

THE
SOUTHERN
PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW:

CONDUCTED BY
AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS,

IN
COLUMBIA, SOUTH-CAROLINA.

VOLUME VII.—MDCCLIV.

COLUMBIA, S. C.
PRINTED BY I. C. MORGAN.
1854.

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SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

NUMBER I.

JULY, MDCCCLIII.

ARTICLE I.

The Principles of Moral and Political Economy.—By
WILLIAM PALEY, D. D.

Dr. Paley's system of Moral Philosophy, like most other modern treatises upon the subject, is divided into two general parts. The first discusses the *theory* of morals, the other comprises the *rules* of life; the first is *speculative*, and the other *practical*. His design, in the theoretical or speculative part, is to determine the nature and criterion of right, to trace moral distinctions to their source, and evolve a principle which shall enable us to settle our duty in all the circumstances in which we may be placed. With him, accordingly, the theory of morals bears very much the same relation to practice as subsists between theory and practice in other sciences. His rules are all applications of his speculative principles, and his speculative principles have evidently been adjusted with a view to their practical results.

There are obviously three questions which every complete system of moral philosophy must undertake to answer. 1. How we come to be possessed of the notions of right and wrong?—whether by that faculty which perceives the distinction betwixt truth and falsehood, or by a peculiar power of perception, which is incapable of any further analysis? 2. In what the distinctions betwixt right and wrong essentially consist?—or what is the quality, or qualities, in consequence of which we pronounce some things to be right and others wrong?

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3. What are the actions that are right,—the things that must be done or avoided?

The two first questions exhaust the subject of theoretical morals; the last comprises the whole province of practical duty. The first two questions Dr. Paley answers in the first two books of his treatise. The remaining three are devoted to the third. In the first two he unfolds the *science*, in the other three the *art*, of a virtuous life.

The method pursued in the speculative part is, after a definition of Moral Philosophy, first, to show the *necessity* of some scientific system, in order to ascertain an adequate and perfect rule of life, and then, from the phenomena of our moral nature, to *deduce* and *construct* such a system. The end which Dr. Paley has steadily in view is the *discovery of a perfect rule of life*; and the only claim which, in his judgment, can commend moral philosophy to our attention, is the claim to teach us our duty, our whole duty, and the reasons of it. If it cannot discharge this office, it is, in his eyes, nothing worth. Philosophy, as a reflective exercise of reason upon the phenomena of consciousness,—an effort to reduce our knowledge to unity by seizing upon the principles and evolving the laws which regulate it,—seems to be entirely ignored by him. Philosophy with him aspires to no more exalted function than to explain the theory upon which practical rules depend. It is simply the antithesis of art. Hence his definition—“Moral Philosophy is that science which teaches men their duty and the reasons of it.”* It is related to life, as the science of agriculture to the business of the farmer, or the science of navigation to the business of a sailor. It prescribes rules, and tells us why they should be observed.

Its end or office being thus exclusively practical, he proceeds to show the importance of such a science, by exposing the inadequacy of the rules that men are likely to adopt for the regulation of their conduct, if not instructed by philosophy. This is done in the first five chapters of the first book. These rules he makes to be

* Book I, chap. i.

the law of honour, the law of the land, and the Scriptures. To these may be added conscience; for, although Dr. Paley does not formally mention it as a rule, in connection with the others, it is clear, from his chapter upon it, that he contemplated it in that light, and regarded it as no less defective than the laws of honour, of the land, and of the Scriptures. There are certainly men who profess to be governed by the dictates of conscience; and if these dictates are an adequate and perfect rule of life, there is no use, according to Dr. Paley's conception of its office, of such a science as Moral Philosophy. His vindication, accordingly, of the science which he proposes to expound, implies that, *without it*, there are no means of arriving to a complete standard of duty. We shall be left to guides that are unsatisfactory and uncertain. The practical tendencies of his mind are here very conspicuously displayed. Instead of attempting to prove, from the nature of the case, that science *must* furnish the rules of art, and that no art can be considered as perfect until the theory of its operations is understood and developed, he takes a survey of human life, notes the laws which different classes profess to obey, and exposes their incompetency to answer the ends of human existence. His argument is briefly this: We need and must have a science of morals; because experience shows that, independently of it, men are liable to serious mistakes in regard to their duty. No rule, not derived from it, has ever yet been perfect. He then assumes that the rules already mentioned exhaust the expedients of man in settling the way of life.

The vindication of moral philosophy, upon the ground that all other means of compassing a perfect rule of life are defective, most evidently takes for granted, that *it* can supply the defect,—that *it* can teach us, and teach us with at least comparative completeness, the whole duty of man. In the second book, accordingly, Dr. Paley undertakes to evince its competency to this end, by evolving a principle from which an adequate and satisfactory solution of all moral questions may be extracted. It is here that he determines the great problems of speculative morals, concerning the nature and origin of our

moral cognitions. Here, then, we must look for his system of moral philosophy.

From this general view it will be seen that the first book is an answer to the question, do we need a science of morals? The second book an answer to the question, is the need which is felt supplied by such a science? If this be, however, the order of thought, the discussions of the first book should have closed with the fifth chapter. The sixth and seventh chapters of that book are out of their logical order. The seventh chapter should have concluded the discussions of the second book, and the sixth chapter, in its present form, should have been omitted altogether, as having no conceivable connection with aught that precedes or follows. That a man should make the tendency to promote happiness the very essence of virtue, and a corresponding tendency to promote misery the very essence of vice, and then gravely conclude, after an enumeration of the various elements that constitute happiness, "that vice has no advantage over virtue,"* even on the score of expediency, is a real curiosity in the history of literature. Dr. Paley's whole system proceeds on the assumption that happiness is the chief good of man. Virtue and vice are respectively determined to be such by their relations to this as an end. A discussion, then, of happiness, which should have been in harmony with the rest of his system, ought to have included such an enumeration of its elements as would show, at a glance, that it was the privilege of the virtuous only. As being the end of virtue, its tendencies to that end should have been made conspicuous and manifest. But nothing of this sort has been attempted. The chapter contains little more than judicious and wholesome reflections, preceded by low and degrading views of the comparative worth and dignity of pleasures, upon the best methods of getting through life with tolerable comfort. It adds nothing to the work, and might be subtracted from it without the slightest diminution of its integrity, as a scientific treatise. It is a mere interpolation.

Having settled, in the second book, his speculative

* Book I, chap. vi., sub. fin.

doctrines, Dr. Paley proceeds to a classification and detailed consideration of human duties, which occupies the remainder of his treatise. These he divides, in conformity with prevailing usage, into three general heads: 1. Duties to our neighbor, or relative duties. 2. Duties to ourselves; and, 3. Duties to God. Relative duties he again subdivides into three classes: 1. Those which are determinate, and are consequently embraced under the category of justice; 2. Those which are indeterminate, and are embraced under the category of benevolence; and, 3. Those which spring from the constitution of the sexes.

Having given this general outline of his treatise, what I now propose is to subject his theory of morals to a critical examination, and then make some remarks upon what seems to be objectionable in some of the details of the work.

The fundamental principle of his system is contained in the answer to the question, what is that *quality* in consequence of which we pronounce an action to be right? This he makes to be *utility*, or its tendency to promote happiness. "Whatever is expedient is right." The process by which he is conducted to this conclusion is brief and simple. He begins with an analysis of moral obligation, and in order that his account of it may be exact and discriminating, he first inquires into the essence of obligation in general, and then proceeds to expound moral obligation in particular.

Obligation, in general, he resolves into a strong sense of interest, prompting obedience to the commands of a superior. "We can be obliged to nothing,"* he openly avows, "but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by; for nothing else can be a violent motive to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws of the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other, depended on our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practice virtue, or to obey the commands of God." A strong sense of interest, then, which Dr. Paley denominates "a violent motive," is

* Book II., chap. ii.

essential to obligation. But is every appeal to our hopes and fears, every prospect of advantage, or every apprehension of calamity, to be considered as creating an obligation? Are obligation and inducement, in other words, synonymous terms? Dr. Paley answers that they are generically the same, but specifically different. Obligation is a particular species of inducement—that species which results from the command of a superior, or of one who is able to curse or to bless. This circumstance, that it results from command, or is the expression of authority, is what differences duty from every other form of interest. Hence his articulate definition of obligation in general postulates inducement as the genus, and the command of a superior as the specific difference. “A man is said to be obliged, when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another.”*

The peculiarity of *moral* obligation, as contradistinguished from obligation in general, consists in the person who prescribes the command, and the nature of the motive to obey. In this case, He who commands is God, and the motive to obedience is drawn from the future world,—the hope of everlasting happiness, or the dread of everlasting misery. Moral obligation may, accordingly, be defined as that strong sense of interest, or “violent motive,” prompting us to obey the commands of God, and arising from a conviction of endless retributions beyond the grave.

The doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is consequently fundamental in Dr. Paley's system. There can be prudence, but no virtue, without it. An action becomes right only by its relation to our future interests. What *binds*, what presses as a violent motive, what creates the sense of duty, is the hope of heaven or the fear of hell. “They who would establish,” says our author,† “a system of morality, independent of a future state, must look out for some different idea of moral obligation, unless they can show that virtue conducts the possessor to certain happiness in this life, or to a much greater share of it than he could attain by a different behaviour.”

* Book II., chap. ii.

† Book II., chap. iii.

From this analysis of moral obligation, it appears that the will of God is the matter, and the retributions of a future state the form of it; that is, the will of God determines *what* we are bound to do, and our everlasting interests *why* we are bound; or, as Dr. Paley expresses it, "private happiness is our motive, and the will of God our rule."

The will of God being the standard or measure of right, the question naturally arises, how is the will of God to be ascertained? The answer is, by inquiring into the tendency of an action to promote or diminish the general happiness. Utility is the exponent of the Divine will, as the Divine will is the exponent of right. Whatever is expedient God commands, and whatever God commands is morally obligatory. Dr. Paley regards his doctrine of expediency as only the statement, in another form, of the Divine benevolence. To say that God wills the happiness of his creatures, is, with him, equivalent to saying that whatever is expedient is right; and, accordingly, the only proof which he alleges of this fundamental doctrine of his theory, is his proof of the benevolence of God. "The method," says he,* "of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of the action to promote or diminish the general happiness. This rule proceeds upon the presumption that God Almighty wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures, and consequently that those actions which promote that will and wish must be agreeable to him,—and the contrary."—Too much praise can hardly be awarded to his vindication of the benevolence of God; it is neat, clear, conclusive, presented in two different forms, in neither of which can it fail to produce conviction.†

From this brief analysis, Dr. Paley's whole theory of morals may be compendiously compressed in a single syllogism. Whatever God commands is right or obligatory. Whatever is expedient God commands. Therefore, whatever is expedient is right. The major proposition rests upon his analysis of moral obligation—the minor upon the proof of the Divine benevolence, and

* Book II., chap iv.

† Book II., chap. v.

the substance of all is given in his remarkable definition of virtue, which, logically, should have followed the exposition of expediency. "Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness."* The matter of virtue is expediency, which becomes right or obligatory, because it is commanded by God, and supported by the awful sanctions of the future world.

In estimating the merits of Dr. Paley's theory, two points must be particularly attended to, as these are the cardinal points of his argument,—his analysis of moral obligation, as yielding the result that the will or command of God is the sole measure of rectitude,—and his vindication of expediency, as an universal measure of the Divine will from the Divine benevolence. Upon his success or failure here depends the success or failure of his treatise.

Is an action, then, right, simply because God commands it, and that upon pain of eternal death? Is it the *command* which makes it to be right, or is its being right the cause of the command? According to Dr. Paley, it is right, *because* commanded. According to the common sense of mankind, it is commanded because it is right. If it is the will of God which creates the distinction between right and wrong, the difficulty which Dr. Paley felt, and which he has endeavored to obviate, † would manifestly embarrass all our judgments in regard to the moral character of the Divine administrations. "It *would* be an identical proposition to say of God that He acts right;"—a contradiction in terms to say that He could, by any possibility, *act wrong*. We cannot escape the conviction—it is forced upon us by the constitution of our nature—that there is a rectitude in actions, antecedently to any determinations of will, and that this rectitude is the formal cause of their authoritative injunction upon the part of God. To this eternal standard we appeal when we vindicate the ways of God to man. We do not mean, as Dr. Paley suggests, when we pronounce the dispensations of Providence to be right, that they are merely consistent with themselves,—for that is

*Book I., chap. vii.

† Book II., chap. ix.

the substance of his explanation,—but that they are consistent with a law which we feel to be co-extensive with intelligent existence. Right and wrong are not the creatures of arbitrary choice. They are not made by the *will*, but spring essentially from the *nature* of God. He is holy, and therefore his volitions are just and good.

According to Dr. Paley, a different arrangement of the adaptations of the universe would have changed the applications of all moral phraseology, and made that to be right which is now wrong, and that to be wrong which is now right. There is no other difference in the properties expressed by these words than the relation in which they stand to our own happiness. For aught that appears, God *might* command falsehood, perjury, murder and impiety,—and then *they* would be entitled to all the commendations of the opposite virtues. Actions and dispositions are nothing in themselves; they are absolutely without any moral character,—without any moral difference, until some expression of the Divine will is interposed. It is not till God enjoins it, and it becomes connected with everlasting happiness or misery, that an action or disposition acquires moral significance. Such sentiments contradict the intuitive convictions of the race; and he grievously errs who imagines that he is exalting the will of the Supreme Being, or reflecting a higher glory upon the character of God, by representing all moral distinctions as the accidental creatures of arbitrary choice. If no other account can be given of the excellence and dignity of virtue, than that God *happened* to choose it, and to take it under His patronage and favour, we may call vice *unfortunate*, but we can never condemn it as *base*.

We must, consequently, go beyond the Divine command for the true foundation of the moral differences of things,—but, as we cannot ascend beyond the Deity himself, we must stop at the perfections of the Divine character. It is because God is *what* he is, that he chooses virtue and condemns vice; and it is because he is what he is *necessarily*, that the distinctions betwixt right and wrong are eternal and immutable. His will is determined by his nature, and his nature is as necessary as his being. His will, consequently, has a law in

the essential holiness of his character; and that essential holiness is the ultimate ground, the *fons et origo* of all moral distinctions.

But while it is denied that the will of God *creates* the differences betwixt right and wrong, it is not maintained that his will does not adequately express the rule of duty. If Dr. Paley had asserted nothing more than that the Divine command was a perfect *measure* of human obligation, no exception could have been taken to his statement. But he obviously meant much more than this; he meant to affirm, in the most unequivocal manner, that the sole distinction betwixt virtue and vice was the arbitrary product of will. It is true that he subsequently insists upon their respective tendencies, but these cannot be regarded as the ultimate reasons of the Divine volitions. All beings are from God, and all the adaptations and adjustments which obtain among them, by virtue of which some are useful and others hurtful, are as much the offspring of His will, as their individual existence. Utility finds its standard in His determinations. It is because He has chosen to invest things with such and such properties, and to fix them in such and such relations to each other, that any place is found for a difference of tendencies. A different order and a different constitution would have completely reversed the present economy. Will, therefore, as mere arbitrary, absolute choice, is the sole cause why things are as they are,—why some things are useful and others hurtful,—some right and others wrong.

Still this error in the analysis of moral obligation does not materially affect the argument. Dr. Paley could have been conducted to his favourite dogma of expediency as well by maintaining that the will of God is the *measure* of duty, as by maintaining that it is the source or ultimate principle of all moral distinctions. What his case needed was simply the proposition that we are bound to do all that God requires, and that nothing but what he requires can be imperative upon us. His will—no matter what determines it, or whether it is determined by anything out of itself,—His will is our law. To this proposition no reasonable exception can be taken—and hence it may be cheerfully admitted, “that to inquire

what is our duty, or what we are obliged to do in any instance, is, in effect, to inquire, what is the will of God in that instance?"

It is in the solution of this inquiry that we encounter the central principle of Dr. Paley's theory. If his reasoning here be conclusive, however we may object to his analysis of obligation, we are shut up to the adoption of his favourite maxim—that whatever is expedient is right. The only argument which he pretends to allege in vindication of this sweeping dogma, is drawn from the benevolence of God; and yet that argument—though I do not know that the blunder has ever been articulately exposed—is a logical fallacy, an illicit process of the minor term. What he had proved in his chapter on Divine benevolence is, that God wills the happiness of his creatures. What he has collected from his analysis of obligation is, that whatever God wills is right. Put these premises together, and they yield a syllogism in the third figure, from which Dr. Paley's conclusion can by no means be drawn.

Whatever God wills is expedient.

Whatever God wills is right.

Therefore, says Dr. Paley, whatever is expedient is right,—an illicit process of the minor term. Therefore, is the true conclusion, *some* things that are expedient are right,—the third figure always concluding particularly.

The secret of Dr. Paley's blunder is easily detected. He confounded the original proposition, which his proof of the Divine benevolence had yielded, with its simple converse, and was consequently led to treat the latter as exactly equipollent to the former. What he had proved was, that God wills the happiness of his creatures. This is all that can be collected from benevolence. It simply settles the question, that whatever may be the number and variety of the things that constitute the objects of the Divine volition, they are all characterized by the quality—that they contribute, in some way, to the public good. They are all conceived in kindness and executed in love. God, in other words, never wills anything that is essentially hurtful or prejudicial to the highest interests of his creatures. Whatever He commands is conducive to their welfare. But to say that *whatever He wills*

is conducive to the general happiness, is a very different thing from saying that *whatever conduces* to the general happiness He wills. It may be true that He wills *nothing* which is *not* expedient, and yet false that He wills *everything* which *is* expedient. The truth of the converse, in universal affirmative propositions, is seldom implied in the original dictum without limitation. Here was Dr. Paley's slip. Because God wills nothing that is not for our good, he took it for granted that He *must* will everything which is for our good. The *proper* converse of the proposition, that whatever God wills conduces to the general happiness, is the barren statement that *some* things which are expedient are willed by Him; or, in other words, that *some* things that are expedient are *right*. It is very remarkable that a portentous system of philosophy, which is distinguished by nothing more prominently than its open and flagrant contradictions to the common sense of the race, and its glaring falsifications of the characteristic phenomena of our moral nature, should lay its foundations in a palpable violation of the laws of thought. It begins in a blunder and ends in a lie. The benevolence of God is only a guarantee as to the nature and tendencies of whatever He may choose to effect or to enjoin upon us, but it is not a standard by which to determine beforehand upon what *particular* things His will shall pitch. In the boundless range of conceivable and possible good, there may be things characterized by the quality of expediency, which yet, on other accounts, are excluded from the Divine scheme. To be the benevolent ruler of the world implies no more than that the economy of Providence, which has been actually instituted, and is daily carried on, *excludes* all laws which are inconsistent with the highest interests of the subject, and *includes* a system of fixed and definite means, adapted to promote them. If God has a plan, the very conception of it involves the notion of rejection and choice. All the reasons, in one case or the other, can never be known to us. Some of the things rejected might have been turned to a good account. But how many soever of this class have been rejected, as not falling within the plan, the Divine benevolence renders it certain that the plan itself is good, and that all its ar-

rangements, if properly observed and heeded, tend to promote our happiness. Given a Divine volition, the argument of benevolence vindicates its usefulness; given expediency, the argument does not show that it is willed. Hence it is much safer to try expediency by the Divine will than to try the Divine will by expediency. God commands it—therefore it is good, is, materially considered, a sounder syllogism than It is good—therefore God commands it.

The argument from benevolence, however, is the only one which *any* advocate of expediency has ever been able to adduce. The fallacy in question is not a solitary blunder of the Arch-deacon of Carlisle. Among those who assume it as a fundamental principle that the happiness of the universe is the final cause of its existence—a principle, however, which never has been, and never can be established,—it has been uniformly taken for granted, that whatever is conducive to that happiness, must be an object of Divine volition. With them, to will its happiness is not simply to reject and prohibit what is inconsistent with it, and to institute a series of laws and means suited to promote it, but absolutely to aim at the production of everything that bears the impress of public good. How, upon this doctrine, the universe *can* be a whole, it is impossible to comprehend. If benevolence is obliged to achieve *every* thing by which the happiness of *any* creature can be promoted, it would lose itself in the infinite region of possible good. If it is to have no discretion, no right to discriminate, to choose or reject,—if *every* candidate who can bring credentials of utility and convenience *must* be received into favour, the notion of a plan—a scheme—a government—must at once be abandoned. Upon what an ocean would this doctrine set us afloat? If benevolence is the *sole* measure and standard of the Divine will—the greatest happiness of the greatest number the only end of universal being—why have not more creatures been made? Why have not other orders been introduced? These additions to the stock of being would certainly enlarge the domain of happiness. Reflections of this sort should convince us, that whenever we undertake to speculate upon the constitution of nature, independently of the guidance of

experience,—when we undertake to pronounce dogmatically upon the whole end and aim of the Divine dispensation,—we get beyond our depth. We may confound a crotchet with a principle—mistake a cloud for a Divinity. It is palpable to common sense that all which we can legitimately make from the benevolence of God is a security against mischief and malice in his government. He will choose *only* the expedient; but *what* expedient things, must be left to His own wisdom. He comprehends His own plan; and only those things, however useful, which fall in with the harmony of the *whole*, will be selected and adopted. When, therefore, the question is asked, What does God will? we cannot answer it, from considerations of expediency. We cannot say, He wills this or that, because this or that is fitted to promote the happiness of His creatures. There may be reasons why the things in question should be rejected or prohibited, *notwithstanding* their utility. Benevolence does not supersede the other perfections of the Divine nature, and if it is limited and conditioned by wisdom, justice, truth, or other attributes of God, then it is clear that it never can be taken as a complete and adequate exponent of the Divine will. To *condition* its manifestations, in any manner or degree, is to limit the proposition, that *whatever* is expedient is willed.

If the distinction had been observed—a distinction obvious in itself, and resulting from the very laws of thought,—betwixt what the benevolence of God really implies, and what the advocates of expediency have assumed it to imply,—betwixt the original proposition and its simple converse,—this ill-omened theory never could have been ventilated. It *assumes* that the benevolence of God is a bare, single, exclusive disposition to produce happiness,—it *proves* that this is *one* of the dispositions which enter into and characterize the Divine Administration; it assumes that benevolence is simple and absolute, the only principle which reigns in the universe,—it *proves* that God is good, and never can inflict gratuitous mischief upon his creatures; it assumes that God wills *nothing* but the happiness of his creatures—it proves that *whatever* God wills shall contribute to their good; it assumes, in short, that whatever is

expedient is right,—it proves that whatever is right is expedient.

That benevolence is the *absolute* principle of the Divine nature—as it cannot be proved inductively from the manifestations of goodness in the universe, so it cannot be demonstrated from any necessary laws of belief. Induction gives us the result, that God is good; but limits, modifies, and conditions the exercise of his goodness, by laws and arrangements that clearly indicate the existence of other attributes, and other attributes by no means subordinate to goodness. We see that happiness is not dispensed without regard to character and conduct. Nature speaks as loudly of justice as of love. Neither, again, is there any process by which we can reduce the manifestations of other attributes to the simple principle of love. We cannot see how *this*, as absolute, implies them,—we cannot comprehend how they are developed from it. There is no law of thought which can reduce to the unity of a single appearance these various phenomena. Accordingly, we are not warranted in asserting that simple, absolute benevolence is the only character of the Author of Nature. To our observation, it is neither simple nor absolute, since it is limited and conditioned. The assumption, consequently, upon which the entire fabric of expediency depends, not only has not been proved, but from the nature of the case, *never can* be proved. If it were even true in itself, it belongs to a sphere of knowledge lying beyond the reach of our faculties; and to us, therefore, it must always be as if it were false.

But more than this—the scheme of expediency, in any and every aspect of it, involves a complete falsification of the moral phenomena of human nature. It does not explain, but contradicts them; it is not the philosophy of what actually passes, but of what might be conceived to pass within us,—not the philosophy of man as he is, but of man as its advocates would have him to be. The point at issue, in this aspect of the case, is whether that which constitutes the rightness of an action,—which makes us feel it to be obligatory and approve it as praiseworthy,—be its tendency to promote public happiness, so that, independently of the perception of this

tendency, we should experience none of those emotions with which we contemplate virtue and duty.

1. This, as a question of fact, must be settled by an appeal to consciousness; and we confidently aver that the true state of the case is precisely the reverse of that which is here assumed. It is not utility which suggests the sense of duty; it is the sense of duty which creates the conviction of utility. The connection betwixt virtue and happiness is only the statement, in another form, of that profound impression of moral government, which is stamped upon all men by the operations of conscience. It is the articulate enunciation of the sense of responsibility. The dictates of conscience are always felt to be *commands* of God. They address us in the language of *authority* and *law*. But a law without sanctions is a contradiction in terms. Conscience, consequently, must have its sanctions, and these sanctions, accordingly, are both implicitly suggested and explicitly revealed; implicitly suggested, in that sense of security which results from the consciousness of having pleased the lawgiver, or that uneasiness and restless anxiety which result from the consciousness of contradicting his will; explicitly revealed, in the sense of good or ill desert, which is an inseparable element of every moral judgment. This sense of good and ill desert is a declaration of God that he will reward the righteous and punish the wicked—it is an immediate manifestation to consciousness of the fact of moral government. Antecedently to any calculations of utility, to any enlarged views of the good of the race, or to any inductions from the consequences of actions, without being able to comprehend why or how, we all feel an irresistible conviction that it shall, upon the whole, be well with the righteous and ill with the wicked, because we carry in our bosoms a revelation to this effect from the Author of our being. Virtue is pronounced to be expedient, because we are the subjects of a government of which virtue is the law. Our nature is a cheat—the conviction of merit and demerit a gross delusion, unless the consequences of obedience and disobedience are answerable to the expectations we are led to frame. Hence we associate, from the very dawn of reason, virtue and happiness, vice and misery. As soon

as the feeling is developed that we are under law, that we are responsible creatures, the conviction is awakened that we shall be rewarded or punished according to our behaviour,—that the consequences, in other words, of virtue *must* be good, and the consequences of vice disastrous. Our nature leads us, nay, compels us, to predict favourably of an upright course, and to augur evil of a life of transgression. Our appeal is to human experience. To perceive that an action is right, what is it but to feel that it is our duty to do it? To be conscious that we have done what is right, what is it but to feel that we have pleased the law-giver, and are entitled to his favour? What means the sense of merit, if it is not the *promise* of God that the obedient *shall* be rewarded? and a promise of this sort, what is it but a declaration from our Maker that virtue is the highest expediency? We do not object, therefore, to the close and intimate connection which the utilitarian makes to subsist betwixt virtue and happiness. We could not, without ignoring or absolutely denying all moral government, be blind to the fact that God has so constituted man and the universe, that he alone shall be finally and permanently happy, who makes righteousness his law, and faithfully discharges his duties. Conscience explicitly declares that the path of rectitude is the path of life. But what we object to is the order in which the utilitarian arranges these convictions. He makes the perception, or rather the feeling of duty, consequent upon the perception of expediency; whereas the belief of expediency is the natural offspring of the operations of conscience. It is a revelation of God through the structure of the soul.

From this account of the matter, it will be easy to obviate an argument upon which utilitarians are accustomed to rely, drawn from the circumstance, that, when pressed as to the reasons of a moral judgment in any given case, we are prone to enlarge upon the benefits of the action, or its tendencies to promote the public good. When we have exhibited its advantages, we feel that we have satisfied doubt, and confirmed our conclusion. Now, in all this there is nothing but the natural propensity to seek, in experience, for what a law of belief

indicates beforehand that we must find. Is a given action right? Then it is entitled to reward. We consequently *expect* that the consequences of it will be good: and what more natural than the effort to verify this expectation by an appeal to events? But that our conviction is not dependent upon experience appears from this: that when experience returns an unfavourable answer, as it often does in this life, we do not doubt the veracity of our conscience. We still feel that virtue *must* and *will* be rewarded, though we may not be able to tell how or where.

2. Another consideration which confirms the foregoing view, is the early age at which moral distinctions are recognised, and praise or blame awarded to human actions. Upon the hypothesis of the utilitarian, the conception of general happiness must precede, in the order of nature, the conviction of right; and as this conception can only be collected from a large survey of human life, as it requires no little experience and sagacity to perfect it, moral discriminations could not be made until the reason had been expanded and matured. Yet we know that children, long before they are capable of comprehending what is meant by the good of the universe, pronounce confidently upon the excellence or meanness of actions, and the merit or demerit of the agents. They manifest the same symptoms of indignation or approval, and utter the same language of praise or censure, which obtain among their superiors in years. They manifest the same sense of obligation, exult in the same consciousness of right, and are tortured with the same agony of remorse. It is clear that they apprehend the right, long before they can appreciate the expedient.

3. If the perception of utility, or beneficial tendency, is that which, in every instance, produces moral approbation, no reason can be given why this species of emotion is restricted exclusively to the principles and acts of voluntary agents. These, surely, are not the only things which are suited to produce benefit or harm. Many animals are possessed of instincts and capabilities which render them eminently subservient to the interests of man: The dog guards his dwelling—the labour of the ox unfolds the fertility of his fields—the ass bears his bur-

dens—and the horse aids him in his journeys. Inanimate objects, too,—especially the contrivances of mechanical skill and ingenuity,—may be of the highest importance to the progress and well-being of society. The printing press, the mariner's compass, the steam engine, the cotton gin,—it is enough to mention these to show that utility is not restricted to the voluntary acts of rational beings. Now, if moral approbation is nothing but the pleasure with which we contemplate the *useful*,—if what we mean by merit and demerit is simply the conviction of convenience or inconvenience,—it follows that we attribute to a horse or mule, a steamboat or a railway, the same praise which we attribute to the benevolent deeds of a *man*. They are as truly *virtuous*—they as really promote the general good of mankind. The printing press, on this hypothesis, is entitled to as much praise as Pericles or Washington—an earthquake or tornado should be held as equally guilty with a Borgia or a Catiline.

The absurdity of the conclusion is a sufficient proof of the falsehood of the premises. Virtue and vice are terms exclusively restricted to the actions or active principles of intelligent and voluntary agents; and the emotions with which we contemplate virtuous or vicious conduct, are essentially different from those which are excited by an unintelligent instrument of good or mischief. Hume saw and felt the force of this objection, but his attempt to rebut it is only an additional proof of its strength. He does not deny that inanimate objects may be useful, nor that their utility is a legitimate ground of approbation. What he affirms is, that the approbation attendant upon utility in the one case is accompanied or mixed with other affections, terminating exclusively on persons, while in the other case it is not. But the question is whether utility, *as utility*, is in each case the parent of a similar emotion. That being admitted, the emotions or affections excited by accidental adjuncts are wholly irrelevant. His illustration from colour and proportions is extremely unfortunate for his purpose. It is evident that colour and proportions are instruments of pleasure, whether found in a statue or a man. But in the latter case, beside the pleasure which they themselves give, they awaken other feelings of which they are not the proper objects. But still we call colour

and proportion by the *same name*, wherever they are found. Hume has confounded *concomitant* feelings with the emotions proper to utility as such. But that is to evade the point at issue. If utility, in itself considered, is the essence of virtue, we approve it, whether in man, beast or machine,—though the sentiment of approbation proper to the utility may be largely modified by other properties of the objects in which it is perceived to exist.

The foregoing considerations are fatal to the theory of expediency in *every* form. There are others which apply more particularly to that form of it which Dr. Paley has taken into favour. That his own principles may be clearly understood, it is necessary to premise that the patrons of the general doctrine of expediency may be divided into two great classes, according as they make the public good to be an ultimate end, or only a means of promoting individual and private interest. These classes are distinguished from each other by essential and radical differences. The first, which may be called the school of disinterested benevolence, admits the existence of a moral sense, and ascribes to it our perceptions of the beauty and excellence of benevolence, and our conviction of the obligation of it, as the all-pervading rule of life. Man, according to this scheme, is so constituted as to rejoice in the happiness of all sentient beings, *on its own account*, independently of any considerations of personal advantage or reward. He has a moral nature which teaches him that to do good is the end of his being, and under the guidance and direction of this nature he condemns or approves actions, dispositions and habits, according to the degree in which they hinder or promote the happiness of all. Virtue is, accordingly, restricted to a disinterested regard for the welfare of the universe.

The other, which may be called the selfish school, while it maintains that beneficial tendency is the criterion of the rectitude of actions, maintains as strenuously that the ground of the obligation to promote the public good is a regard to individual interest and advantage. A man is to seek the happiness of all, because, in seeking that, he secures his own.

This school has no occasion for a moral sense. All that it postulates in order to account for the peculiar

phenomena of our moral nature is a susceptibility of pleasure and pain, and those faculties by which we are rendered capable of experience. That is good which pleases—that is evil which offends—and he who can foresee what, upon the whole, shall give satisfaction, and what pain and misery, is furnished with all that is necessary for the discovery of moral rules. Moral reasoning is nothing but a calculation of personal consequences; the data of the calculation are the facts of experience. Given a being, therefore, who is capable of pleasure and pain, who desires the one and revolts from the other, who is able to compute the consequences of actions from the phenomena of experience,—a being, in other words, who can feel and calculate, and you have all that is requisite to a moral agent. Virtue, in this school, is simply that which shall secure the greatest amount of satisfaction to the possessor,—vice that which shall be attended with more inconvenience than pleasure; and as it so happens that doing good to mankind is found to be the most effectual method of doing good to ourselves, virtue, materially considered, consists in promoting the happiness of the race. It is benevolence sanctified by selfishness. Obligation, accordingly, is only a strong conviction of interest, arising from the fear of superior power. A right to command is nothing but ability to curse or bless. Hence right is the necessary companion of might, and duty and interest are one and the same. Self is the supreme end of existence to every sentient being.

That this school falsifies the phenomena of our moral nature, in every essential point, the slightest examination will abundantly show.

1. If the principles which it postulates are all that are necessary to a moral agent, brutes would be as truly moral agents as men. They are susceptible of pleasure and pain, of hope and fear. They can foresee, to some extent, the consequences of their actions. They can be trained and disciplined to particular qualities and habits. The government which man exercises over them is conducted upon the same principles with which, according to the selfish philosophers, the government of God is administered over man. It exactly answers to Dr. Paley's definition of a *moral* government,—except that he restricts it to *rea-*

sonable creatures, without any necessity from the nature of the case,—“any dispensation whose object is to influence the conduct of reasonable creatures.” A system of intimidation, coaxing and persuasion,—a discipline exclusively relying upon hope and fear,—this the horse can be subject to that fears the spur—the dog that cringes from a kick—any beast that can be trained by the whip. These animals obey their master from the same motive from which Dr. Paley would have a good man obey his God. Now, is there no peculiarity in our moral emotions but that which arises from hope and fear? Is there nothing that *man* feels, when he acknowledges the authority of law, which the brute does not also feel when he shrinks from the lash, or is allured by caresses? Is there not something which the desire of pleasure and the reluctance against pain, as mere physical conditions, are utterly inadequate to explain? We all feel that the brute differs from the man, and differs pre-eminently in this very circumstance, that though capable of being influenced by motives addressed to his hopes and fears, he is incapable of the notion of duty, of crime, or of moral obligation. He is a physical, but not a *moral* agent.

2. This theory, in the next place, contradicts the moral convictions of mankind, in making no distinction betwixt interest and duty, betwixt authority and might. Nothing *can* be obligatory, according to the articulate confession of Dr. Paley, but what we are to gain or lose by; and the only question I am to ask, in order to determine whether I am bound by the command of another, is whether he can hurt or bless me. His right depends upon his power, and my duty turns upon my weakness and dependence. If the devil, according to the case supposed in the Recognitions of Saint Clement, transformed into an angel of light, should promise to men more pleasing rewards than those propined to them by God, and should convince them of his power and willingness to bestow them, they would, upon Paley's principles, be under a moral obligation to serve the devil. If *any* being but their Creator could impart to them more desirable rewards than Himself, they would be bound to transfer their affections and allegiance from Him to the new god. The child whose parents are unable to distinguish him with wealth, and

prosperity, and honours, is under a moral obligation to forsake the father that begat him, and the mother that bore him, and to transfer his filial duties to any rich fool that might be willing to adopt him. If interest is duty, and power is right, natural ties, whether of blood or affection, considerations of justice and humanity, relations, original or adventitious, are all to be discarded, and every moral problem becomes only a frigid calculation of loss and gain. No elements are to be permitted to enter into its solution, which shall disturb the coolness of the mathematical computation. All moral reasoning is reduced to arithmetic, and a man's duty is determined by the sum at the foot of the account.

Now, if there be any two things about which the consciousness of mankind is clear and distinct, it is that there is a marked and radical difference betwixt interest and duty, right and might. The distinction obtains in all languages, and pervades every species of epithets, by which praise or blame is awarded to human actions.—The man who cannot distinguish in his own breast betwixt a sense of duty and a sense of interest, who regards all arguments addressed to the one as equally addressed to the other, who treats them as only different expressions of one and the same feeling, has either so enlarged his views that self-love operates in him in exact accordance with the laws of moral government,—that is, his conviction of the ultimate success and triumph of virtue is so firmly rooted and established, that the temporary successes of vice produce no effect upon his mind, in which state it might be difficult to discern between the influence of interest and conscience, exactly coinciding as they do in their results,—or he has corrupted and perverted sentiments which exist in every other heart, and without which the short-sighted views of interest that men are accustomed to take in this sublunary world would often eventuate in the most disastrous results. The common experience certainly is, that in appealing to interest and duty, I am appealing to *different* principles of action, of which one is superior in dignity, though it may be inferior in strength.

The distinction betwixt right and might, betwixt unjust usurpation and lawful authority, is manifestly something far deeper than the distinction betwixt a lower and high-

er interest. It is not the sword which justifies the magistrate—it is the magistrate which justifies the sword. The successful usurper, upon the principles of Dr. Paley, who is able to maintain his position, is to be obeyed as a just and lawful ruler. His power to injure or to bless brings the subjects under a moral obligation to submit to him—and as right and obligation are reciprocal, he must have a corresponding right to exact obedience. Unsuccessful resistance becomes, consequently, always treason or rebellion. The mere statement of these propositions is a sufficient eviction of their absurdity. All men feel that the *right to command* is one thing, the *power to hurt* another,—that there can be no *obligation* to obey, although it may be the dictate of policy, where *force* is the only basis of authority. The language of all men marks the difference betwixt the usurper and the lawful ruler, the tyrant and the just magistrate; and any system which ignores or explains away this natural and necessary distinction, contradicts the moral phenomena of our nature.

3. The theory of Paley is liable to still further exception, as taking no account of the conviction of good and ill desert, and the peculiar emotions which constitute and spring from the consciousness of guilt, or accompany the consciousness of right. The slightest attention to the operations of his own mind must satisfy every one that the approbation of virtue and the disapprobation of vice include much more than a simple sensation of pleasure, analogous to that which arises from the congruity of an object to an appetite, affection or desire. It is more than the pleasure which springs from the perception of utility, or of the fitness of means to accomplish an end. It is a *peculiar* emotion—an emotion which we are not likely to confound with any other phenomenon of our nature. It is a feeling that the agent, in a virtuous action, *deserves* to be rewarded, accompanied with the desire to see him rewarded, and the expectation that he will be rewarded. The agent in a vicious action, on the contrary, we feel is deserving of punishment, and we confidently expect that, sooner or later, he will receive his due. When we are conscious of well-doing in ourselves, we have a sense of security and peace, arising from the conviction that we are entitled to favor; and when conscious of wrong, we

condemn ourselves as worthy of punishment, and tremble at the apprehension that it will and must be inflicted. The agony of remorse consists in the consciousness that we have done wrong—that therefore we ought to be punished, and that therefore we shall be punished.—The sense of demerit, which involves the sense of the righteousness of punishment, is the pregnant source of all its horrors. It is this which distinguishes it from simple regret. Take away the conviction of merit and demerit, and there can be no such thing as rewards in contradistinction from good fortune,—no such thing as punishment in contradistinction to adversity. The foundation of justice is demolished. The penal code is an arbitrary dictate of policy,—crimes are converted into follies, and virtue into sagacity and cunning. A theory which annihilates the distinction between rewards and favours, between punishment and misfortune, is at war with the fundamental dictates of our nature. It sweeps away that very characteristic by which we are rendered capable of *government*, as distinct from *discipline*. It confounds remorse with simple regret, and the approbation of conscious rectitude with the pleasure which springs from the gratification of any other feeling or desire. It denies, in other words, that in any just and proper sense of the terms we can be denominated moral agents. The very element in the phenomenon which makes a judgment to be moral is left out or overlooked.

These objections are fatal to the system. That can neither be an adequate nor a true philosophy which omits some, and distorts others, of the phenomena which it proposes to explain. He that stumbles in his account of obligation—the great central fact of our moral nature—divests his speculations of all pretensions to the dignity of science.

4. But it deserves further to be remarked, that the theory in question, especially as expounded by Dr. Paley, makes no manner of difference, as to their general nature, betwixt the obligation to virtue and a temptation to vice. There is nothing in either case but a *strong* inducement, derived from appearances of good. A violent motive, we are told, is the genus and the command of a superior, the specific difference of obligation. The violent motive, the genus, is found in temptation; the specific difference is

wanting. Hence, temptation is clearly a species co-ordinate with duty. The bad man is enticed by his lusts, and yields to those passions which promise him enjoyment,—his end is pleasure. The good man is allured by computations which put this same pleasure at the foot of the account. They are consequently governed by the same general motive, and the only difference betwixt them is that the one has a sounder judgment than the other.—They have equally obeyed the same law of pleasure, but have formed a different estimate of the pursuits and objects that shall yield the largest amount of gratification. Temptation, accordingly, may be called an obligation to vice, and duty a temptation to virtue.* Who does not feel that the difference is more than accidental betwixt these states of the mind; that the motives to virtue and the seductions of sin operate upon principles entirely distinct, and have nothing in common but the circumstance of their appeal to our active nature. They are essentially different states of mind, and the theory which co-ordinates them under the same genus prevaricates with consciousness in its clearest manifestations.

5. The last general objection which I shall notice to Dr. Paley's system, is its impracticability. His fundamental principle cannot be employed as the criterion of duty, from the obvious impossibility of estimating the collected consequences of any given action. The theory is, that morality depends upon results; the circumstance which determines an action to be right is its being upon the whole productive of more happiness than misery. It must, consequently, be traced in its entire history, through time and eternity, before any moral judgment can be confidently affirmed in regard to it. What human faculties are competent for such calculations? What mind but that of God can declare the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done? The government of God, both natural and moral, is one vast complicated system; the relations of its parts are so multifarious and minute—the connections of events so numerous and hidden—that only the mind which planned the scheme can adequately compass it. He knows nothing

* See Brown's Lectures, Lecture 79.

of it, as Bishop Butler has remarked, "who is not sensible of his ignorance in it." To be able to estimate all the consequences of any given action, is to be master of the entire system of the universe, not merely in the general principles which govern it, but in all the details of every single event. It is to have the knowledge of the Almighty. It is manifestly impossible, therefore, to apply the principle in practice. He that should wait, until his judgment could be assured in the method contemplated by the rule, would be like the rustic upon the banks of the river, expecting the stream to run dry, that he might pass over dry-shod.

Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

But as the exigencies of human life require action, and not unfrequently prompt and decisive action, the calculations of consequences would behove to be made from limited and partial views. The effects of this procedure would be obviously to destroy any steady standard of virtue and vice. "For since," as Bishop Berkeley has remarked,* "the measure and rule of every good man's actions is supposed to be nothing else but his own private, disinterested opinion of what makes most for the public good at that juncture; and since this opinion must unavoidably, in different men, from their particular views and circumstances, be very different, it is impossible to know whether any one instance of parricide or perjury, for example, be criminal. The man may have had his reasons for it; and that which, in me, would have been a heinous sin, may be in him a duty. Every man's particular rule is buried in his own breast, invisible to all but himself; who, therefore, can only tell whether he observes it or no. And since that rule is fitted to particular occasions, it must ever change as they do; and hence it is not only various in different men, but in one and the same man at different times. From all which it follows, there can be no harmony or agreement between the actions of good men, no apparent steadiness or consistency of one man with himself, no adhering to principles; the best actions may be condemned, and the most villainous meet with applause. In a word, there ensues the most horrible con-

* Serm. on Pass. Obed.

fusion of vice and virtue, sin and duty, that can possibly be imagined." The conclusion is inevitable, that this cannot be the principle upon which the moral government of the world is carried on.

Its impracticability is, indeed, so obvious, that the attempt has never been made, in any moral system, to use it as an actual test of the righteousness or wickedness of actions. Dr. Paley no sooner announces, and, as he supposed, demonstrates it, than he abandons it, and, imperceptibly to himself, introduces a standard of morality of a very different nature. His distinction between general and particular consequences, and his inculcation of the necessity of general rules, are a virtual surrender of the principle, that the morality of an action depends exclusively upon the sum total of its consequences. What he calls general consequences, are not the consequences of any given act, but the consequences of a multitude of acts, agreeing in some prominent circumstances. A single action can have nothing but particular consequences; these are the only ones which flow from it,—the only ones with which it is strictly and properly chargeable. If, for example, I wish to determine whether, in a particular case, I may lawfully lie; if the morality of the act is to depend upon the predominant character of the results, I must trace that *particular lie* through all the stages of its history, and admit nothing into the computation, that does not legitimately spring from it. I cannot take into the account the consequences of *other* lies; these consequences belong to *them*, and determine their character. Hence, the rigid application of the test precludes the possibility of general rules. Each case must stand or fall upon its own merits. To introduce general rules, is to shift the ground of the morality of actions, and to make it depend, not upon their consequences, but upon their conformity or non-conformity with the rule. It is singular that Paley did not notice the distinction, as Berkeley had so clearly pointed it out in the discourse from which I have already extracted.* "The well-being of mankind must necessarily be carried on one of these two ways: either, first, without the in-

* See also Whewell, Lect. Hist. Mor. Phil., Lect. x.

junction of any certain universal rules of morality, only by obliging every one, upon each particular occasion, to consult the public good, and always to do that which to him shall seem, in the present time and circumstances, most to conduce to it. Or, secondly, by enjoining the observation of some determinate, established laws, which, if universally practised, have, from the nature of things, an essential fitness to procure the well-being of mankind, though in their particular application they are sometimes, through untoward accidents and the perverse irregularity of human wills, the occasions of great sufferings and misfortunes, it may be, to very good men."—Dr. Paley himself, admits that there are instances in which the only mischief resulting from an action is the violation of a general rule, which is equivalent to saying, that if the action were measured by its own proper consequences it would be lawful,—which, again, is equivalent to saying, that actions must be judged by some other standard than their own individual expediency.

Neither are these general rules inductions from particular consequences, though Dr. Paley has, strangely enough, represented them in that light. They are not classifications of actions grouped according to the results which have been perceived to flow from them, which is the only way of generalizing from consequences, but grouped according to some circumstance which characterizes the action as a phenomenon of will. The ground of comparison, in other words, is not in the effects, but in the cause. Take the case which Dr. Paley has supposed: "The present possessor of some great estate employs his influence and fortune to annoy, corrupt, or oppress all about him. His estate would devolve by his death to a successor of an opposite character. It is useful, therefore, to despatch such an one as soon as possible out of the way, as the neighborhood will exchange thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wise and generous benefactor." But, says Dr. Paley, though the immediate consequences in this case may be good, the general consequences would be disastrous,—that is, the consequences ensuing from the violation of a *general rule*. But what general rule? The rule, he answers, which prohibits the *destruction of human life at private discretion*. Now, it

is manifest that such a rule could never be collected from any number of cases like the one supposed. The true induction from them would be, that whenever the like circumstances concurred, the action would always be lawful. In the same circumstances, the same antecedents will always be followed by the same consequents. The question is not, whether it is lawful to kill a man upon imaginary pretexts, but whether, when his death will be obviously a public benefit, it is right to destroy him; and the general rule, as determined by consequences, must be in the affirmative. But when you lay down the law that human life shall not be sacrificed to private discretion, you are prohibiting actions, not according to their *consequences*, but according to another circumstance, the source or authority whence they proceed. No induction of the consequences of particular actions could ever yield this rule with anything like the universality which attaches to it.

But is not the general rule itself recommended by its utility? There can be no doubt of the importance of general rules; and of the comparative facility of estimating the consequences connected with their violation or observance. Their evident fitness to promote the interests of society suggests itself spontaneously to the mind, as soon as the nature of social relations is competently understood. But that it was not their utility which first led to the recognition of their authority, is manifest from what has been already said. If a man were introduced into the world with no other means of determining the moral character of actions but from the nature of their consequences, he would proceed to arrange under one class those whose consequences were obviously good, and under another those whose consequences were opposite. He might go on to discriminate among them, making subordinate classes of each kind; but no circumstance in which any actions of both kinds were found to agree could ever be made the principle of classification. As in the case supposed, if it should be found that *some* instances, in which human life was taken without the sanction of public authority, were productive of good, this principle could never be made the distinctive feature of a class. No such rule could ever emerge, as that life

must never be taken by private individuals. The same process of reasoning might be carried out in reference to all general rules. They cannot, therefore, be the offspring of experience, as an inductive comparison of consequences. Paley's theory of the morality of actions could yield no other general rules but such as are denominated general facts. It could do nothing but group, and arrange under different heads, the various actions which were found productive of the same effects. It could create genera and species, but it could not originate laws, by which the character of the action was determined. An action must belong to the class, because it *has* such a character. Hence, to say that its own consequences were good, but that it does not belong to the class of good actions, would be a contradiction in terms, equivalent to saying that the individual has not the properties of the species.

Berkeley saw the impossibility of reaching general rules in this way, and hence discarded the whole system, which measures morality by the individual consequences of actions. His rules are inferences of reason from the very structure and constitution of society. It is their fitness to promote its ends, their evident congruity with the relations it implies, that recommends them to our minds. Society being given and its elements understood, these rules follow, as necessary means of preserving and perfecting it. They are not the educts of experience, but necessary truths; not the results of observation, but the dictates of reason. They *must* be, if society is to be maintained. They belong to the nature of demonstrative and *a priori* truths, rather than of empirical deductions.

Ingenious and plausible as this hypothesis appears to be, it may well be questioned whether any man ever arrived at the laws of morality from the previous consideration of the structure of society. It is one thing to perceive the fitness of means, when they have once been clearly pointed out; it is quite another thing to discover it in the first instance. Any man may understand the mechanism of a watch; few could have invented it. Society is a complicated thing, and if men were to have no moral rules until they were able to understand its structure, and to comprehend its manifold relations,—if they

were to wait until their knowledge was sufficiently enlarged and their reasoning powers sufficiently developed to enable them to draw just conclusions upon so nice and delicate a subject,—many would die without having reached the period of moral agency. The early age at which moral judgments are pronounced by children, when they could not have reflected upon the fitness of means to an end, is conclusive proof that moral rules do not come to us, in the first instance, as the results of reasoning. They are comprehended long before society is analysed. It is probable, too, that if they had to be reasoned out, there would be far greater diversity of opinion in regard to them than actually obtains. We should have as many theories of morals as of politics.

But still, after they have been announced, it is not difficult to trace their beneficial effects, and no doubt this obviousness *after discovery* has been confounded with obviousness *before discovery*, and led to the mistake in question. What is so plain when suggested, we think, could not miss of occurring of itself to our own thoughts. We forget how long it was before the law of gravity was settled, or the circulation of the blood was discovered.

In Dr. Paley's admission of general consequences, and the importance of general rules, we see a departure from the scientific rigour of his fundamental principle, which we cannot but construe into the tacit acknowledgment, that man's moral cognitions have another source than experience. It is an unwilling homage to the scheme which he professedly repudiates. His heart was better than his head. He gives us laws which he could never deduce from his principle, and imagines that he has deduced them only because he felt them to be true.

The incompatibility betwixt a system of general rules and one founded upon individual consequences, is sometimes painfully manifested by Dr. Paley; in his vacillations between the two standards. At one time he makes the rule supreme, as in the case of the assassin; at another, the consequences, as in the exceptions to the general law of veracity. Now, one or the other must be absolutely supreme, or if they reign by turns, we should

have some means of determining which, at any time, is sovereign.

Upon the whole, how much soever we respect the memory of Dr. Paley, as a man, we are constrained to say that his book has no just pretensions to the title of Moral Philosophy, except in the sense that the science of contraries is one. There is no cautious elimination of first principles, no accurate analysis of the data of consciousness, and no rigorous deductions from primary truths. His fundamental doctrine is a sophism, and the superstructure is wood, hay and stubble. Indeed, the building rests on a double foundation, and is, therefore, a house divided against itself, which, according to the highest authority, cannot stand. One of the most amazing phenomena in the history of literature is the eminence which has been given to this treatise.—That it has held its ground so steadily and long, is a humiliating proof of the low ebb to which moral speculations have sunk. It has neither sentiment nor logic, poetry nor science; it has nothing on earth to recommend it, but the vigour and transparent clearness of the style; occasionally coarse and vulgar in its judgments—as where all pleasures are put upon a footing as to dignity and worth—generally degrading in its tendencies—always distorting the moral phenomena of our nature—dogmatic and confident, and yet at the same time superficial and shallow in the extreme,—it is hard to understand how it could ever have gained, and having gained, how it could continue to maintain its ascendancy in the public mind. It is a problem, hardly less curious, how so good a man as Dr. Paley, and so vigorous a thinker, could have written so bad a book.

We come, in the next place, to consider the details of the work, and in noticing them, we shall restrict ourselves to those which are liable to exceptions upon other grounds beside an unfortunate consistency with the fundamental principle of the system. This principle, of course, vitiates his speculations in all his attempts to explain the ground of the obligation in particular duties. A radical and pervading vice, it is unnecessary to call attention to it, in the special instances of its occurrence,

after what has already been said of the general doctrine of expediency.

1. On opening the book, one is astounded with the want of discrimination which makes "Moral Philosophy, Morality, Ethics, Casuistry, and Natural Law, mean all the same thing." These terms, though each of them may be occasionally employed to designate the science, are by no means synonymous. They have distinctive meanings of their own. Morality is applied to actions, and expresses their conformity with the standard of right. Ethicks generally denote a collection of moral precepts, digested into order, without the processes by which they have been evolved. It is the practical, in contradistinction from the speculative part of moral philosophy. It answers the question, *what* is to be done, but not *why*. Cogan, however, in his treatise of the Passions, uses ethicks as the distinctive appellation of the science, and morality in the sense which has just been attributed to ethicks. It must also be confessed that it is becoming quite common to employ ethicks in the sense of Cogan, from the prominence, perhaps, which, in most moral treatises, is given to the elimination of rules. As moral speculations terminate in practice, it is not strange that they should be distinguished by a title which indicates the fact. The design of casuistry is evidently to determine duty in cases of apparently conflicting obligations. It discusses and resolves what are called cases of conscience. In the Romish Church, it constitutes, in consequence of the practice of auricular confession, and the power and influence awarded to spiritual guides, a most important branch of sacerdotal learning; and perhaps nothing has contributed so much to foster corruption and to sanctify evil, as the countless distinctions which have been invented to reconcile sin to the conscience. There are, no doubt, cases of real perplexity, but it will generally be found that an honest heart and a simple understanding are the best casuists. "But this I shall advertise," says Taylor,* "that the preachers may retrench an infinite number of cases of conscience, if they will more earnestly preach and exhort

* Ductor, Dub. Introd.

to simplicity and love; for the want of these is the great multiplier of cases." "I have myself had," says Bishop Heber,* "sufficient experience of what are generally called scruples, to be convinced that the greater proportion of those which are submitted to a spiritual guide are nothing more than artifices, by which men seek to justify themselves in what they know to be wrong; and I am convinced that the most efficacious manner of easing a doubtful conscience is, for the most part, to recall the professed penitent from distinctions to generals,—from the peculiarities of his private concerns, to the simple words of the commandment. If we are too curious, we only muddy the stream; but the clearest truth is, in morals, always on the surface." As the duties of the confessional imposed upon the priest the regulation of the conscience in all doubtful cases, and its instruction in cases of ignorance, the business of casuistry took a wide scope, and embraced the whole domain of practical morality. It was cultivated co-ordinately with natural jurisprudence. The distinction between them is thus happily stated by Smith:† "Those who write upon the principles of jurisprudence, consider only what the person to whom the obligation is due ought to think himself entitled to exact by force,—what every impartial spectator would approve of him for exacting,—or what a judge or arbiter, to whom he had submitted his case, and who had undertaken to do him justice, ought to oblige the other person to suffer or perform.—The casuists, on the other hand, do not so much examine what it is that might be properly exacted by force, as what it is that the person who owes the obligation ought to think himself bound to perform from the most sacred and scrupulous regard to the general rules of justice, and from the most conscientious dread, either of wronging his neighbour, or of violating the integrity of his own character. It is the end of jurisprudence to prescribe rules for the decisions of judges and arbiters. It is the end of casuistry to prescribe rules for the conduct of a good man. By observing all the rules of jurisprudence, supposing them ever so perfect, we should

* Life of Taylor.

† Moral Sent., part 7, § 4.

deserve nothing but to be free from external punishment. By observing those of casuistry, supposing them such as they ought to be, we should be entitled to considerable praise by the exact and scrupulous delicacy of our behaviour."

Natural law, in its widest sense, (*lex naturæ*), is applied to those rules of duty which spring from the nature and constitution of man. There are those who maintain that the distinctions of right and wrong are the arbitrary creatures of positive institutions—"that things honourable, and things just, admit of such vast difference and uncertainty, that they seem to exist by statute only, and not in the nature of things." In opposition to this theory, it is maintained that the moral differences of things are eternal and indestructible, and that the knowledge of them, in their great primordial principles, is an essential part of the original furniture of the mind. Man is a law to himself; from his very make and structure, he is a moral and responsible being, and those rules, which, in the progress and development of his moral faculties, he is led to apprehend as data of conscience, together with the conclusions which legitimately flow from them, are denominated laws of nature. They belong to inherent, essential morality, in contradistinction to what is positive and instituted. The complement of these rules is called right reason, practical reason, and by Jeremy Taylor, legislative reason. Hence that of Cicero: "*Est quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat, quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest; nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus; neque est quærendus explanator aut interpret alius ejus; nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus; ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator, cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiam si caetera supplicia, quæ putantur, effu-*

gerit." Noble as this passage is, a much greater than *Cicero* has declared that man is a law unto himself, and that those who are destitute of an external communication from heaven, have yet an internal teacher to instruct them in the will of God. The dictates of conscience are denominated *laws*, from the authority with which they are felt to speak; they are manifested in consciousness as commands, and not as speculative perceptions; they are laws of *nature*, because they are founded in the nature of things, and are enounced through the *nature* of the mind.

In a narrower sense, natural law (*jus natura*) denotes the body of rights which belong to man as man, which spring from his constitution as a social and responsible being, and which consequently attach to all men in the same relations and circumstances. In this sense it coincides with natural jurisprudence, as distinguished from the municipal regulations of States and nations.

In a still narrower sense, natural law is restricted to those principles or rules which should determine the duties of men in times of revolution, or under oppressive and tyrannical governments, or regulate the intercourse of independent States and nations. In none of these senses does natural law coincide precisely with moral philosophy. In the first sense, it may be said that the *conclusions* of moral philosophy are natural laws; they are the results of its investigations, the end of its inquiries. In the second sense, the view of human nature is too limited for a complete philosophy of the moral constitution.—“Right and duty,” as Dr. Reid has remarked,* “are things different, and have even a kind of opposition; yet they are so related that one cannot even be conceived without the other; and he that understands the one must understand the other.” Hence it happens, that although the inquiries of natural jurisprudence begin at a different point from those of the moral philosopher, they eventually traverse the same ground, and meet in the same practical conclusions. Still, natural jurisprudence is only one branch of moral investigations; and it has only

* Act. Powers, chap. iii.

been by an unwarrantable extension of its terms, that it has been made to cover almost the entire domain of duties to our fellow men.

Dr. Paley's blunder in the nomenclature of his science would hardly be deserving of attention, if it did not indicate an entire misconception of the nature and scope of philosophy. This misconception is rendered still more glaring by his articulate statement, that the use of such a department of knowledge as moral philosophy depends upon its competency to furnish a perfect rule of life.— This, indeed, is not the least of its advantages, that it authenticates the laws which, in the progress of intelligence, we have been led to adopt, and enables us to discriminate betwixt legitimate maxims and the offspring of prejudice. It supplies a valuable touch-stone in cases of difficulty and perplexity. But, though moral philosophy reacts upon our rules, and authenticates or annuls them, moral rules must evidently precede philosophy. It is their existence and authority which give rise to it. Its office is to show whence they come, how they are formed, upon what grounds of certainty they rest. It is, in short, the science of our *knowledge* of moral distinctions. It is the creature of reflection upon all those spontaneous processes of the soul which are occupied with good and evil, with right and wrong. Man finds himself with certain moral convictions, with rules which he feels to be authoritative; and when he begins to *reflect* upon these phenomena, and to seek for their laws, he begins the work of the moral philosopher. There may be ethicks without philosophy,—a classification of all the duties of human life; there may be natural jurisprudence, or a systematic exhibition of the essential rights of humanity; there may be religion, or a profound knowledge and reverence of the will and perfections of God. It is not until the question is asked, *how* we know these things, and thought returns upon itself to investigate the laws and conditions of consciousness, that philosophy takes its rise. The mere classification of objective phenomena is not philosophy, though an important organ of philosophy. The aim of philosophy is to verify human knowledge, or to show how it comes to be knowledge.— In this, the true view of it, Dr. Paley, it needs not to be

said, not only makes no pretensions to it, but had no conception of it. Human consciousness is a territory which he never enters; the moral faculties he has absolutely ignored; and what he has given us is rather a special application of arithmetic, from data suggested by experience, than the evolution and analysis of indestructible elements of the human soul. There is not a single problem of the science which he has grappled with in a philosophic spirit; and there cannot be a more egregious misnomer than to apply the title Philosophy to a scheme which aims no higher than to show how, with no other faculties but those of apprehension, and the susceptibility to pleasure and pain, an animal might be drilled into a particular line of conduct. Dr. Paley set out with a determination to seek for *rules*, and his treatise is only a special plea, upon what seemed to him a plausible ground, for those which he saw to be necessary. Many of his rules are right enough, and no one would have thought of questioning them, if the defence of them had not been so weak.

2. The chapter on the Law of Honour, is calculated to mislead, not because it contains anything positively false,—(it is, on the contrary, a faithful account of a factitious rule of life, introduced by free-thinking into the higher circles of English society,)—but because it may convey the implication, that honour itself, is a factitious principle of action. It notices an abuse, without vindicating the just claims of what had been perverted and misapplied. That Dr. Paley has not exaggerated the abuse, requires no proof to those who are conversant with the history of the times. The licentious speculations of the Infidel philosophers of the eighteenth century,—which were greedily embraced by the frivolous, profligate and vain, and passed into a sort of badge of distinction, as if the admirers of them were the only men of intelligence and spirit,—undertook to compensate morality and religion for the loss of God, conscience and moral government, by introducing a sentiment of *honour*, which, apart from any interested motives,—the fear of punishment, the hope of reward, the approbation of the wise and good, or the sense of duty,—could maintain the cause of virtue in the world. This honour appears

to have been an exclusive admiration of the beauty of virtue. But it is easy to see that when this *sense* of beauty became the only criterion of right and wrong, all would soon come to be felt as beautiful which was felt to be desirable. Virtue would be reduced to the narrow proportions to which Dr. Paley's Law of Honour assigned it. Substantially the same account is given by Bishop Berkeley in the Minute Philosopher.

The very abuse, however, shows that there was something real,—the counterfeit proves the genuine. There must have been a foundation of stone, or the superstructure of wood, hay and stubble could not have stood for a moment. Hutcheson and Dr. Reid made *honour* synonymous with conscience, and a sense of honour with a sense of duty. They were misled by the Latin term *honestum*, to which they supposed that our honour exactly corresponds.

General usage, however, restricts the term to two significations, one of which may be called its objective, the other its subjective sense. In the first sense, it is the esteem or praise which is awarded to a man by others, on account of his actions, considered as praiseworthy.—Any external expressions of this inward feeling are called honours. In the other sense, it is that principle of our nature which leads us to act in such a way as to *deserve* the commendation of our fellow men. It prompts us to perform virtuous actions, not only because they are right and pronounced to be obligatory by the conscience, but because they contribute to our dignity, and are felt to be intrinsically laudable. They are seen to become us—that decency in virtue with the excellence of human nature is what is meant by its beauty. It is lovely in itself, and adorns all its possessors. This beauty elicits admiration, and secures, among the wise and good, esteem and commendation to all who are graced with it. Honour, then, as a principle of action, is only another name for self-respect, or for that pride of character which preserves from what is base, or mean, or shameful in conduct. It is subsidiary to conscience. That must prescribe the standard of virtue, and this comes in as an additional sanction, to secure conformity with it. Honour is distinguished from vanity in this, that honour aims

at being *praiseworthy*, and vanity simply at *being praised*. The one is consequently an inseparable ally of conscience, the other the shadow of public opinion.

Opposed to honour, in both its objective and subjective senses, is shame, which is either the contempt of others manifested in some external expressions, or the fear, on our part, of doing that which shall justly expose us to disgrace. It proceeds from the feeling, that there is in vice, a deformity or filthiness corresponding to the beauty of virtue. Apart from the horrors of conscience or the naked workings of remorse, there is in every guilty breast a profound conviction of meanness and degradation. The transgressor loses his sense of self-respect. He is like a man who, unconsciously having come naked or with filthy apparel into polite and refined society, awakes suddenly to a just sense of his condition.

3. Dr. Paley's representation of the inadequacy of the Scriptures as a rule of practice, should not be allowed to pass without notice. It is true, they pre-suppose a moral nature in us, but they are not wanting in the facilities which they furnish for guiding that nature into all duty. It is not necessary to the perfection of a rule that all the instances and occasions of its application should be minutely described. If none could be perfect that failed in this condition, moral philosophy itself would be as incompetent as the Scriptures. That cannot specify all the cases in which men may be called to act; and if the Scriptures are to be condemned for not doing this, why should it receive a milder treatment. All that we want, practically, is sound general rules; prudence and common sense must apply them. The Scriptures give us such rules, and he who faithfully obeys their teachings will find himself perfect, thoroughly furnished unto every good work. But the Scriptures are not a philosophy. They do not show how the commands of God are deeply founded in the principles of consciousness and reason. The reflective process they have left to human speculation, and here philosophy comes in.

4. The most exceptionable part of Dr. Paley's book is that in which he treats of conscience. If he had been successful in his attempt to construct a moral system, independently of the aid of a moral faculty in man, his

success would have rendered unphilosophical the assumption of any such faculty. The law of parsimony forbids the unnecessary multiplication of causes, and where phenomena can be explained without postulating a new original principle, such a principle is not to be granted. But the failure of Dr. Paley's effort is anything but encouraging to those who would dispense with conscience. And as his general system fails to obviate the necessity of such a principle, so his special and articulate arguments fail to invalidate the proof of its existence.

In order to apprehend fully the weakness and inconsistency of Dr. Paley's discussion of this subject, it is necessary to bear in mind the real condition of the controversy. There are obviously two general questions in relation to conscience—one having reference to its existence, or the reality of moral phenomena, and the other to its origin. The first question is, whether or not there is a class of judgments and emotions, specifically different from all others which we denominate moral? Is there a distinction made by the human mind betwixt right and wrong, a duty and a crime? Is there such a thing as a sense of duty and a conviction of guilt? That such moral phenomena *exist* cannot be doubted. It is a matter of universal experience—and hence no philosopher has ever thought of calling them into question. Now, to the cause or causes of these phenomena we may give the name of conscience, without presuming to determine the nature of the cause, or the mode of its operation. In this sense, the question whether or not conscience exists, must be answered by all philosophers in the affirmative. Then the question arises, what is its nature and origin? Whence are our moral cognitions and sentiments derived? It is in the answer to this question that philosophers split into sects. All the possible answers may be reduced to three. 1. The opinion of those who maintain that our moral judgments are purely adventitious—that conscience is the creature of prejudice, authority, custom and education,—that there is no uniform law by which it is acquired, and that it will consequently be one thing at Rome, another thing at Athens. These men admit that conscience is natural,

in the sense that all men will form a conscience,—but they deny that there will be uniformity in the conscience thus formed. The character of its judgments and sentiments is altogether contingent, and it, itself, is a factitious principle, or complement of principles. 2. The opinion of those who maintain that it is natural, but not original. These men represent it as a necessary product of nature, but not as a primary gift of nature. It is an acquired faculty, or combination of faculties, but it is acquired in obedience to laws of the human constitution, which not only necessitate its acquisition, but determine the elements of which it shall be composed. It is consequently the same in all men. Their nature being what it is, and operating as it does, conscience must be generated, and generated alike, in all who have this nature. It is therefore natural, in the same sense that the acquired judgments of sight and hearing are natural. It springs from nature, though it is not given as a part of nature. 3. The opinion of those who maintain that conscience is not only natural, but *original*,—that it is a simple element of our being,—that no analysis can resolve it into constituent principles,—that its cognitions are primitive and necessary, and its sentiments peculiar and marked.

1. This being the state of the question, the first thing that strikes us in Dr. Paley's articulate discussion of it is, that the conclusion which he seeks to establish is inconsistent with the scope and tenor of his general system. The very conception of a philosophy of morals implies that there is a foundation laid in nature for the distinctions betwixt right and wrong. If these distinctions were determined by no law,—if they were absolutely arbitrary and capricious, the inquest of a principle which should furnish a perfect and adequate rule of life, would be as idle and chimerical as the dreams of the alchemists. But if morals can be reduced to a system, then our moral judgments must depend upon steady and uniform principles. They must spring from our nature; and though they may not be original, they are not wholly adventitious. But in the chapter before us, Dr. Paley not only denies that our moral judgments are original; he denies that they are natural; he denies that they are

acquired by any constant or uniform law. He makes them as variable and fluctuating as the circumstances, education and caprices of men. This is equivalent to saying that there can be no such science as Moral Philosophy. The general conclusion of his book is, that conscience is the necessary result, in beings constituted as we are, of the perception of what is useful in character and conduct, conjoined with a sensibility to pleasure and pain. It is an acquired faculty, or combination of faculties, but the process by which it is acquired is natural and inevitable in the progress and education of the mind. The conclusion of the present chapter is, that it depends altogether upon accident what actions a man shall approve or condemn, and what rule he adopts for the regulation of his conduct. Dr. Paley has been betrayed into this inconsistency, by inattention to the distinction betwixt what is natural and original. The point which he aimed to combat was the originality of conscience—that it is a principle which we bring with us into the world—like the capacity of perceiving truth, or the sensibility to pleasure and pain. He need not have gone any farther. To have been consistent with himself, he ought to have adopted the opinion which Sir Jas. McIntosh subsequently elaborated, concerning the method by which conscience, as a derivative and secondary faculty, or rather habit, is acquired. But, in his zeal to refute the originality, he aims a blow at the naturalness of conscience.—What is natural, under the circumstances favourable to its development, must be as universal and uniform as what is original; and hence, in maintaining the capriciousness of moral distinctions, Dr. Paley demolishes his own book, as triumphantly as he refutes the hypothesis of an innate power. To say that conscience is a complement of prejudices and arbitrary judgments, is to say that moral philosophy is impossible. To say that it is natural, whether original or acquired, is to say that there may be such a science.

2. In the next place, Dr. Paley is mistaken in the *criterion* by which he distinguishes the original from the adventitious. That criterion, according to him, is not simply *universality*, but *maturity*. It is not enough that the thing in question be found in all men who have had

the opportunity of developing it, but that it should be actually developed in every man, without respect to his circumstances, the general expansion of his powers, or the degree of his experience and education. Now, our original faculties are not all unfolded at once, and none arrive at maturity without time and experience. There is an order in their development; some precede others, as the condition of their operations. When, therefore, we inquire whether the manifestations of a power are universal, we restrict our researches to those who are in the condition in which they ought to be found, if they exist at all. The child cannot comprehend a complicated argument; but does it follow that the faculty of reasoning is not original and universal? And so the savage supposed by Dr. Paley, or the wild boy caught in the woods of Hanover, having had no opportunities of exercising his moral faculties, might be incapable, at first, of manifesting their existence. They are in him in the same state in which they would be in an infant. If we wish to know whether moral judgments are universal, we must look among those from whom Dr. Paley precludes us; we must look among those who have had the opportunity, by social intercourse, of unfolding their moral nature; and if we find, among such men, that moral distinctions universally obtain, we are sure, at least, that they are natural. We should no more look for a maturity of moral knowledge among infants, and those who, in regard to education, are no better than infants, than we should look among them for the maturity of the speculative understanding.

Dr. Paley seems to think that education is something contradictory to nature, and that whatever has been effected by education is, on that account, factitious and unnatural. On the contrary, a sound education is but the *improvement* of nature; it is nature in its progress to perfection. It is among the educated, in the proper sense of the term, that we must look for the justest exhibitions of what is original and natural. It is in man's nature as *matured*, that we may best study the faculties and capacities of man. A perverse education may do violence to nature; but these distortions will be local and accidental, and should not authorize the summary

conclusion that education is the re-constitution of the man.

The test, therefore, by which Dr. Paley would determine the question of the originality of conscience, is simply absurd. He might just as reasonably propose his case to an infant hanging upon its mother's breast, as to one whose moral faculties, from the very nature of the case, never could have been exercised. "Did it ever enter into the mind of the wildest theorist," says Dugald Stewart, "to imagine that the sense of seeing would enable a man, brought up from the moment of his birth in utter darkness, to form a conception of light and colours? But would it not be equally rash to conclude, from the extravagance of such a supposition, that the sense of seeing is not an original part of the human frame?" The true test of the question is, whether the manifestations of conscience are universal among all who have had the opportunity of exercising it, and whether these manifestations can be resolved into any other principles of our nature. The universality of manifestation is a proof of naturalness, the simplicity of originality. To these two questions Dr. Paley should have confined himself. Do all men who have a sufficient degree of intelligence make a distinction betwixt right and wrong? Can you explain these judgments without an ultimate principle?

3. Having made the *maturity* of a power the criterion of its originality, Dr. Paley's next blunder is not to be wondered at. He has not favoured us with a distinct statement of what he understood to be the doctrine of an original conscience, but it may be collected from the general tenor of his argument, that he apprehended it to include two things: 1. A habit of rules, applicable to every possible variety of cases, lying unconsciously concealed in the recesses of the soul, ready to be manifested in consciousness whenever an occasion should demand; and 2, an instinct by which the rule to be applied to any given case was instantaneously and infallibly suggested. An original conscience, with him, could mean nothing less than a perfect knowledge of ethicks in its laws, and their applications. It was equivalent to an infallible directory of duty. With this notion in his mind, we are able to explain why he has grouped together, as different

statements of the same thing, systems of philosophy which have nothing in common but their advocacy of the primitive character of our moral cognitions. It was to him an unimportant question whether the faculty to which these cognitions pertained were held to be reason with Clarke and Cudworth, or a distinct and separate principle with Hutcheson,—whether its rules existed in the mind in the form of knowledges, developed (innate maxims) or undeveloped,—or whether they were determined by sentiment or feeling, operating either as a blind instinct, or a refined sensibility to the presence of its appropriate qualities (moral taste); all these were unimportant points, compared with the general doctrine of an original ability of some sort, to distinguish betwixt right and wrong. This ability, if mature and adequate, as it must be, according to him, if original, must be tantamount to a perfect knowledge of duty on all the occasions of life. Hence, all these theories, in his judgment, coincided in this result. They amounted to the same thing.

But no such doctrine of conscience ever has been seriously maintained by any man deserving the name of a philosopher. The primitive cognitions of morality are like all other primitive cognitions. They exist, in the first instance, as necessities or laws of conscience, and are evolved into distinct propositions by a process of reflection. Experience furnishes the occasions on which they are developed, and when developed they become the standard by which we judge of all moral truth.—They stand in the same relation to the moral faculty in which the laws of thought stand to the faculty of speculative truth. Hence, they do not supersede, but suppose reflection. The germs and elements of morality, they require culture as much as any other principles of our nature. What are called the laws of thought are all given in consciousness, and constitute the ultimate standard of truth; but they require reflection to elicit them into distinct and formal propositions, and to guide their application to the complicated problems suggested by experience. So there is a two-fold office of the understanding in the case of our primitive moral cognitions—one to eliminate them in consciousness, to reduce to explicit enunciations what is implicitly given in a spon-

taneous operation,—the other to apply the rules thus eliminated to the various exigencies of real life. Much error arises from the misapplication of laws which are just and proper in themselves. It is the function of the understanding to analyze the cases which are brought before it, and to determine which of the primary principles should be applied to them. Conscience gives us the elements—thought and reflection, the combination and uses of these elements. Conscience gives us *implicitly*—the understanding *explicitly*—the fundamental laws of morality.

This view of conscience, as containing, implicitly and undeveloped, the primary rules of right,—as furnishing the *criterion*, but not the knowledge of what things are right, completely obviates the objections of Dr. Paley to the existence of such a faculty, founded on the supposition that it must act instinctively, instantaneously and infallibly. On the contrary, it begins, like all our other powers, as a feeble germ; it is strengthened by repeated and proper exercise, and brought to maturity by judicious culture and education,—this education imperatively demanding the aid of reason and reflection.

4. The only argument which Dr. Paley alleges against the originality of conscience, is founded on the diversity which is said to obtain in the moral judgments of mankind. This argument is, of course, a complete disproof of any *such* conscience as he supposed to be asserted. If the moral faculty implies an instantaneous, unreflecting, instinctive discrimination of the right and just, in every possible case, any instances of the absence or want of such a power in man, would be conclusive against it.—But the argument has no force against the true doctrine of conscience, unless it can be shown that there is a difference among men as to the primary principles of right. Those laws which are implicitly given, in every spontaneous operation of conscience, if they are contradictory among men, there is an end of the dispute. But nothing can be concluded against them from any amount of discrepancy in their actual application. Men may reason badly upon them, and yet admit them with an absolute faith,—just as all men necessarily acknowledge the laws of thought,—and yet, in a multitude of cases, misapply

them, and fall into error. Speculative error is as much an argument against the primitive cognitions of the understanding as moral error against the primitive judgments of conscience, to be accounted for in the same way; and in both it will be found that there is at bottom a tacit recognition of first principles. The very mistakes of men are confessions of the truth. We have no hesitation in asserting that the primary laws of morality are essentially the same in every human mind, and that, except in cases of grievous, manifest, and monstrous perversion, no instance can be found, among those whose minds are sufficiently matured, of a direct contradiction to them. They answer the condition, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*.

The discrepancies upon which so much stress has been laid are all to be ascribed, not to the denial, but to an ill-judged application of these laws. The conscience was right, but the understanding was wrong. The heathen who murders his aged parents, professes to be acting on the same law of filial reverence and piety, which prompts the Christian to nurse their declining days.—The heathen father who exposed his tender babe, was taking it away, in a spirit of mistaken tenderness and kindness, from the evils to come. The Spartan condemned theft, but encouraged dexterity and skill. There are some instances in which atrocious vices were practised, whose history and origin we are not able to explain. But it does not follow that they who practised them denied the fundamental rules of right. It may be that they did not really approve them—that they condemned in their consciences what they practised in their lives—or that they had some ingenious sophism, by which they extricated these vices from the jurisdiction of the rule. The Jesuits have not called directly into question any primary truth,—but they have contrived a system of casuistry, which, upon given occasions, eviscerates them of all authority and power.

The truth is, when we consider the wickedness of man, and the ingenuity of a corrupt heart in devising excuses, extenuations and shifts, the wonder is, not that there is so much, but so little diversity in the practical judg-

ments of men. It is an unanswerable proof that there are laws enthroned supremely in the conscience, which make themselves heard amid all the tumult, confusion and uproar of passion, interest, superstition and power. These laws are the anchors of the moral system of the world.

Whatever diversity obtains in the judgments of men, may, perhaps, be reduced to four causes: 1. Where the relations which are presupposed in a moral judgment are not developed among a people, they cannot be expected to exhibit, or even to understand that judgment. There are savage tribes which cannot enter into our condemnation of theft, because the notion of property is not definitely unfolded among them. Let this relation be as perfect with them as with us, and the moral judgment would undoubtedly be the same. 2. The weakness and debility of the intellectual faculties which are to eliminate and apply the general principles of conscience, are the most prolific source of moral confusion and error. There is an incompetency in some men to comprehend the cases which are submitted to them; they cannot distinguish and discriminate, and hence they are exposed to perpetual blunders. 3. The influence of passion, interest, selfishness, to pervert the moral reasoning, covers a multitude of cases. Men contrive evasions to escape from the jurisdiction of principles whose general authority they acknowledge. They multiply exceptions to the rule.—The sophistry of a corrupt heart suborns the understanding to silence the conscience. 4. The difference in the moral import of the same action, as performed in different ages, or among different people, must also be taken into consideration. An action may be right to-day which is wrong to-morrow, because in the two cases its significance is entirely different. It expresses a different principle, like a word that has changed its meaning; not that the rules of morality are mutable—but relations are mutable; and with these shifting relations, the same material action may change its moral import. What would be incest with us, was lawful and necessary in the family of the first man. Usury was once universally condemned by Jew and Gentile, because it was then synonymous with oppression of the poor; it is now as universally ap-

proved, because, in the changes of society, it is the life and soul of commerce.*

These four considerations seem to relieve the subject of all embarrassment, by accounting for whatever discrepancy prevails in the moral judgments of mankind, without prejudice to the universality of our primitive cognitions.

5. It remains only to consider the explanation which Dr. Paley has given of the genesis of our moral sentiments. He refers them to the law of association, making conscience a secondary principle or habit, like avarice or the love of money for itself. The sentiments of approbation or disapprobation, which are immediately excited by the contemplation of virtuous or of vicious actions, were, in the first instance, awakened by the utility or hurtfulness of the actions; and this pleasure and pain, arising primarily from its quality, becomes firmly associated with the action itself,—and hence the very mention of the action is sufficient to reproduce it. The approbation of virtue and the disapprobation of vice are, consequently, the pleasure and pain of utility or hurtfulness, transferred from the qualities to the action in which the qualities are found. But to this hypothesis there is one insuperable objection. Association can transfer sentiments, but cannot create them. Now, the approbation of virtue and the disapprobation of vice, are feelings different in kind,—not the same feelings directed to a different object, but feelings specifically distinct from the pleasure and pain of convenience or inconvenience. They are a class of feelings by themselves. The question is, how are they to be accounted for? Association may transfer them to associated objects, supposing them to be in existence, but association cannot *originate* them.—If they were the *same*, with the approbation of what is useful, or the condemnation of what is hurtful, Dr. Paley's theory might be admitted; but being different, it is altogether unsatisfactory. Sir Jas. McIntosh, who agrees with Paley in the general doctrine of utility, as the criterion of right, while he contends that our moral judgments are secondary and acquired, admits the originality of our moral emotions. He saw that they were peculiar

* Vide Stewart.—Phil. Act. & Mor. Pow., chap. 3.

and unique, and could only be explained by an original susceptibility.

These are the special points, apart from the general proportions of the system, to which we have thought it necessary to call attention in Dr. Paley's book. These, however, are not the only things which are exceptionable. His notions of the origin of property are narrow and superficial, drawn from the objective rather than the subjective,—from the crude appearance of things, rather than the analysis of human nature. His resolution of the obligation of veracity into the obligation of promises, is a singular instance of confusion of ideas,—as if the obligation of a promise did not pre-suppose that of veracity. But we have said enough to put the merits and defects of the system in a fair light. We have endeavoured to neutralize its power of doing harm,—and if we have been successful, it is all that we desired.

ARTICLE II.

ORTHODOXY IN NEW-ENGLAND.

A Remonstrance, addressed to the Trustees of Phillips Academy, Andover, on the state of the Theological Seminary under their care. By DANIEL DANA, D. D. Boston: Crocker & Brewster: 1853.

The author of this earnest and dignified paper, is one of the oldest and most venerable of the clergy of New-England, whose long life of piety and labour in the cause of his Divine Master, is now drawing to a close. For nearly fifty years Dr. Dana has been a member of the Board to whom he addresses his Remonstrance, and he has always been one of the most faithful and devoted guardians and friends of the important institution under their care.

This "Remonstrance" was presented to the Board in 1849. After two years a Report was made upon it, and accepted, the nature of which was highly unsatisfactory

to the friends of truth and orthodoxy; and, inasmuch as the considerations and suggestions contained in the Remonstrance have been followed by no corresponding action on the part of the Trustees, Dr. Dana has felt called on to make this public appeal to the Christian public; and such is the history of the present publication.

It may be safely assumed, that when a man of Dr. Dana's age, and character for piety and wisdom, with the prospect of very soon meeting his Master, and rendering up an account of his stewardship, feels himself constrained, in this public and emphatic manner, to raise his voice in remonstrance against beloved and respected brethren, with whom he has been associated for nearly half a century, he is influenced by no slight considerations of duty, and that his words are worthy of serious and candid attention. For ourselves, we are entirely convinced, that the very grave and alarming nature of the matters against which the remonstrance is directed, do not only fully justify its author in the course which he has adopted, but that no other course was open to him, as an honest man, in defence of what he firmly believed to be the great principles of sound doctrine, which were dear to the Fathers of New England; and for the dissemination and defence of which this their Theological school was established and commended to the prayers, confidence, and support of the churches.

We have been aware, for some years past, of two things in relation to this subject. The first is, that the instruction now, and of late given in the Theological Seminary at Andover, was in direct opposition, on several fundamental points, to the received standards of sound doctrine, especially to the Westminster Assembly's Catechism, and that this teaching was calculated to produce an influence upon the cause of vital godliness in New England, which was of the most deplorable character.

The other fact is, that although many of the younger ministers, and multitudes of Christians, have been dazzled and impressed by the splendour of the rhetoric, and the brilliant drapery of learning and talent which has been thrown around this erroneous teaching, and have failed in some cases to detect it, and in others justly to

estimate its dangerous tendency; yet there have been those, and these among the soundest and best men in the land, who were not only fully aware of the facts, but were filled with sad forebodings and sorrowful anticipations of the result, and were determined to bear their testimony, like faithful men, against these grievous departures from "the faith once delivered to the saints." We rejoice to see this class well represented by this venerable servant of God, who, standing as he does on the border line of eternity, has little occasion unduly to regard the plaudits or the anathemas of men, but is doubtless concerned only to discharge what remains to him of duty in such a manner as to secure the approbation of his God.

Dr. Dana indulges in no bitterness of reproach or invective. He writes in calm and impressive style, with simple dignity, and with great earnestness. He writes like a man who feels impelled by considerations which he cannot resist or neglect, to discharge an important though unpleasant duty; and his entire aim seems to be to bear his honest testimony to the truth in a Christian spirit, and in the "more excellent way." He evidently feels the solemnity of his position and the importance of the interests at stake, and for his own high character, and for the nature of his cause, he deserves to be heard.

The principal point in the Remonstrance appears to be that the instruction given by the Professor of Theology in the Seminary is in direct opposition to what is required by the leading provisions of its constitution and statutes. According to him, "The Constitution provides that every Professor in the Seminary, shall be a man of sound and orthodox principles, according to the system of doctrines denominated the Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism. Every Professor must, on the day of his inauguration, publicly make and subscribe a solemn declaration of his faith in Divine Revelation, and in the doctrines of the Assembly's Catechism. He must solemnly promise to defend and inculcate the Christian faith as thus expressed, in opposition to all contrary doctrines and heresies. He must repeat the declaration and promise at the close of every five years; and should he refuse this, or should he teach or embrace any of the

proscribed heresies or errors, he shall be forthwith removed from office."

With these unequivocal and excellent provisions of the constitution of the Seminary, those of the "Associate Statutes" are in perfect accordance. And the language of both these instruments most plainly and satisfactorily proves, that the venerable founders of the Institution designed that the great doctrines of Grace, so clearly presented in the invaluable formulary of the Westminster Assembly, should be always maintained, taught and defended by those who were called to fill the chairs of instruction.

This plain and manifest design on the part of the Founders of the Seminary, as expressed in its constitution and statutes, Dr. Dana, who has been familiar with the details of its history for forty-nine years, new distinctly declares is violated by the sentiments entertained, and the instruction given by the present "Professor of Christian Theology," and this too in the face of his solemn declaration and subscription of the doctrines of the Assembly's Catechism. And he gives us specific doctrines, which he declares are denied by the Professor, if not in a formal repudiation, yet virtually in the character of his instruction.

The doctrine of *original sin*, as fully recognized by the Catechism, is thus denied.

The teaching on this point is, that our nature is not sinful, and that original sin is not sin.

In respect to *Regeneration*, which, according to the Catechism, involves a real and radical renovation by the Holy Ghost, and a restoration of the Divine image in man, the views presented are, that Regeneration consists *in a change in the balance of the susceptibilities*; or in a change from sinful action to holy action; or, (which is the utmost which is allowed,) in a change from a nature *not sinful*, inclining to sinful acts,—to a nature *not holy*, inclining to holy acts.

In respect to the *Covenant*, by which Adam was constituted and regarded as the federal head and representative of all his race, which has always been regarded as a fundamental doctrine in theology, it is declared that this whole doctrine is exploded, and that there is no

evidence of any covenant of works between God and Adam, as the head of the race, or with Adam, as including his posterity.

In respect to the great doctrine of the *Atonement*, by which a full satisfaction was made by Christ to the broken law and outraged justice of God; which teaches that the Redeemer suffered under the wrath of God, and the cursed death of the Cross, the Professor is understood to maintain "that it cannot be said that Christ's passive obedience frees us from punishment; and that in the case of the penitent, the demands of the law are *evaded* or *waived*."

In respect to the doctrine that we are justified by the *imputation of the righteousness of Christ*, received by faith, the Professor is understood to maintain that Christ needed obedience for himself, and could not perform a work of supererogation for others; that if Christ obeyed the law for us, we need not obey it for ourselves, inasmuch as the law does not require two obediences; neither, in this case, is there any grace in our pardon; and that the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's obedience to us involves a double absurdity.

Such are the doctrines which the venerable author of the "Remonstrance" solemnly declares are taught in the Andover Theological Seminary. These are points acknowledged to be of a radical and fundamental character. And if such be the character of the teaching in this institution, then the act of subscription to its constitution, expressing, as it does, a hearty belief in the doctrines of the Assembly's Catechism, must be a meaningless farce, or a piece of Jesuitism, unworthy of any honest man.

But there are other important points of doctrine in regard to which the sentiments of the Professor referred to are lamentably unsound. Dr. Dana declares that such as the following have come to his knowledge:—

"That there was a period when Christ *began* to be the Son of God; that if he was a man, and if he was a holy man, he must have had ability to sin; that temporal death makes no part of the penalty of the law,—nor is it

properly the punishment of sin; and that it is in the power of human beings to hinder the execution of some parts of the Divine decrees."

"Assertions such as these," says Dr. D., "I must declare,—begging the Professor's pardon,—are very reckless, and very dangerous."—(*Remonstrance*, p. 10.)

We would add here, that if any doubts are entertained as to the peculiar and unsound views of the Professor, his celebrated Sermon before the Convention of Congregational Ministers, on "*The Theology of the intellect, and the Theology of the feelings*," and the discussion with Dr. Hodge, in the Princeton Review, to which that Sermon gave rise, furnishes the most abundant and decisive testimony.

We have, then, the melancholy and alarming spectacle held up faithfully to view in this "Remonstrance," of a Christian institution, established at a vast expense, whose foundations were laid in prayer by some of the best and soundest men in our country, and which was intended to be a great means of maintaining, defending and disseminating the cardinal doctrines of pure Christianity, becoming instead, an organ of destructive errors, which tend inevitably to sap the very foundations of orthodox faith and Godly practice. We have the astounding spectacle of a Professor of Christian Theology, of fine talents, elegant learning, and uncommon rhetorical and oratorical powers, in his chair of instruction, and in the pulpit, directly attacking, and endeavouring to destroy those very doctrines, to which at his inauguration he solemnly declared and subscribed his cordial assent, and instilling into the minds of the sons of the church, who are soon to go out to fill her pulpits, sentiments and doctrines which are at war with the plain teachings of the Bible, as well as with the views of the best and ablest Divines of every age and country.

We behold an aged and venerable Father, whose praise is in all the churches, after having privately remonstrated with his brethren of the Board of Trustees as to the grave evils alluded to, but without effect, now obliged, in order to ease his own conscience, in the discharge of his duty, as a pledged guardian of the interests

of the Seminary, and the designs and wishes of its pious founders, to appeal to the Christian public, and bear his sorrowful, but honest testimony, against these alarming evils. These are sad and humiliating spectacles. The seeds of evil which have been sown in this Institution, are springing up, not only in New-England, but all over the land. The preaching of the young men who come out from its halls, is, in a great degree, vitiated by the instruction they have received. The great cardinal doctrines of Religion, do not distinctly and thoroughly pervade their sermons. The doctrines of human depravity, unconditional decrees, spiritual regeneration, the atonement, the imputation of Christ's righteousness, justification by faith, and the true nature of experimental piety, are not held forth clearly, and fully, as they stand in the formularies of the church. And under such preaching, the spiritual life of Christians must be feeble and inefficient; while a spirit of pride, self-reliance, and procrastination, must tend to place impenitent sinners in a dangerous and appalling position.

The language of Dr. Dana himself, will best describe the disastrous results which are now flowing, and must continue to flow, from the nature of the instruction given in the Seminary. He asks—

“Has the orthodox character which for many of its first years, it maintained, been subsequently preserved? Have the preachers whom, in recent times, it has sent forth, been signalized and acknowledged as champions of the doctrines of the Cross? Have their sermons embraced the great principles of the creed of the Seminary? Have they presented distinct and lucid exhibitions of human depravity, of regeneration, of the atonement, of justification by faith, of the nature of experimental and saving religion? That numbers have thus preached, is cheerfully conceded. But they are in the minority.— And this minority has been still decreasing from year to year. This is familiarly declared by the most judicious members of our churches. Nor is it uncommon for spiritual Christians to complain that, under the preaching referred to, they are not fed with the pure truths of the Gospel.”

On this subject, he adds—

“I am constrained to bear an unwilling personal testimony. As a member of the Presbyteries of Londonderry and Newburyport, I have been called to take part in the examination of some scores of candidates, educated in the Seminary. Many of these have appeared well, but the greater part have failed in some essential points; particularly that of native depravity. And you know, my Brethren, that this is a point so vital and pervading, in the Gospel scheme, and in experimental religion, that the minister, the Christian, who essentially fails here, can scarcely be right any where.”—(*Remonstrance*, pp. 6, 7.)

Such is the sad picture drawn by a venerable clergyman of New England, of the state of things in one of her prominent Theological Seminaries. His words are words of truth and soberness. They are spoken deliberately, solemnly, and in view of the judgment day. They come to our ears with gloomy and impressive weight. For we think we see in the very fact, that after two years of patient waiting for the effect of private remonstrance, Dr. Dana has been forced to appeal publicly to the churches in regard to these alarming evils,—an evidence that the remedy is difficult of access, if not entirely inaccessible. We greatly doubt whether, under the congregational polity, a check can be effectually given to the progress of error in this Institution. It seems to us that between the Scylla of Bushnellism in Connecticut, and the Charybdis of Andoverian Theology in Massachusetts, Congregationalism, as a system of church government, is in danger of being wrecked. Sound and good men may remonstrate, and protest, and mourn over the grievous defections of ministers and professors, but to put the strong hand of authority upon their errors, and rescue the churches from their disastrous influence, seems to be beyond their power. Congregationalism, in these days, is being tested as it never has been before, and it seems to us to display its inherent weakness in these emergencies. And we have reason to believe that some of the best and soundest of our New-England brethren are

beginning to feel that the polity of the Presbyterian Church is wiser, safer, and better adapted to guard and maintain the cause of truth and Godliness, to lift up an effectual standard against error, and to preserve, in its purity and simplicity, "the faith once delivered to the saints."

We assure such, of our affectionate sympathy with them, in the trying position in which they are now placed, in the conflict between their views of truth and duty, and a natural reluctance to sever bonds in which they have been long and pleasantly united with their brethren. We pray that God will give them wisdom to see clearly their duty, and strength to discharge it faithfully. We would encourage them in every effort to bear testimony to the truth, and remind them that

"Truth crushed to earth, will rise again;
The eternal years of God, are her's;
But Error, wounded, writhes in pain,
And dies, amid her worshippers."

ARTICLE III.

THE NECESSITY AND IMPORTANCE OF CONTROVERSY.

The capacity, extent, and province of reason, in reference to religious truths,—the design and authority of the Word of God, as the standard of doctrine,—the nature, character and purposes of God,—the trinity of persons in the one eternal Godhead,—the deity, offices and work of the Lord Jesus Christ,—the Divinity and work of the Holy Ghost,—the nature and necessity of the atonement,—these are subjects, which lie at the very foundation of all religion: the pillars and ground of all religious truth. The view we take of these doctrines makes us deists or believers,—rationalists or Christians,—the only true worshippers of the "true God, and our Saviour," or blasphemous idolaters. These truths underlie the very "first principles" of all piety, namely, the relation in which man stands to God, and God to

man, the independence or absolute helplessness of the creature, the way of salvation, and the whole manner and matter of acceptable worship. They lead to two systems of belief, separated by a chasm of impassable depth, and "contrary, the one to the other."

And yet both exist, and both claim the name, the authority, and the sanctions of Christianity. Both are found among us. Both have their ministry, their ordinances, and their worshippers, and both hold forth their claims to the allegiance of ourselves and our children.

What course, then, are we to pursue? Both cannot be true. One or the other must be false, and if false, dangerous, delusive, and destructive. What are we to do? Above all things, says the world, do not controvert, do not quarrel. Peace is more important than opinion.

For modes of faith, let graceless zealots fight,
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right.

Just similar was the condition in which the primitive believers were placed when the Apostle Jude wrote to them his epistle.

The object of God, in this epistle, was to warn Christians of the existence of false and heretical teachers, from whose cunning guile they were in imminent danger,—to assure them of the Divine judgments to which such teachers, and all who gave heed to their seducing errors, were exposed,—and to urge upon them the duty of strenuously maintaining and defending the truth and purity of the Gospel. The design of the epistle is practical. It proceeded from the love cherished towards those who professed to be the disciples of Christ. Their spiritual welfare deeply affected the Apostle's heart. *Their* salvation, and that salvation which was "the common" ground of hope and joy to all believers, was at stake.—For the Gospel is the power of God to salvation only when it is understood in its purity, and received in its simplicity, and in Godly sincerity. He felt, therefore, under a pressing necessity to write unto them, because others were using efforts to pervert them. "For," says he, "there are certain men, crept in unawares, who were of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men, turn-

ing the grace of our God into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God, and our Lord Jesus Christ."

The Apostle, therefore, at once, and with earnest importunity, calls upon those endangered believers to realize the imminent peril of their condition. All error is pernicious in its effects. But it is destructive in proportion as it affects those doctrines which relate to the Author and the way of salvation. And when men represent God as *so* gracious that they may continue to indulge the lusts of the eyes, and the pride of life,—and when they deny the essential Deity, and omnipotent, omnipresent power, and vicarious atonement of "the only Lord God, and our Lord Jesus Christ,"—then, as the Apostle Peter declares, they introduce "damnable heresies",—"pernicious ways,"—and bring upon themselves swift destruction.—(2 Pet. 2: 1.) This is what the Apostle Paul also taught, when he calls upon the Roman Christians to "mark them who caused heresies among them, contrary to the doctrine which they had learned."—(Rom. 16, 17.) The Apostle John goes still further. He makes the acknowledgment of the coming of Christ, as implying an antecedent divinity, and an assumed humanity the criterion of one who "is of God." "Every one professing to expound the Gospel, (says the Apostle,) who does not teach that Jesus was a man,—not, however, as was affirmed by the Docetæ, in *appearance only*, but in *reality*, and yet, that he was *not merely* a man, united, as the Cerinthians alleged, to some super-angelic being,—is not of God, but is that spirit of antichrist whereof ye have heard that it should come, and even now already is it in the world.—John, 4: 3. That teacher only, therefore, is of God, who confesses that He 'who was in the beginning with God,' and who 'was God,' 'was made flesh,' and became the word of God incarnate, 'God manifest in the flesh.'"*

The Apostle, therefore, under the guidance of inspiration, felt that any departure from "the truth as it is in Jesus," and, especially as it concerned the person, character, and work of Christ, endangered the salvation of immortal souls.

* See Horsley's Tracts.

They knew, also, that all religious error is traceable, ultimately, to the malign influence of that seducing spirit, who is denominated "the father of lies."—Matt. 13 : 41.* To him the Apostle Peter expressly ascribes the fraud and hypocrisy of Ananias.—Acts, 5 : 3. The Apostle Paul warns the Corinthians that "the serpent who beguiled Eve, through his subtilty, would also corrupt their minds from the simplicity that is in Christ, by transforming himself into an angel of light, and in the character of a minister of Christ," preaching another Jesus whom he had not preached, and another gospel which had not been originally proclaimed.—2 Cor. 11 : 3, 4 ; Eph. 6 : 11. And Christ himself warns the church of Thyatira against false doctrines, which he denominates "the depths of Satan."—Rev. 2 : 24.

But how does Satan accomplish these hellish purposes? Not singly, but by instigating "false Christs," "false prophets," and "false teachers," "false apostles," "deceitful workers," to transform themselves into the ministers of righteousness. Such being the case,—such being the sleight and cunning craftiness with which false teachers, under a pretence of liberty, with feigned words make merchandize of souls, the Apostle calls upon believers to be on their guard. Not merely human eloquence and sophistry, and philosophy, he in effect tells them,—not merely apparent zeal for God, and for the dignity and happiness of man, are employed to pervert, and, if possible, to deceive the very elect,—but principalities and powers, and spiritual wickedness in high places, are also leagued for the seduction and overthrow of believers. And it is only by taking to themselves the whole armour of God, and fighting the good fight of faith, that Christians can hope to stand firm and true against the wiles of the devil.

The Apostle knew also that there is in every one of us an evil heart of unbelief leading us to depart from the living God, to hold the truth in unrighteousness, and to build upon the foundation of God's word, the hay, wood and stubble of man's teaching. There is, in the very best of men, a corrupt principle which, unrestrained by the

* Matt. 13 : 41. Mark, 4 : 15. Luke, 8 : 12.

grace of God, will lead to error in judgment, and impiety in practice. And when error is flattering to human pride, compliant to human infirmity, and tolerant to human opinions, practices, and fashions, and when it promises heaven and happiness without holiness, self-denial, regeneration and zeal for good works, it is *far more* congenial than that truth which teaches that "except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God,"—that "without holiness no man shall see the Lord,"—that if any man will come after Christ, he must deny himself, take up his cross and follow him,"—come out from the world and be separated,—and that, "denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, he must live soberly, righteously and Godly, in this present evil world, looking for the coming of the great God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ."

Believers, therefore, are vehemently and with great earnestness, exhorted to remember these things,—to consider their danger, corruption within, temptation without,—and to cleave with full purpose of heart unto the Lord, and to the word of His testimony. The great trust committed to every Christian is the truth—"THE FAITH," as it is here called,—the faith which has God for its author, Christ for its object, sanctification for its evidence, and salvation for its end. It is by the hearing of the Gospel, this faith is produced. It is by the truth we are sanctified. And this Gospel, when accompanied by God's spirit, is "the power of God unto salvation."—This faith God has delivered to believers in his word by holy men of God, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. God's word alone can tell us what God is—what God wills—what God requires of man to believe, and to do, in order to salvation. All other lights are false lights, which lead only to precipices and to perdition. This alone is the true light shining in a dark place, to which we do well that we take heed. The world by wisdom knew not God, and it never entered into the heart of man to conceive the things now revealed, the mystery hid for ages.

And as Christ, the sum and substance of this faith, was "offered once to bear the sins of many," (Heb. 9: 28,) so this faith has been "once" for all, that is, *fully*,

finally and authoritatively, “delivered” in the *Scriptures*. It endureth for ever. It is the everlasting Gospel. It has been delivered once, and no more. It is the same yesterday, to-day and forever. No other foundation for our faith and hope can any man lay, than that which is laid. As a *testament*, the Gospel contains the whole will of Christ. As a *rule*, it contains the whole law of Christ. As a *creed*, it contains the whole doctrine of Christ. As a *guide*, it is able to make wise unto salvation. And as *the means* of salvation, it is perfect, converting the soul.

This, then, was the common salvation,—“the faith,”—about which the Apostle gave all diligence to write, and earnestly and vehemently to exhort. And as this was the faith once and always delivered unto the saints, in divers manners, and in divers measures, from Adam until Christ, so it is the faith, the only faith, and the whole faith, now delivered unto the saints. And as in the Apostles’ days, and from the days of *Cain until then*, this faith was assailed and corrupted and derided, and another gospel, which was not another, was, with cunning and persuasive craftiness, urged upon man’s acceptance, so also is it, in these last days, and so will it be.

What then, we again ask, are we to do?

We appeal to common sense. If the faith is that in which our hope for everlasting life is founded,—if it is by the truth, as it is in Jesus, we are made free,—if it is through God’s truth we are sanctified,—if it is the truth which purifies the heart,—if the truth is the source and motive to godliness,—if the truth is a part of the Christian armour, by which every Christian is to stand,—if this truth is to be believed, to be obeyed, to be manifested, and to dwell in the saints for ever,—if we are bound to love the truth, to speak the truth, to judge according to the truth, to rejoice in the truth, to deal in the truth, to buy the truth and sell it not, to abide in the truth, and to contend earnestly for it,—if the church is to be the pillar and ground of the truth, and has received a banner that she may be the preserver, the defender, and the propagator of the truth,—if God is the author of the truth, and the truth is the truth of God,—if Christ is the

truth, and the truth is the truth as it is in Jesus,—if the Holy Ghost is the inspirer of truth—if He guides only into truth, and along the way of truth,—if He sanctifies and saves only by the truth, and is emphatically the Spirit of Truth,—if the Gospel is truth, and nothing but the Gospel is truth,—if it is as the truth, and only as the truth, the Gospel is the power of God to the salvation of them that believe,—if it is the great end and aim, and commission of the church, and of every individual member of that church, to endeavour to convert those who err from the truth, and to bring them into the way of truth,—and, not to multiply these statements, which are all in the language of Scripture, if the enemies of Christ are represented as they who are devoid of the truth, who sell the truth, who speak not the truth, who love it not, and obey it not, who resist the truth, turn away from it, hold the truth in unrighteousness, change it into a lie, preach another gospel, and confess not that Christ is the sovereign Lord and Jehovah, God manifest in the flesh,—if I say these things are so, then what else can any lover of the truth do, than contend earnestly for it, whenever, wherever, and by whomsoever it is gainsayed.

We appeal to the common experience and conduct of men in regard to every other kind of truth than religious truth, and in reference to every other privilege and blessing, which they hold dear. Let the truth of civil and religious freedom, as involving the right of free inquiry, freedom of speech, freedom of action, and freedom of religious worship, be assailed,—let the constitutional rights and privileges secured by the charter of our national government to every member of the confederacy, be endangered or denied,—let the rights and privileges of any citizen, or any class of citizens, in any one of our communities be infringed upon, by our municipal authorities,—or in any other way, let personal and social rights be interfered with,—and how sharp, and long, and loud, and earnest, and costly, and if needs be, even unto blood, will be the controversy, the disputes, the appeal to public opinion; to judicial investigation, and to the true interpretation of our constitution. In regard to civil liberty, temporal rights, and all personal and social blessings, no man would hesitate to contend *earnestly*

and *as often*; and *as long*, as necessity might demand. This freedom of debate and controversy is the main-spring and essential conservator and guardian of free constitutions, repaying for its many incidental evils by activity, energy, knowledge and personal interest in the common weal, awakened by it in every bosom. And just as surely, just as necessarily, and just as profitably will the momentous truths and blessings of the Gospel appear of unspeakable value to every believer, agitate their understandings, inflame their spirits, enkindle their devotion, and when assailed, and denied, excite to controversy and earnest contention.

From the very nature of the case, we conclude that this must be so. What man *loves*, he clings to and defends; for where the treasure is, there will the heart be also. What is worth proclaiming, is worth preserving, and what we feel it our duty to believe, we feel it our duty to defend. What we value we will maintain and earnestly contend for, against all who would defraud us of it. Things must become the subjects of contention in proportion to their importance, and religion and religious truth being unspeakably the most important things in the world, no man can be either seriously or sincerely a Christian, who will not contend earnestly for his faith, and hope, against all opposers. The cause of such contention is not in religion, any more than it is in science or liberty, or social rights. The fault, in every case of controversy, is in the different understandings, tempers, interests, passions, and prejudices of mankind, incited by the great enemy of all peace. As long as these lead to opinions and practices contrary to the truth in science, liberty, or religion, there must be, as the Apostles say, divisions, and contendings and defendings. So long as, on whatever plea, the citadel of truth is assailed, the sentinel must give warning, the garrison must appear under arms, and that citadel must be defended; and he that acts otherwise will and must be a traitor to science, to his country, and to his God.

We appeal to the very nature of the Gospel itself. What is the Gospel? It is the revelation of God's plan of mercy and salvation to guilty, sinful and perishing man. In reference to God, it discloses God's everlasting pur-

pose and plan for blessing us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ,—the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, who for our sakes became poor, that we, through his poverty, his blood, his righteousness, might become rich,—the love and condescension of the ever blessed Spirit, who saves us by the washing of regeneration, and by His renewing, sanctifying and comforting influences. Into the name, that is, the belief, worship and service of the Father, Son, and the Holy Ghost, every one is to be disciplined, and in all that pertains to their divinity, offices and services, all are to be indoctrinated. In reference to MAN, the Gospel reveals to us that he is “born in sin,” “an heir of wrath,” “desperately wicked,” “dead in trespasses and sins,” “already condemned,” and incapable, without being born again, of entering the kingdom of God.

In reference to THE WORLD, the Gospel reveals that the whole world lieth in wickedness, being led captive by Satan, who is the god of this world,—that all that is in the world, is not of the Father,—that the whole world is guilty before God, under his wrath and curse, and in the broad way that leadeth to destruction,—that it is commanded to repent and believe the Gospel, in the assurance that he that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned.

The Gospel, therefore, in its doctrines and duties, its mysteries and its threatenings, is a scandal to some, and foolishness to others. It is everywhere spoken against, and in every way opposed, or else modified and moulded into conformity to the views and wishes of man’s darkened understanding and depraved heart. “I came not” therefore says Christ, “to bring peace on earth, but a sword.” In itself, the Gospel is the tidings of peace and good will to man. But as it throws light into the dark heart, and dark and evil ways of sinful men, men will oppose, resist and condemn it, and thus make that Gospel to be, as it is called, God’s sword, which, in itself, is God’s embassy of love. The alternative, therefore, is the Gospel *with* controversy, or no gospel at all. The Gospel is itself a standing controversy, with the cavils, the objections, the doubts, and the blasphemies of men. There is not a truth in the Gospel, nor in the Bible, nor

even in natural religion, that is not controverted by the sceptical, unbelieving, proud, and self-conceited wisdom of foolish man. The Atheist denies the very being of God,—the Pantheist his personality,—the Deist his word,—the sceptic his providence,—the errorist his moral government, his holiness, justice and severity,—and multitudes deny the authority, the claims, the obligations, and the unspeakable worth of the salvation and sanctification to which the Gospel calls. Let us, then, attempt to limit the doctrines to be enforced from the pulpit to *those* truths which are *undisputed*, and we are at once brought, not to the abandonment of the Gospel merely, with all its high mysteries, but to everlasting silence upon every truth, natural or Divine.

So it has ever been, and so it will ever be. Truth, in this world, and among the men of this world, is like Ishmael among his enemies. Its hand is against every man, because every man's hand is against it. It must either conquer opposition or die. It is a testimony for God and his truth, against man and his lies; against the devil and his wiles. From the very beginning of man's apostacy, until now, there has been enmity between the serpent and the woman, between the sons of God and the sons of men, between righteous Abel and a Christ-denying Cain, between the church and the world, between the word of God, and the traditions and philosophy and wisdom of men. The whole of religion is styled repeatedly "Jehovah's controversy."—Hos. 4: 1; Micah, 6: 2; Jer. 25, 31. The Scriptures are controversial writings. The whole book of Job is a controversy. The prophets were witnesses for God, and his truth, and contenders for the faith. John the Baptist was a firm and vehement and bold contender and martyr for the truth. The ministry of our blessed Lord was a perpetual controversy, and the Gospels a record of it. The Apostles were left to arrive at truth in many things by "much disputing among themselves," (Acts, 15: 7,) and they convinced Jews and Gentiles by much disputing with both.

The early Christians contended against the Jews, Pagans and heresiarchs, of their day, and it was only against the power of the sword, in the face of infamy and death, and with the sacrifice of millions of human lives

from age to age, that the truth prevailed and conquered. When the whole power of the Roman empire and of Vandal fury were leagued to destroy and exterminate that very orthodoxy for which we now contend, it was only by controversy and patient endurance that the priceless truth, as it is in Jesus, was preserved and perpetuated, and heresy overthrown.

When the truth had again been perverted by the man of sin, it was by controversy and faithful contending, even unto blood, that Luther and Calvin, and our fathers in Scotland, and in Ireland, and in France, rescued the truth, and again unfurled its banner to the breeze of Heaven. And it is only by controversy, and contending earnestly, that the truth, in all its purity and power, can ever be maintained and handed down to our posterity, and disseminated throughout the world. The church will remain a living church, and the church of the living God, only so long as she remains the pillar and the ground of the truth,—the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

But if these arguments are insufficient, let us further remind you that controversy and contending is made an imperative duty by God himself. Ministers must *defend* as well as *preach* the truth, and drive away the wolf, as well as protect the sheep. The mouths of deceivers are to be stopped, and gain-sayers must be convinced, who subvert whole houses. If there are damnable heresies, there may be a damnable silence, and a cursed patience, on the part of that watchman who giveth not warning. Woe is unto him, if he do not keep the truth and hold fast the faithful word, and speak the word which becometh sound doctrine. Nor is this woe limited in its effects to their own souls. For it is only when they have declared all the counsel of God that they can feel pure from the blood of other souls crying out for vengeance upon their unfaithfulness. And it is in view of this fact that many corrupt the word of God, and handle it deceitfully, that all ministers are charged before God and the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing, to reprove, rebuke, exhort with all long suffering and doctrine; seeing that the time will come when men will not endure sound doctrine, but after their

own lusts shall they heap to themselves teachers, and they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and be turned unto fables. Every minister, therefore, is set for the defence of the Gospel, and not merely for its proclamation.

Not only ministers, however, but every Christian is a warrior, under the Captain of his salvation, and under obligation to contend earnestly for the faith, and not to sell it. They must hold it fast, and neither give it away nor suffer it to be taken from them. They must keep it in their heads, by being well established in the faith,—in their hearts, by being filled with the love of the truth,—and in their hands, by being ready to give a reason for it to every one that asketh. They must hold it fast, by persevering devotion to it, and by a zealous defence of it, lest, “being led away by the error of the wicked, they fall from their steadfastness, and at last lose their crown. For he that is content to be a looker-on, while his fellow Christians contend earnestly for the faith, shall never be more than a looker-on when they are crowned with that diadem which is laid up for them who have “kept the faith.”

Objections to religious controversy cannot therefore be religious. They are in evident contrariety to the principles of common sense,—to the invariable conduct of mankind in reference to all other truth,—to the necessity of the case,—to the very nature and genius of the Gospel,—to the way in which the truth has, from the beginning until now, been professed and perpetuated,—to the nature and design of the church, and the ministry,—and to the plain and positive commands of God. From whatever motives such opposition to controversy arises, it involves, therefore, the spirit of disobedience, unfaithfulness, and that cowardly timidity and “fear of man which bringeth a snare.” For what is controversy? It is either an oral or written discussion of whatever is controverted as error. Now, to controvert or dispute a point, is only to agitate a question, and sift and weigh its evidence so as to obtain clear and satisfactory ideas of it. And can any man attain to a real personal and assured belief without controversy? It is impossible. Neither can any man maintain his belief, or defend it, but by continually

controverting, discussing and weighing all that is presented to his mind, for and against his faith.

Aversion to controversy, when it is based upon a professed regard for the interests of religion, is founded upon misapprehension and mistake. It confounds controversy with contention, and contending with contentiousness, and disputation with a disputatious spirit. It does not distinguish between controversy and the temper in which it may be conducted. Religion demands and necessitates *controversy*, but it denounces a *controversial spirit*. The principles which are upheld, the purpose in which it originates, the object for which it is employed, and the spirit in which it is conducted, characterizes any particular controversy as good or evil. If it spring from a mere spirit of contention, from a desire of victory, or a love of display,—from personal animosity, and not from love of the truth, Christianity will not acknowledge it as her own. If employed on questions unnecessary or unimportant,—if it is made the vehicle of personal malignity, and is carried on in a spirit that rends asunder the bonds of charity and peace, it is equally unchristian. But these evils flow not from the *use*, but from the *abuse*, of controversy,—not from the truth, but from the evil heart of its defenders,—and are not therefore inseparable from it, nor a prohibition of its use. And these evils, however great, are not worthy to be compared to the evil and guilt of allowing the truth to be lost through indifference, or endangered through our pusillanimity. And all that the Apostle enjoins, is not that spirit of contentiousness, “but that open, manly, unflinching, continuous effort, towards the furtherance of the truth, in all circumstances, and in the face of all opposition, which the truth demands at the hands of those who have honestly received it; and which it will undoubtedly receive, from every man who is deeply and thoroughly convinced that it is the truth, and that all else is but vanity,—yea, worse than vanity,—delusion; delusion and a lie.”

But while many, through *misapprehension* and *mistake*, are opposed to religious controversy, many, it is to be feared, are opposed to it, because they are indifferent to, or opposed to the truth itself. They condemn the

contending earnestly for the faith, because they contemn the faith itself. Some artfully deny controversy, and hold up its abuses and its incidental evils, in order to destroy free inquiry, which would endanger their established errors, and their blinded votaries. Others are so inflated with the idea of their own infallibility, that their insufferable arrogance cannot bear to have oracular declarations, which of course are the voice of God, called in question. Others, again, oppose controversy, but it is only controversy for, and in defence of, the truth; while they are to be freely permitted to controvert *against* the truth. Laziness, pride, intolerance, impiety, indifference to all religious truth, and above all, a secret feeling that the stirring of the waters of controversy may arouse their slumbering but uneasy consciences: these, it is to be feared, constitute the prevailing motives with too many of those who, under the pretence of peace and charity, and the glory of God and the good of souls, cry out against all controversy, unless it be about the paltry questions of some municipal election, or the beggarly elements of mere earthly things.

And when some ever good and pious people affirm that controversy is of no use, we would reply, in the language of Dr. Beecher, "It is nearer the truth to say, that no great advance has ever been made in science, religion or politics, without controversy. And certain it is, that no era of powerful theological discussion has ever past away, without an abiding effect in favour of truth. The discussions of Augustine, of Luther, and of Calvin, are felt to this day; and the controversial writings of Edwards, have been to error, what the mounds and dykes of Holland have been to the sea."

Contending earnestly for the faith, is, therefore, an *imperative* and *all-important* Christian duty. "Stand fast in one spirit with one mind, striving together (wrestling together) for the faith of the Gospel, and in nothing terrified by your adversaries." "Why halt ye between two opinions?" When God's truth is at stake, neutrality must be criminal, and indifference to the truth is, of all others, the enemy most to be dreaded.

Only let our zeal for the truth be combined with charity for the persons of all who oppose it. This discrimina-

tion between *our* accountability for holding and defending the truth, and the accountability of every man only to God, and not to man, for his religious opinions, is the true secret by which we may "speak the truth in love," and so defend it as to maintain peace and charity, even towards its assailants. This will enable us to honour the truth, without dishonouring ourselves,—to be firm and calm,—and with a warm heart to preserve a cool head, and a graceful tongue.

ARTICLE IV.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.

Inquiries into the philosophy of vital existence necessarily involve great perplexity and doubt. It is a subject which embraces both the most enlarged and comprehensive views of nature, and the minutest investigations of the most simple and palpable elements and laws of the material world.

How inorganic substances are combined, and transformed into organisms of perfect symmetry and beauty; and what laws govern the wonderful changes of matter, in the production of life, are problems of the greatest interest to the student of nature. Their consideration has confounded the wisest minds of ancient and modern times, and they still remain, and perhaps will ever be, a fruitful source of speculation and controversy. The most beautiful theories have been woven in the closets of sage philosophers, and have had ardent admirers and supporters, until the lights of science have dissipated them into empty air, and left us still groping in confusion and ignorance, in search of the mysterious agents which are constantly in operation around us.

After all, we can only exclaim with the poet,—

"Full nature swarms with life, one wondrous mass
Of animals or atoms organized,
Waiting the vital breath, when parent Heaven
Shall bid his spirit blow."

Every element and every being is in a condition of constant and unceasing change. Mutation is the law of nature, and when a body is decomposed, its constituents in a moment seek new arrangements and form different compounds. Chemical laws are always in action, and under the influence of various agencies, produce some of the most astounding phenomena in creation. The appearance of the earth before life began, when there existed neither herb nor plant, nor flower, nor tree, when no living being, either animal or vegetable, exhibited the handiwork of the Creator,—when all was as yet one vast, unbounded, dreary waste, impressed with the awful stillness of the grave, presents to the imagination of man some of the most appalling scenes upon which his mind can ponder. How long this state of things continued, we cannot hazard even a conjectural opinion. But at length these dismal appearances commenced, as if by magic, to fade away. The God of nature spoke, and the face of the earth began to smile with life. It is certain that all matter was primarily in a state of unorganization; but by the developement of a principle, denominated *vital*, and by the concomitant action of appropriate excitants, the dead mass assumed a living appearance, chemical laws yielded to vital powers, and the earth, which before presented only scenes of barrenness and deformity, was beautified and ornamented with the richest treasures of organization.

It will thus be perceived, that we indissolubly connect living with organic phenomena. And although the great Hunter asserts, that “life and organization do not in the least depend on each other; and that organization may arise out of living parts and produce action, but that life can never arise out of, or produce organization,” we must think, from natural observation, that they cannot be separated, even in idea. Hunter strenuously advocated this bold opinion, to sustain an hypothesis of life, which will, by and by, be noticed. Whether life is necessarily the result of *germination*, or whether it may, under some circumstances, occasionally spring up without it, is a question which cannot be satisfactorily determined at present. It seems reasonable, however, to suppose, that, as the work of creation is still probably

progressing, there may possibly be spontaneous generation.*

In fact, numerous experiments afford strong confirmation of the theory. What produces this wonderful metamorphosis of matter? What subdues chemical affinities, and clothes inert bodies with vital properties? Is it a principle *sui generis*, or is it the resultant arising from the concurrent action of suitable and peculiar excitants? This is a problem, which the combined wisdom of ages has not been able to solve.

Speculation has followed speculation, and theories have been advanced, resting on abstract reasoning, time after time, to account for the singular phenomena of vitality; but as often have they proved unsatisfactory and absurd.

On this, as on all subjects of an abstruse and mysterious character, men, upon whom nature has lavished her most precious gifts, have devoted years of toil and unsurpassed mental efforts in vain. Being lost in the intricate mazes of speculative reasoning, they have taken flight upon the wings of their imaginations, and promulgated theories equally contradictory to the dictates of reason and the truths of Divine revelation. The inability to detect the fugitive principle of life, induced Magendie, and a respectable portion of the French school, to deny its existence as an *entity*. Thus, according to their views, ignorance of the essential nature of a causative power, even with a knowledge of its effects, proves positively that it does not exist. They make vital phenomena independent of a primordial cause. They build a gigantic structure without a foundation. But a sufficient evidence of their sophistry is, that they never speak of vital existence without referring to the vital principle. They frequently expatiate upon the totality of powers, the totality of properties, etc; and thus deduce positive and infallible conclusions from premises which are really negative and contradictory. We believe that a vital principle exists; yet we as firmly believe, that it can never be absolutely detected. Like other great natural

* We suppose the writer does not use this term in the sense in which it was used by the old advocates of "spontaneous generation."—*Eds. S. P. Rev.*

agents, as heat, light and electricity, the element itself is not *known*, though its action, general laws and results, are palpable to the most careless observer. By a *posteriori* reasoning, which is by far the soundest, we conclude analogically as to the primary cause. The principle, before excitation by suitable stimuli, is in a negative or quiescent state; and the same remark is applicable to other principles. How the vital force acts upon inorganic matter, we shall not attempt to explain. But it evidently acts upon ultimate atoms; makes new corpuscular arrangements, and imparts entirely different properties to it. The evidence of the fact, is a sufficient ground for belief, without an intricate examination into its process of operation.

Having premised the existence and action of a vital principle, a brief review or analysis of some of the most popular theories of life may not prove uninteresting, and is perhaps necessary.

The doctrine of Aristoxenus, a distinguished Grecian physician, will be first noticed. He taught that there is a consent of action in the different organs of the animal frame, and that harmonious action, which constitutes health, results from the proper and united functions of these organs, as harmony in music arises from the due tone of the musical chords. This he called the theory of Harmony. This plausible and ingenious hypothesis was zealously opposed by the Epicureans, and finally overthrown by them, on the ground that it was founded on the gratuitous assumption, that perfect life could only arise from consent of vital action. Its falsity was fully shown by Lucretius, who clearly proved that the mind may be diseased, and the corporeal functions remain unimpaired, and *vice versa*. But even granting the truth of the theory, to its fullest extent, the essential principle of life is unrevealed by it. Another hypothesis, which was heartily embraced by the Greeks and Romans, and likewise the Jews, was, that "the life of all flesh is the blood thereof," or, in other words, that the blood itself is the principle of life. This theory, apparently strengthened by the Mosaic writings, and endorsed by the ritual of the patriarchs, was considered a satisfactory exposition of the chief elements of life. Even the poets of antiqui-

ty seemed enamoured with it, and immortalized it in verse. After having flourished a long time, it paled before the investigations of medical philosophers. It thus remained until the names of Harvey, Hoffman and Hunter, raised it again to the zenith of its popularity.— Harvey, from the brilliancy of the discovery of the circulation, was easily led to the adoption of *ultra* views, with respect to the important functions of the blood.— Huxham, an enthusiastic advocate of the theory, believed that he had traced the principle of life to its ultimate seat in the blood, and contended that the red globules were its receptacles. Hunter pursued the subject with unsurpassed perseverance and accuracy; and, although he did not succeed in establishing his premises, he shed great light upon the physiological uses of the blood. He proved, beyond cavil, that the blood is vitalized and subject to the fundamental laws of living bodies. But the slightest glance into the operations of nature shows the fallacy of his reasoning upon the general subject of life and organization. “We invariably find” says Good, “that organization is the ordinary, perhaps only, means by which life is transmitted; and that whenever life appears, its tendency, if not actual result, is nothing else than organization.” But Hunter’s reasoning fell far short of the mark; for it neither detected the essential principle, nor illustrated its action on the blood in vitalization. Leaving this beautiful, though imperfect, theory of vital essence, we will briefly examine another, which was first suggested by the Epicurean school, and afterwards developed by the researches of chemical experimenters. It teaches that the vital principle is a fine, invisible and subtle gas or aura, which reaches the most remote atom of vitalized matter, and conspiring with other important natural agents, forms, according to Lucretius, the soul itself. Several gases and fluids were supposed by their discoverers to be so nearly assimilated to the vital principle, that a line of distinction could not be drawn between them. Caloric, oxygen and voltaic electricity were each successively assigned as the chief element of vital existence. That caloric is essential to life, no one can deny. That it exercises great influence on the preservation and growth of living bodies, is likewise

indisputable; and, in all probability, it is impossible for vital manifestations to take place without it. Yet the bare enunciation of the proposition, that "heat is life," involves the monstrous absurdity, that there is no such thing as inorganic matter. For, if it is true, (and it undoubtedly is,) that every thing material is caloricized, their reasoning would lead to the preposterous conclusion, that every thing is infused with the principle of life; or, in plain terms, *lives*. This hypothesis was supported by a celebrated Empiric in this country, and is still in vogue with his followers, some of whom have been bold enough to assert, that the distinguished Dr. Rush partially subscribed to it. This is utterly false and ungrounded, as in his writings can only be found the opinion, that heat is requisite for the production and maintenance of life. To Thomson alone is due the credit of having invented a theory so fraught with ignorance and folly. When Lavoisier demonstrated the important offices of oxygen in both animal and vegetable life, it was supposed to be the ultimate source of vital existence.— The equal importance of other gases in the animal, as well as vegetable kingdoms, will, I presume, be a sufficient refutation of this theory. From the interesting experiments of Galvani and other chemists, the probability was thought to be reduced almost to a certainty, that life originated from electricity; or that the vital principle was the electric fluid, so modified by peculiar circumstances, as to produce all the phenomena of life. Wilson Philip, who was a strong advocate of this opinion, with great confidence in its correctness says, "the identity of galvaic electricity and nervous influence is established by experiment."

In these experiments, however, to which he alludes, the phenomena have since been proved not vital, but purely electrical. Even after death, the muscular fibre shows contractibility under the influence of galvanism. The action, in this instance, is simply electrical and mechanical. The curative effect of this fluid, in many diseases, nevertheless, evinces a controlling influence over life. It is an interesting fact, that the human body is possessed of magnetic influence, and at times exhibits magnetic phenomena. Are these properties owing to

nervous influence, or electricity? From the quantity of ferruginous matter in the blood, we are inclined to attribute them almost entirely to the latter. That there is an intimate connection, however, between the two fluids, is illustrated in Mesmeric experiments, in which there is both a transfer of sensation, and an exhibition of magnetic influence. All agree, I believe, that life is produced and continued by the action of some powerful agent or agents. "Life" says Dr. Brown, "is a forced state."—This opinion was first announced by Cullen, who afterwards renounced it. Rush also, antecedently to Brown, intimated the same view, and so expressed himself in his able lectures on the causes of animal life. This opinion is plausible, and probably correct; for, although vital actions appear harmonious, yet it is very evident that they must be the resultants of forcible powers.—Dr. Rush advances one step farther, and says that *animal* life commences with *respiration*. After speaking of demonstrable physiological evidences, he refers to various expositions of Scripture, and proves conclusively the truth of the proposition.

From the writings of this eminent physician, we understand that he regarded life as the direct result of stimuli, without a primordial cause. A peculiar susceptibility of receiving impressions, he denominates *sensibility*, and the capability of transmitting impressions from the brain to the muscles, so as to produce motion, *excitability*. It will be unnecessary and tedious to reiterate and detail the different excitants mentioned by Rush. They have been beautifully arranged and classified by him, according to the various parts of the body, upon which they act. Those which excite the internal parts are termed *internal*, and those acting externally, *external* stimuli. Now, when these act with proper force, and within due bounds, they produce perfect health; but when they fall below the normal grade, or exceed their usual action, disease immediately commences its ravages.

There seems to be an equilibrium between the excitement produced by stimuli and excitability. They are in inverse proportion to each other. If stimuli are suddenly abstracted, there will be no excitement, but an accumulation of excitability, which denotes *direct* debility.

But if, on the other hand, stimuli act too violently, great excitement is the consequence, and there is a decrease of excitability, causing *indirect* debility. One fact worthy of remark is, that the absence of one stimulant may be, in a great measure, supplied by another. All these facts are, I think, reconcilable with the existence of a vital principle. I cannot conceive in what manner the phenomena of life can be explained by parity of reasoning, without supposing the existence of a primordial cause. We do not, however, recognize the vital principle in such unlimited scope, as was taught by Pythagoras, who supposed that it was essentially active, and moreover, that the soul was in a continued state of transmigration; or Epicurus, who thought the universe pervaded and inspired by an "*anima mundi*," which is

"Through the whole system's utmost depth diffused,
And lives as soul of e'en the soul itself,"

but as passive, latent and disguised, until rendered active, free and discoverable by the requisite excitants.

An enumeration of the various appearances which distinguish living from dead matter, would prolong this article to too great a length. Besides, they are so plain, that a repetition is scarcely necessary.

A living being is called an animal when it is endowed with heat, motion, sensation and thought. Beings may be so partially gifted with these, that they cannot with certainty be placed in an animalized class. However, in their more perfect states, the distinctions are well defined and evident. Life is not restricted to the narrow compass of animality.

The vital principle is diffused through the vegetable kingdom also. And as a slight comparison between the animal and vegetable worlds may not be foreign to the subject, a few words will be devoted to their parallelisms and resemblances. In all the various forms of creation, we observe a unity of design; and, although not cast in the same mould, there are evidences of the wisdom of the Supreme in all his works. At the first glance, there seems to be no similarity between animals and vegetables; but when we examine the structures of both, witness their homogeneous natures, and remember, that

some able physiologists have bestowed even sensation and thought on the vegetable kingdom, we must infer that an intimate relation exists between them. Look at the re-production of a plant. The pollen of the male flower falls upon the stigma of the female, is conducted by the style to the germe, which it stimulates to growth, and, in a manner resembling, in a striking degree, the generation of an animal, a new plant is formed. Both are enclosed in suitable receptacles in the formative stage. In structure the analogy is as close. Both are composed of tissues, adducent and reducent vessels, and lymphatics. Valves are placed in the vessels of both, to prevent a reflux of their contents.

A circulation in plants, like that of animals, has been established by direct experiment; and plants, in all probability, are possessed of nervous energy, as we invariably find vital phenomena accompanying, perhaps dependent upon, nervous influence. The parallelism is still further carried out in the allotted time of existence, in some species of both kingdoms. Some plants bloom and wither in a few hours; and, on the other hand, some animals arrive at a perfect state of their existence in as short a space of time, and as soon die. The slips of plants may be productive, and also buds and bulbs; but this only indicates a closer resemblance, as the *hirudo viridis* and *hydra*, are produced by lateral sections, and zoophytic worms by buds and layers. Plants gradually rise in the scale of organization, till it is difficult to distinguish them from the lowest order of animals. There are, however, some clear and well-defined differences.— A plant generally possesses only irritability and contractibility; is confined to one spot; and draws sustenance from the gases, earths, and minerals. Whereas, in the last distinction, animals, (besides differences mentioned before,) are nourished by animal and vegetable substances almost entirely. So, it seems that the vegetable kingdom, by a process of assimilation, renders inert and indigestible, substances subject to animal nutrition.

Having thus shown resemblances between the two kingdoms in some particulars, we must not conclude that the endowment of such low orders of beings with

something more than mere vital existence, is at all derogatory to the majesty of man. He is gifted with properties, which distinguish him from all other living creatures. To him belongs the supremacy of reason, and he alone is possessed of those *prospective* faculties, which enable him to penetrate the dim vista of the future, and look beyond the destructive and vain desires of this world, to the glorious enjoyments of another.

As a particular detail of vital phenomena would demand unnecessary space and attention, we will confine our views to the more important facts. A remarkable property of a living body, is its *recuperative energy*, or, in other words, its capability of resisting the deleterious influence of disease, and restoring the system to a healthy state. What this is owing to, is not certainly known; but the action of a "*vis medicatrix nature*" is deduced from a variety of circumstances. What is reaction, but an effort of the system to overcome the disease, and restore its functions? Does not the body exhibit a protective principle, in resisting excessive heat and cold? And does not the inflammation succeeding irritation appear to be an energetic effort of nature to remove the irritating body? Some suppose the fever consequent upon a chill to be the result of this defensive principle of vitality, which, acting with too great violence, leaves the system in a state of debility, and thus renders it more susceptible of a recurrent attack. Medical teachers advise us to assist nature by remedial agents. Assist her in doing what? Must we not infer that she is striving, by her own powers, to remove the evil? In supposing that nature possesses curative powers, we reject, as presumptuous and untenable, the "*rational soul*" of Stahl. For, to suppose, for a single moment, that the mind can solely avert the influence of baneful agents, would at once concede the possession of the *rational soul*, or mind, to all organized bodies manifesting recuperative properties. No doubt the mind exercises considerable influence over health; yet we must carefully distinguish between the mind and life. They are too distinct entities, though often co-existent and dependent.

We should not be surprised at the curative efforts of

nature, when we consider that life is *in equilibrio*, and that disease destroys the *balance* of health; and, moreover that some curative effort is requisite to restore it. How it acts, we cannot explain; but suppose the impulse to be communicated through the nervous centres. The nerves are placed as sentinels to give the alarm at the approach of the enemy. When this is done, the recuperative energies of the system are roused; every resistance is made to its attack, and the invader may be repulsed. If, however, the protective powers of the system are over-matched and prostrated, disease commences its ravages upon the weakest and most assailable points, the whole body partakes of the evil by sympathy, and eventually death waves his banner in triumph over the deserted fabrick.

We can observe, that even when death commences, the remaining powers of the system, however feeble, exert their fruitless efforts to overcome the disease, which is denoted by the accompanying fever, and extreme nervousness of the patient. It really seems impossible, as we view the subject, to account for the removal of disease, and the restoration of health, without conceding defensive properties to living bodies. Having thus noticed imperfectly the primordial cause of life; its excitants, and some of its chief phenomena, let us take a glimpse at animate nature. How wonderful the thought that all space is filled with habitable matter, and that the universe is teeming with living creatures! And it is a legitimate inference, from daily observation, that myriads of beings are in existence around us, though they, concealed

"By the kind art of forming Heaven, escape
The grosser eye of man."

The globe itself seems alive, and every thing is joyous with life. "No doubt," observes a distinguished naturalist, "there are gradations of existence below the smallest animalcules, which our nicest instruments have not brought to light." Even in a single drop of water, millions of living, moving creatures exist. However ephemeral their existence, there is reason to believe that they enjoy, to the fullest extent, the pleasures of life.

"Each crawling insect holds a rank
 Important in the plan of *Him*, who framed
 This scale of beings; holds a rank, which lost
 Would break the chain, and leave a gap,
 That nature's self would rue!"

Man is, however, the master-piece of life. His anatomical structure is more complicated, his characteristics more striking, and his existence more glorious than any other creatures. His traits are more striking, from the fact that he is created after the image of his Maker. Rational pursuits afford him alone enjoyment, and the prospects of eternity give to him an unbounded field for contemplation. Yet, no matter how brilliant his hopes, or lofty his aspirations, they must be eclipsed and prostrated by the hand of Death. He is at last triumphant, and claims the trophies of his victory. We yield "to his own strong arm," in the belief, and with the hope, that "the life to come" will more than compensate for the momentary pangs of dissolution.

ARTICLE V.

THE RELATION OF JUSTICE TO BENEVOLENCE IN THE CONDUCT OF SOCIETY.

The two virtues which stand at the head of this article are usually put into a sort of antagonism with each other. It may be seriously questioned, however, whether, in *essence*, they are not the same, and that it is only the varying conditions under which the generic virtue is exercised, that causes it to be called by the one or the other name. What is justice? It is that principle which regulates our conduct towards others, according to the relations existing between us. What is benevolence? It is the same principle, associating itself with hearty goodwill to others, and adapting itself to any circumstances of need or suffering into which they may have fallen.—Thus, justice approaches its object in the way of right; benevolence in the way of love. The former demands a claim; the latter an occasion. Still, the generic prin-

ciple is the same; and our Saviour announced as much the law of benevolence as of justice, when he said—“Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them, for this is the law and the prophets.”

This union of two seemingly contradictory elements is not peculiar to morality, but is often realized in the investigations of science. Previously to the days of Franklin, it was believed that there were two kinds of electricity,—the vitreous, and the resinous. That philosopher proved, however, that there was but one; and that what created the difference was, the excess or defect of this element in any one body, or set of bodies. So, at the present time, some persons are beginning to conjecture, that the forces which carry the heavenly bodies around their centres, are not two adverse agents, but the same agent, acting under different conditions.

Now, it must be evident, that if this common nature of justice and benevolence be maintained, the injury done to the one, must be equally inflicted upon the other. He who strikes a man upon the head, may not, it is true, with the same blow, strike also his foot. But the foot suffers as well as the head; and a death-wound inflicted upon the latter member, will as surely carry the foot to the grave as the head: it kills *the man*, including both members. Wherever, then, the doctrines or practices of men have exalted one of these cardinal virtues at the expense of the other, they have as essentially injured their favourite as their foe. To invade justice, is to invade benevolence, and to harm benevolence, is to harm justice. Whenever justice transcends the line of benevolence, it becomes itself unjust; and whenever benevolence oversteps the bounds of justice, it is itself unkind. Thus, if we consider these virtues as having a sort of two-fold personality, but a common nature, the one keeps the other in perpetual check; and each has fixed bounds beyond which it cannot pass.

There is no *perfect* adjustment of these virtues, probably, but in God himself. In Him, justice and benevolence are so harmoniously linked together, that he never can perform an act of benevolence that is not just, or an act of justice that is not benevolence. And in propor-

tion as men and angels approximate in character to Him who is the All-Perfect, in the same proportion will their acts and conduct be under the control of the two-fold, yet ever-perfectly adjusted dominion of these noble virtues. On earth, among men, we perceive the wildest irregularity on this subject. Here, on the one side, we see a class of men, the vigorous adherents of justice. All they demand, in any case whatever, is, the rule, the law, the claim, the decision of the court. All virtue, with them, after this, consists in the unmitigated execution of the sentence pronounced. The rights of humanity, and the sympathies of a common nature, must be hushed to the sterner voice of justice and law. Now, these men are as *unjust* as cruel. They are invading the territory of justice, as savagely as they are that of benevolence. On the other side, we see a different class of men,—men who, nauseated at the inhumanities of past ages, and of present despots, are almost ready to conclude, that government is a curse, and well-regulated society a burden too heavy to be borne! The contrast here alluded to, is well exemplified in the present condition of continental Europe. On the side of government in that country, there is a vast preponderance given to what is meant to be justice. But Americans, who look at these acts of legislation across the Atlantic, and from the bosom of a very different kind of civil government, see clearly that the governments in Europe are, for the most part, tyrannizing over their subjects. On the contrary, this very tyranny seems to find a justification in the fact, that just so soon as kings and statesmen yield, the people are disposed to run into such excesses as to threaten all Europe with absolute ruin. It is easy to see the proper remedy for evils of this kind. It consists in a spirit of mutual concession and confidence between sovereigns and subjects. But how is this to be effected? We answer, without hesitation, the *entire morality of Europe must be placed upon a different basis*. The Bible must be opened to her millions, and preachers, teachers, and Sabbath-schools must be scattered abroad in every hamlet and neighbourhood. Nothing else will ever deliver these mighty governments from the perpe-

tual alternations of tyranny and revolution, oppression and radicalism.

In our country, the tendency, with one solitary exception, is more to *liberalism* than tyranny. The exception to which we refer, is the politico-ecclesiastical government of the Papal church. That government is now, and ever has been, of the most absolute kind. And although in this land, it does not as yet control the greater masses of the nation, so far as it does go, it is as despotic as that of Turkey or Japan. The great sin of this Power is, its withholding a *free Bible* from the people. By thus depriving its subjects of the only means that can either enlighten or christianize them, it consigns to absolute ignorance and oppression, some two or three millions of American citizens! And if this work should go on, and the Bible be taken from the people of the United States, as in Italy and South America, no wisdom or device of man will ever be able to rescue our vast *population* from the same alternating changes from tyranny to radicalism, and radicalism to tyranny, that are now devastating both Europe and South America, as with the "besom of destruction." Apart, however, from this Un-Saxon, Un-Republican element, the general tendency of the American mind is to *latitudinarianism*. The power in this land is now, and, in one form or another, ever must be, in the hands of the people. And, so long as this is the case, we may expect a more or less leaning of the laws to the personal and immediate good of individuals. The great and abiding principles of government will be made to succumb to expediency; and a system of utilitarianism will succeed to that of even-handed justice.

We see the tendency here referred to, in the *political opinions* of our countrymen. There can be no doubt, but that an over-ruling Providence has been preparing our race, through scores of generations past, for wiser and better systems of government than now exist upon the earth. This preparation, however, can only be effected by severe experiences and protracted discipline. Society does not, and cannot, leap from barbarism to civilization at once. Nor can any great error that has

found its way into a political system be soon eradicated. Time, changes, instruction, circumstances, must all combine to effect these moral and social revolutions. The forms which the existing governments of our world have assumed, are the work, not only of centuries, but of thousands of years. To imagine that such institutions can be soon changed by the agencies now in operation for that purpose, or that even the powerful influence of our government can, at any early period, produce essential ameliorations in their condition, is to exhibit utter ignorance of man's past history, and of his nature, as a social being. No; national opinions, usages and laws, like the mountains and valleys, the rivers and lakes, that indent the surface of a country, are not things to be removed by the mere breathings of philanthropy, or the impulsive action of well-meaning charity. Yet, the opinion is exceedingly prevalent in this country, that man can be happy and useful only under free institutions, and that the great mission of our government is to propagate civil liberty throughout the earth. There is a sort of sickly compassion felt for every stranger who happens to have been born under the dominion of a crown, or who happens, in any way, not to possess the general freedom of the great American Republic. Such an one, particularly if opposed, is welcomed to our shores by a thousand hands, while hundreds of pens are calling for the sword, possibly to redress his country's wrongs! Yea, we go further than this. We need but the slightest offence,—the weakest occasion, to call forth our battalions to invade the provinces of a sister country. The justification here is, not that we have received a righteous call to war, but that our neighbour manages her people and provinces so illy, that it were far better for us to take them under wiser and better control! Now, if the history of the past teaches any thing, it teaches this, that a spirit of this sort, if pampered and gratified in its cupidity for foreign conquest, will next seek that which is domestic, and will as exultingly triumph in the destruction of its country's institutions, as it once did in the invasion of those that belonged to strangers.

We see this tendency to set a spurious benevolence against justice, in the spirit and action of many of the

voluntary Societies of the present age. These Societies are all based upon the principle that the laws and usages of nations are to be reached and altered by means of the people. To a very good degree this principle is correct. But where it so addresses the people as to set them against existing institutions,—as to alienate them from their authorized rulers,—as to incite them to rebellion and revolt, “evil, and only evil” can result. Should the people, who may have been the down-trodden serfs of centuries,—should they so unite as to get the power into their own hands,—what then? What! but such scenes as revolutionary France witnessed, under the bloody reign of terror and the guillotine! And having swept away all the higher and better classes of men, who, then, is left to control the dashing and heaving elements of the political chaos that remains? No one: until some great and daring spirit, far more oppressive and arbitrary than the “powers that were,” comes forth, like a Cæsar, or a Buonaparte, to hush the storm and re-establish tyranny! Or, suppose, what is far more likely, that the efforts of the people at revolution should fail. What then? What, but a series of bloody executions, shocking to humanity, followed by an iron yoke of bondage, far heavier than ever pressed the necks of the people before! Such must inevitably be the results of all injudicious attempts, through a false spirit of benevolence, to mitigate the evils which men suffer under their various systems of social order.

Modern Abolition Societies furnish apt illustrations on this subject. It is an amazing fact, that while these Societies exist wholly in States whose constitutions recognize no such relation as that of master and slave, their chief object is to operate upon territory where that relation has been recognized by the laws for centuries past!

Is such a course wise? Is it modest! Can any sensible man suppose for a moment, that human nature can be so down-trodden as tamely to submit to such dictation? It is absolute madness to conceive of such a thing; and so the result has proved. For some twenty years the moral batteries of the world have been turned loose upon the slavery that exists in our Southern States. Argument, appeal, wit, ridicule, local excommunication,

church anathemas, books, pamphlets, political speeches, and even legislation, have all been used, *ad furorem*, to despatch this monstrous evil! What is the issue? A calm and thorough investigation of the whole subject of slavery by Southern Theologians and Statesmen, and a firm conviction, from all the lights that history, philosophy and revelation furnish, that the relation of master and slave is a lawful one, and that there are many circumstances in which men may exist in a state of servitude, in a far happier condition, than in the possession of that nominal freedom, that is not inconsistent with almost every species of oppression, from the laws and usages of the higher ranks in life. Yea, at this moment, the South is willing to challenge *the whole world*, to exhibit a labouring class less burdened, better provided for, or who enjoy more real happiness, than the Africans who are, in the course of Providence, held as slaves by her laws! What, then, has been gained by this foreign assault upon the domestic usages of other States? Two things—the permanent lodgement of slavery as a fixed element in our government, and a vast amount of hatred and opposition between the Northern and Southern sections of our country!

We see the tendency, here referred to, in a very prevalent disposition to *separate punishment from crime*, by considering transgressors as unfortunate, and needing pity, rather than as guilty and deserving the penalty of the laws. Now, the difference between misfortune and crime, is like that between Heaven and earth,—light and darkness. The one we are to hate and avoid; the other we are to compassionate and welcome to our bosoms.—For the one, we are to provide the means of punishment; the other, if borne with a right spirit, exalts to honour and admiration. The suffering martyr becomes, in after ages, the object of universal esteem; but the traitor goes down from age to age, accursed by all, hated by all.—And yet, notwithstanding this absolute opposition of nature between misfortune and crime, multitudes there are who profess to see no difference between them, and who call upon others to sympathize with the vile and abandoned, as heartily as they do, to render aid to the virtuous and pure in their afflictions. True, crime does

not ordinarily place a man beyond the reach of human sympathy and aid. In all else, save his *crime*, the criminal should be treated with humanity. Efforts should also be made to reclaim guilty persons from the ruin to which they are hastening. But, through a false charity, to extend not only to the men, but also to their *misdeeds*, the hand of friendship, is to annihilate moral distinctions of the most permanent and unalterable kind. And what must be the result of such a course? What? but the almost indefinite increase of criminals,—the destruction of law and order,—the banishment from society of all virtue, and the total extinction, at last, of all the hopes and joys of the human species.

The false benevolence, here alluded to, has taken under its charge, specially, the care of all debtors, murderers and sinners. Justice requires that all pecuniary liabilities, voluntarily assumed by men, should be met in good faith, and settled when they become due; and also that, should the debtor be unwilling to meet the claims against him, there should be some power in the law to compel payment. The sickly charity, however, to which we allude, has provided so many subterfuges in the law itself, for a dishonest debtor, and the usages of society have supplied so many others, that in a great many instances he is permitted to set his creditor at defiance, and though “dressed in purple and fine linen, and faring sumptuously every day,” to trample upon the rights of his neighbour, and even to insult him, after having robbed him of his goods! The patronage extended to murderers is still more bare-faced. That Wisdom that cannot err, has declared from Heaven, “whosoever sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.” This law is both just and necessary. It is just, for there is no equivalent by which a murderer can expiate his crime but his own life. It is necessary; for were such punishment abolished, murderers would so be increased, that no man’s life would be safe. But these pseudo-philanthropists, far wiser than their Maker, seem to imagine that murder is simply a crime against the State, and that when one man has irreparably been put out of the way, it becomes the State to settle with the survivor on the mildest terms possible! Wonderful legislators, these!—

Wiser than Solon, Solomon, or even Jehovah! But these opinions extend themselves to another world. God has said, "the soul that sinneth, it shall die;" and our Saviour has declared, "He that believeth not, shall be damned." Our good-natured theologians, however, have undertaken to qualify this harsh language of the Almighty, and after abating much of its meaning, to limit the penalty, whatever it be, to the present life! No matter how much a man sins,—no matter how much he contemns the mercy of God offered in Christ, he is to be saved any how; for it is impossible to conceive that a benevolent God should punish men in hell for the sins committed in this life!

A tendency to *Socialism*, both in this country and Europe, by certain classes of persons, is also proof of the existence of this spurious benevolence. This manifestation of the evil is, in many respects, the worst of all. It seeks the absolute submission of political and social institutions, that have been ordained by God himself, and that, in one form or another, have been observed by all nations. The rights of property and marriage are to be abrogated,—all classes in society are to sink to a common level, and men and women, who can scarcely live peaceably when scores of miles apart, are to be placed in the juxtaposition of a united brotherhood! A state of things like this might have occurred to the dreamy imagination of a maniac, but how it ever took possession of an intellect entirely sane, is a mystery that even philosophy must labour to solve.

Such are some of the more definite forms of that spurious benevolence which seems to be leading so many otherwise sensible persons astray in the present age.—Besides these more marked manifestations of the evil, however, there is what may be termed a *diffusion* of it into the universal heart and mind of the existing generation of mankind. The present is considered, *par excellence*, the age of benevolence. Efforts are made to turn almost every thing in that direction. Now, if the benevolence here referred to were *pure* benevolence,—if no false zeal,—no revolutionary spirit,—no wild fanaticism,—no selfish ends, were associated with it; then, such praise might be just. But perfectly sure are we,

that a very large amount of the sympathy and action of the present age, is wholly spurious. In many cases this is perfectly manifest; but it is to be feared that it often exists where least suspected, and often produces its *crop* where even the *seeds* were not known to have been planted!

We shall now proceed to specify some of the *causes* that have *dissociated* justice from benevolence, giving to the latter, in almost every instance, an unbecoming preponderance over the former. And the first cause we name is, *a corrupted theology*. Many political economists may see but little connexion between the teachings of the pulpit and the debates of the legislature. They may imagine that theology and jurisprudence are entirely distinct sciences, and that their connexion, if existing at all, must be extremely remote. But in this they are mistaken. Every man has his theological opinions, derived too, mainly, from those religious teachings to which he has been subject from infancy. These opinions are not mere loose speculations, exercising no control upon the understanding and the life. True, they may not realize to every man "the good hope through grace" that the true Christian enjoys. Still, their influence is great, and they associate themselves with the views the mind takes on almost all subjects. Hence, we see the phase of their theology spread over the face of the civil code of all nations, ancient and modern. Men's religious opinions are, for the most part, the *matrices* of their political tenets. Now, a very large portion of the theology of the present age seeks to magnify the benevolence of God, at the expense of his justice. The inherent guilt and malignity of sin have been mitigated,—the absoluteness of human depravity has been qualified,—the hereditary impotency of the human will to virtuous acts has been disputed,—the definite character of the atonement has been denied,—the sole agency of the Spirit in regeneration has been controverted,—and the whole system of Christian theology, divesting itself of the sterner features of immaculate justice, has been lowered, for the accommodation of reluctant and sceptical humanity! Others, again, transcending even these alarming boundaries, have plunged into positive heresy, substituting human

goodness for Divine grace,—the merit of repentance for the merit of Christ's blood, and denying all the doctrines that constitute the *essence* of Christianity, as a remedial system for the ruin of man! Now, to all these various classes of Divines, together with their disciples, the sterner features of the Divine character and government are obnoxious. Justice, that *original* virtue, without which no other *can exist*,—justice, that eternal pedestal on which rests the Throne of God, and the scheme of Redemption,—this virtue of virtues, is underrated by them,—is supposed to be kept by the Deity, far in the back-ground of his other attributes,—and is only to be called forth when some Sodom is to be sunk, or some Judas to be executed! Surely, there is a most remarkable resemblance between these good-natured publishers of “glad-tidings,” and those “false prophets,” that were so much in the way of Isaiah and Jeremiah. It is really amazing, what heterogeneous classes of mankind, these kind-hearted preachers have gathered into the covenant and promises of God! Is a man idolatrous,—is he immoral? It matters not; receive him; his *ignorance will* atone for all that. Again, is a man unregenerate,—is he a stranger to an inner, divine life? This matters not; receive him,—his honesty and morality will compensate for all that! And so, these heralds of “smooth things” go on, making out their catalogues for Heaven from men, whom the Scriptures, again and again, doom to a dreadful condemnation. Oh, what clerical quackery is this! And so these “false apostles” will find it, when they stand at the Bar of an insulted Saviour, and shall there be accused by those whom they now deceive, of being the *authors* of their perdition?

Another source of the prevalence of this pseudo-philanthropy, is to be found in *utilitarian philosophy*, that is so popular in our colleges and schools. There is an intimate connexion between theology and ethics; indeed, the latter may be considered as the outward expression of the former. Where Paganism is the prevalent creed in religion, the morality of the people will correspond; and the theology being low, the morality will also be debased. On the contrary, where a sound orthodoxy prevails, and the great truths of Revelation are cordially

embraced, the moral system of a people will be high, and vice and sin will be frowned upon with severity.— There is a strong affinity, indeed, a very close relationship, between Pelagianism, in its various forms, and the Utilitarian philosophy. Both of these systems proceed upon the same principle—the exaltation of benevolence at the expense of justice. The great point to be reached under this philosophy, is the *utile*. Governments, churches, associations, and societies of every kind, must form all their plans, and direct all their action to the promotion of certain *benevolent ends* previously agreed upon. The usefulness of these ends are of course to be judged of by their governments, societies and associations, themselves. Others may take a very different view of the subject. They may consider as exceedingly pernicious, the very ends to be accomplished by these champions of benevolence. To interpose a doubt here, however, is to interfere with the rights of conscience; it is to deny human liberty. You must, therefore, permit these men to determine this primary matter for themselves. If they agree that a certain part of the constitution is pernicious, and ought to be changed; or, if they conceive that a certain social custom is harmful, and ought to be abolished, you must not interfere, but bid them “God-speed” forthwith upon their mission of love. As to the *means* to be used, for the accomplishment of these ends, they are to employ any and all that will promise a favourable issue. If petitions are necessary, then they must be raised to such a number, that, like the locusts of Egypt, they shall darken the very heavens. If eloquent statesmen are to be employed to effect these purposes, committees must be appointed, and addresses and appeals made, to secure these services. If the press, the pulpit, or the stump, will promote the objects, why, any or all must be used, as circumstances shall direct. And such is apt to be the zeal of these disinterested partizans of benevolence, that often, when a question arises as to the lawfulness and propriety of certain means, they are ready at once to decide it, by simply considering its connexion with the end,—“Will it accomplish our purpose?” This is the question—“If so, adopt it—the end is good, at any rate.” Thus, deciding upon their own ends, and selecting

their own means, in each of which they are not always scrupulous, these modern reformers go forth "conquering and to conquer." The histories of modern Revivalists, of modern Abolitionists, and of the modern Propagandists of liberty, all furnish lamentable examples of the facts here stated. By all these, and many others like them, the stablest principles of society have been shaken,—long and established usages have been assailed,—good men have been maligned,—sound doctrine has been ridiculed,—and all to give place to some upstart Luther, pressing forward by "might and main" some wayward and fictitious reformation. The philosophy of Hume and Paley, may not, it is true, be chargeable with all this folly; but certain it is, that to a large degree, they have opened the flood-gates through which these bitter waters have proceeded. The prevalence of these systems of ethics has corrupted the *consciences* of men; and have furnished them with moral rules, that, if carried out, can only lead to the very worst consequences. Fix, for instance, in the creed of some hot-headed, restless spirit, that maxim of Paley—"whatever is expedient is right,"—and you give him an instrument of tremendous power, which he is ready to apply in all cases, and to press forward with all possible zeal. It renders him bold, rash and daring; and, if at the head of some of those numerous associations so prevalent in our country, he is never at a loss to fix his point of expediency, or to lead forward his zealous adherents to its attainment.

The influence, too, of our free institutions upon the public mind, is another source of the evil we are here considering. This effect is produced in two ways: by imparting false notions as to the nature and value of civil liberty, and by furnishing the people with every sort of privilege and opportunity for expressing and propagating their opinions. In estimating the freedom of governments, that is usually considered the freest that allows to individuals the greatest amount of personal liberty consistent with public safety. Any degree of personal liberty that would endanger or harm the government in any way, must be dangerous; and any restrictions placed upon a people, above what is necessary to their proper

control, must be oppressive. Here, however, arises a nice point in legislation, which it is exceedingly difficult to determine. Indeed, it is a point which must vary its position according to the character of the people to be governed, and of the government under which they live. In a country like ours, where the government originated with the people, and was made for the people,—and where, too, the people themselves are sober, calculating and moral, this point may descend far down the scale towards personal freedom. Hence, as a matter of fact, North Americans are the freest people on the globe. But where the character of the people is not such as to make the possession of a large amount of personal freedom consistent with the public welfare; where, too, the people are ignorant and immoral, and have always been accustomed to strong government,—there, the point of equipoise between liberty and power must approximate much nearer to the latter. Now, it is evident, since these things are so, that if any nation is to enjoy a large degree of freedom, it must first pass through a long and tedious probation. Many of our upstart politicians seem to imagine, that our liberty as a nation, began with our Revolution. But this is by no means true. It was then consummated. The freedom of this country began with Magna Charta,—was forwarded by Hampden's refusing to pay ship-money,—was heralded by the *May-Flower*, and was established by the victory that followed our Revolution. It was of long and difficult growth; and if its trunk now appears large, and its branches far-extended, and its immense foliage rich and luxuriant, it is because it is the Tree of ages, and the frosts of centuries have rested on its boughs. Now, what has happened with us, can happen again to no nation on the globe. True, since the establishment of our Federal Republic, we have seen many bold attempts in various nations, to imitate our example. France revolutionized,—Greece revolted, and Mexico and South-America conquered. But, what has been the result? The first has an Emperor,—the second a king, and the rest are perpetually tossed between anarchy on the one hand, and the Dictatorship on the other! No; there are millions on millions of men, living in our world, who are no more fit for freedom than children or

brate animals. Now, the greatest evil that could possibly be done to these immense masses of human beings, would be to increase largely their amount of personal liberty. The axe and the spade, the shop and the field, industry and frugality, would soon all be laid aside, while a vagrant and half-starved population would go forth to revel on the honestly-acquired possessions of their more worthy neighbours. Americans should not, therefore, be under the delusion, that what is suitable to them, is suitable to all men, and that what is a blessing to them, must also be a blessing to all men. Indeed, our own great Republic has not as yet endured all the tests that are to demonstrate its permanence and security. Uncombined, as yet they may be, but floating all around us, are disorganizing elements, that, at some future day, may make an onset upon American Freedom, such as Greece never knew,—Rome never experienced. Let us, then, not boast, either too soon, or too loud. A quiet, self-sustaining policy, is that which suits us best.

But, if our far-extended personal freedom is calculated to give us erroneous notions as to the nature and value of civil liberty, it also grants us every conceivable opportunity for expressing and propagating those notions. There never has been a country in which the powers of thought, of speech, and of the press, are as free as in these United States. Has a man, then, some new theory to propose,—some new Society to organize,—some new ends to accomplish,—there is the pen, the lecture-room, the printer's office, the steam-car,—all at his bidding.—True, he may not go so far as to shock decency and morality, or the mob will put him down; and he may not advance doctrines subversive of social order and domestic quiet, or the police will arraign him. But, any where this side these boundaries, he may write, or speak, or publish, as he pleases. All idea of checking, restraining, or defeating such a man, save in the use of the same privileges he enjoys, would be considered, on all hands, as tyrannical and anti-republican. Now, it is easy to perceive, that a nation like ours, enjoying the greatest amount of freedom that any people ever enjoyed; valiant and successful in the establishment and defence of their own institutions; full of energy and zeal for the happi-

ness of all mankind; abounding in schemes and plans for the amelioration of human suffering every where,—it is easy to perceive, that such a nation, wholly unfettered in all these things by law and authority,—may often go further on the mission of benevolence than either prudence or justice would warrant. And such we find to be the fact. Sometimes evils exceedingly small are magnified by us. Others, again, that are remote, and which do not lie within our jurisdiction, are assumed by us; nevertheless,—means not at all calculated to accomplish our ends are employed; and numerous blunders and mistakes are made, all going to prove, that we have begun to work without counting the cost, and that we have entered upon a warfare without estimating our forces.

The last source of the spurious benevolence we are here discussing, is to be found in what is termed, by way of eminence, "*the spirit of the age.*" There can be no doubt, but that there have been epochs in the history of our world, distinguished by certain great features from all others. There have been colonizing ages, martial ages, ages of philosophy and discovery, ages of monasticism and ignorance, ages of revolution and change, ages of despotism and of liberty. What is meant in the present instance by "*the spirit of the age,*" we suppose to be, that ours is the epoch of *benevolent action*. That Charity, which has been slumbering for centuries, has now gone forth with her numerous ministers and attendants, and is summoning all mankind to the universal and pleasant work of disenthraling the nations, and of uniting them together in one great and glorious kingdom of love and good-will. The picture is a splendid one, and every benevolent heart in heaven and on earth, must pray for its accomplishment. But good hath its evil; and although this conception originated in the purest love, yea, in the love of God himself,—and although we are assured in the Scriptures, that it is no prophetic dream, but a Divinely decreed result, yet, there are thousands of hearts in our world in which this first peal of the trumpet of earth's universal jubilee, has produced but an irregular and unhealthful action. Such persons see the noon at day-break, and seek to realize the end at the begin-

ning. Every thing with them must be placed under a system of high-pressure, and the church is to be marched into the Millennium in far less time than it took the Israelites to travel from Egypt to Canaan. Such a spirit manifested itself in the days of Christ. On one occasion "the people thought that the kingdom of God was immediately to appear;" and James and John were so sure of it, on another, that they began to petition their Master for "the places at his right hand and at his left hand." Now, if such men as the Apostles, and enjoying as they did the daily instructions of Him, who is emphatically the Prophet of God,—the great Revealer of the Father to mankind,—if the Apostles could thus err, we may certainly expect that at this day of feverish excitement about the world's conversion, many would fall into various hallucinations, and even be led by "spirits that are not of God." Hence, as there were "false Christs," and "false signs," in the days of our Lord, so are there now false Millenniums, and false Reformers, springing up in many parts of the earth. These, however, are but the scum and froth that the deep inward agitation of the heart of the universal church has cast upon the shore. It is not to these that we chiefly allude. It is to a far better class,—men of standing,—men of thought,—men of the best intentions. Even these are liable, so to be intoxicated with the magnificence of the picture before them,—so to be touched by the glorious out-gush of so much munificence and joy,—so to be captivated by the promises and prophecies that secure such results,—as to lose their just equipoise, and to select modes of accomplishing these ends that are neither scriptural nor practical. No doubt a mighty moral, and even political revolution, has begun upon our globe. The materials of this revolution have been gathering for ages, and Providence is evidently beginning now to put them together. The work is in progress; this we cannot, do not doubt. But what is any man's specific portion of this work,—what field he is to occupy and what instruments he is to use,—how far he is to go, and where he is to stop,—these and many more, are *practical* questions, which every man must decide for himself, and in the decision of which he needs not only the light of a sound understanding, but also the teachings

of that "wisdom which cometh from above, and which is first pure, then peaceable, easy to be entreated, without partiality, and without hypocrisy."

Thus have we considered the causes of that spurious benevolence, which has deluged our country, and which is seeking to deluge the world. Of pure philanthropy, of genuine benevolence, there cannot be too great a display; but the *base counterfeit* of these virtues, which we have been here exposing, is *evil in its nature, evil in its action, evil in its results*. Its prevalence in society can have no other tendency than to subvert, revolutionize and destroy. It is emphatically an *Abaddon—a Destroyer*. It regards neither right nor wrong, peace nor war, order nor confusion, God nor man. It has *one ultimate object* to accomplish, and that is the *only idea* in the universe that is worth any thing! From such a *Monster* may a merciful God ever protect our Republic and our people! As a nation, we have certainly been raised up for some great and noble ends. But, if our highest privileges as a free people shall be employed only for self-annoyance, and the disturbance of our neighbours,—if a spirit of fanaticism shall be allowed to supplant that of true philanthropy,—if prejudice shall be substituted for reason, and impulsive action for well-premeditated progress,—if, instead of seeking those great and commanding destinies which are so obviously before us in the future, we turn aside to petty evils and petty controversies,—then may our sun go down in obscurity, and the *zenith* of our glory become the *nadir* of our disgrace. To rescue ourselves from a gulf like this, it is necessary that we return more closely to the principles of eternal justice. Benevolence is not every thing, after all; yea, if there must be pre-eminence, we should rather concede it to justice than benevolence. At any rate, justice is the anterior virtue; and wherever an attempt is made at being benevolent, in default of justice, the benevolence is always spurious and worthless. God himself, is at infinite pains, so to speak, to demonstrate to the universe that his benevolence to men is based upon the most immaculate justice. Grace never destroys right, or forgiveness law, under his administration. Is the sinner saved? then Christ must die! Is justice trampled upon,

even in the gospel? then, the fires of an eternal hell must burn. No; we find none of this sickly, base, and fanatical charity displaying itself in the government of God. Not only "are clouds and darkness round about Him; but judgment and justice are the habitation of His throne." And so must it be on earth, if human institutions are to answer any valuable purposes, and human society attain any desirable end.

ARTICLE VI.

THE SECONDARY AND COLLATERAL INFLUENCES OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURES.

Society is the result of varied influences. As we look more carefully upon it, we perceive that the manifold wants of men bring and keep them together, and that as they are thus associated, there are complex forces at work to restrain, guide and control social organizations in their outward form and their inward spirit. As we examine more narrowly, we find all society to be developed from the family relation,—that the first family on earth was also the first civil and ecclesiastical association, and that all others have resulted (more or less) from the expansion of this original germ of the Church and the State. The warm affections of the soul, exhibited in filial or fraternal love, become modified into the affection of friendship, respect, or reverence, towards our fellow men, according to the relations they sustain to us. But the most important of all our original instincts, if so it may be called, is that of conscience, which makes us cognizant of a higher law, of a superior tribunal, of an after reckoning, and prepares us to receive whatever intimations, even though they be mere hints, and whatever fuller teachings may from any quarter reach us, of the existence and presence of a supreme and all-wise Creator, to whom we are also bound, and who binds us through himself and by his retributions, to our fellow men.

Civilization is a term difficult to define. *Civility*, in

in its old English sense, borrowed from the Latin *Civilitas*, had reference to those manners, and that character, which fitted men to live with the greatest advantage to themselves and others *in civitate*, in the state; and *civilization* describes that process by which this is accomplished. It seems, by its very form, to be a word implying change, and we know not how better to explain it than as the improvement of a community of men in all that tends to the public good, and also of the individuals that compose it, in all that truly adorns mankind, and enhances their well-being, both in their individual and social state. It implies that man, either by his misfortune, or his fault, is far below that excellence which he is capable of attaining, and from this inferior state it aims to raise him. As we look forth upon the nations, we see an unspeakable difference in the degree in which it exists among them. The African is far inferior to the European, and one nation of Africans far below another, in the arts of life, expansion of views, and intellectual endowments. The civilization of the nations of the earth who have risen to the *highest* points of culture, how characteristically different! The Chinese, how different from the European, and the Hindostanese from the Persian!

But what we desire especially to present before you, is the fact that in each of these more prominent nations there are sacred books, which are the earliest monuments of literature extant, and which have stood forth their cloudy and their fiery pillar, to guide them in whatever course of advancement they have subsequently pursued.

Such, in historic times, has been the Koran of the Mohamedans, such were the Zend writings to the ancient Persians, the Vedas to the Hindoos, and the Chou-King and writings of Confucius to the Chinese. These were, it is true, the results of a preceding civilization, in part also embracing the fragments of an ancient revelation, which the process of tradition has enfeebled and perverted, but, with this slight exception, the mere product of human ingenuity and toil. But appealing, as they do in some sense, to the conscience of men, and its foreboding of a future retribution, they have had power enough to arrest, temporarily, the descent of these nations to

entire barbarism, and to awaken among them, to some extent, a redeeming spirit.

As far above them in power as the infinite from the finite, is the Book of God, which, though dictated to different men in other generations, through the lapse of fifteen hundred years, and portraying in its costume the manners of those times when it was written, is no result of cultivated mind, but is of Divine origin, spoken by the lips of various Prophets since the world began, and at last by God's own Son; and to beg that you would regard it, not only as teaching the way to live forever—a spiritual, religious, and God-like life; but as exerting a marvellous influence on social and individual improvement for this present world.

We leave to the Christian heart all its enrapturing anticipations of immortality and spiritual perfection,—a perfection for which we ought all to strive,—and confine our view now, to the secondary and collateral influences which have resulted to us from the Divine revelation.

There are to us, we would here remark, three sources of knowledge,—sense, reason, and faith. The first two constitute the field which can be cultivated and occupied by man's unaided powers, and will be so occupied more and more, according to the diligence and resolvedness of his research. They suggest the true and appropriate province of human science and philosophy. But revelation makes known to us truths which lie beyond the reach of sense, and the deductions of reason. Other truths we believe, because we discover them, and step by step infer them from the evidences of their existence around us. And yet, of those things which belong to the region of sense, we ourselves know some things only on the testimony of other men, or by the inference of reason. London, for example, some of us have never seen. But we have seen many who have visited it, read many books that were printed there, seen pictorial representations of its scenes of wealth and glory, and had in possession products of human art wrought in the shops of its artisans, or sold in the ware-houses of its merchants. Nor do we less believe in its existence that its thronged streets and towering pinnacles were never seen with these eyes, and that these ears never drank in the min-

gled sounds that issue from the occupations and voices of its busy people. And so do we believe, though our eye has never looked through the telescope of Herschel, or the microscope of Ehrenberg, that there are unnumbered worlds and systems of worlds filling the infinity of space, and in a drop of water societies of living creatures, equalling in number and surpassing in variety of form and habits the whole family of man. And the more inclined are we to believe it, because we find the same laws of matter, or of life and reproduction, prevailing throughout this extent, that prevail around us on every side. These things I receive on the faith I repose in men, as things however, which, though not the objects of sense to me, are the objects of sense to them.

Again, we watch our own thoughts and actions, and there opens to us a new world,—the world of mind; we ascertain under what circumstances its acts and states are repeated, and thus discover what we call its laws.—And amidst them we find this moral sense, to which we have before alluded, a conscience—a foreboding of some day of reckoning—a sense of responsibility to some tribunal.

All those things of sense have concerned us in our present state, which is at best but fleeting. After forty years at most, of active labour, the toiling scholar and the patient philosopher must pass away, and Bacon, Newton, Cuvier and Davy, cease from their wandering among the stars,—their researches among the relics of buried tribes, or in the laboratory of science, to occupy the grave.

And is there no higher destiny for man? Are there no sublimer truths,—no more permanent and long-lived pursuits? These men in their researches have discovered often, gaps which they could not fill, and have required an agency beyond nature, the agency of some infinite Being, from whom nature itself proceeded, and who is the true and efficient cause of all those changes taking place around us. They have required this, and this great cause of causes, and complement of what is wanting in material things, they have found in the infinite Creator, on whose revelation of himself in the Scriptures they have rested with confiding faith. And just as we believe

in things cognizable by sense, on the testimony of our fellow-men, they have felt themselves called upon to believe in the existence of things not cognizable by our senses, on the testimony of God. And what this God has declared in his Word, they have believed themselves to know on his testimony, as they know that other class of objects of thought, on the testimony of man.

These higher objects of Faith, exist by the side of the objects of sense, and the products of reason, and not without effect upon these other realms of human thought.

Our subject, we have said, is the secondary and collateral influence of Divine Revelation. And we shall consider, in the first place,—

I. *Its relation to science, and its influence upon it.*—Our first remark is that the Scriptures are beyond science,—that what is peculiar to them, is in advance of all the discoveries of reason. Such, *at least in its certainty*, is the doctrine of immortality; such are the rewards of the future state; such is the mode of God's existence, and his attributes of perfect justice, love and mercy; such is the account given us, (no memory of man extending back so far,) of the way in which sin has entered the world, and we are brought under condemnation; and such is the revelation it makes of our way of recovery to the Divine favour. It is by faith, too, that we believe that the worlds were made *out of nothing* by the Word of God; that after the human race had become corrupt, a flood destroyed them from the face of the earth; that both the antediluvian world and the present, numerous and diverse as are the varieties of men, all came of one common stock; that there is yet to be a resurrection of the dead, and a final judgment; that through the whole course of human affairs, God interferes, ordering all things by his wise and holy providence; that there have been times when this interference has been marked and miraculous, so as at once to betray the Divine hand; and that in the closing up of the present order of things, preparatory to another, the earth itself, and all that is therein, will be burned up.

Now, these great and sublime revelations have an important connection with science. In the first place, they arouse the mind by their very greatness, like the sound

of a trumpet. The intellectual energy which is thus brought into action, extends itself with great effect to every department of scientific research, and each is in some measure stimulated and set forward by the great and satisfying discoveries which revelation makes. The stagnant pool of human thought and interest, is put in motion by them, as by the fresh and resistless breath of early spring, and is disinfected of its slimy poison, and filled with vitality and health.

Again, the Author of nature and revelation is the same, and a perfect harmony must needs reign through both. Nothing can exist in true science inconsistent with the Scriptures, nor in the Scriptures, rightly interpreted, inconsistent with true science. If the Scriptures are proved, beyond mistake, the word of God, the deductions of the philosopher, when they impugn them, must be made from *a too limited circle of facts*. He has need to retrace his steps and review his ground. Or, if his conclusions are indisputable, because founded on a knowledge of all facts, the theologian *must reconsider* his interpretation of God's word, and see if he has not misunderstood it, and if its fair and unperverted teachings do not conspire with those of science. And what will be, and has been, the result? That revelation and science go hand in hand, each contributing its share to the materials of human knowledge, and giving greater compass and certainty to it. Revelation does but go beyond science, never counter to it. The same God, speaking in his works, furnishes the materials of science, and speaking in his word additional truths, which are supplementary to the others, and teach relations and things of the unseen and eternal world. And, all together, embrace that whole of knowledge, which man is permitted to attain below the skies.

The processes of reasoning, too, are common to theology and to physical science. The theologian and the student of nature must, both, in the first place, notice and collect all the facts which relate to their points of inquiry. These they must classify, assign them to their causes, and deduce from them those general principles which regulate all. The result of this process is the discovery of truth. Truth in science, and truth in theology.

And truth can never be inconsistent with truth, any more than one hand of the same person can war against the other.

The youngest of the sciences, *Geology*, long thought to be at variance with the word of God, in its latest researches is confirming it in many points. The Scriptures tell us of the creation of man and beast, and every thing that hath life, as well as the fabric of the earth itself.—Geology demands the interference of a Creator, to bring into existence, at stated periods, those creatures which appear in the strata of the earth, for whom no progenitors can be found. The Bible challenges our belief in the supernatural and miraculous, and Geology does the same. It demands miracles of power, and this not the unintelligent power of mechanical or chemical agents, but of ONE all-wise. The Bible speaks of a special providence, and so do the leaves of that book which are composed of the rocky strata beneath our feet. The Bible leads us to believe that man has lived on the earth but some six thousand years, and Geology does the same.—That the earth, once destroyed by water, is to be destroyed by fire, at the close of the present state of things; and natural science sees in the air above, and the earth and sea beneath, materials reserved in store for this final conflagration. Yea, the fires which are to destroy the earth, are sleeping around us, even now. And he who considers rightly, may share in the astonishment of the ancient philosopher Pliny, that even a day passes without a general conflagration.

Again, in giving us a revelation of what is unseen and eternal, God has given it in connection with a *history of the past*, brief indeed, but of priceless value. The first ten chapters of Genesis, are more truly satisfying, and solve more enigmas, than all the many volumes of profane historians. Is language a human invention? The philologist may treat it so, but every man learns it from his mother, up to Adam; and the Bible tells us Adam learned it from God. The languages of the earth have striking affinities to each other, and Ethnology, the science of national descent, is now studied by tracing these affinities, which are most surprisingly found where they were least expected; and the Bible tells us there was a

time when all the earth was of one language and one speech. Again, the philologist is filled with perplexity. He meets with other tongues, so different in materials and structure, that they refuse to acknowledge any relationship to those which he has concluded to be of the same stock, and has grouped together. And the Bible tells us there was a time when God interfered and confounded the language of all the earth, and scattered men who had lived together, abroad upon the face of the globe. Wherever we find man, he is erect of form; has dominion over the beasts; has the same duration of life, and period of youth, manhood, and old age; is subject to the same diseases; has the same memory of the past and anticipations of the future; has the same passions, hopes and fears; is susceptible of the same emotions; and has the same religious dread and anticipation of coming judgment; and though of different complexion, and different cast of features; yet, if we meet him alone, on a desolate island, we should consort with him, and call him brother, though he were in the form of the most degraded African, rather than with wolves, tygers and reptiles. Science goes far to establish the unity of all the race. And where she fails to do so, if the facts were more ample, if they covered over every period, however small of time, as well as all possible circumstances, in which man has been placed, her proof would be perfect; but the Bible tells us plainly that we all, whatever be our hue, came originally from the same womb, and were begotten by the same father; and that, as through the sin of that one, the many became guilty, so by the obedience of one, who also shares our nature, shall many become righteous.

On that interesting question, *the migration and filiation of nations*, the 10th chapter of Genesis, which seems to most but a catalogue of names, the Ludim, the Ananim, the Lehabim, and the Pathrusim, is a more satisfactory document, and more confirmed by historic facts, than all the volumes of profane antiquity.

But, not only does the Bible shed a concurrent light with that emanating from the outward world; in the dim night which mocks us, it *holds the lantern before our footsteps*. It indicates what is true, and then we see the

proofs in the works of God, of what in his word he has spoken. In the things which are made, His eternal power and Godhead are clearly seen, when, with the presumption of his existence, we are looking for them.—The immortality of the soul may be substantiated by reason, now we know it exists forever. And the Deist can make out a tolerably consistent argument to prove his creed, and one somewhat free from the absurdities of Paganism, when the rays which shine from the sidelights of revelation illumine his path. Yes, in the midst of a Christian land, he can do great things, and put forth a show of complacent moralities, even as the companions of Columbus could make the egg stand erect, when he had shewn them the way to do it.

II. If we turn our attention now to the influence of the Scriptures upon *Law and Jurisprudence*, we shall find new illustrations of the secondary and collateral influence of the word of God. We suppose it will be granted that Law is founded upon *morality*, and that amid the defects of human legislation, it always aspires to be *just*. And even when selfish motives have influenced men in the framing of laws, they have always imparted to them the show at least of *justice*. Now, there are two ways in which the Scriptures touch the question of morals. The Law of God is the *teacher* of men and nations, as to the great *principles of human duty*. It holds up before us the just and holy character of our Creator, to which each man and people must be conformed; and *then*, it points its finger to that final tribunal before which each of us must stand for trial, and waves its hand towards those mighty retributions of transcendent happiness and infinite shame which lie beyond it. And thus, with truth it has been said, by the immortal Hooker, that “of Law there can be no less acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power.”

Apply all this now to the governments which exist among men. God has instituted three communities, the Family, the Church, and the State; the two last developed from the first, and the first underlying, as a foun-

dation, the rest. The family extended becomes the tribe, and tribes associated still, for the most part, by the family bond, become the State. And now, to the State, thus constituted by God, and existing as a necessary society, there are Rulers, Tribunals, and Laws. And the mandate of the Scriptures is, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. Wherefore, ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. For this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour. Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake."

With such tremendous force and commanding authority does the Bible sustain law and order; and rest on an impregnable basis, the stability of the State. Thus, by the authority of the Eternal Wisdom, do kings reign and princes decree justice; and, from the supreme tribunals which adorn and rule our land, down to the justice's court of some local precinct, does the Divine word add force to law, and authority to judgment; inspire with life, and power of control, a few characters traced on a strip of harmless paper, and contribute its immense weight to the perceptions of natural justice, to give security to our persons, our hearths and estates.

Even in the laws of Pagan nations, there may be many influences which have come down as the reminiscences of a day when all men were under the immediate teachings of God. But to these influences of the Divine word, all Christian nations have been subjected for fourteen hundred years, and law and precedent have grown up beneath them. Even the Roman Law, as now transmitted to us in the Theodosian code and the Pandects of Justinian, was modified greatly by the prevalence of Christianity in the imperial court, and was rendered more exact, discriminating and humane.

Under such a government as our own, where the inde-

pendence of the individual man is so liable to be driven to extremes, where there is such impatience of restraint, such tendency to revolution and change, and where the government itself is so quickly responsive to the popular will which is often swayed by prejudice and passion, rather than by right, how priceless to us is the influence of the Scriptures, how often does it serve as a break-water against the waves of popular fury; and when there are omens of evil, "signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars," to the terrified imaginations of men; on "the earth distress of nations, with perplexity; the sea and the waves roaring; men's hearts failing them for fear; and for looking after those things which are coming on the earth;" how do we sometimes seem to hear the majestic voice of this clear word rising above the storm, and saying to the winds and waves "Peace! Be still!"

We have been passing through such scenes as these. A lying spirit of disobedience has gone abroad, and assuming the specious garb of philanthropy, a false philanthropy, an unmerciful mercy, and a pitiless compassion, has dissolved their allegiance to government on the part of some, and their respect for religion; has stormed around our courts of justice, and our halls of legislation; and has provoked a mad resistance to this insane fury on the part of others. The robber, murderer, burglar, assassin and pirate, has been pitied rather than condemned; instead of being frowned on as guilty, he has been apologised for as unfortunate. Instead of being thought worthy of the gallows, he has been thought to be the victim of an ill-shaped head, the fault has been put on his brainpan and not charged on his heart, flung back on his Creator, and not pressed home upon himself. Pity has been expended on the criminal, and his suffering victim, the widowed wife and orphaned children of the murdered one, have been forgotten. And States have been persuaded to abolish the death-penalty from their civil codes!

But above all the fallacies of human sophistry, the Word of the Eternal has been heard, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed!" The voice of the pulpit has been true to the voice of revelation, and with noble energy has plead the cause of justice, coinci-

dent, as in this case it is, with the voice of humanity. Providence itself interfered in a city where this poison was working, and over-ruling man's sin, to check man's presumption and to vindicate his once vilified law, allowed a horrid murder to be committed by an intelligent man, on the person of his best friend,—a murder which electrified the world, and put to flight in that place, for a time, at least, the short-sighted legislation of unbelieving men. Wo be to them who live in a State from which the death-penalty is abolished!

Thankful are we for the Bible! And when we look back thirty-two centuries, to the land of Palestine, and see the cities of refuge in different quarters provided, plain and wide highways made to them from every point when other highways were almost unknown, at every divaricating path a guide-post erected with legible letters, "TO THE CITY OF REFUGE;" when we see the homicide in rapid flight, and the Goel, the nearest kinsman of the slain, the blood-avenger, in hot pursuit, every eye through the country strained, every finger pointing to the palpitating fugitive his course, and see him safely housed in the hospitable city, till the exact degree of his guilt is ascertained, we see both the goodness and severity, the discriminating mercy and justice of law,—a mercy and justice which is reached in our trials by jury, and our confronting of witnesses; in the delays and cautious proceedings of law at the present day.

And the same spirit has been interfering with interests especially dear to us; aiming a death-blow at the whole organization of society here; projecting changes which cannot take place without the utter destruction of our industry and our wealth, without the ruin of our fortunes, the overthrow of peace, order and public virtue, and the imperiling of our lives. Sorry are we that any men of our own profession have lent their influence to such madness, that they have so misread or wrested the Scriptures, so mistaken their whole tenor and spirit, so forgotten the example of Christ and the teaching of the Apostles; that some have even counselled insurrection, have advised the fugitive from labour to steal whatever he may choose from the wealth of his master, and to imbrue his hands, if overtaken, if need be, to secure escape, in

his master's blood. That there are possibly some misguided men among them, who practice robbery, and convey away those servants from us, who are born in our house, or bought with our money, and whose services are necessary to us. That there are some who recommend the violation of our national compact, and profess their readiness to lay down their lives as a forfeit, rather than be instrumental in the rendition of the fugitive.

In the midst of these times of confusion, the Scriptures come forward to rebuke the madness of these prophets, and to extend their powerful protection over us. To the servant they say, "Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called. Art thou called, being a servant? Care not for it. Brethren, let every man wherein he is called, therein abide with God." "Be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward,"—"not with eyeservice, as man-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ,"—"not answering again, nor purloining, but showing all good fidelity." While they enjoin upon the master to give to his servants what is just and equal, they speak of them still as property, and as having a pecuniary value. And we need not question that the Bible, and the fearless inculcation of its unambiguous teachings from a thousand pulpits in our land, has exercised a powerful influence in arresting the tide of fanaticism and misrule during the months which have only recently passed; and that to this, and to the hold it still has on the moral sense of our people, are we indebted, in no small degree, for that measure of quiet and safety which we now enjoy.

Were any confirmation of this wanting, the mad defiance which is hurled against the ministry, the church, and the Scriptures, by the extremest advocates of the opinions we now condemn, is a sufficient proof that they regard these principles, drawn by the pulpit from the Divine word, as the chief obstacle in their path.

But this benignant influence enters more deeply into *our domestic relations*. Behold elsewhere trembling woman, the humble servitor of man, his suffering, patient toiling drudge, not his companion and his best counselor, but the victim of his caprice. Notwithstanding the influence of Scripture, the spirit of the East was not

friendly to her true and highest advancement on Asiatic shores. Rome did something to raise her, and the free German something, and feudal institutions, where the Baron, confined to the precincts of his castle, and without other companions, was forced to seek his society in the bosom of his family, did more. But the Scriptures, by rendering permanent the marriage bond, and allowing but of a single lawful ground of divorce; and by their teachings as to the tender and considerate treatment due to her, have returned her to her proper place, by the side of man. Even Edmund Burke says, that "Nothing is more certain, than that our manners, our civilization, and all the good things which are connected with manners, and with civilization, have, in this European world of ours, depended for ages upon two principles, and were indeed the result of both combined; I mean the spirit of a gentleman, and the spirit of religion."* We might, perhaps, show that the spirit of a gentleman itself, has proceeded, in no small part, from the spirit of religion, but accept the testimony of the English statesman, as it is. And Gibbon affirms that the dignity of marriage was restored to the Roman women by the Christians, and that the Christian princes were the first who specified the just causes of divorce, that before, passion, interest, or caprice suggested daily motives for the dissolution of marriage; a word, a sign, a letter, the mandate of a freedman declared the separation. And Seneca, the philosopher, speaks of those Roman ladies, who counted their years not by the number of the reigning consuls, but by the number of their husbands! Behold what a change the Scripture, mildly shining over woman's path, has wrought out for her; what peace, purity and refinement has it brought to our hearth-stones; and how should we detest and loathe those Pagan and disorganizing doctrines, at every turn of affairs arising in our land, tending to thrust her forth from her appropriate sphere, into the walks appropriate to man, or to render her position insecure as the presiding genius in that little sanctuary which we hasten to flee to from the troubles that distract us,—the sanctuary of home!

* Reflect. on French Revolution.

III. Is it needful now, after what we have said, to point out the influence of the Bible in the *civilization of nations*. The system of truths embraced in revelation, arranged in logical order, and connected together in scientific form, give birth to a distinct science, that of Theology. And the believers in these truths, have them dwelling in their souls, as an inward life, and become thus by their opinions, and especially by their personal faith in a personal Redeemer, associated into a new community within the State, to wit, the Church. This church has its laws and order, and its rulers and officers, as well as the State. At times, it has been connected with the State, and at times has asserted its independence of it, but always has acted an important part in the advancement of civilization. It has emancipated from thralldom the inferior orders in society; even when an imparity in the ministry arose, to whatever height the aspiring ecclesiastic attained, the principle of equality was still in *this* acknowledged, that he constituted, with his associates no hereditary nobility, but the same offices were open to the meanest peasant, so that the clergy were most often raised from the body of the people. For a long period, from the fifth century and onward, the church took the lead in civilization. Ancient Pagan philosophy gave way before the more modern and the Christian philosophy. And as, in our own country, the church has originated and sustained most of our high-schools and colleges, so, from that time onward, has it been, to a large extent, the founder of institutions of learning, and the guide of youth, among all the nations which Christianity enlightened. While yet the civil literature of the Roman empire, in its declining age, was cultivated independent of the church, it was servile, tame and spiritless, when that of the church was instinct with vigour and freedom. And after the invasion of the barbarians in the fifth century, from which time Christian civil society commenced, the church abounded in philosophers, politicians, and orators. Ecclesiastical men employed themselves with all questions which concerned the public good, and whether by their own spirit of usurpation, or what is equally probable, because of the confidence reposed in them, and because they were invited to

those stations by civil rulers, they became, to no small extent, the statesmen of Europe. They were invested, also, with judicial powers. At their tribunals, all causes peculiarly connected with conscience came to be tried, and their ambition was thus stimulated, until they extended their jurisdiction over the entire field of civil litigation. A striking proof of this, which the sight of any Honourable judge in his robes of office affords, is the fact that those robes are the very canonical dress of his Ecclesiastical predecessors. Much as the church was secularised, and lost in spiritual power, by thus transcending her peculiar province, in many more respects than we have mentioned, did jurisprudence become Christianised, while in the intercourse of nations, wars were rendered less frequent, and far less sanguinary, and between sovereigns and people, the clergy intervened as a third estate, to mitigate the despotism of the one, and protect the rights of the other.

Those who take little interest in religious disputes, are not aware what an influence these discussions have had in arousing and cultivating the intellect of nations. Theology embraces in its wide compass all other sciences, for all others treat of the works of that God, or the interests of those moral beings created by Him, of whose attributes, character and purposes, or of whose duties Theology speaks. In the view of the Theologian, truth is all-important, and error dangerous to men; and this truth is not to be retained merely by those who receive it, but propagated in the earth for the moral renovation of nations. And the time has been when Theology was regarded as the queen of sciences, and when its truths and discussions occupied the attention of imperial courts, and emperors presided in Ecclesiastical councils. What commotions did the Arian heresy occasion throughout the Roman Empire, Asia and Africa! What the heresy of Pelagius! What the movements of the Monk of Wittemberg at the era of the Reformation! What vast intellectual labour was bestowed on these engrossing discussions, and what revolutions were the result! A great, powerful doctrine, put forth in religion, is a great, powerful event. It stirs up the fountains of feeling, and sways the hearts of men as the trees of the forest are moved by

the breath of the tempest. And thus it has been the fact that the civilization of Europe, as Guizot, a master upon this topic, has taught, has been eminently theological. To the debates and opinions of the Puritans of the commonwealth in England, during the days of Cromwell, does English liberty, for the most part, owe its existence, and especially that civil freedom and those equal rights which adorn and bless our native land, are traceable to this.—The spirit of independence, the cherished right of private judgment, the habit of covenanting with each other, the principle of federation, the bold and fearless testifying which these discussions engendered, have been marked in all our history, and are interwoven in the very fabric of our republican government.

IV. We turn now to consider for a moment the influence of the Bible on *Literature and Taste*. It would weary the patience of our readers, if we should attempt to recount the various departments of literature and taste which pay their homage to the Sacred Scriptures. The immortal Milton, the tender and unassuming Cowper, the impassioned Dante, all caught no small part of their inspiration from these sources. The Bible is said to have been one of the four volumes always lying on the table of Byron. To it Shakspeare is indebted for not a few suggestions, and some of the prominent traits of his most strongly marked characters. Gesner and Klopstock, among the Germans, and Corneille and Racine among the French, have drawn their subjects and inspiration from the Scriptures. Rembrant, Rubens, Poussin, Vandyke, Guido, and Raffaele, and West and Alton, have employed their pencils too on the same. The subjects presented in the Bible struck their imaginations more strongly than others, were more rich in materials of thought, feeling, and fancy, and were more worthy the labours of those months and years of toil which they bestowed upon them. From the simplicity and innocence of the garden of Eden, down to the magnificent revelations of the Apocalypse of John, all is instinct with poetic beauty. From the creation of the world, when the Almighty spake, and it was done, through the terrific, dismaying scenes of the Deluge, the plagues of Egypt, the passage of the Red Sea, the awful moment when

preternatural darkness invested the land of Judea, as the Son of God expired on the Cross beneath the mysterious night, down to that day when the trump of God shall sound, the dead be raised, and the living changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, the heavens be rolled together as a scroll, and pass away with a great noise, the earth and all things therein be burned up, and the elements melt with fervent heat; all is of surpassing grandeur, beneath which the loftiest imaginings of Pagan poetry sink almost into anile weakness. If Jehovah is described to us, He is no cloud-compelling Jove, but is seated on a throne high and lifted up, surrounded by the six-winged Seraphim, who cry in alternate song, Holy! holy! holy! is the Lord of Hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory! And the posts of the door are moved at the voice of him that cried, and the house is filled with smoke. The heavens are unclean in his sight, and his angels chargeable with folly. He looketh upon the earth, and it trembleth. He toucheth the mountains and they smoke. He removeth mountains in a moment, and overturneth them in his wrath. He shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble. The pillars of heaven tremble, and are astonished at his reproof. He commandeth the sun, and it riseth not; and sealeth up the stars. He alone spreadeth out the heavens, and walketh upon the towering waves of the sea. He maketh Arcturus, Orion and Pleiades, and the chambers of the south. He sendeth forth his commandment upon earth. His word runneth very swiftly. He giveth snow like wool. He scattereth the hoar-frost-like ashes. He casteth forth his ice like morsels, and who can stand before his cold! He stretcheth out the north over the empty place, and hangeth the earth upon nothing!" Does he make progress through his magnificent domain, there is no harnessing of the horses of the sun, and no puny charioteer, but a cherubic chariot is provided, with wheels full of eyes, whose fearful circles, while they roll on the earth, are bathed in the clouds of heaven; upon its shining axles are cherubic forms of dazzling glory; their wings with a noise like the noise of great waters, as the voice of the Almighty, the voice of speech, the noise of an embattled host aiding their rapid

flight; sustained by them is a sapphire firmament, and upon the firmament the likeness of a throne, and on this the semblance of Deity encircled by a brightness like the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain. As he moves on to the rescue of his saints, the earth quakes and trembles, the foundations of the hills are moved because he is wroth. There goes up a smoke out of his nostrils, and a fire out of his mouth devours. He bows the heavens and comes down, and darkness is under his feet. He rides upon the cherub, and flies, yea, he flies on the wings of the wind. He makes darkness his secret place, his pavilion round about him are dark waters and thick clouds of the skies. He thunders in the heavens, the Highest gives forth his voice. Hail-stones and coals of fire! He sends out his arrows and scatters them. He shoots out lightnings and discomfits them. The channels of waters are seen, the foundations of the world are discovered at thy rebuke, O Lord! At the blast of the breath of thy nostrils. He sends from above. He takes his endangered servant out of many waters, out the hands of his strong enemy, and brings him forth into a large and gladsome place! The whole material universe, from the stars of heaven to the subterranean abode of the dead, and all its striking objects and wonders of power and skill; and all animated nature, from the ants which are exceeding wise, the conies of the rocks, the spider which taketh hold with her hands, and is in the palaces of kings, to the war-horse whose neck is clothed with thunder, the glory of whose nostrils is terrible, which paweth in the valley, and rejoiceth in his strength, who mocketh at fear and turneth not back from the quiver rattling against him, the glittering spear and the shield, who swalloweth the ground with fierceness and rage, and saith among the trumpets, Ha! Ha! who smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the captains and the shouting; to behemoth, whose strength is in his loins and his force in his navel, which moveth his tail like a cedar, and whose bones are like bars of iron, which drinketh up a river and hasteth not, and trusteth that he can draw up Jordan into his mouth, through the whole circle of animal life, every thing is tributary to the poet's power. In all there is wonderful variety and

exhaustless wealth. There are the quiet scenes of pastoral life, the flock in the green pastures, and by the still waters; and there is the measured tramp and clanging armour of the soldier, the mustering of hosts in hot haste, the prancing of horsemen and the ringing hoofs of their steeds, the crash of iron chariots, the shock of rushing and meeting hosts, the glancing of the spear and shield, garments rolled in blood, and the death-struggles of the smitten soldier, as he bites the dust. There is the peaceful, smiling cot, and the secure valley; and there is the besieged city, the table spread by the delicate mother, to give a short-lived vigour to the panting breast of the warrior father, with the sodden flesh of their tender babe. There is woman's tenderness, and the sweet morning of youthful love, when the bride-groom triumphs over the bride, and there is the plaintive cry of the suffering father, Oh, my son Absalom, my son, my son Absalom! would God I had died for thee, oh Absalom, my son, my son! There is Solomon, in all his glory, the king of Tyre, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty, who, in the poet's fancy, had been in Eden, the garden of God; every precious stone his covering, the anointed Cherub upon the holy mountain, walking up and down amidst the stones of fire, and now cast out in indignation from the mount of God; there is the king of Babylon, exalting his throne above the stars of God, and resolving to be like the Most High, but he is suddenly brought down to the sides of the pit. Hell, from beneath, is moved to meet him at his coming, his pomp is brought down to the grave and the noise of his viols. The worm is spread beneath him, and the maggot is his covering. How art thou fallen from Heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! How art thou cut down to the ground, who didst prostrate the nations!

Are you oppressed with sadness, and stung by the unkindness of friends? Listen to the elegiac strains of Jeremiah, or the murmuring harp of David. Do you live in the world of dreamy visions? Walk with Ezekiel by the river Chebar, with Zechariah by the walls of Jerusalem, or with John on his sea-girt Patmos. Does your heart glow with deep emotion and fraternal love? Listen to the same John, as he describes his adorable Master, or

says, "Little children, love one another!" Do you admire vivid and poetical conceptions, and various and luxuriant imagery? Read over and over the epistle of James. Would you see described the planetary heavens, and this our earth enveloped in devouring flames, hear the groans of an expiring world, and the crash of nature trembling into universal ruin; the original from which Shakspeare has drawn his sublime passage in Richard the Second:

————— the baseless fabric of this vision
 The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces,
 The solemn temples; the great globe itself,—
 Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve;
 And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
 Leave not a rack behind:

Then read it in the epistles of the majestic, noble, vehement and fiery Peter. Would you see examples of the highest Demosthenian eloquence, and skillful rhetorical grouping? Find them in the Apostle Paul, in his high-souled address to king Agrippa, in his noble, manly disclaimer, "I am not mad, most noble Festus, but speak forth the words of truth and soberness:" In his reply to Agrippa's "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian," "I would to God, that not only thou, but also all that hear me this day, were both almost, and altogether such as I am, except these bonds." Behold him then, mark his words and his gesture as he lifts his manacles on high, and you behold the noble Roman, the noble Israelite, the fearless, true Christian, the prototype of the old Puritan, a man more sublimely noble than Julius Cæsar, or the Roman Cato, the highest style, without a doubt, of our fallen humanity.

To the Bible therefore, we are constrained to turn, with affection, not merely as the fountain of our religious hopes, but as those whose life has been spent in the retirement of the scholar, for the pleasure it affords to taste, and as those who love their country and their race, for the manifold benefits of a temporal nature which it has showered on man.

V. The last topic which will occupy us is the influence of the Bible upon social happiness and individual virtue. Already have some of our remarks anticipated this. We

have spoken of its influence in placing woman in her true position in which she was created, and in endowing her with those virtues which so much adorn her, and in making her the presiding spirit in the domestic circle. We might have shewn how the teachings of Scripture accord with those of nature, as to filial and parental ties; how the honour due to parents is inculcated on the child, and tender love and discriminating discipline enjoined on the parent. If, in Christian countries, infanticide, exposure of infants, and disowning of children; or cruel neglect of parents on the part of children have occurred, this has been in the case of those whose vices have rendered them insensible to shame; but in Pagan lands, over at least a wide extent of the earth, they are the daily and tolerated acts of all men, regarded rather as meritorious deeds, entailing certainly upon their perpetrators no disgrace. It is impossible for any of us to say, how much we are indebted for that training which fits us to be men, to the general influence of revealed religion. This we know, that the New Testament tells us every man we meet is our neighbour, and that we should love our neighbour as ourselves. The Old Testament says, Thou shalt not oppress a stranger, for ye know the heart of a stranger. That the Scriptures teach us that God hath made of one blood all nations of men, and thus restore again the brotherhood of the human race. That the very worship of God to which they summon us, inculcates the same great lesson. The rich and the poor meet together: the Lord is the Maker of them all. To us all, the same Scriptures, while they debar us from vain and demoralizing enjoyments, open a life of innocent pleasure. The first duty of man is represented to be, to fear God and keep his commandments, and yet the same pen which traced that line, tells us that a man hath no better thing under the sun, than to eat, and to drink, and to be merry, and enjoy the good of all his labour,—it is the gift of God. Go thy way, eat thy bread with joy, and drink thy wine with a merry heart; for God now accepteth thy works. Let thy garments be always white; and thy head lack no ointment. Live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest all the days of the life of thy vanity, which he hath given thee under the sun, for that is

thy portion. And thus the Scriptures inculcate a happy, joyful, social, but a religious life, as remote from the empty merriment and sensual indulgence of fools, as from the gloomy asceticism of the anchorite.

But more especially do they aid public virtue, and assist the private individual to form that character of integrity of such priceless value to himself, and to society at large. In a mercantile community, all must feel the importance of this. The whole conduct of business rests on the faith which those who engage in it repose in one another. It is the pride of the merchant to maintain an unsullied reputation, for truth, honesty and integrity. It is this which he claims of all his companions in business, and this is what they one and all claim from him. Confidence between man and man furnishes the sinews of trade far more than the command of extensive capital itself. No man of business can *afford* to be dishonest. It will take the bread from the mouths of his children, and make him shortly a starving beggar. And it is wonderful to what an extent confidence is reposed by man in his fellow man. There are men of business, who are entrusting to the care of persons whom they have never seen, between whom and themselves an ocean intervenes, more than the whole amount of their entire fortunes. We will *not say* that in many cases this honesty is a business principle, and not a habit arising out of the choice of the soul, but we *have* reason to fear that self-interest is the real cause, in many instances, of this commercial integrity of character. When, however, there is added to it a spirit of compassion and generosity, which are sometimes dissociated from it, a spirit too, of justice and truth, there is a combined character which deservedly wins the confidence and attracts the admiration of all men. There are some who have made loud professions of their faith in the Scriptures, who have at one time or another failed in these common virtues. It is impossible to say how far the influence of a defective education may modify the character of an otherwise good man. Nor how far one may fall under the influence of overpowering temptations. But of most of these instances, the Christian will say, "they went out from us, because they were not of us."

Now, in what communities do these commercial virtues thrive the most, in Pagan or in Christian countries, and of Christian, where? In semi-infidel, or in strongly religious nations. Where would you feel your property the safest? In Italy, Turkey, Egypt, and Greece, or in Holland, Germany, England or Scotland? Ah, it is where the Bible is the best known and most honoured, that man is most to be trusted, and property the safest. It is where these words are ever sounding, "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things." "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much; and he that is unjust in the least, is unjust also in much." "Just balances, just weights, a just ephah, and a just hin, shall ye have: I am the Lord your God." "He that walketh righteously and speaketh uprightly; he that despiseth the gain of oppressions, that shaketh his hands from the holding of bribes, he shall dwell on high: his place of defence shall be the munitions of rocks: bread shall be given him; his waters shall be sure." "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them."

This word of God of which we have thus spoken, has defied for more than thirty centuries the attacks of sceptics. It is no more manly to thrust it aside, and remain in ignorance of its contents, than it is to thrust with the shoulder the father who begat you, and to ignore the mother who gave you being. The wonderful book was written by nearly forty different writers; the last living more than fifteen hundred years later than the first, exhibiting every possible diversity of style, but breathing one and the self-same spirit, and unfolding one uniform and consistent system of truth. Its teachings are coincident with true science. It presents to the mind the noblest subjects of thought, and has brought into existence that institution, the Church, which has excited such a commanding influence over the world. The godliness which it teaches is profitable for this life, and for that which is to come, and while it shows you the only way of

peace, it sheds inestimable blessings upon you even here. Antiquarian and geographical research never finds it at fault. Science only illustrates and confirms its truths. It has enkindled the fire of genius in many a mind, and called forth the dormant powers of painter, sculptor, orator and poet; it has shed its influence over our courts of law, and has united the earth in one great brotherhood of nations. It has trophies still more glorious to win. It has spread civilization over this continent. It is to spread it in connection with our forms of faith over Asia, Africa, and the islands of the sea. Already it is translated into two hundred languages and dialects of earth. It will yet be read in all the families of man, as it is now read here. What surprising changes it will work, how the down-trodden nations will spring erect from the dust, how the earth will be covered with cities and crowded marts, how industry will be stimulated, and wealth increased, the poets have sung, and rapt prophets predicted. In the midst of all, will rise the Church of God, itself the centre of all these benefits, and the honoured of all hearts, its many pinnacles glittering in the morning sun, its stones laid in fair colours, and its foundation with sapphires, its battlements of ruby, and all its borders of precious stones.

ARTICLE VII.

THE FINAL DESTINY OF OUR GLOBE.

This is a legitimate subject of enquiry: one in which we all have an interest. This little earth, "hung upon nothing," among so many vast orbs in the wide space of Jehovah's empire, is the only portion of matter, with which, during our brief sojourn here, we can be much conversant. We know not the chemistry of the stars that glow in the darkness of the night; we lift our eyes on high and behold them, but can examine them by no other sense than sight. The various substances presented to us here, are the only ones upon which we can ope-

rate.* This is our birth-place, and as such, we naturally feel a strong attachment to it; the scene of our joys and our sorrows, our labours and our sufferings: we are ourselves a part of its substance; we employ its material to nourish us. And after using awhile that small portion of matter we more properly call our own, we return it again to its source, and make the earth our tomb. Nor is this all; we are to return again to the spot of sacred deposit, to take up that portion of dust, by which we become related to the world of matter, to retain it forever. If, then, we are to have a portion of the earth so attached to us, as forever to constitute a part of ourselves, we must feel some interest in knowing what destiny awaits the globe itself. And in relation to this, several questions may be asked. Is it to remain as now, with the same great laws of nature in operation, without any prospect of a termination, "all things continuing as they were from the beginning of the world," as infidels contend? Is it to be annihilated, and cease to fill a place in our family of planets, as well as among the myriads of worlds that people space, vanishing away like smoke?—Is it to be given up to the ravages of eternal fire, and made the prison of the lost, the great penitentiary, the common receptacle of the offscouring of the universe?—Or, is it not only to be renovated and purified from all trace of evil and marks of sin, but also to be fitted up with more than pristine beauty and splendour, and made the future residence of the saints, the great palace of Light, the Throne of God and the Lamb? There is no other question that we need here to consider. And with regard to the first, we have every reason to believe that the present course of nature will at length be arrested; that the affairs of the world will be wound up; that the period will come when the great Author of all will say to the waves of evil, "hitherto have ye come, but no further." That there will not be an infinite succession of beings and generations, according to the course of this

* "Over the physical constitution of every planet, except our own, there hangs a deep obscurity. We may be able to weigh them, and to measure their volumes; but this is nearly the sum of our knowledge concerning them. Here, however, we find ourselves in contact with matter; it courts and compels our attention."—*Harris' Pre-Adamite Earth*, p. 80.

world; and Adam's children without an end. This fact is abundantly established in the Bible.

And as to the second, though it may be the popular belief that the earth is to be "burned up," in the great conflagration, disappear, and never more be found, yet, while we admit that all creatures continue in being by the will of Him "for whose pleasure they are and were created," we may remark:

1. That we and all the world combined cannot annihilate a particle of matter.

2. That while, by the operation of those natural laws that are only expressions of the will of God, we see matter undergoing a great variety of changes around us, from solids to fluids and gases, and vice versa, yet we know of no case where matter ceases to exist. There is a ceaseless play of active energies and affinities which are the causes of these changes. We take the diamond, the hardest known substance, and by uniting it with another element, a gas, we convert it into thin air; but it is by our knowledge of the affinity between the two, and we know that, though in a different form, the same substances exist as before. This may serve as an example of the many cases of the kind that we see. It is probable that the instances most relied on to prove, by way of analogy, the entire destruction of the earth by fire, are the appearances and disappearances of stars in the heavens. Many phenomena of this kind are reported by astronomers. Mrs. Sommerville says,* "Many stars have vanished from the heavens: the star 42 Virginis, seems to be of this number, having been missed by Sir John Herschell, on the 9th of May, 1828, and not again found, though he frequently had occasion to observe that part of the heavens. Sometimes stars have all at once appeared, shone with a bright light, and vanished. Several instances of these temporary stars are on record: a remarkable instance occurred in the year 125, which is said to have induced Hipparchus to form the first catalogue of stars. Another star appeared suddenly near α Aquilæ, in the year 389, which vanished after remaining for three weeks, as bright as Venus. On the 10th of

* *Con. Physical Sciences*, p. 363.

October, 1604, a brilliant star burst forth in the constellation Serpentarius, which continued visible for a year; and a more recent case occurred in the year 1670, when a new star was discovered in the head of the Swan, which, after becoming invisible, reappeared, and having undergone many variations in light, vanished after two years, and has never since been seen. In 1572, a star was discovered in Cassiopeia, which rapidly increased in brightness, till it even surpassed that of Jupiter; it then gradually diminished in splendour, and having exhibited all the variety of tints that indicate the changes of combustion, vanished sixteen months after its discovery, without altering its position.

It is impossible to imagine anything more tremendous than a conflagration that could be visible at such a distance."* In such cases as these, Vince, in his "Complete System of Astronomy," says, "The disappearance of some stars may be the destruction of that system at the time appointed by the Deity for the probation of its inhabitants; and the appearance of new stars, may be the formation of new systems for new races of beings then called into existence to adore the works of their Creator."

The late Dr. Mason Good seemed to indulge in a similar opinion. "Worlds and systems of worlds are not only perpetually creating, but also perpetually disappearing. It is an extraordinary fact that within the period of the last century, not less than thirteen stars, in different constellations, seem to have *totally perished*, and ten new ones to have been created. In many instances, it is unquestionable that the stars themselves, the supposed habitation of other kinds or orders of intelligent beings, together with the different planets, by which it is probable they were surrounded, have *altogether vanished*, and the spots which they occupied in the heavens have become blanks. What has befallen other systems will assuredly befall ours. Of the time and manner we know nothing, but the fact is incontro-

* Certain stars have disappeared from the firmament; a fact proclaiming, at least, that the laws on which their visibility depended are no longer in operation in relation to them, but have been overborne by some countervailing power."—*Harris' Pre-Adamite Earth*, p. 96.

vertible; it is foretold by revelation; it is inscribed in the heavens; it is felt throughout the earth”*

But these conclusions, drawn from such phenomena, that these stars are annihilated, and that by analogy our planet will be, by no means necessarily follow. Even though it were a case of real combustion in the body of the star, of which there is great doubt, it need not be totally destroyed. The appearances can be accounted for in other ways. It is more probable that they are variable stars, that either revolve about their own centres, or that have opaque bodies revolving around them, by which their light is hid for a time from us: or some other supposition can be made more highly probable than that the matter of these stars is annihilated: the same is true of the earth.

3. And so far as the Scriptures give any countenance to the opinion that our planet is entirely to disappear, the impression is derived from such passages as the following: Ps. 102: 25-27., quoted in Heb. 1: 10, 11, “Of old hast thou laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed.” Matt. 24: 35.—“Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my word shall not pass away.” Rev. 21: 1.—“For the first heaven and the first earth were passed away, and there was no more sea.” 10: 11.—“The earth and the heaven fled away, and there was no place found for them.” 2 Pet. 3: 7.—“But the heavens and the earth which are now, are by the same word kept in store, reserved unto fire;”—10. “the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat; the earth also, and the works that are therein, shall be burnt up.”

But such passages only imply the transientness of the present state of things; or in many cases they assert nothing on the point, but serve to confirm the certainty of the Divine promises: and something will be found in connection implying this, as in Ps. 102: 25, 26. Isa. 51: 6; 54: 10. Matt. 24: 35. These great physical chan-

* Quoted by Dr. Dick. Sid. Heavens, p. 88.

ges will occur sooner than the word of God would fail. In other places also, as in Peter, and in Revelation, there are other expressions in connection that imply, not a destruction of the substance of the earth, but a change in its qualities, and its continued existence in another form. And further, if there are places in the Scriptures that speak of the heavens and the earth vanishing away like smoke, growing old like a garment, dissolving, burning up, perishing, passing away; so, on the other hand, there are those that speak of it as abiding forever.—Ps. 119 : 90. Eccl. 1 : 4.

4. While God upholds all things by the word of his power, and can *create*, and can *destroy*, we cannot infer from either what he has *said*, or what he has *done*, any intention to destroy the earth. In fact, we are led to infer that our planet, as it was when man was introduced, was among the last and best of his works. That he had expended great care, skill, wisdom and goodness in garnishing and preparing it. To destroy it, then, in consequence of the introduction of sin, might seem to give the author of sin cause of triumph, that he had marred the handy-work of the Divine architect, and provoked Him to destroy it.

Though the elements melt, then, the earth will abide, and that indefinitely long. And for what end? Is it to have the bad pre-eminence, to be the abode of the Devil and his angels, together with the spirits of lost men? Is here to be the fire that never shall be quenched? Such is the opinion of the venerable President Edwards: he says,* “Here shall all the persecutors of the Church of God burn in everlasting fire, who had before burned the saints at the stake. And here the bodies of the wicked shall burn and be tormented to all eternity. This world, which used to be the place of the Devil’s kingdom, shall now be the place of his complete punishment.”

But, notwithstanding the opinion of so great a man, we are disposed to think that God will reserve the earth for a far nobler purpose. For, if it is to continue, for what object is it more reasonable to conclude that it will be preserved, than to be made the residence of the saints?

* Hist. of Redemption.

There seems to be, throughout the Bible, an important relation between man and his interests, and this material world. It was made for him, not he for the world. Isa. 45: 12.—“I have made the earth and created man upon it;”—18. “God himself, that formed the earth and made it; he created it not in vain; he formed it to be inhabited.” Ps. 115: 16.—“The earth hath he given to the children of men.”—Gen: 1: 27, 28. Now though the bodies of the saints are to be spiritual, (1 Cor. 15: 44,) yet they are real corporeal bodies, like Christ’s after his resurrection.—Phil. 3: 21. They must then have a local habitation; they must be related to time, and space, and the material universe, in a different manner from disembodied spirits. To what part of the universe then, to what world, is it so likely that Christ will gather in his elect, and make of them one family of God, as that he should bring them to their old home, refitted and replenished for their residence? We must suppose them placed in some world in the bounds of space, and what one so appropriate as this?

He, too, who prepares mansions for them, is called the second Adam. There must, then, be, in many respects, a correspondence between him and the first Adam. If the first Adam had stood, he would have inherited the earth, and his posterity would have possessed it. Why, then, will not the second Adam reinstate those whom he has redeemed in the rights and privileges that the first Adam should have secured to his descendants, when he lost Paradise, and introduced death into the world?—Christ hath abolished death, and promised Paradise, only in a more exalted sense, to those who follow him, and in whose hearts he hath destroyed the works of the Devil. As, then, the territory and dominion of the first Adam was in this earth, why may not the eternal kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ have its seat here? The second Adam reigning in a new earth purified by fire, over those whose souls he has renewed, and whose bodies he has fashioned like unto his own glorious body, there would be a fitness in such an arrangement.

“He that sat upon the throne said, Behold I make all things new.” And if Christ is with his people, *that is heaven*: “Thou shalt be with me in Paradise,” was the

best promise he could give. And Paul esteems it the height of his joy to depart and be with Christ. When all sin is removed, and the wicked cease from troubling, and they see God as he is, the happiness of heaven can just as well be enjoyed *here*, as in any other part of the universe. If Adam and Eve, in a state of innocence, could be happy here, as the earth then was, much more will the saints in the new earth, with Christ their head. For at the same time that we are told that the earth and the things that are therein shall be burned up; that all these things shall be dissolved; that the elements shall melt with fervent heat, we also learn that this is to be succeeded by "a new heaven and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness."—2 Pet. 3: 10-13. The expectation of this is according to a Divine promise. Now, righteousness must belong to moral agents; abstractly, it cannot be said to dwell anywhere. We must understand then, that the new earth is to be inhabited by men who universally and spontaneously do justice and equity. It is a well-known Hebrew idiom to employ the abstract for the concrete noun, as in Isa. 1: 21: "How is the faithful city become a harlot! It was full of judgment; righteousness lodged in it, but now murderers." None but holy men are to dwell here; nothing that defileth will enter; the wicked will be cut off; the transgressors will be rooted out of it. Perfect love will prevail, according to the requirements of the Divine law. The Apostle sums up all in one expression, "wherein dwelleth righteousness." According to his statement, this earth is to pass away by the agency of fire, and to be replaced by one vastly superior; and better adapted to reflect the rays of the glory of God, and not to be left empty and void, but to be the residence of the saints, of righteousness itself.

The Apostle seems here to refer to the prophecy of Isaiah, (65: 17-25,) but to apply it in a different way from what it must primarily be understood; for it evidently belongs to some period of the Church's prosperity, yet future, but on the present earth. The slightest inspection of the passage shows this. But the Apostle uses it in reference to the new earth after the final conflagration, and the former things have passed away. What

the prophet describes is emblematical of that more glorious state spoken of by the Apostle, and who includes in that one brief expression above mentioned, the details of the prophet in verses 19 to 23. The palmiest days of Zion, in her earthly pilgrimage, faintly prefigures her reign in glory. Other passages in the Old Testament are quoted in the same way in the New. See Isa. 64 : 4 ; 1 Cor. 2 : 9 ; Ezk. 47 : 12 ; Rev. 22 : 2. We find the same order of things in the descriptions of the beloved disciple : Rev. 21 : 11. The heavens and earth fled away before the face of him that sat upon the throne, when he was revealed from heaven in flaming fire : (2 Thess. 1 : 8) ; then came the general resurrection, and general judgment ; the doom of the wicked, and the appearance of the new heavens and the new earth. "For the first heavens and the first earth were passed away, *and there was no more sea.*"—Rev. 22 : 1 ; which would have no significance here, except on the supposition that the change from old to new, as in Ps. 102 : 26, was upon the present earth ; just as an article of gold may be re-cast, in a different shape, but the substance unchanged. Then the new Jerusalem descends from God out of Heaven, upon the new earth, of course, and the announcement is made, with a loud voice from Heaven, "Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God."

Then what follows in detail (in verses 4-7,) is in precise accordance with what the Apostle had said, that righteousness shall dwell here ; and there are the fruits of righteousness, quietness and assurance forever. All injustice, oppression, sin and consequent misery, have passed away ; there is a total change. Paradise, that was removed to a purer sphere when man fell, is now restored. Now, under Christ, the second Adam, the sons of the first Adam "redeemed, regenerated, disenthralled from the bondage of corruption ;" raised from the dead spiritually, and bodily, "inherit all things." "They are made kings and priests unto God, *and reign on the earth,*" (Rev. 5 : 10,) which they inherit under Christ, according to Matt. 5 : 5 ; Ps. 37 : 9 ; 11 : 22. And though such passages might originally refer to the literal land of Ca-

naan, yet that prefigured a sure inheritance in the heavenly rest.

The Apostle's course of argument, (2 Pet. 3 : 5, 6, &c.) in relation to the analogy of the flood, and the final destruction of the earth by fire, tends to the same point.—The earth being overflowed with water, perished, (*απωλετο*, a very strong word,) yet was only purified and prepared to be inhabited by a new race. The very cataclysm that the same Apostle had before made the figure, to which baptism is the antitype.—1 Pet. 3 : 20, 21. As then, the earth was only changed on its surface, and washed from the stains of blood and violence which had been committed on it, and inhabited again ; so in the future purification by fire, its substance, though melted, will come forth as gold, unto glory and honour, and made the abode of the holy and the happy. It is a plain inference that this is what the Apostle intended to teach.

What Paul informs us in the 8th chapter of Romans, favours the same idea. He represents the whole creation, evidently the same as "the heavens and the earth," in other places, as waiting and longing for some great change, by which it is to be relieved from a heavy burden, to which it is now subjected involuntarily, and by which change it is to be glorified in connection with the children of God. This is, indeed, a bold figure, but the earth was cursed for the sin of man ; and it is often spoken of as sympathising with the moral condition of its inhabitants. Ps. 97 : 11, 12 ; 108 : 8 ; 148 : 3-10. Isa. 55 : 12. Hab. 3 : 16. Isa. 49 : 13. Ps. 98 : 4-6, and in a multitude of other places.

The sins and crimes and miseries of men are a burden and a cause of mourning to the very earth itself, as well as to the inferior animals. This is the most natural sense in which to understand the *κτίσις*, creation, of the Apostle, as the earth, "the heavens and the earth," this material frame-work, and only incidentally, if at all, of the inferior races of animals. Whatever it is that is figuratively waiting in earnest expectation, for "the manifestations of the sons of God," and the glory that is to follow, must of course be something that will itself survive that great change, continue to subsist, and share in what it waits for. But this cannot be said of the inferior tribes, and

therefore they are not included: they are not to exist hereafter.

That creation is something distinct from men: for, 1, it cannot be said of the wicked that they are waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God in hope of deliverance, for then they know their misery will increase, after the resurrection of their bodies. It will bring no joy to them. And 2, the Apostle makes an express distinction between that *crisis*, and "we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit." They share in the general groan of the whole creation, as well as in its earnest expectation: they have a joint interest in the same things, but the parties are distinct. And we may perhaps be able to see an exact correspondence between the burdens and the groans of Christians, and of the whole creation that so deeply sympathises with them; as well as between their hopes and expectations. And here are two parts: 1, what they and it are to be *delivered from*, "the bondage of corruption," and (7: 24,) "this body of death."—1 Cor. 5: 14. "For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened." And 2, what both they and it (to keep the phraseology of the Apostle,) are to be *delivered into*: "the glorious liberty of the children of God," "the manifestation of the sons of God," "the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body," "a building of God, a house not made with hands," "to be clothed upon that mortality might be swallowed up of life." For there is, we conceive, an important connection between the passage in Romans, and in Corinthians: and between the "creation" and "body" in one, and the "earthly house of this tabernacle," and "a house not made with hands" in the other.

Both the creation and the Apostle, and all Christians, as Calvin has it, are not in the agonies of *death and dissolution only*; but while undergoing these, *by hope* they become also the pains of child-birth. They both die, are in a state of vanity, dissolution, transientness; we groan, and are in the agony of death, dying daily, while bearing about this body of death; so it is with this material earth; it is in pangs all the time till now, from the time of the first sin, bearing a great body of death; and will continue in this state the same length of time that the

Church continues on it; but, at the same time, with regard to both, it is a passage through the pangs of death, *as if of child-birth*, towards and into a new life; these are endured, while waiting for, and in hope of, that house which is from heaven; the manifestation of the sons of God, in new and glorious bodies like Christ's; and the new heavens and new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. There is a correspondence throughout between the creation and those who have the first fruits of the Spirit. It is burnt up, dissolved, but rises like a phoenix from its ashes, like a pure metal from its oxide; so this tabernacle is dissolved, but is replaced by another, not made with hands, fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body. They *die in order to live in a higher degree,—a more exalted state*. Death is repugnant to every creature; it tends to preserve itself; but it yields even to death, through Him who hath subjected the same in hope of deliverance and a better condition: a regeneration, as in Matt. 19: 28; or restitution, Acts 3: 21.

But the question recurs, what reason is there for drawing this parallel between the present human body of Christians and the earth?—what propriety in speaking of the physical earth as in the pangs of child-birth, and “travailing in pain together?”

1. We reply that it is a forcible figure of speech to make deeper impression upon men, with regard to the great evil of their own sins, which produce ruin and disorder even in the material universe.

2. As man was made out of the dust of the earth, it is often called the *common mother of us all*; and as such, has been worshipped among almost all nations.

3. All return to the earth; its very mass, to a great depth, is composed of the remains of animals, at least in many places. Some have hazarded the opinion that almost its entire mass has been through the laboratory of animal life.* It was, then, the realm of death, before man came upon the stage. But it is in relation to him that we now speak. And since his creation; since Death began his ravings among the human race, how many human bodies have been laid in the grave to see corrup-

* Mantell's Wonders of Geology, vol. 2, p. 670.

tion; not there to remain, but as a sacred trust to be restored, at the command of Him "who has the keys of Hell and Death."

The Bible representation on the subject is, that the earth is a mother, in whose teeming womb all the millions of the dead are waiting the period of her gestation "to come forth." In reference to this, the whole creation is travailing in pain together. We see the Scripture phraseology in such passages as Ps. 139: 15, where the womb of the mother is figuratively "the lowest part of the earth," the grave, as in Isa. 44: 23; Ezk. 26: 30; 31: 14, &c. The embryo in the forming state in the womb of the mother, is analogous to the dead in the grave. That dark, hollow cavity, Hades, the unseen place, of which the ancients had the idea, as containing all the dead, is by metonymy the womb of the earth; and, as above, a mother's womb.

As all come into being in the same way, and from the same place, and all go out of the world in the same way, to the same state of the dead, they came to speak of both alike. Job 38: 8; Prov. 30: 16.

The Jews were familiar with this idea. Job 1: 21.—"Naked came I out of my mother's womb, and naked shall I return thither." That is, into the womb of the common mother of all. Eccl. 5: 15.—"As he came forth of his mother's womb, naked shall he return to go as he came: in *all points as he came, so shall he go.*" Eccl. 11: 5, 6, the analogy of the growth of the foetus in the womb of the mother, and the germinating of the seed in the earth is spoken of: see this same figure applied to the resurrection of the body, John 12: 24; 1 Cor. 15: 37, by both Paul and Christ. In Ecclesiasticus, also, we read, (40: 1,) "a heavy yoke is upon the sons of Adam, from the day that they go out of their mother's womb, till they return to the mother of all things." In the Apocryphal Book of Enoch,* 50: 1, we are told that at the last day, "The Earth shall deliver up from her womb, and Hades shall deliver up from her's." Rev. 20: 13. This idea is further elucidated by the language of inspi-

* Supposed to have been written after the Destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans.—*Am. Bib. Rep. Jan. 1840.*

ration concerning the burial and resurrection of Christ : Matt. 12 : 40 ; he was laid in "the heart of the earth ;" but Ps. 16 : 8-11, he was not left in the grave, for, Acts 2 : 24 : "God raised him up, having loosed the pains of death." And this is more forcible when we compare the words in the original, in Rom. 8 : 22 ; and Acts 2 : 24. See also Rev. 12 : 2.

If, then, this is the correct understanding of the passage before us ; if the earth is waiting with anxious expectation the period of her deliverance from this mass of death, at the general resurrection, how sublime the thought ! Her capacious womb is crowded with the remains of those who were once, like ourselves, busy and active : to our sight and senses, they are now destitute of life ; but there is, in each, a germ of life ; a living seed : they are all embryos ; the earth beneath is pregnant with living men : the very dust we tread is potentially more full of life, than the living themselves. The great mother groans to carry her burden. In this sense "all live unto God."

"Go, if you will, and traverse the ten thousand battle-fields that have been the vast slaughtering places of men from Nimrod to Bonaparte ; and all is silence and solitude over the graves of these millions. But how changed the scene on the resurrection morning ! Then, not less than one thousand millions of human beings shall start up from these battle-fields, and crowd upwards to the judgment-seat. What vast multitudes, too, shall ascend from the site of such ancient cities as Nineveh, and Babylon, and Thebes, and Palmyra, and a hundred other great centres of population, now the seat of solitude and desolation. Think of Jerusalem, which, for more than two thousand years, has been the great central slaughter-house of the world ; where human relics, and comminuted dwellings have accumulated on the surface, to the depth of forty or fifty feet ; and the whole has been soaked a thousand times in blood.

Oh, think of the scene, when the millions that lie buried there, shall start into life, at the shout of the descending Judge, and the Arch-angel's voice ! From the sea's broad surface, too, what multitudes shall be seen, ascending to be judged according to the deeds done

in the body. Indeed, when we remember that probably as many as ten billions of human beings have already dwelt upon this globe, reasonably may we inquire, from what portion of its surface, will not myriads start into life at the final summons?"* We may simply add that the names of a long list of eminent interpreters, in this country, and in Europe, can be brought, in favor of the renovation of the earth being taught in this passage in Romans; as well as in Peter. We need not occupy space by repeating their names. It was also the opinion of many of the older interpreters, such as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Hieronymus, Augustin, &c.†

And that the earth is to survive this great revolution on its surface; and not only continue on its course, but in a state of splendour and perfection far surpassing the present, is in accordance with what is revealed of its past history in the science of Geology. Dr. Hitchcock says, "It appears that there have been upon the globe several distinct periods of organized existence, in which particular groups of animals and plants, exactly adapted to the varying condition of the globe, have been created, and successively passed away. If we take only those larger groups of animals and plants, whose almost entire distinctness from one another has been established beyond all doubt, we shall still find at least *five* nearly complete organic revolutions on the globe, viz: 1. The existing species. 2. Those in the tertiary strata. 3. Those in the cretaceous and oolitic systems. 4. Those in the upper new red sand-stone group. 5. Those below the new red sand-stone."

Comparative anatomy teaches us that the animals and plants in these different groups could not have lived in the same physical circumstances. The same author remarks that, "if only the greater part of the species have been changed several times, it establishes the inference,"

* Phenomena in the Seasons Spiritualized: by Dr. Hitchcock: pages 34, 35.

† "A spacious eternal heaven shall spring forth in the midst of the angels. The former heaven shall depart and pass away: a new heaven shall appear: and all the celestial powers shine with sevenfold splendour forever. Afterwards likewise there shall be many weeks, which shall eternally exist in goodness and in righteousness. Neither shall sin be named there forever and ever."—*Book of Enoch*, ch. 92: 16

that is, that there have been several distinct periods of organized existence on the globe. "And these have been essentially changed as many as six times. And therefore, (he continues,) I prefer to speak of *seven* distinct periods of organic life on the globe, rather than *five*. But from the next remark, it appears that five *entirely distinct* periods can be made out:

Remark 2. It appears from the following quotation by Dr. Smith, that Deshayes, an eminent palæontologist, is able to make out *five* distinct periods of organized existence besides that now passing on the globe. "M. Deshayes has lately announced that he had discovered, in surveying the entire series of fossil animal remains, *five great groups, so completely independent, that no species whatever is found in more than one of them.*"

Objection. Perhaps the deposits containing these different organic groups, may have been going on at the same time in different countries, or in different parts of the same country.

Answer. Although all the rocks composing these different systems are not found piled one upon another, in any one place, they are all found so connected at different points, as to prove that they were formed successively. Yet where any are wanting in the series, as the Wealden, for instance, in North America, the interval during which these were forming in particular localities, may have been occupied by a prolonged deposition of the next older, or by an earlier commencement of the next newer rock. Most probably, however, the same formation was begun and completed in different places about the same period; otherwise the climate would have varied so much as to produce a marked change in the organic remains."*

"It appears that every successive general change that has taken place on the earth's surface, has been an improvement of its condition." "Animals and plants of a higher organization have been multiplied with every change, until at last the earth was prepared for the existing races; with man at their head, the most generally perfect of all."† And why may we not anticipate some-

* Hitchcock's Geology: Revised edition, pp. 166, 167.

† *Ibidem*, p. 171.

thing of the same kind in the future? That after man, and the present inhabitants, have occupied the surface for a cycle of ages, another change shall occur, that improvement shall advance to another, a final, a perfect stage? The number *seven* is a perfect one in the Bible: as shown above from the records written in the solid tables of stone in the earth, by God's own finger, *five* stages have preceded us; we are in the sixth; one more only is wanting to introduce the great consummation. Here the two great lines of truth, that from physical science, and that from inspiration, meet in the same point. They lead us to expect something better than the present "bound and fettered condition of all nature."

The remarks of a foreign, most eloquent writer, are here so apposite, that I cannot carry out this thought better than by quoting from him:

"We learn that the dynasty of man in the mixed state is not the final one; but that there is to be yet another creation, or, more properly, re-creation, known theologically, as the resurrection, which shall be connected in its physical components, by bonds of mysterious paternity, with the dynasty which now reigns, and be bound to it mentally by the chain of identity, conscious and actual; but which, in all that constitute superiority, shall be as vastly its superior as the dynasty of responsible man is superior to even the lowest of the preliminary dynasties. We are further taught that at the commencement of this last of the dynasties, there will be a re-creation of not only elevated, but also of degraded beings,—a re-creation of the lost. We are taught, yet further, that though the present dynasty be that of a lapsed race, which at their first introduction were placed on higher ground than that on which they now stand, and sank by their own act, it was yet part of the original design, from the beginning of all things, that they should occupy the existing platform; and that redemption is thus no after-thought, rendered necessary by the fall, but, on the contrary, part of a general scheme, for which provision had been made from the beginning; so that the Divine man, through whom the work of restoration has been effected, was in reality, in reference to the purposes of the Eternal, what

he is designated in the remarkable text, "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." Slain from the foundation of the world! Could the assertors of the stoney science ask for language more express? By piecing the two records together,—that revealed in Scripture, and that revealed in the rocks,—records which, however widely geologists may mistake the one, or commentators misunderstand the other, have emanated from the same great Author;—we learn that in slow and solemn majesty has period succeeded period, each, in succession, ushering in a higher scene of existence; that fish, reptiles, mammiferous quadrupeds, have reigned in turn; that responsible man, 'made in the image of God,' and with dominion over all creatures, ultimately entered into a world ripened for his reception; but further, that this passing scene in which he forms the prominent figure, is not the final one in the long series, but merely the last of the *preliminary* scenes; and that that period to which the by-gone ages, incalculable in amount, with all their well-proportioned gradations of being, form the imposing vestibule, shall have perfection for its occupant, and eternity for its duration. I know not how it may appear to others, but for my own part, I cannot avoid thinking that there would be a lack of proportion in the series of being, were the period of perfect and glorified humanity abruptly connected, without the introduction of an intermediate creation of responsible imperfection with that of the dying, irresponsible brute. That scene of things in which God became man, and suffered, *seems*, as it no doubt *is*, a necessary link in the chain."*

We stand upon the graves of a series of departed worlds, and we look upward and forward to the "world to come," which will be perfect, permanent, immovable. When the great cycle of changes will end. The great terminus *ad quem* of the faith and hope of the church in all ages. Abraham, by faith, became "*heir of the world*;" he looked for a city that had foundations, "prepared of God. A kingdom that cannot be moved, though the present material frame-work be taken down, shaken

* Foot Prints of the Creator, by Hugh Miller.

to pieces.—Heb. 12 : 27. This immobility is taught even in the emblems by which the residence of Him who is King in Zion, “the tabernacle of God,” is shadowed forth. For the Holy of Holies in the tabernacle of Moses was a cube: the oracle in Solomon’s temple was of the same form.*—1 K. 6 : 20. Both of these were constructed after a pattern furnished by God himself. Ex. 25 : 9-40 ; 1 Chron. 28 : 12 ; Heb. 8 : 5. And that pattern was taken from the original into which Christ entered when he ascended on high ; for in Heb. 9 : 23, we read that, “It was necessary that the *patterns of things in the heavens* should be purified with these, but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these.” “For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which *are the figures of the true* ; but into heaven itself.” 9 : 8, “the first tabernacle,” “was a figure for the time then present.” But the holy place into which Christ entered was “a greater and more perfect tabernacle,” (9 : 12,) which, in 8 : 2, the Apostle calls “the sanctuary and the true tabernacle, which the Lord hath pitched, and not man.” (8 : 5.) The earthly things were “the example and shadow of the heavenly,” that is, their copy and likeness, by which they were adumbrated.

Now, that great structure which was shown in vision to the holy seer “*descending out of heaven from God,*” was either the original into which Christ is said to have entered, and from which miniature models were taken for Moses and David, or a more enlarged copy of the same: a visionary emblem of what is real, and substantial, “the tabernacle of God with men.” And it was of the same form, for Rev. 21 : 16 : “The length, and the breadth, and the height of it are equal.” Every thing about the description of this wonderful “house not made with hands eternal in the heavens,” is intended to convey some spiritual truth ; but it is with the shape that we are now concerned. And there must be some peculiar reason in the Divine mind, why, in *relation to his own*

* It may be worth mentioning that the fundamental form of all crystals is a cube. And that some writers of late attempt to show that the earth itself is not a sphere, but a great octohedron, the next primary form to the cube.—*Silliman’s Jour.*, March 1852.

dwelling, he is so tenacious of the form of a cube. Almost every work of his hands, all the heavenly bodies are globular, and revolve in orbits nearly circular, so far as we know anything of their makes or their motions; all organisms in general on the earth, are bounded by curve lines. But from Paradise, at the beginning of the present earth, to that which succeeds its close, "the habitation of the God of Jacob," in every instance, built by his own direction, for his visible manifestation; (except God manifest in the flesh,) has been of a cubical form. This is true, also, of the symbolical temple, (Ezek. 41 : 4,) which was surrounded with a square enclosure of five hundred reeds on a side* and located within a quadrangular portion of the holy land, of twenty-five thousand reeds on a side; in another portion of which was situated the city that with its suburbs was a square of five thousand reeds.

Lowth observes that "a square figure is the emblem of perpetuity, strength, and solidity. A great part of the wisdom of the eastern nations was wrapped up in hieroglyphical emblems. This method God hath made use of to discover some mysterious truths in his word; such as perhaps he thinks not convenient to be more clearly revealed till the proper time or season; intending by such hints to encourage man's searching into the more obscure parts of Scripture." To this we will add a remark or two :

1. Though it may seem to some a mere fanciful conceit, yet we will mention that there may be a connection between this shape and that "righteousness" or equity, that the Apostle says is to dwell in the new earth. Moral qualities are often expressed in language derived from the senses: from physical objects. The just man follows the line of the law, &c. The shape and structure of this city, the centre and seat of the King who is to reign in righteousness, over righteous men, keeps this great truth emblematically before their minds. It is perfect and

* Solomon's temple appears to have been surrounded with a similar court.—Josephus, *Ant.* viii: 3-9. So also the temple of Herod.—*Ant.* xv: 11: 3. *Rev.* 11: 2.

equal in all its dimensions. A perfect city and commonwealth. Isa. 60: 21; Matt. 13: 43; Rev. 21: 27.

2. Stability, or immobility, is indicated by this form. There is to be no further progress or change. Just as a cube is least adapted for motion; in direct contrast with all the heavenly bodies, that with a globular shape move with almost inconceivable velocity through space, so this city, or polity, has reached a point of perfection and of rest. It is built of living stones: a habitation of God through the Spirit: "For the Lord hath chosen Zion, he hath desired it for his habitation. This is my rest forever: here will I dwell: for I have desired it." He takes up his abode here, and never departs, as he did from Eden.

Now, then, if this is the case with the new Jerusalem, as indicated by its very form; if that great polity which it symbolizes, has reached a perfect, unchanging state, the same must be true of the earth, from which "the nations bring glory and honour into it."—Rev. 21: 26.

But perhaps, in *endeavouring* to show that the future and eternal home of the saints is to be a real, solid, material earth, as much so as the present, we shall shock the prejudices, and incur the reproaches of those who say "you are making out a Mohammedan Paradise."—But we have endeavoured to follow the mind of the Spirit, and to show that the teachings of science exactly fall in with and confirm inspiration.

Such men cannot entertain any idea concerning that state of rest, but one entirely spiritual. They are like some of the ancients who believed matter the source of evil; and that the only way to holiness and happiness was to separate their souls from all contact with it, or influence from it.* But God created the earth and all things in it, and pronounced it "*very good*." Adam and Eve were holy and happy while in a material world.—But these persons conceive of heaven as some ethereal region in the clouds, where they will spend eternity in solemn assembly, in the midst of the music of seraphs; in exstatic and rapturous delight, where no opportunity is afforded for the play of the active principles of

* The Gnostics, Moehim's Ch. Hist. pp. 73, &c., 109, &c. vol. i.

human nature, but a perpetual sameness. But unless essentially changed in our mental constitution, this would not in the end satisfy us. Says Dr. Chalmers, "a great step is gained, simply by dissolving the alliance that exists in the minds of many between the two ideas of sin and materialism; or proving that when once sin is done away, it consists with all we know of God's administration, that materialism shall be perpetuated in the full bloom and vigour of immortality. It altogether holds out a warmer and more alluring picture of the elysium that awaits us, when told that there will be beauty to delight the eye; and music to regale the ear; and the comfort that springs from all the charities of intercourse between man and man: holding converse as they do on earth; and gladdening each other with the benignant smiles that play on the human countenance.

There is much to affect and elevate the heart in the scenes and the contemplations of materialism: and we hail the information of the word of God, that after the dissolution of its present frame-work, it will again be varied, and decked out anew in all the graces of its unfading verdure, and of its unbounded variety; that in addition to our direct and personal view of the Deity, when he comes down to tabernacle with men, we shall also have a reflection of him in a lovely mirror of his own workmanship; and that, instead of being transported to some abode of dimness and of mystery, so remote from human experience, as to be beyond all comprehension, we shall walk forever in a land replenished with those sensible delights, and those sensible glories, which, we doubt not, will lie most profusely scattered over the new heavens, and the new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness."*

Another forcible writer remarks—

"Let us try to persuade ourselves that the future and unseen world, with all its momentous transitions, is as simply natural and true, as is this world of land and water, trees and houses, with which we now have to do."
—*Physical Theory of Another Life*, p. 191.

* *Astro. Disc. Sermon on new Heavens and new Earth.*

Another objection made to the saints' residing on this earth is the want of sufficient room. And it is said sometimes in the pulpit, when speaking on the subject of the general resurrection and final judgment, that this earth could not contain all the dead that will be raised. But a very few figures will show that such statements are far from the truth: for if, without being very exact, we allow the present population of the globe to be 800,000,000; and that it has always been the same, and will continue the same to the end of 7,000 years from the creation: and further, that three generations leave the stage in a century; there will then have lived at the final judgment, two hundred and ten generations, amounting to 168,000,000,000. Now, the State of North Carolina is put down as containing 50,000 square miles: this amounts to 154,880,000,000 square yards; so that nearly the whole population that will have then been upon the earth, could find a square yard to stand upon in that State, which is a very small part of the world. If the description of New Jerusalem is to be regarded as conveying any idea of the reality, we may see from its dimensions that it affords ample space; being 12,000 furlongs, or 1500 miles on a side, which would give an area of 2,250,000 square rods. Mr. Lowman, however, understands the 1500 miles of the compass of the city; making it only 375 miles on a side: and it seems to have been more especially intended as a temple for worship.

But in regard to the above stated objection, we may remark:

1. That there is to be "*no more sea.*" And if this is to be understood literally, the habitable parts of the earth will be much enlarged. "In the present surface of our planet, the area of the solid to the fluid parts is as *one to two and four-fifths*: according to Rigand, as 100: 270."* So that the sea at present occupies more than twice the space of the land.

2. That though we cannot tell the proportion of the saved to the lost, but as to the past, we have great reason to fear, that *few* out of the whole number have been saved. In the future we expect a greater proportion will

* *Cosmos*, vol. i., p. 299.

belong to Christ. But we are not to account for more space than is sufficient for those whom Christ will gather in.

3. That less space will suffice for the same number of people than now. But some parts of the earth are densely populated at present. Belgium, the most densely peopled country in the world, has 864 inhabitants to a square mile.

4. That though this is their home and the seat of government, yet we need not suppose them all confined to the limits of this world: but that a communication may be opened with other worlds in the same empire. For Christ is made head over all things, "and he shall feed them, and lead them to living fountains of waters:" In his Father's house are many mansions, already prepared for his people. And as God fills immensity as well as inhabits eternity, who can tell but that every star may be one of those mansions, and that the saints will have permission to traverse the length and breadth of creation, and to range throughout the whole universe, while the wicked will feel the galling chains of confinement in their prison of despair. The glorious liberty of the children of God, will be the freedom, not of one city or province, but of the wide realm, in which they have a joint interest and ownership with their King and Head.

ARTICLE VIII.

CORRESPONDENCE.

We give place to the following communication of the author of an article in our last number, "On the Nature and importance of a Christian Profession, and its connexion with Membership in the visible Church."—EDS. S. P. REV.

To the Editors of the Southern Presbyterian Review:

GENTLEMEN,—In looking over the note which you have added to my article in your last number, (on the Nature of a Christian Profession, &c.) it seems to me that you have materially misap-

prehended my meaning; and I trust you will not be displeased with the liberty I take in offering a word of explanation, which of course I place entirely at your disposal. If you have done me injustice, I know that it was unintentional, and you will do whatever may be necessary to correct the mistake, as soon as you are convinced that you have made one.

“Full communion in the visible church,” I suppose is universally understood to include all those ecclesiastical rights which are common to all those members of the church who are regarded as converted persons,—for example, and especially, a right to the Lord’s table. And if so, nothing could be further from my thoughts than that any unconverted person can be lawfully entitled to such communion.

As I do not know on which of my positions your inference is founded, allow me to recapitulate such of them as bear the nearest relation to this subject.

1. Infant-baptism and its ecclesiastical consequences. I cordially approve of the two following sentences, found in the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church: “Not only those that do actually profess faith in, and obedience unto the Church, but also the infants of one or both believing parents are to be baptized.” “All baptized persons are members of the Church, are under its care, and subject to its government and discipline,” &c.

Fellow-membership in a Society, does not imply that there is no distinction as to the privileges enjoyed in connexion with that Society. If, for example, the Constitution of a State requires a free-hold qualification for the right of suffrage, it by no means follows that none but free-holders are citizens. In perfect consistency, then, with the doctrine just stated, I maintain that no man who does not give satisfactory evidence of true conversion, may be admitted to the Lord’s table,—nor is he eligible to ecclesiastical office, or entitled to vote in any election to such office, or in any way take part in managing the offices of the church. Still, it does not follow that he may not be “a member of the church,” “under its care,” and subject to its government and discipline,—“bound” (by covenant) “to perform all the duties of a church member.”

2. The want of piety does not, of itself, infer excommunication. If the propositions quoted from the Constitution of our Church are correct, it follows that many must be recognized as members of the Church, who are not to be regarded or treated as converted persons. How is it consistent with this to infer excommunication from mere destitution of true piety? If such destitution is discovered in one hitherto esteemed regenerate, the proper conclusion seems to be simply this, that he must fall back to the level of those baptized persons who never were regarded as pious,—he must be recognised as a church member, but not a communicant.

3. As to the nature of that Christian profession which every hearer of the Gospel is required to make, and which, in the case of unbaptized adults, is to be made by entering into the communion of the Church. I maintain that it resolves itself into a declaration of one's hearty consent to God's covenant,—it is a solemn and public entrance into that covenant, or a solemn and public recognition of the covenant obligation by which he is already bound. He who does heartily consent to that covenant is a regenerate person. He who pretends to make the profession while his heart does not really consent to the covenant, is guilty of gross impiety in the act. On the part of the Church, any reasonable doubt as to the question whether he is a regenerate person, in other words, whether he does heartily consent to the covenant, ought to ensure his rejection. But every baptized person is really bound by the covenant, no matter whether he was brought into it by his own act, or in infancy, by the act of his parents,—no matter whether any profession of consent he may have made was sincere or hypocritical.

Yours sincerely,

J. G. SHEPPERSON.

Bedford Co. (Va.) April 28, 1853.

While the sheets of Article V. were passing through the Press, the mail brought us news of the death of its estimable author.—Worn out with pain and disease, his unconquerable soul struggling onward ever with vehement desires to be employed in the service of his Master, resorting to his pen, when he could no longer use his voice in proclaiming the Gospel, he closed his useful life on the 15th of June, in the city of Savannah. Few preachers in his native State, have been so universally acceptable, or so successful in winning souls to Christ. His memory will live in the hearts of many affectionate friends, by whom also, what frailties he may have had, will be buried in oblivion. We are tempted to give, as an explanation of the motives which impelled him to write so much in these closing days of his life, the last letter but one received from him by us.—Eds. S. P. REV.

“SAVANNAH, April 20, 1853.

Rev. and Dear Brother,—I am gratified that there is a prospect of having another article published. Not that I desire to appear so often before the public, but because I am *so shut out of life* by infirmity. Ah, my Brother, few know my *daily sufferings*. As the Apostle said, “*I die daily.*” The *pen* is the almost only means of a little diversion from bodily pain. Whenever I can be so absorbed in *thought* as to forget the body, I have ease, sometimes exhilaration. But, for the most part, I only *struggle* and *struggle* with the decays of my frail tabernacle. But I should not thus speak, lest I *seem* to murmur,—for I can feebly testify, that in all my afflictions, no good word of God has failed. For the *past week*, I have been much afflicted; and yesterday, ——— fell sick, and is very sick to-day. Oh, how such things should make us value that good Land, where thorns and thistles grow not, tears are not shed, and *sin* has no existence!

You will find the article hastily written, and of course disfigured by bad-spelling, bad punctuation, and bad grammar, it may be.—Anything of this kind you may see, please correct, as if it were your own. I have had to *erase* much for the same reason. Please see that the *proofs* are correct.

Yours in the Gospel, and in the hope of a blessed immortality.

S. J. CASSELS.

Again he says, under date of April 12, 1853 :

* * * "How little did I think the evening you were here, that before you had been well seated in your chair at home, I should have *another article* for your Review!! But it is even so, and my "prolific pen" is really seeming to become *ambitious* of new *offspring*! I have no desire, I am sure, to be prominent in your Review, or anywhere else. True, the *pen* is all I *can use*, in the way of public usefulness; and it is also *necessary*, yea *essential*, to relieve my bodily and mental sufferings. Still I dialike to be *voluminous*, or anything else of the kind." * * * .

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *History of the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, Volume Five.* By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D. D., *President of the Theological School of Geneva, and Vice-President of the Societe Evangelique.* Translated by H. WHITE; Translation carefully revised by Dr. MERLE D'AUBIGNE. 518 pp. 12 mo. Robert Carter & Brothers, New-York. 1853.

The immense popularity of the preceding volumes of this History, while it whetted the public expectation, rendered the issue of the present volume all the more dangerous to the author's reputation. All that he might hope to accomplish was simply to sustain the interest he had already excited; to surpass it, was beyond the reach of the most sanguine desire. The dramatic interest of this volume seems to us below that of the earlier volumes: but whether this be due to the absence of that freshness and novelty which characterized those; or whether it may not be that the scenes were less thrilling, and less within the dramatic range, we will not here undertake to decide.

This criticism touches, however, only the incidental merits of this volume, and not in the least affects its substantial value. It is still a truthful and graphic picture of the English Reformation,

bearing the stamp of the author's penetration and vivacity. His skill, in grouping the characters of his history, as well as in connecting the subtle links in the chain of events, is revealed in every line. Dr. Merle has clearly established the Divine and spiritual character of the English Reformation,—that it was not, as has often been affirmed, the work of politicians and statesmen. He proves it to have had a truly Bible origin, and must be ascribed to the remarkable diffusion of the sacred Scriptures among the people. Another point, brought out in the boldest relief in this work, is the diplomacy between the English and the Papal courts. The Pope is seen disgracefully hanging between England and Spain, fearing to offend either, yet unable to propitiate both. It is needless to advise the perusal of a book which has been so long and so anxiously looked for, and which has, to English and American Christians, the additional interest of recording the Reformation which gave to them the Gospel, and the salvation of God.

2. *The Bible in the Counting House: A Course of Lectures to Merchants.* By H. A. BOARDMAN, D. D. *Lippincott & Grambo: Philad.* 420 pp., 12 mo. 1853.

We have read this book with deeper interest than most of those which issue from the teeming press of the present day. These Lectures are written in a graceful and polished style; and what is far better, with that freshness and point which always characterize the productions of an earnest thinker. We are pleased too, with the tone of moderation which pervades the volume. In exposing the temptations and errors of a particular class of men, the tendency is always to exaggerated and one-sided views. Dr. Boardman, however, with due caution, discriminates between the malpractices of commercial sharpers and gamblers, and the incidental errors into which the most honourable merchant may fall. He holds the probe with the steady hand of a surgeon, who fully knows the nature of the wound, and is confident of his own skill. It is surprising how the author, amidst the retirement of the clergyman and the scholar, has been able to gather up such minute information of the inner life, and the secret operations, of the Mer-

chant. The same powers of tact and observation are displayed in the facility with which the author explains the results of his varied reading in the illustration of his topics.

Without attempting in any case to settle the grounds of Christian morality, he has successfully applied its ascertained principles to an important class of our fellow-citizens, with a pungency and fidelity every way worthy of a Christian Minister. We trust that this work will contribute to the revival in all our pulpits, of that Christian casuistry which so richly distinguished the ministrations of a former age.

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3. *The Grace of Christ; or Sinners saved by Unmerited Kindness.* By WM. S. PLUMER, D. D. 454 pp., 12 mo.
 4. *The Doctrinal Differences which have agitated and divided the Presbyterian Church; or old and new Theology.* By JAMES WOOD, D. D. 290 pp., 12 mo.
 5. *Presbyterian Tracts, Vol. VIII.* — pp., 12 mo.
 6. *Letters to a Recent Convert: By a Pastor.* 91 pp., 16 mo.
 7. *Bible Rhymes; or Scripture History in Verse.* 132 pp., 16 mo.
 8. *The Short Prayer and the Text of Easy Words.* 64 pp., 24 mo.
 9. *The Child's Catechism of Scripture History. Parts 1, 2, 3, 4.* 2 vols., 18 mo., pp. 64, and 138.
 10. *A Plain and Scriptural View of Baptism.* By Rev. DANIEL BAKER, D. D., of Texas. 134 pp., 16 mo.

The above are the latest issues which have reached us from the industrious press of our Board of Publication. "The Grace of Christ," by Dr. Plumer, carries the reader through the great doctrines of Salvation, which are faithfully, plainly, and often forcibly presented. It is a book to put into the hands of a sinful man, to guide him to Christ; or into the hands of a believer, to assist him in the review of those doctrines on which his hopes for eternity rest. Dr. Plumer never allows himself to construct long sentences, and seeks not so much for harmony and flow of style, as for terseness and directness. Many of his expressions have the point of an epigram, and the quaintness of a proverb. The illustrations from history are frequent and appropriate, and his own

views he fortifies abundantly by the sayings of those wise and good men whom the men of faith of this generation revere.

With the "Old and New Theology," by Dr. James Wood, our readers are acquainted. It now appears in a third and enlarged edition. Its re-issue is appropriate, and those who read the volume recently prepared by a committee of the New School Synod of New York and New Jersey, giving a history of our divisions, should have this in hand, and compare both sides of the question.

The seventh volume of Presbyterian Tracts, embraces, like its predecessors, brief treatises on many subjects interesting to the Christian.

The "Letters to a Recent Convert," were written for the benefit of the class of persons to whom they are addressed, during a season of religious revival. The volumes designed for children are increasing the variety of juvenile books suited for Sabbath-school libraries, and family reading. We shall ere long cease to be dependent on other supplies than our Board furnishes, for this species of juvenile literature.

We have had many treatises on Baptism, but they have been mostly produced by studious men in the retirement of the study. "The Plain and Scriptural View of Baptism," by Dr. Baker, is an argument by one of our most successful preachers, who has been engaged for years in an itinerant ministry, which has been followed in a measure almost unexampled by revivals of religion. In the South and South-west, and of late years in Texas, in daily preaching of the word, in journeyings oft, and in frequent perils on the frontiers of American civilization, he has found time to prepare this little book, which commends itself by easy simplicity, as well as by the weight of its reasoning, to the minds and hearts of the people. It is an excellent book for popular distribution.—We find, in the preface, the following words, which will not be without their effect upon the minds of at least the wide circle of his friends :

"I am now an old disciple ; my locks are silvery. Full three-score years have rolled over my head, and more than thirty-six years have I preached with some success, I hope, the glorious gospel of the blessed God. My sun of life must soon go down ; even now the shades of evening are lengthening around me. With

much love for my brethren who in the matter of baptism differ from me, (and yet with many of whom I have often taken sweet counsel, and gone to the house of God in company,) I now hand over to my family, to the church of God and the world at large, in this little book, my testimony in favour of doctrines and practices which I verily believe to be both scriptural and true; and all I request of the reader is, with a prayerful spirit to read, examine and compare; bringing everything to the test of God's blessed word, withal remembering, that as neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature, even so neither will water baptism, however administered, avail anything without the washing of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost."

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11. *The Old and New Schools: An Exhibit of the most Important differences in their Doctrines and Church Polity.* By Rev. N. L. RICE, D. D. *Second Edition.* Cincinnati: 1853: pp. 133, 16 mo.

The old school Presbyterian Church may thank God and take courage, when she sees how signally she has been prospered since the painful separations of 1837, '38. How she has disappointed the predictions of those who found in the new school all the active elements of progress, and who derided the old, as those who held that "their strength is to sit still." But while we have abode by the doctrines of the Apostles, the blessing of God has rested upon us, till we have lengthened our cords and enlarged our tent, far beyond the measure attained by those who departed from us.—Dr. Rice's little book points out the original differences existing between us on Imputation, Atonement, Justification, Regeneration, Ability, and on Voluntary and Ecclesiastical Boards, on the *ex-animò* adoption of our Standards, and the Plan of Union. The revival of these things, as matters of information, is timely. While we welcome, on their part, all true approaches to us, founded on a renunciation of those points of difference on which we separated, we should never lose sight of the fact, that these differences were real and important.

12. *Question Book on the Topics in the Assembly's Shorter Catechism, for Families, Sabbath-schools, Maternal Associations, and Pastor's Catechetical Classes.* By A. R. BAKER. Boston. Vols. I., II. & III. pp. 90, 108, 116 : 16 mo.

These little volumes, issued by Rev. A. R. Baker, Pastor of the Central Church, Lynn, Mass., are designed to lead children to a more correct understanding of the Assembly's Catechism. The method adopted is that of Socratic question and disputation, awakening the reasoning powers of children, and leading them to work out for themselves an explanation of the several answers in the Catechism, which we oblige them to commit to memory. We have tried the experiment successfully upon our own children, and we have no doubt that a skilful and ingenious parent or teacher, may be much aided by these volumes, in his catechetical exercises. We are especially glad to see our Congregational brethren returning to the time-honoured Catechism of the Westminster Assembly, and to hear of the revival of its too much neglected doctrines on their soil.

13. *The Translators Revived: A Biographical Memoir of the Authors of the English version of the Holy Bible.* By A. W. McCLURE. 250 pp., 12 mo. Charles Scribner, N. York: 1853.

About one-third of this volume is a narrative of the different English versions of the Bible; the remainder consists of the biographical sketches suggested in the title. Some of these are full and satisfactory; others extremely meagre, exciting deep regret that so few memorials should exist of men who were so highly valued in their own day. The work is timely,—appearing at a juncture when a flippant sectarianism undertakes to flout the learning of the most earnest and theological age England ever knew. Nothing will better rebuke the coxcombr of these sciolists than to measure their own learning with that of the men to whom this grave task of translating the Scriptures was committed in the 17th century.

14. *A Commentary on the Song of Solomon.* By the Rev. GEORGE BURROWES, Professor in LaFayette College, Easton, Pa. Philadelphia: William S. Martien: 1853: pp. 527: 12 mo.

We are glad to see a Commentary on "the Song of Songs,—which is Solomon's," free from the doubts and indelicacies which the unbelieving minds and prurient imaginations of so many critics and commentators have found in it. The obscenities of a Grotius are distant *toto cælo*, from the spiritual view taken of this book by Leighton, Pres'dt. Edwards, Rutherford and McCheyne. In proportion as men become spiritually-minded, are they able to enjoy the soul-ravishing views this book presents of Jesus and his love, under the mystic veil of allegory. The relation existing between the believer and the Object of his faith, and the intercourse passing between them, is illustrated in the Scriptures by the relation subsisting between husband and wife. We were cast forth in our pollution into the open field to die. Our Redeemer passed by, and it was the time of love. And so of the Redeemed Church, and each sanctified soul, is it true "her Maker is her husband, the Lord of Hosts is his name." The Church is "the bride, the wife of the Lamb." He rejoiceth over her "as the bride-groom rejoiceth over the bride." That "a man leave his father and mother, and be joined unto his wife, and they two be one flesh, is [represents] a great mystery," "concerning Christ and the Church." That the Song of Songs represents this mystery, the book before us attempts successfully to show, and will render more profitable and sweet to the soul, a portion of Scripture which may be abused by the unlicensed imagination to its own injury, but is full of delightful fruits to those to whom Jesus is precious. The whole commentary is enlivened by appropriate classical and oriental illustrations, which the reading of its author enables him abundantly to command.

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SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

NUMBER II.

OCTOBER, MDCCCLIII.

ARTICLE I.

THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND.

History of the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century.
Volume Fifth. By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D. D.

We have found the new volume of Dr. Merle to be even a more readable one than either of the preceding volumes. It contains some preliminary notices of the early British Church,—its “oriento-apostolical formation,”—its “national-papistical and royal-papistical corruption,”—the lingering of truth on the island of Iona,—the teaching of St. Patrick, of Columba, of Oswald, and of Aidan,—and the recognized equality of the office of Bishop and Presbyter, in those earlier and purer times, which will doubtless be new and refreshing to many of the thousands of readers which the volume will attract. This volume only comes down to the death of Cardinal Wolsey, in the year 1530. It will be apt to suggest to many of its readers, who have also been readers of the former volumes of the series, a comparison between the Reformation in England, and the Reformation in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Scotland. How was it that the results in England differed from the results in all other countries? We make use of the occasion of the appearance of this volume, when the subject will be in many minds, to present the solution of this question, as it appears to us, without confining our view to the small

period of the strictly reforming era which the volume covers.

Out of the glowing furnace of the Reformation, there came, generally speaking, one single unique stamp of personal character, and one single unique stamp of view and practice on the fundamental principles of Church government. This is a general, not a universal remark. There is apparently a very prominent exception in the Reformation in the Kingdom of England. It is an exception, not as to the stamp of the theological doctrine, nor as to the stamp of personal character, but as to the fundamental principles of church-government. A Calvinistic theology, was the universal theology of the Reformation. Intense activity, and yet a thorough dependence on God, was the universal type of personal character at the time of the Reformation. And the equality of the Christian clergy, in rank and order, was the universal principle of the Reformation,—Church-government, without any exception that we know of, save that which is to be found in the kingdom of England.

Now, if we will correctly conceive of the state of things as it was in the sixteenth century,—that the word of God had been long buried,—that it then had an extensive, if not general, resurrection,—that it struck upon the hearts and consciences of men with a sharpness, a novelty, a freshness of impression, unknown in Protestant Christendom in our day,—that there were then among Protestants, no such historical roots of bitterness as there are now, lying backward in the struggles and the principles of their ecclesiastical ancestry, among the heats and the quarrels of former times, as sources of perpetual division,—but that the spiritual men of that day were a company of new-born sons of the Spirit of God, contemporary brethren in Jesus Christ, *owning* obedience to his sovereign word, and *owing* it to nothing else,—we shall see that there was then the best chance which has occurred in the Church since the days of the Apostles, for “simple conviction,” for upright conscience and un-biassed judgment on the great matters of Christianity, about which men have been, ever since, so prone to differ and divide. The harmony of theological opinion among the children of God in England, and his children

elsewhere at that time, and the harmony of that noble personal character exhibited in England, with the noble spirits of other lands, towards all of whom the Christian reader's heart must go out in deep veneration and ardent affection, are things which may well set us to look into the circumstances of the English Reformation, to find the cause of the variation which did arise on the other subject of church-government. If there ever was a generation of uninspired men whose names deserve to have weight as authorities on party questions, it is the generation of the Reformers of the sixteenth century; from the absence of sinister motives, the freedom from traditional causes of quarrel, the freshness of the word of God to their minds, and the deep and faithful subjection with which they yielded themselves to the Divine guidance.

Looking at the Reformation from this point of view, we have an unbroken testimony to what has subsequently been called, from the name of the greatest thinker among them, a Calvinistic theology. In this sense of the word, Luther was a Calvinist,—Zuingli was a Calvinist,—Cranmer was a Calvinist,—Knox was a Calvinist;—Farel and Viret were Calvinists,—Melancthon and Gualtier were Calvinists,—Melville and Buchanan were Calvinists,—Hooper, Bradford, Jewel and Parker were Calvinists. The only alleged exception to the remark is old Father Latimer, a good man and a good preacher, of popular talents as an orator, but no great thinker;—the George Whitefield of that day,—of whom the most that can be said is, that he left a doubt upon the question whether he was a Calvinist or not,—which none of the other Reformers did.

Looking at the Reformation from this point of view, we also get an unbroken testimony to the great practical truth that the doctrine of the Divine Sovereignty is not the same thing as fatalism;—that it does not legitimately produce a lazy and indolent character, or an inactive life, or a guilty tempting of Providence by waiting for his sovereignty to accomplish its purposes without human agency and the diligent appliance of human instrumentalities. Luther trusted in God's sovereignty,—we may almost say that he *utterly* trusted in God,—yet, Luther was a diligent and incessant worker, an earnest employer

of all human means and appliances. So also did Calvin trust in God and work. So also did Zuingli trust and work. So did Knox. So did Cranmer. So did Hooper. And so did Jewel. So, indeed, have all men of any note, from the days of the Apostle Paul to the moment of the present writing, refuted the great calumny of fatalism brought against the doctrines of Grace, by the shining actions of their lives, speaking louder far, than by the professions of their tongues. Looking, for further example, at the lives of such men as Jonathan Edwards, and John Witherspoon, and George Whitefield, and Samuel Davies, men who were as much alike in the deep and earnest labour of their lives as they were in thorough trust in the sovereign power and purpose of God, and the charge against Calvinism of being the parent of an inert fanaticism is crisped and consumed as thoroughly as the other untruths of time and earth will be, by the searchings of the final day. There was no variation, either of sentiment or of practice, on this subject, worth speaking of, during the times of the Reformation.

The question very naturally arises, then, did the Word speak with a forked tongue on the other subject,—the subject of church-government and the kindred topics,—in the ears of the Reformers? In their honest investigations, and with their faithful consciences, how came they to be divided on this subject, any more than on the others? How did it happen that the Church of England parted company with the churches of other countries on the subject of church-government, as they came out of the furnace of the Reformation? Some investigation of that question is proposed in the present article; and a consequent vindication of the word of God, and the English Reformers, from the charges, respectively, of not having given, and not having received, impressions, homogeneous with those of reformation in other lands. If we shall be successful in this undertaking, we submit whether the result will not be one of the most signal of all proofs which the course of human events has furnished, in the flight of time, of the right which the sceptre of Jesus Christ (that is, his word,) possesses, to rule the opinions and to bind the consciences of men,—in the

fact that nations far apart, speaking different languages, of different national habits, starting under different circumstances, and with different traditions, yet all looking into the Eternal word, with unbiassed judgments and faithful hearts, drew from thence the same stamp of theological doctrine, the same type of practical character, and the same fundamental principles of church-government.

Three things came out of the Reformation in England which did not come out of it in other countries.

I. The ROYAL SUPREMACY; that is, the principle that the king or queen of England is the head of the Church of England.

II. The EPISCOPAL ORDER OF MINISTERS; that is, the principle that important power of government and discipline are exclusively vested in an upper and superior rank of Pastors, to whom other Pastors of the Church are subject and inferior in rank, order and office.

III. The LEGISLATIVE POWER ON EARTH; that is, the doctrine that the Church of Christ has the right to decree and enact rites and ceremonies for itself, which are not to be found in the word of God; and this doctrine so put into practice as to resolve itself into the other and still more flagrant doctrine that the *civil* legislature has the right to make such decrees and enactments for the Church of Christ.

These three things mainly distinguish the Reformation in England from the Reformation in other countries.

Our purpose is to show that the newly uttered voice of the word of God did not produce either of these peculiarities of the English Reformation;—that the Divine word really spoke to the Reformers in that kingdom on these points, with the same sound and voice with which it spoke to the other Reformers,—that it was actually heard and understood by them as it was by the others,—that the causes of the variations of that Church are to be looked for entirely apart from the consciences of the chief servants of Jesus Christ at the time,—that the testimony of the men of that time is, in fact, one, single, and simple, on *all* the points mentioned,—and that we have, indeed, as we might suppose we would have under the circumstances, the unanimous voice, the homoge-

neous views of all the men of that great era, in all countries, and with all their various antecedents, to certain great principles of faith and practice drawn from the word of the living God. And if ever that fond vision of many good, but enthusiastic, men of modern times,—the union of Protestant Christendom into one really pure and truly Catholic communion,—shall ever assume any shape of probability worth attention, it is hard to see a more eligible basis of such union than is to be found in the general consent of those wise and holy men, the Reformers of the sixteenth century.

It is obvious that we must distinguish, at the outset, between the will of the Reformers, and the Acts of Church construction; between what those men would have done who consulted the word of God, and put themselves under its guidance, and what those men did do who set up the English Church; between what the judgments and consciences of the spiritual men dictated, and what the civil authorities decreed and established in the Church.

I. The ROYAL SUPREMACY, which was established in the English Church at the time of the Reformation, and continues in it to this day, being at once a great ecclesiastical blunder, and a great hindrance to the correction of ecclesiastical blunders, comes first to be looked at.

It was about the year 1521, the year on which Luther was arraigned at the great diet of Worms, that king Henry VIII. of England, being a very zealous Papist, and a special admirer of the angelical doctor and eagle of divines, Thomas Aquinas, hearing that Dr. Luther was exciting a great ferment in Germany, and that, among other strange things, the heretical Doctor was hotly assailing his favourite Aquinas, wrote, with his own Royal hand, a book against Martin Luther, entitled "The Seven Sacraments," sent an elegantly bound copy of that book to Pope Leo X., as a proof of his Royal zeal for holy mother Church, and in reward for the zeal and the book, and, in compliment to his right Royal and orthodox wisdom, received from Pope Leo that title of DEFENDER OF THE FAITH, which his successors on the great heretical throne of Europe have ever since proudly worn.

But about the year 1527, there appeared, for the second time, among the maids of honour of queen Catharine, a young woman of remarkable beauty, who had been, for five or six years previously to that time, receiving her education and accomplishments in the city of Paris, and in the retinue of queen Claude of France. She was the daughter of Sir Thomas Boleyn, afterwards Earl of Wiltshire, grand daughter of the Duke of Norfolk, and great grand daughter of the Earl of Ormond, and of Sir Geoffry Boleyn, Lord Mayor of London. She had been a short while at the English Court, five years before this time, and had then been contracted in marriage to young Percy, son of the Earl of Northumberland; but Wolsey, in whose train Percy was then a follower, broke off the engagement; and as Percy was very soon married to Mary Talbot, Anne did not find England a pleasant place, and returned again to the French court. By all accounts, queen Catharine was one of the most charming women of her day. She had been the wife of the short-lived Prince Arthur. Henry had been married to her for eighteen years. But with the young and beautiful Anne Boleyn, who was to be the mother of a great queen, and of a great revolution, he now fell very suddenly and very violently in love. It is a question which has never yet been settled, to the satisfaction of observing minds, acquainted with royal human nature, whether king Henry VIII. had already begun to have scruples about the lawfulness of his marriage with his brother's widow before the year 1527, or whether those scruples did not originate exactly cotemporaneously with the appearance at the English court, of Anne Boleyn, the the great aristocratic beauty, with the bright eyes, and the Parisian accomplishments. If we are to believe the word of the proud, jealous and uxorious Defender of the Faith, and author of the "Seven Sacraments" himself, some scruples had arisen in his mind before this time. But if we credit the sternest probabilities, especially those drawn from what he afterwards proved himself to be, then we cannot quite give implicit credence to the Defender of the Faith on that point. At least we must allow, that though his scruples about the lawfulness of his marriage with his brother's widow had previously

grown very slowly, and been very manageable, through a wedded life of eighteen years, that they now grew very rapidly, in the sight of the sweet face, and the bright eyes, and the Parisian accomplishments of the aristocratic beauty, and came quickly to maturity in a few months.

In the year 1528, on application of the Defender of the Faith, the Pope sent Cardinal Campeggio into England, there to be joined in commission with Cardinal Wolsey, as legates of the Holy See, to try the cause of the king's divorce from Catharine of Arragon. But Catharine of Arragon was the aunt of the great emperor Charles V., and was therefore strongly befriended in Europe; and so the Pope directed Campeggio to avoid an issue of the cause, and to seek delay above all things; and finally, after long temporizing, recalled Cardinal Campeggio from England. During the sluggish length of time, when the king of England was knocking as a suppliant at the door of the Pope of Rome, the Royal Tudor was heard occasionally to drop threats which might have alarmed any other Pope than one who had the terrible fear of Charles V. before his eyes: that "he would do what he wished *of his own authority.*"—"We must prosecute the affair in *England.*" "No other than God shall take her (Anne Boleyn,) from me." If I am not allowed to have my way in that affair, then England shall no longer remain a Popish country." But the Pope could not bring himself to believe that there was danger of the Defender of the Faith himself turning heretic; and so, to please Charles V., he issued an avocation of the cause of the divorce to the pontifical court, and cited Henry and Catharine to appear in person or by proxy at Rome, that the cause might be tried. This was a great blunder of the Pope of Rome, for Henry VIII. had already begun to dislike the idea of a head of the English Church, or of any thing else English having to be sought for out of England, or, indeed, out of the doublet and hose of the Royal Tudor himself.

In the month of July, 1529, king Henry, wearied and fretted with the unending trickery and manœuvring of the court of Rome, rode out of London for a summer airing in the country, attended by Gardiner, afterwards

Bishop of Winchester, and Fox, afterwards Bishop of Hereford; and when he stopped for the night, these two courtiers were quartered with a Mr. Cressy, at Waltham Abbey. This Mr. Cressy had two sons of an age to be getting an education, and so there was a young scholar from Cambridge, a relative of the family, domiciliated in Mr. Cressy's house at the time, as tutor to his two sons. This young Cambridge man had been diligently studying the newly printed Scriptures, like Tyndale, and Frith, and Barnes, and Stafford, and Bilney, and Latimer. He was to return to the University. He was only absent from there now on account of a severe sickness prevailing about Cambridge. He was always a rather timid man—this Doctor Cranmer. Fox, Gardiner, and Cranmer, sat together to supper at Mr. Cressy's hospitable board, and the conversation turned upon the king's divorce, the all-absorbing subject in England at that time. On being politely asked his opinion, Mr. Cranmer replied that he saw no end to the Papal negotiations touching that matter,—that the real question was, what does the word of God say about it,—and he did not see why that question could not be solved as well by the learned men of the English Universities, as by the Pope and his counsellors. When the two courtiers re-joined the king, they of course at once reported to him the novel suggestion of the Cambridge man; and the king instantly cried out, in the true Tudor dialect: "Where is this Dr. Cranmer, for I perceive that he has the right sow by the ear." Dr. Cranmer had made his fortune by this suggestion. He was immediately sent for to London, located in the house of the Earl of Wiltshire, the father of the fair Helen, and directed to write out his opinion concerning the divorce. Then came the sudden fall from his dizzy height, of that once great son of fortune Cardinal Wolsey, who

"At last with easy roads did come to Leicester,
Lodged in the abbey, where the reverend Abbot,
With all his convent, honourably received him;
To whom he gave these words: O, Father Abbot,
An old man, broken with the storms of State,
Is come to lay his weary bones among ye.
Give him a little earth for charity!
So went to bed."

Dr. Thomas Cranmer now became the king's favourite adviser, instead of Wolsey; and not long afterwards was made Archbishop of Canterbury, and Primate of all England.

Now, let us mark the course of events, and what point of reform it is which they signify. In the year 1530, a royal proclamation was issued, forbidding the introduction into, or publication in England, of any bull from Rome, under pain of the royal displeasure, and of legal penalties. In the year 1531, the clergy of England were indicted in a body, in the Court of King's Bench, for having acknowledged the legantine authority of Wolsey in the affair of the divorce. In the year 1532, an act of Parliament was passed, abolishing the payment of annates, or first fruits to Rome. In the year 1533, Henry VIII. and Anne Boleyn were married at Whitehall, and Cranmer was made Archbishop of Canterbury.—In 1533-'4, acts of Parliament were passed, declaring it to be no heresy to speak against the Bishop of Rome, otherwise called the Pope; and that the Clergy of England should hereafter be subject to the King's majesty, and not the Pope;—that there should be no appeal taken, thereafter, from England to Rome, under penalty of a *præmunire*;—that Bishops and Archbishops should be elected under the king's letters patent, and not presented by the Pope, as formerly,—and that Peter's-pence, and all other taxes hitherto paid to Rome, should be abolished. In the session of Nov. 1534, the king was confirmed, by the advice of Thomas Cromwell, in the office and title of Supreme Head of the Church of England on earth, with the sole right to reform and correct all heresies by his own authority,—and the first fruits, and also a yearly tenth of all spiritual livings, were made over to the crown.

This is the first chapter of the English Reformation, so far as it consists of those acts of public authority by which the Church was constructed. It is very plain that it was of the earth earthy,—almost simply and only, a revolt from a Pope at Rome to a Pope in England,—from a priest pope to a king pope,—from a pope who might not have any lawful wife at all, to a pope who would have for wife whom he would have for wife. It is equally plain

that the doctrine of the king's supremacy in ecclesiastical matters, originated with the king and the parliament and from the quarrel with Rome, and the supposed exigencies of the times, and not from the word of God.

It is true that the under-current of a spiritual reformation had begun to flow in England, by means of Erasmus's Greek Testament, and Tyndale's English Bible, and the teachings and expositions of Bilney, and Frith, and Stafford, and Latimer. But this true reforming work of the Divine word and of the Divine Spirit, had very little to do with those who were working out the English visible Church. The two movements were totally different things. They met only in Cranmer, and in some of the laymen of the House of Commons.—In the Session of Parliament of Nov. 1530, acts of Parliament were passed, leveled at the exactions of the Clergy, for the probate of wills, mortuaries, non-residences, and for their practice of being farmers of lands. But it was with the laymen in the House of Commons, who were believed to favour Luther's doctrine in their hearts, that these bills originated. They were strenuously opposed by the spiritual peers in the House of Lords, and as strenuously advocated by the temporal peers; and the king gave them his royal assent, much as a traveller in the east threshes his valet, to *strike terror* into the Pope, by letting him see what the Royal Tudor could do, if the Royal Tudor should be driven to extremities. They were as strenuously opposed by the Clergy out of Parliament, as they had been by the Clergy in Parliament.*

It was fourteen or fifteen years after this time before any change was made in the Romish Common Prayer Book of the kingdom of England. The king retained his papist convictions concerning other matters of religion besides the supremacy. And we have the authority of Bishop Short, in his History of the Church of England,—his own Church,—for asserting that that Church could not be called a Protestant Church at all, under Henry VIII., in any other respect than that the king was the head of it, and not the Pope. In fact, the Church of England, visibly considered, received its stamp much

* Burnet's Hist. Ref., vol. i., p. 134.

more from the Royal mind, than from the word of God, through the whole four reigns of the Reformation period. Henry VIII. was an English Roman-Catholic, and so the Church of England was an English Roman-Catholic church, under Henry VIII. Edward VI. was a strong Protestant in inclination, and so the Church of England inclined strongly to Protestantism under Edward VI. Bloody Mary was thoroughly popish and Romish, and so was the vast mass of the Church of England in her day. Elizabeth was half popish and half Protestant in heart, with the strong necessity, from her political position, of taking the Protestant side, and such also was the English Church under Elizabeth. In fact, if queen Elizabeth had not been the daughter of that Anne Boleyn, to find the way to whose arms the king of England had quarrelled with the Pope of Rome, so that both the splendours of the throne and the honours of legitimate birth, conspired with whatever of filial affection she possessed, to throw her upon the English side of that dispute, there is not wanting some good ground to think, that, at one time during her reign, she was willing to make the same sort of return to Rome that her sister Mary made before her.

The student may find at length in Burnet, (vol. i., p. 229 and 230,) the arguments by which the supremacy of the king was attempted to be justified at the time when it was established; where he will be amused to find no distinction made between the king's civil supremacy over the ecclesiastics, and his ecclesiastical supremacy over them;—a total confusion of the rightful authority of the king over them in civil cases, when they are regarded as citizens of the country, with the king's authority over them in spiritual matters, when they are regarded as members of the Church of Jesus Christ.—One of the grossest abuses of Rome had been to deny that churchmen could be punished by the civil authorities of England, even for the most aggravated offences against social good order and public morals. The arguments for the royal supremacy do fairly meet that assumption; and fully refute that monstrous piece of popish arrogance. They are totally irrelevant and impertinent to prove that the king, or any one else, is, or

can be the head of Christ's Church on earth, in spiritual matters, and considered as a Church,—that great point of spiritual freedom, which the Church of Scotland has, in all ages, shown so much true valour, and won so much true spiritual glory in vindicating. Nor are Rome and Scotland to be placed side by side, in the same condemnation, with any truth or justice, as was sometimes done by the tame and sorry Erastianism of the *Via Media*, so called. Had Rome asserted that the word of God was of higher authority in matters ecclesiastical than the Parliament of England—as Scotland asserts,—then Rome would have been right, as Scotland is right.—Rome claimed exemption from the civil laws for the crimes and violence and outlawry of her hordes of shaven myrmidons, as well as their religious independence. Scotland claims freedom from the laws of man for the consciences of her Christian men, in purely spiritual matters, and under the guidance of the Divine word, and the administration of her own constitutional religious tribunals.

The lower House of Convocation in England passed the act of supremacy with a bad grace, and put in a proviso: *quantum per Christi legem licet*,—as much as may be by the law of Christ. And if the authority of Le Bas—a flaming Episcopalian—is to be taken, then that cowardly good man, the reforming Archbishop Cranmer himself, in a speech on the subject of a general council, delivered in the House of Lords in the year 1535, when Scriptural opinions had been making much progress in his mind, distinctly asserted and maintained that Christ had left no head of the Church on earth.*—The doctrine of the king's supremacy over the Church, sprang from the king's divorce. It never did spring from the word of God. It was never nurtured by the word of God. It never will or can be. The doctrine appears, indeed, in a very mitigated form, in the 37th of the Articles, which were framed in the year 1562, after the translated Bible had begun to teach the people of England spiritual truth. In fine, it is sufficient to make good the position that the royal supremacy grew

* Le Bas's Cranmer, vol. i., p. 88.

not from the word of God, to quote the admission of this point of Richard Hooker himself,—one of the ablest advocates with the pen that any church polity ever had, and withal a most thorough-going partizan of the Church of England,—when he says: “As for supreme power in ecclesiastical affairs, the word of God doth no where appoint that all kings should have it, neither that any should not have it; for which cause it seemeth to stand altogether by human right, that unto Christian kings there is such dominion given.”* The royal supremacy, therefore, never could have been established by men putting themselves solely under the guidance of the Divine word. The other churches of the Reformation required a positive warrant from Scripture for what they set up, either in their polity or their worship; but the Church of England adopted the very different principle that silence gives consent; that they might do whatever was not contrary to the word of God. On the same principle, they might have introduced, as parts of church-government or divine worship, a voyage with Gulliver to Lilliput, or a slumber with Endymion in the Grecian woods, or an aeronautic expedition to the moon, or any thing else about which the Scriptures are totally silent, and which they cannot therefore be said to forbid.

II. We come now to consider the SECOND VARIATION of the Reformation in England from the Reformation in other countries, namely, *the Episcopal order of Ministers*; or the principle that important powers of government and discipline are exclusively vested in an upper and superior rank of pastors, to whom other pastors of the church are subject and inferior in rank and order.

The republican tendency of a church-government by synods of clergy of equal rank, mingled with the representatives of the people, is admitted by every writer and thinker of any account on such subjects in modern times. It is admitted by David Hume, (*Hist. Eng.*, Harper's edition, vol. iv., pp. 141, 385 and 572,)—an authority utterly worthless, indeed, on any religious question, except where he praises, contrary to his own prejudices, as in this case;—by Sir James McIntosh, (*Hist. Eng.*,

* *Ecc. Pol.*, Book viii., chap. 2, sec. 5.

vol. ii., p. 126,) a much higher and purer authority;—by Macaulay, (*Hist. Eng.*, vol. ii. p. 13, and many other places.) It is constantly admitted, charged, and insisted on, in that work of great research, and of a very impartial bitterness towards all religion, the *Pictorial History of England*, recently published under the auspices of the Society for the diffusion of useful knowledge, (*Book vii.*, chap. 2, pp. 461-464 et passim.) It is admitted by Edmund Burke, (*Policy of the Allies*, *Wk.* vol. ii., p. 130,)—by bishop Short, in his *History of the Church of England*, p. 223,—by Sir Walter Scott himself, (*Old Mortality*, p. 7,) who is probably the worst enemy to republican liberty, and to spiritual religion of modern times, because he is the most thoroughly prejudiced, the least fair, but the most specious, the most tinselled with a coat of affected and almost canting liberality, over a heart of the cruellest hatred to some of the noblest of his country's dead, and the most gifted and influential of modern romancers. The same thing was vociferated by king James I., at the Hampton Court Conference, in his famous saying: "No bishop no king." And the same view of church-government is well known to have been entertained by an English civilian of far higher and nobler name than even the high and noble names of Burke, MacIntosh and Macaulay,—the highest and noblest name, indeed, in all the manifold lustre of the British annals,—JOHN HAMPDEN, who declared when dying, and dying on a battle-field fought for republican liberty in Church and State, that though he thought the doctrines of the Church of England, in greater part, conformable to the word of God, yet he "could not away with (tolerate) the governance of the Church by bishops."—*Picto. Hist. Eng.*, *Book 6, chap. 1.*

Now, it is very easy to see why such a church-government should not have been adopted, scriptural or unscriptural, in England, in the sixteenth century, under the sceptres of Tudors, and those sceptres invested with supremacy in affairs ecclesiastical. A Tudor king, and his daughter, a Tudor queen, the two most despotic monarchs of England since William the Conqueror, with servile parliaments at their heels, amid the sunset rays of mediæval Europe, in a kingdom having an aristocratic

rank in the civil state, set to work to make a church to suit their own tastes, to fit in beneath the throne, and to correspond with the civil state, and finding an aristocratic order of preachers, Lord Bishops, ready made to their hand in the Roman Catholic Church, where it had naturally grown up, amid the monarchical and feudal institutions of the middle ages, they simply permit it to remain untouched in their English establishment. It was not even intended to throw out the Roman incumbents of the bishopricks, if they would take the oath of the Royal supremacy. Many of them did so, with a ready facility. We actually find such a wretch as Bishop Bonner, taking the oath of supremacy, and taking out a new commission for his bishoprick, from Henry VIII!—And of Kitchen, of Llandaff,—a very prominent Dugald Dalgetty of the English Reformation,—it was remarked that he always believed according to the last act of parliament;—English Catholic under Henry VIII,—Protestant under Edward VI.,—Papist under bloody Mary,—Semi-Protestant under Elizabeth, he kept *his place* through all the changes, and died bishop of Llandaff, in the sixth year of Elizabeth!

But where were the truly spiritual men of England on this subject all this time? Did the work of God speak a language to them on this point different from what it spoke to the other renewed souls of the Reformation?—Let us see. Columba, upholding the early Christianity on the island of Iona, had taught that “Bishops and presbyters are equal.”—*D’Aubigne*, vol. v., p. 27. John Wickliffe, in another day and time, drew his reforming doctrines simply from the living word of God; and John Wickliffe declared it to be his opinion, that by the institution of Christ, “priests and bishops were all one.”—*LeBas’s Wickliffe*, p. 300. In the latter part of the reign of Henry VIII., the more spiritually-minded bishops published a book, entitled “The Institution of a Christian Man,” designed for the instruction of the people, in which it is declared that bishops and priests are the same order, and that diocesans are of human appointment.—*Short*, p 83. A revised and enlarged edition of this work was published soon afterwards, with a somewhat different title, but it contained the same state-

ment on this subject.—*Burnet* I., 586. There was a celebrated brief confession, which *Burnet* says that he had seen, (I., 585,) signed by Cromwell and the two Archbishops, by eleven Bishops, and twenty divines and canonists, containing the same declaration that bishops and priests are the same order. *Cranmer's* opinion to the same effect is admitted by *Bishop Short*, and might be very easily proven if it were not. In a celebrated sermon delivered in the year 1588, on a public occasion, *Dr. Bancroft* undertook to maintain, for the first time, so far as is known, from the mouth of a spiritual man in Protestant England, that bishops were of a different order by divine right from ordinary pastors;—but this was too good news to *Archbishop Whitgift* to be at once received, and that prelate remarked that he “rather wished than believed it to be true.” It did not so well please others of the clergy and laity; and *Dr. Raignolds*, Professor of Divinity in Oxford, came out with strictures upon it as follows: “All that have laboured in reforming the Church for five hundred years past, have taught that all pastors, be they entitled bishops or priests, have equal authority and power by God’s word; as first the Waldenses, next *Marsilius Petavinus*, then *Wickliffe* and his disciples; afterwards *Huss* and the *Hussites*; and last of all *Luther*, *Calvin*, *Brentius*, *Bullinger*, and *Musculus*. Among ourselves, we have Bishops, the queen’s Professors of Divinity, and other learned men, as *Bradford*, *Lambert*, *Jewel*, *Pilkington*, *Humphreys* and *Fulke*, who all agree in this matter; and so do all Divines beyond sea that I ever read, and doubtless many more whom I never read. But why do I speak of particular persons? It is the common judgment of the Reformed Churches of *Helvetia*, *Savoy*, *France*, *Scotland*, *Germany*, *Hungary*, *Poland*, the low countries and *our own*.” So speaks an Oxford Professor of Divinity, about the year 1588, in the thirtieth year of the reign of queen *Elizabeth*. And he settles the question, as to the views of the spiritual of his own, and other countries, and this vexed point of church-government. Among others, he sweeps away, in his full train, the supposed great Anglican champion, *Bishop Jewel*. But we will not delay on this point; as it is a subject usually attended by much

more of warmth than of doubt,—of doubt, there is just none at all;—of warmth, yet much: On this subject the word of God made no different impression on spiritual minds in England from what it made on such minds in other lands.

Two parties were speedily formed in the Church of England, as might have been expected; the one the party of Court Divines, who took their impulses from the civil authorities, and consequently were stout upholders of what the Royal will had set up;—the other party was the party of the Puritans, who insisted on further reformation, in obedience to the word of God; and they were unquestionably, as a general remark, the men who, of all their generation, imbibed most deeply the love of the word of God. These two parties grappled in dire conflict for a round hundred years from this sermon of Dr. Bancroft. Star-Chamber and High-Commission were swept away, as the small devourings of the coming power. The head of king and prelate rolled in the dust. Throne and Cathedral vanished like the baseless fabric of a vision. The whole moral world trembled with the power of the rising spirit, even as a fig-tree casteth her untimely figs when she is shaken of a mighty wind. It is true that hypocrites from elsewhere crept in, and put on puritanism as a cloak, and thereby defiled the good name of that sacred cause; just as baseness and hypocrisy are often seen to render a very solemn homage to truth and righteousness by borrowing some of the most awful of their robes. Yet still, out of that mighty struggle for freedom and purity in Church and State, blessings have descended to the Anglo-Saxon race,—the dominant race of the modern world,—for which that race will never cease, while they are free and sane and wise, to give thanks to Almighty God, and under God, to the Hampdens, Cromwells, and Vanes, puritan, covenanter, republican, and all the circle of strong men, who stood up for truth and freedom in those grand old days. Out of the furnace of the Reformation in England, came just what came from it in other lands, on the subject of the Christian ministry. The word of God spoke with no forked tongue on this subject, any where, to spiritually-minded men.

III. The third and last variation of the Church of England which we have to consider, is its *claim of legislative power on earth*: that is, that the Church has a right to establish rites and ceremonies not found in the word of God; and this doctrine so put into practice as to resolve itself into the other and more errant doctrine still, that the *civil legislature* has the right to make these decrees for the Church of Christ.

The first clause of the twentieth Article of the Church of England, which asserts that "the Church hath power to decree rites and ceremonies, and authority in controversies of Faith,"—is a piece of palpable Romanism. It certainly was not to be found in the original draft of the Articles, as signed by the Bishops and Archbishops, in 1562,—but it is said to have been added to the Article by the right of the Royal supremacy, and, indeed, by the very hand of Elizabeth. It is hardly necessary to waste time to show, what is to be met with in all books on the subject worth reading, that the taste of Elizabeth ran very strongly in favour of a gaudy, and splendid, and striking religious service; and that she followed her own taste, without much reference to the question whether such things as she desired to have set up had any Scripture warrant or not. In fact, she had about as strong a taste as any character known in history for gay and gaudy sights of every kind;—that fond passion for pictures, painted, carved or acted, which is the characteristic of the immature years of the life either of an individual or a nation,—in reference to which, the reader of Scott's Romance of Kenilworth will see what excessive pomps the great favourite, the Earl of Leicester, employed to please his royal mistress,—and which peculiarity of taste made her the most fitting mother of a religion of pomp, and show, and of the holiness of dress and attitude, that has been seen in a Protestant church in any age. The silence of Scripture was made to serve as good a purpose as the warrant of Scripture. In the third Book of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, the student may find a bold and frank and manly defence of the right which that very zealous partizan, and very able man, thought the Church possessed to establish rites and ceremonies for herself, without warrant of Scripture. The necessities of

Elizabeth's position made her a Protestant. She was the daughter of Anne Boleyn, of the divorce, and of her father's quarrel with the Pope. So she gave effective aid to the Reformation in Scotland. She championed Protestantism in Europe almost as gallantly as Oliver Cromwell and William of Nassau did after her. But at the same time, she kept enough of popery in the chapel in which she personally worshipped; she never did become reconciled to the marriage of the clergy; and was as imperious as Henry VIII., or William the Conqueror himself. She once issued an ecclesiastical mandate to Cox of Ely, which that prelate hesitated to obey,—and she sent him a short note thus: "Proud prelate, you know what you were, before I made you what you are; if you do not immediately comply with my request, by G—d, I will unfrock you." We tremble to indicate by consonants the awful oath which was customary in the mouth of the Head of the English Church. If this "good queen Bess" were now alive, she would be apt to be thought the queen of Viragoes, without a particle of what Protestants call religion, very little of what ladies call refinement, and about as little of regard for the word of God as either.

The protest of the word of God against the garments and the pomps of the English Reformation, had already commenced before "good queen Bess" came to the throne. It was as early as the year 1550, during the brief reign of Edward VI., that Dr. John Hooper, one of the ablest and most evangelical men of that day, on being elected to the see of Gloucester, refused for a long time to take upon him "the feathers of the mass"—as he called the vestments and ceremonies of consecration. Much has been written about this man's (so-called) obstinacy, in scrupling to submit to things admitted to be indifferent. But such arguments prove, with treble force, the usurping guilt of the tribunals, in changing the nature of things indifferent into things indispensable;—and Hooper himself, spoke in true prophetic strain on the subject, when he said: "*if these things are kept in the Church as indifferent things, at length they will be maintained as necessary things.*" The political authorities thought it very strange that Hooper should plead con-

science about things indifferent; while Hooper's position was that of the Scriptures; and what he scrupled was the change of things indifferent into things necessary. Hooper, with better reason, thought it strange that the civil authorities should admit such things to be *indifferent*, and yet so pertinaciously insist upon them. After years, which are the best witnesses, have shown that Hooper was right, and that such things do come to be maintained with more tenacity, when once brought in, than far more important things about which Scripture is not silent. With Hooper agreed the no less famous and excellent Bishop Jewel: "They tell us" says he, "of a golden mediocrity, I wish it may not prove a leaden one." "They hoped" he says again, "to strike the eyes of the people with those ridiculous trifles. These are the relics of the Amorites: that cannot be denied." He wishes that, at some time or other, all these things may be "taken away and extirpated to the very deepest roots."—*Burnet*, iii., 434. Pilkington, Bishop of Durham, was of the same mind. You can almost hear him groan, when in writing to Gualtier of Zurich, he says: "I confess we suffer many things against our hearts, groaning under them. We cannot take them away, though we were ever so much set on it. We are under authority, and can innovate nothing without the queen; nor can we alter the laws. The only thing left to our choice is, whether we will bear these things, or break the peace of the Church."—*Burnet*, iii., 475. Jewel even went so far as to say that "in the days of queen Mary, Christ was kept out by his enemies, but in the days of queen Elizabeth, he was kept out by his friends." *Life*, p. 12. We love and honour these faithful men the more, when Burnet tells us (vol. iii., p. 476,) that they themselves acknowledged that it were better for the Church that these ceremonies were laid aside: and affirmed that they (the bishops,) "had often moved in Parliament that they might be taken away, that so the Church might be more pure and less burdened." This entirely unexceptionable testimony of Gilbert Burnet, Lord Bishop of Salisbury, would of itself suffice for our present purpose, to vindicate the pious men of the English Reformation. But there is much more to the same

- purpose. The English Church very narrowly escaped a reformation on this point, and a paring down to something like the Puritan model, at the hands even of a convocation, in the year 1562, when forty-three of the members present voted for such a reformation, and thirty-five against it; but when the proxies were called for and counted, the vote was said to stand, fifty-eight for, and fifty-nine against reformation.—*Burnet*, iii., 455.

Then came the teachings of Thomas Cartwright, Professor of Divinity at Cambridge; boldly and ably advocating simplicity in worship, until he was deprived of his office by Cecil, the minister of queen Elizabeth, in the year 1570.

In 1579, Mr. Strickland moved, in Parliament, for a further reformation of the Church, boldly asserting that some superstitious remains of Popery might be removed without danger to religion. But her majesty the queen took this movement of Mr. Strickland's in such high dudgeon, that she sent for him into the council, and there severely reprimanded him, and forbade his future attendance in Parliament,—in which purpose she would, in all probability, have persisted, but that the Commons, growing stout, and assuming for a time the tone of freemen, took fire at this invasion of privilege; and then, by one of those tricks of policy by which she always yielded when there was real danger, she very gracefully and graciously set Mr. Strickland at liberty.

In 1582, the House of Commons, getting pretty full of pious men, resolved to go to the Temple church, to open its session with religious worship, and prayer for the Divine guidance on their deliberations. This event warms our hearts, as a type, through which we can see, at some distance yet, the approaching era of 1643. The queen heard of it, and sent her vice-chamberlain to express her surprise to the Commons, that they should make such an innovation as to hear preaching, and pray together, without "her privy and pleasure first made known unto them." The faithful Commons humbly acknowledged their great fault, and humbly craved her gracious majesty's forgiveness.—*Pic. Hist. Eng.* The time was not yet come. 1581 could not be 1643. Not a Stuart, but a Tudor, was on the throne. John Pym was not to

be born for yet three years. John Hampden's life was thirteen years in the future. Oliver Cromwell would not be born for eighteen years;—nor Sir Harry Vane, the younger, for twenty-seven years. The time was not come.

So, then, this variation of the English Reformation,—its decreeing rites and ceremonies for itself without warrant from God's word, does not lie at the door of the spiritual men, any more than do the other variations.—They would gladly have complied with the word of God on this point, but were not at liberty to do so. The Divine word spoke with no forked tongue on any of the subjects which have been named; it spoke in the same accents, and was heard with homogeneous impressions, as a general remark, by men every where, at the great forming era of the Reformation. Every where there came out of the furnace of the Reformation, more or less clearly developed in the minds of spiritual men, that doctrine which is the very corner-stone of religious freedom, that Christ alone is Head of the Church,—that other doctrine dreaded as the hammer of despotism every where, that all Pastors are of equal rank and authority under Him,—and that other doctrine still, which guards the purity of his prerogative that He alone is Law-giver in Zion, and is to be worshipped as is prescribed in his own word.

We have already seen how universally a Calvinistic stamp of doctrine came out of the Reformation; and how as universally, no man then waited for the Divine sovereignty to accomplish its purposes without the use of means, and the diligent appliance of all human instrumentalities.

And if the present attempt has been successful, then we have the authority, on *all the points* mentioned, of the most favourable period of time since the days of the Apostles, for "simple conviction" and unbiassed judgment. We have the unanimous voice, the homogeneous testimony of all the men of that remarkable era, in all countries, under all circumstances, and with all their various antecedents and traditionary influences. We submit whether this result does not furnish one of the most signal of all the proofs which human events have

any where exhibited, in all the flight of time, of the right which the sceptre of Jesus Christ (which is his word,) possesses, to rule the opinions, and to bind the consciences, of men.

In our humble sphere, it has long seemed to us that such a vindication as is faintly shadowed forth in the foregoing pages, was due to the spiritual men of the English Reformation, that we might see how thoroughly one in spirit were all the principal men among the newborn sons of God at that great era; and that we might still deeply cherish the memory of the noble-spirited children of God in that nation, at that time, even when we are compelled to feel so little of real respect for the Reformation as it went on in divorces, royal edicts, acts of parliament, star-chamber sentences, and high-commission fines and imprisonments. No better or purer specimens of individual piety were exhibited in any country, than in England, at the time of the Reformation.— There are no purer or holier names on the modern rolls of spiritual honour, than the names of Bilney, Tyndale, Stafford, Latimer, Hooper, Bradford, Ridley, Jewel and Cartwright. There are no more refreshing records of deep faith and holiness, in the whole of modern religious annals, than those which contain the personal history of the English Reformers, when the word of God first beamed upon their minds, and the Spirit from on high was first poured upon their hearts. They are not the ecclesiastical ancestors of such men as Sand and Sacheverel and Pusey. We see them stand deservedly at the head of those rolls whereon are inscribed, lower down, the clear and venerable names of Owen, Baxter, Howe, Bates, Charnock, Flavel, Alleine and Bunyan. They are ours. We will not give them up.

ARTICLE II.

ACTION AND RE-ACTION OF MIND AND BODY AS AFFECTING
INSANITY.

“Sana mens, in sano corpore,” is the embodiment of that condition denominated health: and every deviation on the part of either body or mind, is attended with a corresponding change of the other.

The manifestation of mind being dependent on the brain, it is to this medium of communication, little as we know of its nature, that we must look for an explanation of the influence of the physical on the mental organization.

And, since the brain is the source of that supply, which is requisite to a proper discharge of the functions of the different organs, we can readily conceive how this “*sine qua non*” of human existence may be modified by the conditions of the mind.

But as to what portions of the cranial contents we are to assign the various psychical operations of man, very little is satisfactorily determined. The brain, however, is considered as the sole instrument of intelligence, and the cineritious envelop or cortical portion of the cerebral hemispheres, has been fixed upon, by the most eminent investigators of this subject, as the immediate source of the intellectual faculties. The other class of phenomena, with which our inquiry is concerned, seeming less rational, have, by some, been denied a resting place in this upper chamber. Ranking them with the functions of the organic nervous system, one set of writers have chosen the epigastric centre for their emanation. Being considered, by an other, of a reflex character, the spinal cord has been looked to as their origin. And by Carpenter, an author of more recent date, a new division of the nervous system has been proposed for the special location of the emotions and passions. This distinguished physiologist, thinking them similar to the instincts of animals, supposes “we may reasonably localize the centre in that chain of ganglionic masses, which only occu-

pies the centre of the base of the brain in man, but which, in the lower vertebrata, possesses an aggregate dimension far exceeding that of the cerebral hemispheres."

While Carpenter considers their channel alike distinct from that of the voluntary movements, and from that of reflex operations, (in which category they are placed by Marshall Hall,) he avoids the dangerous deductions into which Bichat and Broussais were led, by their speculations on this subject.

The extremes to which the inquiries on this subject have led, should make us guarded in localizing the mental faculties.

As to the dependence of the mind upon the physical organization, in the sense which Gall and Spurzheim have undertaken to demonstrate, I would say, once for all, that it is not concerned in the present investigation. Neither is it necessary, that we should attempt to fathom the abstruse nature of the soul; and I accordingly leave this matter to Divine revelation. But it is our privilege and our duty, to examine into those elements of our constitution, which are available to our scrutiny: and while a knowledge of the intimate relationship of body and mind, renders us more competent to administer a balm to their disturbances, it cannot fail to increase our veneration for that Being, by whom man is so strangely and yet so completely made.

Without any vain speculation concerning the epigastric centre, the pineal gland, or any other part of the corporeal fabric, we may safely regard the brain as the instrument of the mind: and with the nervous system setting out from the base of the brain, and extending its ramifications to the most remote, as well as neighbouring organs, we have an electro-telegraphic communication of the metropolis with all its dependencies.

Of the real essence of mind, our senses are unable to judge; but the phenomena which indicate its activity are numerous, and of great variety. By observing these, a distinction is recognised between the purely intellectual faculties, and others, modified by the temperament of the individual, constituting the emotions and passions.

For wise purposes, the exercise of the intellectual fa-

culties affects the physical organism much less than the emotional class. The latter are more immediately concerned in the wants, and for the preservation of the species; and hence we find them in intimate relationship with the body. Moderate exertion of the intellectual faculties undoubtedly extends a benign influence throughout the system. Mental occupation, like bodily exercise, prepares the system for its returning wants. And if the individual, who has nothing to call forth the powers of his mind, takes no more physical exercise than the student, he will doubtless manifest much more decidedly the injurious effects of sedentary habits. It would, indeed, seem, that a corrective, to some extent, is supplied by intellectual activity, and that the mind performs a vicarious office.

There certainly is something pertaining to exercise of the mind, which bestows an increased power of endurance on the physical organism. We do not feel the loss of an accustomed meal so sensibly, when the mind is actively employed, and it is said of Sir Isaac Newton, that in his philosophic devotion his dinner was sometimes neglected, and he was even at a loss, on such occasions, to tell whether he had received his usual repast or not. Every one must have noticed the absence of that languor and faintness, under such circumstances, which, without the mental excitement, would have resulted. The nerves, in this case, must be operated upon in such a manner as to supply the stimulus of food; and may not, in like manner, exercise of the intellectual faculties so influence the general system, as to enable it the better to dispense with physical exercise. Notwithstanding the inactivity of the body, which attends long continued intellectual labours, history presents a long list of hoary heads, honoured for their acquirements, showing a good influence of the mind. But the stimulus of mental exertion, like all things of this class, is followed by a depression, proportionate to the excitement; and although the want of food is not felt during the excitement of mind, there is a waste of material, an outlay of nerve power, which requires to be replaced by rest and nourishment.

Every student must perceive, when he ceases from intellectual labour, and his mind becomes freed from

thought, that his digestive functions have been vigorously performed; and that there is an urgent demand for sustenance.

While the mental activity is continued, the individual is not conscious of the consumption that is going on in his system; but when it is suspended, his appetite draws his attention to the matter of replenishing his stomach, and he eats with a relish equal to that of the grubber or ditcher.

As an individual under the influence of mental excitement will accomplish the most arduous physical labour without a sense of fatigue, so there is an absence of hunger under the same circumstances; yet, both alike, succeed to such exertion.

In this case, the physical energies are taxed, and undergo a waste which requires more rest and food than would be necessary under other circumstances, and yet the individual is not conscious of this increased demand, until composure is restored to body and mind.

Thus, we see, that mental excitement abstracts the attention from the physical wants, and yet renders the necessity more urgent for a supply of those wants.

There is plainly a giving-out of energy from the nervous system, in the performance of the operations of the mind, which not only requires a cessation from the intellectual exercise, but makes it incumbent, that a fresh supply of nourishment be received by the corporeal organization.

An inexplicable power of the brain, is brought into activity, in every thought we are capable of. There is not an idea passes through the mind, without this tax upon the resources of the brain, and, through it, upon the general nervous system, with all the various organs and parts of the body.

Thus, there is an influence, (though we may not be conscious of it, at the time,) extending to the entire physical organization, from our slightest and most casual thought, which is attended with a consumption of the nerve-power of the system. Under certain conditions it is salutary, and should be indulged. But, at the same time, it should be recollected that the waste is going on, and must be repaired.

Mental, like muscular effort, causes an acceleration of absorption and secretion in the various organs of the body, and gives rise to increased demands for food.—Bristed says, “Young ladies sometimes picture to themselves students as delicate, pale youths, who live on toast and tea. Never was there a greater mistake. Men who study in earnest, eat in earnest. A senior wrangler sat opposite me, one summer, at the scholar’s table, and to see that man perform on a round of beef was a curiosity.” The explanation of this fact is found in the principles, so ably illustrated by Liebig, in his *Animal Chemistry*: That the manifestations of vital force in a living part, and of course in the whole body, are determined by a certain form of that part, and by a certain arrangement of its elementary particles,—that the production of vital force in the system, bears a fixed relation to the chemical changes in the tissues,—that as these changes are effected by voluntary and involuntary muscular motions, so, where nerves are not found, motion does not occur,—and that each thought, each emotion, is attended with a corresponding change in the matter of the system, and of course, in the expenditure as well as the production of vital force. Hence we conclude, that incessant changes in the matter of the organs are essential to a healthy equilibrium; and that these changes are induced by mental, as well as by muscular efforts. A judicious combination of the two, is, doubtless, most conducive to health and longevity.

It is all-important, therefore, that we should try to understand the reciprocal influence of body and mind,—their normal relation to each other, and the action of each upon the other in their mutual derangements.

“Affections of the mind,” remarks Pereira, “influence the corporal functions, favour or oppose the action of morbid causes on the system, and modify the progress of diseases.”—And hence, he concludes that “An important part of the treatment of mental affections, as well as of many corporal derangements, is the removal of all moral or mental circumstances which either have produced, or keep up the morbid condition.” He further adds, that “emotions and passions of the mind have a most powerful influence upon the disorders of the body.” And I

trust, in the following pages, to be able to show, that they are the prime cause, in many instances, of such disorders, while, in other instances, the more agreeable class impart a healthy tone to the system. Although the purely intellectual faculties are not without effect, yet the physical organism is more especially under the influence of the emotions and passions.

That intense application of the mind is frequently attended with wasting of flesh, is, perhaps, owing rather to the passions involved, than to the mere concentration of the intellectual faculties. Dr. Armstrong says :

T is not thought,
T is painful thinking, that corrodes our clay."

And we notice that the constitution is impaired sooner, if the subject which engages the attention be of an exciting nature. Political life, for instance, is so beset with anxiety, that the mind labours almost incessantly under the load of tumultuous action; and we accordingly find our most prominent statesmen often fall a prey to their patriotic zeal. Those, on the other hand, "who are occupied in abstract speculations, and in whom the passions are seldom called into unusual activity, as astronomers, metaphysicians, mathematicians, etc., rarely exhibit intellectual disorders; and, as a class, are remarkably exempt from physical diseases."

The exercise of the purely intellectual faculties, does not, therefore, seem necessarily to induce a morbid condition of body, and we are warranted in concluding that the intellect is rarely, if ever, the source of disturbance to the healthy performance of the functions.

But, the manifestation of mind, is very generally attended with the modification of those lights and shades which give all the strength and colour of our lives.

"Love, hope and joy, fair pleasures smiling train,
Hate, fear and grief, the family of pain,"

are inextricably interwoven with all the motions of the mind, and a propitious or baneful influence is extended to the corporeal organism, as one or another predominates. "The brain" says Combe, "is the fountain of nervous energy to the whole body, and different modifications of that energy appear to take place, according to

the mode in which the faculties and organs are affected. When misfortune and disgrace impend over us, an impaired or positively noxious nervous influence is transmitted to the heart, stomach, intestines, and thence to the rest of the system. The pulse becomes feeble and irregular, digestion is deranged, and the whole corporeal frame wastes. When, on the other hand, the cerebral organs are agreeably affected, a benign and vivifying nervous influence pervades the frame, and all the functions of the body are performed with more pleasure and completeness."

It is, in fact, a matter of familiar observation, that the physical state is most happy when the mind enjoys a moderate degree of gaiety, and, on the other hand, that the body is consumed by sadness. "Compare the man" says Bichat, "whose days are marked by grief, to one whose time is passed in peace of heart and tranquility of mind, and you will see the difference which distinguishes the nutrition of the one from the other."

The history of mankind goes farther to substantiate such a distinction of the effects of different conditions of the mind. The comparative endurance of armies, when encouraged by hope, or when a gloomy aspect leaves nothing but gloomy forebodings and the harrowing of despair, proves the former decidedly most salutary.—The extraordinary healthfulness of the Philadelphia militia, after the victory of Trenton, although subjected to great exposure, is attributed by Dr. Rush to the new life inspired by such a glorious achievement. The destructive tendency, on the other hand, of depressing mental agencies, has perhaps never been more strikingly exemplified than in the memorable instance of the French conscripts.

In the hygienic regulations on sea, great stress is sometimes laid on the state of mind with which the crew set out; and it is remarked by a writer on this subject, that cheerfulness contributes more to keep a ship's crew healthy, than any precaution that can be adopted.

The prospect of a naval engagement is said to check the progress of scurvy, from the anticipation of a glorious day; and an army, in triumphing over their political enemy, become superior to their social pest, disease.

These diversified effects are not surprising, when we consider the remarkable elation of joy, and the equally striking depression of sorrow. The whole being seems involved in emotional excitement, and the frame is agitated throughout by violent passion.

Whatever view we may entertain of the primary action of different passions, pleasant or painful, stimulant or sedative, it is a well ascertained fact, that sudden and violent mental agitation of any kind may be productive of the most serious consequences. All are acquainted with the case of the door-keeper of Congress, who was overwhelmed by joy. Hunter was a victim to a fit of anger. Loss of speech, palsy, and epilepsy, are by no means unfrequent from fright, while Sir Astley Cooper, and others, give us cases that were actually "scared to death."

Like all those things which ordinarily contribute to our health and enjoyment, but are yet capable of becoming destructive agents, so "what composes man, can man destroy,"—the mental emotions may send disease throughout the frame. Hope and joy, even, are not exempt from this transformation; and love, which some would regard an habitual rapture, is known to be productive of the most baleful consequences.

If passions or emotions of much intensity have sway for a length of time, the nerves fail to perform their life-giving functions as usual, the springs of health wear away, and the whole corporeal system becomes involved in decay.

While a properly regulated exercise of the mind extends a benign influence throughout the system, intellectual effort may be so intense or protracted as to become detrimental to the health and vigour of the individual.

As food which is suited to nourish may be taken in excess, and cause a surfeit,—as physical exertion, which imparts strength and tone, may be kept up until fatigue and prostration ensue,—so the operations of the mind, which are ordinarily salutary, may be so intense, or continued for such a length of time, as to impair the brain and general nervous system, and thus prove injurious to the well-being of the body. While we note the propitious influence of mental exercise, when kept within pro-

per limits; it is of equal, if not greater consequence, to consider the bad effects of over-exertion of the mind upon the performance of the physical functions.

Of the various organs of the body, which are under the sway of our moral and intellectual nature, the heart and lungs are frequently adduced, as illustrating the direct influence of emotional excitement. Every one has noticed the hurried respiration from fright or timidity, and the deep-drawn sighs of those, who are weighed down by grief. The action of the heart is modified, in like manner, and comparatively trivial circumstances sometimes induce syncope. Even the sight of blood is sufficient in some individuals.

In the truly remarkable case of Col. Townsend, the heart seems to have been under the power of volition; and suspension of all the vital powers could be induced by an effort of his will. This was the effect of a morbid condition of his system, and may, perhaps, be regarded as an instance of "organic sensibility" becoming "animal sensibility."

The digestive apparatus is no less certainly affected by the states of the mind. And when we consider the intimate sympathy of the brain with the stomach and the adjacent viscera, it would appear creditable to the insight of those who, in former times, gave a name to certain mental perversions, distinctive of their connection with derangement of these parts. But what was then regarded entirely causative is now known to be, in many instances, an effect.

The vagaries of hypochondriasm are connected with malperformance of the functions of these organs, yet the original disturbance is in most cases referable to the mind. The mental discomfort travelling along "the silvery pneumogastric conductors," imparts a vitiated tone to the nerves of the stomach and intestines, and these, in their turn, may reflect a pernicious influence on the brain. Thus, "the reciprocal action and re-action of the two systems of organs on each other, produce a host of effects, moral as well as physical, by which the temper is changed and the health impaired." The prime source of disturbance is, however, the mental perturbation, and it is to this, much oftener than to physical causes, that

derangements of the digestive functions owe their origin. "The operation of physical causes," observes Dr. Jas. Johnson, "numerous as these are, dwindles into complete insignificance, when compared with that of anxiety or tribulation of mind.—Mental anxiety, not only arrests or disturbs the digestive process in the stomach, by interrupting or weakening the nervous influence on which it depends, and thereby leaving the materials of food open to the chemical laws which would act on them out of the body: but, in a remarkable manner, vitiates or impairs the biliary secretion, thereby adding a new and powerful source of irritation to the delicate nerves of the duodenum and small intestines."

We have the equally high authority of Dr. Chapman, in attestation of the important share which the mental condition has in deranging the stomach. Not only does functional disturbance supervene from excitation kept up in the mind, but in organic lesions of this organ, he is disposed to think that "griefs, anxieties, mortifications, and such like influences, are not the least operative."

The functions of the liver are sometimes influenced in a striking manner, by mental excitement. Jaundice is by no means an unfrequent result. Fear, says Dr. Dickson, has been often known to produce it suddenly, but grief, of all the passions, seems the most adapted to occasion it. Chapman mentions two cases occasioned by excessive grief, and further remarks, that either vehement rage or terror has excited it, and it has resulted from petulance, anxiety, and other irritating or depressing moral influences. The case mentioned by Cooke, of a physician who uniformly became icterose, if annoyed by a dangerous and perplexing case of disease, is a good illustration of the extension of the mental condition to the physical organism.

The popular belief that the spleen is prominently involved in depressing affections of the mind, is perhaps not without foundation, as scenes which interest the attention and cheer the mind, contribute very much to relieve the derangements of this organ.

Various affections might be adverted to, which are influenced by the emotions and passions. Hysteria re-

sults, in some instances, from this source, and it would seem that the susceptibility to this protean malady, is very frequently connected with the sensitiveness, originating in particular trains of thought and emotional excitement.

Enough, though, has been said, to show the influence of an improper action of the emotions and passions, in deranging the functions of the body,—that the corporeal organization deeply sympathizes in the operation of this class of mental phenomena.

Constituted as man is, a knowledge of the influence of the mind is of essential consequence to him, who would correct the morbid states of his organism. It cannot but strike the medical observer, that the moral part of man is, in many instances, woefully neglected in the treatment of disease. Books of practice abound with formularies of nauseous drugs, and long prescriptions for particular conditions,—which are all, doubtless, sufficiently proper; yet, the powerful and direct action of the mental condition on the organic functions, requires special attention, *sui proclivitatibus*.

A sick man should surely claim a little more attention than a sick horse or dog. The means that would cure the latter, would be totally insufficient to bring about the restoration of the former; and while the *materia medica* is taxed, and the lancet unsheathed, those means which are calculated to soothe the mind should not be overlooked.

If the various bearings of the mind are closely investigated, perhaps we may avert the undue excitement propagated from wayward passion or restless anxiety, and intercept the access of a sickly morbidness of unmeaning melancholy.

To counteract such an influence lies within the sphere of the physician, in like manner, as combating a pernicious influence from any other source; and may we not anticipate a more propitious application of the healing art, when these things are given the attention, which their share in predisposition, causation, and complication of bodily ills demands?

The influence reflected upon the mind, from physical disorders, may be diminished by medicine; yet follow-

ing the fundamental principle, to remove the cause, we would be directed in numerous instances to the mental condition, as the source of maladies, and it is of no small moment to effect a proper regulation of the transmissions from this source.

As the therapeutic applications of the mind cannot be appreciated until we understand its counterpart, I now proceed to consider the influence of the body on the mind.

If we carry out the principle of comparative anatomy, and descend to the brute creation, we may observe a striking analogy in the correspondence of the disposition to the physical conformation. We see the huge lion, with his rough and shaggy mane, his large head and mouth, with indications of power in every part of his body, and does not his disposition to attack and destroy, to be furious and unyielding when pressed upon by man or beast, seem well fitted to such an organization?

We see the wild boar, with terror depicted in his ivory tusks, and in every bristle of his coarse envelop; and where could we better look for the embodiment of all that is monstrous and terrific in disposition?

Contrast with these the wild horse, or the deer, animals of equal or greater size and activity, and what physical characteristics are presented! Beauty and grace in every part,—the neatly turned body and limbs, with muscles adapted to render them agile and speedy! Do we find the nature of the lion or boar, the hyena or tyger, associated with this conformation? By no means. Timidity and playfulness, combined with an instinctive pride of their fine proportions, are harmoniously blended with this structure.

Again, view the squirrel or the hare, in all their wildness, and do we not observe a correspondence of their physical organizations to their natures and habits? Looking throughout the round of animated beings, we find the disposition, the character of the mind, (if we may so speak,) fitted to the structure of the body. We never see the gentleness of the dove associated with that conformation, which indicates the bird of prey. And, on the contrary, we do not observe the destructive, devouring nature, connected with such proportions as those of the linnet or sparrow.

There is a correspondence between the disposition and the structure of animals; and I would hope to make it appear that there is a similar relation between the body and mind of man.

It may appear that the foregoing remarks have little bearing upon this subject; but, when we consider how near the intelligent principle of some animals, approaches the mind of man, it will strengthen the analogy. If we take an individual of the human species of the lowest grade of intelligence, and compare with the highest order of the brute creation, we will not have much cause to congratulate our race upon their pre-eminence. By attention and training, the capacity of animals seems to become enlarged and elevated; and we have facts in reference to the elephant, the horse, the dog, and other quadrupeds, which would imply ratiocination on their part,—widely different in degree, it is true, but not perhaps in kind, from the same faculty in the human being.

But our business is at present with man, and if we study closely the connection between the varying condition of his body, and the associated states of his mind, at different periods of his existence, and under different circumstances, we will have sufficient to illustrate the influence of the body on the mind. View the tender nursling in its mother's arms, dependent upon her care and attention for its subsistence,—mark its helpless condition,—examine its body from head to foot, the flaccidity of fibre, the softness of bone, the weakness in every part; and then ascertain what intelligence it has. Do we see those giant powers of intellect which characterize the full development of the physical organism? No. It is almost a blank. We scarcely find a presage of that lofty and commanding mind, which will manifest itself with the growth and maturity of the body.

All our ideas are acquired originally through the medium of the senses. The physical organization, the nerves and brain, are the prime source of every impression of pleasure or pain,—the channel of every thought and impulse; and is it at all strange that, in a frame unfitted for conveying such impressions, we should fail to find any exhibition of mind?

But, let us cast a glance beyond this period, and ob-

serve the merry prattling of that boy or girl, who has felt the genial glow of five or six summers, and note the change in body and mind. The downy softness of the tender babe, has given place to compactness of parts, and we now see the germ of intellect beginning to bud. It is now that we may begin "to teach the young idea how to shoot." Previous to this period, any attempt at education would have been futile, and proved as pearls thrown before swine. That element upon which the mind depends, has heretofore been too small to sustain the intellectual capacity, and even now, we observe most prominent, the lesser part of mind—the memory. This is a point not sufficiently noticed. Logic is not innate to man, and a child is very little qualified for deducing conclusions from premises. But such things as are adapted to the memory, are well suited to this age, and it seems remarkable that facts which are treasured up at this early period of life, are in many instances the last to be eradicated from the mind.

Let us leave this period, and turn our eyes to the picture again, when a dozen years have passed away. Now we behold a figure buoyant with youthful vigour. We look upon that embodiment of youth and beauty, and wonder if a mere image could seem so much like life.—Can this be a statue? No. I see a ray of light flit o'er the scene—the brilliant light of mind. The imagination reigneth here,—a jewel suited to the casket.

Our attention is next attracted by that stately and compact structure, which indicates the maturity of the physical being. Every part and particle has now arrived at that stage which is best adapted to display the physical powers in strength and activity, and in endurance of exposure and fatigue. We now see a correct type of the maturity of the race, and every feature and limb bears that outline and proportion, which the great Architect intended it should wear.

Do we find the intellectual principle affected in a corresponding ratio?—Yes. Now, if ever, the mind will be found competent to any task. We find now, not only the memory and imagination, but that more lofty and commanding feature, the judgment, in full activity and strength; and the individual stands forth a giant in body

and mind. Here we behold all the grandeur of humanity. In one harmonious whole, we view the consummation of nature's work—the master-piece of God.

Tupper has said that "a perfect form of human grace would captivate the world." But when we view this in connection with that high and ennobling principle, the intellect, how much more beautiful is the image! When we consider the finish of the body, as indicating a polish of the mind, then it becomes truly attractive. But in how many instances, alas! we find that the mind falls short of the completeness of the body! I would not have it supposed, that I view the mere outline or form, however perfect, as indicative of the development of the mind; and least of all, that personal beauty is any presumption of mental refinement.

But, in the main, we find a correspondence between the physical and intellectual development, which justifies the position I have taken. Although weeds may grow up and choke the grain, the soil furnishes the same fertilizing principle, to nourish and support the plant.—The progress of the physical, is accompanied by a corresponding advancement of the intellectual part.

In tracing the changes which are impressed upon the mind by the progressive advancement of the body, if it has failed to appear that the condition of the physical organism has a share in fashioning the intellectual element, I would advance a step further in our inquiry.

Is it claimed that man has an innate faculty of mind, or that the intellect has an isolated, independent existence? Then, mark well its state in adult life,—in the prime of man's existence,—and look down the dim vista of time, and view the same person a quarter of a century after. What has become of that brilliancy of intellect? Where are those resources in argument and illustration? Where is that shrewdness and wit, which enlivened the circle around. They have sunk almost to nothingness; and we behold with the wreck of the body, a lamentable failing of the mental powers.

I grant that in some instances this decay of mind does not take place in an exact ratio with the decline of the functions of the body. We occasionally see the aged valetudinarian, who manifests a vigour of mind but little

diminished from his palmiest days. But such strike every one as being remarkable, and must be viewed as exceptions to a general rule. We most frequently observe a striking deterioration of the faculties of the mind as the physical powers give way. And that element which develops itself first in childhood, is found to decline before others. The memory is remarked to fail before the impairment of other faculties; and old persons will recall the scenes of their youth, and recollect the minor incidents of life at that period, with more precision than such as have transpired but a day or a week.

May not future investigation throw such light upon this subject, as to enable us to stay the decline of intellect in persons who are tending to the grave? May not some article be discovered which shall exercise such a controlling influence on man's organization, as to secure the full vigour of the intellectual faculties during his three score years and ten,—yea, during a longer sojourn upon earth; and thus render the aged, monuments of wisdom, to teach and direct the rising generation in the ways of truth and rectitude?

My object now, is not to suggest a remedy, but simply to adduce the fact as illustrating the point before me: and with this *a posteriori* proof, in confirmation of the *a priori* reasoning previously presented, I think no one will deny the general proposition with which I set out.

I have, though, additional testimony: and previous to any inferences, I will briefly allude to the difference in corporeal and mental constitution of the male and female of the human race. When we consider the contrast in their physical organization, and a mental constitution in accordance with this respectively, it must be considered as bearing upon the subject before us.

The athletic, robust frame of man, is found associated with a stern, decisive spirit. We see the mind of man grappling with difficulties and engaging in disputes and controversies. We see it aspiring to gain the renown and applause of his fellows. We see his disposition lead him to the field as a soldier, or to the chase as a huntsman. In a word, all those pursuits which require energy

and decision, devolve upon man, and from his physical constitution, conjoined with a heroic spirit, he is competent for the undertaking.

On the other hand, we find woman fashioned in a different mould, as to body and mind. Her beauty and grace of person—her gentleness and modesty of feeling, are well adapted to each other. One seems to flow as a natural sequence from the other. If we could suppose the mind of woman connected with such a frame as that of man, it would surely appear like a scion transplanted from its native soil. There is an incongruity in the very thought of the disposition, impulses, intellect, etc., of the female, being associated with the physical organization of the male. And again, it would seem equally out of place to see the sternness of man's mental character, connected with the fragile body of tender woman.

Woman's body must have woman's mind, else she is no longer that ornament to society, which virtue and chastity have ever made her.

We occasionally meet with a configuration of the female of the masculine semblance, and do we not invariably find in such cases, that the mind simulates that of man? The woman loses the distinguishing traits of her sex, giving additional and striking confirmation of the influence of the physical on the mental being.

The train of reasoning pursued thus far, may not prove anything more than that certain conditions of body have corresponding conditions of mind associated with them, and it may not appear that the former is in any sense the cause of the latter. But I would suggest that the connection of particular features of the mind, with certain corporeal developments, is so uniform as to afford a distinction of temperaments, which is very generally recognised among men.

The division into Lymphatic, Sanguineous, Bilious, and Nervous, may be regarded as somewhat arbitrary; yet, it conveys an idea of the disposition associated with these several orders of animal constitutions.

The Lymphatic, in which the secreting glands are the most active portion of the system, is indicated by a soft and abundant flesh, languor of the pulse, and of all the corporeal and mental functions; by a dull, ease-seeking,

inefficient, indolent disposition, and an aversion to corporeal and intellectual effort.

The Sanguine, in which the arterial system, and the organs which circulate the various fluids, particularly the blood, are most active; is connected with light and sandy hair, fair skin, a fresh and florid complexion, light or blue eyes, a strong and rapid pulse, strong animal passions, and more ardour, enthusiasm, activity, and zeal, than power of mind or body.

The Bilious, in which the muscular portion of the system predominates in activity, is characterized by a more athletic form; by strong bones and muscles, black hair, a dark skin and dark eyes; a strong and steady pulse; hardness, strength, and power of body, accompanied with considerable force and energy of mind and character.

The Nervous, in which the brain and the nervous system are much more active than the other parts of the body, gives rise to the highest degree of excitability and activity of the corporeal and mental powers; vividness and intensity of emotion; clearness and rapidity of thought and perception; sprightliness of mind and body; and is associated with light, fine, thin hair; a fair, clear, and delicate skin.

These temperaments are generally compounded: the nervous-sanguine gives the highest degree of activity and intensity of thought and feeling: the nervous-bilious gives activity, accompanied with power and endurance, constituting one of the most favourable temperaments, especially when united with a little of the sanguine: the bilious-lymphatic gives mental and corporeal indolence, with power under strong excitement: the sanguine-lymphatic is less favourable to intellectual than to corporeal manifestations.

Independent of those elements which go to make up the temperaments, the eye and countenance give an insight to the mind of an individual. We insensibly associate a disposition and character with the appearance of the person, which supposes the influence of the body on the mind.

In fact, whoever will attentively observe the various casts of the body, and the different phases of the mind,

must find a confirmation of this view. It is not this or that part of the body; neither is it the manner or position of the individual,—nor yet is it the expression of the face, that gives out an impression as to the mind or disposition; but the general appearance, bespeaks the character associated with it. I would remark that such a correspondence, being so uniformly observed, is strong presumption of cause and effect. And I will now adduce the positive evidence illustrating the influence of the body on the mind.

The different states of mind, in health and in disease of the body, afford an exemplification of this influence.—When all the physical functions are performed regularly, and healthfully, we find the faculties of the mind acting harmoniously and energetically. But when disease invades the system, with those “ills to which flesh is heir,” we find the mind wavering and flagging; and with the prostration of the body, we observe incapacity for intellectual exertion. When the corporeal system is just emerging from illness, how impotent is the mind! In cases of extreme emaciation and debility, resulting from long protracted disease, this condition approaches almost to imbecility.

Under these circumstances, we cannot consider the state of the mind otherwise than as the result of the condition of the body. The mental weakness is the effect of the physical prostration. In some diseases, however, we observe a directly contrary influence. All the faculties of the mind seem exalted, and the naturally dull and morose become keen and lively.

Our medical books contain instances of facts long past and forgotten being recalled under the influence of disease; and every physician has witnessed scenes that go to illustrate the remarkable imaginative power, which is bestowed by the feverish excitement of the body. Things are conceived which have no foundation in fact, and the train of reasoning from such false premises, is generally correct and logical. Presuming the reality, their conduct is such as circumstances would warrant, and in accordance with the fairest principles of deduction. If the imagination shadows forth some image of beauty and loveliness, it is attractive and pleasing to the indivi-

dual,—if some loathsome and disagreeable object is presented, disgust is manifested; and if the creative fancy thrusts some monster of hideous proportions before the distempered imagination, we behold the individual shrink in terror and alarm from the dread object.

That such disturbances of the mind, result from the condition of the body, is proved by their disappearance under the use of remedies, addressed to the physical organism. The delirium of fever is found to yield to a free blood-letting; the wild vagaries of hypochondriasis give place to correct ideas under the use of purges and reduced diet; and even the reckless fancy of the somnambulist is modified, if not entirely controlled by proper regimen.

That the mind is thus affected by the changes of the body, affords no just ground for the humiliating conclusion, that all will be obliterated with the material part of man. The analogy presented throughout nature of changes from one state of existence to another more exalted, is a strong presumption that such a change will take place with us. And, as many facts illustrate the pre-eminence of the soul, we should rest satisfied, with the Divine assurance of its immortality, in a world of spirits beyond the grave.

Having, in a general way, portrayed the action and re-action of body and mind, it only remains to make the application to that state of the cerebral functions constituting insanity.

To describe the various forms of this abnormal state of the mind, is not necessary for my present purpose. It is sufficient to understand, that it consists in a derangement of one or more of the faculties of the mind, accompanied with corresponding conduct on the part of the individual.

The causes of this derangement are as various as the individuals affected, but referable to two general divisions,—those which have a direct influence on the mind, and those which operate through the body.

The immediate source of all mental derangement, is an abnormal condition of the brain. It may be an idiopathic condition of this great centre of the nervous system, or dependant upon undue exercise of the mind; and

again it may be a sympathetic irritation connected with improper performance of the functions of some other organ of the body.

The nicely adjusted balance of body and mind, hangs, as it were, upon the brain, as a pivot; and, either being disturbed, or receiving an impression, it must be felt at this connecting point, as well as by the other. From the slightest prick of a pin, to the prostrating disease, we observe more or less sympathy of the mind with all the parts of the body. And the blush of modesty, in like manner with the strongest emotion, displays the sympathy of the body with the impressions on the mind. The brain is the connecting link, and brings the external, into communication with the internal, of this human Leyden jar. Without its important office, they might remain in juxtaposition for any length of time, and give no manifestation of power; but, as soon as it is brought to bear upon the body and the mind, we see the spark of life evolved. This is exemplified in oppression of the brain, and in some lesions of this organ, when no other parts are diseased, but lose their power from their connection with the brain. Remove the difficulty, as by the trephine, and all the offices of the parts are performed as usual. It will be readily perceived, then, with such intimate relations to the body and the mind, how the brain becomes involved in their mutual workings, and insanity is the result of a disturbance of the equilibrium between them.

Under such circumstances, an erethism is established in the brain secondarily; and the prime cause of the derangement is referable to some mental disturbance, or to some physical disorder. Hence the great importance of a full history of the commencement of the insanity, whether connected primarily with mental disquietude, bodily disease, or local inflammation of the brain,—with or without hereditary predisposition.

The application of means of relief must have reference to the cause: and, in the first case, moral means, or those calculated to divert the thoughts; in the second, medical treatment; in the third, local measures; and in the fourth, regimen, will be found most advantageous.

Lunacy is very generally connected with bodily de-

rangement; yet, in many instances, the functional disturbance of the organs succeeds the depraved state of the mind, and arises from this source. The influence reflected upon the mind from the physical system may be relieved by medical treatment; yet, following the fundamental principle, to remove the cause, we will be directed, in numerous instances, to the mental condition, as the source of these maladies.

That the mind is capable of therapeutic management, is abundantly proven by the happy results, which, in latter years, have been obtained in the treatment of this class of patients. It was once considered indispensable for the control of this unfortunate class of beings, that coercion should be resorted to. But it has been ascertained, that in many instances, confinement only exasperates the lunatic, and instead of the straight-jacket and iron bars, a less revolting means has been found beneficial. The maniac is now allowed to seek a balm for his distempered mind in the grove and garden; and, instead of the harrowing spectacle, which, in former times, kept his awful situation constantly preying upon the remnant of right reason he might possess, scenes are presented which are calculated to dispel his hallucinations, and any trace of lucid thought is seized upon and wielded so as to lead him from the darkness which enshrouds his mind. The least ray of returning hope is watched with care; and happily the light has been made to widen and extend itself, until the individual stands again, as it were, in the open day.

In those violent outbreaks which attend a paroxysm of maniac desperation, other measures are of course demanded, and restraint becomes indispensable. But when the cruel barbarity with which the insane were sometimes treated in by-gone days, even to using the lash as a therapeutic agent, is contrasted with the humane attention which is bestowed upon a similar class at the present day, it reflects honour upon those who have been instrumental in carrying out this benevolent design, and must be looked upon as a bright era in medical history.

The known efficacy of a steady look, the power of the voice, and the influence of determined expression of countenance on the part of him who would controul the

madman, illustrate the efficacy of impressions conveyed through the medium of the mind. It is of great consequence that the immediate keeper of the insane should have dignity of character, with great firmness and decision. His authority must be recognised, or his influence will be lost. He should, at the same time, be a good judge of human nature, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, and adapt his bearing to the various dispositions of his subjects.

The accommodations, as to rooms and grounds, should be ample, and indulgence of natural taste carried to as great an extent as compatible with safety.

By due attention to these things, the necessary medical treatment will be greatly assisted, while, perhaps, there are but few cases in which it can be dispensed with entirely.

The bodily functions become disturbed, either primarily, or secondarily, and the treatment must correspond to the organ affected, and the nature of the diseased action.

Practical measures of greater efficacy than any heretofore devised for the relief of the insane, are demanded by the rapid increase of mental disorders; and this essay is submitted to the public, with a hope that it may suggest some improvement in the treatment of this afflicted portion of our race.

Note.—In connection with this subject, I would refer to the proposed measure of removing the Asylum for the insane, which is now located in Columbia, to some point beyond the limits of the town.

If the views which have been presented in this paper be correct, it must be evident that the crowding together of persons in different states of mental derangement, will have a pernicious influence. Those of the most delicate sensibilities, being associated with the most hideous and outrageous maniacs, any remnant of reason is harrowed, until "madness rules the hour" alike with all. A separation of the patients is, therefore, of great consequence, in the treatment of the insane; and the former habits of life, with the particular form of mental derangement, should be considered in classifying the patients.

In the present establishment, with but one contracted yard for male lunatics, and a similar enclosure for females; there is no opportunity afforded for such salutary arrangement. And the only resort is, to confine the violent and dangerous to their cells; while the more manageable compose one promiscuous maniac gang; and a few, in their lucid state, are allowed to go into a front enclosure of small dimensions, or to stroll on the streets with a keeper. Under such circumstances, there is necessarily a constant restraint upon the inmates of the institution, which operates injuriously upon the deranged, and more especially upon those who are recovering their faculties. The proximity of the town presents another source of aggravation to the inmates; as spectators so frequently indulge their curiosity, by ascending to the summit of the building, and thus excite the distracted minds of those in the yard beneath.

The position and the arrangement of the institution at present, fail in several other radical points of the objects in view: and now, when some change is contemplated, it has been proposed to look beyond the limits of Columbia for a location, where the various classes of patients can be better provided for. Such a course is demanded by the increase in numbers recently admitted to the establishment, and the inefficiency of the present arrangements.

The safety, comfort, and permanent relief of this unfortunate class, should be considered, independently of the interests of the citizens of Columbia, and it must be an advantage in their treatment to be removed to a more retired and commodious situation.

The position which is thought most available being near the Charlotte and South Carolina Rail Road, and a few miles from town, would afford facilities for the treatment of the insane, which no extension of the present structure could supply. A space of the desired extent could be secured, and the more manageable patients might then have more indulgence than would be compatible with safety for the desperate and vicious. A building, distinct from the other structure, could be made as a strong-hold for the latter class, where all the necessary means of coercion and restraint might be

exercised. As a resort for those recovering their faculties, and for any during their lucid intervals, a third department might be provided, entirely separate from the others. This might have an extent of outline, and a diversity of scene, which would allow a sense of freedom on the part of the individual, at the same time that a proper watch could be maintained by the keepers.

Under such a plan there would be no risk to the public welfare, and yet the inmates of the institution might enjoy all the relaxation compatible with their condition. That exercise which is requisite for the proper performance of the functions of the body, could be granted with entire safety; and those scenes adapted to cheer and enliven the mind, would be presented in nature's varied works around the rural spot. Thus the mind and the body would be ministered to; and the subject of mental disorder have a better prospect of restoration to a proper exercise of the rational faculties.

I have thought proper to advert in this general way to a matter intimately connected with the practical application of my subject; and without reference to the wishes of the people, or the opinions of those concerned in the management of the institution, I have attempted to show the propriety of a removal of this institution from the town of Columbia, on account of the benefit likely to accrue to such as require its protection and regimen.

I have only to add, that the subject of insanity and its proper management, is one of growing importance, and it is high time that improvements in the institutions for the insane should be adopted.

ARTICLE III.

WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE VISIBLE CHURCH!—OR INFANT BAPTISM.

According to the revealed will of God; who are entitled to membership in the visible church? Two answers to this question deserve attention. The first is, *believers*

only; the second, *believers and their children*. As it will not be needful to prove what is common to both theories, our remarks will relate solely to the children of believers.

It may safely be assumed, as a principle held in common by all who are interested in this discussion, that a right to membership in the church and a right to baptism, are inseparably connected, and reciprocally imply each other. The doctrine of infant church-membership, and the doctrine of infant baptism, are the same doctrine, expressed in varied language: and it is of no consequence to which of these forms of the doctrine an argument directly applies; whatever tends to prove or disprove either, equally tends to prove or disprove both.

It is unquestionably true, that in the New Testament, infants are not expressly mentioned in immediate connexion with baptism. But what if they are expressly mentioned in immediate connexion with membership in the church? We are not here asserting that the fact is so; we merely allude to the hypothesis for the purpose of putting a question. What would be the consequence of such a fact, should it be found to exist? An unequivocal assertion of church-membership, it is certain, can be made without the aid of the word *baptize*, or *baptism*. Suppose we should find such an assertion in the word of God, in reference to infants; ought we to disregard it, because nothing was said about baptism? No doubt, it will be admitted that, in such a case, they ought to be received as members of the church. But if so received, ought they not to be baptized? None, we believe, who regard baptism as an ordinance now obligatory, would answer in the negative. It follows that we have no right to demand an explicit warrant for the *baptism* of infants; if there is found in the word of God decisive evidence of their membership in the church, that is enough.

Under the Mosaic dispensation, the feast of weeks was certainly a positive ordinance; and no where in the law of Moses is the proselyte mentioned in connexion with that ordinance. . But Moses said of him, "he shall be as one that is born in the land;" and in another place, gave the general command: "Three times in a year shall all thy males appear before the Lord thy God in the

place which he shall choose;" and mentioned the feast of weeks as one of the occasions meant. A comparison of these passages decided the duty of the proselyte. His right was fully made out to a positive religious ordinance, though he was nowhere described in immediate connexion with that ordinance,—made out, not by an explicit warrant, but by an inference necessarily arising out of a comparison of different passages. And all that we here claim is, that if a similar and equally forcible proof can be made out, in favour of the right of another class of human beings—infants,—to another positive ordinance—baptism, it shall be admitted as equally decisive.

We wish the principle applied impartially to both sides of the question. If it can be made out from Scripture, as a law admitting of no exception, that no human being is to be recognized as a member of the church, till he has given credible evidence of vital piety, the argument is at an end, and infant baptism is unlawful. If, on the other hand, it can be shown to be a law admitting of no exception, that none but believers are to be baptized, then, the church-membership of the children of believers, *as such*, is unlawful. Whether either of these things can be done, we now proceed to inquire.

If the position relates directly to membership in the church, the most plausible argument in its favor is suggested by the manner in which particular churches are addressed in the New Testament. For example, Paul describes his brethren at Ephesus, as chosen in Christ, redeemed, forgiven, adopted, raised from spiritual death, sealed with the Holy Spirit. But the explanation is easy. When a collective body of people is described, it is by no means implied that the description applies to every individual member. We feel no hesitation in saying that the people of the United States are strongly attached to a republican form of government; but yet, there may not improbably be found individuals who would prefer a monarchy; and there are assuredly many human beings among us who are incapable of forming an opinion on the subject. The description given by Paul was true of every member of the church whose character was such as the covenant, by which he was bound, required.

Infants, of course, were not addressed; and no adult could become a member of the church,—in other words, no one could become a member of it by his own act,—who did not give good evidence of possessing that character: and if there were adults who gave no evidence of possessing it, but who were connected with the church in consequence of having been baptized in infancy, they were held to be, for want of piety, disqualified for important ecclesiastical privileges. On Pede-baptist principles, then, there were stronger reasons for addressing the members of the church, collectively, as believers, than there now are for speaking of the people of the United States, collectively, as republicans. This is surely sufficient.

We turn to the other form of the proposition. Leaving out of view, for the present, what may be said in reply to the arguments adduced in favour of the baptism of infants, do the Scriptures furnish evidence against it, by teaching that faith is, in every instance, an indispensable prerequisite to that ordinance? We think there is not one text which, taken in its most obvious and natural signification, gives even the least appearance of support to that idea. Much stress is sometimes laid on the apostolic commission, as recorded by Matthew: "*Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.*" The word translated *teach*, it is well known, signifies *to make disciples*. It is supposed, then, that in this passage three duties are enjoined, which must be performed in the precise order in which they are here enumerated: first, to make disciples of all nations; second, to baptize them; third, to teach them to observe all things, etc. "The several parts of the commission," we are told, "are to be observed in the order in which they are enjoined. The order is plainly as imperative as the commands themselves. A violation of the order is, indeed, a violation of the commands."*

The argument, then, is, that since making disciples is mentioned before baptizing, it follows that none may be

* See Howell on "The Evils of Infant Baptism," chap. ii., pp. 19, 20.

baptized who have not already become disciples,—in every instance, one must become a disciple first, and be baptized afterwards. Here it is assumed, as an inviolable rule, that when a verb is followed by a participle, (as in this passage, the verb *teach* is followed by the participle *baptizing*,) both expressive of acts of the same agents, the action expressed by the verb must be understood to be done, or required to be done, before the action expressed by the participle. Thus only is it concluded from the passage before us, that ministers must teach first, and baptize afterwards, because the word *teach* occurs *before* the word *baptizing*. Let us, then, apply the same rule to another passage. Luke vi: 1.—“And it came to pass, on the second sabbath after the first, that he went through the corn-fields; and his disciples plucked the ears of corn, and did eat, rubbing them in their hands.” Here the verb *did eat* comes before the participle *rubbing*. And if it be maintained that, in the passage under consideration, the order in which the words stand, proves that men must become disciples first, and be baptized afterwards; this passage furnishes precisely equal reason for maintaining, that the disciples ate the ears of corn first, and rubbed them in their hands afterwards. If any are of opinion that an imperative sentence would afford a more appropriate test, they shall be gratified. “*Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal; knowing, that ye also have a Master in Heaven.*”—Col. iv: 1. Here, we find, the verb *give*, comes before the participle *knowing*. Hence, according to the rule of interpretation which we are testing, masters must *first* give to their servants that which is just and equal; and *afterwards*,—it would be wrong to do it before the duty signified by the verb is completed,—*afterwards* consider their own responsibility to their Master in Heaven. As to the apostolic commission, we think the relation of its several parts exceedingly obvious. The verb *teach*, (or *make disciples*,) expresses the end to be pursued; the participles, *baptizing*, *teaching*, express the means to be employed. The apostles, and other ministers of the gospel, are here directed to make men disciples by baptizing and teaching them. And it may not be amiss to observe, that in enumerating

the means of making disciples, the Saviour mentions *baptizing* first. We do not mention this as an argument in favour of infant baptism; but merely as showing the futility of the attempt to derive an argument against infant baptism from the mere order in which the words stand in this passage.

Let us now turn to the corresponding passage in Mark: "*Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned.*" The whole question, so far as this passage is concerned, turns on the clause, *he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved*. Does it mean that every person must be baptized after he has become a believer? or does it mean, simply, that if we would be saved, we must both believe and be baptized? If the latter be the meaning, it implies nothing inconsistent with infant baptism; if the former, then, should one who has been baptized on a profession of faith, afterwards discover that he had deceived himself, and become a true convert, it would be necessary for him to be re-baptized, before he could claim the benefit of this promise. Certainly, when the Saviour requires us to *believe*, he does not mean simply that we must *profess* to believe. He does not mean that every one who professes faith and is baptized shall be saved. If, then, it be, according to the true meaning of this passage, indispensable, in all cases, that one be baptized after he has believed, it is perfectly evident, that in the case now supposed, the ordinance must be repeated.

By many it seems to be taken for granted that, at the moment of commissioning his apostles to baptize in his name, our Redeemer must, of course, have specified the qualifications for the reception of that ordinance, and answered the question, who shall be baptized? The actual record does not accord with this assumption. Nor need we be surprised. It is, surely, conceivable that the apostles may have been already possessed of an amount of knowledge that would preclude the necessity of special direction on that head; and certain that, under the guidance of the promised Spirit of truth, they were in no danger of mistaking in this matter. If we turn our thoughts from the apostles to ourselves, a somewhat

similar remark may be made. We must take it for granted that the Bible contains information entirely sufficient to determine the question, who ought to be baptized? but in what part of the Sacred volume that information ought to be found, or how it ought to be conveyed, we are not competent to determine beforehand. We must search the Scriptures, and thus learn what they actually contain.

We have now seen, that there is nothing inconsistent with infant baptism, in the apostolic commission. Nor is there, in the recorded practice of inspired men. One of the passages most frequently quoted is Acts viii: 36, 37. "And the eunuch said, See, here is water; what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." Let it be observed, there is nothing here that bears even the appearance of an answer to the *general* question, who may be baptized? The question propounded, and the answer returned, both relate directly to a single individual; and that individual was an adult.—An adult applied for baptism, and was required, before his request could be granted, to profess faith in Christ. This certainly involves nothing inconsistent with Pedobaptist principles. Philip did nothing that a Pedobaptist minister would not have done in like circumstances. When the eunuch asked, "what doth hinder *me* to be baptized? we are not surprised that nothing is said about *infants* in the answer.

But we must attend to another passage in the same chapter, (verse 12.) "But when they (the people of Samaria,) believed Philip, preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized, both men and women." We are often asked, "why are not infants mentioned here, if infant baptism was practised by inspired men?" We answer, a little attention to the connexion will show.—The subject of the paragraph is the destruction of the influence of Simon the sorcerer, by the preaching of the gospel. By being baptized, men and women openly renounced the character of disciples of Simon, for that of disciples of Jesus. Infants had never been of the num-

ber of those who gave heed to Simon, saying, "This man is the great power of God;" and therefore, the mention of their baptism would not have been relevant to the subject of the subject of the paragraph.

The observations which have now been made, seem to warrant the conclusion, that the Scriptures contain nothing positively inconsistent with the membership of infants in the visible church. We are far from regarding this as sufficient for its justification. If God has not appointed it, it is wrong. We fully acknowledge the obligation we are under, either to renounce infant baptism as sinful, or to adduce such evidence of its Divine origin as, when duly considered, ought to be satisfactory to reflecting and conscientious men. But we think it already apparent, that it must be given up, *if at all*, simply for want of evidence,—not because there is independent evidence against it. The judicious inquirer will, of course, examine whatever considerations in its support may be drawn from the word of God,—studying each of these attentively, candidly, patiently, and in connexion with all the objections to which it may be liable. But should these considerations, when thus collected and examined, seem satisfactory, there are none of a contrary nature to disturb or impair his conclusion. We are far from expecting to exhaust the subject in this article. The utmost for which we can hope is, to present such a specimen of the evidence as may be, to some extent, useful in exciting and directing inquiry. We proceed, then, to mention some of the arguments that prove the membership of infants in the visible church.

I. *During our Saviour's personal ministry, the visible church existed, and infants were members of it, by Divine appointment.*

We say *the church existed*. Matt. xviii: 17.—"And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." What is meant by *the church*, in this passage? An institution which has ceased to exist; or with which we, as believers under the Christian dispensation, have no connexion? If so, this direction is inapplicable and useless to us,—a conclusion which pious people would be slow to adopt;

and to which the context assuredly lends no support. It will hardly be imagined, for example, that the promise immediately following, (verse 18,) is confined to the Jewish dispensation.

Or, did the Saviour, in speaking of *the church*, in this instance, mean an institution which, as yet, had no existence? Then the direction could not possibly be obeyed, and had no application to any case that could possibly arise, till after the dispensation under which it was given had passed away; and of this prophetic reference no intimation was given!—a circumstance the more astonishing, as the case for which it was intended to provide, is by no means limited to any particular dispensation, but must be of frequent occurrence, wherever men but partially sanctified are found. The Saviour evidently intended that this precept should be in force from the moment it was given, to the end of time. And from this it irresistibly follows, that the same church which exists now, existed then.

Let us examine another passage. Matt. xxi: 43.—“Therefore say I unto you, The kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof.” Thus the Saviour addressed the chief priests and Pharisees. These, therefore, were *then* in “the kingdom of God:” but in what sense? Certainly not in the sense in which that is confined to the truly pious; for such was not their character. The reference, therefore, cannot be to their spiritual state. But, on the other hand, it cannot be to any thing common to the whole human race; such, for example, as the general obligation to serve God, which must necessarily bind every moral creature. For it is clearly intimated that men who were then without that kingdom were to be brought in; while men who were then in it, were to be expelled. The reference, then, must be to their relation to God, as his covenant people,—bound, as such, to serve him, and enjoying precious advantages for securing his favour. The other “nation” mentioned,—the Gentiles,—were to be brought into the same kingdom in which the chief priests and Pharisees then were. This, as we have seen, must refer to visible relation; and, as it is fulfilled by the Gentiles being made members of the

church, it follows that the chief priests and Pharisees were at that time members of the same church.

Having thus shown that the church existed during the personal ministry of our Saviour, we now proceed to prove that infants were members by Divine appointment. Here we appeal to the memorable declaration, "*Of such is the kingdom of God,*" or "*the kingdom of Heaven.*" Let the several places in which it occurs be carefully examined. They are Matt. xix: 13-15; Mark x: 13-16; and Luke xviii: 15-17.

The first point that demands attention is, the *age* of the children that were brought to Christ, and to whom the words under consideration primarily referred. Luke calls them *βρῆρον*, (infants,) and the following, we believe, are all the other passages in the New Testament where the same word occurs. Luke i: 41, 44.—"The *babe* leaped in her womb,"—"The *babe* leaped in my womb for joy." Luke ii: 12, 16.—"Ye shall find the *babe* wrapped in swaddling clothes, lying in a manger."—"They came with haste, and found Mary and Joseph, and the *babe* lying in a manger." Acts vii: 19.—"So that they cast out their *young children*, to the end they might not live:" (which compare with Exod. i: 22.) 1 Peter, ii: 2.—"As new-born *babes*, desire the sincere milk of the word; that ye may grow thereby." 2 Tim. iii: 15.—"And that from a *child* thou hast known the holy Scriptures." In reference to this last passage, we observe that it would not be thought extravagant or improper, to say of one whose case was like that of Timothy, that he had been familiar with the Scriptures *from infancy*; and similar expressions, no doubt, are common in all languages. The term in question, then, is correctly represented by the English word, *infants*.*

Infants were brought to Christ; and concerning them he said, "*Of such* is the kingdom of God." But what are we to understand by the word *such*, in this connexion?—*little children*, (that is, *infants*), or those who resemble them? On looking into the original, we find that

* For the sake of readers who have no knowledge of Greek, we have, in every instance, italicised the English words representing the Greek term in question.

the pronoun in question, (*τοιούτων, such,*) is here used with the article, marking a reference to something, (in this instance *παιδια, little children,*) already mentioned. Now, wherever this pronoun is used in this manner, its meaning includes what it thus refers to, as already mentioned. It is here stated, then, that “*of little children—infants—is the kingdom of Heaven; and the idea intended cannot possibly be, “of those who are like little children in some respects,”—of those who possess a child-like disposition.* To confirm what has now been asserted, let us notice some other passages, where the pronoun in question is used in the same manner. 1 Cor. v: 5, “To deliver *such an one,*” (the reference is to the incestuous person,) “unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus.” If the view we are opposing is correct, the Corinthians would have been obeying this charge, had they excommunicated, not the incestuous person, but some one who, in some respects not specified, resembled him. Verse 11, “But now I have written unto you not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner; with such an one no not to eat.” Can this possibly mean that the Corinthians must withdraw from the society, not of the persons described, but of other people who might happen to be in some respects like them? Gal. v: 19-21.—“Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revilings, and such like: of which I tell you before, as I have also told you in times past, that they which do *such things* shall not inherit the kingdom of God.” If the view we oppose be correct, then, it is allowable to understand this passage as condemning, not the works of the flesh, but some other works, not specified, but which bear some resemblance to these. 1 Tim. vi: 5.—“Perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, supposing that gain is godliness: from *such* withdraw thyself.”—Now, whatever evidence the first of these passages affords, that the incestuous person was to be “delivered

unto Satan,"—and the second, that the Corinthians were forbidden to keep company with immoral professors of Christianity,—whatever evidence the third affords that those who practise the works of the flesh shall not inherit the kingdom of God,—whatever evidence the fourth affords that those who are described as men of corrupt minds were the persons from whom Timothy was to withdraw himself,—the passage under consideration affords just the same evidence, that of those who were styled by our Saviour *little children*, and by Luke, *infants*, is the kingdom of God.

And what are we to understand by "the kingdom of God," in this connection? Certainly not the blessedness of the heavenly world. Our Saviour is speaking of living children—not of dead ones. He is telling what their condition actually is—not what would be the consequence of dying in infancy. His language points to a state of things actually existing in the case of those concerning whom he says, "Suffer them to come unto me." Nor could the reference be to their spiritual state. From the displeasure which he expressed at the conduct of his disciples, it is plain that the truth declared in the words, "of such is the kingdom of God," was one with which they ought to have been previously familiar; but if these were regenerate infants, the disciples had had no means of ascertaining that fact. We are compelled, therefore, to understand it of outward, visible relation. The kingdom of God is the visible church. That the phrase is often used in this sense, is indisputable; and in this instance, the connexion forbids it to be understood in any other.

Here, then, we have from the Saviour himself, a direct declaration of the membership of infants in his church. And as a right to church-membership necessarily implies a right to baptism, we might safely rest on this argument as decisive of the whole question. But we have further evidence to offer. We argue,

II. *From the Abrahamic Covenant.*

In developing this argument, there will be use for several portions of Scripture which are too extensive for transcription: these the reader is requested to examine

carefully, that he may judge correctly of the comments which we propose to offer.

The covenant referred to, is recorded in Genesis, xvii: 1-14. We propose to prove that this is the covenant under which the church now exists. If this can be established, the conclusion which we have in view is inevitable. Infants were certainly included in that covenant; hence it follows that they were, and still are, by Divine appointment, members of the church.

The promises of the covenant are as follows: 1. "A father of many nations have I made thee." 2. "To be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee." 3. To give unto Abraham and to his seed the land of Canaan.

As to the first of these promises, we deny that it relates solely to the lineal descendants of Abraham, and maintain that it includes all the followers of his faith.—The second we regard as a promise of spiritual blessings, the chief and sum of which is everlasting life through Jesus Christ. In the third, Canaan is promised as a type of heavenly rest: of course, in making such a promise, the antitype was the object mainly in view.—In short, we maintain that the covenant of which circumcision was formerly the token, is the same covenant into which, under the Christian dispensation, human beings are introduced by baptism.

For the confirmation of these views, we rely on other portions of Scripture, (found chiefly in the New Testament,) which explain the effects of circumcision, and the nature of the Abrahamic covenant. Heb. xi: 14-16.—"For they that say such things, declare plainly that they seek a country. And truly, if they had been mindful of that country from whence they come out, they might have had opportunity to have returned: but now they desire a better country, that is, an heavenly: wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God: for he hath prepared for them a city." Here is evidently a reference to the covenant we are considering. It is in consequence of that covenant, Jehovah is known as the "God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob." There is no other transaction recorded, in which this title can be supposed to have originated; or that can impart to it any other meaning than that intended when God said to

Abraham, "I will be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee." The reason, then, why God is not ashamed to be called their God,—the foundation of the title,—is that he hath prepared for them "an heavenly country,"—a "city,"—"a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God," (verse 10.) If there is in this passage an allusion to the promise of Canaan, (and we think it clear that there is,) Canaan is regarded, as we have represented it, merely as a type of Heaven. In the same epistle, the promise of Canaan is called "the gospel," and identified with the gospel which we enjoy under the Christian dispensation. "To whom sware he that they should not enter into his rest, but to them that believed not?" "So we see that they could not enter in, because of unbelief. Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. For unto us was the gospel preached, as well as unto them: but the word preached did not profit them, not being mixed with faith in them that heard it."—Heb. iii: 18, 19, and iv: 1, 2. Now, if Canaan was promised as a type of Heaven; that promise, of course, comprehended a promise of Heaven; and there is no difficulty in understanding why it is called the gospel. But on no other hypothesis is there any propriety in the remark, "Unto us was the gospel preached, as well as unto them."* We think it has now been proved that the second promise in the covenant is a promise of eternal life; and that in the third, Canaan is promised as a type of Heaven. As we pursue our investigations, we shall find much additional evidence of

* A different rendering of this passage has been proposed: "*Unto us were glad tidings proclaimed, as well as unto them.*" If the intention is merely to substitute a definition for the term defined, the question is purely one of taste; but if it is to get rid of the idea that Paul identifies what was preached to the Jews with what was preached to "us," the matter is one of serious importance. According to this interpretation, the whole meaning of the sentence is, "what was proclaimed to the Jews resembled what was proclaimed to us in being adapted to excite gladness;" and the sum of the argument, "Things adapted to excite gladness have sometimes been heard without profit; therefore, since the gospel is adapted to excite gladness, let us be careful that we do not hear it without profit." There may *possibly* exist men weak enough to write nonsense at this rate, even when serious; but Paul, even apart from his inspiration, was a very different man.

the same truths; for it would be impossible to keep the discussion of the several points that will claim our attention *separate*, without incurring an amount of repetition, and extending our remarks to a length which we are anxious to avoid.

In the New Testament, it is taken for granted, that the everlasting favour of God is promised to the children of Abraham *as such*; but the doctrine is earnestly inculcated, that mere lineal descent from that Patriarch will not prove an interest in the promise. For example, John the Baptist said to the Pharisees and Sadducees, "Bring forth therefore fruits meet for repentance. And think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father: for I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." Now, where is the promise alluded to in this passage, on which John's hearers were in danger of presuming, and which implied that if *they* were rejected, others should be raised up as children of Abraham? We find it in the covenant of which circumcision was the token: "To be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee." A promise of essentially the same import, as we think, had indeed been made twenty-four years earlier: "In thee shall all families of the earth be blessed."—Gen. xii: 3. But the immediate reference cannot be to this passage, because those who are to be blessed are not here described as the children of Abraham, but in general terms, as families of the earth.

Let us now examine the second, third and fourth chapters of the epistle to the Romans. Here is a connected train of reasoning, intended to prove that the way of justification by faith in Jesus is needful and applicable to Jews and Gentiles without distinction,—in opposition to the notion that the Jews, being circumcised descendants of Abraham, might obtain the favour of God in a different way.—(See chap. iii: verse 1.) Now, if the covenant of circumcision related solely to *temporal* blessings, to prove that fact would have been the obvious, direct, and only appropriate, method of refuting the error in question. But let us analyze Paul's argument. From the first verse of the second chapter to the eighth of the third, he is proving that God, being a righteous judge,

with whom is no respect of persons, cannot permit sin to go unpunished, because committed by a circumcised person, but must deal with the same character in the same manner, whether it be found in Jew or Gentile.—And this implies that the true end of circumcision is gained, an interest in the promises of the covenant is enjoined, by none who are not *spiritually* qualified.—Ch. ii: vs. 28, 29. His second position is, that the Jews, being sinners, no less than the Gentiles, cannot be justified by works.—Ch. iii: vs. 9-20. The next, that the way of justification by faith in Christ, is of Divine appointment, suited to sinners as such, and, therefore, applicable alike to Jews and Gentiles.—(Vs. 21-31.) He proves, in the last place, (ch. iv.,) that the Abrahamic covenant was made with distinct reference to this mode of justification, so that the promises of the covenant extend to all believers, and to believers only. He insists that Abraham was justified, not by works, but by faith, (vs. 1-8,)—that he was justified first, and afterwards received circumcision in the specific character of one already justified by faith, (vs. 9-11,)—and that by being thus circumcised he became the father of all believers, in such sense that they are interested in the promise made to him, and this includes the imputation of righteousness, (vs. 11-16.) We beg the special attention of our readers to the verses last referred to. The connexion between the 12th and 13th verses, proves that the promise in question is the promise to which circumcision was annexed. Paul then asserts that *by circumcision* Abraham became the father of all believers; in other words, that they are his seed, in the sense of the covenant,—that accordingly they are interested in the promise of the covenant; that the blessing promised is bestowed by grace, received by faith, is sure to all believers, and includes the imputation of righteousness.

It is evident, then, that this covenant is still in force, and contains a promise of God's everlasting favour; and that all believers are interested in it, as children of Abraham.

Let us turn to the ninth, tenth and eleventh chapters of the same epistle. At the beginning of chapter 9th, Paul expresses his sorrow for the Jews, in view of the

fact that they were under condemnation, (vs. 1-5.) This fact, however, he declares, is not inconsistent with God's promise to Abraham; since lineal descent from that Patriarch, and visible relation to the covenant, do not necessarily imply a personal interest in the promise. "Not as though the word of God hath taken none effect. For they are not all Israel, which are of Israel; neither because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children: but, in Isaac shall thy seed be called. That is, they which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God: but the children of the promise are counted for the seed," (vs. 6-8.) And on the sovereignty of God, as implied in this statement, he dwells at considerable length. He then shows (vs. 22-30,) that God is accomplishing his purpose as formerly announced by the prophets, when he rejects multitudes of Jews, and saves a chosen people, consisting partly of Jews and partly of Gentiles. He then proceeds to show, (verse 30, and onward to the close of the next chapter,) that the condemnation of the Jews is owing to their unbelief,—that the only way of salvation is by faith in Jesus Christ,—that this way is open alike to Jews and Gentiles,—and that, therefore, since faith cometh by hearing, it is reasonable that the gospel should be preached to the Gentiles, and God has distinctly announced his will that this should be done. In proceeding to notice chapter the 11th, we must bear in mind the distinction, mentioned at the commencement of this part of the epistle, between a visible relation to the covenant, and a saving interest in its promise. The promise does secure that many, *but not all*, who stand in that relation, shall be saved,—and saved by that means. Actual salvation is certainly referred to in verses 5-7; but to explain the breaking off, mentioned verse 17, in the same manner, would imply that all the Jews who were rejected,—the great mass of the Jews of that generation,—had once been truly pious. Paul, then, teaches that some who formerly stood in that relation, in consequence of lineal descent from Abraham, have been cut off from it, while others still retain it, and have been brought into a state of salvation by means of it, (vs. 1-10,)—that by means of the rejection of a part, Gentiles have been brought into the same

relation from which they fell, (verses 11-22,)—and that reason, (vs. 22-24,) prophecy, (vs. 25-27,) and especially, the original promise made to the patriarchs of the Jewish nation, (verses 28, 29,) prove that a time will come, when the great body of that nation shall be restored to that relation from which their fathers fell. Thus it is evident that the relation—the church—from which the unbelieving Jews were broken off, is the same into which believing Gentiles are introduced, and to which believing Jews are hereafter to be restored. But one question remains: Is the promise which is represented in this portion of the epistle as securing the salvation of the seed of Abraham, the same to which circumcision was annexed? On this point we cannot doubt, if we remember how Paul speaks of circumcision in a passage already noticed.—Rom. iv : 11-16. Moreover, in the commencement of this portion of the epistle, Paul identifies the promise in question, as that to which God alluded, when he said to Abraham, “In Isaac shall thy seed be called.” And there can be no possible difficulty in determining what promise that was.

There is another circumstance which may be mentioned in this connexion, as confirming the conclusion to which this portion of Scripture naturally conducts us.—The most terrible spiritual evils are represented as having been formerly consequent on the fact of being *uncircumcised*—Gentiles; and these, we are informed, are removed,—that is, we are brought into the same relation to God in which the Jews formerly stood,—by admission into the Christian church. “Wherefore remember, that ye, being in time past Gentiles in the flesh, who are called uncircumcision by that which is called the circumcision in the flesh made by hands; that at that time ye were without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world. But now, in Christ Jesus, ye who sometimes were far off, are made nigh by the blood of Christ.”—Eph. ii : 11-13.

The same subject is more fully explained in the second chapter of the epistle to the Colossians. The immediate design of this whole chapter is to guard the people

addressed against the influence of Judaizing teachers. The amount of the argument is this: Christ is a perfect Saviour. In him "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." Hence, his religion, instead of being improved, would be corrupted, by the addition of either the inventions of men, or the abrogated rites of a former dispensation. These false teachers laid great stress on circumcision; as, in their view, that ordinance brought along with it an obligation to observe all the ceremonies of the Mosaic law. On that subject, therefore, Paul expresses himself thus: "And ye are complete in him, which is the head of all principality and power: in whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ: buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead. And you, being dead in your sins and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he quickened together with him, having forgiven you all trespasses."—Verses 10-13.

We, of course, remark on this passage only, so far as to indicate its bearings on our argument. The Colossians, then, according to this representation, were formerly unpardoned and dead in their sins, and these evils were intimately connected with the *uncircumcision of their flesh*. But now, they are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, buried and risen with Christ in baptism, quickened and pardoned; therefore, they have now no need of literal circumcision. That is, as *baptized* believers, under the Christian dispensation, they are in possession of all the spiritual blessings which were enjoyed by *circumcised* believers *as such*, under the former dispensation; and, therefore, they need not be circumcised. Thus we are taught that baptism, under the Christian dispensation, is connected with the same spiritual blessings with which circumcision was connected under the former dispensation. And in asserting this proposition, its converse is of course implied.

This consideration suggests another. As circumcision was formerly connected with the same blessings with which baptism is now connected; so the connection, in

both cases, is of the same kind,—a covenant connexion; and as those blessings were then, as now, to be obtained by faith, it follows that the covenant is the same. In other words, baptism is now connected with the same covenant with which circumcision was formerly connected,—the Abrahamic covenant. But we have other evidence to offer in proof of the same proposition. The sum of the Abrahamic covenant, we have seen, was, *I will be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee*. Of the two other promises, one relates to a type of the principal blessing comprehended in this, and the other to the number that should enjoy the blessings promised. Let us now pass to the other term of the comparison. Baptism into a person, or into his name, is a method of devoting one as a disciple, follower, servant or subject of that person, and brings along with it all the rights and obligations implied in such relation. (As examples confirmatory of this statement, see 1 Cor. i: 13 and 15, and 1 Cor. x: 2.) Now, compare the baptismal formula,—*Into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost*,—with the promise in the Abrahamic covenant, and you will perceive that they denote precisely the same relation. In the one passage, you see Jehovah assuming the public relation of the God of a particular people. In the other, you find a command that human beings should be publicly devoted to the triune Jehovah as their God—their Father, Redeemer, and Sanctifier. The identity of the relation proves the identity of the covenant.

As further evidence on the same point, we are about to quote a passage from the third chapter of the epistle to the Galatians; but, in order to judge of the pertinence of the quotation, the reader will find it necessary to pay some attention to the train of reasoning that runs through the whole chapter. Paul, then, is refuting the errors in relation to the obligation of the ceremonial law into which the Galatians had been led by Judaizing teachers. He argues, that the salvation of believing Gentiles is secured by the promise of God to Abraham,—that the law subsequently given could not rescind that promise, and must not be understood in any sense inconsistent with it,—that it did not reveal another way in which

salvation could be attained, but was designed for a temporary purpose, in subordination to the promise made to Abraham. Now, before quoting the passage to which we have alluded, it will be necessary to identify the promise on which this whole argument is founded. This is not difficult. In a passage already quoted, (Rom. iv: 11-16,) we are unequivocally taught that it was by circumcision Abraham became "the father of all them that believe," and that the promise to which circumcision was annexed secures the salvation of believing Gentiles, in the specific character of the seed of Abraham. This is decisive; but to cut off an objection, we must notice verses 7th and 8th of the chapter under review. "Know ye, therefore, that they which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham. And the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all nations be blessed." The objection is, that Paul here quotes from the 12th of Genesis, and not from the 17th, which contains the appointment of circumcision. The obvious answer is, that he quotes this in illustration of the promise alluded to in the sentence immediately preceding. He had reminded his brethren that, they who are of faith are the children of Abraham; but the sentence quoted immediately after, if taken alone, would not prove that proposition, for it contains no mention of *the children of Abraham*. Our interpretation removes the difficulty. Alluding (in verse 7,) to the promise of Jehovah, to be a God to Abraham and his seed, he affirms that believing Gentiles are children of Abraham in the sense of that promise; and to prove it, he quotes a passage in which the same thing is promised, but not in the same words, the heirs of the promise being described as *all nations, or all families of the earth*. The way is now prepared for the following quotations: "For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus. And if ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise."—Vs. 27-29. It will not be denied that the expressions to *put on Christ*, and to *be Christ's*, denote the

same relation. In verse 27th, this relation is declared to be connected with baptism; in verse 29th, the consequences of that relation are declared to be, that we "are Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise," to which circumcision was annexed. Thus it is evident that baptism is now connected with the Abrahamic covenant,—the same covenant with which circumcision was formerly connected.

The church is the covenant people of God. A member of the visible church is one who, as to visible relation, is under that covenant; and the identity of the church depends upon the identity of the covenant. The covenant under which the church now exists comprehends God's promise to bestow eternal life on believers through Jesus Christ, and binds all who are under it to the obedience of faith. Now, so strongly does this description apply to the Abrahamic covenant, that if any of the lineal descendants of Abraham fall short of eternal life, the Scriptures, as we have seen, explain the fact, by informing us that they are not Abraham's seed in the sense of the covenant. Had we no further proof, this would be sufficient to establish the identity of the church now existing with the society which was instituted in the family of Abraham. From the consideration just mentioned, we would naturally infer that believers, of whatever nation, are children of Abraham in the sense of the promise; and such, the Scriptures assure us, is the fact.

What change, as to the membership of the church, took place at the introduction of the Christian dispensation? Unbelieving Jews were cut off from that visible relation in which they had stood, but believing Jews were retained in that relation, and converts from among the Gentiles were admitted to the same relation. Who, then, can doubt that the church, in the Apostolic age, was the same church that had existed from the time of Abraham; and retained the same relation to God?

In further confirmation of the same truth, we have seen that, previously to the introduction of the Christian dispensation, uncircumcision was connected with deplorable evils, and that these evils are, under the Christian dispensation, removed by embracing the gospel,—that baptized believers, *as such*, enjoy, under the

Christian dispensation, the same spiritual blessings that *circumcised* believers, *as such*, enjoyed under the former dispensation. And, as the church is the human party to the baptismal covenant, we have seen that the baptismal covenant is identical with the covenant which was made with Abraham, and of which, till the introduction of the Christian dispensation, circumcision was the token. To determine, then, who are members of the church, according to the will of God, we have only to turn to the Abrahamic covenant, and ascertain whom it includes; and as it clearly includes infants with their parents, here is a Divine warrant for the membership of infants in the visible church.

One of the most plausible objections to the arguments which have now been presented, is drawn from the fact that there are some passages of Scripture that seem to refer the origin of the church to a later date than that which we have indicated. Thus, Daniel represents it as still future, when he says, "And in the days of these kings shall the God of Heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed;" and our Saviour, when he says, "Upon this rock I will build my church." But if this objection is to prevail, we shall be driven to the conclusion that the church had no existence in any part of the Apostolic age; and, indeed, that its commencement is still future. John tells us, "And I heard a loud voice saying in Heaven, Now is come salvation, and strength, and *the kingdom of our God*, and the power of his Christ; for the accuser of our brethren is cast down, which accused them before our God day and night."—Rev. xii: 10. Without attempting to say to what event this passage relates, we may safely take it for granted that the event was still future, when this book was written. Shall we infer that the church—*the kingdom of our God*,—had as yet no existence? Paul tells us that the Lord Jesus Christ "shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and *his kingdom*."—2 Tim. iv: 1. The event here mentioned is still future: shall we infer that the church—the kingdom of Christ—does not yet exist? To explain these passages is to explain those on which the objection is founded; nor is the explanation difficult. A wonderful increase in the glory of the church is, by

an obvious figure, represented as her beginning; and it would be easy to show that the sacred writers frequently apply figurative expressions of the same kind to other subjects.

Another objection is drawn from the prediction of a *new* covenant, uttered by Jeremiah, and quoted by Paul. (See Jer. xxxi: 31-34; and Heb. viii: 8-12.) This *new* covenant, let it be observed, is contrasted, not with the Abrahamic covenant, but with that which was made at Sinai. The Abrahamic covenant, we have seen, is still in force; but the covenant at Sinai was a temporary arrangement, made for the purpose of carrying into effect, in part, the provisions of that covenant. This subordinate arrangement has been superseded by the Christian dispensation—the covenant described by Jeremiah and Paul—under which God is still more signally performing what he promised to Abraham. Accordingly, a little attention to this latter covenant will convince us, that it is identical with the covenant of which circumcision was the token. The sum of what was promised to Abraham was, *to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee*. In the new covenant, Jehovah says, *I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people*; and with this is intimately connected every other promise that it contains.

As to the objection sometimes brought against our doctrine, that it “engrafts Judaism on the gospel of Christ,”—it is sufficient to say, that the Abrahamic covenant is distinct from the Mosaic dispensation, and existed hundreds of years before it; and that the interest of believing Gentiles in that covenant,—the very principle for which we are contending,—is the foundation of Paul’s argument against engrafting Judaism on the gospel of Christ,—as has been already proved from the third chapter of the epistle to the Galatians.

Various points of dissimilarity have sometimes been specified between circumcision and baptism. These we need not examine in detail. In but one respect does our argument require the substitution of baptism for circumcision—that it is a token of the same covenant. Females, we know, were not circumcised; but they, no less than males, were included in the covenant. This proves their

right to church-membership; and with a right to church-membership, whether in male or female, a right to baptism is inseparably connected under the Christian dispensation.

It is sometimes argued, that the covenant of which circumcision was the token, must have been abrogated with the ceremonies of the Mosaic law, because our Saviour said to the Jews, *Moses, therefore, gave unto you circumcision*, (John vii: 22.) The whole meaning evidently is, that the law of circumcision was found in the writings of Moses; and, therefore, the Jews, being professed disciples of Moses, acknowledged their obligation to observe it: that our Saviour did not intend to class it with the things originating in the law of Moses, is evident from the words immediately following—"Not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers." It is evident, therefore, that what our Saviour here says of the law of circumcision is equally true of every precept of the decalogue; and if this passage proves that the Abrahamic covenant is not now in force—if it even proves, what may easily be demonstrated from other portions of Scripture, that the rite of circumcision is not now obligatory,—then, on just the same grounds, it may be proved that the whole moral law is abrogated.

It is further objected, that even in the case of adults, piety was not prerequisite to circumcision; and that this is proved by the fact that servants were, by Divine command, circumcised simply as property. Both parts of this statement are, we conceive, erroneous in point of fact. As to the former part of the statement, it is obviously inconsistent with the statement of Paul, in Rom. ii: 28, 29, already referred to; and, at present, we shall mention but one passage more. It will, of course, be admitted that no man can lawfully enter into covenant with God by his own act, without a state of heart corresponding with the obligation which he takes on himself. This is only saying that, in every transaction with God, sincerity is indispensable. The engagement involved in circumcision, then, is described in Isaiah lvi: 6, 7. Let the reader examine it, and judge for himself, whether any man could enter heartily into that covenant, without piety. The other part of the objection we deem equally

erroneous. God did, indeed, say to Abraham, "He that is born in thy house, and he that is bought with thy money, must needs be circumcised." The question is, how did this apply to Abraham's adult servants? Was it a command to their master to circumcise them, or compel them to be circumcised? Or, was it a message sent to them through their master, to enter into covenant with God,—heartily, of course,—by circumcision? From verse the 14th, we learn that the penalty of uncircumcision fell on the uncircumcised person himself, and consisted in excision from the covenant people of God, privation of the advantages and blessings of the covenant. This is decisive. The benefits of the covenant were offered to Abraham's servants, and they were commanded to accept the offer, and signify their consent to the covenant by circumcision. Had they refused, the controversy would have been, not between them and their master, but between them and God; but, of course, they could not have been regarded by themselves, or recognised by others, as having any interest in the covenant, or title to its benefits.

We notice but one objection more. Circumcision, we are told, is sometimes mentioned in the New Testament, in a manner quite inconsistent with the doctrine here advocated. Thus we read, "Behold, I, Paul, say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. For I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law."—Gal. v: 2, 3. The answer is easy. Paul here speaks of circumcision, not in reference to what it really was, as an ordinance of God, but in reference to the false ideas of its nature, inculcated by Judaizing teachers, and adopted by their followers. Circumcision was insisted on, as the token of a covenant of works. No attempt had been made to impose it on Gentile converts, in any other view; and Paul declares that to receive it with this view is to renounce Christ; because a man cannot be in Christ, and under a covenant of works, at the same time. That this must be his meaning is certain; since, otherwise, it would follow from his assertion that Abraham had no saving interest in Christ. And we may add,

that in no other view can this passage be reconciled with Rom. iv : 11-16.

This suggests the true answer to a question that is often asked : "How shall we account for it, on Pedobaptist principles, that, in the discussion on circumcision, recorded in the 15th chapter of Acts, nothing is said about baptism as a substitute for that rite?" Circumcision was insisted on, by the false teachers, as a token of a covenant of works. Hence, to argue against them, that baptism has come in the place of circumcision, would have tended to betray men into the error of regarding baptism as the token of a covenant of works. The apostles, therefore, employed an argument far more appropriate, as it reached the radical error, and was not likely to suggest any false conclusion ; and it is the same argument that they uniformly employ, when discussing the same subject : "The blessings supposed to be connected with circumcision and the observance of the law, God has promised to bestow, and does actually bestow, on Gentile converts, without any such condition ; hence, such converts could derive no possible benefit from circumcision."

Here we close our second argument, which was derived from the Abrahamic covenant. We argue,

III. *From household baptism, as practised by inspired men.*

We shall mention but one example. Acts xvi : 14, 15. "And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple, of the city of Thyatira, which worshipped God, heard us ; whose heart the Lord opened, that she attended unto the things which were spoken of Paul. And when she was baptized, and her household, she besought us, saying, If ye have judged me to be faithful to the Lord, come into my house, and abide there." The bearing of this passage on our subject depends on a single question : "Were the members of Lydia's family baptized as believers?" In support of the affirmative, an appeal is sometimes made to verse 40th, "And they went out of prison, and entered into the house of Lydia, and when they had seen the brethren, they comforted them and departed." Here, it is said, the members of Lydia's household are called

brethren. But how does the fact that Paul and Silas met certain persons at Lydia's house, prove those persons to have been members of Lydia's family? Till this point shall have been established, the appeal cannot be sustained.

In support of the negative, we do not rely on the *mere* fact that the conversion of Lydia's household is not recorded. Here, in a continuous narrative, occupying a very short paragraph, two closely connected facts are recorded. One person only is mentioned as concerned in the first; and, in the next sentence, she and others are mentioned as concerned in the second. We say, such a structure of the narrative proves it to have been inconsistent with the writer's intention to convey the idea, that all who were concerned in the second fact were likewise concerned in the first. The sacred writer tells us, (we are not quoting his words,) that Lydia believed, and she and her household were baptized. This is a very different thing from saying, that she and her household believed, and were baptized. And if this latter was true, the distinction drawn between Lydia and her household tends to deceive us, and admits of no explanation. This is not all. The baptism of Lydia and her family, instead of being distinctly recorded, is only alluded to incidentally, as connected in point of time with Lydia's inviting Paul and his companions to her house. Now, this, on Pedobaptist principles, requires no explanation. The baptism of herself and family is just what we would have expected after hearing of her conversion; and hence, there was no need for a formal statement on the subject. But on the other hypothesis, here is an inexplicable difficulty. The idea intended to be conveyed is, that all the members of a family were converted and baptized; and the method adopted for conveying that idea is this: The conversion of the head of the family is recorded very distinctly, in the first place; and then, in passing to a different subject, the writer makes an incidental allusion to the fact that she and her household were baptized. Can any one show an instance in which a Baptist minister, recording the labours of another Baptist minister, has constructed his narrative after this fashion? We need not ask the question. So far as we have

ever heard, no man ever wrote a passage like that before us, when he intended to convey the idea that all the members of a family had become believers and been baptized, and should any one do so, we are confident he would forfeit his reputation for common sense. This single passage, then, establishes the following position: There are human beings who are to be baptized, not as believers, but as members of believers' families.

It has sometimes been said that this argument, if it proves anything, proves too much,—proves that every one who happens to be a member of a believer's family, ought to be baptized, no matter what his age or character. We adhere firmly to the argument; and acknowledge the obligation, either to admit the conclusion here specified, or to show that, in reference to baptism, or membership in the church, there is a scriptural distinction between the infants of believers and unbelieving adults.

It ought to be borne in mind, that the light which this passage throws on the law of baptism is incidental. To illustrate that subject was no part of the end had directly in view by the sacred writer. It was not the primary object of the passage. The law of baptism is presumed to be familiar to the reader, and to him it belongs to avail himself of that knowledge in interpreting the record. If, therefore, any distinction between infants and adults is implied in those passages of Scripture from which we have hitherto argued, it is our duty to avail ourselves of that distinction in interpreting this passage. And, if there are texts, (such as Acts viii: 36, 37, for example,) which, while they have no bearing on the case of infants, represent faith as prerequisite to baptism in the case of adults, the baptism of households must be understood in a manner consistent with that principle. We see then, in the first place, that there are human beings who are to be baptized, not as believers, but as members of believers' families; and, in the second place, that *in adults*, faith is required as a qualification for baptism. Let the reader draw his own conclusion.

Let us now review the ground over which we have travelled. All who acknowledge the obligation of baptism as an ordinance now in force, agree in regarding a

right to baptism, and a right to membership in the visible church, as inseparably connected. Hence, we have not felt called on to prove this connexion. We have seen that nothing is said in Scripture about the church, inconsistent with the membership of infants; and that neither the Apostolic commission, nor the recorded practice of inspired men, implies such a connexion between faith and baptism, as would exclude infants from baptism. Having thus prepared the way for exhibiting evidence in favour of what we deem the true doctrine, we proceeded to show, that the membership of infants in the church was directly asserted by the Saviour himself. We next saw that, in this instance, he simply affirmed a principle which had been in actual operation two thousand years. That the church at this moment stands on the Abrahamic covenant,—that baptism is a token of the same covenant of which circumcision was formerly a token,—we saw to be a doctrine which is taught clearly, in various forms, and in numerous passages of the word of God; and, in some instances, made by the sacred writers the foundation of extended trains of reasoning; and that infants were included in the Abrahamic covenant, is undisputed. And finally, though the Scriptures plainly teach that, *in the case of adults*, faith is prerequisite to baptism, we have found an instance in which certain human beings were baptized by inspired men, not as believers, but as members of a believer's household. We have not undertaken to present all the evidence which the Scriptures afford for the church-membership, or baptism of infants. But to us, at least, the proofs which have been mentioned seem quite sufficient to place the question beyond the reach of reasonable doubt or debate.

This article has grown to a tedious length, but we must beg the patience of the reader for a moment longer. We wish to point out, in a few sentences, the connexion of the subject discussed with another of much importance. There are two theories, as to what constitutes the radical idea of church-membership. According to the one, it is a claim to personal piety, judged credible by competent ecclesiastical authority; and of course, no one can right-

fully continue a member of the church any longer than such a claim exists. According to the other, it is a visible covenant relation to God; and the reason why an unconverted person may not, by his own act, become a member of the church is, that he does not heartily consent to God's covenant.

In a former article, these theories were contrasted; and although a few of our arguments were based on distinctively Pedobaptist principles, yet, independently of these, it was, we trust, satisfactorily shown, that the latter theory, as contradistinguished from the former, is supported by numerous passages of Scripture, taken in their most natural and obvious construction. Now, the fact cannot be overlooked without very strange inattention, that the argument for infant baptism, drawn from the Abrahamic covenant, necessarily contemplates church-membership as purely a covenant relation. Moreover, if the other theory be true, the church-membership of an infant is a gross absurdity; because the radical idea of the relation has no application to his case; he cannot be a member of the church, for he can make no claim to piety, and exhibit no evidence of that quality.

Hence, whatever evidence the Scriptures afford for infant baptism, tends equally to establish the leading doctrine of our former article; and no Pedobaptist can consistently maintain that the want of piety, *of itself*, infers the loss of membership in the church. Its proper effect evidently is, to place the party in the same ecclesiastical position with those baptized persons who have never professed to be pious. A brief indication of our views as to what that position is, has already been given to the public.

But if, as we believe, church-membership is a covenant relation, then, in infant baptism there is nothing even apparently unreasonable. It is merely the application to this subject of the principle that the public relation of the child is determined by the public relation of the parent,—a principle which, in many of its applications, is admitted by all mankind; and which is distinctly recognised in the laws of every civilized nation. And when we look into the Bible, we find the same principle recognised in every federal transaction there recorded to

have taken place between God and man. That the church covenant should exhibit the solitary exception, is before-hand highly improbable. And though this consideration would not, *of itself*, constitute a warrant for infant baptism, it might well awaken surprise, if, on due search, no such warrant could be found.

ARTICLE IV.

THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE SCRIPTURES—THE PHARISEES AND SADDUCEES—RATIONALISM AND TRADITIONALISM.

The incarnate Word, during his personal ministry on earth, was accustomed to warn his disciples against the "leaven of the Pharisees and of the Sadducees," and the warning has been left upon record for our learning, upon whom the ends of the world are come. The wheel of error, like that of fortune, is perpetually revolving, and ever and anon, delusions which we hoped were long ago exploded, and which we had begun to contemplate only as the mummied memorials of influences once terrible to mankind, have re-appeared with almost the vitality and energy of eternal truth. Serpents, which Christianity had strangled in her cradle, have again and again revived after the torpor of ages, and assailed her in her maturity, with a deadlier venom and a sharper sting. The Pharisees and Sadducees have survived innumerable transmigrations, and, at this very time, are exalting themselves against the righteousness of God, as they did in the days of their youthful freshness and vigour. Scriptural Christianity, over which is the superscription written,—“The Bible, and the Bible alone our Religion,”—is still crucified between the two thieves of ecclesiastical rationalism and ecclesiastical traditionalism.

A full enumeration of the points of resemblance between the ancient and modern Pharisees and Sadducees, would obviously transcend the limits of a single article; and we shall, therefore, confine ourselves to the single point announced at the beginning, and signalize the two

great forms of error in regard to the Scriptures as a sufficient Rule of Faith and Practice.

The following general account of these ancient sects has been drawn up by an able hand, and will aid us in forming some adequate conception of their relative position and influence in Church and State :

“The Sadducees exerted their influence over the Sanhedrim, the Temple and the Priesthood : and the Pharisees had obtained the principal direction of the schools, the pulpits of the synagogues, and the prejudices of the populace. The Sadducees were supported by the most opulent of the inhabitants. Since the days of Hyrcanus, who united in his own person, the supreme ecclesiastical power, with the civil and the military, and who was, besides, an intolerant Sadducee, the influence of the council of Elders, and of the great body of the Priests, had been employed in favour of this sect.* During the reign of Jannæus, the Sanhedrim, with the exception of a solitary individual, consisted altogether of Sadducees. Anas and Caiphas, well known in ecclesiastical history, belonged also to the same sect. The Sadducees rejected the doctrines of a special providence, of the immortality of the soul, and of a future state. With such sentiments, the Jewish Priesthood, supported by their tithes, and by their learning, the wealth and the power of Judea, presented a formidable opposition to the progress of the gospel. They combined irreligion with a profession of the established system, which, on account of its emoluments, they did not hesitate to subscribe : a combination which, however pernicious, is, alas ! far from being uncommon in other nations.”

“The Pharisees had, upon *their* side, by far the greater part of the common people. Assisted by the scribes, they engrossed, in a great measure, the ministry of the synagogues. Animated with a superstitious zeal, making pretensions to an extraordinary piety, they contrived to inflame the minds of their hearers with a spurious devotion, by their discourses from the pulpits, and their unwearied efforts to disseminate their sentiments by private conversation. They accommodated themselves to the

* Joseph. Antq. l. 13 : c. 11 ; and de Bel. Jud. l. 1 : c. 3, 4.

ignorance of the lower classes; they adapted their doctrines to the gross conceptions, the prejudices and the passions of the multitude; they imposed upon the credulity, and succeeded in ensnaring the consciences of vast numbers in their own delusions. The Pharisees professed a strict adherence to the ceremonial law, an accurate observance of the traditions of the elders, and a patriotic attachment to the liberties and independence of the country; and while they urged the doctrine of a future state, they taught that salvation was secured to the Jews, upon the sole condition of obedience to these external rites, which they uniformly represented as entitling them to covenanted mercy.”*

Who does not recognise this as a graphic picture of the two great forms of delusion which now curse the church? Differing in the details, in attitude, in distribution of light and shade, the grand outlines and leading features are the same. The resemblance between the peculiar type of rationalism prevailing among the Sadducees, and begotten by their connection with an established religion, and the modern rationalism of the German and English Establishments, is well worthy of remark. The Sadducees, to maintain their status in the church and enjoy the emoluments of place, must not utterly repudiate the canon of Divine revelation: they must hold the Law and the Prophets, or they cannot hold the fat offices in the kingdom.† The most insidious and most dangerous form of rationalism, in modern times, has been begotten in the same way: the child of unbelief by avarice, or cupidity. There was something bold, manly, thoroughly consistent, in the old English rationalism; and qualities resembling these, can be found even in that monstrous birth which reached its maturity in the French Encyclopædia: but the Wolfenbüttel fragments stole into the world after their author's death, who was, perhaps, too timid, or too honest to publish them; and his principles have been promulgated by pastors and professors, who must, by all means, retain the loaves and fishes, while

* *Mason's Christian's Magazine*, vol. iii: pp. 33, 34.

† The notion that the Sadducees recognised only the books of Moses as of Divine authority, is, we believe, now generally abandoned.

they deny the miracle; and whose inventive faculty, aroused by necessity, has furnished the world with a critical machinery worthy of all admiration: an apparatus which will leave you the Gospels entire, after all supernatural salvation is gone; or, by its mysterious alchymy, transform the historical Jesus into a mythological Hercules,—an imaginary wonder-worker,—conqueror of Hades, and restorer of a lost Paradise: in a word, which will give you the residuum (*yea, caput mortuum,*) of the play of Hamlet, with Hamlet's part left out. In both cases, it is the Church Establishments which have given rise to that peculiar form of infidelity, which we have called Ecclesiastical rationalism, and which will live and thrive, not only in its native air, but wherever men can be found who would rather play the hypocrite, even at the risk of making merchandize of souls, than forego the profits of the merchandize. It is not for nothing, that the Apostles so often speak of “filthy lucre” and the “wages of unrighteousness” in connection with false teachers. Let us add, however, that charity compels us to think, that in some cases, those who are guilty of this madness know not what they say, nor whereof they affirm. They are not the followers of Balaam, but the reverse: they curse while they desire to bless the people of God.

Every neophyte in the philosophy of religion is now longing to be God, and is filled with sadness because he is not. The giants of former generations, who have given laws to philosophical investigation, whose glowing anticipations of the progress of human knowledge and of the beneficent practical results to mankind of that progress, seem to us more like the visions of prophecy than the conjectures of uninspired sagacity, received, with the simplicity of children, the “book-revelation” from God. Conscious of the limited range of the human faculties, and of the feebleness of those faculties within their range, they were thankful for any light from the unknown sphere beyond,—for any valid testimony, and especially any Divine testimony in regard to things which the eye could not see, nor the ear hear, and which could not enter into the heart of man: which were revealed neither through sense, nor reflection, nor the primitive judgments

of the mind: they were thankful for any testimony which might explain the phenomena which could be, to a certain extent, cognized by their faculties, or teach them that these phenomena were, for the present at least, inexplicable. "*Franciscus de Verulamio sic cogitavit.*" The giants of the present generation are walking in their steps. "*Noscendo ignoratur, ignorando cognoscitur:*"—"*Sit pia confessio ignorantie magis quam temeraria professio scientie,*"—these are the utterances of the greatest thinker of the fourth century, endorsed by the greatest critic and the profoundest thinker of the nineteenth.*—"*All the true philosophy is learned ignorance,*" is the judgment of the metaphysical monarch of Scotland and of Europe. But our modern Sadducees have exhausted all the contents of the "logical revelation;" they have explored and mastered all the worlds of thought opened to them in the Bible: they weep whole volumes, because there are no more fields for conquest,—and, as was said of Byron, "wipe their eyes with the public." They tell the world in books, how vain a thing is all "book-revelation;" that the "earnest," "inquiring" spirit can never be satisfied with such tangible realities; that it is ever longing to gaze upon and be absorbed into the Infinite.†

* See Sir Wm. Hamilton's Discussions, &c. Philosoph. Appendix, B.

† The folly of this cant about an "external," "logical" "book-revelation," is ridiculed with proper severity and extraordinary felicity in the "Eclipse of Faith," ascribed to Henry Rogers, Esq., the author of "Reason and Faith," and other admirable contributions to the Edinburgh Review. We cannot account for the little notice which has been taken of this book, unless it be the not very happy selection of a title. We know of some instances in which it has been purchased under the impression that it belonged to the same class with the "Phases of Faith," and other effusions of the Martineau school. This is unfortunate. No book deserves to be more generally read. No book is better adapted to open the eyes of young men of certain constitutional susceptibilities, who have been bamboozled by the inflated nonsense and devotional atheism of the "spiritual" writers of the Westminster Review. It is thorough, and, at the same time, elegant and sprightly. Considered merely as a composition, it is worthy of all praise. We are glad to see that so popular a journal as "Harper's Monthly," has taken a decided stand on the right side. See the Editor's Table in the number for March last: though we cannot but think that the editor, in the article referred to, should have acknowledged his acquaintance with the "Eclipse of Faith."

If the Newman Brothers started from the same principles, and pursued the same method, they furnish another curious illustration of the "law of development," which one of them wrote a book to expound: a develop-

So far are they from recognising the perfection of the Scriptures as a Rule of Faith, that they, with very great difficulty, conceal their contempt for them. The faculty of intuition is the only efficient organon in the acquisition of spiritual truth, and the Scriptures, as the record of other men's intuitions, only furnish an aid to private and individual inspiration. These men are not infidels, but rational Christians: they have too much of the aesthetic to relish the ribaldry of Paine,—too much faith for the Pyrrhonism of Hume,—too much knowledge for the blundering ignorance of Voltaire. They sustain a relation to all these, somewhat analogous to that which the Sadducean Herod bore to the Pagan Pontius Pilate, and, like those worthies, will be ready to become friends, when the "Amen, the Faithful and True Witness," is to be insulted and crucified.—Luke xxiii: 12.

In support of the view which we have taken of the text referred to in the first sentence of this article, we cite, without apology, the following passage from an elaborate disquisition on Matt. xxii: 29, in a previous number of this Journal, (April 1851.)

"This little scene at Jerusalem, (that recorded in Matt. xxii: 23-33,) in which the great founder of Christi-

ment something like that of the oriental doctrine of the depravity of matter in the Syrian and Alexandrian Gnostics respectively: leading, in the one, to asceticism, and, in the other, to abandoned sensualism. So, in this case, the *Via Media* has led to Rome, and is leading to Stockholm. But here, as elsewhere, extremes meet, and infidelity is conterminous with drivelling superstition. The intuitional men are at one with the slaves of Rome: they both look for "certitude" (see Morell, Theodore Parker, &c.) to the catholic sentiments of mankind. They both hold to the rule of Vincentius Lirurensis, "*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus,*" though differing as to where the universal consent is to be found, the one taking the whole human race as the basis of the induction, the other confining themselves to the area of the church. It is also a curious thing in the vagaries of the human understanding, that the Unitarians, who, fifty years ago, were materialists and swore by Priestly, should now, for the most part, be transcendental idealists. It is a history worthy of being traced by some competent hand. What a chasm between the chemist of Birmingham and the Pantheist of Boston!

We have spoken of the *devotional atheism* of these writers. Comp. Cicero's remark (De Nat. Deorum): "*At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus Deos libros scripsit Epicurus,*"—It is no new thing under the sun.—Robespierre and his confreres had a good deal of aesthetic piety after their fashion: they made offerings of flowers as well as blood to their divinity. *O cæcas hominum mentes!*

anity vindicates the fundamental doctrine of all religion, whether natural or revealed, from the ignorant and capacious objections of a conceited and arrogant group of skepticks, may be taken as a type, or miniature picture of all the great battles which revelation has had to fight from that day to this, and of those other battles through which it must yet pass until the final triumph of the Son of Man. It is true, the Sadducees did not professedly reject revelation,—they admitted the Divine authority of Moses and the Prophets,—they conceded the inspiration of the whole Jewish canon. But there is no difference in principle betwixt rejecting a revelation wholly and absolutely on the ground of objectionable doctrines, and denying that such doctrines can by possibility be taught in an admitted revelation. It is precisely the same thing to say, the Book is Divine, and therefore the doctrine cannot be there, and to say, the doctrine is there, and therefore the book cannot be Divine. He who would exclude the doctrine upon the ground that, from its intrinsic incredibility it cannot be revealed, would exclude the revelation which professedly contained it. The Sadducees may, accordingly, be taken as the type of all who deny the possibility of any revelation, or the possibility that any particular doctrines are revealed, from measures of natural probability. They are, alike, the representatives of rationalists in the church, who admit the Divine authority of the Bible in general, while they deny the Divine authority of every thing in it which makes it of real value, and of rationalists out of the church, who treat all claims to inspiration as contradictory and absurd, and look upon prophets and apostles in the same light in which Festus contemplated Paul.”

We turn now to the Pharisees. The other sect, as we have seen, was supported by the most opulent of the inhabitants: they exerted their influence over the Sanhedrim, the Temple and the Priesthood. And so with their modern antitypes. The common people, busily employed in the solution of the three great questions,—What shall we eat, and what shall we drink, and wherewithal shall we be clothed, have no leisure for fine-spun speculations. Absorbed in matters of fact, and weighed down by the pressure of the dull realities of life, they

are unable to sublimate themselves into the ether, the congenial element of our spiritual seers: they know more of the wheel of Ixion than of the wings of Icarus: and the only response to such preachers is, "Ye bring certain strange things to our ears." The cloisters of universities and seminaries, the favourite abodes of melancholy musing, the secret cells in which the soul, shut out from the din and bustle of mankind, can sink back upon itself and down into the absolute, are much more promising fields for our subjective apostles, than the material and objective walks and work-shops of a week-day world. Hence the necessity for the Pharisees—men whose religion is altogether outward and tangible,—demanding for its comprehension no mysterious faculty, no earnest gazing into the region of dimness and shadows, no Platonic longing after the beautiful and the good, but only eyes and ears, hands and mouth, nerves and muscle, a homely Socratic religion, come down from Heaven to men. "*Les nerfs voilà tout l'homme*," said the sensational ideologists of France, and so say the Pharisees, ancient and modern. Bodily exercise profiteth much, and he who can fast the longest, and flog himself the hardest, and make the most painful pilgrimages, and show the largest tale of prayers, and wear the roughest and longest coat, and boast the loudest of the multitude who cry—"The temple of the Lord, the temple of the Lord are we,"—all of which obviously require only very strong nerves,—is the holiest man. Let us look at some of the particulars in which the Pharisees of old, and our ecclesiastical traditionalists resemble each other. They say and do not, binding heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders; but they, themselves, will not move them with one of their fingers:* all their works they do for to be seen of men, making broad their phylacteries, and enlarging the borders of their garments, loving the uppermost rooms at feasts and the chief seats in the synagogues, and greetings in the markets, and to

* The common people fasting during Lent, for example: while the Bishops and other clergy, Roman Procurators, feast on terrapin dinners: the common people paying for masses, which the Priests, doubtless, are prevented from *saying*, &c. &c.

be called of men Rabbi, Rabbi,* and Father. They shut up the kingdom of Heaven against men, neither going in themselves, nor suffering them that are entering to go in. They devour widows' houses, and, for a pretence, make long prayers: they compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, they make him two-fold more the children of hell than themselves.† They tithe the mint, anise and cummin, and omit the weightier matters of the law: straining out a gnat and swallowing a camel: making clean the outside of the cup and the platter, but within full of extortion and excess: whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness: building the tombs of the prophets, and garnishing the sepulchres of the righteous, while walking in the steps of those who slew them.‡

These particulars have been drawn mainly from the twenty-third chapter of Matthew's gospel. But the principal point still remains, the fundamental falsehood in in which they agree, and from which, as a fountain, flow those streams of desolation and death, and that is, their corruption of the Rule of Faith and Practice. "Then the Pharisees and scribes asked him, Why walk not thy disciples according to the tradition of the elders, but eat bread with unwashen hands? He answered and said unto them, Well hath Esaias prophesied of you, hypocrites, as it is written: this people honoureth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me. Howbeit, in vain do they worship me, teaching, for doctrines, the commandments of men. For laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men, as the washing of pots and cups, and many other such like things ye do. And he said unto them, Full well ye reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition * * * making the word of God of none effect

* Witness Cardinal Wiseman going into a Church in England, with two sons of gentlemen (oh, shame!) carrying his *scarlet* train. Loving to be called Rabbi, we fear, is not confined to the Pharisees, though we believe the title of "Lord Bishop" is

† Often make them editors of their public journals.—Witness "Freeman's Journal," "Catholic Herald," "Brownson's Review."

‡ Canonizing Augustine, and persecuting the Jansenists.

through your tradition, which ye have delivered: and many such like things do ye.”—Mark vii: 5-13. These traditions, originally delivered orally to Moses, had been handed down from generation to generation, and springing from the same source with the written word, were of equal authority with it, or to use the language of Trent, were to be received, “*pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia.*” How admirably these traditions harmonized with the Law and the Prophets, was made manifest when their most eminent guardians and expounders took the lead in bringing to the shame and agony of the cross, the Incarnate Word, of whom “Moses in the Law and the Prophets did write.” They were developements, no doubt, from the seminal principles of the law, in what the author of Tract No. 90 would call a “non-natural” sense, a sense in which a scorpion might be developed from the egg of a dove,—a wolf from the embryonic vesicle of a lamb, or a cancerous tumour from the normal constitution of the physical frame. So, also, their modern imitators are the chosen custodians and interpreters of the traditions of Christ and his Apostles, and act as if they had a plenipotentiary commission to “rise, kill and eat” every thing common or unclean, that is, beyond the pale of covenanted mercy, within the four corners of the globe. They abstain, with Levitical preciseness, from meats which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving of them which believe and know the truth, and devour without scruple the body, blood and divinity of the Son of God in the sacrifice of the mass, besides giving to the fowls of heaven and the worms of earth thousands of those whose only crime it was that they loved Christ too well.* The controversy between will-worship

* Macrobius (Saturn, cited by Trench in his “Star of the Wise Men,”) has preserved the following sarcasm of Augustus upon Herod the Great, who could sometimes “strain out a gnat,” as well as “swallow a camel,”—“Quum audisset (Augustus) inter pueros, quos in Syria Herodes rex Judæorum intra bimatum jussit interfici, filium quoque ejus occisum; ait, melius est Herodis porcum (uv) quam filium (viv).” This *sanglant* pun, as Trench calls it, is not altogether out of place here. A man had better be a swine in Lent, than a heretical son at any time.

“The mother of Dominick, it is said, dreamt, before his birth, that she was to be delivered of a wolf with a torch in his mouth:” an augury abundantly realized in the founder of the Inquisition, and the “acts of faith.”

and a worship regulated by the will of God, begun in Cain and Abel, and continuing through all the periods of Jewish history, has been marked, on one side, by deeds of violence and blood, and, on the other, by a meek and steadfast testimony for truth and righteousness, even unto death. The Father of Lies has been a murderer from the beginning, and will be unto the end: and as the Saviour concluded his denunciations of the Pharisees of old, by warning them that upon them should come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son Barachias, whom they slew between the temple and the altar; so when He shall come the second time without sin unto salvation to vindicate his cause, and to reward those who have been with him in his temptations, the same crushing burden of "righteous blood" will sink the modern successors of the Pharisees like a mill-stone in the mighty waters. The curse of Cain shall then be branded upon them all, and they shall be "wanderers" from the "presence of the Lord" for ever and ever.—2 Thess. i: 9-2: 8. The controversy will then be settled, and the enemies of God shall know whose word shall stand, His or their's, the Bible or tradition.*

* We cannot refrain from noticing one other point of resemblance between the ancient and modern Traditionalists, alluded to in the extract from the Christian's Magazine: it is their anxiety to get control of the "schools" of the public education of the country. The Reformation, which did so much for the common mind, not only took religion out of the hands of mercenary priests, but knowledge also. Its tendency, and, in a great degree, its aim was to convert the mass of the people from a race of slaves, thinking, praying, worshipping by proxy, into a race of men, conscious of their dignity and their individual responsibility, as the intellectual offspring of God: to remove all barriers erected by the avarice and ambition of unprincipled churchmen, and to bring the soul into immediate contact with the Father of mercies and the Father of lights. The traditionalists, from that time to this, have been educating in *self-defence*: it is Hobson's choice with them now: either a free Protestant education, or a Popish mockery of it. We have no time now to discuss the movement they are making in concert all over the country, to obtain a portion of the public school-fund, nor is it necessary. The unparalleled absurdity and impudence of the claim, upon every consideration of reason and justice, have been amply exposed. We would only remind our countrymen that "perpetual vigilance is the price of liberty," that the leading organs of the Hierarchy in this country now openly avow, what they have been denying for twenty years, that they are, on principle, a persecuting church, the legitimate successors of the men who deluged the valleys of Piedmont

While denying absolutely and most emphatically the claim of Tradition to constitute any part of the Rule of Faith and Practice, and repudiating with horror the theory of the Development of Doctrine as held by Newman and others, we hold that there is a Development of Scrip-

and the plains of Languedoc with blood: that they have defended the Duke of Tuscany in his barbarous cruelty to the Madii in the year of our Lord 1853, and declared their intention to destroy heretics on this American soil when they get the power, which, of course, will be as soon as possible. In short, let us say, the question which will have to be decided is, whether they shall rule us or we rule them. Let those Protestants who are thoughtless enough to send their children to Roman Catholic schools, think of these things, and ask themselves whether they are willing to entrust their children to men who have placed the greatest masters of thought and style, not to say the Bible itself, in their Index Purgatorius, and will cramp the minds, as well as destroy the souls of the victims of their ambition. Let them ask, as has been pertinently asked before, why the priests and nuns who are too holy to have children of their own, should exhibit such inordinate anxiety to have charge of the children of other people.— Let them remember, finally, that a sense of personal responsibility, which is always strengthened under the ministry of the only true Priest, the Son of God, in our nature, and always impaired under the ministry of every other priest, lies at the very foundation of our government, both in theory and practice.

Since writing the above, we have seen a paragraph from one of the Metropolitan Popish Journals, rejoicing in the passage of a Bill by the Legislature of California to allow the Papists a portion of the public school-fund. If the statement be true, (and we cannot believe it till we have other testimony,) it is only another example of the folly of wasting the time of the people in speech-making, and then hurrying important measures through at the heel of the session. If the law be not speedily repealed, the young Samson of the West will find, when he awakes, that he is in the hand of the Philistines, and that all his strength is gone. The Papists are putting his eyes out, and the next thing will be, the grinding in the mill. These enemies of God and man, will not allow American citizens the rights of public worship when they have the power; they are not satisfied to be on an equal footing in this country with Protestants: and, as we said before, one or the other must be supreme: either they must rule us or we them. Under the operation of the California law, Protestants will sustain Roman Catholic schools, for it is notorious that the latter pay only an infinitesimal proportion of the taxes. Let the Californians crown this wise and equitable legislation with another act, vesting the whole property of that church in the person of the Bishop, and they will soon be nearer the Mexicans, socially and politically, than they are geographically. If the American people endure such diabolical treachery to all that constitutes their peculiar glory as a nation, they deserve to be slaves. The signs of the times seem to indicate that the great question will be finally submitted to the arbitration of the sword. Hughes has his military companies in New York, it is said; and a German Catholic company is about to be formed in Baltimore. The clouds are gathering: let every man who loves his God and his country prepare himself for the storm.

ture, and cordially subscribe to the views presented in Mr. Trench's fifth Hulsean Lecture for 1845, (entitled "The Past Development of Scripture,") the purpose of which is to show "how this Treasure of Divine Truth, once given, has only gradually revealed itself; how the history of the church, the difficulties, the trials, the struggles, the temptations in which it has been involved, have interpreted to it its own records, brought out their latent significance, and caused it to discover all which in them it had; how there was much written for it there as in sympathetic ink, invisible for a season, yet ready to flash out in lines and characters of light, whenever the appointed day and hour had arrived. So that, in this way, the Scripture has been to the church as their garments to the children of Israel, which, during all the years of their pilgrimage, in the desert, waxed not old; yea, according to rabbinical tradition, kept pace and measure with their bodies, growing with their growth, fitting the man as they had fitted the child, and this, until the forty years of their sojourn in the wilderness had expired. Or, to use another comparison, which may help to illustrate our meaning: Holy Scripture thus progressively unfolding what it contains, might be likened fitly to some magnificent landscape, on which the sun is gradually rising, and ever as it rises, is bringing out one head-land into light and prominence, and then another; anon kindling the glory-smitten summit of some far mountain, and presently lighting up the recesses of some near valley which had hitherto abided in gloom; and so, travelling on, till nothing remains in shadow, no nook nor corner hid from the light and heat of it, but the whole prospect stands out in the clearness and splendour of the highest noon." And again, he says, "the true idea of Scriptural developments is this, that the church, informed and quickened by the Spirit of God, more and more discovers what in Holy Scripture is given her; but it is *not* this, that she unfolds by an independent power any thing further therefrom. She has always possessed what she now possesses of doctrine and truth, only not always with the same distinctness of consciousness. She has not added to her wealth, but she has become more and more aware of that wealth; her dowry has remained always the same,

but that dowry was so rich, and so rare, that only little by little she has counted over and taken stock and inventory of her jewels. She has consolidated her doctrine, compelled thereto by the provocation of enemies, or induced to it by the growing sense of her own needs. She has brought together utterances in Holy Writ, and those which, apart, were comparatively barren, when thus married, when each had thus found its complement in the other, have been fruitful to her. Those which, apart, meant little to her, have been seen to mean much, when thus brought together, and read each by the light of the other. In these senses, she has enlarged her dominion, her dominion having become larger to her."

It is obvious, from this view of the case, that the true "development" is only a "development" in the *knowledge* of Scripture, the written word, and differs from the Roman and Anglican theory, as widely as the "Westminster Confession of Faith" differs from the "Decrees and Canons of Trent," or the "Anglican Prayer-Book." There has been a progress in the knowledge of the church somewhat analogous to that which takes place in the individual Christian; heresies, persecutions, social and political convulsions, as well as the calm studies of philologists and the researches of travellers, have contributed to it. Wilkinson and Champollion, Young and Rossellini, Layard and Laborde, have all been elements in it. As to the distinctive doctrines of the Gospel, they have always been learned most rapidly and effectually in the furnace; its flames have brought out, to use the figure of Trench, "the characters in sympathetic ink," and revealed the presence of the Son of God in the midst. In this way apostate Babylon has been of more service to the saints in the development of doctrine, than by all her infallible decisions of popes and councils. Thousands have written upon her dungeon-walls sentences from the Bible, which the place itself eloquently expounded, and which the eye of infidel curiosity has been compelled to read. Thousands will be thankful, for ever, for the dragonades of Louis XIV., and the hell-hounds of Claverhouse, as the means by which, in the providence of God, and under the illumination of his Spirit, they have grown in practical appreciation of the preciousness of the pro-

mises, and of the comfort to be derived from knowing that there is an avenging judge. We know more, and more accurately, of the doctrine of the Trinity, for the controversies of Arius and Socinus: more of the doctrine of grace, for the heresies of Pelagius, and the aberrations of Arminius: more of the true nature of ecclesiastical power, for the usurping ambition of a Hildebrand: more of the true marks of the church of Jesus Christ, for the misrepresentations of Bellarmine: more of the morality of the Bible, for the detestable casuistry of the Jesuits: more of the value of a personal God, for the fancies of Swedenborg and the visions of Theodore Parker. There has been a great developement of Bible knowledge, by the favour of its enemies, and we doubt not, the developement will go on, till the church militant shall throw off her armour at the coming of her Lord, and rejoice in her millennial glory. "And as it was at the Reformation"—(I quote again from Trench)—"with the Pauline Epistles, as it is now with the Gospels, so, I cannot doubt, a day will come, when all the significance of the Apocalypse for the church of God, will be apparent, which hitherto it can scarcely be said to have been:—that a time will arrive when it will be plainly shewn how costly a gift,—yea, rather, how necessary an armour was this for the church of the redeemed. Then, when the last things are about to be, and the trumpet of the last angel to sound,—when the great drama is hastening with ever briefer pauses to its catastrophe,—then, in one unlooked for way or another, the veil will be lifted up from this wondrous Book, and it will be to the church collectively, what, even partially understood, it has been already to tens of thousands of her children,—strength in the fires, giving her 'songs in the night,' songs of joy and deliverance in that darkest night of her trial, which shall precede the break of her everlasting day; and enabling her, even when the triumph of Antichrist is at the highest, to look securely on to his near doom, and her own perfect victory."

How different a theory is this from that "which, refusing the Scriptures as, first and last, authoritative in and liminary of the Truth, assumes that in the course of ages there was intended to be, not only the discovery of the

Truth which is there, but also, by independent accretion and addition, the further growth of doctrine, *besides* what is there; which recognizes such accretions, when they fall in with its own notions, for legitimate outgrowths, and not, as indeed they are, for noxious misgrowths, of doctrine: and which thus makes the church from time to time the creator of new Truth, and not merely the guardian and definer and drawer out of the old."

"Ye make the word of God of none effect by your traditions!" What a load of guilt, and what a crushing doom, are contained in this terrible utterance of the Incarnate Word! Well may he who places himself in the throne of the Eternal, and claims to thunder with a voice like Him, be called the "Man of Sin," and "Son of Perdition." The stroke which shall transfix the "Lawless One" at the coming of the Son of Man, will be no "*brutum fulmen*," but a lightning-bolt whose flash shall be seen from one end of Heaven to the other, and which, while it sinks its victim in the bottomless abyss of hell, shall awaken among the morning stars and the sons of God, that song of exultation and triumph: "Rejoice over her, thou Heaven, and ye holy Apostles and Prophets, for God hath avenged you on her." "Let the heavens rejoice, and let the earth be glad; let the sea roar, and the fulness thereof. Let the field be joyful, and all that is therein: then shall all the trees of the wood rejoice before the Lord: for he cometh, for he cometh to judge the earth: He shall judge the world with righteousness, and the people with His truth."

These two gigantic forms of error formally impugn the sufficiency of the Scriptures as a Rule; but as they both spring from the darkened understandings and alienated hearts of apostate men, and are "mysteries of iniquity," the leaven is often working unconsciously in those who truly love God, and cordially abhor any system which dishonours His name, if they know that it does so. Our Saviour warns us against the "*leaven*," the silent, insensible, gradual influence of such principles. What is it but rationalism to say, as good men have often allowed themselves, under the excitement of partisan zeal and theological debate, to say, that if the Bible teaches this or that doctrine, it ought to be burnt, or thrown away?

What is it but traditionalism in the root to say, as good men, in their anxiety to make some innovation in worship, or to carry some measure of reform, have allowed themselves to say, that whatever is expedient is right? Whence all the fierce opposition to the doctrines of grace, as contrary to reason, and the intemperate denunciation of those whose conscience will not let them approve of human inventions in the house of God? Are these things of Him that called us? Are they the offspring of His Spirit, who said, "My sheep hear *my* voice, and the voice of a stranger will they not follow, for they know not the voice of strangers?" Whence the gross departures from Presbyterian and primitive simplicity in our meeting-houses, and our forms of worship? Why have we gone back to the middle ages for models of ecclesiastical architecture? Is there anything in the history of the old cathedrals, designed in sin, founded in iniquity, cemented with the tears and blood of the living temples of Christ, the monuments of idolatry and tyranny, dark and gloomy, chilly and fear-inspiring, to commend them to us who rejoice in the liberty and light of the Gospel? Is there anything in the notes of an organ, which has been so often used to celebrate the Te Deum and the Gloria in Excelsis over the slaughtered bodies of the true witnesses of Christ, to commend it to us, who profess "to sing with the spirit and the understanding also?" Why do we abuse the Papists, and then imitate them? Why do we denounce the Epicurean morality which teaches "that the end justifies the means," that "evil may be done that good may come," and then act so inconsistently? How do we differ practically, except in the extent to which the principle is carried? Building churches by lottery, or paying for them by raffling, (which, in plain English, is *gambling*,)—holding fairs and concerts, and, in other ways, converting the house of God into a house of merchandise, (and, must we add, in some instances, into "a den of thieves?")—or a fashionable musical hall: ought not such things to be left to those who are without hope and without God in the world? What strange infatuation has seized us! May we not ask, with Luther, *is God dead?* Is there no living Saviour, who has said, "Lo! I am with you always"? "Because I live, ye shall

live also"? "Of all that the Father hath given me, I will lose nothing, but will raise it up at the last day"? Is there no Holy Ghost to give efficacy to his own ordinances? Is there no God and Father of all, who is mindful of his covenant? Why, then, should our "faith stand in the wisdom of man"? O, that God would write in characters of fire on the hearts of his people, those pregnant words, "that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God."*

* See 1 Cor. ii: 5. The confusion of thought which exists, even among intelligent men, in regard to the real nature of Christian expediency, is almost incredible. We once heard, in a debate in one of the largest Synods in this country, one of the leading debaters contend that a resolution which he was defending, and which made total abstinence from intoxicating drinks a term of communion in the churches of the Synod, was not at all inconsistent with the action of the General Assembly of 1848, which made the whole matter of total abstinence an affair of Christian liberty. The argument was, that it was not expedient to drink; therefore it was a sin to drink; and, therefore, a church-member should be disciplined for drinking. It never seemed to occur to him and the gentlemen on his side, that the Scriptures never spoke of expediency except in regard to things, the lawfulness of which had been previously, and upon independent grounds, established. "All things are lawful for me," says Paul, "but all things (evidently, all *lawful* things,) are not expedient." The Scriptures know man too well, to allow him to judge of what is expedient in such matters, much less to make his notion of expediency the rule of duty: and the history of his attempts, in this kind, justify their caution abundantly. Many, too, are led into error, by too generous an interpretation of the words in the Confession of Faith, (c. i.,) about circumstances which are common to human actions and societies, and to the church. The circumstances here referred to, are the necessary adjuncts of human actions, such as time and place, decency and order. If there is to be social worship, the worshippers must agree upon the time and place: if there be a deliberative body, its proceedings require an organization, a presiding officer, etc. If any man can prove that instrumental music is a necessary adjunct of singing, then its lawfulness will be established: till then, it must be deemed and taken for an abomination. The 14th chapter of First Corinthians, which is argued mainly upon the acknowledged principles of common sense, wears a very unfavourable aspect towards these inventions for making the simple, spiritual worship of the Gospel more attractive to the carnal heart. Considered merely in the light of expediency, such measures are to be condemned. They are fostering a taste which Rome alone can fully gratify: and, by virtue of the connexion which God has ordained between the forms of worship and the doctrinal character of the dispensations of religion to which they belong, an innovation in worship is sure to lead, sooner or later, to a corruption of doctrine. Splendid churches, which sprung from corruption, will lead back to it. There must be a correspondence between architecture and the inner life of man, and the worshippers will be led gradually to ignore the "true tabernacle which the Lord pitched and not man," and the boldness of their access into the holiest of all, and come again under that yoke of bondage from which they were delivered. But this is a tempting subject, and we must forbear.

Against all these delusions, we oppose the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever. The credibility of the Scriptures once established, their sufficiency as a Rule follows by inevitable necessity; for they claim to be sufficient. They pronounce a curse upon the Sadducees who take away, and upon the Pharisees who add, any thing. "For I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book"—says the last of the prophets, in closing the canon of Revelation,—"if any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book: and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book." And again, "I have heard what the prophets said, that prophesy lies in my name, saying I have dreamed, I have dreamed. How long shall this be in the heart of the prophets that prophesy lies? Yea, they are prophets of the deceit of their own heart; which think to cause my people to forget my name by their dreams which they tell every man to his neighbour, as their fathers have forgotten my name for Baal. The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully. What is the chaff to the wheat? saith the Lord. Is not my word like as a fire? saith the Lord; and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces? Therefore, behold, I am against the prophets, saith the Lord, that steal my words every one from his neighbour. Behold, I am against the prophets, saith the Lord, that use their tongues, and say, He saith. Behold, I am against them that prophesy false dreams, saith the Lord, and do tell them, and cause my people to err by their lies, and by their lightness; yet I sent them not, nor commanded them: therefore they shall not profit this people at all, saith the Lord."—Jer. xxiii. And again, "Your kerchiefs also will I tear, and deliver my people out of your hand, and they shall be no more in your hand to be hunted; and ye shall know that I am the Lord. Because with lies ye have made the heart of the righteous sad, whom I have not made sad; and strengthened the hands of the wicked, that he should not return

from his wicked way, by promising him life: therefore ye shall see no more vanity, nor divine divinations: for I will deliver my people out of your hand: and ye shall know that I am the Lord."—Ezek. xiii: 21-23. We do not deny the possibility of some future revelation; but if it should ever be, it will be in entire harmony with all that has gone before: it will neither "make the righteous sad," nor "strengthen the hands of the wicked by promising him life," which are the characteristics of the visions and traditions of the day: and it will be authenticated by the *signs* of prophets and apostles. Let their soi-disant successors perform real miracles, raise the dead and cast out devils, and we will believe them: but let not their mighty works be impostures of Jannes and Jambres, the enchantments of the chemist or the legerdemain of the juggler, whose only effect is to withstand the prophet and resist the truth of God.

But to the law and the testimony again: "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God; and it is profitable for teaching, for refutation, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works."—2 Tim. iii: 16, 17. This is a testimony covering the whole ground, and annihilating all the pretensions of rationalism and traditionalism; the utterance of that Spirit who sees the end from the beginning, who has numbered and labelled, in his omniscience, all the poisonous delusions which can ever threaten the health or vitality of the church, and has repositied in his word the antidote appropriate to each. It is full of instruction. It teaches us, among others, the following things:

First, that the written Bible has been given by inspiration of God. The inspiration is not predicated of the man, but of the writing: not of the instrument, but of the product. So that all disputes touching degrees of inspiration, whether plenary or partial, ad verbum or ad sensum, of superintendence, of direction, of elevation, controul or suggestion; all disputes touching the "modus operandi" of the Spirit upon the souls of men selected to be his organs; all nice distinctions between revelation and inspiration, (distinctions which we believe to be real, and in their proper places valuable,) all are beside the

mark and impertinent, in the discussion of the Bible as an authoritative Rule of Faith and Practice. The whole record is from God, every word of it: every word rests upon the same authority. The salutations of Paul, his message to Timothy about his cloak, all the little epistolary details which so beautifully illustrate the spirit of Christianity, in the mutual affection, the common interests, sufferings and perils of the followers of the Lamb, speak to us in tones as imperative, as the incomprehensible statements concerning the Being and Personality of God, the mystery of the Incarnation, or the all-comprehending relations of the sacrifice on the cross. In the shallows in which a lamb may wade, in the depths in which an elephant may swim; at the base of the burning mount with the carnal men of Israel, or on the summit in the midst of blackness, darkness and tempest with the favoured prophet of the Lord: instructed by the homely wisdom of James, or entranced by "rapt Isaiah's fire"; while contemplating the history of the church under the law, or, with the apostle in the Isle of Patmos, gazing upon the church of Christ, as scene after scene of "the high and stately tragedy" is brought before the eye, the baptisms of blood and martyrdoms of fire, the conflicts and the victory: wherever we are in the Bible, it is the voice of God that meets the ear. It is the low view men take of the inspiration of the Bible, the perverse and unwarranted application of the law of parsimony, which has given rise to the vanity and folly of rationalism: or the rationalists have framed their theory to meet the necessities of their creed. It matters not which.

Second, it teaches us that the Scriptures are sufficient "for all good works": that for every exercise of the active powers of man, for every exercise of his intellectual faculties, in the business of religion, or in the relations which he sustains to the Object of all worship, and in the relations which he sustains to his fellow-men, so far as moral obligation is involved, he is fully equipped and furnished in the Word of God. There is nothing which a minister of religion needs to teach,—there is nothing which a Christian man needs to learn,—no good work to which the one ought to exhort, or which the other ought to perform, which is not expressly set down here, or ne-

cessarily involved in what is set down. But the particulars are stated:

1. It is profitable for "doctrine" or "teaching," and for "refutation": for the positive inculcation of truth, and for the refutation of error: for didactic and polemic theology. We do not mean that it contains an encyclopædia of all knowledge: that it will make men astronomers, geologists or chemists: though we protest against the notion of a Dualism in doctrine; that what is theologically true may be philosophically or scientifically false, and vice-versa, the author of the Constitution and Course of Nature, and the author of the Bible being the same.* And so, also, for "refutation," the only weapon needed is the sword of the Spirit. Both of these, didactics and polemics, are necessary in our present state, in which we are to be educated in the lessons of faith, in the midst of prevailing error and unbelief. We are to be witnesses for the one, and against the other: for the Father of Lights and against the Father of Lies.

2. It is profitable for "correction" and for "instruction in righteousness": the whole sum of human duty is here contained, and the contrary sins are rebuked: the positive and negative moral education of men are amply provided for, their reformation and their edification,—both which are necessary to a fallen man.

In conclusion, it may be added, that the method by which the Bible teaches is as admirable as the matter of its teaching. He who, to the Jews, the trustees of the oracles of God and the students of prophecy, presented Himself as "the Root and the offspring of David"; who, to the Gentiles from the East, in possession, it may be,

* We cannot sympathize with those of our brethren whose sensitiveness has led them to acknowledge the validity of the present theory of geology, and to interpret the Bible in harmony with it. The discovery of a single fossil may compel them to abandon their position, or to turn infidels. Let us wait till Geology understands itself: the votaries of it have "run too fast," to use Bacon's image, (*Wisdom of the Ancients*, under Prometheus,) "and extinguished their torch." The author of the "*Vestiges*" made a triumphant use of Geology, and men began to think that they had sprung from a tadpole or an "*acarus crossii*": but Hugh Miller's *Asterolepis* extinguished the theory, and restored the race of men to their self-complacency. Before the end of this year, the current theory may be as dead as those which have already passed away. Have faith in the Word, and it will take care of itself: or rather, have faith in God—who spake it.

of some hereditary knowledge of the "Star" of Gentile prophecy, but, at any rate, accustomed to associate the changes in the heavens with the movements and occurrences of earth, presented Himself as "the Bright and Morning Star"; and who, to the Gentiles from the West, (John xii: 20-24,) accustomed to contemplate the processes of vegetable life, as in some sort, the symbols of laws in the spiritual constitution of man, and especially to celebrate the joyous bursting of spring, after the long and dreary desolation of the winter's night, as an adumbration of the final restoration of a lost life to man,—presented Himself as a "corn of wheat," which must die in order to be fruitful: He, who clothes himself in all the names which suggest the sweet and tender sympathies of life, in order to attract us to Himself, the fountain and complement of them all, has made provision in his word for all diversities of mind and taste and vocation,—has become all things to all men, if, by any means, He might save some. To the logical, He has become a Reasoner: to the fanciful, a Poet: to the grave and practical, an Utterer of Proverbs: to the curious about the future, a Prophet: to the curious about the past, a Historian. To the refined and educated, He speaks in the exquisite diction of Isaiah: to the rude and uncultivated, He speaks the language of Amos. The ardent are justified by the fiery zeal and impetuous thinking of Paul: the gentle and loving have their sympathies enchaind by the calm and affectionate style of John. Human instruments all,—all musical with the breath of the same Spirit, all uttering the same tune, and alive, as it were, with the same melody. "Glory to God in the Highest," but ranging in the character of the sound, from the sweetness of "the flute and soft recorder" to the terrible-ness of the trumpet's blast.* Like the drops of the morning-dew, they all reflect and refract the rays of the same Sun, but with the varied and beautiful colours of the spectrum. When man makes a Manual of Faith or Duty, (unless he borrows from the Bible,) it is a repulsive mass of dry bones, a Loyola's "Spiritual Exercises":

* See Gaussen's *Thopneusty* and Hamilton's *Lamp and Lantern*, for some beautiful illustrations of the variety of Scripture.

when God presents us with one, it lives and breathes and smiles: it combines, like the Word of whom it testifies, the attractions of humanity with the awe-compelling majesty of God.

ARTICLE V.

ADDRESS TO THE SOCIETY OF ALUMNI OF UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, VA.*

Permit me, dear Brethren, to offer you my hearty congratulations upon this re-union of our Society, and the enjoyment of another year of mercies and of happy labours. A member of any of the successive classes which have issued hence, in an assemblage gathered from all those classes, meets some to whom he is a stranger in person, though a child of the same *Alma Mater*. But there is no distance between our aims and our hearts. While we meet our own fellow-students with peculiar delight, we meet all as fellow-labourers. I need not suggest how much the enjoyment of each of us would be enhanced, could we gather around us all who studied and prayed with us here; for, doubtless, the busy thought of each one has already surrounded him with the familiar band. Probably, such a meeting would be as impossible for all of us, as it would be for me. Some of those whom I here learned to love, I can see at no anniversary, till we meet the general Assembly and Church of the first-born in Jerusalem, the mother of us all. What stronger evidence of the noble and holy influence of these annual gatherings, than that fact, of which, I doubt not, every heart has already been conscious; that they do not fail to carry our thoughts upward to that glorious re-union? Let it be our aim to make this momentary resting point in our warfare, as like as possible to that eternal rest.

But we are reminded that we have not yet entered into that rest. To-morrow we return again to the struggle.

* Delivered at the Annual Meeting, June 1853.

And, therefore, the appropriate mode of observing this season, will be to make it such as God has made those Sabbaths, which are his type of the eternal rest; a season for sharpening our weapons, and girding our loins afresh for the contest.

I have thought anxiously in what way I could best contribute to this purpose. And it has seemed that, perhaps, as appropriate a topic as any whose discussion the times demand, would be *simplicity and directness of pulpit style*. Many share with me the conviction, that the renewed discussion of this topic is needful. Unless I am greatly deceived, a comparison of much that is now heard from educated clergymen with the pure standards of classic English, will prove that the vice is far gone.—Our ears have become viciously accustomed to a degree of wordiness, complexity, and ornament, which would have been called bombast, by Addison, Swift or Pope. Even Dr. Samuel Johnson, the proverb of his day for his love of the *os rotundum*, seems simple and natural beside us. But let us compare ourselves with the great ancient masters of style, as to the length and structure of sentences, the employment of useless epithet, and the mode of using figurative ornament. Let us compare ourselves, for example, with Horace, as distinguished for the sparkling beauty of his language, as for the hatefulness of his morals, and we shall comprehend something of the excess of our fault.

The profusion of reading matter among us, and the careless speed with which men write and read, must naturally tend to the same vice. Perhaps, after all the rules for style that may be laid down, the real source of transparency and beauty is the possession of the sterling ore of thought and feeling. He who has the most numerous, just, and weighty ideas, in most natural order, and whose own soul is most fully possessed and penetrated with them, usually has the finest style. It is only when the sentiment so fills and fires the soul of the speaker, that he looks wholly at the thought, and not at all at the words in which it clothes itself, that the perfection of eloquence is approached. Hence, as the art of writing much with small materials is extended, wordiness and complexity must increase. The hurried and

shallow author continually strives to outdo his rivals, and his own previous exploits, by tricking out his productions more and more with these ornaments, which are so much cheaper than great or sparkling thoughts.

History shows also, that an artificial and luxurious mode of living surely affects the literary taste of a nation. The simplicity of thought is banished. The manliness of soul, which proceeds from labour, struggles with difficulty, and intercourse with nature becomes rare. The mawkish mind of such a people, demands the same tawdry profusion and frippery in literature, which it loves in its bodily enjoyments. We know how the manly eloquence of republican Rome faded away, as the people were corrupted by luxury, into the feeble bombast of the Byzantine literature. If the rapid increase of luxury can give any ground for expecting a similar result now, that ground surely exists among us.

Hence, the impression has grown strong with me, that we need to be recalled to what would seem, to our exaggerated tastes, a severe simplicity. When one so young as myself, and so little entitled by his own skill to teach on this subject, offers his humble contribution towards this reform, he should do it with great modesty. And you will please receive what I shall offer, not as dogmatical, but suggestive. I do not dictate anything to you, but only offer, as subjects of your more thorough and wise reflection, those ideas by which I have attempted the repression of my own faults.

Permit me also to say, at the outset, that when I advocate a severe simplicity, I am waging no war against Rhetoric. I am not presuming to impugn that argument, by which I know I should be met, that since it is our duty to do our utmost for the salvation of souls, that Christian minister is faulty, who does not avail himself of every innocent aid or ornament, by which the truth can be commended. I only question, whether anything which violates a natural simplicity and directness of speech is ornament, and has any efficacy in commending truth. Let rhetoric be truly defined, as "the art of persuasion,"—the art of so addressing the human understanding, conscience and affections, as best to enforce our views, and I heartily shake hands with it. I will

say, let us have as much true rhetoric as possible. My objection to all meretricious aid is, that it is not ornament, but deformity.

Indeed, throughout this discussion, it is on the principles of a sound rhetoric itself, that I would ground all the considerations to enforce simplicity. The truest art is that which is most natural. The finest statue is that on which the strokes of the chisel are unseen; and the marble is most like native flesh. The finest painting is that in which the beholder is not for a moment reminded of the cunning union of lights and shades, but seems to see the living and breathing man, standing forth from the canvas. And so, considering our profession of public speaking as an art merely, he is most perfect in the art, in whom the hearer perceives no art, but seems to hear nature pouring forth her voice in her own spontaneous simplicity. I have seen somewhere an incident which well illustrates this proposition. A simple countryman was taken by his friends in London, to see Garrick act in Hamlet. He seemed to be intensely interested in the performance. But at his return, when his friends examined the effect of the scene upon his mind, they were astonished to find him perfectly silent concerning the great tragedian. He seemed to have made no impression on him, while he was loud in his praise of all the subordinate actors. When they asked directly, what he thought of Hamlet, they learned the explanation. "Oh!" he answered, "as to the man whose father had been so basely murdered, it was nothing strange that he should feel and act as he did. No son could help it. But as to those other people, who were only making believe, their imitations were wonderful." So true to nature, and so unaffected had been Garrick's manner, that the countryman had utterly overlooked the fact that Garrick was acting! But this was he whom the cultivated taste of Britain decided to be the prince of theatrical eloquence. One of the most just objections therefore, which can be urged against artificial ornament is, that it is a sin against art. Much that is now heard from the pulpit with admiration, would be as explicitly condemned by rhetoric, by Hamlet's instructions to the players, or by Horace's Epistle to the Pisos, as by Christian feeling and principle.

But let us introduce the more direct discussion, by reminding you of the topics and aims of our public addresses. Our subject is the most august that can fill and fire the human soul—the perfect holiness of the Divine law, redemption from eternal ruin, and the winning of eternal happiness. Our aim is to persuade men to embrace this redemption for the salvation of their souls. It is an established rule, that the grandest subjects should be treated with most sparing ornament. The greatness of the topic commends itself sufficiently without such aids. Labouring attempts to give it adventitious force, seem to be a confession that the subject does not itself possess weight enough to command the heart. Ornaments which might be graceful and appropriate when connected with a lighter topic, would seem meretricious, when applied to a grand one. We do not surround the majestic temple with the same tracery, which would be in place upon the graceful pavilion.

Again, we observe that man's nature is such that all powerful operations of the soul are simple and one.—Complexity of the affections enfeebles all. Multiplicity of figure distracts the attention, and by distracting, weakens. It is the single, mighty, rushing wind, which raises the billows of the great deep: while a variety of cross-breezes only roughen its surface with trifling ripples. A moment's thought will show us, that a multiplication of ornaments or epithets must disappoint its own object. The minds of men cannot attend effectually to a large number of impressions in rapid succession.—Although thought is rapid, yet a certain lapse of time is necessary, to allow the mind to receive, and become possessed with the idea presented to it. Hence, he who listens to the verbose speaker, is compelled to allow many of the words which fall upon his ear, to pass through his mind without impression. The mind of the listener cannot fully weigh and feel each phrase addressed to it in so rapid and complex a stream; and, consequently, it suffers them all to pass through it lightly. It cannot do otherwise, though there was, at the outset, a sincere effort of attention. Every writer or speaker, therefore, who indulges himself in heaping up useless epithets, or in the multiplication of adjectives not dis-

tinct and strongly descriptive, or in any other luxuriance of language, should remember that he is himself compelling his reader or hearer, to practice the habit of listless attention. And, then, there is an end of all vigorous impression. The speaker can no longer hope to infuse a strong sentiment into the soul of his audience. Hence the maxim so strongly enforced by Campbell, that "the fewer the words are, provided neither perspicuity nor propriety be violated, the expression is always the more vivid." To admit into our discourse any word, phrase, or figure, which has not its essential use as a vehicle of our idea, is a sacrifice of effect. The effort which the mind of the hearer is called to make towards these unessential phrases, in the acts of sensation and perception, is just so much taken from the force with which it receives the main idea. The highest species of eloquence is that which is suggestive, where clear and vigorous phrases not only convey to the hearer's mind distinct ideas, but point it to tracts of light which lead it along to higher conceptions of its own. But such phrases must be brief. Our language should, therefore, be pruned, till every word is an essential part of the clearly defined idea, which the sentence holds up, like a strong picture, to the mind of the hearer. If we wish to strike a blow which shall be felt, we will not take up a bough laden with foliage. We will use a naked club.

I suspect that the correctness of these views is confessed, even by the consciousness of persons of the most perverted taste. However they may laud their literary idol, they cannot conceal it from themselves, that their listlessness grows more and more dreary under the most brilliant sparklings of his rhetorical fire-works; that the more his sparks are multiplied, the more feebly they strike. There is, indeed, a large class of listeners, whose minds are so utterly shallow, and who are so thoroughly unconscious of the real nature and aims of eloquence, that they are pleased with the mere lingual and grammatical dexterity with which surprising strings of fine words are rolled forth. Their idea of fine speaking seems to be, that it is a sort of vocal legerdemain,—like that of the juggler, who can twirl a plate on the end of a rattan as no one else can,—an art in which the perfection of

skill consists in connecting the largest quantity of a certain style of words, with the greatest fluency, so that they shall have the semblance of meaning and melody. With minds so childish, of course he who can carry this verbiage to the greatest length, will be the greatest orator. But none here, surely, are capable of so base an ambition, as to desire this low and ignorant applause.

There are still stronger considerations, drawn from the nature of the preacher's subject, and of his purpose, in addressing his fellow men. All must admit that appropriateness is the very first element of good taste, in every art. It is needless to argue this. Now, if we consider what the preacher of the gospel professes to be, and what is the topic on which he addresses his fellow men, we shall feel how utterly inappropriate every artificial ornament is. Every minister professes to be actuated by the love of souls, and by a strong sense of their danger without the gospel. He professes to be a man who is speaking, not to amuse, nor to gain money, nor to display his talent, but to do good. Even if he is so lost to the feelings proper to his high office, as to harbour these ignoble motives, as a mere matter of taste he must conceal them; for their display in connexion with a subject so awful, cannot but be loathsome to all hearers. His motive, then, must be benevolent sympathy, and love to the Saviour. And his subject combines all that should awe the mind into sincerity, all that should unseal the fountains of tenderness, and all that should fire the soul with warm and ennobling emotions. His themes are the attributes of an infinite and jealous God, and his perfect law, that fatal lapse which "brought death into the world and all our woe," the immortal soul, with its destiny of endless bliss or pain, the tomb, the resurrection trump, the righteous Judge, the glories of Heaven, and the gloom of hell, the gospel's cheering sound, the tears of Gethsemane, the blood of Calvary, and the sweet and awful breathings of the Holy Ghost. His mission is to lay hold of his fellow men, as they hang over the pit, and draw them from perdition by the love of the Redeemer. How unspeakably inappropriate is every artifice here, which glances at self-laudation! And, how utterly unnatural is all complexity of figure! If ever man should

earnestly feel, he who presents these themes, from the motives which the preacher professes, should be instinct with earnestness. But who is there, that does not know that the eloquence of native emotion is always simple? When the wail of the bereaved mother rises from the bedside of her dying child, ah! there is no art there!— We have heard it, my brethren; and we know that our art cannot equal the power of its simplicity. When the story of his wrongs bursts from the heart of the indignant patriot, and he consecrates himself upon the altar of his country, it is in simple words. When the almost despairing soul raises to the Saviour the cry, “God be merciful to me, a sinner,” he speaks unaffectedly. So should the preacher speak. Let me urge it, then, with all the emphasis which language can convey, that the very first dictates of good taste and propriety, for him who speaks of the Gospel, are unaffectedness and directness of style. To turn away the mind’s eye, for one moment, from these overpowering realities, towards the mere accessories of rhetoric, is the most heinous sin against rhetoric. It is as though the man who desired to rouse his sleeping neighbour from a burning house, should bethink himself of the melody of his tones, while he cries fire. It is as though the champion, fighting for his hearth-stone and his house-hold, should waste his thoughts on the grace of his attitudes, and the beauty of his limbs.

Do I advocate, then, a directness and simplicity so bald as to exclude every figure? By no means. A certain class of figures is the very language of nature. Such we should use in their proper place. They are those figures which, every one sees, are used to set forth the subject and not the speaker. They are those figures which the mind spontaneously seizes when enlarged and strengthened by the earnestness of its emotions, and welds, by the heat of its action, into the very substance of its topic. Such ornaments are distinguished at a glance from the epithets, tropes and similes which the artificial mind gathers up, with an eye turned all the time upon the meed of praise it is to receive. Within the strict bounds of this directness and simplicity, there is ample scope for the exercise of genius and imagina-

tion. Indeed, it is when a vigorous logic, and a truly original imagination are stimulated by the most intense heat of emotion, that the most absolute simplicity of language, and at the same time, the grandest heights of eloquence are reached.

There is no stronger conviction with me, than that the preacher should never attempt to rescue his discourse from baldness or tameness, by those supposed rhetorical ornaments which are collected with deliberate design.—The moment an ornament is felt to be introduced “with malice prepense,” it becomes a deformity. It is always a futile and degrading resort. There is a rule of architecture propounded for some styles by the greatest masters, which speakers might profitably adopt. It is, that while every essential member of the structure shall be so proportioned as to be an ornament, no ornament shall be admitted which is not also an element of construction: no column which has nothing to support,—no bracket which has nothing to strengthen. Next to the possession of native genius, the proper sources of literary ornament are in the warmth of an honest, earnest emotion, co-operating with a clear and logical comprehension of the thing discussed. Unless our ornaments come spontaneously from this, their proper mint, they will inevitably be counterfeit. When, therefore, the preacher, after he has done all in the preparation of his subject, which clear definition, just arrangement, and sound logic can effect, feels that his work is still too tame to take hold on the people, it is worse than useless for him to seek, in cold blood, for ornament. He should seek feeling. He needs to sacrifice, not at the shrine of Calliope, but at the altar of the Holy Ghost.

Let us remember that all men have a native perception of consistency and appropriateness. And all men instinctively judge whether the tones, countenance and language of the person speaking to them, are spontaneous or artificial. The cultivated do not surpass the ignorant and the young, in the strength of these perceptions; for they are the direct result of intuitive capacities, which are often perverted by the habits of a faulty cultivation. Not even does dramatic eloquence offer any exception to the statement that all artificial speaking is inevitably

felt, by all hearers, to be artificial, and therefore naught. For I am sure, that there never has been, and never will be a good actor, whether on the stage, at the bar, or in the forum, who did not become eloquent, by so palpably conceiving the emotions proper to the part he was acting, as to merge his personality, for the time, in the part, and to become sincerely inspired with its feelings. Let us, then, remember, that the prompt and spontaneous perception of every hearer decides absolutely, whether our manner seems to him artificial or hearty; and if it decides us to be artificial, it has forthwith, with equal certainty, the feeling of our inconsistency. But what is worse than this, the chief motive which the world will naturally impute to us, for this insincerity of manner, is the desire of self-display. We may plead that if there is an error of manner, it has arisen from a well-meaning mistake, in our disinterested effort to impress the truth. The world will not be so charitable as to credit us. It will say that the natural language of disinterestedness is simplicity, and that the natural language of self-display is artifice; and it will persist in imputing the latter as our motive.

It is very important to observe here, also, that if, from our perverted training, an artificial manner has become second nature to us, this will not prevent the mischief. To the instinctive perceptions of the hearer, it still seems artificial; and he naturally concludes it is purposely such. It is not sufficient, therefore, for the speaker to say, that it is "his manner,"—that to him it is not artificial; that in speaking thus, he is giving free course to his dispositions. He should inquire how it became his manner; whether through the promptings of an ingenuous, humble, and self-devoting love for souls, or through the itchings of conceit, literary vanity, and servile imitation, in the days of his inexperience.

But where the native perceptions of the hearers receive from our manner this impression of artifice, what reason is so dull as not to draw the inference, that the preacher, if he really believed what he proclaimed of the sinner's risk, and if he really felt that generous compassion which is his ostensible motive, could have neither time nor heart to bestow one thought on self-display? When men

listen to one who preaches of their dread ruin and its sacred remedy, with deliberate and intentional artifice, they are driven to one of two alternatives. They must conclude, "either this man does not believe his own words, when he tells me of my hanging over eternal fires, and of Heaven stooping to my rescue; or, if he does believe them, he must have almost the heart of a fiend, to be capable of vanity and selfish artifice, in the presence of truths so sacred and dire." And, indeed, my Brethren, what must be the callous selfishness of that man, who, believing in the reality of the gospel themes, can desecrate them to the tricking forth of his own rhetorical fame!

Grecian story tells us that when the painter Parrhasius was engaged upon a great picture, representing Prometheus, as he lay chained to the crags of mount Caucasus, and eternally consumed by a ravenous vulture, he bought an old man from among the Olynthian captives, sold by Philip of Macedon, and tortured him to death beside his easel; in order that he might transfer to his canvas the traits of the last struggle, in their native reality. Does not the heart grow sick at the devilish ambition of this Pagan, as he steels his soul against the cry of agony, and coolly wrings out the life of a helpless and harmless fellow man, to win fame for himself, by throwing into his master-piece the lineaments of a living death!

But, is this instance strong enough to express the cruel and impious vanity of that man, who can deliberately traffic in the terrors of eternity, and the glories of God, merely to deck his own oratory? He brings the everlasting woes of his brother man, and gathers the gloom and the groans of their perdition, and coolly dips his pencil in the blackness of their despair, to make of them materials for self-display! Nay, he even dares to lay his hand upon the awful glories of the Cross, and those sacred pangs of Calvary, at which redeemed sinners should only shudder and weep, and weaves them into a garland for his own vanity. Now, the impenitent man can hardly believe that the minister, who shows in all his social life, the sympathies and virtues of an amiable character, is thus savagely and profanely selfish. And, therefore, the alternative which he must embrace is, to believe, or,

if he does not consciously believe, to do what is practically more ruinous, to feel half consciously, that the minister is not in earnest; that his preaching is not really prompted by a settled belief of the sinner's ruin and the Redeemer's love; but by the desire to further his own reputation and earn his bread. For, is not this parade of self-display just in character with such a purpose? And when the lover of sin and godlessness thus feels that the appointed ambassador of eternity does not himself believe, of course he will allow himself to doubt.—Let this, then, be the great and final objection to all artifice of manner in the pulpit, that it most surely sows broadcast the seeds of skepticism.

And, in truth, dear Brethren, does not our proneness to such manner,—does not the fact that we can be capable of it, proceed from the weakness of our faith? The true cure of the vice is to feel the powers of the world to come. The reason that Davies, Tennent and Whitefield, Paul and Peter, and above all, He that spoke as never man spake, displayed such directness and power, was that their souls saw heaven and hell with the vision of faith. The more we can feel the love of Christ, and the nearer we can draw to the cross, the judgment, and the eternal world, the more we shall feel that all else than native simplicity and directness is out of place, and that all else is unnecessary.

ARTICLE VI.

THE PROVINCE OF REASON, ESPECIALLY IN MATTERS OF RELIGION.

1 *Thess. V*: 21.—1 *Peter, III*: 15.—*Matthew, VI*: 23.
Luke, XI: 34.—*Rom. I*: 22.

In the first of these passages of Scripture, we are taught not to receive *implicitly* as the true doctrines of God, what may be inculcated even by the ministers of God. We are to listen to them with reverence, but not with

unthinking acquiescence. We are, ourselves, to search the Scriptures, to become familiar with their truths; and having thus proved that what is taught is scriptural, and therefore true, we are to hold it fast as "good," to lay it up in our hearts, and to practise it in our lives. In accordance with this general precept, our Saviour, on more than one occasion, called upon his hearers to judge,—not of the truth or reasonableness of what he taught,—(for how *could* they believe in heavenly things whose nature transcended their finite capacities.)—but to judge of the evidences which he gave, that He was an infallible teacher, and that all, therefore, that he said, was indubitable truth.* The Apostles, also, in enforcing any duty, do not hesitate to appeal to the reason and conscience of men, and to characterize the whole of piety, both as it is "the obedience of faith," and as it is the obedience of the life, a "reasonable service."†

In the second passage we have quoted, Christians are exhorted, in view of the opposition and hatred to which they and their holy religion are exposed, to see that their knowledge of God is an experimental, saving and sanctifying knowledge, that they may be ever ready to give to every one that asketh it, a reason of the glorious hope that is in them, both as it regards the irresistible strength of the external evidences of the gospel, and of the unspeakable peace and power of its internal working to the salvation of all who believe.

In the third passage, our Saviour compares the reason of man to the eye. If the eye is prevented from a clear and perfect vision by any film or impediment, or by want of sufficient light, then, just as surely as we attempt to use it, will it mislead and injure us. But, if the eye be in itself sound, and the light by which it sees be pure, then will its perceptions be correct, and our steps well ordered. In like manner, reason may be vitiated,—or its present light may be obscure,—or it may be wholly incapable of judging of the truth before it, by reason of its spiritual and supernatural grandeur; and if, in such circumstances, it is made the judge and standard of truth,

* John v: 31; and x: 37, 38; and xxi; 25. 1 John, iv: 1.

† 1 Cor. x: 15. Rom. xii: 1.

it will, and must, lead us into error. But, when reason is in itself perfect, and the evidence before it is sufficient and capable of being fully appreciated and understood, then it will lead us to right and proper conclusions, both as to truth and duty.

In the last passage quoted, we are informed that such is the present *vitiating* and *perverting* state of human reason, that even those who have made the most pompous professions of their love of wisdom, and have claimed to be wise above all others, have proved themselves to be vain and foolish,—have darkened their own hearts, and the hearts of others,—have obscured the knowledge of God, and of duty, preserved to them by primitive traditional revelation,—and, not liking to retain this knowledge of God, have been involved in inextricable doubts and difficulties, both as it regards God and the chief good, and everlasting life. “Having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that was in them, because of the blindness of their hearts.”

We are thus brought to the subject of the present discourse, namely, the province of reason in matters of religion. It has been asserted, and is still maintained, *theoretically* by Deists, and Unitarians, and by thousands *practically*, that reason is a sufficient, and the only necessary guide in matters of religion, and that revelation is either unnecessary and useless, and therefore untrue, or that, being to some extent, and for some purposes, necessary, reason is the standard by which its doctrines and its duties are to be judged. “Whatever opinion agrees not with reason, (says Smalcius, one of the fathers of modern Unitarianism,) is inadmissible in theology, and to admit such doctrines, we neither can, nor ought to, be induced, even by the express words of the Spirit of God himself.”* According to Dr. Beard, one of the most recent and very learned defenders of Unitarianism,† “The fundamental peculiarity of the anti-trinitarian movement is the deference paid to human intelligence as

* See his words quoted at length in Smith's Testimony to the Messiah, vol. i, pp. 75, 76.

† Historical and Artistic Illustrations of the Trinity, by J. R. Beard, D. D. London. 1846: p. 196.

the *judge*, though not the *source* of religious truth." The same author says,* "As *witnesses*, the Apostles and primitive Christians are invaluable; as *authorities*, they are revolutionary." "We may be excused, (he continues,) if we think that these expounders of Christianity did not always rigidly adhere to its sole and perfect type, as found in the mind of the Lord Jesus himself."† He also adds, "Let it not be supposed that, therefore, the writer holds every part of Scripture to be of equal authority. Such an idea is a gross and pernicious error. All Scripture is in some way profitable, but all is not alike valid."

Similar affirmations we might adduce from various acknowledged writers of this denomination of "rational believers," as they proudly call themselves. But this is needless, as it has been affirmed among ourselves that "the religious element in man received a new stimulus and direction at the coming of the Son of Man, and the promulgation of his holy religion. Yet its chief and most potent manifestations are still characterized by much that is arbitrary, wayward, contradictory and inconsistent."—"God, in the mean time," it is added, "gives us REASON to examine, to defend, to CORRECT, to IMPROVE, or to FORSAKE these accompanying errors." *Reason*, therefore, and not any written revelation, it is affirmed, is the source, or at least the arbiter and judge of religious truth. Is it so? This question, it may be perceived, lies at the foundation of all inquiries into religious doctrine, and determines at once, whether GOD, in HIS WORD, or REASON in EACH INDIVIDUAL HEART, is to be the standard and judge of religious truth.

To come to a proper conclusion on this subject, we must, in the first place, understand what reason is, and secondly, what are its capacity, limits, and present condition, and this will at once point out its province in matters of religion.

What, then, is reason? Reason, derived from the Latin verb to think, is the power or faculty of thinking.—"It is (says Locke,) that faculty in man whereby he is supposed to be distinguished from the beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them." "It denotes

* Hist. and Art. Illust. of the Trinity, p. 7. _ _ † Ditto, p. 7.

that power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from wrong, and by which we are enabled to combine means for the attainment of particular ends," and "to deduce (adds Webster,) inferences from facts or propositions." "Reason (says Isaac Taylor,) is the mind acting upon its own ideas."* "It is distinguished from instinct by the knowledge of relations,—or cause and effect."† To have reason is, therefore, to be a rational, moral, and accountable being, that is, to be a man. But while all men are thus *rational*, it must be remembered that he only is *reasonable* who acts according to the principles of right reason.

Reason, then, is that sublime spiritual or intellectual nature, by which man is enabled to know truth, and to obey it,—to examine the validity of the testimony brought before it,—to separate the false from the true,—give assent according to the evidence, and thus arrive at the certainty of *knowledge* when the evidence for truth is unexceptionable,—at *probability* when the evidence for the truth outweighs objections or difficulties,—and at *conviction of falsehood* when there is a plain and positive disagreement.

To receive nothing as truth but what is thus made certain by sufficient evidence, to judge and act only upon such rational grounds, to believe and do nothing but what he is convinced by the proper use of his reason, and the full, candid and impartial examination of evidence, he ought to believe and to do, is to act as a *rational* being, and to be, in fact, a *reasonable* being.

Man is commonly spoken of as made up of distinct and separate faculties, each independent in its power of action from the rest. But while such a division may be necessary and important for general purposes, it is most delusive, regarded as any thing more than an abstract classification of the various exercises, attributes, faculties and powers,—call them what we may,—of THE ONE rational mind. With a capacity to discern relations, causes, and effects, to deduce conclusions, to act from mo-

* See Elements of Thought, by Isaac Taylor, p. 134, and Brown's Philosophy, p. 313, 1 vol. ed.

† Ditto p. 102.

tives drawn from the past, the present, and the future, and to arrive at convictions of the existence and reality of invisible, spiritual and everlasting things,—this REASON or MIND of man, is just that intelligent, moral and accountable nature which God has given him. And, although common language ascribes a variety of faculties to the soul, imputing one action to the blindness of passion, another to the evil of our tempers, another to the heat of imagination, and another to the calmness of our reason, yet, in reality, THE SOUL IS ONE, and every thing that is done, is done by man under the active and controlling power of this rational and responsible nature.—The body, with its animal spirits, desires, and propensities, and its nervous and physical energy, is made to be subject to the soul, to be its servant and helper, to cooperate in the furtherance of every good word and work, and to be restrained from every thing that is evil in thought, word and deed. The body, except for the preservation of animal life, cannot act except as it is acted upon. Passion is *passive* until it receives power from the will, and permission from the reason. Emotions can only *suggest*, they can not *determine* our conduct. The impulses of our nature can only be gratified when the soul, the mind, the reason of the intelligent man concurs in allowing their indulgence, and in securing the means necessary for it. They are intended to be as absolutely under the controul of reason as are the hand, the feet, the eyes, and the other senses.

It is on this account that man is capable of vice and virtue, morality and immorality, purity and impurity, sin and holiness. *He* possesses, and the *brutes* do not, a knowledge of God, of God's law, God's will, and of his own duty, and of all that is required and prohibited under the penalty of God's wrath and curse. But all this knowledge man possesses by his reason, which is, we have seen, that intelligent nature which distinguishes him *from* the brutes. The same actions which in brutes have no moral character, in man become morally right or wrong. It follows, therefore, that since the actions of men are only regarded as right or wrong, blamable or commendable, when they proceed from one who is considered to be in the full possession of his reason,—that

every thing that is imprudence, baseness, villany or sin, in man, however it may require the co-operation of the body, must be the act of his rational nature, otherwise it would have no moral character whatever.

I do not mean to condemn the language which speaks of the several faculties and passions of the soul as if they were as distinct and independent as the governor, officers and citizens of a commonwealth. These distinctions are necessary for mental analysis and general comprehension,—give life and beauty to all language and discourses,—and indicate the particular motive and medium by which, in every action, the intelligent nature of man is induced to judge and to act as it does.

Considered, however, in this light,—that is, as a faculty of thinking and judging,—reason has no moral character. It is neither good nor evil, proud nor humble, presumptuous nor vain. It is merely a faculty or power, and only becomes moral when regarded as under the direction of the intelligent moral nature of man, actuated by motives, arriving at certain ends, subject to the moral law of God, and guided by certain principles. Morally speaking, reason is just what man is. Man is under authority to God's *law* as the rule of duty,—to God's *will* as the supreme and final judge,—to God's *testimony*,—in whatever way imparted,—as the ultimate, final, and infallible evidence of what is true or false, good or evil.—Reason, therefore, becomes morally good or evil, holy or unholy, humble or proud, presumptuous or vain, just as it is employed in faithfully ascertaining God's law, God's testimony, and God's will, and in implicitly obeying them,—or, on the other hand, as it follows the desires and devices of a wicked heart, and under its influences will not come to the light, lest its deeds should be re-proved.

We proceed to remark that this rational nature, and of course this faculty or power of judging, is limited.—All men, in distinction from the brutes, are by nature intelligent and rational beings, by *which*, and not by *instinct*, they discover what is right or wrong, good and evil.

Not that all men are alike in their intellectual, any more than in their physical, nature. There is, in both

respects, perfect individuality and endless variety, and yet, at the same time, one and the same general nature.

This intelligent and rational nature of man, however exalted it may be in its highest manifestations, it is nevertheless inferior to that of *angels*, both in its capacity of thought, and in the extent of its knowledge, and it is infinitely inferior to the reason and knowledge of *God*. Man is endowed with that degree of reason, and that capacity of knowledge, which was proper and necessary for his condition here and hereafter. His glory, therefore, must be to act in accordance with the order and perfection of his being. And to sink *below* it, and prostitute his powers to earthly, sensual, or devilish pursuits,—or, on the other hand, to attempt to *exceed* the powers bestowed upon him,—is equally irrational and sinful. The one is self-destruction, the other presumption, folly and rebellion. There is a line which no created understanding can pass, and that line is fixed to every class of beings according to their own order, even as there is one glory of the sun, and another of the moon, and another of the stars.

And, as there are doubtless many beings superior to ourselves, who are able to discover more truths than we can do, so it is reserved for *God* alone, to have a perfect and universal comprehension of all possible truths.

“When, therefore, reason refuses to submit to *God’s* guidance, or assent to what has all the inward and external marks of *God’s* infallible testimony;—when it will deny, only because it cannot comprehend and fathom the depths of *God* with its own short line,—or, when it attempts to give reasons, and account for things which *God* has not thought fitting to explain,—then it transgresses the bound of duty, and, instead of a guide, becomes a deceiver and destroyer of those who follow its directions.” It is the light of a candle employed to discover that which is irradiated by the light of the sun. It is arrogant profaneness, a wanton encroachment upon the prerogatives of Heaven, and an impious challenge to our Maker, why he has made us as he has. Reason, in such a case, is the ignis fatuus which leads its bewildered follower into fatal paths; or, it is like the lightning

flash to the lost traveller, which only discovers the immensity of the trackless waste before him.

But further, human reason is as certainly limited in its *field of observation*, as in its capacity to judge. We inhabit but a spot in the creation of God. By our connection with the body, and the subjection of our reason to the senses as the inlets of all our original perceptions, the mind cannot go beyond the conclusions drawn from what it is capable of observing.

Reason, in its popular acceptance, is nothing but a faculty. It is not knowledge, but only the capacity or power of obtaining it. When observation, instruction and education are denied, this power lies dormant.—When that observation and instruction are erroneous, reason only confirms us in ignorance and error. Reason, in and of itself, is therefore insufficient to discover and practise what is necessary for the ordinary duties even of the present life.

As our Saviour has taught us, reason or understanding is, spiritually, what the eye is physically. The one is capable of seeing, and the other of knowing. But the eye cannot see without light, nor reason without instruction. Reason is not the light, but the organ which acts by the light imparted to it. Even in reference to the world around it, reason knows infinitely less than it is ignorant of; and the little it does know, is known as the result of close observation, diligent study, and ages of experience and discovery.

The relations and dependencies of the system of our globe, not to speak of our planetary system, and that of the visible universe, are almost entirely beyond our observation and knowledge. So are all the essences of things. How much more certainly and necessarily, therefore, must this be the case, in reference to every thing that is beyond the visible world,—all that is invisible and incapable of observation,—all that is supernatural and infinitely removed from the sphere and capacity of our finite and limited reason.

Whatever we can know by the use of our faculties of *observation and understanding*, is properly within the bounds of reason. Whatever objects are *beyond these*, must either remain unknown, or become known only by

clear and sufficient testimony, in which case they reasonably claim and secure the approbation of our reason. In reference to such objects, the testimony must be supernatural, and the evidence must be Divine, in order to be infallible. Reason perceives the truth and certainty of the testimony, in whatever way it is revealed, just as it perceives God's testimony to what is true in all the phenomena of nature,—and knowing that God will not deceive and cannot lie, it regards the evidence as infallible, and arrives at a most rational assurance of the truth.—This is FAITH, that is, knowledge founded, not upon observation or intuition, but upon testimony.

The things which are objects of this knowledge, that is, which are above and beyond reason, were by the ancients included under that part of knowledge termed *metaphysical*, that is, after or above what is physical.

“In this class, Plato ranges the contemplation of all Divine things; such as, the first being or cause,—the origin of things,—the wonders of providence,—the worship of God,—the mysteries of religion,—the immortality of the soul,—and a future state. He never pretended one of these to be discoverable by reason, but always ingenuously confesses them to be learned by traditions brought from the Barbarians, viz: the Jews, &c. They were frequently termed wonderful things, as being neither discoverable nor demonstrable by reason.”

Such is the nature and limits of human reason, considered apart from any moral obliquity that may attach to it,—clear, and upright, and ever ready to approve and follow that which is good. But such is not its present character. Man was, indeed, “made upright,” but he has become “corrupt.” As men are now, “they have no understanding.” They have “corrupt minds.” Their “foolish heart is darkened.” “Having the understanding darkened through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart.” Man's reason, therefore, is now clouded as well as limited. It is debased by servitude to the lusts of the flesh and the lusts of the eyes. It is enfeebled by moral disease. It is manacled by prejudices. The eye of reason is vitiated. It cannot bear the light. It loveth darkness rather than light, and because it will not come to the light and re-

ceive the truth in the love of it, it stumbleth, even at noon-day. Such is the testimony of "the Father of our spirits."—"the Light who enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world," and who "knoweth what is in man."

And such, also, is the testimony of observation and experience. Even in reference to purely intellectual and philosophical pursuits, the father of philosophy found it necessary to caution against the idols of the mind. The art of reasoning is but the science of exposing and guarding against the weakness, perversity and sophistry of the human mind. Imperfection, contradiction, change have characterized all the efforts of genius. No theory has been too absurd to find advocates and disciples, while rival sects,—from those who believe every thing, to those who believe nothing, however true,—have filled up the history of philosophy. There is no single truth, from the existence of an external world to the existence of an eternal God, which has not been denied and darkened. Reason has, in all ages, rendered man shamefully unreasonable. Philosophy has been the guide to all the errors under the sun. What right reason itself is,—what the chief good is,—what right and wrong are,—what is the nature, ground, and authority of morality,—what man is,—what the soul is,—what God is,—what man's destiny is,—human reason never has discovered or determined, with any fixed or authoritative certainty. There have been as many opinions as philosophers in the world, and among them, there have been *opinions* merely, but no *certain knowledge*. When in the right, they disputed themselves wrong, and left every thing in confusion and doubt. Socrates, the wisest of men, professed to know only one thing with certainty, and that was his ignorance of every thing, and the ignorance of all who pretended to know any more. Plato, again and again, reminded his hearers that he could give them probability, and not proof, for what he taught. Both Socrates and Plato rebuked the pride and ignorance of philosophers as the fruitful source of every error.* Aristotle condemned all

* Plato brings in Socrates in his *Alcibiades*, thus philosophizing: "Thou knowest that errors in practice come from this ignorance, that men think

his predecessors as foolish and vain-glorious, and in regard to all things Divine, *said* little, and *believed* less. And, not to name the skeptics who doubted and disputed every thing, the opinion of Tully may be given as that of all who have ever earnestly inquired after truth, without the light of revelation, namely, "that all things are surrounded and concealed by so thick a darkness, that no strength of mind can penetrate them."*

they know, what they do not." Then he adds, When men are conscious of their own ignorance, they are willing to be taught by others. Again, Believe me and the famous Delphic oracle, Know thyself. This Plato, in his Charmides, speaks, Many have erred from their scope by trusting to their own opinion without judgment. Again, It is a great piece of temperance for a man to know himself. It would be a great advantage if none would act beyond their knowledge and strength. We seem to know all things, but indeed we are ignorant of every thing. It is an absurd thing to philosophize of things we know not; when any attempts a thing above his strength, he greatly errs. Thus Plato, out of what he had learnt from his master, Socrates. So, again, in his Legib. 5, Plato discoursing of self-love: From this, says he, proceeds this great error, that all men esteem their ignorance to be wisdom, whence, knowing nothing, we think we know all things. Thence, not permitting ourselves to be taught what we are ignorant of, we fall into great errors. We have, indeed, a great saying in his Epinom. p. 980, shewing that we can get no true knowledge of God, but by dependence on, and prayer to him. His words are, Trusting in the Gods, pray unto them, that thou mayest have right notions of the Gods. Thus it shall be, if God as a Guide, shall shew us the way; only help thou with thy prayers.

Lastly, Plato, Legib. 4, tells us, That he who is humble and modest will adhere to Divine justice. But he that is lifted up in his own proud confidences, as though he wanted no Guide or Governor, he is deserted by God; and being deserted, disturbs others; and, although he may for awhile seem some body, yet at last he is sufficiently punished by Divine justice.— See the original, given in Gale's Court of the Gentiles, vol. 3., pp. 15, 16.

* The early fathers who had been disciples of Plato, and the other philosophers, speak very strongly of their weakness and folly.

You will adduce, says Justin Martyr to the Greeks, the wise men and the philosophers, for, to these, as to a strong-hold, you are wont to make your escape, whenever, concerning the Gods, any one twits you with the opinion of the poets. Wherefore, since it is fitting to begin with the first and the most ancient, commencing with them I will shew: that the speculation of each philosopher is still more ridiculous, than even the theology of the poets. (1)

He then proceeds in regular succession, through the several opinions of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Pythagoras, Epicurus, Empedocles, Plato, and Aristotle, for the purpose of convicting them all of manifest and indisputable folly. With respect to Plato, in particular, nothing can be more contemptuous than Justin's sneer at him.

(1) Justin ad Græc. Cohort. Oper. p. 3.

But man was made to *practise* as well as to *know*; and *reason* was intended to guide into right *actions* as well as into right *opinions*. To know and choose to do what is good is moral goodness, and to know and choose to do what is contrary to right, is moral evil. What, then, is the character of human reason, as seen in human conduct? All that we commonly call the weakness, blindness and disorder of our passions, is, in reality, the weakness, disorder and blindness of our reason, to whom those passions are in subjection, and without whose sanction they could neither desire, will, nor act. All the tempers

Plato, forsooth, is as sure that the Supreme Deity exists in a fiery substance, as if he had come down from above, and had accurately learned and seen all the things that are in Heaven. (1)

Since, continues he to the Greeks, it is impossible to learn from your teachers any thing true respecting piety towards God, inasmuch as their very difference of opinion is a plain proof of their ignorance; I deem it an obvious consequence, that we should return to our own forefathers; who are of much higher antiquity than any of your teachers; who have taught us nothing from their own mere phantasy; who, among themselves, have no discrepancies; and who attempt not mutually to the opinion of each other, but who, without wrangling and disputation, communicate to us that knowledge which they have received from God. For, neither by nature nor by human intellect, is it possible for men to attain the knowledge of such great and Divine matters; but only by the gift which descends from above upon holy men, who needed not the arts of eloquence or the faculty of subtle disputation, but who judged it solely necessary to preserve themselves pure for the efficacious energy of the Divine Spirit.

For the authors of our theology, says he, we have the Apostles of the Lord: who not even themselves arbitrarily chose what they would introduce; but who faithfully delivered to the nations that discipline which they had received from Christ. FINALLY HERESIES THEMSELVES ARE SUBORNED FROM PHILOSOPHY. Thence spring those fables and endless genealogies and unfruitful questions and discourses, creeping like a gangrene: from which the Apostles would rein us back, by charging us, even in so many words, to beware of philosophy. What, then, is there in common between Athens and Jerusalem, between the Academy and the Church, between Heretics and Christians? Our institution is from the porch of Solomon: who himself has admonished us to seek the Lord in simplicity of heart. Let those persons see to it, who have brought forward a Stoical, or a PLATONIC, or a Dialectic Christianity.

From the Prophets and from Christ we are instructed in regard to God. Not from the Philosophers or from Epicurus.

God hath chosen the foolish things of the world that he might confound the wise. Through this simplicity of the truth, DIRECTLY CONTRARY to subtiloquence and philosophy, we can savour nothing perverse. (2)

(1) Justin. Cohort. Oper., p. 4.

(2) See also Tertullian to the same same effect, adv. hæc. § 2, 3; and adv. Marcion lib. ii., § 13, and lib. v. § 40.

and passions of the heart, all the prejudices and idols of the mind, all the numerous faculties of the soul, are, as we have said, but the various acts and operations of one and the same rational principle which, in its union with the physical nature, constitutes man, and they only receive different names, according to the object on which this reason is employed, and the manner in which it acts. Reason, therefore, as it is the only principle of virtue, so it is the only cause of all that is base, horrid and shameful in human nature. Reason alone can discern truth, and reason alone can lead into the grossest errors, both in speculation and in practice, and hence men are held accountable for all the evil they do, because they do it knowingly, and willingly, that is, in the exercise of reason.

Such, then, as is human nature, such is human reason. And as human nature is every where, and in all ages and places mistrusted, deceitful, and desperately wicked in its unrestrained developments, it follows that though all men *are rational*, they are not *reasonable*; since reason itself is darkened by sin, "so that the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, either as to doctrine, spirit or duty, for they are foolishness unto him, because they are spiritually discerned."

Reason, in man's present condition, is not what it originally was. That light, therefore, which at first was sufficient to preserve man from falling, and to lead him in the way of truth, is not sufficient to restore him, now that he has fallen, and to bring him back to God. "Not (says the Apostle,) that we are sufficient of ourselves, to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God," who alone can "give us an understanding that we may know Him that is true, and be guided into all truth, and be preserved from all error."

This brings us once more, therefore, to the main question before us, namely, whether reason,—the reason of every individual man, or the collective reason of all men, or the particular opinions each man has happened to take up, with or without examination,—whether this reason is the standard and judge of truth. It is not a question now in dispute, whether all men have the *right* and are under a solemn *obligation*, to judge and act accord-

ing to their own reason. This is as clear to our mind as that every man has a right to see, and can see only with his own eyes, and hear with his own ears. This is a matter of duty and of necessity, since man, as a rational being, can only act from reason, and can only really believe what his own reason has assured him is proved by sufficient evidence. To act from the principle of reason and choice, or will, is as necessary to man as his being what he is. This is not the privilege of the philosopher, but is as essential to human nature as self-consciousness, personal identity and conscience are.

In this controversy, we maintain, therefore, the absolute necessity of reason to every opinion which man holds, and to every action man performs. This we do against fanatics on the one hand, and Romanists on the other. Both these classes of errorists agree in denying the use of reason. The fanatic "substitutes in place of the sober deductions of reason, the extravagant fancies of a disordered imagination, and considers these fancies as the immediate illumination of the Spirit of God." He puts out the light, and then follows the vagaries of his own bewildered imagination, forgetting that God never commands, but he convinces also; that men cannot obey without believing, nor believe without sufficient evidence of the truth or duty. They who deny, therefore, the use of reason, in order to the belief of any doctrine or duty, destroy the only means God has given us to convince of the reasonableness and obligation of truth and duty, and instead of a rational worship, have fallen into all the delusions of madness and superstition.

The Romanist allows religion to be a reasonable service only so far as it enables the enquirer to discover that the Romish Church is the infallible testifier, in God's stead, to all that is truth, and to all that is duty. Having done this, its office ceases, except so far as to hear what she inculcates, and obey what she commands. In other words, man, in becoming a Romanist, ceases to be a rational being, and to hold any direct relation or responsibility to God. He believes and does what the church enforces, and this is the sum and substance of the Romish religion. It is not belief in God, in Christ, in a Holy Spirit, or in any one or all of the doctrines of the

Gospel. It is belief in the Church of Rome, not in the Bible, not in our own senses, reason, or faculties. This, however, is as contrary to the necessity of our being, as it is to the word of God, which requires us to search the Scriptures, whether what the church teaches be true, to prove all her teachings by that word, and to be always ready, in reference to every doctrine and duty, to give a reason to every one that asketh.

The question, then, now before us, is not as to the use of reason, in reference to all testimony, and all evidence, and its absolute necessity to all belief, but whether every man's reason is to guide him in his inquiries after truth, and in his reception of the truth by its own light *merely*, by the amount of its present knowledge *merely*, or by that it conceives to be the general opinion of mankind *merely*, or whether in all matters that relate to God and things spiritual and divine, it is to be guided by the light which God has been pleased to impart in his word.

Here we encounter the *abuse* of reason, and contend against Deists, Rationalists and Unitarians, for the insufficiency of reason, as a guide or judge in matters of religion,—for its true nature, office and function,—and for the necessity, both of the Divind Word, and the Divine Spirit, as a standard, and as a guide to truth. And from what we have said, this controversy may, we think, be summarily ended.

Reason, we have seen, is finite, limited, and imperfect, and in reference to all Spiritual and Divine things, weakened and darkened. Reason, too, is only a faculty, a capacity of knowledge. It is not knowledge. Whatever man knows, he knows by observation, experience, instruction, through the processes of his own reason, his intuitive beliefs, his original suggestions, his sense of right and wrong, with all other attributes and powers which together constitute his reason, and make him an intelligent, moral and accountable being. Now, what the reason of a child is, compared with the reason of an educated man, the reason of the most highly gifted and informed mind is to that of angels; and the reason and knowledge of angels is no more than a single ray of light compared to the noontide brilliance of the sun, when contrasted with the infinite reason and perfect compre-

hension of Him that knoweth all things past, present and future,—whether material or immaterial, natural or divine. And since it is the very nature and irresistible tendency of reason to obtain whatever assistance, guidance and instruction, it has the means and opportunity of securing, in order to develop its powers and enlarge its sphere of knowledge;—since, without such light and guidance, it would know nothing, even of things on earth, it is at once evident that human reason only acts rationally when in reference to all things divine, and which are, by their very nature, beyond its observation and comprehension, it submits itself implicitly to the teaching and guidance of revelation. Revelation, that is, the testimony and instruction of God, in reference to the nature of things *spiritual*, supernatural, and divine, is to reason just what nature, observation and instruction, the testimony provided by God, is in reference to things *natural*. Deists, and Rationalists, and Unitarians, might just as reasonably reject all use of these means of obtaining and judging of the truth and certainty and real nature of *natural* things, as to reject the light and guidance of revelation in things supernatural. God can give his testimony as to what is true in regard to things divine by revelation, as well as give it as to things natural by his works, and by the senses, faculties, observation and experience of men. And it is the same exercise of reason when it employs itself in finding out what God's testimony *is*, and believing what God testifies to be *true*, in regard to what God makes known by revelation, and what he makes known by observation, experience and argument. Christians, therefore, no more submit their reason to authority and to subjection, in receiving implicitly as true, without comprehending it, what God testifies in his word, than in receiving implicitly what God testifies in his works. In both cases, God's testimony is the ground of our belief.—In both cases, we rely upon the infallibility of those powers of knowing that it is his testimony which God, who will not, and cannot deceive, has given us.—In both cases we gladly avail ourselves of all the light and knowledge God is pleased to impart to us.—In both cases, we comprehend nothing at all of the real essence of things, but only what God is pleased to mani-

fest concerning them.—And in both cases, when we ascertain with certainty what God has *made*, what God has *done*, and what God has said, we ascertain what is the truth, and all that we can know of the truth. Reason, therefore, has precisely the same office, and the same province, in regard to all truth. The only difference is in regard to the nature of the evidence by which truth is testified, and thus brought before it. In things natural, the *testimony* is found in nature, and the *evidence* of what that nature in *fact is*, is brought before it by the observation of the senses, by the perceptions of the mind, by education and information, conveying to it upon testimony the experience of others. It is in this way reason acts, and acquires all it knows, all it can know, of natural things. On the other hand, in things supernatural, that is, in things beyond the reach of our senses, this *testimony* is found in the revelation of God, and what God *does* reveal, is brought before the mind by the evidence of prophecy, of miracles, and all the other external, internal, and experimental evidences by which what *claims* to be God's word, is *proved* to be indeed such.—By education and instruction, the mind becomes acquainted with these evidences. By its intuitions and inferences, the mind is led to the conviction of the truth and inspiration of the Bible. And being thus assured that *all* Scripture is given by inspiration, and was written by holy men of God as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, reason receives what the Bible contains as infallible truth, although, of necessity, all that it reveals is above its comprehension, and can only be known so far as it has pleased God to reveal it. For reason to judge of the *truth* of doctrines thus certainly revealed, is as absurd and irrational, as for reason to judge of the *truth* of the facts revealed in nature. All that reason can do in either case is to ascertain what *are facts*, and then to believe in them, however incomprehensible, and however apparently contrary to other facts, and to its own preconceived opinions, they may be, and in point of fact are, in regard to much of our natural knowledge.—Reason is unreasonable whenever it attempts more than this, since to refuse to believe on sufficient evidence what is incomprehensible or contrary to preconceived opinions,

is a direct violation of all reason. The truth and comprehension of a fact in nature, or of a doctrine in revelation, is not the province of reason, but only the ascertaining of the testimony and the determination of the evidence by which they are proved to be facts in nature or doctrines of revelation.

Let us, then, learn the true nature and condition of man. Let us be humble. Reason is exalted when it is abased, when it is teachable, conscious of its weakness, imperfection and liability to mistakes. The greatest minds have been the humblest, and the most extensive knowledge has ever been the result of the most docile and patient research. And what we object to in Deists and Rationalistic Christians is, not that they *reason*, but that they reason *ill*,—not that they claim a right to form and to hold fast their *own* opinions, but that they claim the right to hold *wrong* opinions, which is self-contradictory,—not that they thus investigate by reason the evidence of what is true, but that they attempt, by the finite line of reason, to fathom the depth of what is infinitely *below*, to measure the height of what is infinitely *above*, and to comprehend the nature of what is infinitely *beyond* their reason.

“Matters of pure revelation are immediately from the instruction of God, therefore most reasonable to be believed, because most certainly true; but cannot be believed, otherwise than He has proposed them, either in manner or degree. From the insufficiency of reason to guide us in all matters relating to our final good, appears the necessity of revelation against the cavils of those who would so exalt nature as to render it altogether needless. And the evidence of its coming from God, manifests the obligation we are under to receive and obey it, against the atheistical objections of those who would” attempt by reason to judge, to comprehend and to reject it, “represent it as a superstitious contrivance or invention of men. When, therefore, reason refuses to submit to God’s guidance, or assent to what has all the inward and external marks of truth and infallible testimony; when it will deny, only because it cannot comprehend and fathom the depths of God with its own short line; or attempts to give reasons, and accounts for things which God has

not thought fitting to explain; then it transgresses the bounds of duty, and instead of a guide becomes a deceiver and destroyer of those who follow its directions."

"It is this arrogance, self-sufficiency, and exalting reason to an independency upon God, that has been the source of all fatal error and impiety, and tempted men to revolt from religion and from God. Such oracles of vain reasoning have all the doubters and disputers against religion been, since the world began. The more men have depended upon reason for the measure of Divine things, the further always have they erred from the truth. And what this is owing to, we may learn from the confessions of a noble author, Lord Shaftesbury, in the first class among the despisers of revelation. "There is (says he) a certain perverse humanity in us, which inwardly resists the Divine commission, though ever so plainly revealed."

ARTICLE VII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Discoveries among the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon, with Travels in Armenia, Kurdistan and the Desert: being the result of a second Expedition undertaken for the Trustees of the British Museum.* By AUSTEN H. LAYARD, M. P., Author of *Nineveh and its Remains.* New York: G. P. Putnam & Co. 1853. pp. 664, 8 vo.

Those who have enjoyed the pleasure of reading the two former volumes containing Mr. Layard's researches amid the ruins of Nineveh, will require little persuasion to open these records of his second expedition. As a traveller, Mr. Layard conducts his readers over a tract of country possessing all the interest which the most ancient historical associations can impart. The peculiarities of Eastern scenery are gracefully depicted, whilst the usages of a people of patriarchal simplicity lend a freshness to his narrative

not often characterizing the itinerary of the tourist. These sketches of travel are commingled with his severer descriptions, showing admirable discretion in the author.

He is to us the most genial companion, who has the earnest, healthy tone of a man feeling he has a great purpose to work out, yet not wholly insensible to the poetry of life. Mr. Layard fulfils both these conditions—always sensible and practical, he is in sympathy with a working world; yet the enthusiasm of his character, continually breaking through, gives a mellow lustre to his thoughts. There is true poetry in a man who will stand for hours in the cold moon-light, surveying the colossal bulls at Nimroud, that were next day to be dislodged and conveyed to England, and could then write in his journal: "it seemed a sacrilege to tear them from their old haunts, to make them a mere wonder-stock to the busy crowd of a new world. They were better suited to the desolation around them—for they had guarded the palace in its glory, and it was for them to watch over it in its ruin. I stood speechless in the deserted portal, until the shadows began again to creep over its hoary guardians."—P. 202. Standing again in the desert, and viewing with the setting sun more than two hundred mounds, he writes: "the great tide of civilization has long since ebbed, leaving these scattered wrecks on the solitary shore. Are these waters to flow again, bearing back the seeds of knowledge and of wealth that they have wafted to the West? We wanderers were seeking what they had left behind, as children gather up the coloured shells on the deserted sands. At my feet there was a busy scene, making more lonely the unbroken solitude which reigned in the vast plain around, where the only things having life or motion were the shadows of the lofty mounds, as they lengthened before the declining sun."—P. 245. Here is a man too earnest to talk sentiment, except in the gloaming; never, like Lamartine, right in the glare of noon.

It is however the antiquarian character of this volume, which gives it its chief value. We are always delighted with the remains of ancient genius, which the industry of modern research has disinterred. Whether in the streets of buried Herculaneum, or amidst the columns and porticoes of Balbec and Palmyra, or in

the gloomy tombs of Egypt, or in the temples of Central America; or in the recently exhumed palaces of Nineveh, it is deeply impressive, through their shattered works, to be brought face to face with extinct races. No historical record of their exploits, or of their usages, gives such a lively portraiture, as these sculptured walls and carved symbols. The Biblical student will be especially interested in the frequent illustrations of Bible customs, and the frequent confirmations of Bible facts, which the researches of Mr. Layard disclose. As an example of the former, may be mentioned the recurrence in almost every battle scene of a heap of heads piled up before the conqueror, illustrating 2 Kings, 10: 1-8; and of the latter, the inscriptions on the bulls at Kouyunjik, describing so minutely Sennacherib's invasion of Syria, his siege of Lachish, and the tribute extorted from Hezekiah, confirming the record in the second book of Kings.

Mr. Layard speaks always, in the most handsome terms, of the American Missionaries, and of their influence upon the Nestorians; and without naming them refers, in language of strong reprobation, to the course of Mr. Southgate and others, in rousing the prejudices of the bishops of that ancient church, and embittering their minds against the influence and labors of evangelical men, whose only crime was that of not belonging to a Prelatical Communion.

We were pleased to observe in a recent newspaper, the report that an Association was about being formed in England, to provide means for Mr. Layard, by which he may prosecute researches so auspiciously begun. The Christian, as well as the scientific, world, has an interest in labours of this kind. And, Mr. Layard may continue his work of excavating those tombs of ancient History and Art, cheered by the good wishes of thousands whom his writings have instructed.

2. *The Parables of Spring*, by GAUSSEN. *Translated from the French by the Rev. PHILLIP BERRY. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1853. pp. 103, 16 mo.*

Two sermons of the author of the lively and valuable treatise on the Inspiration of the Scriptures. How various are the gifts of

God's ministers. These discourses are characterized by a lively and elegant simplicity, by sound doctrine and religious fervour. Spring is made to speak to the simple congregation of the Swiss pastor, amid the rural scenery of an Alpine valley, and in beautiful parables of the spiritual regeneration of the soul, and the physical regeneration of the body, whose dust shall be reanimated at the resurrection of the just. There is more than one way to preach the gospel of Christ. And in all ways in which it is faithfully preached is it precious to the believing soul.

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3. *A Defence of Luther and the Reformation.* By JOHN BACHMAN, D. D., L. L. D., against the Charges of JOHN BELLINGER, M. D., and others, to which are appended various Communications of other Protestant and Roman Catholic writers, who engaged in the controversy. Charleston: Published by WILLIAM Y. PAXTON: 1853: pp. 520.

The occasion of this contribution to our Theological literature, by one whose published researches as a Naturalist have given him a world-wide reputation, was the visit of the Ex-Monk Leahey, to the city of Charleston. The advertisement of L., that he would lecture on the Confessional, enraged the Roman Catholics, and by mob violence they prevented his addressing the public. He appealed to the City Council for protection, but that body were, on the contrary, persuaded by John Bellinger, M. D., (one of their number, a Roman Catholic,) to "caution all persons against attending" the proposed Lectures, and to "declare that the Corporation would hold itself not responsible for any damages" which might be done by the said mob, in case Leahey should proceed with his Lecture!! Dr. B. subsequently published, over his own name, an account of his speech before the Council,—a pedantic and an audacious document,—in the course of which he referred to Luther's "immoral practices," the "sanction for which is extant in his published writings." The Rev. B. Gildersleeve, Editor of the *Watchman and Observer*, having called on Dr. Bellinger to prove his charges against Luther, is answered by him, at some

length. In the meanwhile Dr. Bachman, who is minister of a Lutheran congregation in Charleston, takes up the Reformer's defence in a series of letters to Dr. Bellinger. The controversy began in March, 1852, and is continued in the *Evening News* of Charleston all through the summer and autumn months. At length the publisher of the *News* sees proper to collect together the various articles thus elicited from a number of different parties, and publishes them all in the volume whose title we have given above. On the Roman Catholic side, besides Dr. Bellinger's two pieces above referred to, we have several communications from the Rev. Dr. Lynch, and some anonymous writers. The Roman Catholic Miscellany also kept up a continual fire upon Dr. Bachman, weekly pouring forth the characteristic venom and gall of its anonymous editor. On the side of Luther there are two letters from Mr. Gildersleeve, (one of them particularly able,) and several from sundry other writers; but the chief part of the volume consists of Dr. Bachman's very minute and thorough examination of all the charges brought against the Reformer. Considering the circumstances of inevitable haste under which he wrote, and the variety of assailants he had to repel, we think Dr. Bachman acquitted himself very creditably, in a literary point of view; but, looking at his effort as a defence of Luther against this new edition of old slanders, we deliberately pronounce it complete and unanswerable. He has done good service to the cause of historic justice and Protestant truth. If some things are brought to the light which shock every refined mind, the blame belongs not to him, but to the revilers of the mighty dead. The results of the whole controversy we know to have been highly favorable to the Protestants, and highly unfavorable to the Roman Catholic cause in Charleston. Dr. Bellinger, who after his letter to Mr. G. kept a profound silence all the summer, at length published that a discreet friend had advised him he must reply; and accordingly he announced, on the 26th October, his intention to answer Dr. Bachman. His bookseller, we have been told, has imported largely for him from Europe. We believe in free discussion, and impatiently await his reply to our venerable friend.

4. *The Student of Philology. Annual Oration, delivered before the Literary Societies of the South Carolina College, in the College Chapel, Columbia, December 7th, 1852.* By Rev. J. W. MILES, Prof. of Hist. of Phil. and Hist. of Gr. Lit. in the College of Charleston. pp. 51, 8 vo. Charleston, 1853.

Professor Miles shows himself to have entered that field of study, Comparative Philology, in which the Adelungs, Niebuhrs, Pritchards, Von Humboldts, Von Schlegels, Balbis, Bopps, Colebrookes and Rosens, of Europe, have rendered themselves so distinguished. Though he speaks with the modesty of a novitiate, he has carried his studies so far in this department that there are few in this *practical* country of ours prepared to follow him. In his description of the isolation, want of sympathy, and manifold discouragements which beset one addicting himself to these pursuits, we could well appreciate the feelings of one who was probably portraying his own individual experiences and sufferings. The noble fruits which these studies in the end bear, and especially in their connections with the great questions of man's origin and filiation taught in the Scriptures, we readily acknowledge. But let us beware of our philosophy, and not mistake analogy for identity. There are some analogies which are parallel, and may meet together, throughout, like two planes brought into contact; there are others which touch only as a plane and a sphere in a single point. Some *seeming* analogies do not even so much as that. We see little resemblance, for instance, between "the embryonic sac," from which living beings proceed, and any principle in man giving birth to language. All that can be said of man is, that he has a capacity in his organs of speech for all manner of vocal sounds, and in his mind for all manner of reasonings, judgments and associations, which belong to the laws of thought. But the "language faculty" we have never yet discovered. It belongs not among the properties of matter, unorganized or organized. It is not found among the powers of the mind itself. The man has not yet been found who originated a language. Authentic history does not speak of its commencement, save in the

single instance Gen. 2: 20. It is a *gift*, and not a *power*. Once given, it undergoes perpetual changes, till connection between the jarring tongues of earth can no more be traced. If within the period of time included in a few centuries past, the word *wig* has been derived from the Latin *pilus*, as we suppose can easily be shown, and those *root words*, too, may have had a connexion with each other in ages past which now have no letter nor syllable in common. Language originally must have been the direct gift of God. But the stimulating effect of Professor Miles' Address upon the youthful scholar, notwithstanding these remarks, we gratefully acknowledge.

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5. *A Letter to the Rev. DANIEL DANA, D. D., on Prof. PARK'S Theology of New England.* By NATHAN LORD, *President of Dartmouth College.* pp. 54, 8 vo.
 6. *The Value and Sacredness of Divine Truth. Address before the Society for Inquiry, in the Theological Institute of Connecticut, East Windsor Hill.* By EDWIN HALL, *Pastor of the First Church in Norwalk, Conn.* pp. 32, 8 vo.
 7. *A Tract for the Times, or Elemental Contrast between the Religion of Forms and of the Spirit.* By S. J. SCHMUKER, D. D., *Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary at Gettysburg.* pp. 58, 8 vo.
 8. *Spiritual Religion and Ceremonial Contrasted: being the substance of a Discourse delivered in the Presbyterian Church, Barboursville, Va.* By the Rev. J. H. BOCK. pp. 29, 8 vo.

These are all pamphlets called forth by the Theological tendencies of our times and country. The first of them, by Dr. Nathan Lord, is characterized by great vigour of style, discrimination of thought, and power of imagination. It gives a more gloomy picture of the aberrations of the New England Theology from "the old paths" than we have ever before seen from the pen of a New England man, and brings sad proof that this is not the mere ima-

gining of a morbid fancy. It traces it to the period when their "theology was directed into a speculative channel, when its learned teachers began to light their torch at the altar of the imaginative reason, and, in their circuits after divine knowledge, went up to Alexandria and Athens rather than to Jerusalem." The address of Mr. Hall touches on the same points.

The discourses of Dr. Schmucker and Mr. Boccock are directed against the formalism of Rome and Oxford; in the former distinctly announced—in the other more covertly alluded to. No doubt each designed to have his remarks bear upon formalism and ritualism, in whatever church they may show themselves. Dr. Schmucker exhibits his usual learning, and both are timely and able discourses.

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9. *The Christian Traveller. A Discourse delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, in Augusta, Georgia, on Sunday, May 15, 1853. By Rev. E. P. ROGERS.* pp. 22, 8 vo.

A discourse prepared, the author tells us, under the pressure of parochial duties incident to a large congregation, and without any reference to its publication. It seems to have produced the effect designed, of awakening those members of the congregation who are in the habit of travelling in various directions during the summer season, to some sense of their responsibilities and duties, and some view of the temptations to which they are exposed. Hence, and that it may have this effect still more when read by themselves and others, has it been given to the press. The topics of discourse commend themselves to all Christian hearts, and will remind them of duties forgotten, and temptations which assail them with peculiar power during those seasons devoted to the relaxation of travel.

1560
SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

NUMBER III.

JANUARY, MDCCCLIV.

ARTICLE I.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPINIONS.

The Eclipse of Faith; a Visit to a Religious Skeptic.—
Third Edition. Boston: Crosby Nichols & Co., 111
Washington-street: 1853.

Reason and Faith, and other Miscellanies of Henry Ro-
gers, author of Eclipse of Faith. Boston: Crosby Ni-
chols & Co. New-York: Charles S. Francis & Co.
1853.

The last named of these two volumes is made up of contributions to the Edinburgh Review, by one of its ablest recent writers. These essays are all valuable, and it is a great convenience to have them thus collected into a volume. That on the "Vanity and Glory of Literature," is worthy of the fine scholarship of the author, and presents to scholars many important lessons, both of hope and humility. The essays on the "Genius and Writings of Pascal," and on "Reason and Faith, their claims and conflicts," may, in this day, when Christianity has to meet her adversaries on a new arena, be read with advantage by all students of the Evidences. And the articles on "Luther's correspondence and character," is just such a tribute to the grandeur and nobleness of the Reformer's mind and life as we like to see. The author's views are produced in the form of an examination of Hallam's Critique upon Luther's intellect and writings. We think he demonstrates that Hallam's "excellent and well-practised judgment deserted him in this instance."

Luther's deficiencies in different respects are admitted and pointed out, and still he is exhibited as "not far behind any of those who have played illustrious parts in this world's affairs; and as leaving behind him a name, than which few have greater claims on the gratitude of mankind,—nay, Mr. Rogers well says, that even "Rome owes him thanks; for whatever ameliorations have since taken place in her system, have been owing far more to him than to herself."

But it is the first named volume which we would especially recommend to the reader's attention. Though published anonymously, it is ascribed to Henry Rogers, and, we have no doubt, correctly. The style, the modes of thought, the illustrations, the allusions to Strauss, to Pascal, to Butler,—all the internal characteristics of the book, unite to show that one and the same pen wrote this work and the articles aforementioned, on "Reason and Faith." At one time, indeed, we suspected that some travelling countryman of our own might be the writer of this book,—and that was when we stumbled on the words *profanity* and *realize*, both used, (see pp. 31, 67, and 102,) as English critics assert that only Americans use them. But, besides the book's allusions to England, as the author's native land, there is unquestionable proof that the work is English in its treatment of the subject of slavery. No American writer of such breadth of mind as is displayed in the Eclipse of Faith, could have indicted, at the present period of that discussion in our country, so shallow a defence of the Apostles and their Master, against the charge of sanctioning slavery, as that, forsooth, they dared not condemn it for fear of ruin to their own cause.

But, whoever the author, we are certainly indebted to him for making, in this work, a most vigorous and well-sustained onset upon some of the latest risen enemies of Christianity. He writes with elegance and ease, and exhibits all the freshness and fulness which belong only to a disputant completely master of his subject. The plan of the work is such as to admit largely of the dramatic element in its conduct and development. It opens with a letter from one Brother, residing in England, to another, long a Missionary in the South Seas, in

which is given a sketch of the progress, in their native land, of the Oxford party, and of the rise there of the “*Spiritualists*,”—propagandists of a subtle infidelity, far more dangerous than Romanism, in the judgment of the author. This sublimation of Christianity is so exquisite, that “when you have ceased to believe all that is specially characteristic of the New Testament,—its history, its miracles, its peculiar doctrines,—you may still be a genuine Christian.” Mr. Francis Newman, brother to the *quondam* Oxford Professor of that name, appears to be the chief leader of this new school of unbelief. His views have been published in his works on the “Soul,” and the “Phases of Faith.” He rejects the rationalism of Paulus, and all the rest of the so-called *Naturalists*, who account for the supernatural occurrences mentioned in Scripture on the ground of misjudged natural phenomena. Nor does his school altogether harmonize with the rationalism of Strauss, which declares the supernatural in Christianity to be, not illusion, but myth. They are neither naturalists nor rationalists, but spiritualists, and talk much of insight into God, the oracle within, the religious instinct, and the intuitional consciousness; nay, they adopt and continually use a scriptural phraseology. “The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.” “The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, because they are spiritually discerned.” “The fruit of the Spirit is joy, love, peace.” These texts they are constantly quoting. They affect a very “unctuous way of talking.” And yet, under all this gosamer disguise of New Testament phrases, and spiritual pretensions, this new doctrine is but a bastard Deism. They reject all the supernatural narratives of Christianity. All the distinguishing doctrines of the system, too, are cast aside,—as the Trinity, the Atonement, the Resurrection, the Judgment. “Christianity is not so much a system as a discipline,—not a creed, but a life,—in short, a Divine philosophy.” They reject, indeed, all creeds, and pour contempt on all discussions, as to dogma, and all examinations of evidence. They hold, in the language of Theodore Parker, (their American brother,) to the “absolute religion” which is found imbedded in every religious creed. “Their faith includes a belief in one

Supreme God, who is a Divine Personality; in the duty of reverencing, loving, and obeying Him,—whether we know how that is to be done or not; that we must repent of our sins,—if, indeed, we duly know what things are sins in His sight; that He will certainly forgive, to any extent, on such repentance, without any mediation; that perhaps there is a heaven hereafter; but that is very doubtful, if there are any punishments.” And thus, “with the exception of the immortality of the soul, on which Lord Herbert has the advantage of speaking a little more firmly,” the Deists and these Spiritualists appear to be tolerably identical.

It is against this modern Deism our author chiefly employs his strength. But his attack is not so much from the side of Christianity as of Atheism. He turns the enemy’s flank, and then makes as brilliant and effective a descent upon him as ever was accomplished by a troop of dragoons in full charge. The chief of the *dramatis personarum* is Harrington, nephew to the two Brothers. After graduating at an English college, he spends three years abroad. The spectacle of the interminable controversies which occupy the mind of Germany, throws him into doubts extending to the whole field of Theology. And “not contented with one-sided theories, or inconsequential reasonings, he pursues the argument to its *logical* termination,” and is landed in complete skepticism. But “he is an *impartial doubter*; he doubts whether Christianity be true; but he also doubts whether it be *false*; and either from his impatience of the theories which infidelity proposes in its place, as inspiring yet stronger doubts; or, in revenge for the peace of which he has been robbed, he never seems more at home than in ridiculing the confidence and conceit of that internal oracle, which professes to solve the problems which it seems Christianity leaves in darkness; and in pushing the principles on which infidelity rejects the New Testament to their legitimate conclusion.” A college friend of Harrington’s is introduced, now a disciple of the Spiritualists, and in their discussions we have Christianity defended by the skeptic, or Atheist, against the Deist. It is the conversations of these two individuals, and sundry others, who occasion-

ally enter on the stage, and of Harrington's uncle, which make up the volume; and the whole is presented to us in the form of a journal kept by the Brother in England for the one abroad.

It will thus be seen, that our author undertook a rather unusual task. He aimed not so much to produce a positive, Christian argument against the new Deism, as to turn the Anti-Christian weapons of Deists against themselves. In the language of the preface to the American edition: "He adopts the Platonic method, and exhibits a dialectic skill in confounding by objections, when objections can be made to do service as arguments." He himself states one end he aimed at, to be the setting forth: "how easily an impartial doubter can retort with interest the deistical arguments against Christianity, and how little merely insoluble *objections* can avail against anything."

The reader will find two important subjects especially discussed in this work, viz: Miracles and Inspiration. The impossibility of God's giving to his creatures a book-revelation or a lip-revelation; and the impossibility of a miracle's being wrought, or, if wrought, the impossibility of its being proved;—each of these three impossibilities being asserted and strenuously maintained by Mr. Newman and the new spiritual Deists, our new ally, the skeptic is allowed to propose a few of his doubts on these points, and his Platonic skill shortly involves in difficulties inextricable, these seekers of a *Via Media* between Atheism and the Gospel.

There is yet another subject repeatedly referred to by our author, on which we feel inclined to offer some observations. It is the question of human responsibility for opinions. Many shallow thinkers maintain that *sincerity* is the chief point in religion,—far more important than *truth*,—and that it is no matter what a man's religious opinions may be, if he is only sincere in maintaining them. In fact this saying has passed into a maxim with multitudes of these loose reasoners. And some, too, who generally are neither shallow thinkers, nor loose reasoners, assert that actions only are the subject matter of responsibility, and that mere opinions are not properly the objects of moral approbation or disapprobation. Sir

James McIntosh gave it as his judgment that the establishment of the doctrine of our irresponsibility for opinions is desirable, as the only thing which can eradicate the evils of controversy and persecution. The spirit of the age is latitudinarian. It says with Pope,

"For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight,
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

It holds all religious opinions matters of indifference. Whosoever so commits himself to any set of doctrines that he will not countenance the very opposite, it calls a *bigot*,—a harsh name, indeed, and designed to be reproachful, but expressing, actually, the age's sense of that very man's uncommon firmness, earnestness and consistency. And surely, as Burke said, it must be a very easy thing, and a thing deserving no praise, that those should tolerate all opinions who deem no opinions of any special value or importance. We are, however, of those, on the contrary, who hold with the author of the work we have been noticing, that a man's creed may be his crime. We hold the latitudinarian spirit to be that of treachery to all truth. We hold that principles of no description, whether religious, moral, political or scientific, are worth having, except to maintain and act upon them. We agree, of course, with Lord Brougham, that it is, or ought to be, "no offence against the law to entertain any religious, or any political principles, neither to discuss them, with decency and propriety."—We look upon religious and political discussion as a matter to be regulated *just as little* as comports with the best good of all concerned. Restraints upon free discussion, like those upon free trade, ought to be few,—only such as public morals and decency demand. We also agree with Lord Brougham, that "man should render no account to man for his belief." But we cannot admit his Lordship's broad assertion, that man "has no control over his own belief," and that "man deserves no praise and no blame for his belief, which he can no more change than he can the hue of his skin, or the height of his stature." We hold that man, even in his present fallen state, has *some* control over his own belief, and that to his Maker he is perfectly and entirely responsible for that

belief; and, moreover, that while society has, indeed, no right to inflict pains and penalties upon his person, or property, for the errors of his creed, she must, she ought, and she always will, measure out to him, while he lives, yea, and long after he is dead and buried, her praise or her blame, her honour or her contempt, her love or her hatred, according to the hue and complexion of his and of her religious and moral opinions.

We are free to admit that the question of human responsibility for belief has its difficulties. Here is a child receiving a distinctive religious training from his parents, and almost sure, we might say, to believe whatever he is taught. How can that child help believing its father's creed? Well, he *very often does not believe it*. Here is a Heathen, involved in Pagan darkness,—how can he help believing in the idol? Well, he very often does not believe in it. Not only did Heathen philosophers of old rise above the popular superstitions of their country and time, but even amongst the common people, in every Pagan land, and in every age, there have been, and there are, those who have no confidence at all in their own religion. But, admitting that the child does generally believe what he is taught, and that the Heathen do generally confide in their native religion,—and admitting their irresponsibility *to us*, and also the impossibility of *our* deciding in what degree each individual is responsible to God for what he believes, we can have no hesitation whatever in adopting the general principle that they are justly responsible to God, and will be judged by the Creator for their religious opinions.

In reference to any of the affairs of life, the maxim referred to is never allowed to operate. For example, no man feels that it is indifferent what his friend believes about him, provided that friend is only sincere. Every one holds his friend responsible for his abstractest and most secret opinions of him. It is the most secret and most abstract opinions respecting us, which others in general hold, that we most highly appreciate. How, then, can any man cherish the notion that we, responsible creatures, may entertain all sorts of opinions about our Father and our God, and about his revealed truth, without being held to account by Him?

Take another example. No man feels that any absolute government should regard with indifference the disloyal opinions of its internal foes, however secret or abstract. It is true, under absolute governments that are in any degree just and liberal, *actions only* are taken cognizance of. But this is because all human governments are necessarily incapable of judging anything but the conduct of men. But, if there was a government possessed of the power to judge the hearts of men, and having also the indisputable *right* of rewarding or punishing their sentiments, every man must admit, not only the justice, but also the necessity and duty of that government's holding its subjects responsible for the abstractest disloyalty. Now, such is the government of God. The Divine Ruler has both the power and the right of judging our opinions. How, then, can any man entertain the idea of God's being indifferent,—much more, how can any man gravely maintain that he *ought to be* indifferent to the religious opinions and feelings of his moral and responsible subjects?

Take another example, from our own free government. At every important juncture in our nation's history, all men of sense and patriotism are expected to have an opinion respecting public affairs. But in any very critical period, when the most vital interests of the country are manifestly at stake, whoever holds an opinion which puts in jeopardy those interests, all men feel that the country has a right to hold that man responsible for that opinion. No matter how he comes by such an opinion, we blame him for it. We may do no more, but at least we blame him for it. But if he proceeds to *act out* his unpatriotic opinions, all agree that he deserves the extremest penalty. And how, then, can any reasonable man for a moment imagine, that in religion, where so many and such vast interests are at stake, it should be indifferent what are a man's opinions? But, if it should still be held by any, that in religion, opinions are matters of indifference, how could the inference be avoided that to act in accordance with wrong opinions is quite harmless, and indeed praiseworthy, because it evidences sincerity? The maxim in question, therefore, leads directly to the most deplorable moral consequences. It sanctions

every wicked opinion, and, in fact, requires, for the sake of consistency, and as a proof and mark of sincerity, it requires all the wicked acts which flow from it.

The true doctrine on this subject was well set forth by the late venerable Dr. Alexander, of Princeton, in reviewing, some years ago, in the *Biblical Repertory*, two volumes of essays by an English writer, on the formation and publication of opinions. He says, "It may be summed up in the following particulars :

1st. Those truths which are *self-evident*, or the proof of which is demonstrative and perfectly clear, are believed by necessity ; that is, the constitution of our minds is such, that we cannot do otherwise than believe them.— We cannot disbelieve them by any effort. In regard to such truths as these, there can be no merit in believing, nor is there any moral quality in assent thus given.

2nd. There are other truths, the evidence of which is not so obvious and convincing as to place them beyond the reach of doubt or contradiction ; and yet these, *having no relation to duty*, men may differ about them, and be equally innocent. In such a case also, our opinions are not the proper objects of moral approbation or disapprobation.

3rd. There may be truths which have an important relation to human duty, which, however, are so situated, as to their evidences, in relation to some persons, that, although they may be diligent and honest in the search of truth, they *may not be able to discover them*. As for example, if a man in the centre of China, or Thibet, who had never heard of the Bible, should be sincerely desirous to know whether the great Creator had ever made any revelation of His will to men, he might not be able, by all the industry which he could use, and all the inquiries he could make, to satisfy himself on this important point. But, *supposing this to be the state of the facts*, it is evident that his doubt, or disbelief, although inconsistent with the truth, would be no object of moral disapprobation.

4th. Again, there is a large class of practical truths, so situated, as to evidence, that the knowledge of them is fairly attainable by the diligent and impartial inquirer ;

while they will be almost certainly hid from the view of men who are strongly under the influence of pride, avarice, or the predominant love of pleasure. In regard to this whole class,—and it is a numerous one,—men are responsible for their erroneous belief, if they are for any thing.”—*Biblical Repertory*, 1832, p. 405.

According to this statement of the case, there are only *some classes of opinions* which can be regarded as proper objects of moral approbation or disapprobation. And, moreover, in relation to these very classes of opinions, there are certain circumstances which must co-exist, in order to give a moral quality to the belief of them. Not only must the truths in question concern human duty, but the individual in question must have opportunity to see, capacity to understand, and evidence to convince him of the truth. God is just and righteous. He will judge every man according to the particular degree of light which he enjoys. The Heathen man acts under a responsibility of his own, and shall give account, as well of his moral and religious opinions, as of his conduct, to the God who made him, and endowed him with reason, and bestowed on him the gift of a measure of illumination. But, as for such a people as inhabits this land, they shall be judged by a very different rule. Favoured more than all the nations of men that are around us on the globe, and beyond all the generations of men that have preceded us on the earth, it is the plain dictate of justice that we shall have to give a stricter account than all other men, for the actions we perform, the words we speak, and the thoughts and opinions we entertain.

To prove the responsibility of every human being for his moral and religious opinions, we think an argument may be derived from *the very nature of God, and of the human soul as God created it.*

God is a Spirit, and man, his creature, is also an invisible and an immortal spirit, sojourning in a clay tabernacle. May we not infer from thence the importance and value in God's sight of the abstract and the moral, together with the probability of his making us responsible as well for opinions as for conduct?

“There is” (says one who has risen of late to shine, a

star of first magnitude among Christian Philosophers,)* "there is at least one other thing, which has as certain an existence as matter, and that is the mind which contemplates matter. What can be nobler, it may be asked, than the physical universe? We answer, the mind, which contemplates that universe. What can penetrate deeper than chemistry, which shews us the very elements of bodies; or than those beautiful microscopical observations with polarized light, which enable us to look into the very interior of matter? We answer, the mind, which has penetrated that far, and can comprehend all this.—There is something larger than the law of gravitation, and that is the capacity of thought which discovered, and can take in that law. We reckon the mind of Newton a grander object in itself than all the discoveries made by it. What, it is asked, can penetrate farther into space than the telescope? We answer, the imagination,—which, when you have taken it to the farthest point to which Lord Rosse's instrument can reach, launches forth into an infinite space beyond. What can carry us farther back than Geology? We answer, the mind, which, when you have conducted it to the beginning of the creation, declares, there must have been an eternity before this."

Now, this mind of man, which the Professor describes in such eloquent terms,—this human mind, has no relations so noble or so grand in its Creator's eye, as those it sustains to Truth, to Morals, to Duty. This human mind is of kin with all those grand, original and fundamental principles, which lie at the foundation of every species of investigation, but for none has it a closer affinity than for those which underlie the science of morals. The peculiar distinction of man is, that he can appreciate principles; but, as no class of principles is so worthy of his investigation, so no class is more adapted to his nature, than the moral or religious class. There is a world without and beneath us, which we may, and must investigate. There is a world within us, the "Realm of Thought," an "Intellectual Domain,"—this we may also investigate, and so, as the same author expresses it,

* Dr. McCosh, in his Inaugural Address at Queen's College, Belfast.

“inspect that eye which inspects all other things.” But there is also within us, and around us, a moral world. We have moral as well as intellectual intuitions and capacities. God, himself moral and spiritual, has made us moral and spiritual. He made us not only to see visible things and their visible and physical relations,—not only to contemplate intellectual questions,—but also to look at moral truths, and apprehend moral relations. We were created not merely for the natural world, and not merely for external actions, but for the moral world, and for feeling and believing internally. And when the human spirit receives anything as true,—when it adopts any moral opinion, that spirit as truly performs *an act* for which it is *responsible*, as when by volition it moves the limbs of its body. Man is an agent, no more in the world about him, than he is in the world within him. His activity is no more real in its external developements than in its external exercises,—no more real or responsible in its intellectual than in its moral operations. For the soul of man *doing*, is no more an act than *willing to do*; nor is *willing to do*, any more an act than *believing it ought to do*.

God, then, being what He is, and man being what God has constituted him, a moral as well as intellectual and physical agent, the Creator can not but hold us responsible for our belief. Whoever denies it, must deny God's and his own spiritual and moral nature, or he must deny the superiority of moral truth to every other kind of truth. The man who would choose either of these two consequences rather than admit our responsibility for opinions, never felt the beauty and the force of Dr. Johnson's fine saying—“Whatever withdraws us from the power of the senses, whatever makes the past, the distant, or the future predominate over the present, advances us in the dignity of thinking beings.” For ourselves, belonging as we do to a school of Theology which has never been addicted to the flattery of our fallen nature, we should nevertheless feel ourselves to be guilty of degrading the moral constitution of humanity, as well as guilty of degrading morality, of degrading truth, and of dishonouring God himself, if we were to

admit the idea that no moral quality attaches to human belief or unbelief.

In the next place, we think an argument for the responsibility under consideration may be derived from *the nature and power of moral opinions*.

Those who deny our responsibility for belief, admit our responsibility for conduct. Actions, say they, involve merit or demerit, but not opinions. Thus they would separate opinions and conduct,—they would *abstract* the former, in order to deprive them of any moral character.

Now, we are of those who maintain the importance and power of the most abstract principles. Action is individual, local and transitory; but principle is general, it is permanent. The human agent himself is transient, he must die; and while he lives, he must be circumscribed in his influence and power. But set afloat a principle, and its influence and power are not to be circumscribed. Principles are the seeds of things. A principle is a portion of eternal truth and right. Principles are statements of universal truths. They are the ultimate results of all science. Borrowing the phraseology of some modern philosophers, we might say they are the only real, the only absolute, the only unconditional, besides the Almighty himself. Next to God, we place Truth.

There are abstract principles of science which have no relation to human duty. And see what power and value these have! The mariner ploughs the deep and connects distant nations by regarding formulas, which are the bare, naked results of astronomical calculations. The miner sinks his shaft, and brings up various treasures from the earth's bosom by following the generalized investigations of geology. Our garments are woven by machinery built according to the abstract principles of one science, and dyed by substances employed according to the abstract principles and general laws of another science. We make our journeys from land to land, and we get our news from distant nations by the employment of powers and agencies which scientific men, abstracted from all the concerns of practical life, first brought to light and taught us how to employ and control. Indeed,

all the great discoveries and improvements in the arts which are now being made, and the benefits of which we all enjoy, are but so many applications of principles,—of principles discovered towards the close of the last century,—all results of the abstractions of science. And thus it is, that while those who know but little of scientific matters are priding themselves upon the superior wisdom and skill of the age we live in, the highest scientific authorities tell us, that with all the show of progress in this age, it is only living on the age immediately preceding; it is operating entirely upon capital borrowed from that age, and is making no further discoveries of abstract and primary principles, for others who come after us to apply, and so roll on the tide of human improvement.* It is principles, new principles, we must have discovered and brought out, before we can make any real advance of science. The great things, the mighty things, the things which operate and have controlling influence in the whole range of material things, and in all the domain of mind, are principles, abstract principles. But if, in the physical and intellectual world, abstract principles have so much value, can they be unimportant in the moral world? Would it not be strange if there were no analogy in this respect, between the Constitution and Course of Nature and Religion, natural and revealed?

Strictly speaking, however, there is no moral principle which you can call an *abstract* principle, in distinction from a *practical* one. Moral truths, and religious truths, are all practical. Every doctrine of natural or revealed religion was given in order to influence the heart and life of man. Accordingly, the Scriptures themselves are silent on very many subjects, of very great and very natural interest to mankind. Every doctrine points, and was given that it might point, to some duty; and whatsoever was in this respect unnecessary, was withheld. Thus, the very *nature of God*, abstracted from his commands to us,—the nature and *personal* qualities of Jehovah, in whatever light creation or the Bible may present them, have a certain influence proper to them, and which

* Prof. Agassiz, at the Literary Conversation Club, Charleston, S. C.

should be felt by us. In fact, there is no abstract light in which we can view man as contemplating moral truth. Every such truth must, from the nature of things, regard man as related either to God, or to others, or to himself; and there is no moral question which can be submitted to his belief, but it has a bearing upon his duties in one or another of these relations.

And yet, owing to the ignorance, not to say wickedness, of mankind, many moral truths come to be regarded by them as abstract ideas. They see not, and feel not, the practical bearing of these truths, and so they practically constitute and declare them abstract. But have we not all observed how the practical recognition of these so-called abstract principles always commands respect? Have we not all seen how it sometimes awakens, in the common mind, the profoundest veneration for the man who thus perceives and thus renders homage to truth?—It is this makes the Christian martyr glorious.* He dies for a divinely revealed principle. It is this ennobles the political hero. Hampden refused to pay ship-money, because of his regard for a mere abstract idea, as it might be called; and this has made his name deathless. Mrs. Motte, of this State, was a heroine, because, out of regard to the abstract idea that a Briton's right to be represented accompanies a Briton's duty to pay taxes, she set fire, by means of lighted and burning arrows, to her own house, then a castle for the invading English. But for this *abstract idea*, to which she was therein paying such costly, yet such glorious homage, her act had constituted her a mad-woman. In fact, it has been well and truthfully said, that the seven years' war, with which our revolutionary forefathers resisted successfully the attempt on the part of the English government to exercise over their colonies an unconstitutional power, was a struggle, not of desperate necessity, or of excited passion, but of pure, in one sense, almost of speculative, principle.†—“Millions for defence, not a cent for tribute!”—No one

* “At the time when the Church flourished most, it was not purple, gold and precious stones which imparted to her the splendour in which she was invested,—but it was the blood of the Martyrs.”—*Calvin's Introduction to the 87th Psalm.*

† Hugh Legare's Works, vol. ii., p. 268.

of us but feels the power of this sentiment. But certainly, to us, at this time, it is only the power of an abstract principle. And is that not a mere abstract idea, (so far as our country is concerned,) to which, with so much effect in some sections of the land, a distinguished Hungarian not long since appealed? And in the case of multitudes whose passions have all been roused by it, is not that a mere abstract idea, which has endangered and still endangers the permanency of this Union?

It has been often said, and well said, that public virtue and public intelligence are the safeguards of popular institutions. Men of observation and experience all agree, that the preservation of our government depends, not on party tactics of any kind, but on the school, the press, and the pulpit. But what power have these? None but the power of certain abstract principles. They only present to the mind of the people certain moral or spiritual and eternal relations, quite abstracted, it may be, from the material and the concrete.

Somebody has said that "no external foe, or public danger, can be half so threatening or formidable as the prejudices, the passions, the corrupt tendencies of demoralized communities. Every selfish, base desire, or feeling, or sentiment, is as anti-republican as it is anti-christian. Every act of private injustice, violence, oppression, proscription, or bad faith, is an injury done to free institutions. They are wronged, and, to a certain extent, weakened, by all private acts of this character; and, only let a sufficient number of citizens pursue such a course, and our system of government would fall as the republics of Greece and Rome did, for want of the sustaining power of private virtue."

If, then, moral principles, whether true or false, are from the nature of things always practical, and if they have so much power for good or for evil, how can any reasonable man imagine that the Divine Ruler could neglect to hold us responsible for our use and management of them? Surely, no man can maintain that belief is in such cases devoid of all moral quality, unless he totally leaves out of view the intimate connection between principles and conduct. Does not the principle on which an act is performed always give character to

that act? Let a man treat you with ever so much kindness, do you value it, except you believe it comes from his heart? You shed the blood of a fellow-man,—if done from one principle, you become an atrocious murderer; if from another, it constitutes you, in one case, an innocent defender of your own life; in another, the proper executioner of public justice; and, in yet another, a patriot-hero, ridding your country of a bloody tyrant!—Can it be morally wrong to act in accordance with an innocent opinion; or, can it be morally right to act in accordance with a wicked opinion? Is not the man who invents a false moral theory, and sets forth a false moral principle, responsible, in a certain sense, for all the wicked conduct which flows from it? And, in every individual man, are not the moral principles he holds, antecedent to, and decisive of, his conduct? Now, is it reasonable to suppose that God would give all his attention, as our Governor and Judge, to the *effect*, regardless of the *cause*? Would He regard the stream, and not regard the fountain? Shall we be held responsible for conduct, and our opinions, which control, and should control it, not come in for their share of praise or blame? Is it not manifest, that if the general responsibility of man is acknowledged, his specific responsibility for moral opinions must also be acknowledged?—and that, on the other hand, the denial of this specific responsibility, is the denial of all responsibility whatever? If these things be so, then the immorality of the notion we are combating is evident. It tends to the release of mankind from the sense of any responsibility whatsoever.

A third argument in favour of our responsibility for belief may be drawn, as it appears to us, from the moral character which belongs essentially to the very act of believing. What is belief? John Locke says it is the admitting any proposition for true upon arguments or proof.—(Essay Book iv., ch. 15.) To believe, is, therefore, to yield to offered testimony. It is an act, in which man sits as a judge, and weighs the proofs submitted to him upon any question. But in all religious and moral questions, it is undoubtedly God himself who stands in the witness-box, and himself directly, or else indirectly, through his messengers, gives evidence before his crea-

ture, man; man, in the meanwhile, taking his high seat of judgment, hearing what God testifies, and deciding the case for himself. And, surely, by how much more noble the faculty is, which we employ in this process, beyond those which we exercise in the larger part of all our actings, by so much the more are we responsible to the Creator, for the manner in which we make use of it. By how much the more God has elevated and dignified us, in giving us such a judicial seat and office, beyond what he has done for us, in constituting us his mere workmen and servants, surely, by so much will he exact from us a stricter account of our discharge of this high and honourable function.

And now that man sits before the reader on that seat of justice to which God has exalted him, let it be supposed that he should be seen admitting a number of individuals there upon his bench, all openly striving to sway and bias his decisions! What! sitting there to decide impartially upon the testimony offered by God himself, does man allow other parties to influence his decision by private considerations whispered in his ear? Does he even suffer them to draw away his attention, in the slightest degree, from the testimony to which he should be listening? Surely, this would be a most responsible line of procedure. But is this a real, or only a supposable case? Does man, in his capacity as judge, actually, and in fact, so conduct his investigations? He does. His private passions, and his private affections, are suffered to warp his judgment and control his decisions. This is the source of most of his errors of opinion. He thinks wrongly, because he feels wrongly. He easily believes sometimes what he wishes were true, and sometimes what he wishes were not true,—and so, hope and fear, by turns, blind and deceive him. He is frequently in a mood not to be convinced, and then you cannot convince him,—for

“A man convinced against his will,
Is of the same opinion still.”

Lord Bacon very justly says, “lies come into favour among men, not only through the difficulty and labour of finding out the truth, nor, again, because, when the truth

is found, it imposes on men's thoughts, but very much through the natural, corrupt love of the lie itself." By reason of the evil tendencies, the sinful prejudices, the wrong feelings, the wicked desires and passions of man, he rejects the truth, and accepts the error. And thus he abuses his trust, dishonours his office, and lays himself open to the condemnation of that Supreme Judge, by whom he was so highly privileged and honoured.

Now, how could there be framed any good and sufficient answer to the charge of sinfulness against such a prostitution of his gifts and honours on the part of man? Let us suppose the plea entered that the evidence submitted to man in favour of Christianity is not sufficient, and therefore man is not responsible for any lack of conformity of his opinions to the Scriptures. Why, then, the ground taken must be either that God's testimony is not enough for man, or that the Bible is not God's testimony. And this, in either form of it, is the ground of an Infidel. Here, then, if the opposers of the doctrine of human responsibility for belief are content, we might leave them in the infidel positions to which they have been driven, it being then to be understood on all hands that infidelity is the legitimate and final landing place of those who defend the maxim, "no matter what a man believes if he is sincere."

It appears to us, however, that no person who really believes the maxim in question, accepting with it all that it involves, can be content to take the position of an infidel; for, unless one admits the Scripture to be true, what possible room is there for this maxim? For, how can any man know, except as taught by Scripture, that God prefers sincerity to insincerity? Or, how else does any man know that God is a pitiful and gracious God, so as to hope and believe he will not punish us for sins of ignorance? How does any man know, except as taught by the Bible, that God may not be an arbitrary tyrant, reaping where he sowed not, gathering where he strewed not, and exacting the very same measures of knowledge and belief from those who have not, as from those who have light. It is not from bald and naked infidelity, therefore, that we so naturally meet with opposition to the doctrine of our responsibility for belief,—it flows ra-

ther from a spurious Christianity. It is the legitimate progeny of a false charity. The infidel plea, therefore, we will dismiss, with the full consent, no doubt, of all who have any respect for Christianity, or who allow insincerity, or any other immorality, to be properly the subject-matter of responsibility. And we wait now for a second and a better answer to the charge of sinfulness which we bring against man whenever seated high on a judicial seat, with God himself condescending to stand before him as a witness: he makes God a liar by rejecting His truth.

Will it then be argued by any, that we are not justly accountable for our errors of belief, because of the fact of our native corruption?—a corruption existing in the deepest recesses of human nature,—in the first springs of human conduct,—in the feelings and desires of the human heart. Let this plea be boldly carried out, then, to its legitimate results, and let us say, that the fact of human corruption excuses the vilest conduct of the worst man that ever lived. The plea is as good in the one case as in the other. It is good for nothing in either case. Do we ever find men reasoning thus in the affairs of common life? The man who wilfully injures us do we ever pardon, on the ground that he is a man of evil dispositions? Is the drunkard justified because he has a raging thirst, or a passionate man because he has an ungovernable spirit? Never! And so the man who forms wrong opinions, when he has the opportunity of forming right ones, is not excusable because he naturally inclines to error. If this inclination towards evil be an excuse for wicked opinions, it is, of course, so much the more an excuse the stronger it is, and thence must follow this absurd conclusion that the most fiendish dispositions will finally involve the lightest condemnation.

But, truly, man is under a responsibility which is universal. It begins at the fountain head, the first springs of conduct,—his feelings and desires; but we shall search in vain to find any part of his constitution to which this responsibility does not extend. Man is bound to feel right, and think right, and do right. God will condemn, and has a right to condemn sin wherever it exists, and in whatsoever form it presents itself before him. Who-

ever is conscious that he has wicked feelings which he cannot subdue, is always conscious of this too, that the more he cannot subdue these wicked feelings, the more sinful and miserable he is. The more opposed any man's heart is to right, the guiltier he is for that. And we shall find that all our objections and difficulties will give us no relief from the responsibility under which our Creator has placed us, as judges of truth. If we are prone to be unfair judges, it is our sin that we are so,—and the greater this proneness, the greater our sin before God. If we are disposed to give a dishonest judgment from that high seat where God placed us, when he undertook to submit his truth to our examination, and commend it Himself to our belief, a dreadful, and a lamentable fact indeed it is, and we should feel it to be such. Responsible we are, and responsible we shall forever continue to be, in every part of our constitution, and at every period of our being. Responsible, not only when we act, but when we *will to act*; not only when we will to act, but when we *yield to those motives* which determine us so to will; not only when we yield to these motives, but when we *form opinions*, and *cherish feelings* which make us capable of being influenced by those motives.

There is a fourth argument, weightier far than any we have yet presented, and it shall be our last. It is derived from the general representation of Scripture, and from the specific nature of Christianity.

How often do the Scriptures represent Jesus Christ as perceiving and condemning the thoughts of the hearts of those around him! And if, while He was yet in our form, as a servant, he observed and condemned opinions, how much more must he now notice,—how much more will he, at last, condemn them from his eternal throne!

“But of the heart (said Jesus Christ) proceed evil thoughts,” that is, in the original *reasonings or opinions that are wicked*. And what other evils does He describe as associated with, as issuing from, and as indicating this wicked character of the heart's reasonings? Why “murder,” adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies. These are the fruits of that tree, the streams from that fountain.

The Apostle Paul charges it against the Heathen, as

one of their sins, that they became vain in their imaginations, (or reasonings,) and had their foolish hearts darkened."—Rom. i. 21.

When Simon, the sorcerer, thought the gift of God's Spirit might be purchased with money, the Apostle Peter pronounced that thought, or opinion, a wicked one; thought it was, no doubt, as deliberately formed and as sincerely held, as it was frankly avowed. The Apostle tells him, moreover, that he is in danger of perishing for that opinion, and he exhorts him to repent of that wickedness, and pray God, if, perhaps, that thought of his heart might be forgiven him.

In like manner, with reference to those that opposed themselves to the doctrines of the gospel, Paul says, (2 Tim. ii. 25,) we must, "in meekness, instruct them, if peradventure God will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth," which shews that not acknowledging the truth is sinful, even in those cases in which it arises partly from ignorance and the want of instruction. Again the same Apostle (2 Tim. iii. 8,) speaks of those who "resist the truth, as men of *corrupt minds*, reprobate concerning the faith."

Thus it is, also, that we find the beloved Apostle John giving commandment (2 John, 10 and 11,) not to receive nor to salute any man who holds a certain "doctrine," which he names, and the ground of the commandment is that whoso wishes that man well, is partaker of his "*evil deeds*." The inference seems unavoidable, that in John's mind it is an *evil deed to hold a wicked doctrine*.

But when we leave these general representations of the word of God, and come to consider the specific nature of Christianity, we see still more plainly that man must be responsible to God for his belief. "He that believeth shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned." The most prominent feature of the gospel is its demand upon our faith. The very foundations of the Christian religion, as a scheme of doctrine and as a personal life and experience, are laid in belief. And to deny our responsibility for religious opinions, plainly, therefore, tends towards a total denial of Christianity.

Such being our views of human responsibility for belief, we, of course, maintain that great dignity belongs

to the office of the preacher; nay, of every teacher, whether more or less directly engaged in the communication of moral and religious instruction. It is in this aspect we see, how truly venerable is every mother with her young charge sitting at her feet. And meditating on these things, we feel how much it becomes all persons, both preachers and hearers, teachers and pupils, parents and children, in fine the whole human race, to beware how they handle truth, how they deal with principles, those most delicate, most sacred, most precious, most mighty of all things outside of God's eternal throne!

We think such impressions very wholesome ones to be cherished, by beings constituted and situated as are mankind. And these very impressions will be made, of necessity, upon every mind which acknowledges the responsibility we have been maintaining. And every such mind will, moreover, be impressed with the duty of rousing itself to earnest and honest inquiry and search after the truth; and with the necessity of controlling the passions, instead of allowing them to control the understanding, the will, and the life. Every such mind must also be sensible of the importance of cultivating right feelings on every subject, with a view to obtaining right opinions on that subject; and will strive to cherish a deep conviction of its own liability and proneness to error, with a view both to the exercise of charity towards others, and to an humble seeking of Divine guidance for itself. We say charity towards others,—but far be it, forever, from us, to appeal to that hollow, that false charity which is so general in this age. Upon that, we trust, we have learned to set its true value. Every good thing has its counterfeit, and why should there not be a counterfeit charity? The early Christians cultivated charity in all things, and allowed liberty in things indifferent, but they insisted, as we would always be found insisting, upon unity and orthodoxy in things essential. There are men, and there are churches in this day, (Mr. Newman and the Spiritualists are, perhaps, the latest found specimens,) who insist on wearing the Christian name, while they deny all the fundamental truths of Christianity. And yet, holding a totally different scheme as being the true Christian scheme, they are found as liberal towards us as

they are towards each other! What a dreadful duplicity and treachery there is in all their charity! We would love the persons, but hate and abjure the errors of such. We would ever remember that truth stands next to God himself; and God helping us, we mean that it shall always stand next to him in our practical regards.

In opposition, then, to Sir J. Mackintosh's declaration quoted in the early part of this article, we hold the establishment of the doctrine, that men are responsible for belief, to be in every point of view most desirable,—and are unable to perceive how any benefits could flow to the human family from destroying their sense of accountability for abuse of evidence, and for rejection of truth. Intimate as the connection is between opinions, and conduct, and necessary as restraint is to beings constituted like us, would it not be a dreadful calamity to religion and virtue, if the race of man were persuaded to believe all religious and moral opinions matters of indifference? Would it not be a monstrous thing for us all to become so indifferent to truth, as to feel the very same feelings towards those who sympathize with our most cherished and sacred opinions, and those who sympathize not? If all men were once persuaded that truth is not the most sacred and precious of all things, there might, indeed, be, as Sir James says there would be, less persecution and controversy, but we should have no more patriots, or martyrs. We should no longer be able to appreciate the very best lessons of history. We should never more be stirred to noble deeds, or to heroic endurance, by any fresh examples of a tried soul yielding life, rather than to yield truth.

Such would be the deplorable, practical influences of the doctrine we are opposing. But what of the doctrine itself? It seems to us that nothing can exceed the folly and absurdity of it as embodied in the maxim, that "it is no matter what a man believes if he is only sincere." This maxim, of course, can only apply to those who hold false opinions. But how can such a man, according to this maxim itself, ever do right, or escape censure? If he act out his wrong opinions, his conduct must be wrong, of course, and he is condemned as an evil doer; but, if he does not act them out, he must be insincere, and is set down for a hypocrite.

ARTICLE II.

THE BIBLE, AND NOT REASON, THE ONLY CERTAIN AND AUTHORITY SOURCE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, EVEN OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

“We have also” says the Apostle Peter, “a more sure word of prophecy, whereunto ye do well that ye take heed as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in your hearts.”—Without entering into the discussion of the various shades of interpretation to which this passage of Scripture has given rise, I would present what appears to be implied as true in them all. The Apostle had adduced the miracle of the transfiguration, of which he was an eye-witness, as an irrefragable proof of the divinity and glory of Christ and his gospel, and of the assurance of future and everlasting blessedness. Of all this, the glory with which Christ was transfigured,—the testimony given to him by Moses and Elias,—and the voice of God openly declaring him to be his Son, and authoritatively requiring all men implicitly to receive and obey his teachings,—are irresistible proofs. But, adds the Apostle, strong as is *this* testimony, and infallible as is this evidence of the truth and certainty of the things in which we have believed, we have the very word of God conveyed to us through the instrumentality of holy men of God in every age of the Church, in those Scriptures which are filled with prophetic and inspired truths. The allusion is therefore to the entire Scriptures, both of the old and new Testaments. These Scriptures were “ALL GIVEN BY INSPIRATION,” as is attested by miraculous and prophetic evidences, that is, by a supernatural power, and a supernatural wisdom and foreknowledge, which imply omniscience, and omnipotence, and omnipresence. They are not, therefore, the result of private or uninspired disclosure, impulse or discovery. They did not originate from the intuitive or rational powers of the human mind. The Prophets were, as Bishop Horsley states it, necessary agents, acting under the irresistible influence of the omniscient Spirit, who made the faculties

and the organs of those holy men the instruments for conveying to mankind some portion of the treasures of his own knowledge." All the information, both as to doctrine and duty, contained in the Scriptures, is the result of supernatural or divine influence, and is, therefore, as indisputably the Word of God, as the voice from "the excellent glory heard upon the holy mount."

To those Scriptures, therefore, we are required to "take heed," as being all "profitable for" the infallible communication of "doctrine" and knowledge of duty. In the midst of that obscurity and darkness which envelope the limited range of human reason, and the ignorance and inability to comprehend divine things, even when revealed, in which sin has involved the understandings of men, revelation shines as a light in a dark place, to instruct and guide, and is completely fitted to direct into all truth and all duty, the otherwise bewildered inquirer. While he who trusts to his *own*, or to *human* reason, is like the mariner without chart, compass or anchor, driven about by every wind of doctrine, and "never in one stay," he who takes heed to this divine light, possesses both a divine compass, chart and anchor, which are "sure and steadfast," and by which he is made "wise unto salvation."

And what is more: the evidences by which the Scriptures are found to be the only and infallible rule of faith and practice, bright, and burning as they *now* are, are ever increasing. Events which, at the time the Scriptures were in their several parts written, were in the womb of time, have many of them come forth, and many more shall yet be brought into existence, giving by their testimony increasing magnitude and effulgence to this radiant light of Divine truth. Monuments silent for ages, and ruins buried for thousands of years from the notice of mankind, are now vocal, and coming forth from the tomb of their supposed oblivion, are proclaiming, as with the united voices of all past generations, the truth, and certainty, and inspiration of the Scriptures. Even now, the day has but *begun* to dawn, and the day-star to *arise* upon our hearts, and this evidence and attestation to the Scriptures, as the word of God, shall shine more and more, until the unclouded blaze of perfect conviction

shines with noon-tide brilliance on every darkened mind of man.

It is thus that the Psalmist also, describes the word of God,—fully developed in the gospel of his Son,—as being the true light imaged by the light of the natural sun.—Like the sun, it is intended for all men, adapted to all, and to be communicated to all. It is the only source of real, certain, and infallible truth, on all subjects super-human and divine. There is no speech nor language, where its voice is not, or is not to be heard. In its light alone, we see light, and destitute of it, millions “sit as in the region and shadow of death,” and “perish for lack of knowledge.” This word of God is, and it *alone* is, perfect to restore the soul from error to truth, from sin to righteousness, from doubt to certainty. It alone convinces of sin, holds forth a Saviour, is the means of grace, a rule of conduct, a standard of faith, a source of wisdom, unveiling to the darkened vision of reason the wonderful nature, and works, and ways, and will, and worship, and purposes, and mercy, of God, and thus enlightening the eyes.

To be a Christian, then, is to believe that Moses and the prophets, Christ and his Apostles, *were endowed with divine* authority to teach all that they taught, and enforce all that they enjoined, and that God will verify in this world, and in the world to come, all that they have foretold,—it is, in short, cordially and with our hearts, to believe and act upon the truth that the Scriptures are the only rule of our faith and practice, of our hopes and fears, and that to add to, or take from, to modify or exchange any of their truths, is to endanger the only “foundation which God has laid in Zion.”

In what relation, then, does reason stand to Scripture and Scripture to reason? To perceive this with clearness, let us remember what has been determined concerning reason. Reason is that intelligent nature by which man is capable of thinking,—of discerning the relation of cause and effect,—of receiving and distinguishing testimony,—of weighing evidence,—of forming opinions,—of attaining knowledge,—of becoming acquainted with what is duty,—and of acting upon it under a sense of deep and solemn responsibility. This reason, we have seen, is

limited in its *capacity*, by its own finite nature, and in its *field of observation* and experience by the senses, to which, as inlets of sensation and organs of perception, it is at present allied. What is beyond this sphere, reason can only know by testimony, or remain ignorant of altogether, as is the case in reference to a *great part* of the things by which it is surrounded, and *universally*, as it regards their essences. Of course, this must be much more evidently and necessarily the case, as it relates to all things spiritual, supernatural and divine. This is an unknown region, which, like the terra incognita of earth, can only be surmised and conjectured, but of which we can have certain knowledge only so far as our actual observation and discovery in the one case, and actual testimony in the other, really extend. Both may be, to a certain extent, comprehensible by reason, when the means of judging of their existence and attributes is brought within its reach. In both, there will be much to be *believed*, as, for instance, the essence of things, which, with its present capacity, it never can *comprehend*. The belief, in regard to both, of all that is proved to be true, is most reasonable, and the attempt to explain or to dogmatize upon what is not proved or revealed, or comprehensible, is most unreasonable and absurd, yea, most sinful and impious.

But reason is not only limited. It is imperfect. It is not infallible. It is not omniscient, nor are its bodily organs absolutely perfect. It is, therefore, liable to misapprehension, perversion and mistake. To err is human. Infallibility is the prerogative only of Divinity. This imperfect and limited nature characterizes man as a creature "made a little lower than the angels," and not merely as a fallen and sinful creature. Adam, in Paradise, needed, and received, and rejoiced in, the instruction, guidance and holiness, imparted to him by his all-gracious and merciful Creator.

But now, man is a fallen and sinful, as well as a limited and imperfect being, and the Divine communion, holiness, and guidance, originally imparted to him, are, by his own sin, withdrawn. As it was in God's light man's reason saw perfectly, holily and wisely, so, when that light is withheld, reason is left to its own feeble

imperfection, and sees but dimly. A disordered heart ever enveloping it in a misty haze, it is seduced into error, mistakes truth for falsehood and falsehood for truth, regards evidence with attention or inattention, and investigates it thoroughly or imperfectly, according to the wishes of the heart. The understanding is itself darkened, and it will not come unto the light.

Thought

Precedes the will to think, and error lives
 Ere reason can be born. Reason, the power
 To guess at right and wrong, the twinkling lamp
 Of wand'ring life, that winks and wakes by turns
 Fooling the follower betwixt shade and shining.

While this limited, imperfect and perverted character of human reason has been manifested in every department of knowledge, it has been most lamentably exhibited in all inquiries into things divine. This was to be expected. These things lie beyond the field of sensible observation, experience and proof. We know not what life is, or what the soul is, or what spirit is, or how these act upon matter. And if thus ignorant concerning ourselves, and of what is within us, and constitutes ourselves, how can we know or comprehend that great Spirit who is infinite, eternal, omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent! How God, thus infinite, can be good, and yet man evil,—how God can be gracious, and yet man miserable,—how man can be free, and yet absolutely dependent,—how all things past, present and to come, can be present to God's knowledge, power, wisdom, and government, and yet the liberty of second causes remain unhindered,—these are difficulties, arising, not from revelation, but from the nature of things as they exist, and which, independently of revelation, reason has found to be incomprehensible, and the source of endless speculations and contradictory theories.

In thoughts more elevate sages have reasoned high
 Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, of fate,—
 Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute;
 And found no end in wandering mazes lost.

Whether human reason *by its own unaided powers* could ever have attained to the knowledge of God's being, attributes, or providence, or of man's future destiny in a

world to come, or of the true origin of man's present contrarieties of feeling, character and judgment, or of the way in which the fears of death, and of evil after death, and of evil during life from some invisible and unknown powers, could be appeased or removed,—this I say is a question which cannot possibly be determined in the affirmative, and must, I would think, be decided in the negative. It cannot be proved that human reason *unassisted*, could discover the truth on these points, and for this simple reason, that human reason never has been without assistance. In the beginning it had the instruction given by God, actual communion with God, and knowledge of Him, of itself, and of its relations to Him. From the first moment of man's fall, reason was assisted and instructed by the remembrance of what was already known, and by a present and permanent revelation of God's purposes and plans for man's redemption,—the necessity and nature of divine worship,—a coming Saviour, and of the salvation and everlasting life to be obtained through Him. And at sundry times and in divers manners, God has replenished and renewed, and increased the light and knowledge thus originally, and always enjoyed. The traditionary rays of this light shining amid the darkness of human ignorance ever increasing as sin obscured what existed, have been preserved by every nation and kindred, and tongue, and tribe, and people, under the whole heavens. To many there was superadded the direct or indirect light of a positive and present revelation. And to *all* there were "the invisible things of God clearly understood by the things that are made," when—with the knowledge of God and the disposition to know of God—these were carefully examined. It was with all this light and assistance, and with more or less knowledge of the Hebrew Scriptures that the ancient philosophers and sages wrote and spoke what they did on these points. In all that was dark, contradictory and obscure, we see the imperfections, vanity, and perversions of human reason, and in all, in them that was accordant to the truth, we see the reflected light of an existing, or of a traditionary revelation.

Any true, certain and assured knowledge on these subjects, the world by all its wisdom never has attained.

What God is, was the question which, the longer "the wisdom of this world" took to answer, the more impossible the answer became. All that philosophers could discover with certainty was what Socrates, the wisest of them, avouched as the great attainment of human wisdom, that God was incomprehensible and that man knew nothing. They all confessed and lamented their ignorance of these things. Plato was sensible of the depravity of human nature, acknowledged the want of a divine guide and earnestly desired such assistance to lead him to the truth. He compared the present condition of the soul to the statue of the sea-god Glaucus, which was partly broken with the waves, and almost covered with shells and stones and weeds. The mind at present, he says, "knows things but as in a dream, and in reality is ignorant of every thing;" and he affirms that he never met with a man who knew what virtue was. The ancients, too, referred all their original knowledge of divine things to the Gods, and to a primitive revelation from them. And when the Athenians inquired of Apollo, as Cicero informs us, what religion they should profess and hold, the oracle answered, "That of their forefathers." And since these were contradictory and various, they inquired again, which, and were answered, "The best." Even when Thales, Plato, and others, imported among them the purer ideas they had derived from their intercourse with nations in contact with the Jews, reason could not even receive, understand and conform to them. It heard the words, but attached to them no clear and certain ideas. Even Plato, therefore, represents himself as wandering upon the sea of truth, having no certain port to which to steer, no pilot to guide him, and ever tossed about like the waves. And thus we find even in the days of the Apostles, when Paul visited Athens, one of the most prominent objects was a statue "to the unknown God."

"The whole voice of antiquity agrees in this, that the knowledge of the first cause is a gift of the gods to men." Even Celsus concluded "That a divine Spirit descended to acquaint the ancient sages with those divine truths they taught the world." And Jamblichus asserts, "That our weak and frail nature possesses nothing of this knowledge as natural to it."

This one thing is certain, that the *earlier* we go in our inquiries into the notions of a God among any nation, the *clearer* they are found, because nearer, we believe, to the original light and purer reflection of revelation. The invariable effect of philosophy and human reason therefore, has been to confuse these ideas and to bring men into a state of practical atheism, or at least of scepticism.

Even the more profound thinkers of the Alexandrian school frankly acknowledged the impossibility of a proper proof of the existence of God.*

Such was the result to which human reason among the most intellectual and refined nation of the ancient world, and aided too, by all that genius, philosophy, the traditions of primitive revelation and scintillations from existing revelation, could attain. "The world by all its wisdom knew not God."

If from the *ancient* we turn to the *modern* world, we find, just as surely as philosophers discard the light of divine revelation,—though their minds are brightened by its influence and their moral code is deduced from its pages,—that nevertheless they run into all the vagaries of rationalism, of transcendentalism, of pantheism, of the worship of genius, or on the other hand, into the depths of superstition. †

* See Hagenbach's *Hist. of Doctr.* vol. i. p. 90, and *Clem. of Alex.*, *Strom.* v. 12, p. 695; *ib.* in *calce et.* 696; *Strom.* iv. 25, p. 635; Likewise Origen *contra als.* viii, 42; (*opp. T. J.* p. 725,) maintains, in reference to the saying of Plato, that it is difficult to find God. Even the notions of the heathen, concerning the immortality of the soul, were founded on tradition and corrupted by philosophy, as may be seen in Leland's *Necessity of Divine Rev.* vol. ii, pt. 2, ch. 7, p. 107.

† Dr. Marehold, the celebrated antagonist of Strauss, in his treatise on *Vaticination* § 4, remarks, after enumerating the various points in which all religions coincide with one another and with revelation,—“I say, we are constrained, without reference to the holy volume, to adopt the sentiment that the supposition, prevalent for better than a century, of a natural religion, so called, is utterly false, and that all religions have proceeded from a common fountain, viz: ‘from the name of the Lord,’ which, when forgotten, righteous Abraham proclaimed again, and therefore as the human race manifests such harmonious doctrines, sages, and customs, as we have shown above, it likewise follows that, whenever in these doctrines, sages and customs appear irrational to subjective reason, when torn from mediate experience, has to be acknowledged as rational, because there exists no function in the human mind capable of producing from itself the same religious representations and figures in all ages, all localities, and among all nations. The great minds among the heathen have, at least in

Even as to the EXISTENCE of God, it is a question of great doubt, whether reason, *entirely unassisted*, could demonstrate this great truth with any certainty. We see, it is true, in all the works of God, evidences of order, wisdom, and design, from which, by an intuitive principle or power of mind, we infer that there must be a wise and intelligent Being who ordered and designed them all. The events of life, the providence and protection manifested towards all creatures, also lead the mind to the contemplation of a Being "distinct from nature, who conducts and determines what seems to us accidental," and who is a GOVERNOR as well as an ARCHITECT. The consciousness of a something within us, which thinks, feels, reasons, plans, desires, and loves, leads us still further to believe that there must be a conscious, PERSONAL, benevolent, and all-wise God. The sense in man of right and wrong, of the evil of the one and the propriety of the other, of their desert of approbation or disapprobation, rewards or punishments, and the consequent emotions of self condemnation, or approval, of hope, and fear, joy or sorrow, these feelings in our nature also lead us, irresistibly, to believe in a God who is the Governor and Judge of men, and who, as He has the *power*, has also the will

part, felt, and humbly laid hold of this truth, that all the talk of subjective reason leads to no result. They therefore adhered to tradition, i. e. to what had been given them, though it had become ever so dim and imperfect. Hence Socrates says, in the Gorgias of Plato, that he did believe the sages of a spiritual world from tradition alone; and in Cicero's work, *De natura Deorum, lib. 3d cap. 17*, Cotta answers another philosopher, who had undertaken to demonstrate to him the existence of the gods by arguments drawn from reason: "This single argument suffices me that our ancestors have delivered to us the faith in the immortal gods.

Thus the individual idea, "God," which we meet with among most nations of the earth, does not yet permit us to prove the real existence of God, and to infer hence the rationality of the idea, as the ancient philosophers, an Aristotle, a Plato, a Cicero, and others, believed; but this historical proof of the existence of God, derived from the unanimous assent of all nations, has in later times been almost unanimously rejected, since we have become better acquainted with the earth and its inhabitants than the ancients were. In this article we agree with our modern philosophers, inasmuch as the idea of God was very indefinite in antiquity; and only admitted the adoption of something higher than man. But the view changes materially, if we consider this general belief of nations as some original revelation, which we shall have to do, so soon as we reflect on the further connection of their other religious traditions and views with our biblical revelation.—*Whitaker's Southern Magazine, Aug. 1852, p. 122.*

to punish or reward, according to the actions of His creatures.

Such are the sources from which human reason, guided by all the light which science, education and revelation, can throw around it, derives its proofs of the **EXISTENCE** of God. And undoubtedly, the premises are sound, and the conclusions most rational. But at the same time, it must be admitted, that these arguments require for their appreciation, a very close and rigid analysis, a very candid and impartial inquiry, and a perfect freedom from prejudice and disinclination to the truth.

There are also, it must be admitted, many difficulties, doubts and objections, which present themselves to every one of these conclusions,—“doubts and perplexities which,” it is admitted, by one of the ablest reasoners upon the subject,* “the mind *must* entertain but which it feels that it *cannot solve*.” “When,” he adds, “the mind is fixed on any one of these groups of arguments, to the exclusion of the others, the conception becomes limited, partial, and so far, erroneous.”†

Beliefs which invariably exist, are those which both rationally and of necessity, we must adopt as primary and fundamental facts, and when it is impossible for us to conceive the negative of such beliefs, we have the highest evidence that they do, and must invariably, exist.‡ Such truths we must regard as the necessary result of the operation of the human mind in its relation to the external world, and to all impressions made upon it from whatever source.§

Now, if, as we may assume, this is the only certain criterion of a belief which is universal and necessary to the human mind, then it will follow that the existence of a God is not such. It is not universal, since nations have

* Dr. McCosh on the Div. Govt., p. 12. † Do. Do.

‡ If there be, as Mr. Mill holds, certain absolute uniformities in nature; if these uniformities produce, as they must, absolute uniformities in our experience; and if, as he shows, these absolute uniformities in our experience disable us from conceiving the negations of them; then answering to each absolute uniformity in nature which we can cognize, there must exist in us a belief of which the negation is inconceivable, and which is absolutely true.

§ See Art. on the Universal Postulate, in the Westminster Review, Oct. 1853.

been found so sunk in barbaric ignorance as not to possess it; since it is only found to prevail in so far as a good degree of general intelligence and traditional knowledge are found to exist; and since when it is found to exist it is not manifested in any uniform belief, as is the reality of the existence of an external world, but in many various modes. And as we can easily conceive of the negation of such a belief, and many philosophers have rejected, and do now reject this belief, we have the most assured evidence that this belief is not universal, or one which the human mind must logically, or of necessity, admit, by any inherent and uninstructed power within itself. In other words, the belief in the existence of a God is not founded upon a priori, but upon a posteriori, evidence.

It is further to be remarked, that the predominating character of the present philosophy in France and Germany, and, to some extent, in all ages and countries, *is* and *has* been atheistical, either resolving itself into Pantheism, that is, making nature God and God nature, or denying God altogether, and reducing all events to fate, or to unalterable mechanical laws.

In Germany philosophy has either utterly scouted revelation, or it has rejected as a mere form, the text of Scripture, and aimed at *creating* a new christianity, a new religion, by its own power. In it, therefore, we see what the human mind is capable of when left to itself, even under the guidance of genius. "What had they been doing for twenty years? They had attacked with a sort of phrenzy all the principles on which rest religion, morality, the family, the State, the civil law. Not only had they abandoned Christianity in their audacious theories, they had denied the existence of the living God, man's liberty and responsibility, the immortality of the soul, and preached the most hideous pantheism with all its consequences." Even now, the prevailing philosophy is a pantheistic perversion of the terms of Christianity.

It is, therefore, very doubtful, whether human reason, if left entirely unassisted, could ever have arrived at any definite, fixed, or certain knowledge even, of the EXISTENCE of God.

The existence of atheism, says John Randolph, in his celebrated letters to H. St. G. Tucker, Esq., published in

the Washington Union, by Septimus Tustin, has been denied, but I was an honest atheist. Hume began, and Hobbes finished me. I read Spinoza and all the tribe. Surely I fell by no ignoble hand. And the very man (—) who gave me Hume's "Essay upon Nature" to read, administered "Beattie upon Truth," as the antidote—Venice treacle against arsenic and the essential oil of bitter almonds—bread and milk poultice for the "bite of the cobra capello."

Had I remained a successful political leader, I might never have been a Christian. But it pleased God that my pride should be mortified; that by death and desertion I should lose my friends; that, except in the veins of a maniac, and he too, possessed "of a child by a deaf and dumb spirit," there should not run one drop of my father's blood in any living creature besides myself. The death of Tudor finished my humiliation. I had tried all things but the refuge to Christ, and to that, with parental stripes, was I driven. Often did I cry out with the father of that wretched boy, "Lord! I believe—help thou mine unbelief;" and the gracious mercy of our Lord to this wavering faith, staggering under the force of the hard heart of unbelief, I humbly hoped would, in his good time, be extended to me also.—St. Mark, vii: 17-29.

"Throw Revelation aside, and I can drive any man by irresistible induction to atheism. John Marshall could not resist me. When I say any man, I mean a man capable of logical and consequential reasoning. Deism is the refuge of those that startle at atheism, and can't believe Revelation: and my —, (may God have forgiven us both,) and myself used, with Diderot & Co., to laugh at the deistical bigots who must have milk, not being able to digest meat. All theism is derived from Revelation—that of the laws confessedly. Our own is from the same source—so is the false revelation of Mahomet; and and I can't much blame the Turks for considering the Franks and Greeks to be idolators. Every other idea of *one* God that floats in the world is derived from the tradition of the sons of Noah handed down to their posterity."*

Mr. Charles Rosenkrantz, a distinguished disciple of Hegel, has published two books, one entitled "The System of Science," and the other "My

So much for the question of the EXISTENCE of God, a truth which, while it is most agreeable to human reason, requires the light of revelation to present it clear and evident to the eye of reason, and to enable that eye to see the invisible things of God, "even his eternal power and God-head, by the things that are made."

Nature, and time, and earth, and skies,
 God's heavenly skill proclaim;
 What shall we do to make us wise
 But learn to read thy name!

To fear thy power, to trust thy grace,
 Is our divinest skill:
 And he's the wisest of our race
 That best obeys thy will.

But we may bring this question to the test of experiment. As all the knowledge of God found among men may be accounted for by an original divine teaching and communicated knowledge, to which even language itself must, in all probability, be ascribed, this knowledge is no certain proof of what unassisted human reason can attain.

But there are and have been human beings who, by the want of the powers of speech and hearing, have been cut off from the instruction of their fellow men, and left to the powers of their own natural understanding.—What, then, I ask, is the fact in relation to them?

We will present an account sent by Mr. Fellebien to the Academy of Sciences at Paris, and printed in their *Memoirs*, by which is fully evinced the absolute incapacity of man, uninstructed, for making or thinking of any religion.* The son of a tradesman in Chartres, who had been deaf from his birth, and consequently dumb, when he was about twenty-three or twenty-four years of age, began on a sudden to speak, without its being known that he had ever heard. This event drew the attention of every one, and many believed it to be miraculous.—

Reform of Hegel's Philosophy." He admits that the opinions of his master, interpreted by ignorant or rash scholars, have favoured the materialist tendencies of our age. He avows also, that Hegel errs in trying to form an idea by the mere force of human intelligence, of the Infinite and the finite, God, man and the universe.

* See *The Scholar Armed*, vol. i: p. 180, 181.

The young man, however, gave a plain and rational account, by which it appeared to proceed from natural causes. He said, that about four months before, he was surprised by a new and pleasing sensation, which he afterwards discovered to arise from a ring of bells : that as yet, he heard only with one ear, but afterwards a kind of water came from his left ear, and then he could hear distinctly with both ; that from this time he listened, with the utmost curiosity and attention, to the sounds which accompany those motions of the lips, which he had before remarked to convey ideas from one person to another. In short, he was able to understand them, by noting the thing to which they related, and the action they produced. And after repeated attempts to imitate them when alone, at the end of four months he thought himself able to talk. He therefore, without having intimated what had happened, began at once to speak, and affected to join in conversation, though with much more imperfection than he was aware of.

Many Divines immediately visited him, and questioned him about God, and the soul, moral good and evil, and many other subjects of the same kind ; but of all this, they found him totally ignorant, though he had been used to go to mass, and had been instructed in all the externals of devotion, and making the sign of the cross, looking upwards, kneeling at proper seasons, and using gestures of penitence and prayer. Of death itself, which may be considered as a sensible object, he had very confused and imperfect ideas, nor did it appear that he had ever reflected upon it. His life was little more than animal and sensitive. He seemed to be content with the simple perception of such objects as he could perceive, and did not compare his ideas with each other, nor draw inferences, as might have been expected from him. It appeared, however, that his understanding was vigorous, and his apprehension quick ; so that his intellectual defects must have been caused, not by the barrenness of the soil, but merely by the want of necessary cultivation.

The case of this young man was not peculiar. What was true of him is true of every human being born in his circumstances. An individual who is cut off by total

deafness and speechlessness from all instruction, is destitute of the knowledge of God, and incapable, by any exercise of his own reason, even with all the phenomena of the heavens and the earth before him, of finding out God. His mind is a blank, in reference to all things supernatural and divine. The power of consciousness, the principle of causation, and the faculty of judgment, fail to lead him up from "the things that are made," to "the invisible things, even the eternal power and God-head" of Him that made them. It is only when, by the wonderful genius of modern philanthropy, he is brought into communication with other minds, with the fact of the existence of God, and with the evidences by which that fact is proved, that his mind is aroused to the deep and powerful conviction of this truth. Such is the invariable and universal fact.*

Here then is a test, and the only test, we believe, of the real, intuitive, unaided, and uninstructed ability of human reason, to arrive at the certain knowledge of the existence of God. The inference from it, therefore, is, that while this truth commends itself to the intuitive powers of human reason, when brought, with its evidence before them, that, nevertheless, reason alone, unaided and uninstructed, is incapable of arriving at the sublime

* The following communication is from Dr. Howe, the celebrated Teacher of Laura Bridgman, the deaf, dumb and blind mute, written in reply to my inquiries on this subject:

"Boston, Feb. 26, 1853.

Dear Sir,—I send you such of our Reports as I can find which mention the case of Laura Bridgman. You know it was laid down by Blackstone, and generally received as true, that a person born deaf and blind must necessarily be an idiot. Laura Bridgman was the first person who found her way out of the dreary isolation into the light of knowledge, and into communion with her fellows. By the way she came, others have followed; but it may safely be said that deaf and blind children would remain in idiocy, and of course in ignorance of the existence and attributes of God, unless their faculties are developed by special instruction. Laura's case proved very clearly the innateness of the *capacity* for religious ideas; for, without such capacity deeply seated in the moral nature, our instructions might have as well been given to a dog.

You will find some remarks germane to the subject of your inquiry, in some of the accompanying Reports.

If I can be of the slightest use to you in any way, please count upon my readiness. Faithfully yours,

S. G. HOWE.

REV. DR. SMYTH."

truth, that there is a God, who is a Spirit, infinite, eternal and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.

Nay, more. We may venture to bring this question to the standard of reason, even in Christian lands. For, in the very bosom of Christendom, how many are there, in the lanes and alleys of our cities, in our woods and forests, in mines and cellars, and among the young, ignorant and vicious every where, who are "without God," and "atheists in the world." "Talk" says Locke, "but with the country people, almost of any age, and with young people, almost of any condition, and you shall find that though the name of God be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions they apply this name to, are so odd, low and pitiful, that no body can imagine they were taught by a rational man."* Man, with all his searching, cannot find out his own spirit which is in him: and how then can he find out the Great Spirit, who is infinitely above and beyond, in His invisible and unapproachable greatness! He needs that one should teach him wherein be the first principles of the oracles of God.—He is a babe, and has need of milk. His reason, therefore, should be employed,—not in the vain attempts to penetrate the clouds and darkness which are round about the Deity, but, renouncing all imaginations of his own, in following that light which has shone forth from God's shrouded glory, and which alone reveals any part of His ways.

Such has, we may venture to say, been the prevailing doctrine among the ablest writers in the Christian church. These have ever maintained that the great principles of what is called natural religion, could never have been represented to the human mind, nor known by man, if God himself had not first taught them, and if they had not been preserved by a traditional, or an existing written revelation. This is perfectly consistent with the fact, which they also believed, that reason is an innate, natural faculty, for knowing the truth, and distinguishing truth from error, when that truth and its evidences are fairly and fully brought before it. The existence of God,

* *Essay L. 1; c. 4: § 16.*

like all other truths of natural religion, when thus represented to the human mind, is rationally demonstrable and intuitively believed, and can be proved to the intellect and become a part of its intuitive inherent beliefs. But, until thus represented to the mind, we only maintain the approved sentiment of Christendom, in maintaining that man has not and cannot find out for, and by himself, any truth which respects things supernatural and divine. And if any parties should object to this conclusion, it ought not to be the Unitarians, since it was held by the fathers of their theology. Socinus says, "that to man naturally, and by his own reason or mind, there is no rooted, settled, or self-originated opinion of the Deity." Ostodorus, his fellow believer, says also, "what men know of God they do not derive from nature, neither from the consideration of the creation, but from instruction, since from the beginning God communicated the knowledge of himself to men."*

The question then recurs, what is the relation of human reason to the scriptures? In this controversy, it is not my business to prove the *inspiration* and *authority* of the Scriptures. I have said enough to show the necessity of revelation to the discovery and knowledge of divine things. But, as I am arguing with professed Christians, I may, at present, assume that the Bible is proved by the evidence of miracles, of prophecy, of history, and of traditions, by its own nature and claims, and by its own self-commending power for the salvation of every one that believeth, to be the testimony of God, that is, **INSPIRED TRUTH.**

To perceive then, at once, what I apprehend to be the office of reason in reference to the Scriptures, I will introduce the following parable:†

A king sends one of his officers to a province, with authority to govern it in his name. After a time, this Governor allows himself to be ensnared and perverted by a faction. Hence the affairs of the province are very badly administered, and all things are thrown into confusion. The sovereign being well apprised of all that

* Socinus Prælect. c. 2; Ostodorus Instit. pp. 1 and 10, quoted on De Gols' Vindec. p. 361.

† From Werenfels, a German writer, in Smith's Messiah, vol. i: p. 83.

had happened, and perceiving that the governor had not the wisdom and firmness, the exertion and authority requisite for remedying the disorders of the province and restoring it to peace, sends a deputy extraordinary, and gives orders to the governor to submit himself entirely, to this deputy, and to take no measures without his direction. The governor's first duty is to ascertain whether the superior minister be really sent by the king; for, unless he have satisfactory evidence of this, he would be guilty of treason in yielding to the *stranger* the authority which his sovereign had committed to *him*. But when he sees the sign manual, and the other unquestionable attestations of the royal commission, he immediately delivers up all his *own powers* to the *deputy*, and submits, in *all* respects, to *his* arrangements and decisions. Now, if I should ask, from whom does the deputy hold his authority over the premises? From the king, who sent him, and whose commission, signed and sealed, he has in his hand, or from the governor, who, on the production of those documents, received him with due honor and acknowledgement? Every man of common sense will say, from the king, surely; for, to suppose the other would be absurd.

The application of this parable is plain. The gracious and almighty God has given reason to man for the guide of his conduct through life. But reason has submitted to be corrupted by sin, and man, therefore, is fallen into a state of extreme misery. God, of his infinite goodness, has had mercy upon man, and, seeing the insufficiency of reason to restore him from his fallen state, and to deliver him from his misery, has sent revelation, and has given orders to reason to yield obedience, and to take no part in directing the conduct of man, except what revelation may assign. What then, has reason to do in this case? First of all, she must examine whether this, which claims to be a revelation from God, is, indeed, such; for, if she have not satisfactory evidence of this, she cannot, without criminal rashness, surrender her own authority, which the Creator had invested her with for the government and guidance of man. But, as soon as she is satisfied, from indubitable proofs, that this is, indeed, a divine revelation, she yields without delay, and if reason

be indeed, *rational*, submits herself entirely, to the *Word of God*.

Against Fanatics, Romanists and Deists, we contend therefore, for the full and proper use of reason, in reference to all revealed, just as necessarily as in regard to all unrevealed, truth. The right and duty of judging for one's self is far more important and imperative in religion, than in anything beside. All the life, and power, and personal benefit of religion, consist in that inward conviction, and full persuasion of mind, which can arise only from examination, and the blessing of God, sought and obtained by prayer. It is to the understanding of every man the Bible addresses its proofs. Faith in the Word of God, is the assent of the understanding to the testimony of God upon the ground of His veracity, and wrought in us by the assistance of His holy Spirit, whose office it is to guide into all that is truth. Faith, therefore, is more certain than every other kind of belief, because the testimony of God in Scripture, is more certainly true than the conclusions of imperfect reason, founded upon the fallible evidence of our own observation, or the equally fallible testimony of man. Faith and the convictions of mere reason, are not, therefore, opposite, but the same, the one being produced by the infallible testimony of God brought home to the mind by the infallible Spirit of God, and the other being produced by the testimony of our own senses and the observation of our fellow-men, brought home to the mind by its own exertion, or by instructions from others. Faith, therefore, as it is the highest reason, is also the highest duty, because, as submission to the testimony of God in his word, is as reasonable as submission to the testimony of God in his works, and as God never requires faith without sufficient evidence that the testimony on which it is to rest is really his, unbelief is inexcusable impiety, since it makes God a liar, and his word untrue.

Whatever God says is, and must be, true: this is the principle of faith, and this is the principle of all reason. No reason can make us doubt God's veracity, whether we find him leading us to the knowledge of what is true by the senses he has given, by the reason he has im-

planted in us, by the intuitive and necessary beliefs to which that reason impels us, by the things he has placed around us, or by things he has been pleased to reveal to us. The office of reason, therefore, is to call to its aid all the powers of mind, and all the evidences within its reach, and thus to assure itself that God speaks, and to understand what God has spoken. Being satisfied by those evidences of miracles, prophecy, and the power of its truth, that the Bible, and that every part of the Bible, is the testimony of God, conveying to us, by whatsoever way inspired, HIS TRUTH, then reason is called upon to apply to that human language, in which God has spoken the laws of interpretation applied to all other human languages, and by their honest and faithful application to interpret the Bible. In this way reason discovers what the sacred writers really meant to declare as true. Reason having the evidence before her of what is really the truth God testifies, is bound by her own necessary and intuitive belief to acquiesce in that testimony, and to receive that truth, without presuming to call in question the propriety of the words in which it is delivered.

Here the office of reason ends, except so far as to explain, illustrate, vindicate, and contend earnestly for the truth. Reason is, therefore, THE INTERPRETER, and not the legislator or judge of the Bible, as she is of all truth. She *is*, indeed, a judge, so far as to know what the evidence proves to be testified as true, but not further. This would be intolerable temerity, since whatever is from God must be certainly true, and whatever God commands must be infallibly right, and our duty. This surely, is the true office, use, and dignity of reason.

Is not this all that reason does, or can do, in regard to the truth of God, in nature? It is but few of the facts or truths in nature, whose operation it can comprehend. What it does comprehend is the qualities or attributes by which things are distinguished and arranged.

Innumerable things are, however, believed in as true and real, which are, in their nature, purpose, and laws, altogether incomprehensible. The fixed principles and classifications of science, are constantly modified by new discoveries, which prove the fallaciousness of pre-existent theories. Many things also, which are exceptions to

general laws, and therefore, apparently, in contrariety to what is true, are, nevertheless, believed to be true. And thus, even in mathematical science, the same principles of reasoning require us to believe that two lines not parallel must, ultimately, form an angle, and yet, that in the curve called the asymptote, its lines are ever approximating, and yet, will never meet. Incomprehensibility, therefore, and apparent contrariety to other truths, or to what may be regarded by us as truths, is no test of what is really true.

How much more must this be the case in the whole region of things supernatural, in all that relates to God, and the relations between God and man, time and eternity? God himself, is the most incomprehensible of all things. His being and nature, are as high above our possible comprehension as are the heavens above the earth. God's providence and procedure being founded upon his own omniscient and eternal knowledge of all things, and of all that would follow from every kind of creation, every kind of providence, and every action of every creature, including the free agency of men, is founded, evidently, upon reasons infinitely beyond our possible comprehension. These things are not only unknown, but they are beyond the possibility of being known by us. They imply for their knowledge the same eternity, omniscience, omnipresence, and infinite almightiness, which can order and direct them. In all his dealings with man, God must also, of necessity, have regard to the whole duration of human things, the whole race of mankind, the whole order of human changes and events, the whole combination of all the causes of human tempers, all the actions of free agents, and all the consequences of his own action upon all the interests of every portion of the universe, in all the eternity that is to come.

A child, therefore, might as reasonably attempt to grasp the knowledge, and perform the functions of an arch-angel, as for finite reason to discover, comprehend, or judge the truth or reasonableness of anything that pertains to the nature, character, or doings of the infinite and omniscient reason. And that man, who, without God's revelation, would endeavor by searching, to find

out God, or determine the propriety of God's course of procedure, or who, having a revelation, endeavours by the rush-light of his glimmering reason, to mould and fashion its teaching into conformity to what he thinks reasonable and proper, and true, is as great a visionary as the man who, without the organs of sense, and without any instruction from others, should undertake to discourse of the true nature of the external, visible creation. In a moral point of view, such conduct can only be likened to the daring impiety of the Titans attempting to scale the heavens, or of the angels in that rebellion which sunk them to perdition, or to the pride and arrogance, and impiety of our first progenitors in attempting to become "*wise as God.*" The very object of revelation is to make known what could not be known at all, except so far as it is revealed. In the more common Scripture sense of the word, all that is contained in revelation is mystery, inasmuch as it was before hidden and unknown, and it all remains, and must remain mystery, except so far as it is now made known and unveiled. To do any thing else than receive this revelation gratefully and humbly, to interpret it conscientiously, candidly, and according to the established principles of all rational interpretation, and then, in implicit reverence and submission, to believe and obey its truths and precepts, is *virtually*, even when it is not openly and avowedly, to reject that revelation. To add to, or take *from* the Scriptures by tradition on the one hand, or by vain philosophy and rationalistic pride on the other, is to incur the curse and the woe with which God, in his book, threatens every such impious audacity.

Does reason then, affect to be self-sufficient, she is an impotent usurper; but if she act in a state of dependence she is a valuable servant. Does she pretend to be our light in matters of a spiritual and heavenly nature? She is then a despicable dotard, or an *ignis fatuus*. Does she kindle her torch at the fire of revelation? She may then be a discerner of doctrines, and we will call her "The candle of the Lord." Submitting to her divine author and learning at the feet of omniscience, she is reason in her senses, presuming to be equal with the All-wise; undertaking to comprehend his words, or dar-

ring to dispute his word, she is reason run mad. In this quality we disclaim and cashier her; in the other, we cherish and employ her." "The prerogative of God, (says Lord Bacon,) comprehends the whole man; and is extended as well to the *reason*, as to the *will* of man: that is, that man renounce himself wholly, and draw near to God. Wherefore, as we are to obey his law, though we find a reluctance in our *will*; so we are to believe His word, though we find a reluctance in our *reason*: for, if we believe only that which is agreeable to our reason, we give assent to the *matter*, not to the *author*, which is no more than we would do towards a *suspected* and *discredited witness*. Theology is grounded on, and must be deduced from the oracles of God; and not from the light of nature, or the dictates of reason."

We only add the testimony of Locke. "Revelation, where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it against the probable conjectures of reason, because the mind, not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony, which it is satisfied comes from one who can not err, and will not deceive."

"There is nothing more required of a Christian, but that he receive all the parts of Divine revelation with a docility and disposition prepared to embrace and assent to all truths coming from God, and submit his mind to whatsoever shall appear to him to bear that character."

ARTICLE III.

THE OBSTACLES TO MINISTERIAL PIETY.

We propose in this article to consider the difficulties in the way of eminent ministerial piety. We shall not spend any time in attempting to demonstrate the desirableness of eminent piety in a minister of the Gospel. By common consent, this is considered the first essential element for his work. Talent, learning, aptness to teach,

zeal, industry and knowledge of human nature, all essential and valuable qualifications, are, and must ever be, subordinate to piety. This only can fit him for his work—can make him happy and successful in it. Greatly to be pitied is that man who undertakes its toils and sacrifices, who engages in its endless and endlessly diversified labours, and expects to meet its many trials, without deep, sincere and earnest piety. Though he “speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity,” love to God and men, which is the essence of piety, he is but “sounding brass, and a tinkling cymbal.” No one will dispute the general proposition, that a minister of religion ought to be a truly pious man.

But while this is true, and is never disputed, it is no less true, that eminent piety in a minister is a most difficult attainment. We are even inclined to believe and maintain that it is a more difficult attainment in the minister than in any other man. We are aware that this will sound strangely, and almost paradoxically, in the ears of most, if not all, of our readers. Men generally imagine that it is easier for a minister to be a good man than for others; that he perpetually breathes an atmosphere which is redolent of sanctity; that he is removed from those exclusively worldly and distracting influences which beset men in secular life, and that all his pursuits are of a character peculiarly favorable to the cultivation of piety. They think that his temptations to worldliness are much fewer in number, and of a much less aggravated character, than those which lie in the daily path of other men, and that there is a sort of ex-officio sanctity thrown around him, which ensures him a more elevated tone of piety and devotedness than that to which men in ordinary life can expect to attain. With these views, sustained by such plausible reasoning, men expect of ministers a higher style of piety than they expect from others; and probably no proposition relating to the subject under consideration, would excite more general surprise, or be received with greater incredulity, than that which we advance, and shall endeavour to demonstrate, that *eminent holiness in a minister of the Gospel, is a greater attainment than in any other man who endeavours to cultivate real piety.*

In support of this proposition, we remark—

I. That the minister is exposed to the same obstacles to piety with other men, growing out of the depravity of our common nature.

It is a fact which none will presume to question, though at times it seems strangely forgotten, that ministers, in common with all men, are by nature totally depraved. Descended from one and the same sinful progenitor, they inherit the same nature, with all its moral disabilities. They are sinners of a sinful race; "by nature children of wrath, even as others." They have the same "carnal mind," which "is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." They, like others, are by nature "dead in trespasses and sins;" their hearts are "deceitful above all things and desperately wicked;" their love for the world and sensual delights is just as strong and imperious as in other men; they desire not the knowledge of God's ways, and are in all respects naturally like all their sinful fellow men. The earthen vessel which is honoured by being made the receptacle of the Divine treasure of the Gospel, was framed out of apostate clay, and though by the renewing grace of God, it has been made a "vessel of mercy, prepared unto glory," it was originally a "vessel of wrath, fitted for destruction."

To shake off the yoke of sin—to "crucify the flesh with the affections and lusts"—to resist the promptings of natural inclination—to agonize to enter in at the strait gate, requires as desperate and determined effort in his, as in the case of any sinner who ever attempted to "work out his own salvation," and "make his calling and election sure." He wept the same bitter tears of repentance at the cross; he suffered under the same sense of the anger of God; he trembled under the anathema of the same inexorable law; he went through the same process of conviction, repentance, self-renunciation, faith and submission, by which all men find forgiveness and justification at the hands of God. And the song which he sings is the same which all God's redeemed ones sing—"Not unto us! not unto us! By the grace of God, I am what I am."

It is then obvious that ministers of the Gospel have no

original advantages over their fellow men in commencing a Christian life. By nature, they occupy the same position, and are the children of wrath, even as others. Nor are they more free from hindrances to the subsequent cultivation of piety growing out of their common nature, with all its infirmities and indwelling sins. They, like other men, when they join the army of Christ, carry to the unending and truceless warfare with sin energies greatly weakened by past devotion to the world. The disabilities, and the loss of moral power consequent upon their former unholy lives, are as many and as lamentable as in the case of others who joined with them the hosts of God. It is the case with them equally with others, that they do not bring to the service of the Lord Christ, hearts which have always throbbed with love to Him, and hands which have always been true to His cause. They have not the vantage ground which an angel would occupy, or in which our great forefather stood, before he fell and lost that spotless image in which he was created. Their natures are but partially sanctified; they are yet susceptible to every form of temptation; there is not a sin to which the depraved heart is inclined, which does not find still something to appeal to within them; they have an intense and intelligent sympathy with that most distinguished of their number, who exclaimed in the bitterness of the conflict between the two natures which struggle within the Christian on earth—"Oh, wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death;" and their only hope that they shall at last be made conquerors, and more than conquerors, over all their spiritual foes, is just where the hope of all the struggling and tempted people of God reposes, in the grace of Him "who loved them and gave himself for them." This is their humble, yet joyful confidence; a confidence which the most obscure believer may equally indulge with the most distinguished Apostle, that "neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus, our Lord."

If, then, we consider the fact, that ministers of Christ

are men of like passions with others ; that they have the same depraved nature and liability to temptation which characterizes our race, and that they are still the subjects of the open or insidious attacks of indwelling sin and remaining corruption, it is obvious that the minister enters upon the Christian life with equal disadvantages with others, and cannot, any more than they, rise above the necessary and lamentable disabilities of a common depravity. There is, then, no warrant, so far as his nature is concerned, for the expectation that he will attain to a type of piety more distinguished and exalted than that of his fellow Christians.

II. The profession of the minister is one which exposes him to peculiar temptations, which are not favourable to the cultivation of eminent piety.

Its temptations to *pride* are peculiarly great. It is an honourable profession. It has always been so considered. Even among the rudest and most untutored races of men, it has been recognised and regarded even with superstitious reverence. In all civilized and Christian countries it is respected and honoured. There may be individuals who affect to scoff at and despise it, but the most enlightened public sentiment of every country has always recognized its title to profound respect. The spectacle which is presented on every Sabbath day, all over Christendom, of thousands of assemblies, including the best and wisest men of all classes, submitting themselves to the instruction of the ministers of religion, receiving their counsels and exhortations with respectful attention, and testifying in the most unequivocal manner to their reverence for their office, affords a conclusive test of its honourable character. Here, then, is an opening for the subtle advances of professional pride. Unless the minister have both wisdom and grace enough to enable and incline him to distinguish between things that differ, he will be liable to confound the office with the man, and claim for the person that consideration which legitimately belongs only to the station. This may lead and has led to clerical assumptions which were neither manifestations of, nor helps to, clerical piety. This snare is not peculiar to him ; it appertains to all exalted stations. But, in his case, the approach of the temptation is

most insidious. For the office is confessedly sacred, more so than any other, more honoured by God and more essential to the welfare of man. A glorious treasure is committed to it, and it is not always easy for the incumbent to remember that the repository of this treasure is humble clay. The deference paid to the station may, unconsciously, be appropriated by the individual; and who that knows anything of the deceitfulness of the human heart, and the intricacies and windings through which temptation reaches its citadel, cannot see in this an influence always, yet often unconsciously, at work, which is very unfavourable to the cultivation of that genuine humility which is a distinguished element of eminent piety.

Again. The *intellectual temptations* of the minister are peculiarly great. They are greater than those of other classes, because they are more constant and unremitting. Called on regularly and constantly to give out the fruits of intellectual toil, and before minds of the highest order, he is in great danger of forgetting the preacher of the Gospel, in the attempted powerful logician, the profound scholar, or the accomplished literary essayist. His study may become, and unconsciously too, the place where he is to prepare himself, not to reach the consciences of his hearers, with the simple, pungent truths of the Gospel, but to impress their intellect with a show of learning, or charm their ear with the beauties of rhetoric and the graces of oratory. It may be more redolent of communion with the minds of earth, than with the infinite mind of God; a place where a champion is to equip himself for the mental arena, rather than a place where God's ambassador to men is to seek for the message which he is to bring to dying sinners. Cut off by the necessities and proprieties of his office from the sphere occupied by other public speakers, the stump, the forum, or the legislative hall, he may be tempted to make the pulpit the scene for the triumph of the man, and not of the truth; and be more solicitous to preach "great sermons" than to warn, convince and win the souls of men; so that the sacred desk shall at last come to be a place for the exhibition, not of *Christ crucified*, but of *the preacher glorified!* And this melancholy re-

sult may come very unconsciously upon the minister. For he must study if he would be faithful to God's truth and the souls of men. The doctrines of the Bible must be investigated, and clearly, symmetrically and powerfully presented. The pulpit cannot accomplish its work by empty declamation, or warm and pious exhortation. The word of truth is to be rightly divided, and a portion given to every man "in due season." Men are to be instructed before they can be reclaimed; and a preacher of the Gospel who could successfully accomplish his great work without study and learning, would be as truly a miracle as that which occurred in the days of Balaam. So you will notice in Paul's admirable charge to Timothy, on the duties of the ministry, that he directs him to "*give attendance to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine.*" The mission of the Protestant Church, too, is one of teaching. Were she merely a ritual church, her ministers need know but little more than the details of the ceremonial at the altar. But she is a teaching church, and her ministers are not priests, but teachers, who cannot do their work, except they be themselves "scribes well instructed in the things of the kingdom."

Thus there is danger that the minister of Christ may, unconsciously, be unduly influenced by the intellectual relations of his work,—that these may seduce him before he is aware from its spiritual aspects and duties. He may study his Bible more as a student and less as a Christian; more for the accumulation of knowledge than for his increase in spirituality. Other Christians have not this temptation. They read the word of God, not as students, but as believing men, desiring to know more of the life of God in the soul, to feed in the green pastures, and repose by the still waters so richly provided in the Scriptures.

The prevailing taste of the age also contributes to endanger the minister of Christ in respect to an undue regard to the intellectualities of his profession. That taste demands novelties in religion; it calls for "new themes," exciting topics; it prates much about originality and individuality; it looks to the pulpit to keep up the excitement which the railroad and telegraph stimulate through the week, and is impatient of the simplicity and triteness

of the great doctrines of Christianity. That sermon is the best which is the most "striking," "most up to the times," most "original," while all that is according to godly simplicity is "tame," "humdrum," and "behind the age." This conduces to add strength to the temptation before the minister to concern himself more with the intellectual than the spiritual relations of his work, to keep his mind ever on the stretch after novelties, either of thought, or of expression, and even though he knows it not, to propose as the great object of all his labor, to make a striking sermon, rather than to bring the simple truth of God into direct contact with the sinner's soul.

From all these sources the temptation to intellectual pride is one which is very prone to assail the minister. To be a great man, rather than a good man; to be noticed and applauded, and run after as a great preacher; to be praised for his talents and learning, and eloquence, —this may come to be his great object, and the end of all his labors. How unfavourable this is to the cultivation of eminent piety, we need not stop to demonstrate. This is a giant temptation, and if not resisted, its influence on the minister's spirituality and growth in grace, must ever be most disastrous.

Again, the minister's temptations to *ambition* are peculiar and great, and the danger to the cultivation of eminent piety from this source are much to be deprecated.

It is true, that the ordinary paths in which ambition loves to stride are not open to him. He cannot aspire to the influence which great wealth gives its possessor. His profession dooms him at best to genteel poverty, and he can never expect any consideration "on change," or among the financiers, or merchant princes of the land. In fact, there is a general unfavorable estimate of the abilities of the clergy to conduct business operations successfully, especially in matters of finance; which may account in part, for the universal fact that so little in the way of funds is entrusted to them. The paths of politics and diplomacy are not, ordinarily, accessible to them. They cannot expect the influence which office gives, nor make themselves felt in the legislative arena. And

though they have sometimes essayed to tread these paths, and have trodden them with some success, it has generally been at the expense of the higher and more sacred profession.

But there are still avenues by which that imperial passion ambition, may stalk into the minister's heart. To be a great man among his brethren, to be esteemed by the churches as one of the shining lights, to be followed by admiring and flattering crowds, to fill posts of prominence in the church, to be foremost in Presbyteries and Synods, and General Assemblies; all this may inflame the minister's soul with an ambition as truly unhallowed as that which inspires the political aspirant, or nerves the warrior for the bloody field. It may fill his mind with envy, crowd his heart with jealousy, lead to selfish intrigue and management, and tempt him from the path of unbending Christian integrity. It is a great mistake to suppose that ministers are not exposed to the attacks of this lordly passion. And how unfavorable it is to the cultivation of piety, need not be said. How few, how very few Christians, who aspire to place and power, are able to maintain an unblemished Christian reputation. There are brilliant exceptions, but their brilliance is a proof of that general darkness amid which they shine.

III. The fact that the minister is constantly absorbed and pressed with thought and labor for others, may be unfavorable to the cultivation of eminent personal piety.

We suppose every real and intelligent Christian will acknowledge that he is greatly indebted, under God, for his spiritual instruction, and progress in comfort and usefulness, to the faithful labors of the ministry. This, indeed, must be the case, because this is God's great instrument, not only in the conversion of sinners, but in the perfecting of saints. Thus, the apostle declares that "He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ."* This is the great means of increasing the piety, the comfort, the efficiency

* Ephesians, 4: 11, 12.

of the church. Often the faithful preaching of the word has revealed to the unconscious and startled Christian his favorite sin, and led him to watchfulness and prayer, and effort, which has resulted in his greatly increased purity, spirituality and usefulness in his Master's service. Often light has been thrown upon a perplexing subject, or a doubtful question of duty, which has cleared up his darkness and removed his indecision. Often has the Christian gone to the house of God in a dull, or desponding, or sorrowful state of mind, clouds over his sky, his hopes darkened, his faith wavering, his whole spiritual life feeble and dying; and there the minister of God was so directed in his preaching that that Christian, as he listened, found light, and comfort and joy, coming back to his soul, his faith rallying again under the spoken promises of the word proclaimed with new power by the preacher, his zeal enkindled anew, and his whole inner man refreshed and cheered; and has gone away with a blessing on the minister, who seemed to have been sent with a special message from God to his soul on that day.

Sometimes he has come to the house of prayer in the depths of affliction. God has laid his hand heavily on him. He has hushed the music of his dwelling. He has quenched the brightness of his fireside. He has changed the countenance of one that he loves, and sent him away. Bowed down with sorrow, in desolation and loneliness, he comes to the sanctuary. The theme of the preacher is adapted to his case. His prayers go up earnestly for him. The truths, the promises, the hopes, the anticipations which he needs most, are set before him; and when he goes away to his house of sorrow, he goes with his burden lightened, and his heart comforted, and the light of heaven shining round him, saying, "I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me," "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away, blessed be the name of the Lord." The minister has been a son of consolation to that afflicted soul.

To offices like these, in behalf of others, the minister is constantly called. This is his life-work. In public and in private, his mind, his sympathies, his affections, his time, are constantly and absorbingly taxed for others.

But in the hours of his necessity, who is to perform these offices for him? Who is to minister to him spiritual instruction, rebuke, encouragement or consolation? Do you not see that he is cut off from those means of comfort and usefulness which are so valuable to the Christian? When his mind is in darkness, who is to enlighten it? When he is unconsciously yielding to the promptings of sinful inclination, who is to rebuke him with affectionate fidelity? Who is to minister to the longings of his soul in its hours of despondency and spiritual abandonment? Who is to pray for him, to preach to him, to encourage him, to stimulate him to duty, to warn him from sin, to comfort him in sorrow, to make him a better man, and more ripe for Heaven? Has he no ignorance to be enlightened, no depravity to be subdued, no unbelief to be helped, no backsliding to be healed, no infirmity to be strengthened, no varied and clamorous spiritual necessities to be supplied? Often does the minister come to his pulpit weak in body and in soul, feeling that he needs instruction and reproof and consolation, more than any of those whom it is his office to instruct, reprove and console; and longing to pause in the pews beneath and wait as a worshipper on the ministrations of the pulpit, if haply they may be blessed to his own soul. But alas! this privilege is denied him, and he must go with a heart perhaps cold and worldly, with a faith weak and wavering, and affections all tending earthward, to labor to inspire other hearts with pious fervor, to strengthen faith in others, and point their affections to that upward path in which he is too acutely sensible that his own is vain essay to travel. Oh! this is a great temptation to the minister! He can scarcely avoid becoming at times, purely official in the discharge of his duties. He cannot always be in an exalted religious state of mind. He cannot always rise above the influences of the world. He cannot always enjoy free and uninterrupted communion with God. He is but a man, frail in body, sinful in soul, harrassed by temptation, vexed by the great adversary, partially sanctified at best: in a word, he is just like all other Christians, and how then can he always be in the Spirit, and always maintain that frame of mind which is essential to the

discharge of his solemn duties. The wonder to one who reflects on these things is not that ministers have so little piety, but that they have so much, that they are able, in spite of all their temptations, to maintain as much uniformity and consistency of Christian character as people in general are willing to accord to them.

These considerations are greatly strengthened when we reflect that certain scenes and influences which are only occasional, and, therefore, powerful with other Christians, lie in the minister's daily path, and by their familiarity are apt to lose their power.

We refer now, particularly to those dispensations of Providence, which, by teaching us the vanity of earthly things, and calling forth also our tender sympathies, are calculated to edify the Christian and exalt the standard of his piety.

Though sickness and death are constantly occurring around us, yet it is only occasionally, that most men are specially concerned with individual dispensations of God's providence, or brought into immediate personal connection with them. Then they may be to them very profitable seasons. The lessons which they are adapted to teach come in a startling and impressive form, and are spoken in tones of more than ordinary depth and solemnity. Therefore, it is declared in the word of God, that "it is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of feasting," and that "sorrow is better than laughter, for by the sadness of the countenance, the heart is made better."* The experience of many Christians is in accordance with these declarations. They have found their occasional visits to the house of mourning, or to the grave, profitable to them, and have returned from them wiser and better men. The awakening of tender and pious sympathy for others, has been a blessing to their own souls, in its subduing and chastening influences.

But the profitable influence of such seasons is due, in a great degree, to the fact that they are only occasional. For it is a law of our being, that may operate in spiritual, as well as in natural things, that familiarity with an

* Ecclesiastes, 7: 2, 3.

object weakens its power. Familiarity with death renders the soldier reckless and callous amid scenes which would excite every sensibility of our nature in the case of others. But the scenes of sickness and sorrow are those *which lie in the minister's daily path*. He becomes familiarized with death, habituated to the sad sights and sounds of the house of mourning. His official duties and obligations summon him there as regularly as those whose vocation it is to attend to the gloomy details of death and burial. And the danger is, for such is the law of his nature, that he will become so steeled to the sight that no profitable influence will be exerted upon himself. The discharge of the appropriate duties of the occasion obliges him to repress any outbreak of natural emotion, which is permitted to others. And thus the springs of feeling may be dried up within him by his constant familiarity with scenes of sorrow. His nature is not an infinite one, there must be a limit to its resources; he cannot always pour out freely of his best life without drying up the fountain, and so it may come to pass that he goes to the scenes of mourning and death as to his official duties, and feels no reproving, or subduing, or elevating influences on his own heart, from his contact with the solemn dispensations of the providence of God.

Does it not then appear that in respect to all those ordinary offices and ministrations which Christians in general depend on, for spiritual instruction, edification and comfort, the minister of the Gospel labors under greater disadvantages than his hearers; and so far as the cultivation of piety is dependent on these means, which it is in a very important degree, he is not permitted to avail himself of them? He provides them for others, but his own vineyard cannot know their fertilizing influence. This consideration enhances the difficulty in his case of the attainment of eminent piety.

IV. The treatment which ministers sometimes receive, is unfavorable to the attainment of eminent piety.

It would be much pleasanter for us to dwell only on the "sunny side" of ministerial life, but fidelity to our subject, and to the truth, forbids us to overlook its "shady side." We remark, then, that a minister's posi-

tion exposes him to constant criticism, and sometimes to that which is neither discriminating, candid or just. Probably no man in the community is the object of such constant observation, of such close scrutiny, of such inveterate gossip. This is, doubtless, a tribute to the importance of his office, and a means of promoting his own vigilance and fidelity in the discharge of his duties. And if it were confined to its legitimate sphere, there could be no reasonable ground of complaint. The Christian public, doubtless, has a right to demand that the clergy shall be faithful to the solemn obligations which they have assumed; that they be men who have a good reputation with them that are without, and that they give no ground even for suspicion that they are not true and devoted men. But when criticism leaves this, its legitimate sphere, and assumes the regulation of the minister's private affairs, declares to him how he shall live, how regulate his family, how appropriate his wordly means, what shall be his style of dress, or equipage, how often he shall replenish his wardrobe or his library, what his literary, or social, or recreative indulgencies shall be, and a host of minor matters which are often the staple of remark and review, then criticism becomes impertinent, and deserves rebuke in the minister's case as much as in that of any other man. There are some people who really appear to think that the pastoral tie binds over the minister, body, mind and soul, wife, children, servants and domestic animals, to the ownership and control of the parish, as if he had no rights or feelings as a man and a citizen; and if he presumes to think and act for himself in matters personal, and in regard to which he is the best and only judge, they look upon it as an invasion of their rights, and a breach of his duty deserving of severe reprobation. These criticisms may or may not reach his ear, they may or may not have any influence on his course of conduct, but his exposure to them is by no means favourable to the cultivation of eminent piety. They are calculated rather to vex, to annoy, to lead to resentful or contemptuous feelings, or words; which, however they may be deserved, are not lovely in themselves, nor attractive exhibitions of the spirit of Christ, whether made by ministers or by other

men. In all the respects to which we have alluded, ministers stand on the same ground with other men,—they have the same personal rights, and the same feelings; yet is it a fact that these rights are always allowed, and these feelings always respected? Our candidates for political office are indeed, during the period of their candidatureship the subjects of criticism, invective and abuse on both sides; but no man presumes to exercise that spirit of dictation or review in relation to purely private and personal matters, which the minister must be prepared to meet so long as he retains his office. The incumbent of office in the State may console himself in the absence of higher considerations with the honors or the spoils of his station; but the minister is not entitled “*His Excellency*,” or “*the honorable member*,” still less has he the substantial solace of “*eight dollars a day*.”

In regard to this last item, we are almost ashamed to speak. For the simple, naked truth on this subject, almost seems incredible. If there were no other reason for the difficulty of eminent ministerial piety, the injustice, the meanness, the downright cruelty, with which they are sometimes treated, furnishes reasons amply sufficient. We do not know of a minister in the Presbyterian Church whose salary is more than sufficient for his reasonable support, or who in the longest and most prosperous pastorate has been able to leave anything from that source for a dependent family. But how many there are who do not receive even a support. There is no use in denying the facts, or concealing them in regard to this matter. If a minister who is shut from all opportunity of creating an income other than by his professional labors,—who is obliged to purchase everything he consumes, and at the top of the market,—who must shun, like a pestilence, the reproach of closeness, or being shrewd at a bargain,—who must respond to the almost daily calls made by the needy, who come always *first* to his door, and be always ready to entertain strangers, and all this on a salary often far below that received by a clerk in a counting room, or a conductor on a railroad, sometimes is unable to avoid debt and embarrassment, this is a great reproach and scandal, and is often the occasion of severe censure and lasting injury to his useful-

ness. For a minister to be in debt is worse than for other men, in general estimation. But who censures those Churches, and there are many such, who having solemnly pledged themselves to a salary, inadequate at best, systematically and regularly violate these pledges, and are constantly in debt—and for years together—to their ministers? Where is the censure for them? And yet this is a breach of common honesty, which, occurring in other relations, would subject the delinquent party to the pains and penalties of the law. Now, how can a minister who is in this predicament, be expected to attain to eminent piety? Wounded by a sense of gross injustice,—unable to redeem pledges made on the faith of those made to him,—embarrassed and humiliated by his irksome position,—how can he rise so superior to human nature as not to be in danger of exercising indignation which may not be always holy, and of violating the admonition “not to let the sun go down upon his wrath?” Let those who expect of ministers that they excel other men in piety, see to it that they put no such hindrances in their way. It may be said that an excess of worldly means is unfavourable to a minister’s spirituality, but our church members do not appear to think that poverty and embarrassment are necessary to *their* spirituality. And as Dr. Mason well said, “It is a poor way to provide for a minister’s spirituality by robbing him of his bread.” We will not dwell on this subject, but will only add, that if the simple facts in relation to what ministers are often exposed to in this respect, were fully made known to the world, there would, at least, be less surprise that those who have so much to bear, are not always able to exhibit any extraordinary degree of piety.

V. The piety of the minister is in danger, both from the indiscriminate praise of friends, and the unjust censure of foes.

It is a universal feature of prominent public position that it enlists a partizan spirit and surrounds its incumbent with friends and foes, both apt to be influenced by mere personal considerations in their adherence or their opposition. Even the minister of Christ is not always able to avoid this exposure. Even if he be so happy as to command the respect and affection of the particular

congregation to which he ministers, there is still, especially in large communities, a wide outside field where his influence is more or less felt and his character criticised, and parties are found for or against him. But even within his own particular charge, embracing, as it does, minds of all kinds, men with very diverse tastes, affinities, and standards, it is scarcely possible that any one man can combine in his person all the varied qualities which can suit the taste of each. We think but little of that minister's good sense, or knowledge either of himself or of human nature, who imagines that he can please equally all his hearers. And we think little of his wisdom, or his self-respect, who attempts to do it. Human nature will be human nature, and there is just as much of it in churches as anywhere else. Men will form their likings or dislikings according to their own standards of taste or opinion, or according to association and habit; and that which may especially commend a minister to one man, may equally render him unacceptable to another. We cannot complain of this. We have our tastes, and they may be as exacting as those of others, and we like to have them gratified full as well as others do. And there is probably no relation in which this diversity of taste has more scope and room for exercise than the pastoral relation. For it is of an intimate character; it brings the minister into constant contact with the minds, the hearts, the families, the every-day life of his people. If he be unacceptable to them, there are many ways and occasions in which this fact is presented to their consciousness, until it becomes irksome and oppressive, and they become blinded to anything that is good about him, and utterly unwilling, if not actually unable, to do him justice. On the other hand, if he be acceptable to another portion, his relations, necessarily intimate, will be naturally rendered more so, until, in the warmth of personal attachment and the zeal of partisanship, they become blinded to his faults and imperfections, and inclined unduly and partially to estimate and applaud him. Thus, between Scylla and Charybdis, between the adulation of friends and the denunciations of foes, the minister finds it difficult to steer with safety to his piety. Wounded, vexed and angered by censure

which he feels is excessive and unjust, he is tempted to angry and resentful feelings, or to contempt and aversion towards those who oppose. Flattered by his equally indiscriminating friends, soothed by their praises, and almost suffocated with their incense, he is in danger of pride and self-complacency, and forgetfulness of his many imperfections; which cannot be favourable to the watchfulness, humility and constant labour for advancement, which are essential to growth in grace and eminence in piety.

It is, probably, a very rare thing for a minister to receive discriminating, candid, faithful and affectionate criticism. There are not very many who are able to give it. The minister's position is so peculiar, and he is obliged to labour for the best good of so large a number, that very few are competent always to give him the best advice. It by no means follows that those who are the most ready are the best able to do so. In most cases he is obliged to follow the dictates of his own judgment, and it is best that he should. For the ultimate responsibility is his, and he must bear it. But could he enjoy the benefit of kind and candid criticism, equally removed from a blind and partial partizanship on the one hand, and a stubborn, prejudiced and unreasonable opposition on the other, it would be a blessing for which many a minister has sighed in vain. It would do much to correct his faults, to confirm his virtues, and to aid him essentially in the cultivation of a deeper and more spiritual piety.

We might mention other reasons why eminent piety in a minister is a difficult attainment, but time forbids. Enough has surely been said to show that the profession has its own peculiar trials and temptations, and that a minister cannot secure a more than ordinary degree of piety without the most earnest and constant effort. Nothing that has been said excuses him from such effort, or extenuates his short-comings and sins. It is his duty to aim at higher attainments, and a more exalted type of piety, and in proportion as he by the grace of God surmounts the obstacles and overcomes the temptations which lie in his way, and grows in grace and knowledge and holiness, so he will more abundantly glorify God, and be a richer blessing to the church.

But our subject admonishes the church to be reasonable in her expectations in regard to her ministers, and not demand of them a type of piety unwarranted by the snares and trials incident to their calling. Let her ever remember that her ministers are but men, of like passions with others, of a common depraved nature, and surrounded by uncommon temptations. Let her not criticise their failings too severely, as if they were things not to be reasonably expected, as in the case of other men. Let her be tender of their reputation; give them more of her sympathies and prayers, and beware lest she bruises and shatters and finally destroys by her rough handling the frail and imperfect vessel, in which the priceless treasure of the Gospel is conveyed to frail and imperfect men.

ARTICLE IV.

THE PRIMITIVE STATE, CHARACTER AND HAPPINESS OF MAN.

All uninspired narratives of the creation are incredible, and many of them exceedingly burlesque. The pagan philosophers of antiquity could neither distinctly comprehend nor perfectly elucidate the momentous theme; but each of them theorized according to the peculiar structure of his own intellect, and after exhausting their resources, left the subject entirely unsettled. None but a Divine wisdom could impart a certain and an authoritative knowledge of so recondite a topic; and the account contained in the Scriptures is in full accordance with the earth itself, is such as to exhibit the glory of the Supreme Architect, and also to commend itself to the intelligence of the human mind. No description can be more natural and probable than that which Moses gives of the wonder-working power of God in creating the boundless universe as the theatre of His operations. Every step in the colossal and majestic work is worthy of silent wonder and devout contemplation. But in vain should God have displayed the wonders of His wisdom

and omnipotence, had no being been formed and fitted for such contemplation, and for offering up the just tribute of honour and praise. His works glorify Him by manifesting His excellencies to intelligences who are capable of perceiving the tokens of His presence, and feeling the impressions which these are adapted to produce. A wild solitude, or a world inhabited only by animals possessed of no higher powers than mere instincts and external senses, would have existed to no purpose worthy of its Maker; and the art displayed in the arrangement of its countless departments of being, would have seemed to be a useless prodigality of skill. The earth would have been clothed with beauty, the landscape unfolded its delightful scenes, the sky spread its magnificent curtains, the sun travelled in the greatness of his strength, the moon and stars solemnly exhibited the glorious wisdom of their Author, without an eye of intelligence to gaze, or a heart of gratitude to adore. It would appear, however, to be an achievement worthy of an all-wise God, to furnish the world with inhabitants of a higher and nobler order, who should contemplate Him in surrounding objects, and be led by the gifts of His bounty, to love and adore the Giver. Accordingly, when the earth was prepared by the hand of the Almighty, adorned with its sublime and beautiful scenery, and enriched by the most munificent liberality, we are informed that an extraordinary being was introduced into it as his dwelling, and placed at the head of all the denizens of the land, the air and the sea. This was man, the last work and the master-piece of all terrestrial existence. The divine Artificer was God, yet not the Father, but the Son; for it is plainly declared that all things were created by Jesus Christ.

Man is presented to us in his compound character. His material, animal body, was formed of the dust of the ground, as is expressly asserted, and also intimated by the name Adam, which signifies red earth. It is remarkable, that even in the account of the creation of his body, an expression is employed which is not used in reference to mere animal beings. Whilst on the other days nothing is heard but the simple and majestic command which was instantly obeyed, on this occasion there

is incontrovertible evidence of deliberation and counsel, and a special preparation for the crowning act as if it were of solemn and superior importance. There was about to be formed a person of a nobler species, and destined to a higher purpose. God was now to complete the silver chain of creation, and bind it to his crystal throne by adding a golden link. The earth having been fashioned and furnished, he determined to bring forward the last and best of his sublunary works. He said, "Let us make man after our image," from which form of address we are at liberty to conclude that all the persons of the Trinity were concerned in the transaction. The human body is a wonderful and sublime exhibition of divine skill. No description can do ample justice to its surprising mechanism. Whether we consider the form and articulation of the bones, or the muscles by which they are moved, or the nerves which convey feeling and activity to every limb, or the circulation of the blood, or the multifarious organs of secretion and digestion, or the action of the lungs, or the senses by which it communicates with the surrounding world, or its external symmetry and features, we must pronounce it to be, in every regard, worthy of its divine Author, and fitted to subserve the varied interests and purposes of the sentient and intelligent being to whom it belongs. In the opinion of some learned theologians, the prominent idea in the creation of man is that of a potter who forms upon his wheel the vase of peculiar elegance and worth. Whether this be true or not, it is universally conceded (even by infidelity itself,) that we are "fearfully and wonderfully made." The formation of the human frame from the ground, is well adapted to awaken interesting and solemn reflections. Our origin is in the dust. However proud and careful we may be of our bodies, they are but modified earth. They are merely tabernacles reared for a temporary purpose, and are rapidly returning to their original elements. They are speedily declining and mouldering away. The prophets, do they live forever? The fathers, where are they? Alas! now mingling with their native earth. We are strangers and pilgrims as well as they. Our days are but a shadow. The night of death will soon cover us with the mantle of darkness, and draw the curtain over the scene of life. What a lesson

of humility should the certain knowledge of this fact impress upon our minds!

Man is also presented to us in the spirituality and dignity of his soul.

The interesting casket we have been describing was to be only the case of a precious and costly jewel,—the house of a celestial inhabitant. Man became a living soul. The Lord breathed into his nostrils the breath of lives, as the Hebrew is, denoting material life, but especially, the immortal thinking principle within. Thus possessed of an earth-wrought frame and a heaven-descended spirit, man may be said to have filled up the wondrous chasm of existence betwixt the angelic hierarchy and the animal creation. He was not brought into the world in an imbecile and infantile state of mind, but was endowed with all necessary knowledge, and with faculties resembling the divine attributes in his perceptive, reflective and moral powers, and feelings. He was created upright, not so much as to his erect posture, the *os sublime* of the poet, as to the character of his moral nature. It is expressly declared that God formed him in his own image and after his own likeness. Now, since God is a pure spirit, no configuration of matter could constitute the impress of his image. This image consisted in his immortality, in the spiritual essence of his soul, in his knowledge, in his holy life, in the authority with which he was invested, and also in dispositions and qualities similar to the communicable perfections of his Maker. Man was a being worthy of his Author, the fair image of his excellencies, a mirror from which the purity of the divine nature was reflected.

How complicate, how wonderful is man!
 How passing wonder He who made him such!
 Who centred in our make such strange extremes,
 From different natures, marvellously mixed,
 Connexion exquisite of distant worlds!
 Distinguished link in being's endless chain!
 Midway from nothing to the Deity,
 Dim miniature of greatness absolute.
 An heir of glory! a frail child of dust!
 Helpless immortal! Insect Infinite!
 A worm! a God! I tremble at myself,
 And in myself am lost. An angel's arm
 Can't snatch me from the grave.
 Legions of angels can't confine me there.

Let us proceed to consider the place prepared for the reception of man. The province in which he was located is called Eden. There is scarcely any part of the world in which it has not been sought, in Asia, Africa, Europe, America, Tartary, on the banks of the Ganges, in the Indies, in China, in the Island of Ceylon, in Armenia, under the Equator, in Mesopotamia, in Syria, in Persia, in Babylonia, in Arabia, in Palestine, in Ethiopia, among the mountains of the Moon, near the mountains Libanus, Antilibanus, and Damascus. Huet and Bochart place it on the margin of the river, produced by the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates. Other intelligent archæologists with more probability, have placed it in Armenia, between the sources of the rivers Tigris or Hiddekel, Araxes or Gihon, Phasis or Pison, and the Euphrates. It may be inferred from a number of circumstances that it was located on a mountain, or, at least, in a region diversified by hills, because only such a country could supply the springs necessary to form four heads of rivers, and because all sources of rivers rise in hills, from which their rushing waters descend to the sea. The name Eden, is very expressive and appropriate. In its primary acceptation, it signifies pleasure and delight, and is often used by writers of the old Testament to denote places which are either more remarkably fruitful in their soil, or pleasant in their situation. In the septuagint it is rendered Paradise, a park or an enclosure of trees, and conveys the idea of uninterrupted enjoyment. What a becoming and delightful region for the residence of man! Being perfectly holy, he enjoyed all the felicity which was suitable to his nature and circumstances. His body contained no seeds of disease, and was not subject to languor or pain. All terrestrial objects, arrayed in the freshness of youth, and beautified by the hand of the Creator, were calculated to delight and regale the senses. Work was prescribed to him, but it was of the easiest kind, and served merely as an agreeable recreation. He was not only placed in Eden, but in its choicest garden, where nature appeared in all her loveliness, and whose atmosphere was life and purity, where the earth was embellished with smiling and ambrosial flowers, where there was an extensive variety,

an overflowing abundance of every means to afford innocent pleasure, and those too, of the most delicious character; a garden which God himself had planted, and in which flourished every tree which was pleasant to the sight and agreeable for food. But two of those trees are especially alluded to. The tree of life appears to have been the sign and pledge between God and Adam of the continuance of his life in bliss. Partaking of this, he would ever be reminded of his felicity and immortality. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil, or as it evidently means, the tree by which the difference between evil and good might be known: from the fruit of this our first parents were prohibited. Here, and here only, was his accountability exhibited. This was the only visible exponent of his moral responsibility. This was to be the grand test of his obedience.

Having obtained a cursory glance at man's primeval locality and princely domain, we shall briefly describe the enjoyments which arose from his situation and character.

First, he was invested with superior dignity and authority. God constituted him his vicegerent upon earth. Read the extensive charter ratified by the mouth of Jehovah. By that instrument he was authorized and commanded to subdue the earth, and to exercise dominion over the fish of the sea, the fowls of the air, and every living thing that moved on the face of the earth. Thus did he obtain the right and title to make all terrestrial beings contribute to his own advantage, to the supply of his wants, and to the convenience of his life. He also possessed the skill and the power to compel them to that submission and service to which their nature is adapted. In other language, God has placed man as lord at the head of all the animate creation,—made him in his image upon the earth, a representative of the Deity. The irrational tribes whose knowledge cannot extend beyond what they can recognise by their senses, can conceive of nothing superior to man. Of God and spiritual things, they know nothing, and, therefore, can have no duties to perform to him. Their business is to submit to man as their lord and ruler, and God has given him the means and the skill to force them to render this obedi-

ence for which they were made. Never was there, and there never will be, an earthly monarch who can be said to possess more dignity and authority than Adam enjoyed. The whole earth was his, and he had dominion over every creature. If adventitious circumstances and external advantages of this nature, impart satisfaction and pleasure to a temporal prince, how unparalleled and indescribable the enjoyment, which Adam felt in being monarch of all he surveyed, and having undivided sway over every species of animal existence. But this was not all. In the midst of abundance he experienced no present want, and betrayed no anxiety or fear respecting the future. Unconscious of guilt, he looked upward with confident expectation to the goodness of his Maker, and forward to a confirmed state of felicity and glory. He was peaceful within, and safe without. Although he was encircled by ever living beauty and magnificence, and breathed an atmosphere impregnated with life, and strolled along streams in which life flowed, and wandered among fruits in which life bloomed and ripened, yet this happiness was chiefly derived from the intimate fellowship with the Creator to which he was admitted. He rejoiced in His glory, which his illuminated eye contemplated in the splendour of the heavens, and the diversified scenery of the earth. He rejoiced in a sense of His favour, and in a feeling of His love; and assured of His friendship, he reposed without suspicion upon His wisdom and benevolence. He was happy now, and he knew he should be happy always, if he continued to perform the easy service which was enjoined upon him. Easy it may be justly denominated, since it consisted in yielding to the bent of his own will, which was inclined only to good, and in exercising the holy faculties with which he was endowed. Obedience was natural to him, and whatever is conformable to nature is attended with pleasure. How delightful must have been the emotions of the first man while employed in admiring, loving, praising, and executing the orders of that adorable Being who had recently called him into existence and showered upon him innumerable blessings. His faculties brilliantly reflected the glory of God. His affections were ever burning with sacred love, like flames of holy

fire. His conscience was transparent and unruffled. No anxiety or fear disquieted his bosom. No tears of sorrow trickled down his cheek. How tranquil and happy! His life was like that of holy angels. But he was not left alone. He was blessed with the sweet society of heaven's last, best gift to man.⁴¹ A more delicate and beautiful form was united in the *woman* to a mind possessing gentler and lovelier affections, a more refined taste, and more elegant sentiments, and manners. In each, the other was intended to find that which was felt to be wanting, while in their reciprocations of tenderness and good will, admiration, and love, they beheld every blessing greatly enhanced and intensely endeared. Another source of pleasure to Adam was the confident belief that he would pass the period of his probation without transgression, and thus acquire a title to immortal felicity. He felt strong and powerful. He did not fear to stand the test. A voice within him whispered, Thou shalt never die. Celestial voices hymned it to his soul. According harps, touched by angel fingers, sounded forth the song of his great immortality. Thick clustering orbs, and his own fair domain, the tall, dark mountains, and the deep-toned waters, join in this solemn, universal song. Listen ye. Drink it in from all the air. It breathed in the winds, flowed in the streams, ripened in the fruits, and exhaled from the flowers. 'Twas in the gentle moonlight. 'Twas floating in the setting glories of the day.

Night wrapped in her sable robe, with silent step came to his moss-covered couch, and breathed it in his ears. Night and the dawn, bright day, and thoughtful eve, all time, all bounds, the limitless expanse, as one vast mystic instrument, are touched by an unseen, living hand, and conscious chords quiver with joy, in the great jubilee,—Man thou art immortal, thou shalt never die. The responsive notes of this long and loud pæan, reverberating along the azure vault, carried with them a thrill of rapture as they penetrated his heart.

Add to this, the enjoyment which Adam derived from celestial and divine communion with those sons of God, who rent the air with shouts of delight when the radiant stars of the morning sang in concert. The bright angels

of glory visited him. They were his companions and friends. See how they open up new and interesting views of Divine wisdom and power to his enraptured mind. He drank in the knowledge they communicated. His intellect was constantly expanding and enlarging. They sung the same songs of praise. They rejoiced in the goodness and love of the same God. With him, his beloved Father, he enjoyed sweet and unbroken fellowship. To Him his affections and praises rose more sweet than the incense of the morning, and made no unhappy harmony with the loftier music of Heaven. He was the High Priest of this great world, and offered the morning and evening sacrifice of thanksgiving for the whole earthly creation. May we not, then, justly exclaim, Truly the glory and bliss of our first parents were perfect.

How glorious this world was when created! Every thing was beautiful and complete. All was very good. We can compare it to nothing save one vast temple, in which every living thing is doing homage to the great and unsearchable Deity. May we not be led from nature up to nature's God, and say with our first parents, in the language of Milton—

These are thy glorious works, Parent of good,
Almighty! thine this universal frame,
Thus wondrous fair! Thyself how wondrous
Thou, unspeakable.

How abundant the goodness of God to man! Although he is lower than the angels, and small when compared with the sun and moon, and stars, yet God was mindful of him, and visited him.

We may also learn the preciousness and value of the soul. It is the breath of Jehovah. Let us care for its welfare, and seek its restoration to the image of God. The same Christ who gave immortal life and youth, spiritual knowledge, refined affections, and spotless holiness to our first parents, can also communicate them to us. By creating them at first, He has proved that He is able; by becoming incarnate, living and dying for our sakes, he has proved that he is willing. He who created Paradise at first, has prepared a more blessed and glorious one for all believers. *There* the tree of life blossoms and bears anew. *There* immortality flows again in the

pure river of the water of life. *There* the sun no more goes down; neither does the moon withdraw itself; for Jehovah is their everlasting light, and this God their glory. From that delightful world the Redeemer cries, Behold, I come quickly, and my reward is with me!

ARTICLE V.

THE BIBLE.

Sixty years ago, a man, clad in the plainest manner and with a musty book under his arm, met in the streets of Paris several of the most celebrated *savans* of France. They were wise in the wisdom of this world, but "the wisdom of God was foolishness unto them;" they disbelieved the Bible, denied the being of God, and the existence of virtue. Though they had no reverence for all that the Christian holds sacred, they paid the most marked respect to the unpretending individual with the old book under his arm, for Benjamin Franklin had even then a world-wide reputation. "I have stumbled upon a rare old poem, Messieurs, would you like to hear some stanzas?" asked Franklin. "Certainly," answered they. The Doctor then began that most sublime of all poems: "God came from Teman and the Holy One from Mount Paran," &c. "'Tis divine," exclaimed they, when the reading was over, "no mortal ever wrote anything so sublime." "That has long been my own opinion," replied Franklin, "I have just read the third chapter of the book of Habakkuk, one of the Prophets of the Old Testament."

There are doubtless many like the French *Savans*: the plan of salvation, the wondrous story of God's love to man, are abhorrent to the corrupt heart, whilst the refined intellect will readily perceive a beauty and sublimity in the Scriptures, which prove their author to be God.

To this class of persons, we propose to address a few

lines, in order to show the indebtedness to the Bible, of poets, orators, statesmen and warriors, for their noblest conceptions, sublimest sentiments, and most memorable sayings.

In sadness of heart, the great Caledonian bard sighed forth, "Sorrow is knowledge": but 2700 years before he was born, the Son of Sirach sang "In much wisdom is much grief, and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."

How many, too, have admired the same great bard's beautiful lyric, beginning with

"She *walks in beauty* like the night
Of cloudless climes and starry skies."

Who never reflected that more than 3300 years ago, Job, the Arabian poet, wrote

"If I beheld the sun when it shined,
Or the moon *walking in brightness.*"

In fact, a carefully compiled concordance of Byron, compared with Cruden's Concordance of the Bible, would show that the poet drew his finest images from "the Book of books."

We will refer, however, to but two more pieces, to prove how much he borrowed from the poetry of the Bible.

The Ode on Darkness, is but a paraphrase of the 23d verse and the three following verses of the 4th chapter of Jeremiah. The Prophet writes

"I beheld the earth and it was without form and void,
And the heavens, and they had no light," &c.

The poet paraphrases

"The bright sun was extinguished and the stars
Did wander darkling in the eternal space
Rayless and pathless, and the icy earth
Swung blind and black'ning in the moonless air."

Who has not admired the Ode on Napoleon Bonaparte?

"'Tis done—but yesterday a King
And now thou art a nameless thing—
So abject—yet alive!
Is this the man of thousand thrones
Who strew'd our earth with hostile bones!

Since he miscall'd the Morning Star
Nor man nor fiend hath fallen so far!

* * * * *
But who would soar the solar height
To set in such a starless night?"

Isaiah, in his Ode on the King of Babylon, more than 1500 years before the fall of Napoleon, broke forth into this strain :

"How art thou fallen, O Lucifer, son of the morning!

* * * * *
Is this the man that made the earth to tremble—
That did shake kingdoms?
That made the world as a wilderness
And destroyed the cities thereof!

* * * * *
Thou art cast out of the grave like an abominable branch
* * * * * as a carcass trodden under feet."

Wilberforce said of Southey's "Curse of Kehama," that all the finest parts were taken from the Bible. The same remark may be made of "Thalaba the Destroyer," and "Joan of Arc," by the same author. His minor pieces also, contain numerous paraphrases of texts of Scripture.

"He felt the cheering power of Spring,
It made him whistle, it made him sing;
His heart was mirthful to excess,
But the Rover's mirth was wickedness."

[Southey.

"The tender mercies of the wicked are cruel." [Proverbs.

"Casteth fire-brands, arrows and death, and saith,
Am I not in sport." [Proverbs.

"Happy those
Who in the after days shall live, when Time
Hath spoken, and the multitude of years
Taught wisdom to mankind."

[Southey.

"Days should speak, and multitude of years
Should teach wisdom."

[Job.

"*There is a path*
The eagle hath not marked it, the young wolf
Knows not its hidden windings: I have trod
That path, and found a melancholy den,
Fit place for penitence and hopeless woe."

[Southey.

"*There is a path which no fowl knoweth,*
And which the vulture's eye hath not seen;
The lion's whelps have not trodden it,
Nor the fierce lion passed by it."

[Job.

“And whatso He commands, that I must speak,
 And whatso is His will, that I must do;
 And I must put away all fear of man
Lest He in wrath confound me.” [Maid of Orleans.

“Speak unto them all that I command thee,
 Be not dismayed at their fears
Lest I confound thee before them.” [Jeremiah.

“Will not God
 In sunder smite the unmerciful, and break
 The sceptre of the wicked?” [Maid of Orleans.

“The Lord hath broken the staff of the wicked
 And the sceptre of the rulers,
 He who smote the people in wrath.” [Isaiah.

The Alpine Hymn of Coleridge, and “The Earth with her thousand voices praises God,” of Longfellow, are but paraphrases of the 19th and 148th Psalms. They are universally admired because they are faithful copies of the originals.

How beautifully Coleridge alludes to the separation of friends, by the whispering words of the venomous slander :

“*Alas ! they had been friends in youth,
 But whispering tongues can poison truth ;
 And constancy lives in realms above,
 And life is thorny, and youth is vain,
 And to be wroth with one we love
 Doth work like madness in the brain.*”

The first two lines are plainly taken from Proverbs and Romans.

Solomon says, “a whisperer separateth chief friends.” Paul describes slanderers as having “the poison of asps under their lips.”

When Marlborough returned to England after the glorious victory of Blenheim, Addison passed a noble eulogy upon him, concluding it by comparing him to the angel of the tempest,

“Who pleased the Almighty’s orders to perform,
 Rides in the whirlwind and directs the storm.”

The English people were excessive in their laudation of the poet for this sublime figure. The pulpit, the press, the forum, the theatre, the social circle resounded his praise almost as much as those of the warrior.

Alison in his recent "Life of Marlborough," speaks of this tribute of the poet as a more enduring monument than the splendid palace of Blenheim designed and built by Vanbrugh as a testimonial of a nation's gratitude to the greatest captain of his age.

All must concede that Addison's figure cannot be surpassed in sublimity, but who will not at a glance, perceive that it is borrowed from the first chapter of Nahum?

"The Lord hath his way in the whirlwind and in the storm.
And the clouds are the dust of his feet."

How touchingly Moore describes the unchanging, unchangeable nature of true love, whether required or unrequited, fostered or neglected,

"Oh! the heart that has truly loved never forgets,
But as truly loves on to the close,
As the sunflower turns on her God when he sets,
The same look she turned when he rose."

It is well known that Moore was a diligent student of the Bible, not that he might be "made wise unto salvation," but that he might find beautiful images with which to embellish his poems.

Job has condensed the noble sentiment above into a single line.

"Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him."

Habakkuk too, has described the confiding love of the true servant of God, even under the afflictive dispensations of his hand,

"Although the fig-tree shall not blossom,
Neither shall fruit be in the vine,
The labor of the olive shall fail
And the fields shall yield no meat,
The flock shall be cut off from the fold
And there shall be no herd in the stall,
Yet will I rejoice in the Lord,
And joy in the God of my salvation."

The sentiment of Moore is the same as that of Job and the Prophet: his language is not identical with theirs, but no one who has read Willis' account of the adroitness with which Moore could appropriate the thoughts of another and clothe them in his own language, will be at a

loss to ascertain the source from which he borrowed the sentiment embodied in the sweet lines just quoted.

Every candid reader will admit that the piece, beginning with, "This world is all a fleeting show," &c., is but a paraphrase of the 24th verse and part of the 25th of the 1st Chapter of 1st Peter.

Wearied with the din and bustle about him, Cowper exclaimed,

"Oh! for a lodge in some vast wilderness,
Some boundless contiguity of shade."

Hundreds of years before Cowper was born, Jeremiah, mourning over the abominations of his people and kindred, cried out

"Oh that my head were waters and mine eyes a fountain of tears.
* * * * *
Oh that I had in the wilderness a lodging place."

Dante's vision of Hell has been translated into all civilized tongues.

The inscription, which the genius of the poet has placed over the entrance to the gloomy regions of the damned

"Abandon hope, ye who enter here,"

has been more quoted and more admired than all the rest of the epic put together.

Was this inscription an original conception of Dante? We think not. We read in Luke that Abraham replied unto the rich man in Hell: "Besides all this, between us and you, there is a great gulf fixed; so that they, which would pass from hence to you cannot; neither can they pass to us that would come from thence."

Shakspeare is more indebted to the Bible than any poet who ever lived. Many able writers have pointed out the numerous instances in which he borrowed from the Bible, the task therefore, does not devolve upon us, but we will refer to two passages, which we think have generally been passed over in the comparison,

"Like the sweet south breathing upon a bank of violets
Stealing and giving odor." [Shakspeare.

"Awake, O North wind, and come thou South,
And blow upon my garden
That the spices thereof may flow out." [Solomon's Songs.

"The quality of mercy is not strained, it gently distilleth like the dew."
[Shakspeare.]

"My speech shall distill as the dew,
As the small rain upon the tender herb,
And as the shower upon the grass."

[*Song of Moses.*]

How frequently does Lope de Vega, the one great Spanish poet, use the figure "Light of my eyes," as a term of endearment.

We scarcely need say that the expression is borrowed *literally*, from the sweet singer of Israel.

Coleridge had felt the purifying influence of trouble and misfortune when he wrote

"There are woes ill-bartered for the garishness of joy."

The sentiment is not new, the language scarcely so.

"Sorrow is better than laughter: for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better."
[*Ecclesiastes*, vii: 3.]

Shakspeare is more universally read than any other poet. Milton holds the second place with the reading world, and Dante the third. We hesitate not to ascribe the extraordinary popularity of those writers to the fact that their pages are so deeply imbued with biblical truth. There is scarcely a nation under the sun not familiar with the name of William Shakspeare. This is the best possible proof of the wonderful truthfulness to nature of his writings, and well may they be faithful to nature, since they contain so much of the book of the God of nature.

Milton was probably the most learned man of his day, but "with all his gettings, he had gotten understanding," and the bible was the book most prized and the book whose spirit and sentiments most pervaded all his writings. We ask the most enthusiastic admirer of Dante, if he believes that the name of the poet would ever have been known beyond his native land, had not the Bible thrown a fearful interest around the awful subject of his poem?

There is much that is heathenish and Popish in the *Inferno*, but the poet represents every lost spirit as being punished according to the nature and measure of his

sin upon earth. Gross as are many of the details in the execution of the plan formed in the mind of the great Italian, the plan itself is based upon immutable truth.

“God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap.” [Gal. vi: 7.]

'Tis an indisputable fact that no poetry in modern times, has been universally admired, which was not deeply imbued with religious truth. Why has France produced no poet whose reputation is as high in other countries as in his own? The songs of Beranger, the plays of Moliere and Racine, familiar to every peasant in France, are scarcely known elsewhere. For the simple reason that they are *all French*, and seem unnatural to a less mercurial people. Passages, in these authors that appear to be the loftiest flight of the sublime to Frenchmen, seem ridiculous twaddle to their less inflammable neighbors, the English, and the most arrant nonsense to the phlegmatic Dutch.

Shakspeare, Milton, Pope, Addison, yea, even Byron and Moore, took the Bible as their model, the Book of the God of Nature to be their guide in depicting scenes and characters in nature, and as a natural consequence, there is a truthfulness and *life-likeness* about all their portraits and descriptions, that give them a place in the affections, not merely of the English, but of every enlightened nation under the sun.

Is it not a well-known fact that the German poets and philosophers are being less read, just in proportion to their abandonment of the Bible, and their wrapping themselves up in mist and darkness?

The poet who most closely imitates the Bible, must obviously succeed the best in gaining a *general* reputation; for this wonderful book is full of exquisite touches so true to nature that all feel their beauty and power at the first glance, but their richness and depth of colouring can only be fully perceived by those who have made them their study, or who have been placed in peculiar circumstances. Who, but he who has expended fruitlessly, every remedy upon some beloved friend, can feel the full force of the Psalmist's prayer? “Give us help from trouble, *for vain is the help of man.*” Can any

other than he who has languished for months upon a bed of sickness, fully understand Job? "I am made to possess months of vanity, and wearisome nights are appointed unto me." The invalid burning with fever, and tossing to and fro upon his sleepless couch, can alone appreciate David when he says, "My soul waiteth for the Lord *more than they that watch for the morning.*"

But while the influence of the Bible is so marked in producing a correct poetic taste, this influence has been equally felt in all the departments of life. The Anglo-Saxon race have studied the Bible more than any other people in the world, and they have excelled all others, in all the arts of war and peace, with the single exception of Music, Painting, Sculpture and Architecture, which have been aptly called the four Evangelists of the Church of Rome. But these four great arts have been exercised mainly upon religious subjects, and the power of the Bible over the conceptions of genius, are just as manifest here as in the glowing lines of the poet. In proof of this, we need only refer, in Painting, to the "Deluge," "Death on the Pale Horse," the "Crucifixion," &c.; in Architecture to St. Peters at Rome, the Madeleine in Paris, the Cathedral at Rouen, &c.; in Music, to the Requiem of Mozart, and the masterly Oratorio of Haydn, the "Creation," &c.; in Sculpture, to "Adam," "Eve," and the adornments of St. Peters and Westminster Abbey. The exceptions then to Anglo-Saxon preëminence establish rather than militate against our position, that the Bible must be the basis of excellence in all the pursuits and arts of life.

The Pope, at one period, divided the new world between Portugal and Spain, the most powerful nations then in Europe. But the Inquisition closed the Bible throughout these mighty kingdoms and they sank into bestiality, ignorance and imbecility. The closed Bible shut up the commerce of the "Mistress of the Adriatic," and the greatness of Venice exists but in song.

France, in abandoning the Bible, abandoned the word and the sentiment of *duty* taught on every one of its holy pages, and substituted *glory* in its stead. The despatches of Napoleon may be read from beginning to end, and the word *duty* be not once found. The orders

of Wellington and his addresses to his troops may be carefully examined, and the word *glory* never once be seen. Trace back the history of the two nations to the days of Marlborough and Louis XIV, the same remarkable difference will be observed in the appeals made to the soldiery. The soldier taught to fear God and that "England expected him to do his duty" would of course perform less dazzling feats in the face of open day, than the soldier taught "to love the praise of men more than the praise of God," but in a long obstinate contest, all would anticipate that the stern adherent to duty would conquer the seeker of empty glory. What have been the facts?

Since the battle of Hastings, no hostile French foot has rested upon the English soil; "but British troops have twice taken the French Capital; a British King was crowned in Paris; a French King rode captive through London; a French Emperor died in English captivity, and his remains were surrendered by English generosity. All the great disasters and days of mourning for France—Cressy, Poitiers, Azincour, Blenheim, Oudenarde, Mindon, Quebec, Salamanca, Waterloo—were gained by English Generals and won for the most part by English troops."

The readers of the Bible have ever been distinguished for soberness of thought, fixedness of purpose and stability of character, and have evinced these traits alike, amid the din of the battle-field, and in the calm cultivation of Literature and Science. None but Anglo-Saxon soldiers could have stood, as did the British at Waterloo, passive all day in their serried squares, against which the French Cavalry dashed in vain, as the waves fume and fret and idly beat against some huge rock of Ocean. The Anglo-Saxon is more deeply imbued with a sense of duty, as it is taught in the Bible, than the soldier of any other nation, and he has consequently given higher proofs of heroic endurance and unconquerable fortitude under overwhelming difficulties. The American child need not be told that the calmest, most confident and most unflinching men in the dark days of '76 were the descendants of those, who had sacrificed all for the privilege of reading and interpreting the Bible according to the dictates of their own conscience.

But while the Bible has imparted steadiness and firmness of character in the perilous times of war, its influence has been no less remarkable in chastening the imagination and repressing extravagant fancies in the devotees of Literature and Science. Before Bacon introduced the inductive method of reasoning, Philosophers projected the most insane theories and endeavored to accommodate the facts of science to their vagaries. An ingenious writer has shown that in the age of Bacon, none but a Bible-reading Protestant could have pursued *truth* in preference to the *phantoms* of the imagination. We think that the writer is not extravagant in attributing the inductive method to the *sobering* influence of the Bible, for 'tis an indisputable fact that the wisest philosophers, without this influence, have rushed into the wildest excesses of fancy.

Descartes rejected the Bible, and set up a Theory of Creation in opposition to the Mosaic account. Mighty as was the genius of the great Philosopher, he abandoned all sober thought in abandoning the Bible and launched out upon a sea of wild and foolish speculation. The *vortices* of Descartes are now remembered but with derision. Laplace was the profoundest Astronomer of his age. His *Mecanique Celeste* was translated by Bowditch, the most original and practical Mathematician this Continent has produced. In reference to the difficulties of the translation, Bowditch said that whenever he encountered the phrase "it is plain to see," that it took him at least two days, to see the point at all. But Laplace with "all his gettings had not gotten understanding," he gloried in his contempt for the Bible, and by his Nebular Theory, endeavoured to weaken our faith in the inspired character of the book of Genesis. Lord Rosse's telescope exposed the fallacy of the theory, and we only wonder now that any man of common sense, let alone a Philosopher, could for a moment have entertained any fancy so supremely ridiculous.

"Hume," say his admirers, "lived and died a Philosopher." Yea, verily, too great a Philosopher to credit Moses, and withal modest enough to give us his philosophical views on the subject of Creation. He supposed that there were an infinite number of moulds or models

floating through the boundless regions of space, and that matter somehow or by some means forced itself through these moulds and came out men, monkeys, toads, lizards, and so forth. The Sapiient Philosopher forgot to tell us who made the moulds, who made the matter, and who forced the matter through the moulds. The whole theory is very like that of the Indian, the world resting upon the back of a tortoise as big as the moon and the tortoise resting upon nothing.

The theories of the high Dutch, short-pipe Philosophers, "wise above that which is written," have been too recently shown up at the University of Virginia, to require any notice at this time. But we submit the question, ought not every true lover of Science to rejoice that there is a book to restrain the lawless riotings of the imagination and to impart a sound healthy tone to thought?

We come now to the second division of our subject, the indebtedness of Orators and Statesmen to the Bible. And here we might anticipate that a book, full of the sublimest conceptions, most melting sentiments and most glowing imagery, would be frequently consulted by all who wished to touch the chords of the heart or to dazzle the imagination.

"Let there be light and there was light," Longinus considered the sublimest sentence ever written. Robert Hall was wont to quote the prayer of David, "Deliver mine eyes from tears, my feet from falling and my soul from death," as the most eloquent passage in any language. John Randolph thought a line in Childe Harold, "the blue rushing of the arrowy Rhone," the finest specimen of descriptive poetry to be found either among ancient or modern poets. Does it not fall far below Isaiah's description of Egypt? "The land shadowing with wings, which is beyond the rivers of Ethiopia."

The facts correspond to our anticipations. Not only have Orators and Statesmen borrowed freely from the Bible, but they have studied it to acquire elevation of sentiment preparatory to making a great speech. It is well known that when the illustrious Chatham had any mighty effort to make in Parliament, he shut himself up in his study and devoted hours to the reading of Isaiah as the best preparation for his task. Wilberforce and

Chief Justice Hale were devoted students of the Bible and most scrupulous observers of the Sabbath. Both have ascribed all their success in life to their keeping holy the day which God has especially set apart for himself. The purest patriot and greatest Statesman the Creator has vouchsafed to mankind, John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina, was a diligent reader of the Bible, and doubtless the loftiness and purity of his character were due to the teachings of God's Holy Book. All remember an expression of the illustrious Senator, "masterly inactivity," which was so much commented upon a few years ago, and which did so much to save our country from the horrors of war. Beyond all question, the expression is borrowed from Isaiah's admonition to the children of Israel: "Your strength is to sit still."

Robert Y. Hayne, the Champion of Southern Rights, was fond of embellishing his speeches with the gorgeous imagery of the Bible. The admirers of the noble Southron will remember the happy allusions to the waters of Marah, in one of his most eloquent efforts in the Senate.

John Randolph *frequently* rebuked hypocritical professions of friendship in the language of the Prophet:—"This people draw nigh unto me with their mouths and honour me with their lips, but their heart is far from me."

We remember the electrifying influence once produced by a quotation from the eloquent Bossuet: "Man proposes, but God disposes." Burns has a similar thought.—Have not the Orator and Poet borrowed from Solomon? "The heart of man deviseth his way, but the Lord directs his steps?"

No more eloquent man ever appeared in the Councils of the Nation, than George McDuffie, of South Carolina. Few or none of his speeches are devoid of quotations from Shakspeare, the great imitator of the style of the Bible; many of his happiest efforts contain extracts from the Bible itself, and owe much of their beauty and power to the judiciousness of those selections. The most eloquent passage in his celebrated speech upon the corruption of the Government is the allusion to a section of the Lord's Prayer: "Lead us not into temptation."

Patrick Henry lamented a few years before his death

that he had not made the Bible his study throughout life, and said that "it contained more than all the books that were ever written." The most touching incident in his whole public career derives its pathos from two quotations from the Bible. When age and disease had impaired his faculties, so strongly was he impressed with the belief that the Resolutions of '98 were about to involve his native State in all the horrors of a war of rebellion, that, notwithstanding his frailty and suffering, he tottered forth to stay, if possible, the torrent of ruin and desolation. Crowds followed him wherever he went, and listened to him with the most unbounded enthusiasm.— "Why," said a caviller, "do you follow Mr. Henry, he is not a god." "No," replied he, "I am a poor worm of the dust, fleeting and unsubstantial as the clouds, which pass over your fields and are remembered no more." Those familiar with the Bible, will recognize these figures as being taken, the first from David, and the second from James. "I am a worm and no man." "For what is your life? It is even a vapor that appeareth for a little time and then vanisheth away."

How graphic is Webster's description of the boundless extent of the British Empire: "a power, whose morning drum-beat following the sun and keeping company with the hours, circles the earth with one continuous and unbroken strain of the martial airs of England." Here is an omnipresent Being, whose first manifestation is at dawn in the East, but from which there can be no escape even in the dark hours of the night, in the remotest regions of the West. It is palpable that the figure is taken from the 139th Psalm. "If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me and thy right hand shall hold me."

It has been said that the grandest exhibition of courage ever witnessed upon earth was that of Luther at the Diet of Worms, when standing alone amid his fierce and blood-thirsty enemies he calmly replied to the threat of a lingering death of torture unless he recanted and swore obedience to the Pope, "I can do no otherwise, may God be my help."

Was not the reply of the Reformer moulded by that of

Peter and John, when arraigned before wretches as ruthless and sanguinary as the minions of Rome? "Whether it be right in the sight of God to obey you rather than God, judge ye, for we cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard."

The answer of the Hebrew youth to the Assyrian king when presented the alternative of worshipping his golden image or being cast into a fiery furnace, is of precisely the same import. Luther must have been familiar with the heroic replies of the Apostles and the Hebrew Captives, and they doubtless stimulated his courage and shaped the character of his defence.

The last division of our subject is the indebtedness of warriors to the Bible.

The time has been when Oliver Cromwell was regarded by almost the whole world as a cold-blooded canting hypocrite. But Carlyle, D'Aubigne and Macauley have disabused the minds of all candid men, and few now can be found, who are not ready to accord to the Protector, purity of character, warmth of heart, and true zeal in the service of the living God. He early discovered that raw, untrained troops, could not contend against the veterans of the king, unless their want of discipline was supplied by religious enthusiasm. He taught them, therefore, to fear God, and to have no other fear; he led them in prayer, instructed them in the truths of the Scriptures, and succeeded in so deeply imbuing their minds with religious feeling, that often, by a single quotation from the Bible, he raised their courage so high that nothing could stand before it. Under such admirable teachings, the soldiers of Cromwell became men.

"Who sat with open Bibles around the Council Board, and answered a King's missive with a stern—"Thus saith the Lord."

Macauley says of them that in war, the foe never saw their backs, and in peace they never broke a law of the land. Cromwell, in his private letters to his wife and family, (which he could not have expected to become public,) as well as in those to Parliament, invariably ascribed all his success to the Lord of Hosts. At Dunbar, he recalled his troops from the slaughter of pursuit to sing the 107th Psalm, and to give glory to Him "who

ruleth in the armies of Heaven, and among the inhabitants of earth." Every thought, word and action of this wonderful man seem to have been dictated by the Bible. A devout Calvinist, he was no fatalist, and profoundly felt the force of the apostolic injunction to employ every means, "*because, it is God which worketh in you to will and to do of his good pleasure.*" We find him accordingly directing his troops "to trust in God and keep their powder dry." In this, he followed the example of Nehemiah, who whilst rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem stoutly resisted the opposition of the Arabians and Animonites, and with his followers "*made their prayer to God and set a watch against them day and night.*"

In the long list of military heroes and naval Commanders with which the English history has been adorned, the names of Marlborough and Nelson are prominent above all others. The warrior and sailor were eminently religious in their character. Marlborough had religious service performed in his Camp every morning, partook of the Lord's Supper before battle, and gave God all the glory of victory. In reference to the Capitulation of Dendermonde he wrote, "that place could never have been taken but by the hand of God." During the memorable siege of Lille, in the same spirit of reliance upon the Most High, we find him addressing the Prime Minister; "if God continue on our side, we have nothing to fear." Just before he breathed his last, his wife asked him whether he heard the prayers offered at his bed-side. He replied "Yes, and I joined them." These were his last words.

Nelson, says the Historian Alison, was distinguished for his manly piety. The first great wish of his heart was to honour God and serve his country. The last French flag had scarcely been struck and the smoke had scarcely rolled away from the shattered rigging and blood-stained decks of the hostile fleets at the mouth of the Nile, when Nelson ordered all his gallant sailors to join him in thanksgiving to Almighty God. The captured French had expected to hear the insulting shouts of victory, and with amazement witnessed the solemn scene. One of them wrote that it was not strange that men, who gave God the glory of success, should be vic-

torious. A few minutes before the first shot was fired in the terrible battle of Trafalgar, Nelson retired to his cabin and wrote a prayer, which is still preserved. He returned to the deck calm and cheerful, and mused a few moments as to what should be the signal for the day. The hero in whose mind, duty as taught in the Bible, was ever uppermost, could not long hesitate, but soon ran up to the mast-head the signal, which beyond all doubt, decided the contest that day, and which will be remembered as long as the English language is spoken: "*England expects every man to do his duty.*"

He fell mortally wounded early in the action, but lingered until victory was no longer doubtful. His last words were, "Thank God, I have done my duty."

Brief as has been our glance at the Bible and its influence upon national character, we have seen enough to endorse the tribute of admiration reluctantly extorted from the infidel Rousseau:

"I will confess to you that the majesty of the Scriptures strikes me with admiration. * * * Peruse the works of our Philosophers with all their pomp of diction; how mean, how contemptible are they compared with the Scriptures? Is it possible that a book at once so simple and sublime should be merely the work of man? Is it possible that the sacred Personage, whose history it contains should be himself a mere man? * * * Such a supposition, in fact, only shifts the difficulty without obviating it: *it is more inconceivable that a number of persons should agree to write such a history, than that one should furnish the subject of it.*"

ARTICLE VI.

CONSOLATION.

Philosophers tell us, that at different depths in the ocean different currents flow; beneath the flood of the gulf stream ebbs a southward tide; thus the balance and level of the waters is maintained. So in the air, we see

the clouds that float at different elevations drifted in opposite directions. And it is not wonderful, therefore, if we find cross currents of truth and reason in this world of providence where we dwell. He who looks at the surface only, finds certain tendencies in the facts,—they seem to draw him to one set of conclusions: he who goes a little deeper is carried elsewhere by his reasonings, while the mind and thought of God may seem to set all human speculation and conclusion at defiance, and write “folly” on our profoundest wisdom.

And the reason of this plainly is, not that truth is ever really inconsistent with itself, but that one conclusion may be, practically, far more valuable than another. Your argument may be ever so perfect, showing that this or that advantage is attainable in your way; but another argument may show better fruit attainable otherwise: while, in the sight of God, each may be alike idle, because of the riches, both of glory and bliss, that his way will reach. It was true, e. g. that if Peter, when he had toiled all night and taken nothing, should come ashore at once, he would get the rest he needed; but it was also true that if, “at Christ’s word,” he should cast his net on the right side of the ship, he would “find” what would overpay his labor.

Now, it is plain, that just in proportion as we reason clearly and well upon the premises we see and realize, and as we rely confidently on the demonstrations we make, just in that measure we shall be indisposed to look farther, or to consult other authority. And thus it continually happens that knowledge, which escapes the eye of the wise and prudent,—bent down to scan the earth and its laws,—sinks into the open heart of the feeble and unlearned, and brings unutterable strength and comfort there.

Therefore it is, that sorrows overwhelm the strong of this world, while the weak and tender bear the same burden steadfastly for years. Therefore it is, that some of whom we hardly expected fortitude are sustained, while those on whom they thought to lean, become dependent on them for support. For the strong will walk by sight, while the weak, taught of God, consent to walk by faith. By sight, we reach man’s conclusions, and are

overruled and disappointed; by faith, we lay hold of God's conclusions, and are safe. Oh, how secure and happy to meet surprise, and trouble, and calamity, with Christ's welcome on our lips and in our hearts,—“even so, Father! for so it seemed good in thy sight.” I profess not to understand thy wisdom; thy ways are past finding out; but what thou thinkest is truth, and what thou doest is goodness.

There is no other way than this to square our hopes and wills with our actual histories. There is no other eternal wisdom or consolation for man but faith. We propose, in a few words, to show that *the Christian's is the only right ground for content in trouble*; and to draw some inference from that truth.

And first, let us state the Christian's position fully. He is in trouble in some way. Losses have befallen him where he looked for gains. Reproach and misrepute are on him, in their exceeding bitterness. Death has made vacant some little chair, and gloom sits down at his fire-side. His body is racked with pains, or his mind with perplexities, or his heart with sorrow.

Now, we are but dust, as other men, and the first onset of a great grief affects us all very much alike. We are simply “bowed down,” in David's emphatic phrase—crushed, and as it were stunned, by the terrible blow. A few never recover from that state; the broken faculties never knit up into reason again—as that mother we have read of, who, having occasion to get some water from the little lake on whose shore she lived, saw some white cloth floating there, drew it, with its burden, to her feet, and found her only daughter in it, drowned. Still, when she has her way, she sits by some water's edge, and searches wearily for her dead child.

But of the unbelieving who revive after this stupor, some awake to passionate and frantic grief, which at last exhausts itself. Others go without this intermediate stage, into a profound and weary gloom, that seeks solitude, not as finding pleasure in it, but as less bitter than society. There it feeds upon its woe—defies consolation—rebels against God. It may wear away slowly, and the interest of life return; or it may draw a black curtain over the soul to the end of life—to be itself im-

palled and buried in death. Others seek diversion, fly early to pleasures, or gains, or duties, to drown the solemn voice of sorrow, and the sterner voice of awakened conscience, in the noisy cares and joys of carnal life. Others take refuge in a fatalist philosophy—things could not be otherwise than they are, and it is idle to mourn about what could not be avoided. Or, perhaps, it is a deistical philosophy; it recognizes a God, but a God all mercy, a mere giver, and no governor. It ignores sin and its demerit entirely; holds that our having suffered establishes a *claim* upon him, and that he must make *compensation* to us somewhere for the tears we have shed.

We are not ready yet, of course, to discuss these views; they are stated here merely to set off the Christian position, and make it more distinct, by contrast. Remember, however, that it is not every Christian that takes right ground at once, in trouble, far from it. Sad and shameful is it, but true. You may find the children of God, at one time or other, in every false position, but they return at last to the truth, and are comforted. Oh, how subtle, how tenacious, how victorious a thing is God's free grace!

The true hearted man of God in sorrow says: "I have earned all this, and more, by my sins. Since I began to be, I have continually offended God. His law, the shield and glory of all the good, I have dishonored: for years I cast it away utterly. Even now, sin dwelleth in me; my passions insult God; my heart forsakes him; my faith fails me; my life annuls my resolutions, and grieves the Holy Spirit. If this affliction came in mere justice, I could not complain. Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? I confess "that thou art clear when thou art judged."

"But it is not justice that smites me—I thank thee, O Christ, for that relief! If it were, I might be silenced, but not consoled. A guilty outcast, just beginning to bear the penalty of the law, would find in God's justice no peace, or hope, or pity; nothing but terror and despair. It is not justice that smites me! My Father—my Heavenly Father—hath many mighty works in hand. He is redeeming me; and to that end he purifies me by sorrow, by privilege, by toil, by prayer, by bounty.

“He has linked me in with vast histories. My life, with its various incidents and deeds, touches everywhere the life of man. The thing I mourn and suffer by, brings safety, or justice, or deliverance, or happiness, somewhere. It accomplishes some worthy end—yea, many ends. It is a cutting from my humble vine; but the great Husbandman will plant it, and find fruit in it. Some one will yet rise up to call me blessed in my sorrow, or rich in my poverty, or happy in bereavement. God, in his goodness, is making me a blessing.

“This world is a labyrinth. We come, we know not whence; and Omniscience only knows whither, or how, we go. Of one thing only am I sure: I am in his hand, whose name is *love*. If, instead of leaving me, by many toils and through many errors, painfully to work out my salvation and arrive at home, he has taken the piloting upon himself, and kindly constrained me along the near and narrow way, shall I not thank him, and be content? He knows best the way to his own glory; and the thing that makes him glorious, must make me, his son or daughter, happy. “When my spirit was overwhelmed within me, then thou knewest my path.”

“Howsoever I consider it, I am content. My share directly in it is discipline—and Heaven. God’s kingdom is blessed by it through his providence; and is not that a joy for Heaven? God himself finds glory in it; without which there could be no Heaven. All is well; this world fades like the field-flowers; but Heaven opens on my sight, with all my treasures and God’s victory! All is well!”

Having thus shown, in the first place, what the Christian position is, we affirm *secondly*, that it contains all the elements—and shall then show *thirdly*, that *it alone* has the elements of true consolation. In other words, that the Christian, as an immortal being, can be comforted in sorrow, and that the sinner never can.

It is plain that only three things can ever reconcile us to a loss: either, first, it must put us in a better condition for our future prospects; or, secondly, it must assure some real good to us itself; or, thirdly, it must bring corresponding advantages to those we love, and whose love we desire. A young man pays willingly for education,

because it puts the means of fortune, respectability, and happiness, in his hands. No one grieves over the burning of a building he owns, if the insurance not only covers the loss, but pays him for the trouble and expense of *building a better one*. All purchase and sale proceeds on the surrender of something we possess, to acquire something more valuable to us. And every day we see parents expending toil or money for their children's benefit.

Now the Christian knows, *certainly*, that in one or other of these ways, if not in all of them, his losses will be made up to him. In which way, or by what process, he may never know in this life; he may, often does; but that does not affect the argument. His certainty depends not at all on that knowledge. *It is built upon the character of God*. Because that is sure, he is safe. He has the most delightful prospect, supported by the most unassailable evidence. And when, in these following paragraphs, we say "*may*," it is not because there is a shadow of doubt about the rich and perfect compensation, but because man cannot always divine the silent process.

We may be repaid for our griefs by the improvement in our spiritual condition; in our efficiency, our knowledge, or our holiness. It is the perfection of Christian excellence to know the truth about God, and Christ, and Heaven, with a clear, intelligent mind, and to love it with all the heart. It is the beauty of a spotless life, to do all for love's sake. It gives assured hope and promise to our coming years, that we have been "tried and found faithful" through God's grace.

Sorrow patiently borne, and with a Godward look upon the troubled face, gives us insight into the Bible. Some of us know how Jacob felt when he mourned for Joseph and feared for Benjamin. How often the darkened and grieving heart echoes David's word—"I had fainted unless I had believed to see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living!" When at last we have conquered the passionate and unbelieving will, how gladly we cry, as Job did, "though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." But the understanding of these words is not shut up to them; they cast their light on many other words; they illuminate for us the whole Bible.

But we get insight, too, into God's character and feeling toward us. We know each other by the looks we wear, the things we do, and the spirit we show in them. And shall not these close and terrible dealings with the Lord, followed, too, by reconciliation and blessing, give us profound acquaintance with him?

The principles on which we live and act through such times of crisis, are strengthened by the strife. We have bent the stubborn knee in acquiescence; we have surrendered back the gift to the giver; we have quelled repining for our dear Father's sake. Now, therefore, *love is king in us*; he has won a great battle, and received the throne.

Thus, with a larger heart full of the Bible, standing nearer our God, and more fully feeling "the powers of the world to come;" having the right principle enthroned within us, disaffection silenced and destroyed; Christ shining out upon us, our sun and shield; we have been borne along, farther from our old state of sin and death, nearer to heaven, our home. Is it not a recompense?

But there is another; our eternal reward is shaped, insured, enriched, by sorrow here. The heart, enlarged by trial, can contain more bliss, and it shall be full. The experience of battles fought and won, of danger and deliverance, of prayer and answer,—what stores of wisdom and bright recollection are here! Strengthened by these events, we shall be ready for greater thoughts, for swifter flight upon God's messages of love, for nobler ventures amid his unfolding plans, for higher knowledge, and sweeter praise of Jesus our "Saviour, Brother, Friend." Doubt not, afflicted ones, that in simply being faithful, patient, humble, we are laying up treasure in Heaven. There are joys and riches there, for which language has not yet a name, nor fancy an image of delight. Suggestions of rest, and peace, and triumph, she gives us, borrowed from Scripture promises. But her utmost is to say that all we lack here shall be given us, and what we never thought of shall be poured on us, even unto "fulness of joy." Have you ever thought of how much happiness, even now, you are capable? How, under circumstances you can conceive, the sweetest transient thrill of pleasure you ever felt might swell out into an unfa-

ing flood? Double that, quadruple it, yea, multiply to your little utmost, and yet you will have fallen short of the truth. "This light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory."

But do you reply here, that it is abhorrent to your feelings that another,—your child or friend,—should suffer and die to make you better and happier? Do you refuse such consolation as unworthy of a generous heart, and declare that you had rather have lost all this gain we have spoken of, than that such terrible things should befall those you love? I answer first, and in passing, that we have hitherto spoken only of your direct and personal relation to the matter. Nobody pretends, e. g. that the friend you have lost, sickened and died *solely* for your spiritual good, only that that is involved in the other reasons why it should be so, and that therefore, you may extract hope and comfort for yourself from that (when done by God's sovereign hand,) which you would rather have died a thousand times than do. But secondly, we remark, that if such is your feeling, you are ready for the purest and sweetest of all consolations, *the good accruing to others* from your affliction.

Our figures of speech often mislead us, cheat us into inferences that are false, or at least, partial. When e. g. we speak of a *chain* of events linked together by Providence and drawing on a result, we are apt to fancy each event as a link in one chain *only*, binding the nearest cause to the nearest consequence, and exhausted of its effects when that is done. A far truer idea is obtained by comparing the arrangement of events to the air, or the sea, where every shock and every motion propagates itself, and is felt everywhere. Each footfall on the earth affects each particular atom. Every utterance of every voice goes out ceaselessly upon the air; its bland, elastic volume is filled with these tremors and impulses, and is affected by their play. And though our faculties fail us at once, if we would follow any single sound or motion through those countless combinations, yet we know that God will read them all at a glance at any instant in eternity. Nothing is lost. The fall of yonder pebble in the sea wakes gentle music on some distant shore. The out-

cry of that bruised heart goes out upon the winds, and past the clouds, and is heard at Heaven's gate. Though it were uttered a thousand years ago, it rocks yet upon the breeze, and sweeps in the gale; and it will not cease its work *forever!*

But do you exclaim that your grief or affliction is lost in insignificance in such a view of the vast universe. We answer again, *nothing is lost*, not a sparrow, not a ripple on the water. To us, one grief, one life, one death, does seem to be a mere atom among the hosts that think, feel, weep, rejoice, and that forever. But nothing is really smaller because comparison with immensity makes it look small. If your grief is large and heavy to you, then will the "over payment of delight" be large to you, though among the immensities it seemed a trifle. Our earth is large enough for us, though it is but a grain of mustard seed beside the sun.

In bearing your affliction faithfully and humbly, as the child of God, you have made your contribution to the universal welfare. You have laid your little all of treasure in his hand, and said "since such is thy will, O Father, lay this out in blessing to my fellow-creatures, and in glory to thyself." And shall we doubt that he has employed it well? In teaching us, by the parable of the talents, what we should do, has he not told us plainly what he will do? To the utmost of his wisdom, it shall tell on the joy and safety of his people, and the praise and love he receives. Are we not repaid?

But it would be injustice to the subject, and to ourselves, not to consider another point. It is not merely the believing these things, that it is to cheer us in our woe; it is the believing them on such evidence and for such reasons as we do. The proof is better and dearer than the thing proved. The heart of God is greater than even his deed.

Yes, friends! Our faith sees that when the Lord does anything with us, especially if he afflicts us, *he has committed himself*. He has entered on a course, whose end we may not be able to calculate, but whose object we can surely divine. Something in us *understands* him; and knowing him, it knows his purpose to bless, to train, to redeem. But *the knowing him* is the true joy and

victory; the sympathy with perfect love; the hungering for righteousness that comprehends his holiness; that is balm for the deepest of our wounds.

Said we not rightly, that we have the most unassailable evidence of the most delightful truths?

We are to show now, thirdly, that the impenitent has not one of the elements of true consolation in his reach; he may direct others to them, but he must not taste them himself. Perhaps we ought to make one exception. It must be a relief, when he can think that others have been benefitted and blessed by his loss, as that the friend or child is gone to heaven. But after all, how slender a consolation, how poor and slight a relief can that thought be to one who must follow it up, as he must, with thoughts of self-accusation and dismay! He must look up, as the loved and ransomed spirit takes its flight, and say, "Farewell, perhaps forever! I have made no preparation for following thee, thou wilt not come back to me, and I may never, never, go to thee!" Small and sad, then, is his only comfort, "they are safe, but I am left to my doom: they have taken the life-boat and are rescued; but I must starve upon the wreck."

For the rest, it is plain that, so long as he remains in sin, no improvement of his spiritual state *can* take place. To improve, in these matters, is to become more accessible to motive, to draw nearer to God, to purify the heart, to abound in prayer, to gain vividness of faith. But the very fact that he continues unrepentant in the face of an angry God, a dark future, and a rebuking conscience, cuts off all hope of these things. He has not been persuaded by these terrible appeals; he has either refused, or evaded. Pain and fear, without repentance, *cannot* but repel man from God, and as we fly from heaven's light, the deeds, and the powers of darkness seize on us. So far from being taught of God, we contend against him. Our hearts cry out aloud against his decrees. We refuse to see bare justice in them, much less goodness. Ah, the blow that does not break the heart hardens it. Affliction to the obstinate sinner is like lightning; it scathes the tree, blights its verdure, dries up its fruitful juices, and leaves it, hardened and blasted, to wither up and die!

Neither can affliction work out a reward for him, here, or hereafter. Of not one solitary event in life can the sinner show, while he is a sinner, that it is a mercy; not even the prolonging of his life; for if he is to die in sin, the sooner he dies the less awful will be his woe. Blessings abused add fuel to the eternal fires; how much more these closest, most personal dealings of God with us, if they are neglected!

But will the thought of saints made happy and God glorified by these sorrows of ours, bring any comfort to the sinner? Will the contrast between their peace and our perdition relieve us? Not a particle. God has more rightly read our hearts, "*there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth*, when ye see Abraham and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of Heaven, and ye yourselves cast out." Ah, remember, unbelieving reader, remember! The thought of God's love and holiness has given you no pleasure in this world of hope, and will his glory bring you happiness when you are shut up in despair? Dream not of it, it will only add torment to your pains!

But will any say "this is cruel language, it cuts me off from all comfort in my time of trouble?" Would to God it were the sharp remedy for all your sorrows! It might well be. This very day you might decide that there is no resource for the suffering, the sinful, the weary, like a covenant with God. To make peace there, is to be at peace forever. To refuse that hope is to bid a long farewell to all hope. What purpose will delusions and self-flattery serve? Suppose you could convince yourself that affliction would bring every benefit to you that it brings to the Christian, what would it profit you *unless it was true?*

Have we then, misstated your case at all? Does refusing to serve God prepare you to serve him? Will discontent with his providence teach you faith, patience, and resignation? Can unbelief ripen into love, or self-will sympathize with his grace and pity? Can a man be scourged by terror and despair into peace and joy in the Holy Ghost? If not, then you will not grow better by suffering, till you give God your heart. How is it with you to-day? Disappointment or misfortune has visited you; are you ready *now*, to give God that heart?

Come then, come to him straightway, confess your sins, take Christ for your redeemer, and be forgiven! Do you hesitate and drawback? Are your thoughts drawn away by grief, or are you buisy repairing your losses, and Almighty God, your jealous, tremendous judge, must wait until you have a convenient season? Then confess, at least, that sorrow has not softened or blessed you, for you "refuse him that speaketh from heaven."

There is a terrible omen and foreshadowing of the end, in this excuse for not repenting now. Fears, doubts, perplexities, then, are reasons for *not coming* to God; instead of sending us to his feet where all trouble finds its cure, they drive us away! Oh, lost sinner! What will you do in the day of desolation? When sorrows multiply, when life flashes in the socket and expires, when death and hell lay hold upon you, will repentance be plain and escape easy? Look down into the pit, and learn of those ruined thousands the worth of a death-bed repentance! But now, while life endures in the land of pardons, when God's insulted Spirit has not yet taken his everlasting flight; now Heaven's gate is open, and "whosoever will," may enter in and dwell there. Oh come, dear, dying friend, come and trust in Jesus Christ! His blood cleanseth from all sin! Let those arms enfold you once, and you are safe!

Let us, in conclusion, affectionately remind all sorrowing Christians, that they have a "God to glorify" in the fires. You have professed before men in other days, that you esteem him as infinitely wise and good; that you take his will to be your will, and renounce every other allegiance. Now is the time to prove that you meant what you said. Now is the sharp test-time of your professions. If you consent not now, in heart as well as word, to what he has done, you not only annul your own professions, but you cast a shadow of doubt on the vows of all who have promised as you did, but have not yet been tried. You reduce the value of the Christian name, and diminish the power of the church. Whereas, if your faith stands this trial, being proved much more precious than gold, men are compelled to acknowledge God as your helper, and your great physician. That shadowy after-world, of which they hear so much and

realize so little, grows palpable and solemn to them, as its powers encompass and sustain you. The Gospel is preached, not now by a plausible tongue, but by a patient, consistent, peaceful life. Conscience is roused, and does her work of warning faithfully. If it "profit a man" nothing "to gain the whole world and lose his own soul," will it not be a happy barter to have lost some one, or many, of this world's comforts or delights, and saved a soul?

Let us not forget that we hold all life's possessions by the same tenure, God's will, and that we must interpret all its history by the same rule, God's character. If the question were, why you were born in a land of prayer and grace, or why you were not cut off in infancy, or in the impenitent years that followed, why you were not richer, poorer, happier, sadder, wiser, weaker, than you are: yea, when you have entered heaven, and sat down at the right hand of the majesty on high, if it should be asked why you were there and others cast away, you could give but one answer. And that same answer will content you now, if your heart be right with God. The hope may be blighted, the friend departed, the heart torn, and sick, and bleeding, but the meek eye seeks Heaven. The body will be bowed down, but the believing spirit will look up even from the dust, and renew its strength from God's treasury of might. Wiping away the blinding tear, hushing the sob of agony, lifting the marred and stricken face to the cross, you whisper "even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

ARTICLE VII.

LETTER TO GOVERNOR MANNING.*

SOUTH CAROLINA COLLEGE,
November, 1853.*To His Excellency Governor Manning:*

I ask the favour of presenting to your Excellency a few reflections upon the subject of Public Instruction in South Carolina. As I feel that I am addressing one whose interest and zeal in the prosperity of letters will induce him to weigh with candour, to estimate with charity, and even to invest with disproportionate value, the crudest hints which spring from the desire to increase the educational facilities of the State, I shall dismiss all apprehensions of being suspected of an officious obtrusion upon your notice. You are the man, above all others, to whom the head of this Institution should look with confidence, to give fresh impulse to the general cause of education; and you will excuse me for saying, that if the suggestions which shall fall from me, or the maturer recommendations which shall come from yourself, shall terminate auspiciously to the wishes of us both, there will be furnished a beautiful instance of Providential retribution, in connecting the name of the first conspicuous benefactor of the South Carolina College with the establishment of an adequate system of common schools. A proud distinction in itself to be the friend and patron of learning, the honour is increased in your case, in that it has been preëminently your care, in its higher and lower culture, to dispense its blessings to the poor. Apart from fellowship with God, there cannot be a sweeter satisfaction than that which arises from the consciousness of being a father to the fatherless; and

*This document, from the pen of one of the Editors of this Periodical, and recently published at the expense of the State, is deemed by those associated with the author in the Editorial control of the Review, worthy of a still wider circulation. The subject discussed in it is one which stirs deeply the public mind, both in Church and State, and is, in fact, the great question of the age. This will be deemed by our readers a sufficient reason for its re-publication in our pages.

if the ends which I know are dear to your heart can only be achieved, every indigent child in the State, looking upon *you* as its real father, may address you in the modest and glowing terms which the genius of Milton has canonized, as fit expressions of gratitude for the noblest of all gifts.

At tibi, chare pater, postquam non æqua merenti
 Posse referre datur, nec dona rependere factis,
 Sit memorasse satis, repetitaque munera grato
 Percensere animo, fidæque reponere menti.

I am not insensible to the dangers and difficulties which attend the discussion of this subject. It is so seductive to the fancy that the temptation is almost irresistible to indulge in schemes and visionary projects. In the effort to realize the conception of a perfect education, we are apt to forget that there is no such thing as absolute perfection in the matter, that all excellence is relative, and that the highest recommendation of any plan is, that it is at once practicable and adjusted to the wants and condition of those for whom it is provided. A system of public instruction, like the form of government, must spring from the manners, maxims, habits and associations of the people. It must penetrate their character, constitute an element of their national existence, be a portion of themselves, if it would not be suspected as an alien, or distrusted as a spy. The success of the Prussian scheme is ascribed by Cousin to the circumstance, that it existed in the manners and customs of the country before it was enacted into law. It was not a foreign graft, but the natural offshoot of popular opinion and practice. It is an easy thing to construct a theory, when nothing is to be done but to trace the coherences and dependencies of thought; but it is not so easy to make thought correspond to reality, or to devise a plan which shall overlook none of the difficulties and obstructions in the way of successful application. In the suggestions which I have to offer, I shall endeavour to keep steadily in view the real wants of the citizens of this commonwealth, and avoiding all crotchets and metaphysical abstractions, shall aim exclusively at what experience, or the nature of the case, demonstrates to be practicable. I have no new principles to ventilate, but I shall

think myself happy if I can succeed in setting in a clearer light, or vindicating from prejudice and misconception, the principles which have already been embodied in our laws. It is, perhaps, not generally known that the legislation of South Carolina contemplates a scheme of public instruction as perfect in its conception of the end, as it is defective in its provision of the means. The order, too, in which the attention of the Legislature has been turned to the various branches of the subject, though not the most popular or the most obvious, is precisely the order of their relative importance. It began where it ought to have begun, but unfortunately stopped where it ought not to have stopped. To defend what it has already done, and stimulate it to repentance for what it has not done, is the principal motive of this communication.

Permit me, in pursuance of this design, to direct the attention of your Excellency to the nature, operation and defects of the system among us. This system consists of the South Carolina College, established in 1801, of the Free Schools, established in 1811, and of the Arsenal and Citadel Academies, which have crept into existence by the connivance, without any statute, of the Legislature, defining their end and aim. This series of institutions is evidently adjusted without, perhaps, any conscious purpose of doing so, to the three-fold division of education, in so far as it depends upon instruction, into liberal, elementary and professional. The College is to furnish the means of liberal, the Free Schools of elementary, and the Arsenal and Citadel Academies of that department of professional education which looks to the arts of practical life, especially those of the soldier. For the liberal or learned professions, those of law, physic and divinity, no provision has been made. The College undertakes to give the same kind of instruction which is given by the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy in the Universities of Europe. Our Military Academies, with a slight change in their organization, might be converted into scientific schools; and free schools are, or were designed to be, substantially the same as the elementary and grammar schools of England. The scheme, as here developed, though far from fulfilling the logical require-

ments of a complete system of public instruction, is amply sufficient, if adequately carried out, to meet the real wants of our people. The kind and degree of education, for which there is any serious or extensive demand, is what is provided for. To make the system logically complete, there would have to be a succession of institutions, individually perfect, and yet harmoniously coöperating to a general result, which, taking the man at the very dawn of his powers, shall be able to carry him up to the highest point of their expansion, and fit him for any employment in which intelligence and thought are the conditions of success. It should supply the means to every individual in the community of becoming trained and prepared for his own peculiar destiny—it should overlook no class—it should neglect no pursuit. It may be doubted whether a scheme so comprehensive in its plan is desirable—it is quite certain that it is not practicable. The Legislature has done wisely in confining its arrangements to liberal and elementary education. It has aimed, by a preliminary discipline, to put the individual in a condition to educate himself for the business of his life, except where his calling involves an application of scientific knowledge which does not enter into the curriculum of general instruction. In that case it has made a special provision. I see then no improvement that can be made in the general features of our scheme—it is as perfect in its conception as the wants and condition of our people will justify. All that the Legislature should aim at is the adjustment of the details, and the better adaptation of them to the end in view.

I. The first in the order of establishment, as well as the first in the order of importance, is the COLLEGE. Devoted to the interests of general, in contradistinction from professional education, its design is to cultivate the mind without reference to any ulterior pursuits. "The student is considered as an end to himself; his perfection, as a man simply, being the aim of his education." The culture of the mind, however, for itself, contributes to its perfection as an instrument, so that general education, while it directly prepares and qualifies for no special destination, indirectly trains for every vocation in which success is dependent upon intellectual exertion.

It has taught the mind the use of its powers, and imparted those habits without which its powers would be useless. It makes MEN, and consequently promotes every enterprise in which *men* are to act.

General education being the design of a College, the fundamental principles of its organization are easily deduced.

1. The selection of studies must be made, not with reference to the comparative importance of their matter, or the practical value of the knowledge, but with reference to their influence in unfolding and strengthening the powers of the mind; as the end is to improve mind, the fitness for the end is the prime consideration. "As knowledge," says Sir Wm. Hamilton,* ("man being now considered as an end to himself,) is only valuable as it exercises, and by its exercise, develops and invigorates the mind; so a university, in its liberal faculty, should especially prefer those objects of study which call forth the strongest and most unexclusive energy of thought, and so teach them too, that this energy shall be most fully elicited in the student. For speculative knowledge, of whatever kind, is only profitable to the student, in his liberal cultivation, inasmuch as it supplies him with the object and occasion of exerting his faculties; since powers are only developed in proportion as they are exercised; that is, put forth into energy. The mere possession of scientific truths is, for its own sake, valueless; and education is only education, inasmuch as it at once determines and enables the student to educate himself." Hence the introduction of studies upon the ground of their practical utility is, *pro tanto*, subversive of the College. It is not its office to make planters, mechanics, lawyers, physicians or divines. It has nothing directly to do with the uses of knowledge. Its business is with minds, and it employs science only as an instrument for the improvement and perfection of mind. With it the habit of sound thinking is more than a thousand thoughts. When, therefore, the question is asked, as it often is asked by ignorance and empiricism, what is the use of certain departments of the College curriculum, the answer

* Discussions on Philosophy, &c., p. 677.

should turn, not upon the benefits which, in after life, may be reaped from these pursuits, but upon their immediate subjective influence upon the cultivation of the human faculties. They are selected in preference to others, because they better train the mind. It cannot be too earnestly inculcated that knowledge is not the principal end of College instruction, but habits. The acquisition of knowledge is the necessary result of those exercises which terminate in habits, and the maturity of the habit is measured by the degree and accuracy of the knowledge. But still the habits are the main thing.

2. In the next place it is equally important that the whole course of studies be rigidly exacted of every student. Their value as a discipline depends altogether upon their *being* studied, and every college is defective in its arrangements which fails to secure, as far as legislation can secure it, this indispensable condition of success. Whatever may be the case in Europe, it is found from experience in this country, that nothing will avail without the authority of law. The curriculum must be compulsory, or the majority of students will neglect it. All must be subjected to catechetical examinations in the lecture room, and all must undergo the regular examinations of their classes, as the condition of their residence in College. The moment they are exempted from the stringency of this rule, all other means lose their power upon the mass of pupils. Much may be accomplished by rewards, and by stimulating the spirit of competition, and great reliance should be placed upon them to secure a high standard of attainment; but in most men, the love of ease is stronger than ambition, and indolence a greater luxury than thought. "For, whilst mental effort is the one condition of all mental improvement, yet this effort is at first and for a time painful; positively painful, in proportion as it is intense, and comparatively painful, as it abstracts from other and positively pleasurable activities. It is painful because its energy is imperfect, difficult, forced. But, as the effort is gradually perfected, gradually facilitated, it becomes gradually pleasing; and when, finally perfected, that is, when the power is fully developed, and the effort changed into a spontaneity, becomes an exertion absolutely easy, it re-

mains purely, intensely and alone unsatiably pleasurable. For pleasure is nothing but the concomitant or reflex of the unforced and unimpeded energy of a natural faculty or acquired habit; the degree and permanence of pleasure being also in proportion to the intensity and purity of the mental energy. The great postulate in education is, therefore, to induce the pupil to enter and persevere in such a course of effort, good in its result and delectable, but primarily and in itself irksome.*” The argument of necessity helps to reconcile him to the weariness of study—what he feels that he must do he will endeavor to do with grace, and as there is no alternative, he will be more open to the generous and manly influences which the rewards and distinctions of the College are suited to exert. There are always causes at work, apart from the repulsiveness of intellectual labor, to seduce the student from his books; and before his habits are yet formed and the love of study grounded into his nature, it is of the utmost consequence to keep these causes in check. No other motives will be sufficient without the compulsion of law. Coöperating with this, there are many others which, if they do not positively sweeten his toil, may help to mitigate the agony of thought.

I have insisted upon this point, because it is the point in regard to which the most dangerous innovations are to be apprehended. Two changes have at different times been proposed, one of which would be absolutely fatal, and the other seriously detrimental, to the interests of the College as a place of liberal education. The first is to convert it into a collection of independent schools, each of which shall be complete in itself, it being left to the choice of the student what schools he shall enter. The other is to remit the obligation of the whole course in reference to a certain class of students, and allow them to pursue such parts of it as they may choose. In relation to the first, young men are incompetent to pronounce beforehand what studies are subjectively the most beneficial. It requires those who have experienced the disciplinary power of different studies to determine

* Hamilton's Discussions, p. 676.

their relative value. Only a scholar can say what will make a scholar. The experience of the world has settled down upon a certain class and order of studies, and the verdict of ages and generations is not to be set aside by the caprices, whims, or prejudices of those who are not even able to comprehend the main end of education. In the next place, if our undergraduates were competent to form a judgment, their natural love of indolence and ease would, in the majority of cases, lead them to exclude those very studies which are the most improving, precisely because they are so; that is, because, in themselves and in the method of teaching them, they involve a degree and intensity of mental exercise, which is positively painful. Self-denial is not natural to man; and he manifests but little acquaintance with human nature, who presumes as a matter of course, that the will will choose what the judgment commends. *Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor*, is more preëminently true of the young than the old. They are the creatures of impulse. Permit them to select their own studies, and the majority will select those that are thought to be the easiest. The principle of choice will be the very opposite of that upon which the efficiency of a study depends. Experience is decisive on this point. What creates more trouble in the interior management of our Colleges than the constant desire of the pupils to evade recitation? And is it not universally found that the Departments which are the most popular, are those which least task the energies of the student? I do not say that the Professors who fill these Departments are themselves most respected. That will depend upon their merits, and in matters of this sort the judgments of the young are generally right. But easy exercises are preferred, simply because they do not tax the mind. The practical problem with the mass of students is—the least work and easiest done. Is it easy, is it short, these are the questions which are first asked about a lesson. I must, therefore, consider any attempt to relax the compulsory feature of the College course, as an infallible expedient for degrading education. The College will cease to *train*. It may be a place for literary triflers, but a place for students it cannot be.

There is much in a name, and the change here condemned is delusively sought to be insinuated under the pretext of converting the College into a University. This latter title sounds more imposingly, and carries the appearance of greater dignity. But the truth is, there is hardly a more equivocal word in the language. "In its proper and original meaning," as Sir Wm. Hamilton * has satisfactorily shown, "it denotes simply the *whole members of a body* (generally incorporated body,) of *persons teaching and learning one or more departments of knowledge.*" In its ordinary acceptation in this country it is either synonymous with College, as an institution of higher education—and in this sense we are already a University—or it denotes a College with Professional schools attached. It is clear, however, that the introduction of the Faculties of Law, Medicine and Theology, necessitates no change in the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts. It is not necessary to make general education voluntary, in order to provide for professional instruction. There is consequently nothing in the name, or in the nature of the case, which demands a fundamental change in the system, in order that the South Carolina College may become the South Carolina University. For my-

* Discussions, p. 479. To the quotation in the text may be added the following passage from the same page: "The word *universitas*, in the common language of Rome, is equally applicable to *persons* and to *things*. In the technical language of the civil law, it was, in like manner, applied to both. In the former signification, (convertible with *collegium*,) it denoted a plurality of persons associated for a continued purpose, and may be inadequately rendered by *society, company, corporation*; in the latter, it denoted a certain totality of individual things, constituted either by the mutual relation to a certain common end, (*universitas facti*,) or by a mere legal fiction, (*universitas juris*.) In the language of the middle ages, it was applied either loosely to any understood class of persons, or strictly (in the acceptation of the Roman law) to a public incorporation, more especially (as equivalent with *communitas*) to the members of a municipality, or to the members of a 'general study.' In this last application it was, however, not uniformly of the same amount; and its meaning was, for a considerable period, determined by the words with which it was connected. Thus it was used to denote either (and this was its more usual meaning) the whole body of teachers and learners, or the whole body of learners, or the whole body of teachers and learners divided, either by faculty or by country, or by both together. But no one instance can, we are confident, be adduced, in which (we mean until its original and proper signification had been forgotten) it is employed for a school teaching, or privileged to teach, and grant degrees, in all the faculties."

self, I am content with our present title, and if it promises less, I am sure that it will accomplish more, than the new title with the corresponding change. As to the expediency of adding the Faculties of Law and Medicine (Theology is out of the question) to the present organization, I have only to say, that it will multiply and complicate the difficulties of the internal management of the Institution, without securing any increased proficiency in these departments of knowledge; that is, if there is to be any real connection between the Faculty of Arts and those of Law and Medicine. I dread the experiment. I think it better that the Professions should be left to provide for themselves, than that a multitude of inexperienced young men should be brought together, many of whom are comparatively free from the restraints of discipline, and yet have an easy and ready access to those who are more under law. The very liberty of the resident would be a temptation to the under-graduates. I have no objection, however, to the founding of Professional Schools by the State. All that I am anxious for is that they should not be so connected with the College as that the members of all the schools should reside together. To be under a common government is impossible, to be under a different government would breed interminable confusion and disorder. That sort of nominal connection which requires that all medical and law degrees should be conferred by the authorities of the College, and which is perfectly consistent with the law and medical schools being established in a different place, would, of course, be harmless. But this difficulty might arise; the College would be unwilling to confer *any* degree without a liberal education—it could not, without abjuring the very principles of its existence, grant its honours upon mere professional attainment.

With respect to the other change, that of allowing students, under certain circumstances, to pursue a partial course, it is evidently contradictory to the fundamental end of the College. These students are not seeking knowledge for the sake of discipline, but with reference to ulterior uses. They come not to be trained to *think*, but to learn to act in definite departments of exertion. It is *professional*, not *liberal* education which they want. The want

I acknowledge ought to be gratified—it is a demand which should be supplied. But the College is not the place to do it. That was founded for *other* purposes, and it is simply preposterous to abrogate its constitution out of concessions to a necessity, because the necessity happens to be real. What, therefore, ought to be done is not to change the nature of the College, but, leaving that untouched to do its own work, to organize schools with special reference to this class of wants. We have the elements of such an organization in the Arsenal and Citadel Academies. Let these be converted into seminaries of special education—which will only be an extension of their present plan—and they will form that intermediate class of schools betwixt the elementary and the College, which the circumstances of every civilized community, in proportion to the complication of its interests, demand.

These changes in the College have been favoured on the ground that they will increase its numbers. But the success of the College is not to be estimated by the numbers in attendance, but by the numbers educated. It should never include more than those who are seeking a liberal education, and if it includes all of these, whether they be fifty or two hundred, it is doing the whole of its appropriate work. No doubt, by the changes in question, our catalogue might be increased two or three fold, but we should not educate a single individual more than we educate now. Numbers in themselves are nothing, unless they represent those who are really devoted to the business of the place. What real advantage would it be to have four or five hundred pupils matriculated here, if some remained only a few months, others remained longer in idleness, and out of the whole number, only four or five applied for a degree. That four or five would be the true criterion of success. The real question, I insist, is how many graduate. That is the decisive point. As long as we receive the whole number of young men in the State, who are to be liberally educated, whether that number be greater or smaller, we are doing all that we were appointed to do, or that we can be legitimately expected to do; and a decline in numbers is not a necessary proof of the declension of the

College, it may be only a proof that the demand is ceasing for higher instruction. The work, however, to be done loses none of its importance in consequence of the failure to appreciate its value; and the remedy is not to give it up and yield to empirical innovations, but to persevere, in faith and patience, relying upon time as the great teacher of wisdom.

3. Another cardinal principle in the organization of the College is the independence of its teachers. They should be raised above all temptation of catering for popularity, of degrading the standard of education for the sake of the loaves and fishes. They should be prepared to officiate as Priests in the temple of learning, in pure vestments, and with hands unstained with a bribe. It has been suggested that if the stipends of the Professors were made dependent upon the number of pupils, the strong motive of personal interest, added to the higher incentives which they are expected to feel, would increase their efficiency, by stimulating their zeal and activity. They would be anxious to achieve a reputation for the College which would enable it to command students. This argument proceeds upon a hypothesis which, I am ashamed to say, my own experience pronounces to be false. In the state of things in this country there is a constant conflict between the government of the College and the candidates for its privileges, the one attempting to raise, and the other to lower, the standard of admission, and every effort of the Faculty in the right direction is met with a determined resistance. It is not to be presumed that young men, at the age of our undergraduates generally, should have any steady and precise notions of the nature of education. A College is a College, and when they are debating the question, whither they shall go, the most important items in the calculation are, not the efficiency, but the cheapness of the place, and the shortness of the time within which a degree may be obtained. The consequence is that no College can resist the current, unless its teachers are independent. In that case they may stand their ground—and though they can never hope to equal feebler institutions in numbers, they will still accomplish a great work, and confer a lasting benefit on society. The South Carolina College

has raised her standard. She has proclaimed her purpose to be, TO EDUCATE WELL, and I should deplore any measure that might remotely tend to drive her from this position. The true security for the ability of the professional corps is not to be sought in starving them, or in making them scramble for a livelihood, but in the competency, zeal and integrity of the body that appoints them, and in the strict responsibility to which they are held. An impartial Board of overseers, to elect faithful and turn out incompetent men, a Board that has the nerve to do its duty, will be a stronger check upon indolence and inefficiency, than an empty larder. The motive of necessity may lead them to degrade instruction to increase their fees; the motive of responsibility to a body that can appreciate their labours, will always operate in the right direction.

“Let this ground, therefore,” says Bacon,* “be laid that all works are overcome by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, and by the conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth endeavour, the second preventeth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of man. But the principal of these is direction.” So far as the under-graduates are concerned I think that all these conditions of success are measurably fulfilled in the present arrangements of the College; as much so as the general state of education will allow. No changes in this respect are desirable. But the interests of higher education demand something more than that culture “in passage,” as Bacon expresses it, which is all that is contemplated in provisions for under-graduates. Our work stops with the degree. We have no foundations upon which scholars may be placed, “tending to quietness and privateness of life, and discharge of cares and troubles.” We are wanting in facilities for “conjunctions” of learned men; and consequently the only persons whose business it is to keep pace with the higher intelligence of the age, are the few professors who are employed in the work of instruction. With only such means we must fall behind in the march of improvement. There must be more competition, more leisure, more freedom from distracting

* Bacon's Works, vol. 2nd, p. 90. Montagu's Edition.

cares. "This I take to be," says the great writer from whom I love to quote,* "a great cause that hath hindered the profession of learning, because these fundamental knowledges have been studied but in passage. For if you will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not anything you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth, and putting new mould about the roots, that must work it."

I do not look to the Legislature to supply this deficiency. Other demands more immediate and urgent must be met, and to meet them adequately will make a heavy draft upon its resources. But I do look to *private liberality*. Many of the foundations in Oxford and Cambridge have arisen from this source. The Northern Colleges are indebted for the largest part of their funds to the same cause. Why should not some portion of the Southern wealth take the same direction? Are we wanting in the love of knowledge, in the spirit of charity, and in zeal for the honour and prosperity of the State? I cannot account for the remissness and apathy of our rich planters and merchants, and professional men, in any other way, than that this form of generosity has not been the habit of the country. I had hoped that your example, and the example of Col. Hampton would have given an impetus to this matter, and I shall not despair until I see the result of the festival which is proposed to be celebrated in honour of the 50th anniversary of the College. A body of learned men, devoted to the pursuit of fundamental knowledges, is what more than everything else is now needed, to complete our system. There is wealth enough in private coffers, and liberality enough in the hearts of our citizens, to supply the want, if public interest could only be elicited in the subject. There prevails an impression that the annual appropriations of the Legislature are amply sufficient for *all* the ends of a College—it is forgotten that these appropriations contemplate it entirely as a place of teaching, and not the residence of scholars. In this latter aspect we are wholly dependent upon private generosity.

The advantages to the College, and to the State, and

* Bacon's Works, vol. 2nd, p. 98. Montagu's Edition.

to the whole country, of such a body of resident scholars cannot be estimated. They might, in various ways, assist in the business of discipline and instruction—they would furnish a constant supply of materials for new professors—they would give tone and impulse to the aspirations and efforts of the young men gathered around them, and diffuse an influence, which, silently and imperceptibly concurring in the formation of that powerful and mysterious combination of separate elements called public opinion, would tell upon every hamlet in the land. "For, if men judge that learning should be referred to action, they judge well; but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient fable, in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet, notwithstanding, it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest; so if any man think philosophy and universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from thence served and supplied."* This homely illustration sets the question of utility in its true light, and if I could impress upon the community, as it exists in my own mind, the deep and earnest sense of the importance of this feature in the organization of the College, the lack of means would soon cease to be an impediment in keeping pace with the highest culture of the age. It would soon be found that wealth has no more tendency to contract the mind in South Carolina, than in Massachusetts and New York, and that there are merchant princes in Charleston as well as in Boston. Who will begin the work? Who shall set the first example of a foundation of ten or twenty thousand dollars, devoted to the support of genius in reflecting light and glory upon the State? It is devoutly to be hoped that something more substantial than echo will answer who.

But as there are those who admit, in general, the advantages of a high standard of liberal education, and the consequent importance of such institutions as the College, and yet doubt the wisdom of the policy which directly

* Bacon's Works, vol. 2nd, p. 98, Montagu's Edition.

connects them with the State, a more distinct consideration of this question will not be out of place here. The grounds of doubt are twofold.

1. The College, it is said, is for the benefit of the few, and therefore, should not be supported by the taxes of the many—what comes from all should be for all. What is for a class should be by a class. This is the substance of the clamour, by which, ignorance and vulgar ambition, and above all, a pretended regard for the rights and interests of the masses, are constantly endeavouring to steal away the hearts of the people from what, justly considered, is the bulwark of their liberties, and the strongest safeguard of their honour and respectability. Hence the cry that the College is an aristocratic institution; a resort for the rich, exclusive of the poor.

The other ground is, that education, in its very nature, belongs to the church, or to private enterprise—that it includes elements which lie beyond the jurisdiction of the State, and that, therefore, the State has no right to interfere with it. These objections, I think, embody the strength of whatever opposition is expressed or felt to the College as a public foundation.

In reference to the first, let it be admitted that the number of those who participate in the privileges of the College is, and must necessarily be, limited. It is, of course, impracticable, even if it were desirable, that *every* young man in the State should receive a liberal education. Some must be excluded. The very notion of their being excluded implies that they do not share in the immediate advantages of the College. But then the question arises, what is the *principle* of exclusion, so far as the College is concerned? If that principle is directly based upon difference in fortune, then there is ground of complaint; otherwise none. Does the College reject any *because* they are poor; does it *admit* any *because* they are rich? Does it recognize any distinction between rich and poor? Who will venture upon such an allegation? And yet it is only by making wealth the ground of admission, and poverty the ground of exclusion, that the College can be justly charged with aristocratic tendencies. It is notorious that the only question which the College asks, as the qualification for admission to its im-

munities, is in relation to the fitness of the candidates to enter upon its pursuits. All who are prepared to comply with its requisitions are welcome to its halls, whether rich or poor. Poverty may, indeed, be a remote and accidental cause of exclusion, as it incapacitates for acquiring the fitness which the College exacts, and which is absolutely indispensable to the ends it has in view. But in these cases, it is not the *poverty* which the College considers, but the *ignorance* and want of preparatory training. There are also *expenses* incident to a College course which put it out of the power of those who are absolutely without funds to pursue it. A man must be fed and clothed and warmed; and the comforts of life do not usually come without money; and if he cannot afford the necessary expenses himself, and his friends will not afford them for him, all that can be said is, that Providence has cut him off from a liberal education. He is not in a condition to reap the advantages of personal residence within the College walls. But the principle of exclusion, so far as the College is concerned, is not a class principle, but one which necessarily results from the nature and end of its institution. It is founded exclusively for a certain kind and degree of education, and it opens its doors to all, without exception, who are prepared for its instructions, and can sustain the expenses necessarily incident to a residence from home. It shuts its doors upon none, but upon those who shut them upon themselves, or against whom Providence has closed them.

A free College means a College absolutely without expense. We must wait for the realization of such a dream until the manifestation of that state in which our bodies shall cease to be flesh and blood, and such homely articles as food, raiment and fuel, be no longer needed. But if an institution is not, *ipso facto*, aristocratic, because the members of it have to pay for their victuals and clothes, then the South Carolina College is not an aristocratic or class institution. It might not be improper to inquire whether in those institutions, whose glory it is to be par excellence institutions for the vulgar, it is pretended that the pupils have absolutely nothing to pay. Can a stark beggar get through them without help? If not, poverty and wealth have the same remote and indirect

influence in determining who shall participate in their privileges, as they have in the South Carolina College.

From a somewhat careful inquiry, too, I am inclined to the opinion, that none, however poor, ever fail to get through College, who have been enabled, either by their own exertions or the assistance of others, to prepare for College. I am sure the number is very small. Hence of all charges that the imagination can conceive, that of educating only the rich is the most idle and ridiculous. Most of our students, as a matter of fact, are from families in moderate circumstances; many are absolutely poor, either expending their whole living upon their minds, or toiling in vacations to acquire the means of defraying their expenses, or sustained by the eleemosynary foundations of the College, or by the assistance of the College Societies, or by private liberality. The public sentiment of the students speaks volumes upon this point. If there were anything in the genius or organization of the Institution which distinguished it as the College of the *rich*, there would be a corresponding pride of aristocracy among the young men, and the poor would be avoided, insulted or shunned as a *profanum vulgus*. They would be branded by public opinion as men who were out of their place; as upstarts, who were aspiring to the privileges of their betters. This would be necessitated as the common feeling by the organic principle of the body. But what is the truth? I have no hesitation in affirming, that if there be a place more than any other where the poor are honoured and respected, where indigence, if coupled with any degree of merit, is an infallible passport to favour, that place is the South Carolina College. It may be preëminently called the poor man's College in the sense that poverty is no reproach within its walls—no bar to its highest honours and most tempting rewards, either among professors or students. On the contrary, if there is a prejudice at all, it is against the rich; and from long observation and experience, I am prepared to affirm, that no spirit receives a sterner, stronger, more indignant rebuke within these walls than the pride and vanity of wealth. Let any young man presume upon his fortune and undertake to put on airs, and the whole College pounces down upon him with as

little mercy and as much avidity, as the jackdaws in the fable, upon their aspiring fellow, who was decked in the peacock's feathers.

No doubt there are many whose circumstances preclude them from the first steps of a liberal education, and who, yet, have the capacity to receive it, and who, if educated, might reflect lasting honour upon the State. But, unfortunately, from the imperfect and inefficient condition of the free schools, these poor children can never be distinguished. One advantage of a more adequate scheme of public instruction will be that of bringing indigent merit to the light. For such cases there ought to be the most ample provision. "This," in the words of Cousin, "is a sacred duty we owe to talent—a duty which must be fulfilled, even at the risk of being sometimes mistaken." The State should either endow scholarships, or extemporize appropriations to meet the cases of those who, when public schools shall have been established, shall be reported as worthy of a liberal education by their earlier teachers. And beyond this, as the same writer observes, it is not desirable that it should provide for the higher instruction of the poor.

So much for the limitation of the immediate benefits of the College. They *are* confined to comparatively a few, simply because it is comparatively a few that are in a condition to receive them. But then the important point is—and it is a point which ought never to be forgotten, though it is systematically overlooked by those who are accustomed to decry the College—that these benefits are imparted, not for the sake of the few, but for the interest of the many—the good of the State at large. Those who are educated, are educated not for themselves, but for the advantage of the Commonwealth as a whole. Every scholar is regarded as a blessing—a great public benefit—and for the sake of the general influence that he is qualified to exert, the State makes provisions for his training. It is because "the proper education of youth contributes greatly to the prosperity of society," that it "ought to be an object of legislative attention." The many, therefore, are not taxed for the few, but the few are trained for exalted usefulness and extensive good to the many. If the Legislature had in view only the

interests of those who are educated, and expended its funds in reference to their good, considered simply as individuals, there would be just ground of complaint; but when it is really aiming at the prosperity of the whole community, and uses these individuals as means to an end, there is nothing limited or partial in its measures. It is great weakness to suppose that nothing can contribute to the general good, the immediate ends of which are not realized in the case of every individual. Are light-houses constructed only for the safety of the benighted mariners who may be actually guided by their lamps? or are they reared for the security of navigation, the interests of commerce, and through these, the interests of society at large.

There is no way of evading the force of this argument but by flatly denying that an educated class is a public good. If there are any among us who are prepared to take this ground, and to become open advocates of barbarism, I have nothing to say to them; but, for the sake of those who may be seduced by a sophistry which they cannot disentangle, I offer a few reflections.

In the first place, the educated men, in every community, are the real elements of steady and consistent progress. They are generally in advance of their generation; light descends from them to their inferiors, and by a gradual and imperceptible influence emanating from the solitary speculations, it may be, of their secret hours, the whole texture of society is modified, a wider scope is given to its views and a loftier end to its measures.—They are the men who sustain and carry forward the complicated movements of a refined civilization—the real authors of the changes which constitute epochs in the social elevation of the race. Pitt could not understand, and Fox refused to read the masterly speculations of Adam Smith upon the *Wealth of Nations*. He was ahead of his age. The truth gradually worked its way, however, into the minds of statesmen and legislators, and now, no one is held to be fit for any public employment, who is not imbued with the principles of Political Economy. The thoughts of a retired thinker, once set in motion, if they have truth in them, have a principle of life which can never be extinguished,—they may,

for a season, be repressed and confined, but they, finally, like disengaged gases, acquire an intensity and power which defy all opposition. They spread through society, leavening first its leading members, and extending in the shape of results, or maxims, or practical conclusions, to every fireside in the land. The solitary scholar wields a lever which raises the whole mass of society. It is a high general education which shapes the minds and controls the opinions of the guiding spirits of the age; it is this which keeps up the general tone of society—it is at once conservative and progressive.

The conservative tendency requires to be a little more distinctly pointed out. The case is this—the universal activity which general intelligence imparts to mind, must be prolific in schemes and theories, and these are likely to be sound or hurtful, according to the completeness of the inductions or the narrowness of the views, on which they are founded. A half truth, or a truth partially apprehended, always has the effect of a lie. A high order of culture, with occasional exceptions, (for profound thinkers are sometimes eccentric,) is a security against the ill-digested plans and visionary projects, which they are peculiarly tempted to originate, whose vision is confined to a contracted horizon, and who are deceived, simply because they do not perceive the bearings of a principle in all its applications. An educated class expands the field of vision, and serves as a check to the irregular impulses and the impetuous innovations of minds, equally active, but less enlarged. It protects from rashness, from false maxims, from partial knowledge. It is a security for public order which can hardly be over-estimated—it is the regulator of the great clock of society. General intelligence, without high culture to keep it in check, will exemplify the maxim of Pope—

“A little learning is a dangerous thing,”

and will prove a greater curse to the State than absolute ignorance. It is not ignorance, but half-knowledge, that is full of whims and crotchets, the prey of impulse and fanaticism, and the parent of restless agitation and ceaseless change. It is in the constant play of antagonist forces, the action and re-action of the higher and lower

culture, that the life, health and vigour of society consist. General intelligence checks the stagnation of ignorance, and a thorough education, the rashness of empiricism. Where these prevail there is all the inspiration without the contortions of the Sibyl.*

In the next place it should not be omitted that general education is the true source of the elevation of the masses, and of the demand for popular instruction. Every educated man is a centre of light, and his example and influence create the consciousness of ignorance and the sense of need, from which elementary schools have sprung. Defective culture is never conscious of itself until it is brought into contact with superior power. There may be a conviction of ignorance in reference to special things, and a desire of knowledge as the means of accomplishing particular ends. But the need of intellectual improvement on its own account never is awakened spontaneously. We never lament our inferiority to angels. The reason is, we are not brought into contact with them, and are consequently not sensible of the disparity that exists. If we had examples before us of angelic amplitude of mind, the contrast would force upon us a lively impression of the lowness of our intellectual level. If we had never been accustomed to any other light but that of the stars, we should never have dreamed of the sun, nor felt the absence of his rays as any real evil. The positive in the order of thought is before the privative. We must know the good in order to understand the evil; we must be familiar with day to comprehend night and darkness. Hence it is that civilization never has been and never can be of spontaneous growth among a people. It has always been an inheritance or an importation. If men had been originally created savages, they would all have been savages to-day. Those ingenious theories which undertake, from principles of human nature, to explain the history of man's progress from barbarism to refinement, are nothing better than speculative romances. They are contradicted by experience, as well as by the laws of the human

* See some excellent remarks on this subject in President Walker's Inaugural Discourse.

mind. Philosophy coincides with the Bible, man was created in the image of God, and the rudeness and coarseness of uncivilized communities are states of degradation into which he has apostatized and sunk, and not his primitive and original condition. Civilization has migrated from one centre to another, has found its way among barbarians and savages, and restored them to something of their forfeited inheritance, but, in every such instance, it has been introduced from without, it has never developed itself from within. Where all is darkness, whence is the light to spring? What planet is the source of the rays that shine on it? Hence it is knowledge which creates the demand for knowledge—which causes ignorance to be felt as an evil, and hence it is the education, in the first instance, of the few, which has awakened the strong desire for the illumination of the many. Let knowledge, however, become stagnant—let no provision be made for the constant activity of the highest order of minds in the highest spheres of speculation, and the torpor would be communicated downwards, until the whole community was benumbed. The thinkers in the most abstract departments of speculation keep the whole of society in motion, and upon its motion depends its progress. Scholars, therefore, are the real benefactors of the people—and he does more for popular education who founds a University, than he who institutes a complete and adequate machinery of common schools. The reason is obvious—the most potent element of public opinion is wanting where only a low form of culture obtains—the common schools having no example of any thing higher before them, would soon degenerate and impart only a mechanical culture—if they did not, which I am inclined to think would be the case, from their want of life, if they did not permit the people to relapse into barbarism. Colleges, on the other hand, will create the demand for lower culture, and private enterprise under the stimulus imparted would not be backward in providing for it. The college will diffuse the education of principles, of maxims, a tone of thinking and feeling which are of the last importance, without the schools—the schools could never do it without the college. If we must dispense with one or the other, I have no hesitation in saying, that on the

score of public good alone, it were wiser to dispense with the schools. One sun is better than a thousand stars. There never was, therefore, a more grievous error than that the college is in antagonism to the interests of the people. Precisely the opposite is the truth—and because it is preëminently a public good, operating directly or indirectly to the benefit of every citizen in the State, the Legislature was originally justified in founding, and in still sustaining, this noble institution. It has made South Carolina what she is—it has made her people what they are—and from her mountains to her seaboard there is not a nook or corner of the State that has not shared in its healthful influence. The very cries which are coming up from all quarters for the direct instruction of the people, cries which none should think of resisting, are only echoes from the college walls. We should never have heard of them, if the state of things had continued among us, which existed when the college was founded. The low country would still have sent its sons to Europe or the North, and the up-country would have been content with its fertile lands and invigorating hills.

The second ground of objection does not deny or diminish the importance of the College, or the general advantages of higher education. It only affirms that the State is not the proper body for dispensing them. The advocates of this negative opinion divide themselves into two classes, one maintaining that Colleges should support themselves—the other that they should be supported by endowments under the control of private or ecclesiastical corporations. The first was the doctrine of Adam Smith, who may be reckoned among the ablest opponents of the policy of public education in the higher branches of learning. He lays down the thesis, that the demand will infallibly create the supply—that in science, literature and the arts, as in the commodities which minister to the physical comfort and conveniences of man, what is wanted will be procured. The double operation of private interest, on the one hand to obtain, on the other to furnish, will present inducements enough to originate all the schools that may be needed to teach all the arts that may be desired. This ingenious reasoner

forgot that, in the matter of education, as Sir Wm. Hamilton justly remarks,* “demand and supply are necessarily coexistent and coextensive—that it is education which creates the want which education only can satisfy. Those again,” says the same writer, “who, conceding all this, contend that the creation and supply of this demand should be abandoned by the State to private intelligence and philanthropy are contradicted both by reasoning and fact.” The expensiveness of the machinery which is necessary to put in motion a higher seminary of learning, renders it hopelessly impossible to make such institutions self-supporting bodies, and the attempt to do so would have no other effect than to degrade them into professional or scientific schools, in which knowledge is the end, and not the instrument. Hence there is not a College or University worthy of the name, either in Europe or America, that is capable of sustaining, much less of having founded, its various departments of instruction by the patronage it receives. Education has always lived on charity. Foundations and endowments, partly from individuals, partly from the State, have always been its reliances to supply the apparatus with which the machinery is kept in motion.

As to private corporations, it is certain that the degree of interest which is taken in learning for itself, will never be adequate to meet the exigencies of higher education. There must be some stronger principle at work, an impulse more general and pervading, in order to touch the chords of private liberality and awaken a responsive thrill. There may be extraordinary efforts of single men, but these spasmodic contributions will be too rare, besides that they may be hampered by unwise restrictions and limitations, to answer the ends of a College. The only principle which has vitality and power enough to keep the stream of private charity steadily turned in the direction of education is the principle of religion. And hence the true and only question is, does education belong to the Church or State. Into the hands of one or the other, it must fall or perish. This, too, is the great practical question among us. The most formidable war against

* *Discussions, &c.*, p. 537.

the College will be that waged on the principle of its existence.

I respect the feeling out of which the jealousy of State institutions has grown. A godless education is worse than none; and I rejoice that the sentiment is well-nigh universal in this country, that a system which excludes the highest and most commanding, the eternal interests of man, must be radically defective, whether reference be had to the culture of the individual, or to his prosperity and influence in life. Man is essentially a religious being, and to make no provision for this noblest element of his nature, to ignore and preclude it from any distinct consideration, is to leave him but half-educated. The Ancients were accustomed to regard theology as the first philosophy, and there is not a people under the sun, whose religion has not been the chief inspiration of their literature. Take away the influence which this subject has exerted upon the human mind, destroy its contributions to the cause of letters, the impulse it has given to the speculations of philosophy, and what will be left after these subtractions will be comparatively small in quantity and feeble in life and spirit. We must have religion, if we would reach the highest forms of education. This is the atmosphere which must surround the mind and permeate all its activities, in order that its development may be free, healthful and vigorous. Science languishes, letters pine, refinement is lost, wherever and whenever the genius of religion is excluded. Experience has demonstrated that, in some form or other, it must enter into every College and pervade every department of instruction. No institution has been able to live without it. But what right, it is asked, has the State to introduce it? What right, we might ask in return, has the State to exclude it? The difficulty lies in confounding the dogmatic peculiarities of sects with the spirit of religion. The State as such knows nothing of sects, but to protect them, but it does not follow that the State must be necessarily godless; and so a College knows nothing of denominations except as a feature in the history of the human race, but it does not follow that a College must be necessarily atheistic or unchristian. What is wanted is the pervading influence of religion as a life; the habit-

ual sense of responsibility to God and of the true worth and destiny of the soul, which shall give tone to the character, and regulate all the pursuits of the place. The example, temper, and habitual deportment of the teachers, coöperating with the dogmatic instructions which have been received at the fireside and in the church, and coupled with the obligatory observance, except in cases of conscientious scruple, of the peculiar duties of the Lord's day, will be found to do more in maintaining the power of religion than the constant recitation of the catechism, or the ceaseless inculcation of sectarian peculiarities. The difficulty of introducing religion is, indeed, rather speculative than practical. When we propose to teach religion as a science, and undertake by precise boundaries and exact statutory provisions, to define what shall and what shall not be taught, when by written schemes we endeavor to avoid all the peculiarities of sect and opinion without sacrificing the essential interests of religion, the task is impossible. The residuum, after our nice distinctions, is zero. But why introduce religion *as a science*? Let it come in the character of the Professors, let it come in the stated worship of the Sanctuary, and let it come in the vindication of those immortal records which constitute the basis of our faith.

Leave creeds and confessions to the fireside and church, the home and the pulpit. Have godly teachers and you will have comparatively a godly College. But what security have we that a State College will pay any attention to the religious character of its teachers? The security of public opinion, which, in proportion as the various religious denominations do their duty in their own spheres, will become absolutely irresistible. Let all the sects combine to support the State College, and they can soon create a sentiment which, with the terrible certainty of fate, shall tolerate nothing unholy or unclean in its walls. They can make it religious without being sectarian. The true power of the church over these institutions is not that of direct control, but of moral influence, arising from her direct work upon the hearts and consciences of all the members of the community. Is it alleged that experience presents us with mournful examples of State institutions degenerating into hot-beds of

atheism and impiety? It may be promptly replied that the same experience presents us with equally mournful examples of church institutions degenerating into hotbeds of the vilest heresy and infidelity. And what is more to the point, a sound public opinion has never failed to bring these State institutions back to their proper moorings, while the church institutions have, not unfrequently, carried their sects with them and rendered reform impossible. In the case of State institutions, the security for religion lies in the public opinion of the whole community; in the case of church institutions, in the public opinion of a single denomination, and as the smaller body can more easily become corrupt than a larger, as there is a constant play of antagonisms which preserves the health in the one case, while they are wanting in the other, it seems clear that a State College, upon the whole, and in the long run, must be safer than any sectarian institution. As long as the people preserve their respect for religion, the College can be kept free from danger.

The principle, too, on which the argument for church supervision is founded, proves too much. It is assumed that wherever a religious influence becomes a matter of primary importance, there the church has legitimate jurisdiction. "This," it has been well said,* "puts an end to society itself, and makes the church the only power that can exist; since all that is necessary is for any officer or any power to be capable of moral effects, or influences, in order to put it under the dominion of the church. The moral influence of governors, judges, presidents, nay, even sheriffs, coroners, or constables, is as real and may be far more extensive than that of school-masters. The moral influence of wealth, manners, taste, is immense; that of domestic habits, nay, even personal habits, often decisive." The truth is, this species of argument would reduce every interest under the sun to the control of the church. It is just the principle on which

* Southern Presbyterian Review, vol. 3, p. 6. The article from which this extract is taken was written by Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, and is the most complete refutation of the manifold assumptions on which the theory of church education proceeds, that I have ever seen. It sets the question at rest.

the authority of the Pope over Kings and States has been assumed and defended. The argument, moreover, is one which can be very easily retorted. If, because education has a religious element, it must fall within the jurisdiction of the church, *a fortiori*, because it has multiplied secular elements, it must fall within the jurisdiction of the State. The church is a distinct corporation—with distinct rights and authority. She has direct control over nothing that is not spiritual in its matter and connected with our relations to Jesus Christ. She is His Kingdom, and her functions are limited to His work as the mediator of the covenant and the saviour of the lost; and if education, in its secular aspects, is not a function of grace, but of nature, if it belongs to man, not as a christian, but simply as a man, then it no more falls within the jurisdiction of the church, than any other secular work. “The duties of the State are civil, not sacred: the duties of the church are sacred, not civil. To exclude the church from the control of general education, and to exempt it from the duty of providing the means thereof, it must be shown that education is of the nature of religious things, and that the duty of superintending it is, in its nature, spiritual. Is not a man bound to educate himself as an individual person? Is not every family bound to educate each other, and the head of the family peculiarly bound to educate the members? If so, are these obligations which arise out of our individual personality and out of our family relations, in any degree at all, or do they spring solely and chiefly, out of our obligations as members of Christ? Is a christian more bound, or is he chiefly bound, or is he exclusively bound—they are three degrees of the same proposition—to acquire and to impart knowledge, which has nothing to do with religion, but much to do with temporal success, and temporal usefulness; all the positive sciences, for example; simply or mainly as a christian, or because he is a christian? Or is he bound chiefly, or at all to do so, from any considerations drawn from his individual position, or his relations to his family or his country? These are considerations, and there are many more like them, that require to be deeply pondered before we arrive at the sweeping generalities which assume and assert that de-

nominational education is the only safe and true conclusion of this 'high argument.'"*

Apart from the principle involved, I have other objections to sectarian education. I say sectarian education, for the church as catholic and one, in the present condition of things, is not visible and corporate. What she does can only be done through the agency of one or more of the various fragments into which she has been suffered to split. In the first place, it is evident, from the feebleness of the sects, that these Colleges cannot be very largely endowed. In the next place, they are likely to be numerous. From these causes will result a strenuous competition for patronage; and from this, two effects may be expected to follow. First, the depression of the standard of general education, so as to allure students to their halls; and next, the preference of what is ostentatious and attractive in education to what is solid and substantial. It is true that there can be no lofty flight, as Bacon has suggested, "without some feathers of ostentation;" but it is equally true that there can be no flight at all, where there are not bone, muscle and sinew to sustain the feathers.

It is also a serious evil that the State should be habitually denounced as profane and infidel. To think and speak of it in that light is the sure way to make it so; and yet, this is the uniform representation of the advocates of church education. They will not permit the State to touch the subject, because its fingers are unclean. Can there be a more certain method to uproot the sentiments of patriotism, and to make us feel that the government of the country is an enormous evil to which we are to submit, not out of love, but for conscience sake? Will not something like this be the inevitable effect of the declamation and invective which bigots and zealots feel authorized to vent against the Commonwealth that protects them, in order that they may succeed in their narrow schemes? Instead of clinging around the State, as they would cling to the bosom of a beloved parent, and concentrating upon her the highest and holiest influences which they are capable of exert-

* *Southern Presbyterian Review*, vol. 3, p. 3, Dr. Breckenridge's article.

ing; instead of teaching their children to love her, as the ordinance of God for good, to bless her for her manifold benefits, and to obey her with even a religious veneration, they repel her to a cold and cheerless distance, and brand her with the stigma of Divine reprobation. The result must be bad. "The fanaticism which despises the State, and the infidelity which contemns the church, are both alike the product of ignorance and folly. God has established both the church and the State. It is as clearly our duty to be loyal and enlightened citizens, as to be faithful and earnest christians."

I think, too, that the tendency of sectarian Colleges to perpetuate the strife of sects, to fix whatever is heterogeneous in the elements of national character, and to alienate the citizens from each other, is a consideration not to be overlooked. There ought surely to be some common ground on which the members of the same State may meet together and feel that they are brothers—some common ground on which their children may mingle without confusion or discord, and bury every narrow and selfish interest in the sublime sentiment that they belong to the same family. Nothing is so powerful as a common education, and the thousand sweet associations which spring from it and cluster around it, to cherish the holy brotherhood of men. Those who have walked together in the same paths of science, and taken sweet counsel in the same halls of learning, who went arm in arm in that hallowed season of life when the foundations of all excellence are laid, who have wept with the same sorrows, or laughed with the same joys, who have been fired with the same ambition, lured with the same hopes, and grieved at the same disappointments, these are not the men, in after years, to stir up animosities, or foment intestine feuds. Their college life is a bond of union, which nothing can break; a Divine poetry of existence which nothing is allowed to profane. Who can forget his college days, and his college companions, and even his college dreams? Would you make any Commonwealth a unit, educate its sons together. This is the secret of the harmony which has so remarkably characterized our State. It was not the influence of a single mind, great as that mind was—it was no tame submission to

authoritative dictation. It was the community of thought, feeling and character, achieved by a common education within these walls. Here it was that heart was knit to heart, mind to mind, and that a common character was formed. All these advantages must be lost, if the sectarian scheme prevails. South Carolina will no longer be a unit, nor her citizens brothers. We shall have sect against sect, school against school, and college against college; and he knows but little of the past who has not observed that the most formidable dangers to any State are those which spring from divisions in its own bosom, and that these divisions are terrible in proportion to the degree in which the religious element enters into them.

I shall say no more upon the College. I have spoken of its end, its organization and its defects; and have vindicated the policy upon which it was founded. What I have said I believe to be true, and I am sure that it is seasonable. And nothing would delight me more, as a man, a Christian, and a patriot, than to see all jealousies laid aside, all sectarian schemes abandoned, and the whole State, as one man, rally to its support. It would find ample employment for all the funds which private liberality is pouring into the coffers of other institutions; and when charity had done its utmost, and the government still more freely unlocked its treasury, we should have a splendid institution, beyond doubt, but one which was still not perfect. Education is a vast and complicated interest, and it requires the legacies of ages and generations past, as well as the steady contributions of the living, to keep the stream from subsiding. Let it roll among us like a mighty river, whose ceaseless flow is maintained by the springs of charity and the great fountain of public munificence. Let us have a College which is worthy of the name—to which we can invite the scholars of Europe with an honest pride, and to which our children may repair from all our borders, as the States of Greece to their Olympia, or the chosen tribes to Mount Zion. How beautiful it is for brethren to dwell together in unity!

II. The next part of our system in the order of Legislation is the Free Schools. And here I am sorry to say that the law is not only inadequate, but there is a very

extraordinary discrepancy between the law and the practice, which increases the difficulty and has added to the inefficiency of the standing appropriation. It is clear from the face of it that the Act of 1811 was designed as the first step towards the establishment of a system of Common Schools, that should bring the means of elementary education within the reach of every child in the State. It was not intended to be a provision for *paupers*. Throughout our statutes *Free Schools* mean *Public Schools*, or schools which are open to every citizen. The first act in which I find the expression is that of the 8th of April, 1710, entitled an act for the founding and erecting of a Free School for the use of the inhabitants of South Carolina. This act created and incorporated a Board of Trustees for the purpose of taking charge of such funds as had already been contributed, or might afterwards be contributed for public instruction in the Province. In it the epithet *free* is synonymous, not with *pauper*, but *public*, or *common*. The same is the case in the act of the 7th June, 1712, entitled an act for the encouragement of learning. Although the School was a *Free School*, every pupil was required to *pay* for his tuition. But the meaning of the phrase is made still clearer by the extended act of the 12th December of the same year. There the School was manifestly open to *all*. Special inducements were held out to patronize and encourage it, and provisions made for educating a certain number free of expense. The act of 1811, which is the basis of our present system, is so clear and explicit as to the kind of Schools to be founded, that I am utterly unable to account for the partial and exclusive interpretation which has been put upon its words. The third section provides, "that every citizen of this State shall be entitled to send his or her child or children, ward or wards, to any Free School in the District where he or she may reside, free from any expense whatever on account of tuition; and where more children shall apply for admission at any one School, than can be conveniently educated therein, a preference shall always be given to poor orphans and the children of indigent and necessitous parents."

I have no doubt that if this act had been executed

according to its true intent and meaning, and Public Schools had been established in every District of the State corresponding to the number of members in the House of Representatives, the advantages would have been so conspicuous that the Legislature could not have stopped until the means of instruction had been afforded to every neighborhood, to every family, and to every child. The law was wise—it was strictly tentative and provisional, but its benevolent intention has been defeated by a singular misconception of its meaning. As a provisional law, it was defective in unity of plan. The Commissioners in each District were absolutely independent and irresponsible. There was no central power which could correct mistakes and which could infuse a common spirit and a common life into the whole scheme. The consequence is that, after all our legislation and all our expenditures, we have not even the elements in practical operation of a system of Public Schools. We have the whole work to begin anew.

You will permit me to suggest a few reasons why we should begin it heartily and at once, and then to intimate the nature and extent of our incipient efforts.

1. In the first place, it is the duty of the State to provide for the education of its citizens. Even Adam Smith, who, we have seen, was opposed to the direct interference of the government in higher, or liberal education, is constrained to admit that the education of the common people forms an exception to his principle. He makes it the care of the government upon the same general ground with the cultivation of a martial spirit. We should be as solicitous that our citizens should not be ignorant as that they should not be cowards. The whole passage is so striking that you will excuse me for quoting it in full. "But a coward, a man incapable either of defending or revenging himself, evidently wants one of the most essential parts of the character of a man. He is as much mutilated and deformed in his mind as another is in his body, who is either deprived of some of his most essential members, or has lost the use of them. He is evidently the more wretched and miserable of the two; because happiness and misery, which reside altogether in the mind, must necessarily depend more upon

the healthful or unhealthful, the mutilated or entire state of the mind, than upon that of the body. Even though the martial spirit of the people were of no use towards the defence of the society, yet to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity and wretchedness, which cowardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading themselves through the great body of the people, would still deserve the most serious attention of government; in the same manner as it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy, or any other loathsome and offensive disease, from spreading itself among them; though perhaps, no other public good might result from such attention besides the prevention of so great a public evil.

“The same thing may be said of the gross ignorance and stupidity which, in a civilized society, seem so frequently to benumb the understandings of all the inferior ranks of people. A man without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man is, if possible, more contemptible than even a coward, and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential part of the character of human nature. Though the State was to derive no advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of the people, it would still deserve its attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The State, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more they are instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders. An instructed and intelligent people, besides, are always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves, each individually, more respectable, and more likely to obtain the respect of their lawful superiors, and they are, therefore, more disposed to respect those superiors. They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition; and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of government. In free countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the favourable judgment which the people may form of its

conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concerning it."

"If the community wish to have the benefit of more knowledge and intelligence in the labouring classes," says Say, "it must dispense it at the public charge. This object may be obtained by the establishment of primary schools, of reading, writing and arithmetic. These are the groundwork of all knowledge, and are quite sufficient for the civilization of the lower classes. In fact, one cannot call a nation civilized, nor consequently possessed of the benefits of civilization, until the people at large be instructed in these three particulars: till then it will be but partially reclaimed from barbarism."

I might multiply authorities to an indefinite extent, showing that it is the general opinion of political philosophers, that popular instruction is one of the most sacred duties of the Commonwealth. The opinion obviously rests upon two grounds—the importance of education in itself and in its relations to the State, and the impossibility of adequately providing for it without the assistance of Legislature. The alternative is, either that the education of the people must be abandoned as hopeless, or the government must embark in the work. Surely, if this be really the state of the case, South Carolina cannot hesitate a moment as to which branch of the proposition she will choose. When it is remembered that education makes the citizen as well as the man—that it is precisely what fits a human being to be a living member of a Commonwealth, we cannot hesitate as to whether our people shall be cyphers or men.

And that this is the alternative, is clear, both from the nature of the case, and from fact. Whoever considers what it is to provide an adequate system of instruction for all the children of a country, the amount of funds necessary to erect school-houses, to found libraries, to procure the needful apparatus, to pay teachers, and to keep the machinery, once set in motion, in steady and successful operation, will perceive the folly of entrusting such a task to the disjointed efforts of individuals, or the conflicting efforts of religious denominations. In either case, there will be no unity of plan, no competency of

means—what is done must be done partially, and because partially, must be done amiss. “All experience,” says Sir William Hamilton, “demonstrates the necessity of State interference. No countries present a more remarkable contrast in this respect (in regard to popular education) than England and Germany. In the former the State has done nothing for the education of the people, and private benevolence more than has been attempted elsewhere; in the latter, the Government has done everything, and left to private benevolence almost nothing to effect. The English people are, however, the lowest, the German people the highest, in the scale of knowledge. All that Scotland enjoys of popular education above the other kingdoms of the British Empire, she owes to the State; and among the principalities of Germany, from Russia down to Hesse Cassel, education is uniformly found to prosper exactly in proportion to the extent of interference, and to the unremitted watchfulness of Government. * * * The experience of the last half century in Germany, has, indeed, completely set at rest the question. For thirty years no German has been found to maintain the doctrine of Smith. In their generous rivalry, the Governments of that country have practically shown what a benevolent and prudent policy could effect for the university as for the school; and knowing what they have done, who is there now to maintain, that for education as for trade, the State can prevent evil, but cannot originate good.”

There are those among us who admit that no complete system of popular education can be instituted without the intervention of the State, and yet maintain that the true method of intervention is simply to supplement individual exertions; that is, they would have those who are able to do so educate their children in schools sustained by themselves, and solicit the aid of the Legislature only for paupers. It is obvious, in the first place, that in this there is no system at all; the schools are detached and independent; they have no common life, and the State knows nothing of the influences which may be exerted within them. Education is too complicated an interest, and touches the prosperity of the Commonwealth in too many points to be left, in reference to the

most important class of its subjects, absolutely without responsibility to the Government. The homogeneousness of the population can only be sustained by a general system of public schools. In the next place, the scheme is invidious. It makes a reproachful distinction betwixt the children of the Commonwealth; and in the last place, it must, from this very circumstance, be inefficient; parents will scorn a favour rather than permit their children to be stigmatized as the condition of receiving it. The true policy of the State is to recognize no distinction betwixt the rich and the poor; to put them all upon the same footing; to treat them simply as so many minds, whose capacities are to be unfolded, and whose energies are to be directed. The rich and the poor, in the school-house, as in the house of God, should meet together upon the ground of their common relations, and the consequences of this promiscuous elementary training would soon be felt in harmonizing and smoothing all the unevenness, harshness and inequalities of social life.

2. In the second place, the State should make some speedy provisions for popular education in consequence of the unusual demand which, in some form or other, is indicated as existing in every section of the country. There never was a greater cry for schools; the people are beginning to appreciate their importance, and at no period within my recollection have such strenuous efforts been made to establish and support them. The extraordinary exertions of the various sects—exertions, too, which deserve all praise considered as attempts to satisfy an acknowledged public want—and the success which has attended them, are proofs that public opinion is ripe in South Carolina for the interference of the Legislature; and if it should not speedily interfere, this great and mighty interest will pass completely out of its hands, and be beyond its regulation or control. It is a critical period with us in the history of education. The people are calling for schools and teachers; and if the State will not listen to their cries, they will be justified in adopting the best expedients they can, and in acceding to the provisions which religious zeal proposes to their acceptance. Our people are not, as a body, in favour of sectarian education. They prefer a general and unexclusive system;

and if they adopt the narrower, it will be because their own Government has been inattentive to their interests. I sincerely hope that the Legislature may be duly sensible of the delicate posture of this subject. To my mind, it is clear as the noon-day sun, that if any thing is to be done, it must be done at once. Now or never is the real state of the problem.

3. In the third place, the State should take the subject in hand, because this is the only way by which consistency and coherence can be secured in the different departments of instruction. Education is a connected work, and its various sub-divisions should be so arranged, that while each is a whole in itself, it should be, at the same time, a part of a still greater whole. The lower elementary education should, for example, be complete for those who aspire to nothing more; it should likewise be naturally introductory to a higher culture. It should be a perfect whole for the one class, and a properly adjusted part for the other. So also, the higher elementary education, that of the grammar school, should be complete for those who are not looking to a liberal education, and yet, in relation to others, subsidiary to the College or the scientific school. This unity in the midst of variety cannot be secured without a common centre of impulse and of action. There must be one presiding spirit, one head, one heart. Education will become a disjointed and fragmentary process, if it is left to individuals, to private corporations and religious sects. Each will have his tongue and his psalm, and we shall have as many crotchets and experiments as there are controlling bodies. The competition excited will be a competition, not for efficiency in instruction, but for numbers; each will estimate success by the hosts that can be paraded at its annual festivals, or the pomp and pretension of a theatrical pageant, played off under the name of an examination. This is not the language of reproach; it is a result which, from the principles of human nature, will be inevitably necessitated, by the condition in which the schools shall find themselves placed.

Let me add, in this place, that Public Education is recommended by considerations of economy. Absolutely, it is the cheapest of all systems. It saves the enor-

mous expense of boarding schools, or the still heavier expense of domestic tutors, one of which must be encountered where it is left to private enterprise to supply the means of education. If the amount which is annually expended in South Carolina upon the instruction of that portion of her children who are looking to a liberal education, could be collected into one sum, we should be amazed at the prodigality of means in comparison with the poverty of the result. The same sum judiciously distributed would go very far towards supplying every neighborhood with a competent teacher. From the want of system there is no security that, with all this lavish expenditure, efficient instructors shall be procured. Those who employ the teachers are not always competent to judge of their qualifications; and the consequence is that time and money are both not unfrequently squandered in learning what has afterwards to be unlearned. The dangers, too, of sending children from home at an early age, the evil of exemption from parental influence and discipline, are not to be lightly hazarded. The State should see to it that the family is preserved in its integrity, and enabled to exert all its mighty power in shaping the character of the future citizens of the Commonwealth. Comparatively, Public Education is cheap; as general intelligence contributes to general virtue, and general virtue diminishes expenditures for crime. It is cheap, as it develops the resources of the country and increases the mass of its wealth. It is not labour, but intelligence, that creates new values, and Public Education is an outlay of capital that returns to the coffers of the State with an enormous interest. Not a dollar, therefore, that is judiciously appropriated to the instruction of the people, will ever be lost. The five talents will gain other five, and the two talents other two, while to neglect this great department of duty is to wrap the talent in a napkin and bury it in the bowels of the earth.

2. But, after all, the practical question is one of real difficulty. What shall the State do? This is a point of great delicacy, and demands consummate wisdom. Nothing should be done abruptly and violently, no measures should be adopted that are not likely to recommend themselves, no attempts made to force an acquiescence into

any provisions, however salutary they may have proved elsewhere, which are not founded in the habits and predilections of the people, or obviously indispensable to elevate and improve them. The public mind should be prepared for every great movement, before it is begun. Popular enthusiasm should, if possible, be awakened by addresses and disputations—which, like pioneers, prepare the way for the law, by making rough places plain, and the crooked straight. Above all we should guard against attempting to make our system too perfect at the outset. The words of Cousin are as applicable to us now, as they were to France at the time he wrote them. “God grant that we may be wise enough to see that any law on primary instruction passed now must be a provisional, and not a definitive law; that it must of necessity be re-constructed at the end of ten years, and that the only thing now is to supply the most urgent wants, and to give legal sanction to some incontestible points;” *Festina lente* contains a caution which it becomes States as well as individuals to respect.

What we first need is a collection of the facts from which the data of a proper system may be drawn. We must know the number of children in the State, of the ages at which children are usually sent to school, the kind and degree of education demanded, the relative distances of the residence of parents, the points at which school houses may be most conveniently erected, the number of buildings required, the number of teachers, and the salaries which different localities make necessary to a competent support. Facts of this sort must constitute the groundwork. In possession of these, we may then proceed to compare different systems, adopting from among them that which seems to be best adapted to our own circumstances, or originating a new one, if all should prove unsatisfactory. All, therefore, that in my judgment the Legislature should undertake at present, is to acquire this preliminary information, including the accumulation of facts, the comparison of different Common School systems, and the digest of a plan suited to the wants of our own people. This can be done by the appointment of a minister of public instruction, who shall be regarded as an officer of the government, compensa-

ted by a large salary, and who shall give himself unre- servedly to this great interest. Let him be required to traverse the State, to inspect the condition of every neighborhood, and from personal observation and authentic testimony let him become acquainted with the number, the extent and the circumstances of the children. Let him be prepared to say where school houses can be most conveniently erected, the distances at which they should be removed from each other, the kind of teacher needed in each neighborhood, and let him indicate what sections of the State are unprepared for Schools in consequence of the dispersion of their inhabitants. Let him be able to give some probable estimate of the expense incident to the successful operation of an adequate scheme. In the next place, it should be his duty to master the existing systems, whether in this country or Europe, and to lay before the Legislature a succinct account of their fundamental provisions. Let him propose the scheme which he thinks ought to be adopted here, and let his report be referred to an able and learned Commission, charged with the final preparation of such a scheme as we may be ready to enact into law :

I shall not disguise from your Excellency that upon many points connected with the details of any and every scheme, my own opinion has long ago been definitely settled. The extent or degree of elementary education—the best mode of securing competent teachers—the principles which should regulate their salaries—the introduction of religion into the schools—these and many other similar topics I have investigated to my own satisfaction. But in the present condition of the whole subject, it would be obviously premature to express the opinions of any individual. The Minister of Public Instruction should have the whole subject before him, and whatever discussions may take place upon details, should be consequent upon, and not prior to his report. All, therefore, that I would now press upon your Excellency is to have Public Instruction erected into a department of the government. That is the first, and an indispensable step, and until that is done, there never can be a plan, adequate, consistent, successful. I have only to add here, that this is substantially the recommendation which I

had the honour to make in concert with the Bishop of Georgia, some fourteen or fifteen years ago, and time and observation have only strengthened my convictions of the wisdom and necessity of the measure.

3. The third and last part of our system is the military schools. What I have to suggest in regard to them, is that they be made to supply a want which is constantly increasing, as the country advances in trade and the arts. It is a great evil that there should be nothing intermediate between the Grammar School and the College, and that all who wish to acquire nothing more than the principles of physical science, on account of their application to various branches of industry, should be compelled to purchase this privilege by bearing what to them is the heavy burden of a liberal education. They do not want Latin, Greek and Philosophy, and it is hard that they cannot be permitted to get a little chemistry, a little engineering, or a little natural philosophy, without going through Homer and Virgil, Aristotle and Locke. "Two great evils," I use the words of Cousin, who is deploring a similar state of things in France, "two great evils are the consequence. In general these boys, who know that they are not destined to any very distinguished career, go through their studies in a negligent manner; they never get beyond mediocrity; when, at about eighteen, they go back to the habits and the business of their fathers, as there is nothing in their ordinary life to recall or to keep up their studies, a few years obliterate every trace of the little classical learning they acquired. On the other hand, these young men often contract tastes and acquaintances at College which render it difficult, nay, almost impossible, for them to return to the humble way of life to which they were born; hence a race of men, restless, discontented with their position, with others and with themselves; enemies of a state of society in which they feel themselves out of place, and with some acquirements, some real or imagined talent, and unbridled ambition, ready to rush into any career of servility or revolt. * * * Our Colleges ought, without doubt, to remain open to all who can pay the expense of them: but we ought by no means to force the lower classes into them; yet this is the inevitable effect of hav-

ing on intermediate establishments between the primary schools and the Colleges." The remedy, as I have already shown, is not to change the constitution of the College, but to employ the elements which we confessedly have, and which are essentially suited to the purpose.

I shall trespass upon the patience of your Excellency no longer. In all that I have said I have had an eye to the prosperity and glory of my native State. Small in territory and feeble in numbers, the only means by which she can maintain her dignity and importance is by the patronage of letters. A mere speck, compared with several other States in the Union, her reliance for the protection of her rights, and her full and equal influence in Federal legislation, must be upon the genius of her statesmen and the character of her people. Let her give herself to the rearing of a noble race of men, and she will make up in moral power what she wants in votes. Public education is the cheap expedient for uniting us among ourselves, and rendering us terrible abroad. Mind after all must be felt, and I am anxious to see my beloved Carolina preëminently distinguished for the learning, eloquence and patriotism of her sons. Let us endeavour to make her in general intelligence what she is in dignity and independence of character, the brightest star in the American constellation. God grant that the time may soon come when not an individual born within our borders shall be permitted to reach maturity without having mastered the elements of knowledge.

I am, with considerations of the highest respect,

J. H. THORNWELL.

ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Consolation: in discourses on select topics addressed to the suffering people of God.* By JAMES W. ALEXANDER, D. D., *New York*: CHARLES SCRIBNER, 1853. pp. 448, 8vo.
2. *Thoughts on the death of Little Children.* By SAMUEL IRENEUS PRIME. *With an Appendix selected from various Authors.* *Fourth Edition.* *New York*: A. D. F. RANDOLPH, 1853: pp. 154, 12 mo.

The above named volumes are addressed by their respective authors to the bereaved and suffering children of God. In this world, stricken by sin, and the domain of death, this class of persons is numerous indeed; and all must successively feel the pain of bereavement, drink the cup of sorrow, and travel onward, now rejoicing and now weeping, to the tomb. Books of this class will, therefore, find many who will enquire for them, who will anxiously search their pages for lessons of instruction or topics of consolation. And he who can skilfully suggest the one and administer the other, will be sure to speak to interested and tender learners. The first of these books has already been read by hundreds of afflicted ones, and the other, first published during 1852, has now reached its fourth edition. Dr. Alexander, in his beautiful and more elaborate volume, has opened those sources of consolation which are found in the attributes and providence of God, in the example and sympathy of Christ, in the promises which are ordered in all things and sure, and in the example of those who have suffered for righteousness sake, "of whom the world was not worthy." He has proved himself in truth, a "Son of Consolation." Nor are these pages filled with mere parenetic commonplaces. They are rich and remunerating in instruction, easy and often extremely happy in expression. Several of the discourses, certainly, we regard as fine models of pulpit style, carrying the satisfied mind onward by easy transitions, gratifying it by grace-

ful expressions, surprising it with images of beauty, while they speak comfort to the bleeding heart.

The smaller, unpretending volume, is from the pen of a favorite religious journalist, whose writings are always read with pleasure. It is not a book to be criticised, but a dear friend, to be heard and confided in. Stricken by the universal sorrow,—called, as almost every parent is, to lay his best loved child in the grave, Mr. Prime has brought forth “sweetness” from the “strong” Devourer, Death, for many aching hearts. He has sought the true consolation for God’s suffering people, which is found in administering consolation. For sympathy is that subtle spiritual anæsthetic, which, while the suffering physician gives, he insensibly breathes it, and is comforted.

Comfort in sorrow, and joy in religion, are the flowers upon the tree of Christian life, of which the roots are doctrine, and the fruit goodness. Mr. P. has therefore, not undertaken to establish those great generalizations from which, by processes of heart and reason, we get relief: he has easily, confidently, inferred their consequence of hope and resignation, and not jarred upon the heart he meant to heal by theological discussion. The only exception proves the wisdom of the rule, we allude to the reasonings (pp. 30, 31,) about the laws of spiritual existence, and their freedom from all relation to time and space. True or not, they fall coldly on the troubled ear, and break in upon the otherwise continuous sweetness of the consolation.

This excepted, the book is one of the *kindest* in the world. Its tone is just what the subject demands; the style simple, and generally chaste and correct. It would not be difficult to point out little defects, which no one is more abundantly able to correct than Mr. Prime—such as “we *love* to think,” &c. But as we have said, criticism is out of place here. We prefer to give one little extract, one of several passages of melody and pathos, among which we can hardly choose: on the association of the lost one with our idea of heaven:

“Yes, blessed Saviour; in thy bosom nestles the lamb from our fold. *We cannot look at Thee, without beholding him.* We cannot think of him without remembering thy sweet words, ‘Suffer little children to come unto me.’

It is not then the illusion of fancy, it is the dictate of Christian faith, to look toward the holy city, and within its gates of pearl to see the little one that has been taken from us, now a pure, beautiful spirit, robed in celestial beauty, with a crown on his head, and a harp in his hand, beckoning us to come up thither."—p. 49.

In the appendix are collected a number of the most beautiful tributes paid by poetry to bereavement. Some few might be spared and their place well supplied from Prof. Wilson, Ebenezer Elliot, or Willis. It is a sad reflection that so few names appear from among the truly evangelical—as if poetry had been given over to be the handmaid of that amiable, but most meagre, "natural religion," from which the vital essence of Christian doctrine is all exhaled. All, however, is beautiful, and much is due to Scripture and our own religious experience.

Having thus paid our debt of gratitude to this excellent little work, let us indulge the thought and feelings it awakens, beginning with that inspired word with which it closes—"Even so Father! Thy will be done!"

3. *Infidelity: Its Aspects, Causes, and Agencies: being the prize essay of the British Organization of the Evangelical Alliance.* By the Rev. THOMAS PEARSON, *Eyemouth, Scotland.* New York: ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS, 1854. pp. 620, 8 vo.

This work is a faithful exhibition of the aspects of modern Infidelity, as it has either sprung into existence during the present century, or has brought back exploded errors of ancient times. It treats of the Atheism, Pantheism, Materialism, Pseudo-Spiritualism, Indifferentism, and Formalism now so prevalent in Europe and this country. It finds the general cause of all these errors in the corruption of man's will, and the specific in the false systems of speculative philosophy prevalent; in social disaffection, which makes the hope of happiness depend on remodelling the present order of things, coupling these changes with the Christian name, and exalting man to the place of a Divinity; in the corruptions of Christianity, as those of Rome and Oxford; in religious intol-

erance, whether exhibited towards the pursuits and conclusions of science, or towards different forms, rites, and ceremonies; in the disunion of the Church by the violent and unrelenting oppugnation of sect. It then treats of the various agencies which Infidelity employs, the mighty agency of the press; the agency of infidel and socialist clubs; the agency of the schools and universities, of England, Scotland, Germany, France, Holland, and Switzerland; and finally, the influence of the pulpit, employed in pomoting formalism, pantheism, rationalism, and other errors which end at last in blank infidelity. To the theologian coming on the stage of action, it reveals the various phases of scepticism now current in the world, with which he will often find himself brought in contact, and against which the old defensive arguments in favour of vital Christianity will not avail. The ground of attack is shifted, and the line of defence must be changed to meet it.

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4. *Septem Contra Thebas, a tragedy of Aeschylus. Edited with English notes, for the use of Colleges, by AUGUSTUS SACHTLEBEN, Principal of a Classical School in Charleston, S. C. Munroe & Co., Boston and Cambridge, 1853: 12 mo. pp. 156.*
 5. *De Porphyrii Studiis Homericis Caputum Trias. Commentatio quam ad summos in philosophia honores rite impetrandos scripsit BASILIUS LANNAVIUS GILDERSLEEVE. Americanus. Gottingae, 1853: pp. 40.*

These publications claim our attention, not only for their intrinsic merit, but as first essays of their respective authors, and as, in some sense, the product of our own soil.

The author of the first is a native of Germany, who, impelled by youthful enterprise and love of liberty, has made his home in our midst, and identified himself with us by family and social ties. Uniting with the highest personal worth, the thorough education and the accomplishments of German institutions, he has devoted himself to Classical pursuits, and is known in his adopted city no less as a finished scholar than as a laborious and successful teach-

er. The edition above mentioned of the "Septem Contra Thebas," is the first fruits of his scholarship and industry: nor could he have made a more auspicious beginning than with this noble master-piece of Aeschylus. The text (that of Dindorf, the late edition of Ritschel from Hermann's recension not having then appeared,) is preceded by a brief, but pertinent and tasteful preface, and followed by ninety-two pages of notes. These have been prepared under the wholesome "conviction that nothing is more injurious to the cause of Classical learning than the system of indiscriminate annotation and translation, which leaves no room for the student's own exertions." The notes therefore, critical and exegetical, are nowhere superfluous, and evince throughout accurate, fresh and independent scholarship. They are followed by an ample metrical key. The style of typographical execution is the same with the select Greek tragedies edited by Prof's. Woolsey and Felton, to which this is every way a fit companion. We trust that it may find its way into extensive use as a text-book, and may give to its author the position as a rising scholar, to which his modesty no less than his merit entitles him.

The other monogram, on the Homeric Studies of Porphyry, introduces to us a native of our own State, and a son of one of our most useful Ministers, who, to the best advantages of his native country assiduously improved, has added three years of enthusiastic and laborious industry in the Universities of Germany. Classical Philology was his chosen and exclusive pursuit, prosecuted with such success, as to elicit (his fellow-students tell us,) very high encomiums from his German masters. His Dissertation as candidate for the Doctorate of Philosophy (more especially Philology,) affords ample evidence of ripe scholarship, and a rare talent for philological criticism and research. We look with high expectations to his future labours in this rich and inviting field.

In the lamentable dearth of learned enterprise in this section of our country, we hail with unfeigned pleasure these first buddings of the coming fruit, even though it be exotic or ingrafted. Scholars there are, and that in our very midst, who need not shrink from comparison with the best this country has reared; but whe-

ther through lack of literary ambition, of external stimulus, of facilities for publication, or all combined, their stores are never unlocked for the public good, or their own reputation. Still more do we lack an appreciative public, "a brotherhood of scholars," to sympathize with, incite and reward scholarly ambition. We long to see the day when the seeds of a far higher classical culture than our country has yet seen, shall be more thickly sown, and shall germinate into a rich harvest of solid and independent learning. We trust that the time is not far distant, when no small proportion of the American mind shall be devoted with characteristic energy and enterprise to the pursuit of Classical Philology;—Philology in its highest and true sense,—the profound and philosophical study of language in and for itself, as concrete Philosophy, "an applied Logic and Psychology," and as the medium of a comprehensive knowledge of Antiquity in its spirit, literature, history, institutions, usages and laws,—believing that, thus interpreted, it comprehends a field of knowledge than which none is more fruitful, and judging, with Sir Wm. Hamilton, that "if properly directed, it is absolutely the best mean toward a harmonious development of the faculties."

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6. *The Christian Father's Present to his Children.* By J. A. JAMES. From the Seventeenth London Edition. New York: CARTERS. pp. 416, 12 mo.

John Angell James, is a name dear to many, whom he has benefited by his faithful and benignant instructions and reproofs. From his writings merely, we judge that the family relations are to him peculiarly attractive, that his thoughts hover much around the domestic hearth, and that he is especially conscientious in discharging the duties of social life. We hear him here giving utterance to his own parental longings for the right culture of his children, now addressed to other than his own offspring. The volume is designed for the use of youth over the age of fourteen, and may be an acceptable present from other Christian fathers to *their* children.

7. *Jacqueline Pascal : or a glimpse of Convent Life at Port Royal. From the French of M. Victor Cousin, M. Prosper Faugere, M. Vinet, and other sources. Translated by H. N., with an introduction by W. R. WILLIAMS, D. D. New York: CARTERS, 1854. pp. 318, 12 mo.*

If ever there was truth of doctrine, accompanied with sincere and self-denying piety within the pale of the Papal church, it was to be found in the Convent of Port Royal, and in the family of the Pascals. Blaise, the brother of Jacqueline, is renowned as one of the greatest minds which has adorned any communion, and one of the purest men. His sister, Jacqueline, is here presented to our view, if not endowed with equal talent, yet as possessed of powers by no means despicable, and of distinguished resolution and courage. The Jansenists acknowledged allegiance to the Pope, practised the rites, and conformed to the usages of the Romish communion. But they believed and strenuously maintained the doctrines of grace as they were held by Augustine, and preached, independently of them, by Luther, Calvin, and Knox.

That the Pope disowned them, that the corrupt confederation which acknowledges him as its head, united in casting them down and trampling them in the dust, shows its incurable apostacy from the doctrines of Christ, far more strikingly than its opposition to the German Reformer who waged an open warfare with the See of Rome.

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8. *History of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. By Rev. W. M. HETHERINGTON, Author of the History of the Church of Scotland, &c. 311 pp., 12 mo. ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS. New York: 1853.*

Though it is several years since we first read this volume, our remembrance of the pleasure then experienced is still lively and fresh. Few councils have wielded a greater or more wholesome influence over the church, than this whose doings are here detail-

ed. So long as the great standards of Christian doctrine and worship, prepared by this assembly, continue to be cherished in the Presbyterian Church, will the history of those men and of those times, excite a lively interest, and command the attention of numerous readers. We are rejoiced to see this work again brought out under the auspices of the Carters, and wish it an extended circulation.

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9. *A complete Analysis of the Holy Bible, containing the whole of the Old and New Testaments, collected and arranged systematically in thirty books (based on the work of the learned Talbot,) together with an Introduction, and three different tables of contents prefixed, and a general Index subjoined, so arranged in alphabetical order as to direct at once to any subject required.* By Rev. NATHANIEL WEST, D. D : 1 vol., Royal 8 vo., about 1100 pages. CHARLES SCRIBNER. New York : 1853.
10. *The Law and the Testimony.* By the author of "the Wide, Wide World." 8 vo., pp. 840. ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS: New York : 1853.

It is rather a singular coincidence that two such works as the above should be issued from the press, nearly side by side. A slight comparison will show that they do not necessarily conflict; though no hesitation can be felt as to which of the two the palm of superiority should be awarded.

The Analysis of Dr. West, like the concordance of Druden, is the "*ne plus ultra*" of excellence in works of this kind. No one will attempt to improve upon it, or to supersede it. The arrangement is complete and scientific; the passages of Scripture being distributed in nearly three hundred chapters and more than one thousand sections. This minute classification of texts, making the book almost to answer the ends of a concordance, shows the hand of a Divine and a logician. All the scattered testimonies relating to any single subject are grouped together, so that the eye ranges easily over the whole. For example, the eleventh book, devoted to the Jews, comprises thirteen chapters, in which a complete out-

line of their history is given under the following heads: their origin—Jews in Egypt—Out of Egypt—Wilderness—into Canaan—Numbers—their Polity—Jerusalem—Meridian state—Captivity—to be restored—Restoration—Catastrophe. Thus, in the compass of forty-seven pages and in one hundred and sixty sections, all the passages, prophetic and historic, relating to this singular people are set down.

The second work mentioned above, "The Law and the Testimony," makes less claim to critical analysis and theological discrimination; as it comprises a vast array of Scripture passages and only thirty-one divisions. These are necessarily so comprehensive, that the relevancy of many of the proofs does not immediately appear. Yet the copiousness of the references may be deemed a sufficient compensation for this defeat. The author's plan is to select her subject, (for example, the nature of God,) and to search successively all the books of the Old and New Testaments, which, in any degree, illustrate it. The particular words, in which the proof lies, are indicated by being printed in German text, a very material aid to the common reader. In some instances also, the passages are collated which explain each other, as for instance, the first verse in Genesis, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," is placed in juxtaposition with John's testimony, "in the beginning was the Word, all things were made by him," in order to establish the divinity of Christ. This collation of texts is not so prominent a feature of the work, as its general plan might admit. On the whole, though far less valuable to the critical student than Dr. West's analysis, it will be greatly useful in conducting to a more general and accurate acquaintance with the sacred volume. It adds not a little to the interest of this work that it proceeds from a female author, who has already won for herself a brilliant reputation in the department of graceful and easy fiction.

11. *Scotia's Bards, Illustrated.* ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS. New York. pp. 558, 8 vo.

A beautiful volume, beautifully illustrated, and comprising choice specimens of the exquisite poetry of the land of song.

12. *Abbeokuta: or Sunrise within the Tropics: an outline of the origin and progress of the Yoruba Mission.* By MISS TUCKER, Author of *the Rainbow in the North*: New York: CARTERS, 1853. pp. 278, 16 mo.

An interesting description of a successful missionary effort by the Church Missionary Society of England, in benighted Africa. Like the "sunrise within the tropics," "where there is none of the lengthened dawn of our more Northern clime, which is so wearying to those who watch for the morning," has the Sun of Righteousness arisen, almost without premonitory notice of his coming, upon at least, that tribe among whom this mission has been planted. Abbeokuta, the chief seat of the mission, thirty years ago, was a robber's cave. In 1853 it had a population of 80 to 100,000 inhabitants, the remnants of one hundred and thirty towns broken up by the incursions of Fellatahs, in their inroads to obtain plunder and slaves. In six years and a half since the mission was commenced, two hundred and thirty-three have been admitted to the table of the Lord, and many have been baptized. There are now, three hundred and thirty-three candidates for baptism, and three hundred and fifty adults are in attendance upon the Sabbath Schools.

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13. *An Exposition of the Epistle of Paul the Apostle, to the Galatians.* By JOHN BROWN, D. D., Professor of Exegetical Theology to the united Presbyterian Church, &c. 8 vo., pp. 451. ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS. New York: 1853.
14. *The Sufferings and Glories of the Messiah: an Exposition of Psalm 18, and Isaiah 52: 13; 53: 12.* By JOHN BROWN, D. D. 8 vo., pp. 352. ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS. New York: 1853.

In the preface to the former of these books, it is stated that the accumulated treasures of many studious years are poured forth in these expository works, which succeed each other so rapidly from the pen of Dr. Brown. It is not surprising, therefore, to find what we discover in these volumes, a thorough acquaintance with

all the literature touching these portions of Scripture, and that an author has fairly availed himself of the labours of his predecessors. It is a very rare achievement to imbue a critical exegetical work with the spirit and life of the gospel. Dr. Brown has to a great extent attained this excellency. He intermingles many practical observations with the more purely critical passages, and ranges with a free discursive pen over the many topics which are started in the course of his exegesis, and succeeds often in catching the glow of feeling which they are suited to inspire. He thus presents to his readers much more than the dry bones of mere interpretation; and we rise from the perusal of these books better as well as wiser men. This practical advantage makes amends for his great diffuseness, of which, otherwise, we might justly complain. These books are, undoubtedly, valuable additions to the exegetical literature of the age. The value of the first book is considerably enhanced by the full analysis which is prefixed, rendering it easy to refer to any given passage in the Epistle.

15. *English Grammar: A simple, concise, and comprehensive Manual of the English Language. Designed for the use of Schools, Academies, and as a book for general reference in the Language. In Four Parts. By Rev. R. W. BAILEY, A. M. Second Edition. Philadelphia: CLARK & HESSER, 1853. pp. 240, 12 mo.*

It gives us pleasure to recommend this book to parents and teachers of youth, as one of the best, in important respects, the very best elementary treatise on English Grammar, which has come under our notice. It is systematically and philosophically arranged, at least when the wants and capacities of youthful learners are taken into view; it is perspicuous, direct, simple and concise in explanation and definition; it commences with the simple facts of the language simply and graphically stated, and advances by an easy progress to those views and principles which require greater knowledge and enlargement of mind to comprehend. The chapter on Idioms is worthy the attention of the most advanced

students. We do not know elsewhere an equal amount of knowledge respecting our noble mother tongue expressed in so few words, or with equal judgment.

16. *Water from the Well-Spring, for the Sabbath hours of afflicted believers; being a complete course of morning and evening meditations for every Sunday in the year.* By EDWARD HENRY BICKERSTITH. 16 mo., pp. 254. ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS. *New York*: 1853.

This title indicates a pious but fragmentary volume. The meditations are brief and disconnected; but have a special interest in having been originally written for a sister in affliction, and designed to set before her "the richest cordials of Scripture." The children of sorrow are so many in this world of sin and deception, and their characters and trials are so diverse, that books of consolation can scarcely be multiplied beyond the demand. Happy is he who can "bind up the broken hearted," and discover a fountain to those who faint in the desert!

17. *The Powers of the World to Come, and the Church's Stewardship as invested with them.* By GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D. D. *New York*: CARTER'S 1853. pp. 384, 12 mo.

A book on a mighty subject, by one who has written much and written well.

18. *A Discourse on Church Extension in Cities. Preached by appointment in the 2d Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, on Wednesday evening, April 6, 1853.* By Rev. WILLIAM EDWARD SCHENCK, Superintendent of Church Extension. pp. 32, 8 vo.

An able discourse, full of important considerations, as to the

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SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

NUMBER IV.

APRIL, MDCCCLIV.

ARTICLE I.

THE BIBLE, AND NOT REASON, THE ONLY AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE AND STANDARD OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF GOD—WHAT IT TEACHES CONCERNING THE UNITY OF GOD.

In the teaching of God's infallible word we have an emphatic corroboration of all that we have previously taught,* as to the nature, powers, and province of human reason in reference to God and things divine. "It is a perilous mistake," says a leading Unitarian Divine, "to call reason a proud faculty in human nature." The mistake, however, is with him who would make reason a faculty, independent in its character and action of that intelligent and moral nature of which it is only a manifestation or power. This writer compares reason to the eye. Now we often speak of a fierce, loving, lustful, envious, jealous, or proud eye, by which we mean, not that the eye is any one of these, but that the eye expresses these several states or dispositions of the mind, and gives character to the individual. And just so it is that we attribute to reason, when considered as the faculty of reasoning, pride, presumption, weakness, impiety, and unreasonableness, by which we mean, not that the faculty is any of these, but that the mind which uses it in any of these ways, and thus perverts and abuses it, is so. Strictly and properly speaking, the intelligent and moral being man, thinks, perceives, judges, exam-

* See on the Province of Reason and Knowledge of God's Existence, in Nos. 1 and 2 of this volume.

ines, believes, and feels in doing so, either proud or humble, presumptuous or teachable, impious or pious, and in the present state of human nature we affirm that the natural man, unrenewed and unenlightened by the Spirit of God, is "compassed about with pride,"—that "through pride he will not seek after God," and "will not come to the light," and that on this account he "errs from the truth."* This is the case in reference to *all* truth so far as it comes in conflict with the wishes and desires, and selfish sensual interests of the heart.

A man convinced against his will
Is of the same opinion still.

But preëminently is this the case in reference to God and all that pertains to God. "For vain man would be wise, though man is born like a wild ass's colt." Their foolish heart is blinded," their "understanding is darkened," their "wisdom is foolishness with God," and "by all their wisdom they know not God."—(Job xi, 4-12.)

Man—human nature—human reason—is here as it is *often* elsewhere in the Bible, called "vain" or empty. It is empty of that with which it should be filled, and filled with that of which it should be empty. It is empty of all that is humble, holy and heavenly. This empty and vain human reason, "would be wise," not for the sake of "getting wisdom which is the best thing," but for the sake of being thought wiser than others; not in things comprehensible by it and profitable for it, but in things above and beyond its capacity and its limits, and in things which only engender "foolish questions" and "damnable heresies." Yea, *so* vain and empty is human reason, that it seeks after what is false, forbidden, and irrational, seven times more earnestly because it is so. By this very proud and presumptuous desire to attain to improper and forbidden knowledge, sin entered into our world, and by sin death, and all our woes. It was not wisdom to know God nor "the wisdom of God," but the desire to be as knowing as God, which the devil promised and apostate man impiously desired. So it

* On the effect of pride in corrupting human philosophy and primitive truth, see full account in Gale's *Court of the Gentiles*, vol. 3, pp. 9-12. See also, the rebuke of Socrates and Plato, in *ibid.* p. 15.

has ever been with human reason, and so it is now. Vain man would still be "wise above that which is written," and instead of "searching what is commanded, and thinking thereon with reverence, would search the things that are above his strength."—(Eccl. iii: 21.) There is a drunkenness of the understanding as well as of the body, and we are therefore exhorted to "be wise unto sobriety."—(Rom. xii: 3.)

Thus has human reason become "more brutish than a man and lower than the understanding of a (*perfect and unfallen*) man."—(Prov. xxx: 2.) * "So foolish and ignorant is it that it is as a beast before God," (Psalm lxxiii: 22.) even "as the horse and the mule which have no understanding." Man's "understanding is like the beasts that perish," yea, like the "wild ass's colt," the most beastly of beasts.

And what is the illustration and proof given of this proud and presumptuous ignorance of vain and empty man in the passage quoted from the book of Job? It is the attempt made from the beginning until now "by searching to find out God," and thus to make God's nature, character, purposes and word, square with the reason, the opinions, and the wishes of the human heart. God, and his word, and his worship, and his truth, and his requirements, must be that, and only that, which human reason can approve and sanction, and to which human passion and human fashion will submit, else vain man "will not have God to reign over him."

The world by its wisdom, its reason, its philosophy, its science, and its literature, has searched and thought, and written much on the subject of God, but it has only like the dove, surveyed an ocean of angry and discordant elements, one theory and one superstition dashing against another in endless confusion. The being of God, the manner of his being, the attributes of his being, these by all its wisdom and searching, human reason never knew and never can know, until it can compass infinity, comprehend eternity, fill immensity, and attain unto

*Literally, the words would read:

Surely more ignorant I am than a man.
I neither possess the understanding of a man,
Nor have I learned wisdom,
And the knowledge of THE HOLY ONES I should know.

omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence. "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as Heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth and broader than the sea."

Almighty Former of this wondrous plan,
Faintly reflected in thine image, man—
Holy and just—the Greatness of whose name
Fills and supports this universal frame,
Diffus'd throughout th' infinitude of space,
Who art thyself thine own vast dwelling place;
Soul of our soul, whom yet no sense of ours
Discerns, eluding our most active pow'rs;
Encircling shades attend thine awful throne,
That veil thy face, and keep thee still unknown;
Unknown, though dwelling in our inmost part
Lord of the thoughts, and Sov'reign of the heart!

Madame Guyon.

When Hiero asked the philosopher of his day, what is God, he asked time to reflect. When urged to an answer, he requested from time to time, still further delay, and at last confessed his ignorant inability to answer. And well he might, for when holy Augustine pondered by the sea-side the same absorbing question, he heard a voice calling upon him to empty the ocean into a cockle shell. An ignorant man might imagine that were he possessed of the towering height and power of genius, he could find out God, even as he might think that from the top of earth's loftiest peak, he could reach the Heavens, but he would find that even there, the unscalable heights, and unfathomable depths of this unsearchable subject were still above and beyond him.

We cannot by all our vain searching find out God. This is "a thing too high" for human reason, since "God is higher than the Heavens, whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain," and whom "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived." "Oh! the depths of the wisdom of God. How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out."

O God, thou bottomless abyss,
Thee to perfection who can know!
O height immense! what words suffice
Thy countless attributes to show!

But while we cannot by all *our searching* find out God, God may be found by his own revelation of himself to us.

We have but faith: we cannot know;
For knowledge is of things we see;
And yet we trust it comes from thee,
A beam in darkness: let it grow.

Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell;
That mind and soul, according well,
May make one music, as before.

The knowledge of God cometh down from God. We know him only when he makes himself known to us. There are but two in the universe who know God by their own unaided knowledge. "THE SPIRIT searcheth all things, even the deep things of God," and "no man knoweth the Father but THE SON, and he to whom THE SON shall reveal him." Would we then be made to know him in knowledge of whom standeth eternal life? "If any man lack wisdom let him ask of God who giveth liberally and upbraideth not," and then shall "he be able to comprehend with all saints what is the length and breadth, and height, and depth of the love of God as it is in Christ Jesus."

When reason fails with all her powers,
Then faith prevails and love adores.

The foundation on which all religion rests is the existence, character, attributes, and government of an infinitely wise and perfect God. The word religious emphatically expresses our bond or obligation, as created beings, to God as our creator, preserver, governor and judge. It implies in the very term—a *religando**—the

* It is a controversy of long standing, whether the word *religio* comes from *religere*, to reconsider, or from *religare*, to rebind. Cicero is the patron of the former; Lactantius advocates the latter. Linguistically, Cicero's derivation is the preferable; by no known process of etymology can *religio* be deduced from *religare*. As respects the meaning, both are correct, religion is the re-consideration of our obligations to God, and our re-union to him. But may not the true etymon after all be *re-eligere*, thus making *religio* equivalent to *re-eligio*, a re-choice? Religion is so in point of fact; objectively, God's re-choice of us; subjectively, our re-choice of God. I may observe, that this etymology has the merit of accounting for the *re* in *religio* being long; a fact which has been strangely overlooked by writers on this matter.—*Alexander's Connex. O. and N. Test.*

rupture of this bond by sin, and our return to God by penitence, faith, and obedience,—by godliness or piety towards Him,—by receiving, believing and obeying his word,—by observing his worship and fulfilling all his commands,—by seeking and serving him only in the way of his own appointment,—by looking forward to a state of rewards and punishments in the life to come,—and by recognising our duties and obligations to each other as fellow creatures of the same God.

Our ideas of God therefore determine our ideas of religion, and the whole character of our religion.

What then do we know of God besides what he makes us know of himself in his word?

Before answering this question we would remark that there is an essential and important difference between *receiving* and *holding* certain opinions as both true and reasonable, and the ability of reason to *discover* them by its own unaided light. Almost the entire body of every man's knowledge which he believes and holds as reasonable and true, is what he has acquired by education, and the information and instruction of others. The amount of knowledge which has been *discovered* by the greatest genius is as a drop of water to the ocean, or a grain of sand to the sea-shore.

It is also to be borne in mind that the amount of truth or knowledge which may be acquired by man is immeasurably greater than the compass of reason, and our powers of comprehension. The most exalted of human intellects know as little as the feeblest,—that is, they comprehend *nothing at all*, of the essence, cause, and operations even of natural things,—nothing whatever of immaterial things—nothing of the infinite relations of the boundless universe. The existence of innumerable things as facts, and the invariable antecedence and consequence of causes and effects we do know, but of their nature and mode of operation we *do* and *can* know nothing.

We are, therefore, very careful to distinguish between the *existence* of God, and the *nature* and *character* of God. The one is a simple fact, the other is an essence and being. And as we have just seen that the essence, being, and mode of operation of any one phenomenon

in nature, is incomprehensible to us, and beyond the range of our intellects, this must be infinitely more the case as it regards him who is a Spirit invisible, illimitable, and "past finding out."

This we have seen to be true, even as it regards the EXISTENCE of God. Beyond revelation there never has been any fixed, clear, certain, or authoritative belief in the existence of a personal and infinite God. The ideas which have been found to prevail on this point may all be referred to an original, primitive revelation, or to the reflected and honoured light of an existing revelation. These ideas have, also, been speculative, confused, contradictory, atheistic, pantheistic, or sceptical, in proportion as we recede from primitive revelation, and philosophy and barbarism usurp its place.

When we proceed from the existence of God to inquire into the NATURE of God, including his unity of being, and his essential attributes, taking unenlightened and unassisted human reason as our guide, we are plunged into the very midst of a sea of uncertainty, and driven about with every possible wind of wild and wayward conjecture. Here more emphatically than in reference to the existence of God, the wisdom of man was foolishness. What was originally known as true was not retained. Philosophers were the great corrupters of the ancient traditionary belief in one true God.* Polytheism and idolatry universally prevailed where atheistic scepticism and doubt had not utterly expelled all faith in God. "The world by wisdom knew not God," and the wisdom of the world was finally led, under the teachings of a better guide, to conclude, in the language attributed to Tertullian that "of God all that is comprehensible is that he is incomprehensible." "We have, says Plotinus, "no knowledge nor understanding of God." "We speak of God," says Parmenides and Dionysius, "only by negatives and relations." The Pythagoreans denominated the Deity "darkness" and a "subterranean profundity.†" The Egyptians employed the terms "thrice unknown darkness," in their most mystical

* See Leland's *Necessity of Div. Revel.* vol. 1, ch. xii, p. 247, and ch. xx. On their Polytheism, see do. chs. xiv, xv, xvi.

† Taylor's *Plato*, vol. 8, p. 25. 4 to.

invocations of the first God.* Proclus says of God, that he is more ineffable than all silence.† Damascus says “God is truly an incomprehensible and inaccessible light,‡ upon which, the more attentively you look the more you will be darkened and blinded.”

“When we speak,” says Plato, in his *Timaeus*, “of the nature of God, and the creation of the universe, we ought to be content if what we offer be but probable; for more than that is not to be required; for it must be remembered that I who speak and you who are hearers, are but men, and if we can only attain some probable fable or tradition of these things we may not inquire farther about them.”

A Plato's mind, ere Christ appeared in flesh
By nature's and tradition's fitful blaze,
Faint though it be, saw something of God.
But who believed him?
Yes, nature's light is darkness, and deprived
Of Heaven's irradiating beams, man roved
From shade to deeper shade, until he lost
All knowledge of Jehovah; and bow'd down
To stocks and stones, and things of carved work,
Form'd after fancy's portraiture; or paid
Blind homage to the sun or starry host.
And though at times a philosophic mind
O'er the dark welkin shed a meteor blaze,
'Twas *but* a meteor blaze, too weak to last,
Too weak to light him in the search of God.

Our understanding of God was compared by the ancient philosophers, to the eyes of an owl, as contrasted with the light of the sun. And in the days of Jamblichus, the last age of the ancient philosophy, it was generally admitted that “human nature can neither reason nor speak of God, nor perform any divine works without God.”§ This is exactly in accordance with the whole spirit and teaching of the Scriptures. Such was the doctrine of revelation in the days of Job as has been

* Taylor's *Plato*, p. 26. † *Ib.*, p. 2. ‡ *Ib.*, p. 28.

§ It will be a reproach to us, says Howe, “if we shall need to be taught reverence of God by pagans; or that such a document should need to be given us for our admonition, as that very ancient inscription in one of the Egyptian temples, “I am whatsoever was, is, or shall be, and who is he that shall draw aside my veil?” (1)

(1) The Temple of Isis. See Plutarch de *Iside*, 59.

proved. Such it was in the time of Moses, who desired to become acquainted with the properties and perfections of God and was told "my presence thou canst not see, no living man can see me." The apostle Paul lays it down, therefore, as a fundamental position which we need not confirm by numerous other passages, that God is absolutely "invisible," that is, that no finite being can ever attain to an intuitive knowledge of Him.

Nor is reason *now* any stronger, nor any the less limited in its capacity and its sphere of knowledge. *We* are, it has been said, but a few steps more advanced than the primitive world. All that even we can possibly know of God is by analogy, that is, by ascribing to God, properties resembling those found in ourselves. The whole system of natural religion rests on analogy. What God is in Himself we can neither know, nor define, nor describe. What, or what kind, the nature of God is, in itself, we have no possible means of determining. What God's attributes are, in themselves, we know not. How God exists in, and of himself, none can tell. To do this would require an immediate participation of his own infinite nature. God dwelleth in light inaccessible. Him none of men hath beheld or can behold." God can only reveal himself, and be understood by us, through the medium of language, which is, however, adapted only to our own nature. What God is in himself, must be, therefore, infinitely remote from what human language could describe, or finite comprehension grasp. It must be literally among "the unutterable things which it is not possible for man to utter,"—"the secret things which God hath reserved unto himself."

Who shall sing Thee fully! Thou art high
Above all height, exalted far above
All praise and blessing of created things.
Who shall declare Thee fully! Thou art low,
Beneath all depth; beneath the utmost hell;
In whose dark howling caverns too, Thou reign'st,
Although thy smiling presence is not there,
To cheer the dismal horrors of their gloom.
Who shall declare thee fully! Thou art wide
Beyond all width; beyond the universe,
Beyond the stretch of thought, unlimited,
Infinite,—not the tongue of finite things;
Not man; not angels; not ten thousand worlds;
For they but see a little part of Thee,
Which little part they sing,—the all they know,
The all they *can* know. Ineffable! Incomprehensible."—*Ragg.*

God's nature—God's mode of existence—and every attribute of God, are unfathomable mysteries to us. All that we know is that he exists, and that he *is*, and *will* be, all that the Scriptures reveal as necessary for our everlasting welfare, and that he must be infinitely different from ourselves, and infinitely above and beyond our present comprehension.

Even now, therefore, human reason is unable to *demonstrate* from any premises which are intuitive or self-originated, the existence, and much less the unity of God. These truths human reason can know and distinguish from error, when the premises from which it is to reason are given to it. But it cannot discover, or by its own powers, demonstrate them. The great, and the only argument upon which THE UNITY OF GOD is based by human reason, is the unity of design found throughout the works of nature.* But were we not enlightened by revelation and thus enabled to obviate all difficulties, it would be easy to reply that after all it is but a small part of the universe we are acquainted with, and that that part may be under the separate dominion of one presiding Deity, but that were we able to investigate the whole, we might find its various regions under the dominion of various Deities. It might be replied secondly, that even in that part of the universe which we are able to examine, unity of design, as even Paley, the great reasoner on Natural Theology admits, goes no further than to prove a unity of *counsel*† and not of being, since there might be unity of counsel among many perfect beings as well as with one. And *thirdly*, it might be replied, that there are even in this world, mixtures of good and evil, misery and happiness, goodness and severity, apparent contrarieties, interruptions and breakings up of what would seem to be wise and good plans and operations, such as to have forced upon the mind of a large portion of our race, the belief in two or more distinct eternal and opposing beings to whose sway all sub-lunary things were subjected. And thus it will be perceived how that even in this advanced and enlightened

* "We maintain that man has not found out (*invente*) for himself what he ought to believe, and what he ought to do. *These two points granted, we leave to Reason all its powers, all its prerogations.*"—*M. Bonnetti Université Catholique.*

† Nat. Theol. ch. 25.

period of humanity, it would be impossible, on principles of human reason *alone*, to establish any CERTAIN, AUTHORITATIVE and ABIDING CONVICTIONS respecting the NATURE, and especially, the UNITY of God.

If Hume be cleared from the charge of Atheism, it is only to fall under another scarcely less creditable—in some respects, considering his circumstances, more odious—the charge of Polytheism. In the face of all probability and evidence, he defends Polytheism as the most ancient faith, and professes that the belief in the Divine unity was an after-thought of the vulgar. He argues, that under Polytheism the worshipper has the advantage of feeling more at his ease, and that to believe that the gods are but a little way removed from us, is therefore more favourable to devotion. His friend, Diderot, held the same opinion, and considered Polytheism more consistent with modern philosophy than the belief in one God! One would be ready to doubt whether men claiming the possession of reason, not to speak of philosophy, could be in earnest in such professed belief; but an anecdote recorded of Hume seems to establish his Polytheistic leaning. Revising the lectures of the late Mr. Bruce, Professor of Logic in the University of Edinburgh—when he came to the division of the course headed “Proof of the Unity of the Deity,” Hume is said to have exclaimed, “Stop, John, who told you whether there were one or more?”

Vain man would be wise, but by all his searchings he cannot find out God unto perfection. “The things of God knoweth no man but the Spirit of God.” And as all Scripture was given by holy men of God who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, “we are brought to the law and to the testimony to know, as far as man can know, which is but as in a glass darkly, what God’s nature and unity really are.”

Beneath a sable veil and shadows deep
Of inaccessible and dimming light,
In silence ebon clouds more black than night,
The world’s great Mind his secrets hid doth keep
Through those thick mists when any mortal wight
Aspires, with halting pace, and eyes that weep
To pry, and in his mysteries to creep,
With thunders he, and lightnings, blasts their sight.
O Sun invisible, that dost abide

Within thy bright abysses, most fair, most dark,
 Where with thy proper rays, thou dost thee hide,
 O ever shining, never full seen mark,
 To guide me in life's night, thy light me shew;
 The more I search of thee the less I know.—*Drummond.*

What, saith the Scriptures, is, therefore, our inquiry, and to any “cavils of reason we must say, be dumb and open not your mouth,” for “what canst thou know.”

The only people who, in ancient times, possessed any certain knowledge of the nature and unity of God, was the Jews and their patriarchal ancestors,—a people antecedent to the very existence of any other nation whose records have reached us, and by whom, as is attested by their Scriptures, this knowledge was attributed exclusively to a divine and supernatural communication. Now what that communication was, and what it taught in reference to the unity of God, is in no way affected by the *present* opinion of the Jewish people. We have in our hands, all the means of ascertaining the real truth of the Old Testament Scriptures, and the opinions of the earliest Jewish commentators and writers, which they have. Many most learned men among Christians, and among the Jews who have become Christians, have devoted themselves to an examination of these writings.

From this examination, as we shall see, there is ample reason to conclude that believing Jews among the ancient people of God,—that the writers of the Apocryphal books,—that Philo in the Apostolic days,—that the early Targumists and Commentators,—that the Cabbalists,—the Yohantes,—that the Zaruschites and others,—have more or less clearly believed and taught the plurality and tri-unity of the one ever blessed Godhead. Such also, is the testimony of the many learned converted Jews, who have from age to age become Christians, and of the ten thousand such, now in the Christian Church, and who are, to a man, Trinitarians.

And as it regards any alleged moral disposition of the Jews now to examine into the truth, and to receive what is truth in the love of it, we know that even in Christ's day they had destroyed the Scriptures by their traditions—that they would not come to the light—that they were cut off because of their unbelief—and that there is now a veil of darkening prejudice before their eyes until

the time of their restoration shall be brought about. The rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity by the Jews, is therefore, a presumption in favour of the Scriptural character of this doctrine and not against it.

That the Scriptures both of the Old and the New Testament, undoubtedly teach that there is a sense, and a most important sense, in which God is ONE—ONLY ONE—and THE ONLY God, we strenuously maintain. In opposition to all idolatrous and polytheistic systems of religion introduced by the proud, perverted, and corrupt reason of man, GOD IS ONE. In every sense in which unity is a perfection, God is one. But in every sense in which it is not a perfection, God is not one. God is not one as man spiritually is one. We say *spiritually*, for in fact, man as a compound being is a tri-unity, being composed of a body, soul, and spirit, a physical, an animal, and a spiritual nature, and yet all united so as to form one person. God is not one as any finite being is one, because the nature and essence of God must be infinitely above, and beyond, and different from, what finite natures are, or finite minds even comprehend, or human languages can express.

To make our nature God's measure, and our idea of God the limit of what he is, is to make "God such an one as ourselves." It is "by our vain searching, to find out the Almighty to perfection." It is in the earnest language of Scriptural rebuke, to "collect the winds in the hollow of our hands—to bind the waters in a garment—to ascend into the Heavens and descend into hell. What is His name and what is the name of His son. For knowest thou?"—Prov. xxx: 4.* Such a unity

* It is to do that which is absolutely impossible to our present capacity of reason, and therefore, the inspired writer, after having in v. 3., alluded to "the knowledge of THE HOLY ONES," in order to bring man's capacity to the test, asks "what is the name of his Son if thou know."—Prov. xxx: 1-5. (1)

(1) On this passage, as understood by the Jews themselves, as referring to God, see Dr. McCaul, on the Eternal Sonship of the Messiah.—London, 1838, p. 3, and pp. 30-55, from which, we make the following extracts:

Aben Ezra, by "Holy Ones," understood God, as he translates it by God; and he conceived the general sense of the passage to be, "The knowledge of God is unattainable by the efforts of unassisted human wisdom—to know God we must search in the Word of God alone, and beware of adding anything to it." "In this," says Dr. McCaul, "I agree

therefore, as God hath not claimed, such as is arbitrarily ascribed to him by our bold and adventurous intruders into the deep and most profound arcana of the Divine nature; such as can never be proved to belong to him, or to be any real perfection; such as would prove an imperfection and a blemish, would render the divine nature less intelligible, more impossible to be so far conceived as requisite; or such as is manifestly unreconcilable with his plain affirmations concerning himself; "we ought not," says Howe, "to impose it upon ourselves, or be so far imposed upon, as to ascribe to him such simplicity."

The system of Unitarianism, as it is miscalled, for they only are *truly* Unitarian, who believe in the *revealed* doctrine of God's Unity—this system is based upon two assumptions, both of which are unfounded, *first*, that they who believe that God's Unity is a Tri-Unity, believe, and must believe, in three Gods;—and *secondly*, that to be truly one or a Unity, God must be absolutely one person. As to the *first* point, however, it is manifest that the very term trinity, itself demonstrates that we believe God to be *so* revealed as to be a Trinity in Unity, and a Unity in Trinity—ONE in such a sense as to be THREE, and THREE in such a sense as to be ONE. And as to the *second* point, we believe that Scripture nowhere, or in any manner, teaches that God is absolutely one person, but that in the eternal Godhead there are three, to each of whom belong all the attributes and perfections of the one divine essence.

Every term employed on this subject is necessarily human, and therefore analagous, imperfect, and only

with him, and shall, therefore, offer some observations in confirmation of this interpretation."

"The scope of the passage evidently is, that there is a certain knowledge not attainable by unassisted human reason, but which is revealed in the Word of God; the question then is, what knowledge is that? What is the great subject of the Divine Word? Is it not the revelation of the NATURE and WILL of God!"

* * * * *

"Having ascertained the general sense, the next question is, what is the sense of the questions, "Who hath ascended into Heaven? who hath gathered?" &c. For what purpose are these questions put, and of whom do they speak? Aben Ezra and the Berlin Commentator, take these questions as a proof of man's incapacity, and as forming the nexus between

suggestive of the fact that the Unity of the divine nature admits of, and requires for, its own perfect and inexpressible beatitude, three hypostases, subjects, persons, or distinctions which we therefore call a Trinity. God's UNITY is, therefore, a TRINITY OF PERSONS IN ONE GODHEAD.

If God is spoken of in Scripture as *one* he also speaks of himself in Scripture in plural terms as more than one, and he emphatically attributes every quality, attribute and work by which his Deity can be distinguished, not only to the Godhead, which is in essence one, but also, to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, who are personally distinct. Hear O Israel Jehovah our Gods (*the Hebrew term is in the plural and not as might have been in the singular,*) is one God.—(Deut. vi: 4.) “The Gods,” (*the same plural noun elohim.*) “The Gods said unto Moses, I am that which I am.”

Unity and plurality are here, and as we shall hereafter show, in many other passages, asserted of God—not

the confession of ignorance, and the direction to the Word of God as the only source of information. Agur first states the thing to be proved, “I cannot attain to the knowledge of the Holy Ones;” then he gives his proof, “who hath ascended up into Heaven?” &c; and then draws his corollary. If so, then we must betake ourselves to the Word of God.”

“The whole passage may be thus paraphrased: With my limited understanding I cannot attain the knowledge of God; for to know God is to know him who is omnipresent, filling heaven and earth; it is to know him who is omnipotent, ruling over the winds and the waters, the most unstable of all elements; it is to know him who created all things; it is to know his name, and the name of his Son. But this knowledge can be attained only by revelation; and he that would attain to it, even from revelation, must not pass over any one word as insignificant, for every word is purified like silver; neither must he add to Divine revelation, or he will be sure to go astray.”

* * * * *

“Having interpreted Agur's assertion and his proof taken from God's name, there remains but one inquiry, and that is, who is intended by his Son? The Yalkut, in the passage already referred to, answers with the words, “Israel is my first born.” But this answer does not agree with the context. Agur is speaking, not of Israel, but of the knowledge of God. The name of Israel is no part of that knowledge. The Son of God here intended must be a being, whose name can be ascertained only by revelation, and a knowledge of whose name constitutes a part of the knowledge of God. He must, therefore, be a Divine person, himself one of the Holy Ones, of whom Agur had been speaking. The old Testament teaches that a knowledge of God's name is an essential part of the knowledge of God. Agur teaches that a knowledge of the name of THE SON OF GOD is an essential part of the knowledge of God, so that both the general

an absolute and personal UNITY, nor an absolute plurality, but a plurality of persons in the essential Unity of the infinite and incomprehensible Jehovah. And thus we find that in one of the very few passages in the Bible in which the Unity of God is pointedly enforced the Son is united with the Father. "Thus saith the Lord the King of Israel, and his Redeemer the Lord of Hosts; I am the first and I am the last, and beside me there is no God."—(Mal. ii: 10.) And thus, when the Apostle declares that to us "there is one God the Father from whom are all things," in contra distinction to "the Gods many and Lords many" of the heathen, he *immediately* adds, "and ONE LORD" (*a most emphatic designation among these heathen of their greatest Gods,*) "Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and we through him," thus attributing to the Son as Lord or Jehovah,* the identical unity and dominion over all things attributed to the Father.—(1 Cor. viii: 16.)†

What we affirm therefore, is, that the Scriptures no-

analogy of Scripture and the particular scope of the passage under consideration, compel us to conclude that the Son here spoken of, is a Divine person, that is, the passage teaches us that God has a Son, and that this Son is very God."

* * * * *

"The Old Testament, therefore, speaks of a Being who is, in a peculiar sense, the Son of God. Thus, in the Book of Proverbs, Agur, the Son of Jakeh, asks, "Who hath ascended up into heaven, or descended? Who hath gathered the wind in his fists? Who hath bound the waters in a garment? Who hath established all the ends of the earth? What is his name, and what is his Son's name?" There can be no doubt that God is he who bound the waters in a garment, and who established all the ends of the earth. From this passage, then, we learn that there is a Being who stands to God in the relation of Son, and that the knowledge of this Son's name is as great a mystery as the knowledge of God himself, and cannot be learned, except by immediate revelation. Agur had complained, in the preceding verses, that he did not possess human knowledge, and from this ignorance argues, how then, should I have the knowledge of the Holy Ones; that is, how should I have the knowledge of God? You will observe that, instead of the usual word for God, he employs a plural adjective, The Holy Ones, and then shows in what sense he understood this plurality, by speaking of God, and of his Son. Agur, then, considered the knowledge of God's Son as a part of the knowledge of God, and thereby manifests his belief in the existence and Deity of the Son of God."—*Dr. McCaul on the Eternal Sonship of the Messiah*, see pp. 8, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46, 55.

* See Smith's *Messiah*, vol. 3. p. 131.

† Lord is the rendering of the Septuagint for the term Jehovah.

where teach, either in the Old or New Testament, that God is metaphysically, absolutely or personally one. The Unity of God is taught, and only taught, in order to show that our God is the true and only real God, in opposition to the variety of imaginary Gods worshipped by the heathen. And whereas, Unitarians would lead us to believe that the Scriptures are full of passages inculcating the doctrine of the absolute Divine unity in the clearest manner, the fact is that the passages which lean directly on the unity of God are very few, and far fewer than those in which the plurality of God, and the Deity of the Son, and the Deity of the Holy Ghost are taught,—and of this fact any reader of the Bible can at once satisfy himself by taking any one of the passages and referring to all the texts alluded to as proofs in the margin. It will thus be seen, that all the passages which declare God's unity, do so only as that unity is opposed to the many Gods of heathenism,—but that in the very words themselves, and in several other passages of Scripture, as found in the original Hebrew, God, in calling himself one, speaks of himself as being also a plurality.* And in the forms of benediction as found, both in the Old and New Testament—in the threefold forms of language—used in application to God,—in the initiatory sacrament of baptism in which all who become disciples of Christianity, are baptised into the belief, worship, and service of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—in these we say, and in the Scriptural proofs of the Supreme Deity of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, God limits this incomprehensible plurality of his one Godhead to three persons, each having ascribed to it the divine attributes, and all inhering in one and the same essence.

The Divine unity, therefore, as taught in Scripture, has no relation to number, or to any kind of unity that is comprehensible by the human mind, as even Jewish writers have taught,† but is exclusively employed in opposition to all human notions of a plurality of independent and separate Gods.

* See Owen's Works, vol. 10, p. 474, 22 vol. ed.

† See quoted in Oxlee's Christian Doctrines of the Trinity, and in vol. 1, pp. 109-13.

This oneness, to use the language of Owen,* this oneness can respect nothing but the nature, being, substance, or essence of God. God is one in this respect. Some of these words are not, indeed, used in the Scripture; but whereas, they are of the same importance and signification, and none of them include anything of imperfection, they are properly used in the declaration of the unity of the Godhead. There is mention in the Scripture of the Godhead of God.—Rom. i: 20. “His eternal power and Godhead.” And of his nature, by excluding them from being objects of our worship, who are not Gods by nature.—Gal. iv: 8. Now this natural Godhead of God, is, his substance or essence with all the holy divine excellencies which naturally and necessarily appertain thereunto. Such are eternity, immensity, omnipotency, life, infinite holiness, goodness, and the like. This one nature, substance, or essence, being the nature, substance, or essence of God, as God is the nature, essence, and substance of the Father, Son, and Spirit, one and the same absolutely in and unto each one of them. For none can be God as they are revealed to be, but by virtue of this divine nature or being. Herein consists the unity of the Godhead.

This unity in Trinity is, undoubtedly, mysterious and incomprehensible. But it is not unreasonable. It is above and beyond the capacity and limits of reason to discover or comprehend. But so is all that relates to God and things supernatural and divine. Reason, we have seen, by all its searching can know nothing of the nature and essence of any material object or of the human soul, much less of God. It never could, and never did, prove the absolute unity of God. This, as may be seen in Plato’s *Parmenides*, was the bottomless and fathomless gulf to human reason. Reason has proved as it thought, and practised upon the belief of a plurality of Gods, and by a corrupti^on of primitive revelation human reason has believed in a trinity of Supreme Gods. Reason therefore, now humbly and gladly receives that teaching which Socrates and Plato sought and even expected, and rejoices to believe that there are three persons

* Owen’s Works, vol. 10, p. 504, 22 vol. ed.

in the adorable Godhead, and that these three are one.*

“Ye lofty minds, whose maxims some e’en now
Pretend to follow, true philosophers,
Who sought whatever ye could find of God,
How would *your* hearts have bounded to the voice
Of God in flesh made manifest! whom they
Who follow up your systems hold in scorn;
And tuning o’er the first part of the strain
Of angels, which, as though from Heaven t’were caught
By inspiration, ye divinely sang,
The closing numbers jarring discords deem
But ye were witnesses of darker times;
And shall in judgment ’gainst your followers
Of these bright days of revelation rise,
As well as those who in your twilight hour
Denied or hated the fair truths ye taught.”—*Ragg.*

* Among the Fathers, says Hagenbach, in his *History of Doctrines*, vol. 1, pp. 93-7, “The more profound thinkers, however, were well aware that it is not sufficient to demonstrate the mere numerical unity of the Divine Being, and accordingly placed the transcendental unity far above the mathematical monas.

The idea of a revealed religion implied that so much of the nature of God should be made manifest to man as would be necessary to the knowledge of salvation. The Church, therefore, has ever cultivated the *λογος προς Θεου* (theology.) On the other hand, the insufficiency of human ideas was always acknowledged, (in opposition to the pride of speculation,) and the character of the Divine Being was admitted to be past finding out; some even entertained doubts about the propriety of giving God any name. Much of what the Church designated by the term mystery (sacrament,) is founded partly on a sense of the insufficiency of our ideas and the inaptitude of our language, and partly on the necessity of employing certain ideas and expressions to communicate our religious thoughts and opinions.

When the martyr Attalus, in the persecution of the Gallican Christians, under Marcus Aurelius, was asked by his judges what the name of God was, he replied “*ο θεος ονομα ουκ εχει ως ανθρωπος.*” Euseb. v. i. (edit. Heinichen. T. ii, p. 29, comp. the note.) Such was also, the opinion of Justin M. Apology, ii: 6; whatever name may be given to God, he who has given a name to a thing must always be anterior to it. He therefore draws a distinction between appellatives and names. The predicates *πατηρ, θεος, κυριος, δεσποτης*, are only appellatives. God is not only above all names, but also above all existence. Minuc. Fel. c. 18. Hic (Deus) nec videri potest, visu clarior est, nec comprehendi, tactu purior est, nec aestimari, sensibus major est, infinitus, imensus et soli sibi tantus quantus est, notus, nobis vero ad intellectum pectus angustum est, et ideo sic eum digne aestimamus, dum inaestimabilem dicimus. Eloquentiam, quemadmodum sentio: magnitudinem Dei, qui se putat nosse minit, qui non vult minere, non novit, nec nomen Deo quaeras: DEUS nomen est. Illic vocabulis opus est, quum per singulos propriis appellationem insignibus multitudo dirimenda est. Deo qui solus est, Dei vocabulum totum est. Quem si patrem dixerō, terrenum opineris; si regem, carnalem suspiceris, si dominus, intelliges utique mortalem, aufer additamenta nominum, et perspicies ejus claritatem.

That the Scriptures are the word of God is, in this controversy, assumed. But if they are, then we know as assuredly that they would be so worded as to guard *in every way* against that idolatry which they everywhere and in all its forms, condemn. The plain, obvious, and necessary teaching of Scripture that God is in one sense one, and in another sense three, and that while there is but one divine Godhead there are three persons, to each of whom, Scripture attributes this Godhead with all divine honour and prerogatives pertaining to it, makes the doctrine of the TRI-UNITY or Trinity of the divine nature the teaching of God himself, concerning his own ineffable nature. And surely, to use the language of Robert Hall, this is the true way of contemplating the doctrines peculiar to revelation, "to consider them as *facts*, believed on the authority of the Supreme Being, not to be proved by reason; since their truth does not result from any perceptible relations in our ideas, but they owe their existence entirely to the will and counsel of the Almighty Potentate. Let the fair grammatical import of Scripture language be investigated, and whatever propositions are, by an easy and natural interpretation, deducible from thence, let them be received as the dictates of Infinite Wisdom, whatever aspect they bear, or, whatever difficulties they present. Repugnant to reason they can never be, because they spring from the Author of it; but superior to reason, whose limits they infinitely surpass, we must expect to find them. The facts which we have become acquainted with in the natural world, would appear stupendous were they communicated merely on the evidence of testimony; they fail to astonish us, chiefly because they have been arrived at step by step, by means of their analogy to some preceding one. We have climbed the eminence by a slow progression, and our prospect has insensibly widened as we advanced, instead of being transported thither instantaneously by a supreme power. Revelation conducts us to the path at once, without previous training, without any intellectual process preceding, without condescending to afford other proof than what results from the veracity and wisdom of the Creator; and when we consider that this truth respects much sublimer relations

and concerns than those which subsist in the material world, that it regards the existence and nature of an infinite and incomprehensible God, the ways and counsels of God respecting man's eternal destiny, is it surprising that it should embrace what greatly surpassed our previous conjectures, and even transcends our perfect comprehension?"

To question or deny this doctrine of the TRI-UNITY of God, although admitted to be taught by the language of Scripture, plainly and naturally interpreted, because it is incomprehensible, is to destroy all certain assurance that the Scriptures are the word of God, or that there is one God, or indeed, as we have seen, a God at all. To disprove the doctrine of Scripture, that while the divine essence, nature, or Godhead, is numerically one, there is a real distinction between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, to whom this essence and all divine attributes are severally and equally applied, we must be able to prove from our actual knowledge of God's nature that such distinctions cannot possibly exist in the divine nature, and which is, we have seen, an impossibility. Apart from what God reveals concerning himself, no finite reason can tell what is God's nature, what is proper or impossible to that nature, what the unity of this nature is, or what a personal distinction in that nature is. "It is a clear point, I think," says Prof. Stuart,* "that the unity of God cannot be proved without revelation. It may, perhaps, be rendered faintly probable. Then you depend upon Scripture proof, for the establishment of this doctrine. But have the Scriptures anywhere, told us what the *divine unity is*? Will you produce the passage? The *oneness* of God they assert. But this they assert always *in opposition to the idols of the heathen*, the *polytheism* of the gentiles—the Gods superior and inferior, which they worshipped. In no other sense have the Scriptures defined the *ONENESS* of the Deity. What then is *oneness*, in the uncreated, infinite, eternal Being? In created and finite objects, we have a distinct perception of what we mean by it; but can *created* objects be just and adequate representa-

* Letters to Dr. Channing, pp. 45-6.

tives of the *uncreated* ONE? Familiar as the assertion is, in your conversations and in your sermons, that God is ONE, can you give me any definition of this *oneness*, except a negative one? That is, you deny the plurality of it; you say God is but one, and not two, or more. Still, in what, I ask, does the divine unity consist? Has not God different and various faculties, and powers? Is he not almighty, omniscient, omnipresent, holy, just, and good? Does he not act differently, *i. e.*, variously, in the natural and in the moral world? Does his union consist, then, appropriately in his essence? But what is the essence of God? And how can you assert that his unity consists appropriately in this, unless you know what his essence is, and whether oneness can be any better predicated of this, than of his attributes?

Your answer to all this is, the nature of God is beyond my reach; I cannot define it, I approach to a definition of the divine unity, only by negatives. That is, you deny the negative plurality of God; or you say there are not two or more essences, omnisciences, omnipotencies, &c. But here all investigation is at an end. Is it possible to show what constitutes the *internal nature* of the divine essence, or attributes; or how they are related to each other; or what internal distinctions exist? About all this, revelation says not one word; certainly the book of nature gives no instruction concerning it. The assertion then, that God is *one*, can never be fully understood as meaning anything more than that he is *numerically one*; *i. e.*, it simply denies polytheism, and can never reach beyond this. But how does this prove, or how can it prove, that there may not be, or that there are not distinctions in the Godhead, either in regard to attributes, or essence, the nature of which is unknown to us, and the existence of which is to be proved by the authorities of the Scriptures only?"

When Unitarians, therefore, inquire what that distinction in the Godhead is, in which we believe, we answer that we do not profess to understand *what* it is; we do not undertake to define *affirmatively*. We can approximate to a definition of it, only by negatives. We deny that the Father is in *all* respects, the same as the Son; and that the Holy Spirit is in *all* respects, the same

as either the Father or the Son. We rest the *fact*, that a distinction exists, solely upon the basis of Revelation.

In principle then, what more difficulty lies in the way of believing in a threefold distinction of the Godhead than in believing in the divine unity?

The unity of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, is, indeed, a mystery, a fact clearly revealed, yet suggesting questions which no analogy of consciousness, no walk of human experience, enables us to solve. "Doth this offend" us? Shall we deny the fact? Shall we, in our pride of intellect, assume the one God must be as one man—his unity shall be as one of our unities—that he cannot contain, in his own essential nature, the element of love, the object of love, and the manifestation of love; that the human definition of God must be the true definition; that if the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost be God, there must be three Gods, and not one, even though the Scriptures teach us that God as revealed in the Scriptures—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—is "the only living and true God?" Rather let us acknowledge, for assuredly it well becomes us, that as "no man knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of man which is in him, even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God. For the whole subject is at an infinite distance from us, and wholly foreign to us, nor is it revealed to us, for it even surpasses the apprehension of angels.*

Concerning this most excellent and holy Trinity, we cannot find any suitable words in which we might speak of it, and yet we must express this supernatural incomprehensible Trinity in words. If we therefore, attempt to speak of it, it is as impossible to do it properly as to reach the sky with one's head. For all that we can say or think of it is a thousand times less proportionate to it than the point of a needle is to heaven and earth, yea, a hundred thousand times less. We might talk to a wonderful amount, and yet we could neither express nor understand how the distinction of the persons can exist in the supernatural unity.

* Stowell on the Work of the Spirit, pp. 81, 406.

O thou Eternal ONE! whose presence bright
 All space doth occupy, all motion guide;
 Unchanged through time's all-devastating flight;
 Thou only God! There is no God beside.
 BEING above all beings! THREE IN ONE!
 Whom none can comprehend, and none explore,
 Who fill'st existence with THYSELF alone,
 Embracing all, supporting, ruling o'er,
 BEING whom we call God and know no more.
 As far beyond the starry walls of Heaven,
 As is the loftiest of the planets seven,
 Sequestered from this earth in purest light
 Out-shining ours, as ours doth sable night,
 Thou all-sufficient, omnipotent,
 Thou Ever Glorious, Most Excellent
 God, various in names, in essence one,
 High art installed on golden throne,
 Out-stretching Heaven's wide-bespangled vault,
 Transcending all the circles of our thought;
 With diamantine sceptre in thy hand,
 There thou giv'st laws, and dost this world command.

Drummond.

But on this subject of the unity of God, as an objection to the Scriptural proof of the Trinity, we propose to make some further observations in a future number.

ARTICLE II.

REPORT ON COLLEGIATE EDUCATION,

Made to the Trustees of the University of Alabama, July, 1852. By Rev. BASIL MANLY, D. D., President of the University.

There is no subject which, of late years, has more intensely engaged the attention of the educators of youth, on both sides of the Atlantic, than that of Collegiate education. During the last half century the enlargement of the circle of the sciences has been more rapid than during any equal portion of time within the authentic records of our race. Throughout this period, the investigation, discoveries and inventions in the physical sciences have been beyond all parallel. In *these*, of

course, the greatest advance has been made. In the moral and mental sciences, which are necessarily limited by the law of their nature, the advance has been more, in the fuller development of old, than in the discovery of new principles. The same may be said of mathematics. But to physical science, which is in its very nature experimental and progressive, there is—there *can be* no absolute limit within the powers of the human mind. Yet it is undoubtedly true, that within the period above stated, learned men everywhere have bestowed their labours on every branch of science, with a freshness and zeal, more characteristic of amateurs in a new, than professors of an old philosophy. And while the study of nature, under all the lights of modern philosophy, has developed arcana before unknown, and given the form and substance of science to facts and observations never before classified and arranged, every other department of human learning has been progressing with the accelerated pace of this busy age. Text books have been improved and multiplied—expedients to facilitate the acquisition of scientific knowledge have been devised—principles have been simplified—in short, every practicable effort has been made to render learning easy; and yet the complaint is as just as it is universal, that the ordinary College curriculum of four years is too short to embrace all that it is desirable should be taught in a thorough course. If this were the only difficulty, the complaint might be met by an easy remedy, as we shall presently see. But there is another demand, of late years importunately pressed upon our Colleges, of graver importance and infinitely more embarrassing than this. We live in a stirring age. The masses—in our country, the *controlling masses*, feel that they have unsatisfied wants, the existence of which were unknown, because unfelt fifty years ago. They begin to aspire to more elevated positions in the intellectual world. They feel that if the school master *is not* he ought to be abroad. Wearing the sovereignty of the State as an every-day garment, their just pride demands that their toilet shall be completed gracefully and in good taste. In short, it is supposed they demand a participation in the benefits of the University, established at their expense, if not for

their especial use. If unable, from the want of pecuniary means, to pursue the full course of instruction, they claim to be admitted to the benefits of a part. If there be any branch of science taught, which is appropriate to their peculiar business or employment, they demand to be instructed in that. Such are the popular demands, real or supposed, which have rivetted the attention of the educators of youth, and others interested in the subject, both in Europe and America, almost contemporaneously, and with great anxiety, on the subject of reforms in Collegiate education.

To these demands, the comparatively youthful University of Alabama has not been insensible. Year after year, the mutterings of discontent have been heard by the Trustees and Faculty with a mortification and regret, greatly enhanced by the conviction perfectly clear to them, although scarcely thought of by the complainers, that there are difficulties of immense magnitude, if not insuperable, in the way of the desired reforms. With a very proper desire to proceed in this matter cautiously, the Trustees, at their annual meeting in July, 1851, passed a resolution requesting the President of the University to make inquiry and report to them, "whether any changes in the system of education pursued in the University are necessary and proper, in order to extend the benefits of the institution to a greater number of the citizens of the State." In compliance with this request, the "Report" at the head of this article was presented to the Trustees, at their next meeting in July, 1852, and was ordered by them to be printed. We propose to make this report the basis for a few remarks of our own, intended more to bring the information on this difficult subject contained in the Report itself, to the public attention, than to attempt to throw any light ourselves on a subject of so much and so deserved importance. But before we proceed, it is due to the learned and talented author of the Report to state, that the time allowed him to collect its facts was limited, mainly, to the college vacation of less than three months, and its composition was effected at such short intervals as he could snatch from his very laborious routine of duties, and was only completed a few hours before it was presented to the Board.

And even then, was presented in the form of its first rough draft, with all the erasures and interlineations common to a hastily prepared paper,—and in this state was committed to the press. If, therefore, any faults of style or diction shall be discovered by any who may read it, they will, of course, be ascribed to the proper cause. Our present purpose has nothing to do with these faults, if they exist.

It is a great mistake, common to the young and the uneducated, to suppose that all the learning for which they have any use is to be acquired during the Academic and Collegiate courses. Indeed, there is a very general misapprehension of the true meaning of the term *education*. As the term itself imports, it is the process of *drawing forth* the faculties of the mind,—training, cultivating, and by proper exercise, invigorating them. To perform its appropriate functions, it must cultivate *all*, not *some* of the mental faculties. In a word, its office is to teach the art of thinking, and improve the faculty of remembering and applying,—and when it has taught us how to study and how to learn, it has laid the foundation on which we may erect a temple of what magnitude and proportions we choose. This, of education in its general sense. “The proper object of Collegiate education,” as Dr. Manly justly remarks, in the report before us, “the knowledge of *principles and causes*, rather than of *facts*, which belongs to a specific or professional education. The one is fundamental to the other. If the foundation be broad, deep and substantial, the superstructure, whatever its specific designation, is secure. Professional education, commencing its adventurous career at the point where the College curriculum has completed its functions, can be rendered as specific and definite as we wish, and efficient to some purpose. And here is the true point of divergence.”

As it is obviously impossible within the short period of the College course to acquire a thorough knowledge of all the departments of human learning, the most that can be done, and all that should be aimed at in a judicious system of College instruction, is the inculcation of the general principles of each science, with such a thorough knowledge of their rudiments, that the student

may be able, if he chooses, in after life, to prosecute to advantage the further study of any or all of them.

But we are detaining the reader too long from the important subjects discussed in the Report before us. The whole investigation may be resolved into the two following questions—first, what effectual means may most safely be adopted, without sacrificing a reasonable thoroughness, to embrace the greatly enlarged circle of the sciences within the ordinary curriculum of four years? And second, how are those best to be provided for who desire only to pursue a partial course of study? To give to these questions, as difficult as they are important, a thorough discussion, would require more time and space than we can at present claim; and is more than Dr. Manly, in the Report before us, professes to accomplish. And we choose, at this point, to take occasion to say, that if our opinions differ at all from those of our learned author on the subjects discussed, it is only on a single point—*the study of the dead languages*,—and we imagine we do not differ essentially, even on this. Learned men and profound thinkers, have long been divided in opinion as to the degree of importance which ought to be assigned, in a thorough and systematic course of education, to the study of these languages. It is an old, and even at the present day, a common complaint, that too much time is consumed (*wasted*, say many,) during the short College period of four years, in the study of Latin and Greek. Speaking of the course of instruction at present pursued in the English Universities, Dr. Lyon Playfair quotes approvingly from Eothen, the following passages on this subject,—the aspirations of our youth towards science “are quenched by freezing drenches of scholastic lore,”—“You feel so keenly the delights of early knowledge—you learn the ways of the planets and transcend their narrow limits, and ask for the end of space; you vex the electric cylinder till it yields you, for your toy to play with, that subtle fire in which our earth was forged. * * * What more will you ever learn? Yet the dismal change is ordained; and then thin meagre Latin (the same for every body,) with small shreds and patches of Greek, is thrown, like a pauper’s pall over all your early lore;—instead of sweet knowl-

edge, vile, monkish, doggrel grammars and graduses, dictionaries and lexicons, and horrible odds and ends of dead languages, are given you for your portion, and down you fall from Roman story to a three-inch scrap of *Scriptores Romani*, from Greek poetry down to the cold rations of *Poeta Graci* cut up by commentators and served out by schoolmasters!" And Dr. Playfair adds, "is this horrible quenching of all our youthful, innate love of God's truth, the education for the youth of a nation, depending for its progress on their development? How is it possible that dead literature can be the parent of living science and of active industry?*" All this may be as true, as it is severe and sarcastic. We have no doubt, from the criticisms of their own Reviews, that the English Universities stand in great need of reform. Yet we would not go quite so far. With Dr. Manly, we have a higher appreciation of the value of the dead languages, and we concur most heartily in the following sentiments of the Report:

"The main features of the Collegiate system appear to be—a substratum, required alike of all, formed by the contemporaneous study of the ancient classics (the Latin and the Greek languages and their literature) and of mathematics, to which a provision is made for adding, with some variety, according to circumstances, a knowledge of the sciences successively developed, and of their application to the useful purposes of life. Of the importance of mathematics, not only as a means of cultivating a capacity for profound consecutive investigation, for close conclusive reasoning, but also as fundamental to much of our most important knowledge and business, less doubt seems to be entertained than with respect to the ancient classics, on which the severest assault has been made. As no satisfactory attainment can be made in this branch of knowledge without much and long continued labor, the time for the acquisition of dead languages, which are the exclusive repositories of no science, is regarded by some as thrown away, for all purposes of practical utility. To this it is replied, that these languages are the most finished and refined ever spoke or written; that

* North British Review, American edition, volume xii: No. 11.

they are fountains of eloquence never surpassed, seldom equalled; that if it be one of the highest attainments of a man of action and thought to reason, instruct, convince and persuade, the knowledge of such an instrument as these afford cannot be dispensed with, but gives him a double advantage, that of the mastery of language, and of sharpening his own powers by intercourse with the master-minds of the world. These languages have been deemed indispensable to a thorough education for the last thousand years, in every clime, under all governments, and by every fraternity of learned men. * * * * * So large a part of our own language, especially in the terminology of the learned professions and of the sciences, is derived from the ancient classics, that we cannot be masters of our own language without them. These, too, are the basis of the living tongues, the languages of commerce and of modern science; insomuch that the full mastery of these will be, even most economically, made through the intervention of the classics."

The objection is, that time is unprofitably appropriated, during the usual College course, to the study of these languages, and the question to be answered is, how is time to be gained to admit the increased demand for scientific attainments? It is very clear, that if the present course of studies be continued, either the College curriculum must be lengthened, or the branches taught must continue to be imperfectly learned. There is no known process by which the natural capacity of the student can be increased. We think it scarcely admits of a doubt that, *in this country at least*, the customary period of four years for the College course cannot safely be extended. Ours are not only a stirring and ambitious, but an impatient, people. Whatever they do, must be done quickly, and this impatience is almost every day evinced by the evident anxiety of those who enter our Colleges to be admitted to higher classes than they are prepared for, and their chagrin and dissatisfaction when they fail. Few young men here are willing, and very many cannot afford, to delay the commencement of their professional education beyond the age of twenty years. If four years, then, be too short a period in the present state of scientific literature for a full Col-

lege course, and the period cannot be extended, what is to be done? It seems to us plain, that the remedy, and the only remedy is, to throw back on the preparatory schools some of the branches now embraced in the College course. What these should be, it is presumed there can be no difficulty in determining. They must be the dead languages, portions of pure mathematics, and such other studies as may be as well pursued in a good Academy as in a College. Far be it from us to undervalue the study of the ancient classics, as a part of a finished education. We believe that no education is *finished* without them. We would only change their position in the course. It is, we believe, a universally conceded fact, that as our mother tongue is the first acquirement of the infant mind, so all languages may be more easily acquired in early life than any other kind of knowledge. Languages indeed, seem to be the appropriate study of the youthful mind. The early part of the educational course is, therefore, their proper position. We can perceive no sensible reason why the study of the dead languages should encumber the College curriculum, when they may be as well studied in the grammar school. Experience teaches that while it is often extremely difficult to procure a competent Professor in the higher departments of mathematics and philosophy, it is comparatively easy to find one in the department of languages. We do not say that, *at present*, attention to the Latin and Greek languages should be altogether excluded from the College programme,—enough to enable the student to retain his previously acquired knowledge might be retained. Yet we do not see why, if their place be needed for other and higher departments of learning, they may not, ultimately, be entirely displaced. But we concur with Dr. Manly in the sentiment, that this should “be done by easy and gradual steps.” We turn again to the Report. On this subject the Doctor remarks:

“The College course has become crowded, perhaps excessively, by adding on new subjects as each comes forward to claim fellowship in the sisterhood of the sciences. Colleges cannot refuse to give these place, so far, at least, as to acquaint students with their principles, and impart some good general knowledge of them.

But as they may be soon burdened with more than can be accomplished in four years, this involves the necessity, that while new sciences are crowding on at one end, we should be crowding off at the other, to an equal extent. It is believed that the raising of requisitions for entrance is, even now, become expedient on this ground. We cannot lengthen the period which young men will spend in College; but we may accomplish the result which such a measure would aim at, by raising the grade at which they shall commence. If this were done by easy and gradual steps, it would create no considerable revulsion, and would be compensated by an after training more extended and thorough, meanwhile more interesting and attractive, because of the more complete mastery of all they attempt. And in the event of a special school being established in our neighborhood by authority of the Trustees, it is submitted whether it may not be practicable and best, to have a large part, if not the whole of the Freshmen studies accomplished there, and before reaching the College classes. Incidentally, this arrangement would exert a beneficial influence on the schools, by making their instruction more extended and important, and by keeping students a longer time in them, (of course, in the nearer neighborhood of their parents,) it would bring them to the College more matured in mind, in body, and in habits, and better fitted to encounter its critical responsibilities."

We turn now to the second and most difficult question proposed to be discussed, viz: How are those best to be provided for who desire only to pursue a partial course of study? On the general subject of changes and innovations in the organization and methods of Collegiate institutions, the Report contains some remarks which are so just and so happily expressed, that we cannot forbear to copy them:

"It has been charged on Colleges," says the Report, "that while every thing else is progressive, they are immovable; conservative, indeed—but of knowledge elsewhere forgotten or useless—opposed to what is intelligible, practical and popular. This is a serious charge, if true. It is admitted that they do not consider every change an improvement; that they do not reject or aban-

don methods because they are old; and that they are more disposed to repair, than to overturn. If the College system of this country, maintaining a remarkable similarity, notwithstanding varieties and changes, were originally the result of intelligent consideration, as is fair to be presumed, this is a becoming spirit. In any well considered scheme, changes must *grow*, and *gradually incorporate themselves into the original structure*;—nor should the conceit of superior or exclusive wisdom, in succeeding generations of managers, be suffered to obliterate the labours of predecessors. Everything we enjoy is, in some degree, inherited. Of an institution of learning, its strength and efficiency, in part, are derived from its stability,—former generations setting a standard, which successors are ashamed to fall below,—and thus, an institution, like an individual, acquires a character stronger and more influential from its long-settled habitudes and well-tried developements. The graduates, not less than the officers, of the past, from their consecrated heights and well-established positions, shed a sympathetic influence on the new-comers; and by inspiring an ambition to acquit themselves as well, transfer to them a portion of their strength and dignity. Men trained, successively, in this way, are conservative of what is old and venerable:—when specious projects and immature theories threaten to overturn the acquirements of centuries, these are the reliable men of the occasion, whose single voice will outweigh the confident clamor of the entire public beside; and without whose conservative power, it is not readily seen how any institutions, domestic, civil, or literary, can subsist.”

To have a perfect comprehension of what is the question before us, we must see what are the supposed defects in our Collegiate system which are complained of, and we state them, briefly, in the language of the Report: “The complaint still is,” says Dr. M., “that education is not sufficiently practical,—that dead languages are taught, not the languages of commerce,—that sciences are taught in general principles, not in their applications to the useful arts; that our Colleges do not accommodate or aid the *working men* of the country.” In other words, that our Colleges are not so organized

that the applied sciences may be learned in connection with the industrial arts with which they are connected,—a demand which, with all deference, we submit is simply impossible, unless we subvert the whole system, and substitute an entirely new organization. As Dr. Manly very pertinently and forcibly remarks, “It is easy to declaim on such a topic, but to lay down a *working scheme*, satisfactory to even the loudest declaimers, may not be so easy. No scheme can secure the approbation of any sound educator, which does not provide a basis of general culture, and a thorough ground-work in the theory of the particular science taught. While none can do less than this, is it in the power of any to do more? To enable a student to step out of a College into the business he must follow, and find his preparation useful and adequate, would require the College to comprise every actual trade, business, calling and profession, in full and successful experiment,—involving the indefinite command of capital, and an ample allowance of time. Such a union of science and labour is the very highest and most difficult achievement of life, and could it be carried out, would convert all educators into Fellenburgs, and all pupils into the great philosophers,—the Bowditches, the Johnstons, the Liebiges of the age.”

To gratify this popular demand, by furnishing the means of acquiring some knowledge of the sciences taught, to those who do not wish to attempt the acquisition of all, most of our American Colleges have resorted to the expedient of what is usually termed “the partial course.” Students have been admitted, in some instances with almost unlimited freedom of choice, to pursue such studies as they conceive will be of the greatest utility to them in after life. What has been the lesson taught by the experiment, is made very apparent by the details on that subject in the Report before us. It is not saying too much to affirm that it has proved a decided and mortifying failure. Students of this description have, necessarily, much more of their time unoccupied by useful employment, and are, consequently, more liable to fall into habits of idleness, dissipation, and all the vices resulting from a state of idleness. They have been found, by experience, to be harder to govern,—and

whatever of laudable ambition they may have had at first, is almost sure to be mortified, and finally extinguished by the comparison they cannot fail to draw between themselves and the better prepared and more thoroughly educated students with whom they are associated.

“If pupils of unequal attainments,” justly observes Dr. Manly, “are thrown together in the same classes, the instructor will be under an invariable tendency to adapt his instruction to the weaker portion; and if his compensation is made to depend on the numbers attracted and retained under his instruction,” (a feature in the partial course system of some of our Colleges,) “the effect is inevitable. Thus the grade of attainment will be insensibly lowered, to the injury of the better prepared portion, and the detriment of the general interests of learning. Without such adaptation or depression in the style and quality of instruction, the association in the same tasks of parties materially unequal, either retards the advance of the better qualified portion, or inflicts the evil of superficial, confused, and unsatisfactory attainments on the less qualified.” * * * * “Students pursuing a voluntary and partial course in connexion with regular classes, though they have less to do, usually have a lower standing in the same studies, than those who take the full course. It is a universal and incontestible principle that the labour of young men and boys will be regulated by the standard adopted. If that be high, (provided it be practicable, and do not overtask them,) the majority of students will work up to it. If the standard be low, the majority will aim at nothing more than to reach it; and thus, not being sufficient to engender the habit, or the love, of study, nor to elicit and reward that power of severe, patient, continuous application, which is one of the most important of all the lessons in life, the main end of Collegiate training is not answered as to them. They aim at but little; and they do far less than if they had aimed at more. If they take but one study, as adapted to their taste or the measure of their ability or application, *that* presently swells into a burden to their languid spirits, and they sink into inanity. What can excite such? The stimulus of a diplo-

ma, of competition, of generous culture, of the consciousness of achievement, of power,—are all absent; and being in a state of mind, or a condition, to render a partial course welcome, the liberty of selection is exercised in choosing a little of what is easiest, and *for that reason least necessary* to them, and *they do that little worst*. The partial course humbles a man with the consciousness of his deficiency when he enters it: it affords him but little of encouragement or animation while he is in it; and it brands him with a palpable mark of deficiency and inferiority when he comes out. What parent, what student, likes this?"

The Report passes in review the experience of most of the American Colleges in reference to the partial course experiment, and the result is just such as might be expected from the *a priori* reasoning of Dr. Manly on the subject. The fear of protracting this article to an inconvenient length forbids the introduction here of all the information that has been derived from this source. We must content ourselves with stating little more than the general conclusion in each case.

In the University of Georgia, the experiment is thus spoken of by one of the Professors: "Our partial or irregular course is but little patronized by the people, and but little favoured by the faculty. On an average, four, or five, perhaps, may be included in this class; but of these, not one a year completes the course. * * * * We have been much dissatisfied with the trial we have made of irregulars. They are not so studious, or ambitious, or attentive, as others. They are more disorderly and vicious. Their standing in the class is almost always low. They seldom stay over a year; but that is about the average period of residence, as few go away earlier." In answer to the inquiry, whether the College or the State is materially benefitted by the arrangement, the Professor says: "To this I would give a decided negative. All of the Faculty agree in discouraging the entrance of irregulars into College; and whenever it is practicable, we induce those who do enter, to prepare for the full and regular course."

In the North Carolina University, in 1851, only about four per cent. of the whole number of students were

in the partial course. In Yale College, in 1849-50 and 1850-51, the per cent. was about seven.

"In the Miami University," says the Report, "the partial course has been regularly provided for since 1839. That class of students are allowed to study what they please; and are furnished with a certificate, on their completion of the course undertaken. It was stated, very emphatically, in a public meeting at Cleveland, Ohio, by the superintendent of public instruction for the State of Ohio, Samuel Galloway, Esq., that the system had not worked well; that such pupils take but few studies, and those the easiest to themselves; and that they make, comparatively, little proficiency in what they do take. At the same time, the President, Dr. Anderson, declared his conviction that Colleges, on the old plan, are doing all that is practicable, consistently with sound scholarship, to educate men to their peculiar pursuits. '*Let them alone,*' added he, '*efforts to reform may ruin what we have without any adequate compensation.*'"

In Georgetown College, Kentucky, where every inducement has been offered within its power, to make the position of that class of students agreeable and advantageous, the last catalogue shows forty per cent. in the partial course.

"Amherst College, Massachusetts, made the experiment of free admission to the partial course, several years ago. Whatever were the motives or the nature of the experiment, it is sufficient to know that *it was tried and abandoned.*"

"In the University of Vermont, at Burlington, in 1829, under the auspices of the venerable President, Dr. James Marsh, who wrote an able pamphlet on the subject, a provision was made for entire freedom of choice, as to the studies they would pursue, in those who did not wish to be candidates for a degree. * * * * * The desire of increased income, as well as usefulness, had had much to do in the origination of the experiment, and the authorities were sanguine that a strong demand would soon be developed by the promise of a supply—that numbers would come in and avail themselves of the liberal and inviting arrangements. The expectation was vain. They but found that they were preparing, with

increased expense and labor, to meet a demand that did not exist, and has not since existed, in that part of the country. * * * * Although they have retained that feature of their organization ever since, President Smith asserts that neither the University nor the public would lose anything were it stricken out."

The experience of Harvard College, Cambridge, under various modifications of the partial course experiment, has not resulted more favourably. "In 1826 the College was made open to persons who are not candidates for a degree, and who desire to study in particular departments only. This scheme, judged so promising at the time, was carried into effect and continued for twenty years. Every department was thrown open, and full liberty of selection was given to students; full instruction was afforded them wherever they located themselves, and certificates of actual proficiency were given. During twenty years *forty-eight* students only, applied for the privilege thus tendered to them, and these were mostly such as had failed on application for entrance upon the regular course. The scheme was abandoned, as providing for a demand which did not exist." Various changes and modifications, as we learn from the Report, were subsequently tried, with results by no means satisfactory.

To meet the supposed demands of the people for participation in the benefits of Collegiate institutions, other modifications have been attempted, the success of which remains, to some extent, an unsettled question. In our own country, the most distinguished examples of these modifications are to be found in the Virginia University, and Brown University, Rhode Island. Of the first we need say but little. Being a Southern institution, and patronized to some extent, by most of the Southern States, its character and prospects are known to most of our readers. It was the favorite project of Mr. Jefferson, who devoted himself, most assiduously, during the last years of his life, to its establishment and organization. While great credit is due to this distinguished philosopher and patriot for the self-denying efforts he made in behalf of this noble institution of learning, we trust we may, without disrespect to his memory,

rejoice that he failed in excluding from it, altogether, those Christian influences, without which the highest attainments in science are often a curse, instead of a blessing. This University was, at the first, organized somewhat after the model of the Continental Universities. It was thrown into departments—the regular College classes were dispensed with—and the utmost latitude of choice was permitted to the students in the selection of their studies. The programme of instruction is very comprehensive; and its chairs have been, and continue to be, filled by learned and able Professors. Although it has had a fair degree of success, it may well be doubted whether it has accomplished a greater amount of good than it would have done, had it been organized on the old plan. It has cost the State and the people of the State a very large sum of money; and if it has been successful, to the extent hoped for by its founders, must have returned a very considerable amount of intellectual profits. Whether the one has been commensurate with the other, we have no means of determining. Certain it is, that but a few years after the formation of the Virginia University, Washington College, in the same State, followed the example, of which she became heartily tired in a very few years, and soon returned to her original organization. In regard to Brown University, we quote from the Report as follows:

“The present organization of Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, had its origin, partly in a necessity for additional pecuniary resources, to enable it to maintain its high grade of educational facilities without encroachment on its capital, and ultimate bankruptcy. The entire reasons which led to this organization are disclosed in a report presented to the corporation, March 28, 1850, and its leading features are such as—‘1. To enable a student to pursue to the best advantage, any single course which he may choose. 2. To enable a student to pursue for a single term, a single year, or any other portion of time, such studies as he may believe to be for his advantage. 3. To allow students who are candidates for degrees to pursue the studies necessary for a degree, in a longer or shorter time, as their age, ability, or pecuniary circumstances may render convenient to

themselves,—the Faculty, however, having the right to direct the studies of such students, in such manner as may prevent idleness on the one hand, or superficial haste on the other.' In conformity with these general principles, the old arrangement of four College classes is abolished,—the institution is thrown into departments,—and the three degrees of *Master of Arts*, *Bachelor of Arts*, and *Bachelor of Philosophy*, are held out as the directing goal, in view of which students are supposed to elect their Collegiate course. The degree of *Master of Arts*, *in course*, or as a consequence of the lapse of time, or the attainment of a profession is abolished; and is here placed at the successful termination of a certain course of under-graduate study. The course for this degree embraces all that elsewhere belongs to a liberal education—the ancient classics, one modern language (at least,) beside the English, mathematics, natural philosophy, rhetoric, logic, chemistry, physiology, history, political economy, intellectual and moral philosophy and the evidences of Christianity; but admits of some diversity in allowing certain equivalents, to a limited extent, to be taken from the departments of mathematics, ancient or modern languages—to suit the views of parties. The whole course is such as *may* be accomplished in four years.

“For the other two degrees the course is so arranged that it may be accomplished in three years. That of Bachelor of Arts requires the student to have been a proficient in nine courses of one year each; of which two must have been in an ancient language, one in mathematics, one in the English language and in rhetoric, and the course in moral philosophy and the evidences of Christianity,—the remaining four to be selected by the candidate from the regular courses.

“The degree of Bachelor of Philosophy requires the student to have been a proficient in nine courses of one year each; of which one must have been in a modern language, (not the English,) one in mathematics, one in English literature, one in history and political economy, one in moral philosophy and the evidences of Christianity,—the remaining four to be such of the regular courses as he is fitted to pursue, at his own option. To be ad-

mitted as a candidate for either of these degrees, the student undergoes a rigid preliminary examination on elementary and fundamental studies, such as suit the course he takes;—the whole adjusted to a high Collegiate rank in the studies which constitute his particular course; and no one is permitted to enter on any course, without first evincing adequate preparation to pursue it with advantage to himself, and without detriment to the grade of instruction maintained in the University.”

Beside the institutions already noticed, the Report gives a particular account of the organization of others of similar character, but differing considerably in the details; yet all having the same object in view—adapting the course of instruction to the supposed wants of the people, making it more practical, and thus drawing to them more extended patronage. Of this description are, the University of Rochester, in New York, opened in 1850, and a new University, very recently founded at Cleveland, in the State of Ohio.

From this brief sketch of an effort so general—almost universal—amongst our American Colleges, to adapt their course of instruction to every imaginable desire of the people, we should naturally conclude that there really exists, in our country, a well-defined and concurrent demand for such radical changes of the old systems of College instruction. Of the existence of such a demand, at least to the extent supposed by many, we have seen no reliable evidence. The experience of those Colleges where such changes have been tried, is far from being conclusive in their favour. That there have been clamors, in the case of State Universities and Colleges, importing that their benefits are not equally distributed—that they are institutions for the wealthy classes, and that the poor are excluded from their benefits,—that the outlay of money for their support is out of all proportion to the advantages which the State derives from them—these, and such like clamors and complaints, we have often and painfully heard. But, we apprehend, they issue, generally, from the mouths of interested demagogues,—not from the hearts of the people. The poorest and most ignorant of our people know that wealth confers advan-

tages, not only in this, but in every other business of life; and they are not weak enough (if left to themselves) to complain of what they know is unavoidable. Few of them are insensible to the importance of learning—they see that it gives elevation, character, and distinction,—that a single learned, great and good man often confers benefits on the State which more than counterbalance the expenditures of years,—and they are thus stimulated to noble exertions to reach a position from which they may be able to confer on their children the blessings and advantages which flow from education and refinement. We believe it would be unwise to jeopard the interests of learning, by so far yielding to such clamors as to make radical innovations on the long-established and long-tried organization of our Colleges. Minor modifications and changes, to meet the ever-varying exigencies of the times, are proper, and are everywhere promptly made. *Great changes* should never be attempted, but upon the clearest proof of a *great and well-defined necessity*.

But there is another phase of this subject, to which we would, very briefly, call the attention of our readers. We refer to that invaluable class of literary and scientific institutions, sometimes called *high schools, scientific schools, schools of arts and manufactures*, and the like. In their proper place—and by this we mean, where the exigencies of the community demand them—these are of the very highest value. They are the handmaids of advancing civilization. Without them, arts and manufactures make but small progress, or ingloriously perish. In our view, they furnish the only true and legitimate answer to the demand, of which we have been treating.

To England, perhaps the very greatest benefit derived from her great exhibition of 1851, was the discovery, that in some of her most important manufactures, in which, until then, she had never doubted her decided superiority over all others, she was rivalled, *if not absolutely excelled* by France,—and that this was the result of the cultivation of scientific knowledge, through her industrial Colleges, in France; while similar efforts were neglected in England. Her wise men and scholars had long foreseen, and warned the government of this result.

But, with his characteristic self-esteem and obstinacy, John Bull would not believe them. His eyes are now opened—and if Prince Albert and his able coadjutors shall carry out (as we doubt not they will,) their great project of “an industrial College of arts and manufactures,” they will have achieved for Great Britain more of real honor, and wealth, and power, and glory, than she has won by all her wars since the days of Elizabeth. The nett proceeds of the great exhibition being set apart, as the basis of its endowment (about \$700,000) and with such patronage as it will command, the successful achievement of this great enterprise is not to be doubted.

In no country of Europe have greater efforts been made for the advancement of arts and manufactures by the cultivation of the physical and mathematical sciences, than in France. Not only her scientific men, but her government, have long been alive to the importance of this subject. Amongst a great number of institutions, having this object in view, her *central school of arts and manufactures*, established in 1829, stands preëminently, a model institution. The object of this school will be seen by a brief quotation which we make from an article in the North British Review:—

“The central school is destined specially to form civil engineers, directors of workshops, superintendents of manufactories,—to foster the industry of men capable of bringing into the direction of these establishments, and of great public works, the lights furnished by the physical and mathematical sciences, not only when studied in their more important and general doctrines, but above all, when considered in reference to their practical application.” No less than twenty learned Professors are employed in giving instruction during the three years of the regular course, and their instructions embrace every science which may be applied to any of the industrial arts. We would gladly furnish the reader with a detailed account of the various branches of knowledge taught in this model institution; but the length to which this article has already grown, warns us to forbear. We refer those who desire further information, to the number of the North British Review for August, 1852.

In our own country, a number of scientific schools

have, of late years, been established, in many respects similar to the great European schools to which we have referred, and which we deem the proper means, as we have before remarked, of filling the hiatus which is supposed to exist in our systems of education. Of these, the most distinguished and influential known to us, are *the Central High School of Philadelphia, the New York Free Academy, and the Lawrence Scientific School, at Cambridge, Massachusetts.* Each of these schools embraces quite a large circle of scientific instruction. With such modifications as might easily be made, by throwing off some studies, and thus affording enlarged opportunities for the acquisition of more extended and thorough attainments in others, they might be made the means (to those who desire it) of prosecuting a course of scientific instruction after the College has performed its functions, and still answer the purpose of preparing those who expect to devote themselves to any of the industrial arts, for the highest achievements of their several trades or professions. Indeed, they are so used at present. These two ends being accomplished, everything has been done that schools and Colleges can do.

We have already anticipated our conclusion. We repeat it. We would touch the old organization of our Colleges with chary hands. What has stood the test of so many ages, with so little disapprobation, cannot be very faulty. We are so far conservatives, that we would, at all times, rather amend than destroy,—and we are almost—not altogether—prepared to say of our Colleges, with Dr. Anderson, “let them alone—efforts to reform may ruin what we have, without any adequate compensation.” We think that the establishment of scientific schools, of the highest attainable grade, either in connection with our Colleges, or as separate and independent institutions, is the best expedient to remedy the defects complained of—and that these, with such modifications of the old College plans as experience and change of circumstances may suggest, will give us as near a perfect system of education as is attainable in the present condition of our race. At the same time, we are free to state our belief, that the demand for scientific schools, of the highest grade, is not yet so great in the Southern

portion of our confederacy, as it is in the Northern. The almost exclusive devotion of our people to agricultural pursuits—the comparative sparseness of our white population—and the small demand for scientific artisans amongst us, would probably forbid an amount of patronage, commensurate with the heavy expenses of such establishments. When a demand for them is created, the supply will follow, as a matter of course. Sooner than this, it would be folly to establish them.

ARTICLE III.

NOTICE OF THE DEAD SEA.

In many respects, this sheet of water, called by the Arabs *Bahr Lût*, the Sea of Lot, and known among us as the *Lake Asphaltites*, or the *Dead Sea*, is, even independently of its historical and biblical associations, one of the most extraordinary localities in the known world.

On the south-eastern borders of Palestine, and separated from the vine-covered, and the olive-bearing hills of Judea, by a range of bare sterile hills, mostly of limestone, the surface of which is diversified by deep clefts, and profound gorges, or wadys, alternately with steep hills, which, towards the east, tower into lofty mountains, constituting altogether, the wilderness of Judea,—lies the lake of Asphaltites. According to Schwartz,* this singular sheet of water is about 70 miles in length, and from 15 to 20 in breadth. Dr. Robinson† estimates its length from North to South, at 38 or 40 geographical miles, and its breadth at 10 or 12 English miles. Lieut. Lynch's map shows a length of about 50 miles, and a breadth of from 3 or 4 in its narrowest, to about 10 miles in its broadest part. This does not greatly vary from the proportions given in the map of Mons. DeSauley.‡

Into this lake, at the North-eastern extremity, flows

* *Geography of Palestine*, p. 42.

† *Biblical Researches*, vol. ii, p. 217.

‡ *Voyage aux Villes Maudites*. Pa. M. F. DeSauley. Paris, 1853.

the river Jordan, a muddy, rapid stream, about the size of the Warrior river, at Tuskalooza, Alabama, or of the Passaic, at Belleville, a little above Newark, N. J. The Jordan rises among the hills around Mount Hermon, and when swollen by the rains of winter, and by the melting snows in spring, it brings down a large body of water. But, although the Dead Sea has no visible outlet, its waters do not seem to be greatly elevated, for any long time, above the ordinary level.

The whole valley of the Jordan, as well as the Dead Sea at its southern extremity, is a vast elongated basin, shut in by lofty mountains on the east and on the west. The Dead Sea itself, is a little over 1300 feet lower than the level of the Mediterranean.* Lieut. Symonds of the British Royal Engineers, estimates it also, as about 1312 feet lower than the level of the Mediterranean.† Nay, even the Sea of Galilee, distant, perhaps, 190 miles to the North, is estimated at about 330 feet lower than that great inland Sea.‡ At its narrow northern extremity the Dead Sea is bordered by the plain of the Jordan valley, which falls by a short and gradual descent of a few feet only, to the water's edge. On the east and the west, this Sea is shut in by high rugged hills, perfectly bare, which rise, for a long extent on each side, almost perpendicularly from the water. On the south the shore is almost a plain, rising gradually to a ridge, of no great elevation, which separates the Dead Sea from the great Wady Arabah, that extends, with a very gradual slope, (interrupted by one ridge, of no great height,) to the Gulf of Akabah, the eastern arm of the Red Sea;—into which, I cannot but think, the waters from the Ghôr, *i. e.* the valley of the Jordan, may once have found their way. This idea, however, Dr. Robinson rejects.§

On the eastern side, and at about three fourths of the entire length of the sea, from the north, a peninsula, in shape like the foot of a man's boot, and having the toe pointing towards the north, projects into the sea, more than half-way across. It extends to more than one fourth

* Lynch's Expedition to the Dead Sea, p. 640.

† Wilson's Lands of the Bible, vol. ii. p. 24.—‡ *Ib.* i. 285.

§ *Bib. Res.* ii. 60.

the length of the Sea, towards the north. The waters of the Dead Sea are exceedingly heavy and disagreeable to the taste, being thoroughly saturated with salt, magnesia, sulphur, and bituminous and earthy matter.* It is nauseous, and very acrid: one cannot, without difficulty, retain in the mouth, even a small quantity, beyond a few moments; and if attempted, the nauseous taste will remain for nearly an hour. Lieut. Lynch found that the spray from the waves in a gale, evaporating as it fell, left incrustations of salt upon the clothes, hands and face, conveying a prickly sensation wherever it touched the skin,—and being, above all, exceedingly painful to the eyes.—(Page 268.)

So buoyant is this water, that it is next to impossible to sink in it; a fact I saw abundantly illustrated on the north-western corner of this Sea in March last, (1853.) Dr. Robinson says, (Bib. Res. ii: p. 213,) “Two of us bathed in this sea; and although I could never swim before, either in fresh or salt water, yet here I could sit, stand, lie, or swim in the water without difficulty.” Lynch found that his boats lay, at least, one inch higher out of the water when floating on this sea, than in the Jordan, with the same load.—(Page 377.) He declares also, that in a gale which met him in the Dead Sea, “*it seemed, from the density of the water, that the boats were encountering the sledge-hammers of the Titans, rather than the opposing waves of an angry sea.*”—(Page 268.)

In the waters of this lake, no fish, no molusk, no shellfish, no insect, even, is found living. Lynch says, “*this water alone, of all the works of its Maker, contains no living thing within it.*”—(Page 311.) In the water brought by him from the Dead Sea, and which was subjected to a powerful microscope, no animalculæ, and no vestige of animal matter could be detected.—(Page 377, note.) To the same effect is the remark of Dr. Robinson: “According to the testimony of all antiquity, and of most modern travellers, there exists within the waters of the Dead Sea, no living thing; no trace, indeed, of animal or vegetable life.—(Bib. Res. vol. ii., p. 226.)

I myself sought, with close attention, to discover some

* See Analysis, Lynch 509: Bib. Res. vol. ii, pp. 224, 225.

shell, mollusk, or insect in these waters; but I could detect nothing. I did, indeed, pick up a small shell, on a heap of broken sticks and reeds thrown upon the northern head, not far from the little gravelly island; but it was a helix, a land shell, that must have been brought down by the waters of the Jordan.

Along the borders of this sea, and to a considerable distance from its waters, vegetation is dead; and the few shrubs and branches of trees occasionally met with, floating upon its waters, or cast upon the beach, are usually covered with a salty incrustation.

Now the question presents itself, where were situated the cities destroyed by the vengeance of Heaven? and where stood the little city of Zoar, the place of refuge to Lot and his fugitive family,—and which, for his sake, was spared?

All authorities, ancient and modern, agree in assigning them to this locality, or its immediate vicinity. It has, indeed, been generally supposed, that these cities were situated on the southern part of the ancient plain, or vale of Siddim; and that, when overthrown by the vengeance of Heaven, in "*the raining down of fire and brimstone upon them, from the Lord, out of Heaven*," they were, in that terrible catastrophe, (which may probably have been accompanied by an earthquake and volcanic eruptions, of which this locality shows abundant indications,) sunk down, by a subsidence of the ground on which they stood, and covered by the salt waters of the Lake, which then, either first appeared, or at least extended further to the South than it had done anciently.*

* Lieut. Lynch says, "The inference from the Bible, that this entire chasm was a plain, *sunk, and "overwhelmed,"* by the wrath of God, seems to be sustained by the extraordinary character of our soundings. The bottom of this sea consists of *two submerged plains*, an elevated, and a depressed one: the former averaging *thirteen feet*, the latter about *thirteen hundred feet*, below the surface.(†) Between the Jabok and this sea, we unexpectedly found a sudden break-down in the bed of the Jordan. If there be a similar break-down in water courses to the South of the sea, accompanied with like volcanic characters, there can scarce be a doubt, that the whole Ghor has sunk, from some extraordinary convulsion, preceded, most probably by an eruption of fire, and a general conflagration of the bitumen which abounded in the plain."—See, also, Robinson's Bib. Res. vol. ii., p. 602: Lynch's Exped'n. pp. 378, 379.

It has, therefore, been generally supposed, that the site of these destroyed cities is now covered by the waters of the shallow bay of the Dead Sea, to the south of the peninsula above mentioned. While in the sea north of this peninsula, the depth of water is 1300 feet, it averages, in this southern portion, only 13 feet; the bottom here being a soft mud, mixed with sulphur and salt; in this portion, also, the waters yield large quantities of bitumen. All search for the ruins of these doomed cities was, therefore, deemed hopeless; unless it might be Zoar, somewhere on the south-eastern coast, among the mountain ranges of Moab, where the tribes, descended from the incestuous daughters of Lot, are known to reside to this day,—the Moabites and the Ammonites. But the fierce hostility of these tribes has long deterred travellers from attempting extensive explorations on the shores of the Dead Sea, excepting along its northern and north-western borders, which I visited in March last, (1853.) Various enterprising travellers have attempted to explore this sea and its shores, but with little success.*

About 1806, Seetzen published the results of his visit to this region. In 1818, Irby and Mangles also, traveled here.—(Robinson ii., p. 484.) Another party, Costigan and Molyneaux, British explorers, succeeded, to some extent, but the chief officers of this party, and most of the men, died soon after leaving this dreary region, from the hardships and the sickness that met them on this Sea of the Dead. Whatever discoveries they may have made perished with them. The grave of the second in command, in this ill-fated expedition, I saw at Jerusalem. Even Lieut. Lynch's company, at one time, exhibited alarming symptoms of exhaustion and commencing sickness.—(Pages 325, 336, 338.)

* Lieut. Lynch says, "There is a tradition among the Arabs, that no one can venture upon this sea and live. Repeatedly the fate of Costigan and Molyneaux, two English explorers, had been cited, to deter us. These gallant Englishmen lost their lives in attempting to explore this sea.—(Page 311.) The first one spent a few days, the last one about 20 hours, and returned to the place from whence he had embarked, without landing upon its shores. One was found dying upon its shores, and the other expired in November last, immediately after his return, of fever contracted upon its waters."—Lynch's Exped'n. p. 369. Sickness invaded also, Lynch's party, (p. 338,) and Mr. Dale, one of the party, died near Beirut, of fever, contracted here.—(Pages 502, 507.)

To the honor of this western Republic it can be said, that Lieut. Lynch of the U. S. Navy, and to a certain extent, under the patronage of the American Government, first succeeded, 1847 and 1848, in the attempt to enter the Dead Sea by descending the Jordan. With two boats constructed expressly for the purpose, he explored every part of the Dead Sea; he took and recorded the soundings of its depths in every direction,—he landed at many points, both on the eastern and western coasts, and he has furnished to the world, a fuller, more minute, and more accurate account of this dismal lake, and of its dismal coasts, than is found in any other work as yet published.

To the accuracy of the statements given by Lieut. Lynch, I can bear cheerful testimony, although to a very limited extent along the northern and north-western coasts. The hostility and thievish rapacity of the tribes on the eastern and southern coasts of the Dead Sea, render explorations in those regions, dangerous and difficult. The sleepless vigilance and undaunted courage of Lieut. Lynch alone, saved his party, numerous and well-armed though they were, from the treacherous designs of the Arab around Kerak, on the eastern coast.—(Pages 364, 366.) Even in our own case, short though the sojourn we contemplated in this locality, and though we went, a numerous company, and well armed, yet a strong escort of Arabs, engaged by agents, sent out from Jerusalem to accompany us, was deemed necessary for our safety, and we could see, as we journeyed, detachments of these, our guard, passing from one mountain-height to another, to descry in the distance, and give timely notice of any approaching, hostile, or suspicious-looking body of men.

One gentleman of our party, more adventurous than the rest, made a compact with one of the most powerful of these marauding Sheikhs, to conduct him in safety to Gebel Sdoum, or Usdum, the mountain of salt, near the south-west coast of the Dead Sea, and which has by some been held to be the site of ancient Sodom. I parted with this gentleman, (Mr. Beaumont,) at Jerusalem, before he set out on the expedition, and I saw him at Damascus after his return. He assured me in general terms, of his success, but with the particulars I was not made acquainted.

In the narrative of Lieut. Lynch, there is one singular statement, which has excited a good deal of interest, and which is likely to produce still more, and lead to no little discussion from the fact, that a recent French exploring party, conducted by DeSaulcy, deny its truth.

Lieut. Lynch shared in the current belief that the southern waters of this sea cover the guilty cities.—(Page 307.) But while carefully cruising along the southwestern coast, a little south from the extreme northern end of Gebel Usdum, he saw, to his amazement, at the head of a deep, narrow, and abrupt chasm in this mountain of salt, a lofty, round pillar, standing apparently, detached from the general mass of the mountains.

This column he saw from his boat. He landed and examined it, in company with Dr. Anderson. The beach was a soft, slimy mud, incrustated with salt, and a short distance from the water, it was covered with saline fragments and cakes of bitumen. He found this pillar to be of solid salt, capped with carbonate of lime, cylindrical in front, and pyramidal behind. It was about forty feet high, and was connected with the mountain behind, by a sort of post, or buttress. It stands on a kind of oval pedestal, about 60 feet above the level of the waters.

Josephus, in his antiquities, Clemens Romanus, and also, Irenaeus of the Second century, all mention such a pillar as existing somewhere in this region.

But now, in a work entitled "*Voyage aux Villes Maudites*," Paris, 1852, by A. S. DeSaulcy, describing the visit of DeSaulcy and his companions to the accursed cities, about a year before my visit to these regions, the lively writer seeks to throw discredit on the work of the American explorer. He mercilessly ridicules the entire account given by Lieut. Lynch, respecting the pillar of salt, and attributes the story "to the imagination of the American officer," insinuating that he has ventured on a pretended verification of the statement found in certain ancient authors.

Now, independently of the insolent tone in which this insinuation is conveyed,—the denial and the insinuation itself, are unworthy of the French savant who has published them, and unworthy of his nation!

DeSaulcy and his companions traveled by land, around

the southern shores of the Dead Sea, diverging at times, necessarily, from the beach and from the coast.

Now, the sketch furnished by Lynch, of the ravine in the side of Mt. Usdum, where he found this pillar standing, and his account in the text, of the manner in which he came in view of it, at 9 o'clock, A. M., April 26th, 1848, (p. 307,) clearly show that a person skirting these shores by land, must necessarily pass on the inland side of this bold ravine, which stands at the sea-ward foot of this mountain of salt. DeSaulcy's party could not have come in view of this pillar of salt, nor even of the ravine in which it stands, unless they had been coasting in a boat, which they did not possess, or unless they had been travelling on the beach itself, between the water and the mountain, which the deep slime here prevailing, renders impossible. The difficulty of moving on the beach, in front of the ravine, has already been noticed; and for some distance below, it is the same. Just opposite to the cave in Usdum, described by Robinson, Lieut. Lynch says, (p. 209,) "Mr. Dale landed, to observe for the latitude. His feet sunk, first, through a layer of slimy mud, a foot deep, then through a crust of salt, then through another foot of mud, before reaching a firm bottom. The beach was so hot as to blister the feet. From the water's edge he made his way, with difficulty, for more than a hundred yards, over black mud, coated with salt and bitumen." Plain it is, then, that DeSaulcy's party, traveling on horseback, could not by any possibility, have passed either by water, or on the beach at the foot of the cliffs, whence alone, they could have obtained a view of this pillar of salt. And yet, because DeSaulcy *did not see* that, which, traveling in the manner he did, *he could not have seen*, he boldly denies its existence altogether, and with an insulting air of superiority over this "Monsieur le Capitaine American," he virtually charges a gallant and accomplished officer of the American Navy, with fabricating and deliberately publishing a lie! and that too, in a narrative officially reported,—a narrative that exhibits on every page, the characteristic impress of modesty and candor! Such littleness of national prejudice, or of personal vanity, is unworthy a scholar and a man.

The sneering remarks of Monsieur Edouard Delessert, the chronicler of the discoveries in DeSaulcy's expedition, "Quelle gloire pour au musée National que de posséder la statue de la femme de Loth! Mais cette gloire leur sera refusée à tous, je vous garantie," (p. 80.)—"*What glory for a national museum to possess the statue of Lot's wife: But this glory will be denied to them (the Americans,) by all, I pledge you my word,*"—betrays the operation of an unworthy motive, and is redolent of a supercilious vanity.*

* The entire narrative of De Saulcy's Expedition, evinces the same self-conceit, and contempt for the American explorers. Thus, after coming upon extensive ranges of foundation walls, and angles, indicating former rectangular superstructures, on the western slope of Usdum, the mountain of salt,—he remarks, "Nous avons constaté une grande quantité de ces angles, si important puisque ils attestent la présence d'une ville, et de quelle ville: de Sodome! La conviction acquise que Sodome était là! Non pas sous les eaux, comme se plaisait à le penser le public intelligent qui ne croit que ce qu'il veut, bien croire,—comme l'a affirmé très légèrement l'expédition conduite par le Capitaine Lynch; cette conviction, des Je, nous semble la première récompense de nos fatigues: ce n'était, du reste, que le commencement, mais nous connaissons Sodome, *Sdoum* comme le désignent nos Arabes, près de la montagne qui porte son nom, Djebel *Sdoum*: il n'y avait pas à douter! Voyage aux Villes Maudetes," (page 78.)—We have traced a great number of these angles, so important, because they show the presence of a city;—and of what city!—of *Sodom*! The conviction thus obtained, that *Sodom* was *there*, and *not under the water*, as the wise public chooses to think; that public which believes only as it chooses to believe,—and as the expedition conducted by Capt. Lynch has very inconsiderately, (very lightly,) affirmed it to be,—this conviction, I say, seems to us the first recompense of our fatigues: as to the rest, this was but the commencement;—but we have found *Sodom*, *Sdoum*, as our Arabs call it, near to the mountain which bears its name, "*Djebel Sdoum*." There was no room here for doubt.

This mountain, Usdum, or Gebel *Sdoum*, has been known for ages; its name has been known; that it is one mass of salt has been known; and that ruins were in its vicinity has been known. And yet these French travellers, because they came upon some of these ruins, and because their Arab attendants repeat the name *Sdoum*, which is given to the mountain in memory of the dread catastrophe it seems to commemorate, and therefore given to the ruins that may be upon, or near it, speak of their achievements as of an original discovery, (see the remarks on p. 79, respecting the salt of this mountain;) and they treat the opinion of other travellers, in reality neither less learned, less observant, nor less adventurous than themselves, with sovereign contempt.—(Comp. Rob. Bib. Res. v. ii. p. 483, 484.)

A little further on, (p. 79,) our French explorer continues: "Nous ne pouvions pas revenir de notre étonnement à la vue de ce singulier rocher de nouvelle composition,—(and yet Robinson has more fully described this same mountain of salt, Bib. Res. ii., 482-486;) and Lynch also mentions its composition, (p. 307.) isolé ainsi au milieu de tant de montagnes en-

And yet this same DeSaulcy, or his chronicler, Monsieur Edouard Delessert, professes to have discovered the ruins of the city of Sodom in extensive foundations of walls of houses and other edifices, on the northern slope of this very mountain of salt, (Voyage, &c. p. 77: 78,) and not far from its base. The Arabs give to these ruins, as well as to the mountain on which they stand, the

virontes, et toutes sortes de souvenirs bibliques venaient nous assailler; mais j'ai moins d'imagination que le Capitaine Lynch, et si cet habile explorateur a pu voir la statue de la femme de Loth, et aller jus qu'à en donner un dessein, Je ne pourrai, moi, ni vous en attester la presence, ni vous en fournir la representation: car Je ne l'ai pas vue, et, *qui plus est, Je crains fort, qu'on ne puisse pas le voir*; le Capitaine Lynch c'est peut être autorise' de certains vers de Tertullien, qui donne des details tres precises sur cette *pretendue statue*,—ou d'oeuvres d'autres ecrivains, plus credules encore, ou plus * * * * inexact: mais dans ce cas il aurait du lire la fin de tous les passages ou il en est question, et ou l'auteur que parle, a soin d'ajouter—*Je ne l'ai pas vue, n'y etans pas alle*.—Nous aurions biens voulu leur donner raison a tous. Quelle gloire pour un Musee National que de posseder," &c. &c., as above cited in the text!—"We could not recover from our astonishment at the sight of this singular rock of *novel composition* (salt,) thus isolated amid so many surrounding mountains; and all sorts of Biblical reminiscences began to crowd in upon us. But, *I have less imagination than has Captain Lynch*; and if this skilful explorer has been able to gain a sight of the statue of Lot's wife, and even to go so far as to give a sketch of it,—for myself, at least, I could neither certify to its presence, nor furnish you with a representation of it; for I have not seen it: and what is more, *I greatly fear it is not to be seen!*—Captain Lynch may, perhaps, fortify himself by reference to certain lines of Tertullian, who gives very precise details respecting this *pretended statue*,—or to the works of other writers, more credulous still, or more * * inexact: but, in this case, he should have read to the close of all those passages in which it is mentioned, and where the author who speaks, has the precaution to add, *'I have not seen it, not having myself been on the spot.'* We should always cheerfully render to all their due. 'What glory for a national museum,'" &c. &c. as above.

Now the whole of the above passages are disingenuous and unjust: they leave the impression that the writer and his party first discovered this locality, and first ascertained the material of Djebel Usdum to be salt; whereas Dr. Robinson and several others have minutely described it before them.

They also leave the reader to infer that Lynch represents his discovery as being precisely that of *the very statue of Lot's wife*: whereas Lynch simply states the fact of his finding, in a ravine in Usdum, a pillar 40 feet high, rising from a knoll, or oval pedestal, 60 feet high, above the level of the water; the pillar and the pedestal being, like the whole mountain at whose base it stands, composed of rock salt, (p. 307.) Lynch says nothing about a statue of Lot's wife,—but he leaves his readers to draw their own inferences, from a comparison with the Bible story.—Gen. xix. 26.

The modesty of the American, and the dogmatic confidence of the Frenchman, are here in striking contrast!

name Sdoum, or Usdum, *i. e.* Sodom; and the mountain itself, they sometimes call, *Djebel el Melehh*, "*the mountain of salt.*"

About three or three and a half miles, a little to the north of west from these ruins, Mons. DeSaulcy thinks, he discovered the site of Zoar.—(Page 173.) This is the Zoweir, or Zuweirah of the Arabs and of Robinson.—Bib. Res. vol. ii: pp. 480, 661, 662.

At a rugged point in the same chain of mountains, but considerably more to the west, and a little northerly, the same author came upon a spot which his guide told him, was once a considerable city, Ouadi el Thameh, which God destroyed for its wickedness. From this one circumstance of the slight resemblance in the sound of the names, (for he does not speak of any considerable ruins yet visible there,) Mons. DeSaulcy concludes this must have been the ancient *Admah*.—(Page 181, and note 12.

Zeboim, our French explorer, thinks he finds, in ruins on the eastern coast, among the mountains directly opposite to the middle of the neck of the peninsula, and not very far from Kerak, the capital of Moab. Kerak is a strongly fortified place, where dwell a few Christians, but which is ruled by a powerful sheikh of the hostile Arab tribes of the Eastern coast.—"*Voyage aux Villes Maudites,*" p. 164, and note 10.

Gomorrah, the other one of the five doomed cities, Mons. DeSaulcy locates among the mountains on the north-western coast of this Dead Sea, and within a day's journey of the Convent of Bar.—(Saba, see his map.)

Now, it may be said that the narrative in Genesis does not absolutely require us to suppose that all the cities except Zoar, must now be submerged beneath the waters of the Dead Sea; but yet the devastation, judging from that narrative itself, seems to have been confined to the plain: Thus—"*He overthrew those cities and all the plain, and all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew upon the plain.*"—Gen. xix: 25. Compare this with Gen. xiv: 2, 3, where these five cities are mentioned as *joined together, in the vale of Siddim, which is the Salt Sea.*" The specification of the place, "*vale of Siddim,*" seems here to designate the locality of the

cities, rather than the spot where a league was agreed to; and this spot is described as being, in the writer's time, a *Salt Sea*—"The vale of Siddim, which is the *Salt Sea*," a designation perfectly appropriate to the lake Asphaltites.

And that the ancient vale of Siddim, is now the bottom of this lake, the nature of the locality shows. There is here no other vale. The mountains rise directly from the water's edge on nearly all sides. The narrow beach occasionally found between the water and the mountain's base, is a deep mud, mixed with salt and bitumen. On the south there is an open extent of land, for some distance from the sea, but, both DeSaulcy and Lynch, describe it as a deep, salt-slime, a mere quag-mire, almost impassable.

The party accompanying DeSaulcy, had the utmost difficulty in getting round the outer-edge of this quag. Their horses, even on its border, sank in mire up to the saddle-girths. One horse they lost, suffocated in the mire.—(See DeSaulcy's description of the quag-mire plain, *la Sabkhah*, pp. 169, 174.)

On the western coast also, around the base of Usdum, and not far indeed, from the ruins, he regards as Sodom, "The soil," he tells us, "is a strange compound of salt, with a little earth, and so soft that the feet of the horses left deep indentations. There it was that the party had to make a considerable circuit, in order to avoid a spot where, only a year previously, (in 1850,) a loaded camel instantly disappeared, in a gulf that opened suddenly, beneath it to a depth of 80 feet."—(Voyage, &c., p. 77.)

So exactly does this southern shore—the small remaining rim of the ancient vale of Siddim, correspond to the account given by Moses, who says, (Gen. xiv : 10,) "*The vale of Siddim was full of slime pits*," insomuch that two of the five confederate kings, or sheikhs, in the hasty flight after their defeat, "*fell there*."

A comparison of the 19th and 14th Chapters of Genesis, leads to the conclusion that the idea generally current, is correct, viz: that the doomed cities were on the plain, *i. e.*, in the vale of Siddim, "*which is now on the Salt Sea*," and that they are therefore, now covered by its waters. This supposition, so naturally awakened by

the narrative, in Genesis, is unsparingly ridiculed by the narrator of Mons. DeSaulcy, "Voyage aux Villes Mau-dites." And yet the appearance of the locality at this day confirms this supposition, from the rugged charac-ter of the surrounding mountains, and their utter sterility.

Mons. DeSaulcy himself declares that the whole of Djebel Usdum, on which stand the substructions which he calls the ruins of Sodom, is one vast mass of good, fine salt, only variously coloured; it is 300 feet high, and twelve French kidometres, or about 13,124 yards across.

Now, Mons. DeSaulcy demands, if these substruc-tions be not the remains of ancient Sodom, of what city can they be the ruins? The buildings of which they show the foundation, must have been standing there *be-fore the catastrophe of Sodom*,—because no city could have been built there afterwards. There are here no natural streams of pure water; and cisterns could not have been excavated, in a mass of pure salt, for holding water. On such ground no man could live,—much less the inhabitants of a large city. The rock beneath their feet, and for thousands of yards, on all sides of them, being pure salt, a supply of water would have been im-possible, and the city must have perished of thirst!

The learned Frenchman does not seem to be aware that this circumstance would be equally fatal to the hypothesis, that this was one of the doomed cities, for no inhabitant could have lived there! Unless, indeed, we be prepared to admit, that not only were these cities destroyed by volcanic action, and by earthquake, so that all the evil inhabitants perished, but also, that *the whole mountain* on which Sodom stood, whatever may have been the original material of the mountain, *was changed miraculously, into a vast mass of pure salt*; and yet so gently and so skilfully was the change effected, that the rectangular substructions, the foundation walls of Sod-om's buildings, remained in their original position, and *remained still stone, unchanged*, the regularity of the lines and angles continuing unbroken. This would be a miracle not recorded by Moses, but equal to any miracle recorded in the Bible!

The triumphant demand of DeSaulcy, "What city

could this have been if it was not Sodom?—What people could, after the catastrophe of the Pentapolis, have had the incredible idea of establishing, far from all drinkable water, a city on a soil of salt, in which it became from that time, impossible to dig cisterns?"—(Voyage, &c., p. 201, note 4.)—remaining as it must, unanswered, furnishes no ground for concluding that this is the site of the ancient Sodom! It would lead us, rather to infer that these substructions mark the site of some military work, some strong fortress, not that of a city. A garrison, located in one place, for a time only, and subject to be removed, and followed by fresh troops, may submit to inconveniences of position, that would be fatal to a city, whose population are permanent residents of the spot. For a garrison, other means of securing a supply of water might be provided, besides cisterns excavated in the rock, on which their citadel may have been built. Artificial cisterns constructed above ground, and filled by rain conducted into them from the roofs of the buildings, might have been in use here, as with us now, in many places, where deleterious ingredients in the soil prevent the possibility of a supply of water by means of wells,—moreover, fresh water might have been brought from regions beyond the limits of the salt mountain, just as the town of Suez is at this day supplied with water, brought on camels from a distance.

At the distance of about three and a half miles from the above ruins, to the west, a little northerly, are found, on the side of a hill, and not far from the crater of an extinct volcano, ruins of some extent, but less considerable than those of Sdoum. These ruins are named by the Arabs Zouera, or Zuweira. In these ruins; Mons. DeSaulcy recognizes Zoar, the little city to which Lot was permitted to flee, and which was spared at Lot's intercession.

This identity Mons. DeSaulcy argues on three distinct grounds: first, the name; secondly, its proximity to Sdoum; and thirdly, its position, neither on the mountain, nor on the plain.

First, then, Zouera, he contends, is Zoar, from the similarity of the name. This argument is weak, at best,—conclusive it could not be; and Dr. Robinson affirms,

that the Hebrew Zoar, and the Arabic Zuweira, are radically different,—the one cannot have been softened into the other, since in Zoar is found the Hebrew *ain*, the most incorrigible of all letters, which never falls away in the middle of a word.—(Robinson's Bib. Res. ii : 480.)

But, secondly, the proximity of Zouera to Sdoun, he argues, is strongly evincive that it must be Zoar. It is above an hour's travel from Sdoun; but as Lot left Sodom when the day was breaking,—and as the sun was just risen as he entered Zoar,—Zoar must have been about an hour's distance from Sodom.—(Gen. xix : 15, comp. 23.)

But, if Zoar be on the eastern coast of the Dead Sea, as Irby and Mangles supposed, and as Dr. Robinson contends, (vol. ii : p. 481,) an interval of eight hours would have been requisite to pass from Sodom to Zoar, even if the sea did not then, as it now does, cover most of the intervening space.

But now, as the resemblance of the names is not decisive, so this second argument, based on the proximity of the two places, is inconclusive. If the modern Sdoun be not (as M. DeSauley contends it is,) the true site of the ancient Sodom, then the argument in favour of Zouera, as the true Zoar, based on the ground of the close proximity of Zouera to Sdoun, is worthless,—and the objection against the location of Zoar on the eastern coast, falls with it. If Usdum be not the ancient Sodom, then that city may have stood on some point of what is now the bed of the Dead Sea, below the peninsula,—perhaps, very near the mouth of the Wady Kerak, opening on that peninsula, and where are ruins deemed by many, as by Irby and Mangles, (Travels, p. 448,) to be the true Zoar, and in this opinion Robinson coincides, (ii, p. 481.)

The third argument offered by M. DeSauley for his location of the Zoar of the Bible is, that Zouera stands between Ouadi et Thameh (Admah,) and Sdoun, (Sodom,) two condemned cities, both of them on the mountain, while Zouera is *neither on the mountain, nor on the plain*, and that the sacred text speaks of a disaster which affected *all the plain and the mountain!*—(Page 215, close of note 12.) It is to be regretted that Mons. DeS. did not quote, or give reference to the *sacred texts*, which represent the disaster of the condemned cities as

affecting *the mountain, and all the plain*. The narrative in Genesis declares *that the whole plain, with the cities upon it, and all the inhabitants of these cities, and all that grew upon the plain, were totally destroyed!* but, instead of recording *the destruction of the mountain with the plain, the very reverse is implied*. The angel charged Lot, "Escape for thy life, look not behind thee, *neither stay thou in all the plain, escape to the mountain lest thou be consumed.*"—(Gen. xix: 17.) Here the *mountain* is pointed to as affording *security* from the coming calamity;—the plain,—*the whole plain was to be overwhelmed,—and the plain only!*

This argument for the identity of Zouera and Zoar is, therefore, worthless. But, the overthrow of this argument sends a more devastating sweep still, over the whole hypothesis of Mons. DeSauley, and over all his boasted discoveries. He has found ancient ruins near the Dead Sea, but these ruins are *all*, without exception, *among the mountains*. The mountains were pronounced by the angel visitor of Lot, *safe from the coming disaster*.

The ruins discovered by Mons. DeSauley and his party, cannot, therefore, be the ruins of the doomed cities destroyed by the vengeance of Heaven in the days of Lot!

This circumstance would be fatal to the identity of all these sites, with the ancient sites, unless it might be that of Zoar. But for the location of Zoar on the eastern coast, there are other and cogent reasons. Zoar, the immediate refuge of Lot, from the dread calamity, must have been near the mountain-range to which he removed afterwards, and where he dwelt,—and in that mountain range, and the regions around it, his descendants would probably settle.

But it is among the mountain ranges to the east of the Dead Sea, that the Moabites, and Ammonites, the descendants of Lot, are known to have dwelt in ancient times, and there they still dwell.—(Lynch, p. 317.) That country was anciently, and it is still called, the country of Moab, and those are the mountains of Moab. There is, therefore, strong historical evidence, for the location of Zoar on the eastern, and not on the western coast.*

* It may be said, that if Zoar were on the eastern coast, then the salt pillar seen by Lynch on the western coast, cannot be the pillar of salt into

Had the modern Zuweirah been the the ancient Zoar, as these French travellers contend,—then, when Lot went and dwelt in the mountains,—(Gen. xix. 30.)—he would not have either crossed the Salt Sea, nor passed round by its slimy quag-mire southern shore, to reach the mountains on the eastern coast, if the Dead Sea and southern coast were left, after the catastrophe of Sodom, as we now find them. He would have gone higher up, among the mountains now constituting the desert of Judea, and his descendants would have been found occupying southern Palestine, rather than the regions of Moab, east and south-east of the Dead Sea.

But, whether he be right or wrong in his conjectures, and in his alleged discoveries, Mons. DeSaulcy does, in the facts stated, and the observations recorded in his narrative respecting this Lake of Death, and its surrounding region of frightful sterility,—just as truly as Lynch, in his narrative, or as Robinson, in his researches,—lend confirmation, and confirmation only, to the marvellous narrative in Genesis.

His theory may be forgotten, and his claim to important original discovery be remembered only with a smile, but the country, even as he describes it, is much such as others have found it,—and such as the Bible account might lead us to expect it would be found!

What a wonderful book, then, is the Bible! All its statements become only the more convincingly confirmed, the more minutely you can investigate them.

Here is a narrative, not written by an eye-witness,—and very brief,—recording a convulsion of nature, the

which Lot's wife was changed, Gen. xix. 26; because she was moving towards the east,—and this pillar of salt, now on the western coast, was in a totally different direction. This is true! We do not contend for the identity of this pillar, although it may be that mysterious pillar of salt.—If so, then, while Sodom was in the plain now submerged, Zoar must have been on the west coast, and Lot, or his descendants, must afterwards have passed round the southern extremity of the Dead Sea, to the eastern side, where his posterity still are.

But, even in that case, DeSaulcy is no nearer to the truth. Zouera cannot be the site of ancient Zoar,—for it is too far distant from any part of the plain, to be reached *in one hour*, by persons moving in a direction which would take them past the spot where the pillar of salt now stands. And as to the other localities, they are *all* found among the *mountains*, which were *safe* from the calamity that destroyed the whole plain.

most wonderful the world ever saw,—and written by one who had not been on the spot, (for Moses never entered Palestine, and could hardly have had an opportunity of examining, in his own person, this strange locality; and yet, after the lapse of nearly 4000 years, the locality is found to exhibit unmistakeable evidences of some great convulsion, unusual and inexplicable, but obviously much resembling what Moses so briefly hints at; and the effect of which was, to change the whole aspect of the country, and leave it a scene of desolation, fearful and unparalleled among all the marvels of our world. Nay, the very traditions, still current among the wild tribes of this region, fierce, intractable, ignorant of the art of reading, and proverbially tenacious of old customs, and ancient traditions, all present dimly, but obviously, the same fearful images of enormous guilt, visited by unparalleled vengeance from Heaven in this dismal region, and all lend confirmation to the Mosaic narrative,—while even the *traditional* names, still borne by several of the most noted spots, although now attached to vicinities, rather than to precise localities, still echo back the Mosaic names, and corroborate the Mosaic Record!

Whence, then, this wonderful accuracy in a narrative so brief, and respecting events so remote in antiquity, so unexampled in history,—and respecting too, a region so wild, and so long totally inaccessible to strangers?

All this super-human accuracy clearly bespeaks the guidance of unerring knowledge, the controlling power of inspiration, over the mind and the hand of the penman of this narrative;—and it proclaims this ancient story of primitive marvels, *a part of the Record of Eternal Truth, a message from the mighty God of Nature, to His erring creature, man!*

ARTICLE III.

THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH.

The unity of the Church is not merely a duty, but a fact. There is but one true Church of Christ; there never can be more. This general statement, it is presumed, will be admitted by all who are tolerably acquainted with the New Testament. But in what does this unity consist? The obvious answer is, *In a common relation to the same glorious Head*. If the reference is to the Church invisible, a man is proved a member of *that*, by the fact of standing in a certain spiritual relation to the Lord Jesus Christ; and in no other way.—And, as all believers stand in the same spiritual relation to Him, it follows that they are all members of the same church. If the reference is to the visible church, the answer must be modified, so far only as the difference of reference requires. The proof of membership in the visible church, is a certain visible relation to Christ.—The relation meant is a covenant relation. All members of the church stand in the same visible relation to Christ, being bound by the same covenant. Hence, they are members of the same church. The unity of the church depends on the unity of the covenant.

The question is often debated, whether Abraham and his family were members of the same visible church that now exists; in other words, whether the church was instituted as early as the time of that Patriarch. Those who maintain the affirmative, rely on the identity of the covenant, alleging that the church now stands on the covenant which was made with Abraham, and of which circumcision was the token. That is, they infer the unity of the church, from the unity of the covenant.—Those who hold the negative, deny the fact alleged, but they never question the relevancy of the argument. So far as this application of the principle is concerned, we are not aware that any human being has ever denied it. We have the concurrent voice of all Christendom in favour of the position that the unity of the covenant, *if*

it can be proved, will establish the unity of the church,—establish it, after the lapse of almost four thousand years,—establish it, after all the changes implied in the transition from the Patriarchal dispensation to the Mosaic, and from the Mosaic dispensation to the Christian. And, if this is true, we may safely infer that nothing which is not incompatible with the unity of the covenant can be incompatible with the unity of the church.

The following passage of Scripture contains not only an explicit assertion of the unity of the church, but a formal enumeration of the particulars comprehended in that doctrine. "There is one body, and one spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all."—Eph. iv : 4-6.

In investigating the bearing of this passage on our subject, the phrase "*one baptism*," claims our first attention. We conceive, baptism is here contemplated as the token of the covenant; and the unity asserted consists in the unity of the covenant into which all baptized persons are introduced. Baptized into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, they are all brought under a covenant obligation to the service of the triune Jehovah. The service demanded is the obedience of faith, the rule of that obedience the Gospel, the promise of the covenant (that is, the hope set before us,) salvation—eternal life. As confirmatory of this statement, the reader will please compare the following passages: Matt. xxviii : 19, 20; 1 Cor. i : 12, 13; 1 Cor. x : 2; Rom. vi : 1-4; Mark xvi : 16. If you substitute any other name for the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, or a different service for the obedience of faith, or a different rule for the Gospel, or a different hope for the hope of salvation, you have another covenant; and of course, another baptism. The unity of the baptism, then, depends on the unity of the covenant.

To return to the passage before us. If the word *faith*, here means an exercise of the human soul, it describes the obligation. If it means *the Gospel*, (and the sacred writers frequently use it in this sense,) it points out the

rule of the service required. On either supposition, the purport of the passage is the same. Paul, then, having asserted the unity of the *body*, or church, proceeds to specify six particulars in which that unity consists.—Five of these relate to the persons of the Godhead, faith and hope. The remaining one relates to baptism. But we have seen that the unity of the baptism depends on the unity of the covenant, and this consists in unity as to the other five particulars. Hence it follows, that the unity of the covenant comprehends all that is included in the unity of the church, and nothing more.

Mention is often made of a secret dispensation of grace, or of salvation by uncovenanted mercy. We allude to this idea, for the purpose of introducing a single remark: If any man is saved in that way, his title to salvation cannot be proved from the Gospel. The Gospel assures the salvation of no man, otherwise than by the promise of the covenant. It says nothing about any man being saved, *who is not in covenant with God*.—Now, let it be remembered, the covenant referred to is the covenant on which the church rests. We have, then, no warrant to regard any man as an heir of salvation, unless we have a right to regard him as under that covenant; but to be visibly and publicly under that covenant is identical with being a member of the visible church. Hence, if a man is not a member of the visible church, we can regard him as an heir of salvation on no other ground but this, that owing to ignorance or error in him, or to something peculiar in God's providential dealings with him, his public and visible relation misrepresents the spiritual relation in which he stands to God the Saviour. If a man is not a member of the church, no matter for what cause, he stands *before men* in the attitude of one who acknowledges no subjection to the Lord Jesus, and has no interest in his promise of salvation. This view leads to another.

The distinction between the Church Universal and a particular church, is unequivocally recognised in Scripture, and quite too obvious to require illustration. Now, it will be readily admitted, that one cannot be constituted a member of the former by union with a particular society which has no just claim to be considered as the

latter. But he who, as to public relation, is under that covenant in which God promises salvation through Jesus Christ, is, as we have seen, a member of the visible church. It follows that, if a society exists for church purposes, its claim to be regarded as a true church of Jesus Christ is not vitiated by any fault which, if found in an individual, would not vitiate his claim to be regarded as a servant of Christ, or an heir of salvation.— In judging of an organized society, the test is, of course, to be applied to what she has done *in that capacity*, and especially to the avowed principles of her organization.

The church is the kingdom of Christ; and the visible relation of any individual or society to Him, determines the visible relation of such individual or society to her. In Him, the kingly office and the priestly office are so united, that a proper recognition of either necessarily includes the recognition of both. *That Jesus is "the Christ, the Son of the living God,"* is the rock, on which is built that Church, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail. He, then, who *cordially* acknowledges Jesus, in the character signified by this phrase, "*the Christ, the Son of the living God,*" is necessarily a member of the Church invisible; and if the fact is duly manifested, he is necessarily a member of the visible church. And precisely the same rule must be applied for determining the relation of organized societies, claiming to be churches, to the visible church of Christ. Whether the question relates to an individual or a society, a claim bearing, at first view, an imposing aspect, may be nullified or disproved, by the circumstances with which it is accompanied. For example, it may be acknowledged, in words, that Jesus is the Messiah, and yet views may be adopted and avowed absolutely incompatible with the recognition of the idea which the Scriptures have taught us to attach to that proposition. There are truths which, if a man deny, we may not regard him as a disciple of Christ; on the other hand, there are questions, evidently susceptible of being determined from Scripture, on which a man may dissent from us, without thereby giving us any reasonable ground to doubt his Christian character. There is constant occasion for applying this principle to individuals. Ecclesiastical officers, for ex-

ample, must apply it to every applicant for admission to the Lord's table. In most cases, the application is quite evident; in some, there is reasonable ground of doubt. Now, if we can judge of the credibility of the claim made by an individual, to the character of a disciple of Christ; we may, by just the same rule, judge of the credibility of the claim made by a society, to the character of a church of Christ.

The unity of the church, then, consists in the common relation of all the parts to the Lord Jesus Christ. If the question relates to the Church invisible, membership is proved by that hidden life which flows from spiritual union with Him; if to the visible church, by our visible relation to Him, as his servants, bound, *by covenant*, to serve him according to the Gospel. But in no sense, does the unity of the church depend on a common subjection to one *visible* Head—to any mere man, or body of mere men. This is only saying, in other words, that Christ is sole Head of the Church. There are, it is admitted, functions of government in the church, which must be performed by mortals, acting in the name, and by the authority of the Lord Jesus. So, in a State, every county may have a distinct bench of magistrates; this is perfectly consistent with the unity of the States, because all the magistrates hold office under the same sovereign authority.

Neither in the kingdoms of this world, nor in the kingdom of Christ, does every particular violation of the law necessarily destroy or disprove the relation of subjects to their Sovereign. Ignorance or mistake, as to the import of many of the Redeemer's precepts, may co-exist with profound reverence for his authority; nor can any fault, thus originating, infer separation from the church, unless it can be shown that Christ has so decided. This principle, which is irresistibly involved in the identity of the church with the kingdom of Christ, will enable us to judge correctly of several doctrines which have been maintained on the subject now under discussion.

Roman Catholics believe that the Pope is "Christ's vicar upon earth;" hence, the unity of the church depends on the common subjection of all the parts to the

Pope; and no man can be a member of the church while he is not subject to the Pope. Now the last of these propositions does not necessarily follow from the first. Suppose Christ has appointed the Pope his vicar, it is certain that many whose sincerity cannot be reasonably doubted, profess to revere the authority of Christ, while they refuse subjection to the Pope, *on the ground that Christ has never appointed him his vicar.* Here, by the supposition, is a mistake as to a question of fact; and nothing more. Does this mistake place them beyond the pale of the church? To support the affirmative, it is not sufficient to prove that Christ has made the appointment in question; there must be produced some declaration of Christ, implying that ignorance of this appointment, or (what amounts to the same thing,) a misapprehension of its meaning, is incompatible with membership in his kingdom.

We do not believe such a declaration can be shown; but this is not all. We are confident the appointment itself can never be proved. And, for a masterly and satisfactory refutation of the arguments relied on for that purpose, we beg leave to refer our readers to Calvin's Institutes, Book iv: chap. 6.

We even think the appointment can be disproved. Let the following considerations be fairly weighed:

1. The silence of the sacred writers on the subject, in connexions in which the mention of the appointment would have been natural and even unavoidable, had such an appointment been recognised. For example, a passage already quoted, contains a formal enumeration of the particulars in which unity belongs to the church. Could the unity of the visible head have been omitted, if that had been a part of Paul's doctrine? Will it be said that the first particular—the unity of the "*body*"—necessarily implies the unity of the Head? True; but the unity of the *invisible* Head satisfies the conditions of the argument. In the same chapter, is an enumeration of the classes of instructors given by Christ, "for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ." They are apostles, prophets, evangelists, and pastors, and teachers.—(Eph. 4: 11, 12.) Did Paul know of an office superior

to all these, admitting of but one incumbent at a time, and conveying to that incumbent supreme power over the whole church? That he should have known it, and yet not mentioned it, is absolutely incredible. Let it be observed that the disparity between such an office and the apostleship simply considered, is quite as great as the disparity between the apostleship and any other office here mentioned. Of course, the difficulty is not removed by saying that the Pope is included in the word "*apostles*." Here, then, are two lists, given by inspiration, and each bearing every mark of being intended for a complete list; neither can be complete without the mention of the Pope, if he is, indeed, Christ's vicar; and yet he is mentioned in neither. This implies much more than the mere want of Scripture testimony in favor of the doctrine.

2. The end for which the Pope is alleged to have been appointed, is represented in Scripture as fully accomplished in another way. What is meant, when the Pope is called Christ's vicar? We think the following answer correct, though the language is our own: The meaning is, that since Christ is not now present in body with his Church, *as he was present with his disciples during the time of his personal ministry*, he has appointed the Pope to act as his substitute, to an extent which that fact must determine. To this doctrine, then, we oppose the statement, that the vacancy occasioned by the departure of Christ is completely filled by the Holy Spirit; and, therefore, there is neither need nor room for a mortal substitute. In confirmation of this statement, we appeal to John xiv: 15, 18, and John xvi: 7, 16.

Independently of any official services rendered by the Pope, Christ fills his church the more completely, executes his kingly functions the more fully, and bestows the blessings of his reign the more largely, in consequence of his exaltation. Indeed, he is exalted for these very purposes. Hence, there can be no possible need for a Pope, to act as his vicar.—(Eph. 4: 7, 10.)

3. It will be remembered that, according to the Roman Catholic doctrine, Peter was the first Pope; and it is in the character of his successor that any other Pope is to be regarded as Christ's vicar. Now, our Saviour, du-

ring his personal ministry, was visibly present with his disciples, and evidently needed no vicar. Did Peter, then, act in that capacity after our Lord's ascension? This is the question to which, we think, an answer may be deduced from the five following facts:

First, Peter was present, as a member of an Ecclesiastical body, met for the authoritative decision of an important Ecclesiastical question; but though he took part in the deliberations of the body, he executed none of the functions of a presiding officer, nor did any thing that might involve a claim of authority, or official superiority over his brethren.—(See Acts xv: 6, 29.)

Second, Peter, when enforcing an exhortation by a reference to his official character, claimed no title which was not equally applicable to every other apostle, except Judas. He simply styled himself "an elder, and a witness of the sufferings of Christ, and also a partaker of the glory that shall be revealed."—(1 Peter v: 1.)

Third, Peter, when his conduct was thought objectionable, was called to account by his brethren, and unequivocally admitted his responsibility to them, by making a formal defence.—(See Acts xi: 1, 17.)

Fourth, Peter was openly rebuked by a fellow apostle, and that in a manner which certainly implied neither acknowledgment nor consciousness of inferiority.—(See Gal. ii: 11, 21.)

Fifth, Peter was sent on a mission by his fellow-apostles.—(See Acts 8: 14.)

All these facts tend to disprove the supremacy of Peter; so far as the record shows, neither the third nor the fourth is true of any other apostle; and the fifth is true of none of the original twelve, except Peter and John; and the five facts, taken together, make up a greater amount of circumstantial evidence against the supremacy of Peter, than could be adduced against a similar claim, if asserted in favor of any other apostle, except Judas.

And now, in view of all the considerations which have been urged, is it not the extreme of absurdity to assert, not only that the Pope is Christ's vicar, but that the man who refuses to acknowledge him in that character—no matter what may be the grounds or circumstances of the

refusal—does by that act necessarily forfeit his right to be regarded as a citizen of the Redeemer's kingdom? We concur with the Roman Catholics in the doctrine that the Church is one. We concur with them in the doctrine that her unity depends on the common subjection of all her members to one Head; but according to them, that Head is a mortal man; according to us, that Head is the Son of God.

We pass on to another topic. Suppose Episcopacy—we here use the term in the prelatical sense—is of Divine appointment; on that supposition, is it true that there can be no church without a Bishop? The affirmative answer to this question constitutes the doctrine now to be examined. We do not understand the doctrine as resting on the assumption, that the want of Episcopacy necessarily proves either intentional opposition to the Redeemer's authority, or such spiritual blindness as is morally equivalent to opposition to his authority. The doctrine, therefore, cannot be legitimately made a mere reference from the Divine appointment of Episcopacy, unless it is contended that every mistake as to the will of God necessarily infers separation from his church. But this would carry us far beyond *the infallibility of the Church*, as held by Roman Catholics.

From the familiar truth that the church is the kingdom of Christ, results this inevitable inference: *Whatever is not incompatible with allegiance to Christ cannot infer separation from the church.* Now, there are but two conceivable ways in which any thing can be proved to have this effect; the one is by the nature of the thing itself, as ascertained by common sense and the general principles of the word; the other, by a declaration from the Lord Jesus, directly applicable to the thing in question. That the doctrine we are considering cannot be proved in the first of these ways, is clear without an argument. Can it in the second? Where has Christ declared that an error about Episcopacy—in whatever cause originating—is equivalent to a renunciation of allegiance to himself? His word contains not a sentence which even looks like such a declaration. If any man denies this statement, on him it devolves to point out such a sentence.

It will hardly be denied that the church rests on the promise of eternal life, in such a sense that every man who is visibly under the covenant of which eternal life, according to the Gospel, is the promise, is a member of the visible church. Hence it follows that the Gospel does not suspend membership in the church on any condition on which it does not suspend the promise of salvation. Let revelation be examined with the closest scrutiny, not an exception to this remark can be found. Indeed, we are not aware that any advocate for the doctrine now under discussion has ever attempted to prove an exception. If, then, the doctrine be true, no one who, through ignorance or mistake as to the will of God on the subject, rejects Episcopacy, has an interest in the promise of salvation contained in the Gospel; the most favorable view that can be taken of his case is, *that he may be saved by uncovenanted mercy*. We do not mean to insinuate that all who hold the doctrine adopt this inference. But we say, they cannot *consistently* reject it. If the doctrine be correct, the inference cannot be erroneous. Nor do we make a charge of uncharitableness. If this doctrine be true, charity *requires* that it be boldly avowed and zealously propagated. But is it true? We think it utterly irreconcilable with the following declaration of the word of God: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost."—(Rom. xiv: 17.) It seems impossible to understand this passage in any sense which will not imply that, wherever there are righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost, there is a title to Heaven,—whatever can co-exist with these qualifications, can co-exist with an interest in the promise. Will it be said, that subjection to Episcopacy is included in *righteousness*?" We reply, If so, it is clearly on the ground of a positive law, as contradistinguished from a moral law. But ignorance of such a law, and consequent non-compliance with its requirements, are obviously compatible with righteousness, in all cases in which they are compatible with a sincere desire to do the will of God. Now, on these principles, even supposing a Divine appointment of Episcopacy, it is clearly possible for a man to be ignorant of that appointment,

and yet to possess all the knowledge which is indispensable to an interest in the promise of salvation, and to be actually interested in that promise. But, if so, it is possible, as we have just seen, for him to be a member of the visible church, and yet ignorant on the subject of Episcopacy. And the argument from the case of an individual to the case of a society, is exceedingly obvious, and has been already stated.

The two passages already cited from the 4th chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians, have important bearings on our present inquiry. In one of them, (vs. 11 and 12,) apostles, prophets, evangelists, and pastors, and teachers, are declared to have been given "for the *edifying* of the body of Christ"—the church. Hence it is evident, that none of these offices are of the essence of the church, since she existed before they were instituted. Hence, the recognition of these offices cannot be, *in itself*, essential to membership in the church. Apostles and prophets, it is true, were employed in communicating, by inspiration of God, those great truths on which the church rests; and evangelists, pastors and teachers, were appointed to make known these truths for the purpose of gathering men into the church, and edifying those who are already members. But, if the recognition of any of these classes is necessary to membership in the church, on any ground not implied in this statement, that necessity must rest exclusively on some special appointment of God on the subject. Now, it surely will not be contended, that the office of Bishop is ecclesiastically more important than the Apostolic office. Hence, if it be affirmed that there cannot be a church without a Bishop, the assertion cannot be sustained without a distinct declaration from God to that effect; and a Divine appointment of the office, supposing it to be produced, falls very far short of such a declaration. In other words, the Episcopal office, whether of Divine or human origin, is not, *in itself*, essential to the church. No matter of how many orders the ministry consists, we have access to the truth for the sake of which the ministry was instituted.

We claim to have examined it attentively. We claim to believe it with the heart. But we are told that we have misunderstood its teachings on the subject of Epis-

copacy. Suppose this is so; does the mistake exclude us from the kingdom of the Redeemer? Yes, if He has so decided; but not otherwise. And no such decision can be found.

The other passage (vs. 4, 6,) will go far to confirm this last remark. Here we find an enumeration of the particulars in which unity belongs to the church; but not one of these particulars relates to the Episcopal office—nor, indeed, to any other office held by mortals. The most plausible reply, perhaps, is that this is included when we are told of “*one faith*.” Now there is recorded, in some instances, the profession required by inspired men of those whom they were about to admit to membership in the church by baptism.—(See Acts viii: 36, and 37.) This was unquestionably a profession of the *one faith*, here mentioned. But in not one instance, did it include a single word about Episcopacy. It is evident, then, that, so far as the government of the church is committed to mortals, her unity does not depend on agreement as to the form of government. And we may add, there is not a sentence in Scripture that so much as seems to represent it as depending on this. Indeed, it has much of the appearance of irreverence to the word of God, to represent that unity as depending on anything not included in the enumeration before us.

But admitting all this: may not Episcopal ordination still be essential to the validity of ministerial functions? To determine this point, let us go back to first principles. The call to the ministry is from God. But to justify an individual in acting on the assumption that he is thus called, he needs some other evidence than a mere impression, however strong, existing in his own mind, that he is called; and the church must have some other evidence on this point, besides his own declaration, before she can be justified in receiving him as a minister. The ordaining power is simply a provision to meet the necessity here described. The man’s pretensions to a Divine call to the ministry must be examined by some person or persons acting in behalf of the church; the decision, if favorable, must be rendered with due publicity and solemnity. This is the precise nature of ordination; and its whole effect is to place the party ordained, in refer-

ence to the Church, in the relation of one called of God to the ministry. Considered in reference to the *particular* church, it is simply the induction of a man into office in a society, on the ground of a certain fact supposed to have been duly ascertained. And *considered merely in this light*, it must be valid, if they, knowing all the circumstances, recognise it as valid. He is certainly an officer in a society, who has been made so according to the forms approved and in use in that society, and is acknowledged as such by the society itself. This, we admit, does not settle the question of validity, except in a relative sense. Still, it would be extraordinary to acknowledge a public society as a true church, and yet to affirm that all the professedly ministerial services she received were null and worthless—rendered so by a fault in her organization.

Let us examine the matter a little more closely. An act is valid, if it really is what it purports to be. If an act is not valid, it is not what it purports to be, and can have no effect corresponding with its name and design. Thus, for example, a law imposes an obligation; but if what purports to be law is null, it is not law, and consequently can bind no one. Suppose, then, God has been pleased to specify certain means which we must employ for certain ends,—to command us to do certain acts with a view to certain results; it is asserted that what purports and seems to be a compliance with this appointment, is null: what does this assertion mean, and how is its truth to be tested? Certainly it must mean more than that the supposed compliance is attended with some imperfection. It must mean that the thing done is not obedience—is not even imperfect obedience to the command; and that there can be no reasonable ground for anticipating the result professedly sought; if that result actually takes place in any instance, it must be ascribed to some unusual interposition of God, such as mortals could have no previous reason to hope for.

Let us apply these ideas to the case before us. The ministerial commission, (see Mark xvi: 15 and 16,) specifies two functions—preaching and baptizing, and the end to be sought by their exercise—the salvation of men. Acts are done in professed fulfilment of this commission

by men who have not received Episcopal ordination. But we are told, that the want of such ordination, no other defect being supposed, destroys the validity of their acts. Now, what does this imply? That the salvation of men by means of such ministrations cannot be reasonably hoped for in any case. According to this hypothesis, professedly ministerial functions, executed by persons who have never received Episcopal ordination, are essentially different from the means of salvation which God has instituted; of course, they are mere human inventions, and in their own nature wicked inventions. Now, to suppose that such inventions can supply the place of Divine institutions, accords with the dictates of neither reason nor piety. The question, then, resolves itself into this:—Is it consistent with the teachings of experience to maintain that Episcopal ordination is an indispensable condition, in the absence of which, whatever else may be true of a professed minister of Jesus Christ, there can be no reasonable hope of the salvation of souls through his ministrations? And of this question we ask our readers to judge for themselves. The test here proposed has the sanction of inspiration. It is the test to which Paul appealed in vindication of his own ministerial pretensions.—(See 2 Cor. iii: 1-6.)

It is no part of our present undertaking to examine the claims of Episcopacy to the sanction of a Divine appointment. If those claims can be established, it will follow that there is something irregular and objectionable connected with the organization of every church which is not Episcopal, and with every ordination which is not performed by a Prelate; but it is by no means a necessary inference, that the society is not a church, or that the ordination is not valid.

The next topic is suggested by the views of our Baptist brethren. They maintain that Christian baptism, from its very nature, cannot be administered to any other subject than a professed believer, nor in any other mode than immersion; and, therefore, Pedo-Baptists have not received that ordinance. These positions bear no direct relation to our subject; and we shall, therefore, reason on the supposition that they are correct. But from these, some have inferred that no Pedo-Baptist society can be

truly a church of Christ; and this inference constitutes the doctrine which we are now about to examine.*

On supposition that the premises are correct, it seems, at first view, to be countenanced by the mention of *baptism* as one of the particulars in which *unity* belongs to the church. But, from other portions of Scripture, we learn that baptism is the token of a covenant; and, (what amounts to the same thing,) that, as administered to adults, it is a Divinely appointed mode of confessing Christ; nor can there be a reasonable doubt that these are the grounds of its introduction into the connexion now alluded to. The unity of the baptism, then, consists in the unity of the covenant or confession. By baptism, one is brought into the covenant, and his relation to the covenant establishes his relation to the church. The question then is, whether, on our present hypothesis, Pedo-Baptists are out of the covenant; for if they are under the covenant, they are members of the church, and the passage of Scripture alluded to suggests no objection to their being so regarded. It is not supposed that their want of baptism is to be ascribed to any thing incompatible with the character which the covenant contemplates,—to any difference to the covenant, or want of reverence for the authority by which its token is appointed. Now, none of these things being supposed, does the mere want of the token exclude them from the covenant? We answer in the negative. If any object to the use of the word *token*, in this connection, we do not insist on it; but it surely will not be affirmed, that the connexion between baptism and membership in the church, is ever represented in Scripture as closer than the connection between circumcision and an interest in the covenant of which it was a token, as declared in the following passage: “And the uncircumcised man-child, whose flesh of his fore-skin is not circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his people; he hath broken my covenant.” But Paul distinctly asserts, that he who possesses the character contemplated in that covenant, is really under the covenant, and entitled to its promises, even though he be not circumcised. “Therefore, if the

* See Howell on the Evils of Infant Baptism, page viii. (Preface.)

uncircumcision keep the righteousness of the law, shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision?" In fact, the Israelites omitted circumcision during the forty years of their sojourn in the wilderness, (Josh. v : 5); but God did not, on that account, cease to acknowledge them as his covenant people. Now, let it be remembered, the doctrine we are examining rests not on the degree of moral delinquency supposed to be implied in the omission of baptism, but directly on the specific connexion of that ordinance with membership in the church. So contemplated, it relates to a ceremony *simply as such*; and in that view, claims for it a higher relative importance under the Christian dispensation than belonged to the ceremony of circumcision, under the Mosaic dispensation. The doctrine, then, must be erroneous, unless the spirit of the new dispensation is more intensely ceremonial than was the spirit of the old dispensation.

The Scriptures afford no ground for asserting that baptism is a prerequisite to membership in the church, in a higher sense than it is a prerequisite to salvation. The former connexion is never exhibited in a stronger light, than the latter is exhibited, in the following words: "He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned." There is, then, altogether as much ground for asserting that *Pedo-Baptists as such* are excluded from the warranted hope of Heaven, as that they are excluded from membership in the visible church. But this former position is uniformly disclaimed by those whose doctrine we are now considering. A comparison of the text last quoted with Rom. x : 9, will ascertain the ground of the connexion between baptism and salvation. It is, that baptism is a Divinely appointed mode of confessing Christ. Now, this is precisely the ground on which those with whom we are reasoning place the connexion between baptism and membership in the church. If, then, *Pedo-Baptists* are to be excluded from the right of church membership in consequence of having failed to make the required confession, how does it appear that they will not be excluded from Heaven for the same reason? In Luke xii : 8 and 9, our Saviour says, "Whosoever shall confess me before men,

him shall the Son of man also confess before the angels of God. But he that denieth me before men, shall be denied before the angels of God." Now, we ask, can a Pede-Baptist, continuing such, have a title to salvation, according to this promise? If so, he can make a confession which Christ will treat as valid; surely then, Christ has not authorized his church to treat it as not valid.— But should any one answer in the negative, or represent the matter as doubtful, to him we would address a single reflection: Baptism, it will readily be admitted, is a *positive ordinance*; but, for reasons already alluded to, and growing directly out of the nature of such an ordinance, it is manifest that an involuntary mistake in reference to it, cannot possibly exclude one from that kingdom which is "righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." And, to imagine that such a mistake can have that effect, is to betray a highly culpable forgetfulness of the essential nature of Christian piety.— True religion consists in a right state of heart; but, from the mere meaning of the terms, it is evident that neither involuntary ignorance as to a religious ceremony, nor any omission resulting from such ignorance, can prove a wrong state of heart.

The cases now examined will serve to illustrate our general position. We reject every restrictive theory.— We resist every exclusive claim. We maintain that the test of a church state is relation to Christ; and the unity of the Church consists in the common subjection of all her members to one Divine Head. If any man claim to be a member of the church, or any society claim to be a particular church, that claim cannot be set aside on account of any thing not incompatible with an intelligent and cordial acknowledgment of Christ as Saviour and Lord, in the sense in which these characters are ascribed to him in the word of God. And if any society professes to be the universal church, it behooves her to prove that she numbers among her members "all that in every place call upon the name of Jesus Christ our Lord." Most cordially do we adopt the sentiment—

"What think you of Christ? is the test,
To try both your state and your scheme."

But the unity of the church is a duty, as well as a doctrine,—the term being used in different, but related senses. Thus, we read of “endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace;” and our Saviour prays for his people, “That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.” The *duty* is simply the cordial and practical recognition of the *doctrine*. It consists in brotherly love, with the natural and appropriate exercises, manifestations, and fruits of that affection. This includes much more than that general benevolence which every human being owes to every other. It is, we repeat, *brotherly* love. It is based on the union which subsists between all the members, in virtue of their common union to the same living and life-giving Head. Some of its manifestations shall now be specified.

Care to avoid angry and useless controversy.—This is so frequently, and so emphatically enjoined in Scripture, that there can be no necessity for referring to particular texts. But, let it be carefully observed, the censure does not extend to the joint investigation of revealed truth, provided it be conducted in the spirit of the Gospel. This is not contention, in the sense in which the Bible condemns contention. It is a duty, not a sin,—a work of love, not of enmity. It is simply an effort to acquire, and to impart a more perfect knowledge of God’s truth.

Liberality in supplying the bodily wants and promoting the temporal comfort of our brethren.—Here, too, argument is unnecessary. The office of Deacon was instituted with express reference to this very duty.

Efforts for mutual edification, including the joint worship of God.—“And let us consider one another, to provoke unto love, and to good works: not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together, as the manner of some is; but exhorting one another.”—(Heb. x: 23, 24.)—“Wherefore, comfort yourselves together, and edify one another, even as also ye do.”—1 Thess, v: 11.)

Joint efforts for the advancement of the Redeemer’s kingdom.—The people of God are appointed to show

forth the praises of Him who hath called them out of darkness, into his marvellous light. They are all commanded to hold forth the word of life. The church of the living God, is "the pillar and the ground of the truth." In labouring for the end here specified, a sacred regard must be had to the unity of the church. The whole of 1 Cor. xii., is devoted to the inculcation of this principle. It follows that, *in labouring for the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom, all needless separation from any of our brethren in the Lord, is sinful.*

As to those duties to our brethren which relate to positive external acts, the frequency and extent of their performance must, of necessity, be varied by many circumstances not under our control; but a disposition to perform them ought to be cherished habitually, and indulged as often as a suitable opportunity can be found.

That there should be, among true Christians, differences of opinion on some religious subjects, is no new thing. It was true, in apostolic times. The sacred writers record the fact, and prescribe the course of conduct to be pursued in reference to it. There must be no diminution of mutual love—no contempt—no indulgence of a censorious spirit. Every member must act according to his own conscientious convictions of duty, and leave every other to act, without molestation, according to *his* conscientious convictions. If separation be necessary to this end, it must take place; but it must be extended so far only as the object here specified requires. In confirmation of these views, we ask our readers to examine carefully Rom. ch. xiv: v. 1,—ch. xv. v. 6.—No separation made on these principles can possibly be schismatical. The sin of schism consists in the violation of the law of brotherly love, and in nothing else. The following text is as decisive on this point, as a formal definition would be: "That there should be no schism in the body; but that the members should have the same care one of another. And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it."—(1 Cor. xii: 25, 26.) It is evident, then, that there may be separation founded on differences of religious opinion, where there is no schism; and that there may be—~~as~~ sad ex-

perience testifies—schism, where there is neither difference of religious opinion, nor visible separation.

We have already seen, that no error which can co-exist with the due confession of Christ, infers separation from the church; and, within this limit no difference of opinion is inconsistent with her *unity*. It is evident, then, that among the members of the true church, there may exist such differences of opinion as will demand a distinction as to visible organization. So far as the government of the church is committed to mortals, there may be no *one* form of government, or no *one* body of officers, to which they can all conscientiously submit;—and it has been shown already that separation in matters of this kind is not inconsistent with the unity of the church. Now, using the word organization in the sense just indicated, a distinction of organization, based on differences of religious opinion, is precisely what we mean by the division of the church into various denominations. It is demonstrable, then, that this division is not, *in itself*, inconsistent with the unity of the church. It grows necessarily out of the application of the teachings of inspiration to circumstances which now exist, and the existence of which must necessarily be possible, so long as man is fallible. Christians were not unanimous on all religious subjects, in apostolic times; they are not so now. The differences now existing, it is true, are not identical with those which existed then; but they are equally compatible with common subjection to the same Lord. Hence, it is a matter of no material importance, that the former do, but the latter did not, require a distinction of organization for governmental purposes.

We often hear vehement declamation about the number of sects; and are asked, Which of all these rival sects is the one true church of Jesus Christ? We answer, No *one* of these sects is the whole church; but every one of these sects that acknowledges Christ, in the sense already explained, is part of the true church. So long as they all confess Christ, the idea that their differences of opinion disprove their membership in the same church, is an idle dream. So long as they all submit to Christ, the idea that they are not members of the same

church, because they do not submit to one common government administered by mortals, is an idle dream.—Notwithstanding these diversities, not one particular, included in the Scriptural idea of the unity of the church, is wanting; but to perceive this unity, you must recognise the Lord Jesus as an actually living and reigning Saviour.

But many think it astonishing that there should be such a variety of opinions among Christians. Infidels infer that the Bible is inconsistent with itself; and Roman Catholics, that it is so obscure as to require an infallible interpreter. Let us test the matter.

No book ought to be charged with contradictions or obscurity, because men derive false and inconsistent ideas from other sources. The inquiry, then, must be confined to those who take the Bible for their only infallible guide. We must leave out of view those who add to the Bible—those who ascribe Divine authority to tradition—those who claim the right of trying the doctrines of the Bible at the bar of human reason—and those who pretend to inward illumination, in a sense which supersedes, either wholly or partially, the necessity for the written word. This single principle throws out of the case the most material differences of religious opinion found among nominal Christians.

Further—A book which distinctly prescribes the manner in which it requires to be studied, is not to be charged with the errors, inconsistencies and absurdities of those who study it in a different manner. The Bible is such a book. It requires to be studied, diligently and attentively,—with earnest prayer for spiritual illumination,—with a deep sense of our own ignorance and weakness, and an unconditional submission of the understanding to its dictates,—with constant reference to practice, and a sincere disposition to obey its requirements,—systematically deferring the investigation of more difficult subjects, till we shall have gained some true acquaintance with its more obvious doctrines. (For these particulars, we refer to the following passages:—Prov. ii : 1-9; Ps. cxix : 18; 2 Cor. iii : 18; Mark x : 15; James i : 21-23; John vii : 17; Heb. v : 11-14; 1 Cor. iii : 1-2.) Now, the errors into which men may be betrayed

by studying or reading the Bible in a different manner, have obviously no bearing on the present question. But on the authority of the Bible itself, we affirm, that all who study it in this manner will be preserved from fatal error, and led into all the truth the knowledge of which is essential to their salvation. But even among those whose mode of studying the Scriptures may reasonably be supposed to be, in the main, correct, there is not perfect unanimity on all religious subjects. Does this prove that the Bible contains contradictions, or is faultily obscure? We never heard either of these faults charged on the Constitution of the United States. That instrument was drawn up in our own country, and by some of the wisest men in it, in our own language, and within the memory of many persons still living. Are there no differences of opinion as to its interpretation? Have no parties been formed on that subject? Why not call for an infallible interpreter of the Constitution? On the other hand, the Bible was written in ancient times; nearly eighteen centuries have elapsed since the work was completed. It was written, too, in languages not now spoken by any nation on earth, in lands far distant from our own, and in a state of society of which we have no experimental knowledge. But we shall not insist on these particulars. Let the two documents be compared, as to the amount of matter which they respectively contain,—the nature and variety of the subjects of which they treat,—and the extent of the influence which they are intended to exert,—and if the variety of opinions as to the interpretation of the Bible shall appear wonderful, the variety of opinions as to the interpretation of the Constitution will appear far more wonderful. And we may add, as the latter will furnish no man with a valid excuse for not being a good citizen; so the former will furnish no man with a valid excuse for not being a good Christian. Let the subject be impartially and attentively considered—let due regard be had to the incurable fallibility of man in the present state, and the diversity of opinion which prevails on other subjects,—and we shall cease to wonder at the diversity of theological opinion found among evangelical Christians,—we shall wonder at the vast extent of their agreement.

But it will be asked, is it not strange—is it not incredible, that the Redeemer should leave his people exposed to such an evil as the one now under consideration? As preliminary to our reply, let it be observed, that the church is composed of members; hence freedom from all error, or freedom from all sin could be properly ascribed to the church, on this condition only—that not one of her members was in any degree infected with the evil specified. We answer, then, that the evil of error, religiously considered, consists solely in its connexion with sin; hence error in judgment is, in itself considered, a less evil than sin. And, if it is strange and incredible that the Redeemer should not yet have given his church an entire exemption from the former, it is still more strange, and more incredible, that he should not yet have given her entire exemption from the latter—that is, that every member of the church should not, from the moment he becomes such, be absolutely perfect in holiness. Both these blessings the church will certainly possess, when she shall be presented faultless before God, with exceeding joy; till then, we conceive, she will possess neither. And whether denominational distinctions will entirely cease before that time, we are not prepared to say; nor do we deem the question of any material importance. But a far nearer approximation to unanimity than now exists, and a far more glorious manifestation of her unity than is now exhibited, we do confidently anticipate; and we rejoice to believe that the blessed change is, at this moment, in rapid progress. The following are some of the means which, we think, Christians ought to employ for its acceleration:

Diligence in seeking to grow in grace. For this purpose, they should seek to be brought more fully under the influence of those great truths which form the life and soul of the Gospel, and in which all true followers of the Saviour are agreed. “I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let us, therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded: and if in anything ye be otherwise (differently) minded, God shall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheless, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing.”

Candid and fraternal discussion. To this we attach much importance—though by no means the first in importance. Discussion of a different description we would most earnestly deprecate. Controversy, conducted with fierceness, presumptuous confidence, or party spirit, ordinarily places the parties at a greater distance from one another than they were before, and *both* at a greater distance from the truth. All unkind feelings darken the understanding, and grieve that Spirit to whom it belongs to lead us into all the truth. But kind assistance mutually afforded, in seeking a more thorough and extensive acquaintance with the truth as it is in Jesus, has a directly opposite tendency.

Coöperation in the work of the Lord. This has been mentioned already, as one of the duties resulting from the unity of the church. Its tendency to unanimity is exceedingly obvious. Known differences of theological sentiment are apt to excite prejudices which are very unfavorable to the discovery of truth. United labor for Christ makes the parties better known to one another, promotes mutual respect and Christian love, and thus removes the obstacle. But a consideration of higher importance remains to be mentioned: It accords with the revealed will of the *Spirit of truth*; and, therefore, we may expect a larger measure of his sacred influence. There are, it is readily admitted, duties which a Christian owes to the particular church of which he is a member, and which must not be neglected or violated, for the sake of coöperating with members of other churches, whether of the same denomination or not. There are, likewise, important enterprizes which, because of their relation to ecclesiastical government, or to the distinctive tenets of some one denomination, ought to be ecclesiastically or denominationally conducted. But we do not hesitate to say, that every joint and public effort for the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom, ought to be conducted by Christians, without regard to denominational distinctions, unless some positive and cogent reason can be assigned for conducting it on a different principle.

ARTICLE V.

THE METAPHYSICAL AND SCRIPTURAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT IN A CONSCIOUS INTERMEDIATE STATE, BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION.

- ISA. LVII: 1.—*The righteous perisheth, (abhadh) is cut off, and no man layeth it to heart: and good men are taken away, (aseph)—gathered,—while none considereth it: but it is from calamity, (the presence of evil, Alexander) the righteous is taken away.*
2. *He entereth into peace. (It is used of the spirit only; the rest of the body in the grave is expressed in the following clause, Henderson.) They rest on their beds: every one that walketh straight before him.**

INTRODUCTION.

There is great comfort in the act of turning one's attention to a topic without controversy; one upon which, in the whole of Protestant Christendom, we may not hear a discordant note. It affords something better than the superficial, doubtful effect of oil upon waves. It is oil lubricating the inmost machinery of the mind and heart; an oil of gladness, certainly, to every spirit that sincerely mourns the divisions among Christian brethren, and yet feels the necessity, sometimes, of contending earnestly for the faith.

Such a topic is this of an intermediate state between Death and the Resurrection. In a long life we have come across no considerable controversy respecting it. The Roman Catholic purgatory is, perhaps, an accretion upon it; one of the many sad errors by way of *excess*—adding to God's word mischievously—which distinguish and will destroy, that unhappy church. The true believer, if absent from the body, with St. Paul, is taught

* Will not the two Hebrew verbs compared, suggest the idea of cutting off, to gather? See the latter used absolutely, Num. xx: 26.

by her to expect penal fires—almost in the presence of his Saviour.† We must rejoice that no scintillation of this doctrine is to be found in the Gospel of Jesus or Paul. It has brought life and immortality to light without it; and this sufficeth us.

But is it not as incumbent upon us to be wise *up to* what is written, as to assume no wisdom beyond this? Who, of living Christians, feels sufficiently his nearness to the eternal world? And, as we near it, shall we not, and *should* we not, feel more warmly disposed to explore, at least, its confines? When “Paul the aged” warns and burns with immortal hope, it is at the prospect which our subject presents—not merely of a final, but an immediate presence with his Lord, at death. Yet, how rarely is this subject presented distinctly, either from the pulpit or the press!

It is rich in hope and joy as it bears on the future of the individual Christian’s own lot. It is equally rich in consolation as it bears on our sorrow for those who depart hence in the Lord. Is our loss “very great?” “It demonstrates,” in the language of the devout Wilberforce, “that as yet the common, old consolation, is not, and never can be worn out, that our loss is our friends’ unspeakable [and immediate] gain:” and opening “a clearer [and nearer] prospect of the glories of the heavenly world that it would be gross selfishness to wish to recall them.”

In these circumstances we have often been surprised that our theme has received so little attention: and now cast these seedlings of revolved thought upon it into the garden of the church, in the humble hope that the Holy Spirit’s breath (as a north or south wind in the east,) may make some of the spices of a Divine comfort to flow out from them.

† The ancient Liturgies collected by Renaudet contain prayers for the faithful, to God (“*who received their souls*”) for a merciful pardon of their sins. They ask “rest and remission for” all who have slept in the faith—the peace of all their souls in the bosom of Abraham. Even the Virgin Mary is supposed to need these prayers—she is included expressly in such as the above; and in the face of all the idolatrous notions of this church respecting her.—See *Edgar’s Variations*.

PART 1. *The Metaphysical Argument—*

How wide the difference between the progress of physical and of metaphysical science! Upon every department of the former much new light has been shed in modern times! We have analyzed anew, and subsidized to our immense aggrandizement, all the elements of the material world;—have decomposed to multiply them, divided to rule—until we talk in the fiery stream; traverse without oar or sail, the mighty waters; travel by sea and land throughout the civilized world, by the simplest union of fire and water, in steam, and at a rate which really adds time where it is valued most, to the busiest, if not the best engaged of human lives. Latterly we have penetrated and marshalled on the roll of science, all the strata of the solid earth and their contents; not here to dwell on the wonderful demonstrations of the modern astronomy!

But in metaphysical and moral science, what have we *done*? Elicited what new truths—simplified what old ones? Produced what single brotherhood of original thinkers, or clear elucidations of thought? Germany pours forth much of pretence in this way; France speculates and presumes; carries all her unsettled revolutionary and destructive propensities into this region, as into the world of politics and civil relations; assuming to conquer everything before her, but establishing nothing. England plods and reasons onward cautiously, but with small efficiency. Scotland founds her new schools of some repute but little power:—and we, on this side of the Atlantic, follow now, on this great and wide sea, in the wake of one gaily trimmed European barque; now in that of another; but nothing, certainly have we *done*; explored no new region; reached no uncharted shore.

What of new light has been shed, in particular, on the application of metaphysics to morals? What new strength been developed, either in the attacks of this pretentious school on religion, or in the defence of religion by its aid? We are compelled to reply to both questions (in so far as we have any claim to the appreciation of light here)—just nothing, nothing!

Sir James McIntosh, a happy union in this case of

Scotchman and Englishman, (scholastically educated as the one—self-educated, in two hemispheres, as the other,) gave to the world upwards of twenty years ago, an elaborate dissertation on the progress of ethical philosophy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He has gone far enough into the doctrines, both of the ancient and modern schools, to confirm all that we have just remarked, as to the *small* progress that has been of late made. He could even reject in his introduction, the word metaphysics, as of no meaning to the ordinary student; “pointing” our “attention to nothing”—altogether “a wrong meaning name,” which, even most thoroughly examined, “in the language in which its parts are significant”—misleads us “into the pernicious error of believing that it seeks something more than the interpretation of nature!

But how? We do not see the force of this. The term and the science have been much abused, but an effective use of both is surely possible. Our use of the term, in application to the present subject, will be found consistent and pretty obvious, we trust, to any reflecting reader. We cannot indeed find any other which is so appropriate. By a “metaphysical argument,” we mean that which concerns itself entirely with something *beyond* physics; we begin with an event,—death, which terminates man’s present existence as a compound of soul and body. We attend the latter, his physical part, to the tomb, and leave it there; and now as he clearly has something *beyond*, or behind that physical part, in life, we inquire what is still behind and beyond it? “Man dieth and wasteth away,—yea,”—in the strictly metaphysical language of the oldest book of the Bible—“man giveth up the ghost,”—(our excellent old Saxon word for the spiritual part of him,) “and where is he?” Where in particular, and what is that spiritual part now? What has it become and whither is its flight directed—immediately or remotely? This portion of our enquiry is confined to whether any, and what light can be thrown upon the subject from the *natural* science of the mind? If it is found, as we think it will be, to yield us nothing direct and positive upon the subject,—nothing on which a meditative mind can contentedly *rest*,—what does it

teach indirectly, or by implication? What does it hold us ever to—and suggest to us to hold fast—as probable? And does it amount to anything highly probable?

Sir James, the lucid historian of ethical science, to the late period we have specified, and the more to be relied upon because he does not affect to be a discoverer here—arrives at a name, over a century old, that of *Butler*, whose single history, including its influence, would fill an interesting volume. His great work on the analogy of religion to the course of nature, is characterized by our essayist, as “the most original and profound” treatise “extant, in any language, on the philosophy of religion.” It sorely tries the patience of all blockheads; McIntosh says of Butler, afterwards, “no thinker so great, was ever so bad a writer;” the late Mr. Pitt told his friend Wilberforce, that this work originated more doubts in *his mind* than it settled. But is there any work whose hold upon the higher order of English and American minds has been at once so extensive and so permanent? It is still a text book in universities and colleges of all grades, where our language is spoken, and after the lapse of over a century since its publication. To the cultivated female mind it may be made by a competent teacher, particularly acceptable and congenial. Its great fault, the intricacy of its style, only illustrates the power of thought that is in it; and in the very charge to which it leads—“that this power was too much for his skill in language” it demonstrates the value of a *suggestive* treatise upon such a subject, above all attempts to be *exhaustive*; or to accomplish, as a modern French Metaphysician,* boasts, “the absolute explanation of every thing.” Butler soothes by his modesty, when you come to feel what he means, all the toil of understanding him. What writer half so profound, is so little pretentious? Mr. Pitts’ difficulties were those of a head full of an unparalleled national debt; and of a heart which could feel, at that time, nothing religious. He declared to the same friend, that he really could not understand from the pulpit the plain-speaking Richard Cecil.

* M. Cousin, or vide M. Comte, who entitles his “*Catechisme*” the “*Fondateur de la Religion de l’Humanite.*”

Butler's chief merit is suggestion. His thoughts crowd upon his powers of utterance and perplex them; but if you can think with him and up to him, you will think beyond him, and be able to think more clearly than he upon some points. His was one of the few minds that *compel* thought, indefinitely, in the minds of others; and thus do, by percussive and "by rebound" (as Robt. Hall said of Foster,) all their best and final good.

And now if, with any reasonable abatement, we may still regard the "Analogy" as the best work extant on the philosophy of Religion, it will satisfactorily answer the metaphysical enquiries we have proposed,—to shew that the chief arguments of Butler for a future life, generally, or at a period *after death*, involve necessarily the commencement of that period *at death*. This, then, is our present object.

The amount of the early part of his argument is, that the human soul has a natural immortality. It is indiscerptible, or indissoluble; the body is only matter which is foreign to it; we live, as rational beings, not in a state of sensation only, but in a state of reflection; and there is nothing that is essential to thought and reflection which will be dissolved by death. He contends simply for a *continuance* of our existing powers of thought and reflection; or that "the living agent" which each man calls himself, and by which our author understands his spiritual nature distinctively—*lives on* through that event.

Now, to the sincere or Bible-loving Christian—(and, as Butler would not write for Atheists—but addresses only or chiefly, those who fully admit the Being of God, we write not for Deists, at this time—but chiefly for the consolation and encouragement of Christians,)—to the sincere Christian we say, two difficulties may here present themselves in some force. 1st. If the soul is to be regarded as naturally immortal,—must we not regard it as, in so far, independent of God's disposal and God's providence? and 2d. If no reviviscence of the soul, but simply a *continuance* of its existence, is contended for, in what sense can the work of Christ, or His resurrection, be necessary to it, or be connected with it? Do you not detract from His glory, as our second and last Adam?

In reply to the first of these questions, we would distinguish between a natural and a necessary immortality; the latter alone is independent; and pertaineth, as we conceive, to God only. He only hath life in himself—underived existence—entire *exemption from death*, or the possibility of dying. St. Paul places it among his most distinguishing attributes. To all created intelligences with which we are acquainted,—all creature *spirits*,—immortality would seem natural;* as to all corporeal existence, death seems the appointment of nature. We can place no limit on the power of the Omnipotent to create (on the one hand) such intelligences, the capacity and *tendency* of whose nature is to live on forever; nor, on the other hand, to His power (whatever be this tendency) to destroy anything he has created. Who shall speak of the reserved powers of Omnipotence?—But spiritual natures tend to life—as they love life. Bishop Butler only argues (and it is the only argument on the subject which we adopt,) that there is a “presumption” that the living powers of the soul will continue as we find they are, in the absence of all positive reasons or known Divine arrangement to the contrary.

To the second difficulty (which will receive our further attention,) Christ is emphatically the Resurrection and the Life of the human soul and body, we reply, because both are, as we are assured, committed to Him, to preserve for a final *re-union*. Upon this last predicted event, philosophy yields no light; has just nothing to say or intimate—nothing for it, or against it. But that which naturally has existence may be made additionally secure or happy in such existence; may have its charter of life, so to speak, re-issued under higher auspices, and for ends of peculiar weight and importance. And thus, we conceive, is the conservation or preservation, resurrection and final judgment of all who die,—soul and body,—committed unto Him that liveth and *was dead*. But more of this, as we have said, will come before us.

Returning to the good Bishop, he establishes the pro-

* Luke **xx.** 36, may be worth considering here: we mean, the reason assigned:

“Neither can they die any more, for they are *ἀθάνατοι*, like unto the angels.”

bability of a future life on the great law of nature, and of our human nature in particular,—that we continue to be the same individuals in very different stages of existence, from the womb to the grave;—on the fact that we are conscious of certain capabilities of thought and action, mental pleasure and mental pain, up to the moment of death; that we naturally presume on the continuance of all things as *they are*, respecting which we have no knowledge that they will be altered; and that any knowledge of this kind which would affect the continuance of our mental powers and capacities after death, must arise either from the nature of their powers, and what we know of death, or from the analogy of nature generally. But no such knowledge is afforded from the nature of our mental powers—they undergo great changes without destruction here on earth; are suspended on their exercise by sleep and in a swoon, and remain undestroyed; while all that we know of death is in its effects on the body, or the dissolution of so much flesh, skin and bones. Nor does the analogy of nature afford us the slightest presumption of a destruction of the mental powers at this period. We can trace them no further; but they are often possessed in their greatest vividness, up to this moment; there is a singular, almost a demonstrable *unity* about them,—*they* cannot be dissolved; at least we cannot conceive of their dissolution. The matter of the body is in no way essential to them.—“It is as easy to conceive that they may exist out of our bodies as in them.”—All the bodily senses are but instruments of perception, not percipient powers. Such is a meagre outline of Butler’s Chapt. 1st., devoted expressly to the probability of a Future Life.

Perhaps we should note particularly, as closely connected with our subject the suggestion—that, “for aught we know, death may immediately, and in the natural course of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, *as our birth does*; that those external organs of sense upon which we now depend for the admission of many ideas, may then be found to have been a kind of “natural hindrance” to our existing “in a higher state of reflection.”—“Thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into new scenes and a new state of life and

action, just as naturally as we came into the present." Our "notion of what *is* natural" being always "enlarged in proportion to our greater knowledge of the works of God."

Very remarkably has geology, since Butler's time, confirmed this *naturalness of death*—and given us the proofs of successive creations; or entire re-organizations of the material world, arising after successive deaths of whole species and genera of created beings: given us, certainly "greater knowledge of the works of God." If no part of this confirmation may be called demonstrative, we reply—it is not produced as such. We only place it beside the "probable reasoning" of this acknowledged great Master of probable argument, and say with him, we are all *acting* upon far less probabilities every day.

While Butler's first chapter deals directly and in terms with the Probability of a Future Life, the other six chapters of his Part 1st. bear with almost equal force on this momentous topic, especially his second and third, on the Government of God as moral, and as a Government of rewards and punishments.

He builds a beautiful structure of government *by means*—government by human agency; a moral government, in which the will and character of the Governor are everywhere present and obvious. As the outward frame of Nature proves it to be the work of an Intelligent Mind, so our own nature, to go no further, and the manner in which virtue and vice are rewarded and punished *as such*, even in the present world, are proofs unanswerable of a Supreme Moral Government and Governor over all. This government he proceeds afterwards (chapter 7,) to shew, is a constituted system and *scheme*,—as distinguished from a number of single, unconnected acts;—a scheme in which *two* leading features are clear: That we have not faculties to comprehend the whole;—and that we are in the midst of its development: enough being exhibited to demonstrate a just and wise scheme *begun*: enough held back, or held over to the future, to demonstrate that it is only begun; and to imply, in the strongest way, by consequence, the probability of its completion.

He argues, as to punishments, that they do not follow

vice immediately; that in proportion to their delay they become terrible; and that the opportunity of repairing errors, or retrieving a natural or moral position, neglected to a certain *degree*, is finally closed upon us. In the natural course of things "there remains no place for repentance."

That with respect to virtue; we are all in a state of probation for the trial, the improvement, the maturing and strengthening it by habit, and by that wise and kind admixture of temptations and satisfactions, which make all true virtue progressive, and a moral qualification for something higher and better.

Every part of this argument is germane to our purpose. If the soul dies not with the body; if its natural tendencies, capacities and enjoyments are to life and to "live alway;" if there is an indissoluble unity about its very nature; if it is ever to be regarded as the true seat of personal identity or what each man calls *himself*.... if as our great analogist contends, there is the highest amount of probable evidence that it must exist in a future life, because it must *live on* after death, then must it live on in that separate and intermediate state between death and the Resurrection, which is the object of our enquiry. It neither dies with the body, nor lives in any farther connection with it for the time being. It does not remain at all as the body does, under the power of the grave. Therefore must it live for the time being, in a separate and distinct life.

If, again, the possession of memory, judgment, all the intellectual powers,—if conscience in a widely awakened state; and all our social and sacred affections in the full and brightest exercise being often found to distinguish the mind up to the very moment of death—and never more, even at the close of long and wasting diseases, than at that moment—if all this is a strong presumptive argument for the soul's future state, it is just the same argument for the commencement of that state at death, or for an immediate future state of undiminished, uninterrupted consciousness and power. The argument is, the soul lives on *unaltered*, for in the very moment of the dissolution of the body we find it in its liveliest and most characteristic exercises of life. In these circum-

stances, and with such powers in the very dregs of life were below, we have a right to assume it lives on unaltered, because we know of nothing that will alter it. Our application of the argument only farther is, you know of nothing to *interrupt* then its liveliest exercises; therefore the presumption is they will not be interrupted. There is no reason to suppose that an interruption or suspension of them equal to that of one night's, or, or, one hour's, sound sleep, will take place.

Again, the whole of Butler's argument being, that there is no probable change in the living powers of the soul *at* death, we only pursue this argument farther by observing that no probable change is supposable *beyond* that event; for on no hypothesis or theory of another life yet imagined, is there any kind of event like death, beyond death, or between it and the resurrection.

The vigor of the mind in old age, is a collateral fact that bears upon this argument. Moses will lead the way with the lover of his Bible—the man of six score years with his eye not dim nor his natural strength abated. But this may be regarded as an extraordinary interposition of Heaven. Some of our best and sweetest poets, however, have found a strange rejuvenescence when at their calling. Dryden wrote his *Alexander's Feast*, the most imaginative and lofty of his poems, in his 66th year. Cowper was in the decline of life when his first volume of poems was published; and 53 or 54 years of age when he wrote the *Task*, and *John Gilpin*. Wesley, it is said, when upwards of 80, made 30,000 people hear him distinctly in a favourable valley of Wales; and preached better (intellectually,) at four-score than at thirty. The *London Quarterly Review* of July last, mentions Dr. Routh, of Oxford, as having at 93 completed a new edition of a classical work, enriched in the revision from the last sciences; and as having recently, at 97, re-edited a work of considerable labour and research on English history. And in the United States there yet lives Dr. James Murdock, who at 75 years of age has issued a Translation of the Peshito Syriac New Testament, of high character. One loves to look at the honourable wrinkles on the face of his portrait; they are the lines of an impressive Epistle of God's

providence to all aspirants at Biblical literature to "go and do likewise."

Do we survive great changes and improve at every change from birth to maturity—at least; and with respect to the mind, our nobler part, and all the nobler parts and exercises of that mind, even to the green old age of such a man as Paul the aged? Can *his readiness* to depart and to be with Christ,—(we are writing for the Christian metaphysician, we remind the reader,)—be for a moment supposed to become unreadiness, unfitness,—or his mental and moral strength depart from him, either just at the moment, like Sampson, when he meets his greatest enemy, death; or at that other moment immediately succeeding, when he meets his Great and Adorable Friend, that Saviour for whose presence his whole life has been a school of preparation?

And then, as to the Divine government,—its essential morality; its essential *justice* in particular, and essential wisdom. Mark here the consequences of an opposite opinion. It will be sufficient to establish the truth of all for which we contend. If the soul does not immediately resume its activity after death,—if we imagine it, with Priestly* and others, to be in a state of torpor or sleep until the resurrection of the body, we exclude it as effectually from the moral government of God during that state of sleep or torpor, as if we imagined it to be extinct. It is to create, at the best, a tremendous gap in its existence, in which it is nothing, and can do nothing;

* The flippancy with which Dr. Priestly could speak on this grave and interesting subject, as well as the kind of arguments that weighed with him, will appear in the following extract from a letter of his to Bishop White:

"With respect to my state of mind in my last illness, I feel far more satisfaction in the idea of shutting my eyes on the world and opening them at the resurrection, than in that of passing into a state of what the Scriptures give us no account at all (!) but which *must be* somewhere underground, where we cannot look for much convenience or comfort, and where we *must be* entirely cut off from the living world. As to the existence of such a state, the silence of our Saviour concerning it in the interview with Martha and Mary, and of the Apostle *when he was writing to comfort* his new converts on the death of their friends, [he could not have read with common attention—2 Cor. v.,] weighs more with me, than any argument from the supposed literal meaning of any particular passages of Scripture."—*Wilson's Memoirs of Bishop White*, 8^{vo.}, p. 185.

a gap, or "great gulf" of inanity, in which the virtuous only (and some of the most virtuous and eminent servants of God and man, as we shall shew,) suffer a species of punishment for ages, and the vicious enjoy repose. It is to give to the infidel his desperate hope, that in that sleep of death (no) dreams may come. It is to deny to the believer, for an indefinite period, that great and noble desire of his daily prayers to *do* the will of God "as it is done in Heaven." It is to exclude from the active government of God all its best subjects, during that period; it is to grant relief, reprieve,—a welcome and important, if limited, impunity, to the worst rebels against that government.

PART. 2. *The Scriptural Argument—*

We have seen that the metaphysical or philosophical argument terminates in a two-fold probability: *i. e.* that of a future and an immediate existence of the soul after death. The one is clearly, to the extent in which that argument has been successfully pursued, contained in the other. The soul dies *not* as, or with, the body; there is nothing (apparently) discernible, or for a moment dissoluble or separable in its nature; the event which we call death, is only the separation of the body from the soul, which immediately lives on again;—continues its glorious or ignoble career, as its character may have been formed and disciplined in this life. It has only cast off its corporeal integuments or clothing. As a soul, therefore, or *intellectual* spirit, which is involved in the very definition of it (as allowed on all hands,) it lives on *consciously*, in immediate and uninterrupted consciousness. The probabilities of the argument to which we have thus far attended, amount fully to this, or to nothing.

It should be conceded, perhaps, and this is the part of our discussion where the concession is relevant, that *the man*, as a compound of soul and body, in all ordinary cases,* dies—in strict language it might be said, the *whole man*. By "man" we mean, generally, what the record of his formation has defined him to be, "a living

* We say "ordinary cases," in the recollection of some few exempt ones, Enoch's, Moses' (perhaps,) and Elijah's.

soul," or a soul living in a human body. Now *that* tie between the soul and body, that relationship, is dissolved, and *is* thus far dead, altogether dead, in death. Man is no more strictly and properly, man (notwithstanding Butler's strong argument respecting the *seat* of identity,) possessing only a human soul, apart and separate from his body, than possessed, if the term be here allowable, of a human body apart and separate from his soul. The man does not go into the grave, but the body of the man only. "The spirit" of the man, and not the entire man, as yet—"returns," in death, "to God who gave it." The union of soul and body is, in other words, essential to our humanity. The man, thus considered, dies and wholly dies, just as in the case of married men, the husband dies, whether he or his wife first descend into the grave. The whole married man is dead, entirely dead, in either case, for the marriage is dead; and from all the laws and duties of it, one party is in either case as much, that is, entirely, loosed, as is the other. It is thus, we conceive, that to the first man death was threatened as a penalty, and thus that in the continuous execution of that threat or penalty, "in Adam, all die." Thus, that in Christ, the second man, and "last Adam," for he will never forfeit his high relation to us, as the renovating Head of human nature, "all will be made alive."

Our philosophical probabilities amount thus far, therefore, only to the continued existence of that important part of man, his soul. Can they ever amount to more? *Metaphysics* are beyond their sphere, as the very term imports, when they venture a conjecture as to what shall be a present or ultimate issue of death on the body. They can have just nothing rational to say on the question. In particular, *they* can neither affirm nor deny any thing respecting the resurrection of the body; or, in the more scriptural phrase, the resurrection of the dead,—which very phrase, by the way, establishes our remark as to the unity of man's nature. For while "the resurrection of the dead" [man] will be the resurrection of the body, the Scriptures never make use of the latter, and far less significant phrase, but of the former only, (as Mr. Locke has long ago remarked,) the resurrection of the dead.

And now the way would seem prepared for inquiry into the Scriptural argument in regard to our subject.— We are discussing in this essay, not the doctrine of a future resurrection of the dead, (which must include the re-union of soul and body,) nor the resurrection of the body, as a distinct question, it should be remembered. We know not *why* men should ever have thought it incredible that God should raise the dead entirely; and have no kind of doubt that He will. But with that question we have nothing to do here. We have weighed the metaphysical probabilities, and are now to enquire into the Scripture teachings on the question—“Is there an intermediate state of conscious existence for the human spirit, between death and the resurrection?”

We cannot attempt to consider all the passages of Scripture which bear on this important subject. A passage or two from the Old Testament; two or three matters of *fact*, that are plainly revealed, and two or three plain doctrinal statements of the New Testament, will, we think, convert the probability of the Philosophical argument into *demonstration*.

In the Jewish church it was a *proverb*—“The wicked is driven away in his wickedness, but the righteous hath hope in his death.” Can any one reasonably doubt that both parts of this proverb bear on the state of man after death,—that the hope of the righteous comes from yon *other* side of the grave, and what he will be there; or that the hopelessness of the wicked, the terrible driving him away described, is just as surely derived from that quarter? The two men arrive at the same outward and literal event, or point in the road of their moral history. The one is unwilling to go on, but he is driven on; the other goes forward cheerfully,—is attracted forward. In his true character while here, each dies; acts, or is acted upon. “In his wickedness” he who lives, (and loves it to the last,) dies; does not quit *that*, nor that him. *It* is no mere clothing; it has become a wicked nature; and now all means of persuasion, and all gentle measures having been lost upon him,—he would not go to his account with a just God, but he must. His death is not a departure, but an ejection from life. He refuses,—withstands to the utmost; but Death takes no refusal; drives

him on and "away"! Few texts are more awful and clear as to the portion of the wicked, their immediate portion in another life.

The other passage of the Old Testament is that beautiful lamentation of Isaiah (lvii., 1, 2,) which we have made our motto. The reader, interested in our topic, will attentively consider it. Gesenius, after Javehi, suggests an antithesis between the first two verses (of Is. lvii.,) which we have quoted, and the third,—"*They shall rest on their beds,*"—"but, ye, (or, as for you,) draw near hither, ye sons of the sorceress, &c.

Exodus iii., 6 and 15, with our Lord's remarkable comment on the phrase, "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," partake of the character both of fact and doctrine here. Indirectly only, can they prove the complete resurrection of the dead,—but they silenced triumphantly, as three of the Evangelists record, the heresy of the Sadducees, "that there is *no* resurrection;" and they especially assert and prove, in the plainest language, an intermediate or separate existence of the soul, after death. And this is all in which we are here concerned with them. "God *is*," said the Saviour, in effect, "and declares he will be," "to all generations," the God of these Patriarchs,—whom you esteem entirely dead. "He is not a God of the dead, but of the living, for they all live unto Him."—That is, these Patriarchs are now in as active existence, and even in as close a covenant-relation to God, as ever they were, or can be. They are dead and buried to the outward eye, and their sepulchres are with us to this day,"—but with Him they exist and have communion."

Our Lord speaks here, then, exactly upon the point we have in view. Wherever we, or any of His creatures live, and whatsoever we or they are,—we live, in one sense, "unto God." It is equally true of the entirely living as of the dead. But the Saviour is here speaking of those whose dust had for ages been mingled with its parent earth. Neither of what was, or what shall hereafter only be true, respecting them: but of what was then true, and was a matter of fact in their personal history; as much as the call of Abraham from Chaldea, the birth of Isaac, or the death of Jacob in

Egypt. It must be conceded, as we have said, that these words prove nothing respecting the resurrection of the body, or with regard to the future re-union of soul and body, but by implication,—*i. e.*, that as this most important part of man has been, in the case of these Patriarchs, re-vivified, re-suscitated, or “raised up,” from all consequences of the momentary stroke of death,—so it renders highly probable that their bodies will be. *But it asserts as a fact, the present life of their spirits.* That death did not reduce *them* either to dust or to inaction.

This is quite plain—a matter that asks for no process of reasoning or argument. It is a fact, asserted by the last and final Prophet of His Church,—in His unmeasured possession of the Spirit of truth and wisdom,—having himself essential immortality and perfect knowledge of the life that now is, and of that which is to come. Were there no other authentic communication about the matter, this must be held, we submit, as final and decisive. And as one fact is worth a hundred arguments in such a case, this one must be allowed to take its rank as to the separate existence of the soul, with that other one of our Lord’s own resurrection, as to the final re-union of soul and body, or the complete resurrection of the dead. “Now is Christ risen, and become the first fruits of them that slept.” Now, have these Patriarchs survived completely the stroke of death as to their souls, have entered into that intermediate and separate state of the soul for which we are contending;—and their case is exhibited by Him who *is* the Truth, as a specimen of the general state of “the dead.”

Did our Saviour exhibit it with the remarkable preface—“That the dead are raised—Moses shews at the bush;—or, as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read,”—thus, in fact, applying the term “raised” and the doctrine of a resurrection to the disembodied spirits of the Patriarchs? We see not how this can be denied. We take it, then, to be a confirmation of our doctrine of the unity of our nature.—The *separation* of soul and body was the natural death of the man: the prolonged death and corruption of the body; the momentary—instantaneously conquered, death of the spirit—as a human spirit. (For that only

can be the subject of a resurrection which has been, in some sense, dead.)* In so far, then, as in strict or popular language—these *men* have died, these spirits have been raised from the dead, for unto God, and with God, they now live. Let wise men consider this interpretation of the doctrine of a resurrection, applied to their souls; but whether they agree with us in that interpretation, or not, it will not affect the matter-of-fact proof here afforded of the separate and happy existence of the souls of these Patriarchs between death and the resurrection of the body; and this is all we seek here to prove.

Another text, exhibiting a matter of fact on the subject, rather than any argument, or process of reasoning, is found in the history of the Crucifixion of our Lord. Two others, real malefactors, are nailed in company with Him, to the opprobrious cross! One of these becomes, however rapidly, a convert to the grace of the Redeemer. He gives promptly and fully, the standard, practical evidence of conversion. He justifies God and man in his condemnation; he preaches in word and deed, repentance toward God, and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. But the connection of his case with our argument is, in his prayer to Christ and its immediate answer, "Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom!"—"This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." This prayer, then, is heard and answered, as prayer addressed to Christ, personally, and answered specifically, both as to time and place. Was it not answered with a sincerity equal to that in which it was offered,—with an equal, yea, surpassing truthfulness and intelligence? In this "hour and power of darkness," was there any incompetence in this King, either to dispose of places in his kingdom, heretofore refused to disciples in very different circumstances, or to include "Paradise" within its range? We must bring our con-

* A portion of the Church, (1 Cor. xv. 51,) we cannot tell how large, shall be alive and "remain unto the coming of the Lord." They shall undergo a "change" equivalent to death,—for "in Adam all die": but their bodies shall not remain for an instant, (or but for an inconceivable moment,) under the power of death. So may these Patriarchs, and all believers, be understood to have survived a similar change as to their spirits,—and to be now therefore, *ἰσαγγελοι*, like the angels, and "children of the resurrection."

struction of this memorable answer right up to a clear, yea or nay—on the point—*Was the promise it contains fulfilled?*” If it was, then here again is a happy intermediate state for the believer, commencing *at death*. There was this believer on that awful day of his death—and, without the monstrous supposition of a reversal of his bliss by him who bestowed it, there he has been for eighteen centuries and a half.

We would for a moment point at the majestic drapery of circumstances closing the scene. This trophy of Christ’s power and grace must have witnessed all the great miracles attending the Saviour’s actual death—the rending rocks, the quaking earth, the darkened sun! Must have heard the thrilling cry of his final agony—the submissive committal of his soul to the hand that inflicted it, and in which he triumphed over it;—the loud voice “*It is finished*”—events that extorted from the heathen Centurion a confession similar to that of this redeemed one—“Truly this was the Son of God!” What alternations of faith and fear, exquisite pain and triumphant hope must they have awakened in *his* breast!—*Crucified with Christ*, literally and spiritually as he was, beyond any other of his most distinguished disciples! Let us remember the final shade-lines of the dark, tragic scene! His Lord and Master dies first, by a long space of time to his sad experience—crowded as it might be into a few fragments of hours and minutes; and the stern executioners advance with their bars or hammers to break his quivering limbs. Oh! what intense interest attaches now to that most definite and sworn-to promise, the single rock of his faith—“Verily—to-day—I say unto thee—shalt thou be with me—in Paradise!” Its broad points jut out, and he is landed safely through the last rage of the storm.

Among the matter-of-fact revelations of the New Testament, on this subject, we feel warranted to include the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. All these inimitable compositions must be held to *teach truth*, and if their scope, or chief intention be duly regarded, they will convey all the great truths of the Gospel to our minds, and establish them in the truth,—just in proportion to the humble patience with which it is wrought out

of them. Our Saviour would rebuke the proud and rich Pharisees, and shew them how soon their vain distinctions, civil and religious, would be no more; that at death, the humblest piety should have its comforts, and *their* good things be exchanged immediately for evil things. As surely as a dead, rich man, would be "buried" by his friends and menials—angels should convey a pious beggar, at his death, to Abraham's bosom. The contrast with a former condition is, in each case, as decided, and as irrevocable, as it is rapidly effected. The rich man is at once delivered over to intolerable sufferings; the beggar to the embrace and fellowship of Abraham. The soul of neither party perishes or is inactive—they are vividly conscious of their respective states which are brought into animated discussion. Would this parable teach the truth as to the issues of death if the soul could be supposed, in either case, to have died with the body, or to become in all other cases torpid and unconscious for ages! The parable is the more valuable as conveying the solemn truth of what is, as to this world, the latter end of both the righteous and *the wicked*.*

The leading doctrinal statement which we would produce on this interesting subject is found in 2 Cor. v: 1-10. "We know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved." "We assuredly know" (Boonfield,) that "*if*" *i. e. when*, we leave our earthly bodies. For the condition of the proposition must be supposed in argument to be fulfilled—*then* "we have a building

* Perhaps, considering who is the speaker, and the manner in which He introduces the first two asseverations, we ought to rank John v: 24, viii: 5, and xii: 26, among the matter-of-fact revelations of the New Testament, on this subject. We copy Tholuck's fine remark on the first of these pages. "He intends to speak here to the circumstance that to him who truly believes, there is no difference in point of fact between this world and the world to come. The same communion with God which the redeemed believer shall enjoy in the other world, he enjoys even here; only here it is imperfect through certain hindrances and limitations. Now, *in this respect*, the Lord means to say the moral awakening of man is so intimately connected with his future life that this awakening itself, may be regarded as the beginning of the great resurrection end or period." Or, as he adds, more correctly, perhaps, on chap. viii: 5, "he receives thereby in himself, *the elements* of a higher, an imperishable existence."

of God, a house not made with hands," &c. While this second building or house, has been variously interpreted, it is pretty generally agreed that the first or earthly house is the body regarded as the temporal dwelling-place of the mind. "If our house on earth—this of our body," the Peshito Syriac reads.* We adopt Doddridge's view of the second house, "I am inclinable to take it in a general view as referring to the *whole* provision God has made for the future happiness of his people; and which Christ represents as his father's house in which are many mansions."† But, it is enough for our present purpose, in quoting it, that the passage establishes an *immediate* provision for the departed spirit's accommodation, on its quitting this earthly body,—that we shall not "then be found naked," destitute, or unaccommodated, although we shall have left our first abode.

Further on our Apostle is more explicit. "Knowing that while we are at home in the body we are absent from the Lord—we are willing rather to be absent from the body and present with the Lord. Clearly, he would here teach a distinct and separate existence of the spirit of believers, that of those who would *migrate* (ἐκδημῆσαι) or travel *out* of the body, [in death] and who seek a *new home*, ἐκδημῆσαι πρὸς τὸν Κύριον—thereafter or thereupon to *reside with* the Lord.

When we consider upon what the prospect of this migration and its immediate result is made to bear—all the weight of afflictions under which the Apostle and his fellow-laborers "groaned;" (2d v.) all their arduous "labours" and utmost *ambition* (φιλοσημοσύνη)—9th v.—in diffusing the Gospel; all their courage or "confidence" in the face of its bitterest enemies, (6 v.); we shall feel what a power of *spiritual motive* was attached by the writer to this doctrine. It was truly "coming events casting" not "their shadows," but their cheering light, "before" them—light from the other side of the grave, never equally needed by mere mortals.

And there is a point or two in the 9th and 10th verses (compared,) that all the commentators with which we are acquainted have overlooked. 1. It was *enough* of

* Vide Murdock. † Exposition, in loc.

stimulus and reward that the writer and his co-labourers should be with the Lord and accepted of the Lord in that anticipated separate state; for here he speaks of no other bliss of the future life. 2. *Yet*, should that bliss and those rewards bear upon the still future resurrection and judgment of "all." It shall be a state, then, both of ample rewards for the past, and of *progressive holiness* and happiness—*preparing* us for the future great day of account. "*For* we must all stand before the judgment seat of Christ, that each may receive retribution *in the body* for what he hath done in it."—(Syriac.)

A corroborative text is Phil. i: 22, 23. The Apostle was now three or four years *nearer* the blissful scene he presents to us; and there is an evident transition and exaltation, both in his feelings and his statements. Before writing to his Corinthian brethren, he was *willing* to depart and to be with Christ. Now he is eager; has "*a desire* to depart." Before it was a simple statement of the fact—now to be with Christ "is far better," (*πολλω μωλλον κρισιστον*)—by *much* more, better; "better beyond expression."—(Doddridge.) To live is Christ, but to die *is gain* to him. It is in these later Epistles of Paul, (Philip., 2 Tim., &c.,) that, as Neander observes, we find passages "in which he expresses *most* decidedly, the hope of a higher developement [of the Divine life,] immediately consequent on death; of a Divine life of blessedness, in immediate communion with Christ."* Add to this that he was now a prisoner for the Gospel, at Rome; and had recently suffered some personal "affliction," perhaps sickness, there, (chap. iv: 14,) and additional interest will be given to this warm experimental passage.

But this great writer supposes, in all his Epistles, the distinct life,—and in some the separate action and glory of the soul. He speaks of real "visions and revelations of the Lord," which he had in the early part of this Christian course. According to Dr. Campbell, (Prelim. Dis. vi: p. 2,) on 2 Cor. xii: 1-4, of more than one, chiefly because he speaks distinctly of "the third Heaven" and of "Paradise,"—a basis too narrow, surely, for this ar-

* *Planting of the Churches*, 8 vo., trans. by Byland: pp. 262: Phil. 1846.

gument. "All Christian antiquity" he says, however, is with him, "except Origen." Be this as it may, the Apostle is careful to say and to repeat, that "whether," in these "revelations of the Lord," he were "in the body or out of the body," he knew not. He affirms, however, that on either supposition, *Christ* was revealed to him, and he was caught up, or caught away, into the abode of the Saviour's glory, and a region of supreme happiness,—whence he was distinctly *conscious* of receiving communications which he might not, and indeed could not, utter on earth. The whole circumstance, Whitby very consistently regards as proof of St. Paul's belief, "that the soul may have perception when out of the body, and consequently have an independent existence." Bloomfield renders the ἀρρητα ρηματα by "ineffably, inexpressibly sublime" [words,]—*verba sacro digna silentio* (in a phrase of Horace); and the words following—"which [if they were capable of being expressed] it would not be lawful for me to communicate."

Perhaps it would be equally vague and unlawful to indulge in much disquisition as to the locality of these manifestations, or that of the abode of the happy spirits whom we may scripturally expect to meet in the intermediate state: but it is worthy of remark that the term Paradise, by which the Jews always have expressed their highest ideas of the happiness of a future life,—and which is used but three times at all in the New Testament, is twice applied to that abode, *i. e.* here, and in Luke xxiv: 43. We may add, our full conviction with Jon. Edwards, that under whatever name we regard this locality, it is the highest Heaven of which one can, *at present*, have any conception,—demonstrably such, as the present abode of the glorified Redeemer. "What is it but"—where HE "hath ascended, far above all heavens"; where, therefore, our conversation, or "citizenship" even now is (Phil. iii: 20); where the proto-martyr Stephen, having "heaven opened to him, and a real vision of his soul, prays by Him to be received,—and where a large,—perhaps the larger part of the whole family of God having already arrived, it has become the new or Heavenly Jerusalem; and they are waiting for

the present and future part of that family from the earth, with them "to be made perfect."

The book of the Revelation may supply us with another text. To render us good service, it does not require that we should form a specific opinion as to the period of its fulfilment. It relates, like our subject generally, to a state, rather than to any particular time,—the state of the faithful martyrs to the Truth, early or late. "I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held." They were the spirits of slain men, ψυχας; of those who had been put to death for Christ, and who speak of "them that dwell on the earth," as no longer of their number.—Rev. vi: 9-11. Without attempting too detailed an exposition of the truths here contained, the psychology of the writer is to us, clearly, that of Paul, and of the other parts of the New Testament. The souls of these martyrs neither perished, nor slept in the grave with their bodies: they are living, conscious, full of interest in the friends, and of indignation at the foes of the church on earth: they offer prayer, and are acknowledged of God, both in the purity of their characters and the reasonableness of their plea.

We cannot conclude without suggesting a *meditation* which, in truth, led us to the entire subject. The probable feelings of a redeemed spirit in a *First Hour after Death!* Is it not among the most important and attractive of all hours upon which the eye of faith and a chastened imagination can fix itself? Certainly the new candidate for Heaven's rest will not hitherto have lived through one equally interesting. Do we gaze upon and ponder the new appearances of the bodies of our beloved deceased friends; apply ourselves, like Abraham, to justifiable cares and honorable sacrifices, to bury our "dead out of our sight"? We are engrossed, it may be, far too much with what is mortal. For if the "living agent" is not destroyed by death, then is not the living believer, and Christian brother, and true younger brother of the Lord Jesus Christ. The benediction of the voice from Heaven becoming at this hour first applicable—*Blessed are the dead who died in the Lord, from henceforth.*

While, therefore, to make this interesting Hour, that of full birth into an immortal state,—in any thing like *detail*, or too close inspection,—an object to dwell upon, may be undesirable, if not impracticable,—it is scarcely not too much to say, that the eye of Christian faith *is* fixed upon it *inclusively*, by all who believe life and immortality to have been brought to light by the Gospel. It may be like the sun—shining alone—too bright an object for our direct and steady gaze; but this does not forbid our appreciation of its light, or our walking and working and rejoicing in its brightness. Sir Isaac Newton is said to have inured his eyes to looking alternately at the sun, until, when he directed his mind intensely to accomplish it, he could command a spectrum of its disk in the dark,—so that at last it *would* return, even at midnight, “as often as he would meditate upon the phenomena.” Oh! for such a spectrum of the Sun of Righteousness, and of being with *Him*, in the Hour we contemplate! May it not be brought profitably into some of our dark earthly hours?

In that first *Hour after death*, the Christian spirit shall be as entirely relieved from the burden of the flesh, all the adjuncts and of mortality,—as at any future period in all eternity! Negatives have no degrees: and no more sin, no more sorrow; no more temptations to sin, nor infirmity connected with sin, shall now annoy it. It awakens to no mere existence, or a dull consciousness and sluggishness of life, like

The fat weed
That rots itself in ease on Lethe's wharf,

but to a vigour, a liveliness and an enjoyment of life hitherto known to it! The work of the soul's redemption is *practically* complete; its purity complete; its victory after the good fight, and its rest after victory, complete. It ascends, even in this blessed hour, the hill where, if loftier heights and more extended prospects are before it, the region of clouds and storms is left forever far below. The Christian's death, like that of his Divine Master, has rent “from top to bottom” the veil that darkened the Holiest, and he has only, unobstructed, to walk forward! *From the presence of evil the righteous is*

taken away, while few "consider" either where they "rest" or where they walk.

We submit that such a profitable and highly consolatory regard may be fixed upon this Hour, as shall very happily prepare us for it; as shall calm our fears, and animate our hopes in approaching it; shall draw from it to the hour, aye, and to many hours, *before* death, most welcome light and comfort. When fording with a carriage, a river of any considerable breadth and depth of current, the strength of that current, if we gaze on it, will sometimes beguile, through the eye, the whole head into a dangerous dizziness; whereas, if we cast our view right across chiefly—on the debouchment or landing-place of the ford, or on any object on the other side the stream, we shall more safely accomplish our passage.

The spirit, in the Hour we contemplate, has fully,—unscathed and uninjured, escaped the conflict, its last conflict, with the great and "last enemy" of man's nature, death. He may have scars, so to speak, but no painful wound from that conflict,—scars, something like those on the risen Saviour's person,—not affecting its organization or its proper functions of any kind. (Our sins must forever leave, perhaps, scars of shame upon us.) He will have the pleasure of ease after pain, which at once implies its absence and former presence, and heightens unspeakably the enjoyment of that ease. Astonishment he may have at where and what he finds himself, but no perplexity; awe and wonder, but no terror; the absorption of a complete astonishment, without the inactivity, the benumbedness appertaining to it on earth.—He is renewed, recreated, in the conflict just past, for all the activities, mingled with all the enjoyments of a new and "far better" sphere of exertion. He is even now "wrought up to" (2 Cor. v: 5—Gr.) a perfect readiness to every good work through an eternal series; for God himself has been the inimitable and special Workman in and upon him, to produce this readiness; delivering him from the action and the presence of every obstacle, every difficulty.

Let us glance at some of his accessory advantages.—We know who is his Sun of Righteousness still—of wisdom and delight and matchless glory. He has exchan-

ged the conscious presence of His grace, for a totally new consciousness of the presence of His glory. But may not that Sun have its herald-light, its morning stars? Nothing does he more readily or deeply feel than that he has no longer any need of earth's beloved, but circumscribed temples. The "Lamb is the temple," rising in magnificent proportions before him. But shall it not have its vestibule, and a kind extension of its outer court?

The morning stars that sang together at the creation *shall* now bestud the opening firmament. They are expressly said to herald the pious beggar to "the bosom of Abraham." Withdrawn from visible attendance on our steps below—*they* shall now renew their ministry. To this his first awakening into a world of realities and unclouded light, that ministry may be in a thousand ways essential. Milton consistently places our first parents under their tutelage.

The spirits of the just made—throughout a long tract of time,—“perfect,” and in various grades of perfection, shall welcome and encourage him. He shall be received as the *last* birth of a well ordered and kindly disposed family on earth, is received;—in which the most, for a reasonable time, is always made of the youngest. We have an unfeigned fear of “*intruding* here, into the things that are not seen,”—and have sometimes checked the speculations of the sanguine on the doctrine of the recognition of departed friends in Heaven—lest we should make a Heaven full of Christians the substitute for a Heaven full of—Christ! We believe, on the whole, in that doctrine, but it shall be a recognition that leads not from Christ, but *to* Christ. “We shall know each other in another world,” said one dying saint to us—“*if* it will add to our happiness there.” “I may be so engaged with gazing on my Saviour,” said another, “that for a thousand years I may not desire to take my eyes from off *him*.”

But hither *may* now come to greet the new candidate for the heavenly presence, converging lines of the redeemed from earth—the older and the later initiated—wisely and kindly intermixed. They are not the less personal temples of the same blessed Spirit that on earth

- consecrated them to himself—because they are disencumbered of “the body,” nor because of the great temple, looming into distinctness from out its dazzling light, to which they lead. Each may be regarded as a vestibule of that temple, the “kind extension of its outward courts,” respecting which we ventured just now to put a question.

The first faculty of his mind which shall be brought into free exercise, or a new and glorious liberty of the sons of God, is an intense personal consciousness. The inward outline of its own being, never before so distinctly marked and felt. Present to itself is that mind—possessed therefore of itself, as it never before was, or amidst the distractions of earth. It is an image, if but a shadow of the Great *I am*, and consubstantial with him as never before.

The next faculty *may be* that of happiest and liveliest association with the known forms of created good.—Spirits familiar to his pilgrimage below may the king depute to revive and re-instamp all his best impressions of those forms—the ministerial angel of God in conversation for whom Galatian believers would, at one time, have plucked out their own eyes, and whom they then received “even as Christ Jesus;”—portions of the church of our first vows, first communion, or first public labours,—below. Some of the last we should expect, first; and some of the first, last! Those who have introduced us to the fellowship of saints and, instrumentally, to the Lord of saints, on earth—how well qualified now to introduce us to the fellowship and Lord of Saints in Heaven! If some have united the strongest and most intimate affections of *nature*, for us, with those of grace, they shall be but the apter for this office!

[For] if as holiest men have deemed, there be
 A land of souls beyond that sable shore
 To shame the doctrine of the Sadducee,
 And sophists, madly vain of dubious lore;
 How sweet it were in concert to adore
 With those who made our mortal labours light:—
 To hear each voice we feared to hear no more!
 Behold each lovely shade revealed to sight,
 [The Prince of Teachers there]—and all who taught the right.

We leave our happy Spirit in this, his *first* unquali-

fiedly happy hour, without presuming to follow him further. Up from the stream of death, deep only on this side, he has advanced to firm footing on the golden sands beyond. And as the last shallow rippings of that stream—noiseless and transparent—spread now into an imperceptible ascent before him (mingling the waters and the shore in gentless beauty,) so shall his holiness and his happiness together, mingle and blend, and lead him upward, until God in Christ receives, and delights, and advances him into all the unsearchable riches of *His* eternal presence!

ARTICLE VI.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE WEEKLY SABBATH.

The Sabbath was instituted in Paradise, and was one of the first institutions which God gave to the world. Of this, we have unmistakable evidence in the second chapter of Genesis. "On the seventh day, God ended his work which he had made, and he *rested* on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God *blessed* the seventh day and *sanctified* it, because that in it he had *rested* from all his work which God created and made." By *sanctifying* this day of his rest or Sabbath, we are to understand that God *set it apart* and *consecrated* it as a holy day, to be employed in the special services of religion; and in *blessing* it, he appointed that, to all who should observe it in a proper manner, a blessing should follow. Here, then, we have a full and formal institution of the Sabbath. It commenced with the creation, and was among the first institutions that were given to the new-made world.

In the fourth commandment, God refers back to the original institution of the Sabbath, and urges the same reason for observing it which had been assigned before. "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labour and do all thy work; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt

not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man servant, nor thy maid servant, nor thy cattle, nor the stranger that is within thy gates: For in six days the Lord made the heavens, the earth, and the sea, and all that in them is, and *rested* the seventh day; wherefore the Lord *blessed* the Sabbath day, and *hallowed* it."

The decalogue, in the midst of which this commandment stands, differs from the other laws of Moses in two respects: First, as to *the manner of its promulgation*. These ten commandments were not originally written, like the rest, by Moses upon parchment, but were proclaimed, in an audible voice, from the top of Sinai to the whole congregation, by God himself. Then they were written, by the finger of God, upon tables of stone. Secondly, these commandments, unlike many of the Mosaic statutes, are of *universal* and *perpetual obligation*. They were designed, not for the Jews only, but for all men. As much as this is indicated in their being written originally upon *stone*. Parchment is a perishable substance, but the rocks of nature are enduring. The universal obligation of the fourth commandment is further indicated in the reason assigned for its observance,—*the creation of the world*. The Jews were no more interested in the work of creation than the Gentiles; and how can it be supposed that a command, enforced by such a reason, was intended for the Jews alone? Indeed, all the commands of the decalogue, unless it be the fourth, are confessedly of universal obligation; and it is unaccountable that this should be inserted among the nine, and be promulgated in the same way, unless the same extent of obligation is to be ascribed to it.

But if the Sabbath was instituted in Paradise, and intended for all men, there can be no doubt that it was observed by our first parents and their descendants, in the first ages of the world. We have, indeed, no express mention of the Sabbath, in the brief history which remains to us of that early period; but we have a satisfactory indication of its existence in the practice, which we know prevailed, of dividing time into weeks of seven days, "*yet seven days,*" says God to Noah, "and I will cause it to rain upon the earth." "And Noah stayed

yet other *seven days*, and again he sent forth the dove out of the ark." "And he stayed yet other *seven days*, and he sent forth the dove, and she returned not again to him any more." We learn from these passages, that seven days was an important division of time with Noah, as it had been, undoubtedly, with his ancestors, from the first. Now, there are natural reasons why time should be divided into years, and also into moons or months; but there is no natural reason why it should be divided into weeks of seven days, except that it was divided by God himself, as recorded in the second chapter of Genesis.

If the Sabbath was made for man, and given to him at the creation, then we might expect to find some traces of it among the heathen nations of antiquity; and so, in fact, we do. The ancient heathen had their hebdominals, or weeks of seven days; and not only so, they were accustomed to regard the seventh as peculiarly a sacred day. Of this, the learned Mr. Selden has collected many proofs.* The following passages occur in Homer:

"The seventh arose, a *sacred day*."

"The seventh day came, when *all things are laid aside*."

Eusebius represents Solon as proclaiming "the seventh to be a *holy day*." Clemens Alexandrinus says: "Not only the Hebrews, but also the Greeks, regard the seventh day as *sacred*."

The seventh day was also held sacred among the ancient Tuscans and Romans. Thus Dion says, in his Roman history: "The same Sabbath which was in use among the Jews, obtained also among the Greeks and Romans;" and Postell remarks, that "next to the Jews, the Romans were the first observers of the Sabbath."—Josephus very confidently asserts, that "there is not any city of the Grecians, nor any of the barbarians, nor any nation whatsoever, whither our custom of resting on the seventh day has not come."†

The day commonly set apart among the heathen was the seventh of their week, or *Saturn's day*, from which our word Saturday is derived. Thus Heraldus testifies:

* De Jure et Nat. and Gentium.—Lib. iii, cap. 16.

† Against Apion, Book ii, sec. 40.

“The day of Saturn, which was the seventh, was *consecrated to rest and peace*, not only among the Romans and Greeks, but among all nations.” Mr. Selden thinks that “Saturn’s day among the Romans was the same with the Sabbath of the Jews, and that it was kept as a day of rest.” The following day, however, (the *day of the Sun*, or *Sunday*,) seems to have been the more sacred at Rhodes, where stood the famed Colossus, dedicated to the sun.

The first mention of the Sabbath in the Old Testament, (after the record of its institution already referred to,) occurs in the sixteenth chapter of Exodus. The children of Israel were now in the desert, and manna had been given for their support, with the injunction that they were to secure only enough each day for their daily necessities. But it came to pass on the sixth day of their week, without any specific direction to this end, that they gathered twice as much as on other days.—How came they to do this, unless they had been accustomed to observe the seventh day, as one of rest? However, “the rulers of the congregation came and told Moses. And Moses said unto them: This is that which the Lord hath said—To-morrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord.” The whole account proves that here was not the origin of a new institution, but only an incidental reference to one which had long been observed. The introduction of the subject, shortly after, in the fourth commandment, proves the same. “*Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy*”;—implying that the Sabbath was an institution already in existence, which they were to remember and observe.

Subsequently, the Sabbath was recognised among the political institutions of the Israelites, and received additions, which, as they did not pertain to the original institution, passed away with the dispensation which gave them birth. Such were the laws prescribing the peculiar manner in which the Sabbath was to be kept in Israel, and the penalty for violating these laws. These things were specifically Jewish; and did not survive the economy to which they belonged.

The Sabbath of the Patriarchs was observed on the seventh day from what is commonly called the creation

of the world; or on the first day after the creation of man. It has been thought by some, that the original Sabbath was changed by Moses; that it was made to occur one day earlier, in order to commemorate the destruction of Pharaoh, and the deliverance of the Israelites from his hands. In proof of this, the following passage has been relied upon: "Remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the Lord brought thee out thence, with a mighty hand, and by a stretched out arm. *Therefore*, the Lord thy God commanded thee to keep the Sabbath day."—Deut. v: 15. As a new and peculiar reason is here assigned for the observance of the Sabbath, it has been thought that there may have been a change of the day.* This supposition may be regarded as highly probable, though we have not now the means of verifying it conclusively.—Certain it is, that a change of the day would not change the original and permanent institution, which only required that a seventh part of time should be set apart for holy rest.

That the Sabbath was observed all along under the Jewish dispensation, sometimes loosely and imperfectly, and at other times with great strictness, we hardly need say. For none of their sins were the Jews more sternly rebuked by the Prophets, than for their frequent negligence and unfaithfulness in regard to the Sabbath. This was one of the reasons assigned for their long and terrible captivity in Babylon, that their land might enjoy its Sabbaths, which it could not do while they possessed it.—2 Chron. xxxvi: 21.

As the Sabbath did not originate with the Jewish dispensation, so it was not to cease with it, but was to be perpetuated under the Gospel. Of this we have abundant evidence. In proof of it, we might cite the institution of the Sabbath in Paradise; its incorporation into the decalogue; the predictions of the Prophets and of our Saviour; and the practice of the Apostles and early Christians. Isaiah speaks of the Sabbath as to exist in Gospel times, and pronounces blessings upon those who shall faithfully observe it. They "shall be brought to God's holy mountain, and be made joyful in his house of

* See Jennings' *Jewish Antiquities*.

prayer."—Chap. lvi: 7. Our Saviour, too, when predicting the destruction of Jerusalem, which was to be accomplished under the new dispensation, directs his disciples to pray that their "flight may not be in the winter, *neither on the Sabbath day*,"—a clear intimation that he intended the Sabbath should exist, and be observed, under the Gospel.—Matt. xxiv: 20.

But, although the Sabbath exists under the present dispensation, it does not exist precisely as before. It underwent circumstantial modifications, adapting it to the altered state of things. Every thing peculiarly Jewish which had been attached to it by Moses, or the Pharisees, passed away, and the institution was restored to something like its original, patriarchal form. Its observance was also changed from the seventh to the first day of the week, that it might commemorate, not the finishing of creation only, but the end of Christ's work of humiliation and suffering in his resurrection from the dead.

Those who think that the Sabbath was changed by Moses, in commemoration of the deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt, are of the opinion that it was now changed back; that it reverted to its original, patriarchal day. However this may be, it is certain that the Sabbath was changed at the introduction of the Gospel dispensation. This change was indicated, not by any express command, but rather by *Apostolical example*, in a way not to shock the prejudices of the Jews. The change of the Sabbath was brought about much like the other changes accomplished at that period. Circumcision and the Jewish law were not abolished by express precept. They were gradually laid aside, and the Jewish believers were weaned from them by instruction and example. And so it was in regard to the Sabbath. In those churches which contained any considerable number of Jewish believers, the seventh and the first days of the week were both observed; the former being called the Sabbath, and the latter "the Lord's day." But in churches composed almost entirely of Gentiles, only the latter was observed.

If any think that the change of day here spoken of was a virtual abrogation of the fourth commandment,

and of the weekly Sabbath, as founded thereon; let them consider that the Sabbath, as a Divine institution, properly consists of two parts: First, the appointing of one day in seven to be kept holy to the Lord; and, secondly, the fixing upon a particular day to be observed. It is the first of these points only, which is settled in the primeval institution, and in the fourth commandment. The second has been settled from time to time, by other intimations of the Divine will. The Sabbath began on the seventh day from the commencement of the creation, or on the first day after the creation of man. In the church of Israel, it was observed on the seventh day of the Jewish week. Under the present dispensation, the Sabbath is fixed, as has been said, on the first day of our Christian week. Still, although the day may have been changed, perhaps more than once, the original institution, as established in the second chapter of Genesis, and in the fourth commandment, remains unchanged, and will remain forever.

The Apostles and primitive Christians uniformly assembled, on the first day of the week, for solemn religious purposes, and thus observed it as a Sabbath. In many places, they observed also the seventh day, in accommodation to the customs and feelings of the Jews. The following passages, taken from the immediate successors of the Apostles, represent the manner in which the two Sabbaths were regarded in the early centuries. Ignatius, a companion of the Apostles, says: "Let us no longer observe *Sabbaths*, (meaning Jewish Sabbaths,) "but keep the *Lord's day*, on which our Life arose."—In the epistle ascribed to Barnabas, it is said: "We observe with gladness the *eighth day*, on which Jesus rose from the dead." Irenæus says: "On the *Lord's day*, every one of us keeps the Sabbath, meditating on the law, and rejoicing in the works of God." The Council of Laodicea, A. D. 360, decreed that "Christians ought not to Judaize, or to rest on the seventh day, but preferring *the Lord's day*, they should rest as Christians.

Of the manner in which the Lord's day was observed in the primitive church, Justin Martyr gives us the following account: "On the day called Sunday, there is

an assembly of all who live in the city or country, when the memoirs of the Apostles and the writings of the Prophets are read. When the reader stops, the pastor makes an address, in which he recapitulates the glorious things which have been read, and exhorts the people to follow them. Then we all *stand up* together,* and pray. After prayer, bread and wine and water are brought in. The pastor again prays, according to his ability, and gives thanks, to which the people respond. After this, the bread and the wine and water are distributed to those present, and the deacons carry portions to such as are necessarily absent. Then follows a contribution in money, which is appropriated to the support of widows, orphans, the sick, the poor, and whomsoever is in want."

So long as the government of Rome continued Pagan, and Christianity was persecuted, it could not be expected that there would be any legal recognition of the Christian Sabbath. But no sooner was Rome governed by a Christian emperor, than we find laws enacted for its observance. So early as the year 321, Constantine "required the inhabitants of cities, and all mechanics to suspend their business on the Lord's day." "No courts of judicature were to be held on this day; no suits or trials at law could be prosecuted. He required his armies to spend a portion of the day in devotional exercises." No labour was permitted, except what was regarded as of necessity or mercy.

These decrees of the first Christian emperor were confirmed and extended under his successors. "All public shows, theatrical exhibitions, and vain amusements were prohibited." The subject was considered in various Councils of the church, whose canons "required a faithful attendance upon public worship, and a strict observance of the day, by a suspension of all secular pursuits, amusements, and recreations."

The following are the sentiments of Augustine of Hippo in regard to the Christian Sabbath: "The Apostles and apostolic men determined that the Lord's day should be observed with religious solemnity, because that upon

* Not sit down, as the manner of some now is.

it our Redeemer rose from the dead. It is called the Lord's day for this reason, that abstaining upon it from earthly avocations, and from the enticements of the world, we should be occupied in Divine worship; showing honour and reverence to it on account of the hope of our own resurrection, with which it is associated. For as on it the Lord Jesus rose from the dead, so we hope to rise at the last day." Augustine proceeds to recount several important events which took place on the Lord's day, and thus proceeds: "For these and other reasons, the Lord's day is distinguished, and the holy fathers of the church have decreed that all the glory of the Jewish Sabbath is transferred to it. Let us, therefore, keep the Lord's day, as the ancients were commanded to keep the Sabbath." He further admonishes those to whom he is writing, that "from evening to evening they should abstain from their customary pursuits; that they should not spend the day in hunting, or in rural occupations, but that they should attend devoutly the public worship of God."*

As we pass down from this period into the middle and dark ages, we find the Christian Sabbath still existing, but encumbered with unscriptural observances, and mixed up and confounded with the other festivals of the church. It lost, during these ages, much of its peculiar and sacred character, and in the multitude of external rites, its spirit and purpose were forgotten. It contributed, with other things, to make up that system of dead formalism which so extensively prevailed. The student will search in vain for a proper Christian Sabbath,—a weekly recurring season of holy, spiritual rest,—in all the middle ages. He will look in vain for such a Sabbath in all the Papal world at the present day. The Council of Trent ordained that the Scriptures should be explained on Sundays, and that all who have it in their power should go to church, and hear the explanation.—Still, the idea of a *festival* was kept up, and this has turned the greater portion of the Sabbath, throughout the whole Papal world, into a season of recreation and amusement. The people go to mass, perhaps, in the

* Works, Vol. x., p. 397.

morning, and devote the rest of the day to visiting, to pleasure, and carnal indulgence.

When the Reformers commenced their attack upon the superstitions of Rome, they found the Sabbath in this perverted, degraded state, burthened with rites of human origin, and not at all to be distinguished, as to any Divine authority, from the thousand other festivals of the church. And what is greatly to be lamented, where these Reformers found no distinction, they made none. In their zeal against rites and outward observances, they discarded all together. Or, what of the sacred days they retained, they kept merely in compliance with public usage, or State regulation, and not at all as Divine institutions. The fourth commandment, according to Luther's exposition of it, "applied only to the Jews, and not at all to Christians. Enlightened Christians have no need of it, though for the common people it is very well, as affording a grateful season of rest, and an opportunity for religious instruction and devotion."—The Augsburg Confession classes the Lord's day in the same category with Easter, Whitsuntide, and the like. They are all no more than human ordinances, which Christians are at liberty to receive, or reject, or reform, at pleasure. "The Scriptures have abrogated the Sabbath, teaching that, under the dispensation of the Gospel, the law of Moses may be omitted."

Thus, to the immense detriment of Northern and Central Europe, the Sabbath was thrown aside by the Lutheran Reformers. In Wittenburg itself, in the century following the Reformation, the successors of Luther and Melancthon held their lectures, their disputations, their sessions of the Senate, &c., on Sunday, without offence.

Nor did the Sabbath receive much better treatment at the hands of Calvin. He lays it down as a fundamental position, that there should be no strict observance of days among Christians. He admits that there should be set times for public worship, but these may best be designated by civil or ecclesiastical law. He would by no means bind the church to the observance of one day in seven; nor would he censure those churches which observed other days, more or less, provided they did not degenerate into superstition. The entire scope

of his reasoning on the subject goes to show, that he regarded the weekly Sabbath as abolished, and that Christians are left to consult their own edification in the matter of public worship, as best they may.*

With principles such as these inculcated by the great leaders of the Protestant reformation, it cannot be supposed that the churches organized under their influence would be very strict observers of the Sabbath. And yet we are assured that, for the next two hundred years, their practice was rather in advance of their principles, and that the importance of the Sabbath was better understood. It was the introduction of *Neologism* into Germany, near the middle of the last century, which contributed more than anything to break down and destroy what remained of the Christian Sabbath, in the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. As might have been expected, the Neological teachers commenced a vigorous opposition to the Divine institution and authority of the Lord's day. They insisted that it had no connexion whatever, either with the Jewish Sabbath, or the moral law. Both the pulpit and the press united in this unrighteous work, and an ungodly world stood ready to applaud and to cheer them on. The consequence was, that all remaining notions of the sanctity of the Sabbath soon passed away. Instead of a *holy day*, it became a *holiday*,—a day of pastime and amusement.

And such, we are assured, with few exceptions, is the Sabbath of the Protestant churches of Germany, at the present time. It is put on a level with the other festivals of the church, and is even held to be less sacred, and is less strictly observed, than some of them. The following testimony of a learned and pious German† on the subject, is as unexceptionable as it is painful:

“In direct opposition to the law and intent of the Sabbath, it is a season of worldliness and sin, with the exception of the hour or two spent in public worship. In the cities and large towns, it is hardly distinguishable from the other days of the week. There are the same noise and bustle; the same worldly and vain pursuits. Even the public officers of State, from the highest to the

* See *Institutes*, vol. i, pp. 418, 425.

† Dr. Liebetrut of Berlin, in 1838.

lowest, almost without an exception, live in an open profanation of the day. The lower orders imitate the example of their superiors; and the more readily, because by this means they increase their gains. Musicians, rum-sellers, mountebanks, rope-dancers, all those whose business it is to minister to the pleasures of men, depend on Sunday as their most gainful day. Every kind of business proceeds on this day, as on any other, unless suspended that the people may participate in the public amusements. The warehouses and stores are everywhere open. The noise of the workshop, the rattling of machinery, the rumbling of mills, the strokes of the steam engine with its hoarse and heavy respirations, unite to disturb what ought to be the stillness of the sacred day. In one place, you see the blacksmith at his forge; in another, the teamster belaboring his weary beast, and toiling at his load; while on every side are pleasure-carriages and post-coaches eagerly pressing forward on their destined routes. At the sound of fife and drum, the people are seen running together to a bear dance; or the the poor minstrel is wailing forth music on his hand-organ; or criers are calling out at the top of their voices to draw the greedy crowd to purchase their wares. Towards the close of the day, parties on foot, or in carriages, or on horse-back, are seen hastening away in pursuit of pleasure, each according to his inclination and ability. The houses of amusement are all open, where, with cards, and nine-pins, and dancing, and sports of every description, the Lord's day is celebrated.

“In the country, as well as in the city, the Sabbath is profaned by secular pursuits and worldly pleasures of every description. The noise of the teamster and labourer breaks the slumbers of the morning. Military parades and public reviews, the clang of martial music, and the roar of cannon, often mingle with and drown the Sabbath bell. On your way to the house of God, you meet here a Jew hawking his wares; there, the penny post from the city, with a crowd about him; and a little further on, the tradesman, huckstering to get off his goods.

“As the people retire from worship, they are met, probably, by a company of musicians who, having waited for them, now boldly strike up their notes, and draw

the idlers around them; while another portion, at the call of drum, are hastening away to the exhibition of some traveling caravan, or strolling play actors. In the afternoon, much business of a secular nature is transacted in the villages. The herdsmen, the watch, the schoolmaster, the field officers, are to be paid; and this is enough to set half the people in commotion. They bring out their hay and their grain in payment of their public servants, and the distribution to them of their several portions often ends in an angry quarrel. The noise and tumult of the scene ends, at last, in drinking and carousing. Thus, in every way, the sacred day is desecrated and profaned, so that it is hardly possible for those who are inclined, to remember it and keep it holy."

Such, then, is the Sabbath in Germany, according to the testimony of a devout, native German minister.* And such are the results of departing from the law of God, and disowning the authority of that sacred day which he has appointed to be kept holy unto himself. In view of what has been said, who can fail to look back, with sorrow and wonder, to the error of those early and excellent Reformers, who brake for us the bonds of Popish superstition, and were the instruments under God, of giving us the Gospel, but who neglected to honour the Sabbath of the Most High, and enforce it upon the world by his Divine authority? How different had been the state of Germany and the adjacent countries, for the last three hundred years,—how different had been their moral condition now, had Luther, Melancthon, Zuingle, Calvin, and those who laboured and suffered with them, understood aright, and urged aright, the obligation to remember the Sabbath and keep it holy?

* A pious English traveller, just returned from the continent of Europe, writes as follows: "On returning from the morning service of the English church at the old town of Heidelberg, I was shocked to observe tradesmen of every degree busily engaged in taking down their shutters, and displaying their wares; while after dinner, at my hotel, a party of gentlemen withdrew into a window recess, and were speedily buried in tobacco smoke and card playing. And in Protestant Geneva, the city of Calvin, what did I behold? archery and rifle matches on the morning of the Sabbath; barrel organs in the streets; drilling of troops; a real English fair in one corner of the park, with whirligigs, and theatres of art, and circusses decked out in their gayest paraphernalia; while in the evening, the brilliant cafes were all crowded."

In England, during the reigns of Henry VIII. and Edward VI., the Sabbath was regarded very much as it had been in the Romish church. The reformation had made but little progress, and had not affected this subject at all. But during the bloody reign of Mary, when many of the English Protestants were in exile, a portion of them felt constrained to push the reformation farther than it had hitherto gone, and to aim at higher attainments in godliness; among other things they urged a much stricter and more faithful observance of the Lord's day. These were the Puritans of those times; and to the Puritans we are indebted, under God, not only for our civil and religious freedom, but for our Sabbaths and sanctuary enjoyments.

On the accession of Elizabeth, the Puritans returned to their native land, carrying their peculiar notions of religion with them. And though they were severely persecuted during the whole of her long reign, and during the reigns of her immediate successors, still they were not destroyed. They seemed rather to increase in numbers and in strength.

The first man who inculcated the true doctrine of the Sabbath in England from the press, was the Rev. Nicholas Pound, D. D. of Norton, in the county of Suffolk. His "*Sabbatum Veteris and Novi Testamenti*," was published about the year 1595, some eight years before the death of Queen Elizabeth. In this book he maintained that the seventh part of our time ought to be devoted to God; that Christians are as much bound to rest on the Lord's day, as the Jews were on the Mosaic Sabbath; and that it was sinful for persons to follow their studies or worldly business on that day, or to use such pleasures and recreations as are lawful on other days.*

This book was circulated with a wonderful rapidity. The doctrines which it propounded called forth a ready response from many hearts, and the result was a most pleasing reformation in different parts of the kingdom. "It is almost incredible," says Thomas Fuller, "how taking this doctrine was, partly because of its own purity, and partly for the eminent piety of those who main-

* See Brooks' *Lives of the Puritans*, vol. 2, pp. 171, 172.

tained it; so that the Lord's day, especially in corporations, began to be precisely kept; people becoming a law unto themselves; forbearing such sports as were by the statute permitted, and even rejoicing at their own restraints herein." The truth is, the Sabbath was a needed institution, after which the church had for centuries been sighing and groping. Pious men of every age had felt the necessity of a Divine warrant for sanctifying the day. Their consciences had been in advance of their reason on the subject. Practically they had kept the Sabbath better than their principles required.

No opposition was at first manifested against the sentiments of Dr. Pound. No reply was attempted for several years. As Fuller quaintly expresses it, "Not a feather of a quill in print did wag against him." His work was soon followed by several others, in support of the same doctrine. The Puritans with one accord fell in with it, and distinguished themselves by spending the sacred day in public, family and private devotions.

Such an observance of the Sabbath on the part of the Puritans was enough (were there no other cause) to excite the established clergy against it. They began to exclaim against the new doctrine, as putting a restraint upon Christian liberty; as making too much of the Lord's day, and thereby eclipsing the honour of the other festivals. In the year 1699, Archbishop Whitgift suppressed Dr. Pound's book, and ordered that it should not be re-printed. In the year following, Chief Justice Popham did the same. "These were good remedies," says the *amiable* Dr. Heylin, "had they been soon enough applied; yet not so good as those which were formerly applied to Coppin and Thacker, who were hanged at Bury, for spreading books against the church." In another place, Heylin speaks of this doctrine of the Sabbath as "the most bewitching error, and the most popular infatuation, that was ever embraced by the people of England."

But these efforts to suppress the doctrine of the Sabbath only served to propagate it the more extensively. "The price of Pound's book," says Fuller, "began to be doubled; as books commonly then are most *called on*, when *called in*; and many who hear nothing of

them when printed, inquire after them when prohibited. Though the book's wings were clipped from flying abroad in print, it ran—the faster in transcribed copies; and the Lord's day, in most places, was strictly observed." Whitgift died in a few years after his vain attempt to suppress Dr. Pound's book; and then a new and enlarged edition was published. From this time, the Sabbath became a principal topic of controversy for several years in England.

The subject was called up again, in the reign of James I., in consequence of his famous,—or rather infamous,—“Declaration for sports on the Lord's day.” In this Declaration, the king signified his pleasure, that after Divine service, “his good people should not be disturbed, letted, or discouraged from any lawful recreations, such as dancing, archery, leaping, or vaulting; neither from having May-games, Whitsunales, or novice-dances, or setting up of May-poles, or other sports therewith used, so as the same be had in due and convenient times, without impediment or let of Divine service.” This Declaration was ordered to be read in all the parish churches; but many ministers refused to comply with the injunction. Others complied, and then went over to show the sinfulness of such sports on the Lord's day. The moral sentiments of multitudes were shocked by this authorized desecration of the Sabbath, and by that flood of licentiousness which was likely hereby to be poured in upon the land.

The persecutions of the friends of the Sabbath were not so severe, however, in this reign, as in the next, under the administration of Archbishop Laud. Chief Justice Richardson had published an order, suppressing Sunday sports and revels, and requiring every minister of the church to read it. Whereupon Laud persuaded the king (Charles I.) to reprimand the Chief Justice, and to command that he revoke his order. And not only so, he induced the king to republish his father's declaration of sports, which was accordingly done, in the year 1633. Many of the bishops and clergy united with Laud in his endeavors to further these odious measures; while great numbers of the laity, magistrates and others, exerted their influence to oppose them. And thus we

are presented with the extraordinary spectacle of the laity petitioning for a strict observance of the Sabbath, and of the bishops and clergy pleading for its profanation!

This was true, however, of only a portion of the clergy. Many of the ministers refused to read the king's declaration, in consequence of which they were suspended, deposed, excommunicated, imprisoned, according to the nature of their offence. We read of one in particular (Mr. Snelling,) who was thrown into prison, and continued there for years, for no other offence than that of conscientiously remembering the Sabbath day to keep it holy.

In spite of all opposition, however, the Scriptural doctrine of the Sabbath continued more and more to prevail. The fury of Prelatical zeal against it gradually abated; opposition ceased; and under the Protectorate of Cromwell, the whole English nation received the Sabbath of the Puritans as an institution of the Lord's appointment. In the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechism, the fourth commandment is set forth as of perpetual obligation. Though the day of observance has been changed, the Sabbath remains, and the Christian is as really bound to observe it, as the Jew.

These views of the Sabbath were early accepted in Scotland, and were brought by the Pilgrims to New England; in both which countries they have prevailed, with slight exceptions, to the present day.

The restoration of the second Charles, and the universal corruption of morals that ensued, gave a check to the sacredness of the Sabbath in old England. But when William and Mary came to the throne, the good sense of the nation, on this subject, as on many others, returned and prevailed. Accordingly, the observance of the Sabbath has for many years been established in England, both by the enactments of law, and the canons of the established church. The following is the thirteenth canon of the church:

"All manner of persons within the church of England shall from henceforth celebrate and keep the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday, and other holy days, according to God's will and pleasure, and the orders of the church prescribed in that behalf."

It is well remarked by Judge Blackstone in his Commentaries, Book IVth, that “besides the notorious indecency and scandal of permitting any secular business to be transacted on the Lord’s day, in a country professing Christianity, and the corruption of morals which usually follows a profanation of it, the keeping of one day in seven holy, as a time of relaxation and refreshment, as well as for public worship, is of admirable service to a State, considered merely as a civil institution. It humanizes the manners of the lower classes; it enables the labourer to pursue his occupation in the ensuing week with health and cheerfulness; it also imprints on the minds of the people that sense of their duty to God, without which they cannot be good citizens.”

We conclude this brief historical sketch with two remarks :

1. The world owes more to the once despised and persecuted Puritans, than it is aware of. Mr. Hume testifies,—much against his predilections,—that old England is indebted to them for whatever of *civil* freedom she enjoys. It is well understood, that they were the earliest advocates, and for the most part the consistent patrons, of *religious* liberty. And it now appears that the world is indebted to them, under God, for the weekly Sabbath. When the true doctrine on this subject had long been obscured and exploded, both by Catholics and Protestants, and the Sabbath was likely to be lost to the world, the Puritans of England have the credit of restoring it. They came to the knowledge of the truth themselves, and they fearlessly published it, and practised accordingly. And though often assailed with reproach and persecution, they persisted in publishing what they believed to be the truth, until they had the satisfaction of seeing it prevail and triumph.

2. We remark, secondly, on the high honour and privilege of Great Britain and America, in being favored with the Christian Sabbath. In the language of Mr. Coleman, from whom we have derived much assistance in preparing the foregoing sketch,* “To a son of the Pilgrims, who loves this day of the Lord, and who has

* See Coleman’s *Ancient Christianity*, pp. 527, 538.

long been saddened by every form of Sabbath profanation in foreign lands, it is most refreshing to enjoy once more the season of sacred rest, as it is observed here at home, or in that fair and happy island from which our fathers came. Even in busy London, that vast metropolis of the world, the suspension of secular business, the repose and stillness of the sacred day, its hallowed associations, its solemn rites, its Divine instructions enforced by the devotions of the sanctuary,—these all are a cordial to his thirsty spirit. In the enjoyment of such a Sabbath, he feels how blessed, above all other days, is that which the Lord has made; and how blessed is that people which knows and observes it.” Happy, indeed, is the people which is in such a case! Yea, happy is that nation whose God is the Lord!

ARTICLE VII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Notes on the Gospels, Critical and Explanatory.* By MELANCTHON W. JACOBUS, *Professor of Biblical Literature in the Western Theological Seminary.* 2 vols. *Matt.—Luke.* New York: ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS. *Eighth Edition.*

The rapid circulation of this work while the Notes of Mr. Barnes were so accessible, is clear evidence of their adaptation to the still existing wants of the church. This is found in the qualifications of the author as a critical scholar and a pastor,—in their designed adaptation to supply the information needed by parents and teachers in the use of the American Sunday School Question Books, as well as those specially prepared,—in the new and felicitous method of combining the harmony of the Gospel, with the events as they are recorded—and the maps, illustrations and other information supplied.

The *Catechetical Question Book*, is by the same author—adapted to the “*Notes*,” and with the Questions of the Sunday

School Union as the general basis, incorporating, throughout, the Questions of the Westminster Catechism.

This plan supplies a most important want. It brings out the *doctrine* of the Gospel narratives. It studies the Gospel in a way to adduce constant illustrations and proofs of the Catechism. Youth who have learned the Catechism in childhood, are here advanced to the second stage of instruction, and they have the Questions and Answers of that excellent summary applied to the Gospel itself, and studied with it. And a *new method* is thus secured of *training* to the Westminster Catechism; not as a separate book, to be learned only by rote, but as growing out of the Scripture, and interwoven with its truths. A pleasing *variety* is also had in the study of the Catechism, the Questions of which are introduced out of their order, and are *repeated*, time and again, in the study of the Gospel.

EXAMPLES.

- Matth. 1. 21.—Who announced the name He should bear, and what was it?
 What is the meaning of this name, and why was it given?
 Did God leave all mankind to perish in the estate of sin and misery?
 What offices doth Christ execute as our Redeemer!
 Wherein did Christ's humiliation consist?
- Matth. 1. 22.—What prophecy was fulfilled by the birth of Christ?
 What are the decrees of God, &c.?
- Matth. 1. 23.—What other name was given to Christ by a prophet?
 What is the meaning of the word *Immanuel*?
 How many persons are there in the Godhead?
 Who is the Redeemer of God's elect?
 How did Christ, the Son of God, become man?

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2. *The Mission of The Comforter: with Notes.* By JULIUS CHARLES HARE, M. A., Archdeacon of Leves, Rector of Herstmonceaux, and Late Fellow of Trinity College. From the Second London Revised Edition. Boston: GOULD & LINCOLN. 1854: pp. 498, 12 mo.

This attractive volume consists of five Sermons, preached before the University of Cambridge in March, 1840, to which is

appended a large body of notes, which fill more than half the pages. The book is not new to the English public, but has only now been introduced by an American re-print to Cis-Atlantic readers. There is a freshness, vigour, breadth, and vividness in the Sermons which deeply interest the mind, while there is a fullness of Scriptural knowledge, and a soundness of Theological instruction rarely met with. We, of course, except the few passages in which there is a leaning to baptismal regeneration. The notes are replete with learning, and will repay abundantly the studious mind for the labour of their perusal.

3. *Noah and his Times: Embracing the various Inquiries relative to the Antediluvian and earlier Postdiluvian Periods: with discussions of several of the leading questions of the present day.* By the Rev. J. MUNSON OLMSTEAD, M. A., author of "Thoughts and Counsels for the Impenitent," "Our First Mother," &c. Boston: GOULD & LINCOLN. 1854: pp. 413, 12 mo.

This volume reached us too late to be noticed in our last number. It discusses a very fruitful and important part of Scripture history. The first ten chapters in Genesis embrace a larger scope of subjects for profound research, and subjects more encompassed with difficulties, than any equal number of chapters in the entire Scriptures. To handle them well demands extensive reading, no small share of knowledge in the several departments of science, sound judgment and discrimination of mind. It is precisely here that scientific and archæological theories come into conflict with the ordinary interpretations of the Divine Word. To harmonize all, is a work of no small difficulty. That it is well and popularly done here, is not saying too much in praise of the book before us. The results of many learned discussions are given in a clear and forcible style, and the readers are but few, who will not find it adding largely to their stores of knowledge, and giving them more consistent views of Divine revelation.

4. *History of the Apostolic Church, with a General Introduction to Church History.* By PHILIP SCHAFF, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Mercersburg, Pa. Translated by EDWARD D. YEOMANS. New York: CHARES SCRIBNER. 1853: pp. 684, 8 vo.
5. *The Life and Labors of St. Augustine.* Translated from the German of DR. PHILIP SCHAFF, Professor of Theology at Mercersburg, Pa. By the Rev. T. C. PORTER. New York: J. C. RIKER. 1854: pp. 150, 12 mo.

The above are from the pen of an able and accomplished writer. Both were first written in the German language, the vernacular tongue of Dr. Schaff, and are now given to the English reader in translations executed, the first at least, under the immediate supervision of the author, and having all the ease and freedom of English originals. The former was published in the retired village of Mercersburg, Pa., in 1851, and, while in its original dress, attracted the attention of scholars. It covers the Apostolic age, or the period of the church from A. D. 30-100, and though it is an independent and complete work in itself, it is to be followed, if the author's plans are allowed to be accomplished, with other volumes bringing the history down to modern times. The author brings to his task peculiar qualifications for his work. The rich literature of his own native country is spread out before him, and the varied labours of her many scholars, illustrating now this, now that, period of the church, and discussing with minute learning the various events of ancient times, he shows himself to have mastered. He has the power too, of concentration, of appropriate grouping, and of life-like description, in an eminent degree. His style is clear, his sketching rapid, his expression enlivened with a quick and rich imagination; his philosophic views of the causes and issues of events often evidently happy. There is a charm in the diction, a fulness of information, and a quick decision on so many points on which the studious reader has himself, perhaps, bestowed some measure of research, that we are carried on with pleasure from page to page. If all the views of the writer which *rule* his own thoughts and representations were true, it were possible to

recommend this book without abatement. But there is a confounding too often of the church *visible* with the church *invisible*. When the author says "There are thousands of church members, who are not vitally united to Christ, and who will, therefore, be finally lost," he utters what we all believe to be true, but when he adds, "there are no Christians any where, who are not at the same time, members of Christ's mystical body, and *as such, connected with some branch of his visible kingdom on earth,*" that "church membership is not the *principle* of salvation,—which is Christ alone,—but the *necessary* condition of it; because it is the divinely appointed means of bringing the man into contact with Christ and all his benefits," we feel that the church visible is exalted to a position which it does not hold in the Word of God. The theory of church developement, so prominently presented by the author as the master-thought of his entire history, appears to us fraught with error. It is true, not of the church as it is *visible*, that it "advances from one degree of purity, knowledge, holiness, to another,"—this is true of each believer, in his transit through life from *his* militant to his triumphant state,—it is true of that Church which is *invisible* in the individual members which compose it. But all this may be, and the church *visible*, as it shall exist on the earth at Christ's second advent, may be no more pure and holy, than it was in the age of the Apostles. Nor can we think it right to represent the growth of the church as "a genesis" "an inward unfolding in *doctrine, life, worship, government,*" changing with changing times and increasing knowledge; and the several forms which it has assumed as springing from the original germ which was planted by Christ. The doctrine, life, worship, and government, were rather settled and presented complete in the Apostolic age. Man is not allowed to carry out into realization other forms. There is no genesis of other worship, government, life, and doctrine, than then existed. The word still is to us, "See thou make all things according to the pattern showed thee in the mount." The mediæval, and every other form of the church, which has varied from the Apostolic, has been only the developement, or spreading of that *fomes peccandi*, which exists in the human heart. Nor do we hope for a new developement in which something being lost from both, the human and

sinful being dropped out and something new evolved, Protestantism and Catholicism shall coincide. The two systems are wholly opposed in all that renders them distinctive. The one stands on the foundation of the Prophets and Apostles, and relies on the written word. The other rests on tradition, called Apostolic, but really of human birth.

In the *Life and Labours of St. Augustine*, whose title is given above, and which we commend as a pleasant and beautiful biography of that preëminent father of the church, after representing him as "one of the chief creators of the *Catholic* theology," the "father of mediæval *scholasticism*," and the "author of mediæval *mysticism*," and at the same time, as having "an *evangelical Protestant* significance," being "the chief teacher of the whole body of the Reformers of the Sixteenth Century," he speaks of him as "a welcome witness and guaranty of the consoling thought, that the differences and antagonisms of these two main branches" [the Roman Catholic and the Protestant,] "of the Christian world are not absolute and irreconcilable, and that we may pray and hope, in the end, after a long and violent struggle, for the dawn of a new age, when all the injustice and bitterness of strife will be forgiven and forgotten, and all the discords of the past drowned forever in the sweet harmonies of infinite love and peace." This is, indeed, the gentle song of the Halcyon, building her nest on the troubled waters. But what becomes of the Primacy of Peter, of Papal Infallibility, of the Celibacy of the Clergy, of The Seven Sacraments, of Transubstantiation, of Tradition, of Papal Intolerance? Will they all fall? Then, indeed, will Rome have changed, and Protestantism have ceased to *protest*, at least, against these errors, which will have run their race. But is this the doctrine of development, as intended by Dr. Schaff?

6. *Emblems, Divine and Moral.* By FRANCIS QUARLES. *New York*: CARTERS. 1854: pp. 323, 16 mo.

A new and good edition of an old book, the author of whom flourished two hundred years ago, as cup-bearer to the Queen of

Bohemia, Secretary to Archbishop Usher, Chronologer to the city of London, and a warm and constant friend of Charles the First, in the times of Cromwell. True piety, quaintness, ingenuity, and odd pictorial illustrations are found in these pages. How much of good taste, and how much of genuine poetry, we were never able to determine. And yet the book will find readers, as it has always done, whom it will interest and profit.

7. *Genius and Faith: or Poetry and Religion in their mutual relations.* By WM. C. SCOTT. 328 pp., 12 mo. CHARLES SCRIBNER. *New York*: 1853.

The modest author of this volume first presented its substance, if we mistake not, in a series of articles in the *Southern Literary Messenger*; which were received with such favour, as to warrant their publication in a more permanent and independent form. The book before us is thoroughly apologetic in its tone; the first part being a defence of Poetry against the prejudices and misconceptions of the utilitarian; and the second, a vindication of Christianity from the charge of antagonism to Poetry. The writer employs these terms in their largest sense: Poetry with him, comprehends the whole æsthetic department of literature; and Christianity embraces not only systematic theology, but all the forms in which its Divine spirit may manifest itself.

In the first division of the volume, he establishes the intellectual dignity of Poetry, refutes the theory of Macaulay that it necessarily declines before the advancement of science and civilization, and infers from the dignity of its nature and its perpetuity, its benign influence upon man in refining his sensibilities and elevating his aspirations. From these topics, the author proceeds in the second division to exhibit the congeniality of true religion with the spirit of true poetry. It is here the animus of the book is found, as the writer, with the spirit both of a poet and a Christian, seeks to reconcile these, whom the ignorance and folly of men have sought to estrange.

The whole design is well conceived, and there are many passa-

ges of great beauty showing the writer to be an accomplished scholar, competent to the high argument he has undertaken. The comprehensive range of thought, the nice analysis of the pleasures derived from true Poetry, and the felicity of diction, will recommend this volume to all lovers of literature: while the Christian spirit, breathing throughout its pages, will win the regard of religious readers. The author, known among his friends for his great modesty and private worth, will be recognized in a larger circle of those who know him only as a writer, as having made a rich contribution to the religious literature of his age.

8. *Homiletics: or, the Theory of Preaching.* By A. VINET, D. D. Translated and Edited by THOMAS H. SKINNER, D. D., Professor of Sacred Rhetoric and Pastoral Theology in the Union Theological Seminary of New York. 524 pp., 12 mo. IVISON & PHINNEY. New York: 1854.

This work is properly the supplement of the author's treatise on Pastoral Theology, noticed by us some time since. This discusses the work of the Preacher, while that makes the preacher himself, and especially the Pastor, the subject of discourse. The two together cover a wide range of topics, but do not wholly exhaust that branch of study known in our schools under the title of Practical Theology. They do not cover the circle of subjects in this department so fully as the work of Dr. Cannon; which, for this reason, is, perhaps, better adapted for use as a text-book; though on the particular topics lying in common between the two, Vinet is more full, more fresh and more philosophical than the other.

The complaint has of late, been loudly uttered against our Theological Seminaries that they train theologians rather than preachers. It is not, perhaps, sufficiently considered how much easier it is to impart knowledge, than to bestow the ability to use this knowledge when acquired. Much may be done by instruction in improving the taste, and in correcting positive vices of manner: but to create an effective speaker is the work of no school.

Where the gift of eloquence has not been bestowed, no training can perfectly remedy the defect. However this may be, the issue of such works as these from the American press, shows that the Practical department is not so grossly neglected in our Theological Seminaries as some have supposed: and that an open ear is given to the complaint so constantly reiterated against the scholastic habits of our young ministers, and some commendable efforts are made to repair the error.

This work of Dr. Vinet is characterized by the same vigor of conception, the same point of expression, the same philosophic and suggestive tone, and the same flashes of genuine eloquence, which we marked as the attributes of his previous book. While the plan is sufficiently methodical, he is not purely didactic. His thoughts flash upon the reader, waking him to feel and think. It is this preëminently suggestive character of Vinet's mind which renders his writings so attractive: and in the hands of a judicious teacher, they would serve the purpose of class instruction better than the lectures of one who simply plods, without enthusiasm, through a mere routine of topics.

9. *Connection of Sacred and Profane History.* By D. DAVIDSON. New York: CARTERS. 1854: pp. 274, 12 mo.

The three volumes of this well-known compend, covering the period from the close of the Old Testament canon to the establishment of Christianity, are here printed in a single volume, and form a convenient manual for the use of the general reader and the student of theology.

10. *Daily Bible Illustrations: Evening Series. The Apostles and Early Church.* New York: CARTERS. pp. 448, 12 mo.

We have so often expressed our opinion of this series, as issue after issue has made its appearance, that we have nothing further

to say than to announce the publication of the closing volume. It has been an interesting succession of explanatory essays on the principal points of Scripture history, in which the author's oriental travels and long attention to those external aids by which the Bible can be elucidated, have done good service. The present volume covers that period, so important to us all, when the foundations of the Christian church were laid.

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11. *History of the French Protestant Refugees from the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes to our own days.* By M. CHARLES WEISS, Professor of History in the Lycee Bonaparte. Translated from the French by HENRY W. HERBERT: with an American Appendix by a descendant of the Huguenots. 2 vols., 12 mo. STRINGER & TOWNSEND. New York: 1854.

These volumes have just fallen into our hands, and the only judgement we can form of them is drawn from the table of contents, and an occasional glance here and there upon the pages within. The reader of general history is, however, sufficiently aware of the momentous consequences flowing from the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, not to France alone, but to Europe and the world. These results it is the aim of these volumes fully to portray. In seven consecutive books the history of the French Protestants is traced from the promulgation to the revocation of this famous Edict, from A. D. 1598 to 1685: then the fortunes of the Refugees in the different States of Germany, in England, in America, in Holland, in Switzerland, in Denmark, Sweden, and Russia. The influence exerted by these pious exiles, the apostles of civil liberty as well as of true religion, in all the countries whither they were driven; the different mechanical arts and manufacturing skill which they carried with them, and by which they enriched their protectors; the contributions which they made everywhere to science and to letters:—all this is spread out in the pages before us, promising an intellectual repast in our first moment of leisure.

Although in their wide dispersion the lapse of time has greatly

fused those exiles into the native populations of these respective countries, their descendants are yet sufficiently distinct to create an interest in the volumes before us. And in no part of the world, should these historical records possess a deeper relish than for the citizens of this State; many of whose oldest and noblest families still perpetuate the names scattered through these volumes.

Abundant guarantees are given by the publishers, both for the truthfulness of the original work, and the accuracy of the translation: and the whole is enriched by an appendix containing the principal documents necessary to substantiate the history.

The freshness of these sketches, disentombed from the national histories in which they have hitherto been buried, must certainly attract the eyes of all readers of history: who will be grateful to have in a correct and connected narrative the story of a people, which hitherto has been inaccessible and fragmentary.

12. *Lectures on Female Scripture Characters.* By WM. JAY, author of the "*Morning and Evening Exercises,*" etc. New York: CARTERS. 1854: pp., 351, 12 mo.

"While the last sheet of this work was passing through the press, the venerable author was summoned to his rest. He died on Tuesday, December 29, 1853, aged 84." Thus labouring to the last for the Redeemer's kingdom, he passed to his everlasting reward. He had turned many to righteousness, had assisted many in their spiritual pilgrimage. Partially recovering from a long illness, while yet unable to engage in any public service, the aged author revised the manuscript Lectures delivered by him forty-eight years before, on the remarkable female characters mentioned in Scripture, and prepared them for the press. His original object was to be useful to the female members of his congregation. He felt the difficulty of addressing them directly, but in commenting on characters absent and removed so far back in the past, he could commend the virtues or censure the faults which might equally exist in the living.

13. *Morning and Evening Exercises for April, May, and June.* By WM. JAY. 601 pp., 12 mo. ROB'T. CARTER & BROTHERS. *New York*: 1854.

The "Exercises" of William Jay need no "epistles of commendation" from any, having been so long the closet companions of so many saints. The volume before us embraces only one fourth of the entire series; which afford throughout the year, a meditation for the morning and evening devotions of all who love, in this way, to ponder God's precious Word.

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14. *Right of the Bible in our Public Schools.* By GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D. D. pp. 303, 16 mo. CARTER & BROTHERS. *New York*: 1854.

The title explains the book. It is an argument against the Romanists who seek to exclude the Bible from the public schools, as a sectarian book. The argument is well put for popular apprehension; being to a great extent, conducted by illustrations, and consisting largely of the *reductio ad absurdum*.

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15. *Rome against the Bible, and the Bible against Rome: or Pharisaism, Jewish and Papal.* By W. S. PLUMER, D. D.: pp. 129, 18 mo. AMERICAN BAPTIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY. *Philadelphia*: 1854.

Another little work from the spicy pen of Dr. Plumer, having the same general direction with the preceding. It however, covers the wider ground of Papal hostility to the diffusion of the Scriptures: and presents well the analogy between the Pharisees and Papists in their common treatment of God's book.