growth and advance of the kingdom of Christ. The missionaries of religion have gone ahead of those of commerce, and have entered field after field and planted missions and churches before the workers of science or of trade had found an entrance. And mighty as has been the growth of the United States of America during the century, the growth of the church in the United States has been greater, and still greater than the growth of the church at home has been the success of missionary work in these last years.

It is said that the population of the United States has doubled once in twenty-five years. The membership of the church here at home, counting communicants only, has grown faster than that. In Japan the missionary church is doubling her numbers once in

a little less than three years, and in China in less than ten years. In Syria, Persia and Hindostan the work grows more and more successful, promising, and important. In Africa the valleys of the Congo and the Zambesi, of the Niger and the Orange, Equatorial and Southern and Western Africa, lie open to mission work, and and here and there through that great field the gospel has been introduced, and the work prosecuted for a few years with results that tax our credulity and rebuke our coldness, timidity and unbelief. Similar reports come to us from Polynesia and Malaysia, from Cuba and Mexico and Brazil.

Much is said, too, of the increase of income for the missionary work of the church. It has not from the first been sufficient for the work on hand, but while the income of the last year was none too great, and, in fact, required careful administration to meet the most pressing wants, and in some cases left no choice between debt and injurious curtailment of the work, this income would have been counted princely a few years ago. The wealth of the United States has outgrown that of any other nation. The gifts for the missionary work of the Protestant churches of America have increased in larger ratio, have grown faster than the wealth of the country has grown. And it may be said that this rapid increase is itself increasing, the rate of increase growing as the work grows on our hands. Thirty or forty years ago the church would have been puzzled to know what to do with an income which now she finds too small for all that ought to be done.

These statements have been carefully kept within the mark. Those who know the state of the missionary work and its history for a few years past know that this is so. And yet, simple and modest and moderate as they are, they will sound like reckless boasting to one who is unfamiliar with the work. They give an answer to our question. We are making progress, and if we had no experience of the church to check our hasty judgments we might begin to be overconfident and say that the time is at hand. Speaking of time as men speak and counting it as men count it, we might be led in our haste to say it is at hand.

But we remember Pentecost and the rapid growth of the early church. We have seen the history of its vigorous missionary

work and of the results which followed. Neither writers nor speakers will let us forget the eloquent paragraph in which Tertullian recounts the successful advances of the church; nor are we permitted to overlook the statements given by heathen writers of the rapid spread of the church, and the "mighty multitude" into which the disciples of Christ had grown before one century had passed. We have imagined ourselves standing in the place of these early Christians, looking forward to the future, and wondering what it had in store for the church. We think we would be strongly inclined to judge the future by the recent past, and as we looked upon the swift and resistless progress that had been made, we think we would in all probability have been very confident that the day of the Lord's triumph was very near. And now eighteen centuries have passed and the kingdom of God is still to come. Yet why should we have thought that that rapid advance would cease? And who of us all would have expected the dark ages instead of the millennium? Or who would have anticipated the rise of the anti-Christian, Papal and Mohammedan systems in place of the coming of the Lord in his glory? The remembrance of what did occur makes us cautious in our conclusions now, as it impresses upon us the truth that we have this treasure in earthen vessels. Never in any other kingdom was so fair a prospect so wantonly lost. In the Lord's kingdom it has happened, and it may occur again. There is need for us to remind ourselves continually that we are engaged in a mighty and unremitting struggle with principalities and powers, and that great forces are at work to prevent and change the result for which we labor. We may hope for greater and more rapid success in our work, both at home and abroad, for increasing zeal and devotion among the Lord's people to the Lord's work. But we cannot venture to predict. The dangers are not all past.

It may be noted here that there seems to be a very widely spread opinion among those who are working for the Master, that we are on the eve of a great forward movement, which shall embrace the world in its final outcome. Even Prof. Murphy, of Belfast, the cool and clear-headed expositor of Scripture, is of the opinion that the time is at hand for the great awakening of both

Jews and Gentiles, and he reaches his opinion by the study of Messianic prophecy. Dr. Leighton Wilson, it is said, entertained the same expectation. It is reported that in his last days he said that he thought the end of heathenism would come within the next fifty years. It can hardly be necessary to refer to Pierson's "Crisis of Missions." The wide and recent circulation of this impressive little book has made us all familiar with the glowing hopefulness, as well as with the zeal of its accomplished author. Nor can it be necessary to cite the correspondence of missionaries, or the reports of boards or committees, or the articles of religious newspapers and reviews. They are referred to here for the purpose of confirming the statement that the church seems to be receiving the impression that its largest opportunity is opening before it already.

It is well in such an inquiry to follow as many lines of evidence as we can find. We ask attention to another branch of the subject, more difficult to deal with because it cannot be set forth in tables of figures, but not on that account less worthy to be studied, or less instructive. It is a matter of common experience that when any church is ready for revival the revival comes. It would be more entirely true to say that it has already begun, and the awakening and conversion of sinners are an extension and continuation of the same work. It may be added with equal truth, that the work of reviving does in all ordinary cases precede the work of conversion. Reasons why it should be so are not hard to see. On the other hand it would be hard to give any trustworthy reason why the Lord should commit to a sleepy church the training of his children just born into his kingdom. Such a course would bring disaster beyond doubt, unless the disaster were averted by the power of God. It would not do to say that infinite wisdom, power and watchfulness would fail to prevent the evil. But surely it will do to say that it is an indication of the unerring wisdom which guides the church that the risk is not incurred to start with. The elect of God are born into his kingdom, when they will not be chilled into indifference, nor starved into imbecility for his work.

As a matter of fact, the case stands precisely as we should ex-

pect to see it. A cold church is also barren. An earnest and self-denying church is fruitful in the ingathering of souls to the Lord.

Let us apply the fact and the underlying principle to the wider field of the church and the world. There was a reason why the swift growth of the early church was arrested. Is not the reason just this, that the church was not fit to have the training and care of the world committed to its hands; nay, was so unfit that it was better to arrest its growth and adjourn the coming of the kingdom, than to commit the children of the kingdom to its pastoral care? And its unfitness was painfully demonstrated by the false teaching, the false worship and the ungodly living that went through the church itself, and took possession of communities where the church was strongest and seemed to be most intent on its work. Did not the worst come of it that could come when every people on the shores of the Mediterranean was given over to the pope or to the caliph? What would such a church have done with the world? If the brightest and strongest people then known were ready to apostatize at the persuasion of the scimitar or the stake, or of worldly wealth or ease, and in fact did so apostatize, what would savages and barbarians have done with the same training? For we are not to forget that these two apostasies did not appear till the church had had centuries in which to teach and train the people. Yet when they did appear, how swift was their victorious progress, how readily did the people submit, and how viciously was the true church persecuted and driven into the wilderness! Bad people, do you say? Yes; but they were of the same flesh and blood with ourselves. A bad people, but also an unfit church. Unfit and unqualified for the work that was needed. To hold and to teach the simple truth of God's word amid the philosophies of the day, to preserve it uncorrupted among the heathen, to meet the dense ignorance of men and overcome it, to encounter the wickedness of the world and not yield to it, to be surrounded by the temptations of the world and the snares of the devil, and remain faithful to the Lord and true to his word—all this required a deeper experience, a better personal knowledge of the Lord, a stronger grasp of his word; in fine, a

clearer faith than the church had yet attained. And the proof of this is found in the result. The people who thus apostatized had been trained by the church. Very many of them were members of the visible church. It was not a small task that was given to the church, and it need awaken no surprise that such want of preparation was found. It was found, and for the present we rest on that fact.

It is, then, a more needful thing to inquire whether the church is prepared to undertake the work of leading and training the nations than it is to find out whether the nations are ready to listen to the gospel; far more important to the matter of this discussion to ask is the church ready for the world than to ask is the world ready to become Christian. Is the church preparing, and how far is it from such a state of fitness that to it may be wisely entrusted the responsibility and the duties belonging to the pastoral care of the world?

We are not to expect perfection even in the church, nor in the degree of its fitness for such a post, though it be more laden with responsibilities and perils than any other that was ever committed to men. This is of course. When the day shall come in which it will be wisest, counting all things, for the Lord to commit such extensive service to his church; when the earthen vessels shall have been so purified, annealed and strengthened that they can pass through that hot struggle and not be destroyed, then we may be sure it will be done, and through their instrumentality the kingdoms of this world will become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ. The kingdom and dominion under the whole heavens will be put into hands prepared by divine grace as far as human hands can be prepared to hold it.

Let us note, too, that the question of the readiness of the church is a question of the maturity of its training. What lessons have we learned in these nineteen centuries? More particularly, what have we so learned that we will not forget the lessons? An answer may be found in the history of the church.

Let us here set together in a group, for convenience of study, a few general historical propositions:

I. The great advances of the church have been made by means

of revivals of religion. And this is true, whether we speak of increase of numbers, or of extension of territory, or of growth in grace.

II. The great historical revivals of the church have been first revivals of doctrine, and after that of religion, of piety and zeal, and of spiritual power. To this may be added the further statement that in every case the revival of doctrine has been specifically the revival of one doctrine which has been set in the front of the movement, and for the time has been made the "article of a standing or falling church."

III. No doctrine has ever been made mighty to revive the church till those who taught it have been led by the Spirit and providence of God to risk upon it everything that could be put at risk whether for time or eternity. An illustration will make our meaning clear. The doctrine preached by the apostles was "Christ and him crucified," the Messiahship of Jesus. If this were not true their hope of heaven was vain. And for this Jesus they had left all—home and friends and hope of earthly things—that they might follow him. The Lord has required this in each case before he has given to the doctrine power to revive the church.

IV. No doctrine once vivified in the experience of the church has ever again been set in the front to repeat its reviving work. Nor has it as yet ever been necessary. In a revived church the truth is never denied, and in every case the truth honored of the Lord to lead his people has been reënforced by those which had been so honored before.

Let us examine these propositions one by one.

I. The great advances of the church have been made by means of revivals of religion. As far as growth in grace is concerned, or in numbers of true believers, there is need only to state the proposition. It is too manifestly true to call for proof. But it may impress the truth upon our minds if we will recall the fact that the progress of the church has not been steady. The Scripture idea of a warfare has been verified in the history of the church as well as in the experience of individual Christians. We have had all the changing movements of a war. There have been

advance and recoil, success and repulse, and this, too, though the final result has never been doubtful and the gains that have been made are only a part of what was expected from the beginning. The conditions which arrest advance of any kind, in grace, in numbers, or in territory, are found in the church and not in the world, nor in the attitude of the world towards the church, whether that attitude be one of indifference or hostility, or of pretended friendliness. There is of course no real friendliness, and there is little to choose between hostility and disdain so far as the growth of the church is concerned. The one varying and controlling factor is the state of the church. Wherever in history we find the people of God ready to move, the advance is made, and it matters little whether the men of the world are breathing out threatenings and slaughter or are speaking words that are softer than oil.

Only let the one condition be found: let the church be awake, obedient, unworldly, and intent on the Lord's work, and there will be also found both power and progress. Before such a spirit in the church the indifference of the world gives way and changes to malignity or repentance. And even when hostility blazes out into persecution, the ordinary rule has been that progress has not been stayed. Here and there a detached colony of Christian people may have been exterminated and the work in that place arrested. We have read of such a thing. And we find it not beyond thought to imagine such a fate falling upon the whole church. If the Lord could change and give up his purpose of mercy, and take back his promise to his Son, such a thing might happen. We know but the one insurmountable barrier. But that stands, and the gates of hell will not prevail. And the ordinary rule of providence is truly expressed by the proverb which makes blood-shedding equal to seed-sowing in the history of the church. Meanwhile there is but one other way to arrest the advance of a church revived and in earnest for the Lord. If the church can be seduced from its place at the feet of the Master it may be done. And any forgetting of him may be a beginning of such unfaithfulness as shall bring the very worst result. Otherwise the revival and the progress of the church must go on.

We are not unmindful of the criticisms that may here be made.

It is asserted very commonly that reaction from revival must come from causes that are purely physical. The flesh is weak and the limit soon comes at which it is impossible any longer to bear the strain. This assumes that times of revival are of course times of high nervous excitement, and the assumption is so often accepted as true that we are obliged to give it attention, though it seems to us but little thought is needed to show its unsoundness. An increase of spiritual life does not excite the mind. Excitement may come with it through the oppositions of sin in the hearts of those who are visited by the Holy Ghost. And the work of Satan in the community may produce it as he stirs up his agents to resist the gospel. Excitement does not prove a revival to be spurious; neither does it prove one to be genuine.

Beyond all question, it has been seen in every age of the church where the mightiest revivals have been felt that increase of grace has been attended by increase of numbers, and both by an increase of trust in the Lord and by increase of quietness and assurance. "The work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness quietness and assurance forever." But our best answer is that the criticism is utterly false historically. It is not a thing unknown in history that revivals have lasted through the lifetime of a generation, and more. Nay, in Presbyterian history it has been seen that revivals have gone forward through such periods of time, and have made brave the timid, have brought the weak to be strong, and have so quieted the nerves that whole congregations, not of men only, but also of women and children, could meet habitually in danger of death, and while their outlying sentinels watched for the coming of enemies who sought their blood, could listen with glad hearts to the gospel, and grow in knowledge by such ministry till the fame of their learning in religious truth has gone through the world. It seems to us that revivals have been but superficially studied by those who speak of the nervous tension which they put upon the church. The accusation, if it be intended for one, is unjust. "Why do you defile the water and make it unfit for me to drink?" said the wolf to the lamb. "Nay, the water runs down stream from you to me," was

the suggestive answer. Nevertheless the wolf persisted in his charge, and he assaulted the lamb.

It is not true that revivals must end because of the sinless infirmities of our nature. If, now, any one shall say that in a condition of the church such as that of which we are speaking the church has been revived and has then remained in a state of living earnestness and power, and that it is only correct to speak of the beginning of that state as a revival, our answer is that this is a question about words into which we do not care to enter. All that we care for is the truth contained in the statement; and that we hold to be of the highest practical value. Whenever the world is won for the Lord it will not be through the instrumentality of a church unrevived and full of the spirit of this world.

Let us now look at some historical confirmation of our statement. We recall three great instances. There are others, but these have made their mark upon the history of the whole church and of the world, and are so conspicuous that others seem small in comparison. We refer to the great revival of the first century, to that of the Protestant Reformation, and to that which in Germany is associated with the name of Zinzendorf, and in England and America with those of Wesley and Whitefield. Of the first of these it may be enough to say that at its beginning the whole church was with one accord in one place, and before it closed the same church had grown to be a vast multitude, had reached the outer limit of the Roman Empire and had gone beyond it, and within the empire had so increased that a heathen writer called them "a great multitude," and a Christian writer could assert that if they were taken away they would leave behind them "a great solitude." Of the second, we only ask that the weakness of its beginning be recalled, and then the proportions to which it rapidly grew, though we are strongly tempted to turn aside for a while to show that whatever service may have been rendered to the cause of religion by other agencies at this great crisis, it was the living piety of the people of God which saved the movement from failure and set it on high among the greatest epochs of Christian history. Of our third instance, we may say that the revival has not yet died away. And by its power the evangelical fervor and en-

terprise of the church have in these days risen so high and gone so far that the gains and conquests of even the apostolic era look small upon the map by the side of those of our own time.

And now we pause and ask for an instance of progress such as either of these, or indeed of any remarkable growth unconnected with revival. So clearly true does our proposition seem that we are almost ashamed of the time we have spent upon it. Yet we have often heard revivals discredited by pious and intelligent people.

II. Every one of these great revivals has been first a revival of the truth—a revival of doctrine, and then of religion. And in every case the revival of doctrine has been that of one truth prominent in the system taught in the Scriptures. And in every case the doctrine thus revived has been made the emphatic point of the church's creed, the leading article in the church's attacks upon false doctrine, the leading and living truth of the gospel preached by the revived church. It has been made the means of the revival, and has been quick and powerful to convince and confound the gainsayers, and to stir and win the hearts of them that hear it. With it the Lord has put the keenest point upon the sword of the Spirit.

We recall for a moment, and for present use, the statement that the church has not had an uninterrupted growth in any direction. Seasons have been known of great decline in grace and in knowledge of our Lord and Saviour. At such times the gospel falls from careless lips upon careless ears. It comes not from the heart, and it fails to reach the heart. It seems then to have lost its power. Yet it is still true that the gospel of Christ is the power of God to every one that believeth, and every one that is born into the kingdom is born by the word of God. Now, at such a time, when false teaching has misled the church and hid the truth, or when the love of many has grown cold, there is need that new energy be put into the word. And then, when the Lord sees fit, some truth suited to the work is chosen, and some man whom the Lord will honor is called to see the truth and to hold it with uncommon grasp and to preach it with the confidence of one who has personal knowledge of its truth and saving power.

Let it be understood that it is not meant here to claim that the preaching of the gospel has ever been confined to a single point of doctrine. The manifest absurdity of such an assertion makes this caution almost useless. Let it be understood also that other truths of the Christian system are not preached in vain at these times of revival. Rather, on the other hand, let it be said that greater power attends every part and point of the gospel message. Only, to one truth has been given peculiar and commanding prominence.

In the awakening which attended the preaching of the apostles the leading doctrine taught was that of Christ crucified, the Messiahship of Jesus, the person and work of the Saviour of sinners. This was the key-note, as in its widest sense it must always be the key-note, of that majestic harmony of divine truth. The claim that we now make is that it was in the narrow sense that the church received it. Every controversy of that age grew up round the person and work of Jesus of Nazareth. And in the later time, Luther would have found no trouble in filling his quiver full of arrows taken from the armory of the fathers and from the early councils if he had found need to do so. It is worth notice that he found so little help for the matter in hand except in the word of God. It was this doctrine which the church received and on which it made its battle. And it does not seem to us possible even to imagine anything more precisely suited to touch, to alarm, and to win both Jews and Gentiles. It came to the Jews at first like the knell of doom. "Ye intend to bring this man's blood on us," said the highpriest to the apostles. It was a fearful charge which that preaching brought against them, a charge from which, as patriots or as men, they might well recoil. It charged them with seeking the innocent blood which Judas betrayed. It made them guilty before God and man, with a guilt which must stand apart from that of others, alone and peculiar, to the end of time. Every word of that preaching and every evidence of its truth was a note of alarm to their consciences. And all of it, in all its power to confound the guilty, could but sound to them like the forehearing and announcement of inevitable ruin. To those who would hear it as citizens of the Jewish commonwealth, it could but seem to be

a premonition of offcasting forever from their high place of favor, and of outcasting from the home of their fathers. To one who heard only for himself the words, "Ye denied the Holy One and the Just, and desired a murderer to be granted unto you, and killed the Prince of Life," they would sound like the opening words of a sentence of death eternal. How could it be otherwise in the anticipations of those who as yet knew not the riches of the grace of God? Afterward, and on a larger hearing, this preaching came to mean nothing less than life from the dead even to the Jews. To the Gentiles, the gospel offered a solid foundation for their faith, where they had known nothing more reliable than the speculations of heathen philosophy, or the fables of heathen mythology. But more than this, it gave them a faith; it set before them a God who is worthy to be praised and obeyed, who is greater than fate, whose very existence excludes the existence of fate, and who in his majesty and holiness and glory is not indifferent to the sins and sorrows of men, and who does care whether we are saved or lost. It gave a religion which interprets the findings of conscience, and offered to faith a divine Saviour, whose love and power are attested by both death and resurrection in our behalf. Providence opened the way for the truth, and gave it power. It found the heathen systems wornout and dying, it laid hold of Gentiles as it had laid hold of Jews, and it held both conscience and faith with a mighty grasp. The revival which began at Jerusalem was felt in Rome also.

When the time for the Protestant Reformation came, a truth of narrower scope was needed, and it was called out and set in the front. It was not in terms the same with that which had led the church before, yet it differed from it only in such a way that the preaching of the foremost truth of the Reformation also called up again the power of the earlier teaching of the church, and reinforced the later doctrine with that which had so long ago impressed its leadership upon the church. The Reformation preaching of justification cannot possibly be true unless the apostolic preaching of atonement be true; and this again cannot be true unless the Sufferer on Calvary be the Son of God and the Son of man in one person. So the doctrinal teaching of the Reformation may be said to be a part of that of the earlier revival; but it was not on that

earlier occasion brought out and wrought into the life and the conscious experience of the Lord's people. When the truth had been perverted and hid by a false and insolent church, and it was dangerous to say that the grace of God was not to be bought for money, then in that time of peculiar need was heard, as the very pith and marrow of the gospel, the doctrine of justification by faith. It had been heard before, but never with such emphasis, and never with such power. There is no need to say more of the revival which followed than that its impress upon the church seems destined to last for ever.

A hundred and fifty years ago, and more, began the third of these great revivals. In Great Britain and her colonies, and in Holland and Germany, Denmark and Sweden, after many fluctuations the religious fervor of the Reformation had sunk to the lowest point. Elsewhere it appeared to be dead. It seemed to many that only here and there a few pious people were mourning over the state of religion when the great awakening came. It is not so easy in this case as in the one which preceded to put into one undisputed phrase the title of the doctrine used by the Holy Ghost to revive the church and set it again upon its work. But perhaps it can be done. Let it be remembered that formalism and its attendant legalism had captured large portions of the church, and that it was taught from press and pulpit that grace comes by church connection and forms and sacramental privileges; and it will be easy to see how it would be that many so taught would form for themselves a practical directory of life something like this: "Let me but secure a place in the visible church, attend upon its ordinances, and lead an orderly life, and I shall be safe." We know how hard it is to keep men from this blunder even with the most evangelical teaching. And when formalism is in the pulpit, then both formalism and legalism flourish among the people. Such was the state of religion at the time, with this addition. Reaction set in from various directions, as it will do when anything is offered as a substitute for the vital teaching of the word of God. The public worship fell into contempt, the state of morals was bad, infidelity was widely spread and aggressive. Now to meet such a condition of the church nothing will serve but such truth as shall

at once cut up the falsehood by the roots and awaken and convince the conscience. The same work was to be done that had been done by the word on other occasions and under other conditions. It was to be expected that at this time the truth would especially magnify the work of the Holy Spirit of God. And this is what did occur. It was boldly asserted that the hand of the Lord Almighty is needed at every step of our progress toward heaven. "If any man be in Christ he is a new creature." First, a new creation, and then newness of life; the one impossible without the other, and both impossible except as wrought in us by the effectual working of the mighty power of God. We know of no book or treatise in which it has been claimed that this was the leading truth of this revival. Yet we think it clear that it was. A new creation by the Spirit of God; a new life in the Spirit. Born into the kingdom by divine grace and power, we live the life of the kingdom by divine grace and power. The birth and the life both possible and real, because they are of God; the two joined together and inseparable, because they are of God; both of them and each of them incredible except as it is of God. This truth brings us each one face to face with our present dependence upon the Lord. It puts emphasis upon the fact that even now, though Christ has died for us, there is for every one of us indispensable need of both grace and power, not less than divine, to save us from perishing.

The result of this preaching was that a revival came which swelled and rose like the tide, and especially in Great Britain and America produced results at which we may yet hold up our hands in wonder and gladness. The wave rose and fell, and rose again, and now, after more than a century of checkered progress, it seems to be reinforced with new life, and to be moving faster and going farther than ever before. For though we have come very far short of both privilege and duty in these latter days, and though inconsistencies have weakened and sorely afflicted the church, and though coldness has hindered its growth, still it is true that throughout this period its condition has in the main been what would be called revived in comparison with most of its former history. Indeed, we know of no other time in which the standard of godly living has been so high among the mass of

the people of God, or in which the preaching of the gospel has been generally so intelligent, faithful, pungent and powerful, or when the word of God has been so actively diffused, and the active work of Christians has been so great and so wisely directed.

There are blots upon this fair picture; of course there are, and will be, till the final victory is won. Satan is not asleep and the world is always awake where a revived church is at work for the Lord. So long as human nature is what it is, and the tempter is not restrained from tempting, we may expect the blots. It is sadly true that worldliness is still a frequent sin among us; that congregations grow cold and weary of the Lord's work; that in this country at least, Sabbath-breaking is growing bolder and more defiant. On every hand we see signs which give us notice that the long fight is not ended; signs that backsliding and loss may come, and will come, unless by the grace of our Master we resist and put down the tendencies to evil that are in full play among us. Yet we say, as we have said, that the present state of the church is a state of revival, and is hopeful.

It may be mentioned here as a fact worthy of notice, that by these revivals there has been a remarkable progress and development of the doctrines of grace in the history and experience of the church. We know what was the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesie* in Luther's day, and we know that it was not identical with that of the earlier revival; and again, that it was not the same with that of the later. Of course, a truth of Scripture is always true, and its place in a logical arrangement of the system always the same; but in the changing fortunes of the coming kingdom its relative importance may at one time be greatly increased and at another it may decline. At one time it is the captain of the Lord's host, and at another it is only a private in the ranks. The wider and fundamental truth came first, and afterwards the narrower, more specific, and explanatory. And the progress of the church in doctrine has been very closely conformed to that of the individual soul in passing from the power of darkness to the kingdom and fellowship of God's dear Son. In the individual there is first conviction of sin, often of the specific sin of having rejected the grace of Christ. But whatever be the sin charged upon the

conscience, the first truth which a sinner lays hold upon for help is the central truth of the gospel, the doctrine of salvation through Christ crucified. Then comes the question, How am I to obtain an interest in his death? What must I do to be saved? The answer made by the apostle to the jailer at Philippi comes to the lips of every teacher of the way of God. And when the answer has been heard, then very frequently comes the further question, What is faith? or how can I get it? Again there is no variance in the answer—faith is the gift of God. It is a fruit of the Spirit. It is a natural affection of one who is born of God. It is the work of the Holy Ghost. And so by degrees we learn how helpless we are, and how vain and futile is all help but the saving help of the Almighty. Beaten away from all other trust, we turn our eyes to him, and light comes, and grace and spiritual life. We have realized that life comes only by the Spirit, and now we are to learn that godliness comes only by him. Most of us put this to a very early test. We try to live in our own strength, and learn by painful experience that we are not wise enough nor good enough to take charge of ourselves. After that, trusting the Lord and distrusting self, we live more securely, and we are more obedient towards the Lord and more fruitful because of the lessons we have learned. To point out the analogy in detail would require us to go over all that has been written of each of these mighty and reviving truths. The chief point is that there has been progress, and the same progress in both cases. And when we remember that our Saviour is Lord and administrator of the divine providence in the world, as well as Head of the church, then it becomes significant. It begins to dawn upon us that the same teaching by which the children of God are perfected and made ready for glory may also be the best for the church at large, and that the lessons which have been so impressed upon the life as well as the history of the church have been chosen for the purpose, and that in each case they have been chosen because they were the richest, fullest and most necessary to the learner.

The power of these truths so learned has been demonstrated in a very peculiar manner. Committed only to men, and not to angels, they have been yet more specially committed, not to all

men, but to those who have been peculiarly called and fitted to preach them to others. For—

III. It is a fact that not one of them has shown itself to be fitted to revive the church till those who taught it have been led by the Spirit and providence of the Lord, and made ready to put everything to risk for it, to give up every earthly hope or plan for it, and to venture on it even the hope of heaven. “He called unto him the multitude and his disciples, and said unto them, If any man would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel’s, the same shall save it.” In the time of our Lord his disciples literally left all to follow him, and the same may be said of those who followed him through the preaching of the apostles. There was left to them not one earthly thing, and not a hope of any earthly kind. They gave up business prospects and connections, and human friendships and associations; they became exiles and wanderers on the face of the earth, homeless, poor, and in daily peril; and by multitudes they did in fact lay down their lives for the Lord and for his truth. The same demand came to the Reformers, and was met in the same way. Neither Wesley nor Whitefield was led to the stake, but there was an abundant outpouring of scorn upon them and their co-workers by the world and the worldly church of their time. There were occasions when they had to face that which many people think is even harder to face than death. Their good name was assailed, and through life there was for them a daily endurance of the weight of public dislike and contempt. The path by which they followed the Lord was one that tried sorely their courage, their faith, and their devotion to him. In none of these cases did the revival come till the required sacrifice was made. In every one of them the alternative was offered of serving God or this present world. And in every one the way of life and the way of death parted at the truth they were called to teach. In every case, if their testimony was not true, they were risking upon a lie their hope of heaven. Thus these great revivals began in the preaching of men who had honored the truth in their hearts, and in their lives had set it above

ease, or wealth, or honor, or good repute among men. Perhaps it may be explained that there was power in the speech of men who spoke with such conviction. Perhaps it is in the ordinary method of the divine procedure that the Lord honors those whose faith and devotion have so honored him. It is an open fact that the historical sequence is as we have stated it.

We desire now to recall for another use a proposition already presented. It is worthy to have great emphasis laid upon it.

IV. No doctrine has more than once been set in the front to repeat its reviving work in the church. The progress of doctrine has not once turned back upon itself. To lead in the hot conflict with sin and false teaching; to impress the church with its truth, importance and power; to prepare the way for a further advance, and then make way for some doctrine better fitted to lead under existing conditions, this is what has been given to each one; but never to repeat its work of leadership and revival. And in this fact we find reason for hope. If it had ever been necessary surely it would have been done. But, upon examination of our history, we find that a doctrine which has once been made strong to do great things for the Lord has never afterward been idle when the church was awake and at work. When Luther was preaching justification by faith alone, the doctrine of Christ crucified for our sins was not only the basis on which he built; it was the strongest antagonist of any other theory of justification. And in the later revival, the doctrines of the new life and of the atonement, of the Spirit and the Saviour, have been brought together and united as links of one chain by the doctrine of justification. If any other doctrine of justification be true, there is no need of the work of the Holy Ghost and no need of the death of the Son of God. If justification by faith alone be true, there is need of both. It thus becomes manifest that our progress has not been an aimless one. The church has not been picking up at hap-hazard a collection of disjointed dogmas. She has been learning a system, and at each step has been reducing doctrine to experience, and has thus become better qualified to testify the gospel of the grace of God.

Now, if this be true, it ought also to be true that in the

series of revivals each succeeding one will be more powerful than that which preceded. This is not saying that it will be so under all conditions and in spite of all limitations. But it will be so under any conditions which do not forbid, and for this reason: there is a better knowledge of the truth, and consequently a better presentation of the truth, and greater power to use it.

We think, again, that history shows this reasonable proposition to be true. It would be impossible to find any measure of any of them that can be put into figures, and so a mathematical comparison is excluded. There are other things which may give us help. Let us take the first and second of the series. The first difference which impresses us is that in one of them the gospel was attested by miracles, and in the other no miracle was seen, yet the truth did not fail to make its impression. The study of the word of God was more earnestly and successfully prosecuted at the time of the Reformation than at any earlier time, and the biblical literature of that day is worth more than the writings of the early fathers. Proof of this assertion is found in this, that the church's grasp of vital truth has been closer than ever before, and the heresies which have appeared since then have made less impression on the church, on its teaching, on its history. They have done their work for the most part outside the church, which has therefore suffered less from their assaults. There have been some striking exceptions, but the rule is as we have stated it. And it is probably true that if the test of godly living could be applied the advantage would be found on the side of the later revival. The First Epistle to the Corinthians will illustrate this point. And the training which the church received in the study of the word and submission to its authority was of incalculable value. We believe it may be admitted that there was a larger gain in territory, and perhaps in numbers, in the first revival, but we think the second surpasses it in all other respects.

We find no difficulty in dealing with this question in its application to the revival of the eighteenth century. Speaking of it as a revival of religion, we say without hesitation that we look upon it as decidedly the greatest of the three, the greatest that has yet appeared in the history of the church. We have already called

attention to the reasons for this opinion; that it has added a larger number to the church; that it has occupied a larger territory; that it has produced a more general and more successful study of the Scriptures; that it has developed a higher standard of Christian life; that the enterprises of the church are larger, more vigorously pressed, and more wisely directed than ever before; and that it has not ceased, but is making itself more widely and profoundly felt continually. What must be the training power of such a revival as this?

We would be willing, perhaps, to arrest this discussion here, and rest upon what has been said a very decided opinion that the outlook is most promising, were it not that there have been cases in which revival in the church has gone down from flood-tide to lowest ebb. We have said that the revival which began in the eighteenth century seems to be increasing in strength. We now call attention to the fact that there seem to be strong indications of reinforcement from another doctrine.

It is hardly possible for any one to have failed to note that every doctrine which has thus far been made a means of revival to the church is to be found in the class of "what man is to believe concerning God," rather than in "what duty God requires of man," among the articles of belief rather than of duty. This is significant. Doctrine is in order to godliness. So is duty. But duty rests upon doctrine. In this connection, we now ask attention to the fact that every vital doctrine of the plan of salvation has been used to revive the church, and that the unreturning progress of history has now brought the church to a point at which it seems reasonable to think that some call of duty will next be used by the Holy Spirit to arouse and stimulate the zeal and devotion of the Lord's people. And this is what seems about to be done. A call seems to be going out to all the church, and it includes so much and goes so far in asserting the claim of the Lord and our duty that it is impossible to see how anything but a downright refusal to obey can prevent the early coming of an eager and yet orderly movement that shall carry the gospel to all nations. The call is the old one of the Master, to go into all the world and preach the gospel; and it

seems to be as full of power to revive as those that preceded. It is finding response such as we never saw before. Some who are able to do so are going to the heathen and paying their own way. Single churches are undertaking the support of a missionary, and the providence of God is calling for more and yet more. "Bring all the tithes into the storehouse." And when the tithes are in, and the heathen are not all reached, and men and women are still offering to go, shall we stop with the tithe? It seems clear to us that we are now called as never before to realize our Lord's ownership in us and his right to use us and with us all we have in forwarding his mighty and saving work on the earth; that we are called as never before to settle in our minds that this is why we are here; to impress fully upon ourselves that we cannot without sin use our means nor ourselves for any purpose outside our Master's service, and to realize that the wisest provision we can make for ourselves and our families is to secure an interest in the Lord's covenant and the promises thereof. We are called to show a faith that puts more confidence in the Lord and his care than in stocks or bonds or real estate. When this call of duty comes home to us all as it seems to be doing, and is met with the answer of faith as it should be, can there be any doubt as to the reviving of the church? We have no doubt about the call and no doubt as to the answer of faith, if the Lord will but put into this doctrine of duty the power to revive his people as he has done with those that have gone before. And if the awakening shall come to a church already revived, then, with all the increase of power which may be expected from larger knowledge and greater impression of the truth, and better preparation of the church, with centres of influence and of activity in every continent, what will the revival become?

For a moment we go back now to the question, Why this long delay in the conversion of the world? what was it, or who, that was not ready? The world, distinct and differing from the kingdom of God, will never be ready till the change itself shall be wrought by which the difference shall be put away. As long as it remains unconverted it will remain unready. We repeat with emphasis the statement that there is no variable factor in this great problem except the church and its condition.

We have lightly and briefly traced one line of the Lord's providential dealing with the church while preparing it to take charge of the world. We have found a solid spiritual temple rising upon the solid foundation that was laid long ago. We have found a real advance in the church, a visible approach toward a state of readiness for the weighty trust which it is to receive. And so far we feel sure of our conclusion. But if the question shall be further pressed, "How near have we come?" we must answer that the date of its coming is not to be found in such an inquiry as this. We cannot even prophesy that it will come soon. There is in man such a dangerous readiness to backslide that we cannot venture to say there will be no more falling away. We can only say that the church is in such a state and is making such answer to the call of Providence that the prospect is full of hope. In other times the servants of the Lord were called to testify by laying down their lives for him and his truth. We speak of it now as an opportunity which came to them to show the power of the grace of Christ and to give example of what courage and devotion it can awaken in the heart. This opportunity does not come to us. It is not a common one anywhere at this time. In the place of it is coming one which is harder to meet, just because it is harder to overcome the covetousness of the heart than it is to put away the fear of death. And we have been asking what will the answer be at this time? Will we also give example to the world of what the grace of our Lord can do? Will we let men see by our own life that it can overcome the love of the world and its blandishment, as well as the fear of the world and its threatenings? Will we show what this Saviour is to us and that we love him more than we love money or business prosperity or an easy life?

There is ground for an answer. What is the meaning of the steady increase of the missionary income of the church, and of the number of those engaging in the work? What can it be but that the Lord is trusting us now with more than we were ever before ready to use for him, but that the training of the past has had its effect? More than this. By both precept and example the call and the opportunity are pressed upon us with increasing urgency.

Many are saying that this is no time for the followers of the Lord Jesus to be laying up estates or to be spending incomes in luxurious living; and many who are making money remain poor because they are spending what they make in the service of God. The long training has not been in vain.

We need, perhaps, to look a little at the alternative that is before us. Not more than a glance is required; but so much at least it would not be well to omit. It is possible for us in all things to come short of this opening opportunity. And what then? If we fail now the failure will be without excuse. And in such cases it is a part of the common method of divine Providence to take away from churches and peoples the privileges which they have definitely refused to use for the advancement of his kingdom. The people of Israel are not the only ones who have been so dealt with. It is a terrible judgment. Not in a single instance has the withdrawal of privileges failed to be attended with darkness and wandering for ages. The possibility of failure is therefore enough to awaken apprehension and to call to diligent labor and prayer that it may not come.

We close now with this thought. There are three lines of inquiry, each of which leads to hopefulness. A study of the prophecies of Scripture has led many to think with Murphy that the time is at hand. A study of the condition and progress of the work gives results which it is not possible to receive without enthusiasm. And a study of the state of the church and of its preparation for the work takes nothing away from the brightness of these hopes.

We fully believe that a church which intends to keep up with the opportunities of the coming morrow will have to be on its feet with the early dawn and be busy till the short and well-filled day shall be merged in the glorious day of the Lord.

D. E. JORDAN.

VI. THE INSPIRATION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT WRITERS.

It may facilitate our inquiry if we consider, 1, The task assigned the New Testament writers; and 2, Their native fitness and qualifications for executing it.

I. The task assigned the writers. This was no ordinary undertaking. We cannot separate it from the burden laid upon their predecessors of the Old Dispensation. Those men of the twilight left to their successors the task of expounding what they themselves understood not. "*Novum Testamentum in Vetere latet; Vetus Testamentum in Novo patet.*" The New Testament, in its essential truths, lay hidden and veiled in the Old, and upon the New Testament writers devolved the task of lifting the veil and bringing forth the priceless treasure, hidden for ages, into the light of gospel day. It behoved them to show that all things which were written in the Law, and the Prophets, and the Psalms, concerning the person and mission of the Messiah, have their fulfilment in Jesus of Nazareth. It was theirs to do what neither Moses nor the prophets could do. They were commissioned to interpret the types and symbols of a shadowy dispensation, demonstrating their accomplishment in the mediatorial office of Christ. Under their hands the carnal ordinances of the ceremonial law were to start into spiritual life through the realization of all they foreshadowed in the person and work of the Redeemer.

Such was their task, and it is not too much to claim that the mere outline of it is sufficient to show that the men who should execute it must surpass the greatest of Israel's prophets.

II. This leads us to consider their native qualifications. On this point there does not seem to be much room for debate. Judging from their previous positions and engagements in life, they were not the men one would have deemed likely to possess the talents or culture necessary for such work. In harmony with the design of the economy of grace, the treasure was committed to earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power might be of God,

and not of the agents he employed. John Stuart Mill, in his *Essay on Theism* (p. 252), puts the case with much force: "Who among the disciples of Jesus, or among the proselytes, was capable of inventing the sayings ascribed to Jesus, or of imagining the life and character revealed in the gospels? Certainly not the fishermen of Galilee; as certainly not St. Paul." It is true the apostles had the great advantage of personal intercourse with our Lord for three years; but, notwithstanding the unspeakable privileges thus enjoyed, they gave evidence, up to the very close of his ministry, of an utter misconception of the nature of his kingdom and the means by which it was to be established. The sons of Zebedee were admonished for their misconception regarding the spirit of the gospel they were afterwards to proclaim, and Peter received a stern rebuke for his ignorance of the one great central truth to which the whole Mosaic economy bore witness, viz., that doctrine of expiation through the shedding of blood which must be regarded as the organic principle of both dispensations. He showed that he was not the man to give voice and utterance to the symbols and types of that ancient sacrificial economy. He had no conception of the necessity of Christ's death, or of the relation it sustained to the sacrifices that were under the law, or to the expiation of human guilt. Nor was Peter alone in this ignorance of type and antitype. The death of Christ took all his disciples by surprise. The language of the two disciples as they journeyed toward Emmaus expressed the common views and feelings of the whole land. "We trusted that it had been he who should have redeemed Israel." (Luke xxiv. 21.) They had no idea that the redemption of Israel must be achieved through the Messiah's death.

It is true the Apostle Paul stands out preëminent above all the New Testament writers. His training under Jewish rabbis who were learned in the sacred Scriptures, one might think, gave him peculiar advantages in the exposition of Moses and the prophets. He profited in the religion of the Jews above many his equals in his own nation (Gal. i. 14), yet he never ascribes his knowledge of the gospel he preached to his previous training or to his personal unaided studies. The gospel he proclaimed he neither received

from man, nor was taught, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. (Gal. i. 12.) Of course the reference here is to revelation, and not to inspiration, to the informing of Paul himself, and not to the communication of that same information through him to others. The former, however, was subordinate to the latter, as the subsequent context (vs. 16) shows. God revealed his Son in Paul (*ἰνα*) in order that he might preach him among the Gentiles. The revelation made to Paul was not for the sake of Paul alone, or for his own personal enlightenment in the way of life, as its ultimate end. He was enlightened that he might enlighten others, and it is certainly not a strained inference to conclude that as great care would be taken to secure accuracy in the latter case as in the former. More of this, however, when we come to speak of the apostle's own testimony on this point.

This estimate of the native qualifications and culture of the men employed to unfold the truths of the Old Testament Dispensation is fully confirmed by the achievements of the Jewish rabbis in this department. We have specimens of their comments on the oracles committed to their care, in the Talmud. These comments may be taken as fair illustrations of the views of the very ablest of them in regard to the import of the writings of Moses and the prophets. In view of the trivial questions they have singled out for discussion, and the foolish and absurd conclusions they have arrived at, and the rules they have laid down for the guidance of their disciples, we may fairly ask the opponents of a thorough verbal inspiration, whether they would regard these men as capable of writing the gospels or epistles? If the rabbis were the Biblical *literati* of the apostolic age, we must conclude that the age was incapable of producing the writings presented in the New Testament revelation. The writers were all Jews, accustomed to Jewish modes of thought, and, in view of this fact, it is hard to conceive how such men could have produced writings at variance with Jewish prejudices and in manifest antagonism with the most cherished convictions of the Jewish race. Apart from an inspiration extending to both thought and language, the Scriptures of the New Dispensation had never been written by their reputed authors. All that is necessary to satisfy any intelligent mind of the

justice of this verdict is simply to place these writings side by side with the Talmud.

In harmony with this estimate of the qualifications of the apostles for the execution of the task assigned them, is the verdict of the Lord himself. He did not regard them as qualified to enter upon their mission, either as speakers or writers, even though they had accompanied him, going out and in with him for the space of three years. Notwithstanding all the instruction they had received through his own immediate personal intercourse, he enjoined it upon them that they should await the promise of the Father, tarrying in Jerusalem until they should be endued with power from on high. His estimate of the nature and extent of the endowment they needed may be gathered from what took place on the day of Pentecost. Surely the gift of tongues was an endowment extending to language and determining it. Those on whom it was bestowed spake with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance. There can be no doubt that the agency of the inspiring Spirit extended to the language employed by Peter and the other speakers on that memorable occasion. To enable one to speak in a tongue previously unknown is to furnish him with a vocabulary and with skill to use it, discriminating, among shades of meanings, the one best suited to give accurate expression to the thought as it struggles onward toward the birth, for it is never matured thought until it is expressed in words. Whether, then, we consider the task, or the men employed to execute it, or the training they underwent, or the estimate of their qualifications expressed by their Master, or the provision he made for their full equipment, we must conclude that, apart from a supernatural agency, such as the verbal theory of inspiration implies, the task had never been executed at all, or else had been executed in a manner so imperfect as to preclude the acceptance of the record as an authoritative rule of faith and practice.

Passing from these unquestionable facts, let us hear what views the writers of the New Testament entertained regarding their relation to the inspiring Spirit and his actuating energy as he moved them onward in their work.

On this subject the Apostle Paul bears remarkable and most

decisive testimony in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter ii. He is meeting charges preferred against himself as a preacher. There were some in the church at Corinth who thought him deficient in philosophical acquirements, and looked upon his addresses as lacking in rhetorical finish. His reply to the former charge is that the subjects he was commissioned to proclaim were such as the heart of man had never conceived, subjects, therefore, which transcended human philosophy, and which he and others—his fellow-servants—had received by revelation. They were subjects which none could reveal save the Spirit of God, who knows the mind of God, even as the spirit of man knows the things of a man.

With regard to the other charge, he informs his critics that he was not left at liberty respecting the language in which he was to clothe these heaven-revealed truths, as he set them forth before the minds of others. These things he and his commissioned brethren spake, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but in the words which the Holy Ghost teacheth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual, or combining spiritual things with spiritual words, that is, words given by the Spirit. The claim here advanced by the apostle is a claim not only for himself, but for his official brethren also, who were chosen instruments, as he was, to make known to men the will of God. Of both he affirms that the words in which they gave utterance to the truths revealed to them were not words which man's wisdom teacheth, but words taught them by the Holy Ghost. In both instances the resultant record was divinely determined in its *form* as well as in its *matter*, in its *language* as well as in its *thought*.

The absolute necessity of such action on the part of the inspiring Spirit is further manifest from what the apostle states regarding the utter inability of the natural man to receive, or know these truths, even when they are uttered, or recorded. By the natural man he means, as the context shows, the man who is not taught of the Holy Ghost, for he contrasts him with the spiritual man who searcheth (*ἀνακρίνει*), examines closely, sifts all things, even the deep things of God. Now if man, in his natural state, left to the exercise of his own unaided native powers, which

are so dominated and paralyzed by a heart that is enmity against God that the things of the Spirit are foolishness unto him, and that he can neither receive nor know them, surely there is no need of formal argument to demonstrate his utter unfitness to apprehend, or utter, or record, infallibly, the mysteries of redemption, or those historical incidents in connection with which these mysteries have been revealed. His unfitness to act in relation to the history of redemption is just as patent as his unfitness to act in relation to its doctrinal truths. How could one out of sympathy with such truths, and who regarded them as foolishness, and whose apprehending power was beclouded by sin, make selections out of the historical incidents that have transpired in the history of our race, incidents which were divinely ordered so as to form an appropriate setting for each fresh communication as the tide of revelation rolled on from its native source in the unsearchable wisdom of God? In presence of such a problem the Newer Criticism may well feel perplexed, for its position implies the capacity of an un-inspired agent to write the history and expound the doctrines of redemption, presenting both in a form that shall serve to instruct the church of God throughout her militant career and fit her for making known to the principalities and the powers in the heavenly places the manifold wisdom of God.

The fact is, there underlies this whole question, as between the Newer Criticism and the immemorial doctrine of the church, the whole subject of man's estate as a fallen moral agent, and the agency of the Spirit in his recovery. No one holding with the men of the Reformation, whether Lutheran or Reformed, that, by reason of the fall, man is "indisposed, disabled and made opposite to all spiritual good," could hold with the men of this new critical school, that the sacred writers needed no gifts, or graces, or qualifications, save their own native intellectual endowments and the virtues of honesty and fidelity.

Of course these critics, at least those of them who have been trained in evangelical churches, admit the necessity of the gracious influences of the Spirit to fit a man to hold communion with God, and, through such communion, to become acquainted with his will. This partial recognition of an indirect agency of the

Spirit in the production of the Sacred Scriptures bears on the face of it a confession of the inadequacy of the agency it recognizes which justifies its instant rejection. We are informed that those good men who through their communion with God drunk into his Spirit and learned his will, had, from time to time, as their own subsequent experience suggested, to eliminate from their conceptions of the divine character and will many ideas which they had previously cherished as unquestionable truths. The question thus raised is certainly a very grave one. It is no less than this: "What guarantee have we that those who erred in the original apprehension, did not err in the subsequent elimination?" And there is another question, inseparable from this, which necessarily forces itself upon us for settlement, viz., "Have we any reliable guarantee that there were, at any stage in the history of revelation, men who, by virtue of their attainments in godliness, so accurately interpreted and gauged the mind of God that their interpretations could be relied on as a sure, infallible rule of faith and practice?" This novel theory of repeated rectifications, as experience created the suspicion of misapprehension and misinterpretation, must, if accepted and acted on, lead its advocates to challenge the doctrinal deliverances of even the best of men when they happen to be in conflict with their own interpretations of their own religious consciousness. If inspiration rests on godliness, why should one godly man defer to another? The assumption underlying this theory is, that the degree of the inspiration varied according to the attainment of the writer in personal conformity to the image of God. The more holy the inspired agent, the more reliable his interpretations of the divine will. The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable, that as none of the sacred writers were perfectly holy, none of their writings can be accepted as absolutely infallible, notwithstanding the testimony of our Saviour to the absolute infallibility of the entire Old Testament record! The church of God will not long remain in a strait between these views. Accepting the verdict of her Lord, she will spurn from her, with holy aversion, the faith-subverting theories of the Newer Criticism.

In so short an article there is not room to establish the claims

of the other New Testament writers. What is true of Paul, in regard to inspiration, is true of all the other apostolic penmen. They were all present on the day of Pentecost, and were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and spake the word as the Spirit gave them utterance. It was not for the delivery of mere transient gospel addresses they were supernaturally endowed. It was certainly more important to write an infallible gospel, or epistle, than to preach an infallible sermon. The latter would soon pass away, or abide, perhaps, very imperfectly as a tradition among their auditors and their descendants. The former were to serve as sources of saving knowledge to the church throughout her militant career.

The only writers in regard to whose inspiration a question can be raised are Mark and Luke. Suffice it to say, however, 1, That they were of prophetic rank, not only companions of apostles, but *συνεργοί*, fellow-workers with them in the gospel; 2, That during the period within which they exercised their ministry, and even till the completion of the Canon, supernatural gifts of the Spirit, as a provisional arrangement for the edification of the body of Christ, in the absence of the written word, were very extensively bestowed upon individual members of the churches; 3, "The character of the facts selected for record, the character of the doctrines represented as coming from Christ, and the unquestionable harmony of both facts and doctrine with the historical facts and doctrinal statements recorded by the other New Testament writers, satisfy all the demands and fulfil all the conditions of the most rigid rules of internal evidence." (See the writer's book on "The Rule of Faith and the Doctrine of Inspiration," Hodder & Stoughton.)

But the crowning, the absolutely conclusive argument, is furnished in the fact, that the Holy Ghost was given to our Saviour, as the God-man, to qualify him for the execution of the functions of his mediatorial office. That the unction of the Spirit had reference to his exercise of the prophetic, as well as to the priestly, or the regal function, is placed beyond all doubt by express Scripture testimony. In the synagogue at Nazareth our Lord informed his auditors that it was to him the prophet Isaiah referred (ch. lxi. 1) when he said, "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because

the Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek," etc., etc. The extent and specific character of this anointing, as well as the fact of it, is clearly stated in the Scriptures. In the normal prophecy (Deut. xviii. 15-19), in which the rise of the great Messianic prophet and his prophetic forerunners is predicted, Moses is informed that God would put his words in his mouth, and that he should speak all that he should command him. If this did not amount to an inspiration extending to the words it would be difficult to say what would constitute it. The language employed in this forecast of the functions and relations of the Prophet, is peculiarly comprehensive and significant. It embraces both the *influx* and the *efflux* of the communication. The words were to be given him, and he was to speak, give out, all that God should command him. Now, prior to John the Baptist this predicted Prophet, in whom this prophecy should find its *complete* fulfilment, had not arisen. The Jews were, in John's day, expecting him, and asked John whether he was that Prophet, and were informed by him that he was not. After John there certainly arose no other prophet, save Jesus of Nazareth, to whom this prophecy could possibly apply. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that our Saviour recognized its application to himself in that remarkable passage (John xii. 49, 50), "I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, he gave me a commandment what I should say (*εἶπω*) and what I should speak (*λαλήσω*). And I know that his commandment is life everlasting; whatsoever I speak (*λαλῶ*), therefore, even as the Father hath said unto me, so I speak (*λαλῶ*)." Of similar definite and comprehensive import is a passage which occurs in his great intercessory prayer (John xvii. 8), "Now they know that all things whatsoever thou hast given me are from thee; for the words which thou gavest me I have given unto them; and they received *them*, and knew of a truth that I came out from thee, and believed that thou didst send me." It was not, according to this account of the message where-with the Saviour was entrusted, an undefined revelation he was commissioned to make. It was definitely determined in its language, and, as thus defined, he communicated it to his disciples.

One other reference must suffice. It is, however, of itself suffi-

cient to vindicate the claim already established, regarding the inspiration of our Lord. The passage referred to occurs at the close of each of the seven letters to the seven churches in Asia. The ever-recurring refrain, as each message to the churches closes, is, "He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches."

The argument from this testimony of our Saviour, to the relation which the Spirit sustained to these seven letters, does not need any lengthened elaboration. While he is himself personally present with the beloved disciple (for he had laid his right hand upon him, strengthening him to hear him,) he, nevertheless, does not claim for his words an independent, uninspired, utterance. Though the language of the letters comes forth from the lips of the glorified Saviour, he will have his servant John know, and, through him, will have the churches of Asia know, and will have the church in all time know, that, in communicating the will of the Father to men, he acts, and has ever acted, under an inspiration of the Holy Ghost which extends to the language of the utterance, or the record. Is there any need of further argument? If the incarnate *λόγος* needed such unction of the Holy Spirit, will any one venture to say that Peter, or James, or John, or any other organ of revelation, needed no such endowment?

The principle on which the writer has proceeded in this discussion is simply this: that the testimony of the Scriptures, in reference to all the subjects of which they treat, must be accepted by all Christians as conclusive. We have no right to make selections among the subjects they discuss, and say we accept their testimony regarding these, but reject it in such other instances as we may think fit. Regarding this as a valid common-sense principle, the sole question to be decided is the question of fact, viz., "What is the testimony of the Scriptures in regard to the agency of the Holy Spirit in their production?—do they simply teach that their authors wrote as intelligent men of unimpeachable veracity, bearing testimony to their own impressions of what they saw and heard?" Or do they teach that they spake and wrote under an actuating energy of that Divine Agent, which extended to the *form* and *language* they employed, as well as to the *matter* or *ideas* they were

commissioned to convey to others? This latter is, beyond all question, their account of their origin, and he who rejects their testimony on this point can assign no reason for accepting their testimony on any other. In a word, the rejection of the doctrine that the Scriptures are the offspring of an inspiration which determined the language employed by the sacred writers involves, logically, the rejection of the Bible as the word of God.

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NOTE.—In the last number of the QUARTERLY, pages 371–374, read “zeit-geist” for “zeit-glist.” The author’s proof-sheets were duly corrected by him, but not carefully followed in the editorial revision. It is due to him that this statement be made.—MANAGER.

VII. NOTES.

THE PROPOSED REVISION OF THE STANDARDS OF WESTMINSTER.

THE question of creed-revision is now fairly before us for discussion, if not for action. Some of our churches are under stress of action, and the bond of ecumenic Presbyterianism is so close, the points at issue so vital, the consequences involved so grave, that churches under no such stress share the solicitude and join eagerly in the discussion.

With us of the Southern Church of America there is no call for action. The ordinary channels for the public expression of opinion convey no desire for revision;¹ and enquiry has failed to discover any private leanings in that direction. We are content with the Standards and with the terms of subscription as they are. Yet we do not live within a Chinese wall; our church is a member of the one body holding the Reformed Confessions, and we are vitally concerned with all that affects that body; and so, grateful as we are for the repose and content we enjoy, we share the interest in this movement and watch its progress with unconcealed anxiety.

Already the discussion has spread far beyond the limits of the question, and threatens to prove endless; and if any definite conclusion is to be reached, it must be recalled and held close to the points at issue. Pending this discussion, the church cannot take time to vindicate her right to make and to maintain doctrinal symbols as against the so-called Scripturalists (Plymouth Brethren and Campbellite Baptists,) who ostentatiously reject all subordinate standards; nor can she pause to prove her fidelity to the Westminster system of doctrine as against those who have for so long a time been prophesying the death of Calvinism; nor yet is it incumbent on her to enter the Augustinian controversy and to show anew the accord of the Westminster symbols with

¹ Whilst this note is passing through the press the development of the discussion has shown the statement above to be incorrect. Dr. A. W. Pitzer, in the columns of a representative journal of the Church North, announces himself as in favor of revision; and one of our own papers remarks editorially, "We find that there are advocates of revision even in our staid old Southern Church."

the Word of God; nor can she tarry to restate her relation to these documents as subordinate and not final, implying as this does her perpetual right to "revise, purge, and add to" them, as Dr. Wilson, Moderator of the Free Church of Scotland, in 1866, expressed it, and carrying for the advocates of revision ample protection against charges of heresy, apostasy, iconoclasm; yet all of these questions have been imported into the discussion.

I. The standards of the Presbyterian Churches in Great Britain and America were produced by the Assembly of Divines which sat at Westminster from July 1, 1643, to April 12, 1648, and which was composed of representatives of all the counties of England and Wales, the two Universities, and all parties except extreme High Churchmen and Anabaptists. Commissioners from Scotland took seats later, in the hope of thereby producing documents that would effect throughout the entire island unity in faith, government and worship. The Assembly first attempted to revise the Thirty-nine Articles, but upon the entrance of the Scotch commissioners abandoned the attempt, and on July 7, 1645, began work upon a new Confession, which was completed and sent to Parliament for approval on December 4, 1645. The Larger Catechism was sent up on October 15, 1647, and the Shorter Catechism on November 25, 1647. The rest of the time of the Assembly was occupied in the preparation of proof texts.

From a statement of Anthony Tuckney, Dr. Briggs infers that the Standards were not composed with a view to subscription, and he maintains that subscription was imposed upon the Church of Scotland by Parliament in the interest of liberty, and as a protection to Episcopal clergymen; but Mr. Taylor Innes finds the origin in that "solemn league and covenant" of the two nations who banded together to be free under Charles I., for the sake of which Scotland was willing to forget its Confession of 1560, prepared by John Knox, and to adopt this Puritan Confession.

Up to 1867 the chief churches of Scotland were bound by this unrevised Confession. In the Free and the Established Churches the subscription of 1711 was still in force: "I do sincerely own and believe the whole doctrine contained in the Confession to be the truths of God, and I do own the same as the confession of my faith."

In America the Synod of Philadelphia introduced subscription in 1729, when it passed the adopting act in which the ministers—

"declare their agreement in, and approbation of, the Confession of Faith, with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster,

as being in all *essential and necessary articles* good forms of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine, and do also *adopt* the said Confession and Catechisms as the confession of *our* faith."

In 1788, when the General Assembly was formed, the Confession was revised in Ch. XXIII. 3; Ch. XXX. 1; Ch. XX. 3; and Question 109 of the Larger Catechism; also in 1887, Ch. XXIV. 4. The Form of Government and Discipline was revised in 1788, in 1805, by the Southern Church in 1879, by the Northern in 1885. The Directory for Worship was made anew in 1788, revised in 1821, amended in the North in 1886, and a new revision has for several years been before our Southern Church.

To the Assembly of 1804 a committee, appointed the previous year to consider whether any, and if any, what alterations ought to be made in the Confession, reported adversely—

"In a word, what was true when our Confession and Catechisms were formed, is now true. We believe that this truth has been most admirably and accurately drawn into view in these excellent performances. They have become venerable from their age. Our church has flourished under their influence, and we can see no reason to alter them."

The history of the Standards thus briefly outlined develops several important facts:

First, The doctrine of the Presbyterian Church concerning the plan of salvation has continued unchanged in statement since 1645. The revisions effected have not touched any chapter before the twentieth, and no one will seriously maintain that in that plan of salvation the doctrines of civil magistrates, synods, marriage, occupy the same place as the doctrines of God, of Christ the Mediator, of effectual calling. The revisionists cannot, therefore, argue with unbroken force from past revisions to proposed revisions. The only possible exception is the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, which, in 1814, revised chapters III. and X.; but the exception is more apparent than real, as that revision is commonly held to have put that body beyond the pale of the Churches holding the Reformed Confessions, and its admission to the General Council has for many of us deprived that body of its distinctive character.

Second, Doctrine has ever been more emphasized than government, discipline, worship. To-day we *adopt* the former, we *approve* the latter, and the Synod of 1729, which fixed the term of subscription to doctrine as above, thought it enough to "declare the Form of Government agreeable to the Word of God *in substance* and recommended it to be

observed *as near as circumstances will allow and Christian prudence direct.*" This impairs somewhat the force of the argument: You have revised the Form of Government, even made it anew; why not revise the Confession?

Third, Terms of subscription in America mark an advance upon those in Great Britain. We "receive and adopt the system of doctrine;" they receive "the whole doctrine as the confession of my faith." That is, since 1729 we have been subscribing to the standards in terms which, if adopted to-day in Great Britain, would go far towards solving the difficulty there, even if they should fail of that entire relief which Dr. Warfield thinks they would afford. We have therefore no occasion to revise merely because the British churches are revising, and they might well be content if the present agitation brought them to our historic position.

II. In Great Britain, according to Mr. Taylor Innes, the present state of the question is the culmination of a movement begun in 1866. Even before that date the United Presbyterians had disclaimed "anything in these doctrines which teaches compulsory and intolerant principles in religion," and required subscription to the Confession "as an exhibition of the sense in which I understand the Holy Scripture." In May, 1879, their Assembly passed a "Declaratory Act," setting forth as vital and important doctrines three, which the Westminster Confession does not "sufficiently emphasize," "the love of God to all mankind, his gift of his Son to be the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, and the free offer of salvation to men without distinction on the ground of Christ's perfect sacrifice," together with liberty of opinion on such points as do not enter into the substance of the faith, as the six days of creation.

In the Free Church, the movement dates from the agitation concerning the views of Prof. W. R. Smith, beginning in 1876, who, curiously enough, defended himself as maintaining the confessional doctrine against his prosecutors. At the end of his second trial, Dr. Norman Walker, the editor of the official magazine, declared that the time had come for parting with the Westminster Confession in its capacity as modern standard. In 1884, deacons were released from the Confession of Faith, and bound only to the "system of evangelical truth . . . set forth in the Westminster Shorter Catechism." The last Assembly, after electing Dr. Marcus Dods to the chair of New Testament Exegesis in Edinburgh, on the ground, as one member stated, that he put Christianity first and the documents of Christianity unmistakably second, adopted the following motion:

“The General Assembly having taken up the overtures regarding the Confession of Faith, and recognizing alike the importance and difficulty of the question thus raised, and the indications of a present call to deal with it, hereby resolve to appoint a committee to make inquiry and to consider carefully what action it is advisable for the church to take, so as to meet the difficulties and relieve the scruples referred to in so large a number of overtures—it being always understood that this church can contemplate the adoption of no change which shall not be consistent with a cordial and steadfast adherence to the great doctrines of the Confession.”

The motion was that of Principal Brown, of Aberdeen, who, in supporting it, said that “the Confession, like Mr. Gladstone’s bill, was ‘dead.’” In a full house the motion was carried by a vote of 413 to 130, and the dissentients have so far withdrawn their opposition as to serve on the committee.

In the Established Church of Scotland, Dr. Cunningham, of Crieff, supported by Dr. Tulloch, first propounded the now popular theory of the Confession as a “historical monument,” and last May an overture was adopted, under the approval of a majority of the presbyteries, requiring church officers other than ministers only to endorse in general “the doctrines, worship, discipline and government of the church, and to accept the Confession as the sum and substance of the doctrines of the Reformed Churches.”

The Presbyterian Church of England first undertook the question of revision at the Synod of 1883, in London. It adopted a paper, affirming its unabated adherence to the doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession, and appointing a committee to consider what, if any, changes were desirable in the formulas of subscription; whether an explanatory declaration was desirable; and whether a briefer and more available compendium ought not to be prepared by the next council. In 1884, the committee recommended that subscription be required to “the system of doctrine” rather than to “the doctrine”; in 1885, it laid before Synod a declaratory statement; and, in 1888, the Articles of the Faith were submitted; but as yet none of these has been adopted, and Dr. Dykes writes: “We have determined upon no change, and it is very difficult to see what it is best to do.”

III. In America the movement is in the Church North, as distinguished from the Church South and the United Presbyterian Church. The Presbytery of Nassau overtured the Assembly of 1888, asking for a revision of the third chapter of the Confession. That overture was referred to the Assembly of 1889, and in the meantime was adopted by fifteen other presbyteries. The Presbytery of Newark sent up an over-

ture, prepared originally in the Presbytery of New York, asking that the following questions be propounded to the presbyteries:

1. Do you desire a revision of the Confession of Faith?
2. If so, in what respects and to what extent?

The Assembly sent down an overture embodying these questions, which is now before the presbyteries.

The discussion thus arising is three-sided:

1. The revisionists very properly realize their responsibilities, and are setting forth the grounds on which they propose changes. Dr. Van Dyke would amend Ch. III., 3, so that it would read, "God foreordains men to eternal death *simply and solely for their sins*;" he would give expression to what Dr. Chas. Hodge calls the "general belief of Protestants," that all infants dying in infancy are elect, and therefore regenerated and saved; and for Sec. 7 he proposes the insertion of the following, or of something like it:

"God's eternal decree hindereth no one from accepting Christ as he is freely offered to us in the gospel; nor ought it to be so construed as to contradict the declarations of Scripture that Christ is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, and that God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance."

Dr. Monfort looks forward to a time when Westminster, Heidelberg and Dort will adopt new standards for the sake of unification and coöperation. He would eliminate Chap. III., 4; he favors Dr. Van Dyke's amendment; he thinks the church does not believe that the Pope of Rome is antichrist, and for Chap. X., 3, he would substitute:

"All elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word, are saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, where and how he pleaseth."

Numerous suggestions are made, apparently diverse, yet sufficiently alike to justify Dr. Van Dyke's claim that there is substantial agreement among the revisionists.

2. Dr. Briggs occupies a position quite unique. That he has thus far attracted but little open support does not impair the force of his vigorous argument, or deny to it a wide, even if a silent, influence. He is satisfied with the Confession as it is, and with the terms of subscription as they are; they are not too exacting for him; they are the highest attainment of doctrinal advance in the Christian Church. The people lack systematic training in the doctrines of the church, because the ministers do not expound the Confession of Faith as in former times; they preach the Scriptures or sermons for the times. The revisions now asked

for enter into the very pith and marrow of the system; they have to do with the Calvinism of the system; . . . any revision that proposes to satisfy the cries for relief will be so thorough that the greater part of the Confession and Catechisms must be revised. Yet along with these admirable statements are others which will startle the church. The ministry and people have drifted away from the Westminster Standards; officers-elect examine the doctrines with amazement and are troubled; young men hesitate to become candidates in a church which seems to them to compel men to an iron-clad creed and to discourage theological research and Christian liberty; the ministry are unable to preach the doctrines of the Standards because the people will not listen to them; the Presbyterian Church is at an angle with the Confession of Faith, and modern dogmaticians have led the church into contra-confessional views of Scripture, and consequently (*sic*) there is a conflict between the common doctrine of the Bible and biblical criticism (this cannot fail to suggest the line of defence adopted by Prof. W. R. Smith before the Free Church Assembly); biblical critics will not much longer tolerate persecution (*sic*) on the part of a contra-confessional majority; slowly but surely the more humanitarian views of the Arminians have entered the Presbyterian Church, and even the ministry; among us to-day are Arminians, Premillenarians, Annihilationists, Second Probationists, Kenotics, Non-churchmen, Scripturalists.

Yet "Broad-churchmen will agree with the conservatives that new doctrinal standards are not practicable at the present time in the American Presbyterian Church." The only relief is in the historic interpretation of the Standards, as distinguished from the dogmatic systems of the Seminaries, and in the historic interpretation of the terms of subscription as against the presbyteries which are constantly transgressing the bounds set by the Confession and imposing the opinions of a majority. Doubt as to one's accord with the Confession can be solved by Presbytery, and on appeal by Synod, General Assembly, and ultimately the civil courts (*sic*). For the mixed multitude which Prof. Briggs finds in the church, "the only possible relief is toleration. They cannot be officially tolerated under the constitution of the Presbyterian Church, but they may be unofficially tolerated so long as no one undertakes to play the part of a heresy hunter and bring them to trial."

One cannot be surprised by the almost indignant remonstrance with which these views are disowned by different writers in the Church North. Dr. Spear emphatically denies an Arminian tendency. Dr.

Monfort asserts that "the great body of our church was never sounder than now;" an editorial writer challenges Dr. Briggs to name five who have left the church on account of the *yoke* of their subscription vows, and claims that among six thousand ministers there are hardly so many heretics as there are fingers on a man's hand. To this I may add, that if the mixed multitude enumerated by Dr. Briggs has made its way into the church under the present terms of subscription, their consciences are probably strong enough to allow them to remain, and that it would scarcely be worth while for the church to attempt legislation that would satisfy such very "tender" consciences as these.

3. The third party oppose revision, but on grounds quite different from those of Dr. Briggs. Dr. De Witt opened the discussion by suggesting that "if any one wants revision on any subject, let him try his hand at a formula correlated to the formulas which he does not want revised;" he thinks the proposed revision would make the Confession a narrower and less liberal symbol than it now is; and he criticises Dr. Van Dyke's proposed amendment as violating the fundamental idea of a creed statement, which is composed of dogmatic propositions constituted of language other than that of Scripture, of the church's interpretation of Scripture, and also because the verses quoted by Dr. Van Dyke will revive the unhappy controversy begun before 1838 and only ended in 1869.

Dr. Warfield maintains that, as long as the church remains as heartily convinced as she at present undoubtedly is, that what is known as the Augustinian system is the truth of God, . . she is without grievance in her relation to her standards. The term of subscription is an ideal one. It does not ask us to affirm that the Westminster Confession is perfect or infallible, or that we adopt every proposition in it; but only that we heartily accept the system of doctrine taught in it and all the doctrines essential to the integrity of the system. The individual's relation to the creed might be improved by letting him make his own creed, but just as this fitted his idiosyncrasies, it would be unacceptable to every other individual.

In reply, the revisionists say that we subscribe, not to the necessary and essential articles, but to the system of doctrine; that every Presbyterian office-holder not only "recognizes" the Confession as an "adequate expression," but adopts it; that we want, not a loose and qualified subscription, but a sound creed, and that this method would result in as many different creeds as there are subscribers to the Confession; and that, besides all this, the Confession, as a public document, should

reflect accurately the faith of the church, and that mere relief in the terms of subscription will not accomplish this.

This is the state of the discussion at the present writing. Each day brings some fresh contribution, however, and changes to some extent the aspect of the question, making it less and less possible to foresee what the ultimate combinations will be. Still, the lines indicated above will scarcely be entirely obscured at any stage of the discussion.

The discussion is only begun, and it may not be amiss to indicate at this early stage certain open questions in Symbolics which, unless promptly met, will introduce confusion and delay needlessly the final result. They concern the purpose to be subserved by a Confession, and may be grouped in three pairs of alternatives. Thus, are the Standards to be:

1. The expression of our faith? or the monument to our fathers' faith—the register of my opinions? or the tombstone over the opinions of my ancestors? The difference is apparent: we need our opinions every day, but we repair to our ancestors' monuments only occasionally; theological bric-a-brac is interesting to the connoisseur, but for common life we need something more; and greatly as we admire the ecclesiastical antiquarian, we cannot fail to distinguish him from the man that holds fast the form of sound words. If the Confession is only a historical relic, we can dismiss all anxiety, for discussion cannot change history; but if that Confession is the statement of God's truth for us, we must scrutinize closely, and even severely, every proposition to alter it.

2. An authoritative guide? or a popular compendium? Some laymen are clamoring to be heard in the proposed revision on the ground that they know what the people want; and they are quite right if the purpose is to provide a statement of essential truth to which the most immature believer can assent. But if the purpose is to exhibit the doctrines essential, not merely to the existence, but to the perfection, of Christian character; to set forth not what all Christians believe, but what they ought to believe: the aid of the untrained layman is not needed, but rather that of him who best knows the truth of God in its completeness.

3. A symbol of scriptural doctrine? or an instrument of Christian unity? If the Standards are to be the basis on which we bring into union with us the various Christian bodies of Methodists, Episcopalians, Baptists, etc., etc., it must be greatly reduced in size and in range. It must lose in intension what it gains in extension. If we re-

gard unification as our great mission, we will reduce the scope of the symbols to the barest necessities of Scripture truth. But if our first duty is to exhibit the whole truth of God, that Confession will be as complete as possible, and will contain truths denied by many evangelical bodies, thus furnishing a basis of contrast rather than of unity.

Upon these questions there is in the church no formulated consensus, and variations abound; still, I believe the weight of opinion is towards the first alternative in each of the three cases, and that the desiderata in a symbol of doctrine, are: an expression of present faith, an authoritative guide, and an exhibit approximately complete of the revealed truth of God.

W. S. PLUMER BRYAN.

A PLEA FOR BIBLICAL THEOLOGY.

IT is a disputed question whether there is such a thing as progress in theology. Some theologians claim that revelation, as a historical process, having been completed, and the doctrines of Christianity having crystallized in creeds, henceforth the office of theology is to expound and defend those truths which have been defined by the church. Fresh light on the great doctrines of sin and grace and redemption is not to be expected. Our views may be clarified, our doctrines set in better order, and some further logical consequences may be drawn from them; but the work of the theologian is essentially conservative, not aggressive; it is expository of received doctrine, not inventive or constructive, so far as new materials are to be dealt with. Others of a more advanced school demand greater liberty of thought, and claim that new factors should be admitted into the science of theology. The Christian consciousness, the spirit of the age, the enlightened reason, must have their place and their authority in constructing a system of theology.

Between the two extreme positions is there no middle ground? The great body of evangelical churches holds that the Scriptures contain the only and the complete revelation of God. Nothing is to be added, nothing to be taken away, but the Scriptures constitute the norm by which all theories, all doctrines, all systems are to be tested.

The duty of carefully studying the Holy Scriptures becomes then all the more necessary. The Bible being the word of God, is not to be overlaid by any system of scholastic theology, nor obscured by any pre-conceived opinions of theologians. No human creed, however ancient, no opinion of men upon religious truths, however widely spread,

no traditional interpretation, however hallowed by association, can claim immunity from examination and testing by the Scriptures, nor from re-adjustment, if necessary, in consequence of clearer light derived from the holy oracles. There is little danger that any serious revolution will be effected by this process. The great doctrines of Christianity stand out so clearly on the page of Scripture that the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein. But for the thorough knowledge required by the minister of the word a more careful and comprehensive study of the Scriptures is necessary. In point of fact, few men engaged in the active work of the ministry find time, or *take* time, for any thorough study of all the books of the Bible. They may read more or less systematic or practical theology; they may devote some time to the study of certain passages of Scripture in preparing their sermons, but they shrink from the labor of undertaking a detailed survey of the whole Canon.

There would seem to be a place in theological study for that department or "discipline" known as Biblical Theology. It is strange what slight knowledge of the meaning of this title is exhibited by many clergymen. They do not seem to understand what is meant by "Biblical Theology," as distinguished from Systematic, or better, Dogmatic Theology. The name is sometimes rejected, as if it implied that Systematic Theology is not biblical, or as if Biblical Theology attempts to supersede Systematic Theology altogether. Neither of these is the case.

The object of this paper is to answer briefly the questions, What is Biblical Theology? what is its value in theological education? what is its relation to systematic theology?

I. Biblical Theology is the historic presentation of the religious teachings of the Bible, as these teachings have been uttered and developed by the writers of Holy Scripture, during the entire progress of revelation. Or, to give the exact definition of some noted writers in this department: According to Oehler (*Theologie des Alten Testaments*), "The theology of the Old Testament is the historico-genetic delineation of the religion contained in the canonical writings of the Old Testament." According to Weiss (*Lehrbuch der Biblischen Theologie des Neuen Testaments*), "The Biblical Theology of the New Testament is the scientific delineation of the religious ideas and doctrines contained in the New Testament."

Let not the Teutophobist start back in alarm at the mention of these German theologians. We will go on to examine the real signifi-

cance of these definitions, and seek to justify the use of this theological discipline.

Biblical Theology is the connecting link between Biblical Exegesis and Historical Theology. The first task of the student of Scripture, after having settled the questions as to the canonicity, genuineness and authenticity of the writings, is to ascertain what the writers mean, to interpret the various books of the Bible by the help of lexicography, grammar and archæology. To know the language of the writers well, and to have a clear conception of the scope and connection of each passage, is indispensable. Then follows the gathering up of all these separate phrases and ideas into unity. After studying one or all of the Pauline epistles, we cannot avoid attempting to construct a Pauline theology. Paul has certain leading doctrines, thoughts and expressions, which mark him out distinctly. How far may these be reduced to a system and fitted compactly and coherently together? Why is it less important for the minister to know just what was Paul's view of the atonement than to know what was the view of Anselm or Abelard or Calvin? Why should he not wish to have as clear a conception of the distinctive teachings of John and Peter as he has of the differences between Rome, Luther and Zuingli, as to the Lord's Supper? If it is essential to thoroughness in Systematic Theology to know something (the more the better) of the history of doctrine and of the gradual embodying of the church's views of truth in certain formulas, definitions and creeds, it would certainly appear necessary to have the knowledge of this movement most clearly at the very beginning of all church history. Much time is given to discussing the terms "homousion," "trinity," "filioque," "vicarious," and others, none of which is found in the Bible, but a corresponding fulness of treatment in regard to "the kingdom of heaven," the "parousia," "the Son of man," and other similar biblical expressions is often looked for in vain in Systematic Divinity.

It cannot be denied that there are characteristic differences in the various books of the Bible. In the Old Testament, the doctrines of immortality and of the resurrection are expressed much more clearly in the later books than in the earlier. The problem of the sufferings of the righteous looms up in sombre but magnificent outlines in the Psalms of Asaph, the Book of Job, and some of the Prophets. The Messianic idea is a constant growth, and only the historical tracing out of its development will bring light to the student. Of course the arrangement and disposition of the materials out of which Biblical Theology is to be

constructed may bring about somewhat different views. The questions of age and priority must be settled, as far as possible, by means of Biblical Introduction. He who adheres to the marginal statement of the English Version, that "Moses is thought to have wrote the Book of Job whilst among the Midianites, B. C. 1520," will not be prepared to interpret that book in accordance with the historical setting given to it by Prof. Davidson, of Edinburgh, in his valuable commentary. He regards it as a reflection of the terrible fate of Judah, the actual struggle of a pious heart in contemplating such evils as those set forth in the pathetic language of Lamentations:

"Behind the author's time there probably lay some great public calamity, which reduced multitudes of men to a wretchedness more unendurable than death, and forced the questions of evil and the righteousness of God upon men's minds with an urgency that could not be resisted. Such a calamity could be nothing short of deportation or exile."

II. As one of the chief advantages of Biblical Theology we may mention the fact that it necessitates a more careful study of the questions of Biblical Introduction than is usually made by ministers. Whether a book is early or late, at what precise period a prophet lived, what was the actual condition of things in the history of the church of God when a certain writing was composed, are questions which seldom trouble most ministers. If the wording of a text seems to fit in well with the subject under discussion, if it rounds off a period smoothly, and if it appears to clinch the argument with Scripture, it is sometimes used with little care to ascertain its true interpretation. Typological interpretation is particularly given to this lax use of Scripture, and, indeed, it is sometimes dignified by the name of "the deeper and more spiritual interpretation."

Biblical Theology is not only valuable as leading to a historical study of the doctrines of Scripture, and to the method of tracing out step by step the unfolding of a great spiritual truth, but it is even more important as tending to the study of the whole Bible. We are inclined to have certain writings or passages with which we are quite familiar, because they support our own system of theology. These we study carefully, to the neglect of other parts of the Scriptures. No Presbyterian is apt to forget Romans viii.; no Baptist, Romans vi.; no Arminian, Hebrews vi. Thus a portion of the Bible may be carefully studied and used as a quarry from which to dig "proof-texts," while other parts of Scripture are neglected. But the biblical theologian must take into account the whole of each writing, and must fit each

part of it into its proper place in the writer's scheme. Instead of selecting certain texts and reading their meaning into others which seem to disagree with them, he must give each sentence its proper force, having regard to nothing but ascertaining the meaning of the writer.

Under what different aspects the same great truths of Christianity may be considered! How important it is to gain a clear knowledge of the individuality of each sacred writer, and to have a firm grasp on the principles advanced by him. Thus the Epistle of James expresses itself distinctly and clearly; but a vast amount of labor has been given to the discussion of the relation between the use of the word 'justify' by James, and by Paul. The fact that this leading Pauline expression does not once occur in the writings of John, (Revelation xxii. 11, reading *δικαιοσύνην ποιησάτω*, according to correct texts,) will cause a deeper investigation of John's view of faith as related to salvation. So in the topical treatment of any subject, the biblical method would require a careful tracing out of every passage bearing on it, in chronological order if possible. Then all the light thus obtained would be gathered up and presented without the omission of anything bearing upon it in the Bible.

In the discussion of the miracles and the relation of miracles to nature, carried on within and without the pages of the PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY, in 1888, one of the most remarkable features of the discussion to a biblico-theological student was the fact that nowhere was the attempt made to get a clear conception of the views of "nature," and the "natural" as held by the scriptural writers. In attempting to define our own conceptions of the relations of the Divine Being to his works, it would certainly seem desirable to inquire how far the modern view of the *κόσμος* differs from that of the inspired writers. Very little research is required to show that the distinction which we make between the natural and the supernatural was not present to the mind of the old Hebrew writers, so far at least as the action of elemental laws and forces is conceived. "He looketh on the earth and it trembleth; he toucheth the hills and they smoke." "The God of glory thundereth; the Lord is upon many waters; the voice of the Lord breaketh the cedars, yea the Lord breaketh the cedars of Lebanon." "He maketh winds his messengers, his ministers a flaming fire." To the old Hebrew writers there were no "second causes," no "laws of nature," but God was the agent in all events, natural or supernatural. Much of what we moderns write about law, and force, and nature,

would be without meaning for them. Herein lies the chief good of Biblical Theology. It leads to a careful study of biblical phrases and definitions, as these are given by the Scriptures themselves. Any difference or peculiarity in the phraseology of the various biblical writers is thus made apparent and becomes familiar. So, too, in each period of history, the prevailing religious ideas are brought out and become associated with that particular epoch.

But it may be said that such a method leads to too much division of the one system of truth contained in the Scriptures. Instead of clearing up our views of truth, it may tend only to confuse them, and to substitute a mass of varying ideas for one compact system. This is not, however, the effect of this method of study. We do indeed learn to be cautious in making "the system of doctrine" a norm by which to interpret all passages of the Scripture. Instead of the view, so often caught up in theological schools, that "the system" is something fixed, definite, and sharply defined, we learn that while the great fundamental truths of Christianity are as clearly seen as the primary colors in the rainbow, like those colors they are not sharply marked off from each other, but blend with each other by soft and imperceptible gradations. Theology, anthropology, soteriology, and eschatology are convenient divisions for the "*loci communes*" of Dogmatics; but many parts of Scripture may be classed under several divisions, and the truths contained under one head cannot be understood out of their true relation to all others. Thus the very diversity of biblical teaching brings us at last to a deeper and more satisfying view of the unity of the Scriptures. Not a mere formal and logical unity always, but the unity of a common spiritual life, springing from one indwelling and sanctifying Spirit, given through one Redeemer. The life may be more or less highly developed, it may exist under different economies, it may express itself in different periods in slightly differing phraseology; but the beating of the heart, the sinking or soaring of the spirit, the upward tendency of soul, the shrinking from sin, the aspiration for closer communion with God, the only source of truth and good and life, are the characteristics of souls born "not of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."

Another great advantage of Biblical Theology is its freshness, and its tendency to arouse an enthusiastic interest in studying the Scriptures themselves. It may not be "progress in theology," but it is certainly a variation from the repetition of the same themes by systematic theologians. A new and wonderful interest is given to the study of

the Bible, when the attempt is made to gain a broad and comprehensive view of the teachings and the religious life of each period, and of each great religious teacher. The student is the more encouraged to proceed with this work, because he has in his hands the entire material for the mastery of this subject. To be a thorough student of historical theology, he must accumulate a number of books of the patristic, scholastic and reforming periods of church history; for the dabbling in "hand-books" will never make a man master of any subject. Treatises on Biblical Theology we should study, but they all come back to the Scriptures themselves for confirmation or refutation.

It is quite possible for the student to construct for himself, a full summary of the leading doctrines of Peter, or of John, or of the Epistle to the Hebrews. One biblical writer may become the centre of patient, thorough study, the language, the thoughts, the intention, all being carefully examined and then compared with the other writers who touch on the same great themes. Finally, all the varied teachings are to be gathered up into a compact mass, comprehending the "fundamentals" of the Bible itself. What a quarry for students has Cremer opened in his "Biblico-theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek;" and how much clearer and deeper is the impression made by a great biblical word, when we have traced it back through its use in the Old Testament Hebrew and the Septuagint Greek up to the full development which it has obtained in the New Testament writings!

Enough has been written to show what a fresh and fertile field lies open here for diligent workers. How much interest is felt in this department of theology may be seen by the number of modern books on theology which are being written directly under the influence of biblico-theological training. Exposition itself is quite as largely indebted to it for breadth as Biblical Theology is indebted to Exegesis for accuracy of treatment.

III. The last point to be briefly considered is, What relation does this department of theology bear to Dogmatics? Is Dogmatic Theology to be discarded or neglected for this younger rival? Not at all. If Biblical Theology is necessarily limited to the religious truths contained within the canonical books, no one can gain a knowledge of theology who does not take into account the whole course of its development down to the present age. Many of our theological terms are not contained in the Bible, but they justify themselves as good definitions of truths which are biblical. "Incarnation," "trinity," "sacrament," "regeneration" (in our sense), and other such terms, are not biblical

terms; but they are as necessary and as well understood as those which are found in Scripture, such as "holiness," "justification," and "redemption." The conflicts of the church with heresy, with error, and with various opinions within her pale, have tended to bring out clear definitions and sharp distinctions against partial views. No theologian can attain to clear and right thinking who does not group all these opinions around one central system, and grasp them all, as he sees them related to the fundamental doctrines of the word of God.

Systematic Theology is, and always must be, an essential part of theological education. On this point we cannot find a clearer statement than that made by the late Dr. A. A. Hodge: "It has been an immense loss to Systematic Theology that its cultivators have so long neglected Biblical Theology. The historical method, and the gradual communication and variant human forms in which revelation has been given, are not of interest merely as matters of fact, but as such they are of prime importance to the adequate interpretation of the inspired text, and to the understanding of the mind of God in the entire scheme. The axiom of the systematic theologian is certainly true, that the whole must interpret the parts; but the axiom of the biblical theologian is no less true, that the whole cannot be adequately understood until all the parts have been thoroughly studied in their historical forms, just as they have come to us from the hand of God."—*Presbyterian Review*, Vol. VI., p. 170.

There may be little hope of anything being accomplished in our Southern seminaries for the study of Biblical Theology. But Southern students are not now being trained exclusively in our own institutions, and many of them have come and are now coming under the influence of this theological discipline. Moreover, each minister has the opportunity of pursuing this branch of theology for himself, as many of the best works of the German writers in this department are accessible in English translations for those who do not know German. The Scotch writers show the inspiring effect of Biblical Theology in their later treatises. The writings of Candlish, Smeaton, A. B. Davidson, Marcus Dods, and A. B. Bruce, are all saturated with its spirit. It will be a decided gain for American theology when fresh and scholarly treatises shall emanate from our own writers, based on impartial and independent investigations, conducted in the method and spirit of a pure Biblical Theology.

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF LORD MACAULAY.

WHEN the "Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay" was published in 1876, the issue of the book was immediately succeeded by a number of elaborate reviews. Some of the best essayists in England and in the United States found a worthy subject in the character and writings of the illustrious historian. Among the many articles which followed Mr. Trevelyan's book, one of the fairest and most interesting, and quite the most exhaustive, came from the pen of the Honorable William E. Gladstone.¹ If the public curiosity respecting this article could have required any stimulation beyond that derived from the commanding position and the high literary reputation of its author, it would have found abundant quickening in the recollection that it had been Mr. Gladstone's treatise on "The State in its Relations with the Church" that had furnished the occasion for one of Lord Macaulay's most vigorous, most overpowering essays. Of the general character of Mr. Gladstone's *critique* we shall not say more than this, that one will search in vain for any trace of bitterness that could plausibly be referred to the abiding sting of the great essayist's logical whip. It is a single passage in the article, a passage making reference to Lord Macaulay's religious views and experiences, which we wish to make the subject of a brief examination. We trust that the reader will unite with us in a sufficient interest in the inquiry to absolve us from the necessity of offering any apology for its consideration. The passage is as follows:

"There is one patent, and we might almost say lamentable, void in the generally engaging picture which the 'Life of Macaulay' has presented to us. We see his many virtues, his deep affections, his sound principles of civil, social, and domestic action in full play; nor is there anywhere found, nor even suggested, a negation of those great principles of belief which establish a direct personal relation between the human soul and its Creator, and an harmonious continuity between our present stage of destiny and that which is to succeed it in the world to come. Mr. Trevelyan has noticed his habitual reserve on subjects of religion; a habit perhaps first contracted in self-defence against the rather worrying methods of his excellent, but not sympathetic, not always judicious father. He speaks of Bacon's belief of Revelation in words which appear to imply that the want of it would have been a reproach or a calamity; and when challenged as to his own convictions before the constituency of Leeds, he went as far in simply declaring himself to be a Christian as the self-respect and delicacy of an honorable and independent mind could on such an occasion permit. He nowhere retracts what is here stated or suggested. Much may be set down to the reserve which he com-

¹ *Quarterly Review*, July, 1876.

monly maintained on this class of subjects; but there are passages which suggest a doubt whether he had completely wrought the Christian dogma, with all its consolations and its lessons, into the texture of his mind, and whether he had opened for himself the springs of improvement and delight which so many have found, and will ever find in it. At the same time, with a sigh for what we have not, we must be thankful for what we have, and leave to One wiser than ourselves the deeper problem of the human soul and of its discipline."

These sentences of Mr. Gladstone, generous and fair-minded as they are, have always affected us with some surprise. We sympathize utterly in this expression of his regret that in all the voluminous essays and speeches and letters of Macaulay we are able to discover so few intimations of his own personal recognition and enjoyment of Christian truth. These intimations are, at the best, lamentably few. And yet we cannot but feel that in making the above inventory of the more or less unequivocal utterances of a spiritual kind to be found in Lord Macaulay's writings, the reviewer has overlooked more than one that are far more positive and significant than those to which he specially refers. One or two of these we shall venture to quote, not only because they cast a narrow, yet very distinct, line of light on the question of the author's religious views, and contribute far more to the determination of that question than either the observation on Bacon or the reply before the constituency of Leeds mentioned above, but because the extracts deserve in their own right to be counted among the most eloquent and the most forcible that have come from any source for the vindication of Christianity.

Of these two extracts, the former will be found in the essay on *Milton*, first published in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1825.

"Logicians may reason about abstractions, but the great mass of mankind can never feel an interest in them. They must have images. The strong tendency of the multitude in all ages and nations to idolatry can be explained on no other principle. The first inhabitants of Greece, there is every reason to believe, worshipped one invisible Deity. But the necessity of having something more definite to adore produced, in a few centuries, the innumerable crowds of gods and goddesses. In like manner the ancient Persians thought it impious to exhibit the Creator under a human form. Yet even these transferred to the sun the worship which, speculatively, they considered due only to the Supreme Mind. The history of the Jews is the record of a continual struggle between pure Theism, supported by the most terrible sanctions, and the strangely fascinating desire of having some visible and tangible object of adoration. Perhaps none of the secondary causes which Gibbon has assigned for the rapidity with which Christianity spread over the world, while Judaism scarcely ever acquired a proselyte, operated more powerfully than this feeling. God, the uncreated, the incomprehensible, the invisible, attracted few worshippers. A philosopher might admire so noble a conception, but the

crowd turned away in disgust from words which presented no image to their minds. It was before Deity embodied in a human form, walking among men, partaking of their infirmities, leaning on their bosoms, weeping over their graves, slumbering in the manger, bleeding on the cross, that the prejudices of the Synagogue, and the doubts of the Academy, and the pride of the Portico, and the fasces of the Lictor, and the swords of thirty Legions, were humbled in the dust."

The other extract will be found in the essay on *Southey's Colloquies on Society*. In connection with some severe criticisms of the views of Mr. Southey on "Religious Toleration," the essayist writes:

"We will not be deterred by any fear of misrepresentation from expressing our hearty approbation of the mild, wise, and eminently Christian manner in which the church and the government have lately acted with respect to blasphemous publications. We praise them for not having thought it necessary to encircle a religion pure, merciful, and philosophical—a religion, to the evidence of which the highest intellects have yielded—with the defences of a false and bloody superstition. The ark of God was never taken till it was surrounded by the arms of earthly defenders. In captivity its sanctity was sufficient to vindicate it from insult, and to lay the hostile fiend prostrate on the threshold of his own temple. The real security of Christianity is to be found in its benevolent morality, in its exquisite adaptation to the human heart, in the facility with which its scheme accommodates itself to the capacity of every human intellect, in the consolation which it bears to the house of mourning, in the light with which it brightens the great mystery of the grave. To such a system it can bring no addition of dignity or of strength that it is part and parcel of the common law. It is not now for the first time left to rely on the force of its own evidences and the attractions of its own beauty. Its sublime theology confounded the Grecian schools in the fair conflict of reason with reason. The bravest and wisest of the Cæsars found their arms and their policy unavailing when opposed to the weapons that were not carnal, and the kingdom that was not of this world. The victory which Porphyry and Diocletian failed to gain is not, to all appearance, reserved for any of those who have in this age directed their attacks against the last restraint of the powerful and the last hope of the wretched. The whole history of the Christian religion shows that she is in far greater danger of being corrupted by the alliance of power than of being crushed by its opposition. Those who thrust temporal sovereignty upon her treat her as their prototypes treated her author. They bow the knee and spit upon her; they cry, Hail! and smite her on the cheek; they put a sceptre in her hand, but it is a fragile reed; they crown her, but it is with thorns; they cover with purple the wounds which their own hands have inflicted on her; and inscribe magnificent titles over the cross on which they have fixed her to perish in ignominy and pain."

We do not intend to venture upon any considerable comment on either of these splendid passages. Anything that we can write will appear stale and colorless beside them. Moreover, our purpose is simply to present evidence upon the question of Lord Macaulay's religious convictions, not to argue concerning it. We are more than inclined to think that Mr. Trevelyan, holding the point of view of a man of litera-

ture and of the world, failed to present this side of his illustrious uncle's character with the whole clearness that truth would have warranted. And it would appear, too, that Mr. Gladstone, seeking no further than the data supplied by the biographer, erred by the same defect. Our aim, therefore, is to attempt nothing more toward a juster statement of this evidence than is involved in merely pointing to these passages, which seem to have been by this able reviewer either neglected or overlooked.

It has often been said that Macaulay was nothing so much as a rhetorician; that in seeking to dazzle others, he blinded himself by the splendor of his own coloring; and that in the passages quoted above, we behold only the genius, exerting itself indeed upon a very different theme, of the same word-painter who pictured the great trial in the hall of William Rufus. But this we cannot bring ourselves to believe. If Lord Macaulay was the honest, upright, sincere man which he has been described to be, he can never have feigned to believe truths which his soul doubted; nor can we persuade ourselves that in the noble and pathetic sentences which we have reproduced in this article, there speaks nothing warmer than the selfish and soulless muse of rhetoric. Nor need we to be reminded that it is one of the awful and mysterious truths of the Christianity here so eloquently defended that a man, wrapped in the cerements of the spiritual grave, may simulate the prime phenomena of life; that men have prophesied of truths of which they had no experience, and climbed mountains to view the glories of a Canaan into which they were never to enter. We remember well that an apostate prophet uttered that noblest aspiration for the death of the righteous, and that a reprobate highpriest gave distinctest proclamation to the divine mystery of substitution. Realizing and remembering all this, we nevertheless seem to discover in the words of Lord Macaulay a spiritual intonation that confirms our hopes. The very least that they can, with charity, be thought to imply is a positive conviction on the part of their author of the truth and divinity of the religion which he declares to be "pure, merciful, and philosophical"; of the superhuman origin of that kingdom which issued an easy victor from its conflicts with the Grecian schools, and from its life-wrestles with the bravest and wisest of the Cæsars. Coming from a man so reserved—we may truly say, so sensitive—these sentences may well be thought to indicate a spiritual appreciation of the force of the evidences and the attractions of the beauty here displayed. When the writer speaks of Christianity as "the last restraint of the powerful and the

last hope of the wretched," we find something that more than faintly suggests that, after all, he may have "wrought the Christian dogma, with all its consolations and its lessons, into the texture of his mind;" or if not, that he may, at least, have "opened for himself the springs of improvement and delight which so many have found in it." His words will nourish the hope that when, sitting all alone on that last December evening, he heard the call to his soul, he recognized it as an angel-voice, speaking gently as to a child of God. They will always enable us to sigh less distressfully "for what we have not" in his writings and life, and encourage us to "leave to One wiser than ourselves the deeper problem of this human soul and its discipline," with profounder thankfulness and a more expectant hope.

JAMES HENDERSON SMITH.

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

BAIRD'S "THE GREAT BAPTIZER."

THE GREAT BAPTIZER: A Bible History of Baptism. *By Samuel J. Baird, D. D.*
12mo, pp. 489. Philadelphia: James H. Baird. 1882.

Baptism—its mode, subjects, significance—is a topic, it would seem, of perennial interest. Not to speak of the literature of the subject which belongs to past centuries, or even that which originated in the first half of our own, one who should undertake to make a catalogue of the publications in English alone which have appeared within the last two decades, would find that catalogue growing to no mean proportions under his hand. These contributions are of all dimensions, and addressed to all grades of intelligence and every class, whether learned or unlearned. There are, for example, the four brimming octavos of Dr. James W. Dale, requiring, for their thorough appreciation, mastery of the Greek tongue and acquaintance with its literature from Homer to Chrysostom; next in order come the more modest duodecimos in cloth and paper; there are the tractates and leaflets issued from the several denominational publishing houses, a goodly number; and then there are the newspaper articles, whose name one is tempted, in a fit of pardonable exaggeration, to call legion. Now, it is not a little strange that a treatise which, for the ability with which it is written, is second to none of these publications, and one which presents the most complete discussion of the subject, inasmuch as it takes into account more fully than any of the others the Scriptures as a whole—the Old Testament as well as the New—has attracted almost no attention, although it is already seven years since it was first issued from the press.

We will not undertake to enumerate all the causes which have contributed to this singular neglect of Dr. Baird's BIBLE HISTORY OF BAPTISM. Among these causes we are persuaded that not the least efficient was the character of the criticisms, which appeared in the two leading Presbyterian periodicals of this country, of the author's first considerable contribution to theological literature, *The Elohim Revealed*. It is now some thirty years since this work appeared, and it is no trifling indication of its importance that it at once attracted the attention of the two most influential theologians of the Presbyterian Church, and called forth from the pen of each of them an elaborate review. But each of these distinguished thinkers, while recognizing the ability and learning of the author, and the extraordinary merits of the book in many respects, saw fit to condemn as unsound and dangerous certain views held by him as to the relation of our first parent to his posterity; and so great was the stress laid upon this condemnation that the praise accorded him for his learning and ability made no impression on the public mind, and he was practically silenced as a teacher in the church by the withdrawal of his audience. The hardship of this disability visited upon the author of *The Elohim Revealed*, as the outcome of these criticisms, is not a little aggravated by

the fact that views upon this subject of the federal headship of Adam, substantially identical with those so severely condemned in Dr. Baird, were subsequently adopted by the abler of those reviewers, who, notwithstanding that, has suffered no diminution of influence; for "being dead, he yet speaketh," as he deserves to do, with the voice of authority in our Southern church.

We may mention, further, as a reason why some of those who have seen *THE BIBLE HISTORY OF BAPTISM* may have failed to give it due consideration, the fact that the fundamental proposition which it is written to establish is one which involves, if it be adopted, the abandonment of some time-honored opinions of pædobaptists, especially that concerning the relation of baptism to circumcision.

It is no new thing among the opponents of immersion to insist that the "divers washings," connected with the rites of purification among the Jews, were baptisms which should be taken into account in determining the *mode* of baptism under the Christian dispensation; but that Christian baptism is *identical* with the baptism which Moses administered at Sinai, and which continued to be administered from that day to the coming of Christ, is quite another matter. It is this proposition, with all that flows logically from it, that Dr. Baird affirms. If that proposition be established, then it follows, as a necessary consequence, that baptism did not come in the room of circumcision, and that circumcision was not intended to symbolize under the old dispensation what baptism sets before us under the new. Such a doctrine, so novel, and apparently so revolutionary, was not apt to commend itself to those who had been accustomed to make much of the argument for pædobaptism drawn from the fact that infants were circumcised. It was natural enough for one thoroughly wedded to that view—and how many amongst us were not?—to lay aside, after a cursory inspection, a book devoted to the vindication of such a proposition as not worthy of serious consideration. We bring no railing accusation against our brethren. Others *may* not have been influenced thus to neglect giving this book such an examination as it deserved. We confess that we were influenced by such considerations. We are glad that subsequently we were led to examine the volume with care, and this perusal has convinced us that the arguments with which Dr. Baird seeks to sustain his position are not to be treated lightly.

It would be impossible, in the limited space allowed to a notice like this, to deal in any adequate manner with the question raised in this treatise concerning the identity of baptism under the two dispensations, or to put our readers in a position to estimate fully the value of this contribution to the subject as a whole. We therefore reserve, for a later number of the *QUARTERLY*, the discussion of this question. We hope then to reach a point of view from which we may judge whether Dr. Baird has succeeded in lifting the discussion of the subject to a higher plane than it has hitherto occupied, and in showing that the ordinance of baptism, while it "symbolizes the most lofty, attractive, and precious, conceptions of the gospel," also "unfolds a history of the plan of God in proportions of unspeakable interest, grandeur, and glory." (Preface, p. 2.) What we desire to accomplish, in the space which still remains to us, here, is to give some idea of the method the author has employed, and of the thoroughness with which he has covered the ground, always contemplating the subject, as he does, from the historical point of view.

The volume consists of two Books, entitled respectively, *Old Testament History* and *New Testament History*. The whole is, again, subdivided into sixteen PARTS,

six of which belong to Book I., and the other ten to Book II. Further still, each Part is, itself, divided into *Sections*, which Sections, like the Parts, are numbered consecutively, and are, in all, one hundred. By adopting this method of division, the author has succeeded in making the numerous topics with which he deals stand out most distinctly from one another; and yet, by the consecutive numbering of the Parts and Sections, he has avoided the confusion which is apt to arise from beginning over again the numbering of the subdivisions when passing from one superior division to another. He has thus been able to give the reader in the table of contents a most complete and satisfactory conspectus of the entire work. Part I. deals with *Baptism at Sinai*, where, it is maintained, the sacrament of baptism with water was instituted. Part II., under the heading of *The Visible Church*, is devoted to a discussion of the relation of the Abrahamic covenant to the Sinai covenant. The author takes the position that the organization of the church was begun under the former, but completed under the latter. The Sinai transaction "was the espousal of the bride of Christ, whose betrothal took place in the covenant with Abraham" (p. 37). In Part III., we have a careful review of the *Administered Baptisms*, which were all *Sprinklings*; and these are sedulously discriminated from the *Ritual Self-washings* which engage attention in Part IV. The former of these were all instances of baptism proper, and were administered in connexion with the purification from *Seven-days uncleanness*, which uncleanness was a type of the corruption inherited from Adam. The water of *nidda* (נידה), or water to do away with separation,—living water mingled with the ashes of the red heifer,—was employed in this baptism; the water typifying the regenerating power of the Holy Ghost, the ashes—a reminder of a sin-offering—indicating that there could be no shedding forth of the life-giving Spirit except on condition of an expiation for sin. The *self-washings* typified, on the other hand, the efforts of the renewed man, under the influence of the Holy Ghost, "to cleanse himself from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit." (2 Cor. vii. 1.)

Part V. gives us, in eleven (11) sections, a conspectus of the *Later Traces of the Sprinkled Baptisms*, and Part VI. closes Book I. with a *résumé* of the points established by the foregoing evidence, and prepares the reader, by putting him in possession of the *State of the Old Testament Argument*, to pass over, in Book II., to the *New Testament History of Baptism*.

The titles of the ten Parts which constitute Book II. are, after part VII., which is *Introductory*, and gives the state of the question, *The Purifyings of the Jews; John's Baptism; Christ's Baptisms and Anointing; Christ the Great Baptizer; The Baptist Argument; Baptismal Regeneration; The New Testament Church; Christian Baptism; The Family and the Children*. The conclusion is devoted to an arraignment of the pretensions of the immersionists, and a summation of the points established in the foregoing investigation which discountenance or condemn their doctrine, each item telling more decisively than that which preceded it, until one closes the book with the firm conviction that Dr Baird is fully justified in saying, concerning immersion: "This rite will not assimilate with, nor recognize, the baptism which Christ dispenses from his throne. It ignores the exaltation whence that baptism descends, and refuses to testify of its outpouring of grace. And, hence, although administered with the use of the words, it is not, in the sense intended by the Lord Jesus, baptism 'into the name of the Father and of the Son

and of the Holy Ghost'; for its doctrine has no relation to those blessed Persons, nor to our union with them. It is wholly occupied with another theme. Whilst the true baptism exultingly points upward to the throne of Christ's glory, this rite looks downward ever to the grave," (p. 479).

In our perusal of this book, we have been greatly impressed with the thoroughness with which it is thought out from beginning to end. Every detail has been carefully considered, and nowhere is there evidence that there has been even momentary forgetfulness of the exact issue in hand, or tendency to lapse into loose or disjointed expression. If there is a single slipshod sentence in the volume, we have failed to discover it. We had marked a number of passages to be quoted as illustrating the author's style as a writer, as well as his skill in bringing out the meaning of the Scriptures. Of these we select the following, taken from *Section VI., on The Living Water*:

"In the Sinai baptism as at first administered to all Israel, and in all its subsequent forms, living or running water was an essential element. This, everywhere, in the Scriptures of the Old Testament and of the New, is the symbol of the Holy Spirit, in his office as the agent by whom the virtue of Christ's blood is conveyed to men, and spiritual life bestowed. In the figurative language of the Scriptures, the sea, or great body of salt or dead water, represents the dead mass of fallen or depraved humanity. (Dan. vii. 2, 3; Isa. lvii. 20; Rev. xiii. 1; xvii. 15.) Hence, of the new heavens and new earth which are revealed as the inheritance of God's people, it is said, 'And there shall be no more sea.' (Rev. xxi. 1.)

"The particular source of this figure seems to have been that accursed sea of Sodom, which was more impressively familiar to Israel than any other body of salt water, and which has acquired in modern times the appropriate name of the Dead Sea—a name expressive of the fact that its waters destroy alike vegetation on its banks and animal life in its bosom. Its peculiar and instructive position in the figurative system of the Scriptures appears in the prophecy of Ezekiel xlvi. 8, 9-11, where the river of living water from the temple is described as flowing eastward to the sea; and being brought forth into the sea, the salt waters are healed, so that 'there shall be abundance of fish.'

"Contrasted with this figure of sea-water is that of living water, that is, the fresh water of rain and of fountains and streams. It is the ordinary symbol of the Holy Spirit. (John vii. 37-39.) The reason is, that, as this water is the cause of life and growth to creation, animal and vegetable, so the Spirit is the alone source of spiritual life and growth. The primeval type of that blessed Agent was the river that watered the Garden of Eden, and thence flowing was parted into four streams to water the earth. The river was a fitting symbol of the Holy Spirit 'which proceedeth from the Father,' the 'pure river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb,' (John xv. 26; Rev. xxii. 1,) not only in its life-giving virtue, but in its abundance and diffusion. But the fall cut man off from its abundant and perennial stream, and thenceforth the figure, as traceable through the Scriptures, ever looks forward to that promised time when the ruin of the fall will be repaired, and the gates of Paradise thrown open again. In the last chapters of Revelation that day is revealed in a vision of glory. There is no more sea; but the river of life pours its exhaustless crystal waters through the restored Eden of God. But the garden is no longer the retired home of one human pair, but is built up, a great city, with walls of gems and streets of gold and gates of pearl and the light of the glory of God. And the nations of them that are saved do walk in the light of it. But still it is identified as the same of old by the flowing river and the tree of life in the midst on its banks. (Rev. ii. 7; xxii. 1, 2; and compare Ps. xlv. 4; xxiii. 2; John iv. 10, 14; vii. 38, 39; Zech. xiv. 8.)" (Pp. 31-33.)

We will add that the book is well printed, and although it was not sent out from a regular publishing house, but the entire expense of its issuance fell upon the

author, it will not suffer by comparison with the publications of any of the great establishments. We do not recollect a single typographical error.

We commend to those interested in the subject with which it deals this volume which bears so many marks of genuine learning, of painstaking labor, and of reverent, fruitful study of the Word of God.

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McGILL'S "CHURCH GOVERNMENT."

CHURCH GOVERNMENT: A Treatise Compiled from his Lectures in Theological Seminaries. *By Alexander T. McGill, Emeritus Professor at Princeton.* Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. 12mo, pp. 560. 1889.

This volume is the author's parting gift to the church he served so long and so well as teacher in her theological schools; for, as the last sheets were passing through the press, he departed, full of years, to his reward. It is the fruit of long continued study of the subject in hand, "the substance of over forty years' teaching on church government" being condensed in its pages.

It was not to be expected that, in a treatise on this subject, and from an author so conservative as Dr. McGill, we should find anything new or unfamiliar. "I write as a teacher," says he, "more than as an author, and the intelligent reader will see that the man who stands by his standards in attempting to teach 'the generation following,' must give what he has received rather than what he has contrived. I claim invention of order more than of thoughts and words, independence in managing the premises, guiding the conclusion and handling the logic of events." (*Preface*, p. 4.) He tells us that, from the beginning to the end of his career as a teacher, however "varied in form and extension" have been his instructions "from time to time in order to face the changing aspect of controversy in this field, where so many questions are open still, and problems which, though settled once, are unsettled again," yet "there has been no change of principles in the granite foundation of his convictions, laid by the Bible as interpreted by Westminster literature of the seventeenth century, and the reproduction thereof, with lucid and masterly exposition by Drs. John M. Mason and Samuel Miller, in the first half of this century." (*Preface*, p. 2.) We are prepared by these statements to find, what in fact we do find, a straight-forward, conservative exposition of old-fashioned, *jure divino*, Presbyterian Church polity.

We would not be understood as intimating, by these remarks, that Dr. McGill undertook in the preparation of this volume a superfluous task; for old and well established as are the principles, and sufficient as has been the illustration in one form and another of them, a succinct and handy exposition of them suitable for use in the class-room, and for ready reference in the study of the pastor, was a desideratum. Many of our readers are familiar with the *outlines* of a work on this subject, which we had hoped would, before this, have filled the place which this volume of Dr. McGill's seems destined to occupy. We refer to Dr. Thos. E. Peck's *Notes on the Church*, printed some years ago by the students of Union Theological Seminary, but "exclusively for their own use." These *Notes* richly deserve to be expanded into a volume, and to be widely circulated. We regret that their author

has not found time and opportunity for the task, since we are quite sure that a treatise from his pen would supply some things which are lacking in Dr. McGill's book. One of these things which we miss, and which would be supplied by a simple expansion of what is already, for substance, in the *Notes*, is a clear and adequate discussion of the nature and extent of church power.

As already intimated, Dr. McGill believes that the polity of the church is revealed in Scripture, and that it is obligatory upon the people of God to organize the visible church upon that model. The "form given" is not something peculiar to the Christian dispensation. The visible church under all dispensations is the same, and so is its constitution. The insistence upon the identity of the synagogue and the Christian church is nothing new, but we do not remember to have met anywhere, outside of a special treatise like Vitringa's *De Synagoga Vetere*, with so satisfactory a discussion as is given us here. The great truth is brought out with the distinctness which it deserves, that all that was permanent in the old Jewish worship associated itself with the synagogue, and that the central idea which dominated whatever was connected with that worship was the universal priesthood of believers. It was to be expected that, under a system which confessedly left nothing to human invention, the synagogue would, not only in its worship, but in the form of its government and in its provisions for securing purity in the lives of the worshippers, express the will of Jehovah. This presumption is fully justified by all the references to the synagogue in the Old Testament Scriptures. "The elders of Israel," who appear as persons of consequence, possessed of authority as representatives of the people, in the earliest notices we have of the church after it passed from the patriarchal to the national stage of its development, were the ruling body in the synagogue. To them, as constituting a bench of rulers, equal in dignity and authority, was committed authority in the house of God. In all the centuries, from the time of Moses to that of Christ, this was so.

"When the Hebrew pilgrimage was ended and the settlements in Canaan were completed, 'elders of the city' and 'elders of every city' composed the main authority of government, in local distribution as well as national Sanhedrim, and of course that theocratic constitution of the Old Testament people would have elders to rule in the ecclesia as well as in the municipality, the conventicle of moral and religious instruction as well as the bench of justice at the gate. A plurality of elders in session became the germ of organism for assemblies of revealed religion under all circumstances of the nation—under judges, under kings, in empire and in captivity. No political revolution, even where church and state were united, no change of dynasty, no loss of temple and altar, no lapse of covenant or decadence of piety, could abolish this one feature of eldership in the ancient church. It waited intact for the redemption of Israel, when a greater than Moses would come to gather elders, to be joined with him and share his spirit in the mission of his ministry." (Pp. 277, 278.)

What took place, when the time came for the old dispensation to pass over into the new, may best be expressed in the words of Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, who, as a prelate of the Church of England, may be presumed to have no disposition to state as facts, in this connection, what is not borne out by evidence, seeing that these facts militate most decisively against the pretensions of his own sect. "It appears highly probable," says he,—"I may say morally certain,—that wherever a Jewish synagogue existed that was brought, the whole or the chief part of it, to embrace the gospel, the apostles did not there so much *form* a Christian church as *make an existing congregation Christian* by introducing the Christian sac-

raments and worship and establishing whatever regulations were requisite for the newly-appointed faith, leaving the machinery (if I may so speak) of government unchanged, the rulers of synagogues, elders, and other officers (whether spiritual or ecclesiastical or both), being already provided in the existing institutions; and it is likely that several of the earliest Christian churches did originate in this way; that is, that they were *converted* synagogues, which *became* Christian churches as soon as the members, or the main part of the members, acknowledged Jesus as the Messiah." (Whately's *Kingdom of Christ*, Essay 2, as quoted by Dr. McGill, p. 92.) "The Acts of the Apostles," continues our author, "loud as words of the apostles could be, simply proceeded on the assumption that the church of their childhood was the church of all ages, in which the seat of Moses should be occupied henceforth by the presiding elder, called bishop—one who would be heard and heeded when his works would correspond to his word, unlike his predecessors of the scribes and Pharisees. Accordingly, they went forth in missionary work to 'ordain elders in every church' without the slightest intimation of this feature as a new one, but as one of course in perpetuating the church of their fathers; and when they passed beyond the territory of converted synagogues to the Gentiles, and organized the church among converts, it must have been done after the same order, because no mention is made of the contrary, and because Jewish and Gentile converts at Antioch, who differed about circumcision, had no difference about church government, but agreed to send commissioners to Jerusalem 'unto the apostles and elders about this question' on which they did differ. And, following 'Paul and Barnabas and certain other of them' to this council assembled, we can see in the deliberation there the parity of ministers, the office of ruling elder and the judicatory composed of both conferring, debating and deciding not to send down advice merely, but to promulgate decrees that were 'necessary things' to be obeyed. . . . In short, the old ecclesiastical institute is perpetuated in the Presbyterian system, according to all that can be gleaned of apostolic measures and methods." (Pp. 93, 94.)

This view of the Christian church, as identical in the form of its government with the synagogue, effectually sets aside the assumption that the apostles were appointed to *constitute* the church under the new dispensation, and to convey the authority conferred upon them to successors who, by virtue of that authority, should perpetuate it for all time. On the other hand, it is shown that these extraordinary officers, so far as they were *apostles*, were not invested with any power whatever to rule or organize. All the perplexity which has vexed the church in connection with this matter has been introduced by confounding the functions of another office, held by all these persons, with the functions of the apostolate. They were at the same time both apostles and presbyters, and in virtue of this last-named office they received investiture of the functions of the evangelist, and went forth in that capacity to organize new churches in conjunction with the discharge of their duties as apostles. It is just as unwarranted to conclude that the apostles, as such, were organizers and rulers, as it would be to affirm that, because the same person happens at present to be both an elder in the Presbyterian Church and President of the United States, therefore the functions of a Presbyterian elder are identical with those of the President of this Republic. Notwithstanding the fact that one of these offices is ecclesiastical and the other secular, they are no more distinct or separable than those of evangelist and apostle, although these are both ecclesiastical.

The Scriptures speak with no uncertain sound as to the office of the apostle. He was to be a *witness* of what he knew by his own personal observation concerning the life, the death, and especially the resurrection, of Jesus of Nazareth. Among the last words spoken by our Lord to his apostles before his ascension were these: "Ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and to the uttermost part of the earth." (Acts i. 8.) Again, when Peter shortly afterwards urged the necessity of filling the place from which Judas had by transgression fallen, he stated by implication the qualifications of an apostle in these terms: "Wherefore of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John unto the same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection." (Acts i. 21, 22.) To be witness, then, to the facts which established the Messiahship of Jesus of Nazareth, and evinced the completeness of his atonement, was the office of the apostle. (See pp. 148-152.) It is true that these apostles, and they alone, were capable of conferring the ability to exercise miraculous gifts, but this had nothing to do with organizing the church or bearing rule in it; nor is this claimed now as a function of the so-called successors of the apostles. When this clear and well-founded distinction between Peter, Paul, and the rest, as apostles on the one hand, and presbyter-evangelists on the other, has been made, little else need be said by way of evincing the puerile absurdity of the doctrine of apostolical succession. It is seen at once to rest upon no basis of fact.

The primacy of Peter and the pretensions of the Romish communion receive due attention at the hands of Dr. McGill. His refutation of the papal claims is complete and crushing, as we should expect it to be. We introduce the subject here only to say that our author does not stop with rejection of the claims of Rome to be the *only* church, (which would follow if the figment of the vicarship of Peter's pretended successor could be shown to be a fact,) but he also rejects Rome as not entitled to a place among true churches of Jesus Christ. We are glad to find him aligning himself with John Knox, John Calvin, and the rest of the great leaders of the Reformation, Lutheran and Reformed, in affirming, in the words of one of these, that "the form of the legitimate church is not to be found either in any one of their [*i. e.*, Romish,] congregations, or in the body at large." (See Calvin's *Institutes*, Book IV., Chap. 2, Sec. 12.)

One of the most satisfactory and, in our judgment, most valuable, chapters in the book—although we cannot agree with Dr. McGill in one particular, to be mentioned before we are done—is that on *Ordination to Office* (XIV.). The value of this discussion lies in two things: First, in the clearness with which is brought out the fact that this "solemnity in which one is set apart from the universal priesthood of believers to a special ministry in the church of Christ," conveys nothing to the subject of it, nor has any mysterious or mystical character, but is a simple recognition, in an orderly way, of a call of the head of the church to a work for him; second, in the emphasis laid upon the two elements which must concur for the completeness of that recognition, and which were both comprehended under the word *ordinatio* in its original use, to-wit: *χειροτομία*, or election by the people, and *χειροθεσία*, or laying on of hands by those already in office.

No one who has learned the most elementary lesson in Presbyterianism could for a moment suppose that it would be allowable for one to bear rule as a member

of the session of a particular church without first having been elected as a ruling elder by the members who compose that church. The question now is, Whether one may, by the laying on of the hands of the classical Presbytery, without any antecedent expression whatever on the part of the people, be inducted into the office of minister of the gospel, which includes his being made an elder, and having the right to exercise joint rule along with the other members of the Presbytery. Again, as preaching the gospel and administering the sacraments are done by the minister of the gospel as the representative of those who constitute the universal priesthood, the question demands an answer, Whether a Presbytery has the right to set apart any person as a minister of the gospel without such an approval on the part of the people as would make it certain that they regard him as qualified for the work and accept him as their representative in performing it? To both these questions the answer must be an emphatic *no!*

Is no man to be ordained as an evangelist, then? Must every one who is to labor as a domestic or foreign missionary first be called by some church to its pastorate, and after his ordination and installation upon that call, seek release from his charge in order that he may enter upon his evangelistic work? Let no one charge upon us or upon Dr. McGill, the spirit of whose views we trust we are faithfully representing, any such deference to *red-tape* as this. There is a far better way to secure an endorsement by the people of the candidate for the evangelist's work, at home or abroad, than that; and a way which will test specially his fitness for the peculiar work he wishes to undertake. That way is to send him out as a licentiate, to go among the churches and approve himself by labor among them for a period long enough to make the trial complete. "The itineracy of a whole year, at least," in the opinion of our author, "should be assigned to any probationer, however gifted, if it could be done, by sending him to vacant churches, with a scale of appointments made in advance by competent authority, to save him from the embarrassment of being self-sent, with the appearance of scrambling for places. . . . Small denominations [*e. g.*, the Associate Reformed Presbyterian Church] have adopted this method with a happy success, and large denominations should have a bureau of supplies, with similar management, to make adjustments wisely, which will at once relieve and circulate the probation for that popular assent which the solemnity of ordination requires." (P. 417.) The licentiate, returned from such a tour of service as this, having exercised his gifts with acceptance in a number of congregations, may be said to have, in a sense perfectly true and proper, an election by the people, and may then receive formal ordination at the hands of the Presbytery, and appointment to his work as an evangelist.

We like very much a suggestion made by Dr. McGill, and which may be mentioned in this connection, as tending directly to the same end as that had in view in this continuous itineracy of a year. Says he, "A candidate for the ministry should quit the cloister as soon as he quits the college, and should manifest his gifts to the people of the church as much as possible in consistency with training by study; and especially if the practice be prevalent of contracting the interval between license and ordination to few days in order to pledge a novitiate quickly for evangelism at home or a mission abroad without the prior test of popularity, he should begin the trial of his gifts before them as soon as he begins theological study. For this element of popular consent is more ancient than are theological seminaries, and is too sacred to be strained out of ordination by haste and urgency

of any circumstances." (P. 409.) This means that, with the beginning of the theological preparation, in the seminary, the candidate ought to receive licensure from his Presbytery.

The common sense of our people and of our ministers has already given its approval to the practice of our seminary students who employ their vacations in supplying vacant churches. What is needed now is the formal recognition, by the church, of the propriety of this course, by altering the requirements for licensure so as to make it possible for the presbyteries to license their candidates when they are ready to enter the seminary, reserving the more searching and extensive examination as trial for ordination. This would at once authorize what our candidates are doing, with popular approval, without authority; and tend powerfully to elevate the character of the examination for ordination. These ends it would secure, as well as the more adequate trial of the gifts of our young men before the people.

We have left ourselves little space for a consideration of our author's views of the part of the presbytery in ordination, which culminates in the χειροθεσία, or laying on of hands. He holds, of course, that this is only a fitting ceremony, and "is not essential to the validity of ordination. Reverence for examples in the Bible and respect for the usage of nearly all Christendom, ancient and modern, as well as the becoming naturalness of the action itself for such a purpose, ought to make us careful and scrupulous in the conservation of this form while, at the same time, we should not forget that it is only a form, and not explicitly commanded or appointed as a rite." (Pp. 422, 423). "The transaction of presbytery which orders it is more important than the ceremony itself. The substantial norm of which it is the proper sign is the vote of a representative presbytery." (P. 423).

It is with no little astonishment that we read, after all this, that, in the laying on of hands, only ministers of the gospel should participate; and this, not only in the ordination of a minister by the classical presbytery, but of the elder and the deacon by the parochial presbytery. Here is the reason assigned: "The gesture in question [laying on of hands] is intrinsically soluble in words, and, therefore, only ministers of the word whom we call 'teaching elders,' should perform it!" (P. 424). "It is enough for the ruling elder to vote the ordination, in session or in presbytery, but he is not in every office, nor commissioned to expound the nature of any office, in the way of public instruction, and, therefore, that epitome or symbol of such instruction which we see in the laying on of hands should be reserved in all cases to the ministers of the word." (P. 425).

It will be observed that, in this last quotation, Dr. McGill forgets himself, and, in the expression, "he [*i. e.*, the ruling elder] is not in every office," shows the lingering taint of the notion that ordination does *confer* something; else why should only those lay on hands who are "in every office"? Isn't this about equivalent to saying that one cannot confer what he himself does not possess? But after all, the ruling elder participates in the vote, which alone is essential. In doing this, he does participate in the ordination. How impertinent, then, is it to intimate that he cannot lay on hands because in some cases he would thus be conferring functions which he does not himself possess!

But taking Dr. McGill on the ground he chooses to occupy, is it true that nobody but a minister of the gospel has a right to give expression to the action of a church court, since such promulgation is teaching? Unless that general proposition can be vindicated, it signifies nothing to say that the gesture of laying on of

hands is soluble in words (words which simply state what the whole body—preachers and elders—have done by their united vote), and therefore only ministers of the word, whom we call “teaching elders,” should perform it. Ordination is the act of a representative body of rulers, and one class of these rulers has nothing more to do with it than the other.

We had intended to say something, by way of refutation, of Dr. McGill's doctrine that baptized non-communicating members of the church should be subject to discipline, in the technical sense of the term. We desired also to discuss what he has to say about the “ministry of gifts, without ordination,” sent out by the Holy Spirit as a rebuke to the ordained ministry for neglect of the gift that should be in them. (See pp. 215–218.) But we cannot do so now. We will only add an expression of our gratification at his condemnation of the rotary eldership, adopted by the Northern Presbyterian Church. His vindication of the principle of permanency in the office leaves nothing to be desired. (See pp. 345–354.) The almost plaintive strain in which he expresses the hope that the genius of Presbyterianism (and in this connection our Southern Church is mentioned) will reassert itself and work out the cure has in it an element of pathos which touches us.

Many things upon which we have fallen, in the perusal of this volume, have impressed us with the fact that the author of it belongs, not to one section of the Presbyterian Church, but to the whole. Our Southern ministers and elders who may read it will feel that he speaks with no accent of the alien, but is, in spirit, one with us.

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GORE'S MINISTRY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

THE MINISTRY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. *By Charles Gore, M. A., Principal of the Pusey House, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford, and Examining Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of Lincoln.* Second Edition. Svo., pp. xviii., 424. London: Rivingtons. 1888.

Not only the High Church party of the Church of England, but the Christian Church at large, is to be congratulated upon the learning and candor with which the latest champion of the High Church principle has performed his self-imposed task. No one can read Mr. Gore's delightful treatise without profiting by it. Least of all can sound Presbyterians read it without a pleasurable sense of being at one with him in much of the essentials of his position. That our Lord, in bringing redemption into the world, for example, founded also a visible church to be the pillar and ground of the truth, and in “founding a church founded also a ministry in the church,” we all most firmly believe. And if we may accept Mr. Gore's dictum, that “the whole doctrine of the apostolic succession” is summed up in the two principles—“the principle that the church is a differentiated body, in which different individuals exercise different and clearly defined functions, and the principle that power to exercise these functions, so far as they are ministerial, is derived by succession from the apostles” (p. 322)—we may fairly claim to be believers in the “apostolic succession” also, although we would rather say that ministerial power is derived by appointment of, rather than by succession from, the apostles, conceiving, as we do, of the apostles as Christ's representatives in founding the

church rather than as elements in the church as founded. Though we cannot agree with him that men become united to Christ only through the visible church, nevertheless we stand by Mr. Gore's side when he argues that the visible church is a divine institution and its ministry a divine appointment.

Nor do we fail to find within his treatise certain passages which seem to promise a more liberal (not to say Christian) attitude on the part of our prelatial brethren towards Presbyterian churches. Thus we are told that "in the light of apostolical succession," "there is no objection on the ground of principle" to the conclusion "that the churches in the West were governed simply by a council of presbyters, who had no superiors over them, and who therefore must be supposed to have handed down their own ministry." "These presbyter-bishops legitimately 'ordained' and fulfilled episcopal functions, because those functions belonged to the equal commission they had all received. Subsequently, at later ordinations, this full commission was confined to one of their number, and the rest received the reduced authority which belonged to the presbyterate of later church history. Such a process would not represent the elevation of any new dignity from below, but the limitation of an old dignity to one instead of its extension to many, and that in accordance with the precedent set by the apostle St. John. 'Monepiscopacy' takes the place of a diffused episcopacy," (p. 334) Again, "the principle of succession" would not be touched "if we were to accept Jerome's testimony, . . . to the effect that in the early church of Alexandria, on the vacancy of the see, one of the presbyters succeeded to the episcopate after mere election by his fellows. This would only mean that the Alexandrian presbyters were by the terms of their ordination bishops *in posse*, even though their exercise of episcopal powers without special election would have been irregular," (p. 339). Consequently he can say broadly: "No one, of whatever part of the church, can maintain that the existence of what may be called, for lack of a distinctive term, *monepiscopacy*, is essential to the continuity of the church. Such monepiscopacy may be the best mode of government; it may most aptly symbolize the divine monarchy; it may have all spiritual expediency and historical precedent on its side; nay, more, it may be of apostolic institution; but nobody could maintain that the continuity of the church would be broken if in any given diocese all the presbyters were consecrated to the episcopal office, and governed as an coördinate college of bishops without presbyters or presbyter-bishops. A state of things quite as abnormal as this existed for many centuries in the Celtic Church of Ireland. Something equivalent to this very arrangement has been commonly believed in the West to have existed in the early church" (p. 74).

After such statements as these, it appears utterly illogical to deny, as Mr. Gore does deny (p. 344), the validity of Presbyterian ordination. The ground on which the denial is based is that "it cannot be maintained that the acts of ordination by which presbyters of the sixteenth or subsequent centuries originated the ministries of some of these societies were covered by their commission or belonged to the office of presbyter which they had duly received." Thus Mr. Gore's whole case is made to hang on what Dr. McGill not unfitly calls "the mere ligature of succession," rather than on the succession itself; and in thus erecting the act and intention of ordination into the chief thing, he raises several very curious questions. How does he know, for example, that the Alexandrian presbyters were "by *the terms of their ordination*" made "bishops *in posse*?" and unless he knows this, must he not (on the supposition that Jerome's testimony is credible) unchurch the whole

Alexandrian succession? How does he know that the Western presbyters received a different ordination in earlier times from that given later? How does he know that they were justified in laying aside their episcopal rights in favor of one of their number? How does he know that these rights, once laid aside, could not legitimately be claimed back again? Above all, how can he teach that a right given by God can be irretrievably laid aside on human authority alone? In a word, how can he erect a human provision of order above a divine gift of function? The dispute really reduces to this so soon as we admit (as Mr. Gore cordially does) that in the New Testament presbyters and bishops are one order; and the prelatie position can be sustained only on the assumption that the post-apostolic development of the church is as authoritative as the apostolic prescription. Of course this is the very antipodes of Mr. Gore's primal principle that the ministry comes by devolution from above, not by evolution from below; but he is hopelessly driven to it; and we cannot be surprised to find him approvingly quoting this position from Mr. Stanton, on p. 343; or at an earlier point (p. 269) to observe the consciousness already pressing forward that only "the principle of a ministry with different grades of function and power is given us in the apostolic age," while for the prelatie position we are left only the recourse of "accepting in detail the mind of the church, as soon as it declares itself, as the mind of the Spirit." Hence he is led (p. 270) to distinguish between "the ministry of the future" and the New Testament ministry; and to reiterate that "all that the New Testament can be said to prove clearly is the principle that the church ministry is a thing received from above, with graduated functions in different offices, so that it follows as a matter of course that there would always be persons who had the power to minister and persons who had also the power to ordain other ministers." Here are the intrenchments of the Presbyterians; they refuse to be governed by the "future" mind of the church; they desire to stand firmly by the mind of the Lord, as expressed to us by the apostles. They remind Mr. Gore that he himself confesses that the driftage of time has introduced "immense changes," and advises the recovery of the "primitive standards, which ought never to have been abandoned" (p. 114); they invite him to listen with them to Cyprian's indication of "the short way for religious and simple minds to lay aside error, or to find and elicit truth;" "for if we go back to the head and origin of the divine tradition, human error ceases, the real nature of the heavenly mysteries is seen, and evolution, hid in darkness and under a cloud, is opened out into the light of truth."

When we go back thus with Mr. Gore to the "divine tradition" where "human error ceases," Presbyterians have no reason to quarrel with the evidence as he adduces it; for we find in these pages the sure evidence for all the distinctively Presbyterian positions. The original oneness of "presbyters" and "bishops" is recognized. That, even after the differentiation of presbyters and bishops, they together constituted one order, as over against deacons, is recognized; that one might pass from the presbyterate to the bishopric without reordination is admitted (p. 143, cf. 115, note); that early bishops were not diocesan, but pastoral, is recognized (pp. 104, 106, 112, 145, 329); that Christian ministers are not called "priests" for a century and a half is acknowledged; and much more of the same kind. We confine ourselves, however, for the present, to remarks on two points.

Mr. Gore insists that ordination was an apostolic function, and strives hard to render plausible his statement that there is no proof that it was ever performed by

presbyters. To do this, however, he has to explain away almost the whole body of very early evidence, including that of the New Testament itself, which never suggests that ordination is confined to apostles or the extraordinary ministry. (Cf. *Pres. Review*, October, 1887, p. 702.) It is only by confusing the communication of miraculous gifts of the Spirit by the laying on of the apostles' hands with ordination, that Mr. Gore can make out even a specious case. His theory of ordination is closely connected with his theory of the origin of the episcopate. His view is that the episcopate was not formed out of the presbyterate by development, but by the settling of "apostolic" men, *i. e.*, evangelists or prophets, over special churches; and thus that it was not a development out of the permanent local ministry, but a localization of the general ministry. This is an advance on the crude theory which makes Timothy and Titus the New Testament examples of "bishops;" but it is no more tenable. Let us observe how Mr. Gore deals with Timothy and Titus. After an admirable account of the presbyter-bishops of the Pastoral Epistles, he speaks of Timothy and Titus with great accuracy as "apostolic delegates," but (p. 24) proceeds to represent them as if not "bishops" (which he admits they are not called, but rather "evangelists;" an office he confesses not to be "local," p. 241), yet as "exercising what is essentially the later episcopal office." In order to make this plausible he is led to confound the permanence of Timothy's ministry with the permanence of his localization at Ephesus (p. 248), suggesting that Timothy was ordained at Ephesus, and that he was to continue his ministry after Paul's death, "presumably with the same church of Ephesus," and adding that we cannot "argue against his localization [at Ephesus] from the fact of St. Paul summoning him to Rome," or "from the fact of his having gone there." This, however, is not quite the point; the question is rather, do these facts raise a "presumption" in favor of his localization in Ephesus? And Mr. Gore has failed to mention that when Paul summoned Timothy from Ephesus he *supplied his place there*: "Tychicus, however, have I sent to Ephesus." (2 Tim. iv. 12). The fact is, Mr. Gore was on the right track when he designated Timothy and Titus "evangelists" (p. 249, note 1), and when he represented "evangelists" as one class of "the general or catholic ministry of the church" (p. 241).

And now we must go a step forward. Timothy's and Titus's title and authority, inherited in Paul the apostle,—they were not "apostles," but "apostolic delegates," (p. 246, adopting Winterstein's phrase,) and ranked in *office* with presbyters (cf. *Clem. Hom.* vii. 12, where Peter's travelling attendants are called presbyters), while exercising, as delegates of the apostle, his *authority*. There is no historical proof that any of these evangelists, attendants of the apostles, ever settled in local charges; and the wandering prophets of the *Didaché*, when so settled, passed over into bishops, as into another and separate office. The bishops, in a word, were plainly contemporaneously existing local officers—belonging to a single church, not exercising authority over many—among whom a "prophet" might come to take his place; but they were not dependent on this contingency for the recruiting of their ranks. If investigation has settled anything, it has determined the origin of this local (pastoral) episcopate out of the presbyterate by differentiation of function. All historical indications point that way, and the only question that remains is whether this differentiation took place with apostolic sanction, or only in the post-apostolic age. With Bishop Lightfoot, and the majority of competent and unprejudiced scholars, we believe that the evolution was apostolical—whence arises divine sanc-

tion for the pastoral office. But any effort to derive the office itself from another and "general" (rather than local) source is already obsolete; and is an unpleasant excrescence on Mr. Gore's generally sober and learned treatise. It is even dangerous to his central idea of the unbroken succession of episcopal ordination, as it suspends the whole western succession (when succession is so conceived) on the may-be of an hypothesis, unillustrated by a single historical example.

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DELITZSCH'S NEW COMMENTARY ON GENESIS.

A NEW COMMENTARY ON GENESIS. *By Franz Delitzsch, D. D., Leipzig. Translated by Sophia Taylor.* In Two Volumes. Scribner & Welford, 743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 1889.

For fifty years the name of Franz Delitzsch has been a familiar one to critical students of the Scriptures. Quite recently, however, he has been introduced to a much wider circle of readers in America through the series of twenty-four papers entitled "Suggestive Jottings," which appeared in the *Sunday-School Times*, in 1887. These articles afforded glimpses of the beauty of his spirit, the richness of his learning, and the vigor of his style, which only deepened the desire of the public to know more of this remarkable man and his work.

He was born at Leipzig in 1813. It is supposed by many that he was originally a Jew, but we are informed by one who has known him intimately for many years that this is not the case. The impression is doubtless due to the direction taken by both his literary and practical work. In the first place, his almost matchless Hebrew scholarship, covering as it does the Biblical, Talmudic and Rabbinic literature, and giving him a well-nigh vernacular mastery of the language, naturally suggested that he was himself a Hebrew. Professor Driver, of Oxford, a judge whose competence on this point no one will question, speaks of him as "amongst living Christian scholars perhaps the most profoundly read in post-biblical Jewish literature." We do not think the statement would be too strong even if "perhaps" and "post-biblical" were left out. One proof of his preëminence is the fact that he has written the most accurate and idiomatic Hebrew version of the New Testament, not even excepting that of the lamented Salkinson. This brings us to the second reason for the erroneous supposition that he is a Jew, viz., his life-long interest in Israel, and his indefatigable zeal for their conversion. Of his translation of the New Testament into Hebrew for circulation among Jews, eighty thousand copies have been distributed and a tenth edition is now in preparation. For a quarter of a century he has published a missionary quarterly called *Saat auf Hoffnung*, (Seed Sown in Hope), which has done more perhaps than any other single agency for the evangelization of the Jews. While a student in the gymnasium at Leipzig, he began to learn the Hebrew language, but was then indifferent not only to the spiritual welfare of Israel, but also to his own spiritual condition, and, on entering the university, he gave himself up, not to Hebrew and the Scriptures, but to philosophy and speculative questions of every kind. Through a combination of evangelical influences providentially brought to bear upon him while in the university, his personal attitude towards religion underwent a complete change; his interest in Israel was awakened, and his studies were directed into a

new and permanent channel; so that, as his friend Professor Salmond has said, "the gain of a living faith, the enthusiasm for the winning of Israel, and the choice of Oriental learning as his vocation in life, came hand in hand." Christian, missionary, scholar—that is the life of Franz Delitzsch in a nutshell.

In 1842 he qualified as a university teacher. His first professorship was at Rostock, beginning in 1846, and continuing about four years. In 1850 he was called to Erlangen, where he taught for sixteen years, and in 1867, he returned to Leipzig. Here, for more than twenty years, he has been gathering around him crowded classes of the choicest students from every land, attracted not merely by his fame as an author and his gifts as a teacher, but also by a character of singular purity, sweetness, and sympathy, and a personal piety of peculiar fervor and fruitfulness.

His extraordinary versatility and productiveness have made him a sort of *stupor mundi* even to the view of his prodigiously prolific countrymen. "The languages, the interpretation of Scripture, biblical introduction, textual criticism, apologetics, biblical psychology, discussions in dogma, devotional writings, historical studies, popular tales, have all come under the touch of his active intellect and untiring pen." But in America he is best known as an exegete. The ample learning, the vigorous reasoning, the patient attention to detail, the delicate appreciation of style, above all the spiritual insight and "reverent enthusiasm for the word" are qualities well known to thousands of readers of his commentaries on both sides of the sea. His method as an exegete is what he himself has somewhere called the *reproductive* as distinguished from the *glossatorial*. Instead of making detached comments on separate verses, he endeavors to reproduce the contents of each section as a whole, to give "the whole mass of the exegetical material in continuous and living flow." This is the most difficult method, but it is the most satisfactory in the hands of a master like Delitzsch.

The work before us, while doubtless not equal to his commentaries on the *Psalms* and *Isaiah*, is perhaps the best critical commentary on *Genesis* that Germany has yet produced, certainly the best that has issued from the evangelical school of exegetes. The first edition of "this standard commentary," as Dr. Green, of Princeton, has well called it, appeared in 1852. This translation was made from the fifth, but has received so many additions from the author while in preparation that it might almost be regarded as a sixth, and it certainly represents better than the original his present position on some questions.

"Genesis is the most difficult book of the Old Testament," says Professor Delitzsch, and those who have given sufficient study to the book to know how true that statement is will best appreciate his success in solving some of the problems which have made it almost the despair of the commentators. He holds, of course, that the days of creation were æons, that man was "immediately" created, and that the flood was not universal, but partial. It is only what we expect of a German scholar that he should be abreast of the most recent research in biblical geography and antiquities, and therefore it is no surprise to find our author correct in all his references to Ur, Goshen, Pithom, Kadesh-Barnea and the Hittites, but he holds an antiquated view as to the origin of the Dead Sea, and makes no attempt to locate the notorious Pentapolis. His view of the four rivers of Eden is not satisfactory. But what view is? The vexed questions about the cherubim, the sons of God, the angel of Jehovah, circumcision, and Shiloh, are all fully reviewed here,

and upon each of them our author expresses a decided opinion, and gives a reason for the faith that is in him. But it is in the discussion of such vital subjects as the fall, the protevangelium, supernatural revelation, faith, and prayer, that the deep spirituality and essential soundness of the man most clearly appear.

The point of chief interest about Delitzsch at present is the relation between his doctrinal views and his critical attitude. His uncompromising opposition to the "new theology" has given him great favor with conservative theologians in every part of the world. It is not very long since we all read in the *Expositor* what he called his "last confession of faith," in which he used these brave and touching words concerning his adherence to the doctrine of the supernatural state of grace: "Even if in many biblical questions I have to oppose the traditional opinion, certainly my opposition remains on this side of the gulf, on the side of the theology of the cross, of grace, of miracles, in harmony with the good confession of our Lutheran Church. By this banner let us stand; folding ourselves in it, let us die." And in the *Independent*, only a few months ago, appeared from his pen a refutation of the Ritschlian theology that must have rejoiced the heart of Mr. Spurgeon and all others who like him are trying to arrest the "down grade" movement in Europe. And here, too, in his work on Genesis, while avowing his acceptance for the most part of the latest literary analysis of the Pentateuch by Wellhausen, Kuenen and Dillmann, he reiterates his emphatic rejection of their principles and conclusions. In the very first paragraph of his preface he affirms that "the spirit of this commentary remains unaltered since 1852. I am not a believer in the 'religion of the times of Darwin.' I am a believer in two orders of things, and not merely in one, which the miraculous would drill holes in. I believe in the Easter announcement, and I accept its deductions." Many people in our country have been taught to believe that no distinctively evangelical scholar has accepted the theory of the composite structure of the Pentateuch. But truth is better than falsehood always. It is very easy to say that all who do not agree with us in our views of the mode of revelation are rationalists and skeptics, but it is also very wicked. Some, of course, make such statements through ignorance, placing Delitzsch, Briggs, Curtiss, and even Keil, in the same category with Wellhausen and Robertson Smith, not merely because they lack "the faculty of seeing differences," but because they know nothing whatever about the subject. They are sincere, but ignorant. Others, however, have apparently adopted the Jesuitic principle of doing evil that good may come, for it is impossible to believe that *they* know nothing for instance of the character and views of the foremost biblical scholar in Europe. But aside from the immorality of that principle, good does *not* come in this case, for after a while the young men who have thus been taught that a belief in the partition of the Pentateuch is incompatible with living faith in the Redeemer and unqualified acceptance of supernatural revelation, discover that they have been deceived, and then they begin to suspect even the truth they have learned from such teachers. They discover, for example, that the analysis is accepted by Dr. Delitzsch, who is pronounced even by our ablest and most strenuous defender of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch to be a "distinctively evangelical scholar," and who is said by the same high authority to be "revered alike for his learning and his piety." Those who persist in stating that all the higher critics are infidels will find some intensely interesting reading in the following extracts from this last book of the man whose soundness and piety have been thus attested by "the Hengstenberg of America":

“In the first edition of my *Commentary on Genesis*, 1852, I already advocated the claims of critical analysis, and obtained herein the concurrence of J. H. Kurtz. In the later editions I acknowledged the necessity of distinguishing two Elohist Narrators. Later on the more recent revolution in the criticism of the Pentateuch so far influenced me that I now perceive also that the writer, with whose account of the Creation the Pentateuch opens, is not relatively to the narrator of the occurrences in Paradise the more ancient, but the more recent, and that the historico-legal and literary process by which the Pentateuch was brought into its present form was continued down to the post-exilic period. Nevertheless my view of the circumstances differs essentially and on principle from the modern one. . . .

“The perception that the Pentateuch contains the Thorah, but is not identical with it, and that it subsequently received this name as though it were so, exercises a liberative effect. For, if this is the case, it is self-evident that the book of the Thorah, which according to Deuteronomy xxxi. was written by Moses, can have been neither the Pentateuch nor Deuteronomy in its present historical form. Hence we need entertain the less scruple in holding that the Pentateuch, like the other historical books of the Bible, is composed from documentary sources of various dates and different kinds, which critical analysis is able to recognize and distinguish from each other with more or less certainty.

“If inspiration is the mental influence which contributed to the formation of an authentic record of the history of redemption, such inspiration holds good, not of the several documents of the Pentateuch, but of the extant whole into which these writings, which, regarded in themselves, might have been incomplete, one-sided, and insufficient, were worked up. The Christian as such regards the Pentateuchal historical work and the Holy Scriptures in general as a unity, the product of One Spirit, having one meaning and one object. And this unity really exists in everything which concerns our redemption and the history of its preparation and foundation, and is exalted far above the discoveries of critical analysis. Criticism seems indeed, by breaking up the single into its original and non-affinitive elements, to threaten and question this essential unity of Holy Scripture. Hence it must always remain unpopular; a congregation has no interest in it, but on the contrary takes offence at it. And indeed there is a kind of criticism which, while dismembering the Pentateuch like a *corpus vile* with its dissecting knife, finds such pleasure in its ruthless hunt for discrepancies as to thoroughly disgust not only the Christian layman, but also the Christian scholar, with analysis. Still, the just claims of analysis are indisputable, hence it is scientifically necessary. It is an indispensable requirement of the history of literature, which it supplies with copious material, and of historical criticism, to which it furnishes the foundation of the various traditions and authorities.—In the department of Holy Scripture it is, however, a dangerous matter exposed to that arbitrariness, ill-will, and want of moderation, which thinks to see through everything and crushes everything to atoms. And yet believing investigation of Scripture will not subdue this nuisance of critical analysis, unless it wrests the weapon from its adversary's hand, and actually shows that analysis can be exercised without thereby trampling under foot respect for Holy Scripture. Of such a process however scarcely a beginning has been made.

“It is true that the present destructive proceedings in the department of Old Testament criticism, which demand the construction of a new edifice, is [the grammatical slip must be the translator's] quite fitted to confuse consciences and entangle a weak faith in all kinds of temptation. If, however, we keep fast hold in this labyrinth of the one truth, *Christus vere resurrexit*, we have in our hands Ariadne's thread to lead us out of it.

“God is the God of truth, אלהים אמת! The love of truth, submission to the force of truth, the surrender of traditional views which will not stand the test of truth, is a sacred duty, an element of the fear of God. Will ye be partisans for God? (הפניו תשאון) exclaims Job (xiii. 8), reproving his friends, who were assuming the part of advocates for God towards him, while misrepresenting the facts of the case *ad majorem Dei gloriam*. This great saying of Job, admired also by Kant the philosopher, has always made a deep impression upon me. Ever since I began to officiate as an academical tutor in 1842, I have taken up the standpoint

of inquiry, freely surrendering itself to the leadings of truth. I have not been in sympathy with the Hengstenberg tendency, because it allowed the weight of its adversaries' reasons to have too little influence upon it.

"But in my view a correlative obligation is, combined with freedom, an obligation which is not so much its limitation as its foundation. I esteem the great fundamental facts of redemption as exalted far above the vicissitudes of scientific views and discoveries. The certainty and security of these facts have no need to wait for the results of advancing science; they are credibly testified, and are sealed to every Christian as such by inward experience and by continual perception of their truth in himself and others. And to this obligation of faith is added an obligation of reverence, and, so to speak, of Christian decorum. For faith in these facts of salvation naturally involves a reverent relation to Holy Scripture, which is to the Christian a holy thing, because it is the record of the works and words of God, the frame and image of the promised and manifested Redeemer. Certainly Holy Scripture is not a book which has fallen from heaven; on the contrary, the self-testimony therein given to the Divine is affected by all the marks of human, individual, local, temporal, and educational diversity. But to the end of time the church renovated by the Reformation will confess that, *Primum toto pectore Prophetica et Apostolica scripta Veteris et Novi Testamenti ut limpidissimos purissimosque Israelis fontes recipimus et amplectimur*. And they who thus confess with her will not make a boast of uttering depreciating, insolent, and contemptuous criticisms concerning the writers of the Bible. Their attitude towards Holy Scripture will be free but not free-thinking, free but not frivolous. And this will be especially the case with respect to Genesis,—that fundamental book in the Book of books. For there is no book in the Old Testament which is of such fundamental importance for all true religion, and particularly for Christianity, as the religion of redemption, as this first book of the Pentateuchal Torah, which corresponds with the first book of the *quadriforme Evangelium*.

"We do not belong to those moderns who, as the children of their age, are so charmed by the most recent stage of Old Testament science as to see therein the solution of all enigmas, and to disregard with an easy mind all the new enigmas created by such solution. But as little too are we of those ancients who, as the children of an age that has been overtaken, see in the new stage a product of pure wantonness, and are too weak-brained or too mentally idle to take up an independent position with respect to the new problems by surrendering their musty papers. Only in one point do we remain now as ever faithful to the old school. We are Christians, and therefore occupy a position with regard to Holy Scripture quite different from that which we take toward the Homeric poems, the Niebelungen, or the treasures of the library of Asurbanipal. Holy Scripture being the book of the records of our religion, our relation thereto is not merely scientific, but also in the highest degree one of moral responsibility. We will not deny the human element with which it is affected, but will not with Hamitic scorn discover the nakedness of Noah. We will not with Vandalic complacency reduce to ruins that which is sacred. We will not undermine the foundations of Christianity for the sake of playing into the hands of Brahmosamajic, *i. e.*, of Brahmanic or Buddhistic, rationalism. For the notes that are struck in German lecture-halls and books are at last re-echoed from distant Asia, and make vain the efforts of our missionaries. We will not give up what is untenable without replacing it wherever possible by that which is tenable. We will interpret Genesis as theologians, and indeed as Christians; *i. e.*, as believers in Jesus Christ, who is the end of all the ways and words of God."

Now, whatever may be his errors, and there are several in the foregoing paragraphs, the man who writes thus is no rationalist, and if we continue to teach that he is, we not only teach what is untrue and unjust, but we also defeat the very end we profess to have in view. Then, in the name of Christian truth and charity, let this defamation cease. Let us admit that Delitzsch is an honest and reverent student of God's word, and then let us show how even such a man as he can be led astray by a too purely subjective method of investigation, and at last be landed in an erro-

neous and dangerous theory of the structure of the Scriptures. This we can do, Delitzsch attempts to meet the extreme critics on their own ground and vanquish them with their own weapons, but he makes unnecessary and disastrous concessions. His theory is fundamentally different from the irreverent naturalism of Wellhausen, but it is wrong nevertheless, and much as we honor him for his ability, his learning, and his sincerity, we must place him also among those who "carry analysis beyond the bounds of the discernible." The chief desideratum for German criticism is *objective evidence*. And for lack of such support even the moderate theory of Delitzsch must be rejected.

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WORKMAN'S TEXT OF JEREMIAH.

THE TEXT OF JEREMIAH; OR, A Critical Investigation of the Greek and Hebrew, with the Variations in the LXX. Retranslated into the Original and Explained. *By the Rev. George Coulson Workman, M. A., Professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Literature in Victoria University, Cobourg, Ont., Canada.* With an Introductory Notice by Professor Franz Delitzsch, D. D. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1889.

Scientific students of the Old Testament have of late been so fully occupied with the problems of the higher or literary criticism, that those of the lower or textual criticism have received but scanty attention. There are indications, however, that these fundamental questions of text will hereafter be given greater prominence. Cornill's radical reconstruction of the text of Ezekiel, recently published, may be regarded as the first gun of a new campaign against the Massoretic recension. That it should be followed so soon by such a work as the one before us, is sufficient evidence that the war will be vigorously prosecuted. So let it be. The discussion is sorely needed. The Hebrew text has been allowed to remain too long in its present deplorable condition. While the learned labors of Griesbach, Lachmann, Tregelles, Tischendorf, and Westcott and Hort, have given us an incomparably purer text of the New Testament than that from which the Authorized English Version was made, almost nothing has been done towards a similar restoration of the text of the Old Testament. The reasons for this failure of text-criticism in the Hebrew Scriptures are, first, The belief that the text did not need correction; and, secondly, The belief that the material for correcting it did not exist. Both of these opinions are erroneous, though both have been held with the utmost tenacity.

I. That anybody should still believe in the infallibility of the Massoretic text will not seem so strange if we remember that less than two years ago, at a conference in Philadelphia on the inspiration of the Bible, a paper *defending the inspiration of the Hebrew vowel points* was read, and has since been published in the volume entitled "The Inspired Word" (edited by Arthur T. Pierson, D. D.).

The opinion that the text of the Old Testament needed no correction, will excite even less surprise in the readers of this journal if it is remembered that our own Confession of Faith has retained to this day the astounding declaration that the Old Testament in Hebrew, and the New Testament in Greek, have, by God's singular care and providence, been "kept pure in all ages." This in the face of

one hundred and fifty thousand various readings in the New Testament, and an unnumbered multitude in the Old. As our brethren of the Northern Church seem so anxious to revise the Confession of Faith in some way, pray let them revise this; and, if they stop with this, perhaps our church also will, in the course of ages, have the courage to follow the example, and expunge a statement that is scouted by every competent scholar in Christendom.

Stranger even than the statement of our Confession is the position of the Victorian Revisers. The English Committee have corrected a number of textual errors, but not one of these corrections has been admitted into the body of the translation. They are all placed in the margin. The American Committee, however, object even to this, and would omit from the margin all renderings from the Septuagint and other ancient versions. In view of the following facts such a position is utterly inexplicable: The Massorites themselves did not regard their text as free from error, for they have given in their notes over two thousand *Qeris*, which they themselves prefer to the readings in the text. They state explicitly that in a number of cases the text had been changed by the scribes. The evidence of such parallel sections as we find in Samuel, Kings and Chronicles (*e. g.*, 2 Sam. xxii., and Ps. xviii., where there are more than fifty variations) is absolutely conclusive against the purity of the received text. There are at least a hundred errors of transcription in proper names alone, as shown by the different forms of the same name in different passages, to say nothing of such cases as 1 Sam. vi. 19, where the incredible statement is made that over fifty thousand inhabitants of a small village were slain in the harvest field, or 1 Sam. xiii. 1, where the Massoretic text states that "Saul was a year old when he became king, and he was king two years over Israel." The revisers, being both too scholarly and too honest to retain the false rendering of the Authorized Version, have followed some late MSS. of the LXX., and inserted *thirty* in the first clause, which, as Dr. H. P. Smith has shown, lands them in the absurd conclusion that Saul died at the age of thirty-two, *leaving behind him a son forty years old.* (2 Sam. ii. 10.) Certainly these are very surprising statements to be found in a text that does not need correction.

II. The other opinion which has prevented text-criticism in the Old Testament is scarcely less tenable, *viz.*, that the needful material for making the corrections did not exist. It is true that the authorities are neither so numerous nor so valuable as those which have settled the text of the New Testament. There are no divergent Hebrew manuscripts. All our present copies are supposed to represent one prototype, and that of no great antiquity, as it probably dates from the time of Hadrian, while the oldest Hebrew copy of this text, whose age is known, belongs to the tenth century after Christ. But we have ancient *versions*, some of them of the greatest value, and one of them representing a text belonging to the third century before Christ. This is the Septuagint translation. Let us remember, then, that this venerable version represents a text which is five hundred years older than that of the Massorites.

But, it will be asked, can a mere translation into another language be used as an authority in text-criticism, and even if so, is not the Septuagint itself too corrupt to serve such a purpose? Answering the last question first, all must admit that the text of the LXX. is in very bad condition and sorely needs critical revision, but at the same time it affords a great deal of sound material for the reconstruction of the Hebrew. As to the other question, the value of a version for textual criticism,

any good Hebraist can easily satisfy himself by turning part of the English version back into Hebrew and comparing his work with the original. Those who have followed the foregoing discussion can now understand Prof. Workman's plan, for this is just what he has done. Taking Tischendorf's edition of the Septuagint, he has retranslated into Hebrew those passages in which variations occur; the last part of his book, one hundred and sixteen pages, being wholly given up to a Conspectus of the variations arranged in parallel columns, the right-hand column containing the deviations from the Greek in the Hebrew, the left-hand column giving the deviations from the Hebrew in the Greek retranslated into Hebrew. That the mere exhibit of the differences without comment should occupy so much space will be a surprise to many; but it must be remembered that the divergences in Jeremiah are more numerous than in any other book, being counted by thousands. Neither Proverbs, Job, Esther nor Daniel, irregular as they are, can show such an array of divergences. This part of the book is designed exclusively for scholars, of course, but the earlier and larger part, covering more than three hundred pages, is written for the general reader, and may be easily and intelligently read even by one who knows nothing of Greek or Hebrew. The style is clear, but diffuse and repetitious, the latter characteristics being due doubtless to this attempt to write a popular book on a technical subject.

Prof. Workman rejects all theories which would account for the divergences by carelessness, caprice or ignorance, and maintains with Eichhorn that the differences in Jeremiah at least are due to the use of two different text recensions, one of which circulated in Palestine and the other in Egypt. The investigation by which he seeks to establish this position is scientific and scholarly from beginning to end; and as to his success, our view may be expressed in the words of Prof. Dr. Franz Delitzsch who, in his "Introductory Notice," says: "I fully concur with him in the opinion that the original of the Septuagint was, in many respects, a different text from that attested and established by the Massorites."

The book is a delightful one to handle, lying open easily at any page, and presenting to the eye the clearest and most beautiful print, in which we have not discovered a single typographical error; such a book, in short, as Bible scholars have now learned to expect from the great importing house which is pouring such a wealth of T. & T. Clark's publications into the libraries of America.

Hampden-Sidney, Va.

W. W. MOORE.

HARPER'S HEBREW SYNTAX.

ELEMENTS OF HEBREW SYNTAX BY AN INDUCTIVE METHOD. *By William Rainey Harper, Professor of Semitic Languages, Yale University.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1888.

The author of this volume enjoys the unique distinction of having written the best text-books of Elementary Hebrew in the English language. His "Introductory Hebrew Method and Manual" and his "Elements of Hebrew" have been before the public a number of years, were promptly adopted by teachers of the language, and are now used in every progressive seminary in the United States.

The work before us is the complement of the series. It was scarcely less needed than were its two predecessors. Hebrew Syntax has been a neglected field.

Professor Harper himself once said that Ewald's was the only really valuable work ever written on the subject as a whole. But it was not at all suitable for a text-book. Driver's masterly monograph on the "Use of the Tenses" is a book for specialists, not for beginners. Müller's work is too meagre, as well as otherwise unsatisfactory. The same is true of Gesenius. Green, too, gave but scanty treatment to the subject in all the editions of his grammar save the last (1889). That, however appeared after Harper's (1888). But in any case Green's work could not have obviated the necessity for some such text-book as the one before us. Nor will the promised works of Stade and König supersede it in any degree. For these are all fundamentally different from this in aim and method. They are the works of mere scholars. This is the work of a born teacher. While fully abreast of the most recent Semitic scholarship, it does not profess to be an original investigation. It claims to be a text-book, and its primary object is to *teach* the elements of Hebrew Syntax.

The distinguishing feature of Dr. Harper's plan is the use of the Inductive Method. The order of work is, 1, Facts; 2, Principles; and 3, Application. In the first place, the phrase or sentence is quoted and translated, book, chapter and verse being cited, so that the student may at any time consult the context, a matter, by the way, of far more importance in Hebrew than in Latin or Greek. In the second place, the principles underlying these facts are deduced and formulated. And finally, there is added a large number of references to texts containing further illustrations of the laws thus learned, and affording the student practice in what the author rightly regards the most important part of the work—application. The book could be still further improved by adding under this last head in every section exercises to be written, English sentences to be translated into Hebrew. Without such exercises no grammar is complete as a practical text-book. We think the author makes a serious mistake also in printing the examples in the last fifty pages without vowel points. It has the effect of diverting the student's attention from principles of syntax to problems of etymology. דְּבַר יוֹם בְּיוֹם

As to the author's forms of statement, the *Syntax* is characterized by that same succinct, staccato style which is now familiar to all readers of his books and journals. There is nothing spongy or hazy. Everything is solid and clear. No superfluous verbiage encumbers his rules. There is an admirable directness and crispness of statement which mark him as a master of the art of "putting things." In fine, whatever may be the measure of our disagreement with him on other subjects, we must all admit that he has won a distinguished place as a teacher of language. By his indefatigable efforts in the class-room, by his copious contributions to periodical literature, and above all, by his invaluable text-books, he has done more than any other man living to promote the intelligent and successful study of Hebrew in America.

W. W. MOORE.

Hampden-Sidney, Va.

LANCIANI'S ANCIENT ROME, ETC.

ANCIENT ROME IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DISCOVERIES. *By Rodolfo Lanciani, LL. D. (Harv.), F. R. A. S., Professor in the University of Rome, etc.* Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1889.

Archæology "is that science or branch of knowledge which investigates the

history of nations and peoples by means of the remains, architectural, implemental or the like, which belong to the earlier epoch of their existence."—*Imp'l Dictionary*.

The early history of nations and peoples was formerly sought for mainly in the critical study of such ancient writings as had come down to our age, and of ancient traditions reaching further back than these writings. During the present century, more especially since the publication of Layard's "Nineveh and its Remains," about thirty years ago, the attention of archæologists has been largely turned to the recovery and study of architectural remains, monuments and monumental inscriptions, such as are found in greater or less abundance in every country which has been long inhabited by man. Of the results of these investigations in Egypt, the Tigro-Euphrates valley, Greece and Rome, all of us have heard something, but few of us, perhaps, realize the extent to which they render necessary the re-writing of ancient history.

In the light of modern archæology, some things once regarded as certain have to be given up, and others which, under the influence of strained literary criticism, we were ready to give up we may now receive as undoubted facts. An instance of the first kind, Sir J. W. Dawson gives us in his words: "It is very wonderful to find in these ancient Egyptian papyri—some of them dating from the earliest dynasties—chemical facts, arithmetical formulæ, and medical recipes, almost in the identical forms in which they were copied by Greeks and Arabs, heretofore believed to be their authors." (*Egypt and Syria*, page 163.) As an instance of the second kind, take the results of Dr. Schlieman's discoveries on the site of ancient Troy, by which the story of that city's destruction given us by Homer, once regarded as having little more historic value than the story of the capture of the city of Mansoul in Bunyan's Holy War, has come to be accepted as an historic poem, with no other departures from the exact truth than such as are incident to its poetic form.

Since Rome became the capital of Italy under the rule of Victor Emmanuel, it has had a growth unequalled by that of any other ancient city of Europe. Prof. Lanciani tells us that "between January 1, 1872, and December 31, 1885, eighty-two miles of new streets have been opened, paved, drained and built; new quarters have sprung up which cover an area of 1,158 acres;" and he adds, "I state these facts simply on account of their connection with the progress of Roman archæology, because it is impossible to turn up in Rome a handful of earth without coming upon some unexpected find. It is easy to understand what an amount of discoveries must have been made by turning up two hundred and seventy million cubic feet of that land of promise." (*Preface*, page 1.)

Of the general drift of recent archæological investigation, in so far as the credibility of early Roman history is concerned, Professor Lanciani writes: "We are already far, thank heaven, from the period in which it was fashionable to follow the exaggerations of that famous hypercritical school which denied every event in Roman history previous to the second Punic war. Late discoveries have brought forth such a crushing mass of evidence in favor of ancient writers, and in support of their reports concerning the kingly period, that every detail seems to be confirmed by monumental remains. In our younger days, when we were stepping for the first time over the threshold of an archæological school, we used to scorn the idea that a real Romulus had existed, and that such was the name of the builder of

Rome. Philological researches have shown that the name of Romulus is a genuine one, and that it belonged to the builder of Rome, as we shall presently see. There is no doubt that the general spirit of modern criticism has been unreasonably skeptical and unduly captious with respect to early Roman history; any further attempt to diminish or lessen the value of its traditional sources must be henceforth absolutely unsuccessful." (Pp. 33, 34.)

The remark of Professor Lanciani, quoted above, respecting early Roman history may be made with equal truth respecting the early history of other peoples also—*e. g.*, the Jews. The time is passed when such statements could find acceptance with scholars as that of one of the "higher critics." "We do not know precisely what Moses did for his people. Under the guidance of God, Israel grew in wisdom, and worked out a great Torah, an instruction in righteousness; and it matters little to us whether it was Moses or somebody else who had the chief part in it; but it is probable that he was a great man and did much for his people." (*Toy's Religion of Israel*, p. 26.)

As furnishing at once a proof and an illustration of the minute and exhaustive character of modern archæological investigations, I may mention the attention paid to the study of *graffiti*, defined in the Imperial Dictionary as "A class of ancient delineations or inscriptions found on the walls of Pompeii, the Catacombs, and other Roman ruins, and consisting of rude scribblings or figures on the plaster of the walls and on pillars and doorposts." On this subject Prof. Lanciani writes, "The mania for writing on the plaster, in public or private buildings, with a nail or a sharp point of any kind, was perhaps stronger in ancient times than it is now. It must have been tolerated by municipal regulations. In that portion of Pompeii which has been unearthed up to the present time, not less than six thousand graffiti have been copied and published; and we have gained more knowledge of the life and habits, the love and business transactions, and the political feelings of the Pompeians from this source than from any other written or engraved documents. In Rome not a single edifice escaped the nail and the pocket knife of idlers or schoolboys" (p. 120).

One of these graffiti, from the walls of the *domus Gelotiana*, a building which "after the murder of Caligula became a residence and a training school for court pages," is interesting as throwing light upon the introduction of Christianity at Rome. "This widely celebrated graffito," Prof. Lanciani tells us, "was discovered at the beginning of the year 1857, in the fourth room on the left of the entrance, and removed soon after to the Kircherian Museum at the Collegio Romano, where it is still to be seen. This graffito contains a blasphemous caricature of our Lord Jesus Christ; a caricature designed only a few years after the first preaching of the gospel in Rome by the Apostles. Our Lord is represented with the head of a donkey, tied to the cross, with the feet resting on a horizontal piece of board. To the left of the cross there is the Christian youth Alexamenos, with arms raised in adoration of his crucified God, and the whole composition is illustrated and explained by the legend, 'Alexamenos worships his God,'" (pp. 121, 122.) This graffito probably antedates any that have been discovered in the Catacombs, and bears unimpeachable testimony to the early introduction of Christianity into "Cæsar's household"; and further, that the Christ believed in by these primitive Christians was a Christ crucified, and yet a Christ truly and properly God.

In concluding this brief review of the work before us, I would say the book is just what its title, "Ancient Rome in the Light of Recent Discoveries," would indicate. The information it imparts is thoroughly trustworthy, as it is largely information derived from the personal observation of one properly trained for the work he has undertaken. The conclusions reached are evidently the result of sober thought and careful study, and the record of discovery is brought down to the present time. The work is not a translation, in the ordinary sense of that word, but was written by Professor Lanciani in English; and, remembering that English is not his native tongue, in remarkably good English, and in a very readable, pleasant style.

GEO. D. ARMSTRONG.

IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHURCH HISTORY. Vol. I. *Edited by Rev. S. M. Jackson, M. A., Secretary.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

This ample volume is of great value for two reasons: First, it contains a series of papers by such widely known authors as Dr. Schaff, Henry C. Lea, Dr. Moffatt, Dr. McGiffert and others, on themes of the greatest interest and importance, as "Toleration Edicts and the Progress of Religious Freedom from A. D. 313 to 1787," "Indulgences in Spain," "A Crisis in the Middle Ages," "The New Testament Canon of Eusebius," etc. But, secondly, and much more, it is the first series of a society "formed for the purpose of cultivating church history as a science in an unsectarian, catholic spirit, and for facilitating personal intercourse among students of history as a means of mutual encouragement." It goes without saying that such an organization, its work made permanent and available to others by frequent publications, will be of rare advantage to those immediately connected with it, and will give a stimulus to independent study and investigation that will immeasurably enlarge this important department of theological learning.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE HARMONIZED AND ITS RATIONALITY VINDICATED. *By John Steinforth Kedney, D. D., Professor of Divinity in Seabury Divinity School.* New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1889.

An Episcopal paper has lately uttered the sad lament that its clergy have produced so little in the department of theological literature that they must needs have recourse to the able and learned productions of thinkers of some of the "despised sects" for their knowledge, especially of systematic divinity. The work before us does not supply the void. It is an attempted defence of doctrine rather than system of doctrine. The author appears to be essentially orthodox in his faith, and places due value upon the important doctrines of God, sin and redemption. His style, however, is obscure and faulty. The attempt to demonstrate and enforce Christian doctrine on transcendental grounds naturally tends to such abstruseness and obscurity as one finds here.

RECOGNITION AFTER DEATH. *By the Rev. J. Aspinwall Hodge, D. D.* 16mo, pp. 184. Cloth, \$1. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1889.

In the present agitation of the subject of the soul's condition after death but little has been said on that phase of it which this little book considers, and yet there is no subject more interesting or attractive to the true believer, or more comforting to those who mourn the death of loved ones. The author has stated the grounds upon which he bases the belief in heavenly recognition, discussed the methods by which this recognition will be practicable, and answered the objections usually urged against the doctrine. All this he has done in a manner which will commend itself to every reader as being free from the controlling influences of sympathy or sentiment, and as being thoroughly scriptural and reasonable. The pastor will find it most helpful in suggesting words of comfort to the bereaved.

OUR CELESTIAL HOME: AN Astronomer's View of Heaven. *By Jermain G. Porter, A. M., Director of the Cincinnati Observatory.* 16mo, pp. 116. Cloth, \$1. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1888.

An attempt to "locate" heaven. The author is a practical astronomer and considers the subject in the light of astronomical science and the light of the most recent investigations and discoveries in the field of stellar physics. His conclusion is that there is no insuperable argument against heaven being within the bounds of the astral universe. His discussion of the materiality of heaven would lead one to attribute to him gross views of the future state. He guards carefully against this, however, throughout the book. While many will disagree with him all along, none can find fault with the reverent spirit and thoughtful mind of the author.

DAVID: HIS LIFE AND TIMES. Pp. viii., 222.

SAMUEL AND SAUL: THEIR LIVES AND TIMES. Pp. vii., 213.

DANIEL: HIS LIFE AND TIMES. Pp. viii., 203.

The first two volumes by *Rev. William J. Deane, M. A., Rector of Ashen, Essex*; the third by *H. Deane, B. D., formerly Vicar of St. Giles, Oxford, and sometime Hebrew Lecturer of Wadham College, and Grinfield Lecturer in the University of Oxford.* Each volume 12mo. Cloth, \$1.00. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1889.

These volumes are a valuable and worthy addition to the publishers' "Men of the Bible" Series. They embrace vastly more than the size of the books would indicate. A fine yet clear and easy type is used, that enables the publishers to give very much able thought and discussion in small compass.

The author of DAVID, Israel's ideal king, has a fruitful theme for his book, and he pursues it with great ability and acumen, presenting most fairly the unfavorable as well as the favorable in that great king's checkered career. Of his crimes the author says: "Never greater was a fall, never more utter a repentance. Marvellous was the faith which from the abyss of guilt could turn to God in steadfast hope of restoration." As shepherd, courtier, soldier, leader, king, psalmist, husband and father, he is portrayed as "in all relations eminent, blameworthy at times, but in all cases remarkable, and worthy of and requiring the deepest study."

The SAMUEL AND SAUL is also of thrilling interest from the happy grouping of the events connected with the lives of these men, the one so great and good, the other so great and yet so unhappy and sinful. The relations between the two were so intimate that the author has done well not to attempt a separate consideration of their careers.

In DANIEL the author has drawn most largely from every possible source of information concerning the condition of the Jews and their conquerors in the age in which the captive prophet lived. In this way he has given a work which is most valuable, aside from its purely biographical or expository character.

THE PEERLESS PROPHECY; or, The Life and Times of John the Baptist. *By Archibald McCullagh, D. D., author of "Beyond the Stars."* 16mo. Pp. 146. Cloth. \$1. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1889.

The author believes that John the Baptist has not received that attention in biblical literature to which he is entitled, both on account of the unique position which

he occupied in the history of the order of divine revelation and the grandeur of his personal character. This book is the outcome of that conviction. The author first gives a brief description of Palestine and a short sketch of Jewish history of the period between the Old and the New Testaments. In this historic setting or frame he places the "Peerless Prophet," under the chapters, "The Angelic Announcement," "The Birth of John the Baptist," "The New Prophet," "Preaching in the Wilderness," "The First Meeting of John and Jesus," "Imprisonment, Despondency and Doubt," "The Martyrdom of John." The volume is too small to enter very largely into many of the deeper questions connected with John, as his relation to the prophecies concerning Elias, the nature of his baptism, etc., but will still be found useful and suggestive.

LIVES OF THE FATHERS: Sketches of Church History in Biography. *By Frederic W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Archdeacon of Westminster; Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen.* In two volumes. Pp. xxii., 582, and vi., 556. \$5. London and New York: MacMillan & Co. 1889.

These sumptuous volumes are a history of the first four centuries of the Christian era, as the events of that age clustered around those men whose names and deeds tower above others of their day, and are the embodiment to us of the church's life and thought during the period in which they lived. Ignatius, Polycarp, Irenæus, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Cyprian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine,—these and others like them are to us almost the very church itself of their day. Their lives were almost the life of the church. It was in their time, and largely at their hands, that the great doctrines of the early church were settled and firm foundations laid for her subsequent development. The author must needs handle doctrine as well as life in portraying these great characters. He does this in a way that will commend itself to all as fair and liberal. He does not allow the facts to be warped by his own predilections. This is especially true in his treatment of the question of the apostolic succession, where he clearly indicates his belief, and shows by his study of the Fathers that originally the presbyter and bishop were one, and that it was not by apostolic authority or institution, but as a result of the exigencies of the times, "that the Episcopal system came into being, and that the Bishop of Rome became primate of the West." It need not be added that the author's style is characteristically crystalline in its clearness, and so engaging that one is entranced with it.

A VISIT OF JAPHETH TO SHEM AND HAM. *By Samuel A. Mutchmore, D. D.* 12mo, pp. 569; cloth, \$1.50. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1889.

This book of travels is as different from all others with which we are familiar as the title is unlike theirs. It is a suggestive title, but not altogether accurate, as one-half the book is an account of Japheth's visit to Japheth, and the other half, except one short chapter, of Japheth's visit to Shem. The author travelled through Europe and Asia with his eyes open and his mind well equipped, and his heart full of love for souls. The religious aspects of the regions he visited are presented with special care and interest. It would be hard to find in any book more delightful chapters than those which he devotes to the mission work in Syria. Writing these travels first for the paper of which he is an editor, he made them bright and attractive. They are as entertaining as a story-book, and are well worth the more substantial form now given them by the publishers.

THE FATE OF THE INNOCENTS: A Romance of the Crusades. *By Margaret E. Winslow, author of "Three Girls in Italy," etc.* 12mo, pp. 336. Cloth, \$1.25. Phila.: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. 1889.

One of the most thrilling stories of middle age history is that of the Crusade of the Children. It has been told often already in a fragmentary way, but in the present delightful volume the author has gathered all the available legends and traditions of this pathetic episode and has wrought them into one connected account. The story is told in the form of chronicles. A thread of romance runs through the whole and binds it together, giving it a tender and sustained interest. The book is valuable for its life-like portraiture of the crusading times. Young people will find it intensely interesting and inspiring.

AN INDUCTIVE LATIN METHOD. *By William R. Harper, Ph. D., Professor in Yale University, and Isaac B. Burgess, A. M., Latin Master in Rogers' High School, Newport, R. I.* 12mo, pp. viii., 323. New York and Chicago: Ivison, Blake-man & Company. 1888.

AN INDUCTIVE GREEK METHOD. *By William R. Harper, Ph. D., Professor in Yale University, and William E. Waters, Ph. D., Cincinnati, Ohio.* 12mo, pp. viii., 355. Same publishers.

Each book contains, besides the Preface, in which the authors' method is described, Suggestions to Teachers, Lessons, The Text, of a part of Cæsar in one book and of Anabasis in the other, Literal and Free Translations, Word-lists, and a Vocabulary. By the skillful use of type, the Lessons are made so plain and simple that any mind can grasp them.

The books are an adaptation of the well-known method of the distinguished Yale Professor to the study of the classical Latin and Greek. That method has been already fully described in more than one place in this journal. It may be stated briefly to be that method by which, instead of beginning with the grammar, the student begins with the language itself, and makes his grammar as he goes. The author's design is to give, first, facts; secondly, principles gathered from these facts by a natural grouping of them; and thirdly, application. That this method has been marvellously successful in the study of the Hebrew, no one doubts. Its adaptation to New Testament Greek has been so recent that it cannot yet be determined what its effect will be there. The volume before us will soon decide the question as to whether the inductive method is confined in its advantages to those who have once studied the languages, or will be found of the same great benefit to the beginner, the youthful as well as the more matured student. The method is worthy of a faithful test, and these books are recommended to all who would make it.

VIEWS AFOOT; or, Europe Seen with Knapsack and Staff. *By Bayard Taylor.* With a Preface by N. P. Willis. Large 12mo. Pp. 481. Cloth, 50 cents. New York: John B. Alden. 1889.

This perennially popular book of travels, written so long ago, is made more popular still by its appearance in this edition at so low a price, and yet in such handsome form. The vast stream of similar books that has poured from the press since Bayard Taylor's first saw light, and that this latter day ease in travelling renders an actual flood, will never displace the old favorite. With all the ardor of our boyhood days we welcome him again.